1.

Abstract The detente between Germany and the USA over the Iraq war between 2002 and 2003 consituted a shock to the international community of academics and analysts following German foreign policy and Atlantic relations. Efforts to clarify German behavior have, in the main, focused on either an anti-American or pacifist streak in German society. There is more than a little truth in these explanations, but they do not go much towards explaining the timing of the change, its rapid development and its focus on the Iraq issue. This essay argues that the salient driver behind the change was neither anti-Americanism nor pacifism, but Germany’s political emancipation. The Germans had been slowly developing into their role as an eminent power in Europe that is prepared to adopt greater international responsibility. When Germany felt excluded from consultation in the decision-making process, it reacted robustly. The question at stake was the nature of the world order and the relations of the USA to its allies, and no longer the single issue of Iraq.

2. Foreign Policy Decision Making of the US 2.1 Constitutional Conditions The debate over Iraq presented an interesting triad in the realm of foreign policy, with the President, the Congress, and the people all vying for power and influence. According to the Constitution, the Congress has the "power to legislate, provide for the common defense, to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a Navy... and to make all laws which are necessary and proper to execute the foregoing powers." On the other hand, "The executive power shall be vested in a President... [and he] shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states . . . [and he] shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."1 Edward S.Corwin has argued, "the Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers capable of affecting the issue(s), is an invitation to struggle [between the President, the

Congress, and the people] for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."4 With this struggle in mind, it is instructive to review a few of the most relevant legal precedents in Supreme Court decisions and Congressional resolutions. There are three types of resolutions. First, a simple resolution is a statement of fact or opinion by one of either the Senate or the House of Representatives and is binding only on that House of Congress; it is frequently used as an internal procedure for housekeeping, administrative, or legislative purposes. Second, a concurrent resolution is a simple resolution that passes both Houses (also normally used for housekeeping, administrative, or legislative purposes) and is binding on both Houses. However, a precedent has been set to use this for legislative or executive purposes as in the War Powers Resolution. Third, a joint resolution is a concurrent resolution that goes on to the President to be signed into public law or vetoed; it is usually used as a means of expeditious legislation to bypass the normal legislative process, as in the annexation in Texas in 1845. In the course of the Vietnam Conflict ("war" is no longer declared) the struggle between Congress and the President returned to where it left off in the 1930s concerning the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939. Congress initially attempted to cut off the funding for Vietnam; when that failed the desired effect, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which was re-passed by a two-thirds majority over President Nixon's veto to become law (PL93-148). The War Powers Resolution states in part that: "It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States, and to insure the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations." 7 (Emphasis added.) In the most controversial part of the War Powers Resolution, Section 5 (c) states: "Not withstanding subsection (b), at any time that the United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by

the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution."1 8 (Emphasis added.) The second controversial part of the War Powers Resolution is Section 8 (d) (1 & 2): "Nothing in this joint resolution ... is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties [e.g., NATO] .. ."19-although that is exactly what it did. The President is now restricted in his freedom of action as the embodiment of state sovereignty (the sole organ) and as commander in chief of the armed forces. Congress has aggrandized unto itself the power to order the President by concurrent resolution to remove armed forces from hostilities. This places Congress in a superior legal position in relation to the President and violates the principle of co-equal branches of government and the separation of powers. In 1983, the Supreme Court held, in INS v. Chadha, 20 that Congress could not stop the deportation of a nonresident because that was an executive function not permissible under the principle of the separation of powers between the President and Congress,

2.2 Participating Institutions In the early years of the 21st century, Iraq became a major issue of U.S. foreign policy and in the deliberations of the UN Security Council. After the United States and its allies drove the Iraqi Republican National Guard out of Kuwait during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, President George H.W Bush (in concert with his advisors) opted not to totally defeat the Iraqi army and march on to Baghdad to remove Saddam Hussein. They believed, in part, that a completely defeated Iraq would be a greater liability than a contained one that left Saddam Hussein in power. The concern was that a totally defeated Iraq would create a political vacuum that could draw in all the surrounding states seeking power, territory, oil, and regional influence. Further complicating this scenario was a concern about international terrorism, specifically Islamic extremism. Additionally, there was some concern that Saddam Hussein harbored weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As a consequence, the United States decided to utilize the UN system for weapons inspection and to ground the Iraqi air force through the imposition of "no-fly zones,"

which would help to protect the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. An intervening event in national and international politics was the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, at the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. These were catalytic factors that changed both the substance and processes of U.S. foreign policy. Not since the War of 1812 had the United States been attacked on its mainland-and at the centers of world capitalism and American military power. The more immediate consequences were the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the declaration of the Global War on Terror, and a counterattack on Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. After the Taliban were defeated, the long-term effect was to transfer attention to Iraq as a possible source of terrorism in the Middle East and a major base of operations for Al Qaeda.The on-site inspections in Iraq, along with aerial surveillance, did not reveal any WMDs. Nonetheless, the United States pushed 14 resolutions through the UN Security Council; the last one, UNSC 1441, which passed 15-0 on November 8, 2002, declared that there would be "serious consequences" if Iraq did not come clean on WMDs. Saddam Hussein eventually complied with this demand of the UN Security Council for further information by submitting a 1,200-page report to the UN Secretary- General. This report did not satisfy the United States, however, which argued that it was too general and did not sufficiently address the issue of WMD. 2.3 Interests and players In the midst of all this military and political activity, Congress passed a legal structure which "authorized [the President] to de facto amend the constitution use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and in a manner and fashion that is and appropriate in order to: 1) Defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and 2) Enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq." It is interesting to note that section 5 (c) (2) states: "Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution."" The significance of this is that Congress seems to be developing a legal structure that defacto is amending the Constitution in a manner and fashion that is of dubious constitutionality. The public concern over Iraq

was the dominant feature of the congressional elections in November 2006. The Democrats gained a substantial majority (233 to 202) in the House and a slim majority (51 to 49) in the main Democratic resolution, which was voted in the House on February 16, 2007, passed by a vote of 246 to 182, On the following Saturday, the Senate held a cloture vote on whether to debate the resolution on Iraq. This vote failed by 56 to 34,24 because a closure vote requires a majority of 60 to proceed with debate on the resolution similar to that passed by the House. An important point to mention here is that the House resolution was a simple nonbinding resolution that expressed the opinion of only the House; if the Senate had passed this simple resolution it would have become a simple nonbinding concurrent resolution. This then might have been converted into a House Joint Resolution requiring the signature of the President. However, the President would surely have vetoed such a resolution, and Congress did not have the necessary two-thirds majority to override a veto. However, the Democrats' strategy to ram a simple or concurrent resolution through the Senate failed on the cloture vote, and the Republicans offered a counter resolution to fund the surge and related costs proposed by the President. This move essentially checkmated the Democrats' strategy because they had threatened to restrict or restrain funding the surge as a means of forcing the withdrawal of the armed forces. At the conclusion of the closure vote, the Senate adjourned for the February recess, and little to nothing could be done during this period. But Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, floated the idea that Congress might repeal the resolution of October 2002 authorizing the use of force in Iraq.25 However, such a step would require the signature of the President, who would certainly veto instead. If this drastic step were taken, there is a contradiction it would be reminiscent of the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on Vietnam. 3. Foreign policy decision-making of Germany 3.1 Constitutional Decisions Under the Basic Law, decisions on war and peace are entrusted to the Bundestag, including the use of armed forces within systems of collective security in the meaning of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law. A

parliamentary vote on the deployment of German soldiers would be required when the concrete circumstances of the case warrant the assumption that a participation of German soldiers in armed operations is to be expected. Some uses of armed forces clearly fall out of the category of “armed operations”: relief missions do not need to be approved by Parliament provided that the soldiers carrying out these missions are not involved in any kind of armed undertakings. A mere possibility that armed operations will occur is also not sufficient to trigger the requirement of parliamentary consent. Rather, two further conditions have to be met. First, there is the requirement of sufficiently concrete factual indications that a mission will eventually entail the use of military force. In this regard, its purpose, the concrete political and military circumstances as well as the rules of engagement would need to be taken into account. Hence, a concrete situation of military danger (konkrete militärische Gefahrenlage) would need to exist.Second, for this “qualified expectation” to materialize, it is required that there is a certain imminence of the use of military force. Such imminence can either be given due to the time factor alone – a military conflict being on the horizon – or to a more general assessment of the rules of engagement that can indicate the probability of the use of military force.27 An indication that the German soldiers may become engaged in hostilities can, inter alia, be found in the level of armament of the troops and the authorization to make use of them. An authorization to self-defence (in the sense of self-defence of the individual unit of the Federal Armed Forces) and the deployment of armed forces which is of a nonmilitary character does not require parliamentary approval. Yet, a mission has a military character if it has been launched to defend a given territory against foreign attacks. Under these circumstances the military operation has to be voted on by Parliament even if the soldiers are not armed and do not constitute part of an integrated military unit. The decision whether or not an involvement in armed operations has taken place, is subject to full judicial review by the FCC. 3.2 Participating institutions Nurturing relations with foreign states is a matter for the Federation, and more specifically for the Federal Government. However, regarding both the transfer of sovereign powers to international organisations, and

treaties that regulate the political regulations of the Federation or relate to subjects of federal legislation, the Basic Law (Germany’s constitution) stipulates that Parliament must be involved. In practice, this involvement takes place via the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Committee on Foreign Affairs is one of the largest and most prestigious of the German Bundestag’s committees. It is one of only four of the twenty-two specialised committees to be anchored in the constitution. Article 45 a of the Basic Law clearly states that the Bundestag must appoint a committee on foreign affairs, and thus recognises Parliament’s involvement in shaping foreign policy. The very fact that it is enshrined in the constitution ensures that the Committee on Foreign Affairs has a high standing among the German Bundestag’s committees. Anyone who wished to abolish the Committee on Foreign Affairs or even change its name would need to amend the constitution, which would require the support of two thirds of the Members of the Bundestag as well as two thirds of the votes in the Bundesrat.The tasks and powers of the Committee on Foreign Affairs match its status and significance. The Committee on Foreign Affairs is the only committee of the German Bundestag to scrutinise, monitor and guide the Federal Government’s actions in the field of foreign policy. Naturally, international crisis areas are at the forefront of this: currently, the situation in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, as well as the Middle East, but also in Kosovo and Africa, the conflicts in the Caucasus, in North-East and South-East Asia, the situation of countries in transition in the territory of the former Soviet Union, but also of Russia itself, and the impact on regional and global stability of the rise of new centres of power like China and India. In addition, the Committee on Foreign Affairs is responsible for the ratification of important treaties under international law. For these to apply in Germany, an “instruction relating to the national application of law”, as the Federal Constitutional Court put it, is needed; these instructions are prepared for the plenary by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 3.3 Interests and players The Bundeskanzler (Federal Chancellor) heads the executive branch of the federal government. He is elected by and responsible to the Bundestag, Germany's parliament. Germany, like the United Kingdom, can thus be classified as a parliamentary system. The Chancellor cannot be removed from office during a

4-year term unless the Bundestag has agreed on a successor. This Constructive Vote of No Confidence is intended to avoid the situation of the Weimar Republic in which the executive did not have enough support in the legislature to government effectively, but the legislature was too divided to name a successor. So far, the Chancellor has always been the candidate of the party with the most seats in parliament, supported by a coalition of two or more parties with a majority in the parliament. He appoints a Vice-Chancellor (Vizekanzler), who is a member of his cabinet, usually the Foreign Minister. When there is a coalition government (which has, so far, often been the case), the Vice-Chancellor usually belongs to the smaller party of the coalition. The heads of governments may change the structure of ministries whenever and however they see fit. For example, in the middle of January 2001, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture was renamed to Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture as a consequence of the BSE crisis. For that measure, competences from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Health were transferred to the new Ministry of Consumer Protection. Subordinate to the cabinet is the Civil service of Germany. By contrast, the duties of the Bundespresident (Federal President) are largely representative and ceremonial; power is exercised by the Chancellor. The President is elected every 5 years on May 23 by the Federal Convention (Bundesversammlung), a special body convoked only for this purpose, comprising the entire Bundestag and an equal number of state delegates selected especially for this purpose. In 1999, Johannes Rau of the Social Democratic Party was elected. The fact that the President is not popularly elected is to prevent him from gaining enough popular legitimacy to circumvent the constitution, as occurred with the Weimar Republic. The Bundestag (Federal Assembly) is Germany's parliament. It is elected for a 4-year term, consists of at least twice the number of electoral districts -- 328 in 1998, being reduced to 299 -- in the country. (More deputies may be admitted when parties' directly elected seats exceed their proportional representation.) Elections for an all-German Bundestag were first held on December 2, 1990, and again on October 16, 1994 and September 27, 1998. A total of 669 deputies were seated after the 1998 national elections. In order to prevent political fragmentation and strong minor parties, a party must have 5% of the vote or at least three direct elected deputies to be

represented in the Bundestag. The Bundesrat (Federal Council) is the representation of the state governments at the federal level. It consists of 69 members who are delegates of the 16 Bundeslander and usually, but not necessarily include the 16 Minister Presidents themselves. The legislature has powers of exclusive jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction with the Lander in areas specifically enumerated by the Basic Law. The Bundestag bears the major responsibility. The necessity for the Bundesrat to concur on legislation is limited to bills treating revenue shared by federal and state governments and those imposing responsibilities on the states, although in practice, this is quite common. Still, Germany's legislative branch cannot quite be considered bicameral. 4. Comparison of the decision-making processes of the United States and Germany in OIF 4.1 Comparison of the decision-making The war on Iraq began to emerge onto the political agenda in the course of 2002, particularly after US President George W. Bush’s ‘State of the Union’ address, in which he declared Iraq to be part of an ‘axis of evil’. Germans, like most other Europeans, found the concept of three different states forming an axis unfortunate and were critical of the idea of invading Iraq. They were also increasingly concerned that the views of allies were being dismissed in Washington. Fischer (2002a) warned the US administration that European allies did not want to be treated like satellite states. Even the Christian Democrats warned that ‘it cannot be that you act on your own and we trot along afterwards’ (Erlanger, 2002). At this point, however, Schröder remained accommodative and argued that ‘we should not slip back into the old mistrust of the superpower and the Bush administration’ (Ford, 2002). Karsten Voigt (2002), coordinator of German–US relations at the foreign ministry, argued that Bush was no cowboy and that Washington would take the views of the Europeans into account. Indeed, when Bush visited Germany in May 2002, he made his case against Iraq but gave reassurances that he would not act without consultation with allies. Moreover, it was agreed that Bush would not start preparations for war before the German elections, and Schröder would not ride on the antiwar issue during his election campaign (Gordon & Shapiro, 2004: 109).

The issue of the war on Iraq bounced back onto the agenda when US newspapers began to circulate stories about war plans for Iraq: already at the beginning of June 2002, Bush (2002) had declared in his West Point speech that ‘we must take the battle to the enemy’ and ‘be ready for preemptive action’. This speculation was immediately picked up by Schröder’s campaign team, as the issue of war with Iraq was identified as a potential vehicle with which the chancellor could still win the elections against the odds of projected results. Public opinion polls showed that an overwhelming majority of Germans opposed the war. This mattered especially in former East Germany, where the SPD had to compete with the PDS, the former socialist party of the German Democratic Republic. When US Vice-President Dick Cheney delivered a strong appeal for a pre-emptive regime change in August, the Iraq war became the dominant theme of the Bundestag elections (Chandler, 2003). Immediately after the start of the German election campaign in August 2002, Schröder stated explicitly that he was not going to support a war on Iraq. He argued that it was a mistake to think about military intervention and– returning to the message of his September 2001 warnings – declared that Germany was not willing to play with war and to participate in military adventures (tageszeitung, 2002). In an unusually patriotic declaration of his vision of Germany, Schröder (2002a) announced his faith in German society and advocated a ‘German way’ that reminded many of the old German Sonderweg between East and West. Fischer was also critical of the war on Iraq, describing it as a risky decision (though he was careful to formulate his positions diplomatically). Schröder’s political stance against the war on Iraq – as well as his rhetoric– put Washington on the alert, but the real uproar was caused by Justice Minister Hertha Däubler-Gmelin’s gaffe in a small local campaign event that was subsequently reported worldwide. Däubler-Gmelin suggested that Bush’s preparation for war was comparable to Hitler’s policy of shifting attention from domestic problems to international ones. The insult was simply too much for Washington: the White House announced that German–US relations were poisoned. Schröder wrote to Bush, explaining that he believed the words of his

minister had been wrongly reported, but he did not apologize. Bush was offended: he did not congratulate Schröder on the latter’s election victory and refused to talk to him at international meetings.

While the German government refrained from aggravating the issue, it was not prepared to make any Uturns in its assessment of the Iraq war. In December, Fischer (2002c) continued to keep open the possibility that Germany might eventually lend political support to the war, and he stated that nobody could know how Germany would vote in the Security Council. But in January, a few weeks later, Schröder declared at a regional election rally in Goslar that Germany would not support a UN resolution legitimizing the war on Iraq (Die Welt, 2003a). Schröder’s statement seemed to come as a surprise to Fischer, who disagreed with any categorical ‘no’ to the war. Schröder’s statement triggered a further episode in the transatlantic drama, when US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld lumped Germany together with France as ‘a problem’, arguing that they did not represent the whole of Europe but belonged to the ‘old Europe’. Rumsfeld also grouped Germany together with Libya and Cuba, describing all three as countries that were not willing to help the USA, thereby failing to acknowledge Germany’s solid commitment to the Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan and Kuwait, as well as the continuous support given to US bases in Germany. Rumsfeld’s comments were dismissed by the German government, and they also created irritation among traditionally US-friendly circles (Ford, 2002). Fischer (2003) defended the German stance against the war in an emotional speech delivered at the annual Munich security conference. In the presence of Donald Rumsfeld, he declared that he was not convinced of the case for the war on Iraq: ‘Why now?’ In Fischer’s view, the more important task in the Middle East was to promote reconciliation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. With regard to the war on Iraq, he reiterated that diplomatic had not been exhausted and argued that there should be no automatism leading to the use of military force. At the same time, Schröder (2003a) seemed to raise the stakes, defining the issue of Iraq as the issue of the fate of the future world order: will decisions be made multilaterally or not? 4.2 Development of the central thesis

Although it is possible to explain German foreign policy using realist and liberal approaches, constructivist explanations seem particularly relevant since European countries were so divided in their response to the war (Rittberger, 2003). But what are the cultural factors that could explain Germany’s reactions to the war on Iraq and the deterioration of German–US relations? Three cultural explanations can be given for Germany’s behaviour. Some emphasize the antiAmericanism of Germans, others their pacifism, and a third group their growing emancipation and self-assurance. I will look at each of these in turn, but conclude that the third factor seems to have the strongest explanatory power, at least in this specific case. Many political commentators and analysts have argued that Germany’s unwillingness to support the war on Iraq was based on strong anti-American sentiment (Berman, 2004; Berendse, 2003; Markovits, 2004). ‘Anti-Americanism’, of course, is a contested and politically loaded concept, insofar as it is defined as a prejudice that is based on ignorance, not justified criticism. What is indisputable is that the image of the USA deteriorated radically after 9/11 in Germany. While nearly 80% of Germans had a positive opinion of the United States in 1999, by summer 2002 the figure was down to 61%, and in spring 2003 only 23% of Germans subscribed to a favourable view of the USA. The image of the United States had somewhat improved by spring 2004, but still remained more negative than positive. At the same time, a majority of Germans supported the US-led war on terrorism, but the level of support had decreased from 70% in 2002 to 55% in 2004 (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2004). However, public opinion ratings as such prove nothing about cause and consequence. On the contrary, it seems that the US decision to go to war with Iraq explains the increase of negative feelings towards the USA, rather than anti-Americanism explaining opposition to the war in Germany (Noelle,2003). The swing in public opinion reflected dissatisfaction with the Bush administration and its policies, not anti-Americanism as such. Indeed, public opinion polls showed that Americans were not hated as a nation or people (Mertes, 2004). Moreover, as Elizabeth Pond (2004), a long-time journalist based in Germany, witnessed, ‘to an American who lived in Germany during the massive antimissile demonstrations in the 1980s what was new about the brief German antiwar marches of 2003 was precisely the effort of protesters to differentiate between their opposition to the Iraq

war and their affection for the United States’. In Pond’s view, Schröder’s opposition to the war set off no wave of popular anti-Americanism in Germany. On the contrary, the chancellor’s policy was widely criticized for isolating Germany. There are many who think that anti-Americanism is a persistent part of German culture. Dan Diner (2002), for example, has argued that German anti-Americanism has deep historical roots and is a reflection of German anti-Semitism. However, Diner’s evidence for contemporary antiAmericanism in Germany remains fragmented. Moreover, the fact that parts of the cultural elite in Germany were vocally ‘antiAmerican’ does not explain the policy change that took place, because such sentiments were expressed frequently by the same groups long before the war on Iraq. Furthermore, ignorant and offensive antiAmericanism – such as advocacy of the conspiracy theories about 9/11 that were supported by a considerable number of Germans – was firmly resisted by those opinion leaders that were otherwise critical of Bush and the war on Iraq (Der Spiegel, 2003). It is true that the political elite adopted a more critical stance towards the USA than previously, and 2002 was therefore different from earlier transatlantic clashes. The primary example of this critical approach was the Hitler–Bush comparison made by DäublerGmelin. Yet, the overall negative response to Däubler-Gmelin’s utterance reveals far more about the attitudes of the political elite than the original remarks themselves. Of course, in relation to this incident, Schröder’s sin was that he did not fire his minister immediately but tried to argue that the reported statement was a misunderstanding. Indeed, Schröder (2001a) has occasionally adopted what can be seen as anti-American rhetoric himself, declaring for example that he disliked ‘American conditions’ in the labour market. Fischer, for his part, was never caught using anti-American rhetoric before and during the war on Iraq. In one interview (Fischer, 2002b), he noted that his image of America remained contradictory but insisted that the positive sides were clearly dominant. 5. Conclusion The clash between Berlin and Washington over the war in Iraq in 2002–03 came as a surprise to the community of scholars and analysts watching German foreign policy and transatlantic relations. Following

unification and the end of the Cold War, German foreign policy seemed to be characterized by considerable continuity, despite the dramatic changes in power relations, the subsequent move of the capital to Berlin and the change of government into the Red–Green coalition run by the postwar generation. Most attempts to explain German behaviour in the war on Iraq have focused on either the anti-American or the pacifist nature of German society. However, while such explanations have some relevance, they fail to explain sufficiently well the timing of the change, its sudden emergence and its focus on the Iraq issue. In this essay, I have argued that the most important driving force behind the change in German–US relations was neither anti-Americanism nor pacifism, but rather Germany’s political emancipation. The Germans had been gradually growing into their role as a leading power in Europe that was willing to take on greater international responsibility. Germany also expected that others – most importantly, the United States – would listen to its concerns when making crucial decisions about peace and war. When Berlin felt that it was not being consulted in the decision-making process, it reacted strongly. Germany could not simply follow the US position when it felt that it had had no opportunity to shape it. The question at stake was the nature of the world order and the USA’s relation to its allies, no longer the single issue of Iraq.

References Berendse, Gerrit-Jan, 2003. ‘German Anti-Americanism in Context’, Journal of European Studies 33(3– 4): 333–350 Berman, Russell, 2004. Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Bush, George W., 2002. ‘Graduation Speech’, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1 June. Chandler, William, 2003. ‘Foreign and European Policy Issues in the 2002 Bundestag Elections’, German Politics and Society 21(1): 161–77 Diner, Dan, 2002. Feindbild Amerika. Über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments [Enemy Image America: About the Permanence of a Resentment]. Berlin: Propyläen Fischer, Joschka, 2002a. ‘Wir sind keine Satelliten’ [We Are Not Satellites], interview with Joschka Fischer, Die Welt, 12 February. Fischer, Joschka, 2002b. ‘Ein unheimliches Gefühl’ [A Horrible Feeling], interview with Joschka Fischer, Der Spiegel, 18 May Fischer, Joschka, 2003. ‘Struggling Hard To Find Solutions to the Conflict in Iraq’, speech at the 39th Munich Conference on Security Policy, 8 February; available at http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/2003/ (accessed 4th April 2011). Ford, Peter, 2002. ‘United Against Terror, Divided on Trade, Coalition Strains’, Christian Science Monitor, 8 March Gordon, Philip & Jeremy Shapiro, 2004. Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq. New York: McGraw-Hill

Markovits, Andrei, 2004. ‘European Anti-Americanisms (and Anti-Semitism): Ever Present Though Always Denied’, Working Paper no. 108. Cambridge, MA: Center for European Studies, Harvard University Mertes, Michael, 2004. ‘Schein und Sein. Das Schlagwort vom deutschen Antiamerikanismus [German Anti-Americanism: Forget It]’, Internationale Politik 59(2): 78–84 Noelle, Elisabeth, 2003. ‘Die Entfremdung. Deutschland und Amerika entfernen sich voneinander’[The Estrangement: Germany and America Are Distancing from Each Other], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 July Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2004. ‘A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists’. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center; available at http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206 (accessed 22 February 2005). Pond, Elizabeth, 2004. Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Rittberger, Volker, 2003. ‘Selbstentfesselung in kleinen Schritten? Deutschlands Außenpolitik zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts’ [Self-Emancipation with Small Steps:Germany’s Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the 21st Century], Politische Vierteljahrschrift 44(1): 10–18. Schröder, Gerhard, 2001a. ‘German Chancellor Delicately Strives Not To Get in the Middle’, interview with Gerhard Schröder, Los Angeles Times, 1 April Schröder, Gerhard, 2002a. ‘Meine Vision von Deutschland’ [My Vision of Germany], Die Bild-Zeitung, 8 August Schröder, Gerhard, 2003a. ‘Unsere Verantwortung für den Frieden’ [Our Responsibility for the Peace], government declaration, 13 February. Tageszeitung, 2002. ‘Gerhard Schröder auf Anti-Amerika Kurs’ [Gerhard Schröder on an Anti-American Course], 6 August

Die Welt, 2003a. ‘Schröder schließt erstmals Ja zu Irak-Krieg im Sicherheitsrat aus’[Schröder Rules out for the First Time Yes to the Iraqi War in the Security Council], 21 January

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