Asian Philosophy Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2005, pp.


Is Svasamvitti Transcendental? E A Tentative Reconstruction ´ Following Santaraksita E
Dan Arnold

Introduction1 There has emerged in recent years the recognition that the characteristically Buddhist doctrine of svasamvitti2 (‘apperception’, as I will render it for reasons to become E clear presently) was variously understood and developed in the Indian Buddhist tradition. Thus, in his illuminating study particularly of some Tibetan debates regarding this doctrine, Paul Williams identifies two principal understandings of svasamvitti that grow out of the Indian scholastic tradition. For some thinkers, E it seems to denote a special kind of (intentional) cognition—that kind, specifically, whose object is other cognitions. When this claim is combined with the claim that all cognitions must, in order to count as cognitions, be the objects of svasamvitti E thus understood, the doctrine is clearly vulnerable to the charge of infinite regress—that is (we will see), vulnerable to precisely the kind of critique against svasamvitti characteristically developed by the M dhyamika thinkers Candrakrti and a i E ´ Santideva.3 But svasamvitti was taken by other thinkers to denote whatever it is—and I will E suggest, as a plausible candidate, intentionality—that is constitutive of subjectivity. In that case, to say of any cognition that it must involve svasamvitti is just to say that it E exemplifies the feature in virtue of which sentient4 beings are to be distinguished as such, apart from things like rocks. As Williams notes, this understanding of ´ svasamvitti seems particularly to be the innovation of Santaraksita.5 Recognizing this, E E Williams is in a position to argue that the Tibetan thinker Mipham—who understood the characteristically M dhyamika critiques of svasamvitti as undera E mining only the claim that this is an ultimately existent phenomenon (while allowing it to stand as conventionally real)—advanced the interpretation he did largely owing

Correspondence to: Dan Arnold, University of Chicago Divinity School, 1025 E. 58th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA. Email:
ISSN 0955-2367 print/ISSN 1469-2961 online/05/010077-111 ß 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd DOI: 10.1080/0955236052000341050

78 Dan Arnold

´ to his having presupposed the doctrine of Santaraksita; for as we will see, critiques E such as that developed by Candrakrti do not have any purchase against svasamvitti to i E the extent that it is thus understood. What I would like to suggest is that on the view that can be developed following ´ Santaraksita, svasamvitti is usefully understood as something very much like Kant’s E E ´ transcendental unity of apperception. Understanding the idea that Santaraksita E identifies as a specifically transcendental one can help more precisely to distinguish his formulation from that of Dign ga (to whom the doctrine of svasamvitti can be a E ´ antaraksita’s view can also (more importantly) give us traced). Thus reconstructing S  E the conceptual tools to appreciate why the critique of svasamvitti advanced by E Candrakrti does not—indeed, cannot—coherently be thought to undermine i ´ ´ Santaraksita’s version.6 So characterizing Santaraksita’s innovation also has the E E advantage that it can help us appreciate the extent to which Indian debates concerning svasamvitti quite closely parallel similar discussions in post-Kantian E philosophy; for Kant’s own statements of his doctrine of the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ were susceptible of comparably divergent interpretations—a further indication that we are on something like the same conceptual ground here. Accordingly, I will begin to develop this proposal by first considering the various ways in which Kant expressed his understanding of the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’, and by indicating the two chiefly divergent understandings of it that emerged in the course of subsequent philosophical discussion. I will then sketch Dign ga’s initial statement and defense of the doctrine of svasamvitti, identifying a E some ways in which that maps onto one of the attested interpretations of Kant. We will then consider the critique of Dign ga developed by Candrakrti, noting where a i this critique may hit its target. ´ I will then introduce Santaraksita’s statement of the doctrine. Given the brevity of E ´ antaraksita’s expressions on the matter (regarding which he does not advance an S E argument so much as he stipulates a definition), it will be useful to develop this statement with reference to philosophical developments of Dign ga’s trajectory of a thought particularly in the hands of Dharmottara—and with reference, as well, to the ´  later figure of Moksakaragupta, who interestingly combines Santaraksita and E E Dharmottara at the point where he adduces the former’s doctrine of svasamvitti as E authoritative. This trajectory of thought will, further, be reconstructed with reference to the other principal interpretation of Kant’s doctrine—the more properly transcendental one. We will see, in concluding, that Candrakrti’s arguments fail to undermine the i ´ understanding of svasamvitti that can be developed following Santaraksita—with the E E ´ antaraksita’s view now expressed as a function of its being a invulnerability of S  E basically transcendental idea. More precisely, while Candrakrti’s critique targets the i view on which svasamvitti is considered a particular kind of intentional cognition E ´ (considered, that is, to display intentionality), Santaraksita’s is more like the view that E svasamvitti is itself ‘intentionality’. Among other things, this difference has farE reaching implications with respect to conceptions of truth and objectivity; for it is precisely to the extent that thinkers like Dign ga take svasamvitti as an example of a E

Is svasamvitti transcendental? E


‘perception’ (and indeed, as the uniquely indubitable kind) that they cannot finally take it as capable of being involved with what Kant considered to be objective ´ judgments. On Santaraksita’s understanding, in contrast, the way is (at least in E principle) open to entertaining something other than subjective occurrences as the ´ locus of truth—though whether that is how Santaraksita deployed the idea is another E question. Kant’s ‘Transcendental Unity of Apperception’ Kant’s notion of the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’—or, as he also referred to this idea, ‘pure apperception’, ‘original apperception’, and the ‘synthetic original unity of apperception’—is foundational for the entire Kantian edifice.7 This idea is pivotal for Kant’s ‘ Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding’; for it is the basis for the claim that all experience is demonstrably structured in terms of the basic categories that Kant enumerates. It is, indeed, the transcendental unity of apperception from which these categories are ‘deduced’. These categories, in turn, represent the basis of Kant’s entire claim to have developed a philosophical project that can be taken to concern the objective validity of knowledge. Thus, while Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’ famously turned attention away from objects in the world (‘things-in-themselves’) and towards the knowing subject—by emphasizing that we could never have immediate cognitive acquaintance with things-in-themselves, but only with things-as-they-appear-to-us—it was because Kant thought he could show that how things appear to us is necessarily structured in certain ways that he nevertheless claimed to trade in objectively valid judgments. All of this is because the categories could, Kant argued, be derived from one irreducibly primitive fact: that having any experience at all necessarily presupposes the imposition of some perspectival unity on the relatively discrete data of perception or (Kant’s term) ‘intuition’—subjectivity must, that is, consist in the ordering or ‘synthesis’ of the various causally efficacious ‘impingements by the world on a possessor of sensory capacities’, in John McDowell’s phrase (1996, p. xv). Kant’s table of categories then represents simply the various ways in which this basic fact can be expressed. This is why Kant could say that the transcendental unity of apperception is ‘therefore that highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed, this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself ’ (1965, B134, note). Clearly stating the role this plays in the grounding of objectively valid judgments, Kant emphasized that ‘[o]nly the original unity is objectively valid; the empirical unity of apperception, upon which we are not here dwelling, and which besides is merely derived from the former under given conditions in concreto, has only subjective validity’ (B140). While it is thus pivotal for his project, though, Kant had a hard time expressing clearly just what the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ is—a fact reflected not only in the variety of terms he uses for it, but in his having developed the idea rather

which can stand alongside one another in one experience. ‘becoming conscious’. For experience as such necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of appearances’ (A100–101). it can only be from the resemblance. indeed. In the first edition. it can only be by mistake we ascribe to it an identity. our misleading convictions regarding the continuity and unity of such events were a function only of recognition or memory—of those causally produced states. form a whole. . Kant says. by which we contemplate one continu’d object. and ‘forming’ of experiences? The problem. ‘which. since it would lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it. all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless. for example. as the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances. . Hume had famously argued that there was nothing more to a person than a ‘bundle or collection of different perceptions. . ‘ There must be something’. For it would in its present state be a new representation which would not in any way belong to the act whereby it was to be gradually generated. makes their reproduction possible . which this act of the mind bears to that. If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before. and are in a perpetual flux and movement’. Thus. which produces an association of ideas.8 Kant rejoins by elaborating a compelling question: how could we even recognize two moments as similar without already presupposing the very continuity putatively explained by this recognition? Thus. and an easy transition of the imagination from one to another. which leads us into this mistake. That is. Kant develops the point in ways.80 Dan Arnold differently in the second edition of the first Critique. A103) Kant’s strategy here displays the constitutively transcendental logic that is his preoccupation throughout. This transcendental unity of apperception forms out of all possible experiences. among the points regarding which the two editions of the Critique most significantly differ. is really nothing but a quality. For Hume. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge. (1965. which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity. something for which criteria of identity could be . But Kant states his point in ways that clearly invite various readings. that is. whose phenomenological content in some way ‘resembled’ that of other such states: For as such a succession answers evidently to our notion of diversity. I think. then. he can thus argue that Hume’s own account (his own denial of a point like Kant’s) necessarily presupposes Kant’s point. therefore. (A108) This way of putting the point raises the question: just what sort of ‘thing’ is it that is thus the locus (the agent) of such apparent actions as ‘synthetically combining’. and as the relation of parts. a connection of all these representations according to laws. that the error arises. This is. The manifold of the representation would never. is that this way of expressing the matter seems to imply an empirical locus of these actions. that clearly respond to Hume’s account of personal identity.

That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition. p. Thus. that it must be logically possible for me to ascribe my representations to myself . . It is. 1966. As we will see. which are given in an intuition. The subsequent course particularly of German philosophy can arguably be understood in terms of the divergent interpretations of which Kant’s statements here will admit. ’ (Pippin. 1989. (B131–132) Despite this emphasis simply on its necessarily being possible that all experiences (if they are to count as such) be expressed as the object of some subject’s judgment. where the emphasis is rather more on a strictly logical condition of the possibility of experience. to distinguish it from empirical apperception. or at least would be nothing to me. in contrast. I think. when he says that ‘the manifold representations. ‘Kant is clearly referring to apperception as a logical condition. Thus: It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations. including what Kant is calling experience. for example. the problem is how this putatively ‘transcendental’ condition relates to (or whether indeed it must in some sense be) the empirical self. while generating the representation ‘I think’ . On the latter reading. On the former. Pippin distinguishes what he calls the ‘logical condition’ reading of Kant’s point from a much different. a necessary relation to the ‘I think’ in the same subject in which this manifold is found. is a species of self-consciousness. would not be one and all my representations. 20). it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility.11 I call it pure apperception. . for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all.10 All the manifold of intuition has. that is. 107). But this representation is an act of spontaneity. p. or. Contextualizing this project.9 In this regard. This is nicely brought out by Robert Pippin. Strawson helpfully characterizes most likely objections to Kant’s point as thus turning on the point that ‘the ascription of states to a subject require[s] the subject itself to be an intuitable object for which there exist empirically applicable criteria of identity’ (Strawson. . . something like this problem that Kant has in mind in restating the argument in the second edition of the Critique. therefore. because it is that self-consciousness which.Is svasamvitti transcendental? E 81 adduced—which is to say. ‘all consciousness. again. for example. if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness’ (B132).). representing objects is at the same time attending to the mind’s activities and objects’ (ibid. ‘Cartesian’ reading. and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible. original apperception. cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. We can anticipate this point by noting that at least some a developments of this reading of Kant turn out to be vulnerable to the same kind of ´ a critique that the M dhyamikas Candrakrti and Santideva will direct at Dign ga and a i his successors. the latter claim might just as well express the view of svasamvitti E advanced by Dign ga. Kant’s restatement of the doctrine retains expressions that invite questions about criteria of identity—as. some of Fichte’s formulations of the Kantian . who argues that the ` philosophical project of Hegel is usefully understood as framed vis-a-vis Kant’s ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ (and this despite the relative paucity of clear discussions of Kant in Hegel’s corpus).

nor as I am in myself. if it is thought that any act of consciousness must. two mental events occur. at least as suggested by this version of Fichte. 1989.12 It is. would seem to require an empirical agent). then we undermine our ability to distinguish. Strawson is particularly concerned to jettison Kant’s reference to the action of ‘synthesis’ (which. cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation’. Kant’s is the strictly formal point that a condition of the possibility of our having any experience at all is that our experiences (sensations. We can develop Pippin’s other alternative—the ‘logical condition’ reading of Kant’s doctrine—with reference to Strawson. More compellingly. would also be an instance of consciousness and so subject to its conditions. who lucidly reconstructs Kant’s basic argument. between my thinking and its thought. But if that is the right reading. in order to count as such. the empirical existence of a soul. say. not an intuition’. fantasies) are unfailingly experienced from some perspective. . Kant’s point from the Cartesian appeal to the ‘I think’. memories. an argument that trades on an equivocation concerning the key term. This representation is a thought. and that they be expressible as judgments. if Kant’s doctrine is interpreted in the way that Pippin finds reflected in Fichte.13 In such passages. (Pippin. 46–47) That is. a a E But Kant seems to have had it in mind to head off precisely this sort of regress. since self-consciousness. then. be accompanied by a further act of consciousness. precisely against Descartes that Kant urged: ‘In the synthetic original unity of apperception I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself. pp. as (we saw) he says. as an action. or two two-place relations. then the arguments that showed why consciousness of X must be accompanied by consciousness of consciousness of X would all apply to the latter too. and between me and my thinking a thought’. the claim seems to be (in Pippin’s words) that ‘in ‘‘thinking a thought’’. in the way that Kant very clearly wanted to. while generating the representation ‘‘I think’’ . .14 but also (and therefore) that we cannot draw any inferences from this fact about. the distinctiveness of Kant’s constitutively transcendental approach is perhaps most evident in his critique of Descartes. then this doctrine is clearly vulnerable to what Pippin calls ‘the iteration problem’: If consciousness and self-consciousness are treated as separate aspects of any consciousness. We will see that this could serve just as well as a concise statement of the characteristically M dhyamika argument against Dign ga’s idea of svasamvitti. In these formulations. as transcendental. if it is to count as such—must in turn be accompanied by a yet further act. whose famous argument Kant adduced as a paradigm case of a ‘Paralogism’—that is. rather. Indeed. then the latter—again. Kant emphasizes not only that he does not mean (as Descartes arguably did) to adduce a putatively foundational sort of epistemic ‘certainty’. his point in distinguishing ‘transcendental’ from ‘empirical’ apperception was to emphasize that the former is ‘that self-consciousness which.82 Dan Arnold doctrine seem to take that as claiming that all episodes of intentional consciousness are necessarily accompanied by an additional intentional consciousness. instead developing the point that ‘the thesis of the necessary unity of consciousness can itself . but only that I am.

163)—with this reference to ‘aboutness’ suggesting that we may be talking here about intentionality. . Yet if he rejects this interpretation of the ‘‘abiding self ’’. between the order of the world and the order of experience. Properly understood. This necessary doubleness is the real point of connexion between what Kant refers to as ‘original (or transcendental) self-consciousness’ on the one hand and the objectivity-condition on the other. between how things are in the world which experience is of and how they are experienced as being. implicit in the concepts employed in experience. p. the point is (in Robert Brandom’s phrase) to urge that we necessarily presuppose a difference between ‘what is said or thought and what it is said or thought about’ (Brandom. the answer is that if ‘subjects must be conceived of as perceptibly belonging to a common world. is—among much else—an embodiment of a temporally extended point of view on the world. . then. p. I think it becomes clear that he does not thus have it in mind to argue (contra Sellars) that we can have unmediated cognitive access to uninterpreted data. an understanding of why Kant can think that even Hume’s denial of his point necessarily presupposes precisely that point. 2000. Hume—of facilitating. rather. without producing anything to fill the vacuum?’ (pp. 107–108) This point has the considerable advantage of facilitating an appreciation of the constitutively transcendental logic that Kant is here using against. against the objection that the notion of ascribing experiences to a subject presupposes (empirical) criteria of identity for such a subject. though. Strawson concludes by summarizing the extent to which he . It is not essential for Kant to maintain that his provisions are sufficient to explain the actual occurrence of self-ascription of experiences. Thus. that the main point of this objection can be ‘conceded without detriment to the Kantian position. (pp. we might way. (p. 104) And again: What is necessary is that there be a distinction. the objector’s point does not contradict the Kantian point. though not (usually) an opposition. And what is thus necessary is simply that subjective experience be constitutively perspectival: The more fundamental point of the Kantian provisions is that the experiences of such a subject must themselves be so conceptualized as to determine a distinction between the subjective route of his experiences and the objective world through which it is a route. Again.Is svasamvitti transcendental? E 83 be represented as resting on a yet more fundamental premise—on nothing more than the necessity. The history of a man. 105). From the way that Strawson develops this reading. say. for any experience at all to be possible. 103). it includes it’ (p. does he not evacuate the notion of ascription of experiences to a subject of its ordinary meaning. 97). To begin with. of the original duality of intuition and concept’ (1966. they must also be conceived of as each having his own experience of that world. Strawson nicely states (as we have already seen) the recurrent line of objection to Kant. Kant ‘speaks of the ‘‘abiding self ’’ of transcendental apperception. Strawson rejoins. that is. but he certainly does not mean by this the (at least relatively) abiding man . It is enough if they are necessary to its possibility’ (p. . 102–103).

which appears as the basic condition of the possibility of empirical self-consciousness. one that Strawson better develops elsewhere. I think. Strawson argues that experiences are necessarily individuated with reference to their subjects. p. (Ibid. as I have indicated. . then. . owe their identities as particulars to the identity of the person whose states or experiences they are.84 Dan Arnold has here reconstructed a point that he takes Kant only dimly and inadequately to have developed: . Strawson here targets what he characterizes as the ‘no-ownership’ view of subjective states—that is. . This is worth noting. Here. they must be possessed or abscribable in just that way which the no-ownership theorist ridicules . his understanding of E the matter is stated more in the form of a stipulated definition. Against this. we have what amounts to an interesting unpacking of Strawson’s claim that Kant’s ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ can only express a coherent thought when it is interpreted in the way he suggested specifically with reference to Kant. one might say. if it is to be ‘experiences’ that are being picked out at all: ‘It is not coherent [to deny this]. Strawson’s alternative statement of the basically Kantian argument. Santaraksita does not really E argue for the interpretation of svasamvitti he advances. rather. or experiences. The point is that ‘experience’ is constitutively perspectival. such that it must always be at least intelligible to distinguish any particular example of such from what . the necessary reflexiveness of experience. And it must do so. 97). then. his approach is more characteristic of those analytic philosophers who would defer particularly to ordinary ´ language. In particular. Thus. E It is clear that the point Strawson develops in this way is recognizably the same point he judges Kant to have grasped. . first. the view (arguably held by Hume) that mental events can coherently be thought not to be constitutively perspectival. Strawson’s Individuals—his 1959 ‘Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics’— develops a transcendental argument with clear affinities to the one he reconstructs in the foregoing consideration of Kant. for it only expresses a coherent thought when interpreted in these terms. 111) But Strawson’s last point—that only on this reading does Kant’s insight reflect a coherent thought—is. since. It yields its place.) Here. in pressing his case for the denial. in that one who holds [the contrary view] is forced to make use of that sense of possession of which he denies the existence.’ This is because the defining characteristic of the class of ‘experiences’ is that ‘they are ‘‘my experiences’’ or ‘‘the experiences of some person’’. can give us a way to reconstruct ´ particularly Santaraksita’s way of proceeding. though. From this it follows immediately that if they can be identified as particular states or experiences at all. where the idea of possession expressed by ‘‘my’’ and ‘‘of ’’ is the one [the ‘‘no-ownership’’ theorist] calls into question’ (1959. to that of the possibility of empirical (personal) self-consciousness. the simple-seeming notion of ‘a unitary consciousness to which diverse experiences belong’ appears less and less adequate to express the fundamental thought on which the argument rests. He elaborates: States. then to that profounder notion of transcendental self-consciousness. (p. .

to thematize something like the idea of intentionality. Any ostensibly designated phenomena that are not so identified are. this point (as both Strawson and Kant stress) is not such as to warrant any inferences regarding empirically identifiable existents—not. then the reason it makes sense for Kant to say that this phenomenon ‘cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation’ is that he here means to identify precisely that phenomenon which is displayed in any act of representing— precisely that phenomenon. that is. some subject’s experiences of some object. this is just what we mean by ‘experience’. with Kant) simply that the criterion for individuating experiences as such is that they be intentional—that they be. we are not only a in a position to appreciate how Kant could think he differed from Descartes. precisely what Candrakrti will i argue with respect to Dign ga. That is. This. . cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation’. in Strawson’s words. Depending. This point becomes clear if (as I think we are entitled to do) we take Kant’s ‘transcendental unity of apperception’. for example. Thus. that they be ascribable to some subject).15 That is. not ‘experiences’. as here understood. in contrast. I have said in anticipation. to put the point conversely.Is svasamvitti transcendental? E 85 it is that is putatively experienced. our subjective states. and (the point we have now developed) this cannot coherently be denied insofar as. not what it is that we are here talking about. but also . the point is the deceptively straightforward one that the fact of intentionality is not itself intentional. if we call the phenomenon thus picked out ‘intentionality’. the history of a person just is ‘an embodiment of a temporally extended point of view on the world’—amounts to the idea that conscious states are about their contents. the point is simply that this criterion for thus individuating these is not individuated by itself. but of entailing the ‘iteration’ problem. then. in virtue of which any act could count as an act of representing. I think. This is the claim. or (with Strawson and. then. the point is either (with Fichte) that all intentional cognitions are themselves at the same time intended by (are the objects of ) an additional intentional cognition—one of the type ‘apperception’. ipso facto. but are invariably experienced as ours. say. If that is right. insofar as Kant has here given us simply the criterion for individuating tokens of the type experience (viz. that is. This is. to deny that feelings of. there is no way to individuate even those ‘experiences’ of which this would be denied except with reference to some subject whose experiences they are. It is literally nonsensical. on how we read Kant’s claims regarding the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’. most basically. is why Kant could say that the phenomenon he meant to identify is ‘that self-consciousness which. are not freefloating and unassigned. On the alternative reading. that ‘the objective world through which’ any subject is a route is what that subject’s experience is of (or ‘about’). The former reading has the distinct disadvantage not only of failing to account for Kant’s own attempts to distinguish his view from that of Descartes. That is. the idea that subjectivity is a constitutively perspectival phenomenon—that. But again. hot or cold must always be someone’s feelings of such.. . such as to warrant the conclusion that there must therefore exist souls as the loci of perspectival unity. while generating the representation ‘‘I think’’ . by definition. then.

indeed. causally producing a certain representation. as it were. for example. As the second half of E Pramanasamuccaya 1. in contrast. under conditions not necessarily of the subject’s choosing. E E   while the object of the latter is ‘universals’ or ‘abstractions’ (samanyalaksanas). that is. this kind of cognition would be distinguished by its being causally precipitated. that may very well appear the same way to a subject regardless of her circumstances (and that may. the claim that the word E pramana should finally be understood as referring not (as for most Indian philosophers) primarily to such cognitive instruments as perception and inference. 600–660 CE)—developed a spartan epistemology that admitted only two E irreducible criteria of knowledge or justification. then. the result   E or ‘fruit’ of a pramana—and that it is therefore only ‘figuratively’ (upacarat) that we E take the word pramana also to denote our cognitive instruments.17 Dign ga says as much in developing a claim characteristically associated with all of the Buddhist thinkers in the tradition of thought that he initiated—specifically.86 Dan Arnold (and more importantly) in a position to appreciate the claim that this ‘unity of apperception’ is properly transcendental—that is. by a really existent thing that. and associated with his tradition thereafter. The resultant phenomenological content of such a cognition. would necessarily be a function of the size and color and shape of just this particular fire. to those cognitions that result from the exercise thereof. present itself even in the absence of any particular fire). E E Thus. An inferential cognition of a fire. The former E constitutively has as its object uniquely particular events or sensations (svalaksana). that we are dealing with something different is clear when it is further urged (as it is by Dign ga) that the only really occurrent sort of ‘perception’ has (in a sense that can be a a variously specified) other mental events as its objects. and ‘inference’ (anumana). a E E this is the claim that the word pramana chiefly denotes the pramanaphala. in the sense that it is necessarily presupposed even in the very act of denying it. a perceptual cognition of a fire would be the kind of bare cognitive occurrence that is produced by (again in McDowell’s phrase) ‘impingements by the world on a possessor of sensory capacities’—that is. a ´ antaraksita’s account of svasamvitti can usefully be reconstructed as making S E E something like the same point. first to Dign ga. then. ‘Because of [its] . then we will be in a good position to appreciate its invulnerability to Candrakrti’s critique. in contrast to Dign ga’s. but rather. presents itself to the subject. i a Svasamvitti in the Thought of Dign ga a E It is well known that Dign ga (c. Dharmakrti a i (c. If. would have as its content the kind of image of a fire that appears before the mind’s eye whenever (say) one hears the word ‘fire’—something.16 While this may seem an intuitively plausible development of the insight that Strawson characterized in terms of ‘the original duality of intuition and concept’. two ‘reliable warrants’ ( pramana):  ‘sensation’ or ‘perception’ ( pratyaksa). 480–540 CE)—and following him. In the terms first stated by Dign ga. Let us turn.8 puts it (in characteristically laconic terms).

while the pramana and its    result are. that a pramana is something other than its result. these three are not separated’.25 and to the extent that that ‘result’ is (as Dign ga E here says) svasamvitti. rather.26 To say this much is not. the action is figuratively designated as being the pramana. as for proponents of external objects.23 This. to say that ‘perception’ designates only sensory cognition. . as that word is generally understood in English. Richard Hayes has nicely expressed (in terms familiar from many modern versions of empiricist foundationalism) the point that is advanced by thus arguing that the . there arises a cognition. as Dign ga proceeds to make clear. Dign ga asserts. the only indubitably immediate cognition concerns the occurrence of our own mental states. Of course. but simply that it denotes whatever cognition immediately (that is. [respectively. then.] is [in this case] its being of the appearance of an a object’. . a pramana is real only as a result’. the one that is apperception (svasamvitti) is the one that is the result. existing as the result.20 Thus. ‘Cognition arises E E as appearing twofold: [having] the appearance of itself [as subject]. E Hence. in other words. In terms of these two appearances. that kind of cognition whose phenomenological content is at the same time its direct object. corresponding to differences of [aspect of] the cognition. hence. but that fact is explicable without reference to contact with anything external. though [the latter is in fact] devoid of activity. that E E a ‘a pramana is real only as a result ’. then. it is not the case. And we have now seen Dign ga argue that in the final analysis. is that when one has the experience of a (say) seeing a tree. without the mediation of any concepts) apprehends a uniquely particular object—which is as much as to say.18 Dign ga’s auto-commentary explains: a E In this regard. svasamvitti is the only a E really occurrent type of such unmediated cognition.22 And again (in verse E form): ‘That which appears is the object known ( prameya).21 Dign ga concludes: ‘Thus. is the context in which Dign ga brings into play that type of a ‘perception’ ( pratyaksa) which is ‘apperception’ (svasamvitti).] the subjective aspect of [the cognition] (grahakakara) and the cognition [itself]. thus. that the only ‘cognitive instrument’ ( pramana) in play is simply the E fact of the cognition’s having that phenomenological content: ‘The pramana. ipso facto.’24 To the extent. and this very [cognition] is E understood as comprising the action [of a putatively ‘instrumental’ pramana]. it turns out that the latter is the only really occurrent pramana E in any case—that.Is svasamvitti transcendental? E 87 E being comprehended along with its action. but it is important to recall that Dign ga has defined pratyaksa only as being definitively ‘free a E  of conceptual elaboration’ (kalpanapodha). containing the representation of an object. this is not typically regarded as an example of ‘perception’. in regard to cognitions whose phenomenological content is an a E external object. and the appearance of an object. are [only] figuratively attributed to the respective [distinctive] factor in each case . all that can be said indubitably to have occurred is that a cognition     has arisen having that phenomenological aspect or representation (akara or abhasa). [in the sense of a cognitive instrument. [it should be understood that] the roles of the E means of cognition ( pramana) and of the object to be cognized ( prameya).19 The point.’’.

Thus. for while we can always doubt that the world is as it is represented in cognition. Similarly. though. the only finally warranted knowledge) concerns the contents of our own mental states. though. Dign ga can be taken to have developed a a basically representationalist epistemology. that our Knowledge is only conversant about them’ (1975. non-conceptual. this is the one kind of cognition with respect to which. . even if there is in fact nothing blue outside the cognition for one to be aware of. . . one cannot be mistaken. in a sense. 525). Locke similarly argued that ‘[s]ince the Mind. or the strictly epistemological claim that mental events (such as representational ‘sense data’) are all that we can directly know. even if Dign ga’s is understood as the strong idealist claim that mental a events are all that exist—and accordingly.30 As in many of the Western philosophical discussions where idealism seems to lurk. It may be that ‘Tomorrow is Friday’ is a false proposition at the time that it constitutes the content of a thought. it is an exegetically complex matter which of two claims is being made: the ontological claim that mental events are all that really exist. blue is certainly the content of that particular awareness. On either reading of the foregoing arguments from Dign ga. For Dign ga. conceptual) cognitions are (as cognitions) themselves ‘perceived’—which is just to say that our acquaintance even with the conceptual contents of our minds is itself alleged to be. though. what we cannot doubt is that cognition occurs. if one has an awareness of blue. that svasamvitti is the only finally occurrent E . . the relationships that are thought to be involved in cognition—and here. p. it is evident. too. hath no other immediate Object but its own Ideas. the point in urging that svasamvitti is a E the only really occurrent sort of cognition may be that the only finally indubitable (because uniquely immediate) knowledge we can have (hence. there turns out to be a sense in which even inferential (and hence.27 That is. most basically. one with clear affinities with the project of empiricists like Locke. The foundational status of this putatively immediate acquaintance is clear from its relation even to propositional judgments (even. but it is impossible to be in error regarding its being the content of the thought of which it seems to be the content .88 Dan Arnold only thing with which we are immediately acquainted is the contents of our own mental states: At least one of the reasons that one might regard acts of awareness as sensa is that we are perfectly safe in saying that the fact of awareness itself cannot be denied . which it alone does or can contemplate. . for insofar as all instances of cognition have an ‘apperceptive’ dimension. a real question here whether Dign ga may thus be seen to a uphold something more like a full-blown metaphysical idealism than simply a representationalist epistemology. it can thus be claimed. Thus.29 There is. to those constitutively discursive cognitions that are to be characterized by Dign ga a as ‘inferential’). we still have to face a question a concerning. . that is.28 Given the position so far developed. the issues start to resemble issues that arise given one reading (the ‘Cartesian’ reading) of Kant’s doctrine of the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’. in all its Thoughts and Reasonings.

that ‘in ‘‘thinking a thought’’. that is. Dign ga’s is simply the claim that only something like internal ‘sense a data’ can be the direct objects of cognition. how does this (non-conceptual.Is svasamvitti transcendental? E 89 sort of ‘perception’ insofar as all that exists is causally explicable mental events that have a particular sort of phenomenological content—there is still the question of how the different ‘aspects’ of these mental events are to be related to one another. to mean something—how. one has simply deferred the need to explain the subject–object relation. explain the success (the ‘objectivity’) of discursive thought. the need to establish such a relationship threatens to open up an infinite regress.g. two mental events occur. and between me and my thinking a thought’. ‘perceptual’) sense of our own mental states relate to the (conceptual. to the extent that one stresses (as. does not provide it with sure foundations such as it would otherwise lack. to ask this question is to ask how cognition could seem invariably perspectival (could seem invariably to be cognition of something). for even if this relation is thought to consist only in different ‘aspects’ (and not. between my thinking and its thought.35 . How. I think. the problem is that Dign ga still has to explain how the ‘subjective aspect’ a    (grahakakara) can seem. specifically. Indeed. And in either case. however. then. qua cognitions. in particular. what we have on either reading of Dign ga’s argument involves a the idea that Pippin identified with respect to the Fichtean reading of Kant’s doctrine: the idea.   E that is. then. that is. discursive) knowledge that we are presumably trying to explain?33 For the claim that even propositional cognitions are. when there is finally nothing other than it for cognition to be about. I think. and are consigned instead to the sort of solipsism that follows from taking subjective representations as the locus of truth or justification. it can (seem to) be about (what seems to be) the ‘objective aspect’    (grahyakara). Dign ga clearly means to) this aspect of (necessarily discursive) a judgments—to the extent one stresses. e.32 there is still a question concerning this putatively immediate acquaintance with these contents of our mental events. if Dign ga’s appeal to svasamvitti advances the claim that a E only mental events finally exist. does ‘whatever appears as the content’ of the cognition (yad abhasam prameyam) relate at once to the ‘cognition itself ’ (samvitti) and its ‘subjective aspect’ E    (grahakakara)?31 Another way. By explaining the cognitive process with reference only to mental events.34 Be that as it may. phenomenologically. or two twoplace relations. in a sense ‘non-conceptual’ does not advance our understanding of whatever judgment is expressed in the cognition in question—does not. that all that is finally certain about any judgment is the bare fact of its occurring to some subject—we end up forfeiting any meaningful claims to objectivity. the two mental events whose co-occurrence requires relating are the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ aspects of any such moment. and one’s non-conceptual awareness of the bare fact of having it. for example. Thus. If. we still have two terms here. Put in terms of intentionality. in ontologically distinct ‘substances’). while if the appeal to svasamvitti advances simply a representationalist epistemology. the two E mental events to be related are (to take the case of one’s entertaining a proposition) the conceptual thought one experiences oneself as having.

given that [cognition’s] being an object obtains due to [its] apprehension by apperception. that (in the grammatical terms characteristically favored in Sanskritic philosophical discourse) the act of ‘characterizing’ seemingly referred to by Dign ga’s use of the word svalaksana must involve an a E E ‘instrument’ (laksana) that is identical with the ‘object’ (laksya) characterized E E E thereby. where Candrakrti i   briefly rehearses the argument from the Madhyamakavatara. radically distinct from the kinds of things (like ‘defining characteristics’!) that can serve as the referents of word—requires. It is the normative presupposition of these relata that leads. But Dign ga’s understanding of svalaksanas as the uniquely particular objects of a E E perception—as. indeed. he will have shown the possibility of something ‘self-characterizing’. The basic structure of that critique. that svalaksanas neither be nor have any properties at all. ‘svalaksana’ means E E E (as indeed it conventionally means in Sanskrit) ‘defining characteristic’. to this anticipated move that Candrakrti thus responds: i Perhaps you think there exists [the faculty of] apperception (svasamvitti). on Candrakrti’s view. Candrakrti chiefly attacks the coherence of a i Dign ga’s categories of explanation—and more particularly. that is. is perhaps E  more clearly on display in the first chapter of the Prasannapada. if Dign ga can argue that there a obtains a sort of cognition whose subject is at the same time the object thereof. E [you maintain that]. whose Madhyamakavatara comprises an influential i critique of svasamvitti. that actions can invariably be analyzed on the model of semantically complete verbal constructions. then. the coherence of a Dign ga’s claim to offer a conventionally valid account of our epistemic practices. Thus.) subject. It is. as Candrakrti i i recognizes. object.e. incoherently posited something that is simply selfE E characterizing—on the grounds. though. for Candrakrti’s arguments in regard to ordinary usage turn i (as is eminently conventional in Sanskritic philosophical discourse) on the Sanskrit  grammarians’ karaka analysis of verbal constructions—on the view. In this context. then. Rather. which require the separate specification of (e. The presentation of this  argument in the Prasannapada is interesting because of the extent to which it does not have to do particularly with epistemology or ontology. agent. inexorably to a i a E E i consideration of svasamvitti. Candrakrti anticipates that Dign ga might adduce svasamvitti as i a E the unique example of precisely such a case—that is. etc. in the course of Candrakrti’s critique of Dign ga’s use of the term svalaksana. Hence. a while yet using words like svalaksana in something other than their ordinary sense.37 Candrakrti E E thus attacks Dign ga on the grounds that he has.90 Dan Arnold Candrakrti’s critique of svasamvitti i E Something precisely like the foregoing criticism was developed by Dign ga’s a   co-religionist Candrakrti. in his engagement  with Dign ga in the Prasannapada.38 To this we respond: based on an extensive refutation of apperception .36 E E Here. that is. with his peculiarly technical a understanding of svalaksana. the basic structure of the argument (i. [cognition] is included among warrantable objects.g. as simply concerning relations) is most clearly on display.

43 At the end of the full passage.’ That is. Candrakrti concludes: ‘ Thus. there is no [faculty of] i apperception. [the case that] the intentional object is one thing. though.42 and a finger-tip cannot be touched by that same finger-tip. of there being one example of a characteristic E E which is at the same time the thing characterized (laksya) thereby. E E Moreover. in just the same way. would also be an instance of consciousness and so subject to its conditions. E Candrakrti has argued that this idea opens an infinite regress—and in this way (as I i have already intimated). [and] since it is non-existent. the intentional object is one thing and the thought another. Candrakrti here i E   adds a lengthy quotation from the Ratnacudapariprccha Sutra.45 Against this. a [moment of] thought cannot be seen by that same thought. that the discussion of svasamvitti has in this context been chiefly E meant to address the possibility of there being something essentially selfcharacterizing—of there being. the one called svasamvitti] doesn’t E exist at all.46 As we will now see. that is. and the thought another? Or is that which is the intentional object precisely the [same as] the thought? If. and that one by apperception. for not only does this tell us something distinctive about characteristically Sanskritic philosophical discourse. this is . since—given that there’s no subject to be characterized (laksya). Is it. again. since self-consciousness. simply a statement of the extent to which i svasamvitti can be thought to entail the ‘iteration problem’—as indeed is the case E on either of the interpretations that I have said can be gleaned from Dign ga’s a elaboration of the doctrine. at least one example of a ‘characteristic’ (laksana) that is not the characteristic of anything (which is how Dign ga must a E E understand svalaksanas)—or rather. his point is much like the one that (Pippin noted) could be leveled at the Fichtean version of Kant: ‘If consciousness and self-consciousness are treated as separate aspects of any consciousness.  then how does thought perceive thought? But thought does not perceive thought.Is svasamvitti transcendental? E   in the Madhyamakavatara. this last [sort of] cognition [i. as some kind or episode i a E of cognition that will admit of the sort of agent–instrument–object analysis that can necessarily be given for anything involving a verb. Just as a sword-edge cannot be cut by that same sword-edge. It is important to note. 39 91   And. the extent to which Candrakrti’s version of that argument is informed particularly by Sanskritic i grammatical analyses. then there will obtain [its] being two thoughts (dvicittata). having thus referred the reader to his own Madhyamakavatara. Or if the intentional object itself is the thought. then. the crucial part of E which is this:  Thought arises when there is an intentional object (alambana). Candrakrti’s argument is. then. what is characterized by what?’44 This makes clear. first of all.e. owing E to the impossibility of [its] establishment by a separate svalaksana—there is no E 41 E possibility of the operation of a characteristic without a locus. then the arguments that showed why consciousness of X must be accompanied by consciousness of consciousness of X would all apply to the latter too. but it shows as well that Candrakrti takes Dign ga’s svasamvitti as an action—that is. at least as suggested by this version of Fichte. it doesn’t make sense to say a svalaksana E E is characterized40 by another svalaksana.

´ Santaraksita’s innovation: Svasamvitti as a defining characteristic. i. has different reasons E E for endorsing this characteristically Buddhist view that the word pramana really E denotes only the pramanaphala. with Dharmottara: chief among his revisions is his attempt to qualify Dharmakrti’s exhaustively causal account of perception.49 Nevertheless. 1992) that Dharmottara’s dates make him a likely respondent to ´ Santaraksita (725–788). in other words. 12th century) combines the thought of Dharmottara and ´ E Santaraksita. by doing which the goal is obtained.e. it is. E To begin. 740–800). not an action E E ´ In attempting to reconstruct Santaraksita’s distinctive reading of svasamvitti. this seems to be precisely what Dharmottara allows in the course of revising Dharmakrti’s account of perception. for even if we grant (with Krasser. The word prapaka has. a cognition still has some intentional    function ( prapakavyapara) necessarily to be performed. Dharmottara must i explain the outputs of perceptual cognition as being constitutively ‘unsuitable for association with discourse’. even given its arising [causally]  from some object to be intended ( prapya). Dharmottara. Dharmottara wants. As we saw. E And the capacity for intentionality is not based only on invariable concomitance with the [causally efficacious] object [that produced the cognition].92 Dan Arnold ´ precisely the point that Santaraksita denies with respect to svasamvitti as he E E understands it.50 My translation of Dharmottara’s argument as involving ‘intentionality’   (‘prapakatva’) is. first of all. though. i This emerges clearly when Dharmottara explains why (as for Dign ga and a E Dharmakrti before him) the word pramana ought to be understood as referring i principally to the cognitive outputs of our epistemic practices. conveying. the sense of ‘leading to. since. then. I think. to urge that useful knowledge consists in something more than being the E effect produced by specifiable causal factors—that. procuring’51—and surely it is not . And that [function] just is the [final stage of the cognitive process. Dign ga’s a point in pressing this claim was to urge that it is finally only ‘apperception’ E (svasamvitti) that counts as a pramana. warranted by a couple of points here. i that is. because of the exercise of which a cognition becomes intentional. for things like sprouts are not intentional even though [their production is] invariably concomitant with [causes] like seeds. in my view. any pramana worth the name must involve some judgment. the] result which is the reliable warrant.48 This is. His point is that only the result of the completed process of cognition represents the kind of ‘knowledge’ that can be thought E pragmatically to further human ends (and that should therefore count as ‘pramana’). as a purportedly faithful interpreter of Dharmakrti. it is E E useful to begin with the figure of Dharmottara (c. difficult for him to allow. Therefore. Thus: ˜ E  E It is intentional cognition that is a reliable warrant ( prapakam jnanam pramanam). of course. Dharmottara’s significant revisions in the E ´ trajectory of thought initiated by Dign ga47 that best make Santaraksita’s innovation a E intelligible—a point we can appreciate by seeing how the much later figure of  Moksakaragupta (fl.

rather.52 and his whole point here is that this criterion is to be distinguished particularly from those insentient phenomena that can be exhaustively described in causal terms.g. for whom any a i propositional content at all would seem to be excluded from the kind of ‘perception’ E that they admit as a pramana. is something like a ‘hallmark of the mental’. note that Dharmottara here invokes the idea as specifically distinctive of cognition or consciousness. again urging that the idea he has in mind will not E admit of an exhaustively causal description. that only ‘apperception’ (svasamvitti) is finally indubitable. [these are related] as being intended and intentional (vyavasthapyavyavasthapakabhavena). according to which there would be a contradiction within a single thing. that what distinguishes our epistemic practices as (in a word) epistemic is the fact of their involving something more than causally efficacious ‘impingements by the world on a possessor of sensory capacities’. Accordingly. This is particularly clear in the passage that I will now adduce as a bridge to ´ the view of Santaraksita. a E the point is the very different one that only judgments count as epistemically useful— E and hence. the relation between the thing known and the way we know    it (sadhyasadhanabhava) is not based on the relation of produced and producer. of course.Is svasamvitti transcendental? E 93 unreasonable to think that this semantic range overlaps with the idea of the directedness or ‘aboutness’ of cognition. then.53 As I have indicated. but rather in the recollection of a similarity between the currently sensed object. Dharmottara is at pains to make his point. as it was for Dign ga. the appearing sense datum ‘blue’) is causally related to the object perceived—and that the resultant judgment (‘that is blue’) consists no longer in the bare sensing of immediately present content. it is nevertheless in some sort of relation thereto. for the whole point of his counter-example (‘things like sprouts are not intentional even though their production is invariably concomitant with causes like seeds’) is that  whatever we mean by prapaka is (a) not to be understood as exhaustively explicable in causal terms. then.55    The challenge here. E On Dharmottara’s reading. only judgments count as ‘reliable warrants’ ( pramanas).54 And what he needs to argue is that while that judgment is not directly caused by the same thing that causes the bare perception. and (b) not to be understood as exemplified by insentient things like sprouts. What he would thus seem to be proposing. rather. Thus. and other things like it. and it is not clear that he finally succeeds at framing that point as a nonquestion-begging alternative to the view he is resisting. Thus. is to understand Dharmottara’s alternative terms   (vyavasthapya and vyavasthapaka) in such a way as to avoid attributing to him . The question is: what kind of relation? Dharmottara: In this case. Dharmottara tries to argue that the phenomenological content of a perception (e. Dharmottara here argues. More suggestively. though. in effect. the point in urging that the word pramana E primarily denotes the cognitive outputs ( pramanphala) of (say) perception is not. this is a difficult reading to reconcile with the basic commitments of the philosophical program initiated by Dign ga and Dharmakrti.

[it is explained] as being an intended and     intentional [relation] (vyavasthapyavyavasthapakabhavena)’. in order to meet precisely the kind of objection leveled at the doctrine of svasamvitti by Candrakrti: viz. then it must.’ because of the axiom that ‘a thought by which the qualification has not been comprehended does not engage the thing to be qualified’. i. according E  to the axiom here cited. and an intending (vyavasthapaka) subject. deploys Dharmottara’s formulation in a slightly different context— specifically. ‘it is cognized’ is the qualification. and the phrase borrowed from Dharmottara. jnana) consists in. too. an object is the thing to be qualified. If cognition were not intrinsically (svayam) understood in the form of this idea.56 Moksakaragupta. then. Thus. we can read him as again having in mind the relation between the object   intended (vyavasthapya). rather. E though. it is to be understood as characterizing (in the phrase he borrows from Dharmottara) the relation of ‘intended and intentional’. though. that is not how svasamvitti is to be understood. While the characteristically Sanskritic way of making it here is perhaps not  compellingly self-evident. that this doctrine leads to an infinite regress if it is i E understood as the claim that a cognition must. other than a ‘janya–janaka’ relation)—which is precisely why. E E rather. in order to count as such. by appeal to essentially grammatical presuppositions—specifically. then. he says. . though. the property of knower in relation to what is known is not explained as being an object–agent [relation]. that ´  Moksakaragupta approvingly quotes Santaraksita on svasamvitti—and the passage E E E . E finally.57 E  For Moksakaragupta. Moksakaragupta (in characteristically E Sanskritic fashion) argues this point.e. if ‘cognized’ and ‘cognized’ (jna ´ ˜ ˜ (jnata) just means ‘qualified by cognition’ (jnanena visesita). In this case. Whatever Dharmottara has in mind here. it is clear at least that Dharmottara means to argue that the relation between these two terms of a perception is to be understood as something other than a causal relation (something. otherwise. I think. The point is that this  relation does not—on Moksakaragupta’s reading as on Dharmottara’s—admit of E the kind of agent–action–object analysis that can be brought to bear. . That is (if I understand the passage correctly).94 Dan Arnold precisely the sort of contradiction he has here set out to avoid. already—‘intrinsically’ (svayam). where ‘cognized’ means ‘qualified by cognition’. would seem to turn simply on the definitions of ‘cognition’ (jnana) ˜ ta). on any action. presuppositions concerning the adjectival relation of ´ ‘qualification’ (visesana). ordinary E E expressions involving this qualification (‘an object is cognized’) would be unintelligible. to the key passage that he adduces in between the immediately foregoing passage. itself be the object of an additional cognition (one of the ‘svasamvitti’ type). then it would be impossible to say ‘an object is cognized. Whether or not he can do so. then how could it be understood that E an object is qualified by cognition?58 ˜ The point. Moksakaragupta’s point becomes more clear if we attend. Interestingly. though. he seems to  allow. Moksakaragupta says59— E E ´ ˜ be known what the ‘qualifier’ (visesana. if cognition were not apperceptive. he says: E E . It is here. the later thinker  Moksakaragupta suggestively adduces precisely the same formulation: ‘With respect E to cognition.

E it would have to admit of the kind of agent–instrument–object analysis that can (in the view of the Sanskrit grammarians) be given for any verbal construction. his statements on the subject really amount simply to his stipulating a definition. is that E ‘cognition is distinct from insentient forms. in chapter 23 of i E a a the Tattvasamgraha. Santaraksita (whom Moksakaragupta E E here quotes) takes svasamvitti to denote simply the ‘subjective’ aspect that defines E cognition as subjective: ‘Cognition is distinct from insentient forms. Thus. But how could there be cognition of something distinct. it is just this apperception which is its ´i [cognition’s] not being an insentient form’. rather.65 This claim then raises the question (made explicit by Kamalasla): ‘Then ´ why is it not accepted as being intentional?’66 Santaraksita answers: E Its [cognition’s] apperception [does not exist] as being in an action-agent relation.Is svasamvitti transcendental? E 95 that he thus adduces as authoritative does indeed represent a compelling rejoinder to i the standard objection to svasamvitti (hence. though. we have already seen Santaraksita say. to Candrakrti’s critique thereof).61 That is. the foregoing passage ´ ´i from Santaraksita is introduced by his commentator Kamalasla as answering the E following question: ‘But why do these various conceptions not apply as well in the ´ case of apperception?’64 The answer. because of its being of the nature of intellect. Santaraksita had argued that ‘cognition does not perceptually cognize E   (vijanati) any external object whatsoever’. it makes sense that there be apperception. we find that Santaraksita E E E does not tell us much (beyond the fact of its warranting the word svasamvitti) about E just what it might be in virtue of which this is so.62 ´ Thus. Indeed. having the nature of an object?68 The point of the first verse of this two-verse response appears to be that if svasamvitti referred to some action (to a particular kind of perception that can occur).67 whose form is partless. and a E  compelling clarification of the force of Moksakaragupta’s own grammatical argument E ´  against the agent–object–action analysis. naturally—being itself luminous. [it is admitted] as intrinsically (svayam)—that is. We do not. it simply refers to the constitutively subjective aspect that defines any E . which develops the argument that the characteristically Yog c ra E analysis of our epistemic situation represents the best account of our conventional intuitions. is that what he understands by svasamvitti is E (we might say) simply the ‘defining feature of cognition’.63 In this context. Thus. then. get ´ much help regarding this from consideration of the context in which Santaraksita E says this. I think. though it is important to note that this statement is ventured in the course of his ‘consideration of external objects’ (bahirarthaparksa)—that is. all he here says. Kamalasla elaborates: ‘For apperception  is not admitted as being intentional (grahaka). since the threefoldness of [cognition]. like the light in the atmoE ´i sphere’. does not make sense. but for ´ Santaraksita. Turning to Santaraksita’s text. it is just this  apperception (atmasamvitti)60 which is its [cognition’s] not being an insentient E form’. as I indicated at the beginning. ‘apperception’ (svasamvitti) refers simply to whatever it is in virtue of E ˜ which a cognition (vijnana) is constitutively to be distinguished from insentient ´ ´  objects (jadarupa).

or simply the claim that the direct objects of ´ cognition must therefore be sense data. Santaraksita has E suggested that svasamvitti is simply the criterion for individuating tokens of the type E ´ ‘cognition’. Santaraksita here deploys E the point in a way that is not obviously different from Dign ga’s appeal to a ´ svasamvitti. in fact. This is the force of my taking Santaraksita to have intuited that this is a E basically transcendental point.71 and it is not even clear that E this way of reading him is warranted by the two subsequent verses from his text that . It is therefore fitting that the perennially vexed exegetical issues that arise with respect to the trajectory of Buddhist thought centered on this claim concern the question of whether or not we are dealing with idealism. Particularly Santaraksita’s initial response. there is no way to stop a regress. And the problem is that if it is thought that intentional acts (‘cognitions’) count as such only in virtue of their being thus intended. Kantian insights are taken in a decidedly idealist direction. that svasamvitti denotes (as for Santaraksita) simply the E E defining feature of cognition (as opposed to insentient forms)—the hallmark. That is. though—his definition of E E svasamvitti. Santaraksita makes the a E additional claim that insofar as cognition is constitutively distinct from putatively material objects. for on the ‘Cartesian’ reading of Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception (the reading arguably advanced by Fichte). we ´ seem to be rather closer to the thought of Dign ga. With the second verse. perhaps.96 Dan Arnold cognition as a cognition—with this aspect being. that is. Thus. And the stronger claim that I am now reconstructing Santaraksita as E suggesting is that. particularly as that is elaborated by Strawson. distinguished from those that can be described in strictly causal terms. a that svasamvitti is (arguably as by Dign ga) thought to denote a special kind of E cognition that can occur (one whose object is other cognitions). That is. of the ‘mental’—we seem rather closer to the ‘logical condition’ reading of Kant’s ´ doctrine. To the extent. then. that is.70 for (per Strawson’s reconstruction of Kant) even E denying of cognitions that they are subjective requires first having individuated them—and it cannot be cognitions of which one denies this if they are not individuated as things that are subjective. themselves  ‘of the nature of intellect’ (bodharupa). as simply what it is in virtue of which cognition is distinct from E ‘insentient forms’—represents a potentially cogent rejoinder particularly to the iteration problem. it makes more sense (in terms. ´ But to the extent.69 Once again. it would seem. ´ Of course. however. it is a vexed question whether the claim thus made is that mental events are therefore all that exist. that is. Be that as it may. of ontological parsimony) for the direct objects of cognition to be of the same nature—to be. For it makes sense to say that a ‘defining characteristic’ is constitutively different from any act that may be defined thereby. Santaraksita does not argue in this way. it seems we would have to allow (in Sanskritic terms) that it is therefore an action that will admit of the standard analysis of a semantically complete verbal construction—that (in a more contemporary idiom) it is therefore an intentional act whose object must be specified. it is a condition of the possibility even simply of identifying what it is that we are talking about that it be identified under a ´ description such as Santaraksita’s. too. though. even one who would deny this turns out necessarily to ´ presuppose it.

In the context of this reading. yield some judgment— and the judgment that thus completes an episode of perceptual cognition E a i as a pramana is. reference to the idea of svasamvitti does open up a regress. Thus. Santaraksita’s concise and E underdeveloped statement on svasamvitti—his claim. . that is. But the verse quoted from Santaraksita by Moksakaragupta. insofar as Santaraksita has simply stated the criterion for individuating E tokens of the type cognition. E ´ That is. suppose (as Candrakrti does with respect to Dign ga) that svasamvitti must itself instantiate i a E an intentional structure. then. then. if ‘intentionality’ is the fact that E E ´ is picked out by Santaraksita’s definition.  And this is just the point that Moksakaragupta borrows in introducing E ´ antaraksita’s definition of svasamvitti—a definition that he adduces specifically to S E E head off precisely the kinds of objections thereto developed by Candrakrti. E that is. if they are to count as ‘reliable warrants’ ( pramana). for Dharmottara (and contra Dign ga and Dharmakrti). that is ´ presupposed by any act even of denying Santaraksita’s point). Thus. that is. as itself simply another kind of intentional cognition—but as intentionality itself—that is. that this denotes E simply ‘cognition’s not being an insentient form’—can be reconstructed as the claim that svasamvitti denotes not a particular type of (intentional) cognition. E E understood particularly in light of Dharmottara’s characteristic revision in the ´ trajectory of thought initiated by Dign ga. That is. as exemplifying a janya–janaka relation).72 The reason. as what it is in virtue of which any cognition could count as a token of that type. i i the reason that svasamvitti cannot (contra Candrakrti) be thought vulnerable to the E iteration problem is that it constitutively involves not causal. because Kant means to identify simply that fact in virtue of which any act could count as an act of representing in the first place—can apply as ´ well to Santaraksita’s idea of svasamvitti. recommends the view that Santaraksita a E can be taken to have understood svasamvitti not as exemplifying intentionality—not. but intentional ´ relations. it is to be   understood as exemplifying an intentional relation (vyavasthapya–vyavasthapaka bhavena). rather. but simply E the intentional structure that constitutively characterizes any token of the type ‘cognition’. therefore. the point to be made in response to E the M dhyamika critique of svasamvitti is the deceptively straightforward one that a E the fact of intentionality is not itself intentional—and hence. why Kant could coherently claim that ‘pure apperception’ cannot (as he said) ‘itself be accompanied by any further representation’—viz. And that something E like ‘intentionality’ is what is thus necessarily presupposed is what I have suggested by ´  considering Santaraksita in light of Dharmottara and Moksakaragupta. the point is simply that this criterion for thus individuating these is not individuated by itself—and we cannot. E E Dharmottara emphasized that even specifically perceptual cognitions ( pratyaksa) E E must. not to be understood as causally produced by the perceived sense datum (not to be understood. for svasamvitti is here to be understood simply as the E ‘intentionality’ that itself is displayed by any cognition (and hence.Is svasamvitti transcendental? E 97 ´  we considered.

as sympathetically understood by Williams) it is to be understood as arguing only that it is not an ultimately obtaining fact. I noted at the beginning of this essay.73 Garfield’s parenthetical distinction here is important. and. Indeed. E ´ cannot—coherently be thought to undermine Santaraksita’s understanding thereof. and Mipham and Williams are dead wrong (both hermeneutically and philosophically) .98 Dan Arnold Conclusion: Towards Inferentialism in Buddhist Philosophy? ´ Thus reconstructing Santaraksita’s view gives us. the conceptual tools to E i appreciate why the critique of svasamvitti advanced by Candrakrti does not—indeed. and in terms of its a philosophical adequacy—that is. we are. the debate among Tibetan interpreters of Indian Madhyamaka. a and that his usage therefore cannot make sense of ordinary usage—given which. I think. for the offering of any explanation will. Consider. I think.74 I have argued elsewhere75 that. considered along with the reconstruction I have here proposed. Jay Garfield has recently defended the characteristically venturesome claim that ‘Tsong khapa and [his disciple and commentator] rGyal tshab are dead right. intentional character of cognition. the constitutively subjective. What is a . as is particularly clear in chapter one of the  Prasannapada. as that has been studied (specifically with respect to this issue) by Paul Williams. in a position to better appreciate several points.’. . and the i extent to which the interpretation’s inferential relations with other things we believe are defensible. the matter is not as straightforward as it may initially seem. on this understanding. Much of that debate. cannot itself coherently be E thought to require explanation. Candrakrti’s whole procedure is simply to argue i that Dign ga’s approach depends on its peculiarly technical usage of ordinary terms. By thus reframing the debate on svasamvitti in terms suggested by the E alternative readings of Kant’s ‘transcendental unity of apperception’. Thus. as itself involving cognitive acts. . without denying its conventional utility. can help us clarify the issues at stake in such a way as to appreciate that Garfield’s claim is problematic. Dign ga cannot be thought to explain what he says he is explaining. it cannot be cognitions that are being explained. both in terms of the extent to which it can plausibly ´ claim to restate (in this case) the arguments of Candrakrti and Santideva. Otherwise. Candrakrti means to show that Dign ga’s philosophical project i a cannot coherently be said to give an account of our epistemic practices as they are conventionally described—and that it therefore cannot coherently be taken to be even conventionally valid. concerns the question of whether the kind of critique characteristically advanced by the M dhyamikas Candrakrti and a i ´ Santideva is to be understood (with Tibetan interpreters like Tsong-kha-pa) as refusing even the conventional validity of this idea—or whether (with Mipham. In terms of the first point. necessarily presuppose precisely the point it purports to explain: viz. Garfield is right that it is important to consider the cogency of an interpretation such as Mipham’s (as with any interpretation of philosophical texts) in terms both of its exegetical adequacy to the (M dhyamika) arguments interpreted. E This is because svasamvitti. for example.

my argument dovetails. We have seen. intentional acts. not conventionally valid. then. I E think.79 Sellars’s influential arguments against the ‘myth of the given’ can be understood as directed particularly against the kind of representationalist epistemologies in which Dign ga’s svasamvitti can be said to play a pivotal role. then. Here. then. in ways that basically follow Kant. then. with the broadly inferentialist case against empiricist foundationalism developed. This point would. it would seem that that we are entitled (with Garfield) to judge i interpreters such as Mipham to be exegetically inadequate to Candrakrti’s thought. Candrakrti nevertheless did not ‘mean’ for his critique thereof to apply i ´ as well to the version of the doctrine that would later be developed by Santaraksita— E but insofar as Candrakrti’s critique clearly does not touch the latter. is just our conventions. depend on the (historically problematic) claim that though he had only Dign ga’s understanding of svasamvitti a E before him.78 I would here like to conclude by briefly suggesting some additional philosophical points that recommend this reading of svasamvitti. and any technical redescription thereof is. as one thus takes Candrakrti to i refuse only the version of svasamvitti that is comparable to the ‘Cartesian’ version of E Kant’s doctrine. to be sure. a E we saw that the whole point in Dign ga’s taking svasamvitti as a type of ‘perception’ a E ( pratyaksa) is to advance the claim that we are immediately acquainted with the E contents of our own mental states—that we can know. In terms of the philosophical adequacy of this alternative reading of svasamvitti. That this is a defensible ´ reading of Santaraksita is suggested by the fact that Mipham makes some arguments E that are very close to this. without mastery of any prior concepts and without awareness of the inferential relations of this claim with any . Mipham clearly presupposed Santaraksita’s understanding thereof. then one cannot coherently deny its obtaining since one could only claim to deny this of cognitions if these have already been individuated as such—and it will not be cognitions of which this is denied if we have not thus individuated constitutively subjective. to claim E that Candrakrti did not mean to deny the conventional reality of svasamvitti insofar i E ´ as one takes something like Santaraksita’s view of it as the one that reflects our E conventional understanding—and insofar. following Dharmottara and Moksakaragupta. in other words. To the extent.Is svasamvitti transcendental? E 99 conventionally true. an argument to the effect that if svasamvitti picks out simply whatever it is in virtue of E which cognitions are to be distinguished from insentient objects (and I have  suggested. by Wilfrid Sellars and (more recently) Robert Brandom. that Dign ga’s category of svasamvitti is among the targets of a E Candrakrti’s critique. ipso facto. this nevertheless i remains a viable move.76 and we E have seen that Candrakrti’s critique does not have any purchase against that view— i ´ that (to put the same point less contentiously) it is not Santaraksita’s view of E 77 i svasamvitti that Candrakrti targets. i But this conclusion can nevertheless be qualified. Thus. It would be at least defensible. that the criterion thus E identified is intentionality). For in defending the view that svasamvitti should be retained as part of our conventionally valid account of the E ´ world. I E have already tried to develop (following Strawson on Kant) a sympathetic reading of the cogent transcendental argument to be made in its defense.

80 It is. As Kant put it. the empirical unity of apperception. and which besides is merely derived from the former under given conditions in concreto.81 This is. Recall. and if. svasamvitti is taken to identify something like the transcendental unity E of apperception. more significantly) to take this putatively foundational sort of cognition in such a way that it is finally incapable of being involved with what Kant considered to be objective judgments. upon which we are not here dwelling. though. has only subjective validity.85 If. to advance the claim that this is all that we can finally know with certainty.86 It is not necessarily the case.100 Dan Arnold other knowledge. that Kant emphasized that we are not warranted in drawing inferences from the transcendental unity of apperception to any empirically existent locus thereof—and that he criticized Descartes’s characteristic arguments in this regard as fallacious. simply through the necessary relation of the manifold of the intuition to the one ‘I think’. the case is very different—which is precisely as Kant tried to emphasize in developing his understanding of the transcendental unity of apperception. it is also (and a perhaps. merely as intuition in general. and so through the pure synthesis of understanding which is the a priori underlying ground of the empirical synthesis. an interestingly complex question whether the Kantian reading of svasamvitti here proposed is finally such that it can be deployed in order to support E constitutively Buddhist doctrines. in this connection. then. that this idea commits one to refusing the constitutively Buddhist . to the effect that recognizing the necessarily mediated character even of our awareness of our own mental states represents the most compelling basis for a refutation of solipsism. I think. in the end. familiar arguments to the effect that knowledge even of one’s own mental states necessarily presupposes the attribution of similar states to others—arguments. if it a i is held (with Dign ga and Dharmakrti) that one’s acquaintance with the contents of a i one’s mental states is constitutively non-conceptual. which contains a given manifold. one can ‘know’ the contents of one’s mind without any knowledge of the inferential relations of these with anything else that is known—then one is led inexorably to the epistemological solipsism that is finally entailed by ‘psychologistic’ conceptions of logic.84 This is clear if we consider. in turn. for example. (B140) It is.82 That is. that is. for we here have the virtually Cartesian argument that the only thing we cannot doubt is the fact that we have some experience. a useful way to characterize the problems that are widely understood to follow given the radically sharp distinction that Dign ga and Dharmakrti posit between perception and inference. then. in other words. But to understand svasamvitti thus is not only to hold a view that (as Candrakrti i E shows with respect to Dign ga) exemplifies the iteration problem. the pure form of intuition in time. fitting that Dign ga’s doctrine of svasamvitti has affinities with the ‘Cartesian’ reading of Kant’s a E ‘apperception’. is subject to the original unity of consciousness. at least that we have cognitions. and the point in taking svasamvitti E as finally the only really occurrent kind of perception is. further. however. it is held (also with these thinkers) that one’s acquaintance with one’s own mental states is therefore constitutively ‘unsuitable for association with discourse’83—that. Only the original unity is objectively valid.

perhaps. 1978. a [7] For these different terms. et passim). Section VI (Hume. [2] Also referred to as svasamvedana (from the same verbal root). it nevertheless provides a criterion for individuating instances of such (viz. 19–35). 2004. i a ´ ˜ It may. A108 (‘transcendental unity of apperception’). Book I. such a view might be philosophically preferable. cf. Garfield. respectively). Cf. though. may not presuppose that empirically applicable criteria of identity can be given for the locus of ‘synthesis’ (that. pp. who had only Dign ga in his sights. in other words. [6] This point cannot. Brandom. [5] Williams (1998. B157 (‘synthetic original unity of apperception’). pp. This would. E See also the review article by Kapstein (2000). [4] Or we might instead (with important implications) say sapient (cf. That is. E [3] Williams’s study (1998) then concerns the question—much debated among Tibetan interpreters of Indian Madhyamaka—of whether or not these M dhyamika critiques were a meant to show that svasamvitti is (not only not ultimately. 2004. undermine the view (surely held by Dign ga) that svasamvitti is to be reckoned a kind of perception a E (hence. persons consist in the kind of ‘selves’ that Buddhists are constitutively concerned to refute). Goodman. 2000.Is svasamvitti transcendental? 101 E  denial of an atman. as being from different perspectives)—and it is not clear to me particularly that the Yog c ra stream of Buddhist thought (in the a a ´ context of which Santaraksita makes the point we have here considered) is in a E position to do this. Nevertheless. count against Santideva—or at least against his commentator Prajnakaramati. that Kant’s point concerns the constitutively perspectival character of experience. though. Blumenthal (2004.87 we must ask what could possibly keep all these mental continua apart—what. as non-conceptual)—though as I will suggest in concluding. p. of course. such that they can represent distinct perspectives on the world? And what can they be perspectives on (what can they be about) if they alone exist? Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. pp. Notes [1] This paper was fostered partly by an exchange of scholarly work and correspondence with Jay Garfield and Charles Goodman. the emphasis is mine.) Thanks also to Rick Nance and Rajam Raghunathan for their comments on an earlier draft. ´ who specifically addresses Santaraksita’s understanding of svasamvitti. be held against Candrakrti. but) not even conventionally valid. [8] This and the preceding quote from Hume are from his Treatise of Human Nature. 2. To the extent. as it were. there may be a real problem in reconciling characteristically Buddhist commitments in this regard even with the idea that experience is constitutively perspectival. 252. then. note 70. and tries to show that it E E does not escape the M dhyamika critique. (Cf. 220–227). below. if the ‘intentionality’ picked on this understanding of svasamvitti is E understood as a particularly semantic phenomenon—as the kind of ‘aboutness’ that is particularly displayed in judgments—then we are talking about the distinguishing characteristic of a particularly conceptual sort of awareness. see Critique of Pure Reason. whom I thank for the stimulation. and that such continua are finally independent of the causally continuous series of physical events that are bodies. . 255. channels them. B132 (‘pure’ or ‘original apperception’). for to the extent that Buddhists want to assert that a ‘person’ is really just a causally continuous series of mental events.

. etc. Kant makes. this greatly complicates our picture of causally efficacious ‘svalaksanas’ E E as what precipitates perceptual cognitions. A344. ff. pp. It is in this way that Kant characteristically contrasts ‘receptivity’ (the mode of ‘intuition’) and ‘spontaneity’ (the mode of ‘thought’. not an intuition’. the ‘synthesis’ of manifold intuitions represents. . we will see that for Dign ga. the point at which deliberative freedom becomes possible—with its arguably being the whole point of his entire project to explain how freedom is possible in a scientifically describable world. the point in characterizing svasamvitti as a a E E species of ‘perception’ ( pratyaksa) is to say that the acquaintance we have with our own E mental states is constitutively immediate (that is. it must not be forgotten that the bare representation ‘‘I’’ in relation to all other representations (the collective unity of which it makes possible) is transcendental consciousness. Kant’s point finds expression in the 20th century in the work of Wilfrid Sellars. with the replacement of a subjectively epistemic desideratum (‘certainty’) by an arguably objective one. for Santaraksita. 143–4) helpful statement ´ that. Sellars and Brandom. p. Whether this representation is clear (empirical consciousness) or obscure. A117n: ‘. Thus. Cf. Kant urges precisely the opposite in thus arguing that the content of the transcendental unity of apperception is ‘a thought.. [13] B157. cf.102 Dan Arnold [9] In that case. and that whether it is clear or obscure is of no importance. a [14] Cf. or ‘judgment’). . [15] And in fact. does not here concern us. namely an imprint for the arisal of an image of a patch of blue. [11] That is. by introducing ‘the apparently insignificant but actually fateful change whereby the ego becomes a substantia cogitans . [17] Among other things. in this regard. . . pp. or even whether it ever actually occurs. But the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge is necessarily conditioned by relation to this apperception as a faculty. Cf. Consider. Kant’s doctrine is arguably the precursor to the idea of intentionality as that is developed by thinkers as diverse as Brentano and Husserl. and as such they are still formed E and restricted by their causes. 80. there is an equivocation between ‘I’ as grammatical subject (‘I think’). it does arise from a causally functioning internal particular. More on this point when we turn to Dign ga. 24). for it is difficult to retain the view that perceptual cognitions alone are causally explicable if svalaksanas are really something like ‘sense-data’— E E given which. The arisal of images in perception is thus not an arbitrary affair (and to that degree it is . [12] Specifically. Kant’s would be a basically Cartesian argument—though as we will note. Brandom’s comment that the course of philosophy changed significantly with the ‘replacement of concern with Cartesian certainty by concern with Kantian necessity’ (2000. Even though an image of a patch of blue does not arise from a group of causally functioning external blue particulars. ‘intuition’ (or ‘perception’) involves (to invoke McDowell’s phrase again) simply causally efficacious ‘impingements by the world on a possessor of sensory capacities’. and ‘I’ as naming an ontologically distinct substance (‘therefore I am’). this is as it must be if language is to be possible at all. . [10] That is. whose influential critique of the ‘myth of the given’ (1963. inter alia. pp. for Kant. p. [16] Indeed.’ In this and the preceding passage. the grounds for distinguishing these from inferential cognitions become less obvious. where Kant emphasizes that ‘[s]ince the proposition ‘‘I think’’ (taken problematically) contains the form of each and every judgment of the understanding and accompanies all categories as their vehicle. and [the] point of departure for inferences according to the principle of causality. 163–164)—that is. non-conceptual. 127–196) develops the point that even our acquaintance with our own mental states necessarily presupposes mastery of some concepts. he clearly meant to emphasize that he did not intend for it to be read thus. ‘understanding’. a point that would decisively cut particularly against Dign ga’s characteristically foundationalist deployment of a svasamvitti. Husserl similarly argues that Descartes’s argument is problematic precisely insofar as he compromises its essentially transcendental character—specifically.’ (1995. non-discursive). it is evident that the inferences from it admit only of a transcendental employment of the understanding’ (A348). sense data ‘are still causally produced. Sara McClintock’s (2003.

1. E   E Pramanasamuccaya 1. p. . Tibetan at ibid. p. for (as he argues there) any account of external objects necessarily presupposes some version of minimal part atomism. For this reason. ibid. p. in terms with striking affinities with Dign ga: ‘. ptasankhadijnanasya-abhrantatvam ca  i ´ E  ˜  E E E ˜  katham na bhavet? ucyate: vikalpajnanam api svatmani nirvikalpam eva / ghat o ‘yam ity anena E [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . Of all the types of knowledge of the objects of experience. ‘metaphorically’). inner perception is not merely the only kind of perception which is immediately evident. 183: de ltar rnam pa du ma rig pa’i shes pa nye bar blangs pa de lta de ltar tshad ma dang gzhal bya nyid du nye bar ’dogs pa yin te .. . p. with Hattori. p. it is really the only perception in the strict sense of the word . Dharmakrti makes the same point at Nyayabindu 1.’ (Singh (1985. moments of inferential awareness presumably could similarly be described as caused by ‘an imprint for the arisal’ of such—in which case. p.55. Hattori’s    translation. Brentano (1973.’  As much is conceded by Moksakaragupta. inner perception alone possesses this characteristic. p. ’bras bur gyur ba’i shes pa de nyid yul gyi rnam pa can du skyes pa dang. p. besides the fact that it has a special object. and how would the [mistaken] cognition of a yellow conch shell not be non-erroneous? We reply: even conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with respect to itself. infallible selfevidence. 183: shes pa ni gnyis su snang bar skyes te. 183: yul gyi snang ba nyid de ’di’i / tshad ma . cognition must be explicable without a i E reference to any external objects. 28). cit. op. p. the translation is that of Hattori. p. Mental phenomena. 91) makes almost precisely the same point. 1968. Tibetan at Hattori..10. who anticipates an objection to this effect: ‘But if E all cognitions are [instances of the kind of] perception that is apperception. Moreover... note 1.’ But of course.. may be described as the only phenomena of which perception in the strict sense of the word is possible. it is rooted in karmic imprints and ignorance. snang ba de gnyis la gang rang rig pa de ni ’bras bur ’gyur ro. p. perception would seem to lose its distinctive status. 28. rang gi snang ba dang yul gyi snang ba’o. Tibetan at Hattori. cf.. 29. above. here. op.67. inner a perception possesses another distinguishing characteristic: its immediate. Hayes (1988. p. bya ba dang bcas par rtog pa de nye bar blangs nas. . but [it does] not ˜   E [conceptualize] itself. . p. 29. .. 81). Tibetan at Hattori. ibid.  Indeed. 107) is: yad abhasam E     E E prameyam tat pramanaphalate punah / grahakakarasamvitt trayam natah pr thak kr tam. tshad ma nyid du ’dogs pa ste. strictly speaking. rather. anyone who in good faith has taken them for what they seem to be is being misled by the manner in which the phenomena are connected. ibid. 97) is: savyaparaprattatvat pramanam i phalam eva sat. which Dign ga argues cannot coherently be adduced to a explain our cognition of macro-objects. Hattori’s translation. ibid. 1971. 136). must be taken to have other mental events as its direct objects. cit. cf. My translation is adapted from that of Hattori (ibid. [then] how would conceptual cognitions like ‘‘this is a jar’’ not be non-conceptual. i E E E E Hattori’s translation.. note 18. ibid. bya ba med par yang yin no. cf. therefore. . 183: ’di la phyi rol pa rnams kyi bzhin du tshad ma las ’bras bu don gzhan du gyur ba ni med kyi.. [such cognition] conceptualizes the external object with [propositions like] ‘‘this is a jar’’. 29 (though I have rendered the Tibetan equivalent of upacaryate as ‘figuratively’ rather than. Cf. so-called external perception is not perception.20: arthasarupyam i E asya pramanam (Malvania.    E E The Sanskrit (as given in Hattori. as Dign ga argues in his Alambanaparksa. [for] the phenomena of the so-called external perception cannot be proved true and real even by means of indirect demonstration. . Therefore. 24): nanu sarvajnananam svasamvedanapratyaksatve E E ˜ ghat o ‘yam ityadivikalpajnanasya nirvikalpakatvam. The Sanskrit (per Hattori. . note 1. E At Pramanasamuccaya 1. . Consequently.Is svasamvitti transcendental? 103 E real). p. .. when we say that mental phenomena are those which are apprehended by means of inner perception. we say that their perception is immediately evident. p.

It should be clear. Frege] considers the judgment component of empirical knowledge as the real source or manifestation of its objectivity. 107). anatmavada) that is ultimately advanced by this epistemology. . which thus stands in contrast to the eminently private and subjective status of ‘representations’. this is (more straightforwardly) because if. Moksakaragupta tried to address (cf. insofar as there is finally only the fact of occurrent cognitions having various phenomenological aspects. I have developed my understanding of Candrakrti’s critique of Dign ga at length in Arnold i a (forthcoming. Alex Wayman has long opposed the ‘idealist’ reading of this and cognate schools. This seems to be the view of Hattori. pp. for to undertake to say what things are like independent of reason. cf. Wayman a a a writes: ‘. inter alia. for being ‘absolutely existent’ and uniquely ‘particular’ can just as well describe sensations as external objects. It is helpful. must itself be the object of a further such awareness. of course. above. ‘It is in this way’. and of all construction of mental pictures out of memories of earlier sensations. note 23.. would be as much as to judge without judging. . 1959. ‘that I understand objective to mean what is independent of our sensation. in the latter (representationalist) case. E  above)—though it seems that Moksakaragupta’s expression simply states what the problem is. 1.. Frege therefore said. Wolfgang Carl’s characterization (1994. . then either one of these aspects.  This is the question that. chs 6–7). a conceptual thought counts as a cognition only in virtue of one’s non-conceptual awareness of the fact of having it. cf. . intuition and imagination. in order to count as such. [Thus. then there can be no empirical knowledge without something subjective . Frege’s notion of ‘objectivity’ as consisting only in the kind of intersubjective availability that is a hallmark of language. E rather than resolving the tension.) This conclusion surely follows from E E Dign ga’s initial contention that our various cognitive instruments ( pramana) are only a ‘figuratively’ so called. 192–193) of Frege’s critique of the empiricist version of ‘psychologism’: ‘If empirical knowledge includes or is even based on perceptual knowledge and if sense perception requires sensations. nor themselves possessed of any properties—for in either case. na tv atmanam. in this regard.65. And this claim. my terms are those of Pramanasamuccaya 1. rather they call it a a  svalaksana (the ‘‘particular’’) and even sometimes describe it as paramartha-sat (‘‘absolute E E existence’’). sect. though. in order to count as such. In an article specifically addressing the relations between Dign ga and the Yog c ra school. Dign ga’s is the view that what is a finally warranted by the kind of cognition that is uniquely in contact with really existent phenomena is only the conclusion that there are sensations—which does not also warrant the inferential belief that these must be the states of a ‘self ’. but not what is independent of reason. Cf. . or to wash the fur without wetting it’ (Frege. I have noted. . for example. E p. to underscore the reality of this object of direct perception ( pratyaksa)’ (1979. it would a a hardly be possible to find its position attractive to the Buddhist logicians who were to follow. note 28. that none of these points self-evidently counts in favor of Wayman’s conclusions.’ On the former (idealist) reading. in understanding Dign ga’s argument.67 (p. of the basically Buddhist point (viz. 65). to remain mindful of what is finally at a   stake for him—to remain mindful. that they are not themselves the properties of anything. we would be left with something that is analytically . Consider. say. as a separable component of cognition. for the concession that ‘even conceptual cognition is nonconceptual with respect to itself ’ does not make clear what is gained by identifying that fact. since Dign ga and his successors . 26). this is because if any cognition. That is. can be thought itself to have two such aspects. that is. his notes1.104 Dan Arnold [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37]    bahyam eva-artham vikalpayati. . do not deny an external object. then it can be thought that the latter awareness. if indeed the Yog c ra school denies the reality of an external object. thus. E Here. is neutral with respect to the question of what might finally exist in the world. must have separable ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ aspects.10.

e. This familiar reference to a clearly subjective/agentive sort of svalaksana then requires that Dign ga must (if his concepts are to a E E track ordinary usage) allow that svalaksana might also be understood as the ‘instrument’ of E E this action (‘characterizing’). Consider. Na tenaivangulyagrena E E ´ ´ _ tadevangulyagram sakyate sprast um. Tadyathapi E E E E E ´          nama taya-evasidharaya saivasidhara na sakyate chettum. E E E E ´ ´  tat katham cittam cittam samanupasyati? Na ca cittam cittam samanupasyati. the conclusion of Candrakrti’s critique as that is developed in the i   Madhyamakavatara: ‘ Thus. To the extent. tadabhavat kim kena laksyate? E E E E More generally.72–78 (La Vallee Poussin 1970a.  ´ La Vallee Poussin (1970b. La Vallee Poussin (1970a: i   pp. and an infinite regress looms—which is ´ what svasamvitti has here been posited to halt. the possibility being addressed is that of there being any action whose subject and object are identical. E ´ La Vallee Poussin (1970b. because of an object)—the one thus pointed out as what is characterized. p. p.Is svasamvitti transcendental? 105 E reducible. Cf. that Yog c ra doctrine typically a a  claims that the paratantra-svabhava alone is really existent—and that the ‘perfected’ nature  ( parinispanna-svabhava) consists simply in the paratantra without the ‘imagined’ E ( parikalpita) fact of its being distinct from one’s subjective perspective thereon— Candrakrti wants to know: ‘If the paratantra-svabhava exists as empty of both subject i  ´ and object.10–62. 172)]: de’i phyir rang rig yod pa ma yin na / khyod kyi gzhan dbang gang gis ’dzin par ’gyur / byed po las dang bya ba gcig min pas / de nyid kyis de ’dzin par rigs ma yin // ). 63. Tatah E E   E     svasamvittya grahanat karmatayam satyam asty eva prameyantarbhava iti. p.. 61. Candrakrti’s critique in the i   Madhyamakavatara is framed particularly against the characteristically Yog c ra doctrine a a  of the ‘three natures’ (trisvabhava). p. If the latter. 168–169). is then to count as E E knowable. then. Cf.’ (6. pp. if svasamvitti doesn’t exist. tada dvicittata bhavisyati. too. Arnold (2003). 166–174). Ucyate: vistarena E E E     Madhyamakavatare svasamvittinisedhat. E ´   The reference is to Madhyamakavatara 6. La Vallee Poussin (1970b.72 [La Vallee Poussin (1970a. Api ca. too. tad api nama jnanam svalaksanavyatirekenasiddher E E E E    ´    i asambhaval laksyabhave nirasrayalaksanapravr ttyasambhavat sarvatha nastti kutah E E E E E E E svasamvittih? E E ´ Candrakrti adduces the same image in the Madhyamakavatara. The claim.76 [La Vallee Poussin (1970a. in addition to Arnold (forthcoming). where Dign ga’s project requires that sense data be (as the only ‘ultimately a existent’ things) irreducible. cf. Recall that Candrakrti is here arguing from the view according to which the verbal noun i ‘laksana’ (‘characterizing’) is to be analyzed as an action. As throughout his engagement with Dign ga. pp. then who is aware of its existence?’ (6. and one is not warrantable—the one by which something is ´ characterized’ (kimcit svalaksanam prameyam yal laksyata ity evam vyapadisyate. 61. 62] svalaksanantarena laksyate tad E E E E E E E E E ˜ E    api svasamvittya iti na yujyate. Tat kim anyad E    alambanam anyac cittam.8: Tad evam nasti svasamvittis.5–63. Candrakrti had just argued that only a svalaksana that is understood as an object i E E  (karmasadhanam) could be knowable ( prameyam). it must at the same time be an object. it’s not suitable to hold that [a cognition] ´ grasps itself. svalaksanam [ p. 166)]: gal [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] . Evam eva na tenaiva cittena tad eva cittam sakyam E EE E E drast um. cittam utpadyate. as exemplified by the expression vijnanasvalaksana (which Candrakrti i E E would read as ‘the defining characteristic of cognition’). EE E    Ibid. and action aren’t the same.3–9). pp. kimcid E E E E E E E E ´ aprameyam yal laksyate ’neneti vyapadisyata iti). Atha yad evalambanam tad eva cittam. then who perceives your paratantra? E Since the agent. then. atha yad evalambanam tad eva cittam? Yadi tavad anyad E E E     alambanam anyac cittam. As reflected in this verse.2): Alambane sati. that a svalaksana is E E E E ‘characterized’ is chiefly to be understood as the claim that it is the object undergoing this action (the laksya)—and that it therefore requires some instrument of this action. Candrakrti then argues that this requirement cannot be reconciled with ordinary a i ˜ uses of the word. 62.3): Atha manyase svasamvittir asti. This absurdly entails that there are two kinds of svalaksana: E E ‘one unique particular is warrantable (i. object.

then. note 101)]. hence.106 Dan Arnold [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] te bzung med ’dzin pa nyid bral zhing / gnyis gyis stong pa’i gzhan dbang dngos yod na / ’di yi yod par gang gis shes par ’gyur /. I am borrowing Dharmakrti’s gloss of kalpana (‘conception’) to state precisely what it i   is that ‘perception’ ( pratyaksa) is without.’). it refers to whatever is an ‘effector of acquisition’. E   E    yena kr tenarthah prapito bhavati. 19) can rightly say: ‘Mental items that cannot be identified by ‘‘that’’-clauses at all have no claim to being beliefs or other propositional attitudes’. in order for a pramana to count as usefully furthering human aims (which is E  how Dharmakrti defines pramana at Nyayabindu 1. see i Dreyfus (1997. cf. 1971. E That is. and it is precisely a continuum that is to be intended by perception. Here. Thus. 1130). p. recognize—that . E .19): prapakam jnanam pramanam / prapanasaktis E        _    ca na kevalad arthavinabhavitvad bhavati / bjadyavinabhavino ‘py ankurader aprapakatvat / i ´ ´ ˜          tasmad prapyad arthad utpattav apy asya jnanasyasti kascidavasyakartavyah prapakavyaparo. above. Dharmottara’s point. yadanust hanat prapakam E E EE E ˜ bhavati jnanam. 82.ap. I think. 71): pratyaksasya hi ksana eko grahyah. ‘It is a single moment that is to be apprehended by perception. E E E ´   ksanasya prapayitum asakyatvat]. E E See Malvania (1971. 47): E     abhilapasamsargayogyapratibhasaprattih kalpana (‘Kalpana is a thought whose appearance is i E E suitable for association with discourse’). . p.     Malvania (1971. santana eva ca pratyaksasya prapanyah. Nyayabindu 1. 1970a. 168). Nyayabindu 1. it must (as I would put it) i be expressible as the object of some propositional attitude. while it is a continuum [of such moments] that is to be ascertained by a conviction based on perception. . adhyavaseyas tu E E E E ´    Ei pratyaksabalotpannena niscayena samtana eva. The argument is circular and therefore invalid’ [adapted from Huntington (1989. This is. Apte (1992. Cf. pp.7–9): na ca-atra janyajanakabhavanibandhanah sadhyasadhanabhavo. for on the view that the only i E E ‘real’ existents capable of precipitating a perceptual cognition are radically fleeting moments. ‘to obtain’. cf. among the points of Kant’s contention that ‘It must be possible for the ‘‘I think’’ to accompany all my representations’. ˜ E   E  E ´ ´ Malvania (1971. On Dharmottara as having significantly revised the commitments of Dharmakrti.5 (Malvania. . 79) (ad. 354–364). More basically. while at the same time memory is used as the proof of reflexive awareness. It is to this extent that Lynne Rudder Baker (1987. p. note 31.   The main thing that Candrakrti’s critique in the Madhyamakavatara adds that is not in the i  Prasannapada is a refutation of the memory argument for svasamvitti (which brings to mind E s Kant’s argument contra Hume in the first edition of the Critique). indeed. p. since a [single] moment cannot be  intended’ [Malvania (1971. . p. E     yena-ekasmin vastuni virodhah syat. p. basically a question of the same form as the one that (I indicated above) could be put to Dign ga if his account of svasamvitti is read a E as a statement of idealism. p.3–6). 82. The acuteness of the problem for Dharmottara becomes clear especially in the context of Dharmakrti’s commitment to ‘momentariness’ (ksanikatva).  even to take (what are really) different moments in a certain causal ‘continuum’ (samtana) E to be moments of the same thing is already in a sense to have made a ‘judgment’—and E Dharmottara wants to allow that the latter is to be reckoned as part of the ‘pramana’. p.73 (La Vallee Poussin. See the bhaEya on ´   Madhyamakavatara 6. Candrakrti’s conclusion is that i this argument is circular: ‘Apperception is taken as the proof of memory. Which is the role that ‘intentionality’ plays for Brentano and Husserl. p. The criterion ‘suitable for association with discourse’ could. be taken as basically co-extensive with the criterion ‘identifiable by ‘that’-clauses’ (note 48. sa eva ca pramanaphalam. is that mental items not identifiable by ‘that’-clauses E have no claim to being pramanas.1).) This is. some ‘that’-clause (‘I believe— feel. api tu vyavasthapyavyavasthapakabhavena. 244. I think. sense. above). the word is the agentive form of the verbal root pffiffiffi  pra.

1989. above. but E to what is ‘intrinsically cognition’. Interestingly.: na hi grahakabhavena-atmasamvedanam abhipretam. That is. nabhastalavarttyalokavat. Again. given that Dign ga’s own text is in turn dependent on i E a ´  this) similar to an argument from Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika. 477): vijanati na ca jnanam bahyam artham   E E ˜cana. This term. I think.3–8).’) are those denied in Tattvasamgraha 1998a–b. too. is similar not only to the basic argument of Dign ga’s a  Alambanaparksa. as it is glossed in the ´ Abhidharmakosa). E E E E E E E ´ ´ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ E  E jnata iti visesanam. these verses are also translated by o Blumenthal. experienced ‘things’) is itself mental. p. 1997.21–25): Api ca yadi jnanam svasamvedanam na syat. 194–197. Tatha hy artho visesyah.8–10): atra-ucyate: na karmakartr bhavena vedyavedakatvam jnane E E    varnyate / kim tarhi vyavasthapyavhavasthapakabhavena.    [68] Tattvasamgraha 2000–2001 (Shastri. p.Is svasamvitti transcendental? 107 E ˜  [56] Singh (1985. ‘as being the grasper of E something to be grasped’). 237). E     [66] Ibid. p. Cf.prefix in the word svasamvitti. it follows that the more ontologically parsimonious account has it that ´  what is created by karma (viz. or ‘cognition itself ’. ´ [62] The passages here considered are repeated by Santaraksita in the context of the same E  E  discussion in the Madhyamakalamkara. the foregoing statement from Moksakaragupta is immediately preceded by an E imagined interlocutor’s appeal to precisely the kinds of examples adduced by Candrakrti— i such as that a sword cannot cut itself. The latter is a standard image for talking about svasamvitti. or a metaphysical one (that mental events are all that exist)—though surely the former has a better claim to reflecting a ‘conventional’ sense of the matter.3. 23. 478): vijnanam jadarupebhyo vyavr ttam upajayate / E      iyam evatmasamvittir asya ya-ajadarupata //. it is an exegetically complex question whether the ‘characteristically Yog c ra analysis’ that is here advanced concerns a chiefly epistemological a a point (that sense data are the only direct objects of cognition). or with a   E  different kind of aspect’ (anirbhasam sanirbhasam anyanirbhasam eva ca). cognizer. 23. the axiom here cited comes from i  E E E ´ Mm msaka discourse—in particular. and cognition’). ‘‘nagrhtavisesana buddhir visesye vartate’’ iti nyayat. thus. Singh (1985. etc. 478): nanu ca-atmasamvedane ‘py ete ‘nirbhasadayo vikalpah kasman E na-avataranti? The various conceptions in question (‘without aspect. p. 1997. for Moksakaragupta’s quotation of this. pp. see E E E Singh (1985. p. E E  [57] Indeed. the word E svasamvitti on this understanding might be said to refer not to ‘self-reflexive cognition’. ´i [67] Kamalasla glosses: vedyavedakavittibhedena (‘as separate cognized. Jnanam cet svayam na bodharupena prattam. Ichig . 478): kriyakarakabhavena na svasamvittir asya E E ´       tu / ekasya-anamsarupasya trairupyanupapattitah // tad asya bodharupatvad yuktam tavad E E E  svavedanam / parasya tv artharupasya tena samvedanam katham //. 23. 23. E [69] The argument of verse 2001. p. Tattvasamgraha verses 1999–2001 occur also as E  E  Madhyamakalamkara 16–18 (cf. p. 1997. to a gloss of the sva. p. but also (fittingly. ˜ E   ˜ [58] Singh (1985. [60] The term is used interchangeably with the more common svasamvitti (and is used here. Vimsatika 7: ‘It’s E imagined [on the account Vasubandhu is refusing] that the dispositions [originating] from . will admit of the range of readings mentioned in note 59. no E doubt. ˜ E E   E  [61] Tattvasamgraha 1999 (Shastri. Thus. kathan    E  [64] Shastri (1997. jnato jnanena visesita iti.13–14).     [65] Ibid. there is no kind of cognition that cognizes an external E object—not ‘one without a phenomenological aspect.33. and (b) karma is an essentially mental function (cetana. then. i aE i E   [59] In what amounts. tada ‘‘jnato ‘rtha’’ iti E E ´ ´ ´    E i    durghat ah syat. p. for metrical reasons). from Sabara’s commentary on Mmamsa Sutra 1. or with such an aspect. tat i E E E E E E ´ ˜ katham jnanena visesito ‘rthah pratyatam. kim tarhi svayam prakr tya E E E E  ´   prakasatmataya. 2004. Cf.: Atha kasmad grahyagrahakabhavena na-isyate? (literally. Vasubandhu had argued E that insofar as it is admitted that (a) the karma of sentient beings creates the experienced  world. Thus. ˜ E  [63] Tattvasamgraha 1998c–d (Shastri.

yadi punar E ´      dosabhayal lokaprasiddho ‘pi sabdarthah parityajyate. it is interesting that Prajnakaramati here as much as allows that the most ´ promising way to refute Santaraksita’s point is simply to refuse that people conventionally E ´ understand svasamvitti as reflected in Santaraksita’s stipulated definition. this point is harder to make with respect to the similar critique by Santideva. ch. then you will be in contradiction with ´     everybody’ [Vaidya (1988. Cf. [i. et passim). above). above. 196). rather. having quoted Tattvasamgraha 1999–2000 (Vaidya. why [is their result] not accepted [as being] ´   precisely where the dispositions are?’ [Levi (1925. 23 of the Tattvasamgraha precisely to ‘cognition’. p. But if.)—though of course. see Williams (1998. E ˜ Thus. it is S  E E argue that this account represents the best expression of our conventional epistemic ´ practices. pp. even the meaning E of words that is familiar to everyone is abandoned. Arnold (forthcoming. for Candrakrti. E Williams (1998. Prajnakaramati’s most significant point E ´ is simply to deny that Santaraksita’s definition reflects the conventional use of the word. To be sure. This is why. p. See.108 Dan Arnold [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] karma are here. and note 70. ´ Again. to the extent (as Candrakrti would emphasize) that Santaraksita can i E plausibly claim to have identified the way in which people conventionally understand ´ antaraksita’s aim in ch. 253–269). 91. and why we must instead allow that we invariably perceive things under a description. 6). ´ ˜ whose commentator Prajnakaramati clearly knows the thought of Santaraksita. p. though. rather. i a ´ urges between ‘defining characteristics’ (svalaksana) and adjectival ‘qualification’ (visesana). Cf. what makes something an example of that kind in the first place. svasamvedanasiddhih . tada lokata eva badha bhavato E E ˜ bhavisyati). pp.e. As I noted at the beginning (note 6. See. and (for Mipham’s   interpretation particularly of Tattvasamgraha 1999 / Madhyamakalamkara 16) Doctor (2004. Santaraksita could not succeed a E  in demonstrating that svasamvitti obtains ultimately (Ibid. however. because of fearing faults [in your argument]. at least. Prajnakaramati says E ´ antideva’s critique (which is precisely like that of Candrakrti): ‘The refutation was of S  i explained having understood the meaning of the word that is well known in ordinary usage. . and that I am not therefore speaking here of the interpretation that I know him to have upheld. and of course. 222–223). 5): karmano vasanany atra phalam E   E  E E anyatra kalpyate / tatraiva nesyate yatra vasana kim nu karanam //]. as well. . The difference here is similar to the difference that Candrakrti. 91–96). Williams (1998): passim. 91–96). p. though. since that is the meaning expressed by the word svasamvedana. See.] as [involving] separate action and agent. 196): kriyakarakabhedena vyavaharaprasiddham sabdartham E ´ s E    adhigamya duEanam uktam. svasamvedanasabdasya tadarthabhidhayakatvat. See especially Williams (1998. 1988. E E E E That is. Garfield (2004. pp. E E Though his Tibetan interpreter Mipham does. a ‘defining characteristic’ is. Blumenthal (2004.: ittham api na paramarthatah E E ´ antaraksita did not claim thus to establish it. notes 27 and 29. chs 6–7). while any instance of the latter qualifies some particular example of the kind in question. Santideva’s commentator ˜ Prajnakaramati had (unlike Candrakrti) a vantage point in history that allowed him to i explain how the characteristically M dhyamika critique of svasamvitti might apply as well to a E ´ ˜ Santaraksita’s understanding thereof. 85–106). it is incoherent to suppose (as Dign ga does) i a that unique particulars could be bare even of their own defining characteristics. 2). In this regard. McDowell (1998). . in his critique of Dign ga. above. Williams (1998. E ´ This is true. E E pp. and their result somewhere else. S  E E E ˜ Be that as it may. It should be said here that I am not a scholar of Mipham. Prajnakaramati then proceeds to argue (in characteristically E ´ M dhyamika fashion) that even if this definition is admitted. I am speaking simply in terms of the different possibilities that seem to me to be available for finessing the exegetical issues in question. Arnold (forthcoming. p. pp. Cf.

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