Fukushima event‐ as we understand of now

Nuclear Power Reactors in Japan
•Total Reactors in Operation •Under Construction •Reactors in the zone of event •Reactors at Fukushima Daiichi Site
•In operation(At he time of event) Under Maintenance Shutdown

: 54 : 02 : 13 :6
: 3 (Unit-1,2,3 ) : 3(unit-4,5,6)

• Fukushima-Daiichi(6), Daiini(4), Onagawa (3)

•Fukushima unit-1 and 3 details
•Rated Capacity ( Net MW) : Unit-1 :439 •Year of Operation(connection to Grid) : Nov.1971 Unit : 3 :760 Oct.1974

Reactors affected by Earthquake in Japan
• Fukushima Daiichi
•Unit ‐1‐ Automatic Shutdown •Unit‐2‐ Automatic Shutdown  •Unit‐3 ‐ Automatic Shutdown •Unit‐4 ‐ Maintenance Outage •Unit‐5‐ Maintenance Outage •Unit‐6 ‐ Maintenance Outage

•Fukushima Daiini
•Unit ‐1‐ Automatic Shutdown •Unit‐2‐ Automatic Shutdown  •Unit‐3 ‐ Automatic Shutdown •Unit‐4 – Automatic Shutdown

•Onagawa
•Unit ‐1‐ Automatic Shutdown •Unit‐2‐ Automatic Shutdown  •Unit‐3 ‐ Automatic Shutdown

Fukushima – on the map

The Fukushima Site

Fukushima NPPs
• Operated by TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Co.  Inc.) • Fukushima prefecture
– Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station – 6 units (Fukushima 1 to 6‐ All BWRs) – Total 4696  MWe – 220 kms north of Tokyo

• Fukushima‐1 
– Capacity 460 MWe – Built by GE – Commercial operation – March 1971

Fukushima‐1
• • • • • • • 460 MWe, BWR RPV – 19 M high, 4.8M diameter Primary Containment vessel – 32 M high Steam pressure – 66.8 kg/cm2g,  Steam temperature – 282 deg. C Fuel – UO2 ; Enriched 2.1 to 3.4 % Fuel assemblies ‐ 400

• • • • • • • •

What is a nuclear reactor BWR in particular What is nuclear safety about what happens when you are not able to cool TMI How emergency is planned to be handeled Fukushima Our reactors

Thermal and Nuclear Energy
Thermal  Nuclear 

SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF COMPONENTS OF A NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR
C O N T R O L

U MODERATOR

U

BWR 

•Heat produced should be  equal to heat removed

at all times
Including even when plant is not  operating

UO2 FUEL PELLET

ZIRCALOY  CLADDING

FUEL ELEMENT

Some important Fission Products
ISOTOPE
I-131 I-132 I-133 I-134 I-135 Cs-134 Cs-137 Kr-85 Kr-87 Kr-88 Xe-133 Xe-135 Xe-138

HALF LIFE
8.01 d 2.23 hr 20.8 hr 52.5 min 6.57 hr 2.07 y 30.14 y 10.7 y 1.27 hr 2.83 hr 5.24 d 9.1 hr 14.17 min

Decay heat curve
1.00E+00

R e la tiv e P o w e r

1.00E-01

1.00E-02

1.00E-03

1.00E-04 0 5 10 15 20 25 30

time(days) after shutdown

What happens if not  able to cool?

FUEL OVERHEATING

U MODERATOR

U

Loss of coolant Accident &  Emergency Core Cooling
Pre-Test Configuration (radial) -Test Configuration (radial) Post 37ELEMENT BUNDLE Post-Test Configuration (axial)

BACK

FUEL CELL

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Fission Products
ISOTOPE
I-131 I-132 I-133 I-134 I-135 Cs-134 Cs-137 Kr-85 Kr-87 Kr-88 Xe-133 Xe-135 Xe-138

HALF LIFE
8.01 d 2.23 hr 20.8 hr 52.5 min 6.57 hr 2.07 y 30.14 y 10.7 y 1.27 hr 2.83 hr 5.24 d 9.1 hr 14.17 min

Hydrogen Formation
•Reactors are cooled by water. •Water is hydrogen and oxygen. •Any  corrosion  process  (as  slow  rusting  in  iron)  absorbs  oxygen  from  water  and  releases  hydrogen  free. •The corrosion reaction on zircoloy, a  metal used to  cover fuel, becomes excessive at high temperature. •Therefore  when  fuel  over  heats,  because  of  lack  of  cooling,  any  interaction  with  water  or  its  vapour  provides  oxygen  for  the  corrosion  reaction  and  hydrogen is left free at a fast rate.

Safety Systems
Shut Down System(s) Emergency Core Cooling System Containment System

BWR Schematic

Fukushima Daaichi‐1, Unit‐1 Cross Section

Mark‐1  containment

Fukushima Daaichi‐1, Unit‐1 Cross Section

Fukushima Daaichi‐1, Unit‐1 Cross Section

Steam blow‐ down from  SRVs

Fukushima‐1

BWR Schematic

Accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPP, Japan
Time 11‐March‐2011 14:46 hrs 19:30 hrs  20:50 hrs Incidents Radiation field at site boundary

Japan  experienced  severe  Normal earthquake    followed  by  high  Normal value  is 0.05 microSv/h  intensity Tsunami. (0.005mR/h) Govt  declared    state  of  nuclear  Normal Emergency Directive  for  evacuation  was  Normal issued for  residents living in the  area of 2 km radius from unit‐1.

12‐March‐2011 14:40 hrs  12‐March‐2011 20:20 hrs 

1. North‐East coast at 14:46 hrs JST.
Pressure in containment building  increased  significantly

Normal

Sea  water  Injection  for  unit‐1  Normal core cooling started.

Radiation field at site boundary from Unit‐1 
Time 13‐March‐2011 04:300 hrs  Incidents Radiation field at site boundary Monitoring point (MP‐1) at North End  Normal . of  site  boundary    detected  by  Normal value  is 0.05 microSv/h  Environmental survey monitoring car. (0.005mR/h) Monitoring point (MP‐1) at North End  17 microSv/h (1.7mR/h) of  site  boundary    detected  by  Environmental survey monitoring car. Value for Declaring off‐site  Emergency is 10 microSv/h  (1.0mR/h) as per AERB  safety  guide . MP‐1 26 microSv/h (2.6mR/h)

13‐March‐2011 11:40 hrs 

13‐March‐2011 18:30 hrs 

Radiation level at Monitoring Points( MP‐1 & MP‐4) at  site boundary on 13th March‐2011  detected by Environmental monitoring Car
MP‐1 , At 11:40 hr‐ 1.7mR/h At 18:30 hr‐ 2.6mR/h

Rx

MP‐4 ,  At 12:20 hr‐ 4.7mR/h At 19:33 hr‐ 4.4mR/h 1.6 km 

Site Boundary

Monitoring point (MP‐4) at North End of site boundary  detected  by Environmental survey monitoring car.

Threshold value  for declaring  off‐site Emergency

Safety Systems
Shut Down System(s) Emergency Core Cooling System Containment System

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Types of Emergencies
1. Emergency Alert: Defines abnormal probabilities 2. Plant Emergency: Radiological consequences of  abnormal situation within plant or section of a plant. 3. Site Emergencies :  Accidental emergency situation in  plant involving Radioactivity transgressing the plant  boundary 4. Off‐site emergency : Accident condition emergency  situation involving excessive release of radio active  material / hazardous chemical from plant to public  domain

Protective Measures
Control of entry and exit in affected  zones. Control on Food Stuff. Administration of stable iodine  (radioactive prophylaxis) Sheltering  Evacuation

Pathways of Exposure

Exclusion zone

Emergency Planning Zone Action Plans Drawn for Public

No habitation

20 kms

Population Centre around is divided in Sectors

PHWR Schematic

Nuclear Power Generation : Heat Source (PHWRs)

Fuel Bundles Heat Generation due to fission 

Nuclear Power Generation : Heat Source (PHWRs)

Fuel Bundles are kept inside tubes (pressure tubes) There is a large number of Tubes These tubes are kept in another tubes called calandria tubes

Nuclear Power Generation : Heat Removal (PHWRs)

Pressure Tubes and  Calandria Tubes assemblies  are kept in  low  temperature large  inventory of moderator

Nuclear Power Generation : Heat Removal (PHWRs)

Flowing coolant removes heat from the fuel bundles and  transports it to steam generators  from where steam is used to  drive turbine and generate electricity  

Multiple Means to achieve functions

Control Reactivity Cool Fuel Contain Radioactivity

Through Off‐Site   Power Normal Heat Removal System Through Steam Generator – Main Boiler Feed Normal Heat Removal System Through Steam Generator – Auxiliary Boiler Feed Normal Heat Removal System Through Shutdown Cooling System – Process Water Normal Heat Removal System Through Steam Generator – Fire Water Normal Heat Removal System Through Shutdown Cooling System – Fire Water Emergency Core Cooling System – Process Water  Emergency Core Cooling System – Fire Water  Fire Water Injection into Core  Moderator Heat Sink ‐Process Water Moderator Heat Sink –Fire Water Passive Thermal Capacity of Moderator Passive Thermal Capacity of Calandria Vault Water  Severe Accident Management  Provisions √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ On‐Site   Power Independent of  station power supply 

In case all power supplies are lost …. Time available to restore heat sinks

260 tons (13 hours to  boil off ) 625 tons (36 hours  to boil off)

Prevent Radioactivity Release by Ensuring Protection of Physical Barriers

Control Reactivity Cool Fuel Contain Radioactivity

MULTIPLE BARRIERS TO PREVENT RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE

Fuel Fuel Clad Primary Coolant Inventory Containment Exclusion Boundary

CONTAINMENT
TAPS

Provisions to handle SBO in TAPS‐1&2
Provisions of Reactor Safety Functions
Reactor Shutdown/Scram
Reactor Scram due to de‐energization of Reactor Protection  System (RPS) channels  Reactor sub‐critical within 5 secs.

Reactor Core Cooling
Primary Steam Isolation Valves (PSIVs) go close on de‐energization  of RPS channels.  Additionally, PSIVs go close automatically on  Reactor water low level Primary steam line low pressure Primary steam line high radiation Dry well high pressure Primary steam line high flow Primary steam line area high temperature

Provisions to handle SBO in TAPS‐1&2 (Contd…)
Provisions of Reactor Safety Functions

Reactor Core Cooling Emergency Condenser valved in on PSIV  closure Emergency Condenser de‐pressurizes the  core and cools down RPV at the rate of  50oC/hr. RPV cooled and maintained upto 8 hours  beyond which secondary side inventory of  EC replenished.
Reactor Core Cooling (Backups)
Availability of SBO DG to supply station power

Provisions to handle SBO in TAPS‐1&2 (Contd…)
Provisions of Reactor Safety Functions Reactor Containment Isolation
High steam flow in respective steam line (s) High temperature into pipe “tunnel area” Low pressure in steam lines Drywell high pressure

TAPS‐1&2 would be maintained under sub‐critical and cooled state due to  our provisions.

Chernobyl

TMI

* Fukushima 

Thanks for your kind  attention

Fuel Cooling Provision
NORMAL OPERATION (FISSION HEAT)
PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM – SECONDARY  COOLANT  SYSTEM (forced circulation)

SHUTDOWN (DECAY HEAT)
SEVERAL OPTIONS :
PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM With circulation by : Pumps Natural Circulation SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM PROCESS WATER
Two Loops provided; one is sufficient.

SECONDARY STEAM SYSTEM with SG’s fed by any of : Main BFPs Aux. BFPs Firewater

ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ( During LOCA ) MODERATOR HEAVY WATER IN CALANDRIA

Cooling systems essential for safety have power supplies backed by emergency diesel generators

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3,90,000 ft3 (11000 m3)

1,10,000 ft3 (3100  m3) 1,32,800 ft3 (3700  m3) DRY WELL

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BACK

FUEL CELL

REACTOR CORE
TAPS

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THERMAL POWER PLANT vs. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
(SCHEMATIC) THERMAL POWER PLANT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
Steam

Steam

Turbine

Turbine

Generator Reactor Coal Furnace Water Condenser Water

Generator

Condenser

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TAPS

CONTAINMENT
TAPS

BACK

Fission Products
ISOTOPE
I-131 I-132 I-133 I-134 I-135 Cs-134 Cs-137 Kr-85 Kr-87 Kr-88 Xe-133 Xe-135 Xe-138

HALF LIFE
8.01 d 2.23 hr 20.8 hr 52.5 min 6.57 hr 2.07 y 30.14 y 10.7 y 1.27 hr 2.83 hr 5.24 d 9.1 hr 14.17 min

Loss of coolant Accident &  Emergency Core Cooling
Pre-Test Configuration (radial) -Test Configuration (radial) Post 37ELEMENT BUNDLE Post-Test Configuration (axial)

REACTOR CORE
TAPS

CONTAINMENT
TAPS

TAPS Reactor Building

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1. SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM System provided for• Provided for removal of decay heat of the reactor core during shutdown. The System is designed to cool the reactor core from 300oF (148.9oC) to 125oF (51.7oC).

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2. FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM System provided for• Safe Storage of Spent Fuel in the Pool. • Removing heat generated by Spent Fuel Bundles. • Providing a circulating and filtering system to maintain clear water in the pool and reactor cavity during refueling.
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LIQUID POISON SYSTEM

• Liquid Poison System is a Standby System to make reactor sub-critical from full power condition and maintain it in that state in the event of failure of CRDs to achieve the same. It has adequate capability to maintain reactor sub critical in cold condition. This is an engineered safeguard system, part of which is shared between two units. • The Poison Tank Inventory considers the requirement of both the units. The Squib Valves and injection lines are dedicated to separate units. • However, the poison tank and Pumps are common between two units and the system is capable of injecting poison in either of the units at one time.

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• Site Emergency will be declared if Ambient radiation levels s at 100 m distance from the reactor reaches 25mR/Hr. or ambient air activity of Iodine-131 reaches to 5000 b/m3 • Off-Site emergency will be declared if any of the following conditions exist:

• Gamma radiation levels at one meter above the ground in offsite locations exceeds 0.01 mSv/hr. • Levels of contaminations in water or food materials in Off-site locations exceed the following values:
Food item Sr. No. 1. Milk Conc. In milk (Bq2/1) Conc. In grass (Bq/Kg) 2 MILK PRODUCTS (Bq/Kg) 3. FRUITS & VEGETABLES (Bq/Kg) I-131 Sr-89 Sr-90 1.5 E03 5.0 E04 2.0 E04 1.5 E04 Cs-134 Cs-137

2.0 E03 2.0 E04 7.0 E03 9.0 E05 3.0 E04 3.0 E05 1.5 E05 1.5 E05

1.5 E04 2.0 E04 6.0 E04 9.0 E04 1.0 E05 1.0 E05 4.0 E04 5.0 E04

Intervention level :  Action intended to reduce or avert exposure. 

Concern : Earthquake prone
• Criteria ‐ No capable fault within 5 km • Jaitapur in Zone III, no capable fault within 30 km radius • NPPs can be set up in the highest seismic zone with  appropriate design
Site  Seismic Zone Tarapur III Rawatbhata II Kalpakkam II Narora IV Kakrapar III Kaiga III Kudankulam II Jaitapur III

Developed scenario
1.Earth quake of 8.8 magnitudes struck at  around 03:00 PM on 11 March, epicenter was  approximately 110 miles from NPP. maximum  acceleration of 0.35g at the epicenter  2.Plant came to shutdown on sensing earth  quake.  3.DGs came on line to provide emergency  power supply 4.Tsunami waves of 10 to 20 meters high hit  the place within an hour
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Developed scenario
• Tsunami waves damaged 
– pump house equipments  – including suppression pool heat exchangers  – cooling pumps that provide cooling water to  DG sets. – It also damaged switch gears that were  located in higher elevations
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• Contd from last slide • The tsunami was larger then the design basis and the  water overflowed the pumps for the cooling water  system.  • The tsunami carried away DG fuel oil tanks, which  were above ground • Tsunami flooded the AC and DC switchgear located in  the basement of the turbine building (reported from  TEPCO LE and various emails), this has hampered  operator response as many indications have been lost  and plant lighting has been lost.

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Developed scenario
1.So no electrical power was available: both off  site power, Emergency diesel power not available  to equipments 2.In such case 2 actions are needed: – Residual heat removal by cooling and  depressurization – Emergency feed 3. For lining up both the above systems  valves are  to be operated which are DC operated, but these  were not available
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Developed scenario
• As there was no sufficient cooling, the  pressure inside RPV increases and relieves it  to the suppression pool through auto blow  down system through instrumented relief  valves.  • This steam gets quenched in the suppression  pool partly (as per efficiency) and remaining  steam and non condensable comes to  drywell, the primary containment and results  in pressure rise of drywell also.
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Developed scenario
• Suppression pool recirculation pumps which  are part of emergency cooling were not  available so heat removal efficiency comes  down and suppression pool temp increases,  which further raises containment pressure. • They allowed the pressure inside the reactor  containment to increase as high as twice the  design pressure in order to control the  release the radioactivity.
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