Petitioner,
v.
Petitioner, Anna Paulina Luna, by and through counsel of record, Zachary C. Lindley of
Gallian Welker & Beckstrom, L.C., hereby files her Closing Arguments as requested by the
Court at the conclusion of the Evidentiary Hearing held on February 11, 2020 (“Hearing”), and
states as follows:
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties and their respective counsel of record appeared for the regularly scheduled
Evidentiary Hearing in this matter, on February 11, 2020. The Court, at the conclusion of
testimony and introduction of evidence, requested counsel for both parties to submit written
closing arguments within fourteen (14) days, summarizing their respective positions. In
accordance with said order, Petitioner submits the following written closing arguments.
INTRODUCTION
This case deals with nothing more than an estranged uncle’s personal attacks on his
niece. Respondent is Petitioner’s uncle. Petitioner is Respondent’s niece. This is not a case of
freedom of speech, and this is not a case wherein a critic simply disagrees with the stances of a
political figure. The law is unambiguous in Utah that a stalking injunction is based on a
reasonable person standard, in the victim’s circumstances, after considering the entire context of
the facts. The entire context of this case goes far beyond a simple relationship between a critic
and a political figure. Indeed, the context of this case requires the Court view the standards of
the stalking injunction statute through the eyes of a niece who has been repetitively belittled and
attacked by her estranged uncle through electronic communication. Anything beyond such view
would unduly strip Petitioner of her right to obtain the necessary protection from Respondent in
LEGAL ARGUMENT
Petitioner has satisfied her burden in proving up her cause of action for a civil stalking
injunction against Respondent. In arguing for a civil stalking injunction, Petitioner was only
required to show, by no more than a preponderance of the evidence, that stalking of the
and knew, or should have known, that the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person in
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the Petitioner’s circumstances to (1) fear for her own safety, or (2) suffer other emotional
the evidence, that Respondent is guilty of stalking, nothing more. Pursuant to Model Utah Jury
Instructions, as well as supporting case law, preponderance of the evidence in a civil matter
requires only that a party persuade the Court, by the evidence, that the fact is more likely to be
true than not true. MUJI 2nd, CV117; see also Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah App.
1998). More specifically, proof by the greater weight of the evidence, however slight. Id.
(emphasis added). The evidence presented satisfies the burden of proving to the Court that it is
more likely to be true than not true that Respondent is guilty of stalking—however slight.
Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is more likely to be true
than not true that Respondent has engaged in “course of conduct” directed at Petitioner.
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5, “course of conduct” means two or more acts directed at or
toward the Petitioner. Such acts can be either direct or indirect, and can take the following
forms: (1) communication to or about the Petitioner; (2) contacting the Petitioner’s employer or
coworkers; (3) sending material by any means to Petitioner’s family, employer, coworker, friend
or associate of the Petitioner for purposes of obtaining or disseminating information about the
Petitioner; or (4) using a computer, internet, text messaging or any other electronic means to
commit an act part of the course of conduct. U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5(b). Respondent, at least two
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The evidence shows it is more likely true than not true that Respondent communicated
directly or indirectly to Petitioner through social media platforms by electronic means. Pursuant
to the various social media platforms, when an individual uploads a post and includes an
person or entity that owns the included handle is immediately notified and can view the post. An
individual uploading a post who wishes to include a specific handle is required to manually and
voluntarily type that specific handle in the post. According to Petitioner’s testimony given at the
Hearing, Petitioner occupies the social media handles, #realannapaulina and @realannapaulina.
Respondent directed his posts to the social media handles owned by Petitioner on more
than two occasions. On March 3, 2019, Respondent posted derogatory and demeaning
comments regarding Petitioner, personally attacking her, wherein Respondent included the
humiliating and degrading remarks regarding Petitioner, wherein Respondent included the
hashtag, #realannapaulina. See Exhibit B. Finally, on November 24, 2019, Respondent posted
discrediting and shameful comments regarding Petitioner, wherein Respondent tagged the social
media handle, @realannapaulina. See Exhibit C. In fact, Exhibit C shows that Respondent was
voluntarily choose to click this option on the social media platforms. Accordingly, the evidence
shows it is more likely true than not true that Respondent directed communication at Petitioner.
Additionally, and perhaps more egregious, the evidence shows it is more likely true than
not true that Respondent contacted and sent material to Petitioner’s employer, associates and/or
affiliates. Petitioner, given her career as a politician running for office, works closely with her
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own campaign team. Petitioner testified at the Hearing that her campaign team helps manage the
social media platforms alongside Petitioner. Therefore, when, as shown by Exhibits A-C,
Respondent was also contacting and disseminating his derogatory comments to Petitioner’s
entire campaign team, i.e. her associates and affiliates. Additionally, at the Hearing, Petitioner
testified that she received a phone call from her employer, Turning Point U.S.A., notifying her
that they were contacted directly by Respondent. Petitioner also testified that she received notice
from a specific organization with whom she is affiliated that Respondent had contacted them as
well. Finally, in the November 24, 2019 post, Respondent tagged and was “Reply[ing] to” the
social media handle, @RepMattGaetz, which is owned by the current Florida Congressman, Matt
Gaetz, who openly endorsed Petitioner’s career. See Exhibit C. Therefore, the evidence shows
Respondent contacted and sent material to Petitioner’s employer, associates and/or affiliates.
Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent’s acts would
cause a reasonable person in Petitioner’s circumstances to experience emotional distress and fear
for personal safety. Importantly, under U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5(e), the “reasonable person”
standard is that of one in the “victim’s circumstances.” Case law in Utah provides that “the
offense of stalking does not focus on the particular emotional distress [a particular victim]
suffers, but rather, on how defendant’s conduct would affect a reasonable person.” Baird v.
Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶24, 322 P.3d 728 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “[T]he
subjective effect of the respondent’s conduct on the petitioner is irrelevant,” rather the Court is to
consider the “entire context surrounding [respondent’s] conduct.” Id. at ¶26. In fact, after
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considering the “context surrounding the respondent’s conduct, acts that seem perfectly innocent
or even well intentioned may constitute stalking.” Id. The reasonable person standard in this
case must be viewed in the context of a niece being personally attacked by her estranged uncle
who has a history of inappropriate and volatile behavior with her family.
The evidence introduced shows it is more likely true than not true that a reasonable
person in Petitioner’s circumstances would experience emotional distress and fear for her own
safety. Petitioner testified at the Hearing that she has built a career in politics from the ground
up after being honorably discharged from the United States Air Force. She has worked
extremely hard to form a strong reputation—nothing has been handed to her. However, just as
Petitioner’s career began to gain traction and progress, Respondent, Petitioner’s own uncle,
sought to exploit Petitioner just as he had done in the past. As Petitioner testified, and as shown
by the photographs introduced into evidence by Respondent, the Respondent attempted to exploit
Petitioner as a teenager trying to begin a career in the United States Air Force. See Exhibit 3.
commanding officer with the photographs in an effort to gain power over Petitioner.
Respondent’s recent conduct mirrors such attempted exploitation, while having a greater
negative impact on Petitioner’s current career given her national recognition and the difficulty of
a result of Respondent’s personal attacks through his posts on March 3, March 4 and November
24 of 2019. Such posts are degrading, discrediting, inappropriate and demeaning, and seek
nothing more than to destroy the hard-fought career of Petitioner. Importantly, despite
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Respondent’s arguments for freedom of political speech, not one of the posts in Exhibits A-C
discuss any political matter for which Petitioner advocates. Rather, Respondent personally
attacks Petitioner as an individual, using his status as her uncle to strengthen such attacks. As
shown in Exhibits A-C, Respondent seeks solely to discredit Petitioner by spreading lies,
attempting to smear her name and reputation, using phrases such as “false claim,” “making
herself out to be something she is not,” “Right’s Elizabeth Warren (Pocohontas) [sic],”
Even more, the March 3, March 4 and November 24 posts were sent to Petitioner’s
associates and affiliates to whom Petitioner was required to defend herself unnecessarily.
Petitioner prides herself in her heritage, and in fact, as shown by the DNA Compositions,
Petitioner is every bit what she says she is—Respondent chooses instead to continue his attacks
under false assertions, despite being a blood relative to Petitioner who has a better understanding
of her history than a politician’s random critic. See Exhibit 4. Such evidence shows it is more
likely true than not that a reasonable niece in Petitioner’s circumstances would experience
emotional distress.
Petitioner also testified that Respondent uploaded additional posts to Facebook that
degraded and demeaned Petitioner, but that Facebook removed the posts for being harassing in
nature. Facebook has a “Bullying and Harassment” policy, wherein Facebook provides the
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goes further: we remove content that’s meant to degrade or shame, including, for
example, claims about someone’s sexual activity.
See Exhibit D. Such standard shows that it is more likely true than not that a reasonable person
in Petitioner’s circumstances would view the posts as inappropriate and harassing, and would
Finally, the evidence shows that a reasonable niece in Petitioner’s circumstances, who
has grown up with her uncle that has a reputation of being in financial trouble, volatile and
violent, would experience emotional distress and fear for her own safety. Petitioner, her mother,
Monica, and her father, George, all testified at the Hearing that in their opinion, Respondent had
a reputation of being violent with family members. In fact, George, Petitioner’s father, testified
that at the end of 2009, Respondent held a handgun to his head and told George he was going to
“kill him.” Testimony and evidence were also introduced that Respondent had a reputation for
being in financial trouble, and Petitioner specifically testified that she believes his recent
obsession with her is racially motivated and is a ploy for obtaining financial gain. See Exhibits
F-G.
Therefore, given the evidence and testimony, it is more likely true than not true that a
reasonable niece in Petitioner’s circumstances, taking into consideration the entire context of the
relationship, would not only experience emotional distress, but also fear for her own safety
IV. Petitioner Has Experienced Emotional Distress And Fear For Her Own Safety
Given the evidence and testimony introduced at the Hearing, it is more likely true than
not true that Respondent’s acts would cause emotional distress and fear for personal safety.
Emotional distress, for purposes of a stalking injunction, does not require proof of “outrageous
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and intolerable conduct.” Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶38. Rather, the standard is only that a reasonable
106.5(1)(c); Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶39. Again, “the offense of stalking does not focus on the
particular emotional distress a particular victim suffers, but rather, on how [respondent’s]
conduct would affect a reasonable person” in the victim’s circumstance. Baird, 2014 UT 08,
¶24.
Petitioner testified at trial, which was supported by the affidavit of her husband, Andrew,
as well as the affidavit of her mother, Monica, that she has been extremely upset, has lost sleep,
her career has been negatively affected, and she has experienced marital and financial stress.
Evidence shows that Respondent did not address any political issues in his posts, but rather,
directly and personally attacked his niece’s integrity and reputation, and even worse, directed
such derogatory and demeaning remarks at her associates and affiliates. See Exhibits A-C.
Respondent has a history of attempting to exploit his niece, Petitioner, and Petitioner has testified
that she believes the recent conduct is another ploy at attempting to exert power over Petitioner
by destroying her career that she has worked extremely hard to build. See Exhibit 3. Testimony
at the Hearing also shows that Respondent has a history of violence and volatile behavior,
including the occasion wherein Respondent pointed a gun at Petitioner’s father’s head and said
he was going to “kill him.” In addition, Respondent has a history of being in financial trouble
Respondent argues that, given Petitioner’s alleged “training” in the military, along with
the alleged protection of her husband, Petitioner cannot possibly be feeling fearful of her life or
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be experiencing emotional distress—such arguments are unavailing. Again, “the offense of
stalking does not focus on the particular emotional distress a particular victim suffers, but rather,
on how [respondent’s] conduct would affect a reasonable person” in the victim’s circumstance.
Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶24. Therefore, given the evidence and testimony introduced, and
recognizing that “the subjective effect of the respondent’s conduct on the petitioner is
Notably, under U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5(4), “it is not a defense that the actor: (a) was not
given actual notice that the course of conduct was unwanted; or (b) did not intend to cause the
victim fear or other emotional distress.” Therefore, despite Respondent’s arguments that he did
not intend to cause any emotional distress or was not notified that the conduct was unwanted,
such arguments are irrelevant to the Court’s determination, and Respondent is therefore guilty of
stalking.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing, the evidence and testimony introduced at the Hearing, however
slight, show it is more likely true than not true that Respondent is guilty of stalking. Therefore,
Petitioner respectfully requests the Court grant her Request for Civil Stalking Injunction, and
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Zachary C. Lindley
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the 25th day of February, 2020, I submitted a true and correct copy of the foregoing
CLOSING ARGUMENTS to be filed with the Court and served upon the following parties via
the Utah Electronic Notification System:
Christian Jones
Wayment & Jones Law
51 East 400 North, Suite 1
Cedar City, Utah 84721
cjones@waymentandjoneslaw.com
Attorney for Respondent
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