LEIBNIZ

THE MONADOLOGY,
LATTA

ETC.

HENRY FROWDE,

M.A.

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

LONDON, EDINBURGH, AND NEW YORK
7

LEIBNIZ

THE MONADOLOGY
AND

OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS

TRANSLATED
WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES
BY

ROBERT LATTA,

M.A., D.PHIL. (EniN.

LECTURER IN LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1898

&
=2558

PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
BY HORACK HART, M.A. PRINTER TO THH UNIVERSITY

PREFACE
IN this country Leibniz has received less attention than any other of the Mr. Merz great philosophers. has given, in a small volume, a outline
general

of

thought and work, Professor Sorley has written for the Encyclopaedia Britannica a remark ably clear, but brief, account of his philosophy, and
s

Leibniz

large correspondence, criticism, magazine articles, and other liscursive writings, and it is only in recent years that this material has been made fully available by the
publication of Gerhardt s edition. etailed account of Leibniz s

there are American translations of the Nouveaux Essais and of some of his That philosophical papers. is very nearly the whole of English writing about him. Yet few philosophical systems stand so much in need of exposition as that of Leibniz. His theories have to be extracted from seven volumes of

een published in English, and accordingly I have ten a very full Introduction to this book, with illustrative foot-notes, consisting mainly of transla tions from Leibniz himself.

No complete and philosophy has hitherto

The endeavour
addogy
illmann
in

of

the

book
I

is

to

make

the

clear to students.

cannot agree with
little

treating

it

as

of

importance.

A 3

which I have endeavoured to place the philosophy of Leibniz in relation to the systems which came before and after his. places the Principles of Nature is most akin to the Monadology. of Glasgow. but on re-consideration it seemed better to translate several short different papers a translation illustrating Theodicee. and finally Part IV of the Introduction. as being the centre of the book. Nourisson. and Stein. farthest away If I which from it. but I may mention as specially helpful to me the works of Boutroux. Dillmann. the other translations. then the My indebtedness to authors is so great and varied that I cannot acknowledge it in detail. way in might venture to suggest to the student the which the book should be read. publish passages along with the Monadology. . is that The only disadvantage it of this and of Grace.V1 PREFACE Leibniz himself expressly intended it to be a com pact and ordered statement of the views he had he There is evidence of this in his corre spondence and in the fact that he annotated the Monadology with references to passages in the Theodicee. afterwards Parts II and III of the Introduction! the Monadology again (with the notes). My original of these intention was to parts of Leibniz s system and explaining its growth. Thus the Monadology. in duction. I would first recommend him to read Part I of the Intro Monadology (without the notes). Nolen. while the other writings follow in arrangement chronological order. is printed first of the translations (although in date it is last). My thanks are due to Professor Jones. expounded in many somewhat desultory scattered papers the only and in book his published.

HFAVS. It ought perhaps also to be mentioned that Parts II and III of the Introduction were accepted by the University of Edinburgh as a thesis tor the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. I numerous improvements Leibnix the in place of have adopted the spelling traditional Leibnit/. r8q8 . AM&amp. and to whom it owes as well in form as in matter. the because former was invariably used by Leibniz in signing his own name.gt. ROBERT LATTA. who read the whole hook. for much valuable suggestion and criticism: and I am moiv than grateful to Professor Ritchie.PREFACE Vll who read the Introduction in manuscript. June. Andrews. UNIVERSITY OF ST. of St. both in manuscript and in proof.

.

Leibniz J B. General Principles Leibniz .TABLE OF CONTENTS I . Formation of the Idea of Space Meaning of Cause .UiK PREFACE INTRODUCTION Part -r. I2O 121 Knowledge Ethics 137 . Leibniz and Bayle on in the Monad G. Matter .. the multiplicity 272 274 . Organism Theory . E. C. 86 108 . - Proof of the Existence of God .. Leibniz s Logic his relation to Leibniz . C.Mathematics in relation . II.. : V I. . ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE 281 . Philosophy of III. D. Historical and Critical Estimate of the Phi losophy of Leibniz . Self-Consciousness of . Detailed Statement of the Philosophy of 74 74 s Leibniz A. V &quot. Explanation of the Pre-established Harmony B. - D. 200 202 - .. 1 5 APPENDIX A. Kant on 204 206 208 2I 5 THE MONADOLOGY APPENDIX F. Life and Works of Leibniz of the .. to his Philosophy .IV.

. 33-7 Growth of Leibniz s Theories regarding Force and Motion NEW ESSAYS ON THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING duction PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND OF GRACE . . 329 THIRD EXPLANATION OF THE APPENDIX NEW SYSTEM .. 297 319 ... Intro 351 355 405 425 INDEX .. .. .. .. ON THE ULTIMATE ORIGINATION OF THINGS I.X CONTENTS SYSTEM OF THE NATURE OF SUBSTANCES AND OF THE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THEM X NEW EXPLANATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM APPENDIX H... . ... .331 . . . On the Elements of Extension . .

G.ABBEEVIATIONS E. I859-75Mollat. Gerhardt. E. Werke von Leibniz. G. Berlin and Halle. ed. Leibnitii opera omnia. gallica. Berlin. Leipzig. 1875-90. Guil. herausgegebeii von C. ger- manica omnia. 1840. 1850-63. par A. . Die philosophischen Schrijten von G. Foucher de Careil. Foucher de d apres Careil. 1864-77. Math. la Hanover. von Dr. nunc primum collecta. studio Ludovici Dutens. les manuscrits originaux. Leibnifii opera philosophica quae extant latina. J. Berlin. Erdmaun. Leibniz. Georg Mollat. 1885. Gerhardt. Leibnizcns mathematische Schriften. God. Klopp. W. Dutens. herausgegeben von Onno Klopp. herausgegebeii von C. J. G. publie es pour premiere fois Paris. (Euvres de Leibniz. J. Die Geneva. Itechtsphilosophisches aus Leibnizens utiyednickten Schriften. G. 1768.

.

and his father was Leibniz was of Leipzig. Philosophy in the University of age when his father died and. finding of him. and having . a Professor of Saxony and Prussia. thrown open to him. passed sity studies. two years before the close of the Thirty Years War. but his ancestors for several generations had lived in . LEIBNIZ.INTRODUCTION PART I. ON June 21. supple and menting his scanty Latin by a study of the pictures As an indirect result of this some judicious guessing. she also away before he had completed his Univer . he managed to get a tolerable idea of its contents. some good in all (as was ever characteristic 1 . of which he could not thoroughly understand a single line. precocity. found in the house an illustrated copy of Livy. appear to have The boys of Leipzig in Leibniz s time been brought up on the picture-book of Comenius and the little Catechism (Luther s) but the soul of Leibniz already sought stronger meat. THE LIFE AND WORKS OF His Boyhood. though only six years in his early years he had the training of a pious mother. 1 It is characteristic of me to hold opposition (Widerlegen] as of B . 1646. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was His family was of Bohemian origin born at Leipzig. his father s library was and he wandered at will from volume to volume.

e. I took the greatest pleasure in the Predicaments (i. a little At fifteen years of age Leibniz new book comes it . and in verse I found great pleasure and ease but as soon as I began to . to and Cicero. 425 Before I reached the school-class in which Logic was taught I was deep in the historians and for I had begun to read poets the historians almost as soon as I was able to read at all. the Categories) which came before me as a muster-roll of all the things in the world.2 INTKODUCTION Providence or Fortune seemed to say to him. exposition (Darlegeri) as of much account and when into my hands I look for what I can learn not for what I can criticize in it. learn Logic I found myself greatly excited by the division and order of thoughts which I perceived therein. Wagner (E. the historians of the Koman Empire. and finally enough but uncon sciously his mind was coloured by their style and thought. Of these he tells us that he understood at first nothing. Tolle. then gradually something. Wagner b G. vii. I often asked myself and my schoolfellows to which Predicament and also to which sub-class this or that Schreiben an thing might belong. vii. and about the same time he became account. 516) . . Quintilian. (E. Seneca. it the rule of his life and a useful purpose in acting (in verbis claritas. 1 Pliny. 526). I immediately began to notice so far as a boy of thirteen could. 420 a G. Herodotus. Plato. G. as men walking in the sun have their faces browned without knowing it. and I turned to &quot. of all sorts to nnd the best and most detailed form of this list. Schreiben an G. by his fellows a prodigy of learning and ability. and the Fathers of the Church. became a student at the University of Leipzig. Xenophon. that there must be a great deal in it. 1 from . in rebus Thus at fourteen years of age he was counted usus). (1696. and already his reading of Logic and intense determination towards clearness of thought and speech had led him to ideas which were afterwards developed into the of a logical ever to seek clearness in speaking means suggestion Calculus and an Alphabet of Concepts as to the discovery of truth ! . it is significant for the philosophy to come that he turned first to the Ancients.Logics&quot. lege . and under their inspiration he made . University Life.

ostensibly 011 the ground of his youth. was immediately . a graduation thesis with the significant title De principio individui. he walked works of : Leipzig. Although his favourite teacher at Leipzig was Jacob Thomasius. calls how. deeply versed in ancient and scholastic learning. his scholastic studies. 702 a . and But he was no reading-machine. beginning with Bacon s De Augmentis Sclent iarum. He thought for himself he read in order up And thus in after-years he re to weigh and consider. and going. in which he de fended the Nominalist position. where the mathematician. Intending to devote him of law. as he himself tells us. called the Rosenthal. refused to give him the Doctorate in Law but his thesis. aside.LIFE AND WORKS 3 acquainted with the works of some of the modern philo sophers. B 2 . iii. Erhard Weigel. where he declined the offer of a professorship. At this time also. G. Rcmond (1714) (E. transmuted. 1 Lettre a M. was lecturing on the Law of Nature. or what we should now call Jurisprudence in general. when he was fifteen years of age. in later years. however. Thus ended his connexion with Leipzig. De casibus perplcxis in jure. and he still continued his study of history. accepted by the University of Altdorf (near Niirnberg). the private reading of Leibniz at first prevailed in his thought and he turned from the older philosophies to mechanism and mathe The Substantial Forms were for the time set matics. to not he should retain in his philo consider whether or of the Scholastics Substantial Forms sophy the alone in a wood near . he went for a year (in 1663) self to the profession to Jena. bore fruit in the earliest of published writings. a Professor of Philosophy. Galileo. 606). Doubtless the influence Weigel tended to confirm Leibniz s mathematical In bent. he read with interest the Cardan and Campanella and the suggestions of a better philosophy in Kepler. of 1666 the University of Leipzig. all wound Descartes. His to reappear.

The Elector of Mainz. &quot. in the course of which his extensive curiosity led him to become a member of a secret society of the Eosicrucians. says Leibniz. In Niirnberg. at that time the capital of a small republic. who was dreaming of world-wide sway. one of the most find l celebrated diplomatists of his age. from which life seemed almost to have The gone. ere there was time to rebuild. which had suffered less than many other German States from the Thirty Years War. his This was the beginning of career as a Germany the whole empire was threatened by the immense power of Louis XIV. where he wrote and pub lished a paper on legal education. who had formerly been minister to the Elector and Archbishop of Mainz. and.INTRODUCTION Boineburg and the Elector of Mainz. which was the means of introducing him to the archbishop. which he produced as evidence of his fitness for membership. country was (as one might hardly say) peopled with : &quot. and if war were to break out again (as might be expected when Sweden was irritated arid France threatening) there was every reason to fear that this seed of a new population would be destroyed and a great part little children. The long war had left diplomatist. Leibniz went to Frankfort. the most powerful man in the With Empire. whose ruins were still smoking he was one of those who had laboured most to bring back rest to the land. who were trying to find the s philosopher stone. in whose service Boineburg he remained for some time. The society was so impressed that it immediately ap pointed him to be its secretary. in ruins. Leibniz spent a year. Fontenelle tells us that Leibniz s method of gaining admission to the society was to collect from books on alchemy all the most obscure phrases he could and to make of them an unintelligible letter. The chief gain to Leibniz appears to have been that through this society he became acquainted with Baron von Boineburg. had seen the miseries of Germany. .

ln de I &jypte was published by It shows a most remarkable knowledge regarding Careil vol v and so clever are the state of the country and its possibilities. quoted by Foucher de Carcil. with in 1671) that he found to Arnauld (expressed in a letter view of material it impossible to reconcile the Cartesian extension either with the Roman substance as pure He accord Catholic or with the Lutheran doctrine. Paris and London. but it pointed also to an ecclesiastical the Elector reunion. a letter of Leibniz. formed the purpose of discovering a theory of ingly should thus substance which should satisfy both. yet to be realized.LIFE AND WORKS 5 Tinof poor Germany left almost without inhabitant had secured peace and some measure treaty of Westphalia of political unity. in which he Leibniz prepared a most elaborate work the advantages that of France suggested to the King tried to con would arise from a conquest of Egypt. and more worthy of a Christian king vince him that it was to harass a poor to fight the unchristian Turks than little 1 people like the Dutch 2 . From T vol. At the suggestion of Boineburg he made a special study the result of the doctrine of transubstantiation. intercourse with the necessity of drawing into safe channels felt strongly and accordingly the military ambitions of Louis XIV. which to men like seemed the best means of re of Mainz and V Boineburg and happiness storing power for the reunion of to the country. Negotiations Roman Catholics and Protestants had thus early in his diplomatic already been begun. and took part in the work of conciliation career Leibniz which in various ways he continued throughout his life. and the reconciliation of the become a philosophical basis for Churches. ^^^y^Qmgu^ Foucher do . This book was never iv. which led Presently events occurred Mainz and gave him new him away from and of opportunities of study Leibniz and his friends learned men.

and extract roots. says Leibniz himself. during which he devoted himself to the study of the higher mathematics and to the discussion of the Cartesian philosophy. . But in the time of Louis XIV Paris was the intellectual centre of Europe. he tells us 3 had no taste for metaphysics/ but Leibniz learned from him mathematical methods and principles which influenced the growth of his philo sophy. and to write for the world was to write in French. plans which it language for philosophical to have borrowed been shown to be a suggests that Napoleon was at one time supposed its ideas for his campaign. Though thifhas mistake. his writing so much in French. divide. . but he remained in Paris for and he now met also Huygens and MaleAt this time. as the reaS n wh ^ J remained som me^Fran anc rder * P erfect myself in mathematics. While. advice was not taken. For instance. but Leibniz in 1672 went by invitation to Paris to His explain his project. in his of Nizolius (1670). 456). four years. branche.INTRODUCTION actually presented to King Louis. iv. advo and other works. law and history were my forte V But intercourse with Huygens and the study of the mathematical works of Pascal intro duced him to the problems of modern mathematics. iii. and which set him on the to the of Arnauld. He had already corresponded with l way the Differential Calculus. He it And in greatly probably led to essay on the philosophical style cated the use of the German had already. superior to that of Pascal. but in order to make them contribute to the advancement of piety Lettre of &quot. and time to these sciences not on their own gave my * account. The merit ^ V\ ^ Frederic (undated) (Klopp. other ways the residence of Leibniz in Paris affected his life-work. therefore. subtract. while his own machine could also multiply. 450) Kilmansegg (I716 ) Catena. Huygens. vented a calculating At discovery this time also Leibniz in which could only add and machine. the coincidence between the auDuc Jean an author in mathematics cannot be * disputed.

he is only author. Apart from Oldenburg. 85): I constantly maintain among my friends. to Hobbes. Parisian period Calculus.cf Leibniz s Letter to Hobbes (1670) (G. Leibniz seems to have had most intercourse during this visit to London was Robert Boyle. the famous physicist but there is no reason to suppose that Leibniz gained much from his stay in England.his political theories. came the discovery of the Differential which was practically accomplished by Leibniz - 1 See Tonnies in PhOos. to which he received no answer.LIFE AND WORKS 7 Leibniz has rightly been called the father of to a very small extent a philosophy. 557-573. Hobbes was still living there. that I know no writer who has philosophized more than you. with which to a great extent he found himself in agreement. it that is not sur meet. vol. excepting a man of such excellent genius as . and he had also been greatly the philosophy of Hobbes. German German The of 1673. but left it unfinished. Accordingly Society. more clearly. It has recently been maintained that. up to the year 1670. xxiii. and. pp. As a fitting conclusion of his after his return to Paris. and after to the wards he began another letter. although In 1670 he wrote a letter to. prising that they did not man with whom . the study of the higher except an additional stimulus to which he carried on more systematically mathematics. four years residence visit to broken by a brief lish learning of Leibniz in Paris was England in the early months Leibniz had already sought the favour of Eng by dedicating one of his publications interested in Royal Society. not even accurately. especially as regards he was strongly opposed questions of physics. Leibniz was more deeply affected by Hobbes than by new time V When any other of the leading spirits of the Leibniz visited London. Monatslufte. i. but he was eighty-five years of age. who was Hobbes was the secretary of the Royal in his dotage. and more elegantly Descartes himself. with the help of God. I will always publicly maintain also. and some years earlier Leibniz had heard from his countryman Olden burg.

first INTRODUCTION There can be no doubt that Newton was in possession of a similar method made known only some itself. Leibniz had given much attention to the of f last Shortly before Leibniz went to London. m m insufficiency his ench l Classics) - iij - . He at of the results of the method made to show that Leibniz : worth to be belongs the glory of priority. To Newton and not the method as early as 1665. with the result that he became more more convinced of its I In 1 . Boineburg died and the visit to London was unexpectedly brought to an end March. Hence an attempt has beeri got hints of the method during his first visit to England. whatever that may be while the form which Leibniz gave to the Cal culus.8 in 1676. Newton signs used. But there is nothing to confirm this. At . and a full consideration makes it much more likely that each discovered the method indepen Leibniz published his account of the dently. Descartes philosophy and the Cartesians. 1673. and that he was thus more or less a plagiarist of Newton. Leibniz was now without an official position and during the next few years he made various unsucisful attempts to obtain a diplomatic appointment. have come universally employed in preference to those of \ Visit to Spinoza. he somewhat reluctantly accepted the post librarian to the Duke of Brunswick at Hanover. method in 84 Newton s was first published in 1693. the names and the which he .676. by the death of the Archbishop Mainz. which to be his home during the remainder of his life ring the earlier years of his residence in Paris.

if the master vantage. dam (G. do not doubt in the least that believes that the is too limited. Finally. author will thence gain a great ad as he promises to show at length. Spinoza who was at that time in acute critic and correspondent. Towards the end of 1675 Leibniz became acquainted with the s young Bohemian nobleman. p. as an intimate acquain theology. He adds that he is most skilled in physics.). . to pursue the perfection of the intellect. found In unpublished system of Spinoza. and also in metaphysical studies concerning God and the he concludes that he is most the master s worthy of having communicated to him for he writings. his physics is too hasty. remarkably learned and also free most skilled in various from the vulgar prejudices of sciences. 321 (Letters. a medical friend of Spinoza in Amster November. and in 1676 he translated the Phacdo and the Theactetus. ii. H. but by the out any impulse sole dictate of reason. in the same year written Paris. and who had earlier some of the remarkable letters on account of which his name will always be associated with that of Spinoza Leibniz had already (in 1671) written to Spinoza from Frankfort about a question of optics but now Tschirn hausen seems to have aroused in him the hope that a solution of the difficulties of Cartesianism might be 1 . 61 sqq. soul. if you will first give your permission. . his geometry his metaphysics has all these faults combined (G. Tschirnhausen. But if not. reckons nothing better or more useful. 328). be so pleased. p. vol. i. 1675. 1 Letters. With him he has formed founded on the fact that Leibniz labours with him tance. 204 . Schuller) wrote to him: Von Tschirnhausen further mentions that he has found at Paris a man called in the Leibniz. and errors. Van Vloten and Land. and. Bruder. Von Tschirnhausen and speaks with says that he is most practised in ethics. vol. ii. derived from the passions. 57 sqq. in fact.LIFE AND WORKS 9 deavour after a more satisfactory metaphysic he after wards made a considerable study of Plato.

where he seems to have spent some time. Letter 70 Van Vloten and Land. if he is not mistaken Spinoza. de Spinoza . when he left Pans in October. laws of motion Descartes- most leading axioms. before entrusting his writings to him. and he n ^ slightest men- V would also like to have Tschirnhausen s Leibniz. after a longer and opinion of fcpmoza -s shyness had probably no other effect than to whet the curiosity of Leibniz. had permission to make a copy of the jave 3finitions. 1 His recent study of Plato had impressed ii. in ^master reply recollects having some correspondence with Leibniz but Leibniz was at that time a counsellor at Frankfort and Spinoza would like to know. Toucher de Careil. and propositions \ What at this time dissatisfied Leibniz was Spinoza s treatment of Causes. They had many conversations together regarding philosophical matters. in November. At last. and accordingly. Leibniz obtained an inter view with Spinoza at the Hague. of which Leibniz has hardly any record except the remark that Spinoza not quite see the . Refutation inedite p.gt. he went for a week to London (where he met for the first time Newton s friend Collins) and then crossed to Amsterdam. more intimate acquaintance. he was surprised when I began to show that they were inconsistent with the equality of cause and effect 2 The of : .INTRODUCTION he will honourably keep them concealed as he has promised as in fact he has not made the Leibniz also highly values the Theologicop 7. 235 r&amp. 1 clearly defects of persistence Leibniz ultimately induced Spinoza to show him the MS. on the subject of which he once wrote a letter. vol. 1676. of the Ethics (or at least a portion of and he seems even to it). eagerly reading and criticizing every writing of Spinoza s which Schuller could give him. where he stayed four weeks with Schuller. 7 lohtical Treatise. what he is doing in France.

from his mind that we hear of him bringing from the Catacombs a piece of glass. in what has been grandiloquently called the Systema Theoloyicum. Residence in Hanover. reddened with the blood of martyrs. when he had settled At essential points of his own doctrine of substance. 1 . (a Koman with Pellisson and he had begun a correspondence convert from Protes tantism) in the hope of finding some means of Church reunion. a statement of dogma to which both sides could but inevitably it would express the real belief of neither. He was offered the librarianship of the Vatican and other posts with a vista of preferment but conversion was so up for a in . Utinam ex ! nostris essct ! draw up assent . in order to submit it to chemical analysis far ! He actually attempted this. though Leibniz was more or less occupied with these discussions throughout the rest of his life. This correspondence led to others. of which the most important was one with Bossuet. had already been made to convert him to the Catholic faith. Efforts Leibniz arrived at Hanover in the last days of 1676. But. and a brief visit of his to Rome 1689 seems to have caused a flutter of excitement. Bossuet s attitude in the discussion was only too distinguished well expressed in his exclamation regarding Leibniz : Would that he were one of us And Leibniz was too much of a scientific inquirer He might to unite two opposed religious communions. The endeavour to convert Leibniz was not given very long time. his general hostility to Spinoza s system did not itself until But show the ten years later. this time Leibniz was still seeking light in every quarter.LIFE AND WORKS II Leibniz with the value of teleological considerations. and he was already seeking in that direction an escape from the imperfections of the mechanical view of things. Correspondence and Growth of his System. nothing practical came of them. written in 1686.

but something individual sire forces.ideas I (the Specimen Dijnamicum) in the Leipzig Acta Eruditorum. issatisfaction with Spinoza s position. by Spinoza s conclusions. .INTRODUCTION was during the early years of his residence Hanover that Leibniz worked out the leading ideas It in of system. he turned with renewed interest to Plato with the result that towards 1680 he had reached the conception of substance as essentially active It is possible also force. Disappointed in his hope of finding in Spinoza a saviour from the errors of Descartes. the recogni tion that the force constituting a substance is not a universal world-principle. however. which took place between 1686 and 1690. was not published as a whole until 1846 and the learned world was first made aware that Leibniz had worked out a philosophical system of his own by two papers which he published in i6 95 _one .lt. Leibniz uses the term monad for the first time in 1697. self-preserving To he seems this position little later. namely. to have attained about 1684 or a through a return to the consideration of Aristotle and the Peripatetic Schools. This correspondence. that. and the other (the Systeme Nouveau) in the French Journal des Savants. in spite of his general 1 . whose views he had set aside in his boyhood. harmony) were first stated in the correspondence with Arnauld. in his conviction of the insufficiency of any merely mechanical / interpretation of things. The main. nearly twenty-five years before. and being the rather confirmed. One further step was needed to complete the theory. &amp. simple * ^ rnSa Of all the ancient philosophers I find Plato the most satis- meta ^ sics * ^urguet (1714) (E. his philosophy (such as his conception of substance and his pre-established of &amp. some ideas of Spinoza s (such as that of the conatus or that there are substances which tendency of things) may have contributed to the develop ment of his new view of substance.lt.

205. to Locke. But before it was to call forth a rejoinder from Locke. 6ia). and be had a kind of superficial metaphysics which he knew how to make the most of. changed and changed again. Having thus definitely fixed his philosophical system \ leading principles. Locke s Essay was questions that are connected a few years afterwards Leibniz published in 1690. according as new light and it is only about twelve years since I found what satisfies me. After writing some other papers on psychological and book was I have In 1697 he writes to Thomas Burnet of Kemnay came to me. Ltttre a liemond S E. of himself are set in contrast throughout of Locke and a discussion dealing with the subjects of Locke s Essay This book was evidently intended chapter by chapter. allowed the thoughts independently of another person s. Nom-caux Essais to remain in manuscript. a long dialogue. says that he was not surprised at Locke s disdain. for the most part by and criticism. iii. Some of these criticisms were in 1697 sent who treated them with contempt. and the psychological carefully the theory of knowledge with it. and read it. The difference between our principles was somewhat and what I maintained seemed to him to be paradox. so that the first published by Kaspe in 1765.) capable of demonstration. writing (as was his custom) notes and comments as he read. Leibniz (in 1714. and made no In 1703 Leibniz wrote the Nouveaux Essais sur in which the views I Entcndement humain. and that he now preferred to publish his . but lie did not know the method of mathematicians. reply-.LIFE The AND WORKS the l T3 Nouveaux Essais and TJieodicee. and Leibniz. and arrived at demonstrations regarding matters which did not seem 1 : (G. G. too great. ready for publication Locke died (in 1704) refutations of saying that he greatly disliked publishing dead authors. 703 b . nearly fifty years after Leibniz s death. Leibniz detail. He adds that Locke had subtlety and dexterity. iii. Hitherto ho and having published its gradually expounded it in means of correspondence had given most attention to ontological or purely meta But now he began to consider more physical problems. .

in connexion with which he ransacked the libraries of and Italy. and its purpose was to develop the principles of its author s philosophy in maintaining. published his one great work of his which was printed in his lifetime. during the last two years of his life with Bourguet on the chief doctrines of his philosophy with special reference to biological questions. Besides the exposition of his system which he gives in such elaborate ks as the Nouveaux Essais and the Thtodicte. It was written. Further. not continuously. During the greater his residence at Hanover he worked at a history intellectual many much and Brunswick. and to vindicate the ways of God to man. among many other epi stolary discussions. The writing of the Theodicee was suggested to Leibniz as the result of conversations with Queen Sophia Charlotte of Prussia. in 1710. and who encouraged him in his plans for the founding of an Academy at Berlin. Leibniz met the objections of critics and suggested new applications t his principles in the course of a varied correspondence n questions of mathematics and physics in their con nexion with metaphysics.es and more than twenty years (from 1694 to for ten years (1706-1716) he discussed with Bosses the possibility of combining his philosophy of substance with the presuppositions of the doctrine of transubstantiation. He Germany suggested the development of mining in . &amp. The amazing expression in : of the house of travelled activity of Leibniz found other writings. the harmony of faith and reason. Closing Years. who also induced him to write various other philo sophical papers. Leibniz. the srnouffli for 1716). but at intervals. and with Clarke on space and time and the Divine attributes. he corresponded with John Theodicee. mention may be made of Leibniz s correspondence. in a very diffuse and discursive style.gt. Founding of Academies.T4 INTRODUCTION epistemological subjects. against the arguments of lerre Bayle.

St. Petersburg. (the 1 Successor of the duke who had originally appointed Leibniz to the librarianship at Hanover. and the peaceful plans of Leibniz were set aside. and no other was founded until long after Leibniz s death. But. shown in his displeasure on account of the latter s residence in Vienna. and he was for whom also strongly supported by Prince Eugene of Savoy. who (according to Frederick the Great) was an Academy in himself. George I succeeded to the English crown in 1714. The happiest years of the life of Leibniz were now The Duke of Brunswick died in 1698. The Berlin Academy had a struggling existence. of which he himself was appointed the first president Afterwards he made long-continued but un (1700). Leibniz s position became intolerable. wars. whom he expected to become the Solon of Russia. successful attempts to induce the King of Poland. Charles VI favoured his projects for the founding of learned societies. above all. the Principes de la Nature et de la But Europe was full of wars and rumours of Grace). and the Emperor to found similar Academies at He had inter Dresden. succeeded after much effort in obtaining the foundation of an Academy at Berlin. the Czar. where he tried to bring about an alliance between the Czar and the Emperor. our George I. the two Electresses. as Gerhardt maintains. Sophia and Sophia Charlotte mother and the sister of George I). the interest of Leibniz in these later years lay in the endeavour to extend science and With this end in view. he. civilization throughout Europe. and in connexion with this he studied and wrote on geological subjects and on the currency. 1 Leibniz seems gradually to have lost favour with his son and successor. and over. were encouraged by some of Newton s friends. . in 1714 he wrote the Monadologie (or. After the death of his friends.LIFE AND WORKS 15 the Harz Mountains. views with Peter the Great. and Vienna. and he lived for some time in Vienna. and his prejudices against Leibniz.

he died during an attack of gout. of Leibniz s death. with a difficulty in pronouncing gutturals. through Leibniz. but not one of them came. delivered before the Parisian Academy. the ornament of his No minister of religion was present for country/ . of London took no notice of his death but a year afterwards Fontenelle commemorated it in a fine . John Ker of Kersland 1 . Leibniz was parcu-s deorum cultor et infrequens. whom the people of the Court to his funeral. He was broadshouldered and always walked with his head bent for ward. dark-brown hair. with a somewhat As and small but very sharp but had no difficulty in reading. leader of the Scottish Cameronians. and his legs eyes. In the Political Memoir containing Ker s proposals there is a curious of religious considerations and the medley hope of gain.1 6 INTRODUCTION he met in England. He was near-sighted. oration. and Eckhart alone followed his master s body to the grave. large head. and on November 14. His lungs were not strong. 272 sqq. a presented project for privateer ing and buccaneering against the Spaniards in the Pacific. An acquaintance of Leibniz. says that he was buried more like a robber than. He lived on political and when his resources in England were failing him he to the Jimporor. who had come to Hanover on the very day . invited all . Cf. believer in The Berlin Academy and the Koyal Society nothing). and his absence from church was counted to him for irreligion. His secretary. and he had a thin but clear voice. Eckhart tells us that he was of middle height. what he really was. Leibniz thought of leaving Hanover but in later years his health had been some what broken. and himself wrote a very small hand. so that he looked like a man with a humped back. intrigue. Personal Characteristics. to the personal characteristics of Leibniz. Eckhart. iv. Toucher de Careil. so that from priests and people he got the nickname Lovenix (the Low German for Glaiibet niclits. 1716. 1 A . In figure he was slim rather than stout.

C . he called * AND WORKS 17 His household arrangements (if they can had arrangements ) were very irregular. ready-made knowledge He often his own.). He no fixed hours for meals. 1 Encyclopedic. one considers oneself and compares one s talents with those of a Leibniz. disliking physicians. says Diderot. For he is ever (he tells us) eager to penetrate into all things more deeply than is usually done and to find something new. When. hut the lady took time to this gave Leibniz also consider. and thus and to strike out paths of ficial. (Euvres (Assezat s ed. p. he em He enjoyed ployed remedies more heroic than wise. when a convenient oppor he sent out for tunity came in the course of his studies. and (Fontenelle says) He slept little. congratulates himself on being self-taught able to avoid acquiescence in super (avToSidaKTos). time. it . man s mind was things fell a foe of disorder : the most entangled it. and he never married. spirit of discovery and that of method and the most determined and varied study. one is tempted to throw books away and seek some hidden This corner of the world where one may die in peace. he was a philosopher and a mathematician V bear. time to consider. vol. and but well sometimes he would remain in it for several days at a : This enabled him to do a great deal of work but led to illness. he often spent the night in his chair. 440. He once made a proposal of marriage (when he was fifty years of age).LIFE were crooked. into order when they entered He com bined two great qualities which are almost incompatible with one another the. widely differing kinds. through which he accumulated knowledge of the most . * and conditions of men. but. believing something even from the most ignorant. says Eckhart. xv. intercourse with all sorts that he could always learn i made the best of everything (er keJirte alles zum Besten}. and sum. Cum Socrate semper ad discendum paratus He spoke well of everybody. weakened neither the one quality In the fullest meaning these words can nor the other. something to eat. for which.

containing some papers of Leibniz on ethics and jurisprudence. iv. those which appeared in the Ada Eruditorum. A. along with his corre spondence on the reunion of Christendom and his writings in connexion with the founding of academies. 1686-90. matical works were published by Gerhardt in seven volumes (1850-63). Veritate et Ideis. litione. Toucher de Careil also published in seven volumes (1859-75) some of Leibniz s political works. S. (In French. with the dates at which they were written or published. with the addition of the correspondence between Leibniz and Arnauld. quantities of manuscript were preserved in the Royal Library at Hanover. Of the historical and works in published ten volumes (1864-77). containing the principal works as they are given Erdmann. E. the latter being the most complete. and others regarding the Philosophy of Descartes 281 sqq. 1684. ii i lished by Grotefend.) G. In 1866 Janet published an edition in Large French. (In French.i8 INTRODUCTION The Works of Leibniz. E. which had not been pubshed when Erdmann s edition The mathe appeared. which contains some things not in cluded in any of the others. The letters J.) G. E 70 Pub . The chief editions of the philosophical works are that of Erdmann (1840) and that of Gerhardt (1875-90). 1846. G. and the booklet of Mollat (1885). iv. 1679-80. and the letters A. Those The following m with an asterisk were published in Leibniz Correspondence with Philipp marked s lifetime. Onno Klopp political are the principal philosophical works of Leibniz. and successive editors have contmually drawn upon it for publication. indicate those which appeared the Journal des Savants. Many of the most important philosophical works of Leibniz were not published till after his death. In addition to these may be mentioned the old edition of Dutens in six volumes (1768). 422 Correspondence with Arnauld.

et *De Primae Philosophiae Emendat/one G. E. J. 1692. *Systeme Nouveau de la Nature et de G. J. Published by Guhrauer. iii. . ii. et la Mature (Letter to Queen Sophia Charlotte G. vii. Published an 1696. E. 70. 1708 (including the sophia. iv. lished Commentatio de by Foucher de Careil. 1702. 1694. 177. 147. E. Various papers (without titles) on Cartesianism. 1765. 529 Sur ce . 86 . 463. E. 434. Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum. iv. la Communication des Substances. gives 29 only. 1705). vii. * Essais de Theodicee sur la Bonte de Dieu. G. E. 1710. 19 Nouvelles de la a M. 1735. G.LIFE *ExtraU d une Lettre AND WORKS Published in the . J. 154. G. G. 1702. vii. 118. Republique des Lettres. A. Patrem des Bosses Epistolae 71. E. G. ^Considerations sur les E. 488. of Prussia). 393 sqq. Principesde Vie et sur les Natures plastiques (Histoire . Leibniz in a letter to Bernouilli. de Notione Substantial. . Mentioned by maticus. 1704. 104. . 1698. Published by Guhrauer. i E. Dutens gives De Modo distinguendi Phaenomena realia ab imaginariis. 443Animadversiones ad Joh. . preface to Codex Juris Gentium DiploE. vi. . Considerations sur la Doctrine d un Esprit Universel unique. 1697. vi. 539 1706-16. iv. G. 1687. Anima Brutorum. 471 E. 1844. Essence du Corps consiste dans I Etendue. written between 1700 and 1702. vi. 464. vi. 1840. vii. 302 E. 429. 178. 350. G. Wachteri Librum de recondita Hebraeorum philoRefutation of Spinoza ). 319 . 1696. S. iv. E. 671. 1838. &c. G. 124. Pub c. Ad rev. E. C 2 . S. G. 418. 323 *Si I . iv. vii. 109. 1691 and 1693. E. 468 E. 468. E. G. G. Bayle. 121. G. 1695. iv. 1840. Also three Eclaircissements du Schreiben Gabriel Wagner wm Nutzen der Vernunftkunst oder Logik. E. De Rerum Originatione radicali. E. 328 . Published by Raspe. *De ipsa Natura. 1697. A.nl. . des Outrages des Savants. 1838. 51 E. 41 . 1854. Nouveau Systeme. 504 E. published in 1693. 1690. De Vera Methodo Philosophiae et Theologiac. by Erdmann. Published et I by Kortholt. v. 1710 (?). G. *De Notionibus Juris et Justitiae. vii. sive de Vi insita Actionibusque Creaturarum. la Liberte de du ~M. G. G. . 514 E. Nouveaux Essais sur I Entendement humain. 194. 1710. G. 112. 291 . I Homme Origine Von der GliickseUglmt. les qui passe Sens Published by Erdmann. G. Published by Guhrauer. S.

7 ai - er Original French in E. C7arfe. 746. . . 7IS _ l6 7 5 vii. a ^ A&amp. J 1840. I7OQ T6 i I6&amp.INTRODUCTION . E &quot.) French. iii. ^ dn ^ In v French. esponrf^ 599. G. E. with Bourguet toifft E.) 539. . CbmqKmdmw E. 718.gt. ao . & c Correspondence ^ ^^^ ^ .gt. iii.) G. 701. 347 . &o. G. 7 3 I5 (In French.

as the which he describes offeTsTSohTfioTT-ome problem of philosophers. the latter Accordingly.PART II. GENEKAL PRINCIPLES OP THE PHILOSOPHY Statement of Letbni/s Problem: Elements? continuous consist of indivisible 1 How can that which is IN the preface to his Theodicee in which our reason there are two famous labyrinths. . of these perplexes of the infinite. Leibniz Thus. OF LEIBNIZ. 29. 470 a. goes : consideration almost all the human claims the attention race. of philosophers alone. of the meaning ot his TUodicee an investigation makes I while in others of his writings liberty and necessity. knowledge of necessity is equally great. The former liberty . special perplexity latter problem with which It is this we are here mainly concerned. especially in regard in the of evil the other consists production and origin of the indivisible points which discussion of continuity and and this question involves the appear to be its elements. G. E. of continuity standing of the principle while a right under is of the utmost tru the practical value of a speculative importance. one relates to the great question the often astray of Leibniz declares that and necessity. philosophical of substance as endeavour to reconcile the notion Con notionofsubstanee as consisting tinuous with the contrary The work of Leibniz was an -oaGonoiT&se two nouc vi.

finding a better hypothesis than that which had satisfied his Cartesian substance. these parts must definite bounded. if it is conflict interpret the relation of iontinuity or complete we to whole id_ parts so that the divisible at divisible If it were not all. or that the parts Quantitative or extensive Notion of Substance held Des cartes and Spinoza. separate from one another. The philosophy According to . and consequently the whole which they constitute must be . with its cardinal principle DeifirfflUiatiorUa.aegation. Stated in another way predecessors the problem is: How are unity of the wholelhall not be in with the definiteness or real diversity of the parts ? To say that the whole is continuous or really one seems to mean that. but only arbitrary parts \ On the other hand.gt. practically amounted o an assertion of the unity and continuity of the whole expense of the reality of the parts. it ^ould and would thus be the whole be reallv con- no fixed boundaries or lines of that is to say. it is infi-Jitely consist of insoluble ultimate elements. on the one hand. we cannot and the parts and the whole unreal. to be it. no real. or.INTRODUCTION seemed to him to arise from an inadequate conception of and the task he set himself was that of deepening the current notion of substance. as he himself would have put it. by of Spinoza.y on the other. if the whole consists of real parts and not merely possible subdivisions. if discontinuous. divis. but a mere collection n^ / arbrfrsrunity. the whole are real is real Nevertheless. and the Atomists l&amp.on tmuous there seem within Accordingly.not a real continuous unity. hold either that unreal. infinitely divisible.

of indivisible material atoms con Accordingly. be determined or cond. substance in other conceived through itself. 3. tells us at one time atoms and the void. if the . prop. L not than that LlrUo^r^ennin^Ty the There is srfgtajic^sJhijmcjmdjtimed. i The i. I In the one case substance would determination. it determinations . . Part def. real system of reciprocal determination be unbroken being. its _umty stitute the ultinTate reality . of the parts at the expense the reality bare the presuppositions to lay It is necessary. a part implies that it must 2 bv other parts there is the theory c In contrary opposition to this. to which every would dominant aspect of substance The latter is the is foreign That aspect alone i in the philosophy of Spinoza. i* of the world. true unity. sistent with the principle amounts to saying that Consequently his position For the very meaning of stance can have no real parts. Part 3 i. itscontinuitybecomesjBjls^. is 23 in itself and is words. any ambiguity in substance either that is hmg other statement itself. Tr. that Determination is neg. - constitute Y. that the ol which does not need the concept conception of That it must be formed another thing from which V or that which is to say. 3. may mean it is self-condemned or to the exclusion of al absolutely-uuconditioned. of these contrary theories truth in each and to reconcile them in a is more compre the consii hensive view. Ibid. . 12 d( New System. . in the other. then. s Ethics.livisibility^Unatiar. which Leibniz To affirm the real existence charmed his imagination atoms is to deny the uifinit. doctrine of Spinoza Halo White and 13.GENERAL PRINCIPLES that which is Spinoza.f^ of but only a collection or heaping up to establ Atomism thus endeavours parts ad infinite of the whole. ot in order to find the elements . H destroyed.

who (Lemoine.lt. Quid sit materTa of Descartes se^s to k. that created things are modes or accidents of God that our mind has no wider outloot .lt. Archtvfur Geschichte d. as time went on although. . 346 ) 2 Lettre a I Abbe Nicaise G. providence ai*d immortality I reird his book as a dangerous one for people who will give themselves 3 trouble to go deeply into it. iii. .24 logical INTRODUCTION development of the principles involved in the In this connexion it is Descartes s position of Descartes \ has done Spinoza/ nothing but cultivate certain seeds of the philosophy of 2 M. m are also friends of Spinoza. . for example! yhich that there is only one substance. j consciousness) all specific qualities or determinations. for others do not care to understand it. as is kniwn to sTmeJf my friends 53). iv.lt. in an early letter (February. on the ground that no contradiction in terms is involved in regarding each of these qualities by itself as non-existent or other than it is. but the experience (as it is given in common i i nothing instrument by which the process of stripping has been carried out. 5 (1697) (E. Thus. As. as the residual ultimate certainty. bK T^ **** p. 1678) we find Leibniz writing: I find in it [the Ethics] t^nty of fine thoughts agreeing with mine. special theories that Leibniz has mostly in view.lt.0. viz. it became more and more evident to him that they were funda mentally at variance. which is verbally to retain but etain. PMlosophie. who dared to say what Descartes carefully avoided. even plausible. The result of the method is to give. 75. vol. (G. Per ] Rfter * his life ^at God ed but ndJldTutlnevertheless neither understands nor Himself thinks l wills that all * * neCeSSity f fate that God ** an end ***&amp. who denned it in his great principle that Determination isjf.ad straight to the opinions of Spinoza. 6&amp. he tells us &amp. although his arguments are equally applicable to the more thorough metaphysic of Spinoza. recognized 4at his philosophy had much common with that of Spinoza.*** necessity of nature. Descartes / Descartes endeavoured to reach absolute metaphysical certainty by a method which was after &amp. 139 b Leibniz especially ln his earlier days. The essence of Descartes s method of doSbt negation^ The endeavour to attain certainty by stripping from &amp. ii. h ? really to give up. seem to me unreal and not But tnere are\so paradoxes T .lt. ? wards more clearly and fully applied by Spinoza. hacsentmUa Mum apud LetimUum p in The philosophy . .lt. the Curtesfanae disdplinae intemperantla Spinozae doctrinam parit reperire est Leibnitium j &amp. namely God .

that which includes or is common to everything because it is not (specially) anything. there arc two created substances. determinations. challenge the reality of this instrument. as in the case of Descartes. If we hold strictly to the second of these views of substance. are left with nothing but quantity either. we do so by means of the instrument itself. ii. : Emendatione. divisible only on the ground that there is nothing to divide. namely. quantity of substance in general or. the confounding of a substance possessing infinite attri butes with a substance whose reality is reached by the exclusion of all specific determinations. iii. and consequently that the ultimate reality or substance is that which is free from all specific thought&quot. with Tradatus dc Intellectus It is true that . quantity of a specific substance. Part i. The thinking Ego cannot be thought to think its non-existence would be a con non-existent : tradiction in terms. then substance can be said to be in Cf. oi that wTiich is common to all its forms and^hiamfestations. as in the case l of Spinoza. whose exis tence 1 is not conditioned by anything but by infinite Spinoza regards substance as indivisible. namely. Now when we rigorously apply this principle. that the reality of substance is that specific or differential qualities which remains after all have been removed. Ethic*. we . V / Thus Descartes s that is to say quantity of one quality. the discarding of specific deter minations) to the general metaphysical principle which the method implied. 12 and 13. . the principle. God. in the sense that it has no real parts and this may seem inconsistent with the contention that Spinoza s substance is merely quantita tive. that the essence or reality of a thing is that which remains after the differences in its states and qualities have been r away. is that in addition to the one true and perfect position substance. prop. But the contradiction is Spinoza s it is a fragment of the great fissure of inconsistency that traverses his whole system. finite. and so involve ourselves in self-contradiction. without any specific thought. Spinoza s advance upon this was merely to pass from Descartes s practical method of attaining truth (namely. 108.GENERAL PRINCIPLES 25 If we thinking Ego. whose existence is externally uncon ditioned. Spinoza.

. hardness may be rejected. bodily substance and think ing substance. The essential attribute : &quot. . but even of what is called void space (Veitch s Tr. and the whole consists of their aggregation. we may reject cold. Part ii. namely extension stance is quantity of one other determination. arid depth and this something is comprised in our idea of space. Cf. thought without a specific object. taking a stone for and reject all that is not essential to the nature of body. They are mutually opposite the one what the other is not. 63-65. namely . then. things are reducible to one or other of these as a common and consequently the essence or reality of quality created substance comes to be either extension without . Principia. that of thinking sub. INTRODUCTION These are. In the first place. with the change of these qualities. . heat.26 substance alone. 51-53. Descartes. is still a body and finally. we may reject weight. and all the other qualities of this sort. because if the stone were liquefied or reduced to powder it would no longer possess hardness. provided we reflect on the idea we have of any body. specific contents or thought. The atoms are material par If ticles. stance is thought. : It will be easy to discern that it is the same u extension which constitutes the nature of body as of space. because we have the case of fire. though very light. and yet would not cease to be a body colour also may be thrown out of account. Part i. bodily substance is quantity of one while thinking sub determination. either because they are not considered as in the stone. example. All the specific qualities of created&quot. . because we have frequently seen stones so transparent as to have no colour again. and that these two things are mutually diverse only as the nature of the genus and species differs from that of the individual. except that it is something extended in length.). Prindpia. or because. In other words. . 8: Quantity and number differ only in thought \ratione] from that which has quantity and is numbered. systems parts \ is Thus the presupposition of the Cartesian a purely quantitative relation of whole and The same presupposition in another form underlies the Atomist philosophy. which. breadth. the stone is not supposed to have lost the nature of body. Neither is conditioned by the ofSer nor dependent upon it. not only of that which is full of body. the theory is self-consistent they must be regarded i as 1 Cf.is of bodily substance is extension. After this examination we shall find that nothing remains in the idea of body.

that . i. it must be real. * 2 / no quantitative elements 3 that and yet it must comprehend a manifold in unity y is to say. 3 Ibid. La 2 Monadologie de Leibnitz. the essence of Leibniz s argument is that a quantitative conception of the relation of whole and parts affords an inadequate theory of substance. And : to call 1 The mechanical view of things has two forms Cartesianism The one. be qualitative. which makes matter continuous. i. Accordingly. developed through criticism of Cartesian and Atomist views regarding material Substance. Boutroux. . and the specific qualities of things must arise from the variety of their combinations. may be called arithmetical mechanism. and that the relation of whole and parts must be conceived as Thus a simple sub rather than extensive. continuous. a quantity of parts. . matter as ultimately pure extension is to make regard it essentially shadow of a substance with nothing more than a An extended nothing is meaningless. 12. it must intcnsjve stance has no parts. may and Atomism. And in any case the very essence of the theory is that the whole should l)e taken as a sum or totality. Leibniz s non-quantitative or intensive Notion of Substance.GENERAL PRINCIPLES C 27 homogeneous. While the general principle of Leibniz s argument it may be stated in this way. the other. namely. An extended something must have quality. which makes it dis be called geometrical mechanism E. . the essence of substance is non-quantitative. . The common element in the contrary positions of the Cartesians and the Atomists is the explicit or implicit And reduction of qualitative to quantitative differences it appears to Leibniz that the solution of the dilemma is to be found in the opposite hypothesis. f . . Monadology. &c. . quality. e.. They could not all really exist and be different from one another without some of them being complex. it must be something. he actually develops through To criticism of Descartes s theory of material substance. 36. p. specifically determined.

p. 4. some attribute. 3 You are right in saying that all magnitudes [grandeurs] may be divided ad inflnitum. 467). Epistola ad Schuleriburgium (1698) (G. i. 692 b G. Lettre a Foucher (1692) (E. but is not equivalent to it for number. i. time. Cf. 356). and these lines as made up of real points. ask ourselves what it is that occupies the 1 Those who hold that the extended is itself place : i . continuity. magnitude enters into the essence of extension. and coexistence of parts and consequently it [extension . Again. consists only in extension ? Philarete. which quality extends or diffuses itself along with the thing. Cf. and the point is the limit of the line. The line is the limit of the A mathesurface. Similarly. Malebranche (c. iii. carries But do you not think that the destruction with it that of body. Ariste. 242&quot.Eng. P. For extension means nothing but a repetition or a continued multi plicity of that which is spread out. . & plurality. 115 a . iJ4b . vol. alsoExamen cosmus. a substance transpose the order of the words as well as of the thoughts.. proves that body . G. iv. the notion of which is anterior to that of its repetition V . . Trans. in fact. . 580): 2 1 real parts. Micro2 . motion have also magnitude. 1711) (E. It proves only that extension enters into the essence or nature of body but not that it constitutes its whole essence. vi. ch. 584) : . Math. that is to say a substance which can be repeated or continued. Lotze. Extension is nothing but an abstraction and requires some thing which is extended. It presupposes some quality. . In my opinion corporeal substance consists in something quite other than being extended and occupying a place we must. It would be cannot be said that pure extension has any There can be no real unit of mere extension 3 which of extension. Extrait d une lettre (1693) (E. des principes du Ii. vii. vi. G. ] is not sufficient to explain the very nature of extended or repeated substance.28 INTRODUCTION that quality extension itself is merely to cover up the an extended extension is much difficulty with a name : the same as a shaded shadow of nothing. Besides extension there must be an object which is extended.. 691 a . bk. None of them is so small that we cannot conceive in it an infinity of divisions which will never be exhausted. some nature in the thing. 403). continues itself. it an erroneous conception to regard mathe matical surfaces as made up of real lines. and yet they are not extension/ Also (E. G.).

but matical point may. the nature of Descartes s extension. Math. so there is no (given) cut into par s or ^act ons element for a line. but they are only [i. Ul. Lettrea of a line. strictly speaking. though it has everywhere pass them Cf. he extension as thus indivisible that the parts to which maintains on the other hand are real only if Atomism reduces material substance claim to be indivisible Their they are not indivisible. for there is nothing to it as the unit of that whose to conceive We should have sole characteristic is to x^nsist^ro!^^ For such is. You infei f that all the terms of this series actually infinite term. &quot. : Indeed numbers And the . ii8a G. By an atom. . 535 ) (1698) (G. points are exact that modalities existences 2 mathematical it. indivisible] abstractions and not real is to say of Cartesian Yy * . then. as there hardness is a self-contradictory conception.GENERAL PRINCIPLES as indivisible. is not composed &amp. while Leibniz regards the parts without being real. Explanation of the of them. i. only because there determine its unity. but I think his that there is also an absolutely that there actually exists any nothing else follows from it than is . nor parts. further progress. rests upon the supposition Now But hardness There is no absolute a relative term. as a unity. And or rest. Lett line/ Cf. thus infinite understand a corpuscle.I sme number and an absolutely true of an absolutely greatest Now just as . fraction leat number or an absolutely smallest or smallest part of unity or there is no (given) numerical element least line or lineal eat among numbers.lt. 416). be regarded is nothing in it to divide. can be 1& * line there are actually \ I J. says Leibniz. whether no and leap is needed to Thus points are neither large nor small. we cannot conceive i. such Yet the continuous. note. Thus. e * aContradiction.e. if it be taken as a^ernoulUum iii. is &amp. i. that they are infinitely hard. a number or sum of all years ago I proved that 7 one whole. of the mere extremities of a time actual or potential them new extremities. .lt. Suppose that in a -exist. be a real unit. m ^ New System. or a line. as Leibniz puts . is no absolute motion hardness. FndivisibTe points. or as ends [termini] the sense As to indivisible points (1693 (E.

n. and it must be indivisible in a sense which Leibniz to find a unit of substance is consistent with the continuity of the whole. the Relation real s problem thus takes the form of an attempt which shall avoid the imper This fections of both the Cartesian and Atomist theory. How The of Wliole and Parts is to be conceived. so that such a particle as an atom is as considerable in itself. and in relation to others proportionately less (and consequently. -particularity in space or time. least ideally divisible. unit must be at once^real must be of such a kind that it does not conflict with its indivisibility. defini But it suffices for perfect hardness. from the foundation of the world demand my | 1 to the present 1 day . whose particles have never been separated. Math. but a unit of substance sive rather than extensive. Every material atom must be at The atoms of matter be real. . Not that it cannot be actually divided for such atoms do not occur. which comes from infinity and goes to infinity. i . must then be inten and the continuity of the whole must be not a mere empty homogeneity. . 443). as our visible system is considerable in relation to it.30 INTRODUCTION mentally divisible indeed. are still composed of parts. since the invincible attachment of one part to another (if one could rationally conceive or suppose it) would in no way destroy their 2 diversity . in the sight of God). iii. Cf. but which actually neither is nor has been divided. ad Bernoullium (1697) (G-. and indivisible Unit of Substance (Monad\ Perception and Appetition. since they would . Its reality and indivisible. except by comparison. if it . its The basis of ^indivisible. tion that there should be corpuscles. Nothing is large or small. Lettre a Hartsoeker (1710) (G. for indivisible points in space or time may form an aggregate but cannot become reality cannot be quantity. 507) : System. for no quantity is And its indivisibility cannot be exclusive^ ^a continuum. Atoms are the effect of the weakness o our imagination. which likes to rest and to hasten to an end in subdividing or analyzing. It is not so Epistola 2 1 The New i in nature. iii.

as in the . whole.. are not determined or characterized without reference to the individual. but in the sense that the whole is expressed. which was the issue of the quantitative or extensive view of sub stance. the whole is a secondary construction. or. does not help us much. mi^t inp. contrast with this the intensive doctrine of substance /which regards determination as I amounts to a declaration that primary or essential whole and part are in- All specific determinations. the whole beingregarded as prior to the parts or the parts as prior to the whole. and the whole independent * / / jtain is not a mere vague e aggregate of / In some sense each part must CQH=W nit. That is to say. from the primary parts. io8j. tions are determinations. word intension. &quot. .liulft the whole within itself. as in the view of Spinoza. however Thus thejgarts specific._ Atomist doctrine. from the whole as self-evidently given. either. It must be more precisely defined. whole is not merely other than the part. general._-* parts. or functions of the whole. not in the sense that they are ultimately reducible to one vague determination which is common to everything. but in some ThatJJ passes into it and expresses it^fj|ji rough it. had its roots in the conception of whole and parts as inevitably exclusive of one another. however. symbolized.GENERAL PRINCIPLES 4 31 The continuity through infinite degrees of intension. states. p. [ /infmfEe&quot.mamfoldT The~whole ^stands not merely in a but in a dynamic relation to the partf^ The mechanical. or func tseparable. In of a purely synthetic kind. states. each unit must inrtlmlft an * . in a purely analytic way. and therefore in some way included it in each. limited may be. the parts are to be deduced. is the conception of substance as essentially^ intensive rather than extensive^ way yn There is here an approach to the modern conception of organism as more adequate to the expression of substance than are merely mechanical conceptions \ But the special 1 Leibniz does hold that all real substances are organic (cf. The antinomy between whole and parts.

Being and unity are convertible terms [ens et &quot. and parts is not to be conceived as one of greater and less. De docta ignorantia . and there is no manifold without real units. Epist. can. expresses itsalf in. &quot. and where&quot.-. l 2 is . His early imaginative liking for atoms and the void/ when first he freed himself from the yoke of Aristotle / the love of historical system and 1 of well-grounded hypothesis which set his whole intel lectual character in revolt against Spinoza s abstract unity and his purely a priori deductions.gt. of thing containing and things The and ideally or relation of whole . contain the whole ^potentially by means of representation. but the plural presupposes the singular. According to Leibniz anything is an organism if it has a soul or principle of unity. Arnauld (1687) (G. It rather is : must be the nature of a part or unit which can ir) self^ ISfow the part cannot contain the whole within itself for actually and fully. 7- (i44)&amp. there is not one being there will still less be several beings. 3.beings&quot. that is to say. thus the distinction The_j&amp.art between whole and part would /vanish. as he uses it. ii.- of organism. is another. ii. must. The phrase is used by Nicholas of Cusa.gt.32 INTRODUCTION angle at which Leibniz regards his problem prevents him from developing this. 435 b G. probably also the influence of his Scholastic training with its suggestions all substantial forms of an infinite multiplicity of //resulted in a tendency to emphasize rather the elements That . ii. In short. ad des Bosses (1706) (E. ^ whole and : Leibniz s guiding thought his question does not primarily take the accordingly What must be the nature of a whole which form without real units. 304). namely. It has always been thought that unity [Tim] and being are reciprocal things. . if it is other than a mere aggregate of independent elements. in which the difference is 2 Cf. I take as axiomatic this identical proposition. in all its realized completeness . Lettre a entirely a matter of accent. 97): Every machine pre supposes some substance in the pieces from which it is made.be no real II of reality than its wholeness. But the notion it l 1 New System. is one thing. therefore.there. unum convertuntur}. is much more vagiie than has since become. Being&quot. that what is not really one [n] being is not really a [un] being.r-eack -of afea^jaagts ? .

to unfold spontaneously from within itself all the I variations of that which it represents 2 This new atom or unit of substance (the . but there is also variation in the representation itself. Praedicatum inest subjccto but. the part would merely represent one aspect of the It is in virtue of its whole. . appetition that the part is able to realize the life of the whole. 466 a G. . in so for as in the part the potential whole tends to realize itself. Wagnerum (1710) (E. but rather as a relation of 33 a symbolized and part That is to say. Leibniz says that he applies the term Monad to the simple substance. 3 and 1 1. Epistola .GENERAL PRINCIPLES contained. 464 b G. : . and in virtue of this Leibniz describes the individual substance as essentially a fqrjee * Thus the * I * rather than a quantity. 529) Monads. as a matter of fact. if it had perception alone. must be a representation of the whole from some / symbol or expression of the and the part must contain the whole in such / whole. 561) In fact. sign and thing signified. a within I it l . 12 (E. vii. the part. iv. so to speak. 511). vii. De ipsa natura (1698) But Monads are not to be confounded with (E. the n symbols. in Leibniz s terminology. or rather Monads. for. . and. 330) Not only is the variety of the object represented in that which has perception . : ad R. atoms. . metaphysical atoms. This intensive essence or force in the part (or individual substance) appears in two ways. without parts. 2 Cf. Also Rtplique aux Reflexions de Bayle (1702) (E. See also New System. : . We Although. Atoms (as people imagine them) have shapes Monads no Cf. the partis said to have Appetition. while. in my opinion. in the case of any actual thing. ? since. Both of these characteristics * must belong to it. like an unchanging picture. which 3 . as atoms of substance. since that . a way that the whole might be unfolded entirely from/ particular point of view. there are no atoms of matter in nature and the smallest portion of matter has still parts. C. iv. I regard souls. 186 b G. it never is so unfolded. is to be represented varies. because it is unum per se. As representative or symbolic of the whole. De Anima Brutorum. has Perception. 158 a G. to develop the predicate out of the subject would involve an infinite analysis. here touch a fundamental inconsistency in Leibniz s thought. simple substance 1 in his own phrase) Leibniz calls a Monad 3 . . part must have a certain spontaneity or power o? acting from within itself.

but by Leibniz s contemporary.34-4 INTRODUCTION is The word almost as old as European philosophy. Apperception. in his Leibniz und Spinoza. Leibniz himself attributes the term to Pythagoras. and has varied greatly in meaning and application. Geschichte der Philosophic. It is also used by Nicholas of Cusa. iii. however life little or valueless. has shown that the term Monad was actually suggested to Leibniz.s_ca ]JLed -by Leibniz perception. but not necessarily or soul. for instance. many * more have a shape than vii. souls have. has perception. as. 503). ^TBuFthe essence of perception in general is that in it we have a unity variously modified or a unity I have which appears in a multiplicity of relations. in adopting the term Monad. In the sense of a numerical unit it occurs in Plato (Philebus. 2 Hegel. in the sense of consciousness. the essence of perception. [ Vorstellungen]. 101 E). Bruno s contention that there is nothing. not by the writings of Bruno. 1 Professor Ludwig Stein. but For consciousness is not merely an additional i determination belonging to certain kinds or degrees of Conscious perception_j. . Fra^ois Mercure Van Helmont (1618-1699). one is not necessarily because I am conscious of many ideas . Shortly before the time of Leibniz the term was used by Giordano Bruno. then. with whom he had much intercourse and considerable correspondence. 15 B Phaedo. that does not contain in it But Leibniz repeatedly attacks the doctrine of a world-soul. ad Bierlingium (1712) (G. regarded as possessing both spiritual and material charac There are some parts of the philosophy of teristics. many it and yet wealth of thoughts is in me . which is Bruno s central conception. Leibniz may be said to have taken from Bruno little more than the name \ The Monad. 2 But I remain. Thus. But Leibniz s chief forerunner in the use of the term was Bruno. 105 C. Bruno with which the doctrine of Leibniz has affinity. thoughts or objects that I perceive and thus All representation is exhibit a multiplicity in unity. 412. . They but presuppositions of them/ Epistola are not parts of bodies. 77 novas to the Greek meant simply the unit in arithmetic. whose Monads were ultimate spherical points. in spite of this variety.

c oLay in what the perception of plants And as in some kind to be dvriTima and figure of body there are understood know what are the figures of although we do not soul there are understood to be bodies. so in the D 2 . 135. rather as perceptive is thus a than_ the particular. there And thus. which the Monad must be the unfolding of the whole That is to say.GENERAL PRINCIPLES 1 . nature and experience from within universal within. wherever there is change another. 466 a Also Epistola ad E. C. as we have seen change within a Monad. every change This change. action of the internal principle or has appetition. a genuine unity. to for the spo] It is simply another name appetition. 1 dynamic and nt static 1 . 1 Cf vii C WV p. passage from Monads alone are one perception to another in nature must real. but Similarly. not necessarily in the sense in unity so As the essence of perception is multiplicity within the Entity the essence of appetition is change Appetition K or permanence of a simple substance. 35 perception of conscious desire or will. Wagnerum (1710) (E and external 01 correlation of the internal This . itself. it contains or represents. potentially As must be the passing from one perception (or ^state whether conscious or unconscious) representation. its win its power of unfolding taneity of the Monad. while as appetitive eiduifeTof. the Monad which produces change 2 .

as contrasted. . the imperceptible elements the imperceptible elements Bierlingium (1711) (E. by which of bodies are expressed. on the other hand. which is indivisible only when it ceases to be real. The Identity of Indiscernibles and the Law of Continuity. if it is real. as they are without parts 3 . But. is 2 inseparable from it. must always be divisible . Monadology. 678 a . in some special aspect. because. in the sense that each represents it or reflects it as in a mirror from some particular angle. 501). 7. being entirely n on. i. vol.* The Monads are also real ultimate elements. no as the quality of a substance. Further. on the one hand. a quantitative continuum cannot have parts!&quot.quantitative. As The we have indivisible seen. there remains the question of continuity and the infinite. 3 although we do not distinctly know of the confused perceptions. such a transference is impossible . pp. with the mathe matical point of Descartes. a part or element of the universe. and. another. as the actual indivisible elements of reality are essentially perceptive. with the physical point of the Atomists. real continuity must As each Monad is also be a continuity of perception. vii. in the sense of 1 and thus no one Monad can include having no parts . 399 sqq. 2 Ibid. . Monad can really influence another For that would mean or produce any change in it. Ibid. they cannot have been formed out of any combination of simpler elements. But a transference of quality from one to the other.. which. each must be absolutely exclusive of all others.36 1 INTRODUCTION As the Monads are purely intensive centres or units. they are simple. 1 i.* The point which is at once real and indivisible has thus (Leibniz thinks) been found in the Monad. * As to the contrast between Leibniz s view of substance and that of Locke. nor is it possible in any way to dissolve them. Epistola ad G. being its very essence. see Locke s Essay. indivisible having thus been established. the whole must perception and appetition. 3-6.Not being quantitative. Eraser s ed.

e. This is the doctrine are impossible.. each of quality. of quantity. wnd n^jf^. then. totality of Monads.lt. can be exactly are all aggregates things. Guhrauer&quot. differing in quality called the Identity of Indiaof LeibiuTwhich is usually of continuity in a It is simply his law cerniblesy be in The number of Monads must negative form. quoted by his biographer.. by some of Monads.^ eirte Bio!lrap . . . not be represented 2 otherwise the universe would finite : The Monadgjjjffgjrom and would thus be from every possible point of view. which a merely numerical differ the same: no thing can have The Monads are essentially nonence from another.M X so that two Monads not quality or intensioT alone. representing the and number by itself is merely a measure e &quot. universe from every possible point one another. of Monads is infinite and the number imperfect But if other then Monad differs in quality from every if every that they might be considered the Monads must be such from term or member of which differs as a series. f ordin-vtos of a curve. of view. are entirely separate from while the Monads in a way which dii each must represent the universe from the representation given to the least possible extent two No two Monads (and a fortiori no other. D&quot. quantitative.GENERAL PRINCIPLES be the infinite 37 And thus. This is an argument Yl^/meTa^c a^ * 3 to series of Monads compares tho infinite BoUfrom nothing to infinity. i. vol. Anmerkungen. by small degree the next by an infinitely which can be assigned of quality less than any a decree of continuity in a letter Leibniz explains his principle I think.u&amp.^ &quot.&quot. p... are no two indiscernible be found discernible. which grow e 3*.. A clever gentleindividuals.

who knows distinctly their essential gradations. \l I w^^J^ e those essential determinations alt tlie properties of any being approximate^ of another. and New Essays. Probably Johannes Franciscus Buddaeus (1667-1729). But^the law of continuity requires that. the existence of zoophytes. p. See also Introduction. in which the different classes. are so closely connected with one another that for sense or imagination to determine it is of the former must gradually those of the latter. 380. these with plants. that I have good reasons for believing that all the different classes of beings. . Introduction. i. Plant. merely like so many ordinates of one and the same curve. the totality of which forms the universe. and these again with fossils. places where the curve or chain turns back upon itself. Part iii. _ Therefore all the orders impossible exactly the point where any one of them begins or ends all the species which border upon or which occupy. . &quot. note on . and afterwards of Theology at Jena. \ I approximate to of natural beings must necessarily form only one chain. for instance. 6. Literally.. so to speak. All they proved was that the letter had not been addressed to the person to whom it was said to have been addressed. in the ideas of God. Cf. iii. p. dis .animals. Essay. bk. 83 note. Locke. p. 376. Accordingly men are linked with animals. which in their turn are connected with those bodies which sense and imagination represent to us as completely dead and inorganic [informes]. ch. are. p. mostly on moral philosophy. does not imply but it is indeed agreeable to the order of monstrosity.1 38 INTRODUCTION he says. And so strongly do I hold species. Eraser s ed. 2 or. 12. as Buddeus calls them. teristics which may equally be ascribed The Academy of Berlin declared this letter to be spurious but there seems no good reason to doubt its genuineness. He. the relations of / j l which do not allow of others being put between any two of them. like so many links. putable territory [regions ff inflexion ct de rebroussement ] being necessarily ambiguous and endowed with charac to neighbouring Thus. nature that they should exist. because that would indicate disorder and imper fection. vol. Professor of Philosophy at Halle. published many books. 67 cf.

. that continuous and infinite gradation to or representation. ns ot its to indicate the perf everywhere. but at once continuous and not only infinitely of an infinity of real ele infinitely divided. but every part of matter is actually . consisting have to consider how the principle ments \ But we still is consistent with the of continuity. . vegetables as well common rules. then. ^ . combined with appesay of perception And thus the universe is or spontaneous change. I maintain abhors it. founding upon very inclined to Sink that plants maybe anatomy is much needed are imperfect animals. and that they I hold by the actual that nature sucn an exteniThat. 65 note. in . .^ place~ of admitting infinite to that nature affects it as is commonly said. as regards several properties might pass for of feeding or multiplying themselves and which upset the as for animals. Harmony Mivcen Substances. when smallness conceals that infinity of living beings whose and which lie hid in the them from ordinary observation. those which together : little astonished at it that I am even convinced that there will perhaps must be such beings. I should be so fill the universe not only should I not been found beings for instance. There is. tition divisible. In changes of i Monads the &amp.lt. filfed with an infinity of Not only is the continuous infinitely divisible rr686^ (G ii 77) See divided into other parts. . the eiame genus as animals.M corresponds principle of continuity t( considerable analogies in Malpi*hi. : Jfonadologij. of the waters bowels of the earth and in the depths TJie pre-estaUishcd 1 . the system which take place in real things. rded as a world the smallest particle must be rega consequently Also Lettre a Arna t* different creatures. so as the better matter which Thus I think that there is no part of Author and but actually divided not I do not say merely divisible. founded upon the supposition of a complete orders of beings and absolute separation of the different I say. as thus interpreted.GENERAL PRINCIPLES that to the principle of continuity that there had be astonished to learn 39 which. and that natural history it has further studied some day come to know them. the system of the Monads a is of intension.

and each containing within itself the destroying tinuity of the 1 series 1 ? Each Monad contains within the erfect impendence of the Monads is to be ? reconciled L the continuity of their series is a question which Leibniz does lot answer. however.4 * INTRODUCTION in the older void correlative of the indivisible Atomism. the universe be a quantitative plenum. Any change within a plenum affects every part of it. escapes the contradictions that are involved in the idea of a void. is motion from which again occupying to occupy. each independent of the rest. It must receive its I and must thus be regarded as finite. However separate things may be. but as a continuity or infinite gradation of qualitative differences. not as an infinite mass all that there is outside. Everything in the world acts and reacts change take else. impenetrable and unaffected by them. take place in any one without affecting every other. For him the ideal unity of the Monads (as each repre senting the same universe) does not make their mutual indepen dence any the less complete. it is impossible to understand how any change could originate within it. which became current with the rise of modern philosophy. Leibniz overcomes this difficulty by regarding the universe. To give up the independence of the &amp. but it exists. or how change can place without disturbing the continuity of the infinite series of Monads. inconsistent with its reality as a plenum. Each is the necessary and impenetrable elements. If. infinitely upon everything no change can small. how is it possible for a change to take place in any one of them without the con But if the universe consists of an infinity of Monads. by implying a plenum. The conception of continuity. principle of all its changes. ^W . however. each containing within itself the principle of its own changes.lt. But it has still to be shown how is possible within a plenum. This is the principle involved in the scientific point of view regarding the universe. He substitutes for an extensive plenum of mass an intensive continuum of force or life. The influence may in some cases be imperceptible.

the continuity of the series will be But it is of we shall have two indiscernible Monads. takes place in the perception or representation of one broken and Monad. If the system were a plenum of mass. as the Monads form a qualitative continuum of such a kind that no part can really act upon another. unless system we can say that any change within one Monad produces. whole system is maintained. correlative changes in of such a kind that the equilibrium of the other 1 Monads. Cf. If. In other words. p. however slight. there must be something of the nature of mutual influence. for The succession of s ^ Monads would him have meant to fall into Spinoza pantheism. or is invariably accompanied by.GENERAL PRINCIPLES itself a 41 universe from one representation of the whole differs to an infinitely which particular point of view. hypothesis is required to complete This hypothesis is Leibniz s systemfof the pre-established * j ( Though no true! harmony between substances. of their series while. spontaneously unfolding a sequence this change within the Monad does take place cordingly The continuous order or it is essential to its nature. action and reaction. from masses). small degree from the representations contained in some other Monad. a further the tkeory. . on the other hand. the very essence of the forces (as distinct Monads to be living mirrors. to give up the continuity would have meant having recourse to Atomism. the inner development of each been so prearranged that all its j jfi changes are ac^npanied by ccr^sjwndii^chang&quot. Part iv. And these he regarded as equally irrational alternatives. centres of appetition^ : . In the creation TjuTof Monad has oTTIie~world. But. then. 1 88. this Introduction. between the various elements in the system. any change. substance can really acLnpon another^ everything in the] universe takes place as jf this mutual interaction were! i rear~Substances fornTa^^eniTliororj^ysicarTelatjons. liarmony or mutual compatibility.eTiii^others. of the Monads must therefore be destroyed. Ac of perceptions. this interaction would be intelligible without further explanation.

51 sqq. 135) : The scholastic philosophers believed that there is a reciprocal physical interaction between body and soul but since a thorough investigation has shown that thought and extended mass have no connexion with one another. v. The general problem which it is meant to solve appeared at first for Leibniz in a particular form. The usual pre-Cartesian solution of this special problem was the theory of an influxus physicus or actual passage of elements from the one Descartes s compleje^ separation substance to the other. Cf. G. each soul must necessarily have received this nature (or this internal ground of its expressions of what is external) from a Universal Cause. 14 and 15. 2 10 (E. Part i. or rather. of Like most of the other doctrines of Leibniz. 421) own way what takes place outside of it. or what is called one person. .42 INTRODUCTION is different from that in every and yet all are in harmony. of thinking substance from extended substance. and which makes each of them to be perfectly in agree ment and in correlation with every other. others. infinite New 3 System. bk. and is unable to have any influence upon other par ticular beings. say. This implies the use of : Cf. upon which these beings are all dependent. vi. 10. One Monad extra. Monadology. as each must draw this expression entirely from within its own nature. . not ab influences another ideally \ that is to but through an inner pre-established conformity 2 Eclation of the System ofpre-established Scholastic Harmony to and Occasionalist Theories. each of these souls expresses in its knowledge and power and great ingenuity. and that they are created things which differ toto several modern writers have recognized that there is no physical communication between soul and body. total opposition to the earlier theory^. ofsoul from body. and 81 . 376 a. which makes of soul and body one and~tlie same agent. Also Monadology. G. . iv. As Nouveaux Essais. Theodicee. especially with reference to the spontaneous agreement of a mechanism with the activities of the rational soul. ch. the perfections of one being accompanied by counterbalancing imperfections in changes in each Monad other. this system the pre-established harmony is a new hypothesis devised to remedy trielmperfections of previous theories. although there always remains the metaphysical communication. 519 b . that of the rela tions between soul and body. 59 (E. 1 was in 51.

l that Leibniz. spoke thinking alike (concours ordinaire) sionalist theories varied jo the ordinary co-operation dependent on nothing but The Occaassistance of God. E. Zeller comes The illustration appears in a note to Geulincx s Ethica. 488. which take.oTa phenomenon The two a corresponding phenomenon in the other. ThirdTract. to assign any illustration. Leibniz s pre-established harmony has sometimes been of Occasionalism.GENERAL PRINCIPLES The problem . 43 satisfactory itself is left by him without any a definite attempt to but his followers solution of Occasionalism. and consequently that the changes body are both directly produced by G0d:~ Consequently on the occasion of the appearing in the one substance God produces &quot. L. clusion. not knowing that it was used by Geulincx. spite of his frequent And he has been accused of borrowing (without acknow Geulincx the wellledgement) from the Occasionalist known illustration of the two clocks which he uses in But Dr. or ^ some extent. special source for it. inasmuch as it With other characteristic of the Cartesian school (a Schulbeispid ].but__in__its_most_ is the^soK consistent form~the hypothesis is that God that finite substance has no power or activity real Cause. . in regarded as merely another variety criticisms of the Occasionalist theory. Cf. and they do not seem to have been known to Leibniz. He received the illustration from Foucher. are quite independent. 2. note 19 The notes are not in the nrst Explanation of the New System.lt. Stein holds that Leibniz was unaware of the source of the 1 Leibniz und Uhrengleichniss . i. Land s ed. references the illustration is used both by Descartes and by Cordemoy. 1884). who probably arrived at it independently. 130 a G. cap. in which they solve it by the theory had been made by Descartes developed a suggestion that and extended substance as of when he made &amp. Cf. place in soul and real Cause. p. except for the fact phenomena the one of their contemporaneous production by God. iii.L &quot. 59. ii. i. Philosophic. who Edmund Pfleiderer has clearly shown Geulincx mit besonderer Pezichung auf ilir beiderseitiges to the same con (Tubingen. . iv. of its own. and may have considered it superfluous was a universally used simile. edition of the Ethica. note 3.. See Archivfur Geschichte d. explaining his pre-established harmony. vol. an.

unless in the sense it is When I speak of the force and action of created beings. G. iii. The whole is potentially present and seeks its realization in each of the parts. and that it naturally follows a certain and course. nevertheless. must have been And quite unaware of Geulincx s use of the illustration. or. since they include the representation of everything external [to them]. if nothing hinders it that the Monads.44 INTRODUCTION never mentions Geulincx in his writings. the Occasionalist theory is open to the criticism which Leibniz repeatedly 1 . Consequently. . that the former regards finite things as empty of all activity except that which is immediately communicated to them by God. and I am rather of opinion that preservation is a continual creation with an orderly change. on the other hand. But. . Lettre a Bourguet ^1714) (E. that it involves the supposition of perpetual miracle. have at least this in common. 566). if it be true. that it is of the essence of each to represent the same world from a particular point of view. and that each unfolds the series of its perceptions or representa tions in an intelligible order. brings against it. I do not say that the future state of the created being follows from its present state without the co-operation [concours] of God. but rational : impossible to regard Leibniz s theory as the com pletion of the Occasionalist doctrine. Monads spontaneous activity Thus. The Monads. that. namely. which are the true and only substances. 722 a . 1 . to the effect that God is the sole Agent [acteur] though it is true that otherwise it [his hypothesis] does not appear to me well founded. in other words. the pre-established harmony is not arbi no Deus ex machina is invoked. I mean that each created being is pregnant with its future state. cannot be naturally hindered in their inner determinations. the connexion between soul and body must be a purely arbitrary one. in any case there is this essential difference between the Occasionalist theory and that of pre-established harmony. there being nothing in the nature of either which can serve as a reason why this phenomenon of soul should accompany that phenomenon of body and not some other. while the latter is founded on the with conception of finite things as in reality forags. Thus Father Malebranche might perhaps approve the pre-established harmony without giving up his own hypothesis. Thus trary.

in such a way that there is a mutual transference of vibrations between them. on so absolutely that nothing but a purely arbitrary connexion could be supposed a connexion external to the nature of both. 200. The Scholastics seemed to Leibniz to be right in holding that the con nexion is a real one. W. and found that. it impossible to draw any clear line The Cartesian other hand. tions which each gave to the bar of wood caused them ultimately to swing in harmony. separated them the or Occasionalist view. though the vibra they were set swinging out of time with one another. Sigwart. representation. j mutual ideal influence. who hung two pendulums on a bar of wood. that is solved for Leibniz by the supposition of a antinomy substances . 107 sqq. They may be actually connected together. 332. for instance by a piece of wood. C. is given in the Third Explanation of his Two clocks may be made to keep perfect Nciv System. grounded in the nature of the the Cartesians seemed right in maintaining And the the substances are mutually exclusive. p. Or. see Appendix A. Third Explanation of the New System. (Tubingen. 2 For an application of the doctrine of pre-established harmony to a particular case. time with one another in three different ways. The simile of the clocks. pp. between independent the harmony of whose inner developments has been established before their creation 2 . 3 This was suggested to Leibniz by an experiment of Huygens. H. Die Leibnizsche Lehre von der prdstaUirfen Harmonic in ihrem Zusammenhange mit fruheren Philosophemen betrachtet Cf. 1822). p. . Cf. by means of which Leibniz illustrates his theory in relation to the Scholastic and Cartesian views. resulting in a of the perfect agreement of the motions 1 3 pendulums . Leibniz s Illustrations of the pre-established the Clocks Harmony and the Choirs. a relationship of perception or self-active Monads. making between them.GENEKAL PEINCIPLES that it 45 an hypothesis which seeks to reconcile the views of Scholastics and Cartesians \ contrary The scholastic theory of an influxus physicus connected in a way which ultimately confounded soul and is body them.

Or. however. of connexion corresponds to the doctrine of an ways the Occasionalist view. with which alone the earlier Leibniz would maintain that. It is. the imperfection of the editions of his writings. of Monads). and influxus pJiysmts. and are therefore only intellectually apprehended. body. as has too often been done. without any mutual influence or assistance. in which the illustration in 1846. jthey perfectly constructed tEaTthey keep time of themselves. that this is Leibniz s favourite simile \ explaining his system of pre-established harmony for He uses the illustration. 1 Too many historians and teachers have been content with a Wolffian Leibniz though for this there was doubtless some excuse in the For instance. the second to the third to the pre-established harmony. who in a very imperfect way. finally. misleading to suppose. as substances (Monads) are not physical but metaphysical. of the choirs Correspondence with Arnauld. These relations are metaphysical or ideal. and consequently of Monads (or phenomena of the connexion between soul and body is the question of the question as only a confused and imperfect form to the relation between any one Monad and another. If we comthe first of these pariTsoul and body to the two clocks. The relations of body to larger problem thus deals with the to soul as well as the relations of soul and body and soul theories were concerned. was first completely published by Grotefend . they in time with one another a skilled may be supposed to be kept to moment by may have been_so from moment workman. not so much to explain his own it stands to theory as to make clear the relation in which He accepts for the moment the previous hypotheses. occurs. But thesis is is larger and his own hypo more comprehensive than those of his therefore his own problem is nothing but a collection predecessors. to this illustration is to be attributed to Wolff and his school. limited problem which these hypotheses endeavour to solve. represented the metaphysics of Leibniz The somewhat misleading prominence which has been given . it is impossible for us to realize the true relations between them by conceptions of sense or imagination. Body. for Leibniz.46 INTRODUCTION in the second place.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES 47 But he elsewhere uses a simile for the pre-established of the two clocks. which he is. ii. . But in the case of the bands there is a real harmony formed out of the complementary movements of several self-acting units. in such a way together by each following that he who hears them all finds in them a harmony if there that is wonderful and much more surprising than had been any connexion between them. . and so placed hear one another. he should 110 it) that. It would even be possible that some one. but of the longer think of the choir beside take his own merely for an echo of the other. clocks. is comparable to several comitance. or should 1 Tne analogy must not be pressed to an &c other extreme but the simile is much better than that of the . which can nevertheless keep perfectly their own notes. a symbol of . for Leibniz. Cf. ii. should by means and should even acquire such a habit of doing is doing. harmony more adequate than that the Monads to completely independent when he compares In bands of musicians playing in perfect harmony. playing that they do not see or even separately. which I maintain. and the harmony of their and almost meaningless. being beside one of two such of the one judge what the other choirs. hear his this (particularly if we suppose that he could own without seeing it. The clocks are too much Monads. their parts different bands of musicians or choirs. and see the other without hearing with the help of his imagination. 74. and there is also of the spontaneous development from the written notes the score to the system of sounds which they signify. I will say that short. have now considered the three chief conceptions of We 1 Lettre a Arnauld (1687) (G. 2 i the corresponding conscious perception. This development from the written signs to the sounds^ be said to correspond to the passage from\ signified movement alike to represent the is too empty might unconscious to conscious perception in the Monad An unconscious perception is. 2 95). G. this con to use an illustration.

and when it makes on the sense of sight is which says. those which are clear. clear. The distinction of one idea from all others is emphasized by Descartes. of strictly individual substances. Mefkod part Leibniz. present and manifest to the attentive mind. with considerable modifications. force. Meditationes de Cognitione. the distinctness its elements. place. individual substance. In the first place. however. an impression but I call sufficiently strong and definite that distinct which is clear and at the same time so . must now consider more fully the varieties of per ception and appetition which constitute the differences In regard to perception Leibniz adopts the Cartesian distinction among ideas. essence the things which we clearly and distinctly con ceive are true 2 Leibniz follows Descartes in regarding clearness and distinctness as the marks of perfection in ideas or perceptions 3 . in the third place. as we say we see an object clearly when it is present to the eye looking on. Descartes divided ideas into those which are obscure. while Leibniz rather lays stress upon the internal distinctness of the idea. is the essence of real. in the form af-^arception and arise as the solution of his the metaphysic of Leibniz. Veritate et Ideis (1684) 1 ^ . the pre-established harmony is introduced to account for the possibiliiy^^bafigaJn elementary substances without prejudice to the whole. Clear and confused Perception and Degrees of Appetition. but he does not limit the disall .4-8 INTEODUCTION we have seen how they problem in the form which is given to it by its historical setting. and those which are distinct as well as clear. or life. interprets clearness and distinctness some what differently from Descartes. and appetition. And definitely distinguished from everything else that its 1 is evident to him who properly considers it . I call that he We amongst Monads. Cf. the principle (^continuity or the identity of indiscernibles is the hypothesis by which In the second Leibniz endeavours to explain the system or inter-relation And. intension. 2 Prmcipia i. 45.

bk. . into which its notion may be analyzed. Confused are not for Leibniz. Monads consist entirely in the various degrees of perfec distinctness : tion or distinctness with which they perceive or represent not suffice notion is obscure when it does iv. 1 ii. nor does he draw a sharp line between ideas which are perfectly clear and distinct. i Prineipia. that the thing they give a reason for their opinion and saying But a distinct dislike is lacking in something. correspondence of perceptions to reality. of things. it enables Essay. 486). in so far as the name is applied indifferently Thus knowledge is clear . i. question. . obscure and confused ideas are of no avail in affording us the knowledge of anything out of ourselves. ch. namely one acquired through marks and tests sufficient for the discerning For Locke s views. Thus the differences among the is. they know not what. &quot. vol. cause&quot.. of Aristotle. which are confused or obscure. V \ . p. although the thing really has such marks and essential elements. formal efficient. the thing represented.entelechy&quot. ct. and final causes. notion is such an one as the assayers have regarding gold. Part iv. of the thing from all other similar bodies.GENERAL PRINCIPLES tinction 49 - between distinct and confused ideas to the ideas which we consciously possess. 29. 203. when recognize It is contused distinct. regarding the And there is no . 422) (E 79 a instance when for the recognition of the thing represented. or when I think of some scholastic term the &quot. and clear us to G : A &quot. (Eraser s ed. as for not so well I remember some flower or animal formerly seen. knowledge again is either confused or when I cannot separately enumerate the marks which are sufficient for distinguishing the thing from others. as for Descartes.. . but it as to be able to recognize it when it appears and to distinguish from some other near it. while. sqq. clear and distinct ideas representing their objects with perfect truth. the more perfect any perception or repre-*| it sentation is. So we see painters and other artists knowing but often unable to rightly what is well and what is badly done. but serve rather to impede it According to Leibniz all perceptions but are more or less perfect representations of objects distinctness or of they vary infinitely in their degrees Confusedness is simply a low degree of I confusedness.. which without them could not be what it as in Descartes. while the less perfect J the more is it confused. the more distinct is it. or insufficiently explained. mere perceptions mistakes and illusions but they belong to the real order is. like to material. E . and all others.

Thus the - might _be_givenjo^all certain perfection ^ wx. inasmuch as it ideally seen^ potentially contains Aristotelian name of Entelechies_ the whole within itself. however confusedly or living principle. distinctness. with this very important An omniscient reads itself off. proceeding. an exceedingly condensed algebraical some which can be indefinitely expounded statement of determining what like the symbol TT in the problem the diameter and the relation between the lengths of It is like : differcircumference of a circle. It is big with the ithin itself all that it is to be. but vii. the confused perception to unfold into for or less confusedly Each Monad contains the whole more 1 rise to a more within itself and by its appetition may contains as it were enfolded Ea^h Monad (perfect state. c\ and a certain self-sufficienc more Distinctly i The world is entirely in each of its parts. rational every Monad perfection c or simple substance has a certain degree or or completeness. While there is thus a perfect continuity in the degrees the of perfection with which the Monads represent created universe. Monad actually represents or imperfectly. future. Lettre a la Princesse Sophie (1696) (U. that the Monad and history of the whole feeing could see the reality [universe within the lowest Monad. Leibniz has roughly distinguished or bare Monads into three main classes (i) unconscious and (3) Monads (monades nues). (2) conscious Monads. but it is possible not essentially separate from one another. fence. Three Classes of created Monads (i) unconscious. from one L &amp. and as each is essentially a force the distinct and the confused are perception to another. As we have or self-conscious Monads.lt. in some than in others. 544)- .c INTRODUCTION But as each the universe. . (3) self-conscious. (2) conscious. by its own spontaneous activity. the whole universe.

G. by mereTeeling. possible to draw broad lines of division among them. every Monad might. which there is a and the intermediate degree. vii. Nevertheless. . the Conscious sensation or feeling. . . the characteristics of the 18. and memory. in spite it is of this essential unity of nature in the Monads. accompanied by marks oif certain simpler forms of memory. reason. also occurs in those who are stunned. perception combined with E 2 . we may 2 esprits) . The differences of appetition in the three classes of Monads (corresponding to the three grades of be expressed perception which characterize them) may as mere impulse. The spirits class of rational souls or spirits includes (intelligences. Now thought 3 . men and bare higher intelligences. . animal instinct or blind desire governed created or will. The intermediate beings that soul - class is that of animals.lt. 464 b Cf. which we call sense is certain higher degree which we call thought. Monaddogy. in addition to uncon may name scious and conscious perception or rational souls call these &amp. And general as there are still higher Monads which have self-conscious ness and reason or thought proper. De Anima Brutorum (1710). being or force. in the general wlrich has BeenTalready explained. clearly Monads from those which have merely unconscious or To the former class the name confused perception. and self-conscious desire two higher classes possesses. so to spafllf. 10 and 13 (E. of Entelechies or Monads will suffice.GENEEAL PRINCIPLES and. while for the latter the be souls specially applied. and all the class of Entelechies or Monads includes real have not reached the stage of consciousness. in addition Each of the to its 1 own specific qualities. eachjsjjnnits^ownj^ the universe and complete in itself as an active living other hand. . On the son I/ Inasmuch as it has both perception be called a * 1 sense of these words alio^appetition. degree of perception. 5T incorporeal automata / 1 That is to say. : . Sense is perception which contains something distinct and 330) Besides the lowest is combined with attention and memory.

vol. Self-consciousness in the Philosophy of Leibniz and in a that of Descartes. * 3 T. probably had I out by of this may be brought significance which Leibniz reference to the position of Descartes. ^8. in most of our the dawn. a profound fall into a faint or have ample. 22 and 23. acts of the soul b not functions of self-consciousness. the According to Descartes in view. i. ii. or trance his conscious animal awakes out of a sleep unfolded themselves out of imme . p. of it. when they 1 In such a case they are not and dreamless sleep is inde of perceptions. oh. v 4 S 2 Ibid. but may we are empi actions and beliefs Indeed. perceptions must of an unconscious kind diately preceding perceptions the animals both sense-perception Again men share with and imagination and the empirical sequence of memory to the concatenation of rational which bears a resemblance if. be sufficiently distinguished from thought. INTRODUCTION Thus both animals and men have for . is no mind or jsciousness there have no soulsself-consciousness and therefore they have sensations and But animals are mere machines. f/^sqq. Cf. . processes. inferior unconscious as well as conscious . but because because we know the cause 4 in the past happened regularly . are purely physical and animals. of Locke s Essay. &quot. are and consequently sensation and impulse impulses. for the Monad entirely destitute and it cannot exist without. i have . comes only from Thus without self-conAnimals have no soul. not as for instance when we expect rics. perception of so that when the man are entirely from within. ***.k (E. A s ed. The rational soul is the mind and its reality of Silts conscious certainty itself.c- 2 Monads. in man or in the lower they occur I mechanical whether G. Monadology. 129). perceptions. and FraL 28. structible (being indivisible) The changes of the Monad some kind.

in virtue of the dependence it is possible to give a goobeings upon Him. it is : returned to how sitionHoeiweelilmnTand oTkiiid but degree_. 136. an attribute (as an independent substance. to the phrase that that being. God Himself. real and correct. p. 53 we have immediate selfto the from which we may proceed outward alone that certainty of other things. and that the knowledge some attention to it. merely a modification . In this way God is the object of our souls and that meanin&quot. of this Introduction. 452 . c&amp.ecomes 1 G and The truth is that we see all things in ourselves we have of the soul is very in our souls. it is through the knowledge which we and it is substance. alone self-consciousness identical with self-consciousness of mere con must not be taken as entirely exclusive Otherwise we have unconsciousness. in Spinoza made it) of the infinite number. independent of substance. Makbranche (1708) (E. on the other hand.gt. its various forms one or other mind must not be regarded as But. provided we have given have of the And further.gt. Yet it is true that God gives us all that is positive bodies md all the perfection involved in it. not body_J&amp. sciousness or of There must somethe Cartesian dualism. The validity But. . Cf. to a reality external to it \ depend on reference of Descartes other hand. we see all things in Him. we know vi *V78) Cf Pvnarques sur le b sentiment du P. the conception of the Monads as preserved through Mind is not substances.f be an unconscious a^y^y^jnmd^aiidLlhe^^ppQi a difference. Leibniz desires to preserve the independence is of and self-sufficiency self-consciousness or the self-certainty of thinking must not be made mind. Thus for Descartes the line on the one between consciousness and unconsciousness on the other must be very side and self-consciousness independence of self-con sharply drawn the complete : sciousness Now of the to the root of the Cartesian dualism. also Part iii. through an immediate and of all created continual emanation.GENERAL PRINCIPLES self-consciousness certainty. soul that we know extension and through reflexion upon our thoughts in this. the mechanical dualism on the must be avoided. is The independence of self-consciousness a plurality of real.

54

INTRODUCTION

The latter arrives at as the result of a rigorous analysis whose instrument is doubt \ It is an ultimate fact the fact of a subject thinking, without regard to any specific object of its thought. Self-consciousness is the bare witness of consciousness to itself, its self-conthe self-conscious

Self-consciousness in the philosophy of Leibniz is however, a very different thing from self-consciousness the philosophy of Descartes.

m

Ego

tency.

In the certainty of self-consciousness Descartes

empty

(justifiably or not) finds involved the certainty of God Perfect Being, and from this he proceeds to the

certainty of the external world and to the principle that :lear and distinct ideas are characteristic of self-conscious ness and are a sufficient warrant for the reality of their For Leibniz, on the other objects. hand, the Ego is not a pure subject, whose essence
is

W-

immediate
<

sciousness.
.t

can be a pure subject. immediately clear to me that I think, but

No Monad

self-con-

--

Not only
quite

it is

Leibniz seems strangely to have missed the significance of Descartes s method of doubt, probably because his Interest lav

iroror to m older

"

, , attract people

open theatres

sale get m which they show farces for their remedies set up and other extraoJd narv

and

a

oaro

Descartes lays special stress upon self-conseiov

question

- <Whtn

What

in reality

his answer to the
is

substance

?

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
as clear to

55

now have different thoughts; that An Ego is one of an &e." I ttfcfc of A, now of B, and its self-consciousness infinite number of substances, but a difference the ground of its existence, is thus not others it and in degree of quality between which .has developed conscious Monad is merely one. nature more fully than those or perceptive representative In or baiaJHoB^s which we describe as animal souls of ourselves, before we think oilier words, we are Egos or reflect upon ourselves as Egos. realize ourselves, of ourselves and of God are raised to the knowledge

me

that

I

.

^

We
.
;

clearness and distinctness others consists in the greater dis ideas. But, as clearness, and of its perceptions and terms (every Monad having percep-. tinctness are relative the speci degree clear and distinct), must be a self-conscious being perceptions of cannot accept Leibniz, as we have seen, defined. confused and obscure Cartesian view which totally rejects and distinctness the sole criteria ideas and makes clearness t to being clear and distinct, In addition of truth*

The

difference

between

the self-conscious

Monad and

i,,

bk. iv. eh.

7,

7

&&

*

;

fe. v.

39D80 b;

G

iv.

r6 J
ideas

INTRODUCTION
which are
characteristic of a rational being

must

be analyzed, so that their grounds or premises may be And thus the specific as fully exhibited as possible. of a rational soul or self-conscious Monad is jjhe

qu^ity

j
/

knowledge"

of necessar^_and eternal truths/ that is to sa^oEJEeultimate grounds or ^premises ol aTTknowledge. The self-conscious Monad represents or perceives the

universe in an articulate way. It has carried the internal evolution or realization of the universe so far that its themselves. principles have clearly revealed

underlying It is by the knowledge of necessary truths and by their
abstract expression [leurs abstractions] that we are raised to acts of reflexion which make us think of what is called and observe that this or that is within us and thus, in thinking of ourselves, we think of being, of substance,
:
"I,"

of the simple and the compound, of the immaterial and of God Himself, conceiving that what is limited in us And these acts of reflexion is in Him without limits.

^ furnish the chief objects of our reasonings V
a difference.
principle
:

This at once suggests Descartes, but Descartes with For Leibniz, as for Descartes, the idea of
whatever I dearly and distinctly perceive regarding anything,
it.

that is true or (rightly} practicable [enuntiabile] of

which are

filings and distinct to really obscure and confused seem clear men judging hastily. The axiom, therefore, is useless, unless there be added such criteria of the clear and distinct as we have given, and unless there is certainty [constet] regarding the truth of the For the rest, the rules of common Logic, which are also ideas. are not to be despised as criteria of true state used in

For often

Geometry, be admitted ments, such rules, for instance, as that nothing should as certain unless it has been proved by accurate observation demonstration. But strict demonstration [experientia ] or by strict is that which keeps to the form prescribed by Logic, not necessarily custom of always in syllogisms set out in order according to the but at least in such a way that the conclusion of the schools the argument follows from its very form. Any right calculation might be taken as an example of an argument of this kind, con ceived in due form. Therefore no necessary premise must be left been either proved or out, and all the premises must first have assumed by way of hypothesis, in which case the conclusion also is will hypothetical. Those who will diligently observe these things easily guard themselves against deceptive ideas.
.
.

.

1

Monadology,

30.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
God
or the

57
_

involved in that jof rds Si imperfect self-conscious being. Yet Leibniz_re ga in the self-congcious tEe lcTea~ofOo<ras contained, not

most Perfect Being

is

being alone, but, in one
being.

way

than consequence for Leibniz the idea of God is pre-supposed in the foTfecartes that consciousness of self. That which is of most importance a know-j to Leibniz is that self-consciousness pre-supposes for Leibniz, in general Thus, ledge of necessary truths

or another, iiT every real^
.

Thus

it is of less

not merely the eternally necessary Being whose existence and who is 111 very idea (or essence) involves He of existence to all other things the that

God

is

f

of Monads is also the greatest of beings, the highest monadimi ), whose own existence is one among (Monas must not many necessary and eternal truths. eternal truths, being dependent imagine, as some do, that
]

way

ground

:

,

|

We

and depend on His will, as Des Monsieur Poiret, appear to have cartes, and afterwards There are truths or facts which are dependent held 2 and on The will of God, but these are not necessary

on

"God,

are arbitrary

.

eternal.

The Kinds of Truth according to Leibniz. Necessary and eternal Truths and contingent Truths.
the self-conscious Accordingly as, on Leibniz s view, has not a primary and independent reality, based being on a complete difference in kind between itself and other

^

kind of beings, so the special

(that of eternal to a self-conscious and necessary truths) which belongs certain being is not to be regarded as the only absolutely to the form of which all other real knowledge, truth, There are two kinds of truths, those must be reduced.

knowledge

\

of reasoning

and those of fact

.

The former

are the

eternal and necessary truths, the latter are contingent.
1 Giordano Bruno, as well as Leibniz, speaks of God as monadum.
Mt>na*

2

Monadology,

46.

58
nd the
difference

INTRODUCTION
between them

is that, the., truths .of self-evident principles or reasoning are either ultimate truth s which are reducible to such first principles by to a process of strict logical analysis, while any attempt loads truths of fact into their ultimate grounds analyze must filially b referred to an infinite process, and they 1 to God as their ground eminenter
.

the Philosophy of Leibniz, Logical Principles of or Contradiction. Principle of Identity
.-

(a)

With this division of human knowledge into two great of kinds we come in sight of the guiding principles
Leibniz lrpnTosophy,
tincf from
its logical

presuppositions

as dfc

underlying

The logic its specific metaphysical doctrines. of Descartes and Spinoza the
philosophies
2
.

was a

one kind. All all real knowledge of that kind must be that is not apparent knowledge unreal and illusory. This was neces as
<

logic of abstract self-consistency must be ultimately of

In their view

regarded entirely in the position that there is no appeal sarily involved The order consciousness to itself. beyond the witness of and of ideas is the same as the order and connexion

connexion of things V

And,

as all things

must be

re/

referable to one ground or cause, so garded as ultimately referable to one standard ;* all ideas must ultimately be tncmther bv one principle. that is, musUbe linked

standard^riuin5e~t!Taf ot

aeii-e videnceoT absence ofjjejf-

I

of doubt as supenoi tc a logical for instance, regards his method Here, if I am based on the principle of contradiction. deduction, be beginning to see that he not wrong says Eudoxus, "Jon must to deduce from who can make a proper use of doubt will be able more useful U very certain truths, nay rather, more certain and the great prmcip truths than those which we derive from or centre to which all other Pnciples usually lay down as the basis same thing can both be is impossible that one and Ihe mTv be referred, (Euvres de
:
>

*aXv^
be."

evident to themselves.
,

Descartes

eje

and not

Recherche de la Verite par

les

lumieres naturelles,

Descartes (Cousin), vol. xi. p. 366. 3 ii. Prop. 7. Spinoza, Ethics, Part

^GE>
>

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
another

59

is simply way contradiction in the ideas, winch immediate witness of consciousness of describing the and ..^istmct-^d*itself. Truejdeas must ba.*lear are free JroDDLSgtfbe-jrnanifest that they that it may must either be imme contradiction-. All real knowledge or as eternal and necessary truth, diately recognizable such truth by a formally or must be deducible from conclusive process. Thus the philosophies

mathematically
of Descartes

contradiction,

and Spinoza were ruled by the principle of_ and not that A cannot both be A

A^

identical propositions, that necessary truths are involves an express contradiction^ opposite held that self-consciousness is self-consistent,

who*

words, they itself. that it never absolutely contradicts a perfectly sound doctrine.

-T^^rS^S^aSl^S,
it

Its fault is that

does not go far enough.

Self

sciousness

is

much more than merely

self-consistent.

I

and on the surface./ self-consistency is not immediate of parts, wither is not a mere negative self-identity content. to their specific To^be self-conjistenj^
regard according to
to
Tr>e

t.hft

itself.

thing whose
is

principle of contradiction, t a else/ to "oiranythmg ihat_ia, not anything els ultimate essence is to be

T

be"

Nothing is immediately 2 In other words, all real as much as something quite be mediate il self- consistency must (not merely formal) from the specif must have grounds. It must spring 3 And thus, a^ the self- consistent thing nature of
nothing.
<

self-consistent

.

.

contended, even

axiommay

requireroot

involves a contradiction, and

2? In ; Frase^s 9 (E. 3 6a a G. v. 392; that a thing is what statement the natural [i. e. logica l] order, the that it is not another thing. it is, is prior to the statement It eh. 3, * *4 (E aaa a Or. v. 98) Cf. Nouveaux Essais, bk. i. f that it is good to work out proo is one of my great maxims,
;

3

C f Nouveaux

e,

true

that
3

h

is

opposed
ed. vol.
;

o

bk.

iv. eh. 8, 5

ii

p.

3

Essais, bk. iv. ch. 7,

.

;

7
g

^.
INTRODUCTION
:
.

basis of it must be evidence requires elucidation the is really s Self-consciousness, then, made manifest a definite system, consistent only in virtue of its being or development, which contains a self-revealing process or reason of its self-consistency, (within itself the ground AccordjagljaJ! or reason of existence. the

and

:

treat

as if it were merely in philosophical investigation as if the law which expresses superficially self-consistent, of cMiilra.li.-ti Ui, would its whole nature were
it
11."

ground

Ew

to arrive at

die the principle of contradiction as thus interpreted, the reason for this inadequacy. clearly enough perceive not a He regarded the principle of contradiction, of all of the one principle imperfect interpretation but as an inbe made perfect by further definition, to a certain kind of to dependent principle, adequate co-ordinate to be supplemented by another yet requiring kind be the standard of another should principle, which be the the principle of contradiction of truth. whatever is not self-contradictory principle of knowledge,

an empty and abstract result. the inadequacy however, while recognizing Leibniz,

o

H

i

is

true

;

and nothing

is

true unless

it

can be

it is

what

not self-contradictory. According to is or is not self-contradictory? t. done by analytically reducing C-irtesiaiis this is to be or more self-evident propodoubtful statement to one that the state words, by showing sitfoSr^n~offier or more propositions ment is ultimately involved in one is manifestly conta of such a kind that their predicate maintains that ther But Leibniz in their subject I
1

But how are we

to

shown that determm

the axioms themselves.

Cf.

Eraser

s ed.

of Locke s Essay, vol.

ii.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
sati sfactorUy statements to which it is impossible that Their very nature is such to apply this test. be brought to an cannot in their case process of analysis we remain unable to say whether end, and consequently At any rate, or not. the; are really self-contradictory or the absence of it, cannot be!

many

their self-contradiction,

,

made
I

that For instance, the statement true be perfectly took a lo njL walk yesterday may
self-evident.

1

buTb^no amount
its

truth

by

not

the eternal nature of things dir^ctiylr^nded in of other truths, which may determined by a multitude demand an infinite analysis each in their turn
.

^esmilsJ^^^^^^me.

for us to test of analysis is it possible reducing it to self-evident propositions. Its truth is not

IUM

but

b etve

T

the tarn,, of

20 oA

;

The

difference

between necessary ami

l*rk

truths. But, as ir or their reduction to identical an infinite process ratios the reduction involves

and yet

62

INTRODUCTION

are to be truths at/ contingent truths, however (if they false or doubtful statements), musj; all, and not merely 1 truth is such that have some ground or reason JEfjfche to find for it an absolute and eternal it is impossible there must at reason in the first principles of things, reason why it least be some satisfactory or sufficient
.

should be so and not otherwise.
the Philosophy of Leibniz, (b) Principle of Sufficient Eeason. Thus Leibniz supplements the principle of contra of sufficient diction by the addition of the principle sound as if one name has a makeshift
)gical Principles

of

reason.

The

should say, [\
in cases

We must be content with
a perfect reason
is

a sufficient reason

where

not to be found.

But

more than a in the philosophy of Leibniz it is much This principle is essential to his system and, makeshift.
In the the greater part of its value. as that ^in this principle Honadology, Leibniz defines be found real or virtue of which we hold that no fact can unless there be a sufficient exisEng, no statement true, reason why it should be so and not otherwise, although As us 2 these reasons very often cannot be known by reason might thus defined, the principle of sufficient of contra almost be regarded as including the principle the self-consistency of necessary diction, inasmuch as Self-consistency or truths is their sufficient reason.
indeed, gives
it
.
^

which God alone can accomplish. Accordingly it is by with certainty. alone that these truths are known a priori and be found For although the reason of any succeeding state might this preceding state can that which precedes it, yet a reason for the the final reason a^ain be given, and so we never come to But this infinite process itself takes the place of a reason, series have because in its own special way it might from the beginning God, tJ been immediately understood outside of the series, states Author of things, on whom both antecedent and consequent even more than they are dependent upon c are
analysis,

Him

m

m

m

dependent,

another.
3
2
Ibid"

32!

In the

Theodicee,

44 (E. 5*5

J

G. vi

-

I2 7;

?

he

calls

it

Determining [deciding] Reason.

720 a 1 cor^eivaW_and_ Cf. be made explicit. often can only while in the case of contingent truths we without knowthat there must be a sufficient reason. 111. 573)Lettre a Bourguet (1714) (E. Port-Eoyal Logic. the for in the case of necessary truths superior position. in some sense.In I/We have / truth seen that the grounds of any contingent truths or or fact are to be sought in other contingent an attempt to analyze a contingent truth facts. it is possible \ I everything whichjs_not self-contradictory is Accordingly. to say that eve^thmgjBossible is true possible everything which is perfectly . The PosslUe and ComposslUe.call or real.GENERAL PRINCIPLES 63 test of the sufficiency absence of self-contradiction is one on the other hand. without which has consequently an essence. But the opposite of every particular 80 b Meditat tones de Cognitione. an idea.lt. 428). . a G. that is. . &c. itself free from contradiction is the say that a thing is in to same as to say that. be called the the principle of contradiction. to_say_that is true or real I . of the reason. contradiction has an independent and. who is necessary Substance or God. viz. the The lest of all sufficient The value and importance of the principle of more manifest when we inquire furtherreason become consist? what does the sufficiency of the reason &amp. possible Worlds. Baynes. and that an infinite process. the principle of But. But their source. of things allows it to considering whether the remainder become existentl. iv. what may the reason consisted in the absence of of sufficiency But to self-contradiction in the thing or proposition. or fact into its grounds thus leads to Accordingly | it seems to_LeibmzJh^ \ 1 in something outside contingent truths irmstTbe sought in an eternal. In the case of this requires some further explanation. and of the system of contingent things. by itself and without reference other things. can reason can always be given. say reason ing fully what the is. G. (1684) (E. 425: .

a direct self-contradiction. Leibniz. contradiction with the general system. Everything 2 that which is also compossible has existence but in Leibniz only . G. s l Accordingly^ compossible. Spinoza. we shall see that the truth alone is possible. not in to an indefinite itself alone. 57 2) ^ in order to know whether the romance of Astraea is admit 1 ( . things. for it sitting here at this moment. the contingent in their^ here at this moment. and consequently to make the contingent (which is the result of on the other hand. work. does not involve I am the truth of contingent tilings is not_groundfidJurJJieir-. made the contingent necessary. for it involves an immediate self-contradiction. are not jointly possible. is the true test of reality. their opposite*.64 INTRODUCTION : event or contingent truth is possible in this sense it does not necessarily imply a self-contradiction. the actual systemjof compossibility. are true or ival. Each is possible. but assigned the choice among possible things But this is practically to make the choice arbitrary will of God. The opposite of the truth. &c. character. (1697) (E. Descartes did not admit that everything which is possible is to the mere realized. IrT themselves. an approach to Spinoza s view. Accordingly. mid not. Their sufficient reason lies relafiohTo olIieFIEmgs]! truths and their opposites are alike possible considered in relation to other things. iii. &c. that in this its number connexion opposite is impossible. Lettre a Bourguet (1714) (E. 719 b. everything possible is realized. . or conformity with sufficient reason. in one passage Principia. by holding that choice) fortuitous. Rcponse aux G.The opposite of the axiom. but in relation my of other truths regarding (say) habits. buTThey or. : that. The opposites of are in contingent truths. however. iv. points out that Descartes Matter must successively take all the forms of iii. Reflexions. phrase. the hour of the day. mutually compatible. 47) says that which it is capable. the truths alone are possible. 144 a 2 * do n( Cf. is possible. Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another/ is not possible. though not self-contradictory. It is not in virtue of their very essence or possibilitvA idea Unit they. if we consider the truth that I am sitting : beyondjthemselves. the which is possible has an essence or nionning. For instance. 340)..

mean . . that it may because it involves no contradiction. without that. in part* written by Honore d Urfe (1568-1625) and was published ot J between the years 1610 and 1619. W( . yes. it ffi^TB^upposed of which one only has existence as possible universes. r&amp. consequently. . _each_of of compossible elements. while the ground of the individual thing of things. and La Rochefoucauld. modelled . Arnauld (1686) (G-. 45 ^ : J .ut the principle of sufficient mi sou know its connexion possible it would be necessary to That would be necessary in order to of the universe. n. anything. compossible. him as a general reference to system not interpreted by to be the only or as reference to a system which is held 1 one possible. 24) remarks that in and the world of existences remains one of the obscure points the philosophy of Leibniz. and. is now. several to an all-inclusive system . plays such write it was read with much appreciation by it.gt. is possible should do away with the contingent. its compossibility with the actual system with Leibniz does not admit that mere compossibility the existence of the cornany system whatever implies The principle of sufficient reason is possible essences. has never for it if by possible we existed and never shall exist. with the rest know whether this whether it is compossible with it. or shall be [realized] For assuredly. 1 we were to reject absolutely things which arc merely possible. in order to b have actually exist. the rest of the universe would be otherwise other than it is.ll as essence.t was works as the Aminla of Tasso or the Pastor Fido of Guarini. many keys to it were written. It is a strange medley and the Court society torical and imaginary events and characters. in any corner ot romance has been. . La Fontaine. It was translated into almost every European were founded upon lan-ua-e. is not possible. The correspondence with Arnauld shows that Leibniz was conscious of the insufficiency of his explana tions and of the difficulty of the problem. But it is another as I have just said. say question whether Astraea is absolutely possible. whatever create would be necessary-supposing that God has resolved to Nolen (La Critique de Kant et la Mdaphysr^e de Leibniz. there will be no place the universe And it is very true that what does not exist. F . and it is possible that it may s on L Astree was the first French pastoral romance. to identity tne of Europe for a long time amused itself by trying characters of the story. systems or universes. Remarqnes sur /a lettre de M. Indeed^ that there is an_endless series^ suchy.GENERAL PRINCIPLES 65 s reality is But. possible There are which coiiSrorrcSIIectioh . But. the relation between the world of possibles p. and Rousseau. . if nothing God has created except what God has actually created. for.

He may because. whether it be in the actual world or merely in the 43 and 47. of the best of all possible worlds actual universe is all : \ worlds which are really worlds or systems. the principle principle of sufficient of contradiction and the reason remain side by side in the 1 According to Leibniz. Also Monadology. region of the Divine ideas. Its essence is the same. actual universe ground both of the essence and of the existence of the 2 which. being perfect in goodness of will. in Leibniz s language. His choice possibl~e&quot. ) : . the actual universe of God operates. Monadology. He chooses Thus the Divine Nature is ultimately the the best. that is to Thus the the fullest and most complete essence. that is to say. actual universe that whose liompossible elements admit of the greatest 1 amount of perfection or reality. 201 (E. vi. 1 . Theodicee. in its turn.66 still INTRODUCTION for the requires that a cause or reason be assigned the actual universe rather than any other existence of among those which are possible. possibilities. 53-55. vi. 7 (E.world unlimited. ments. 107 Cf. notes. existence (or the creation which produces existence) involves no change in the essence of a thing. He contains all possible worlds in His understanding and perceives that which is best and. is the immediate ground . Accordingly. it is not an arbitrary choice. His understanding is G. since it is the . being create any being omniscient. The existence of the actual universe i! II is its creation by God. say. jn which the. of all worlds whose elements are compossible. 236). 1 limited God chooses as the jlbut a choice according to reason. i| God makes is . which is the pure understanding I but also in the sphere of iiiial causes. that is. being un- in its application. this choice P omnipotent. sufficient reason of all particular things. 506 a the source of essences. and His will is the origin of existences. 565 b G. as a system of cornof its individual ele possibles. ^ While the choice of God amongst all possible God is free. its not merely in the region of ideas. * . will In other words. or essences^! being of God. Cf. I isThe~result of a free choice of universes.. . and Theodicee.

Strictly speaking. B for ever exclusive of the other. throughout all changes. is is always B Black is black. Each the principle of sufficient reason. and these are subject to the but the reality of all mcliprinciple of contradiction vidual substances and their changes is dependent on the will as well as the understanding of God. in every variety of relations. . inconsistent not so true as with the best possible. inclining. F 2 . . philosophy of Leibniz. I j whikTthe latter is a relative. is 1 What follows is. TJie leading Characteristics of Leibniz s Philosophy as * Results of the two great logical Principles.of j being~an absolute.-see how . i . or metaphysical necejssiisk whose opposite is impossible. involving self-contmdictioa. as The principle of contradiction. inconsistent not with itself but with the system of which iris a part. great logical principles of contradiction. furicusement white. a certain necessity but the necessity principle expresses of the principle of contradiction differs in kind froin_ the principle of sufficient reason. not an exposition of Leibniz s explicit doctrine. the former that all subject to . while no attempt is made to find a more comprehensive include both. &quot. each having its specific but neither reducible to the other. compelling. of course. but an analytic investigation of the way in which his logical principles fix the main lines of his philosophy. in all circumstances. sity^ whose opposite is not impossible. white white. thus interpreted. and they are_ . then. is A A can each is never become B. A is always A. taken winch underlie by itself.GENEKAL PKINCIPLES 67 function. Wejvre_ now in a positiojauio. or moral nesssbut incompossible. principle which may There are certain eternal and necessary truths which are independent of the will of irTHis understating alone. much with the eternally .A is (every real thing is identical with itself) at all times.the main features of the -Metaphysics of Leibniz are determined by these The principle it \ a principle of exclu sion. furieusemcnt black.

68 INTRODUCTION v a principle of pure self-identity which asserts permanence to the exclusion of change or. if the parts be real and purely self-identical. C. For Leibniz. in this sense. On the other be A without further distinction. leaving otherwise accounted for. which has no real parts or determinations because it is equally indifferent to all possible determina or a bare collection of severally possible. identical. the . on the other hand. yields either a whole.__jt is the influence of ai 1pf T. and is determined without reality of each is self-centred then there is no regard to its relations to the others. considered that the real is that which is not self-contradictory. only if the hand.^ parts. incompossible parts. and since not-A includes B. The A as meaning merely principle of contradiction. simple. but may receive a variety And Since A as it is simple it can have no real parts. a& to the conception of r^n] And it is the same. but jointly tions. the principle of contra Now. can Some it cannot be true that some A is B or C. relations subordinate or of Terms.1 infinite plurality of simple i from one another.A. relations it must be simple. but only a numerical collection of individuals which may even be contradictory of one another. e. thus_jfcskap-tiy intfi^pr^^j ft substance as. i. the reality making fictitious. principle thataceounte f^ +. in order to give due value to the differences isolation in the universe. cannot be not. must treat whole and parts as (consciously or unconsciously) exclusive of one another. it must exclude as unreal all not be purely selfOtherwise it will or differences. it insists on exclusion of difference. And. without indecomposable. Consequently a philosophy whose dominant is principle that of contradiction. holds the principle of contradiction as the whole to be ensuring reality to the parts.mhni/ diction. real whole. unity to the In other words. &c. in general.. &quot. of real predicates. asserting the reality of the one For if the whole be real as against that of the other.

While the predicate actually in some way be contained of every true proposition must in each parHcuTar in the subject. may . though not self-evidently of its reason changes the reason of each.GENERAL PRINCIPLES mutual isolation of simple 69 substances is but another can never become name for their abstract self-identity. ! whole nature V: . made The predicate must Lave perfectly and self-eviaentl^ a sufficient ground or a self-evident reasoTT in the subject. this Introduction. have the manifold [multitude] can contain differences is 1 The problem how the simple substance of contradiction and the same as the problem how the principles as independent and co-ordinate. the various per the variety or change in the Monad. the whole variety of its existence of contradiction requires thntj-eal tain its it is The principle substance must con.!. that. or a part of one Monad can ever become another.. p. can ever are simple. 811011 a wav !&amp..7 case. Part .m:imust Every true proposition must be self-sufficient.gt. or varieties. Cf. ceptions which are in the simple substance. wijto^ML^-. . but potentially analytic. --. be anaiyhcallfa^^ of substance !. Ivtic. Tllus ^ie iiow the principle in every that the analysis is not necessarily completed substance must be self-sufficient and self. while in every its self-sufficiency is not necessarily explicative.l:r-!ii\v. but not necessarily Monad must be conceived as sufficiently the The one. it does not foTkwThat : fully it is case the relation can be . 60. In other words... become B. and. but pro Many true propositions are not gressively self-revealing. note 2. no part of and B B. as One Monad can never become of B. ii. But Monad of sufficient reason is added to explain cae dynamic not immediately self-explaining.e th ^&quot. sufficient reason can be treated Of 2 this Leibni/ offers no clear solution.-.. and no quality a quality of another. with The principle of sufficient reason in combination the idea of the the principle of contradiction yields it con Monad as itself the source of all the differences A A A tains. is not static but Its self-identity realized.

and those things for which we must be content with a ground or reason in olio would be entirely illusory. there an infinite number of angles. points. On the other hand. ciple of contradiction. 542) : tion of the world. this empirical sequence is the series of perceptions in Monads that have not reached the selfcoiiscious stage) attributes to this sequence a relative work Leibniz (for whom reality. the contingent sequence of ideas that comes ab as confused and therefore unreal and a of imagination.70 INTRODUCTION reality even though they are not all perfectly clear and Thus Spinoza. Extrait du Dictionnaire de Principles of Nature and of Grace. it is potentially. \ clear inasmuch as and distinct. 2. principle of sufficient reason imposes the further condition that the simple substance must have relations to other simple substances and to the whole. 1 . but they are not Terms exclusive of relations. l . rejected merely empirical know ledge. Cf. under the guidance of the prin distinct. ^ / Further. It is a part of theirl essential reality to contain within themselves a multiThe Monad may be likened to 1^ plicity of relations. &c. formed by the lines which The principle of contradiction requires nothing but a pure simplicity in the individual substance any kind of simple substance would satisfy meet in it . centres exclusive of one another . and that only those simple (self-consistent) substances are also consistent with the real unity For otherwise every real substance would have its ground or reason wholly in se. exists centre or point in which. God lias put injeacli soul a concentra Bayle. illusory. though not actually. \it. Thus the combination of self-consistency with consistency in relation to the But the are real which of the whole. quite simple though it is. (1702) (G. we see the influence of the principle of sufficient reason in the conception of the Monads as each representative of the whole universe from its particular The Monads are indeed Terms or absolute point of view. expericntia vaga. iv.

while the latter is compatible perhaps be incompatible. contradiction the principle of the best or most it is inconsistent with that the actual system of things. would Monads is cease to be ruledjL&quot. But this. on^elliHnrg-thrFesI^L-the &amp. But it is inconsistent of the world. of admitting the principle of the consideration will show that Lastly. say. a very slight of inits obverse. universe as a the ground or the principle of its reason of the appetition in each. fitting which governs of sufficient the principle it is inconsistent with to A : is reason. more perfect That one possible thing is in itself for the existence of than another is no sufficient reason the former might the former rather than the latter . harmony the is The~^re-established harmony substances system of compossible of of a system. ^U^M^petition of-tba i hv the Principle of realizing the full but by the principle consistent or theabstractly possible.lt. is a consequence changes. to the principle of sufficient have no ten its mere possibility can is real in virtue of If it were really to change of state to a A-ain the appetition of the Monads is due entirely A dency it change . effort endeav by which ouch thing thins..GENERAL PRINCIPLES whole is 71 of the_ what Leibniz means by the character and represen Monad as at once exclusively individual of the whole universe from tative or perceptive ticular point of view. sufficient reason.*. itself. as we have seen. with the rest he &amp. the identity law of continuity (with of the principle discernible*) is a particular application the breach in the continuity of reason. of sufficient a void in nature mean series of simple substances would the principle of Such a void is not inconsistent with it is not self-evidently impossible. . substance which reason.lt.

011 the other hand. God imparted to them. vii. . 758 In like manner. : ele- me Lettre. among others. also the beginning of Leibniz s second something to nothing. upon the necessity of a sufficient which God could impart to things ciple that every perfection been without derogating from their other perfections has actually us fancy a space wholly empty. . ot there should be any principle to determine what proportion from matter there ought to be. ysical atoms is not a mere aggregate th these. . I hold that there is absolutely .giving. that is to say. to admit a vacuum in (Clarke s translation) tis violating nature is ascribing to God a very imperfect work which the grand principle of the necessity of a sufficient reason its true meaning. Now let in any oould have placed some matter in it. 378) 1 Cf. . . the more G. and that to be as much more matter than vacuum as the former deserves be no have the preference before the latter.. And thus ln gener^ 1 . vii. without understanding To omit many other arguments against a vacuum and atoms. empty therefore all is full.Leibniz s the lion of his main problem is accomplished by &amp. . out of all the possible degrees The P ro |_? a plenum to a vacuum. : . re&quot. : : &quot. a Clarke b G. dkj^as-on. I shall Tis impossible rounded upon the necessity of a sufficient reason. which contains the fullest reality or compossible things law the greatest amount of essence \ Qonseciuently^the the -tUrives^dts. it will be said that the one should a vacuum. 1 . no void. Perhaps of either plenum to vacu urn or of vacuum to plenum. reason requires that because matter is more perfect than there should a geometrical proportion should be observed.gt. a real whole. eveTTmore thoroughly impenetrable and indivisible than. . The more matter there is. But then there must as vacuum at all for the perfection of matter is to that of a vacuum Cf. ofliidependent and perhaps mutually contradictory . or from a vacuum to a plenum.ason7&quot. 748 b His wisdom and His power opportunity is there for God to exercise and for this reason. ^^incipiaI5f soJUfe jmaTioTr of the principles of contradiction and sufficient on the one hand. in consistency and. IV (1716).-2 INTRODUCTION with the principle of sufficient reason that nothing should exist where something is possible for the prin . ciple reason requires the existence of a of that entire system of complete world. many have talked of.] portion be equal to the other but.force _from_ &quot. without derogating therefore He hath actually placed respect from all other things some matter in that space therefore there is no space wholly add another argument. 356) letter ^E. which . . Apostille (E. I shall and here mention those which I ground upon God s perfection I lay it down as a prin reason. .. ._ of sufficient of_ continuity^- . real units of substance.

p. 174- . great Further consideration of the relation between these^two in the 1 in the philosophy of Leibniz is given principles of this Introductiun. in each of mutually consistent! which the wliolt jjjj some way ideally contained^.GENERAL PRINCIPLES ments but the most perfect system in i 73 of or compossible substances.

hypotheses. biological and mental science ? A. This review of human knowledge. and we endeavour to trace the principles of the Monadology in the various departments of knowledge which are con cerned with Matter. PASSING from the general consideration of the doctrines of Leibniz. of Descartes and with its consequences in Physics led him to reject the Cartesian theory of matter and motion 1 gion The consideration of Leibniz s Theology or Philosophy is beyond the scope of the present volume. DETAILED STATEMENT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNIZ.PAKT III. We the first place. of Keli- . pro the most ceeding from the most abstract or simple to 1 will reveal to us concrete or complex of the sciences which Leibniz s conception of Sub the interpretation stance requires us to give to the judgments of common . From another point of view. with Organism. LEIBNIZ S MATHEMATICS IN RELATION TO HIS PHILOSOPHY. It was partly through Mathematics that is Leibniz arrived at the notion of Substance his which the core of Dissatisfaction with the Mathematics philosophy. we may What are the answers consider ourselves as inquiring which Leibniz would make to objections against his or common beliefs system. we now come shall. : in mathematical and physical. based upon facts. consciousness. and with Selfconsciousness. more specific develop examine the relation between his philosophical principles and the ruling con shall afterwards ceptions of his Mathematics. in to their ment.

STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 75 and to substitute for it a more adequate theory of Force and a higher Mathematics. other words. a considerable ad Early in the seventeenth century vance was made in the science of Mathematics. exact or demonstrative science. a curve. however distant change figures of The geometrical mathematical methods. in order to attain to greater exactness in the statement of mathematical finite (or definite) figures might relations. suggested that . Every curve must have capable of being pictured. at least by the methods of as A . through the work of Kepler. Kepler. bring them more into touch with The Transition from Synthetic to Analytic Geometry. and the great object concrete reality. is Thus a curve is still still however small may be its curvature. The barriers between them are re figure is another. The Geometry of the Greeks was synthetic or synoptic. a definite curvature. and therefore the Greeks or. A polygon a polygon. : of passing into is regarded as having in it the possibility a curvilinear is one thing rectilineal figure another. ellipse is still be from the other. And the kinds of curves are each independent of the others. Both the Mathematics and the Physics of the time appeared to Leibniz to be too of his speculations was to abstract. Cavalieri. Each is what it is no one are considered as external. garded insurmountable. It dealt with ideal figures as discrete wholes. Every polygon must have a de finite number of sides. in capable of representation to the eye. not taking into consideration the possibility of their being analyzed func into elements. An s one focus Kepler infinity introduction of the notion and the name of into Geometry was the beginning of a great in may an ellipse. of which they are combinations or Thus the relations of the figures to one another tions. however numerous may be its sides. mainly and Descartes. were all finite.

76 INTRODUCTION be regarded as consisting of an infinite (or indefinite) to be number of elements. Accordingly. pictured. not capable ception of at once suggests the possibility But it common . or. promise of a connexion relations may be sym of such a kind that geometrical and the knowledge of them may be bolized algebraically Such a con extended and generalized by calculation. the length fqua to half the product of terms (i e the altitude of base of the triangle) and the number out that. not by a rough drawing or terms infinite numerical series the image. of the discontinuous nexion would mean the reduction of Synthetic Geometry to the comparative concepts up It would or Numbers. Thus he considered a circle of an infinite number of triangles. problems mathematical demonstration. In a similar way Cavalieri afterwards suggested as made up of an infinite number of a triangle might be conceived the base. continuity of Algebraic Concepts make it the abstractness of Geometry. in thus considering of elements. As against this it was pointed lines can ever make up a has no breadth. and thus lessen more adequate to the continuity of nature. no number of straight that the area m p^ . of course. representing the figure. since a Ime the triangle). would i arise many new problems which the old methods could not touch. indirect and the Greeks had to solve by the which now of reductio ad dbsurditm would unsuggestive method and there be capable of a direct demonstrative solution. i at the same thing from the opposite point of space-relations would enable the continuous system within the range oi to be more completely brought For instance. looking of view. ot the of the last term U-e. we have of an infinite number made between Geometry and Algebra. The lengths of these of straight linest each parallel with arithmeti cal series lines he regarded as forming an infinite The sum of tin sexies is of which the first term is zero. having composed their the vertex at the centre and forming 1 an analytic con Such circumference by their bases of being of the figure is. gression. but by an their sum is that of which are so related to one another the finite as finite.

STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 77 The Basis of Analytical Geometry. Greek mathematics. part of a unity which And yet a quantitative ratio can express the relation and its side. with a special figure It is its sick. n times n. the relation affecting the result. Thus Pascal. that is to say. s or a simple series of The square of n is a quantity of homogeneous units.e. of a geometrical which it is square to the line upon is not purely constructed (i. however. Pascal vindi cated Cavalirri s method on the ground that it differed only in manner of expression from the method of exhaustions. showed that Oavaliori s method piano area. of which he was the The of a basis of the Analytical definite Geometry is the finding or ratios investi proportion between the space-relations and certain numerical ratios. intelligibly be regarded as the side of a square it has properties other than those which it would have as a mere line. But gated by Geometry of Geometry are not merely quantita the space-relations the simplest tive as are the relations of number. transition from the ancient to the modern methods. The line cannot characteristics. which may be interchanged within the series without in any way On the other hand. To take of instances. It is.f . This indefinite Pascal is the infinite of later mathematicians. it is the sum of n n w is s simply added together. and as its unit. It is quantitative. in such a way that the between the square be algebraically calculated properties of the square may without direct reference to the geometrical figure. the square upon a line may be represented But the square of a number by the square of a number. . which are so small that the minute triangles between thorn and the sides of the given triangle maybe neglected in the computation. is more than merely quantitative.gt. and his small Thus we have here the is manifestly their infinitely little. definitely was This connexion between Algebra and Geometry established by Descartes in the Analytical inventor. of straight lines is an in really implied that the infinite series definite number of small rectangles. in fact. to any one of its sides) The square is not a sum of lenqths. Geometry. used in the 1 &amp.

and according to the special way in which it is related to the whole. &c. relations in which the part is not indifferent to the whole but characteristic of it. Infinite Series and the little. Relations of purely quantitative Unit?/ and geometrical Unity. more real unity has various functions) character of the whole. The difference is that geometrical unity. infinitely fixed between quantity unity and geometrical unity. Thus the abstract number i remains the same. a sine.? re ?y Ae^mffn mer uantlt y ls quantitative unity is a contradiction Va difference. the absence of unity T it what I mean here is unity of the lowest on the point of vanishing. or the most indeterminate degree. is less abstract than merely quantitative unity And the bridge between the unity which is expressed in ie Algebra of finite quantities and that which is expressed the Geometry of finite space-relations is to be found in the analysis of a finite quantity into an infinite series. But the conception line. unity wW P^ unity . into whatever algebraic combination it may enter as a part. where the part is indifferent to the special according to the nature of the whole into which it enters as a part. for instance. a radius. however complex and elaborate are forms of the addition and the subtraction (or tion) relations of quantity (that is to say. a directrix an axis. &c. All the processes of Algebra. finite quantity can be resolved into an infinite tive 1 But there is no absolute gulf m series Speaking a . Thus in relation to different kinds of figures (rectilineal. curved. or on account of the various forms of its relation to one and the same figure a straight line is a side. of mere aggregation) may become signs or symbols of relations which are of abstract separa units. varies (the line of a straight mere between the part and the whole than in the relation of quantity. a tangent. while abstract in comparison with organic unity or with the real concrete unity of all existence.? INTRODUCTION more than quantitative.). There is a closer.

or even 1 + 2 + 3. little. that we are (i +i+ i.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 79 formed by an addition of independent integers. not as a merely quantitative unity. from one another. such as that is to sa by an x + r 4. &c. little in mere is The infinitely little here considered infinitely little That is to say. I? &c. addition not conditioned by any special law. however far the process of analysis thus inferential certainty as determined by the law or character may be carried . &c. But there are certain numerical series in which the terms are not to a set mutually indifferent (nor immediately reducible or rather of mutually indifferent terms). according to a definite law. finite quantity. but are arranged. or is entitled to disregard the infinitely little difference between the sum of its terms and the There can be no absolute infinitely quantity. proceed which law is of such a kind that. that the law of the series holds unchangeably. Accordingly it is held that. and geometrical.gt.. the finitude of its with its having an infinite number incompatible It is only inasmuch as the series is regarded. even although we may be unable actually to count each one of the terms. and we have regarding the result of the analysis (the equation of the sum of the terms to the whole finite quantity). the series be regarded as a pure sum. but as a unity deter mined by a characteristic law or principle. &c -&amp. if the series be regarded as consisting of an infinite number of terms.). physical. and therefore is practically This bridge if * practically negligible the keystone of the between algebraic quantity relation. or any other kind of Strictly speaking. the difference between the sum of its terms and the finite quantity will be infinitely negligible. Y&amp.gt.. we are certain of the particular series. It is the law . it results in the sum brings of the series approaching more and more nearly to some finite quantity. and therefore ultimately analyzable into an addition of homogeneous units sum n + n + n. although it never the series actually to an end. of terms.

Encyclo ed. is not one of quantitative are capable merely. elementary space-unities (figures) unities of but also of more comprehensive geometrical unities which these are elements. the whole. of son s article Infinitesimal Calculus in the 9 th Thought in the Nineteenth paedia Britannica. practical development function of the Infinitesimal The of this possibility is the Calculus of Leibniz and Newton 1 . elements in deals are differences of a unity. a unity in which the parts but indifferent to the whole and to one another. And yet its elements dif with a degree of accuracy such that its expression be neglected so far as ference from absolute accuracy may ji. from the unity of mere quantity to have virtually passed are not a unity of character. i. But in we because of the special character or law of the series. physical science is concerned. . neglecting this little difference. But the unity. Merz. will be found fr. Cf. to have thus given an indefinite increase of elasticity have prepared the way for the formulae of Algebra and of the an algebraic representation and calculus not merely of the Greek Geometry. As we have already seen. entirely are connected in accordance with some special principle. and further of physical We are and indeed of any unity the elements of which in themselves capable of a sufficiently accurate quantitative For instance. and of the different WzlhamLeibniz and Newton expressed it. the phenomena with which expression.8o INTRODUCTION that the or principle of the series which enables us to say be neglected because the infinitely little difference may character of the series is not affected by infinitely it. Consequently to work out possible to state and science in terms of Algebra. the Analytical 1 A succinct account of the famous controversy regarding the forms in which discovery of this method. it becomes problems of physical The Infinitesimal Calculus and the Principle of Becoming or System. 100-103. History of European m & Century. Physics of quantity whole.

by the Calculus of should overtake the tortoise divisibility. It may be otherwise expressed by saying that the series of finite numbers or quantities is ulti as a series of terms which mately to be expressed. is the continuous. and no leap is needed to pass them. Father Gregory as will be found if they are put into strict form. G . Lettre a M. in the sense of the mere 416) him. and in the ing the quantities as variables first between their elements or place finding equations l differences . nothing insurmountable in these objections.). as the objections of sceptics seem to suppose. according velocities. be made continuous by regarding not as finite units. or quantity metry to the relative continuity But number as a sum of finite of homogeneous units. ties. their differences being infinitely small. not I + I ) finite increments (like i+(i + i) + (i + grow by one another. but as a series whose terms flow into &c. any numerical unit we little quantities. it may take the form of an infinite units (even though some extent discontinuous. series) is still to its elements however. in my opinion.? STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 8l of Synthetic Geo Geometry reduces the discontinuity of number. be regarded as increasing or any variable magnitude must small increments or decrements. G. It may. may choose sum of finite number may be regarded as the thus every This is the small terms. That is to say. not by between unknown considering them merely quantities as fixed wholes and directly but indirectly. 1 From one point of view it may be regarded of Achilles : as the solving of the problem E. Vincent has excellently shown. As to indivisibles. i. and to employ may be subdivided infinitely. nor actual nor potential parts Yet neither large nor small. or as growing. Thus Geometry dissipates these apparent difficulties. but as infinitesimals or infinitely In other words. by treat finding equations between them. we cannot conceive new Thus points are in them. although it everywhere has such indivisibles. not composed of them. Foucher (1693) and the tortoise. 118 a. series of an infinite infinitely conceived basis of the Infinitesimal Calculus as originally by Leibniz. There is. the place where Achilles to the proportion of their which starts before Cf. diminishing by infinitely The work of the Calculus is to determine the relations or magnitudes. infinite of St. extremi extremities of a time or of a line.

surfaces that of small degree of length. When we say that a thing (a geometrical figure. when we have shown that the difference between . So in general. in physical science we have to deal with phenomena which not merely are variable but are continually varying. The value of the Infinitesimal Calculus in the interpre tation of nature rests that the con ultimately on this. we mean that it both has and has not that quality or characteristic. thing ap maintained through an Thus. not absolutely. the identity of the thing is indefinite amount of difference. the difference between the line and the surface is an infinitely small degree of breadth. for instance. but merely in the degree in which they possess certain characteristics. Again. the point. and the solid are all recog nized as differences or relations within one system. for instance) has a certain quality or characteristic in an infinitely small it finitely small degree of depth. The having pears . to establish proportions different sets of between ception of infinitesimals which employs amount. and solids by that of surfaces. of putting it. that is to say. these figures are dis tinct from one another. as we have seen. the surface. of such a kind that when a quality seems to pass away from it the thing ceases to exist and another it. Newton regarded all geo metrical magnitudes as capable of generation by con tinuous motion. and the Infinitesimal Calculus is of the utmost value in enabling us to state the laws of these constantly changing phenomena. the line. Lines may be regarded as generated by the motion of points. is in this connexion * in Newton s way variations. is a virtual recognition of System in knowledge or of the principle of Becoming as distinct from that of abstract Being. or (to use another metaphor made familiar by Psycho-physics) that it is on the threshold of l identity of the thing is not merely superficial. That is to say. The difference between the point and the line is an infinitely Accordingly.82 INTRODUCTION by lines. Motion. the difference between the surface and the solid is an in merely a metaphor for continuity.

is which an expression of the same tendency of thought reason so important an makes the principle of sufficient influence in his philosophy abstract. . in terms of the other. i hope.~~i have seen E.&amp. of nature which he laid down in the Recherche them up himself. : G 2 . 51 on some laws the reply of Father Malebranche to the remark I made de la Write. and which conflict with a certain principle of general order that I have observed. It isHielaw of the emT to say more. provided we state expli press each to one another within some system. less dogmatic. It has its origin in the conception and it also holds good in it is absolutely necessary in Geometry. with one of its foci at an infinite distance from the other. inasmuch as to a of all things. Continuity and the Logical Calculus.lt.I in connexion Leibniz upon his philosophy appears chiefly and his prolonged efforts to with his law of continuity As to jthejaw of continuity establish a Logical Calculus. and his in appears somewhat disposed to give reasons for it and makes genuousness is most laudable but he gives from restrictions which would bring us back into the obscurity which I think I have delivered this subject. which is the source Physics. tho principle the finite multiplicity in_ unity.-ss relativity of things. and we have seen that On the of it \ Calculus is an application Infinitesimal Cf&quot. that he will kindly allow me to take is of great use in reasoning. . which which does not yet appear to be sufficiently employed nor known of the Infinite in all its scope. acts as a perfect geometrician.~Ba{ Je (1687) (G.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY 83 we have not one thin* and another is infinitely little. citly their relations but a parabola is an ellipse is not an ellipse A We parabola . it is unnecessary of system. more fiontrastwiththe _ oTthe Cartjjknj Thelnluence of the mathematics of ^_ :~&quot. this opportunity of therefore. &quot.The principle may thus When the difference between two cases can be diminished below any . can ex both by referring them to a common ground. of in l. the Supreme Wisdom. and explaining this principle. but the truth The Infinitesimal Calculus in his mathematics thinking. iii. but have explained them converted each into the other. Now it cannot be said that all this was fully manifest of it underlies his to Leibniz himself. and according be stated harmony which cannot be bettered ---. 104 a) l ~Lett^M.

where : . Leibniz also phenomena. in the grounds [If there is order ordinatis etiam quaesita sunt ordinata. vol. For instance. a small change may sometimes produce things a spark falling upon a large mass of gunpowder might instance. i. Accordingly. iii. iv. f : VB ut the beauty of nature . duction. . or (to avoid The same from some ellipse by less than any given difference. constructed. . 29. 392 a bk. rectores proceeding from distant from the other. Intro mate to equality as much as we like. It is standing to approximate. In the same way equalicy may be regarded . further references See also Eraser. otherwise nature would not be the result of infinite 1 As to the analogy between Symbolic Thought and Algebra. ch. G. So. p. so to speak. 54) lot a great effect. p. In the letter IB true that in compound Remarks (E. requires the appearance will be found.. bk. known that the case of this.] But. 376. 106 a . as much or supposition of an ellipse may be made that the difference between as we like. overthrow a whole town but that is not contrary But in the and might indeed be explained on general principles. the consequences or results (or : datis to wit This again depends upon a more general principle. pp. Essay. Otherwise it regarded as a particular case that these laws are illthis does not hold. an infinitely small velocity or as an infinite slowness. and are finally lost in one cases (or what is given] continually approach what is required} must do the same. instances are necessary. 12 and 124. . and inequality may See also New Essays. ii. be made to approxi infinitely small inequality. ch. and Nouveaux Essais. la (E. to the case of a parabola. . 16. vol. for then the radii : radii vectores as little a this distant focus will differ from parallel be we like Consequently all the geometrical theorems which may be applied to the parabola by proved of the ellipse in general can one of whose foci is at an infinite considering it as an ellipse differs this expression) as a figure which distance. 49)9 (Eraser s ed. ii.84 INTRODUCTION a Logical Calculus other hand. rest may be regarded as principle holds in Physics. to our principle. like this could happen case of elements or simple things nothing wisdom. to Bayle above quoted. for the under there will also be order in the consequents. another. also to be whatever is true of slowness or velocity in general ought so that the law of rest should be true of rest. . to put it more simply consequents [ce qui en resulte]. G musical cadences among of discontinuity [saute] and. cf Locke. thus understood of the law of motion. the endeavour to find a universal philosophical language or system (implying and philo is an attempt to apply in theological of signs) an analytic method analogous to sophical investigations in Geometry and that which had proved so successful seemed to Leibniz that if all the complex It \ Physics will neces or in the antecedents [ce qui est pose] it qiven magnitude in datis in quaesitis or in the be diminished below every given magnitude sarily also when the Or. it will be a sure sign . so less than any given differ the ellipse and the parabola may become foci of the ellipse be made sufficiently provided that one of the ence.

and apparently into their simple elements, knowledge could be analyzed a could each be represented by and if these elements a kind of alphabet definite sign, we should have
-

85 STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZS PHILOSOPHY our disconnected ideas which make up

human
(letters

in which reality would knowledge would be built up, or symbolized. more and more adequately represented con to Leibniz, the progress of knowledge For according from clear to clear ideas, sists in passing from obscure when from distinct to adequate. Ideas are obscure distinct,
1

these sign By the combination of thoughts. a system of true of the alphabet of thought)

so far as to enable us definitely analysis has not proceeded They are clear when to distinguish them from others. but are not yet able we can so distinguish them, are enumerate their particular elements or qualities. They and they their qualities, distinct when we can enumerate is complete, that is are adequate only when the analysis the clear and distinct of to say, when all the elements In many cases idea are themselves clear and distinct. in an infinite series of elements the analysis may result

;

mathe Calculus but the principles of the Infinitesimal not necessarily render matics have shown that this does Thus it seemed to calculation impossible or inaccurate based upon a thorough Leibniz that a synthetic calculus, of be the most effective instrument analysis, would I feel, he says, that be devised. that could
>.

m

knowledge

nor silence imposed controversies can never be finished, unless we give up complicated reasonings the Sects,

upon

of vague and un in favour of simple calculations, words character es]V certain meaning in favour of fixed symbols [ is nothing b Thus it will appear that every paralogism controversies arise, there an error of calculation. for disputation between two will be no more necessity Nothing than between two accountants. philosophers in hand, sit be needed but that they should take pen will

When

Cf

ii. p. 61 note. tliis Introduction, Part b De Scientia Universal sen Calculo Phihsophico (E. 83

;

G. vn. 200,.

86

INTRODUCTION
their counting-tables, if like) say to

down with
a
friend,
calculate.
;

they This sounds like the ungrudging optimism of

and (having summoned one another: Let us

to cherish the youth but Leibniz was optimist enough hope of it to his life s end. This project of the Logical Calculus or philosophical mathematics of Leibniz with his language connects the while the Calculus of Infinitesimals theory of knowledge,
finds

immediate application in his revision of Descartes Descartes treated theories regarding matter and motion.
s

motion and
wholes.

rest synthetically as constant quantitative them analytically as consisting Leibniz

regards

one constant force. of an infinite series of degrees of Leibniz admits that the Cartesian laws of Accordingly abstract to motion have a certain validity in relation con but denies that they are adequate to the
motion,
crete

physical phenomena.
B.

MATTER.

As

Descartes s Theory of Matter and Motion. matter can we have seen, Leibniz s view of

already

that of be understood only as it appears in contrast with his interpretation of the In accordance with Descartes. viz. that the essence of a thingprinciple of contradiction, that only which is common to all its manifes consists in in that only which tations, or (otherwise expressed) have after all varieties or specific determinations remains matter is essen Descartes maintained that been

excluded, tially extension.

or Bodily substance and magnitude And all the changes in are identical. spatial extent to motion. matter or extension are ultimately reducible Hhe transference is regarded by Descartes as being Motion the neighbourhood of a portion of matter or a body from with it, and of those bodies which are in direct contact

which we consider
i

other bodies or portions
Prindpia, Part
ii.

as at rest, to the neighbourhood of Matter is infinitely of matter

V

25.

Descartes adds

:

By

a body, or rather

STATEMENT OF LEIBNIz
divisible.

s

PHILOSOPHY
Its forms arise
i

It, division is due to motion.

of combinations and separations solely from the All the variety of matter motion. which also are due to on motion or the diversity of its forms, depends no I acknowledge in corporeal things frankly avow that be divided, shaped can other matter than that which
.

\

is to say in all kinds of ways, that forces], and moved and which they call quantity, that which mathematicians demonstrations; and in take as the object of their

matter I consider only

its divisions,

shapes

[.figures],

am

accept this motions; and, in short, regarding from it wit. as true which is not deduced nothing demonstra much certainty as belongs to a mathematical this means all the phenomena as
tion

I

will

of nature

seems to me that to be accepted, or ever Physics no other principles ought are here expounded desired, than those which
...
it
.

by And inasmuch may be explained

.Conservation of Motion (or
left

Momentum),

its

Direction leinf,

out of account.

of motion! to Descartes, the quantity Again, according material system complete in the world (or in any

m

itself

The motion
stant,
is

and apart from whose quantity (or momentum},

is constant. all external influences) is

thus con

the mass

in each particular case directly proportional and it may and the velocity of the moving body,

a portion of matter, I eether although this

tothe whole of what is transferred which be composed of several parts And I say that motion is the themselves have other motions. order and not the force or activity ^ich transfers the moving object and not to show that motion is always in two "ings are no which moves it for it seems to me that these care. Further, I mean that usu-tllv distinguished with sufficient and not a substance; motion is a property of the moving thing which has a form, and rest is a property of the thing just as form is at rest. is a property of that which

mean

may

Srlnce

m

;

French).

the motion in the world is one, object is to show that all which referred each parti to get rid of the later Scholastic theories in the moving body. cular motion to some unexplained principle

Descartes and thus

88

INTRODUCTION

be expressed by the formula $nv) Now no new motion can come to any body from itself no material body is self-moved, because its essence is pure extension, and the idea of extension does not necessarily involve the trans
;

To any quantity of matter, whether ference of parts. motion comes entirely from without. Thus large or small, at the creation of the world the whole material universe
received a certain fixed quantity of motion, which is con served by the ordinary co-operation [concours ordinaire]
of God.

thus a positive thing and not merely Motion is not opposed to motion, but relative to rest. Motions do not cancel one another they are to rest.

Motion

is

;

quantities

which can merely be combined and separated*

And, on the other hand, each individual portion of matter must remain in the state in which it is, unless it receives motion from outside itself. The motion of any one body is increased only by a corresponding decrease in the motion and the motion of any body is decreased of some other Motion is a part of it passing into some other. only by
;

diffused, but
1

never destroyed

*.

With respect to the general Cf. Principia, ii. 36 (Veitch s tr.) cause of motion, it seems manifest to me that it is none other than God Himself, who in the beginning created matter along with motion and rest, and now by His ordinary concourse alone pre serves in the whole the same amount of motion and rest that He then placed in it. For, although motion is nothing in the matter moved but its mode, it has yet a certain and determinate quantity, which we easily understand may remain always the same in the So whole universe, although it changes in each of the parts of it. is moved with that, in truth, we may hold when a part of matter double the quickness of another, and that other is twice the size of the former, that there is just precisely as much motion, but no more, in the less body as in the greater; and that, in proportion as the motion of any one part is reduced, so is that of some other and also know that there is perfection equal portion accelerated. in God, not only because He is in Himself immutable, but because He operates in the most constant and immutable manner possible o that, with the exception of those mutations which manifest we per experience or Divine revelation renders certain, and which ceive or believe are brought about without any change in the lest there Creator, we ought to suppose no other in His works, should thence arise ground for concluding inconstancy in God to reason, that Himself. Whence it follows, as most consonant He merely because God diversely moved the parts of matter when
:

We

;

STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ

S

PHILOSOPHY

89

Now it follows from this, that, while the quantity of motion in the world, or in any isolated system of bodies,
is

constant, its direction is variable.

For, as all space

is

must con body and is therefore & plenum, moving bodies and if a moving body be tinually impinge upon others to upon a body at rest, of such mass
;

impinge that the moving body is unable to overcome the resistance of the other and to make it move, then the direction of the moving body is changed it rebounds in the direction
supposed
;

from which

some other way. unable to impart any of But, as the moving body has been its motion to the body at rest, the quantity of its motion
it

came or

is

deflected in

remains unchanged, while its direction changes it being, of course, understood that the action of all other bodies,
except the two in question,
Leibniz
s
is left

out of account \

Theory of Motion.
to Leibniz,

Conservation of Force.

Now, according

motion

is

simply change of

It is not a positive quality belonging, for the position. time being, to the moving body but motion and rest are If the relative position entirely relative to one another. two bodies changes, we may regard either as of
;

any

moving and the other
is
first

as at rest

in created it, He also always preserves the same quantity of motion in the matter itself. Each thing, whatever it is, always con Cf. Principia, ii. 41 tinues to be as it is in itself simply, and not as it is in relation to other things, until it is compelled to change its state by contact From this it necessarily follows that with some other thing. a moving body, which meets on its course another body so firm and impenetrable that it cannot move it in any way, entirely loses the determination it had of moving in this particular direction, and the cause of this is evident, namely, the resistance of the body which prevents it from going further but it does not necessarily on this account lose any of its motion, since it is not deprived of its motion by the resisting body or by any other cause, and since motion is not contrary to motion. * 25 Cf. Animadccrsioncs ad Cartesii Principia (1692?), Part ii.
1
: ;

merely an infinitely created them, and now preserves all that matter, manifestly the same way and on the same principle on which He first
;

And, in general, rest small degree of motion nothing
.

2

^G. iv. 369

;

Duncan

s tr. p. 60).

9
in

INTRODUCTION

the world is absolutely at rest. Accordingly no body begins to move from a state of absolute rest, but from a state which is to be conceived as already one of motion, however small in amount. Actual motion is not some

thing added to a body which, to begin with, is bare mass; is always gradual growth or increment of a motion which is already there. Actual motion always
it

pre-sup-

poses potential motion or a orce which, though it may not be observed, tends to appear as actual motion.
Descartes, then, was right in interpreting actual motion as change of position, but wrong in overlooking -potential motion and thus in regarding the total of actual

quantity apparent motion in the universe, or in any independent He was right also in holding that system, as constant. each body tends to continue in the state in which it is but he was wrong in thinking that a can ever be in
;

body

a state of absolute rest, and thus in supposing that one motion cannot oppose another, but can only be opposed ] ^L st As a matter of fact everything tends to move, and would move, were it not for counteracting tendencies to motion in other things \ That which is conserved, then, is not actual motion, as an extrinsic property of material
-

substance, but this intrinsic_tendency or potentiality of motion^ which Leibniz calls force. As mere change of position does not enable us to attribute motion to one of the two bodies whose position changes, and not to the other, the body which we call the moving body (as dis
tinct

from the body at rest) is so, not in virtue of its motion (in the sense of change of position), but because it
1
;

not been prevent by our moderns. They imagine that a body might be perfectly at rest, without any effort. But this is due to their failure to understand what bodily substance really is for in my opinion substance cannot (at any rate naturally) be without action. This also disproves the inaction which Sociniang attribute to dis embodied souls.
sufficiently noticed
;

Cf. Lettre a M. Pelisson (1691) (Foucher de Careil, i. 208 Dutens, It must be observed that 733) every body makes an effort to act on outside and would perceptibly act if the contrary things, efforts of it. surrounding bodies did not This has
i:

STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ
.

S

PHILOSOPHY
The notion

91
of

within

i^filf

+-h*

MUM

<rf

the.change.-Uie force or

activity
force,

which produces the motion.

says Leibniz, when is that fronqjodiich. .activity follows, passivity, for jt It is effort, conatus\ and while it. nothing prevents

is as clear as that of activity

and of

motion

never a successive thing, which consequently its parts never because all exists, any more than time, on exist together while, I say, that is so, forc_ox-effprt, at every instant the other hand, exists quite completely
is

and must be something genuine and real. And, as nature do rather with the real than with that which does has
"to

not completely exist except in our mind,

it

appears (in

that it is the consequence of what I have shown) of force, a.nd not (as Descartes believed) the

same same

.

quantity in nature V quantity of motion, that js preserved which is constant, is not only an This force, then, It is not mere capacity actual but a potential reality.
for""motion,

mere passive movableness, nor

is it

actual

manifest motion or activity in general. It is something between the two, an undeveloped or restrained tendency to act, which in appropriate circumstances is the producer This force is to be measured by the quantity of action ~. Descartes rightly insisted on the of effect it produces. but he of effect as the thing to be measured quantity
;

1

Lettre

a M.

Pelisson

The relative velocity of two bodies Foucher de Careil, i. 157). may remain the same, although the e. their apparent motion] [i. in an infinity real velocities and absolute forces of the bodies change to do of ways, so that conservation of relative velocity has nothing Essai de dynamique V U. Math. with what is absolute in the bodies.
l
c

(no date, probably 1691) (Dutens,

i.

7*9
j

vi. 2i6j.
a

Cf.

De Primae Philosophiae Emendatione, &c. (1694) (E. 122 b CT. iv Active force differs from the bare potency commonly recog 469) nized in the Schools. For the active potency of the Scholastics, or of acting, which neverthe faculty, is nothing but a mere possibility be turned less requires an outer excitation or stimulus, that it may into activity. But active force contains a certain -activity^ actu^] and is a mean between the faculty of acting and action itself. It includes effort and thus passes into operation by its,gli;.i:eqiunru^jio__ of luudranw. This may bo illustrated aids, but only the removal the rope which by the example of a heavy hanging body stretching holds it up, or by that of a drawn bow.
Cf.
:

Appendix

I, p.

351.
;

[

92

INTRODUCTION

conceived the effect in too narrow a way, regarding it merely as actual motion (i. e. the momentum acquired by a body) rather than the work done by the force, the kinetic

en.gl_it produces (i.e. the vis viva which the body and which Leibniz calls action motrice). The formula for this action motrice is not mv but mtf. In the uniform motions of one and the same body, (i the action l
acquires,
l

)

of traversing two leagues in two hours is double the action of traversing one league in one hour (for the first action

contains the second exactly twice) (2) the action of tra versing one league in one hour is double the action of
;

traversing one league in two hours (or, actions which produce one and the same effect are proportional to their therefore (3) the action of traversing two velocities)
:

is four times (quadruple) the action of traversing one league in two hours. This demonstration shows that a moving body which receives a double or

leagues in two hours

triple velocity, in order that it may produce a triple effect in one and the same time, receives a

double or

or nonuple action.

quadruple T^s^tim^MS^aportioiial to the

But most fortunately this happens to agree with my calculation of force, drawn both from experiments and from the pre- supposition that there is no mechanical perpetual motion.
squares of the velocities.
to

my

For, according calculation, forces are proportional to the heights

by descending from which heavy bodies might have obtained their velocities, that is to say, as the squares of the velocities. And, as there is always conserved the total force for re-ascending to the same height or for producing some other effect, it follows that there is conserved also
the same quantity of motive

world that is to hour there is as
;

force [action motrice] in the say, to put it definitely, that in any one much action motrice in the universe as

"

"

there
1

is

in

any other hour.

But

at

every

moment

2

the

the work done or vis viva. For a full explanation of the whole matter, see Stallo, Concepts of Modern Physics, ch. vi, especially
I. e.

PP^

7i sqq.

A

momentary

state of a

body in motion cannot contain motion,

STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY
same quantity
of force is conserved.

93
to the

And
.

in fact action

is nothing but the exercise of force, 1 of the force into the time

and amounts
of

product motive force or
includes

Accordingly this

vis viva,

the

amount

which

is

constant,

For as well as quantity, of motion. _direoti<Ml*. to the the measure of it is height, or position relatively Descartes s quantity of motion surface of the earth. force regarded merely as actinga is the effect of
(mv)

given z s vis viva (mv ) is the effect daring a given time. Leibniz a given of a given force regarded also as acting through And Descartes did not take account of the distance. into con direction of motion, because he did not take
sideration the ^distance through

which the

force acts.

Leibniz s Theory of Matter.
(i)

Materia prima.

This doctrine of the conservation of force, as Leibniz conceives it, involves the rejection of the theory that 2 Extension material substance is nothing but extension
.

motion requires time, but it G. vii. 534). a Den Maizeaux (1711) (E. 676 a 1 G. in. 60), cf. G. Math, Lettre a Bayle (undated) (E. 192 a Of course, from one point of view, Leibniz s statement is vi. 117. of which not quite accurate, since there are many forms of energy And indeed It is, however, on right lines. it takes no account. Leibniz in one (as Du Bois-Reymond and Stallo have pointed out) of the transformation of passage anticipates the modern theory molar motion being represented by energy (the apparent loss of not worked increase of molecular motion), although the idea was I had maintained, says out until a much more recent time. in the world. It is objected Leibniz, that act ice forces are conserved lose that two soft, or non-elastic bodies, when they collide, ^some It is true that the "wholes" lose I answer, No. of their force. motion but the parts received it, force in respect of their total the force of the collision. Thus being agitated within the whole by The forces are not that the loss occurs. it is
for
;
_

none the
;

less involves force.

Lettre

;

the particles. That is not losing destroyed, but dissipated among them but doing as is done by those who turn large money into small change. Cinquieme Lettre a Clarke, 99 (E. 775 a; G. vii. 414). a Extension is an ii. 72) Projet d une Lettre a Arnauld (1686) ^G. attribute which cannot constitute a concrete [accompli] being. cannot draw from it any activity or change. It expresses only which the a present state, and not at all the future and the past, When two triangles are to express. notion of a substance
:

only apparently

We

ought

iv. it must be motion i. to distinguish the state of the world at one moment from its state at another moment. The body is not mere found joined together. And if this force were not of the essence of material bodies there would be no resistance among bodies and the absurdity of perpetual motion would be true. Episiola : 1 sians. in addition to figure. motion is possible at all. if through space. if they are to be intelligible. For there could not be any variety in the phenomena. it would follow that there would never be any thing in the world but a substitution of equivalents. is. then the former must (i. ad Des Bosses (1706) (G.94 is INTRODUCTION for receiving motion. material bodies consist solely of extension. 158 b . size.e. we were . every material body must have resistance or impenetrability. with the Carte to admit a plenum and the uniformity of matter. 295) If. Force. The avrirvn-ia of a body is simply its need of space. we cannot infer from them how the joining has taken place. it would not be pos perfectly homogeneous matter. there is but space to resist the progress of the nothing moving at rest body. mere capacity is is while motion to that which complete activity and is entirely extrinsic moved. something between the two. ii. there must be admitted forms from which there arises in matter a variety of appearances and I do not see whence we can draw these forms. . positive motion. motion which mere space cannot resist 1 . the latter along with it. G. and if one such body moving should come into contact with another destitute of motion). as we have seen. carry For. Cf. viz. and. a potentiality of motion or action that is always passing into actual not prevented by a similar tendency in This force. in addition to extension (however it may be interpreted). then. bare movableness. ex hypotlicsi. e. Accordingly. and movement. on the other hand. (1693). but in hindrance or resistance. De Ipsa Natura except from Entelechies. being. shows itself not merely in actual. even for an angel. This mere passive resistance Leibniz on vafldtRh-oe^asions calls avrirvTria. 13 (E. as if the whole universe were to reduce itself to the motion of a perfectly uniform wheel about its axis or to the revolutions of concentric circles of In that case. 512). For it may have happened in various ways but which can have several causes is ever a concrete [accompli] nothing . sible. That is why. adding only motion. For if action it is when another body.

then. As the but is the indivisible limit of point is nothing actual.. . It is essen force 2 or energy. if it : passivity there as absolute according to Leibniz. prima alone. so materia prima limit^ by itself matter. + extension). 328). as thus denned Leibniz usually calls materia prima. no such thing Passive resistance. 501). a G. vii. activity of some kind.limit of motion. i Bare or abstract matter. as we have seen. . something tially 1 SSTest is the Passivity is the limitL of activity. is. By AvrnWa I mean that attribute Extension is con-. passivity. And dvrnWa by consists in its maintaining its place. that tendency may actually be prSvehTed by counteracting itself at this or that particular forces from realizing moment.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ place: but it S PHILOSOPHY it 95 its cannot be a body unless its has a place of own. tEen7is ultimately more than uvrnWu + extension. inertia. And G. the abstract a mere mathematical point. vii. of supposing that this materia But we must beware prima is mathematical anything actual. But. (2) Materia sccunda. Resistance itself is thus a passive matter consists of or bare AmiWa and extension. of is the indivisible extension. . just as no portion of extension is For materia prima is were purely passive it is simply ^oliy-con slcrered as of body. it consists of bare matter. i (E. is in space. V extended and occupies a place which cannot be occupied other body at the same time (for this is the by any meaning of dimiWa or impenetrability). 678 . impenetrability. no material body. staying where Matter taken force. a tendency to though aTvvayslnvolve a real force. No portion of matter.so far. Epistola ad Bicdinyium ^1710) (E. l Matter is that which consists in dvrnWa out a place and thus bare matter is or which resists penetration is In. auction. consists of materia. 462 a Ik Aitima Bmtvrum 1710). as a material body merely passive in virtue of which matter . or continuous diffusion through tinuation through space. Every material body. it is.

but not a merely passive one materia prima is merely passive. Materia secunda must con tain an entelechy. . 1 on the other hand. It should be noted that the expres sion substance.e. maiemlj&amp. it INTRODUCTION this force is a potential activity. iii. m which would penetrate ^ ^ ^^ * &quot. br Ught ut in ^eibniz s later i Tf note and this S Introduction. as here to materia applied secunda. not to be confounded with individual substance. i. 466 a G. being abstract passivity. Ihe nineiple. but doe^Jt re-ac S lastic foi&amp. it a force to realize itself.lt. i 2 (E 158 iv. is automatic or sponta contains within itself the principle of its future it is an Thus every actual Entelechy. indwelLg Yaw! immimprinted by Divine 5 decree.e. 529) is not attributed by me to bare matter or materia prima. materia secunda is indeed a complete substance. SC / &quot.gt. . from which materia prima is merely a mental abstraction 1 Every complete substance is materia prima + Entelechy. itse1 ^ a certain [s nt p 98 note * Th^ Materi *** so much substantia as ^! 6 ^ Mmadol 9y. which must be conceived as striving force. Also De Ipsa Natura (1698).sis): Matter is understood as either materia secunda ormalria pnma.ot it. passivity + conditions. that is &quot. (E. but is not identical with it. Materia secunda is an aggregate of : it is to be divisible. vii.r._ftdy is materia secunda.9 inasmuch as which tends neous. activity. under the relation olmsansOa end 2 . to Now while materia prima. C Wagnerum (1710) (E. - . inasmuch t is matter and is therefore extended and infinitely is. . but for another reason because it is Cf. iii. consisting of paries extra partes. is not be regarded as real substance. And materia secunda (as. Lettre a in g Remand (1715) ^^ S : namely.r/a or passivity impenetrability? by which indeed it resists that Cf. which is and consists solely in dmmerely rmna and extension but to passive body or clothed matter or materia ntainS n ad diti n entelechy or active Tb resistance of bare matter is not . things conceived as quantitative. is not to be 00 fanTafa T dTn^ f rC f acthlg Which ^rrj. Epistola adR The active principle . complete. for the organic body) instance. Part &amp. and is thus quite distinct from substance.gt. and thus also from an active force superadded to matter. but is not a complete substance and there must further be added to it a soul or form analogous to a 4vTX* x a soul. P7 mus be derived fto r from motion. G. Clearlya. 657): Strictly S 1S n0t a substan but something e. materia secunda.ce b?G . is not a substance. i. 736 a. activity but mere inasmuch as it has d. c omBl t TT&quot.

3 God. l&amp. may In fact. it is not by itself anything real. * G. which are purely spiritual. 440 b .existfimces^^but in ^relatively confused fish. 78 sqq. as a matter of fact. without is not acius purus. like a pond a flock : of sheep a word. or simple substance Accordingly every or.. existences are the Monads..1706) (E. 436 b. soul which the body contains 1 . A it is what is called unum per acddens m is real substance (such as an animal) &amp. m&ndMonadology.ii. and consequently phenomenon. because is essential to every entelechy Materia created Monad . regarded The only real as a temporary aggregation or collocation. cannot deprive thus make it wholly pure materiaprima] for He would He Himself alone is 2 actus] which . as- 97 materiaprima is abstract passivity. Ibid. on the other hand. in so far as it is not entirely active has materiaprima are relative in other words (since activity and passivity must have materia prima. prima it completes it. a . Ibid. . but is secunda*. which is essentially one and of that is&quot. 325^. and can never be separated from it. non-spatial . is constantly varying. since whole complete and is itself the passive potentiality of the a substance of substance. (1706)^ E. or thus in reality merely the finitude and of activity. ii. a 3 2 4) Epistola ad Des Bosses (1706) (E. activity it potential. Cf.lt. to any specific entelechy or individual attached conceived by of Monads imperfectly a is [purus relationship us|y from time to time. the limit of intension. Part iii.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY In short. pp.. or or full of a collection of several substances. * .* &quot. an organic body and it is the composed of an immaterial soul and combination of these two that is called unum per se.. 44 3 71. G. (. 1 6f. 5 . every created Monad but is in part because its activity is not entirely realized. as a group of things which may vary and which.. the limit mere phenomenon of the indivisible. terms). H . activity Materia secunda. this Introduction.so6. p. by His absolute Leibniz compares it to a river be able to deprive substance of materia power.. abstractly merely the relation of certain Monads. and is thus a abstract quantity. passivity. God . It is not necessarily substance. sccunda is mere so materia imperfection of a Monad.gt.

for regular a heap of stones.. one and the same collective name. in from thought proper) we are as distinct imperfect imagination presented with the phenomena of things variously grouped in space.. society or college. accident that they are compelled to share is not one concrete [accompht\ I hold then that a marble pavement be the water of a pond with all substance.e. 75. Now more or less nearer one Accordingly. structible concrete [accomplie is being includes all that ever to happen to it/ . we were to join to them tor body in such a way as to prevent them separating againmake them in one ring all that would instance. the diamond of the Grand in respect of their the Great Mogul we might give them both. acts. and that one could not be touched without There would be as much difference between out. : itself (setting aside . . which are only beings by aggregation with unity of sub or irregular arrangement has nothing to do is probably only stance . and even make them after they had none the more united in substance and although. in which there is something imaginary and created by mae of substance requires an indivisible and naturally Unity since the notion ol such a ] being. As materia secunda is always a mere aggregate. or the Cadaver. although they be said that these distant from one another. our ii. in the same motion. are actually far they are one pair of diamonds. can be called like a machine or one substance only by a wrong use of terms. ?6) the soul). could only should be supposed to be so bound together that they all the walk in step. For it is as by of them only what is called unum per accidens. and groups of things. qua groups.g8 abstract 1 INTRODUCTION and or sense thought (i. even although all the water in which the sheep frozen together. together described by Leibniz as wellaifections. But it will not make no diamonds compose one substance. while as its reality an in founded phenomena (phenomena bene fundata). which our mind. any more than would and the fish were the fish it holds. I hold that a marble pavement for only one sub like a heap of stones. they will be another. are sometimes divisible Phenomena lene fundata. Duke and that ot stones for example. and thus cannot pass For suppose there are two stance. some other been brought into contact. are materia secunda \ yet every aggregate pre-supposes such aggregates or simple substance or soul. or than a flock of sheep.lt. They are body in In my opinion. touch one another. with their powers. and we might say that value. if we were to set 1 Cf Leltre a Arnauld (1686) (G. &amp. and these groups. army. others crying and a community a substance and such a being as between a man are moral beings and like a people. but is a collection of several. if we bring them difference here.

not having any proper bond or connexion. so far. . attributed by Leibniz to phenomena bene fundata is entirely relative to the illusoriness of pure phenomena. especially when it of these tests is by the testimony of other people who have themselves supported also applied reality of But the most powerful proof of the phenomena (a proof which is. . is the most satisfactory. iv. varied in their relations and capable of a variety of tests or observations^.e. which we find in other phenomena. 2. And entire life Although were said to be nothing but a dream. and the visible world nothing but a phantasm. I should call this dream or phantasm real enough. because it establishes . multiplex (i. such as we have in dreams. v.truth of the things of sense consists only in the connexion of the phenomena. cli. 344 b that materia secunda is l . inasmuch as the former are vivid. 320&quot. by itself) is success in predicting future phenomena from those which are past and present. and is not to be confounded with the reality of substance. realia ab imayinariis (E. of a reason or In short. indeed. 14 (E. . Leibniz goes so far as to add: this 1 De Modo distinguendi phenomena vii. or upon custom so far observed Icne fundata are distinguished from illusions. G. 444 a . when we use our reason rightly r . sufficient it.substanj&at . The connexion of the pheno mena which establishes truths of fact in regard to sense-objects . and congruous or consistent both with and with the general course of life or The last experience. which must have its reason [ground]. whether the pre diction be founded upon the success. : 353&quot. II 2 . if w e were never 3 On deceived by it. Phenomena lene fundata may be distinguished from the phenomena of dreams. hvpothesis. nected. The G. but held together in a system so that their ante 2 cedents may be traced and their consequents deduced . 2 a Can this be reconciled with the view mere aggregate or collection ? 3 Of course it must be remembered that the reality Zoo. bk. Cf. and that is but the truth of our what distinguishes them from dreams existence and of the cause of phenomena is of another kind. which are phenomena pure and simple. phenomena inasmuch as they are not merely separate and discon 1 .STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 99 bcnc fundata in contrast with the phenomena of dreams or visions. cit. Xoui-eanx Essais.).

metaphysically speaking. a soul). a sword pointing towards us out of a concave mirror. as.lt. or as Dr. note). being an appearance which results it has a ground physical conditions of light and moisture. phenomenon the fore lenc fundatum and not a pure phantasm or illusion. bk. 1 : . 2. that this certitude is not of the highest degree. . qualities of matter./&amp. as the pheno but that is a thing tive dream lasting as long as the life of a man as contrary to reason as would be the fiction that a book could . ii. vol. 185 14 Cf. pp. inasmuch as. 332 I prefer G. of something and is there it is the or cause. ii. not fully or symbols of analyzed) representations. as qualities of a matter which has no soul. Eraser s ed. ( expressed Ultimately as Leibniz would say) they reducible to non-spatial perceptions or appetitions of are Monads but in the form in which they are given to us metaphysically . are phenomena bene fundata. but true phenomena.1715) (E.rt. e.. that there a consecu be formed* by chance through throwing down type in confusion. 728 b [i. which. in the sense in which a rainbow or a mock sun is a species. : v6p&amp. &c. is that distinctly.p &amp.. extension. ii. Also EpisMa ad De Voider (1706) (G. . 504) Cf. . S qq t? w ith Prof.100 INTRODUCTION several occasions Leibniz uses the rainbow as a simile by which to illustrate what he means by a phenomenon bene He simply mentions it without explanation. and motion. smell. Taken by themselves. Thus. note) mass and motion. iv. outside of us is verified mena is of admitted Yet it must be optics are explained by geometry. Faustus ate a cartful of hay. For it is by means of truths of reason . sense -qualities] to say that not substances but species like a dream or like remain. and accordingly they are confused (i. fundatum 1 . it exists as a rainbow only who actually behold it. they are not real but merely subjective.v&amp. from certain while. not impossible.. Fraser s Notes.lt. ch. Locke. in general. or primary. e. But their order or connexion implies a principle of order (i. according to the Cartesians Extension itself. and is thus a mere appearance.. and also his Notes on pp. Epislola ad Des Bosses (. that is. indeed and in truth. as secondary.gt. perceptions.lt. are no more things than the image in a mirror to rather than or the rainbow in a cloud They exist use the expression of Democritus (p. and 333. 281. for those being merely colour.e. colours are species. Essay. and that these are not illusory. figure. but we may suppose him to have meant that the rainbow is the type of a phenomenon lene fundatum. real substance. 282. whether as colour. sound.

tr. in the simply the order of co. but as not as the mutual exclusiveness of real substances. to desires specially case. bene fundata. and the continuous are in which they are considered in mathematics. Epistola ad Des Bosses (1706 (E. cntia mentalia 5 or phenomena actual events in time are entia semimentalia . 306. extension is the order of possible co. ii. are not to be conceived as the central thought of Leibniz s paries extra paries: is that this quantitative aspect of things philosophy In any maintain is _ the should be treated as subordinate. motion. 3 Hist. 1 G. he did not intend this statement to value in the view and there is much rigidly interpreted. Cf. 185. . way only ideal things possibilities. Hence space essence of real things. as time is the order of possibilities which are inconsistent. more exactly. things which express Ilobbes has even do. Thus but which have nevertheless some connexion. p.). ii.. as not belonging to is to be regarded. in the extension. which are the sole realities. . abstractions or incomplete things. in general. to speak denned space as phantasma existent Is.existence pre-supposed or grouping of phenomenal things. Space and Time. 436 b G. 2 Eng. In one of the Letters to Arnauld\ Leibniz speaks of bene fundata. what Leibniz that space and time are not real substances but nor attributes of real substances. . of Philosophy ii. Probably. They are nothing and successive orders or arrangements oT~co-exi sting Individual substances or Monads. time is the order of sequence of phenomena. But. space and time as phenomena be very however. as of Erdmaim that space and time are to be regarded 2 extended bodies and while purely ideal. suppose souls or Monads.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY IOI things by our senses or imagination (which perceive are mere connected or orderly pheno confusedly) they which pre mena. 1 1 8. that as is just numbers to say. while aggregation Time. vol. things or phenomena.existences.

IIl me Lettre a Clarke. as time is an order of successions. as. 260. or possibly useful when recognized as abstractions. for instance. nor space . 752 a I hold it to be an order of co-exist thing merely relative. of possibility.) (E. time any particular succession of phenomena. and is to be regarded as a kind of sensorium of God or as His omnipresent perception of things. con sidered as existing together . Cf. but they are regarded as actual things. And when many things are seen together The corre one perceives that order of things among themselves. i.102 INTRODUCTION extension relates to simultaneous things or things which exist together. then. so that these orders (that is space and all successive. harmless space or empty time. but all other theories which make space real. 189 b Cf. : s text. the things or phenomena related might have been other than they bilities. spondence question of the meaning of space and time. The translation G. s disproof of the independent reality of space and time is directly based by him upon the principle of hurtful if Leibniz sufficient 1 reason. vol. in terms ences. . (1702) (E. that if space was an . Space is simply the indefinitely applicable relation of co-existence. of Locke s Essay. Clarke endeavoured to defend the view of Newton that infinite space is real. without inquiring into their particular manner of existing. 568). between Leibniz and Clarke is mainly devoted to this Repliqne Reflexions de Bayle is from Gerhardt . while time is the indefinitely applicable relation of In each case succession or order of successive positions. 363): 4 (Clarke s tr. but also time) square not only with what actually exists with whatever might be put in its place. and thus the orders are orders of is possi But in neither case the order actual apart from some ordered or related things. Eraser s ed. See also Explanation of the New System. aux . an order of things which exist at the same time. vii. There is no actual empty These are abstractions. and it is .But space and time taken together constitute the order of the possibilities of a whole universe. 259. are. as numbers_are 1 \Thus indifferent to whatever can be res numerata does not mean any particular situation of bodies. iv. as time is For space denotes. time to those which are incompatible and which are nevertheless this that makes them conceived as existing. I hold space to be some G. I say. pp. those which confound infinite space with the Immensity of God or with any other of His attributes. Leibniz attacks not merely this particular view. i. note.

thing as the other. the other supposed to states the one such as it not at all differ from be the quite contrary way. God has should infer from thence that tis not possible done something concerning which not otherwise a reason why He did it so and should be be right if time would the answer is. was anything distinct from things existing should be any reason why there it would be impossible rath should be applied to such particular instants. and the quite contrary way for instance. not absolutely differ of space does placed iiTit. thing was not placed But if space is nothing else east into west. there things than to others. Their difference. and is nothing then those two bodies but the possibility of placing them. besides there should be a reason why selves) that tis impossible of bodies among God preserving the same situations in space after one them themselves. they being to inquire after a reason and consequently there is no room the other. is against my without the thing. and that they without the things. . . now is. considered then the same argument proves at all. . But the successive order of things . their succession continuing that instants.. which it is impossible there And I prove it thus Space is axiom. are nothing consist only in the same. The case is the to of the preference of the one any one should to same with ask why God the same person respect timej Supposing and did not create everything a year sooner. one point another point of space. is only to one another. of the reality space found in our chimerical supposition be the same in truth the one would exactly But in itself of absolutely indiscernible. would be therefore. something absolutely uniform. and. in any respect whatsoever from to be some Now from hence it follows (supposing space the order of bodies among them thing in itself. that his inference 1 or in time. : which by changing at all without but that order of relation. should have placed not otherwise why every certain particular manner.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY for 103 absolute being there would something happen should be a sufficient reason. which .

18 (E. theory of space and time may Phenomena are lent fundata in be summarized thus. prove be neither any external nor Space being uniform. really as a sufficient reason. be a God only in name. Leibniz s space for and pure time are at two removes from reality. there . Space and proportion as they of connexion between pheno time are orders or systems in the one case. Apart succession in the other. that the mere will of God is to be counted In answer to the does not and that therefore Leibniz s application of the principle G. unanalyzed there must be something nonsimple substance. would . are connected together. (1698) Leibniz. are inseparable. between them can only be grounded upon some or choose Otherwise we should discern what is indiscernible. be the chance without discerning.INTRODUCTION order remaining the same. 374) Cf. one of the two states. the bond being co-existence from the phenomena. would not at be discerned from the other which now is nor could 1 . Lettre a ClarJce. namely.) (E. cf. 242. and that space in itself and matter differ as time and motion. Math. mena. 756 b his case. However these things. 62 (E. me With regard to the general question. and time are mere abstractions. Yet ultimately phenomena are imperfect They have a basis in perceptions. all differ. while professedly admitting denies its validity by maintaining ciple of sufficient reason. 5. see Appendix B p. that of a supposed anticipation. lV me Lettre a Clarke. and Eternity beyond the Divine Immensity * IJl&quot. who should act by such a will. Thus pure space Accordingly. 3 For Leibniz s account of the origin ol G. And in a letter to Schulenburg after denning space and time in his usual . Clarke. G - vii - 3 6 4^ prin this. 202. A will without reason would A God. way. any internal one. . says that in themselves [per se\ they have no reality 2 . Space matter. not Monads the things which are in space and time are but phenomena. 752 a. vn. realities. V Lettre a Clarke. vii. of the Epicureans. our idea of space. thing. Thus and non-temporal of which space and time are spatial the imperfect expressions. there can its parts and to make internal reason by which to distinguish For any external reason to discern choice among them. I only say. though different. I don t say that matter and space are the b G vii 406) -771 : same is no space where there is no is not an absolute reality. 6 (Clarke s tr.

a . 521 a G. Descartes held. &c. as each Monad perceives or represents the whole universe from its own point of view. unless it be the Spirit of God.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 105 Mutual Influence Activity and Passivity of the Monads. mere soulless body has no real exist ence The world is active. has materla prlma. Thus every^ there is no such thing as an absolutely soul has a body disembodied spirit. vi. may be described is . active in so far as they are relatively clear and distinct. matter. and through. from space being. Cause of Substances. And similarly. as essence of matter. every one of the real substances (the Monads). internal. and is But. And. however. each of which is the essence or reality of a portion of matter.. activity belongs to God . It through is compact of souls. Now this activity and passivity of the Monads do not : it that any Monad exerts a real influence outside of itself or receives any real impression from a substance The relations between the Monads are external to it. In spite. in itself passive in so far as its perceptions are relatively obscure or confused. those who speak of them as real. and their activity and passivity are altogether seen. Tlu-oiliwe. taken abstractly. one Monad is As we have Monad is said to be passive in relation to another in so far as certain or confused in com perceptions in the former are obscure in the latter parison with the corresponding perceptions 1 . the then. 138). as we have seen. livingis an abstraction. even in its infinitesimal parts. for there is no such thing as absolute passivity. contains that as materla which. Cp. who . it is a purely ideal relation which we construct between things or phenomena whose So far. Every created Monad is both active arid passive prlma. of this reduction of space. and Effect. as active it is entelechy. J on the other hand. mean purely ideal. and pure As passive the Monad ^ alone. to Leibniz continues to use the language of confused perception. comparing himself to a Copernicaii 65 (E. . mentally ultimate reality or essence consequently not material \ not quantitative. speaks of sun rise.

contains within . further. fi Corollary. r rart v. accordingly those in which the reason of the changes in the others may be read more distinctly than in those in which the changes actually occur \ Thus the connexion between cause and effect in different substances is a purely ideal elation. 135 jf. of course^ioact upon Thus. winch Leibniz gives a summary of his position There must be everywhere in body substances indivisible. but one does so more distinctly than another. Cf. in virtue of which SU anC foll Wn laws a rees &quot. the pre-eSblished harmony is the basis of the inter-relation of the while.Prop. in so far as it is active. f ^d hT ? ^ - ** in^ ^ w ^ t r . 107 b\ in (1690) (G. see also Lettre a Arnauhl p. Substances acting upon others are. . Spinoza s views of action and passion in Ethics A&quot. P^^ an 2 ^ ^ Part i * 2 and : . / Operation of one substance upon another. as we have already seen.io6 INTRODUCTION whose perceptions be so far active in relation to the other or (ideally. the Monad are clearer and more distinct is said to or explanation of the and of their mutual changes \ Further. happened and shall happen to A f All its actions come from its own inner being ffondsl excent n e G d EaCh SUbstanCe the entire niveT umveise. a harmony of internal changes and operations implying no physical influence of one substance upon )ther. as clear and stmct perceptions are simply the unfolding (explication) corresponding more confused per Monads itself (or. and fi . . unborn and inTperish! able having something corresponding to souls. on the other hand. &amp. [the principle of succession contmuatlonLslriei of the series of Us Wn P e ratio J all that has ?. .legem marum operations&quot. Each of these substances contains in its own nature &quot. 40 E. 3Pa rTv . and each 8 16 eS P ecia11 ^ with gard to certain things and ?orT J -T Wn P mt VieW The Union of soul wi ^h body. ii. the action of one substance upon another is to be regarded as meaning that the active substance. And. . Cf. in so far as it is passive. simply. . 40. . is) the explanation of the passive substance.lt. 49 S qq. definitely estab}\ i i ished through the order of their first creation. Monadology. consists *nlv /n tl ei mUtUal aCC rd f subst P ances. the cause of any change is not its bscure antecedent nor any power or activity prior in/ 1 ceptions.*h the rest ing its mP^in J mands and the operations of the one thus follow aoinm f I or accompany the operations or change of the other.

Soul and Body. 1 2 See Appendix C. S PHILOSOPHY 107 ception. we the concrete reality even of material substance explain must employ dynamical rather than mechanical concep we must regard the world as tions. of Thus we may have an the phenomena of physics by which abstract science abstract matter is. And the soul. on the one hand the relatively body. cause of the substance.gt. It has something more its unity unfolds itself in the a static self-identity Its reality is thus not determined merely of its changes. its confused the physical or mechanical and in bare possibility. in other words. pure substance. whatever may be the time-order of the events or phenomena \ Mechanical and final Causes. its passivity. taken as a principle of by the principle of contradiction.e. not of an indifferent which system of an all-powerful Will which knows powerful Will. consists of soul and Every substance. 204. p.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ time to the effect . is perception. Of. a thing whose essence be adequately described by purely cannot.consistency. and on the other distinct perception hand its activity. of final causes. end for which it is. The body of every or abstract self. the self-development of its nature. that are explained on purely mechanical principles. as But if we would a system of physical or efficient causes. the series . G V1K 501 ) : . than mechanical conceptions. of Becoming. as we have seen. or. as It must be conceived under the notion It it is to move towards an end. on the other hand. a ultimately and essentially a system allis the expression. body may by itself be adequately the principle described by mechanical conceptions. being of the substance. Epistola ad Bicrlingium (17&quot. Being entirely abstract. but and decrees the best -. under of contradiction. the true cause is always the reason or the distinct as opposed to the confused per explanation.) ( E - 6 77 b &amp. therefore. its matter. itself a i. is the final cause of the substance.

perception of good and evil. ORGANISM. 77) obliged of which our knowledge is not sufficiently clear and distinct. or The source of mechanism is primary force [vis primitiva]. on the other hand. the notion. : 4 meehanicfl.ltiE. such as the Platonists and of things in final Aristotelians. and some other Platonists) that there are phenomena which cannot be explained on mechanical principles. when we are explaining is of no use for matheparticular phenomena of nature. I hold that the knowledge of extension is very much less so he has been speaking]. The notion of body existing by itself and that of soul or imperfect existing by itself are results of confused we ask about spiritual. . e. but not to the same extent in what they deny. their So that bodies would without doubt be sub-division ad infinitum]. The Formalists. force. But. are right in seeking the source and formal causes. Yet it is of no use to mention the unity. [than that of substantial Forms. as also they are to us prior in knowledge. or from that Thus it is that efficient causes are dependent upon final causes. 1 have found that most of the philosophical sects are right in a good part of what they maintain. but the laws of motion. because of the actual sub-division of their parts [i. or rather incorporeal things. that in the phenomena ofTnrtllfU evervLnmg happens . or those who hold exclusively to the mechanical philosophy. Simple and compound Dominant Monad. 702 a observed. because we perceive more immediately [interius] the mind (as it is nearest to us) than the body and this indeed Plato and Descartes have G. True but. the Materialists.iiJM*-** th Also Lettre a is in the metaphysical/ admit VV6 are oblied o admi many things Arnauld (ibi&) (U. precise shape.I08 INTRODUCTION C. and spiritual things are in their nature prior to material things. Substances. or substantial Form of bodies.myself that I have is dependent on the imagination. of which witness the remarkable difficulties as to the composition of the continuous and it may even be said that bodies have no definite and source of the mechanical : l . iii. discovered the harmony of the different systems and have seen that both sides are right. provided they do not clash witn on another. according to which impulses [impetus] or derivative forces arise out of the primary force. Henry More in England. principles of the mechanism. 607) Also Lcttre a Eemond (1714) (E. issue from the which is most fitting. . 11. Organic and inorganic Bodies. as it . but matter something merely imaginary and apparent if there were nothing and its modifications. err in setting aside metaphysical considerations and in trying to explain everything by that which I flnttm. But they err in neglecting efficient and material causes and in inferring (as did Mr. we understand from this [what we see] the cause of motion. and you say that see the mechanical arrangement of the parts but not the when we see motion also.

63 sqq. &amp.ofrMriiMMii alone.&amp.l when &amp. the senses. and analysis of the principles -:. s account of Ihe development . See also Antibarbarus Physicus. It has a formal superiority over the others continui math-inns to investigate the difficulties de compositionc of some problem. is purely pheno grouped or combined the aggregation Now each Monad implied in any such aggregate menal. more distinctly This Monad of most distinct perception in each compound of the substance Leibniz calls the dominant Monad substance 2 . substances. 70 . according arc laid down without taking into principles of mechanics. Principles of Nature and of Grace. we compound substance.gt. ibid. Appendix.lt. TTiing eiscj. all the phenomena constituting its perceives or represents ^ simple .. since are parts. his views.lt.lt.&amp. All the phenomena of bodies can bo explained to certain mechanically or by the corpuscular philosophy. 351. is meant there is nothing really inorganic common distinction between organic or living and by the bodies? In order to answer this inorganic or material must consider more fully the nature of question.gt. see Co.Lcilmi/. group. Indeed. then. substances alone are real they appear While the What. . . appears Tnftt we cann( rexp!atn these r -Spiff* hy mnri^PJL^oiiK force already requires sojjii. although in reality they compound to simple are secondary. p.gt. l . (alter 1087) (G. each perception.f . Monadology.gt. These things they are working at the solution in thenare none the less important and worthy of consideration own place. 2 Cf. Cf.&amp. as which we call phenomena in groups or aggregates. differs from all the others But as each Monad it must the group in each group be one Monad which represents than does any other Monad implied in it. compound substances are prior As phenomena substances in the order of knowledge. there in the degree of distinctness of its perceptions of which they perceives the whole universe. and Uie nature vii. Ultimate Origination of Things.&amp.f &quot. &amp.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY The world consists solely of Monads.lt. FT physics. which but in an ultimateconsideration whether there are souls or not even mechanics. of entelechy of which is a concrete unity of soul and body. &c.f &amp. . . nature is throughout living Thus and matcna priwa. 1 3. while the Monads they can be perceived by For the Monads are not really cannot be so perceived.

Thus the materia prima or passivity of the individual Monad is . along with it. active and passive (entelechy and materia prima). is merely sub stance by courtesy or common usage. for the body as compound has no name for its confused. is merely an aggregate. stance. though upon to activity in the or of distinct one to corresponding passivity in the other. and thus we have simple substance consisting of secunda materia prima and entelechy. : taken abstractly it is perception of its own. every portion of which in turn But this aggregate is materia implies a Monad or soul. but merely the relation of implied in the group. and therefore cannot be an element in a compound). which is non-quantitative. While observing this analogy. and compound substance consisting of materia secunda and dominant Monad. while its body is a phenomenal aggregate. compound substance is not confused perception in the substance itself. in so far as from the former. The dominant Monad is the entelechy or soul of the compound substance. we must not forget the essential difference between simple and compound sub . apart from its soul or dominant Monad. constitute a compound substance is similar to the relation between the two elements. in so far as it compound (i. confused perception. but is dominant because of its and distinctness. which together constitute simple substance or the indi vidual Monad. is a undeveloped or implicit nature confused perception in the sub But the materia secunda or body of the stance itself. Thus the relation between the activity dominant Monad and the phenomena (implying other Monads) which.HO INTRODUCTION all are really independent. The former it alone is really substance : the latter. as distinct from the perceptions . Simple substance differs is a concrete unity compound substance. one substance another. control or dominance consists solely in the distinctness Its Just as cause is not a real influence of of its perceptions. e. so the central Monad of any compound substance has no physical con trol over the others.

. we call the body of distinctness in the perceptions inorganic. If the dominant Monad be a bare Monad. Monads. and the degree of pass imperceptibly is nothing but the organic unity possessed by any body in the perceptions of its dominant degree of distinctness Monad. the unity in as distinct which an aggregate or compound is one thing from other things. we call the of and the inorganic body a plant and so on. virtue of in a specific or definite aggregate. as no unity other than their aggregation. inorganic. The dominant Monad is the unity implied difference. its per than is more distinct). secunda. more firmly held together. because Monad is greater. body would be mere indeterminate without form if not void. Without in their dominant really differences The aggregates a dominant Monad. with unconscious perceptions. or mere matter considered as inor an aggregate of parts which have ganic. Body without soul. is unreal. Thus the parts of an organism are more closely connected. are describe by the names of organic. due to the confused perceptions of those Thus to observe the compound substances. of phenomena which we call things or bodies are thus the result of confused percep extended And the differences amongst them. : . than those of an the dominance of the central inorganic mass. &c. no com the eye of God there can be substance for in Him there is no confused percep who pound tion. If the degree the dominant Monad be a little higher. no materia sccimda. which we tion. is Matcria substances which it implies. a chaos of pure quantity.. in the case of the former ception in the case of the latter. more complete (that is to say. that is to say.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ of S PHILOSOPHY III the simple then. The organic into one another. from concrete regard it either as an abstraction We may substance or (more nearly in Leibniz s way of thinking) concrete as an imperfect perception or representation of Nature is organic throughout 110 real thing substance.

This. ^ Part ae Thus i when he does not see the ditch before his fVW Ai ^ifi .112 is INTRODUCTION completely inorganic: what we 1 call inorganic is really organic in a The body view of low degree . changes in any one body of every created substance is the point of As there is no vacuum in nature. it of its own represents (or of distinct3 . d and yet its variety is not confused bul orderlv. of course fol lows from the view that body in general is relatively confused perception. for they are entirely relative) of its perceptions sifted. and its point of view is simply the degree of confusedness t . For each substance represents the universe from its own point of view. the every body the whole world But each dominant m forming its particular body than the rest of the world. more distinctly represented Thus each soul perceives or medium whole. the aggregate is affect is m a form in which its own body is more distinct than 2 The body is like a any other special lens through which the soul sees the universe. Thus in every other represented or expressed Monad. its soul. represents the universe through the While it does represent the )dy. or soul.

that the Ivmph but this may be compared with the fact have some perception of the motion of each wave on the shore. only in consequence ii. 24 and 27. Thus we know the satellites of ~ of a motion which takes place in our Jupiter. except when there is a considerable change Now since we are conscious as at the beginning of an illness have to our own. soul of it But this representation is accompanied in the rational Now this expres by consciousness. because has its effect upon divisibility of all matter. Spinoza. can ever be entirely rest: each. the motions which take place in us. must be continually varying in particular cases. namely the great noise that I result dose to the sea. from passing of any thus. Cf. and each receives some proportional change. Part eyes. Envelopment. as other bodies or their actions have more or And I think that M. and then it is called thought. but being accustomed we are not distinctly and reflectively it. veloping) fused perception). which results in order that I may be conscious [apercevoir] of that hear when from the totality of them. of to this internal motion. the least motion one body after another neighbouring bodies. Hence the universe. or enfolding (en from distinct to more con e. the relations of formal dominance which constitute a compound sub and And subordination. in constant No at in virtue of its appetition. every It is true that we are not distinctly tion or expression of them. the effect proportionally diminishing. . as we have seen. Ethics. is Development and change. all m I . Now must be in some way affected by the changes in all others. is continually either unfolding (developing) itself (i. and consequently upon Thus our body ad infinitum. itself (i. e. Thus also we experience some confused &amp. Descartes himself would have admitted this. Every compound substance created Monad. which happens anywhere in the corresponding to the least change universe. because all substances with one another. stance. as.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 113 Changes in compound Substances. according less relation to ours. in will have some thought of all the motions in other soul or substance will have some percep m my opinion. passing confused to more distinct perception). and. of the continuity and for he would doubtless allow that. for instance. conscious of it. that conscious of all the motions of our body. as the dominance of distinct dominant Monad consists solely in the degree ness of its perception. certain more or less to all the motions of our body there correspond the soul also confused perceptions or thoughts of our soul. of other bodies only through the relation they best what belongs I was right in saying that the soul expresses Saturn or of to our own body. are sympathy sion occurs everywhere. props.lt. though this change is more or less observable.

cf. 2 i. Scholium. body. 368). . Tr. in new relations. may Accordingly the change in compound substance of than metem every kind is always metamorphosis rather 3 The fundamental element in every com psychosis substance is the dominant Monad. ch.. . &amp. iii. Of. belonging to a particular dominant Monad. and parts are entering And there is endless room for variation it continually substance is made up of other because each variations its body is V . Such a transference would involve a sudden or discon tinuous change in the soul itself. iii. Epistola ad Bernoullium (1698) (G. Monadology. i p. 561) admit utrt^vx^^^ into a new animal. increase or decrease indefinitely. I would ad Bernoullium (1698) (G. Metamorphosis. Lemma vii. Birth and Death. iii. It is the body gradual which bit by bit transfers itself from one soul to another. Also Monadology. bk. which is impossible. Microcosmus. Math. : . and the matter . 4 (Eng. 560) inreadily allow that there are animals (in the ordinary sense) comparably greater than ours and I have sometimes said in jest that there may be some system similar to ours. pound or body of the substance is continually changing by a removal and addition of parts.INTRODUCTION The phenomena which make up the body of a compound substance must be continually changing according as the dominant Monad rises or falls in perceptive rank. Spinoza. vol. 1 So Lotze compares the life of the parts to 71. which is the watch 66 sqq. No dominant Monad has a changeless body because of its . own in a perpetual flux like a into it and passing out of river. There is no such thing as the sudden transference of a soul from one body to another entirely new body. a throng of travellers. 3 I do not Cf. Part ii.lt. Math. 2 and these again are made up of others ad infinitum at one time form Thus some or all of the things which an inorganic body may. Epistola : . compound compound substances (each with its dominant Monad). but ietWu of the same animal. 4. become parts And the size of any of an organic body and vice versa. Ethics. of a very great giant.

G. 1 Monndvhgy. is in no direct arid immediate implanting of soul no complete sever body. tinguishable from growth. 527 b. development. we mean that its broken up into been body has decreased in size or The animal has not new compounds. In every case the process takes place birth is. yet on the particular phenomenal aggregate can be completely and instantaneously other hand. 5 There is no spontaneous involution decay. that of this metamorphosis 1 . similar to the change which when she a caterpillar develops into a butterfly. Cf. I 2 . 2 : . sper an animal from the first. 74 and 75. Lettren Arnauld (1686) (G. on the one hand. no soul severed from its body and transferred to another. . 90 (E. When we speak the body of a microscopic animalcule has enormously under increased in size. as its body. 47 Monadolo(/y. matic stage. ii. All the Monads which substance are alike unborn of a the sole to say. changes in the relations of an animal being born. on the other hand. whicli 4 Birth is thus indis conceals on other occasions . we speak of an animal as dying. 75). and of Grace. reality compound They proceed directly (ingcneraUc) and imperishable from God they are produced by figurations of His 3 None of them comes out of anything else. decrease. f-ee the note to that section. transformations. but has been contracted so that Death is thus the same as it is no longer perceived. and there is no absolute death. In being born it has merely become an of animal of a higher kind. constitute ance of soul from body. ceased entirely to exist. nature being wont to reveal in some particular cases her secrets. Again. when And increase. we mean that . vi. in fact. 2 Cf. and that its dominant Monad has The animal was gone a corresponding internal change. Theodicee. even in the microscopic. Monaddogy. Principles of Nature . 73 sqq.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIz s PHILOSOPHY 115 no soul is limited to any Though. 3 4 5 6. Divinity Thus the phenomena we call birth and death are between Monads. forms the birth and the death of any organism are simply There is no absolute birth.

memory. a higher degree than to other animals which are known to since man must continue to be. which is the most perfect Monarch. but merely as sensitive [sensible] souls. as ours are larger the least atoms [atomulis] there are worlds not inferior to our own in beauty and variety nor is there anything to prevent what may that animals at death are appear a still more wonderful thing. iii. and indeed in . reason) only I grant an existence as old as the is to animate. while the soul of man is beings are inde both indestructible and immortal. not merely an animal but also most a person and a citizen of the City of God. Lettre a Des Maizeaux (1711) (E. absolute lifeless: For lifelessness is entirely relative the very dust and ashes still have life \ Indestructibility and Immortality of all living Souls. l says 1 : otherwise the Others. which is nevertheless perpetually changing animal so that the body is not the same. in Leibniz of man to degenerate so as to pass into a lower stage of The possession of self. Accordingly the souls of structible. was conceived. but per saltum. nay it must be. whom the soul degree (that is to say. G. alienable. 534) Cf. Leibniz latter are subject. but apparently in us . : all result Monads or simple substances from which compound phenomena and I hold that each soul or Monad is always accompanied by an organic body. inasmuch does not as those to which the experience such wide variations In a letter to Arnauld (1687). but in general to world not . I definitely avow that there are in the world animals as much than microscopic animalcules. to the souls of the lower animals. are.consciousness is in existence.1 16 INTRODUCTION life to generation and no passing from ness. that in the very smallest grains of dust. 676 a. only . The rational soul thus differs it from as it all souls that are beneath in rank. perfect possible state. impossible for the mind apparently. And again it may be. Epistola ad BernoulJium (1698) (G. which attained this higher when the man. of opinion that the souls of men pre-existed. I do not laugh at your conjecture. since it not merely persists in existence but continues to have consciousness. These rules apply also to the human body. and such 2 It is personality s view. Nor does nature know any limit. other characteristics as constitute . 553^ that changes do not take place entirely to my mind when you say And further. though the soul and the . Math. not being able to explain : You argue Cf. larger than ours. transferred to such worlds for I regard death as nothing else than the contraction of an animal/ I am 2 vii. under the . not as rational souls.

a new physically or as an animal corrupted by creation or otherwise. of which God of which are higher its members and the laws none of than those of bodies &amp. have allowed While I grant this creation creation. namely reason. although the promotion of a Monad is practically no more than Minds [esprits] are not subject to to self-consciousness. .i rnouW (1687) - . at since they must always retain [grassier] body. ii. think were created with the which do not all forms world. of things. 2 . 91 (E. they believe that when the smallest worm this creation is happens every day There is. . And to the soul. to put perfection. already harmony with the Divine justice to give the sin of Adam. something comparable this creation case of every mind or rational soul. by death. m = . 75) is formed. or to the Divine economy regarding of bodies are subservient minds.gt. engendered 1 . and that they with perception and feeling. . ginning in a real and hold that in time only as regards the rational soul. always in some kind of existed. as revelation informs it is much more immediate acts of God upon our souls. day and have consequently seed and in their ancestors up to Adam. like those of other species. 527 h (G.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY 117 that they have their be origin of forms. since the beginning It appears to me also for various reasons probable organic body or animal souls endowed that they then existed only as sensitive reason . to a special creation in the then. but that means ot raising whether we suppose that there is a natural soul (which I find it a sensitive soul to the rank of a rational has given reason to this soul by difficult to conceive). or (if you like) by a kind of us of many other more easily admitted. God creates them when the time comes and least from the earthly detaches them from the body. and devoid of of the man remained in this state up to the time of the begetting then they received reason to whom they were to belong. ii. rather these revolutions these revolutions [of bodies]. because it is capable fettre &quot. Thus . being entirely different only at the time when its body ot reflexioi from the other souls we know. recollection in order to be their moral qualities and their universal all-perfect common of that perpetual citizens lose is the Monarch. by is to be morally corrupted a rational soul into a body in which it The rational soul is created Also Lettre a Arnauld 1686) (G. Cf Theodicee. 99% will some I should think that the souls which G vi isaV been in the be human souls have. which can wealth. or that God I his is the translation a special act. than.

we regard it as without a dominant Monad. as in the case of a heap of stones. such as a heap of stones. it is united by a common purpose. strictly speaking. its unity consists in the contact of its parts or as the case of a regiment. there is a genuine bond of connexion between its :t As to organic substance. since this connexion arises from the In short. or a flock of sheep. Whether. is not to be regarded as bsolute. not a substance but substances semiIt has no substantia). p. The compound substance has a certain consideration. or.n8 INTRODUCTION The Vincutum Substantiate. and therefore as not having a genuine It body. in virtue of which we describe 3m as bene fundata. according to Sydney bmith.96. in other words. Leibniz draws a distinction between a compound substance. when we regard such a thing as aere collection. notes i and a. The mere collection hand. the distinction * already considered between phenomena bene fundata and the pure phenomena of imagination and The vinculum substantiate is simply the con nexion of the phenomena. the bond of connexion is entirely in the mind of culum substantiate). unity of its own.lt. one other point requires a brief In a correspondence with Father Des Bosses. m we have which Tf thK Gi. (substantiae. however.* f. . like the corporation which. It involves something which gives a certain reality to its phenomena (ens realigns phenomena). 98. is unity . Introduction.gt. It is unum per accidens. or an army. per se \ This distinction. in another form. Part P.lt. substantiate. has neither a body to be kicked nor a soul to be damned. on &amp. this ^ r &amp. art &quot. and a mere collection of things. on the other Itis is phenomena (vinunumper se. in contrast with unum an observer. iii. substantia composita [singular number!. It is.! u&amp.

to be forgotten o bod ly essence Cartesian view that the rejecting the the iact that extension and motion.. that bodies should he has no great liking for Leibniz tells us plainly that that it is better to dispense the ri.lt. It is in no way of a way in which the suggestion sophy but it is made consistent with he Koman might possibly be syltem which .. by substance is .. it. unless any would-be It not. Catholic requires of Transubstantiation. . Lomoine.( sit Jf&amp. ra of it involves ^cons stency with Ms genera HSs^5^stS?5S?5rs feature of C T There is also a considerable my plalosophy our mysteries for it tl ic . be considered as real substances.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ substance. in his thesis entitled .. and I disciple of his dogma with ought to religious faith necessary as an aid in that Leibniz was encouraged however.Z.m sulstantiale. S PHILOSOPHY Iig which are implied in the mutual relations of the Monads no rincufem substantmle is compound The in the correspondence where mentioned by Leibniz except essential to his philo with Des Bosses. naw . { contradiction to unsatisfactory.

each more perfect than the one beneath it. having a knowledge of eternal and necessary truths. There must be between man and God a continuous succession of other embodied souls. it can represent things in logical . D. 1 . Of course it is not to be supposed that the scale of organic being ends with man. (i) mere living beings. order.. and Substances of the first class. that is to say. in their necessary rational relations. By means of the different degrees of clearness and distinctness in the perceptions of their respective souls or dominant Monads. Monadology. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. appearing now as self-consciousness or The self-conscious soul or spirit does not apperception. This is what is a rational soul. including plants (3) men. the organic compound substances of which the world is composed may be divided into three main classes. meant by its having reason. having mere perception or representation. because necessary and eternal truths are simply perceptions developed to the highest degree of distinctness. which appears as consciousness or feeling (sentiment . have as their soul a bare Monad. or being The possession of reason means the power of reflexion or self-consciousness. on the other hand. 18-30 Principles of Nature and of Grace. including memory. merely connect its particular perceptions in the empirical sequence of memory but. have a higher degree of perception. The soul of man possesses the characteristics of both of the lower classes. but its perception has a still higher degree of clearness. and hence indirectly a clear and distinct knowledge of substance in general 1 .120 INTRODUCTION theory is inconsistent both with the Koman Catholic and with the Lutheran doctrine regarding the Keal Presence in the Eucharist. and consequently the knowledge of such truths is a clear and distinct conscious ness of what is in ourselves (of the perceptions which constitute our nature). Otherwise the law of continuity would be broken. 4 and 5. and all lower forms of existence. . Animals. (2) animals. un accompanied by consciousness.

knowledge. which . i 16. and it is quite we shall bo of their number. place without have thus a position of peculiar inde conscious beings us to devote to them special pendence. as S PHILOSOPHY 121 in considering the meaning of life and death \ while the self-conscious or rational soul really and the uncon differs only in degree from the conscious can never completely lose its rationality. as there arc such substances us and that our soul. . The order of possible that some day Lett re a la Princesse Sophie (1706) the universe seems to require it. vii. calls these higher beings (17051 (E 431 a.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ Now. But death lose memory and descend this is not possible in the case of the self-conscious soul. G. Now apperception is the thus a theory of knowledge. The animal soul may at to a lower grade. 543). 569^. Leibniz It is to be believed that there are rational souls genies (genii more perfect than we. vi. proceed. And on be raised the other hand. It is clear of eternal and necessary truths.. Principes de Vie (G. &quot. take Leibniz finds it difficult to conceive that this can Selfa special act or operation of God. while to an animal soul may self-consciousness. account (a) of (&) man. and him these being human soul as well as of every other Monad. occupies down or a middle position. But the human soul has also below us sub It is also reasonable to suppose that there are above stances capable of perception. to consider Leibniz consideration. which may be called genies. . Sur les certain philosophers call vacuum formarum. &quot. the form in which perception appears in of the form in which appetition appears in the two essential characteristics of the We (O) THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. which requires s then. Human is . from which it is possible to go up otherwise there would be in the order of things a defect. far from being the last of all. 1 p. perception and distinct knowledge. it scious we saw soul.between Leibniz seeks a Via Media the Views of Descartes and of Locke. perception or apperception Leibniz s theory of apperception is strictly speaking.

tabula rasa. clear and distinct. As the human soul is a does not come Monad. its activities. being spontaneous in all must produce its knowledge entirely from . and necessaiy. . its its knowledge to it from outside itself. v. complete and unrestrained in its activity. i. cannot be really influenced not originally a tabula rasa absolutely perception. a growth. within itself. which nature does not allow and which has its grounds . Essais. 99) This my opinion nothing but a notion. It is not a vacuum. actus purus. bk. 1 Cf. ch. On the other hand. is in : . knowledge of contingent things which it cannot reduce to eternal and This must be so. But this characteristic of perfect intuitive knowledge and absolute activity belongs to God alone the perceptions of man are always at best only relatively Accordingly it is impossible for Leibniz to assent to the Cartesian theory of knowledge. Descartes s use of the principle of possibility of was inconsistent with the It explains the universal but only by setting aside the contingent as ultimately inexplicable. It is on which externally-produced impressions are made for no Monad can ever be purely passive or without . The human mind.INTRODUCTION knowledge which is not clear and distinct. distinctively human knowledge does not consist solely in the perception of universal and necessary truths. of which so much is said. expounded in Locke s Essay on the Human If Understanding. all else. which gave worth only to the absolutely clear and distinct. neither is the human mind altogether destitute of such knowledge and dependent for ideas entirely upon the contingency of the senses. gradually filled ab extra with independent ideas it is a force or life transforming 1 itself. human soul would be perfectly clear and distinct in its perceptions. for it by any other substance. Nouveaux 2 (E. drawing a hard and fast line between self-conscious thinking and contradiction relative truth. a self-revelation . ii. for otherwise the necessary truth. 222 b G. the theory of Leibniz is equally opposed to the opposite view.

and indeed there is always disposition there is a tendency an infinity of these tendencies at once in every object and these tendencies are never without some effect. rests to the relations in Each knowledge. perception. cannot give. New Essays. And besides the action. that against me But the soul come from the senses. whether and one soul or body. has its own special relation to every other must always differ from another by intrinsic characters without this tabula rasa. Experience is necessary. soul has originally and by nature philosophers means that the without any activity. after mentioning that those who say so much about what remains of it. unity. Things which are as absolutely passive [sans aucunes formes ]. on the absolute (not the relative) validity of like the void. but also from specific. who finds the agrees well enough with your of a considerable section of the ideas in the mind s reflexion : this axiom. substance. in order that the soul should be determined take notice of the ideas and in order that it . like the Scholastic philosophers who leave nothing that this tabula rasa of the prima. senses give ideas? tablet? Is it like of the soul make But by what means can experience and the Has the soul windows? Is it like a writing- may wax? it It is plain that all those at bottom corporeal. having removed from it the ideas. which nature knows not and world obtained only by making abstractions. . only in the incomplete notions of philosophers. excipe the notions of being. which the senses author of the Essay. 360. there is no substance is no body whose parts are at rest. This reasoning and many others. in nothing but bare faculties. one another. among origin its on own nature. Introduction. For where in the shall we ever find a faculty which is shut up in mere potency to without any activity? There is always a particular disposition another. cause. identity. . Cf. nothing is in the soul that docs not Nihil est in intellectu. or like the materia prima. quod itself and its affections must be excepted. to its unity as a system. and the other beings of pure mathematics. nisi ipse intelltctus. the difference is not of the kind that is called although And I think I can prove that every substantial thing. . There like time. accepted who think thus There will be brought the philosophers. a whole in atoms and absolute or relative rest of two parts of which is conceived regard to one another. which are in us. the basis of both of which in its own way fails to do justice Each than dynamical. which are selves only fictions. But faculties &quot. uniform and contain no variety are never anything but abstractions. cannot tell in their wafenio. pp. not only from other souls. But the soul contains nonfuerit in senate. are them a word the pure potencies [puissances] of the Scholastics. such thoughts. Perhaps it may be replied. 367 sqq.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ Thus in S PHILOSOPHY 123 his theory of knowledge. and to one action rather than to action. Leibniz may be media between two extreme regarded as seeking a via is mechanical rather views. and Human which has nothing to distinguish it from every other. -ouls differ. space. to such and I admit.

ubt is Wittilv is: r &quot. Leibniz would rather reconcile than overthrow. forming the totality of knowledge.f The question What is man s first ? In what part of the soul does it knowledge dwell? And why is it so imperfect at the beginning.I2 4 INTRODUCTION certain ideas or impressions . which are as it were the Hvin image of objects. tOhefin fiTS &quot. xi p ?4. sketched b art. Cousin). correcting grauay now one gradually featnr feature. the dispositions of 01 mind. . are to be painted. -d &quot. c f ibTd 5 U rU f0 10 fr ne an ther -eun ed by a co^n nt L 7 d common bond. vol. it nevertheless has value in its own sphere. great though it was. our teachers and our intelligence are the different painters who can execute this work. While the mechanical view of things is not the truest. intelligence and yet is it still necessary that it should serve an apprenticeship of several years and for some time follow the example of its teachers before it dare rectify one of their errors ____ It is like a clever 1 m Y &quot. and those among them which fre La erfect se ^s. For instance. Our senses. ought not to be emphasized to such an extent as to hide the fact that they have much in common. Wind instinc and foolith nurses. the whole secret consists in beginning with the an d ri radual] to the most L^st coZlex Sf alS S ng S S ed y f L Cke S remote and . imagination of infants to a tabula rasa on which our ideas. tO CheS to a . P^^re ^ ^ m . lays: ^That appeal to me be very clearly if we liken the explained. . &quot. the figures were illdly and little attenarranged .ion was given to proportion. now another and putting in all that has been omitted 11 * because the *** ******* S P ictlll e . they are a priori atoms. here as elsewhere. See FraS6r vo1 ***&amp. they are a posteriori atoms or data of knowledge \ But. Thus he regards the errors of Descartes and Locke as due in each case to the over-emphasis of one of the two com plementary elements in knowledge.? Epistemon thp representative of Scholastic learning.gt. we know that Locke s firs attraction to philosophy came from a reading of Descartes and HP noay perhaps owe the suggestion of some of his leadTng ide t o such passages as the following extract from an unfinished dialogue h6 f d tiast with the s\ tatIShti Scholastic metaphysics. The eternal and necessaiy truths (or clear and distinct ideas) of Descartes are unconditionally valid. knowledge Locke s opposition to Descartes. ^^ . ^A/ last comes thePbest ih n u At of all. The simple ideas of Locke are equally unconditional in their validity . the necessary and the Descartes s view might hold if contingent. Recherche de la Verite par Itslumifres natureUes. badlv drawn at first. (Euvres de Descartes (ed. each is a kind of atomism.

are bodily. truths and truths of fact.&quot. must have affinity with the views both of Descartes either. as in continue view. and at the As a Monad the soul of man is not. to Leibniz. by combining same time setting truth they each contain. S PHILOSOPHY 125 hold if knowledge were entirely necessary Locke s might But human knowledge is both were merely contingent. all true theory of through the knowledge This was the contrary entirely from sense-experience. sphere must explain it a priori. eroftEeT entire sequence of its experience. All appear they of their self-evidence is the result of a process. . &quot.eas. are in the human mind any innate no innate extra. view that all our genuine opposite of the Cartesian in complete knowledge comes from pure thought. It is always an active receiving external impressions. without altogether accepting LeMz s Solution of the Locke endeavoured Ideas Question of Innate establish and the Tabula Rasa. a develop ment from Locke But what relative confusion to distinctness. and that the from the fore excluded senses. ideas. aside their errors. it includes both self-evident It : A true theory of knowledge must do equal justice to both. But none of its. deduction from self-evident innate as a logical the human mma of Leibniz it seems that the conception which har as a Monad leads to a theory of knowledge in a new form the monizes the other two. our knowledge must reach us ab And accordingly the only must explain it a posteriori. and of Locke. only true theory of knowledge To ideas.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ . confused according calls sensation is. and there independence of the senses (which of thinking).ideas is its ideas are therefore innate. When they first clear and distinct. and it is Locke s Td. a purely passive tabula rasa. to his empiricism as there of Descartes by denying that against the position If there be ideas. of all itself the spontaneous source force. from the beginning are confiSicTancTunperrecr The recognition i.

though our experience is entirely internal.t once set aside this notion. with a superficial depreciation of its somewhat inappropriate name. Boutroux. And though our ideas are innate. not as complete innate images always hovering in our consciousness. which are to our thought. there are many which can never be reduced to the perfect clearness and distinctness though that experience of experience. 83. but as so grounded in us that hey indeed require the stimulus of experience. . they are all acquired in so far as they are ideas distinct for us. for it self-evident truth. Thus the self-evidence of uni versal and necessary truths is a result all is purely internal. Human knowledge is thus at once a priori and a posteriori. ex cluding all other forms of human experience as certainty pheno of body. but are never given to us by experience. of Nouveaux Essais &c Introduction p. the aesthetic necessary clings and the consciousness of obligation rest upon anything else than the immediate depth of our spiritual nature. original possessions of our nature. Lotze. in accordance with the pre-established harmony between substances.126 INTRODUCTION perception. m &amp. 13 people made too free a use of the name of innate ideas but now it seems to me that they have fallen into an opposite error when they . The acceptance of this theory involves a change in the point of view held both by Descartes and Locke. consists in a representation of the Relativity of the Distinction between Perception and Apperception. of which we have nevertheless quite sufficient ground for recognizing as true. p. but whole universe. the indistinct representation of things external to the individual mind. ed. both argue on the assumption that perception and apper ception are quite distinct from one another. innate and experiential . In earlier times Streitschrtft. Farther. which is the contradictory opposite of If all our ideas [connaissancesl are innate in so far as they are deas distinct themselves. so that they under the stimulus of come into our consciousness as experience. : . I have never been able to convince that the logical and metaphysical principles regarding the nature of things. Descartes s theory of innate ideas rests on his doctrine that absolute by They mena belongs to self-conscious thought alone. it is none the less objectively real.lt. Cf.

Otherwise the mind would make a reflexion upon each reflexion ad infiniium. denies the innate ideas on the ground that children. But I must surely come in short. some thought which we allow to pass without thinking of it otherwise we should always dwell upon the same thing. are may first principles. (which is perception not of necessarily real qualities) are not different in kind but merely in 1 anything more than the mere possession ii. l . 19 (E. which has already there used for the overthrow of innate ideas and truths. be reflecting upon all these reflexions. there is & petitio prindominated our first discussion. both cases mere it is apperception that is appealed to does not count perception Now the great central principle of the philosophy of . on the other hand. are two assertions which appear equally [s apercei-oir~\ Forgive Theophilus [representative of Leibnizj. but we should have without any reason to give up our opinion. sir. have never produced any proof it is easy to confidently declare regarding this matter. while by Locke it is but simple ideas. v. not In the elements out of which knowledge is built. 107) : Phil- alethes body [representative of Locke]. S PHILOSOPHY 127 existence of Locke. unintelligible. (in the Leibnitian sense) is regarded by Descartes as from which containing absolute. i. I should always have to think that I think of it. Noureaux Essais. which implies that we have an idea only when we are is to say.&quot. and there must. throughout feeling ception. that it is not possible we &quot. very clever though they ciently intelligible. For instance. G. conscious having parts and that a thing thinks without being that it thinks. that Thus apperception self-consciousness or apperception. 226 a . . which held to give. innate first principles. which I think I have made suffi But our opponents. bk. If we were to grant this principle. savages and an argument idiots do not consciously possess them . but I must tell you that in your contention that there the soul nothing of which it is not conscious. Cf. we should not merely find ourselves in conflict with experience and reason. . that is to say. without ever being able to pass to a new thought.&quot.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ mind. and besides to them the opposite. that ideas exist only in fully aware of it. It was cipii. particular truths be deduced. &quot. That is extended without prove should always deliberately reflect on all our thoughts. Leibniz as is the idealizing of all substance. and again to think that I think of think to an end of ing of it and so ad infinitum. of what they so often and so are. ch. in being conscious of some present feeling. is in me. perceptive and bare or by regarding it Apper representative.

being. Accordingly. a mind. no one of them barrier.itself. the growth is of the essence of every substance. . and is out of class from within class. individual with every other substance. apperception or potentially clear and all J . the variety of and within its unity. is separated from another by any impassable soul is clear and distinct body. is in itself and is conceived through need of anything else. but a high degree of clearness and distinctness in that which is already real in lower forms. the lifting is a mere as in the case of Locke.I2 8 INTRODUCTION One reality pervades degree. so that either. the unity of real thought the elements remaining un aggregate of its varieties. changeable into whatever groups entire. &quot. mind essentially the same argument as he used against The Cartesian view of subs view of matter. distinct perception. contained. There is no sub common stance which is not potentially an Ego. resulted in the without Leibniz. stance as that which &quot. unifies without absolutely identifying substance as that which is them. is confused soul Body Self-consciousness is not a unique certainty or reality. development. the becoming. as in the is case of real thought Descartes. through his view of V continually in processo^erceiving_ ^^representing T5escartes s view of matter as an things. sub-sumption. internal and movement. or. we may gather them. Leibniz argues abstrac of substance makes matter by itself an doctrine which is for it is really the confused perception tion. an idea. againsl that a true independent substance. of Matter and Mind. them all . a principle is what it is. The self may be but it is so only in exclusive. unchangeably . perfect to be set forth by pure JAs Leibniz denies the complete Separation against Descartes. Leibniz brings against Descartes s view of Descartes r. on matter and mind.TEus. self-limited. which For them a thing. a self-conscious What Descartes and Locke both ignore is the . complete separation of the other hand.&quot.

not relatively different from unconsciousness. When . against the view of Descartes that mind an independent substance. and that mind as we have it is inseparable from matter and is really nothing but matter raised to a higher power. sleep. as against Locke. without any 2 specific thought. While motion and Could this be regarded as a strictly logical development of one side of Descartes s philosophy. And a posteriori exists Locke holds that in dream without thinking. Mind always that the the other hand. But I cannot conceive it to be more necessary for the Philalethcx. thus revealing Descartes s inconsis is the essence of tency ? Descartes would say that. it is absolutely at rest when a mind has no clear and distinct consciousness or consciousness. v. soul always to think than for the body to be always in motion. ch. S PHILOSOPHY I2Q And is similarly. K . the Cf. bk. it is absolutely without To this the central principles of the philosophy of Leibniz are in complete opposition 1 2 . confused perception that has passed into greater clearness and distinctness. he thinks. 10 (E. that clear and distinct consciousness is absolutely and 1 . i. similarly. assured to us by our during such recollection afterwards of what took place in the mind before the Further. Locke maintains that. a mind without thought On supposition. ii. 223 a. . so there is no soul without body. mind can exist as body without thought Now the ground of this contention motion and rest are not relatively manifestly is that hut absolutely distinct from one another and.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ mind. If mind is a tabula rasa. G. Its existence less sleep the mind a sleep is. Leibniz contends mind is never without thought. he thinks. as thinking mind cannot exist without thought and yet it may exist mind.J In holds that the opposition to Locke. receiving all its impressions from outside is a perfectly natural itself. a body has no apparent motion. apperception. can exist without motion. Leibniz maintains that pure mind belongs to God alone. 101): XouwaHx Essais. 1 &quot. opposed to matter. As among created substances there is no body without soul.

which corresponds to it ever be without Ph. for all its impressions persist and are merely mixed with other new ones. for There can be no of total absence of absence perception would mean absence of relation to the rest of the world. neither will the body soul. sir. This is a question of fact. actual. the soul always thinks is not evident by itself. &quot. complete motion.You are right.. &quot. rest are apparently absolute opposites. In the same way. but they make themselves known by certain . when mind apparent. perception. and every fluid has some degree of solidity. We settle it in the same way in which we sense-experience. When we strike a we arouse in it (or body rather determine) an infinite number of vortices as in a liquid for at bottom every solid has some degree of fluidity. when we regard them not abstractly but concretely in their relation to the rest of the can be understood world. It requires a little attention and reasoning to see it. Activity is no more inseparable from the soul than from the a state of the soul without body.&quot.. (representation) &quot. In the same way there are perceptions without much sharpness.. which are not stmct enough for us to be conscious of them or to remember them. I don t say it is. is considered as a real substance concretely. Ordi it as little as nary people recognize they recognize the pressure of the atmosphere or the roundness of the earth. to be settled by Th. &quot. prove that there are imperceptible bodies and invisible motions Ithough some people regard these things as absurd. would be broken. Ph I doubt if [ thought last night. thought and absolute rest in the body appearing to me to be things which are equally contrary to nature and of which there is no instance in the world. rest must be considered as an infinitely small degree of motion. Th. related (through its representation of them) to all the other substances of which the universe is composed. even if it has no only as relatively distinct.&quot. and there is no way of ever entirely stopping these internal vortices. the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness is seen to be relative. and every body possesses at least a tendency to motion or a virtual motion. and thus a breach of the law of continuity. In virtue of this law. Now we may believe that if the is never at rest.T3 INTRODUCTION they For otherwise. . &quot. then. the law of continuity. ^ consequences . A substance which is once in activity will be so always. in reality.&quot.&quot. Unconsciousperception of ideas being to the soul what motion is to the body .But this proposition perception. which is the basis of any workable interpreta tion of the universe. Theophilus.

it is the nature of the forth from it Leibniz regards his mind to look before and after. veins which give the outline of the statue that is to come 2 In other words. of the mind are forecasts again. 60 note. The present perceptions of the mind may be regarded much past as they were as recollections of the past. 21 and 23. on the ground that perception can only proceed from perception. And indeed. confused perceptions. and p. s ed. Introduction. the present perceptions are confusedly or prophecies of the future. vol. must possess at least virtual thought or consciousness. and accordingly that in the passage from the unconsciousness of a swoon or a deep sleep to full waking consciousness Thus in the existence of there must be an infinite series of perceptions gradually rising in degree from infinitely little perceptions. from The which It has the sculptor may take what figure he pleases. even although it may actually appear to be empty of all thought \ mind is not like a block of veinless marble. 80 note. life. a tendency to clear and distinct perception. inas already virtually contained in these perceptions and are developed from them are. as we might now call them. Eraser . since all its future perceptions wrapped up in its present states. The Petites Perceptions. p. Eraser s ed. Locke.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 131 ness or apparent absence of perception is then merely an and every mind infinitely small degree of perception. Essay. sub-conscious thoughts or mental activities) express the continuity of 1 Cf. 3 E*Htyx. 48 note.. p.. . i. or. Monadology*. which are apparently indistinguishable from absence of percep tion. view as expressing the truth that underlies the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence. Essay. p. Leibniz maintains the unconscious perceptions. Ci Locke. K 2 . - Ntw i. 367. these past perceptions grown more distinct. upwards to the fuller perceptions of actual waking These little perceptions (petltcs perceptions. vol.

or if lot prevented by their multitude. angel. ch&amp. n. are still there. p.Cf bk ? of which we v 121^. so to speak. J. Nouveaux of things :22 4 a. ness in this were not aware at the time. p. but having lost the claim our attention and to they are not strong enough more interesting objects. them and reflect upon them. Introduction. which .lt. some consciousand perceive that a moment ago we had Thus there were perceptions of which we of it. 371. New Essays. of all .INTRODUCTION all souls. GL v. apperception arising been drawn to them case only from our attention having 8 The petites perccpafter some interval. The perceptions when attractions of novelty. their aware of number. 37. Introduction. Bernoulli! The tells characteristics of these petites perceptions. Essais bk. to take notice are not. warned and directed we let them certain of our own present perceptions. and even without observing draws our them but if some one immediately afterwards to us. &quot. are. . however small .We ourselves have also petites perceptions. G E 2 3a \^ New Essays. would have none either. should prefer to distinguish between perception of which we have For instance. memory. when we pass without reflexion. And by means them he explains such psychological phenomena the sound of a mill or a waterfall ceasing to be aware of we have become accustomed to it. them. It is true that we might are not conscious in our present state. of some attention to them. we . 103): We think of a number eh i n(E which are most but we t ake notice only of the thoughts . were we quite well be conscious of distracts our mind. of as our or their individual indistinctness. they were not effaced or and apperception.1 rather obscured by greater ones. as from the soul of the pebble to that of the it in his correspondence with Leibniz puts 1 .Cf. at once. for instance.gt. the perception of light and colour. which are directed to For attention requires memory and often. and speaks recall it to ourselves noise that has just been heard. 2 &quot. and no more would the whole have any. of is made up of a quantity ofpMta which we have no apperception [are not conscious] of which we take and a noise of which we have perception but addition or no notice becomes apperceptible by a small addition this little increase^ For if what precedes had no effect upon the soul. 9&amp. &amp. clearly their smallness.gt. which prevent us from being he us 2 . apperception [are conscious] perceptions.

conscious of them The realm ot distinct apperception or self-consciousness. there appears itself can of little confused feelings. . by no means limited to self-consciousness But in the infinite variety of substances. and there are infinite variety of degrees exists in an is infinitely little. if we wore to take mailers cuiiuut and matters cannot be otherwise. substance the foiiim has a perfect of the individual: TTiis is what constitutes the identity necs s no memorv is not necessary nor even always possiwhich come of the multitude of present and past impressions. fall. without dreaming. and none can ever be entirely e ffaced ouJpast thoughts remains.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ tions. Leibniz s in relation Theory of Knowledge Ms Philosophy. fo sooner or later..gt. ancT their im be estimated by reference to the psychology may portance of confused decree still perception in Leibniz s general However great may be their doctrine of substance. retains connexion with the T . are merely function and value n the self-conscious Monad. and when we aie stunned Now when we . Principles of s to the main Thus Leibniz epistemological distinct of nod : is simply the theory of knowledge the main principles of his expression of u&amp. for I do not believe that there to-ether in our present thoughts. .lt. and however little we may be of confusion. all of which something from all I say even more impression on our senses. of them in the right way. . : by some blow.fnM. substances in which its degree . perceptions. at least some confused arf in man any thoughts which have not to be combined with some vestige effect or which do not leave We can certainly forget things but we might later thoughts. in illness. they most one in kind with the highest. less than be assigned any degree that can or named. if only we were reminded also recollect them after a long interval. . and death which must other effect on the souls of animals. or other accident. everything in nature happens in an orderly way. . . S PHILOSOPHY 133 the confused perceptions of accordingly. and cannot split its all its preceding impressions. are individually or collectively. it is of substance self-consciousness includes the whole man and spirits higher than man. we we feel and all of which make of things at once. Lae so. many that is to say. regain distinct perceptions sleep u&amp. n infinite number produce no Without doubt. for -an infinity should have to think attentively of all.

and however many particular experiences we may have of a universal truth. and Julius Caesar have doubt these things. p. 9 Eraser s ed. . It is obtained by induction rather than demonstration. Great. a certainty connexion we see between the ideas. from peasant of the Ardennes might justly but a man of letters and of the world could lack of information not do so. or perception which we cannot and self. 77). that is to say. ii. . . p. and no farther. 209 b Thus Leibniz rejects the view of Locke that our real know extends as ledge. also Locke s 75 (Eraser s ed. employed about par (Essay. virtually if not actually. philosophy.) Cf. iv. because of the certainty. when we do not see any. ii. by induction without knowing its The senses may suggest. 373)Essay. 76. 1 . a knowledge of truth which we cannot doubt practically without madness and sometimes we take certainty in a still more general sense and apply it to cases in which we cannot doubt without evidence would be a luminous deserving to be greatly blamed. It is either self-evident or the result of strict demonstra tion from the self-evident. : . we are certain that According to this definition of certainty. without great mental derangement/ Cf. . far as the present testimony of our senses. because analyze into perfect distinctness of its relations to the system of of the infinite complexity G. All truth But there are two kinds of truth. but cannot demon support. v. But such that. 5 (E. is not demonstrable through the principle equally 2 of contradiction. vol. .. : . 378 b passage in that we might extend the names of knowledge and certainty to things other than actual sensations. {is distinct from merely probable knowledge. Alexander the Constantinople is in the world. i. i. It is truth of experience. 332. v. bk. It is true that some existed. ch. the corresponding bk. truth of fact or contingent truth. Eternal and necessary truth has its ground in the principle of contradiction. and confirm On the strate their infallible and perpetual certainty 1 . 2 . Yet I think G.INTRODUCTION is innate. ch. .. 21. bk. To doubt and we might take certainty as seriously is to doubt practically. that Constantine. Our mind is the source of necessary truths. we have no doubt whatever. Nunveaux Essais. 426) the Nouveaux Essais (E. and I regard them as a kind of certainty and it would without doubt be an absurdity seriously to doubt whether there are men in the world. for clearness and plainness [evidence] extend further. these truths. but through that of sufficient reason other hand. ii.evidence. we cannot assure our selves of it for ever necessity through reason. ticular objects that do then affect them. while innate. ch. i. vol.

197) 73 (E. for reflexion. the other Monads or perception But distinct perception is the representation which is in ourselves. to produce which per flower of perception. rightly interpreted experience Sense. is our confused perception. they cannot without or even tlr t G. is the must not be derided as fictionexperience. growing its degrees. if we did not with which the senses o say of the particular things souls and created spirits are tnis Ais And I am persuaded that and never without sensations. the beauty . What a strong suggestion of petitio principii What is perceived.The never organs reason without symbols/ 2 See Appendix D. representation. imagination.consciousness implies external things indeed. the key-word about it. There is knowledge. ii. The Meaning which Leibniz Representation. then. or meaning of this which i expression. simplicity. p. and we should senses furnish us with material . 206. think of something of thought. ai. that is to say. in us not of our own the tion representation is. the very sciousness of objects apperception is. 269 b Noureaux Essais. 135 of relations which This infinitely complex mass reduce to perfect order and us to it is impossible for Confused percep. : Hunk 1 e is . represented. but of the system as they are related to us. bk. to be said as to the representation. basis of distinct.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZS PHILOSOPHY things. in all there or confused thought. &quot. Thus separate from our knowledge of i knowledge of ourselves through the con 1 Self. and makers by the intellect which they have nourished attaches to . v. . is living ception. a. mean? exactly does it does the perception. perceptions into clearness it is not something quite rise to we our confused perception. rational knowledge. expressed? And what real subIf the essence of every consist in? expression to Leibniz s theory of 1 Cf. of things other than ourselves. eh.f that of some of our confused the at the same time evolving . naTure. and it of our~W^atoC~o&quot. endless Relativity ? How Perception does he endeavour to avoid or an Something remains perception.

that which is separated from it by the whole diameter of being (or by an even greater distance if that were possible). For no sign can be entirely cut off from the thing signified. are themselves perceptions. : . be) always vary concomitantly with the or qualities of the other. of which natural per ception. is is God alone has . Cf. we have come upon the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge in its worst form. this Introduction. Thought cannot in any way represent that which is entirely other than itself. Part iii. perfectly realized Him the universe transparent through and through. then. There all soul-principles [formes]. Perception. As to the meaning one is thing expresses another (in my sense) when there relation between what can a constant and regular [regie] be said of the one and what can be said of the other. is no reality beyond thought. &amp. repre predicates or expression is then a relation of harmony (or sentation. qualities may development according to some law or principle) between But these qualities the qualities of individual substances. Sign and thing signified must have some ground of unity in virtue of which this relation between them is possible. It is thus that a projection in perspective expresses the Any two things. when the predi cates or qualities of the one (whatever these predicates or 1 . represent. are related to original figure one another as perceiver and perceived. who s earn a precarious livelihood by taking in of the terms. is the ultimate Leibniz s ? reality of which they are all representations answer is that the ultimate reality is the nature of God or the ideas of a in God as an intuitive Knower. INTRODUCTION is to perceive. to which thought must correspond. 112.lt. It seems as if knowledge must be compared to the life of those unhappy to islanders . 1 Lettre a Arnauld (1687) (G.136 f^Sjl^e seeixi. ii. then. or express every other. p. Leibniz says that one another washing. animal feeling and intellectual knowledge are species. note 3. 112) Expression is common to It is a genus. What. knowledge which entirely adequate.

that the clearer Nevertheless it is evident vice versa. seen that well as Ultimate Keality. It is hardly necessary but it is manifest that the unsatisfactory is this explanation inevitable conse weakness of Leibniz s theory at this point is the with two first principles.ill of whom TTas seenTto imply that God is the ultimate reality manifestations. Every Monad has Appetition is as well as perception. Confused ceive that which is absolutely not-thought. perceptions in various degrees symbolize distinct thought. in other must be perfectly clear and words. or represent. to express. thought and the symbol both of other confused thought as between Accordingly. by main Leibniz endeavours to avoid such a conclusion of things are independent ideas in the Hiniii&quot. of clear and distinct thought. nature of God is He must be the Ultimate Cause of ETHICS. Accordingly. which all other thing signified. confused thoughts the relation of sign and thing signified is is such that that which is now regarded as sign may and another point of view be taken as the thing signified. the fundamental reality. distinct perception. For we have already clear cause is always reason or explanation. represent. from and more any two corresponding perceptions the will naturally be regarded as the thing signified by that is to say. the quence of his attempt to work out. but is the more confused perception is trying distinct of And thus the ultimate unable to express adequately. the principle of change in the Monad. that appetition . that the essences nature is mind and understanding of God. as the fused 1 So also God is First Cause as perception. or. absolutely clear and 2 all things . individual created things are modes or as this. the relatively the corresponding con and distinct perception as against which is the effect. Instinctive Desire. the thing which more confused perception. mutual relations of which he has not thoroughly thought . the thought of God. . eternal truths whose to point out now not subiect to His will. Decrees of Appetition in tlie Monads Will Impulse.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY or 137 per Thus pure thought cannot symbolize.

there are distinct inclinations responding to them . of which we have no consciousness 2 : Nouveaux Essais. which tends to unwind itself a tendency such as that of the stone which goes by ] . the most direct but not always the best way towards the centre of the earth 2 The appetition of animal souls is . although there is always in the mind something corand finally. ch. knowledge Appetition. Finally. ch. instinctive appetite or desire. Cf ibid. 1 and physical powers which belong to the ii. v. 175). 248 b . bk. but which are formed without our being aware of it. 259 a . 1*0) 20. present satisfaction. bk. a potential blind force It is tending to become actual. 21. INTKODUCTION which the Monad passes from one perception Like perception it has an infinite series of degrees but three main varieties of it may be noted. perceptions. most rational . ch. sentation) watch-spring it is wound up. which we attribute to the body. v is2. but has instinctive impulses and passions. having nothing to guide it but the consciousness and memory of the animal soul. 42 (E. which proceeds from feeling or conscious. 3 in the nature of man we find all degrees not a purely rational will. and these are confused inclinations. the appetition of the bare it seeks immediate Monads. the particular appetition or change of perception (repre which has its source or ground in unconscious This bare impulse may be compared to a perceptions. Thus the appetition of the lowest class of Monads (the bare Monads) is mere unconscious impulse or tendency. whose existence and object we know. 180) unfelt [insensible] inclinations. ii. corresponding to the three main varieties of perception. and of it varieties. Ibid. a principle of change whose basis is apperception or clear and distinct rational is perception. ii. . yet Like relatively confused. G which reason gives aware. G. . 36 (E. . 261 There are b. v. bk.*3 in virtue of to another. G. which belong to the middle class volition. And he is of appetitions. [apperception] there are felt [sensible] inclinations. and of whose force and formation we are . the appetition of rational souls is self-conscious desire or will. 6 (E. 21. like one and the same throughout all its degrees from bare force to the freest. us.

ifc fh st 4 (Eng. a Cf. by these In applying them it is necessary who have become familiar with post-Kantian to remember that the usual threefold and division of mental elements into cognition. but merely the . Microcostnus. The for us. Feeling.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY lowest class. of his nature. Tr. eh. Pleasure and Pain. . Totons usually attributed to 1750)- But i. appetition and perception always accompany Leibniz maintains that there is no perception absolutely at rest.. 139 As on the cognitive. iii. we may say that every perception has has but it must not be forgotten that a value or worth absolute or pre for Leibniz this value is not anything unrealized potentiality of real. that is less potential or virtual. although of feeling perception has an element If we can be small. for pleasure and pain seem (circa to consist in It conies into prominence through Kant. eminently clearness and distinctness in the perception which includes Speaking then of human nature. so on the practical side the law of continuity holds. Every colourless and entirely unchanging or and activity. as well as the feeling and will (in our unconscious lower forms of both. 1 i Semi-pains and Semi-pleasures. fixed chief features of Leibniz s ethics are general considerations. be it more or say. p. which are conscious and of the forces to one another. Accordingly. as infinitely the degree of may of using a phrase which Lotze pardoned the anachronism made familiar. sense of the terms). bk. vol. but when their effect is them i indifferent is . indifferent that there are no perceptions which are entirely not observable we can call to us. 366). distinctions. 4. more or less restrained from full activity. than the age of Rousseau \ and will. 2 all Leibniz says the varieties of perception and appetition. . is not of older date that Leibniz still works with the Aristotelian accordingly twofold division elements into theoretical and Thus the appetition of Leibniz covers both practical. Lotze. feeling.

248 a G. with note in I raser s ed.. i. 246 b Nouveaux Essais. Pain is essentially of a Monad s appetition. of P^ think that fundamentally pleasure is a feeling is provided the pain pan a feeling of imperfection. ai. bk. absolutely without ever be . pleasure is its free action 2 . every soul has continually pleasure pain in some degree. 261 b G v 180) Cf. P *3 I 42 (E. 149)i (E. ch. which and That is to say. no created soul can be purely active. Locke - i . s Essay Corresponding place). is an observable help or hindrance taken as a strict definition of pleasure and pain. by growing into one totality. *& . ii.conscious of it feeling s [s en marked for us to be definitely De tribus juris naturae et gentium gradibus (Mollat. v. ii. and semi-pleasures may. s See Nouveaux Essais. ch. while hindrance or restraining . 151. hindrance or freedom of appetition as pain reached the degree of con has only when the appetition consciousness is separated from unconscious sciousness. ai) of increasing perfection is nothing else than the sense 6 (E. 20. p. un interest in the Accordingly Leibniz takes great Locke finds the first movings of in which easiness Cf G. bk. vol. Thus every soul has continual is partly free and partly restrained. ii. become observable sity or by combining 3 No in consciousness as complete pains and pleasures at rest. 152. and consequently appetitions or of a lower degree may be regarded as minutely painful Thus or advanced. yet ness by no hard and fast line.INTRODUCTION 1 This.. They are thus entirely relative to one another. he warns us. 20. . v. not to be such a definition. ch. Leibniz speaks of semi-pains and } semi-pleasures or little imperceptible [inaperceptilles of in the theory corresponding to the petites perceptions Like the petites perceptions these semi-pains knowledge. : . soul can absolutely And appetition. for he does not think it possible to give to follow directly But his account of these feelings seems a from his general point of view. . according as they are retarded pleasant. in individual inten pains and pleasures. And while we speak of the or pleasure. Nouveaux Essais. with a perfect freedom. . appetition. bk.

out of which. for every simple substance of the soul to . In this really consists us act in which makes easiness which we feel without knowing it. 258 b. which its is to This it unfold does in virtue of its itself own spontaneously from within. the its own pleasure: it follows instinctively seeks of least resistance. bk. were it These little impulses consist in the continual implies apperception. which comes merely more at ease.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ desire 1 . of And this is contrary to the novo. S PHILOSOPHY 14! or pain. at which our nature freeing of ourselves from little hindrances. 247. ch. this Leibniz s view can be no such thing There an absolutely undetermined choice the Will to mlV From of freedom directly follows. 150). mean absolutely un that the state of the An is not an orderly unfolding when but is a the state of the soul preceding the choice. we suffer pain in so far as proceeds smoothly soul line Thus every without impediment. If you consider your 21 S q6 (E. as a liberty of indifference. Noureaux E*sais. G. by and undeveloped striving or appetition and of evolution. i primarily a force. ii. that un works without thinking about it. soul-restraint be active. In so : far as this evolution is re it strained. which not that the notion of pain perceptible \inaperceptibW pains. Cf. most tranquil. that but a vague feeling of discomfort and so to produce tends to pass into more definite desire for Leibniz the confused perception It is thus action. nature. we might call im those little unfelt \insensiWe] perceptions. for that would imply discontinuity in the life determined choice can only soul it of the soul. for we are never passion as well as when we appear from this. beginning of action de makes the choice ch 6 (E. 174): this I do not admit that easiness &quot. This uneasiness is not exactly pleasure or restlessness. and holding a prophecy of and it is of the essence is pain pleasure. v.as a real discomfort Most frequently the goad i sense it is the sole goad to action. 20. clear and distinct perception a process free volition arise. m . G v. we enjoy pleasure. that nature is always working so as to put herself 1 [*#]. from its past present state flowing entirely Soul-activity i its future. . without some activity and motion. Liberty of Indifference. and Freedom.

say that.. and all these pleasure perceptions are Iher new sensations or images remaining from some past sensation. but the totality f which produces an uneasiness. Lay 7h 21. of course. resolving to do a thing contrary to our judgment and wishes. 21. several of these perceptions combined together direct us towards some object or away from it. Yet the desfres and . although the will to will. namely that of showing to ourselves or to others that we possess a certain power \ so that in every case 1 Cf. There are perceptions and inclinations which are individually imperceptible. i. not only what pleases them most but also the opposite of that. i 11. The extreme case. just to show their freedom Bu Ttls to be noticed that this very caprice or obstinacy or. Thus we do not will merely what we will. 255 b G. Leibniz freely illustrates his view by reference to particular instances. . Both in the Theodicee and in the Nouveaux Essais. is that of willing to will. \ ch. bk. after having known and which prevents from obeying other reasons. . From all these impulses there finally results effort which constitutes the full volition. to say the least s still power 25 (E. also comes Ce ai makes P asin g ^ them that which otherwise ? wonld not please them at i f d all. accom panied or unaccompanied by memory which renews the attractions bk (bk. ii. Leibniz points out that even here our volition is determined by a previous idea. his reason l 8 ] aS We 6 6 had In theSe P&quot. v. Noweaux in their Men Essais. ch.T 42 INTRODUCTION very notion of substance. 178) Several perceptions and inclinations conspire towards complete volition which is the result of their conflict. 327. is some determining element made of perception. but an uneasiness which does not always amount to pleasure or pain [deplaisir]. in every case there is in the state of the soul before the choice . merely because we have the power to do it. vol. ufor no s A T^ 7 V a C ntribute to make may indirectly s e c rr thing pleasing to f POnding P^sage in Locke . hint of Leibniz s of volition is given in the psychology Nouveaux Essa^s^. 39 C E. but what pleases us. ii. : T 1 m - thejSL tendencies of which volitions we (although less are conscious are also frequently called complete-) whether or not they prevail and . and accordingly their choice is always determined by perception.*ding sensations. v i68V considered eve^thing i . 260 b G. Eraser s ed. as a matter of fact. such as the parable of the ass between two equal bundles of hay and he makes it evident that. p. Finally there are impulses actually accompanied by and pain. which impels us without our seeing the ground of it. and so rinf iT age8 lonpws the old impulses proportion to the vivacity of the imagination. and then we have desire or fear. also accompanied by an uneasiness. 21. 24). ch.

according to the order partv prevail by a majority o the mind whLh we put the questions. 127 i. such as love. to go on to as neces all volition a liberty of indifference. Locke with regard akin to the error of Descartes and only self-conscious that of knowledge. Everything result and 1 the at that moment has a strong influence upon almost as in mechanics. arises from neg The error of abstract indeterminism of sub-conscious perceptions and appetitions. Hi. conscious desire or cannot be restricted to deliberate any new intention. tuSnu* i always uneasiness but the contrary what we want. note. it may happen that the he result of weighing. cruelty. Gearyics. regarding and conscious. nee horses and the chariot heeds not his guidance].. p. and then there have uneas ness without knowing is . give rise to action. The quotation is from Part Virgil. and is accordingly never able of Similarly. We have as self-conscious or reft seen that to regard all thought in thought impossible. as in an assembly in of votes. anger. to make up a compound direction. As the final determination [to action] is no definite desire. the doctrine thought. combined tendencies taken singly? it may use of the it The mind may even make together. although we ultimately contribute to We follows. namely 1 regarding knowledge or apperception as real knowledge. implies a power of willing sarily developed But in fact volition to will that we will ad infinitum. favour and shaU but also in their opposites.. hope.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ the will is S PHILOSOPHY 143 determined by some reason or perception. of this Introduction. I should think t most pressing uneasiness does not prevail [m influencing over each of the opposite for even though it might prevail be that the others. overcome and now another set of mSthod of dichotomy to make now one we can make one or another tendencies prevail. It is true that moment of ought struggle make provision for this beforehand. there It may be said that wherever o-lorv true because often we is not . tive would make any progress mind thinks that it thinks that the because it would imply that it thinks ad infinitum. envy onlv in the troublesome passions. do and experience many things which determine our will. 514. composed we cannot stop it. Lm 1 auriqa. It thus readily for 1 think we ma\ hardlv exist without r7^/rfi and avoidance $ fuite] There is uneasiness not to th(T5ppo^ite of desire like hate. there is desire. Fertur and without some quick turning aside borne on by his audit currus habenas (The driver is . . for at the which strikes us U ere Es no time for these artifices.

255 do and we should will to will to will and that if we willed a wou would on mmtam Yet we must not overlook the fact that mjmtam. it is utterly impossible that it should ever break.^ re us n ere no d ff difference.lt.gt. Ho th nk of a mind exactly balanced between two like desires For it is indubitable that it will never come to a decision actions We wTth^ m though they are all alike and there is no reason which disposes us to a preference-the Stoics reply that this motion of the S oS is extraordinary and exceptional. On w^ Nou We we eaux Essais bk - will ^ often contribute indirectly to other voluntary actions and though we cannot will what we as we cannot even udge what we will. we succeed in deceiving ourselves or it * east changing ourselves. whose principle is that of contradiction. 14. arising in us from a strange accidental and fortuitous It s?ems to me impulse. they mSfht &quot. Cf. becoming converts or pf rve^s accorfm to the experiences we have had. There is an interesting suggestion of the views of Leibniz in Montaigne s Essais. the other hand. ii. T&amp. 21. devote ourselves to the people the k. by voluntary &amp. bk. rei &quot. Leibniz may quite well have read it It is a pleasant fancy.lt. however slight. the conditions generally that are to a certain side. to sight or to touch g S 78 S me reference whi and dmws us tempts houh -t F though it be imperceptibly: just as if we suppose a piece of twine equally strong throughout.^ . we give no heed to^ha comes from Durable the opposite side. says Montaigne. so act beforehand that when he time comes we may judge or will that which we would wish o be able to will or judge to-day. volition is not absolutely neces sitated as the system of Spinoza requires. b G v 16 l do not will to will.X 44 INTRODUCTION do not at the time deliberately contemplate that they shall afterwards have this effect \ Moral and metaphysical Necessity. thinking of it. and that. we may nevertheless will. For in what part of it is the brewing to begin the flaw to appear? And for it to break in every part at oncf^s against all nature. Will is not to be identified with the abstract understanding.* p. and by these and many other directions which USUallj With Ut definite intentional think&quot.nd of reading. but we will to23 (E. wc r &amp. Will does not invarich. Introduction. New Essays. ch.

and not merely of our own nature. regards dom as consisting essentially in spontaneity and intelli intelligence gence. not a mere fiction of our own imagination. on and distinctness of its perceptions. because we must because the eternal do not act : We merely ? do nature of things makes it absolutely impossible to ideal which is act towards an end or otherwise. which arises from its re however perfect or imperfect cognition of the best. appetition) these ideals are nothing but our perceptions.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 145 the opposite of which is selfably act from a reason from a sufficient reason. but of the nature of all things. Similarly in human beings. since our perceptions are universe. for in accordance with our ideals moves . and no actual concrete substance is subject to an abso to a necessity which is other lutely pure necessity. Thus a capricious or wilful action. following Aristotle. far from indicating any . that is to say. than an infinitely small degree of freedom. But is not to be interpreted merely : There is thus an infinite variety of degrees in freedom. contradictory it frequently acts from an inclining or probable reason. representations of the whole Freedom is Spontaneity + Intelligence. the degree of freedom of its belonging to any Monad depends on the degree the degree of clearness intelligence. but a recogni We tion of the fitness of things. that is to say. an action is free in proportion to the clearness and distinctness of the reasons which determine it. that is. free Accordingly Leibniz. as the abstract understanding of pure self-consciousness it includes every degree of perception or representation. the potenti alities of our nature. a of the best will is more or less clear perception various possible courses of action. Our will (being our conscious that recognition may be. Our among thus determined by a moral. And as all Monads alike have spontaneity (for they unfold the whole of their life from within themselves). not a metaphysical by the inclination necessity.

The soul instinctively tries to take the shortest that way to happiness . wisdom. the end of conduct is the highest degree of freedom. nature. and thus fails to find the best way to freedom. tend to seek satisfaction in present. termined. to be continually active. which is at once the highest degree of pleasure or felicity and the highest degree of perception or knowledge. since its activity is more free the clearer and more distinct are its perceptions. and God is the freest of beings. Actions are good in so far as they are determined by clear and distinct perceptions. nor because He always acts spon from the necessity of His own taneously. but the highest freedom accompanies the most perfect knowledge. He Good and Evil. is rather lacking in freedom. evil in so far as their determining reasons are confused. so sin is the action or appetition which flows from confused perception. Tfie End of Conduct. So also good and evil are relative terms. Its obscurity leads people to overlook it and to fancy that the action is No human action is unde entirely without reason. since its determining reason is so obscure or confused that it is hardly possible to describe it. but the way is really shortest is apt to appear to purblind souls a . momentary pleasure. As error is confused perception and is thus imperfect truth. not because He can do whatever pleases. and since pleasure consists in the freedom of its activity. Its blindness or confusediiess of perception means that it does not think the matter out. Every soul more or less blindly seeks pleasure but the blinder it is . felicity. but because every act of His is determined by infinite wisdom to the best possible ends. that it does not take into account the deeper nature and it the more does connexions of things. as none is absolutely necessitated .INTRODUCTION special freedom of will. and is thus imperfect Now since it is of the essence of the soul righteousness.

G. 260 a G.STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ roundabout way their end. v. * S PHILOSOPHY 147 an Umwcgimd so they fail to achieve direct. But they do not give them selves the trouble of carrying on the analysis of their mind at all. so to speak. bk. 2 ch. 171). ii. hardly having the symbols. if some happy revolution of the human race were some day to give it vogue and make it fashionable. bk. ideas 1 2 . 177): I consider how much ambition and avarice can effect in all those who once set themselves in this line of life. insensible [gourdes] (I call them in Latin. going straight towards present pleasure. which is almost entirely without sensuous and immediate attractions. * thus. Ibid. Even sions in which the senses have very little influence. most of our thoughts are. would have infinitely more effect [than these vices]. The stone goes by the most but not always the best way which it being able to foresee that it will meet rocks on will be broken. . Yet it is thus that men most often think of God. L 2 . 21. In this respect words usually have the same effect as arithmetical or algebraic often reason in words. the same chapter (E. after is mainly due to this. cogitationes caecae [blind thoughts]). Cf. accompanied as it is by so many substantial ii. Now this : something vivid is . I despair of nothing. without looking from time to time at the geometrical figures. 21. and I hold that virtue. We object in us knowledge cannot move required that we may be moved. while it would have more nearly attained its towards the centre of the earth. 175). they speak and reason without definite ideas. like the work of those who make calculations in algebra. not end. of happiness. As this (E. v. 36 {E. v. Leibniz is full of moral optimism. that is to say. 257 a 38 of passage suggests. Noureaux Essais. if it had had the intelligence and the means to turn aside. When blessings. Not that they cannot have these ideas for they are in their minds. we sometimes fall over the precipice of misery We must not abandon those old axioms that the will follows the greatest good it perceives and shuns the That the truest good is so little sought greatest evil. of virtue. 259 a G. 35 . they are void of perception and feeling and consist in the bare use of symbols. . that in matters and on occa . ch.

. Love of Man and Love of God. if I mistake not. that is to say. A good man is one who loves all men. like all are not mere self-centred good ends of God. that in realizing our own perfection we are also realizing theirs. . 118 b). a love for others. We can really love others. merely external arrangement. Charity is 1 Cf. But as. Self-love. This follows from the very constitution of our being. our self-love is degree. Accordingly. and express our love to them only in proportion as we fulfilling the To love others is to desire their good as we desire our own. we we perceive . more or less enlightened. defined as the charity of a wise man. the more are we seeking the of others and highest its universe. In other words. the higher is the ethical value of our action and the better are its results. an arbitrary command. . 285 (E. p. And as it is the essence of our souls to represent or perceive all other souls. On the Notions of Right and Justice. justice (which is the ruling virtue of that affection which the Greeks call faXavOpwTTLa) will. an It is a moral expression of bare power. power. the more clearly perceive what is best for them. and moral means that which is natural to a good man. love of God 1 . according to what is best for them and the more what is best for ourselves. be most fittingly . other Monads. Self-love. Law is not a Accordingly love is the root of law. Arid the more enlightened our self-love is. says Leibniz.INTRODUCTION Justice. Thus the more enlightened our self-love is the more disinterested does it become and the more nearly does it approach to a pure clearly perceive clearly . is the ground of all our actions. however blindly and we are so united to all other men. the more enlightened our own desire of good is. our souls atoms but reflect the whole at the same time. we seek our own perfection. so far as reason 1 allows. charity in obedience to the dictates of wisdom.

If now a noble [hohe] Cf Von der Gluckseligkcit (E. if we would express useful we should have to say that moral good or evil is an imposed author! which he who has command of or ordaimd iinstitutif] good or evil. yii. i physical good. &amp. Geschichte der nemnn Philosophie. 673 a G. for such an imparting upon the have the same common aim can -iver. his ethics as expressing leads Windelband to describe ideal of morality which was character the Thus the philanthropic istic Enlighten Awfklarung period in Germany. P. make us do or shun. as that is not the meaning itntons of men I should prefer for my Iven o ^ra ly good and virtuous actions. Cf. help one another and give new light of that which the increase of human powers. 2 : God . of thy fel and have a care for the enlightenment thyself that is the philosophy lows so shall you all be happy 2 / the whole eighteenth century in Germany professed by of the : . every moral good may be assured ancients said. bk. or not. and benevolence the habit of loving . 28. 477Windelband. through the appetition lightenment.f vol. : . : for others. of his under he vet finds his greatest enjoyment in the activities then I hold him doubly noble standing and the practice of virtue. or as the the view of our in place of which. to the ethical progress of man is an approach the image of in God. just and accordingly one and cons dered virtue as that which is praised. v 232) 5 (E. and the promotion Thus the exalted [hohe] happiness of noble [hohe] is best for all. and true joy of his. according to the different the same action would be virtuous that is usually Now. endeavours by rewards or penalties to power ordinance The good thing is.283 (E.lt. and those who in the investigation of truth. every honourable act i. one and the cord ng to this notion [externally imposed aw]. that what proceeds from the general reason/ is conformable to nature or to .. 118 a). also impart light and virtue his power and insight. 286 b VoHveau* Essais.&quot. through growing of the is to say. ch. ii. which it is the office becomes also that by His means. on account of this happiness on account of since it is most certain that this person. i On the Notions of Eight and Justice (1693).STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ 1 S PHILOSOPHY is 149 universal benevolence. can and will means a reflected light o many others. and in himself. p. of moral good and virtue the invariable part to take as the measure bo we of God to maintain. . time morally good or morally same action would be at the same as our able author [Locke] bad under different legislators. i. that clearer and more distinct soul passing forward to ever of the philosophy of Leibniz This feature perceptions. -uL of reason. a bringing forth of is reality that en God which is hidden in the soul. Ac G. 89) honours that in the midst of all luxury and person attains to this.

INTRODUCTION and as that they can do also enlightened persons appears from this and for their happiness as if they had a thousand hands live a thousand times a thousand lives. enjoyment . indeed as if they were to For our life is to be counted a true life in so do. and consequently a few years more good can happen for their highest peace ^and than otherwise many centuries could bring to pass. as as much long far as in it. Now he who does much good in a shorter the same as him who lives a thousand times longer which time a thousand and more than a is the case with those who can get in thousand hands to work along with them. they we do good is .

and try to find it in what he takes to be the simplicity and certainty of his own nature but. if he had not made them his own. it so very modern. No genuine tionary he thinker his can set himself outside of the philosophic succession. with the infallibility of could afford to despise what seemed ancient. but he cannot escape from it. that. which they had history . When (as Leibniz frequently calls them) were not contemptuous of older thought they were unconscious of it. or scorn it. intellect is to l problem is always to a great extent him by the systems of the past. especially Peripatetic to the and Atomist Positions. strong in Leibniz. it against the fashion of his of the seventeenth century was early part a time when the new felt itself to be so very new. * our moderns worn-out. that very nature of his is to a great extent what He may ignore history the tiresome world has made it. Unless . and superseded. However protestant or revolu may be. for them meant a blind tradition.PART IV. In fact. time. the He held The modern youth. He may cease to seek for truth in the perplexing world. The conviction of some such truth as this was very . whether he knows it or not. Relation of Leibniz to earlier Thinking. HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNIZ. determined for be called bloodless these systems may be he could not turn against them if said to be in his blood they were not in him.

though I will not inquire into what known. and by which he may afterwards make use to master the most abstruse sciences To wh?ch reason can attain. Cf. or in other words if we suggest to it a right method \ Descartes Thinking thus. . 109 et sqq. courts and camps to meditation cast when he turned from by his own fireside. Huet says that (Veitch s though Descartes . Descartes was the discoverer of the earlier thinkers. provided we begin with the most simple and learnt rise gradually to the most exalted. (Euvres de |J human I life. Suffice it to observe that although all the knowledge we can desire were to be found in books yet the good they contain is mixed up with so much that useless and is his feet a treasure which diligently sought after have known or have not undert * kin S ^ not so difficult Is branches of knowledge which are not beyond the reach of the human mind are united together bv wonderful a bond and can be deduced from one anothefwith so jo complete a necessity. Cf - de Rfcherche la Verite par les Lumieres NatureUes. / has not turned his eyes in the right only because he ? direction nor given his thoughts to the same objects^ I have and I no more deserve glory for discovered these things than would a peasant deserve it forhaving having found by chance mhtbt imagined. Translation. f f In night be mavfen 1 T*^f T ia haVG any what I say&quot. Descartes. This I intend to show here? by means of a succession of reasonings so clear and so commonplace e tha y ne Wl ! f 6 haS n0t n ticed the sa -e tWngs s I h we it is 1 have.*? the .). if only we put the right instrument into its hands. pp. professed to renounce entirely the and to plain Unsophisticated mother-wit will of itself produce absolutely certain knowledge. .T 52 INTRODUCTION off. for instance. that not much art and skill are required to find them out. and to recognize what is useful n them would require more ability than to find it out foi ourselves So I hope the reader will not be displeased to find here a shorter and that the truths I bring forward will be way accept! a bio to him. r V unZ otS Method. like money which has the same worth whether it comes from a peasant s purse or from the treasury. But lest the magnitude of my plan should at once fill your mind with such amazement hat youcaS the conduct of his of this knowledge scattered throughout so many big volumes that life not long enough to read them. although I do not borrow them from Plato or Aristotle tier them as having value in themselves. Part vi. fact. methods and results of draw from his own unaided con sciousness a system of truth which no learned sophistry could shake. Discourse on is had long remained hidden.

and this led to CL Eegles pour la historical methods in philosophy . Nothing may be right. xi. (Eitvres Completes. the Scholastics may . on the other hand. th. not proceed per a]5soEi]*rcI^^ in all other history. for out in the past is to be completely set The one cannot be the present has come. there of history. to Scholasticism. ch. . . vol. Voltaire also gives point humain. learned what others have thought of our study we must inquire. And but they are not entirely right. even although if we are not capable heart all the demonstrations of other people. have a steady judgment. the fn~the~Estoiy of thinking. p. Regarding the Also. at naught. 209 not a science. Prolegomena. for Leibniz. as 2 with the past and full of the future present is laden have been wrong.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY . Descartes by the opinion regarding ftmcal suggestion not even the Gospels. the moderns but they were not absolutely wrong. p. 153 back upon the history of inevitably turned his 1 ^thought old wives fables little better than counting it is a double re In Leibniz. T Esprit. (Eurres de we were to know by never be mathematicians. \avec evidence]. 10. line 37 in thought that gave It was not only the fact of a revolution of history: the very nature ot the rise to the Cartesian disregard The substitution ot end. Systhnes. moderns. : Descartes (Cousin).h we have read all make us philosophers if we cannot bring to any question will not In such a case we should indeed. an: ^ct on^ WE shall . p. x. to the genera bk. he yet affected to appear ignorant In of his doctrine mi-ht be regarded as the sole discoverer followed his everal of his disciples have too thoroughly this his feigned ignorance bycultiexample for they have imitated cle VEspnt Traite phUosophique de lafaiblesse vat ng a reS ignorance. of them. not obiect what we can see clearly ami nor what we ourselves surmise. In the same way of solving by ourselves all kinds of problems that the reasonings of Plato and Aristotle thou&quot. or what we can deduce manifestly This is the only way to obtain real knowledge [la science]. Thus. of the past and ?everal of the had carefully studied the ancient philosophers in orde . but history. i . 169. revolution itself contributed to this of explaining things a mechanical for an a priori dogmatic way in the study ot was inevitably connected with a fresh interest a preference ot mathematical to mathematics. but with certainty. had been carried in its opposition ami! s thought was against sharp whole bent of Leibniz saltmn. Logic of Hegel (2nd ed.. and a actiona reaction against the scorn modern philosophy reaction against the extremes to which The. Descartes had never read anything. 2 Cf Wallace. 203 sqq. lit. vol. pp.

21. 3 trickeries of that kind almost nothing. . In Leibniz the dogmatic philosophy comes in all points so near to the critical that only one step is needed to rise from the K. neuercn Phil. Leibniz rather glories in his indebtedness. iii. of Hegel. And after having devoted a great deal of thought both to the old and the new. iii. p. . of course. vol. 445. iii. d. 3 Lettre a Bourguet (1714). demonstration. (G. Eosenkranz. 1 extremists. So people have called him an and possibly his fame has suffered from the But there is no lack of originality in the imputation. point of view of the one to that of the other. he says. i. who While convinced repudiated all obligation to the past. he counts as foreign to him nothing that men have thought. Gesch. ii. dogmatic and not l critical 1 . and his ideal philosophy would be a philosophy which says clearly all that all previous thinkers have stammeringly tried to say. of hypothesis or suggestion rather than that of dogma or In the Kantian sense his philosophy is. 2 . Philosophic. and his erudition days tempered his imaginative optimism with reverence and caution. of the value of his own hypotheses. 236). 3 he brings us. 4 Specimen Dynamicum (1695) (G. 408. Kant also speaks the universe of Leibniz as a kind of enchanted world [eine Art von bezauberter Welt}. Math. vol. vi. ch. 562). It except judicial astrology and happens somehow that the thoughts of other people are usually not displeasing to me. 1 d. I have come to the conclusion that most of the So that received doctrines can be taken in a right sense. Fischer. claim to put forth something new as to mistrust old impressions. for he is to be metaphysical romance called an eclectic mainly in contrast with the Cartesian eclectic. rejoicing to I despise find himself in the philosophic succession. but to some extent he foreshadows the critical spirit As a thinker. Gesch.. Thus his philosophizing most often takes the form understood without the other. though in divers degrees V There is as much or more reason to beware of those who. 521 Hartenstein. . i. and I appreciate them all.154 INTRODUCTION Leibniz from his earliest had been a vast reader of books. most often through ambition.

Campanella. . Henry More V 1 Nouveaux Essais. late M. i. Ethics. G. and even the monies. ) by rejecting limiting are full of similar passages. the with unintelligible paradoxes). as Descartes says. v. what accord of another life. (though otherwise bristling with his friend. bk. as out against the senses and have nevertheless souls and feeling. numbers. though in different degrees. the late Mr. Scholium. 13. 92). i. 64). Leibniz might have all individual bodies ^ ien b G-. ch. without any Spinozism of others the Stoic connexion. things such people as Cardan. . rational explanation is to be given of people think how a to all the views of those who attribute life and perception . one Whole of Parmenides and Plotinus. v. and perceptions. * ch. It seems to take the to go further than any one has yet all sides.. . and then what Plato meant when he regarded gone. Cf. 5^ prop. reason than we penetrate deeply into things. . i added the name of Spinoza. &amp. 219 a. viewed from which the object (confused the harmony of its other point of view reveals its regularity and spirit. to the Sceptics lack of reality in the things of sense. Pliny ing how animals are automata. which Democritus himself made.lt. the forms and entelechies the mechanical and the Scholastics.. . Ft. we observe more Ihe would be believed in most of the sects of the philosophers. who says that are animate. I see now Aris matter as an imperfect and transitory thing what is that promise totle intended by his entelechy. . according as in a centre and the moderns -these are all combined together from every of perspective. far the Sceptics were right in crying how to 1 . Frai^ois Mercure Van Helmont our friend. G.One&quot. 153 (E. of Aristotle bute feeling to everything. compatible with the spontaneity who attri the vital philosophy of the Cabbalists and Hermetics. iv. theology best from and ethics with reason. and on the other hand to Democritus explanation of all particular phenomena. n. 21 (E. ourselves . 205 a. . We have failed to accomplish this by our sectarianLeibniz parts The writings of others. the Scholastics with the moderns. ideas. and (better and than these) the late Countess of Conway (a Platonist). Aristotle appears to combine with Descartes. 2. bk.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY I 155 wish clever men would seek to satisfy their ambition than by going rather by building and making progress This system [Leibniz s own] back and destroying Plato with Democritus. Lettrc a Basnage ^1698) (E. Ibid. according of everything to har the Pythagorean and Platonist reduction the &quot. .

For the idea of progress on the basis of history controls the mind Leibniz.lt. G. admitting the value of the modern nechanical philosophy. Yet it must not be forgotten that Leibniz sought to effect this recon truths. Lettre a Remand (1714) (E. from it neglected present theories may be improved and thinking may go forward. . and so build up a more 3 perfect system Thus illmann rightly contends that Leibniz can be properly stood only if we recognize that his main endeavour to reconcile the modern mechanical view of things with the ancient doctrine of substantial forms. to recover the gold from the mre. and yet being conscious of its mperfections and dissatisfied with some of its results. iii. was a growth of the Peripatetic philosophy. which in course of time had run to seed.INTRODUCTION irom the men of old took a good part of his best thoughts And thus. and not by merely dovetailing one system into another. by the aid of which our draw ciliation by modifying and reconstructing. 625).gt. Leibniz turns back to Scholasticism and its roots in the philosophy of Greece. to whatever objects he directs his think ing Accordingly. past that we may. 704 b . substantial forms/ which Descartes favour of a mechanical The way of explaining phenomena by reference to and Gassendi rejected explanation of nature. Leibniz would say. Descartes himself &amp. E Dill- &quot. . events or particular things to active principles not Thus one of his latest (and not least able) expositors. if possible.. It sprang originally from the sound Aristotelian idea that all to be explained by reference . it frankly to own our obligations and to go back to ^better e &amp.

it in air. To him ? Descartes turned his back upon history be an explanation must at seemed that an explanation to i least There can be truth and certainty. Can we wonder. screen of ignorance and a source be no obscurities. which was described by the name &amp. fancies. . produces fire. he is clearness and distinctness. thought. phenomenon Thus. but appearing entirely external the spirit of Aristotle s method them. a form. But the meaning. while. recollects that fire is sometimes produced by ment he he proceeds with grave thincrs other than fire. the most reference accident. there explanation cardinal and thooFrancisco de Toledo (1532-1596). only where and inexplicable all these hidden principles Accordingly lumber. was lost sight of. or there must be intelligible.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 157 in to the events or things. Toletus be explained. form of fire is information that the substantial valuable with heat as its instru which fire. that seen the humour of it. a Spanish of logian. then. for instance. the reductio ad absurdum of the Penpate farther for indeed prlndpii could no pctitio the virtus dormitiva of It is almost worse than go But the author does not appear to have Moliere s satire. changes in substances in addition. And thus came to be the of substance was substantial forms or principles of multiplied minute indefinitely. m water. gives us the an active principle by After making this amazing state ment. Find a principle. a forms must be thrown aside as philosophical In true of confusion. of any kind. as it was were each explained by or principle accidental form to some so long sufficed as an explanation Anything when no intelligible Thus called a form. and fire can result from all elaboration to prove that substantial forms capable of producing or in anything else.lt. This may be . Scholasticism . it be given account of a phenomenon could readily ittributed to was to some hidden principle (quaUtas of the 1 occulta}. author Summa Casuum Conscientiae. the number rule of explanation.

we we cannot * clearly and distinctly explain reason. Now He Leibniz. considered in abstraction from the realities of which they are the phenomena. thinks Descartes has gone too far in the zeal of his Doubtless the Scholastics were guilty of gross absurdities. while ideas or abstractions ( possible things) may be capable of such we shall explanation as this. why it exists. For to be perfectly intelligible or clear and distinct in the Cartesian sense. but he returns . while such an exam ination is valuable so far as it goes. our science must remain a science of abstractions and not of actual things as they exist. complexity and consequently. then. the mechanical view of what explanation ought to be. of things makes a perfect analysis impossible. in brief. may clearly and distinctly explain how such a We thing is possible . and distinct as Descartes was. as we have clear seen. is not absolutely perfect in its intelli have to do without explanations of most things. is not so exclusively enamoured of the reformation. it requires to be An The infinite supplemented by other considerations. if we confine ourselves to a strictly mathematical method. it is impossible so thoroughly to explain any actually existing finite thing or phenomenon. Leibniz. an explanation must either be a self-evident truth or must be logically reducible to such a truth. And Leibniz maintains that. INTRODUCTION but it must consist in tracing the necessary connexions of things or finding definitely measurable connexions and relations which relations between them That is.158 guesses . admits the value of the mechanical view as regards phenomena. the understanding can clearly grasp. . as the Cartesians held it in opposition to the Scholastics. for its existence absolute reason can be given must be content with a sufficient No examination of the measurable relations or connexions o^ +^ ngs does not yield an exhaustive account of their na ^ id accordingly. but if we are to be satisfied with no explanation which gibility. and our science will perforce be very abstract and very limited.

for all the changes in nature by regarding accounting of one them as due to variations in the distribution motion is not a deep But constant quantity of motion. But this which passes . ciples in a sense deeper almost entirely emptied the term who k of these form of signification. Going back to the source had so degenerated. We than the human soul. and that every real existence And in this way the Monadology restores to principle.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY to the older philosophy for 159 an explanation of the realities has done well in clearing away Descartes themselves. as forms than that of the later Scholastics. along with unity and cannot have a better example of this in which we find continuous process self-identity. force and meaning. explain that which is half-hidden. entirely enough principle to explain reality. what it is in the thing Cartesian physics by the idea Leibniz supplements the that mere body or matter is an abstention.ul or living nowhere. every it has In so far as it exists. from potentiality into actuality. approach to what he is seeking had. the most Leibniz s relation to Atomist philosophy is for to add a negative one. indeed. it is its nature to pass from potentiality to actuality. which explained nothing. the principle of a thing in the sense of its implicit perfect to be or become. Thus it seems to be conceived Leibniz that real things or substances are to or living prin as analogous to the human soul. and is not merely possible. It is apparent. which comes and goes. come into being . with new which was the chief feature of the number of forms Peripatetic philosophy. and in the great mass of forms. And when he sometimes speaks . the characteristic of every real thing. existing V . been anything to what has incidentally He is on the side of modern science in rejecting the idea of an absolute vacuum. is res complcta. Leibniz finds the nearest views that in Aristotle s entelechy. Thus realization. the infinite philosophy. and therefore it cannot on the surface phenomenal. and it is hardly necessary part said regarding it.

it is impossible to find any such unit that the of the m . assumes without any attempt and it is the real basis of his it). he finds it necessary to have recourse to the principle that everything must have an efficient cause which is at least as real as the 3ffect (and may be more real than This . principle he to demonstrate its validity ion. pp. and in the second place of the existence of an external world 3 The proofs of the existence of God form the keystone of Descartes s system Leir function is to make up for the inevitable imperlons of a logic based solely on the principle of contra.J 6 Monads as INTRODUCTION atoms his object is probably to show Monadology expresses clearly what the atomists are groping for. on their lew of reality. regard his use of the principle of m proofs. When we knowing it. pp. 58 . external reality. Part ii. mind and 1 Cf. in the first place. The atomists are right he would say. to the dualism of Introduction. insisting upon a real unit. this arranged argents . His leading thought in this connexion that a real whole presupposes a real unit. 21 sqq * Introduction. Part ii. of the existence of God. Leibniz s Sufficient Reason in relation to the Cause of Descartes and Spinoza. and not in a merely accidental or indeterminate relation to it. Descartes. as we have seen 2 develops his item under the guidance of the principle of contradiction tie But order to pass from the subjectivity of the Ego to an objective. that is to say a unit which is essentially connected with the whole representative of it. look/not at what Leibniz was himself aware doing but at what he actually did without we may clearly sufficient reason as a development of what was implied in the use which Descartes and Spinoza made of the notion cause. Clinging. as he does. but.

(Veitch s Tr. and which ho the world. the consistency. . the God (who would riot which I have already taken for a rule. we should have no ground assurance that possessed the perfection of being true . however clear and distinct our ideas might on that account for tho be. If we did not know that all which we possess of real and true proceeds from a perfect and infinite Being. l found a criterion for the consistency of thought with itself. again employs in establishing the reality of God must exist.. without and accordingly such a wish cannot a doubt. A it clear and distinct idea completely satisfied thought. the things which we clearly and distinctly conceive are and because true. Hegel. 319. for otherwise no adequate cause can be And in us. p. feebleness or malice Cf. iii. and meets with some kind of imperfection although it may seem that to be able to deceive is a mark of clever ness or of power. Part impossible that iv. Now that there actually exists that which it according to Descartes. He not rest must he must justify get beyond the idea to the reality not one or another idea but thought itself. fulness. they that of Accordingly. we must postulate 1 Mrfhwl. In the charac distinctness in ideas he had teristics of clearness and .. GescJtichte tier Phil. . by means of which he proves the existence of God. objective validity represents. that all derived from Him. assigned for the existence of the idea of God the real existence of external again. says Descartes. of thought and external existence. M . exist in God. namely. distinct ideas. it is the truth existing goodness of an actually be perfect had He not these to us the validity of our clear and qualities) that assure Even the principle. satisfied with the idea of a most perfect being. and because all that we possess is .. is certain only because God is or exists. He is a perfect Being. the wish to deceive always indicates. everything turns upon this unexplained principle of cause.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY l6l Descartes could matter. but has still remained to be shown that such an idea . as regards real existence (apart from in Descartes s system ultimately the pure Ego). God should ever deceive It is Cf. Meditation TV: me since in all fraud . p. 80). and deceit one .

in spite of it. in a more general form. and accordingly proofs of the existence of God have for him no meaning. which Descartes and Spinoza employ without attempting to explain or justify it. acknowledged by Leibniz as an independent logical principle. like that between a geometrical figure and its properties. for Spinoza the finite. And yet. m And his distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata he endeavours. and without God can neither nor be conceived In short. as finite. Spinoza takes the one substance.INTRODUCTION things as the cause of certain ideas in us. things which exist in God. Natura naturans is substance expressed in attributes or God as the free cause of all that is. 29. Apart from this distinction without a difference it would be impossible for Spinoza to V . to bridge the gulf which his logic has set between the infinite (as purely indeterminate) and finite or determinate existence. prop. exist i. is. There must be. causa sui or substance is analyzed into two moments. 2 Ethics. God. unless we are to suppose that God deceives us *. he does not altogether dispense with the notion of cause! Ostensibly he reduces the relation of cause and effect to a logical connexion. considered as identify his infinite substance with the actual world. Scholium. Meditation VI. that of sufficient reason. not merely an adequate cause but a sufficient reason for the existence of each individual thing. 1 Now this notion of cause. Part i. cause (natura naturans) and effect (natura but both of these are naturata) ultimately the same thing. Nevertheless. But he makes use of the notion of cause to introduce variety into the perfect unity of sub stance by describing it as cause of itself (causa sui). Cf. by a further application of the notion of cause. Natura naturata is all that follows from the necessity of the Divine nature or from one of the any attributes of God. passim. . all modes of God s attributes. e. remains unreal. as his startingpoint of absolute certainty.

suggestion that place in the one all-embracing system. but is an out novel in the reasonings of growth of what was already involved It is a step towards the his immediate predecessors. are all of suffi cient reason to that of contradiction is not an entirely on the part of Leibniz. he had discovered Monads century. i. hands of his immediate of Leibniz suffered grievously at the 2 Probably this was disciples . Otto F. 17. Rosenkranz. And the And as we have it may be) argument of Spinoza (however inconsistent that every finite thing must find based on the conviction is its must follow from the nature of God in whom Thus the addition of the principle perfections. Cf. Manifestly s is more vaguely implied in Descartes out of what references to the perfection of the character of repeated God as our warrant for the reality of things.. 478. and power. Kosenkranz. be the through masses of manuscript which might well And the philosophical system despair of his friends. It has been with Leibniz as with several philosophers of us from our &quot. 390. p. ch. &c. is to say.) earlier writings (Triiume elms Geistersehers. Kant^ himself in one of his Hegel (2nd eel. vii. 66. 58) speaks of Leibniz s amusing idea. Wallace. dltere entlehrlich gemacht went en . into clear reconciling of their inconsistencies by bringing and imper consciousness a principle which they blindly fectly employed. The philosophy inevitable. thought that .so//. Part ii. Hartenstein. Miiller. &quot. were published in his and his philosophical opinions were dispersed lifetime. ultimately on the nature there is here a workinggoodness. according to which we might perhaps swallow in our coffee atoms destined And a naturalist of the end of last to become human souls. 45 Hartenstein. iii.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY 163 seen \ the sufficiency of the reason rests of God as perfect in wisdom. Kant. The Philosophy of Wolff. Logic of Prolegomena. we ourselves shall be able to protect ourselves from them. under the microscope ! M 2 .May God preserve antiquity. iii. der reinen Vernunft durch eine . Entdechung nach der alle neve Kritik 1 2 : . Few of his writings This Introduction. who might have said friends as for our enemies.

He holds that the difference between 1 thus to make contradiction. . e. So not-being supreme. and his fame had led to Leibniz s discredit. who himself. is And on the other hand. the possible always something V It ought logically to follow that everything possible is actual. This systematizing and modifying of the philosophy of Leibniz were accomplished by Christian Wolff (1679J 754). i. some reason why it exists rather than does not exist. reason stood side by side. for otherwise would something being something : proceed out of nothing. that of which there is some notion. On the other hand. and this defect must somehow be removed. and must therefore to some extent be modified. Leibniz s metaphysics seemed in some points incompatible with the Newtonian physics. and that there is no distinc tion between essence and existence. His solution of the difficulty arising from the supposition of two co ordinate first principles is to make the principle of sufficient reason a logical inference from that of and the law of contradiction the one supreme law of thought. 101. 102. and there was no clear account of the relation between them. system independent principles can have no stability.lt. 3 2 Ibid ?o Ibid. 59. But ex niliilo nihil fit there is no middle term between something and in Wolff the antithesis of being and sible is nothing. But at this point the 1 The impos Ontologia. 57. Newton had triumphed in the long controversy.164 itself INTRODUCTION must have seemed as broken as was the expression The two principles of contradiction and sufficient of it. nothing V is &amp. to the exclusion of the notion of becoming. with two A Wolff s position may be regarded as in some respects a return to the Cartesian attitude of mind. something and nothing is absolute. while nothing is that of which there is no notion \ Thus everything must have a sufficient reason. however. strongly objected to being called a mere disciple of Leibniz. or an elaborator of the Leibnitiaii philosophy.

68. principle developed character of the It is because of the essentially dogmatic can each be represented as extremes principle that such . is not the supreme and gives us. after all. actual development (its exis is and the compossible. And this. 1 Ontologia. and mutual exclusiveness of the Monads. of Leibniz. the actual something is flatly and nothing. of contradiction. As employed by Spinoza and by Wolff flowing from it. p. in the thinking with the survival of a narrow interpretation of Leibniz. sufficient reason. Part ii. on which the distinction is more something it otherwise. here implies). the self-sufficiency of which we have seen to be connected. Thus while Wolff makes a show of logical completeness and system. just as Spinoza an abstract universalism or pantheism. as the outcome power in Leibniz s thought). 174. if the actual existing s than a merely possible something (as Wolff position there must be a middle term between then . distinction between the possible potentially in the seed.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ Leibnitian influence reasserts confused. can legitimately yield nothing but the bare the principle or assumptions with which each self-identity of the data Accordingly (as in this case) if the begins his work. of contradictory of Wolff s original principle. the principle of after he has emptied of all meaning To put rests. As an illustration of what he means he 1 possibility takes the case of a tree . course. which but which requires for its of other tence as a tree) the co-operation or complement Wolff returns to the Leibnitian Thus existing things. . 2 This Introduction. 2 Wolff carries to an ex the principle of contradiction treme this tendency (which. S PHILOSOPHY 165 itself. else is still needed for possibility of a being. something Existence or reality is the complement of its existence. 173. and Wolff becomes Besides the His ruthless logic gives way. an abstract indi of the bare principle had already from the same vidualism. he is really hacking in pieces the philosophy He is fascinated by its individualist element.

the system of pre-established Wolff retains the name but it. both wS . He sees no really influence Monads and According to . simplicity. and inking. . the guise of a hypothesis. being purely diffi one another. as Leibniz con harmony. characteristics of unity. but merely atoms between soul and body.hen. between spiritual phenomena of the one set being thoughts As an xion or corporeal atoms. could be no real interaction there do physica Wolffs atoms of nature. *. Si Atomism 1 . systems. disappears also. between Monads.. two substances (thought and have n place of Descartes* substance. ceived to as a hypothesis by which he regards the harmony not subof each independent particular explahi the relations as an explanation of the stance to every other. othesis. of t inevitable consequence other set motions.J65 presuppositions INTRODUCTION are in complete opposition to we may have two contrary philosophical same first principle. with that has some analogy to a position which is a Monadology Ostensibly his philosophy Descartes of Monadology with is a kind of combination in the form The Cartesian dualism is restored one another. e whole of Leibniz and are thrown aside. two sets of independent particular and of th hypotheses regarding unconscious we Snsion the . nrentlv flowing from the aPP urns law of continuity and re r Jects the &quot. ^Leibm/. and physical ff a distinction between spiritual Monads in common with s the spiritual Monads excepUhe activity. petit* peraptio**.

preferable to Occasionalism merely because and comprehensive initial miracle it means one into thought ? And large rather than an endless series of miraculous interventions of God. 182 sqq. but which cannot be actually divided by any natural power. but the ends of things are com the things themselves. is the principle of this unity. indeed. of a physical substance is not. according There is. a soul differing not in Leibniz. a to mechanical laws. 1 Here again Wolffs position is glaringly inconsistent. but in a law imposed teleology upon it from becomes almost outside. to Wolff. entirely subject realm of final causes. See Cosmologia. and suggests at times of things which are to be found in such explanations that the writers as Bernardin de St. . kind but in degree from the conscious and rational soul. natural. but Wolff regards the atomi jumble of the characteristics of both. 186 sqq. and 232. it enables us to carry of day is of great advantage to us works which comparative darkness on comfortably certain would make impossible or difficult. in Wolff s view. in its to be found in the nature of the The tendency towards self-realization. but he regards the stars as existing that the light and he points out give us light at night. them naturae as in themselves indivisible..ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 167 transferred from one to holding that motion can be His difficulty is the original Cartesian problemanother How can a purely thinking substance influence an abso or how can motion pass lutely non-thinking substance. Thus the Wolffian the naive childish. for of the Leibnitian Monads. and thus distinguishes from atomi materials*. and also more expenit . neither atoms nor Monads. The final cause pletely external to of Leibniz. in short. The atomi a contradictory naturae are. ^ the pre-established harmony is. as in the view substance itself. who tells us with other fruits to melon is made large in comparison indicate that the famille. viz. physical world is thus. to rises to this height. Pierre. and that but en ought to be eaten not in solitude cow with only one calf has four teats Wolff hardly because the human race is fond of milk. His to have a unity like that physical atoms or Monads are supposed Yet he denies to them that which. which are in themselves divisible. .

although Verniinftige Gedanken Ausfiihrliche Nachricht von seinen eigenen Schriften. For. questions regard as to the questions. while to final causes. 186 _sqq. and consequently. Works. in. for instance. continually have recourse of Leibniz. deserted to. vol. he takes best Thus the optimism of Wolff best for mankind. by purely although nature is ultimately explicable cannot actually reduce it to its mechanical laws. view of space what dissatisfied with the current Wolffian of inquiry that ultimately and was beginning the course a doc led to the doctrine of the Transcendental Aesthetic. his In the earliest writings of Kant (who. under which trom being ^iblp but which prevent what is true of phenomena ^ from reaching the oi thhigfin themselves. adopting phrase * create the best of all possible worlds. rather his teleology. real space with that of Wolff must be distinguished from imaginary space.views more akin to the greater matter. freely choosing to but as meaning not best on the whole. m Edation of the Philosophy of Leibniz to that of Kant. Leibniz s doctrine of sense as such a way as to make us represent in space and time-though Kant rather elaborated than superseded * confused thought-confused the world as an order of thmgs explicitly rejects it. according part of the Wolffian system. ing space are discussed has three dimensions and as to the reason why our space of other spaces having more than possibility and reality Kant was evidently already some three dimensions. and turned back thoughts of Leibniz. and it is not is as shallow and arbitrary as even in the early years when he surprising that Kant. and knowledge t T. p. through teacher Knutzen. Green. m _ is in fact and by his doctrine of space alone experience is time as forms of sensibility. in explaining Wolff.X 68 INTRODUCTION sive essential This doctrine of final causes is a most to Wolff. H. with the view of Leibniz than in trine more harmony . we must physical phenomena So also. 2 According to Wolff. speaks of God as the elements. this him followed Wolff on most points. we V ultimate as they are presented to us. was bred a Wolffian). . 135totality which it seeks. Cf. i von den Absichten der naturlichen Dinge.

between doctrine which points to a possible reconciliation them. Leibniz und Wolff (Rosenkranz. successive things In analogy with time which is the order of the order of simul in a continuous series. the one hand. this real space is not the space On : of it. * f- 599. .. . . &amp. an abstract or imaginary notion of space. the Wolffian of a kind doctrine of space is riddled with inconsistencies. 516. pium of the identity of indiscernibles (princiif from A and B. we are in error. space is not merely confused As space it has reality it is a real order in perception. space is defined as c Ontologia. 59taneous tilings. of space is that Kant received the problem main interest form which Wolff had given it and that throughin the It might easily be shown that :. hand. Cf. by thinkingindifferent to) the co-existing things it as distinct from (or and this imaginary space is. 1 Ontoloftia.: . valid space. . Hartenstem. The space of of course.ititatis indiscernib ilium} is that. but a neither the view of Leibniz nor that of Newton. but mathematics and physics is thus imaginary space and physics are it is such that the laws of mathematics Manifestly we have here in relation to real of which it is an order . been noticed in Wolff s similar to those which have But the matter of account of individual substances. -m of Leibniz illustrates this. on the other of the mathematician. which.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY 169 of the notion of the results obtained from consideration be applied to real imaginary space may justifiably 2 Real space is the order of co-existing things space \ God and is inseparable from the things themselves. i. we and we ought to have taken them tor omthings.%/&amp.lt. in so far as they co-exist. Fortschritte der Metnpfnpik s iii 44 i . that and the same thing (numero cadcm. of it and can alone can have a perfectly adequate notion But we can form thus actually perceive its continuity.. . Leibniz could not admit The principle Mr. homogeneous and continuous. which physical things exist. and deals with a kind of projection or symbol s Newtonian position also is without Wolff thus the He assent. in arid oi respect of all their internal characteristics (of quality make a concept as of two different quantity) are entirely alike. But.lt.

a real object but as it is a per fectly pure perception. such m 6 es P eciall y ^tuition a priori. - w V r in one place reduced to pure notions [_Begriffe] of set himself against common 6Ver be P ersuaded that the existence of a drop f makes it and thus he for a perfectly similar i ch. vol. that space is a form presupposed in the of our s view more the Newtonian satisfactory. . Nor it recognizes that space prior to actual cases of spatial existence and while it maintains the reality of space.lt.1 7 INTRODUCTION way. through a course of thinking which we need not here trace \ Kant arrives at the position which expounds in the Critique of Pure Reason.gt. it implies that the whole universe is set in space and that the spatial system of relations has a real existence independent of the things related. of impossible and equal drop to exist in another place. l64 -i68 and 178-18* Also 34 43 . namely. we find Kant working towards a view of space in which the Leibnitian and Newtonian positions shall be reconciled. problem be regarded as that of finding a single con ception of space which can take the place both of the real and of the imaginary space of Wolff. In what sense can space be regarded as at once real and ideal ? Not in the Wolffian sense for that involves out the writings of his pre-critical period. while possibility ab extra the condition of there being externality for us.l W &amp. 5. for he reless). is not a thing in itself. Accordingly. asOn the ] contrary htTn? i f ?? ?f must be thought that this sense-experience. it is ^T &amp. especially pp.gnizes istence or succession. Although e does not himself express it in this his fairly might 4 . It is but not in any way given . free from all the contingent detail we could still distinguish them through their places in space (as it 6 similar &nd e ual q outside of one Inother with n* without being able to say that they are one and the same Bother otherwise we could space for the whole of infinite put space into cubic mch or Leibniz could not admit this. for. no other distinction than that which is made among things through notions [Bcgrlffel and refuses to allow any way of repre sentation specifically distinct from intuition ?lnthis. practically is circulus in dcfiniendo : simultaneous or co-existing physical things presuppose space. For a full account see Caird s Critical Introduction. Philosophy of Kant.

because its reality while always implies a complementary element. so well be doubted whether the opposition is really Pure In the Critique of it to be. is abstract also. ception and conception than difference as one of kind. because it contains The weakness of the Kantian position is its perfection. it belongs to our it is subjective to it. complete may great supposed Reason Kant does draw a much sharper line between per Kant may be Leibniz did. and or direct intuition and is therefore not. according to Kant. gave to perception Kant perception Nevertheless Kant s s is limited to sense-representation.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ of sense. yet from minds. as Leibniz Wolff prior which are held. But mere sense-perception under the forms of space and time is not. though In fact. between abstract perception and conception is a distinction whole of experience. which Here Kant believed him function of the understanding. . a relation or order among things or ideal. for Kant the distinction between different way. it S PHILOSOPHY 17! satisfies the requirements of Newtonian even better than if it were an independent mathematics while it belongs to perception entity. while for said to regard the Leibniz. a meaning which includes conception and representation But of every kind. which is Leibniz s name for in a somewhat sense-knowledge. and the confused perception. is the It requires the complement of conception. seen. while the elements in a concrete perception is a distinction be corresponding distinction in Leibniz tween degrees of perfection in one quality or function. as Kant an exceedingly wide meaning. whether conscious or unconscious. it is imperfectly deve for Leibniz it is abstract because the potentiality of greater loped. as we have Leibniz it is a difference of degree. is avowedly abstract. a complete experience. Thus for Kant sense-perception is abstract. and yet it self to be in opposition to Leibniz. the Newtonian for instance) are avoided. and accordingly the difficulties inseparable view of space (as expounded by Clarke. On the other hand.

while treating each. and 2 can read their reconciliation in we Hegel . Works. H. lowest not as essen self-consciousness. begins with the Wolffian view that the principle of sufficient reason is reducible to that of contradiction 3 and accordingly. 4. p. as we find in the Critique no less than in his earlier that his mind In this. . i. but as mere representation or multiplicity in unity. vol. that the principle of contradiction is the sole ultimate principle of knowledge. as he uses them in his philosophy but it is evident that he considered them to be. Part iii.i self-consistent 1 merely system of knowledge. But gradually he comes to see that the principle of contradiction has to do with nothing but the form of thought and that it yields The course of Kant s He . Green. based on dogmatic writings. 134. constantly worked arid there would be a better case. which the position of Leibniz. TT. T. The tendency of Kant. at any rate. for describing him as a corrected and Leibniz than for developed putting him in such a relation to any one else. to interpret ) by it.I l2 INTRODUCTION tendency to over-sharpen the distinction between percep tion and conception by ignoring the idea of development. Hartenstein. they are on similar lines. to which consciousness and self-consciousness are added characteristics Yet while Kant makes an advance from is its . Monads. in some way. most perfect develop ment. doubt helped to determine the mode in which he absorbed and transormed them but it was upon them. pre-critical thinking makes this clear. .p Il6 T neS nlZ f rmed the P e anent atmosphere of Kant s mind. Leibniz does not give any clear account of the relations between the principle of contradiction and that of suffi cient reason. 4 ). this Introduction. I think. iii. other hand.readin K f 1 His reading of Hume in middle life noospere . Of. while the defect of Leibniz is his inclination to define the common quality or function ( its rather than tially its perception highest terms. . is to emphasize the distinction between them. mikes with such apparent inconsistency. on the ultimately in harmony. . apart from the other. 01 Pnnapwrum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae mva diluddatio J 755) V (Rosenkranz. there is to be found the explanation of the separation (almost amounting to a distinction of kind) between rational souls and the other which Leibniz ^ . as abstract! . iii.

the certainty of mathematics. i. dtr negativen Grossen Harteiistein. emphasize the distinction between logical understanding and empirical sense. as a begging of the the existence of God. i. i. for example. but it is inadequate to reality. Thus. Kant protests admitting mathematical method in deal against the use of a purely the theory of knowledge. that is to say.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 173 It ensures order and necessary con presuppositions. you cannot take out of any a predicate. That is to say. (1763) (Rosenkranz. and to lay stress on experience (un: rationalized and unexplained) as the ground of reality. while in a way that recalls the position of Locke. in die Weltweisheit einzufuhren (1763) (Rosenkranz. of things (logische gives the logical ground the ground of their reality (Eealgrund) \ not is insufficient principle of contradiction the ultimate principle of metaphysics. determined by the principle of contradiction. always and thus reality must presupposes something given. n). 113. demonstration which maintains question. 161 Harteiistein. and in the Versuch den Beyriff Da set us Gottcs Kant . It nexion in thought. . on the ground that it does not analyze * actual experience but deduces 1 from (or builds zn einer upon) arbi- Cf. is always more than a mere the real cause of anything reason a causal connexion is not a merely logical con It is this line of thinking that leads Kant to nexion. Gnmd) but Thus the treated as when Kant develops this position in connexion with the problem of proving He rejects. Harteu- 19). i). 55 Spitzfindiykeit der vier syllngistischen Figuren (1762) (Rosenkranz. stein. i. the principle of in it subject more than is contained : contradiction will never entitle you to pass from any mere idea to the reality of that idea. cannot be the most perfect Being. i. the Cartesian that existence is necessarily involved in the perfection of Existence. Thus. Kant says. ultimately lie outside of pure thought. Pure thought. ing with metaphysics or with on the ground that such a method is merely synthetic. fier einzifj mogliche Beweisgrund . Demonstration des vi. makes advances towards this position in the Essay on Die falschc.

The totality of possible worlds is at once a On the other hand. thought and experience. 301 Hartenstein. feee also Kant s Thesis on Inaugural ThcoJogie 1 berg. : system and not a system. after ^ its all. imper explanation of the existence of the actual system of things as the result of a choice among all possible worlds is due to the inconsistency in his tion fectly applied. 123 ) . which Leibniz had philosophy Kant. The best possible world would be the best world in that system.X 74 or at least INTRODUCTION mind-made presuppositions \ trary Finally in the Critique of Pure Reason we have Kant s solution of the problem as to the relations between a priori and a posteriori. 75 . which has its place in the best possible system or world for Kant the real is that which is in an orderly experience constituted by principles which are the logical a priori conditions of its possibility. iii. In the of : lined by Leibniz. i. possibility. For Leibniz the real is the that fitting. And his contention is that the a priori is not merely that which is self-evident and can be expressed in an analytic judgment. Harteiistein. i. (Rosenkranz. Leibniz s which comes from working with two co-ordinate posi first principles. and thus the problem of Leibniz would not be solved by the choice. the choice of God would prac at least it would be tically be arbitrary on no back. if the totality of possible worlds were not a system. which the becoming Professor in KonigsDe mundi semiUlis atque intettigibilis forma et principiis (1770^ in distinction between sense and understanding is brought o the sharpest point. is but the working out of what insists is out compossibility. Untersuchung uler die Deutlichkeit der Grundsatze der nat&rlichen und der Moral (1764) (Rosenkranz. when he on accordingly. but that which experience universally and necessarily involves as the condition of This. but would merely be carried a stage farther grounded Cf. 63). i. or necessity arising from the system of things. the choice by God of the best possible world would be determined by the nature of the whole system of possibles. . If it were a system. as the ground of reality. we have a more thorough application of the principle of sufficient reason.

ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 175 God would choose the best reason intelligible to us. Now relatively to the world of sense. the system would itself be incomplete. Spinozism prevented that For Kant there is but one system of experience. They may thus be possible the empirical cognition the world ot sense. neces Leibniz wishes to avoid a doctrine of blind Kant. ii. of the system of mutually related that the ultimate ground in some principle outside the things must be sought of Leibniz appears in his system itself \ The dogmatism : Kant is ii. p. is The supposition of a choice among But in possible worlds no much Kant s doctrine the thing-in-itself performs very as did the choice in Leibniz s scheme the same function * part of his philosophy. explain . other reason than . the object of a mere prehensible . principle of but volves the supposition of one all-embracing system an inkling of the truth though Leibniz had certainly of individualistic tendency and his dread of this. : they cannot must he outside since in this case the ground of explanation world and can thereto re be no object of a possible experience. 2 Hartenstein. of sub 5 i 3 (Meiklejolm s Tr. have no signifi stance. has the appearance of being a system. . I may admit such Ian incom idea may not though being. Each is a way of allowing for a possible reality the need of this other than the actual system. of things. although and from another in arises from one cause in Leibniz. which actually exists. his him from fully realizing it. 414) existence itsrli. of necessary their use in making cance in determining any object. but used to explain the possibility of things in the possibility of theunuerseitsdj be used to 1 . rightly understood. sity They both feel afraid of a pure relativity. possible ideal worlds It is this ambiguity that conceals it is not. The in sufficient reason. while really the incon the fundamental inconsistency of Leibniz both within the system of God as sistency of regarding outside of it (as the Creator). 5 4 Tho notions of reality. making things and quite once the source of the whole system of mutually Him at exclusive without whom Monads and the highest Monad of the series. Rosonkranz. beyond of a thing. Cf Cntifiw of Pure I?caw. no but it would be the best possible for possible world Thus the totality of that He chose it. the . of causality.

as a merely regulative nature of which the speculative idea. div. iv. I attribute notions of the understanding in the empirical sphere. final and efficient part. but we cannot understand from mechanical ! their producing anything. on ultimate principle negatively. as a ground of systematic characteristics analogous to the unity in cognition. from whole to such an intelligence. Kant. For it to know and to create the world would be the admit its existence in itself.chanical system. p.. but to which.. Critique of Judgment. for we and the ends it knowledge of the ultimate intelligence sets before itself. to us by the practical reason. Part ii. leads him to interpret this Kant. however much it of grass by mere mechanical production of even a blade causes must. 326). however. apart causes. . is assured reason can say nothing. 1 77 (Kosenkranz. But we can quite conceive an intelligence which can think the world. cause. of the absolute Its reality.776 INTRODUCTION a real and independent l making this principle constitutive over the difficulty of ground of the world. absolutely no human reason (in fact no finite reason like ours in quality. . not discursively from part to part as we do. and he glosses world by metaphors such as explaining its relation to the the Divine choice and the producing of created Monads The criticism of by continual figurations of Divinity/ the other hand. postulate adaptation 1 . of the of grace. vii. and for freedom and necessity. It is only a something in general which I know not in itself. but immediately and completely. of kingdom of nature and the kingdom mechanism and teleology. . We may guess at final causes . passage. and in it we must suppose that there is a reconciliation of necessity and freedom. We cannot give a completely world as a system satisfactory account of the phenomenal have no speculative governed by final causes. in certain cases. 301 . 288 Bernard s Tr. ii. may surpass it in degree) can hope to understand the We to ends. while we cannot help regarding the phenomenal world as a me.. would be harmonized. See the whole Hartenstein. And on the other hand.

but for us ever with certainty to define which . falls into a contradiction For Leibniz regards God as at once the highest of the Monads (the ultimate term in the series) and the Creator of the Monads. that is to say. the sufficient is But if God reason of the world which they constitute.). and serving only to produce the greatest systematic unity in the empirical use of our reason. as choosing to is create the system of which He an element. it is impossible In short. 519 sqq. . Meiklejohn. or otherwise. Harteiisteiii. inasmuch as we deduce this or that object of experience from the imagined object of this idea as the ground or cause of the object of experience. ii. Leibniz. by means of which we may give unity to our knowledge. to the world in a way which we may attempt to describe as causal. p. And on the other hand. 410 sqq. also Rosenkraiiz. so far as account our theoretical knowledge of things is concerned. e. 581 Meiklejohn. one of the series of Monads. 471. 508 sqq. . ii. pp. its objective reality does not consist in its being immediately referable to an object for in this sense we cannot establish its objective validity) but it is merely a schema of the notion of a thing in general. ii. Thus Leib and Kant are at one in placing the ultimate synthesis of things. the sufficient reason of experience. if the essence of the Monads is to repre sent the universe. a schema constructed according to the conditions of the greatest unity of reason. i. Cf. 598. Critique of Pure Reason (Hartenstein. however. creative.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ : S PHILOSOPHY 177 same thing creation would be its thought. ii. which Kant avoids. 1 . Cf. the we give of the relation of God to the world is simply a useful hypothesis. and if He (actus purus) perfectly realizes the universe within Himself. it seems impossible to regard Him as their sufficient reason. what place is there for a system of Monads apart from Him ? Kant avoids the difficulty by the sharp distinction he draws between experience and He can thus regard God as related the thing-in-itself. having perfectly clear and distinct perception. in some thing that is beyond experience itself.: The notion of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea. and that is related to experience in a way which stands in need of further niz explanation. and avoid the fallacies of Roscnkran/.

&amp. in so far as they are conceived as positive. reference to a reality may beyond experience becomes unmeaning as well as unnecessary. In the modern idealism which first took shape in the writings of Fichte.lt. The generally regarded as an endeavour to give systematic unity to the philosophy of Kant by get ting rid of the thing-in-itself. INTRODUCTION dogmatism Yet. while Kant thus escapes the contra diction in Leibniz s view. Nolen (La Critique de Kant et la Metaphysique de Leibniz pp Qo r sqq. There is a hint of the same view in Ueberweg s Commentary on the two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason. have the characteristics of Monads. less to work of Fichte is than justice. Fichte regarded himself as an expositor of the true Kantian view. The unity of the universe is maintained with pantheistic D. a function similar to that of philosophy the or possible thing essence in the system of Leibniz An ingenious attempt has also been make by Otto Eiedel (Die Monadologischm Bcstimmungen in Kants Lehre vom an sich} to show that .I l^ . both in its be deduced.) regards the Monadology as a necessary complement to the Criticism of Kant. It seerns to him that the thing-in-itself has in the of Kant. between Both subject and object are subject and object. 1 E ^o?* Appendix .Ding hings-in-themselves. The Influence of Leibniz on Ficlite. Thus all self-consciousness. he cannot be said to give us 2 a satisfactory solution of the difficulty . regarded as entirely outside of experience. 2 111 8 a COUnt f his own relation to Leibniz see . logically involved in the original out of which all experience. and a defender of the critical philo sophy against the misunderstandings of its unintelligent Fichte s main idea is that disciples. there may be traced the influence of which Kant had inevitably done certain leading ideas in the philosophy of Leibniz. until Kant repudiated his inter pretation. matter and in its form. Indeed. experience (in the Kantian sense) has its basis in a self-consciousness (an IcMieit) which is itself the root of the distinction between the empirical ego and the empirical non-ego.

. The time things arise in the soul in virtue of its own laws. . is. Nothing is further removed from the thought of Leibniz than the speculative dream of a world of things-in-themselves. which may constitute an internally self-consistent whole. between sense and They are correlative yet they are treated quite independent. Such a dogmatism. . But this dualism indicates. And thus he is continually pointingout that the great error of Leibniz is that of regarding experience as a system of concepts. is Accordingly it is not surprising to find that. by him ception cannot evolve from itself the forms of the under standing. 2 . 130. as in an isolated world. as if . the necessity of a noumenal world. that which he makes his starting-point. Adamson s Fichte is (Blackwood Philosophical Classics). however completely such a world may be beyond the reach of our intellectual comprehension or proof. which no mind comprehends or knows. under 1 2 new conditions. Fichte goes back to the doctrine of Leibniz and proceeds to develop. The first of his thoughts. It is in revulsion from dogmatism that Kant holds this position. through which alone it loses its blindness and conception cannot produce for itself the matter of sense . and the system of Fichte has well been Spinoza in terms of Kant V the need of a thing-in-itself. and thus to give up the to lose sharp distinction between perception and conception our grasp of reality and truth.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ completeness described as . but which has no cer tain contact with reality. so that the result of Per their combination is a merely phenomenal world. in a negative way. Kant holds. has no answer to scepticism. come for reviving the philosophy of Leibniz. and as if nothing were present in it except God (the Infinite In thus expressing and the soul (consciousness of the Infinite). But now-a-days people will insist on philosophizing. such as Kant postu arises from the thoroughness of his separation between perception and conception. even when philosophy is the last ) . that the representations of external . understanding. S PHILOSOPHY 179 Now lates. . and experience. himself Leibniz spoke for philosophers. s some of its leading ideas p. in setting aside the thing-in-itself (as Kant understood it). . without which it is empty. but which nevertheless acts upon us and produces all our ideas.

To be a philosopher one must believe that the Monads have windows. The final notion of Fichte s philosophy. there is endless astonishment. Under this stages 4 go. vol. . and its highest and to its within 1 perceptions of the universe. of course. . proceed spontaneously from as if there were itself. in antagonism to the dualist position of Descartes. Cf. is that of the divine or spiritual order of which finite spirits are the manifestation or realization. 20. Thus. and returns to the position of Leibniz that all knowledge is one great process of development. gives full weight to the distinction. i. i. 382). all indefinite form. Tor Kant. ego primal self-consciousness. does not lay stress on the distinction of subject and object. is a perfectly spontaneous force. only God and itself in the .) 1 Leitre a Foucher (1686). making its own external world. but conceives it as overcome in the unity of self-consciousness. projecting that world through the power of imagination. Werke. Natur. If anyone tells us that no idea \_Vorstellung] can arise in us from an external action. the Similarly. thing they are fitted for. and in the light of which -human life and its surroundings appear as the continuous progress in ever higher towards realization of the final end of reason. through which things come and Ideen zu einer Philosophic der (Schelling. i. commended by Fichte. Sammtliche Werke. 515 note. subject and object. the distinction of subject and Fichte object is all in all. expressed more clearly in the later works than in the Wissenschaftslehre. the pure Accordingly Fichte throws down the barriers which Kant had raised between perception and conception. 14. (G. in the sea of life enisled. of Fichte. though. according Leibniz. or rather as flowing necessarily from that unity in its most abstract still and being lost in that unity in most perfect form. but conceives the universe as an of each self-sufficient and infinity subjects. New System. he gives a very different account of this development from that which we find in Leibniz 2 intellectual intuition. producing from within itself the empirical ego and nonego.INTRODUCTION Leibniz. and continually striving towards the ultimate overcoming of this distinction between outer and inner in a 1 world and every created Monad contains within itself both matter and form. which are in reality degrees of one power or function. the whole succession of a Monad s states.

of course. . 227. to something. Sdmmtliche Werke. as the present system upon this activity of imagination rests the possibility of our consciousness. that is to say. as well as the ego for itself. soul and body. Adamson. and they both have their source in the original self-consciousness But the from which they necessarily proceed It is. our being as ego [unsercs Seyn als Ich]. ii. as it were. the subject. Fichte. then. 1 unscientific language. but gives 1 There are. does not deceive us. This activity of imagina make abstraction us truth. since that which makes abstraction from itself. 562. should show. nor itself. this unless we are to activity of imagination cannot cease. but it creates imagination objectifies illusions. . is given for the ego. The ego. two sides truth only possible In so far as it is sensation to our knowledge of things. 2 Fichte. They appear in their due place as different aspects of the several stages in and through which the spiritual order is realized. the object as it is an idea consciously projected by us or referred . 219. And the words of Schelling may so important conception. the oppositions of thought which play a part in philosophy being and thought. and through this Fichte. make abstraction from our ego. : 220. them. our life. it attributes them unconsciously. and thus our them to things outside of us. 2 indicated their systems of Leibniz and of Fichte to have connexion is sufficient. as understood in common object Werke. natural inclination and moral effort. an idea unconsciously while in so far it is a product of the non-ego. mind and nature. action of ego and non-ego is reciprocal. pp. the tion. tions . created by the mind) (that is to say. it is a product of the ego. but both are posited posits neither the external object the through general and absolute thinking. i. our being for ourselves. freedom and law. beyond the scope of our intention to consider the many essential differences between the . that be shown. Yet imagination does not give us mere If but truths more or less perfectly expressed. which would involve a cannot contradiction.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ The S PHILOSOPHY l8l sense is for Fichte a result of reality of the world of Our mind creates our sensa the activity of imagination. mechanism and teleology are reconciled.

. as separated from the absolute all. The principle of the best dency to realize the moral order which is the form) is ultimate (the ten of the infinite good will) is with Leibniz the determining principle of actual. he is obliged to place it in God. expression things I p 1 2 ^5 An chellin ^ Propaedeidik zur neueren Philosophic. and. he does not go beyond Leibniz. is generally placed in the region of the ideal. while with Fichte it is the ultimate ground of all reality. that the soul by its own act posits itself for itself as finite. Werke. is vol. and consequently imposes on itself the ne ? cessity of contemplating no longer this absolute all. Monad why the of this. which involves him in inevitable contradictions. bounds of its infinity Accordingly it may be said generally that in the philo sophy of Leibniz will and intelligence (appetition and perception) are co-ordinate principles of things (the will of God. not being prior to His understand ing nor His understanding to His will). Fichte on the other hand. in this regard. The only difference . of the one 2 system of . . between them soul or the in it is this. Since Leibniz. if he tries to find the cause .1 82 INTRODUCTION be taken as showing that this connexion was from the first fully realized. the finite. i. in the Infinite. is Leibniz cannot explain subject to affections which produce finite representations or. if we set aside secondary doctrines which do not count. but only the negations. he says. limitations. Fichte takes up this idealism which is a denial of the independent being of the real. as distinct from merely possible existence. for instance. excellent account of Fichte s historical position given in . but only in the representations [Vorstellungcn] of the soul. finds that the finite nature of the soul has its explanation in the absolutely free activity of the soul itself and results from this. The whole real world has no existence in itself. while the philosophy of Fichte is essentially a practical idealism in which will (in however undefined a and predominant. we see that the real.

will a metaphysical priority. n. of the best. vol. which the source of the world is will + idea (i. 422 . As is in the philosophy of will. 420 . the phenomenal world. Leibniz and by meanings of the term Evolution. in a way which is beyond explanation. follows Fichte \ Schopenhauer (however unconsciously) His starting-point is the Kantian distinction between the or noumenal and the empirical or phenomenal As regards the main principles of character of a real subject Fichte. Though this is the statement I venture to think it a little too sweeping. Fichte. . 333. destitute of anything that can fairly will is essentially The world is not a be described as ethical character. recalls idea. which is not attributed Wallace See also ch. p. gives to perception. 2 Critique of Pure 7ieo. Hartenstein. s Logic of Hegel. ot 1 Except his pessimism. ii. 183 intelligible his philosophy. but rather progress towards the realization an unfortunate episode in the existence of the eternal and the highest good is to be attained not by allow will.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY Schopenhauer. ii. and in general will is a pure activity which character Thus the is the source of the system of phenomena. like Fichte. 424. but by suppressing it as live) to have free course much and expression. the ultimate reality character is 2 . later writers. sophy which is not contained in the of an expert. which is no necessary consequence the system. Vorstellung. Prolegomena (2nd ed. 219. the world as will as possible. to ing this will or striving (ivill in us. The intelligible empirical a will. phe nomenon). p. representation. p. The the Leibnitian view of substance as essentially appetition + But Schopenhauer. as it is used by Cf. The absolute is the purely practical activity of will.so. for our understanding cannot pass the limits of the But this ultimate conditioned.\ references chs. there is absolutely nothing in Schopenhauer s philo later works of Fichte. Meiklejohn. is . ii. which gives rise to the relative or mutually conditioned. e. 12 and 13 for an account of Schelling with suggestive In ch. Adarnson. 13 there is a lucid explanation of the various to Leibniz. Rosenkranz.

33- . ostensibly subordinated of thinking. His absolute. of the general laws being regarded as one metaas a judgment discovered by induction and used the ground or sufficient be which . conceived as that which for the will is 2 . reducing to causality (interpreted in a wide sense). there is abstract form. 5. 1 The principle of contradiction is expresses i to that of sufficient reason. the be from acknowledging it) really (however far he may in determined by the principle of contradiction.. Schopenhauer. 16. indicates the deeper and more comprehensive interpreta reason as underlying tion of the principle of sufficient he does not allow it to mould his that of contradiction. &c. priori. ch. is and his metaphysics. for tached. the cate Again. ch. reason of other may clearly But here judgments between Schopenhauer s logical theory an inconsistency ultimate will. in some mysterious way. and Another thinker who owes something to Leibniz Herbart (1776to Fichte. 1 He is of not content to subordinate the principle Ucber die merfache Wurzel des Satzes vom sureichenden Grunde. is something more to Kant and 1841). logically true. as the governing principle to one another in a All our ideas [Vorstellungen] stand form is connexion. while Schopenhauer independent of them. absolutely is. nothing separate and It is this connexion us. that a system which may. Accordingly. Herbart.lt. Ueler die vierfache Wurzel. to the principle of sufficient reason gories of Kant gives great importance he regards which (in one or other of four different forms) of the phenomenal world. system. can become an object in its univer which the principle of sufficient reason. 2 Cp. that which is apart from all relation. which as to its regular {gesetzmassig} and on account of which nothing a determinate self-sufficient de and independent. 3.INTRODUCTION to it by Leibniz. &amp. sality. produce but which has an identity that is perfectly of differences.

Wallace. has something real in its reality is that which or relations to other things. so that the static variety of the world is due to the power of self-preservation (Selbsterhaltung) in each real. And each real is the immediate cause of one and only one phenomenon of experience. a this or that of some kind. But it is absolute position (in the Fichtean But apart from conditions it has absolute sense) or affirmation without negation self-identity. Every it &quot.. abstraction. The actual changes which we find in experience are due to the different aspects in which the reals appear. any number of or as not occupying the * them may equally be thought as occupying same point in space. a plurality of qualities and it is pure quality. without any quantitative element or aspect. so that it is perfectly simple and not. And these different Mere uncritical experience or merely empirical knowledge it suggests gaps. and each is different from But they are absolutely every other. p. no one real can act upon another otherwise they would cease to be absolute. like the Monad of Leibniz. and they are not impenetrable. they perception of Leibniz. l although their true natures remain unchanged (as in the phenomena 1 of colour contrasts). like the Monads. flexion serves at first only to deepen into contradictions. Heyel s Philosophy of Mind. Like the . which indeed further re only offers problems . eliminating the contradictions that appear in common consciousness by transforming the ideas which are given in it \ This transformation. soviel Hindeutung auf s Sein. a qiidle. These reals. a substance involving in its unity . have no characteristic analogous to the unalterable. for Herbart. Ixiii. for . bit of experience. so that it is neither a divisible totality nor an unbroken continuum. . 2 Wieviel Schein. Monads. practically means it is. are infinite in number. 185 but he practically endeavours to do without the former principle as far as The task of philosophy he regards as that of possible.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY sufficient reason to that of contradiction. being given. when they are in different relations to one another. The real is always something.

and completely dominated by the abstract use of the principle of contra diction. must not be represented as having in itself powers. Hegel s Philosophy of Mind. on the supposition that the principle of sufficient reason is to be dropped. which relations of the apparently is little relation to other characteristics of are to for to be ascribed to other things. Ixviii It may also be noted that Leibniz s theories regarding un conscious and petites perceptions are developed and applied in the psychology of Herbart. gave His application of mathematical methods. accordingly Herbart thought of the Dualism in Leibniz. in a negative way. being a real. Hegel s Solution the father of those who apply 1 mathematical methods in empirical This psychology is natural in one whose is so is . however. if we leave out of account the influence of Fichte upon his psychology. again. It is absolutely faculties. . of sufficient reason. due to the possibility of conceiving the reals as both together in one point and apart from one another. see Wallace. and conceived by indicated by this dualism under lies the whole course of German speculation from the time of Leibniz onwards. These phenomenal (of course.INTRODUCTION reals to one another are. In the philosophy of Hegel we have a solution of the dualism between the principle of contradiction and that explanation. and has nothing but self-preservation. Wolff. as they are used The problem 1 lull sqq. qualities. simple. differs entirely from that which occurs in the psycho-physics of the lechner School. in short. Leibniz. more than a permanent possibility of reals. we may regard Herbart s work as a remodelling of that of Leibniz. They much as the reals (one of aspects of certain the soul) in certain relations to one another. None of the functions and mind belong to it intrinsically. quite as itself. Accordingly the soul. &c. not real) interactions of the reals admit of mathematical mind or soul the phenomena or is They are merely names which calculation. and in modern For physiological psychology. . And. pp.

universe sites it a system of such perfect unity that the oppocontains are all contraries and never contradictories. 8.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ precision to the problem possible solution. 30. ii. of course. which. we attribute to it not merely a difference from other things but a a The oneness with that from which we differentiate it ultimate. in different ways. and that each by itself is an abstract expression The real is not of the principle of self-consciousness \ merely in se (as it would be if the abstract principle of contradiction were ultimate). There is no such thing as a purely analytic or a purely synthetic judgment but when w e attribute any quality to a subject. gives positive precision to the problem by the sharpness of his distinction between the absolute and the relative. development or progressive self-realization. Hegel practi that the cally reverses the procedure of Wolff. that no two things are stractions. which is so important a feature of Leibniz s thinking. through being not itself. reason that of contradiction. 1 . Prolegomena to the Logic of Hegel (2nd ed. by showing of contradiction presupposes that of sufficient principle reason. as did Leibniz. brings us to the verge of Hegel s solution of the problem. vol. 2 Cf. Caird. pp.). eh. 7 See Caird s Hegel (Blackwood s Philosophical Classics Also Wallace. exactly the same implies that no two things (not even the most extreme opposites) are entirely different. r . to S PHILOSOPHY of 187 by suggesting the most superficial principle sufficient reducing the This (though Wolff did not realize it) was little better than telling perhaps Kant. . while Fichte and Schelling. on Leibniz that he had discovered a mare s nest. real is that . endeavour to make explicit the unity to which the Kantian Their re-employment of the principle of divisions point. is Absolute contradictories or absolute differences are ab To say. A must 1 and chs. Critical Philosophy of Kant. 64 sqq. nor is it merely in alio (as it would be if the abstract principle of sufficient reason were no one maintains). the other hand. But the which becomes itself through being in alio.

and it system. interpreted of pure or immediate self-identity. such inexplicable product the production of as an unconditioned will. p. is an essential element in This isolation. it Thus Hegel points out that the notion which Leibniz had in his eye when he spoke of sufficient ground and urged the study of things under its point of view. in other one of an infinite series of independent units. implies 1 . is one system needs nothing to hang upon.. we omit from the conception of the Monad all words. even some difference. if The other stands over against is to have any meaning. and 119 (Wallace s Tr. being all-com is prehensive. external its beginning. sufficient is of not a merely phenomenal system. whole passage. rather an evolution of that whose end is in which would involve the supposition that whose development it is free. nor yet is it some noumenal it hangs upon nothing. 224 sqq. See the . 222). their difference must have its other on the other some ground. because. also pp. By and intrin the notion Hegel means a content objectively sically determined and hence self-acting. And of a thing with the identity hand. It is absolute as the source or support of all.INTRODUCTION their opposition have something in common with not-A. abstractly as a principle of course. Hegel regards the universe The world we know is the only world. 2nd ed. some underlying unity. if that is due to the principle of contradiction. The universe not a merely static of endless mutual determinations. This would if the sufficiently describe of Monad of Leibniz we keep out as view the Monad s absolute particularity. It of cyclical revolutions. independent of a as itself one absolute reason. is perfectly self-determined. the expression the arc electric something heterogeneous with it (like of carbon \ nor is it an light between two opposite points of something other than itself. no absolute first principle. Logic.. or. itself. There is no pure ground. That is to say. system nor a system endlessly of an repeated. yet absolute. 1 its isolation Hegel. every identity.

comprehending or (or its For Leibniz develop relatively concrete. just as he does not push his logical analysis far enough to reconcile the principles of contradiction and sufficient reason.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY 189 Leibniz s conception of the Monad. The difference is that by Leibniz the development is conceived as a continuous growth or increase in a certain fundamental quality (clearness and distinctness of perception). to great (witness. but it can really give nothing and it can really receive nothing. notion implicitly contains all in itself. the universe. or rather to the definite from the vague and undeter and determined. through its correlative abstraction negation ) to that which. for instance. Accordingly what Leibniz means by saying that the (or its qualities) cannot go out of itself and cannot be entered or influenced from outside. the notion . is is ment from small . The difference . and that accordingly it can neither go beyond itself nor have anything beyond it. his for Hegel development is from frag pctites perceptions) uniting both. may ideally be sundered into active and passive elements (entelechy and materia primal. and all through its which all is For the is realized logical (not temporal) development. would by Hegel be Monad expressed as the doctrine that thought or self-consciousness is reality. not in time any more than space it comprehends both. while by Hegel it is represented as a dialectic movement from that which is relatively abstract. ments mined to wholes. The is Hegelian shadowed forth in the Monad of Leibniz. and the result is that while his speculation points to a view of the universe as one system in which the elements are intrinsically and not externally combined. and vaguely is notion thus the completion of what more especially in the Monas Monadum. but it cannot really go out of itself. in (however unsatisfactorily) brought to unity. In the same way the Monad for there is no out of itself. he does not go far enough to secure this metaphysical position. is Like it is in the Monad. It may sunder itself ideally.

and regards the lower forms as abstract or incomplete by undeveloped expressions of it. i p. ch is. thought by But Lotze s ii. vol. at the same time. of the whole. i. expresses itself in the greatest possible variety. 30. having any reality Leibniz by holds that the Monads must be conceived on the analogy of the soul. every member or organ.. so that no part can be conceived as itself. For Hegel as foreshadowings. 62 sqq. actually other than self-determined. Critical Philosophy of Kant. 206) . bk.19 at this point INTRODUCTION between the attitude of Hegel and that of due to the fact that while Leibniz interprets Leibniz is perception as that which it is in its lowest ). and which. bk. explicitly or implicitly. Hegel interprets representation or relation in general as being essentially that which it is in its highest form (self -consciousness). It seemed to Lotze that the bold Monism of Hegel undertook far more than human powers can achieve. In short. Metaphysic. for the unity of the whole and its parts is absolutely complete. especially pp. vol. See also Monadology. 7. he regards self-consciousness. Lotze. Lotze s Reconstruction of the Hypotheses of Leibniz. Cf. the overcoming of the contradictions in although its V ^ bringing 1 all knowledge to systematic unity. form (mere it representation or expression ness and self-consciousness as and regards conscious developments from * increase or addition. Hegel insists on a unity which is closer than mere analogy. it may be said that in Leibniz s account of simple substance we have the first suggestion of the transition from substance to subject (as the ultimate reality of which is things). generally Caird. to completion brought by Hegel ! . for Leibniz the universe is organic No part of it is throughout. 88 (Eng. i. ch. leading idea by no means loses its value through the great defects in its execution This leading idea was in Lotze s opinion the reconciliation of opposites. Tr. as the reality of every part.

is governed solely by the principle of principle it. as we could not help thinking them to be. 337. contradictory predicates of every subject. thought can describe but it cannot explain It can give an account of what happens. than thought. expressing the whole evolution of reality. This explains how the extravagant utterance could be ventured upon.lt. 21) minimizes pp. &amp. History in the Nineteenth Century. that he thought is very different from that of Although he expressly repudiated the suggestion to be counted. but that there is an alternative between them. . can express in the . that being We know Reality is infinitely richer that in fact the nature of It teaches us reality yields a result to us unthinkable. holding explanation to be generalization. see Merz. and the work of science or philosophy is thus not that of laying down an absolute all-comprehensive system./ European Thought Venn (Empirical Logic. vol. and can possibly reduce these laws to one general system but it cannot tell what the things themselves really are. as a follower of Herbart. In . short. and why they are so and not otherwise. resolving the contradictions that appear in common experience. i. notes. beyond . contradiction the of sufficient reason (in Leibniz s sense) is . and not-being are not. cannot understand them so thoroughly that it could make them.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ interpretation of S PHILOSOPHY 191 Hegel. the distinction. arising out of a union of the two which we cannot construct in thought. Like Herbart he regards thought as essentially analytic. ch. . To use a distinc tion which has become a commonplace among writers on 1 natural science. 382. 383. so as to be able to calculate occurrences. that it is just contradiction 1 For a fuller account of this distinction. Lotze s is position as regards thought and the reconciling of its contradictions is more akin to the view of Herbart than to that of Hegel. as interpreting rather than constituting reality. thought . Thought cannot pierce to the inner nature of things. but that of unifying our knowledge. form of general laws the relations between things. how they originally came into being.

in the form in which science. bk. felt it necessary to bring down thought from the high horse of idealism/ and assign to it the humble work of observation and descrip tion.lt. 2 doctrines of his philosophy. vol r * vol i? Metaphysic. Metaphysic. Lotze. as a scientist. 224 sqo ^- i Streitschriftj p. p. Johannes Mtiller (1801-1858). 8. 6.X 92 INTRODUCTION them in their legitimate application. the universality of mecha as an account of the relations between phenomena. pp I7 8 8 Lotze. The sphere of i. ii. Z6 the Nineteenth Century.lt. History of European Thought in q&amp. had changed the whole aspect of biological science by extending the conception of mechanism to all the phenomena of life 3 Lotze took a further step in the same direction when he defined mechanism as the con nexion of all those universal laws.gt. or rather the whole of them. Merz. which I had chosen as my . and Hegel was due to the bad treatment which Schilling. 57. according to which every individual in the created world acts nism . Tr. but as to which no sort of positive conjecture could possibly be formed as l a result of such application . other 4 1 . real. mechanism ch. life-work. 3 Streitschrift. viz. &amp. . vol. the Philosophy of Nature had received at their hands. 76 (Eng. &amp.. 7. is upon every thus extended so as i. and hence (in brief) I came to see how completely untenable is a great part of the views of Hegel. of natural made it necessary for me to acquire a knowledge It was to a they are put large extent through his medical studies that Lotze arrived at one of the chief . ch. Those who used regarded that as contradictory which was in fact superior to logical laws which does not indeed abrogate it which constitutes the truth of the The revolt of Lotze against the idealism of Fichte The self-confidence of a thought which had found itself absolute resulted in a NaturpliilosopMe which despised facts and Lotze. The father of modern physiology. The study of medicine. bk.

may they do not account for the things themselves. so mechanism (the system of laws which it is the work of science to discover and express) is not an eternally necessary system. the good. it Kleine Schriften. myself the notion of ! it. only accept what laws. relations. The laws of science are laws of phenomena . Introduction (Eng. has freely itself Not thought. cf. iii. of inorganic and The function of mechanism in the construction of the world is. P. . which is for me absurd) might. thinking its is the principle is of contradiction. chosen to realize 3 . Loc.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ to include the S PHILOSOPHY 193 phenomena not merely but also of mind. bk. is Thus while the function of is mechanism 1 .. say that the essence of a thing is to stand in relations to But the thing itself is more than the other things. a kingdom of universal laws appears to me to be compre hensible only in a world whose ultimate principle is an another world (if I were to try to form for ethical one . it subordinate in its As mere thought is by itself inadequate to reality. xvi). iii. i.398. without The conception of an exception. but is merely the way in which the ultimate idea. This view explores the sphere of means. (Eng. Tr.) Microcosmus. 310.. given in experience which can and systematize But Lotze protests strongly against the view that mechanism gives us a final explanation of the reality of the world. 3 Mechanism is but the collection of all the instrumental forms in which God has willed that created beings shall act on one another with their unknown natures.. vol. Tr. and the establishing of mechanism is the first The fact that there is ethical deed of the Absolute. 1 organic bodies. in the construction of the world entirely universal in importance its extent. constituting the very nature of things. cit. for the principle of all our . We and mechanism gives us an account of the rela tions only. but goodness is ultimate. universal in its extent mechanism governs all science. i. and that all their states shall be welded into the endless chain of a world-history. vol. not the sphere of ends to which these 2 minister. p. Microcosmus. Conclusion.

194 INTRODUCTION appears to me. vol. there are the things themselves. and which (being intelligible only through the idea of a personal Deity) realizes the highest moral ends in the to of Monads. vol. Things are to be thought of as Monads. 360). p. Lvilnitz. which is merely a postulate of thought. 3 (Eng. p. have arisen a world without this thread of consecutiveness. His choice is not arbitrary. on the other hand. according to Lotze. In addition mechanism. s iii. There is no nature of things outside of God. bk. without this veritas in the sense of the old metaphysic Accordingly for Lotze the ultimate reality is a personal God. V r which are ultimately one in nature. Pensees cCun Idiote sur Descartes. StreitschrifL p. 2 Ibid. who sets before Himself the V highest moral ends. But . 564. the facts. w e are constrained to conceive the real world as a world 1 : . S7.. or the system of laws governing (or ex pressing) the relations between things. Spinoza et iii. &quot. And both of these (the laws and the facts) presuppose a universal and all-pervading substance. because nature is to be con with 1 ceived as animated throughout all things are endowed modes of sensation and enjoyment 3 Otherwise . i. which may be conceived as Monads. 4. &quot. Cf. Lotze early writing ch. 3 Microcosmus. Thought is a means of mechanism is a means attaining to complete experience of realizing the best. but is a reality for feeling. sphere of the facts by means of the laws. (Kleine Schriften. governed best. limiting the sphere of His choice. . ) . p. Tr. and has established the absolutely valid system of laws which rules the world as the best means of securing these ends. 7 . but is by His perfect idea of what is absolutely In this the influence of Leibniz is so manifest that it does not surprise us to find Lotze writing to the younger Fichte 1 went willingly through the splendid gateway which he [Herbart] is convinced that he has been able to erect as an entrance to his metaphysic the gateway of the Leibnitian Monad-world Thus.

while none . Only if the course of all. i. 64 sqq. cit. i. 360. 4. Microcosmus. ch. Tr. . its reality and substance as the mode of being and substance of this one existence.. i. 79 (Eng. Kant. ch. constant or transitory. 1 * loc. 3 Metaphysic. cf. in its nature and form as a consistent phase . delusive imitation of that inner consistency which was pronounced to be. be more than a hypothesis. in one word. even of the most trivial. and thought has to do for the we should have drama to regard all nature as of human i consciousness only w ith r their relations. p. 184). the whole context.. 2 For an excellent account of the general relation of Lotze to see Jones. could the assumption of O 2 5 . events were fixed by immutable predestination.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 195 merely machinery a view which could never satisfy our longings and cravings. its reality consists in a hollow and . it may be one of those which do not contradict actual facts V Lotze is here manifestly more in harmony with Kant than with Leibniz 2 And he further differs from Leibniz in maintaining that the Monads are not completely isolated from one another. everything goes on as if they all did so accordingly. for Lotze. Cf.. bk. because it is a hypothesis regarding the nature of things. yet to further concession than * [of the real world] condition each other. The monadology is * a concep tion of whose essential truth we which we can hardly expect any that. 3 (Eng. bk. vol.gt. 6. of the one existence. it will have the appearance of doing so and. yet to an intelli . Philosophy of Lotze pp. the unfolding of the same 4 The pre-established of Leibniz is thus set aside by Lotze Its place harmony . If Leibniz s doctrine be true. as such. are convinced. iii. the ultimate reason why its realization was possible 3 / Accordingly for Lotze every single thing and event can only be thought as an activity. while it does not really form a whole. among the dreams of our imagination. i. r&amp. Thought can never determine its truth. 363&quot. of the members gence directed to it. But this monadology or hypothesis of unextended atoms can never. so that each contains its own relations within itself. Tr.

ch. i. bk.. 2 . 63 sqq. 309 ) Mreitschrift. Like Leibniz. : a pro-established harmony not. are at the same time only parts of one single infinite which embraces them all and cherishes them all within substance. It is impossible for our but it is how one physical phenomenon is invariably connected with another physical phenomenon how. p. p. tions of their connexion can be stated as laws. vol. explain anything but tolerably well describe the facts. Metaphysic. iii. i. the burning match is connected with the explod In neither case can thought do more ing gunpowder than describe a connexion invariable in our experience. Microcosmus. vol. ii. i. ix. explain this to explain . that their reciprocal action. or what we call such. Tr. 597 59 8) Cf. Such relations as those between the phenomena of the soul and the phenomena of the body can be described on that is to purely mechanical principles the condi is we : say. being finite individuals. and of Lotze in his application of the principles of contradiction sufficient reason keeps them sharply apart from which no connexion can reach only if all of them. As in our life we see the physical motions of external nature employed as stimuli to excite that in ourselves which is far higher conscious sensation so. It is only if individual do not float independent or left to themselves in a vacuum things across * 2 ^Eng. theory of a pre-established is not And the required (not to say that it is insufficient) to explain how the phenomena of the soul have any connexion with those of the body- harmony how. is possible Microcosmus. . ch. .. e.. within in numerable beings.. the true action of a more intelligent life Conclusion. itself. 5. absolute ontological) occasionalism Thus in Lotze we of Leibniz modified by Kantian find the principles of the philosophy influences. designed to kindle at innumerable points. . indeed. 96. i. Science must be content with a practical occasionalism 1 . 5 (Eng. pp.. p. vol. through which describe the relations in which things are for thought. physical nerve-motion passes into psychical sensation. thought to just as impossible for our thought as distinct * from the theoretical of the Cartesians (i. (Eng. bk.INTRODUCTION taken by the conception of mechanism. for instance. Tr. Tr. throughout the universe mechanical events are but the external tissue of regularly crossing stimuli. bk. for instance. 150). we think.

no clear explanation of the relations between the gave two principles of contradiction and sufficient reason. From early years Lotze was familiar with the works of Leibniz. mechanism in the real world is subordinate to of contradiction But at least the co teleology. in the understanding of God. but maintains that any such explanation is beyond the reach of human thought. on the other hand. had been the most perfect means the best) have made a world in which to the realizing of But as Leibniz the law of contradiction did not hold. the realm of ideas. 342. does away with this realm of possi bles. allowing the choice of God to be independent even of the principle of contradiction. indeed. iii. . universally applicable According to completely subordinate in importance. and his writings continually suggest Leibiiitian ways of looking at things. in general never had the to declare myself the successor of Leibniz. Leibniz. unlike Leibniz. he regards the principle but as. ordinate priority of the principle of contradiction is secured of the possible things or essences. influence It would be impossible 1 Kltlne Schriften. efficient to final causes. Lotze. presumption I have. . independent of all violation of save the ideal of absolute ethical worth. indeed. briefly to indicate the full of the philosophy of Leibniz in other directions. . p. vol.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ one another. but I must have the in the sense of being his heir to admit that I could only have entered into presumption 1 3 possession of this inheritance cum beneficio inventarii . . But. though an inheritor of Leibniz s ideas. so Lotze does not explain the subordination of the one to might conceivably (if it the other. Other Influences of Leibniz. making the principle of the best absolutely by the conception supreme. S PHILOSOPHY 197 But. * he could not take over the philosophy as a whole. but God the law of contradiction is an absurdity for us A .

for.j vol. The life of the animal or of the plant appears to be only the result of all the activities. whose life is underived : [primitive] 4 and appears incapable of destruction. quotes the well-known lines The poem belongs to Schiller s war der grosse Weltenmeister. Comte. Mill and Spencer. but a very indifferent philosopher. (Eng. p. Again. has been in various forms developed by naturalists like Buffon 3 and . English literature . of all the little individual lives (if I may so speak) of each of these active molecules. (1787). Buffon s Histoire Naturelle. Weismann . has finally gained something like scientific verification in the cell-theory of Schwann. its spirit was felt in the literature of Germany through the works of Lessing and Herder Nor was Leibniz s thinking altogether without effect upon 1 . 22 Living beings contain a large number of living and active molecules. Schonland. pp. Freundlos Phil. 1840). This is the poem from which Hegel in his Geschichte d. Cf. &c. i. J Cf. that sense of the varied whole ness and harmonious system of things which pervades the Theodicee is cleverly expressed in the Essay on Man by the phrases of which Pope was a master ~. and For a good account of the relation of Shipley. 25 and 27).198 INTRODUCTION While the academic writers on philosophy missed much of his best thought. &c. Johannes Miiller recognized this by giving of i to the cells the 4 . of Schiller. pp. by Poulton. vol. pp. &c. the over-tones of Helmholtz and the 1 local signs of Lotze). 91 (ed. regards the unicellular organism as immortal. who is said to have written his poem Die Freundschaft when his mind was full of ideas suggested by the reading of Leibniz. * organic monads the attention it directs to name somewhat inappropriate Modern psychology also. 195 There are also traces of the influence of Leibniz in the works sqq. Press). in processes and * sub-conscious in its analysis of sensations and perceptions into elements which are individually unnoticed (e. p. with to the influence of Leibniz upon natural science. regard reference may be made to the way in which his idea that the organism is a group of smaller organisms. First Period. see Watson. owes much to See Merz s Leibniz (Blackwood s Philosophical Classics). g. ed. Essays upon Heredity. Leibniz s philosophy to modern scientific thought. 126 sqq. iv. though the doctrine is sadly straitened into platitude. 2 See Introduction to the edition by Mark Pattison (Clarendon Bolingbroke said of Pope that he was a very great wit.

Act 2 . in his lieden. p. Erste Folge. by Coupland. 16 sqq. vol. pp.und Ganzwisser. 2 He was learned not merely in many things but. . so far as man can be.ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 199 Leibniz s far-reaching suggestion of the unconsciousnesses perceptions. in these days the real is persistently assured that Monadology may be said to be in the i when we air. The materials of his philosophy were derived from every sphere of thought. E. in one form or another. and he gave to the future as liberally as he borrowed from the past. a Bois-Reymond. soweit der Mensch es kann. All. war 1 stets zugleich schopferischer i. in all and everything. it has its adherents in theologians like Dorner. Nicht Vielwisser war er. and expositors like Dill- mann. and we need not be surprised to find that. and his very comprehending or acquiring of knowledge was also an act of creating. The fruits of the philosophy of Leibniz are as widely scattered as its roots were far spread. und sein Erfassen. are so the individual. from every generation of thinkers. For this suggestion also s (if Hartmann Philosophy of the Unconscious for little else) is indebted to Leibniz \ And further. 33. Du See Tr. Leibnizische Gedanken in der neueren Naturwissenschaff. sein Erkennen. philosophical teachers like Groom Robertson. sondern.

moment .gt. Fror^ /^T^ 6X ^ ^ a n in to &amp. thnk that it is thnt. n e soul at J { (Pain. of this union .t- te - CT rerffc(.200 INTRODUCTION APPENDIX A. B. how the soul sFtS^ is conscious of the motions of it bein. EXPLANATION OF THE PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY BY A SPECIAL INSTANCE.gt. * moment B (Kn . T di .priek o -&amp.) A.

i marked phenomena. Accordingly. bodies which for the time belong to state of the body at since the pin-prick is a part of the moment (i e. in a substance who tion follows from another representation soul must needs nature is to be representative.APPENDIX A and essentially expressions of Btates of the soul are naturally of the states of the world. i&amp. we his day). and thus have within their representations is because the motions an. can find t I cannot imagine where anybody this explanation. Thus the when the laws of relation require conscious of the pin-prick. according to the natural that they express by or representations. that is to say. when these are still hidden in the representation of we sleep or in some other way are unaware as when to express more m tl 1 of But that approach of the pin. in a machine the motions mathematicians represent heavenly bodies (as when Jura poll rerumque fidcm legosque deorum Cuncta Syracosius tnmstulit sir to senex. unless he is prepared least shadow of farther difficulty. Archimedes could in which we can do to-day much better than who excels them infinitely. It of its coming pain. of the causes of the pin-prick. all that is to change of their thoughts . one representa as one motion follows from another motion. and especially the corresponding the soul. the pin motions and we are already in some way affected by all these us the in our soul. and though at that time make too little impression. from not God. of the causes of the pin-prick and conscious ol the state A. when it thinks equally of all Alt* thinking distinctly of any. the representation B a part of the soul at the moment the pain) will be . when they the multitude of other thoughts only them from the more become noticeable. wards in harmony with the phenomena of so made f own nature is after Now and since nobody seems to deny this possibility. why could substances in such a way the beginning create representative their own laws. Our soul reflects only upon which stand out from the others. so it or expression of the pm-pri B. substances which are deny that God can create its the beginning that each in virtue of all the others. representation or expression the same pir the cause of the representation of consequently unravel the cause of the pain-yet we can prick. distinctly a more observable change not always distinctly is true that the soul is parts of its body.lt.

since all substances must This seems to God and have a mutual harmony and connexion and all must express same universe and the universal cause. acquires the same relation to the others as the former had we then say it is come into the place of the other. Otherwise the phenomena of different minds would not harmonize. can not act upon one another. wherein is the immediate cause of the change. and there would be as many systems as substances or rather. . which is the will of their Creator. and in a way in themselves the me not only easy of the beauty of the necessary. APPENDIX B. we can always determine the relation of . They consider that many things exist at once and they observe in them a certain order of co-existence. Thus this mutual correspondence of different substances (which. co-existent things should change according to certain direction known rules of and velocity. order is their situation or distance. FORMATION OF THE IDEA OF SPACE. And or even all the . among though several. Leibniz gives an account of the origin of the idea of I will here show how space. and this change we call a motion in that body. and yet are in harmony as if one did act upon another) is one of the strongest proofs of the existence of God or of a common cause which each effect must always express according to its point of view and its capacity of expression. without their their relations ^ changing themselves. and the decrees or laws which He has established in order to make them fit into one another as well as possible. but also worthy of universe. and that another thing. IN 47 of the fifth letter to Clarke. men come to form to themselves the notion of space. speaking with metaphysical strictness. according to which the relation of one thing to another is more or less This simple. it would be entirely a matter of chance if they ivere sometimes in harmony.2 2 happen to INTRODUCTION every body? to conceive. When it happens that one of those co-existent things changes its relation to a mul titude of others. newly come.

in the order of their co there has been no cause of change is the same thing) in whic existence with others. object to another. But this can . involving really this is what we here call place and space. &c. had not changed or if it had changed And supposn co-existents there is a sum. in win only be an ideal thing. . in order to have an idea these relations and the rales of their it is sufficient to consider to fancy any absolute reality outside chants. otherwise. as A and B. F. situation which is in the body occupying A t A and B is the same whereas the relation of place of and individually the same as the fixed bodies is not exactly into its place) will have t the relation which B (that comes relations are only in agreement. G co-exWence which A formerly there has been no cause &c provided that in C. And here it is right to results from places taken together. And that 1 have the same place shows that these places is called space. without needing a kin situation we consider. of place. and conceives it as outside be comprehends all : 1 V . or feigning that among those then we which have undergone no change. and the relation of the difference between place consider the place. to give of the things whose is the same for A and which we say of definition place is that of co-existence between for B when the relation ot G &c is in perfect agreement with the relation C E had with the same C. E. looks for an identity.APPENDIX B 20 3 with reference to every other and situation which each acquires the relation which any other [co-existent we can even determine to any other. For t. E. space is that which there has been no motion. .. which and consequently of space. for something which should agreement. when the re different moments to different between each and certain other existents. it being impossible from one should be in two objects or pass individual accident not satisfied with mere But the mind. F. lations of co-existence from moment to moment. G. which are supposed to continue fixed And fixed existents are those in which a^ree entirely together. and a certain order. that the same same individual affection. . the same fixed bodies: these cannot have exactly the For two different objects. to those fixed existents have may say that those which now others formerly had to a relation such as that which which which these latter had. of the objects the same. And. number of them. P^ce is that which is the same of chano-e existent things. if it or which this would have would have [to this]. or (which In short. .

It is true that certain thoughts come 3 us when there are certain bodily motions. Now.) have made some slight alterations in Clarke of clearness. there is an infinity of notions of the parts of the water.lt. 158 of space. nothing but the consequences of the nature of our soul and arise in it virtue of its notion. cf. of Locke s Essay vol i to 86. ii. substance includes ever to happen to i_t. Thus when a body passes through water.20 4 the I INTRODUCTION relations to be applied. and it is in this respect that concrete things [etres accompli* = res complete?] differ from 3 which are not so. (E. 768 a mind conceives G vii 400. who sees it perfectly. m m We . IN a draft of a letter to Arnauld (1686) (G. say that this body is the cause of the motions. such as there must be in order that the place which the body leaves may be filled up again by the shortest way. _that is . the soul being an individual )scance. and that expression of the universe which is Jtion the body is perhaps a pain in relation to the soul t we attribute activity [action] to that substance whose expression is the more distinct. since our thoughts are Accordingly. THE MEANING OF CAUSE. essence or nature must include all that is ever to happen to it and God. sees in it all that it will ever do or suffer and all the thoughts * will have. idea. and that certain bodily motions happen when we have certain thoughts. besides that such an influence is absolutely inexplicable. for the sake As s doctrine pp. . 68) Leibniz expounds Ins view of cause as follows The hypothesis of concomitance is a consequence of my notion of substance iy V16W the individual noti of a . because by its means we can explain itinctiy what happens but if we consider what is physical 7r?A&quot. and we call it cause.&amp. its notion. 1 Eraser and s translation other details of Leibniz s ed. but that is because each substance expresses the entire universe its own way. it is useless to seek in it the influence f any other particular substance. APPENDIX C.

and as it is not reasonable to we can give matters recourse to God for the immediate explanation of have of detail. is 205 well suppose that the we may equally and that everything else moves. taking all and great. than and that the water is compelled to make all these ripples with it. to wit. cause in their final. each individual substance expresses the re and consequently solution which God has taken It is with regard to the whole will is universe quite right to say that my contimd the cause of the motion of my arm and that a solutio the one in the matter of body is the cause of pain. we have recourse to the vessel. means the water to make this great number of ripples by to say that of which the place of the vessel is filled up. little And in fact. we have no more reason to say that the vessel compels ness. although this body may not be an efficient its idea is at least. And we may indeed say that. so far sufficiently explained. if you like. let us imagine that there is anything real all the changes of situation to wills God produce directly in the universe exactly as if this vessel . it compels the vessel to move in conformity has willed directly to produce except by saying that God one thing. so to speak. so great a number of motions all tending to this no reason for it. expresses distinctly what is to be attributed to the substance of and activity [action] which the expression is more distinct.) . in metaphysical strict to assign any real difference. not with mathematical exactness]. are all productions of one and the same cause. since the whole motion in itself which a relative thing. but. if we wish to find in the motion. or. in accordance body is only with the hypothesis.APPENDIX C and real in the motion. for my the other expresses more confusedly. God. the agreement of all the phenomena that they of the various substances comes only from this. 71. physical cause of these effects. a change of position [situation] how to explain with mathematical exactness we do not know which all is but we do attribute it to a body by means of e. (p. viz. though [i. distinctly explained at rest . there is only one hypothesis the phenomena which serves to explain the whole distinctly. For. archetypal [exemplaire] whether the understanding of God. in an ultimate analysis. although actually. were producing them would in passing through the water is it not true that there same thing ? For it is impossible actually happen exactly the Thus.

although reason furnishes some which are not absolutely general and are only probable. . when we presume that an idea. 1 1. say effect: Granted such a thing. &amp. according to the usage of logicians. and it is in this respect that categorical propositions. 428 there is an interesting passage explaining in more detail a part of the logic of Leibniz. But as.. v. I say nothing but this. that supposing s a figure with three sides. because we do not see its necessity General propositions of reason are necessary. 14 (E. It contains some remarkable anticipa tions of more modern views. There are. while others are necessary propositions and such are numerous geographical and astronomical conclusions about the globe of the earth and about the course of the stars. finally. as when we observe that all quicksilver evaporates by the force of fire and this is not a perfect generality. As to eternal truths it is to be that at bottom they are all conditional and noted. the conclusion follows the weaker of the premises. these mixed propositions have and only the m . is possible. which conclusions are obtained by combining the observations of . . of which some come from facts and observations. iv.206 INTRODUCTION APPENDIX LEIBNIZ S D. Propositions of fact also may become general in a way. which are drawn from premises. For instance.gt. I say this same figure. and cannot have more certainty than they. oh. this same figure will have three angles. when I say.gt. IN the Nouveaux Essais. LOGIC. mixed propositions. until a more strict investigation reveals its contrary. &amp. such another thing is. 379 a G. bk. but it is by induction or observation so that it [the general proposition of fact] is nothing but a multitude of similar facts. which can be stated unconditionally astronomers with the theorems of geometry and arithmetic. Every figure which has three sides will also have three angles. as for instance. : travellers and certainty generality which belong to observations.

into a categorical often be transformed hypothetical might the for instance. 1 be thought unnecessary And lest it should says in a vivid way noted that these necessary to have recourse to this. i of this certainty what would then become of the real foundation to the ultimate founda of eternal truths ? That leads us at last universal spirit. The angles of every threeI were to say preceding hypothetical Scholastics have sided figure are equal to two right o^tojThe as they called it. . again : Where would these ideas be. namely. do not have are equal to two right angles) three-sided figure case in which the preceding the same subject. 2 (Migne s ed. if the subject the subject truth is only conditional and says that. cap. whicl tion of truths. such as those that are In to two right a figure has three sides. souls. being . Thus these necessary truths. how a proposition regarding ^ no existence. The fact is that the has truth. its angles are equal angles^ we see that the antecedent (namely. the figure this latter case the angles with three sides) and the consequent (namely. and the consethe antecedent was-lTm figure has Nevertheless quent-m said figure has three angles. in our ideas and truths which are graven the ori-inal of the but as sources from which of propositions. IE whose understanding. ever exists.. anterior to universe. vi.real say. the laws of existences themselves. that supreme and to speak truly. if no mind existed. (although fundamentally they the following: If called hypothetical. But that it is in : . it is to be principle truths contain the determining reason and regulative in a word. as they had in three sides. supposing But it will still to be so-and-so. exist. be not deceive? The reply will within it reality which does it will be asked the connexion of ideas. that is to argued much de constantia sul&amp. if in place of by a slight change in the terms. and. and cannot but and as St.gt. 30). not in the form will produce actual state application and opportunity 1 The (Migne _ . have their foundatic existence of contingent beings. it will be found since there be asked: On what is this connexion founded. must It is here that I find the existence of a necessary substance.jecti. a subject can have a. Augustine has recognized region of eternal truths. 13 sqq xlix.APPENDIX D differ 20 7 from are conditional).

when he attached a great importance to this principle tis an addition to the principles of earlier philosophy? It is indeed so universally known and (within proper limits) so manifestly clear. for our assertions . something must be added to this notion. there must be other first principles? It is as much as to say that. that is to say. pp. For what is meant by saying that. nach der neue Kritik der re men Vernunft durch eine altere entbehrlich yemaclit werden soil. who have misunderstood it. and thus we must find a special principle different from that of contradiction.tlle of his THE Wolffians endeavoured to show that Kant s philosophy was merely a degenerate product of Leibnitian thought. 478 Hartensqq. But for Leibniz this principle was merely a subjective one.lt. The metaphysic of Leibniz contains three great original (i) iii. 390 sqq. See Rosenkranz. have greatly ridiculed it. according to the principle of contradiction only that can be known which is already contained in the notion [Begriff] of the object but if we say anything more about the object. Thus it is that critics. stein.208 INTRODUCTION APPENDIX E. i. Kant in 1790 wrote an interesting account own . in addition to the principle of contradiction. Now propositions of this . the doctrine of the pre-established harmony (i) Is it to be believed that Leibniz desired his principle of sufficient reason to be understood objectively (as a law of nature). must have their own special reason. KANT ON HIS KELATION TO LEIBNIZ. In reply to Eberhard. relation to Leibmztfber cine Entdeckung. especially in shows the insufficiency of the principle of contra diction for the knowledge of necessary truths (2) the monad. lgy (3) . principles: so far as it the principle of sufficient reason. &amp. that the poorest intellect could not imagine it had made a new discovery in finding it. a principle having reference merely to a critique of reason.

ar\ doubtless we merely to the idea of reason. this he did not refer to the things of sense. although at present only obscure.&quot. Leibniz meant a mutual conformity of two beings entirely independent of faculty to referable : . a wrong inter the innatepretation is given to the view of Leibniz regarding ness of certain notions.APPENDIX E latter 209 kind are now-a-days called synthetic. like Plato. established harmony between soul and body. To take this defect as a deliberate and careful speculation on the part of Leibniz (as copiers. by principles. there must be another principle. and thus Leibniz means nothing but this: &quot. forms of intuition peculiar must not allow ourselves to be perplexed by his explanation of sensation as a confused kind of perception. which he attributes to intuition [Anscliauung] of a special kind. namely. but to its substratum imperceptible [unerto us. to attribute to the human mind an original. and in which must represent to ourselves as made up of simple substances substance. of which we are know [fur uns capable only in relation to things we can really and he regards the things of sense mogliche Erkenntnisse].gt. This&quot. by which he means a fundamental which the a priori principles of our knowledge are he makes use of this idea merely as against Locke. who recognized no other than an empirical origin of these his pre(3) Is it possible to believe that. the intelligible world which belongs kennl&amp. was a new and remarkable suggestion of investigations in metaphysics which had not yet been undertaken (and which (2) Is have actually been undertaken only recently) it to be believed that so great a mathematician as Leibniz held that bodies are composed of Monads (and consequently that space is made up of simple parts) ? He referred not to the corporeal world. if it is taken too literally. reproduce can hardly be credited to its mistakes of form and language) the disciples of Leibniz as a service done to the fame of their master. intellectual But in intuition [Anschauen] of these supersensible realities. in order to make their copy exactly the same as the original. as mere phenomena (in the strict use of the term). everything which we think therein as compound He likewise appears. as specific With regard to this we to us. Similarly. for otherwise his system would be in consistent with itself. namely that of synthetic judgments. but must rather substitute for it another explanation more in harmony with his main purpose.In addition to the principle of contradiction (as the principle of analytic judgments).

He merely he did not in union. unknown to us) of the (entirely indeed two quite elves. are mere Vorstellungen}. regarding which the understanding teaches us nothing a priori. but these phenomena themperception&quot. and further we can find no reason as priori the m this relation) a pre-established harmony. as well as the necessary why they. which it would exercise even if it were The soul and the substratum entirely isolated? brought into connexion through their own forces? That would have been to proclaim idealism for why should the . Neither we nor any one else can explain how this harmony is as com plete as if nature had been arranged expressly to suit our power of comprehension. For this harmony between under standing and sense. always so completely harmonize in rendering possible experiential knowledge in general and more especially (as the Critique of Judgment shows) rendering possible an experience of nature. to explain it. criticism has given as a reason that without this harmony no experience is posble But we can give no reason why we have just such a kind of sense and an understanding of such a nature that through their combination experience is possible. Leibniz called the principle of this union (especially with reference to the knowledge of bodies and in particular of our own body as a middle term in knowledge of universal laws of nature. Manifestly this way give an of the explanation pointed out that we must regard the order established by the supreme cause of ourselves as well as of all things outside of us as involving a certain conformity to end. phenomena which we call bodies are different beings. under its manifold special and merely empirical laws.INTRODUCTION one another as regards their nature and incapable of beincr existence of bodies in general be admitted. without sacrificing ixternal things to idealism. completely heterogeneous sources of knowledge. if it is possible regard everything that takes place in the soul as the effect i its own powers. as mere forms of their intuition [Amchauung] depending upon the nature of the subject (the soul). but only . in so far as it renders a possible to certain a priori laws. and sense -in Hence the connexion between understanding the same subject can be understood according and natural dependence of sense upon external things. nor did he profess . This purpose is regarded as present at creation (pre-established) yet as a pre-established agreement not between things taken as outside one another.

as it it can only be understood by referring it to an intelligent mony. e. the application of tho appears from this. although he did not clearly develop it. is to be thought of as a harmony between what follows from of notions of nature and what follows from our notions our two completely freedom. 1 cause of the world. no way be comprehended from the nature of created things is for us an essentially contingent har [Welttvesen] but. having completely dissimilar principles. man under moral laws). that he extends soul harmony beyond the relation between pre-established and to the relation between the kingdom of nature and body to the the kingdom of grace (the kingdom of ends in relation Here the harmony i. in order other. can in And this another. and not between two different things taken as external to one as the teaches. P 2 . of each in relation to the cording to the special constitution to In the same way criticism teaches that.APPENDIX E ac between our mental powers of sense and understanding. That this was what relationship to one another in the Leibniz really meant. supreme end. stand in a knowledge of things a priori. these powers must mind. Critique harmony. and thus as a harmony between different powers in us.

.

THE MONADOLOGY .

.

1 . two years having been written at Vienna he had met the last visit of his to On this dpTth THE Monatolon is works of Leibniz. 1714- before Vienna in . one of the latest of the m r=t MSS.714. . have no title.THE MONADOLOGY PREFATORY NOTE.

expounding the general principles .lt.216 THE MOXADOLOGY the earlier of the two Cerfainly &amp.W ears to * p^ble rightly t understand it ata Lt reldS ^ &quot. ^ the nature of Created of Monad (God) throuo-h thp tw .

who G. being supplemented by an analogous of nature distinction and harmony between the physical realm and the moral realm of grace. which. he elsewhere tells us. vi. Part iii. like the Monads. 10. is not a substance. are must be simple substances. in in which the whole system of relations is brought to unity efficient and final God. There is a slight but interesting difference between this and Grace (see the corresponding passage in the Principles of Nature and of Leibniz speaks here of a compound in general (le com p. has collated the MSS. taken merely as a suggestion of the line brief analysis the texture of the work is of thought in the Monadolonj God considered as Monarch is to be .THE KONADOLOGY 217 of of the inter-relation of subsUnces through the hypothesis the best the Pre-established Harmony and the doctrine of in more detail flt-82. 406). pp. 9 6 and m). By simple is meant without parts. &c. . between God. (Theod. since there 2 is nothing but a compounds. text given by M. 607 sqq. is nothing 1. The Monad. Boutroux. at Hanover and corrected some in E. which enters into compounds. In both cases he must be understood mean body. compound in the other passage he uses the expression pose} to substance (la compose). 3 of . s If the are can we attach any intelligible meaning to compounds/ which mere aggregates of them ? Does not an aggregate always imply terminology in this connexion.J 3 . Accord strictly speaking (Introduction. for a compound And there collection or aggrcgatum of simple things &amp. the expression but the difference illustrates the looseness Grace and : of*Nature of Leilmi/.) 2. the distinction and harmony between distinction causes (which had been found to be the basis of the between body and soul). so close that it is impossible to make perfectly satisfactory divisions in it. non-quantitative. soul and body. explaining of all possible worlds (&) the relations of particular classes of substances to one another. shall here speak. that is to say. here is more exact than that in the Principles ingly. including birth anu death. The Monadology is given The translation is mi^e from the ^ .gt. . 705 sqq. of which we but a simple substance. of and dealing with questions of oi^anism and of the relations 83-90. simple things are. universe and considered as Architect of the machine of the This of the divine City of spirits. and (c) . errors of Erdmann.

are no spatial distinctions. E. 1702. s History of Materialism. G. Tr. indeed. It then. should it not is not born perfect. 449). is gradual. ch. a fertile simplicity/ a centre hich expresses (or repre i &amp. Hegel 4 s Geschichte der Philosophic. 89. have still. and there is no conceivable way in which a simple sub stance can be destroyed by natural means. 2.. Leibniz s IrpW esis of a living [formel] atom. p. According to Leibniz a thing is produced by nature only when comes into being gradually. sect. p. div. bk. since it cannot be formed by the combination of parts [composition] 6 . and thus there s. which a simple substance can come into being by natural means. ems a weakness in his reasoning at this point. cannot come into being by the adding of part to part. (Eng. fully means ? come into being by natural . in the spirit of much of Leibniz s to perfectly clear that nothing quantitative can ever be absolutely simple. 124 sqq. which realized. way elements which are quantities. . the elements of things 5 No dissolution of these elements need be 4.21 8. extension unreal. iii. Lange ii. 3. 271) See also the interesting analysis and criticism of Kant s &quot. We &quot. sect. vol. i.. iv. (TMod. i. A. bk. Why. &quot. note. Thus for Leibniz all merely physical atoms are Cf. having no parts. Ordinary physical atoms have form and and. ch.. feared. &quot. bit by bit. in a word. arguments Cf. it pp. ask ourselves the question Are not simple and compound purely relative terms. iv. The difficulty is fun lamental and affects the whole of Leibniz s system: it is.. however small ? philosophizing. 5 e. Now where there are no. inasmuch as they occupy space. These Monads are the real atoms of naturo and.).) 5. vol. i. the crux of every Individualist 1 or Atomist philosophy. Yet it may be pointed out that every Monad has an internal development. Meiklejohn s Tr. 187 a. infinite circumference (Eeponse aux Reflexions de Bayle. in Hegel s Wissenschaft der Logik. makes Leibniz elsewhere it sents) an . is the suggestion of a way out of Atomism but it does not take us entirely out of the wood. For the same reason there is no conceivable in . 6 Cf. 562). where there New System. parts there can be neither extension nor form [figure] nor divisibility. Tr. though they may not be physically divisible.lt. p. But the Monads. 4. so that to search for an absolutely simple thing is to explore blind alleys ? Kant shows us the blind alleys in his second Antinomy (Critique of Pure Reason. 525 (Eng.- THE MONADOLOGY . i. 4 3. yet they must be ideally divisible ad infinitum.

&quot. / havejodomgng^ Part m. . ^TheJIonads Accidents cannot separate themselves go out. Monad by any other created in it it is impossible thing. direction of motion. by way of analogy and contrast. though . what Spinoza says Consider. whose creation is. although of compounds. common with the accidents or essences in things. v. while that end by parts comes into being or comes to an of explaining how a Further. &quot. i.. Monad can neith -FT^nTmeTnmg is that by other things the some into thing else nor be altered as to its nature. of them as the from substances nor go about outside used to do sensible species of the Scholastics .^ ^^^^ ~&quot.Vot au event in time. According to immaterial representations of material qualities to us the accidents of things are known Thomas Aquinas. while we moans of sensible species. Cf. &quot. since or to conceive the place of anything in it to change be produced internal motion which could any directed. increased this is there in could come have no windows. I II II I MJII II l*ij viiv/ _i. there is no way 7 in quality or internally changed can be altered Thus it may . pp. prop. The scholastic theory in general may in us have something in species the sensible or intelligible t. 89 sqq.e. the eternity of the human mind. re-arding with the idea of creation. the doctrines Leibniz seems here to have in view partly were scholastic theories which Thomas Aquinas and partly the The species are images or based on the system of Democritus.THE MONADOLOGY 6 2T 9 come be said that a Monad can only that is to say. changed which it can undergo affected in those changes of state dition them.&quot. know or particular images. in which in the case among the parts . through which anything or possible are changes all or diminished therein. See Introduction.i even without a change of nature. means of intelligible species or genera the essences of things by be said to be that images. to an end all at once into being or come creation and come to an it can come into being only by which is compound end only by annihilation. for time ^&quot. in bodies are reducible to trans It is implied that all changes in the amount and of parts. and space .nmiH?i lipinniz L bni/ tinfiTfl DIB grtfuivi Mnnnda. r 47 and Introduction. and ultimately to changes position Part iii. Ethics. But nccordmgto Spfnoza dispenses nevertheless^ &quot.

things simple substances did not differ in quality. Wallace s a hL &amp. On the other hand.^ that h6 desir S t0 -d People s mind o an these httle images. ^ ^ &quot. cf. called intentional which give so much work to the species. Herbart (1776-1841) whose Monadology owes much to that of Leibniz. - A SS quantity wrote.f as spatial parts as well quantity which is so divisible. in a certain sense.THE MONADOLOGY neither substance nor accident can come into a Monad from outside 11 8. has o n ly one ultimate quality . M rr &quot.lt. according particles Images pass into the percipient. Yet the Monads must have some qualities. lose and receive qualify Cf kind of -m/luxus IT &amp. in whom they are reconstructed into images or representations of qualities in the thing perceived of this ^inking of a theory which sense-perception are detached from the body perceived and to 1S evident1 ^ kind were called rfa^a by Democritus the action of body upon soul by the suggestion of some ph ysic us.z seems also to imply that each Monad must more than one quahty. e o A&quot.. flying through the air. Part pp^a. nt that a H being without quality is indistinguishable from : - e words the^word &quot. note 2 by Idea editations. there would be . stone descending from a height loses a certain intensive quantity without losing any of its spatial parts. otherwise 12 iey would not even be existing And if . sqq Leibn. &amp. Kant pointed out that a ointed thing may have intensive as well e quai ity quantity whieh is not *e . substances were nonentities be 6dUCed * n thi This e pomt t. Hegel s Logic. see Introduction. imagination Tf sophers Dioptri^ Discours I. and then deleted. phi -&amp.gt. ancPwhoYa nTh nothmg.gt. T means that Tho Thomas Aquinas). Cf.lt. Descartes has a parallel passage to thi { Ch &quot. And thus a simple ubstance may. other passages quoted Vei ch inhisTranslation of Descartes s Method and eo an Meditations. I5 8 sqq Quantit^ always presupposes quality.^r^rsimp l e -And if l6ibniZ ori g ina % -pzes Tr. pp. b be perfectly simple unless it t a substance .

ii. Part iv. nomena. . Epistola ad Des Bosses (1706) (G. does not rightly interpret Pure Reason. Cf Introduction. to the revoluof a perfectly uniform of exactly the same materials. Kant. they are to be taken. even t The result of this would be that it would not at one moment from an angel. . from the For what is in the compound can come only the Monads. unless it be if . which is a noted that for Leibniz. Moiklejohn s Hartonstcin.. which he discusses in the Critique of ii. is to make use of certain in one point or dispersed throughout space.. 256 sqq. 4 5 Space is the 682 b as time is the order of successive order of co-existing phenomena. in any motion. to represent to ourselves fictions of our mind. 168 sqq. as the Cartesians desire. Aristotelian distinction between voTw quantity as sharp as the in some respects his Law of Continuity suggests and irfoov. or distance.THE MONADOLOGY absolutely no any change in things. Cf. 13 ^ Kant would say that they may differ in intensive quantity and Leibniz makes the distinction between quality see note n . again. each made be possible. . view of space. p. we in addition to figure. not in space. would be indistinguishable from one another. whence there do not see whence these Forms the phenomena of matter and I from are to be intelligible. 101. Part in. 199x : . from E reads one state of things would be indistinguishable &quot. and motion. whether spatial or phenomena. if they had and simple elements it contains. to distinguish the state of things For there could be no variety in the phe their state at another. the Monads are see Introduction. 191 sqq. Epistola ad Des Bosses (1712) (E. it should Entelechies. relation between phenomena . pp. 216 sqq. ii. Accordingly. especially - pp. Cf. imagination what cannot be imagined but only Leibniz s misled by the position of Wolff. among Monads. 295) : but a substitution oi nothing would ever take place among things to the motion as if the whole universe were reduced equivalents. wheel about its axis or. exactly one state of things would be disalready had. arises a distinction among must allow certain Forms. G. . size. Yet a different view. in quantity Consequently. the matter. tions of concentric circles. Tr. another uniformity the plenum and to admit. each part of space would always space being the equivalent of what rt receive. There is no nearness and to say that they are collected together absolute. p. ii. by which we try understood. Rosenkranz. they do not differ a plenum. it would follow that of adding to these motion alone. no means of perceiving qualities. be To avoid a possible misunderstanding. and no 14 cernible from another since .

because they are and others which : . ii. 8. are those which things have Dutens. constant change in created substances. His theories are full of suggestions of Leibniz. but in a letter to the Ada any of Leibniz s philosophical writings Eruditorum (1697) Leibniz refers to him as a mathematician (cf. internal. xxvii. Sitzungsmann. ch. ... which are names this 16 called in the schools external denomination. What appears to us as absence have here of change is really a very small degree of change. may taken from something which is not in the substance. For Kant s criticism see Critique of Pure 3 (E. Cf. ii. seen. 36. Introduction. change. &c. Cf. : square . v. to find are perfectly alike and in which it is not possible a difference founded an internal difference. ch.) All things must of necessity differ from one another. p. I assume also as admitted that every the created Monad. ii. for in there cannot be several things exactly the same [aequalia]. is subject being.222 9. taken from the actions of another and desired. Reference may also be made to a very interesting article by ZimmerAkad. and consequently and further that this change is continuous to . Reason. p.lt. e. being perceived. 229 Meiklejohn s Tr. There is nothing in the universe diversity which does not enjoy a certain singularity. motion. but one Therefore all things both agree with and differ from itself. or at least 15 upon an intrinsic quality [denomination] created 10. Port-Eoyal Logic. while extrinsic qualities their those which arise from their relations to other things. e. There are some modes which may be called (Baynes s Tr. &c. as loved. p. is what is There is We . i another. English Tr.g. figure. There is no mention of Nicholas of Cusa in berichte. iii. Intrinsic qualities are in themselves. (De Venatione Sapientiae. ii. Cf. THE MONADOLOGY Indeed. each Monad must be different from every For in &quot. even though there may appear to be no change. 345). in each 15 see This is the principle of the identity of indiscernibles .. vol. He says that in the writings of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). Among is necessarily a several individuals of the same species there of degrees of perfection. Nicolaus Cusanus als Vorldufer Leibnitzens (Wien. as round. 20 sqq. iii. 306). an application of the Law of Continuity. De docta ignorantia. desired. 267 the first statement of the principle is to be found Probably p. bk. History of Modern Philosophy. 202. the same thing that case there would not be several things. 277 b &amp. because they be called external..g. 214).nature there are never two beings which other. Nouveaux Essais. which is to be found in Cf. Part ii. 23. no other thing. part i. 37) are conceived to be in the substance. G. 16 . Hartenstein. . pp. Kosenkranz. . Falckenberg.

that its changes of itself in the simplest Whence comes it. soul as of the atom. e. though it is their relations has a composite tendency. . a tendency.THE MONADOLOGY ii. involve a This particular series of changes should remains unchanged something changes and something and a simple substance must be affected and consequently 50 although it has no parts in related 17 many ways. as may i. The state of the G. cf. everything is not entirely other. has nothing because it is supposed that these parts do not change tendency. each to change its thought tends to change its place. 186 b Reflexions The atom is a state of change. the soul and most uniform way. That is to say. Mofi^ijcOTne_from__an . there But. upon theiiTnnejrbeing. fas it is supposed which causes any variety in its although it has parts. it perfectly indivisible. in the creation or annihilation of a be implied And gener wrote is At the beginning of 12 Leibniz originally the is nothing but the principle of ally it may be said that force a afterwards to have felt that force was not deep chnn&amp. It follows from what has just been Jhat the natural^ chai^es_ofjhi Imvo no influence since an external cause can principle. enough notion to be an adequate expression and he describes under the names of Perception in 14 and 15. thing which is. The Law of Continuity. of whicii each tends to contains a multitude of present thoughts. . : change He seems of the principle which. Appetition. For. as every natural change 19 of the simple substances. 396. to : atom be. so to speak. Reponseaux 20 In illustration of this and the following sections. : . and variety 13. nevertheless. unit [unite] or in that which is simple. &quot. is both a permanent and a andTneyery part of this change there both element. multiplicity in the takes place gradually. je than such other than miraculous changes or Monad. while on the other hand the soul. that is to say. at any moment everything varying some is becoming something else and is not. iv. 223 said. Everything is continually changing. ~~~i2 ls . . besides the principle scries of changes [un detail de ce qui must be a particular nature which constitutes.lt. 562) de Bayle (1702) (E.always motion in a straight soul ? The reason is that the so much variety in the changes of the for there is no such thing in nature. 400. that there state allows much simplicity in the change of the atom [which is taken is so line at a uniform speed] and as bein.internal (TJieod. the specific change]. then (I shall be asked).) of the change..

and that there are no souls of animals nor other Entelechies. Because of the continuity and divisibility of all matter. Introduction. p. :esian view fm 23 See also Principia Meditations. n : m .lt. See perception Cf. because of its confused and imperfect perception of the infinite. For there is no individual thing. Thus like the \ substance. for it treats as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not 22 This has also led them to believe consciously aware that minds [esprits] alone are Monads. according to the nature of its content and which all are present together in the soul. 2 and 6. It is because they do not have this relation that the atoms of Epicurus have no existence nature. m m Appendix F. trances. and and cf. Sleep. the burying of . all Entelechies or Monads must necessarily be endowed with Also Lettre a Arnauld perception. in virtue of the soul s essential relation to all the other things in the world. crowd. ^ . Now. a particular change. z 4 8. to all the motions of our body there corre&quot. M Cf Method Part . and consequently the soul to the regard variety of its modifications. rather than to a material atom.j^hichjnvolves and represents a multiplicity in the unit called Perception* distinguished from Apperception or onsciousness.losop^ae. . 438 a Since perception is nothing else than the expression of many things in one. as will afterwards appear. 272. is nolEm^Hut wFat be [unit^~T^h^h^lQ is which is to . spond certain more or less confused perceptions of our soul and accordingly our soul also will have some thought of all the motions * the universe and in my opinion every will have some or expression of them. ad Des Bosses G. in a gradually lessening degree and thus our body must in some way be affected by the changes in all other bodies.22 4 THE MONADOLOGY / I4 The_agsiDg condition. ^^ ^ Introduction. 311) (1706) (E. whose infinity it represents/^. a) (1687) (G. p. which is not to be regarded as expressing all others. ii. ought to be likened to the untverse. which it represents according to its point of view and even in a way to God. they have failed to distinguish between a prolonged unconsciousness and absolute death 25 which has made . Epistola &amp. which is an image of death. In this matter the Cartesian view is extremely defective. Ia6 The cfrthat animals and plants are purely mechanical aUt mata g f 6XtenSi0n 5. ii. Part iii. the least motion has its effect upon neighbouring bodies. Cf. and consequently upon one body after another ad infinitum.

if this were not done). 25 dependent Meditations a Arnauld (1687) (G. would it do you to become king of China. as it is established by Descartes.) destroyed you. the resuscitation swallows which make their winter quarters among the reeds. the cases of are found without where they any appearance men frozen to death. however. the resuscitation of drowned means of a dry powder sprinkled upon them (when they would of remain quite dead. others.ke matter. nothing is lost in nature. will change in appearance and. sir. our instruments. at the moment He (G. See the Abrege prefixed to the . it think certain things. reward and punishment. people Lettre 21 may have is about ) life and (what more solid and death. reads mal touches Descartes regards the immortality of the soul as ultimately on the will of God. . or strangled. it is either because we do or because.THE MONADOLOGY them fall 225 again into the Scholastic prejudice of souls entirely separate [from bodies]. will others. E. iv. as. indeed.. and Boutroux. drowned. For. the soul of which a man is made has at other times belonged to plants and but animals. Descartes can say: Al for though all the accidents of the mind be changed although. the human body is no longer the same It Abrege des Meditations. Accordingly we must not content ourselves with the notions which the common . will have no re it will pass through innumerable changes and But this immortality without collection of its former states. : . ii. on condition that you forget what you have been? Would it not be the same as if God. mal tournes. but. in the same way the soul may be immortal. of life. granting that the soul is a substance and that no substance perishes. useless for it is inconsistent with recollection is quite Deurtimes : [Syn-opsis in Veitch s translation]. our hands. the soul then will not be lost. when we have both analogies arguments which prove the contrary. on the if a change take contrary. especially when dissolution takes place too quickly and has gone too far. ethically . Eeponses aux Objections. and if we have in other the means of bringing about resuscitation from death not know what ought to be done forms. 7. Leibni/ thus criticizes the view of Descartes The immortality of the soul. example. and perceive the mind itself does not vary with the^o changes while. were to create a king in China? From his own point of view. and our remedies cannot accomplish it. G. 24 minds in the opinion that souls are ill-balanced and has even confirmed mortal&quot. Cf. though we do know it. 123). who have been brought that all these things serve to confirm my opinion to life again not these different conditions differ only in degree. What good. p. as the matter li. flies by a silkworm in its cocoon. is of no use and can give us no kind of consolation. . 300. indeed. place in the form of any of its parts.

whoainvolves variety m rts objec leaj is that the hought : a in the &amp.ience of which we are conscious that the soul Thus ill those who admit shouid admit this we find Instance.iew of new books. X pe. 33. having to of the Church by censures .ought not and M.^ u.22 g THE MONADOLOGY The internal activity of the principle^hHLP^ ^tw: hTe r in of 8 a multiplicity e : . W sn . the Princess Leibniz writes to nn. P. ale.lt. Bayle multeity to have found any &quot. . A to - of established &quot. . -.t &quot. . - p art became a o olic returned to hia lasting and. gm G a aTo de .

which was the In 1693. who maintained the impossibility of reconciling faith with reason. Leibniz seems to have He always believed in the sincerity of Bayle s religious faith. an Italian.re inexplicable on mechanical was deprived ho political as well as theological grounds. article Kora- 1 7. This treatise ^Quod an iw alia bruta ratione idantur mdius hominc j was not published until about 100 years after it was the souls of animals written. Among other writings he also published a tract against religious persecution and a reply to Maimbourg s He died in 1706. saying of him (Theod. of his professorship. as he has 2y rius . which is refused to earth. since. Q 2 . that Moreover. one of the greatest minds in Europe ) has made some suggestions of the general problem which are worthy (in regard to the solution These suggestions are contained in the New of being developed. Probably meant to follow the example of Descartes. is to a large extent devoted to answering the arguments of Bayle. We Ubi lene. writes of Bayle with the greatest respect. 227 L done in his Dictionary. according to all appearance. when Descartes s views regarding were under discussion. he has always been a man of good will. nemo mdius. the article Rorarius may be said to consist mostly of foot-notes. Bayle thinks it a pity that the position of Descartes to maintain and so unlikely to be true. in the course of which he expounds and criticizes the opinions of Leibniz. There is much difference of opinion as to whether Bayle was sincere in his combination of philosophical scepticism with an in this regard he appeal to faith in matters of religion. on hearing a learned man speak of him Otho and to Frederick Barbarossa. he was moved to write a treatise maintaining that men are less rational than the lower animals. Jerome Rorarius (1485-1566). He was so great an admirer of the as inferior to Emperor Charles V that. Bayle accordingly makes the name of Rorarius the occasion of a full consideration of the question. The Thcodicee of Leibniz libels upon Calvinism. ostensibly on movement precursor of the Encyclopaedias and the Encyclopaedist in the following century. for otherwise it would be Cartesian view very helpful to the true faith. after his death: 174): must believe that Bayle is now enlightened with that light. it must be confessed that perception and which depends upon it r. was Papal Nuncio at the Court of Ferdinand of Hungary. the is so difficult is of the soul by regarded as confirming belief in the immortality making a very great distinction between man and the brutes But it seems to Bayle that Leibniz (whom he calls which perish. 29 Like the greater part of Bayle s Dictionary. That is to say. and he afterwards devoted him self to his Dictionnaire Hlstorique et Critique (1695-96). and again.THE MONADOLOGY in this.

even if we had microscopes powerful enough intricacies of nerve-cell and reveal to us. that is. Thus it istic of all compounds. is inconceivable how perception is equally inconceivabK whether it be made up of fluids or solids. a coarse &quot. that substance. 59 Introduction. 272.fibre in the brain. that .. as we do at present.machine. is chara ai Mechanism always means paries extra paries. except mechanism. v. find only parts which work one upon another. same proportions. Appendix F.) 400. if but only a difference of magnitude. 463 a motions. of Bayle s Dictionary appeared) 1695 (the year before the the pre-established Bayle s criticism is directed mainly against states by and the spontaneous development of all their harmony simple substances. 328) is and figure bare matter. it would be the same See also New Essays. If in that which is organic there is nothing but mechanism. while keeping the by means that one might go into it as into a mill. p. on a large scale. that there is no essential difference it &quot. and never anything by which Thus it is in_a_simple to explain a perception in a machine. all the never get beyond figures and nerve. we should still G. vu. to to say. the and it matters not whether the things contained Further we know are solid or fluid or made up of both. as to And supposing there were a machine. (G. E. except such differences as I have just taken hy itself nothing can be deduced and from anything . feel. nothing perception must and their changes) canjbejoimd this (namely. That being so. nothing can be deduced and explained mentioned.machine&quot. it for if our how perception can arise from a finer &quot. i . be sought for Jurther. machine between coarse and fine bodies.gt. as if we were perceiving senses were finer. so increased in size. 31 but in the Journal des Sarans of June 27 System which was published second vol. of figures and motions. m it follows that. but not of any simple a can never be said that matter thinks. perceptions It is als&amp. of the attributes which constitute it. so constructed it might be conceived as think. plained except differences or clock as such is Hence we may readily conclude that in no mill what takes place there to be found any principle which perceives in &quot. on examining its interior. . and have perception. and not in a compound or 30 . p. having differences of place. 203 a. Commentatio dc Anima Bnttorum ( 1710 That is &amp. Cf. Matter pre-supposes it 5 thinking or at least a perceiving principle. that is THE MONADOLOGY to say. Whence arises in any coarse &quot. This substances.22 Q grounds. we should.n_this _alonejhat_ all .&quot.gt. magnitude from it. * Cf.machine. E.

not merely machines. but which Leibniz it rather implies the tendency or virtuality. they have a certain self-sufficiency which makes them the sources of their internal/ (avrapKcia) 33 activities and. ever. Mclaph. fia and ^P7 eia in 1050* 22. which It is thus not so much the final developed it tends to develop. f*ovds is. 33 That is to say. The^ entelechy. 3.THE MONADOLOGY 229 activities of simple substance^L_gan consisj. are automata in this sense. 474 (TJieod. De Anima. [E.gt. sance] and the fully developed activity (acte] The Forms of the Ancients Cf. In the eighth book of Cf. pp. so to speak. _the internal G. 1044^ sense of a unit. Corporeal automata. pp. opposed to its potentiality (Swa/xty or V\TJ). Tims he defines the soul Aristotle is not &amp. vi. such as those made by which contain man. 1043 35. 8. 320. ii. evTt\*x fia in Aristotle is the state of perfection rovvofta li/e/ryeta or realization in which fvepyfia. caTrea-errttlecFiy. 146 a. i. but entirely self-moving machines or machines within themselves the ground or principle of all their states or else as conditions. Lettrc an Pere Bouret. used here in its original 7. ical avvreivti -rrpos TT)I/ kvrfXtxeiav. But the distinction between hr(\ex means a sharp one. or Entelechies are nothing but forces. by any De Anima. not because it is a but because it contains in germ an infinity of perfections. 37]. rivos. First entelechy is related to second entelechy as l-mar-q^ (implicit) is related to 6ewpcfv (explicit). But elsewhere he calls it ovaia Kal fvep-yeia Mdaph. of course. Part iii. is probably derived from tv reAct ex ftv to ll complete Leibniz s use of tbe term differs considerably from or absolute. fection (e xot o-i TO e vreXe s) . E. is to be understood as an It is containing within itself the principle of its own changes. 91. ends. . . Introduction. II. in as complete independence of all if there were Monads alone nothing in the universe but God and themselves. 295. as a process. incorporeal automata (Theod. of between the bare potency (puis speaks as something intermediate of the Scholastics. state of perfect realization. All simple substances or created Monads might be s2 for they have in them a certain per called Entelechies 1 8. \ey(Tai Kara TO (pyov.) Prcf. Trendelenburg. 3. that of Aristotle. d\ ovx c&s 77 considered in relation to Leibniz d\ tVT(Xcx (ia Ka ^ Qv*71 * T? \eyovai nvfs olov /xovds -m ovaa rj (niypri. in so far as they . s Metaphysics there is a remark of much interest. 105. H. when ovaia cv OVTUS. Thus the soul is defined as first or implicit entelechy because it exists in sleep as well as awake. . condition of a thing. 0. of Leibfti_z1 how individual substance or force. Aristotle : f/tdarr].

em unconscious perception. and this affection is nothing but But when there is a great multitude of its perception. indeed. 1 THE MONADOLOGY If we ! i ! ! which has perceptions all simple substances sense which I have explained. ii. 85 . i. is nothing distinct. tione. perish. mind without memory (mens momentanea. 64. 3* from thus the sign of consciousness as distinct with the view. as when we fall into a swoon or when we In are overcome with a profound dreamless sleep. Theoria Motus Abstracti (1671) (G. are corporeal. This is in harmony that conscious sensation pre-supposes phasized by modern writers. for the reasons already given to exist without being and it cannot continue And it is . 35 Leibniz originally wrote variation. cannot be said to have soul as acting according to certain laws and Spinoza speaks of the De Intellects Emendaas if it were a kind of spiritual automaton.e. for it cannot cannot be. (Thcod. is something \le sentiment] name of Monads or I think it right that the general should suffice for simple substances which . and that the name is more be given only to those in which perception 34 distinct. without any perception. affected in some way. as when one turns continuously round in the Cf. it. 230).2o 19. it has because we can know one sensation only when memory. this avrapicein. in one of his been brought into comparison with others. 64. this state . For we experience in ourselves and have no distinguishable per we remember nothing . Bruder is s cd. Leibniz remarks that body is momentary early writings suggestively * seu mind. ception . from a bare Monad the soul does not perceptibly differ and the soul comes out of but as this state is not lasting. is something more than a bare Monad. and is accompanied by memory a condition in which 20.. are to give the name of Soul to everything and desires [appctlts] in the general Eiitelechies of Souls should have perception only. iv.) substance does not follow that in this state the simple That. then souls but as feeling or created Monads might be called more than a bare perception. in which there 35 is stunned . the soul 21. recordatione). one little perceptions. 34- Memory * .

It thus appears that if we had m our perceptions nothing marked and. to perception 40 for their full explanation. although we were not at 23. for way . 14. for the time. i.) 24. p. We perceptions see also that nature has given heightened to to animals. every perception must have a cause. which. vol. or them with organs. although festly as to be imper consciousness has. 37 way . &amp. there motions are them the existence of the soul. And as. 186. And as every present state of a simple of its preceding state. striking and highlyshould always be in a state of stupor. we so to speak.. and which keeps giddiness which may 36 Death can for a time us from distinguishing anything .gt. of such a selves perceptions stated according kind that their relations to one another can be . ice are conscious of imme our perceptions. to make them have greater uniting 4 &quot. by Someeffect them. 38 Cf. note 23. 4. Ultimately. of system of final causes or the laws Helmholtz. which can be nothing but another perception . 7 8 ^ lld 79- In virtue of the principle of sufficient reason. Lectures. Principles of Nature mechanical laws. Popular Scientific and of Grace. diately conscious of one perception can in a natural as a motion way come only from another perception. which the bare Monads are. bee alsc .) that its present is big with its future . and if the antecedent perception did not immediately 17) (see would be a breach of continuity in precede the consequent. And this is the state in 25. of course. from the care she has taken provide of light. in order. Cf. 37 Cf. 401-403. condition put animals into this substance is 22. in such a naturally a consequence 38 (Thcod. we must have had perceptions all before we awoke. are abstract and pre-suppose. on waking from stupor. Monadology. we are still mani s point is that in such states as these in certain peculiar relations to the external world. whence comes a make us swoon. but they are confused perceptions. however. the in general. flavoured. which collect numerous rays numerous undulations of the air. become so slight a6 Leibniz ceptible.THE MONADOLOGY 231 same way several times in succession. can in a natural them . 39 from a motion come only (Thcod. 350.

f f r^ W unconsciously adopt the hich im P ies that subs -ally T* eaCh th CaUM of a 8 Harmony and an. (Thcod a stick instance is shown to dogs. especially pp. &amp. and they come to have feelings similar those they had on the former occasion. Thus we see that when animals have a perception of something which strikes them and which they have had a tiveness&quot. ^ . of t the hA r of Weas Association v33 (B a v - - ^ ) he is thinking mainly of a look h ook hi. For led. or as many and they remember the pain has caused them. they are similar perception Discours de la Conformite.. Lubb ck Ants and 225 &quot. often And unknowt to . 26. bk. 220 See 61 and 62.. Memory formerly when : by means of representation in their memory to expect what was combined with the thing in this pre vious perception. 296 a as the reasons [of the connexion of thing. provides the soul with a kind of consecuwhich resembles [imite] reason. ii. in taste and in touch. exporfencet&quot.And the strength of the mental image which im presses and moves them comes either from the magnitude or the number of the preceding perceptions. ch. S S0m Critics fuZT &quot. over- ^ ^* 252) &quot. ordinary perceptions 45 oft-repeated . Nouveaux Essais. a p Pre-established . ch. but which is to be distinguished from it.] Cf.. 65. &c. and perhaps in a number of other senses. For often strong impression produces all at once the same effect 3 a long-formed habit.232 THE MONADOLOGY thing similar to this takes place in smell. G. v. 8. and howl and run away&quot.) 27. Eees and W W.lt. which are unknown to us And I will explain presently 2 how that which takes place in the soul represents what happens in the bodily organs. 33 (E.

They are innate in us. Xew Essays. it happens have as vivid as long experience could fancy an image as deep and Whence it comes that a chance but violent impression done combines in our memory two ideas. men 46 . when we expect we do so empirically. to attend to particular instances in proportion ano then the expectation or recollection ol frequency are ex connected with the perception we perception. sects of physicians. and it is not easy to the same effect as experience Cf. rational knowledge. One of these was the aii&amp. For instance.L *. &c. empirical physicians whose methods are those of mere practice without theory. Introduction. usually in cases where we have to periencing is reasonable. of all The necessary and eternal truths are the first principles in fact.THE MONADOLOGY 28. oneself from these inclinations. in three-fourths of that there but empirics.D. Thus association produces the custom produce alsc reason does not exist. It is only the until now. They are. same effect. we must . is 233 In so due lower animals. which were already together to connect them and there and gives us the same inclination as if long custom had verified their expect the one after the other. . Authority and same free arid reason. 47 Cf. that is called us. resembling the far as the concatenation of their perceptions act like the to the principle of memory alone. raising gives us licason and 4 And it is this in us of Go&amp. the whole universe. because i the very principles of our nature. there sect of the Empirics. were various 150 A. p. But as the violence [vWmmee] effect as the fre often produces all at once as much impression could have of several moderate impressions quency and repetition the that this violence engraves done in the long-run. ledge of ourselves and the rational soul or mind [esprit].). it . especially of a very powerfu take precautions. But it is the knowledge animals ar^ truths tHaTdistinguishes us from the mere us to the know the sciences. though the connexion. Thus conscic of our essence to represent Until the time of Galen (circa 364. their for m p. 365. Introduction.lt. has always so happened 4T astronomer who thinks it on rational grounds and eternal of necessary 29. as of the universe. our actions we are nothing Indeed. because will be daylight to-morrow. who laid stress upon observation of the visible antecedents In later times the name of empiric fell into disrepul disease.lt. and was given to physicians who despised theoretical study trusted to tradition and to their own individual experience. note 39. New Essays.

. 5. virtual cor manner. Cf.J truths which he introduces Socrates leading a child to abstruse without giving him any information. so that we could find them by attentively what is already in our mind.THE MONADOLOGY abstract expression. i. Principles of Nature and of Grace. but knowledge ot led^e of the nature of things is nothing mind [esprit] and of those innate ideas. - - 5 men is an pretty general agreement among 72). by questions alone. &amp. self-consciousness (reflective con when we realize the eternal truths as eternal. Nouveaux Essais. of and thus. 211 b . vL 2 ?]-) /Y (Theod. 469 and of these truths is knowledge of ourselves.lt. ness or knowledge of God. : 30.lt. i. as Plato has shown in a dialogue [Meno. succession o Boutroux finds in this passage the indication of a The nature in the progress of self-conscious reflexion. and through their us think of what is rise to acts of reflexion. . 190. Cf. all things. 82 sqq. i. that ii sciousness) and of the whole to say. of the substance. It is also through the knowledge of necessary that what is immaterial. Prcf. subject m . that we truths. thinking of ourselves. is no need to look for outside of it. as the ultimate metaphysical reality. who is the final reason of it is at the same time knowledge ^. v. We &amp. i. from substance to a form) the germ of the Kantian transition Thus consciousness becomes 1 .v bk. and of God Himself. 4 ( E 2O 7 b . which there nature of our Cf. without sidering and arranging or by external making use of any truth learned by experience tradition. v. Nouveaux be something analogous to what we find in ourselves. which make that is within us called /. conceiving acts of in us is in Him without limits. but the exact and and not a demonstration of an innate principle in showing that then decisive proof of these principles consists It may be said that is in us certainty comes only from what innate and are in us in a all Arithmetic and all Geometry are A indication . And these limited 49 our reasonings reflexion furnish the chief objects of &. as the innate principles of our being because it must world. stages Thus of our nature. that is to say. of God is the truth or ultimate reality in the return of the being towards reflexion. G. . and observe that this or we think of being. derived from o Intellectual ideas or ideas of reflexion are 71): could have mind and I should like very much to know how we and thus idea of being. Substance is always a soul of some kind. [_E. were it not that we ourselves are beings the see here (in however imperfect find being in ourselves. 212 b G. Cf. Essais. p. ch. also 23 (E. ch. bk. Very often know21 (E. of the simple and the compound. 70).

Nomeaux Essais. b&amp. known by 1 (Thcod. ^.. 44. in virtue of which &amp. why these reasons it should be so and not otherwise. v. sufficient reason of a thing is always to be found in its relations to give the sufficient other things. ^2) or that negations of the true and the false are not compatible.31. which is God . principle of sufficient reason. Metnph. r 9 6 -) those of reason- source. usually cannot be usj kinds of 33. ch. through perception which has thus become we reach the Infinite Being. 58 sqq.gt. he also sometimes uses the phrase. As synonymous with the &amp. whom. But he recognizes that they The G-. 156. principle lie thus suggests that the of fitness [convcnance] or of harmony. bk. ioir 23. false .lt. 169. each of which b involves no self-contradiction. false are not compatible in the same proposition or that a proposition that the opposites or at the same time true and cannot principle of contradiction is in general : . 3. 343 i (E. identity (A . &quot. 19 and 7. with J - . created beings so to are seeking confusedly and unwittingly.lt. or rather See to lie neither true nor false. a proposition is either true or This contains two true statements (i) that the true and the false. substance and the And finally. in so far as it is limited and distinct from being immaterial. There are also two . other beings. we that there can be no fact real or existin i_no statement true. that it is for a impossible proposition Aristotle. meaning the reason whirh determines tence of tins or that out of a number of possibilities. pp. truths. 2.. of La Monadologie. is to the false opposed or contradictory that (Theod. T.) And of sufficient reason. closes upon itself: the created being that its the Creator in so far as He is in it the finite has done all (Edition nature allowed in the way of reproducing the infinite. Then the circle. /oZSTtfiat which 32. and : true^ . from the first. Part ii. 339 * Cf.) Leibniz sometimes Cf.A). coming ever nearer to the Divine Essence reflective and conscious. Our reasonings which . unless there be a sufficient reason. itself. or the which is in us. THE MONADOLOGY 235 are groundedjupon two grcaticiof which. p. reason of anything when we show its compossibility with other We . we first of all come upon the ego. and that of distinguishes between the principle of contradiction are ultimately one. 44. identifies itself speak. although hold&quot. and then upon being. .. Introduction. 1005&quot. there is no middle term between the true and the false. we that involves a contradiction. iv. its place in the general system. a In his earlier reason the writings Leibniz calls the sufficient the exis determining reason.

the relations 5* Leibniz does not give us a very clear idea of This is probably the two principles to the two kinds of truths. Cf.lt. 367. Leyden and But it Hague : the ingly. two principles due to his hesitancy regarding the relations of the to the Theodicee entitled Remarques another. Theodicee. not at the was said Ubi bene. Leibniz says (E.imagined that any goodness. 414): Both to necessary. 217). Leibniz necessitating/ But on the other hand. as regards power of God. its reason can until we come to it into more simple ideas and truths. . however insignificant. it M.) of The principle things in addition to its abstract possibility. G. God s wisdom and can be regarded as indifferent in relation to must not be . King. that be non-existent. 174. it must be said to be contingent. we . inclines without to have its origin in a prevailing reason. For it may in a manner be said necessarily and are included in the definition of the true two le one Appendix livre de these principles the see that it Nevertheless when. event. nemo It may be said of could not be said of him. M 58 Cf. Abrccjc. is . resolving necessary. the Scholastic ratio cognoscendi arid ratio essendi. which at a later date. Bayle adds quoted by Leibniz in the previous section] remarked. that which has no truths. 28 those which are primary (Tlieod. : 174 E. by analyzing a suggested truth. It is true that there had died at no contradiction in the supposition that Spinoza Accord it was perfectly possible. G. diction. vi.*. &amp. 641 b. would have been not well fitted to be chosen. with what cannot happen. Bayle as it at the er. 282.236 ing THE MONADOLOGY r2 . In the to *ur M. false. But when. 170. but also to contingent principles must apply not only sufficient reason must and. When a truth is tingent be found by analysis. 557 b .d Yet M. words which somewhat spoil what he has so justly what contradiction would there have been if Spinoza had Now less wise. nemo pejus [of a passage. and those of fact Truths of : reaao: of fact are con and their opposite impossible truths and their opposite is possible. Object. though of Origen: Ubi male. we like. the matter was indifferent. &quot. its of the word sufficient is supposed to have been suggested by we say that use in Mathematics in a sense similar to that in which a certain magnitude satisfies a particular equation. He here confounds what is impossible. 51 l8 9. vi. involves a contra depends upon truths whose opposite we can say that it is absolutely necessary. Leibniz s adoption sufficient reason is the principle of final cause. because less powerful ? because it is involves a contradiction. 3. we can never reach such carrying our analysis as far as and elements of the given truth. indeed. melius. died at Leyden? Would nature have been less perfect.

121-122. 35. See Introduction. Cf. vii. or yos anotyavTiKus.* Leibniz says because bodies are infinitely divisible only as phenomena benefundatci and not as real beings. G. 748 a . in a word. :s . 36. &amp. the principle of sufficient reason. (Theod. Truths of fact can find a sufficient reason only in God. because of the immense variety of things in nature _ and the infinite division of bodie_s me Ecrit (II 58 . Leibniz s position is the same as in the earlier of the passages quoted. 337. detail. 45. of which no defini tion can be given 55 there are also axioms and postulates. in which the analyzing into particular reasons might go on into endless. i. Veritate ct 7c7e/s (1684) (E.. It is thus that in Mathematics speculative Theorems and practical Canons are reduced by analysis to Definition*. pp. for Leibniz. But in order to pass from Mathe matics to Physics. : 50 Leibniz uses the word enonciation for enunciatio. knowledge is adequate. MUrocosmus. Axioms and Postulates. bk. there are simple ideas. 423). 66 sqq. G. which is the usual Latin translation of Aristotle s diru^avais..) 36. . Part ii. ch. Truths of reasoning have their sufficient reason in the selfevident. that is to say. 355): principle of contradiction is by itself sufficient for the demon stration of the whole of Arithmetic and Geometry. which cannot be proved. 37. and indeed have no need of proof and these are identical propositions. When everything which an clement in a distinct idea. the statement of the elements which a complete analysis reveals in it. for the . approaches it. or when analysis has been completely made. 44. is 79 b . is in its turn distinctly known. identical truths to which they may be reduced by analysis. iv. (Eng. I know not whether human knowledge can supply a perfect instance of this the knowledge of numbers. In the Monadology. E. diction. primary principles. sequence or connexion of the things which are dispersed throughout the universe of created beings. whose opposite involves an express contra . 5. another principle also is needed. A real thing or substance must be indi. 52. 372 infinite division instead of infinite divisibility. Lot/e. There is an infinity The tie Leibnfc. 49.THE MONADOLOGY 237 34. In short. 55 The definition of an idea is. But there must tingent truths or truths of fact also be a sufficient reason for con 7 that is to say. Mcditationes de Coymtionc. iii. Tr. however. 340-344. writes to Clarke of all mathematical principles.7 i Cf.gt.

) cannot consist of paries extra partes. See Introduction.THE MONADOLOGY of present and past forms and motions which go to make up the efficient cause of my present writing and there is an infinity of minute tendencies and dispositions of my soul. : division 59 Appendix F. : And exists only however infinite this series may be 60 Thus the final reason of things must be in a neces sary substance. 7. arises the difficulty as to the relation of Leibniz s principles to one another. agent and the effect are of the same kind (univocal} (thus man begets man). 237 b 3 256&quot. And efficient causes are by Leibniz usually identified with mechanical causes. It depends on his prin ciple. 0.of particular contingent miiafj^j^f. Cf. 13. we are no further forward and the sufficient or final reason 37. we must come to a stop somewhere in the i0 &amp. r&amp. or in a more eminent. The terms are Scholastic and they were adopted by Descartes. agent another kind (equivocal). in which the variety of particular changes 61 things. that is to if the say excellent. whose principle is that of contradiction. . See also regress of causes or conditions. bk. each of which still needs a similar analysis to yield its reason. 107. which go to make its final cause . stance visible we it as in its source. Descartes says: By the objective reality of an idea. 2 s Critique Dialectic.gt.17 of Pure Reason. Phys.lt. in another form. B. Yet elsewhere Leibniz represents efficient causes as ultimately depending on final causes. ii. . e. side_of the secLuence or series . as all this detail again involves other prior or more detailed contingent things. 5. eminently God. 251. is of the same way . i. p. and this sub call (Thcod. 6. 61. Thomas Aquinas expresses the difference thus: Whatever perfection is in the effect must also appear in the after the same manner if the cause. in so far as this is in the idea and in entity . I mean the entity or of the thing represented being by the idea. we may speak of an objective perfection or an objective design. 38. &c. 3. Here. Eminently in contrast with formally. p. . i. 272. and . Part iii. 0.9 . il Cf. And the infinite of bodies is merely another way of describing the in finite number of particular substances or Monads. Apparently the efficient and the final cause combined make up the sufficient reason. Also Kant ch. This is an argument on the same lines as that by means of which Aristotle infers a prime mover. Ava-YKij m-T^ai. neither by itself being enough. For all that we conceive as being in the objects of ideas is objectively way. Transcendental .

. _ and necessary^nothing out- or by representation in the ideas themselves. note on this distinction in Veitch s Translation of Descartes. not really exist as we conceive them. believes and wills one thing in me. and who thinks. believes and an opinion the absurdity wills quite the opposite in some one else . The whole spirit of Leibniz s philosophy is opposed to the supposition of a universal substance or spirit.THE MONADOLOGY 39. Formally as opposed to almost equivalent to our objectively i^as opposed to As opposed in idea }. but from the fact that the whole forms one system to the existence of one ultimate sufficient reason of the Otherwise there might be various orders or disorders whole. viz. one necessary The argument is not merely from the substance. cf. who thinks. when they exist in the objects just as we conceive them to exist and they are said . principle or proof of the existence of God. Thus in the Considerations sur la Doctrine d un Esprit Universel (1702) he endeavours to refute the view that there is but one spirit. iii. We is may also hold that this li:! which unique. which is universal and which animates the whole universe and all its parts. but when they are so great that their excellence Ri pomes aux Deuoriemes Objections. each according to its structure and according to the organs it possesses.. all particular things are connected together in one system. and iv. as the same blast of wind produces a variety of sounds from different organ-pipes or that the universal spirit is like an ocean objectively is subjectively } or composed of an infinite number of drops. of which all particular substances are merely modes. 6That is to say. The same things are said to be formally in the objects of the ideas. in conflict with one another. when they do Raisons qui prouvent I existence de Dieu. 40. to be eminently in the objects. formally is secundum eandem formam ct rationem. existence of order in the world to the existence of an intelligence which produces this order. while eminently is gradu or modo eminentiori. who will have it that there is only one substance. which are separated from it when they animate some particular organic body and which are reunited with their ocean after the destruction of the organism. really (as opposed to to eminently. universal supreme substance. and God^ sufficient^ . one God. 6! Universal in the sense of being equally the cause or first principle of all things. which are connected this together throughout is there is only one God. This is the view of Spinoza and of other similar authors. God. which implies one principle. each pi e-supposing its own first This is Leibniz s form of the Cosmological God. makes up for this defect. 239 all Now as this substance is a sufficient reason of also this variety 2 of particulars.

Whence it followa. 377 sqq . As God is the sufficient reason of all. vi. substance. n. is the essential imperfection of created the cause only of the perfection or positive It seems to have been added . 22.24 side of s it THE MONADOLOGY being of this independent it. namely that possibility or potentiality is never a mere empty capacity a tabula rasa. mentioned 65 sequently His possibility cannot be limited. For that which is possible must be real. For is&quot. a potentia but always. beings derive their perfections from the influence of God. b iDga mUSt be essentiall y Ignited otherwise they not be created. unless there is some other possible thing.m this thaF instance of this original imperfection of created beings may be seen in the natural merlia of bodies (Theod. Con.) 41. 54 and Introduction. This is what is meant by the claims and aspirations 535| 537 ). (E. but that their imperfections come from their own which nature. that is to say in God. but would be identical with God. pf This sentence is not given by E. which is kept back only by other similar tendencies. they differ from God. l8a a G. must be illimitable and must contain as much 64 reality as is possible . (Theod. degree a tendency to realization. malum autem deftdentem). that is to say. it 42.9. 5. uses this as a hypothesis to remove from God the for the existence The responsibility origin of evil is Stances reality 16 and God created things. that-GodJs^bsolutely piafectj for perfection is nothing but amount of positive reality. it must by some possibility outside and independent of Him. 27-30. It follows also that created is incapable of being without limits. But if His possibility were in any way limited. which a pure sequence of possible being. 153. unless there is something else with which it is not compossible.85 An dictionary M would in 51 and 54. 63. p. 167. nothing is independent Him. Bayle has well shown in several in . x 78 places his a l8l b. m . the strict sense.the following sections will become clear if we keep in view the idea which Leibniz seeks Constantly to emphasize in every department of thought.) of which M. 20. In the Theochcee Leibniz (following the Scholastic principle. in however small a nuda. bonum habet 1 oUhe Monads. whose nature limits it. leaving out of account the limits or boun &^tliings which ^e limited. 27]. E. And unlimited possility means unlimited reality and unlimited existence. ^ . . Cf. vi. I he argument in this and. 469 a G. And where theYe are no bounds. perfection is abso lutely infinite. by which umqfflamtem. Pref.

in another sense.) by Leibniz in revising the first copy of the Honadology. and as His understanding is perfect (i. essences or possible things are independent of God. the source of what is real in the possible 67 . not a mere appearance to us). exist. that is. having regard to the nature of the essences themselves. and His perceptions are all perfectly clear and distinct. G. Part ii. (Thcod.. Without Him there would be nothing in existence. p. entirely without passivity. inasmuch as they are all expressions of His nature in one or another aspect or with particular limitations. 241 is It is farther true that in God there not only the source of existences but also that of essences. So far as the passivity of the body is real (i. E. of Plato He mentions there as one of the that is .e. they may be said to be dependent upon God. for all that is possible is the object of His understanding. 380. 67 That is to say. Cf. 445 b. The natural inertia of a body is its passivity or that in it which limits its activity.s many most excellent doctrines in the Divine mind an intelligible world. God is not only the source of all actual existence. of all that tends to What is real in the possible is its tendency to exist. He does not create them as essences. The nature of essences or possibilities is determined solely by the principle of contradiction. Leibniz connects this part of his system with Plato s world r&amp. the very essence of God Himself. E. that is to say. and not only would there &quot. in so far as they are real. which I also am wont to call the region of ideas. For the understanding of God is the region of eternal truths or of the ideas on which they 6 and without Him there would be nothing real depend in the possibilities of things. of ideas. and He is not the author of His own under standing (Theodicre. be nothing in existence. G. for the existence of things is the result of His will. Without Him nothing would be possible. But God is actus purns. 614 b. 20. and this choice is determined by His wisdom and His goodness. its object must be the ultimate nature of things.e. 66. entirely free from confusion in its perceptions). gives it in a foot-note. but nothing would even be possible. And yet. In a sense. His freedom. They are the objects of His understanding. vi.gt. it consists of confused perception. Epistola ad Hanschium (1707^. Introduction. extends only to a choice of those which shall actually exist. but also the source of all potential existence. Thus in 44 Leibniz practically identifies essences or possibilities with eternal truths. His choice. 341&quot.THE MONADOLOGY 43. however..

69 G.. that being dependent on God. Cf. through the reality of eternal truths. to say. or in to be possible is to be actual 70 (Theod. in a letter to Honoratus If truths and the Fabri. just as a king establishes laws in his &amp. this And pos which involves no limits. Leibniz writes natures of things are dependent on the choice of God. p. loc. I do not see how knowledge [scientta] or even will can be attributed to Him. p. Indeed. 184-189. We cannot : ftomj. vol. for in God willing and knowing are one. standing presupposes something that can be understood. vi The metaphysical truths which you call eternal have been Lettre ^^ Him Bstablished all other created things. We must eternal truths. since no one can will except in view of some good [sub rations But under &amp. 109). as Descartes 72 and afterwards 46. God has established laws nature. and conse quently in the existence of the necessary ] _ essence involves existence. which can have their final or sufficient reason only in the necessary Being. however. without blasphemy say that the truth of anything precedes the knowledge which God has of it. kingdom.) . .24 2 fi9 THE MONADOLOGY if there is a 44. As early as 1671. 335. But if all natures are the result of will. . this [His is sufficient of that of itself to as nothing can interfere with the possibility make known the possibility] We existence of God a poste since there exist contingent beings. have thus proved it. no negation and conse quently no contradiction. riori.. 274. E.. Elsewhere he says that God was perfectly free to make it untrue that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right-angles. whom . p. or rather in eternal truths^this reality must tfeeds be founded in something existing and actual. jscartes.lt. imagine. if He is 45sible. reads car. But a little while ago n we proved it also a priori not. by God and are entirely dependent upon like m cit. that is some nature. are arbitrary and depend on His will.gt. For will certainly presupposes some understanding. 103. 71 I See Appendix G.For reality in essences or possibilities. cependant. as some do. au Pere Mersenne (Cousin s ed. Thus God alone (or the necessary Being) has prerogative that He must necessarily exist. to say that these truths are independent of God is to speak of God as a Jupiter or a Saturn and to subject Him to Styx and the Fates. .. which has the reason of its existence in itself.

a charge in the He Pierre Poiret (1646-1719). as distinct from & unconditional reality or truth.. then. He wishes to maintain both the individuality of the Monads and their essential unity with God.t rationales de Deo. whose life he wrote and whose views he This influence led him to at very great length. Thus he seems to take fulguration as a middle term between creation and emana Creation would mean too complete a severance between God tion. Cogitationes was J&amp. note 85. How. That is to say. 351. The relation of God to the other Monads is the crux of Leibniz s philosophy. Cf. _Tlius_. of which the principle is fitness [con74 or choice of the ~best. which is the principle of conditioned. so to speak. who held Duchy of Zweibriicken. 76. iv. (Thcod. much discussed by the Scholastics. God is the primary centre from which all else emanates (G. 2 . 243 is to have held. E. the Divine and the human understanding differ in kind for Leibniz they : differ 73 merely in degree. iv. Anima et Halo. in the Rhine Palatinate.THE MONADOLOGY M. 180-184.gt. of the Divinity from through continual fulgurations 47. whereas necessary truths venance] depend solely on His understanding and are its inner object. 335. Descartes s view is in harmony with that of Duns Scotus. Fulguration means that the Monad is not absolutely created out of nothing nor. which Bayle attacked. That true only of contingent truths. of which all created or derivative Monads are products and have their birth. . flashings or sudden emanations. 74 By conrenance is meant mutual conformity. 553\ Cf. the Stoic rovos which Cleanthes calls a stroke of fire (77X7777) rrupos). does The point was will presuppose understanding? (G. attack Cartesianism with much fervour.gt.) primary unity or origin*! substance. understanding also will be the result of will. a Calvinist minister. and he is now remembered as a mystic rather than as a philosopher.God alone is the simple 7:&amp. of such a kind that expounded things one another in the most perfect way. 259). Thus the fit into principle of convenance or of the lest is what we should now call the idea of system. while Leibniz follows Thomas Aquinas. 185. 011 the other hand. With Leibniz it is the same as the principle of sufficient reason. 380. Afterwards he came under the influence of Antoinette Bourignon. with special reference to the question whether or not the moral law is independent of the will of God. and the other Monads emanation would mean too complete an identity between them. merely a mode or an absolutely necessary product of the Divine Frag. For Descartes. the Dutch religious enthusiast. first a Cartesian and published a book. Poiret 73 appear .

provided are chooses to allow this unfolding. free to exist and through which certain possible things were set states of any being are alone they can persist. so that each is automatically that God from its predecessor according to a regular law. that is to say. but that . ire to be distinguished from the is not. nor another that each proceeds from it absolutely dependent on one bi or mathematical necessity (Spinoza). 3950 is Power. i . at the will ot ( but it is ready to spring or flash into being. an absolute re-creation constantly repeated which the activity. limited by the receptivity of it is to have limits. E. 7. counteract were no choice of God. also Knowledge. choice or will of God. vi. &amp. even thought that there is in doctrine of the Trinity. in the sense of a mere is Thus the continual figurations of Leibniz Eternal Being. of whose essence to moment created 382-391. continual creation of Descartes. which and will . predecessor by a logical has its ground are connected together in a sequence which they unfolded in the nature of the being. 398. p.lt. possibilities would simply If there o But His choice means no more than the removal one another certain elect possi hindrances to development. actus purus) it has essential limits (i. as with Descartes. &amp. Accordin. bilities modification of the one not emanation. by the continuance of nature. yet it is a possibility tending to set it free from the assistance. 549 a . The successive of one another. actual world Origination of Things.244 THE MONADOLOGY the moment. 199) Leibniz hints at the Godhead [Divinite] .lt. so that at each neither completely independent are they so moment there is a new creation (Descartes). choice or will of God to requiring of opposite possibilities. conservation the existence of things from moment a miraculous renewal of but to moment. in the case of and yet Creation adds no new being to the universe. M9. Word. G. being. whose content is the variety of the ideas. which is the source ot all.to Leibniz. a connexion and the between this characterization of God s nature Some have&quot. As a possibility the counteracting influence it is not entirely perfect. tc Trinity that power has reference : In the Theodicee( 150. which makes changes or products 76 the best (TJieod. wisdom to the eternal called Ao-yos by the most sublime of the evangelists love to the Holy Spirit. The continual figurations the Monads of the the continual exercise of God s will in allowing Cf. u .e. according to the principle of 48. 344. realize itself. and finally Will. On the ultimate to unfold or develop their nature. (Theod. In God there . reference to the Holy these three perfections of God a hidden to the Father.

to make known the true - Aristotelian doctrine as against the degenerate forms which Scholasticism had given it. This is merely Leibniz s explanation of what we mean when we speak of outward action.) 245 to .THE MONADOLOGY 150. itself with Leibniz s view that the existence of . what in the the created as Monads or tlxe Entelechies (or perfectihabiae. But in God and in these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect created . (Theod. 80 This connects Thus the explanation or reason of an event is its actual cause. These characteristics correspond Monads forms the ground or basis 77 to the faculty of Perception and to the faculty of Appetition. Of course. just as the Copernican system explains what we mean when we speak of sunrise and sunset.) perceptions are confused. (Theod. according to the degree of perfection of the Monad. 78 Hermolaus Barbaras translated the word ) there are only imitations of these attributes. pdtir\ in it relation to another. and we must not suppose that the ground or Leibniz basis is anything in itself. though the sun neither rises nor sets. Thus in so far as it has activity [action] is attributed to a Monad. 50. by means of translations of Aristotle and of the Aristotelian commentaries of Themistius. 87. in this. and passivity [passion] in so far as its distinct perceptions. 66. that there is found in the more perfect that which serves to explain a priori perfect. He came of a Venetian family and was Professor of Philosophy at Padua. 32. said to act upon the latter 77 Leibniz does not elsewhere discriminate three elements in Un created Monad. itseiT~i ii__ essentially force or activityTmanifesting- perception and appetition. And one created thing is more perfect than another. in so far as is imperfect. where he lectured on Aristotle 79 s Ethics. no Monad really does act outside itself.) created thing is said to act outwardly 49. A 79 in so far as it has perfection. - 78 to correspond Perfect ihalia (from perfede and habeo} was formed Hermolaus cf note 3 2 to fvT(\xtta (from IfTfAwy and ex 6tl/ )Barbarus or Ermolao Barbnro (1454-1493) was an Italian scholar who endeavoured. the view that the Monad. apart from the two faculties. what takes place in the less is and it is on this account that the former 80 . and to suffer [or be passive. 386. whether created wishes to emphasize is or uncreated.

(Theod. Ethics. 82 No two simple philosophy. Its perfection in the actual world is the ground of God s creation. Berkeley and Hume regarding cause and necessary See Introduction. 2. at effect are relative every created Monad is both (actus purus). also Spinoza.} 52. 66 2O1 &amp. i. Part ii. 83 But he Leibniz s expression here is point de consideration. and .gt. have here the principle of the Pre-established Harmony 80 and 81). in the others from the beginning of things. in so far as in the ideas of God any Monad rightly claims that God.J Accordingly. - Him to substances.246 51. pp. a thing arises solely fection. 2 and 3. to their per to say. 105. contrasted with the views of connexion. yet all represent which is comparatively a Jhe same universe. among created things.lt. effect only through the mediation of God. . : its essential activities. Part iii. substances are exactly the same. and Prop. 81 . comparing two simple passivities are mutual. 3. Cf. 81 i and We . to the distinctness of their perceptions. God alone is pure cause or reason relative activity = relative distinctness of instructively be Cause = compared and This may perception. Therefore perception distinct in one must be comparatively confused in another or in one must be accom others. THE MONADOLOGY But in one simple substances the influence of and it can have its Monad upon another is only ideal. which a regular term in philosophical literature. It is a harmony or mutual (further referred to in anterior to their compatibility in the very nature of things. it is only by this means that dependent upon the other Abrege. See Introduction. activities For God. that is from the liberating of and that the Monads claim existence in proportion Cause and once. p. 8&amp. Object. 54. and whatever changes take place Thus each fits panied by corresponding changes in the others. For since one created Monad cannot have any physical influence upon the inner being of^ the one can be another. should regulating have regard to it. he introduced as generally uses the phrase point de vue. 39 sqq. into the others. Part iii. and thus it is not in any sense a created choice of that world In this respect it differs from every form of Occa harmony. It need hardly be remarked that the term has a peculiar importance in Leibniz s sionalism. 6 5. finds in each reasons which oblige 82 what is active in and consequently adapt the other to it certain respects is passive from another point of view . Def. 9.

354-) See Introduction. which makes distinct possible germ. 10. but inclined by metaphysical Ihe is the best. Math. and as only one of them for the can be actual. 225. are never quite empty they : accord- fact that there exists proportion . And this reason can be found only in the fitness the degrees of perfection. explain [rendrc of what takes the explanation [raison] passive in so far as in that place in it is to be found in another. 574&quot. (G. existence and to proceed from confused to as the things of Leibniz real essences 8* . to exist. 65. that these [convenancel or in 85 since each possible thing has the right worlds possess amount of per to aspire to existence in proportion to the 80 (Theod. .THE MONADOLOGY active in so far as 247 what we distinctly know in it serves to and raison de] what takes place in another. . that in possible something rather than nothing. notes 64 and 67.). 66.) 54. there must be a sufficient reason one rather choice of God. 345 sqq. 352. that essence by itself tends to existence. i. From the very Cf. God is not compelled by a moral necessity to create necessity. iii. fection it contains in germ . Whence it further follows that all possible things. moral necessity and absolute compulsion is of distinction between involve Possible things are those which do not Scholastic origin. i?3. all things considered. 44. which leads Him to decide upon than another 84 414-416. and. (Tlieod. Epistola into *6 This aspiration to existence is the tendency to pass distinct perceptions.) Now. (Tlieod. as in the Ideas of 53. 1 9^ sqq. the world which. 74. Actual things are nothing but the possible things a contradiction. wills to do. Therefore things whicl which. He wills to do the best. 350. to the quantity of essence or reality they existence in ing to from purely indeterminate capacities. Part ii. a certain aspiration existence [exigentiam existentiae] or (so to speak) in a word. we must recognize or essence itself. which is distinctly known God there is an infinite . Possibilities. note 74. number of possible universes. 8. we must are not on that account impossible for are less perfect which God can do and those He distinguish between the things He can do everything. are always realities in Leibniz. p. 13. there is a certain need of or in possibility things. ad Bernoullium (1699). things tend with equal right to expressing essence or possible reality. are the best. 167. 201. an absolute. See Monadotogy.. as one harmonious system.e.

88 . is their limitations as essences or is Consequently evil is not created creates the universe in which there the least by God but He amount of evil that . contain or to their degree of perfection for perfection is nothing Ultimate Origination of Things. And (Theod. means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others. and His power makes Him produce itf7~ (Theod. 147. and the Creator can be seen and known by the creatures as in a mirror darkly [quasi in specula et aenigmate~]. . : any system of things. Thus to say that the body is the point of view .) 56. which are fully expounded and defended in the Theodicee. Now things to each this connexion or adaptation of all created and of each to all. Dialogi de ludo globi (1454-59% i. 84. its body ctepends on the degree of confusedness (or distinctness) of its perceptions. Object. 204.THE MONADOLOGY Thus the actual existence of the best that wisdom makes known to God is due to this. and 8. and the nature of space. and becomes as it were numerous in aspects [perspectivement] even so. limitations of created things possibilities. 360. i 8. p. 87 This section states briefly the principles of Leibniz s Optimism. A world entirely free from evil would be indistinguishable from God Himself. consequently. 340. 88 . 119. n : l . that His goodness makes Him choose it. which. as if the Monad s point of view depended on its having this or that position in For the Monad is absolutely non-spatial. ignorantia (1440). as a result of the appears quite different infinite . But we must not give a spatial meaning to the expression. and. 157 a The whole is reflected in all the parts all things keep their own Also De docta relation [}iabitud6\ and proportion to the universe. from various sides. but quantity of essence. 78. Abrege. looked at number were so many of simple substances. nevertheless_are [perspectives] nothing but aspects (Theod. Nicholas of Cusa. 80. according to the special point of view of each Monad 89 . 208.) as the same town. The evil of the world arises entirely from the essential . 206. Visible things are images of the invisible.) of a single universe. i. it is as if there__ different universes.f tli* soul menus simply that the particular way in which the soul represents or perceives the universe is determined by the degree possible in Cf. 130. 89 The point of view of each Monad is its body. that it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe 57.

it is the way to get as much perfection possible 59. casting and weighing anchor. 1 90 (article ). accommodating itself to varying winds. 275. the points of view from which they represent it are infinitely For a world to be possible. no hypothesis but this (which and exalts the greatness of God call proved) fittingly this Monsieur Bayle recognized when. . it is enough that it should various. 214. 243. point for point. because the essence of each because the same universe. vi. show that one and - 5 the same circle can be represented by an ellipse. and yet there is an exact relation unlike. 120. Cf. Bayle compares Leibniz s theory to the sup be constructed of such a kind that position that a ship might it could sail from place entirely by itself. proportion as there is much to distinguish . without captain or crew. He admits that the omnipotence of God could give such a power to a ship.THE MONADOLOGY 58. (TJieod. 357 ( E 6 7 b of distinctness of its perceptions. 249 obtained as great . by a parabola a hyperbola. between them.) I venture to Besides.. than these figures. Theodicee. and even by another circle. with the greatest possible order variety as possible. . s Pre-established Harmony . a machine knowledge and power of God. . 558). the circle. 241 sqq. a haven avoiding shoals. Thus it must be recognized that of each soul represents to itself the universe. Deus ex machina is involved in Leibniz quite as much as in Occasionalism. along as that is to say. and consequently maintains that the spontaneity in the Monads. seeking when necessary and doing all that a normal ship can. according to its point view and by a relation peculiar to itself but in this there always continues to be a perfect harmony. are the same as the Conic Sections. which. And by this means there is . The Monads have . in his Dictionary he raised objections to it. 7i8b G. nothing more point. See note 29. in which Rorarius* . He cannot. by means of which lacks a certain part. 327). to place for years on end. in the case of G. but in order to exist it must have a pre have intelligibility eminence [prevalence] in intelligibility or order for there is order in in a manifold [multitude]. 124. by a straight line and by and by a Nothing seems more different. iii. while they have the greatest variety. 90 For Leibniz the highest perfection is the most complete unity the most or order in the variety. do that which requires the help of that Thus Bayle argues against the possibility of complete part. but he maintains that the nature of the ship would make it impossible And however infinite be the for it to receive such a power. greatest consists in representing complete unity. Lcttre IJ1 a Bourguct (1712 ?) (E. The projections of perspective.

and can be distinct only as regards those which are either nearest or of . 60. though really it is spatial in itself and in relation So G. 6 8J 1. perceptions. greatest in relation to each of the Monads . seek the : things same. body of the Monad. Further. Contrast : See Introduction. how can we speak of anything When therefore nothing but an aggregate of non-spatial Monads. Dialogue de Genesi (144?)^ which is something absolute. in relation to it is said that certain things are near or great what is meant is that they are near or great in relation a to the Monad. is limited only by itself there with not an object of thought. more or less adequate. pp. reads has a regard [a un egard]. the representing of only one part of things though it is true that this representation is merely confused as regards the variety of particular things [le detail] in the whole a small part universe. to whose nature nothing can confine it to being represent. thought in the widest sense. but as regards the different ways in which they . Nicholas of Cusa. have knowledge oftheir object. conscious or un can be nothing that is conscious. this the position of Kant. otherwise each Monad would be a deity. 93 namely. according to which eveiy substance exactly expresses all others through the relations it has with them. A11 95 I2 b Cf. . But he was unable to give any reason which could show the impossibility of this universal harmony. the land differentiated through the degrees of their distinct . 178 sqq. E. and in particular to each Monad. It is not as regards their object. in what I have just said there may be seen the reasons a priori why things could not be other wise than they are. Tor God in regulating the whole has had regard 92 to each part. things. that the Monads jire In a confused way they all strive after limited 94 whole 95 but they are limited pJoSJToJlbhe infinite. And compounds are in this respect analogous with 93 Monad ? Every Monad being nearest or greatest in relation to a has a body of some kind and this body is confusedly perceived as to other bodies.250 THE MONADOLOGY indeed he was inclined to think that I was attributing too much to God more than it is possible to attribute. 94 That is to say. Part iv. If the Monads are non-spatial.

For J simple in the thus all matter is connected together) and (and distant bodies in an effect upon plenum every motion has not only is to their distance. has happened or shall happen in the universe thing that happens. in the present that which i observing far off as well in time as in place 97 But a soul can read in Hippocrates said shall happen. breathing together. such that a change Pre-established one point affects every other. again.rv//. adjective).gt. As numbers calculus idea which are symbols of degrees. Leibniz makes the same quotation in the New Essays. so that each body proportion in contact with it and in some affected by those which are that happens to them.x Trai/ra.&amp. since Similarly. another by infinitely at any and re-action throughout the universe. Introduction. lit. of the material world are phenomena benefunclata. of things extends it follows that this inter-communication And consequently every to any distance. suggests the &amp.lt. What of the simple substances which compose symbols is not a mere illusion but an perceived confusedly in compounds ol or symbol of the real characteristics imperfect representation in this section.gt. . conspirantia. : . way feels the effect of everything affected by bodies adjoining those but also is mediately Wherefore with which it itself is in immediate contact. the material action small j so continually in Leibniz s mind. is calculations without the things numbered. He there translates the phrase by the words tout est p.irvoto (the noun) in agreement.lt. Leibniz would say that simple substances. And. as itself only The expression symbolize &amp. that takes place in the uni all body feels the effect of is he who sees all might read in each what a verse. *&amp. of the spatial or material plenum (which is a confused perception series is a symbol of the infinite (or perfectly complete) ours) the Monads differ from one Monads.lt. 97 is probably a corruption from avfiirvoa (the 2u&amp. so in general unanalyzed things are of their simple elements. 373.gt. Thus.THE MONADOLOGY \symbolisent avec 251 all is plenum substances. so that % and even what has happened or happening everywhere. however great. is a symbol of the the fact that every Harmony among the Monads. which has no gaps. and we make accurate for which oui at every step to the particular things referring thoughts may be symbols symbols stand. &amp. In the same way compound them. is a symbol of the representative might be read in any one body the whole within character of each Monad as ideally containing the phenomena It is because they are thus symbolic that itself.

The mistake may be due : to an imperfect recollection of the phrase in Hippocrates vppota pia. would cognize all real individuals. [ Trans b y Prof Adamson. Dutens. nature is one connected whole In every moment : in every moment each part must be what it is. 574 E For a later statement of the ovra.^gles: G. Philosophy - - of Kant. through the secrets of nature would. and no other. 106). and shall be. unless something suggests them .. each image our soul receives will with the things which are to come. iravra. from any possible moment of my existence. am. . admit that for this is what we were. Whence it follows that the more virtuous we have been and the more good deeds we have done. reads sesreplis. 178 sqq. to discover infallibly what I had been and what I was to become. For who can remember all things ? But since in nature nothing is futile and nothing is lost. You cannot conceive even the position are. vi. vol. 332. it cannot all at 98 once unroll everything that is enfolded in it ^for_its is infinite &quot. Werke. Plutarch..252 that which is THE MONADOLOGY there represented distinctly . other than it is in the present without being compelled to conceive the whole indefinite past as having been other than it has been. of her duration. was possible one single man.I : av^irvovv. but everything tends to perfection and maturity. reads sf . De fato. My connexion. position. The i. . [ni propre ni whatever has once happened to the soul is eternally imprinted all times come back to us in upon it.gt. Littre. although it does not at memory just as we know a number of things which we do not and makes us recollect.lt.J9 p. the more shall we have of joy and satisfaction. and the same spirit would be able. Part after death we do not at first remember &amp. in the Principles of Nature and of Grace. 13. . ^v^nvoia /j. see Fichte. ix. and the whole indefinite future other than it will be. same ii. from knowing be able distinctly to declare what men had formerly existed and what men would exist at any future moment in one individual he . vol. av^Tra9rj. ultimately become one [un tout] so that we shall be able to see all as in a mirror and thence to derive that which we shall find to be more fitted to satisfy us. . latter phrase I is used Cf. complexity conspirant. I am what I am because in this conjuncture of the great whole of nature and a spirit who could look only such.ia. neither naturally right nor in accordance with the fitness of things Nevertheless I believe that bienseant dans la nature]. 4. Leibnitiana. p. avrov KO. (Do Alimento. u/x7ra0a CEuvres d Hippocrate. then. because all the others are what they of a grain of sand . p. 221. TO tyvaei SioiKfTaOai rov 8e rbv Koopov Cf. avra&amp. always think about them. .] 98 E.. with the whole of nature is that which determines what I have been.

and consequently there must be order in the body. each differing from its neighbour to an infinitely small extent. 400. which belongs to it in a special way. and of which it is the 100 and as this body expresses the whole uni entelechy . 102 Thus order and organism are conceived by Leibniz under the all infinite series of elements. extending from God to the lowest of Monads. and that again is reflected in the series of perceptions within each Monad itself. Part 101 p. in its own way. although each created Monad represents the whole universe. in the perceptions of the soul. idea of an . The body belonging its to a Monad (which is its entelechy or lechy what may the soul what is called an animal the entesoul) constitutes along with and along with be called a living Icing. no. is reflected in the structure of the individual organism. as a living being or of an animal is always organic Monad is. The Monad-series of the universe. Cf. for. it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it. through which the universe is represented in the soul 1!XJ 102 . while in the animal (as distinct from the living being} the dominant Monad has con sciousness and memory. the soul also represents the whole universe in representing this body. e. - . Leibniz uses the term living being not as including See 19. The entelechy or soul is at once the final cause of the body and tMTpower which controls it or the force which As dominant Monad. and (i. 43-) See note 32. verse through the connexion of all matter in the plenum.THE MONADOLOGY 62. a mirror of the universe. The soul is thus relatively the perfection of the body. extending from the dominant Monad downwards. the Monads the perceptions which are relatively confused implied by the body. the soul has more clearly acts through it.) 63. e. 253 Thus. every and as the universe is ruled according to a perfect order. i. the distinct perception) m it is therefore the iii. And similarly. . extending from the most distinct perceptions to which it has attained down to the most obscure. activity or force of the body. Now this body of . but specifically with reference only those whose dominant Monad is unconscious. to beings which have life. in the soul is to be read the reason of what takes place in the body. there must also be order in that which represents it. (TJieod. 101 . (Tlicod. Introduction.

de 104 Cf. so that our succession is itself an infinite . evidently not products to suggest that while the fragments of the wheel are of human art. Meta infinite. living bodies. That passes our imagination. and. Careil. Lettre a M. acts spontaneously as is surprising) in one sense each substance of all other created things. Formerly people admired to be the right way understanding it. i. all independent it may be said others compel it to adapt itself to them so that miracles that all nature is full of miracles. . Latterly they thing some understand that they have developed a contempt for it. not a machine made by man. rather the least part . See also imagining that they know enough about it [s y pousse sees that things must be so. which become miracles in virtue of their being rational. Introduction. while in another sense. an infinite mind while cannot follow so as to nature without in any comprehend. I Eveque de Meaux (Bossuet) (1692). It is this that constitutes the 4ifparts From another point of view. Part iii. i. but miracles of reason. world. (Foucher The machines of nature are i. which for us are not artificial products. which even that there is in the rest of the expresses in its own way all it must universe. e. are still machines H ad infinitum *. Geometry. and (what physics. For the reasons of things follow one another a un progres in/mi]. in its a product of nature. is not a machine the skill of man the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or For instance. and fragments which do not have the special characteristics of the of the use for which machine. words for us in the next sentence of this section were added by in order Leibniz in a revision of his original manuscript. 531). Dutens.254 64. however small a part of them we take or machines 103 throughout. the wheel was intended. 108. for they give no indication But the machines of nature. 103 in each of its parts. it is (as this section says) a machine as Thus the smallest parts. yet we know that in all its be so and all that infinitely infinite variety is animated wisdom that is more than parts by a constructive [architect onique] It may be said that there is Harmony. p. . and that was supposed have begun to think nature so easy to to do. in their smallest namely. which infinitely For a machine made by surpasses all artificial automata. Ethics [morale ] everywhere. THE MONADOLOGY Thus the organic body of each living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton. in a way in which amazes us. and in idleness by of the new philosophers even encourage themselves nature already. so to speak. 277. they are yet products of divine art. for in reality all bodies are living bodies.

lt. . 4 (TO 5e ^erajSaAAoi/ airav avayftrj Siaipcrbv etVat) b See also Bayle s Dictionary. 30 sqq. might reply that matter as infinitely divisible. I. 6-. (Cf. . of which without end .. (Lettres a une Princesse d Allemagne (1761). 33. . Z. 231 De Caelo. because the relation of whole to parts is so indefinite that we have no means of determining what exactly Thus the term infinite here means that the process is a part ? of division is one which can never be completed. i.-&amp. ii. . Again it may be asked whether a real whole can consist of an infinite number of real parts ? Does not infinite divisibility mean that it is impossible to bring to an end the enumeration of parts.lt. each of which is nonquantitative. Ov yap avyKfirai 6 TWV vvv dSiaiptrcuv. Z. as 10G but is also actually subdivided the ancients observed 107 each part into further parts. . Foucher (1693). 2. Nicholas of Cusa. There is no part of matter which is not. article Zeno/ notes F and G. Consequently it seems self-contradictory to speak of things as or infinitely. 82 a.) Euler s argument is directed mainly Leibniz against the Wolffian adaptation of Leibniz s position. iii. is a mere pheno menon. two opposite senses (2) as (i) as equivalent to incapable of completion. i. between the 1 5 i vine art and ours 134. 106 tfc See Aristotle.1 ) ( Theod. First vol. 4 . i. Idiotae Libri quatuor. actually sub Critique of divided without end Reason. and consequently the smallest divisible. but actually divided . 2p8 107 G. Phys. with an infinity of particle must be considered as a world filled different creatures/ The paradox in such statements as these arises from the way in which Leibniz speaks of matter as composed of non-spatial elements. each portion of matter is not only infinitely divisible.vos artes imagines Divinae artis. 9. But even in this explanation the laea of infinite seems to be used in . Humana? xp&amp.THE MONADOLOGY 255 ference between nature and art. It was Euler. the mathematician. 118 b. 18 Z. wancp ou5 aAAo [AtyeOos ovfitv. pp. equivalent to absolutely complete. Phys. See also Bosanquet s Logic. Reponse a la lettre de M. Kant s Pun pp. Cf. Brewster s Trans vol. saying that the existence of units in the shape of Monads implies the finite divisibility of matter. 239 5. resulting from an n6tual infinity of real Monads. Leibniz regards matter as a mere aggregate and as therefore not itself a real substance. 105 Cf. I do not say 416).gt. And the Author of nature lias been able to employ because this divine and infinitely wonderful power of art. T. while Leibniz at the same time maintains its infinite divisibility. 1 .. But he never explains what he means by an aggregate of Monads. i 4 6 194. Cf. . and Second Antinomies.) brought this criticism against Leibniz. (E. who first 172 sqq. &amp. that is to say.

be each has some motion of its own otherwise it would for each portion of matter to express the whole impossible universe 195. are The portions of matter. each member of every animal. Prelim. living beings. it entelechies. animals. pond a garden full each branch of every plant. who. (Theod. Each portion of matter may be conceived as like full of fishes. or the water which be neither plant nor fish yet they the fish of the pond. Swammerdam. made a microscopic study 103 : . of there is a plenum it is impossible for each portion And unless matter to express or be affected by all the rest. It is very necessary to la Justice (Mollat. 66).256 THE MONADOLOGY . so minute as to also contain plants and fishes. de la Conform. of microscopic investigation. and though there of the thousand. spermatozoa. The Monads are infinite in number. a atoms necessarily imply a void they are inconsistent with plenum. p. of the physio among many other works. and Malpighi. there must be ultimate undivided atoms. or each drop of its liquid parts is also some such garden ^ of plants and like a But pond. 68. Leibniz says: world our microscopical knowledge. 70. as it universe. must ideally contain the whole ultimately Monads. and Whence is matter there of appears that in the smallest particle a world of creatures. In a Meditation sur la notion commune de logy of animals and plants. And though the earth and the air which are between . they would not be too many for the discovery the of this new world which is the inside of important wonders world we know and which is capable of making our knowledge this reason a hundred thousand times as extensive as it is. but mostly 109 be imperceptible to us . Scarce ten men in the advance were a hundred are earnestly devoted to it.. Disc. of parts. is between the plants of the garden. the discoverer the entomologist. For led to make I have often wished that great princes might be who would devote arrangements for this and to support people . 67.) 66. of which Leibniz here speaks. 109 Leibniz had a deep interest in the remarkable development his lifetime. must therefore contain an infinity ideally Or the argument which Leibniz implies may be otherwise put not actually subdivid If the thus portions of matter are But such without end. each of which and each. souls. 108 . which took place during ol He frequently refers to the work of Leuwenhoek. contains all.

&quot. Yet Leibniz maintains that God has no body. Math. 44]. 100). And I think that there is nothing sterile and fallow in nature. they are not. members plants. entelechy or soul The view of Leibniz also suggests the cellthemselves to it. See Sandeman. 40. for instance. . j^eibnizL repeatedly disclaims the doctrine of a world-soul. Epistle i. 53 sqq. Problems .THE MONADOLOGY 257 69. then. [E. 477 b G. body are full of other living beings. pp. Munadology. nant entelechy. p. in which. animals. without separately distinguishing the fish themselves. in which one would see a confused move . nothing dead in the universe. may be the cells in any too far. The difficulty is a fundamental one. of Biology. May not the whole world. each of which has a soul of its own. the although 111 Monad of Monads? Whose body nature All are but parts of one stupendous whole. ment and. vi. But not consistent with wisdom that such places should remain. portion of an organism. if it is understood as in any way Although a soul destroying the independence of individual souls. which in an animal is the soul but the . Pope.tne soul or form of the whole is not composed of the souls Letfre a Arnauld or forms of the parts. Part iii. See Introduction. Pref. nothing sterile. like Leibniz s portions of In fact. 72. something might have been produced. be conceived as one body. . iii. out of the infinite number of possible things. Epistola ad Bernoullium (1699) (G. theory has in many ways a closer relation to the mechanical view of things than to the position of Leibniz. the cellmatter. 110 Cf. nevertheless. 267. (1687) (G. it is many things appear to us to be so. may liavo a body composed of parts. . 4 75 b Hence it appears that each living body has a domi 70. ii. a swarming of fish in the pond. without prejudice : to any other things. theory of modern physiology but the analogy must not be pushed However numerous. chooses by His wisdom that which is most fitting. 565) God. each of which has also its dominant of this living 111 . Thus there is nothing fallow. whose dominant soul is God. Essay on Man. But it is evident that if there were a vacuum (and similarly if there were atoms) there would remain sterile and fallow places. as it were. in. is and God the soul. Cf. infinitely subdivided in their turn.) (Thcod. 110 confusion save in ll somewhat as it might appear to be in a pond appearance at a distance. no chaos.

not a derived identity. has what he calls real and physical identity (i. Cf. If I were to forget all the . 6. Nouveaux 6. the passive iii. who. every soul or entelechy. 987* 32. See also Burnet. and body are quite distinct from one another. likened things to the flowing of a river. as old as Heraclitus. is The phrase sophy. p. Early Greek Philo * reality. 72. but never metempsychosis or transmigration of souls 114 . ii. Aristotle. in virtue of this. Introduction. G. but an identity belonging to its own nature. A. Cratylus. soul changes its it is body only by all at degrees. that each soul has a quantity or portion of matter belonging exclusively 112 it for ever and that it conse quently owns other inferior living beings. the changing body of a compound substance.. 402 A. (E. 27. of the closest possible kind. and that the identity of plant. although it is founded upon materia prima. whether conscious or not. For all bodies are in a to itself or attached to . But it must not be imagined. because it means that the body remains the same. Changes in the one correspond to changes in the other. which is phenomenal and not perfectly real. 278 b Essais. with materia secunda. v. . pp. 149. im perishable (incessable\ while the self-conscious soul has in addition a personal or moral identity. 0wrw). Hetaph. though the soul is changed. ch. Thus. changes in the soul cause or explain the changes in the body. in virtue of which it is immortal. Neither continued consciousness nor memory is essential to the maintenance of this moral identity. never once deprived of all its organs and there is often metamorphosis in animals. 95 sqq. U3 and parts are entering into perpetual flux like rivers them and passing out of them continually. But as the perceptions of the soul are clearer and more distinct than those of the the soul is * While their imion body. the identity of any individual substance means the preservation of the same soul.) He argues against Locke that identity is not fixed by time and place. according to Plato. Accordingly. Part. nor are there souls entirely separate [from The misunderstanding probably arose from a confusion of element in the individual created Monad. according to Leibniz. and man does not consist in the possession of the same organic body. Cf. as has been done by some who have misunderstood my thought. and is. animal. in Leibniz s view. which is inseparable from the active or soul element. Transmigration of souls is inconsistent with this. so that . little Thus the by little. which are devoted for ever to its service. 216.258 THE MONADOLOGY 71.e. . bk.

if I entelechies. E. A soul without body (in the sense of mater ia secunda] would be a soul without any relation to other Monads. 281 b. v.) this that there never is absolute birth [generation] nor complete death. It retains impressions of all that has formerly happened to it but these feelings are usually too small to be capable of being distinguished and of being consciously perceived. soul and body) consists ultimately in the relation of a dominant Monad to subordinate Monads. we call deaths are envelopments and Philosophers have been 116 . cit.. This continuing and connexion of perceptions makes the being really the same individual. 373. 219). v. is completely without body 115 . E. 280 b An immaterial being or a mind ^esprit] cannot be deprived of all perception of its past existence. 90. vi. cit. or souls perplexed about the but nowadays . although they may perhaps be developed some day. in the strict sense. . Pai-menides (of whom Plato speaks with veneration). 432 b G. 74. Kirchmann (Erlduterungen zu Leibniz a mere assertion. No more constitutes the same person . maintained that there is no generation nor corruption is own heir. Lettre a Arnauld (1687) (G. . i. 9. Introduction. 546). but apperceptions that is to say. I proceed to the question Cf. just as I should still retain my rights. so that it would not be necessary to divide me into two people and to make me my required to maintain the moral identity. which Schrifteii) dismisses Leibniz s statement as indeed does not necessarily follow from Leibniz s own principles. much origin of forms past. as well as Melissus.THE MONADOLOGY bodies] nor unembocliecl spirits [genies sans corps]. Again. (Joe. a soul without body (in the sense of matcriaprimd) would be a Monad without passivity or confused perception. For a compound substance (i. had even to be taught anew my own name and how to read and write. 222). New Essays.gt. : S 2 . 259 God alone 73. I could always learn from other people my life in former times.. The difficulty is the same as that mentioned in note in. deserters from the general order/ Considerations sur les Principes de Vie (1705) (E. G. ii. Cf. e. e. 1 . 116 The form is the life or vital principle in any organic being. while what diminutions. as it were. ir&amp. What we call births [generations] are developments and growths. 116) of forms or souls. which G. 14. which I hold to be indivisible and indestructible. when one is conscious [s aperqoit] of past feelings prove also a moral identity and make the real identity apparent (/or. it would be actus purus or God. 124. and. Creatures free or freed from matter would at the same time be separated from the universal connexion of things. consisting in the separation of the soul from the body. It also follows from (Thcod. p.

is as old as the world. This theory of preformation. life comes from inorganic matter. instead of transmigration and the transformation of an animal already formed. not able to explain otherwise the being origin of forms. Albeitus Magnus and John Bacon seem to have thought that sub stantial forms were already hidden in matter from the beginning of time. to Hippocrates).260 it THE MONADOLOGY has become known. but while I allow that this creation takes place in time only in respect of the rational and hold that all forms which do not think were created soul. except in appearance Aristotle mentions this (De ch. along with the world. and t has existed since the beginning of time. have admitted that they begin in a real creation. According to the theory of preformation. iii. from chaos or putrefaction. that the organic bodies of nature are never products of chaos or putrefaction. and animals. i. They have all seen a part of the truth but they have not developed Several have believed in transmigration. Sande- Immediately before the . or man was explained either by a theory of traduction or by a theory of eduction. time of Leibniz. has now been entirely abandoned. and even a sper matozoon may contain an indefinite number of other living beings. in which there was undoubtedly some pre 111 and it is held that not only the formation organic insects. there is no limit to the smallness of things. Fernel makes them descend from heaven. For. adopted by the germ contains in miniature the whole Leibniz. 2 \ And the author of the De Diaeta. which was based on the microscopic investigations of Malpighi and Leuwenhoek. Cf. According to the theory of eduction. the of the offspring comes from the parental form or forms ^form in the same way as the body of the offspring comes from the parental body or bodies. on the other hand. to say nothing of those who regard them as taken off from the soul of the world. point for point. } 43 and 44. expressly says that an animal cannot be engendered absolutely [tout de nouvcau ] nor completely [tout a fait] destroyed. New day notes . they believe that this creation takes place every when the smallest worm is begotten. but always come from seeds. Others. plant or animal. e. and accordingly the form of the plant or animal exists in the spermatozoon in a contracted or enveloped state. is bk. (which : Caelo. The Lettre a la living [aninu e] and organic seed Reine Sophie Charlotte (G. through careful studies of plants. as we have seen ( 65). others in the traduction of souls [i. bk. as the result of more thorough observations. in the soul of the offspring being as it were begotten of the soul of the parent] . attributed System. Eduction thus corresponds to what we now call spontaneous gene ration. animal. the origin of life in the individual plant. vi. 517). to the theory of According traduction. Cf.

the spermatic visibility.gt. 475b. is ra ovrw of Plato that the object of wisdom speaks of the view which are called by me [Leibniz J ovra that is simple substances.] more satisfactory {trattaUe] he describes as a kind of traduction. they that if this opinion had occurred 1 think half is nothing more natural would not have found it absurd. But this is only half of the truth lly . 261 also a soul animal itself and that by in this body. become^/ butterflies. 7&amp.THE MONADOLOGY before conception. While ordinary form. but body was already there . 123)v dvaf K rj Jvai. theatre. Leibniz s point is that. and there Lettre a does not perish. th-m to believe that what does not begin EimS*. they are not entirely. p. Leibniz elsewhere faivriTtv ton. and. and are destroyed ones [dus] that pass to a greater and it is only a few chosen &amp. Leibniz recognizes its affinity to rejecting traduction his own view which t&amp. the majority) are but remain in their own kind (that is. G. the this animal has merely been prepared means of conception involved in its becoming an for the great transformation like this is indeed animal of another kind. Pinto. in short. world. Problems of Biology. ii. Cf. (Thcod.gt. irpwra Monads and which once existing always the chie arc that is God and 80Uls alld of thcse are certain elect larger organisms of the visible world means of conception world by &amp. 89. 118 like the large animals. 397 &. *45 D Arnauld (1687) (G.gt. which The statement is made in the form parently destroyedand it s time would have put it. just as there is a undergoing in miniature all a microscopic world of spermatozoa. *al AStAjOopo&quot. 86.lt. multiply. [E. G but only ap to Leibniz. 5. : . continue to exist.86 397-) vi.. which take place in the larger visible the ^ 1 5 Ac cording m which. than that which is commonly taught. 92. flies and caterpillars become l88 43. PJmcdru*. subject to the qualification so there is visible world of larger organisms. of of which some are raised by means 75 The animals. 76. scientific observers of Leibniz made in 76. born. Something as when worms seen apart from birth [generation]. 9. be called of larger animals. changes members of have been ^ . &amp. and accordingly in its man. Theodicee. 4osqq. may conception to the rank so raised but those among them which are not spermatic. l8 Prcf.gt.]. enabled to grow from microscopic minuteness half of the truth The scientific observers have only stated no objection to the other but Leibniz thinks that they would have to them.

calls his 120 atoms TO 6V. the mechanical with the dynamical or . It illustrates his belief in the harmony of the physical with the metaphysical. images of the Deity.262 I hold that if THE MONADOLOGY means an animal never comes into being by natural no more does it come to an end by [naturellement]. as above soul (mirror 77. like a river and what we call generation or death is only a greater and more rapid change than usual. 4. [sans passer par le milieu\ Lettre a Rcmond (1715) (E. 724 121 3. which are universals. This last passage Democritus of Plato s &quot. the strict sense 1. natural means and that not only will there be no birth also no complete destruction or death in [generation]. my of I (Thcod. Because the soul must always have a body of some kind. which accord ing to Leibniz implies an endless series of miracles. . such as would be the leap or cataract But these leaps are not absolute and such as I have of a river.) principles deduced a priori. and they agree with each other in virtue of minds. (E. and 5. 445 b). 544).5. in contrast to the Occasionalist theory. Thus it may be said that not only the the animal I an indestructible universe) is indestructible. how Immortality belongs only to rational souls ever. Epistola ad Hanschium involves a misunderstanding (1707. are not immortal. 635). as would be that of a body which should go from one place to another without going through intervening places a G. Animals. ment of a priori with a posteriori conclusions is specially characteristic of Leibniz. its body is in a continual change. produced by God. of explaining 78. 123 As a snake casts its old skin. but also 122 itself though its mechanism [machine] may often perish in part and take off or put on an organic . or self-conscious Monads. refused to admit. This endeavour to show the agree Monadology. And and drawn from experience these reasonings. These principles have given me a way 121 the union or rather the mutual agreement naturally The soul conformite] of the soul and the organic body. is. iii. 90. but . final. made a posteriori are in perfect agreement with 1 21 . 1 -3 slough [des dcpouilks organiques ]. There is always going on in the animal what goes on in it at the present moment that is. follows its own -laws. 124 That .o . and the body likewise follows its \~ own laws . vii. which ultimately consists of imperishable Monads. . Lettre a laPrincesse Sophie (1696) 122 itself (G. not Monads.

180 a d un . is in matter.t . is meant i that they pass from one When it is said that bodies act/ what is meant appctition. nisi ipse intellect^} is not accompanied by some never an abstract thought which and I have made out a perfect material images or marks [traces]. and &amp. . namely. i.gt. and that this is and always G.lt. having from matter but yet is always accompanied by thing distinct of the soul are always material organs. souls act. soul and what takes place mrallelism between what passes in the someshown that the soul. that there is sensu. which the external in intellect quod nonfuent in the soul itself and its functions (nihil est but I find nevertheless. them. .[E. which must correspond t accompanied by functions Considerate will be reciprocal. vi. any the one is reducil They are in harmony. that they change their state or their and its motion. ends. relation to other bodies i. the motion Thus the difference between of its constituent Monads. with its functions. And according to the laws of and that of final the two realms. (unconscious) Nature of soul and body thus Leibniz describes the parallelism there are this matter and I have shown that : of Grace. the problem of the connexion o of the wider problem as to the relation body is a special case one simple substance or Monad to another. 27&amp. 156 G. appetition and like that between the unconscious efficient and final causes. are in harmony souls cannot impart any 80.e. what e. because ultimately to the other. carefully examined really in the soul some materials of thought or objects ot senses do not supply. 475 . 5 3 79.lt. n. is merely a difference From a psychological point of view. Principles o. 532). When it is said that &amp. What we call the state of a body that they have in strictness to be called the ought relations to other bodies Monads which constitute the body perceptions of the is perception to another. 352. efficient causes or motions. . of degree. and also that the functions of its organs. understanding. Unirerscl unique (1702) (E. 39] a verse (Pref. the conscious. . sur la Doctrine Esprit . between soul and i Tint is to say. that they have And of the body is really the (unconscious) similarly. Descartes recognized that because there is always the same quantity force to bodies. through of final causes Souls act according to the laws Bodies act and means. 340. . Cf. since the pre-established harmony between of one and the same uni they are all representations od. that of efficient causes ]2b one another with causes. appetitioiis. vi.THE MONADOLOGY 263 all substances.

[E. Had Descartes noticed Tlwod. passions the par In a word. might somewhat direction of the motions which take place in the body to the horse he as a horseman. . 61. p. vi. and both act influenced the other 127 129 . nothing in soul or in body. 22. are justifying automaton.264 of force in matter. 355-) as 8 1. like Epicurus and Hobbes. and that they I must therefore be regarded as acting merely in harmony. 477 a. believe that true or as if man himself were only a body or an Those who show the Cartesians that their way of are only automata amounts to proving that the lower animals him who should say that all men. ^ i. 63. but there and other material aids. were . This applies because of the characters which represent them to the imagination. 59. That is to say. and souls suppose the impossible) there as if each act as if there were no bodies. 135^ that the with internal motions. matter 127 . . as if the the soul is those who. 345. nevertheless guides he thinks right. except himself. everything takes place in bodies. .9 All that ambition or any other passion brings to pass in the all the motions soul of Caesar is also represented in his body. Part iii. which could serve Theodicee. to the effect that the same quantity for motion is conserved in bodies. in thought or in mass. material. spurs. change of one by the other. According to this system bodies act if (to were no souls. THE MONADOLOGY Nevertheless he was of opinion that But that the soul could change the direction of bodies.. . that is to say. 354. 60. 128 to explain this . 89. 346 sqq. as regards evil doctrine of ticular series [detail] of their phenomena. bit. vi. 44 (Pref. although he does not give any force that it by directing its force in the way rides. in his time it was not known that there is is because of the a law of nature which affirms also the conservation same this total direction in 128 . agreeing with it. 66. he would have come upon my system of pre-estab j lished harmony G. and come from the impressions of objects combined these of 60 (E. . See Introduction. . Descartes believed he had of found a law of nature. He did not think it possible but he thought the influence of the soul to break this law of bodies nevertheless have the power of changing the the soul . 519 b G. And the body is so constituted of the body soul never makes any resolution without the motions even to the most abstract reasonings. Descartes would have seen that neither soul *7 nor body has any influence whatever upon the other. As this is done by means of bridle. we see how it can take -place for this purpose are no instruments which the soul could employ that .

397 (K 618 a G. by our consciousness of the Ego which consciously perceives the things which take place in the body and as perception cannot be explained by figures and motions. be attributed to the extraordinary reason might. yet there is this As regards minds peculiarity in rational animals. being essentially different from them and containing Theodicee. there is in the hypotheses of Epicurus and of Plato. . 185 G. of the greatest Materialists and the greatest Idealists. vi. that their spermatic animalcules. 352). and [em-eloppeni] the reason which that only the organic bodies of these souls are preformed and pre disposed to take the human form some day. only those souls which are destined some day to attain to human nature contain in germ * will some day appear in them. is combined here.THE MONADOLOGY 82. . 265 I find that or rational souls. question of the relation of rational to sub-rational souls is treated by Leibniz in a very unsatisfactory way. so long as they are only spermatic. the other my . the Epicurean doctrine is refuted by inner experience. . their sensuous souls are raised to the rank of reason and to the prerogative of minds also 150 [esprits ]. iv. indivisible substance. so to speak. 559\ 1:0 This elevation of the merely sensuous soul to the rank of . operation of God. 397. everything takes place in the soul as if there were no body just as. the other animalcules or seminal living beings. apart from the prin of which com ciples which make it certain that there are Monads. pound substances are only the results. merely ordinary or sensuous [sensitive] souls but . when attain to human nature through an actual conception. If we follow out Leibniz s . according to this second half of my hypothesis. everything takes . Bu-t. have those which are chosen [clus]. But he prefers to dispense with miracle in the generation of man as in that of the other animals. says Leibniz. Consequently. 91. . Whatever of good place in the body as if there were no soul. have said exactly what I need for that halt of hypothesis which concerns body. half of my hypothesis that there is in us an is established. in which nothing of this kind is preestablished. (Theod.) mere automata. according to the first half. and says that among the great number of souls and animals (or at least living organic bodies) which are in the seed. J&pvnsr mix Reflexions de Bayle (1702 (E. and we are obliged to recognize which must be itself the source of its phenomena. This only what is lower. though [esprits] what I have just been saying is true of all and souls living beings and animals (namely that animals come into being when the world begins and no more come to an end than the world does).

is. to other created things). ii. and to some extent of imitating it through architectonic ensamples each mind being like a small [echantittons]. but that minds are also images of the Deity or Author of nature Himself. . having been so fashioned that they have a peculiar relation to the image of God. divinity in its own sphere. Eplstola alone are understanding ad Bernoullium (1699) (G. Math. constructed on similar principles. It is this that enables spirits [or minds esprits] to enter into a kind of fellowship with God. Cf. In the draft of a letter to Arnauld (1686) he speaks of this question as a special point wwe [ particularite] about which I have not light enough C f. and brings it about that in relation to them He is not inventor is to his machine (which is only what an the relation of God a prince is to his his children !:!4 . as it were. such as ours is.. but also what subjects. while not regarding as absolute the distinction between the rational and the merely sen suous. That machines. : that souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created things. 73). of His .) 84. principles. can not merely express in himself the but he can also make for himself small subsidiary creations or imitative constructions Man machine of the universe Concerning the human soul I dare not assert anything as to igm nor as to its state after death. it main between these two classes of souls. differences I have there is also this already noted Among other ordinary souls &quot. (G. also Principles of Nature and 64 of Grace. $ 14. An ap X iTKT(uv is literally a master of works. and are. and. because rational or intelli gent souls. iv. is e not him 13 intelligent substances and those which as great as the difference there is between a mirror who looks therein. Leibniz is afraid of minimizing this distinction and of thus putting in jeopardy the pre-eminence of man and the immortality of the soul. THE MONADOLOGY differences which exist between and minds some of which [esprite]. indeed. capable of knowing the system of the universe ^. Introduction. are governed by very different laws from those to which souls without are subject. 565). 147. what a father is to ought to be impossible to draw a sharp line Yet. Spirits made in His image. 1 The difference between so. Part iii.266 83. 131 19^30. Paper without a title (1686) (G. (TJtcod. iii.

Nicholas of Cusa. but all men. universe. or rather it is the most certain of all things. . Part : iv. except in conformity with this plan. 2. things only rightly love the good. . race or like children of the house. p. since they alone can serve Him and act with knowledge.. possible. 136 4 Cf. 16 is things for the manifestation of His glory an unknown king Cf. Cribratio Alchoran. is not set in state. but is the moral order of the opposition to an earthly state. title (1686) (G. every bad action fails that all necessarily work for the greatest good of those who way . on the other hand. as distinct from its natural order. is a moral world in the natural world. any more than a sparrow from its roof and every truly good action succeeds.. in so far as it does not result from his personal conduct. Augustine but the meaning is very great. Darstellung der Wissenschaftdchre spirit itself (Werke. and is the most lr6 and exalted and most divine among the works of God . Fichte. in imitation of the Divine nature one single spirit [esprit] is worth a whole world. Augustine s civitas Dei is the Christian Church as opposed to the civitas terrcna or earthly Leibniz s City of God. the most perfect State that is of God .THE MONADOLOGY 267 that the totality 85. since it not only knows it and governs itself in the expresses the world but also freely : world 135 [s y gouverne] after the iv. . 137 See Introduction. . manner of God. (Theod.) This City of God. and indeed the foundation of all certitude. else. .. . is a consequence of this general not a hair can plan that. 188 : doubtful. Object. 35) : The ground of the universe is . includes not Christians alone. the sole absolutely is a moral order in the indisputable objective reality. 180 all God created Cf. also Excitationea ex wanting in honour and in beneficence. 146 86.. St. 461). ii. that fall from his head. v. according to Leibniz. Whence it is easy to conclude must compose the City [assemblage] of all spirits [esprits] 135 that is to say. it is in it that the glory of God really consists. for He would have no glory were not His greatness and His 7 It is goodness known and admired by spirits [esprits ]. a kingdom of It is Also Werke. difference of The reference is to the civitas Dei of St. spirits and absolutely nothing in no . Paper without . note. a place indicated by his special work each of the accidents of his existence. Abregc. The City of God. this truly universal monarchy. that there universe that each rational individual has his definite place in that this universal order. under the most perfect of Monarchs. .

2 58
8

THE MONADOLOGY
divine City that

also in relation to this
,

God

specially

has goodness" Alrege, Object. 2.) (Theod. 146 manifested everywhere. As we have shown above that there is a perfect 87. in nature, one of efficient, harmony between the two realms also final causes, we should here notice and the other of between the physical realm of nature another harmony that is to say, between and the moral realm of grace
;
,

while His wisdom and His power are

mechanism [machine] God, considered as Architect of the
of the universe

and God considered as Monarch of the
[esprits].

divine City of spirits
112, 130, 247.)
Hermmibus,
vi.

(Theod. 62, 74, 118, 248,

112 a:

God

-lory and on

this account

creature, that He might the glory of for this creature alone can perceive
;

desired to manifest the riches of His created the rational or intellectual manifest to him the riches of His glory

He

;

God with
^

ir

but these telloctual appreciation \intdleduali gustii} God wishes to be of God] are eternal life. -lory

riches [of the

known, and
(Du
.

hence on this account all things are (Zoc. ctt., 104 a). &c. Freundlos war der grosse Weltenmeister, Schiller s
Freundschaff).
8

,,

Because moral distinctions and moral qualities belong specially of rational souls. to the moral order, i. e. to the society realm of nature The question of the relation between the Leibniz and that of grace is, in one form or another, perennial. his philosophy in a reconcil seeks to apply the principles of il discussion of the question spirit to the seventeenth-century The harmony, of which Leibniz speaks, rnu* theological form. between the Monads) not be taken as meaning (like the harmony of grace are entirely exclusive that the two realms of nature and not The realm of final causes, for instance, does of one another. the realm of grace is the realm of to nature belong entirely The relation between nature form.
!=

m

:

final causes in its highest is analogous to that and

body! considered as an aggregate,

between body and soul. Just as is merely phenomenal and there while yet it distinct from soul or real substance, fore quite that of its Component bene fundatum and its reality is & phenomenon as subject to the law o Monads or souls so nature, considered from grace, while yet, since efficient causes, is quite distinct and itself, derive their meaning efficient causes, even in nature grace, from final causes, nature finds its perfection force 88 and of final cause.
grace
;

m

which

is

the highest expression

illustrate this.

Cf. Principles of Nature

and of

Grace,

15-

THE MONADOLOGY
88.

269

A

result

of this

harmony

is

that things lead to

grace by the very

and that this globe, and renewed by natural for instance, must be destroyed means at the very time when the government of spirits and the reward of requires it, for the punishment of some

ways

of nature,

others.
89.

no, 244, 245, 340.) also be said that God as Architect satisfies may u and thus that sins in all respects God as Lawgiver must bear their penalty with them, through the order of of nature, and even in virtue of the mechanical structure and similarly that noble actions will attain their things rewards which, on the bodily side, are mechanical,
It
",

(TJicod. 18 sqq.,

;

by ways
.

although this cannot and ought not always to happen ul immediately no good 90. Finally, under this perfect government be unrewarded and no bad one unpunished, action would

and

all

to say, of those
state,

should issue in the well-being of the good, that is who are not malcontents in this great

but

who

trust in Providence,

after

having done

their duty, and who love and imitate, as is meet, the Author of all good, finding pleasure in the contemplation 142 of His perfections, as is the way of genuine pure love
,

140 That is to s;iy. the world is built on a plan which perfectly harmonizes with the moral government of its inhabitants. 141 Leibniz regards sin as seeking one s own good in an imperfect, unenlightened way, without regard to the moral law or order, which is the only way of securing the highest possible good of all

and
the

Thus sin brings punishment as inevitably as neglect of each. or deliance of natural laws brings disease and pain. But owing to

harmony (above explained) between spirit and body, the moral and the natural worlds, the punishment of sin is not merely
spiritual

the bodily or natural has a share in it. Similarly its reward, both spiritual and natural, because it is enlightened action in accordance with the ultimate law of the whole universe, the principle of the highest good. 14 That is to say, disinterested love, as distinct from interested One of the great subjects of theological discussion or selfish love. in the seventeenth century was the question whether there is such About this a long pamphlet a thing as purely disinterested love. controversy (lasting from 1694 to 1699} took place between Bossuet
:

virtue has

270

THE MONADOLOGY

which takes pleasure in the happiness of the beloved. This it is which leads wise and virtuous people to devote in harmony their energies to everything which appears or antecedent will of God, and yet with the
presumptive

makes them content with what God and pass by His secret, consequent
will
143
,

actually brings to
positive
[decisive]

recognizing that

if

we

could sufficiently under-

and Fenelon.

Fenelon (partly in defence of Mme. Guyon) main

that is, a love tained the possibility of a disinterested love of God, which has no regard to rewards and punishments. Ultimately, the views of Fenelon, at however, Pope Innocent XII condemned Bossuet. time censuring the controversial methods of the same On the The view of Leibniz is more fully given in his Preface, cf. Butler, Sermons xi, Notions of Right and Justice (1693), p. 285
;

and xiv. 143 The distinction between the antecedent and the consequent He says: This dis will of God is due to Thomas Aquinas. will itself, for in it there tinction is not founded upon the Divine but it is founded upon the objects of is neither before nor after
xiii,
;

itself, absolutely, His will. ... A thing maybe considered either which forms a subsequent or with some particular circumstance, in itself that man should consideration. For instance it is good the matter live and bad that he should be killed, considering but if we add, with regard to some particular man, absolutely is a source of danger to that he is a murderer or that his living of people, in this case it will be good that the man a large number live. Accordingly it may should be killed, and bad that he should will that every man be said that a judge wills with an antecedent a consequent will that should continue to live, but wills with Summa Theol. i. Qu. 19, Art. 6 ad be hanged. a murderer should

in

;

primum.

Cf.

De

Veritate,

Qu.

23,

Art,

2.

Leibniz brings this into

be said

with his own hypothesis regarding the region of possible In a general sense it may and the actual, existing world. things in will consists in the inclination to do something that
relation

This will is called antecedent, it contains. proportion to the good when it is separate [detachee] and has regard to each good by itself, it may be said that God tends in so far as it is good. In this sense in so far as it is good, ad perfedionem simplicity simplicem, to all good antecedent will. He has in Scholastic language, and that by an all men, to do away an earnest inclination to sanctify and save be said that this with sin and to prevent damnation. It may even that is to say, so that the effect in
will
it is efficacious
itself

(per se\

would
;

stronger follow, were there of effort (ad for this will does not go to the extreme

not some

reason which prevents

summum

THE MONADOLOGY
:

271

we should find that it stand the order of the universe, and that exceeds all the desires of the wisest men, 1 not only as a it better than it is impossible to make in particular whole and in general but also for ourselves to be, to the Author of if we are attached, as we ought and efficient cause of our all not only as to the architect and to the final cause, which being but as to our master and which can to be the whole aim of our will,
",

ought
alone

make our
G-. vi.

happiness.

(Theod. 134, 278.

Prtf. [E.

469

;

27, 28].)
it

concern), otherwise

would never

fail to

produce

its full effect,

Complete since God is master of all things. only to consequent will, as it is called.
belongs
this rule applies to can. will, when we
it,

and

infallible success

It is

Now this consequent final and decisive volitions [ will from the conflict of all the antecedent results evil, towards good and those which oppose both those which tend of all these particular volitions ,nd it is from the concurrence as in mechanics the compos that the total volition comes: and tendencies which concur in one is the result of all the motion and equally satisfies each of them s the same movable body, ... In this sense it may be said as it is possible to do so at once, efficacious and even is in a
that antecedent will [volition]
effective

namely, that

we never

fail to

complete and do what we
will

way
fol

and
;

successful.
<<\

From
conse?

antecedently

33

the Sio b G. vi good of all b e ing
<K.

md

^

this

it

"IP

best.

ows that God_wi]ls 22 and Theochcee

Li.

that

is posst"

essential limitations of their

relationsjoonejtnot h^r in thfi System with a certain Els greatest iMssibte good is thus compatible

and

tTTolr

am

it is impossible to This is not to be taken as meaning that moment o the world better than it is at this or any particular make a system including all is speaking of the world as Leibniz lime. time. he does not exclude progress time, and accordingly

w

m

272

THE MONADOLOGY

APPENDIX

F.

THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN LEIBNIZ AND BAYLE REGARDING THE MULTIPLICITY IN THE MONAD.

THE difficulty regarding the possibility of a multiplicity in 16 of the Monadology, the Monad, to which Leibniz refers in Rorais variously expressed by Bayle in his Dictionary (article As Leibniz with much reason supposes that He says rius ).
:

all souls

are simple

and

indivisible, it is impossible to

under

how they can be likened to a clock [see Third explana that is tion of the New System, and Introduction, Part ii. p. 45], to say, how by their original constitution they can diversify
stand
their operations, by means of the spontaneous activity they conceive clearly that a simple receive from their Creator. if no extraneous cause inter act will

We

being
feres

always
it.

uniformly,

a machine,

If it were composed of several pieces, like would act in divers ways, because the special at any moment the course activity of each piece might change of the activity of the others but in an independent simple substance [substance unique], where will you find the cause of Leibniz s answer to this appears any variety in its operation ? see Monadology, note 20 in the Eeponse anx Reflexions de Bayle I compared cf. Lett re a Basnage (1698) (E. 153 a; G. iv. 522)

with

it

;

;

;

:

its

the soul to a clock, only as regards the regulated precision of in the best of clocks, but it changes. This is but imperfect And the soul may be said to be is perfect in the works of God. an immaterial automaton of the very best kind. When it is
said that a simple being will always act uniformly, a distinction

must be irade if acting uniformly means constantly following the same law of order or varying succession {continuation], as in a certain order or series of numbers, 1 admit that of itself every acts uniformly simple being, and even every compound being, but if uniformly means exactly in the same way [semblablement],
:

;

do not admit it. ... The soul, though it is perfectly simple, has always a feeling [sentiment] composed of several perceptions
I

at

once

;

and

this

is

as

much

to our

purpose as

if it

were com

posed of pieces, like a machine. For each preceding perception influences those which follow, according to a law which there s as in motions. is in Bayle allows that Leibniz
perceptions view contains the promise of a theory which will solve
all diffi-

APPENDIX
culties
;

F

273
power of a simple

but he

still feels

dissatisfied as to the

substance, like the soul of man, to develop spontaneously all the variety of thought, &c. It has not the necessary instru ments for doing this. Let us freely imagine an animal created

by God and intended to sing incessantly.
is

It will

always sing, that

indubitable

;

but

if

God

assigns to

to sing \inie certaine tablature], He this before its eyes, or imprint it arrangement of muscles which, in

a certain piece of music must necessarily either place
it

on

its

memory, or give

it

an

accordance with the laws of mechanics, shall make one note follow another exactly according Otherwise it is to their order in the musical score \tdblature\.
inconceivable that the animal should ever be able to conform Let us to the whole succession of notes indicated by God. apply this to the soul of man. M. Leibniz thinks that it has
received not only the faculty of continually supplying itself with thoughts, but also the faculty of always following a certain order in its thoughts, corresponding to the continual changes of the bodily mechanism. This order of thoughts is like the

musical score assigned to the animal musician of which we have been speaking. In order that the soul may from moment to moment change its perceptions or its modifications in accord ance with the "score of thoughts, must not the soul know the succession of the notes and actually think of it ? Now expe rience shows us that it does nothing of the kind. And, failing this knowledge, must there not at least be in the soul a succession of special instruments which might each be a necessary cause of this or that particular thought ? Must not these instruments
"

be so situated that one acts upon another, in exact accord with the pre-establislied correspondence between the changes of the bodily mechanism and the thoughts of the soul ? Now it is quite certain that no immaterial, simple and indivisible sub
stance can be composed of this countless multitude of special instruments placed one before another in the order required by

the

score

"

in question.

Accordingly

it

is

impossible for the
of Bayle
see Intro
s

human soul to carry out this law. (This illustration may be compared with Leibniz s simile of the choirs,
duction, Part
ii.

was written in

letter containing Leibniz s simile In a paper written in 1702 (G. iv. 549 sqq.) Leibniz makes the following reply to Bayle (referring in the first place to Bayle s supposition of an animal created by
p. 47.

The

1687.)

God

to sing incessantly) It is enough if we suppose a singer paid to sing at certain hours in church or at the opera, and T
:

2 74

THE MONADOLOGY
"
"

that he finds there a music-book, in which there are the pieces of music or the score he is to sing on the particular and

The singer sings with open book [a litre ouvert], his eyes are directed by the book, and his tongue and throat are directed by his eyes, but his soul sings, so to speak, by memory or by something equivalent to memory for since the musicbook, the eyes and the ears cannot act upon the soul, it must by itself, and indeed without trouble or application and without seeking it, find what his brain and organs find with the help of the book. The reason is that the whole score of the book
hours.
;
"

days

J

beginning of its existence as this "score was in some way graven in its material causes before the pieces of music were composed and the book made out of them. But the soul cannot be conscious
"

or books that shall, one after another, be followed in singing potentially [virtuettement] graven in his soul from the
;

is

of it [s en apercevoir], for it is enveloped in the confused per ceptions of the soul, which express all the detail of the universe. And the soul is distinctly conscious of it only at the time when its organs are markedly affected by the notes of the score."
"

have already shown more than once that the soul does many things without knowing how it does them, when it does so by means of confused perceptions and unconscious
I

...

[msensibles]

inclinations or appetitions, of which there is always a very great number, and which it is impossible for the soul to be con scious of, or to unravel The soul has all the distinctly.
.
.

.

instruments which M. Bayle thinks necessary, arranged [place] as they ought to be. But they are not material instruments. They are the preceding perceptions from which
the

themselves, succeeding perceptions arise by the laws of appetitions

[appetite].

APPENDIX
THE

G.

PKOOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.
view of Leibniz, expressed in the Monadology ( 44 and 45), must be carefully distinguished from the Cartesian argu ment (derived from Anselm) that the idea of God involves His existence, because if He does not exist, a more perfect Being may be conceived, namely one who does exist. It is also to be distinguished from the view of Spinoza, which amounts to saying that the essence of God involves His existence, because

APPENDIX G
all

275
is

essence exists, all that is possible Descartes s proof Leibniz argues that it

actual.

is

As against incomplete, for the

idea of a most perfect being might perhaps be self-contra
dictory, like the idea of the swiftest possible motion or the greatest possible number. Thus, after stating the Cartesian

argument, Leibniz says
logical conclusion is:
exists."

:

But

it is

is

to

be noted that the only

"If

For we cannot

possible, it follows that He safely use definitions in order to reach

God

a conclusion, until we know that these definitions are real or that they involve no contradiction. The reason of this is that from notions which involve a contradiction opposite conclusions may be drawn at the same time, which is absurd. To illustrate this I usually take the instance of the swiftest possible motion,

which involves an absurdity.

For, suppose a wheel to revolve with the swiftest possible motion, is it not evident, that if any spoke of the wheel be made longer [produced, in the mathe matical sense] its extremity will move more swiftly than a nail on the circumference of the wheel wherefore the motion of the circumference is not the swiftest as was
;

possible,

supposed by the hypothesis. Yet at first sight it may appear that we have an idea of the swiftest for we possible motion seem to understand what we are saying, and nevertheless we have no idea of impossible things. Meditationes de
;

Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis (1684), (E. 80 a G. iv. Therefore there is 424.) assuredly reason to doubt whether the idea of the greatest of all
;

is not uncertain, and whether it does not involve some contradiction. For I quite understand, for instance, the nature of motion and velocity, and what the greatest is. But I do not understand whether these are compatible, and whether

beings

"

"

it is

possible to combine velocity of which motion
I
"

them
is

into the one idea of the greatest

know what

"being"
"

there

.

most perfect are, is not a hidden contradiction involved in combining these together, as there actually is in the instances I have just given Yet I admit that God has here a great advantage over
. .

In the same way, although and what the "greatest" and the nevertheless I do not therefore know that
capable.
is,

other things. For, in order to prove that He exists, it is sufficient to prove that He is possible, which is not the case with regard to anything else that I know of. ... Simple forms [i. e. living principles] are the source of Now
all

things.

simple forms are compatible with one another. ... If this be granted, it follows that the nature of T 2
all

I

maintain that

2 76
(rod,

THE MONADOLOGY
which contains

all simple forms taken absolutely, is have proved above that God is, provided He is possible. Therefore He exists. (G. iv. 294 and 296 ) Thus Leibniz, as he himself says (G. iv. 405), holds a middle

possible.

Now we

His possibility, for all real possibility includes a tendency to existence, and there can be nothing to hinder this tendency in a being supposed to be In the Reponses aux Deuxiemes perfect.

position between those who regard the Cartesian proof as a sophism and those who say that it is a complete demonstra tion. God s existence, for Leibniz, follows immediately from

Objections, Descartes maintains the possibility of the idea of a most perfect But he does not make this a prominent being. or essential part of his proof, as Leibniz does. Cf. Descartes, Meditation 5 Principia Philosophiae, Part i. 14 sqq. In the Animadversiones in pat-tern genemlem Principiorum Cartesianorum (1692) (G. iv. 359) Leibniz suggests that the argument might be simplified by omitting the reference to perfection, and merely saying a necessary Being exists-or a Being whose essence is in itself existence, or a
;

Being

as

[ens

is

evident from the terms.

se]

Now God

(from the definition of God), therefore God ment holds if it be granted that a necessary being is possible and does not involve a contradiction, or, what is the same
;

such a being exists. This argu
is

things. of a created being does not involve its existence, because it is limited, and thus its existence depends upon its fitting into other essences so as to constitute, along with them, the best But the essence of a necessary being involves possible world. its existence because it is unlimited. There is to

thus nothing can exist. As against Spinoza, Leibniz s argument would be that not all that is possible is actual, but only the compossible or com There are unrealized possibles/ essences which do patible. not involve existence, and consequently the necessary being, whose essence involves existence, is not the all, but is some thing distinct from the world of created The essence
itself:

thing, that the essence from which existence follows is possible. Clsewhere (E. 177 b G. iv. 406) Leibniz points out that those who hold that from notions, ideas, definitions or possible essences alone we can never infer actual existence deny the of being in itself possibility But if being in itself [ens a se]. is impossible, all beings through another [entia ab alia] are also impossible, since indeed they are only through being in
.
. .

nothing

Rosenkranz. that How or inclining necessity. anticipates Gaunilo in his existent his Liber to this Anselm replied in objection of Kant. 173- . be is-not the the sumnnun cogitabile is and by the hypothesis. 11.L1 St. idea to the existence of this its content. . makes between possible on the worth of the distinction he is to say between a metaphysical and compossible. . (See Critique of mere idea to the existence of its Hartenstein. p. but to adduce For a mere idea is an here is to beg the question. 462 Pure Reason. v). Part p. 456 Meikleii. .APPENDIX G hinder or condition sible. and saying. absolute necessity and a moral of necessity related to one another are these two kinds them solution of the opposition between hardly a satisfactory to the understanding and the other to refer the ojxe to weakness have here again the fundamental will of God between the uncertainty of the relation . and accordingly. iv. from a mer It is true that we can never pass iohn s Tr s J . 364. that be -round that existence can never in passing from a :a y that we are never justified logically content. Anselm of Canterbury. the summum cogitaMe would not. among pro insipiente. it its 2 77 if it must exist. of Leibniz s argument be pos depends 1 %e of Leibniz philosophy. if it did exist. argument while the idea o non-existent idea of that which may be cannot be non is the idea of that which a necessary being Liber pro insipiente. 71. need not exist merely because That which can be thought without really existing sequence so that. which See the whole of his chap. (*gg s is in the last degree absurd cogitate. apologeticus contra respondentem Let us assume that the Summit** cogitaMe other thinas: Mark the con it is thought. Introduction.) as an . The value existence. Cf. the principle of contradiction the whole argument as a paralogism on Kant rejects the a predicate. and that of sufficient reason.

.

OTHBE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF LEIBNIZ .

.

is on the point of being concluded (Klopp. The whole preface is given by Dutens (iv. adding a few sentences from the succeeding paragraphs which deal with I In the foot-notes will be voluntary and divine right. on behalf of the Empire. found translations of a number of illustrative passages from the very interesting collection of papers from the Hanover . a general peace vi.D. . 1693. He observed that the French took every opportunity of obtain ing and preserving documents on which they might found rights of the claims. vi. The preface. trouble says he contributed only the title. have translated the portion given by Erdmann. The work was never finished but an Appendix (mantissa) to the first volume was published in 1700. 454). he set make a collection of Treaties and State papers (international and national) affecting the European nations. however. contains the most convenient summary of its author s views in an important department of ethics. PREFATORY NOTE. himself to And accordingly.ppeared. Leibniz remarks that his book is a little less in season than it was at first. His plan was to publish them in three volumes under the title Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus. In 1693 the first volume containing papers of date from uoo to I5OOA. To this work Leibniz and the preface. graphs dealing with the eternal rights [or laws] of a rational nature. 441). for we are assured that a. the of reading it over (Klopp. 457) . LEIBNIZ was deeply interested in the maintenance of the Empire as against the pretensions of Louis XIV.ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE. and Gerhardt includes no part of it in his edition. 287) and but Erdmann (118) gives only the para by Klopp (vi. Writing to the Count de Kinsky in 1697.

unequal people universal virtue and natural fourthly. 23). 21. 33). that we may have regard to perpetual obligation must be added the elements of legitimate happiness. 32. thirdly. and evils ^among concerning the dispensing of common goods for the greatest common good in this life. aequi elementa (Mollat. has been immensely even after so many distinguished lect \ I am not sure that. ethical science &amp. in which is denned as lasting sadness or that state misery. the charity of first. MSS. * Juris et of is a duty or. (De Mollat. p. EigJit is a 2 certain moral power. p. the aggregate which the aggregate of evils preponderates over Juris et aequi elementa (Mollat. nations. Nothing impossible . the notions of Eight and writers Justice be considered sufficiently clear. have discussed them. inward right. a sum The following statement of Leibniz may be used as of this part of the Preface to the Codex Diplomatics mary must be ex In stating the elements of natural right there of justice. concerning towards God. divine right in the tribus juris naturae et gentium gradibus. of com the wise man secondly. published by Dr. of goods.282 ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE title. so far as they are regarded as equal. and obligation a moral necessity Now by moral I mean that which is equivalent to natural for as a Koman lawyer admirably says. necessity o Necessity is the avoiding De debitis et Ulicitis (Mollat. confined by nature within narrow extended by the human intel limits. as it is commonly put. political is the science of the the science of the useful. Everything necessary there is no obligation impossible things has no law is permissible or. The doctrine of right.) The ideas expressed in this Preface are to a large extent derived from Grotius. private right or the precepts men in mutative concerning what is observed among : . : it is not to be believed that we are capable of doing things 1 is science Medical science is the science of the pleasant. just. as it is commonly put. pp. Georg Mollat under the Rechts- Leibnizens ungedruckten Schriften (Leipzig. the common principles pounded.lt. in a good man may . Robolsky. To these human right both in our own divine and human right : commonwealth and between universal Church. justice. 92). philosophisches aus 1885). p. public right.

24). . G. Again. if it comes into Juris cf existence. that is he who is wise.ON THE NOTIONS OF EIGHT AND JUSTICE which Further. the Giver of good things.Mollat. and it maybe predicted of a house that it will be beautiful. and in this sense it may be said that the right we have of acting or not acting is a certain power or moral liberty. for the idea of justice is a priori.. is just or permissible. iv. C. Justice nothing but that which is in conformity with wisdom and goodness combined the end of goodness is the greatest good. which is the virtue governing that disposition of mind [affectus] which the Greeks call will. charity in obedience to the When the nature of justice and (as is necessarily involved in this) the nature of wisdom and charity is understood.7ria. so far as 5 R .gt. will love all men. fittingly sapientis 3 denned as the ]. 13). . so far as concerns a person s conduct : and ills of other persons. cit. obligatory [debitum]. Since justice consists in a certain congruity and proportion. 283 &quot. but each in proportion as the traces of divine virtue in him shine out. I have in most places translated the aequi elementa (Mollat. be most &amp. while De tribus juris naturae et gentium gradibus obligation is a necessity. loc./&amp. it is manifest that that which to a good man is possible. (Mollat. 5 The doctrine of Right must. 4 He who loves God. a good reason allows 4 . of a commonwealth that it will be happy. Cf. elementa . necessary (if he wishes to retain the name).iAaj/$/oa&amp. vii. p. 26). Justice therefore. p. For it is not to be believed unjust. according to Leibniz. and finally.lt. fi All virtue is the bridling of the desires [affectus] so that Juris et aequi nothing can oppose the commands of right reason. and in proportion as he hopes to find in him a companion ready and able to promote the common good. word jus by Right. 2 and 6. the just may have a meaning.gt. although it may never come into existence. 92 sqq. p. impossible. if I mistake not. of a machine that it will be effective. 261) he says Justice is perfection in accordance with wisdom. Clark s Practical Jurisprudence. 7 Leibniz gives various longer definitions of justice. but in relation to the goods is . ch. although there may neither be any one who numbers nor anything which is numbered. Regarding the ambiguities of these words see T. that we are capable of doing things which are contrary to good morals. that is charity of the ivise man [caritas to say. In a letter to KesmT 1709) (Dutens. be deduced from definitions. just as the ratios of numbers are true. are contrary to good morals [contra bonos mores] man is one who loves all men. or (what comes to the same thing) the glory of God. although there may neither be any one who practises justice nor any one towards whom it is practised.

to his son . There are two ways of desiring the good of others. pro ceeds from ignorance of the definition of 10 justice Charity is universal benevolence. odness m . it definition of justice is the habit of loving others taking pleasure in the thought of other people s good as often comes into consideration. commune true f and perfect de la justice (Mollat. even against their own nterests. who have setting God the CMollat.lt.lt. for the sake of . and benevolence is the habit of u loving or esteeming [amandi sive But to love diligendi] dictates of Carneades 9 . : loc. the one desire it on account of our own good. neglecting our own. Justice is &amp.lt. which is nothing but the knowledge of the good. The saying comes from the Epitome of the Divinae Institutiones of Lactantius. p. Graec. tit. . nor can prudence be separated from one s own Juris et aequi elementa (Mollat good. the will. not being sensitive to the pleasure of virtue. 32 and 35). Carneades 213-129 B. 75). the second of him who loves the first is the feeling of a master to his servant.C. De Rep iii 2 o (Ritter and Preller. he visited Rome as an ambassador from Athens and caused much astonishment by his skill in arguing successively for and against justice. even in those apart.284 ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE wisdom 8 . in order to recognize it we require wisdom. p. i. New pads. Prolegomena. majority of those who would act in accordance with justice in all things. jure Cyrene. Wisdom is in the understanding . pp. because it bids us attend to the interests of others. . it should be remarked that Leibniz God Himself is the reward says &amp. 43 6 and 438). the first is the feeling of a man towards the tool he . Instit. the other when tesire it as if it were our own The first is the way good. p. The prudence in bringino bout the good of others or not bringing evil upon them for the sake of bringing about one s own good (by thus manifesting one s id). v.lt. 26).gaming reward or avoiding punishment). ch. Hist.). For. In 156 B. Phil. 62). 14 and Cicero. Cf. 9 Academy. &amp. De belli et Grotius. a native of was founder of the . him who esteems. but in certain cases they would not themselves act as wise men. 5. the second that of a father 11 when we .C. And Meditation sur la notion justice consequently is in both. or not bringing evil upon oneself (that is. Of. Therefore the saying attributed to that justice is supreme folly. would in fact do what is required by the wise man who finds his pleasure in the general good. Meditation sur la notion commune de la justice . There cannot be justice without prudence. . not attained to this wisdom. . 10 &amp. Juris et aequi elementa ollat. Regarding the last statement.

ON THE NOTIONS OF EIGHT AND JUSTICE
or esteem
is

285

or

what

of another, to take pleasure in the happiness another s happi comes to the same thing, to adopt

ness as our own.

In

this

way

there

is

solved the difficult

in theology, is also of great importance problem, which love [amor non mcrcenarms\ there can be a disinterested and every consideration a love apart from hope and fear o the solution being that the happiness of advantage becomes a part those in whose happiness we take pleasure 13 for things which give us pleasure of our own happiness 14 And as the very confor their own sakes
; ,

how

are desired

.

in the first case the that of friend to friend requires, the second the of something else of others is sought for the sake good own sake/ Juris d aequi eJementa (Mollat p 3 second for its
;

m

.

In tins note the word translated in the Aristotelian is a ? the text it is dMgere. Benevolence of the mind, not an act, but a habit or strong inclination ,ense, of birth, or by have acquired either by the fortune which we Dejustitia a special gift of God, or by repeated practice.
(

esteem

is aestimare

while

i

P

In the Preface to the second Cf. Monadology, 90, note 14210 (Dutens, iv. 313;, of the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomatics, part on the ground to those who objected to his solution Leibniz replies God, so as that it is more perfect to cast oneself entirely upon
to be

7

s own pleasure. moved by His will alone and not by one nature of things: This says Leibniz, is contrary to the the feeling endeavour to act springs from a tendency to perfection,

of

volition otherwise. which is pleasure and there is no action or G. 11. 578) a Cf a paper on the views of Fenelon (1697) (E. 79 We do everything for our own good, and it is impossible for us t about others, have other opinions, although we can speak when we do not nevertheless, we do not yet love quite purely, own sake and because seek the good of the loved object for its of some advantage which comes it pleases us in itself, but because own But ... we seek at once our own good for our to us from it.
;
;

s-ikes

when the and the good of the loved object for its own sake, and by li good of this object is immediately, finally (ultimata] with regard to all our aim, our pleasure and our good, as happens us in themselves th- things which we desire because they please to conse are consequently good in themselves without regard and are ends, not means. quences they The prerogative of true happiness is that it is increase, 7)e JHstitia .Mollat, p. A 0the multitude of those who share it. 14 Everything pleasant is This is a convertible statement.
:
"

286

ON THE NOTIONS OF EIGHT AND JUSTICE
15

templation of beautiful things

is

pleasant

,

and a picture

it by Raphael moves him who understands it, although it becomes dear and delightful brings him no gain, so that

to him, inspiring in

him something

like love

1G

;

so

when

the beautiful thing is also capable of happiness, his feeling 17 excels But Divine love for it passes into real love.
other loves, for
since

God can be loved with the happiest result, more nothing is happier than God and nothing 18 beautiful or more worthy of happiness can be conceived
.

And since He possesses supreme power and wisdom, His of ours (if we are wise, happiness not only becomes a part 19 But love Him) but even constitutes it that is, if we
.

since wisdom ought
sought for
is

to direct charity,

wisdom

also requires

for its own sake sake, and whatever is sought Other things are sought on account of what is contribute to it, or remove pleasant, that they may produce it, what is opposed to it. All men feel this whatever they may say, Juris et aequi or at any rate they do it, whatever they may feel.
its

own

pleasant.

dementa (Mollat, p. 30). 15 seek beautiful things because they are pleasant, I define a beautiful thing as that the contemplation of which is pleasant.

We

loc.

cit.
<

16

He who

(Mollat, p. 31). finds pleasure in the contemplation of a beautiful

picture and

would suffer pain if he saw it spoiled, even though it with a disinterested belong to another man, loves it so to speak of love but this is not the case with him who thinks merely or getting applause by showing it, making money by selling without caring whether it is spoiled or not, when it no longer b G. ii. 581). Cf. Kant, belongs to him/ Lettre a Nicaise(i6 9 8) (E. 791 1-5. of Judgment, Part i. div. i. bk. i. Critique 17 i.e. love for God. 18 He Himself is always happy and will never be a cause of His misfortune, nor will He be in need of our to us
; ; k

grief

help.

in the most again, since He always does everything than reasonable way, we can act in relation to Him otherwise in relation to those who, being carried away by their emotions, those follow no fixed rule of conduct and may even be offended by who are most anxious to honour them. But He is always content or with a good will and richly rewards all things well done His that is, all things which are in harmony with intended,

through

And

Dejustitia,^ (Mollat, p. 38). presumptive will. 19 The happiness of God constitutes ... the whole of ours. G. ii. 57 8 -) (E. 790 a
;

ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE
to
it

287

men have of wisdom is nothing So we are brought back again to the notion of happiness, which this is not
be defined.
I think that the notion
will best be satisfied, if we say that but the very science of happiness 20
.

And

the place to explain 21 Now from this source flows natural Eight [jus naturae] of which there are three degrees : Eight in the narrow sense
.

[jus strictum] in commutative justice, equity (or charity in the narrower sense of the word) in distributive justice 22 ,

and
20

lastly, piety (or

uprightness) in universal justice

2a
.

Wisdom

is

of the good.

the science of the best, as prudence is the science Specimen demonstrationum politicarum (1669), prop. 38
is

(Dutens,
21

iv. 559).

Happiness

a lasting state of joy.

Initium institutionum juris

perpetui

Nothing contributes more to happiness than the enlightenment of the understanding and the inclination of the will always to act according to reason, and such an enlighten
(Mollat, p. 4).

ment is especially to be sought in the knowledge which can lead our understanding ever onward to

of those things a higher light

;

because from this there arises a continual progress in wisdom and virtue, and consequently in perfection and joy, the fruit of which remains with the soul even after this life. Von der Gluckscligkeif. G. vii. 88). Cf. E. 792 a G. ii. 581. (E. 672 b
; ;

22

These correspond respectively to Aristotle
oiKaiov or oi/taiov oiopOwTinov
Ethics, v. 2,

s

fj.aai

and

his

Iv rctf? Siavo^ais.
Pol. iii. 9.

H3o b

3o;

SiavffJLrjriKov SiKaiov b v. 4, 27

TO kv rots avvaXXdyor oiftaiov

H3i

and

33.

Cf.

Commutative

justice has to do

with private

right,

distributive with public right. De tribus juris naturae et gentium Cf. loc. a7., p. 17, where they are called gradibus (Mollat, p. 14). But Aristotle recognizes right of property, and right of society. or commutative justice (TO avTirrf-novOos} distinct a catallactic (at least according to what seems the best interpretation of Eih. v.
l

justice (TO SiopOcuTiKuv] and distributive corrective and distributive justice pro-supposing the existence of a state (rroAt?), while catallactic justice is pre-supposed by the state. See Prof. Ritchie On Aristotle s subdivisions of Particular Justice, Classical Review, viii. p. 185.
5)

both from
(TO

corrective

justice

Siavffj.rjTiKov};

K While justice is only a particular virtue, when we make abstraction from God or from a government which imitates that of God and while this virtue, thus limited, includes only what is called commutative and distributive justice, we may say that as soon as it is founded upon God or upon the imitation of God, it be
i ;

comes
notion

universal justice

and contains

all

the virtues.

Meditation sur la

commune

de la justice (Mollat, p. 75).

Cf. infra, note 42.

288

ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE
we
should do injury to no should give each his own, that we should rather piously), the universal and
that

Hence come the precepts
one, that
live

we

virtuously

(or

commonly
.

accepted precepts of Eight [jus]** when a youth, in my little book De Methodo suggested, -5 The precept of bare Eight or Eight in the narrow Juris 6 lest if is that no one is to le injured, sense [jus sirictum] should have ground for it be within the state, the person he should an action at law, or if it be without the state, 27 From this there comes to make war the
.

;

as

-

have

commutative and the justice which the philosophers call 2S which Grotius calls right proper [facultas] the right
.
-"

right

.

The precepts
i

are given

by Ulpian.
i.

Lib

Tit.

i.

3 (Moyle s ed., vol.
<

p. 100).

naturae

et gentium gradibus (Mollat, p. 14), the supreme rule of Eight, which is t precepts flow from to the greater general good. all things 74-7 25 Methodits nova discendae docendaequc JurisprudenUae (1667 This was the work through which Leibniz (Dutens iv. 213% an introduction to the Elector of Mainz. See Introduction,
,

See Justiniani Institution**, In his De tribus juris Leibniz says that the three

obtained Part i. p. 4. and jus 26 Grotius distinguishes between jus stridum
latter

laxius,
i

tne

bk. i. ch. i, 9, et being moral right. De jure belli pads, that 10. Leibniz holds, as against Hobbes, Cf Prolegomena, before the foundation of the State. is a right and even a jus strictum of an He who produces a new thing or puts himself in possession which no one has already taken possession already existing thing, and fits it for his use, cannot as a rule b
of

and 2

and who

cultivates

it

deprived of
la justice
-7

it

without injustice.

Meditation sur la notion

commune

de

without necessity, then Against him who knowingly injures The object Juris et aequi elementa (Mollat, p. 33) is a right of war. of peace, which does of this first degree of Right is the preservation is an essential condition ot not necessarily secure happiness but another man who It is an evil to a man that there is happiness is another man it is a good to a man that there wishes him ill, and who wishes him well. Axiomes ou principes de droit (Mollat, p. 54)Dejure
self
belli et

(Mollat, p. 78).

aut stride dictum.

(which is ownership (dornmmm),

Facultas is jus propne 5 sqqpads, bk. i. ch. i, over one a It includes power (potestas} whether also or over another (which is authority), liberty), full full (as of property), or less whether
<

to which corresponds debt (as of compact, pledge, credit, Whewell translates facultas jural claim in contn other side).

ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE
The higher degree
charity (that
is,

289

I call equity, or if you prefer it, in the narrower sense), which I extend

beyond the rigour of bare Eight to those obligations also on account of which those to whom we are obliged have no ground of action to compel us to perform them, such as gratitude, pity, and the things which are said by Grotius to have imperfect rigid [or fitness, aptitudo] not rigid
proper [facultas].

And

as the precept of the lowest degree

was

to do injury to no one, so that of the middle degree 30 is to do good to everybody ; but that so far as befits

each person or so far as each deserves, since we cannot 31 Therefore to this place belong equally befriend all men 32 distributive justice and that precept of Eight Ijus] which bids us give to each Ins own. And to this political laws in the state are related, laws which have to do with
.

the happiness of subjects and which usually bring it about who had only moral claim [aptitudo] acquire a jural claim [facultas], that is to say, that they are
that those with
pktrix)

moral claim

(aptitudo).

Commutative

justice

(justitia exattri-

concerns facultas, while distributive justice (justitia butrix) concerns aptitudo. 9 This degree of Right presupposes some sort of

society

social

arrangement among men.

which the first degree of Right is alone recognized, but it cannot be a happy state, for there must be perpetual quarrels in it, and thus the higher degree of Right comes to be De tribus recognized. juris naturae et gentium gradibus (Mollat, pp. 17 sqq.). Do not do to others what you do not wish to be done to your self, and do not deny to others what you wish to be done to yourself. It is the rule of reason, and it is our Lord s rule. Put yourself in the place of others and you will be at the true point of view for
*

There may be such a

society

or in

judging what
:il

is

just or not.

5

Meditation sur la notion

commune

de la

justice (Mollat, p. 70).

juris gentium gradibus (Mollat, p. 16). * The different degrees of Right are merely degrees, not absolute divisions, and thus one passes into another. Thus to refuse to give a man his due is to injure him, for the absence of is an evil
<

See note 4. In which I include contribute justice, that is, not merely the giving to each his due, but the promoting of the common good and the averting of the common evil. De tribus naturae et

good

U

ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE
others should give. enabled to demand what it is fair that of Right no regard was But while in the lowest degree men (except to those which paid to the differences among matter in hand\ and all men arise from the particular merits were regarded as equal, now in this higher degree and punish rewards are weighed, and hence privileges, this ments appear 34 Xenophon has cleverly represented the case of the youngdifference in the degrees of Right by 35 who was chosen to decide between two boys
.

boy Cyrus

,

the stronger of whom had forcibly exchanged other boy s gown the other, because he had found that the fitted the other boy fitted him better, while his own of the robber but his better. Cyrus decided in favour that the question here was not tutor pointed out to him some whom the gown fitted but whose it was, and that more rightly make use of this way of judg he would
;

clothes with

day
ing

when he

himself had gowns to distribute.
evil is a good.

For equity
the

Thus gover (Mollat, p. 70.) are obliged not only t nors of societies and certain magistrates The science p. 68.) prevent evil but also to promote good. (Mollat, the science of public and the iust and that of the useful, that is, of involved, and it is not easy ft that of private good are mutually Juris aequ,, in the midst of the miserable. any one to be happy
,nd the absence of
<

t

,

tementa (Mollat, p. 23).
*

called arithmetical, that all are account of persons as having the same merit, and, no far redded receives just as much as he gave up. being taken, each The distribution of p. 15). juris naturae et gentium gradilus (Mollat, s virtues and and evils is often made in proportion to people ".roods vices and faults, and this is called geometrical equality, merits, or of ratios is observed, sc because in this very inequality an equality to unequal persons, the same pro that unequal things are given between the things given as there is between portion being kept The distinction and the names are due loc. cit., p. 16. the persons, Leibniz s -application of them is somewha to Aristotle, although b b I2 3i 2 5 sqq. See sqq. and v. 4, different. Cf. Ethics, v. 3, "3i and Grotius, De jure belli et paeu, also Plato, Laws, bk. vi. 757 A sqq.,

of right, Leibniz says Regarding the lowest degree
is

:

This

is

that equality which

commonly

bk 1 bk.

C?opaJa!
ch.
i,

bk.

i.

ch. 3,

H-

The

story

is

quoted by Grotius.

i.

8.

ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE
itself leads

29 1

sense [jus

strictuwi],

us in business to act upon Right in the narrow that is, the equality of men, unless
.

a weighty reason of greater good requires us to 36 depart from it Moreover, what is called respect of

when

persons has place, not in the exchanging of goods with others, but in the distributing of our own goods or those of the public.
I

have called the highest degree of Right by the name
.

37 of uprightness or rather For what has been said piety so far may be understood in such a way as to be limited

to the relations of a

mortal

life.

And
;

indeed bare Right

or Right in the narrow sense [ju-s strictum] has its source in the need of keeping the peace equity or charity
It is not allowable to take from the rich their goods in order Because the disorder which supply the poor with them. would arise from this would cause more evil and inconvenience in general than the special inconvenience of the present state of Thus the state should maintain individuals in their things. Yet it may make a tolerable breach in them for the possessions. common security, and even for a great common good. Meditation la notion commune de la justice (Mollat, p. 81). 7 The third principle of Right is the will of a superior. But the superior is either superior by nature, as God is and His will again is either natural, hence piety, or law, hence positive Divine Right; or the superior is superior by agreement [pactuni], as a man is hence civil Right. Piety therefore is the third degree of natural For God, Right, and it gives perfection and effect to the others. since He is omniscient and wise, confirms bare right and equity
"

to

.

.

.

.

.

.

>/

.

.

.

:

:

;

and. since

He

is

omnipotent,
race,

advantage of the
>f

human

Hence the and indeed the beauty and harmony
carries
out.

He

them

the world, coincide with the Divine will. Methodus Nova, &c. T Elsewhere Leibniz argues that 667), 76 (Dutens, iv. 214). there must be a higher degree of right than mere equity, for God is supremely just and supremely good, and the justice of God differs not in kind but in degree from the justice of man. But it is not for his ease nor in order to keep the peace with us, that God shows us so much goodness for we could not make war
4 ;

upon Him. What, then, will be the principle of His justice and what will be its rule ? It will not be that equity or that equality, which has place among men. We cannot regard God as having any other motive than perfection. Meditation sur la notion commune
. .
.
<lc.

la justice

^Mollat, p. 72).

U

2

2Q2

ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE

something more, to wit that while each to much good as possible, each may increase his own happiness through that of others and, to put it in a word, Eight in the narrow sense [jus strictum] avoids misery, Eight in the higher sense [jus superms] tends to happiness, but of such a kind as falls to our mortal lot.
other does as
;

strives after

But that we ought to subordinate makes life desirable to the great
of others
,

life itself and whatever good of others so that it

this is beautifully inculcated by philosophers rather than For the moral thoroughly proved by them. dignity and glory and our soul s feeling of joy on account 39 of virtue, to which philosophers appeal under the name of rectitude, are certainly good things of thought or of the mind, and are indeed great goods, but not such as to pre vail with all men nor to overcome all the sharpness of evils, since all men are not equally moved

behoves us to bear patiently the greatest pains for the sake 38

by imagination

:

especially those who have not become accustomed to the thought of honour or to the appreciation of the

good

things of the soul, either through a liberal education, or a noble way of living, or the discipline of life or of method. But in order that it may be concluded a universal

by

demonstration that everything honourable is beneficial [omne honestum utile] and that everything base is hurtful

[omnc turpe damnosum]
<The

40
,

we must assume

the immor-

principles of charity are abnegation of self, esteem of others/ Tabulae duae disciplines Love feels juris, &c. (Mollat, p. 9). not the wounds which it suffers, but those which it makes/ loc. cit. p. 12. Among true friends all things are even to

misery.
1

aequi elementa (Mollat, p. 33). If you had listened very attentively to Cicero declaiming on behalf of rectitude as against pleasure, you would have heard him
et

Juris

common,

magnificently perorate about the beauty of virtue, the deformity of base things, about a conscience at peace with itself in the depth of a rejoicing soul, about the good of an untarnished reputation, about an immortal name and the exultation of
Juris et glory. aequi elementa (Mollat, p. 30). In his Initium institutionum juris perpetui (Mollat, p. 4) Leibniz,
| :

using a similar expression, adds
into natural.
Cf. Monadology,

And

moral qualities are turned

88-90.

ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE
tality of the soul
41

293
.

and the Euler of the universe, GOD 42 Thus it is that we think of all men as living in the most *3 under a Monarch who on account perfect City [civitas] of His wisdom cannot be deceived [falli] and on account 44 and a Monarch who is of His power cannot be avoided
,

;

also so loveable that

it is

happiness to serve such a master.
his soul for

Therefore he
Christ teaches
to

who spends
4:>

Him

gains
it

it,

as

.

By His power and
,

providence

comes

factum

pass that every right passes into fact [omne jus in 40 that no one is injured except by himtranseat]

possible for even a wise

u If the soul were not immortal, Leibniz thinks it would be im man to have a sufficient regard for his
perfection.
(Mollat, p. 21.)

own

To a similar

effect

he writes

against the view of Puffendorf, of whom he had a very poor He is not much of a lawyer and very little of a opinion. ( philosopher/ Dutens, iv. 261.) Puffendorf limited natural right to external laws and regarded all virtues or moral qualities as based 011 principles not of reason but of revelation. See Monita quaedam ad Samuelis Puffendorfii princlpia (Dutens, iv. 275 sqq., and
262).
4-

Grotius held that
if it

even

there would be a certain natural obligation, were granted (which it cannot be) that there is no God.

It is true that Aristotle n. belli et pads, Prolegomena, recognized this universal justice, although he did not refer it to God, and I think it admirable in him to have had, nevertheless, But this is due to the fact that for him so high an idea of it. a well-constituted government or state takes the place of God as

De jure

regards earthly things, and such a government will do what it can to compel men to be virtuous. Meditation sur la notion commune de
Injustice (Mollat, p. 76).
43 Finding, as I do, the principle of justice in the good, Aristotle takes as the rule of expediency [convenance} the best, that is to say, what would be expedient for the best government (quod optimae reipublicae convenircf), so that, according to this author, natural right is that which is most expedient for order. loc. cit. (.Mollat,

p. 80}.
44

Cf. Monadology,

85.

So that the honourable and the advantageous are the same, and no sin is without punishment, no noble deed is in vain or Cf. Monadology, 90. (Mollat, p. 96.) goes without reward.
45

St.

Luke,

ix.

24

;

xvii.

33

;

St.

John,

xii. 25.

power is combined with wisdom and goodness it makes right become fact, so that what ought to be really exists, in
46

When

so far as the nature of things allows.

And

this is

what God does

but .that is.lt. we not only injure ourselves. 5 (Dutens.*&quot.ther of importance to a o as it is it the universe. of is his ^ own 53 Accordingly from .P^oWs it miv We w not born merely for were ourselves. and He is in a position to them as He undoubtedly does. Quicquid ^ mus Dei Monitaadlorf ! Saluspublicasupremalexest (Mollat. as for instance we abuse our own body or our own &amp. although He does not alway and immediately do so. it which commonwealth 2 so much more is that no one should make a bad use .gt.lt. itself &quot. this is derived M cUtatwn V 62} Tlf&quot. &amp..** The immortal a&t^^t^T ?lt^ ofod God of exposed to no injuries except from 11118 f G d? hris ^ *&quot. -hat n will tho* bri t many to righteousness [jnsUtia] shall shine as the stars and the common good. For. that property. are neverthe less forbidden by the law of nature [jus naturale] . as Christ divinely taught 1 our hairs are numbered. p 3) For when we are vicious. But happily for t^e tv rans rdains an &quot.on commune de la justice (Mollat.&* its .294 ON THE NOTIONS OF EIGHT AND JUSTICE nothing done rightly is without a reward and no without a punishment. by the eternal laws of the Divine since we owe ourselves and all that is ours to Monarchy. God For &quot. but others claim for themselves a part of us. sur la n t&amp. seeing that those who De p But law e 2o) - cf - G h - - lazl and UnJ Ust a : that ^W a be a contradiction. iv. and not even a draught of water is given in vain to one who thirsts. for which He has if this power is lacking in wisdom or goodwill ordain and uphold very wicked laws. sSz). and thus nothing disregarded in the commonwealth of the universe ^ t is on this account that justice is called universal and sin 5 self 47 . and God the whole/ io. M soul. and which are beyond the range of human laws. comprehends all other virtues for things which other wise do not seem to concern any one else. W USce oa). united laws of God are always just.

derived from And indeed superior. that the basis of right is power. (see Mollat. p. be no less founded on nature than on law. the divine ing of Christ) TO. p. ao(f&amp.) M While admitting a right of this kind as distinct from natural that the two ought always to be in right. the three precepts of Eight or three degrees of explained the sources of natural law. which is printed by Mollat (pp. 57 sqq. in .). disciplinam Christianorum. p. to be desired. 8sqq. diKaica^a rov Oeovy . Possibly Leibniz is thinking of 57 avcaQtv Leibniz seems himself to have intended to supply the want to which he here refers.). nature which destines men for civil life endows &amp. rightly put it down among things that natural law and the law of nations [jus naturae et should be formulated in accordance with the men have Thus I think I have very fitly things of the wise. He thus condemns the view of Hobbes. la notion commune de la justice (Mollat. the royal law (ch. And in this virtuously gentium] doctrines of Christianity. iii. n. Paul.lt.gt. which he identifies with the view of Thrasymachus Cf.ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE 295 the force of that highest precept of Eight. bk. on virtue than on fortune. for he sketched the outline of a book on the subject.&quot.Mollat. 8). that is (according to the teach M the sublime things. in order that the power of the sovereign in a monarchy and the inequality between those who command and those who obey in a republic. avwrcpa . the perfection commonwealth. comes from the supreme King (St. James. 461) : the authority of those who govern them and on the dependence of their peoples. i. under the title Tabulae duae disciplinae juris naturae et gentium secundum 15. So princes ought to be above them their subjects by their virtue and their natural qualities. which bids us sense learned live (that is. of which God is the Monarch. As the order of States is established in Prince (Klopp. i. Leibniz maintains harmony. charity vu^us 0aai\tic6s. 32. in so far as the great Meditation sur it depends upon us. In this he refers to St.&amp. iv. piously). 17). James as i calling inasmuch as it ii.n at birth with different qualities. Le Portrait in Plato s Republic. 76). receives its force from him we of 54 in the commonwealth who civil Eight M has the supreme power : also diminish.ia (St. some for commanding. Romans. there is also observed a customs or made by a voluntary Eight. as they are above them by the authority which the laws give them. justice.gt. and have pointed out Besides the eternal rights of a rational nature which flow from the Divine Source. others for obeying.

. . by merit as by fortune.296 ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE commonwealth or outside of the among those who are there are sometimes sharers in supreme power several even in the same commonwealth) there is the of the voluntary law of nations. accepted by the . the heads of which were in sacred in temporal things the Pope [Pontifcx Maximus] and seemed to things the Emperor of the Eomans. who also law of the old Eoman monarchy retain so much of the as was needed for the common good of Christendom. namely the positive Divine law [jus] which is contained in the sacred To which are to be added the sacred canons books. the Papal law [jures] to which kings and peoples submit And in general (and certainly not against reason) it seems for a long time to have been accepted. without prejudice to the Eight of kings and the liberty of princes. like the kings in the world. that there should be understood to be a certain general commonwealth of the Christian nations. order to reign both by natural right and by civil right. received by the whole Church and afterwards in the West themselves. com manded as much by nature as by law. (of whom sphere tacit consent of the peoples. But Christians have also another common bond. before the schism of last century. first . who having been raised to the government of their peoples by their virtue and their intellectual gifts.

The New System may us how he was i-ii inclusive) Leibniz shows first of which : : in ( 1 a of of soul with body. us the course which his thought cally indicating to in the be divided into two mam parts. AS WELL AS OF THE UNION THERE IS BETWEEN SOUL AND 1 BODY 2 . see something of Leibniz s the New System is that it lets us For in this work he writes histori philosophy in the making.NEW SYSTEM OF THE NATURE OF SUB STANCES AND OF THE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THEM. character it is much more tentative that he md it is only towards the end of the paper (a 17) more than hypothesis. I will not use hypotheses. 12). explaining the nature title in the First Draft is New system for with one another. took. he will not rest there if it is possible merely a stepping-stone matters where certainty can be obtained. IN this paper. which System. In to go farther. he says to Bernoulli! (XI Math. after he published the *ew And nearly twenty years 575). than his later writings. Leibniz Thus the peculiar interest of 59)call proved (Monadology. inter-relation or interaction. p. In ment of his New System (see Introduction. as well as the umo substances and their communication i e The . his view as ventures to speak of he likes to advance by This is very characteristic of Leibniz But he regards hypothesis as suggestion and hypothesis. we Part i. which appeared anonymously ^Journal have Leibniz s first public state des Savants of June. 1695. I venture to writes of this hypothesis. m. 1695. PREFATORY NOTE.

who in 1652. simple substances or real units are to be understood while in the second ( 12-18) he applies his theory of substance to the question of the relation between soul and body.) gives the New 477 System as it ally published. Essay vi. They kept a correspondence on theological and ecclesiastical subjects until the death of the Landgraf in 1693. shortly after the close of the Thirty Years War. Erdmann (E. souls. iv. But having received explana tions from me. biography. especially with one of the greatest theologians and i. :-&amp.lt. i. vol. I have translated from Gerhardt s text. who tells us also that with regard to his New System he followed the rule of Horace nonumam prematur ^n annum (G. Leibniz felt this very keenly it Arnauld made ample explanations and apologies in a letter to . having been informed of some of my opinions by a person of the highest rank 4 had found them very paradoxical*. Note by Leibniz. but not in G. Arnauld. 5 Arnauld writes to the Landgraf I find in these thoughts so many things which alarm me and at which almost all men if I am not mistaken. There is an interesting account of Arnauld and his friends in Stephen s Essays in Ecclesiastical &amp. The Port-Royalists Landgraf Ernest of Hesse-Rheinfels (1623-1693). . he withdrew what he had said in the . mind and matter.) gives it as it was origin was afterwards revised and altered by Leibniz. between paper. 124 sqq. . .) .gt. 3 : rejected Leibniz himself. and in what sense these forms. all harmony simple substances. became a Roman Catholic and published a justification of the taken A copy of this work he sent to the Duke ofcourse he hadand he Brunswick. 25. indicating its differences from Erdmann s and in the notes will be found some passages from the First Draft. and he also prints an interesting First Draft of it. we may say that the Analyzing the title of the first part deals with . . years ago I conceived this system and had communications about it with learned men.NEW SYSTEM led to re-introduce into philosophy the substantial forms of the Scholastics. our time philosophers of Mons. and finds that the problem can be satisfactorily solved only through the hypothesis of a pre-established &amp. what use there could be in a writing which apparently will be by everybody (G. 490).the nature of substances and the second with their communication. Gerhardt (G. ii. Several who. iv.lt. The paragraphs are numbered in E. ii. will be so shocked. sqq. 15). (G.lt. that I do not see 1 ur&amp. thus came into communication with Leibniz.

he praetermitted his cen sure as regards the others.NEW SYSTEM most generous and exemplary way a . I I have been led to this mainly in order that may profit by the judgment of those who are en lightened in these matters . I have ventured upon these meditations. and I have also endeavoured to meet the objections raised against my essays on Dynamics. their mechanical explanations of nature charmed me. since it would be too trouble some a task those to seek out and call to my aid individually be disposed to give me suggestions. 299 and having approved number of my propositions. although they are by no means popular nor such as to be relished by eveiy kind in short. And as have desired to see 7 of mind. 234. (G. . while I was still quite young. which have this 6 . 1695. Lettre a Masson (1716) (G. some connexion with some people of consideration my opinions more elucidated. in order that I might give to the public only well-tested opinions.) 7 The First Draft has in addition the words Which they think may be useful in harmonizing faith with reason as regards matters of importance. me that there something I had penetrated far into the country of the Scholastics. Since that time I have continued my medi tations. was a vi. as I had opportunity. which oblige me to go beyond what I have already said. Objections of this kind are instructive and I like them because I may profit by them and make others profit by them but it is not easy to make them. 629). I have none the less meditated upon philosophy from my youth up for it always seemed to I am . : . one of those who have worked much Although at mathematics. 6 Leibni/ s principal essay on Dynamics is the Specimen Dynamicum. to which he was still unable to agree. . when mathematics and modern authors brought me out The beauty of again. Math. possibility [mot/en] of establishing solid in philosophy by clear demonstrations. provided they are marked by a love of truth rather than by a passion for who might 8 preconceived opinions 2. published in the Ada Eraditorum for April. which I shall always be glad to receive. * I desire objections to be made against me. vi.

At first. makes for the laws of nature which experience a reason consideration of an known. unity in matter alone. 11 of action. for force passes of itself into action. iv. we in the same way as other physical things.lt. but we cannot perceive. of Aristotle. m of substance. is improbable and indeed is although it seems possible. The meaning is that. 472). never produces an action to act [pouwtrj from without. 156. By force or power In the First Draft. 3. . having tried to go deeply nothing . I do not mean the power [pouDofr] &amp. [acte]. Introduction. although force is not &amp. But having got over tion. for that the view which best this. .-aii &amp. to the though it belongs sphere that the view of those who trans appeared to me also form or degrade the lower animals into mere machines. Leibniz says of a mass. which is very intelligible. 10 It of metaphysics .VT ? lTl2ni [puissance-] which is nothing but a near possibility of acting and which. Wherefore I regard action. the potential energy can understand. p. I took to the void is and the atoms.lt. Part ii. contrary to the order when I had freed myself from the yoke 3. : and an actual working something which includes an effort.NEW SYSTEM make and I rightly contemned the method of those who from which we learn use only of forms and faculties. but I mean something between power i&quot. after much medita to find the principles of a real reality only from elsewhere and are quite other than the mathematical extremities of the extended and points which are only anything that it can nevertheless be pictured or represented in imagination. force as consti tutive as nothing hinders it. since it is the source [principe] the characteristic of substance (G. 23. that it is impossible or in that which is only passive. p. See Introduction. being without being stimulated as it were dead. in order to find into mechanical principles themselves.lt. The notion of that can be perceived because force is not merely a physical thing For instance. p. wnicl Cf. satisfies the imagination. and Part iv. I perceived that the mere that use must also be extended mass is not sufficient and made of the notion of force. Part i. of things. force is metaphysical he quite well understood. but a collection or aggregation of parts since it is nothing can derive ad infinitum \ Now a multiplicity [multitude] units [unites] which come its from genuine l I perceived. 9 But afterwards.so _fa an entelechy.

necessary to recall and. . so to speak. but properties or two ends of a stick. not independent beings. The essence of feeling. iv. 472. and to give an exact and complete explanation of any particular phenomenon (such. then. the former being used to explain substances. to rehabili 5 which are so much decried tate the substantial forms^ or active principle. the abuse which they have suffered. 13 Accordingly. is not consciousness but the representation or concentration of many in one . the latter to explain their accidents. reads: atom.NEW SYSTEM modifications 12 . ticular problems of nature. but in a way which renders them intelligible and separates the use to which they should be put from I found. as weight or elasticity).. but that between feeling and force is more obscure. 301 of which it is certain that the continuous . in order [continuum] cannot be composed to find these real units [unites] I was constrained to have recourse to a real and animated point. now-a-days. force or vital principle. so as to make . for instance. for establishing true general principles Aristotle calls them 12 first entclechies. 16 The transition from point to point is here rather rapid. I call them (in a way that may like the 13 it is cer See Prefatory Note. that the nature of the substantial forms consists in force. &c. The analogy between desire and force is manifest. 17 In the First Draft. reads: quite other than the points of which relations. then. and similarly the manifold actions or potentially contained in its of any substance are enveloped Cf. Mona lology. since a material being cannot be at once material and perfectly indivisible or possessed of a genuine unity. although they are necessary 17 . nothing but figure and motion need be used (G. tain. 15 Substantial forms as distinct from accidental forms. . and that from this follows something analogous to feeling and that thus they must [sentiment] and desire [appctit] be conceived after the manner of the notion we have of 1G But as the soul ought not to be used to explain souls in detail the structure of the animal s body. 13 sqq. E. Leibniz says In opinion everything That is. as it were. accord ing to Leibniz. : my in nature takes place mechanically. I held that similarly these forms must not be used to solve the par . or to an atom of substance which must contain some kind of form It a complete being 14 was. 14 I was constrained to have recourse to a formal E. .

Nature and of Grace. Albertus We hold that the souls of the Magnus says : 24 wn iv. had an inkling of part of the truth regarding the origin of these forms 24 And all this ought not to appear exTo distinguish it from the which is . The statement of Leibniz is so vague that one can hardly fix the passage in Albertus Magnus Jt which he is In his Summa de Creaturis part ii qu 16 thinking. by a quantitative division. art.lt.* Possibly Leibniz refers to the passage in which Aquinas The substantial form. : Monadologit. which requires diversity in the parts. this new view. Anima. note 116. for instance the soul and the soul of complete especially animals. . 474).&quot. it follows that with regard this truth 1 Thus I was obliged to recognize that (with the exception of the souls which Clod still intends specially to create) the constitutive forms of substances must have been created with the . * l called secondary. like Albertus Magnus and John Bacon. however. as every simple* substance which has a genuine unity can have a beginning and an end only by miracle.I saw that those forms and those souls. 4 7 1 i HI dissoluble Cf. an end only by annihilation they can come into being only by creation and come to 22 world and must always continue to exist 2 So some of the Scholastics. Principles of e 6 5 6. it is incorruptible De art. instead of cette verite E. 14 ad primum. Janet reads cette nouveaute. iv. Monadology. (G. as well as [esprit]. but also an original activity. . . limitation r variation f movin&amp. Aquinas says: The sensitive soul in the lower animals is but in man. &quot. ought to be this indivisible.3 02 NEW SYSTEM our mind I perhaps be more easily understood) primary forces&quot. which contain not only actuality [Vacte] or the comple ment of possibility. ~ Cf. does not stand in exactly the same relation to the whole and to the parts. . 4.lt. And hence it is not divided per accidens. fact remembered that 20 was the opinion of Thomas to the souls of the lower animals 19 But renewed the great difficulty about the origin and the duration of souls and forms. &quot. Summa Theol i q!i 76 Elsewhere. 12 The First Draft has in addition the words brought about expressly by the supreme power of God (G. t &amp. 3). For. omits simple. and in St. 474). that to say. since it is the corruptible same in substance as the rational soul.

Is . : . . 65 sqq. as to truth itself. . -7 Which in my opinion are to be found everywhere is given by G. Tract. i. and in 1329 century. for 303 we I are duration which the Gassendists 5. . Cf. held that we must not (or include among without ^). 2f) Nevertheless these. atoms. I say &quot. i. His attitude was both anti-Scholastic and anti-Cartesian. . . That which act and not like the eiitelechy of an organic body. which are rank and have incomparably more than those forms which are sunk in matter. : it the soul or not ? We say that it is not The principle of life Cf. God alone can know it. but not by E. Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655). expounded the doctrines of Epicurus and endeavoured to adapt them to the conditions of modern thought. lower animals and plants are educed from the matter of the seed through generation.. 13: The soul is soul. but not by E. Bacho. a French priest and a disciple of Bacon. . See Descartes. 3. In Secundum.gt. Lettre -6 a Golius. Cinquiemes Objections (by Gassendi himself does not attribute eternity to his Gassendi). Besides a book on the rule of his order. He lived much in Oxford and Paris. Dist. 3. perfection and which in my opinion are to be found everywhere of a higher &amp. where he obtained a great reputation for He was called the Kesolute Doctor. only attributing to forms the accord to their atoms. and in another They are not there actually [actu]. which he regards as created by God. Leibniz probably refers to a passage in this book. . But if it be asked whether they are in the seed or not. This clause within brackets is given by G. efficient cause ? . learning. Monadology. distinction confound with other forms or souls minds [esprits] or rational souls. xii. and nothing can be cut off from it. is in the seed is something of the soul [aliquid animae] and not the See also De Anima.. John Bacon or indivisible. . are there in the potency [potential of the efficient cause and the matter [efficients et mater lae]. Art. Meditations. . he became Provincial of the English Carmelites.&quot. bk. . Qu. 2. . He died in 1346. And if it be asked What is this . . for. The spirit of his The shadow of thinking is well expressed in his own words: truth which I everywhere pursue suffices to fill me with joy. is better known as John Baconthorp.the shadow. his chief work is the Commentaria sen quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum. cap.27 .NEW SYSTEM traordinaiy. De Animalibus (xvi. in the way in which the act is in the instruments is in the seed And in this way also the soul is in the seed like an of the act. &quot. we say that they are there in one way. He severely criticized Descartes s Meditations and thus began a long controversy with Descartes regarding the origin of knowledge. from the place in Norfolk where he was born towards the close of the thirteenth He was a Carmelite monk and a schoolman. Gassendi taking a purely experiential standpoint as against Descartes s belief in innate ideas. but they way they are not. n) the soul.

84. 32 The First Draft says: This transmigration of souls _is an do not nutter outside of absurdity. 29 Cf. the duration which must be attributed of that which used to be attributed to atoms) (in place lead to a doubt whether they do not go from body might to body. these of revolutions themselves being arranged for the felicity 29 the wicked the good and the punishment of or material 6. which seems to suggest By while Leibniz. transformations noted by . Cf. The principles of substance substances (G. when the quality of the leaven is imparted to the whole lump or the red colour of a drop of wine is diffused throughout water. Monadology. some For this reason God governs minds [esprits] as a prince governs his subjects. expression. has dmes materielles while G. Thus minds . works with his deals with other substances as an engineer have special laws which machines. has times brutes. something almost analogous to the transmission of motion and the 31 transmission of species which certain philosophers have But this fancy is very far from the nature maintained. However.304 in comparison with like little gods. is given by * E. 474). Malpighi. to return to ordinary forms . ( phenomenon is bene fundatum. Swammerdam. . 33 The reference is to such changes as that from caterpillar to . to them souls. holds that all are immaterial. but not by E. 33 who are among the most excellent and Leuwenhoek 28 Through the very order which God has put in them 83. MM. i. note 10. unconscious souls. 89. NEW SYSTEM which minds or rational souls are made within them [lumieres]. iv. God and having in the image of the Divine enlightenment ray of [esprits] of matter through the put them above the revolutions 28 and it may be order which God has put in them very said that everything else is made only for them.e. Monadology. 32 And here the There is no such passing of things. as 31 i. 30 G. which would be metempsychosis. of course.e. Leibniz prob the ambiguity of the other ably wrote brutes in order to avoid that some souls are material. on the other hand. and indeed as a father He looks after his children while. transference of quality from one body to another. material or brute souls he means the souls which are sunk matter as a in which in matter 5).. .

ch. reply. Regis % M. : r&amp. Nonadoloyy. 461 a G. Kuiio Veitch. which. Cf. ii. is famous Marcello Malpighi (1628-1694% of Bologna. calls him rir clarisKiuttts in E. 41) cf. p. x. 70. bk. along with Leibniz s G. Hartsoeker 30 tion is only a I mentation].gt.f-c. is probably mentioned by Leibniz because of his work on the process of incubation. corresponded intermittently with Malebranche upon philosophical and other questions between 1674 and 1711. 7. Pierre Sylvain Regis or Leroy Tetrus Silvanus Regius) (1632-1707) was an exponent of the philosophy of Descartes. Left res et opuscules inedils de Leibniz. In 1694 Hartsoeker published an atomist philosophy of nature. . have come to my aid and have led me the more readily to admit that no animal nor any other organic substance comes into existence at the time at which we think it does. 199 sqq. Leibniz endeavours to harmonize Malebranche s view with his own on many particular points. whose earlier work had mainly to do with the making of microscopes and telescopes. 476 a butterfly. Regis. While differing greatly from Malebranche s general theory. in 1674. This attack. so that new organisms are nothing hut a mechanical consequence of a preceding organic constitution as when butterflies come from silkworms. Leibniz. he developed in an empirical direction. Swammerdam has shown to be merely a process of develop ment. lh/&amp. and that its apparent genera development and a kind of growth [aug have noticed also that the author of the Recherche de la Vcritc. on Innate Ideas. Regis. 74.NEW SYSTEM 305 observers of our time.ncls : . the famous anatomist.&amp. G. . . 377. disowned the views of See (Ewcrcs de Dexcaitcs (ed. Descartes and his School. Introduction. pp. Leibniz refers to him on account of his investigations regarding spermatozoa. will be found. of Descartes. 2. iii. ii. of Amsterdam. did much to support Harvey s theory of the circulation of the blood. Jules Simon s ed.gt. Cf. as an observer of insect . Descartes. vol. . in connexion with which he may be regarded as one of the founders of the science of embryology. ch. Method Fischer. iv. . whose philo sophical school at Paris was in 1675 closed by Archbishop Harlay on account of its Cartesian teaching. which M. life.lt.. John Swammerdam (1637-1680). vi. 333. wrote a violent attack upon Leibniz. charging him with injustice towards Descartes. . 140 &quot. Descartes had already given a similar title to one of his writings.ee. Anton van Leuwenhoek (1632-1723 of Delft. Cousin vol. however.).gt. iii. anonymously published. in E.. note vi. based oil the sup. 3 (CEurres. &amp. . bk. writing to Des Bosses in 1709. God has preformed things. In his Eechenlie de la Vt/ifc. Theodic. See Toucher de Leibniz Careil.Nicolas Hartsoeker (1656-1725) was a Dutch physicist.1 Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715^ published his DC la Recite refitde la Verite. in opposition to the idealism of Malebranche. Malebranche uses expressions which indicate a belief in the theory of preforrnation. M. Preface (E.

if men were And in a position to reconstruct the [animal] mechanism 30 . of the organic substance ? This is a most perplexing question. what becomes of these souls or forms at the death of the animal or on the destruction of the individual. 73 and 77. position of perfectly hard atoms in a perfect fluid. Third Explanation of the Neiv Cf. : a des Naizeaux (1711) (E. Monadologij.36 and other able opinion. and from 1706 to 1712 he discussed his philosophy of nature with Leibniz in a correspondence to which Leibniz frequently refers his letters to Des Bosses. System. but that Cf. But there still remained the greater question. note 23 and 21 14. and several similar instances which are sufficient to inform us that there might be other resuscitations. Accordingly I came to the conclusion that there is only one view that can reasonably be taken. though Pliny laughs Democritus spoke (thorough atomist as he at what he said 40 Accord. although the destruction of its grosser parts has reduced it to a minuteness which makes it as little perceptible to our senses as it was before its birth 38 Thus no one can exactly note the real time of death. that which affirms the conservation not only of the soul but also of the animal itself and its organic mechanism . even when the destruction of the organic substance had gone much farther. of Grace. inasmuch as there seems little reason in thinking that souls remain uselessly in a chaos of confused matter 37 . p. matter which 38 39 Cf. namely. may activities be taken for a mere suspension of perceptible and which at bottom is never anything else than this in the case of mere animals witness the re : suscitation of flies buried in which have been drowned and then powdered chalk. The correspondence is given by iii. Principles of Nature and . NEW men have SYSTEM not been very far from this 7. G. Cf. 12. Lettre . which for a time . In 1704 he became Professor of Mathematics and Physics at Dusseldorf. * 6 and is (comparatively) inorganic. Monadology. Plato 535) believed that material things are in a perpetual flux. vii. in 7 That is. 676 b . 483. Gerhardt. 334. apparently it was about something like this that the great was).

: substances&quot. bk. X 2 . to which Leibniz refers in had asked (as an objection to Leibniz s theory of the indestruc what became of the ram which Abraham tibility of animals) The foregoing passage contains 111 sacrificed in place of Isaac. having always been of great penetration living and organic (as some people re are beginning to recognize).. there is nothing but of souls. brief Leibniz s answer. since that it or entirely new begetting [generation]. in the will in strict metaphysical sense. God having provided for of matter cannot make them fully that all the changes And it may lose the moral qualities of their personality. and that consequently. will not destroy it to such a smallness that animal. i of the New System. by Democritus. By &quot. put \ o not come to life again]. who himself did what has hardly know anything about this great man. s occur in his Ilistoria Natural. place of the transmigration a transformation of one and the same animal. n. of organized in one another. iv. \. vii. except GJ been borrowed from him by Epicurus. much higher make laws and are exempt from everything which could of the society them lose the rank [la qiialite] of citizens this so care of spirits [csimts] . contain enfolded a continual succession Leibniz writes: In the First Draft (G. vol. * Monadology. But perhaps Democritus.genuine he appears to have meant only souls. since it will at most reduce In the correspondence with fire can no longer act upon it. . who was not capable The words quoted from limy always taking his best things. should likewise always^ an animal has no first birth main so. And thus. enclosed infinite (which may bo seen from the fact that their seeds. according and more or as its organs are differently enfolded [plies] 41 less developed Nevertheless rational souls follow 8. 474) 72 and 73. it follows have no final extinction or complete death. Arnauld Arnauld. but also of genuine substances continue to exist. of the thorough atomist as he was. not only be said that everything tends to the perfection. (Sillig ed. believed in the conservation animaf also. cap. qui ipw as Plinv says of him reviriscendi promissa Democrilo forth nun m-io-tV [the false opinion of a coming to life again. 55. these created of the universe in general. As the minuteness of organic bodies may L which is and animate bodies). an the most penetrating and violent agent.NEW SYSTEM ingly it 37 is natural that an animal. it is easily seen that even fire. For he taught that there is resuscitation [reviviscence vanitas.

possible/ Heraditi Ephesii Reliquiae. longer regarded as the author of the De Diaeta The passage to &quot. not of each of a plurality of substances. which are destined to such a degree of happiness that the universe is concerned in in it.which (-rrepl SiaiTrjs}.wov -yap cure yiyvcaOai ov &amp. As to the ordinary body to corporeal substances. Jf Set vo^ ioai \fyeiv. far removed from the position of Leibniz.NEW SYSTEM beings in particular. we suppose.gt. They deny change or becoming of TO tV. so far as supreme wisdom can allow. 10. But the views of Parmenides and 74. Monadology. &amp. el KCLL 8o/civ TIIIIV olov oi irepl MtXiGffov T Of. who deny the reality of change or of becoming.gt.s rdAAa \eyovai aAws. except along with all (for how shall it die f) nor can that which is not come thingsbeininto :for whence shall it be?). 42 of animals and other 9. I observed with pleasure that the author of the 43 book DC Diacta (which is attributed to Hippocrates ) had some inkling of the truth. the father of medicine. 4.lt. i. aAA . is no Hippocrates. a\Xa Kal UnpfjLtvi^rjv^ ovs.lt.paoiv ovrf tpddptaOat ruv OVTUV. note 116. Now . .t&amp. 298 14: . la 42 Ha fi none among all things is destroyed. Appendix ii.vffttc&amp. which have hitherto been supposed suffer total extinction and whose changes are de pendent rather upon mechanical rules than upon moral laws. in confounding natural with arbi. I am as ready as man can be to do justice to the moderns. And neither is it possible for an animal to die. TO priKiOTov KOI [I? TO] tXa^iaTov.lt. when he expressly said that animals are not born and do not die and that the things which we suppose to come into being and perish merely appear and disappear. reads cows ordinaire ( usual history ). yet I think they have carried reform too far among other things. E. 44 -De Cae-o. . ^Qopdv ovBlv H&amp. virtue of the Divine goodness which is imparted to each. are very Melissus. but all things grow and diminish to the greatest and to the least that is See Bywater. of yuei/ yap aurwv 6 Acus dvetXov yeveoiv KOL T^i. has corps ordinaire. TWV 76 Swaruv. and there does not come into being that which was not in existence before. This was also the opinion of Parmenides and of Melissus according to Aristotle 4 for these men of old had more worth than . G.

has merely which is not worthy * A machine made by man lias a finite number of organs 01 in relation to the who parts having each a definite function of the whole of a wheel is an organ of the wheel and &amp. on the Plurality of World. lished 1686) was intended It to popularize the This hook (pub1 * ^*** has been several times translated into English.eat annee 1716 VAcadLieSoyale des Sciences de Paris. through not having great think that the difference They the majesty of nature. we find av that. One of his duties of those members o e^rv ve?r Lges or tributes to the memory and among the ablest the year. The tooth machine But the material ire not make up this tooth particles which wheel or the machine. popularizing of is possible. on the no part of it is not an organ other handf is organic throughout machine has really infinite of the whole.lt.hew Bovier de Fontenelle (i6 5 7-i757\ Paris was secretary of the Acadewie des Sciences at as secretary was to prepare from 1699 to 1741. Thus a natural organs of the : &amp. Cf. Nature.lt. and sounds like a parody of Leibniz) that everything Pierre Corneille. had thought.) author of the Entretiens sur la plumlite it less when we look closely at nature. . he main work consis ed i. 64. and moreover of * nei&amp. the Lademy who had died during the Histore to of these papers is his Eloge de Leibniz. ot it.&amp. [admiralle] artistic made by the Divine wisdom and the greatest difference mind [esprit]-tte masterpieces of a limited one of degree. is not possible to destroy i A remains a machine in Bernard le its smallest parts. which is not quite just nor is to oive an idea of nature 47 and that it is only our system which worthy of it is the distance real and immense after all shows how that are between the least productions and mechanisms . but his Inch There is a saying ot his scientific ideas.gt. deal of indifferent verse. but even one of kind. being not merely of to be observed that the machines Accordingly it is * and are of organs nature have a really infinite number all accidents that so well equipped and so proof against natural machine still them. published He wrote a g. and ours is only a difference between nature of size s machines This has lately led a very able man 4 dcs Mondcs&quot. Monaddogy. it being than we wonderful to It seems to me that this merely a kind of workshop. *7 E.NEW ficial SYSTEM 39 enough ideas of things. of Copernicus. m i &amp.a number of organs.gt.lt.

ch. abandoning Also Lettre a Arnauld (1686) (G ii 7 8\ M Cordemoi in order to account for the substantial unity in bodies. to have recourse to atoms his master. arrived independently at an Occasional^ position. concentrated. Cordemoi 50 to give up Descartes and to adopt Democritus s doctrine of atoms in order to find a real unit But atoms of matter are [unite\. and sometimes expanded. . 561) . were. since the invincible attachment of one part to another (even if it could rationally be conceived or would not contrary supposed) 49 When I say &quot. (born early in the seventeenth I Cordemoi! see ng hat compound things must be the result of simple things wa! forced. . besides being still composed of parts. ^Introduction! gave up Descartes as to adopt a theory of atoms.k. to Further. Of. It was this that compelled M. was more devoted to history than to : &amp.**. reason. even though it were frozen solid with all the fish in it. See Kuno Fischer. Leibniz s vii. and it was in this book that he so Tar l&amp. Lettre i century. will always be a pond only but i and Fiwt collection *&amp. army.]f Cordemoi. or as a pond full of fish 49 or as a watch com posed of springs and wheels. about the same time as Geulincx developed his more famous system. a Pnncesse Sophie (1705) (G. .lt. a I speak of one substance flock. however well organized it may be. Descartes andMssZoL in.3 10 NEW SYSTEM it always remains the same machine it originally was. a had become full of fish. by real unity . being merely transformed through different foldings [plis] it receives. however. but he had What the real notion of a substance consists/ Co . 473). there is a which corresponds to what in us is called the Ego but this cannot be the case in regard to the machines of art or to mere material mass. Td 1684 1 a French Cartesian.&quot.gt. Nevertheless if there were no real substantial units [unites] there would be nothing substantial or real in the collection. m ^r m philo- .lt. when we think means of the soul or form. 2 His most important philosophical work is Le discerne ment clu corps et cle dme l6 ( 66l. Cartesian though he was. ^^ ?^i d .M. ii. sometimes it contracted and.I. as that it is lost. . which can be considered only as an army or a flock. felt obliged to admit atoms or indivisible extended bodies older to find fixed to constitute a something simple being Le appears to have recognized something of the truth.

but his disciples. . M. and without them nothing there would be no mult without genuine units \unitcs] real . 68 and M Cf. Ct. I was as it were driven the union of soul and body upon I found no way ot explaining For back into the deep sea. 69. I thought I had to inedita but when I set myself gained my haven. Monaddogy.SYSTEM make one 3 11 &amp. of forms or souls) are indivisible [exact \ points (consisting for us physical point indivisible. Monads. 3&amp. make but one Thus physical points are only apparently but they are are indivisible [exacts]. sine. are the sources absolutely devoid actions^nd of the composite of things the absolute first principles the analysis o elements as it were.gt. the soul or vice versa.- - t D . how the body transmits anything to communicate with another nor how one substance can irom his So far as can be gathered created substance. Monadology. for expressing the universe their points of neware . wntings. lft j^niz says : .U ty f2 Having settled these things. it will no longer be ft being by it will I* something sun ftg .gt.. p. and would be real.. this up-. of of parts. Mathematical points or subs antia None but metaphysical only modalities. the less different from part any that is to say real unite [unite] Only atoms of substance. But when a corporeal substance oi-ans together is contracted all its . Part ii. 60-62. the ultimate m They might be called things am have something of tlie nature of life points they mathematical points and they have a kind of perception. Descartes gave See Introduction.gt. 1&amp.

42 sqq c .. 1U P artj cular t f departments of . *f body on oT &quot. For to do this. Malobran -^HffHwS^^*?^ . is just to have recourse t.gt. o.sdom in conformity with the notion o matter we are 58 dealing with . held th6 qUalitieS f bodl es b God thoughts anse . when ou he that it is od t who we* the body for it And as c Ommunica ti on of motions also appeared to them inconceivable. Oee.. ^y ^ a . Kuno he en .ne w. and. the system e of occas.* r 0y S iS - which has been brought reflexions of the f o called Z) C 5 t miracle reason for thmgs by showing how they are carrie^ out D.v.&quot. without r planation which e of secondary causes. In philosophy we must endeavour o I machine. Part u.onal causes. pp. they of opinion that God gives motion to common f LalrZ Tr 77 M . experience. on the other hand. -- * g M ^SSSlgiS^LbgSgjMigJo admit thatjysjn. y&amp. the soul on occasion of the o ions of matter.NEW seeing that the SYSTEM opinion is inconceivable.

lt. and. renowned a certain person of high between for his piety ). things or rather genuine appearances these internal perceptions in the is forwity to things outside ofJL And thus our inner to say. And Draft fil See Introduction.&amp. m but surprised me. of its organs. 9 E.lt. must come of it in relation to its organs expressing beings outside constitutes which was given to it at creation and which since each of And accordingly.NEW SYSTEM should receive soul or any other real substance possible the the Divine omm-_ from outside.&quot. Kirchmann suggests that this may perhaps refer to reference or But Leibniz uses the phrase. the whole universe these substances accurately represents and from a certain point of view. being only connected phenomena as it were. of from the representative nature (capable say 61 own soul (to adopt the phrase of nothing but God and the intellectual power. Foucher. p. has it ion arises. see M&amp.j)in(JoJofJUt 47iim^ so genuine thai they can 477). As to the spontaneity r of the soul and its ere &amp. written in 1686. (I*. 3 2 ) in a letter to Foucher. . ((+. Fart iii. without any special i. m iif(wcify are 111 feelings [sentiments] (that the finer parts or in the soul itself and not in the brain of external of the body). to it from its original constitution. It is this. and in its own way come the perceptions or expressions of external things virtue of its the soul at their appropriate time. its individual character.gt. I beauties. ^ l&amp. unless through anything potence.gt. . in into * laws. according to the nature and disposition cE has the world. those which well-ordered soul itself that is to dreams&quot. _ 51 or it ?l) that everything must arise any other real unity. First &amp. from its own innerjiature_[/o^s] with___a jperfect a perfect conas regards itself and yet with . one would be observed if they had communication with (i:! &amp. That is. fact which was insensibly led to an opinion which seems inevitable and which.gt.e successfully foreseen. 98 sqq. there will be a perfect agreement which will have the same result as all these substances. iv. that considerable has very great advantages and very God at first so created the soul.: - acknowledgment. as in a world by itself and as if there existed .lt.

ii. with the desires it. a very subtle wind. is ready of at the moment the soul of the corporeal mechanism. E. set aside by the results of microscopic study 2. 10.NEW SYSTEM or of qualities. part i. o^y anatomy. Fischer. ^/u^ be present to the whole Descartes also held that the soul must is in the he maintained that nevertheless there But organism exercises its functions -ore specially body a part in which the soul * of the BOU! being than in any other part/ this special seat Passions. without either of them interfering 65 and laws of the other the animal spirits [les cspnts] moment the right the blood having exactly at that and perceptions motions to correspond to the passions in each the soul -this mutual relationship. according to conversely. ch. such another by a transmission of species 61 Further as the mass of ordinary philosophers suppose the point of view c is as the organized mass. Descartes and his School. 7. by means of lead them to the nerves* and thence can be which they move the body in all the different ways ^ See also articles 11-13. has its seat in the is as is in the near as possible. (Les pineal gland . produces and and alone constitutes the union of soul communication how the soul And in this way we can understand call their body. note Sec Monado ogy. part i. ^7 m m & . 9. which . what we substance in the universe. in which * the soul the soul. art. 64 05 10. articl in the brain. * Animal spirits was the name given by Descartes to certain of which he explained y fine particles of the blood/ by means ^ ^ *ny so that they do not vht h come from a lighted torch the cavities of the brain. prearranged . Dlace and as soon as some of them enter in its substance. moved/ Les Passions de I Ame. since the soul i is in the multiplicity which body as the unit [unite] 61 the resultant of units [unites] body through an immediate presence. which pores others go out again through the pores to the muscles. is more nearly expressed by the laws itself to act. or rather a very pure 7 was name survives in common language. animal spirits are hke MdSwfto* part v. omits by the soul (par elle). and the hypothesis U. where he says that the and vivid flame. bk.

on his hypothesis. all the appearances or expressions it and that without the help of any created progress or change. as tho realm of efficient causes is to that of final causes. &quot. inasmuch as it produces from within itself the series of its states or phenomena but rational souls alone have liberty. Formd conveys the idea of the form or individual unity of the tiling. . y No substance can act upon anything outside of it. naturally to the succession of changes in the universe itself while. Leibniz says . concluding 7In the First Draft. 8 The French is: vn automate spirituel ou fonnd. why might not God nature as in in the beginning give to substance an inner or force which could regularly produce in it an automaton that G8 . : I call this the system of . This adaptation of the body to the soul is the more reasonable inasmuch as bodies are for spirits [esprits] 71 which alone are capable of entering into fellowship with God and Thus as soon as we see that this celebrating His glory. on the other hand. The soul is immediately present to the body and thus has no special seat but is in every Leibniz seeks to part (independently of the part s position) as the unit is in every part of the whole. everything that will happen that is will have. for liberty is action under the guidance of right reason. we see show that. the connexion between soul and body is much closer. as in the phrase substantial form. the body has also been adapted to the soul to fit the circumstances in which the soul is conceived as acting outwardly. without which it would have no 70 force to act And as the nature of the soul is to .NEW 15. the succession of representa tions which the soul produces for itself will correspond . SYSTEM For 315 This hypothesis is very possible. 39 Every substance has spontaneity. 71 That is to say. thing ? This is the more likely since the nature of sub stance necessarily requires and essentially involves a to say. See Monadology. bodies are entirely subordinate to spirits. Thus its action must appear in some internal change. is spiritual or endowed ^vi1/t a lictng principle to l)id free J in the case of a substance which partakes of reason it. represent the universe in a very exact way (though with greater or less distinctness). - hypothesis of agreements [accords] is possible. made only .

to use strict that instead only apparently a perfect independence as physical language. we must rather say that we are clever people have held. may be to the contrary. and that. of saying that we are free only as several apparently and enough for practical purposes. which is nature and independent of whatever appearance there its own perfectly well-ordered by all external contingencies. calling. Part iii. the universe in the way that is most fitted to contribute to the perfection of the society of . Leibniz says Divine perfections for by a participation. There is also here a new and surprisingly clear proof of the existence of God. hold that each spirit should always play its part [faire figure] in lasting.all spirits. iv. ^ For this perfect agreement of^so correspondence He is still feeling for the name (G. independent of every other created the infinite. though limited. 475). expressing the universe. which constitutes their moral union in the City of God. note 49. in the the the agreement among the effects arises from their expressing common cause (G. is thing. we possess 73 This the influence of all other created things regards the immortality of also throws a wonderful light upon . 1 6. which he uses for the the First Explanation of the New Sijstem (1696). Never has any system more completely shown our high Every spirit [esprit] being like a world apart. 74 It is true that this is only In the First Draft. 141 sqq. 73 See Introduction. 476). In addition .C f Principles of Nature and of Grace. There is also this great advantage in our hypo thesis. : . iv.316 also that it NEW SYSTEM is the most reasonable hypothesis and that of the universe it gives a Wonderful idea of the harmony and the perfection of the works of God. Thus we should as the very universe of created things. our soul and the ever unbroken preservation of our individuality. with many substances which have no communication 74 from their common cause one another can come only to all these advantages which this 17. n. meta constrained. - . involving as continuous in its existence and as absolute as sufficient to itself. pp. first time Pre-established Harmony.

p. :&amp. . iii. * Leihni/ opposes the idea that there is a fixed quantity of motion dispersed throughout the universe and passing indifferently r . it may be said that it is a hypothesis. caused hy the. according to the order of the decrees of God) is the substance which. lias aiuse &amp. and it can be rationally understood only in the way I have It is true that w e quite well conceive just mentioned. are also of remarkable service in physics for establishing the laws of motion. &amp. 105 sqq. 76 &quot. G. iv. itself can only be what have just said that These considerations.lt. The expressions of ordinary language also be quite well adapted to it. caused by 77 the motion which is already in it 78 And i cS. and since several great difficulties.lt. of physics it . See Introduction. to explain mechanically but as material mass is not a substance is evident that action as regards I. substance it is. rf. pp. substance upon another is not an emission nor a trans is plantation of an entity as commonly r supposed. : cas . For we may say may whose condition [disposition] explains a change in an intelligible way (so that wr e may hold that it is this substance to which the others have oil this that the substance point been adapted from the beginning. however metaphysical they may appear.lu. has (or the) cause of the. which have hitherto perplexed men s minds [Ics esprits].gt. as our Dynamics will be able to show.NEW hypothesis has in its SYSTEM 317 something more than favour. since it hardly appears possible to explain things in any other intelli gible way. 476). For it may be said that in the impact of bodies each suffers only through its own elasticity. The First Draft has which comes from a motion already existing in it (G. no.a iii. Part K. in matter both the emission and the receiving of parts through which we are entitled all the phenomena 7G . we should consequently conceive as acting upon the others 75 Thus the action of one . seem to disappear of themselves when we rightly comprehend this hypothesis. Part See Introduction. in respect of this change.

pp. the cause of its actual motions. Part iii. One body has motion only in reference to another. and the according to which all the planets move to which the sun hypothesis of Tycho Brahe (1546-1601). See Introduction. bodies real motions.318 NEW SYSTEM as to absolute motion. equally well explained the phenomena i5~i 8 Of. e. with 79 . 369. from one body to another. nothing can determine it mathe in relations. composite. iv. with matically. and such a degree out it whatever number we may arbitrarily assign rest or such of velocity to whichever we like. since all ends [se termine] the result that there is always a perfect equivalence of hypotheses as in astronomy of bodies we take. whether it be in a straight line. and Descartes. according to the supposition which explains the phenomena in the most intelligible for this is in harmony with the notion of activity the pheno being possible for us to be refuted by of motion. [action] 80 which we have here maintained . mena to a circle. in Yet it is reasonable to attribute or way. Each body. according moves round the earth and the other planets move round the sun. as observed at that time. and this release shows itself in the elasticity of their rebound. absolutely) if we wish to determine which of the two really (i. rest. and when two bodies transference of motion from one to the other. and. 204. collide. which is J - . has a force. * See Appendix C. Part iii. to some third body and so ad moves. he would say. we must refer them both The equivalence of hypotheses in astronomy probably infinitum. so that. I I refers to the fact that the hypothesis of Copernicus C 473~ 543) round the sun. G. accordingly. 79 Absolute motion would be motion that is not in any degree But motion must always be determined through relation. 89 sqq. p. Principia. there is not a but a certain release of the pent-up force in each.

. PREFATORY NOTE. established good and useful truths. Gassendi has resuscitated the Sect of Epicurus. I took the liberty of giving : 1 Tlic reference is of course to the letter of Foucher in the Journal das Sai ants. l . as M. 1695 1696. who professed philosophical scepticism and endeavoured to restore the teaching of the later Academics. there appeared a letter to Leibniz from Foucher in which various Simon Foucher objections to the Xetv Si/stem were stated. His curiosity was limited. TN the Journal dcs Sarants for September. In 1697 Leibniz I am grieved at the death of writes to Nicaise (G.EXPLANATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM OF THE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SUBSTANCES. Between 1676 and 1695 Leibniz corresponded with Foucher. Cicero. death was to some extent due to overwork. and even these he did not treat with the accuracy they required. and was directed only to certain somewhat dry matters. (1644-1696) was a Canon of Dijon. Foucher. ii. 1695. discussing in the earlier letters questions regarding the theory of knowledge and in the later Fouchers comparatively early letters questions of Physics. Plato. lie might have advance. BY WAY OF REPLY TO WHAT IS SAID ABOUT IT IN THE JOURNAL OF SEPTEM BER 12. Sextus Empiricus and others might have enabled him to make a real And under pretext of doubting. 566) M. But he ought not to have confined himself to generalities. somewhat as Gassendi sought to interpret anew the doctrines of Epicurus. Perhaps his aim was merely to be the resuscitator of the Academics.

as the Troisieme Edaircissement contains practi cally the which Dutens and whole of s it.) of Foucher in an Explanation of the Neiv System. simile was originally applied the Introduction. iv. Third Explanation of . The (E. 493. and hence Leibniz replied to the objections I lament him. J. S. G. 498). iv. I at in philosophy several years ago. G. although my . s revised In the translation of the Explanations I follow E. all the great Artificer of the universe. iv. but he had perhaps other views of which I did not know enough. 331 note. by means of which all the thoughts and modifi cations which correspond to these motions might successively its arise at the same moment in which the body performs and it will also be granted you that corresponding functions. p. A further Explana was tion (called by Erdmann the Troisieme Edaircissement) I have translated in the Journal for November. 488).) hypothesis I under I recollect. and that on the make a construction in the soul (be it a mechanism of a new kind or not). p. ^ew System. 1696. tions. 365. can so perfectly adjust the organic parts of a man s body. 131. published these two Explanations. gives them as they were origin text (G. or to out the soul having the power to change these motions other hand God can modify them in any way. which appeared in the Journal des Savants for April. 134 sqq. 1696. Feb. )29b weight or the same spring See in this way by Geulincx. (Cf. 1696. 500 sqq. time this is no more impossible than to make two clocks keep so uniformly that at the moment [Jaccorder] so well and go so that strikes twelve. clock B will strike twelve also. G. .320 him my opinion FIRST EXPLANATION as to this . omitting that Erdmann call Second Edaircissement (E. i. of letter of objections there appears the simile over in his immediate reply the clocks. cf. that in compliance with what communicated to you stood to be your desire. which Leibniz passes In Foucher but takes up and develops in the Second and Third Explana Foucher writes: It will be granted you that God. that they may be capable with of producing all the motions which the soul combined with this body will desire to produce in the course of his life. 133. Part ii. Sir. Yet he had much cleverness and subtlety and he was a most virtuous man. ally published (E. clock two clocks to be kept going by the same the we A imagine G.). 43 note cf.

iv. I am not of those with whom the of them committing selves to an opinion takes the place of reason. Nevertheless they still come in time. s text they are not numbered. I do not find the principle of the animal s conscious ness [le principe sensitif] in the arrangement [disposition of its organs and I agree that this arrangement concerns 7 only the bodily mass . of a clock. a . known. to say. that is not enough to make it . In E. as you will find when you are able to that have 2 say you brought any precise and urgent reason against my opinions which apparently has not been your purpose 8 Your intention was to speak as an able Academic and \ thus to give an opportunity for a thorough forward . that extension has no real elements. may be a substance possessing a genuine unity. adds are able to bring forward. 320 Foucher had said: Whatever arrangement [disposition the organs of an animal might have. I should not have caused you to offer the same objections twice over.OF THE the NEW SYSTEM to 321 same time exchange I indicated it resolved to in make . Appendix (E. 6 ultimate ] G. i. . teachable [docile] as I am. In reference to Foucher s philosophical position.e. aggregate [assemblage]. has E. that . s text the paragraphs are numbered. on this occasion. : but I you that I had not yet your opinion of it do not recollect having received I asked objections from you otherwise. principles. extension is I intended to explain here. . are real unities.) Cf. p. is in view quite other than that of an animal for an animal . which you mention. substances possessing a genuine unity G . 8 E. in etendu effcdif] or of bodily mass my opinion. and the paragraphs arc differently divided Foucher had maintained that the essential principles of ex tension cannot really exist. 487. like what is called ego [moi in us while a clock is nothing but an ] The unity my . i 5 . 3. although they come after I have For published. 129 H. when you See Prefatory In G. investigation of things. [I actually extended and these is 2. not the principles of but the principles of that which [I eiendue].

it have reason. iv. elaborate contrivance nature 12 ? Sir. . as a consequence. through not being aware that it follows from view unities my . FIRST EXPLANATION I notice these things in order to prevent misunder standings. substantially different from that of men] because we do not find that the animals make the reflexions which constitute reason and which. 130 a 2 conscious [sensible-] for in short this has to do with nothing but the orsanic and mechanical structure. 488). appear to say that the soul of the lower animals must when you hypothesis of harmony or concomitance still my is possible. In the Remarks sur les Objections de are right in a &amp.T- gether. if we attribute 9 feeling {sentiment] to it that is an inference of which I do not see the 11 proof laudable candour 5. But have a certain you repugnance to it. make the soul capable of personSity The lower animals.With you recognize that 1(l . having perception. reads you make use of an inference E. distinguish good and evf they are not capable of moral good and evil. eanmas *.gt. which presuppose leason and conscience (G. iv.(E. and to show that what you say on this point is by no means contrary to what I have forward appears that you do not make me out to be wrong in requiring genuine unities. and as . 6. 492). Accordingly you ask. allow to them reason. . But Thus brought . for everything in my theory is regarding connected t&amp. also. reads force/ 2 Foucher s question is: Of what use is all this great elaborate -ontnvance among substances.lt. Monadology. we ev. and in consequently rehabilitating the substantial forms. Cf. unless to make us believe that they act upon one another. it is not without ground that the Cartesians acknowledge that if we allow to the animals a principle of consciousness. doubtless because you think that it is purely arbitrary. does not have this sentence Toucher wrote After all. discrimination and judgment (E 129 b G. : m . producing the knowledge of necessary truths or science.3 22 4. capable of distinguishing good from o rom evH. and I do not see that you tri buting to the lower animals a principle of conscioC ness substantially different from that of men 129 b G iv 488 L. 25-30 E. this exact mutual correspondence of reHeS: ue o the animals a principle of nrnc f consciousness. although this is not the case? (E. of what use is all this which I attribute to the Author of As if one could attribute too if much contrivance lim.

. in his letter of objections. 7. that is what I have already said &quot. which the soul. before we admit it. . 15 E. whence it comes that God does modifications of the soul. 13 Has Leibnix shown that ? his pre-established This elaborate contrivance. iv. has I shall be asked. 492). but a thing cannot but be there no need to ask of what use it is. The answer is easy. he says harmony cannot . it is said. is necessary because all substances are the effect of a supreme wisdom and it was not otherwise possible (at any rate in the order of nature and without miracles) to bring about their inter dependence and the changing of one by another or in consequence of another.OF THE NEW SYSTEM 323 at substances. through the special laws which each has the beginning received. which makes each substance correspond to all others. The question was put by Foucher Y 2 . It nevertheless remains true that they act upon one another. is the incommensurability of the side with I reply in the second place. I might refer to I reply. about which we are not liable to make mistakes as He was not obliged to avoid the system of the earth s motion. 14 See Monadology. when ] Of what use the diagonal ? 8. which seems out of accord with the fitness of things. which is incon ceivable. It was God s will that there should 15 Again. hut be In the Eemarques already quoted. so there are also laws of nature in souls or forms and the . provided we give a right sense to these words. or to a new intervention of God. can neither more nor know. that this correspondence of use in explaining the communication of substances and the union of the soul with the body. note 10. were not a thing most admirable in itself and worthy of its Author You ask also what ! advantage I find in it. almost all astronomers fell until Copernicus (G. . I am asked not think it enough to produce which I have just indicated. through the is laws of nature which have been established from the first [par avance]. without having recourse either to a transmission of species u [qualities!. in order to save us from the error into which : . meaning 9. of these laws is that all the thoughts and without these useless bodies. God is not obliged to make a system. For it is to be observed that as there are laws of nature in matter. 7. first. . .

and rightly it is that most true to say that substances act upon one the cause of another. which the Divine wisdom has established -. objection bodies. moving . and as a Copernican speaks truly of the a Platonist of the reality of matter. 13. although this knowledge other. no 20 Toucher says that. and it lfi He thought spond 10. No substance 1T co-operate 11. i e the qualities of bodies.FIRST EXPLANATION be more substances rather than fewer. that ulti (the answer he would have given so that to ask why there mately all bodies are souls or Monads. on Leibniz s hypothesis. even although action of the motion took place in bodies [in harmony with the such a motion the soul would nevertheless always think that soul] think they ai does take place in the same way as sleeping people their limbs their limbs and walking. has I will even raise no objection against saying. See Principia. while nevertheless 18 17 E. which those of the other corporeal substances. these are real.lt. animals surround us (G iv. has E . to As sensations. . The lethargy [action] which is based on the supposed which would be without activity while the soul believes them to be in motion. 19 as they are perceived by our senses. are bodies is to ask why there are other &amp. &amp. : sufficient ? they all co-operate. provided we other in consequence of the laws of the changes in the understand that one is harmony. facts of consciousness. according there but as qualities of bodies they are confused and Descartes 66-70. from saying that the soul moves the body rising of the sun. Part i. of cannot hold because of this very unfailing correspondence. Jmoiv bodies. upon the I will not even shrink . arises 18 without any influence of the one 12. fore unreal. of the soul should corre right that these modifications to something outside . in the same way I hold we . 19 provided a Cartesian of the reality of sensible qualities understand them. 493 are in our bodies and in those which to the difficulty This last sentence indicates Leibniz s real answer in later years\ viz. Is the answer souls. I am towards they are all made to the plan of God. r Bodies were necessary so that In the Eemarques Leibniz says and souls but also there might be produced not only our unities and plants.lt. fulfilling not also far from admitting that the soul docs is useless .

That is. having invented of it. useless. 130 a . and is idle. activity which reference everywhere. at rest and do not move at all. It is usually enough that a hypothesis be proved a posteriori. I should have more I . and all systems appear l/j way of afterthought [viennent aprcs coup]. I airs is meant is that. a new have delighted because of to its make use rather myself have found any usefulness in it. in order to safeguard phenomena or appearances but I do not see what are the . though nevertheless these idle and masses would bo inactive and would remain in a. (J. 489). that you have so bad an opinion of me as to attribute to me these thoughts. as is actually this is rather a commendation of the hypo than an objection to it. principles in favour of which I am said to be prejudiced and which I wish to safeguard.s lethargy 21 (E. souls would always continue to be persuaded that their bodies move in obedience to their volitions. . But perhaps what opinion. There is I maintain it even . were constructed merely to safe guard certain principles ? All hypotheses are made with a special purpose in view. if I were so fond of novelties.in- to give novelty than because I am not sure.gt. tlicse opinions were formed ivith a special purpose and that these systems. by being adequate to but when there are in addition other the phenomena reasons for it. more I fully than does the received philosophy because hold that there no body without motion. and that. and these a priori. Sir. NEW SYSTEM is 325 I have no knowledge of these to \action~\ inactive masses. So. when wide awake. appearing by way of after- thought [vcnant aprcs coup]. and made. it is so much the better. . If it is meant that I am led to hypothesis also my by reasons the case thesis . iv. is it not : evident that in view. i 7. 15. but includes tendency or the active potentiality of observed force. For you know that I love truth. a priori or by fixed principles. -continual usele&amp. 1 6. Sir. no sub stance without force [effort]^. force which is not necessarily observed. I do not understand the nature of the objection that is contained in the words In truth.OF THE 14.

the nature and of resistance may be inferred. and what follows speaking. my view. uses the expression 10 157 b G. transeuntes creaturarum adiones. 7. where Leibniz (1698% 24 E. This is the first use of the term by Leibniz. lest those who know which we should should give to your words a meaning 22 it will be enough to say. . will find that I have already put these questions Academics have applied what and I is am not sure that your more rigorously and 22 a3 effectively good in their method I strongly than I 2G . note 26 We ought to observe the laws of the Foucher wrote forbids us to put in question Academics. You say. that you knoiv there are still many questions can le decided. c manente] [faction would and that I thought that the use of my hypothesis the most able be evident. 25 I0 See Monadology. That is. But. from and of a liarmony pre-cstablislicd^ (if I may use the word). rightly but in all substances the substance itself. difficulty in this. (E. It is true that. in . the second of which almost all matters which we clearly see cannot be settled. 510). that in my opinion not like . As I have explained what activity [action] of force [effort] 19.326 FIRST EXPLANATION them especially those whose sound eagerness to produce me less ness is recognized. only in them in other substances takes place only in virtue 1 8. iv. before those which But perhaps you . owing to the difficulty which our time have found as to the inter philosophers of is relation [esprits] [communication] and and even of bodily substances with one another: have found some I do not know but that you yourself of minds and bodies. . as are those of which we have been speaking not that these questions - : . and passivity [passion] are. reads contrary to my intentions. it transeunt activity impossible otherwise to explain 23 in conformity with the laws of nature. there are forces [efforts] these forces [efforts] are. activity which apparently passes beyond the substance It is the same thing as itself and has effects in other substances. See De ipsa Natura the influence of one substance upon another. transmission of in no wise by a real influence or by the some species or quality 25 . Sir. to be ^vc have been discussing put.

fo philosophers I will add a further reflexion. which seems to me and use of my system better helpful in making the reality in that M. Introduction. break this in saying that out of it (which is certainly ingenious) and direction and between motion Nevertheless. Descartes believed You know understood. in the body in consequence changes which take place because they seemed of modifications of the soul. the same of moving force. the pre-established that there harmony . p. Part m. infallible mark ot truth. the same quantity of motion the conservation of in this but I have It has been shown that he was wrong conservation of shown that it is still true that there is m . 59and Introduction. . but also of quantity I have discovered moving in because they are soluble only arc absolutely insoluble. but that this and that it is of the course of the animal spirits. and I would that your mend what you say to think of it as lead our example may &quot. instead of which he put quantity perplexed motion. and proved.m 10 in an agreement as to the from first principles should confine themselves to demonstrations om often? Cf. 89. but by which requires that philosophers should beg. See Monadolvgy. p.OF THE NEW SYSTEM 32 7 from first to demonstrate truths approve of seeking than people think. I have often&quot. bodies. there is in saying that the soul gives difficulty in this as to unless with me you have recourse motion to bodies. note 127. Part ii. m . but it is to be observed which is another law of nature. and useful it is more principles: Thus I com in practice. 80. and which M. put this precept on this point. Descartes not only of the same namely that there is conservation the same quantity of force. was unaware ot. 28 It is true that take place way that voluntary motions acts so as to made no attempt to explain how the soul he for there seems as much change the course of bodies. he was we must distinguish nor diminish the moving that the soul cannot increase the direction or determination it changes force. .nand i cert-iin order. . But he thought he had found a way law.

considering all these That is bodies together. full explanation. . A . . Nevertheless this quantity of progression differs from quantity of motion in this way. Epistola ad Bernoullium (1696. reads rers quclqne cote. that while the soul cannot increase or diminish body the quantity of motion in the world. but also of the same directing force and the same quantity of direction in the same lines [_ad easdem paries]. n.328 the world. And indeed I prove that there is conservation not only of the same absolute force or quantity of action in the world. Math. drawing any straight line you please. with diagrams. 243. the same quantity of progression. e. which is no less beautiful and inviolable than the law of the conservation of absolute force The quantity of progression would [virtus] or power of action. although I can deduce and demonstrate directing force from the sole consideration of absolute power. note 48. and taking also such bodies and so many of them as you please. its direction being taken into account and the quantity of pro - 9 . and not by the square of the velocity [mv. now be called a projection of the quantity of motion. deserved as . without omitting any of those which act upon any one of those which you have taken. being as good and as general as the other. not mu ]. he erred through not knowing this new law of ours regarding the conservation of the quantity of direction. you will find that. will be found in the appendix to Buutroux s edition of the Monadologie. the amount of progression :0 of those which go in the opposite direction This law. E. FIRST EXPLANATION of direction in ivhatever line [de quelque cote] we take it in to say. i. 108 note): In the next place it is to be observed that I make a distinction between absolute force and directing force. Cf. See Principles of Nature and of Grace. there will always be the same amount [quantite] of progression in the same direction [du mcme cote] in all lines parallel to the straight line you have taken observing that the total amount of progression is to be calculated by sub tracting from the amount of progression of the bodies which go in the given direction. (G. it can nevertheless increase or diminish the quantity of direction of the [animal] spirits. E. Therefore when Descartes thought that he could safeguard the soul s power of acting on the in this way. iii. that when two bodies are moving in opposite directions their total quantity of motion (in the Cartesian sense) is to be got by adding together the quantity of motion of each (calculated as the mass into the velocity) but the quantity of progression is to be got by subtracting the one from the otber for in such a case the difference between the quantities of motion will be the quantity of progression.!0 gression being counted equal to the mass multiplied by the 2 velocity.

407). and the surfaces. without our it. the number \ in the abstract is a perfectly simple ratio [rapport]. as in the case of 4 E. are nothing but relations of order or orders both as regards that which actually exists and as regards the possible thing that might be put in place of that which exists. according to my in which there is conservation of force and system direction. iv. G. iv. ON THE ELEMENTS OF EXTENSION. the breach of the law] is avoided by my system. strictly speaking. Again. &amp. APPENDIX H. : reference to everything which 31 is possible. can be further broken into two-fourths or four-eighths and so on ad infinilum. And it is also in this way that mathematical points are to be regarded they are merely modalities. reads and this i. not at all formed by the compounding of other fractions. to 3 . lines and points that can (E. or the masses of which these abstract lines indicate the relations. for instance \. and this is so. it has ties. that is to say extremi And as in the abstract line all is indefinite. notwithstanding the changes which take place in body in consequence of changes in the soul. Fouclier (G. Thus they have no ultimate component And as has. Extension or space. being able to reach the absolutely smallest fractions or to conceive the number as a whole formed by the combination of ultimate elements.APPENDIX little II 329 be broken. . ONE of Foucher s objections to the Neiv System was based on the contention that extension has no ultimate real elements In some Itenwrques xur les Objections The author of the 490) Leibniz replies objection does not seem to have rightly understood my view.oT^co^existence. elemenfs^[^&amp. one-half.lt. since compounding takes place only in concrete things.gt. 129 a . so it is with a line which can be divided. L o.75ic^ l]j any more than number a broken number. although in numbered things there is equality between two-fourths and And we may say as much regarding an abstract line. just like this number. : be conceive~d in &quot.lc ^f. and none of the natural laws of bodies are broken.

H.&quot. cannot be formed by f .t - nf r fInV ? Ot * hus ^PO^ed. * c the things.** p. &quot.. m if y &quot. .. .ties. or as if there were no simple an&amp. gl egation of polnts have usually made the mistake of * PmnaiJ 6lements of -^tantial as . f DOSSlble ^ realities.33 APPENDIX H contim. .gt. - are likewise compound) besides that which . that the number of simple substances which enter into &quot. &quot.lt. Those h e posed the iine to be ave h for the sought f primary elements in ideal things or relation.&quot.l ar re eSS DUmber &quot. * *&amp.1 the Une &quot. 1V for they ce with oider of what is ideal the same is the case with th .

L. I think the matter may be made intelligible to minds of every kind by the following illustration. PROPOUNDED TO THE MATHEMATICIANS BY ONE OF HIS FRIENDS. REGARDING HIS PHILOSOPHICAL HYPOTHESIS AND THE CURIOUS PROBLEM. 1 2 1696. L. such a motion as it wills occurs. which is omitted by G. Therefore He bound together these most diverse things (the motion of matter and the choice of my will). and having found it of value. SOME learned and acute sidered friends of mine having con my new hypothesis on the great question of the union of soul and body. .EXTRACT FROM A THIRD EXPLANATION LETTER OF M. 3 Suppose two clocks or two watches which perfectly E.D. have asked me to give some explanations regarding the objections which have been brought against it and which arose from its not having been rightly understood. Himself also formed my will. 3 See Prefatory Note. Nicholas Hartsoeker. so that when my will wills. Geulincx s use of the simile is as follows My will certainly does not move the moving power that it may move my limbs but lie who imparted motion to matter and laid down laws for it. M. lias Third Explanation. and on the other hand when 1 2 : . WITH AN EXPLANATION RE GARDING SOME DISPUTED POINTS IN PRECEDING JOURNALS BETWEEN THE AUTHOR OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PHYSICS AND THE AUTHOR OF THE OBJECTIONS. D. is a pseudonym of Leibniz.

gt. Now that may happen mutual in- way in the astonishment. first consists m keep time together three ways. He attached two large pendulums to the same piece of wood. . that of accuracy. ascertained on trial by the late M. influence. was great . but as these different vibrations could not particles of &quot.33 2 THIED EXPLANATION The [s accordcnt]. The continual swinging of these pendulums imparted similar vibrations to the &amp. Huygens to his . own luence of each clock upon the other. the second/in the care of a man who looks after them the third in their .d The first way.

that is to say. the third way will be to skill \pendulcs] at first with such r [consentcmcnt]. that even when their swinging was deliberately disturbed they soon came to it swing together again. in which it is reasonable that God should intervene only in the way in which He supports [concourt a] all the other things of nature. two put the soul and the body in place of the Their agreement [accord] or sympathy will The ivay of in also arise in one of these three w^ays. somewhat like two stretched strings Tlic second way of making two clocks (even though they be bad ones) constantly keep time together would be to put them in charge of a skilled workman who should keep them together from moment to moment. I call this the way of assistance. Finally. each substance is yet in harmony with the other. make the two clocks and accuracy that we can be sure that they w ill always afterwards keep time This is the way of pre-established agreement together. by a kind of wonder. Now cannot conceive material particles or immaterial species or qualities which can pass from one of these substances into the other. but as we clocks.OF THE NEW SYSTEM 333 continue in their proper order. or as if God were continually putting His hand . is that of the system of occasional is causes but I hold that this to introduce Deus ex machina in a natural and ordinary matter. so regular and accurate a manner that by merely follow ing its own laws which were given to it when it came into being. unless the pendulums kept time together. that are in unison. the way of the harmony pre-established by a con trivance of the Divine foresight. Tl i e way of assistance . without interfering with one another. fluence is that of the common philosophy. happened. Thus there remains only my hypothesis. which has from the beginning formed each of these substances in so perfect. just as if there were a mutual influence between them. we are obliged to give up this opinion.

6 T The Second Edaircissement reads is skilful enough. Now all these scruples cease. For since hitherto we have been obliged to explain their inter-relation [communication] by a kind of miracle. in pro And supposing that portion to the skill they have. do not exhaust the possible hypotheses. 8 I have omitted two paragraphs dealing with a purely mathe matical problem. G. note 36. Sir. 499). instances even among men. currence]. 10 Foucher. See New System. it is very evident that this is the best way and the most worthy of Him. part of which is printed as the Second Edaircissement. . we have con stantly given occasion to many people to fear that the distinction between mind and body is not so real as people think. But now you see clearly. God is able to make use of this means. Leibniz three ways seems rather to have prided himself on emphasizing. that no one has established their independence more completely than I. are in reality quite independent and separate from one If this be not admitted his proof breaks down: the another. since our reasons for maintaining it are so far-fetched. 8 . The reference is probably to such arguments as those which * he afterwards gave in the Monadology.334 upon them. iv. THIED EXPLANATION in addition to His general support [con I do not think that I need offer 5 any further proof unless I should a position of which G be required to prove that God is in to make use we have of this contrivance of foresight. Leibniz You had a suspicion that my explanation would be irre says concilable with the great difference which. by his hypothesis. 9 Hartsoeker. Let me say a word about the dispute between two very clever people. have also other proofs of it 7 but they are deeper and it is unnecessary to adduce them here It is true that I . or soul and soul. 5 It should be observed that Leibniz s argument from analogy proceeds upon the assumption that body and soul. there : is between mind [esprit] and body. in our opinion. the difference between body and soul. 134 b. 6. the author of the recently-published Prin ^ 10 ciples of Physics and the author of the Objections (which appeared in the Journal of August 13 and elsewhere\ because my hypothesis serves to bring these controversies I do not understand how matter can be to an end. (E. In the post script to a letter to Basnage de Beauval (1696).

holding that all our ideas including those of external objects) are merely modifications of ourso ves and that. 14 Frai^ois Bernier (d. thinkable. And it number of parts accordingly I often say that each body. admitted already excellent mathematicians have Nevertheless I do not regard the solidity of bodies as a primary quality. and if it is so. but as a consequence of motion. fact. I do not know what I even hold that matter meant by being extended 12 is essentially an aggregate. parts of matter which are perfectly hard or of invincible solidity while. is a world number. and consequently that there Thus it is by reason. Introduction. and I hope that Dynamics will show in what this consists. I as little believe that there is a perfectly 1S and fluid matter opinion is that each body is fluid . merely by the senses. part of matter) is divided into a greater I hold it ultimately nothing but a collection as true that matter (and even each than it is possible to imagine. Bcrnicr specially devoted a i. still said that an equal quantity of motion. o. is probably to the views of Foucher. an idea must be like it. that is to say. on the other hand. and not are always actual parts.OF THE as NEW SYSTEM 335 extended and yet without either actual conceived 11 or ideal parts. opposite. was more famous as a traveller The reference l:i . I which nnntules. is always conserved . the atoms combined forming tangible bodies. is . . Lettrcs ct Opuscules incdits dc Leibniz. 1688. however small of creatures infinite in may be. See Foucher de Careil. Thus I do not believe that there are atoms. in the Car for I have proved the tesian sense. and it. who denied that the essence of matter is extension. believe I can intelligibly answer all the doubts u has the late M. my in comparison with more solid bodies and solid in com I am surprised that it is parison with the more fluid. that we judge that it is divided. Hartsoeker s theory was that the ultimate elements of things are perfectly hard atoms in a perfect fluid. or rather that it is [multitude]. as the understanding of or consistence my my In to 11 12 culties hypothesis will also serve to remove several diffi which still engage the attention of philosophers. in order to represent an object. &c. while the fluid transmits light.

and the Mo gl . a re afterwards to Cashmir He assisted BoiSau ^^^11^^ Tn P p hyslclan . * t . . THIRD EXPLANATION and those who will think out what I have rmerly published will perhaps find that they already have the means of making this answer.33 6 book. AuruBgzebe).l.

written 23. 83 b Calculo 36-48 of the philotophico (see . 70 and 72. but it remained unpublished until 1840. not as the soul is dominant in me or rather as the ego only itself is dominant in my body. expand about 1685. J)e Scientia Universal! sea G. For the sense . Monadology be regarded as a condensation of the main of this Essay On ike Ultimate Origination of Things. 147 sqq. there BESIDES the world or the aggregate of finite things is a certain unity [unum] which is dominant. 1 Cf. 1697. and is thus the ultimate reason of things. vii. 200). November have been intended for the Ada Eruditonttu . when Erdmann in cluded it in his edition. reads and. and some of the chief doctrines of the Theodicee are may given in outline. The Ultimate Origination of Things G. It 1697. . vii.ON THE ULTIMATE ORIGINATION OF THINGS. THIS paper. may in Latin. but also in a much higher For the dominant unity of the universe not 2 only rules the world but constructs or fashions it. is given by E. 302 sqq. ing what he had already said in a paper written to which Erdmann gives the title. argument In the latter part of the Essay we have a vindication of the optimism of Leibniz (that this is the best of all possible worlds). E. is dated by Leibniz. Leibniz here explains the function of the principle of sufficient reason in his philosophy. It is higher than the world and. 2 E. extramundane. PREFATORY NOTE. notes in and 115. Monadology. so to speak. .

this reason is.33 8 ON THE ULTIMATE cannot be found either in the whole aggregate and suppose that a book of the sufficient reason of existence particular thing or in series of Let us things. any elements of geometry existed from all eternity and that in succession one copy of it was made from another.gt. and written in also true of the why of that state sort. notes 64 and 67. and these. For in eternal things. in Leibniz s are it. always ask why such books have at all times that is book by the book from which it was copied. if it be supposed that they succeed 3 things = essences Ihe possible things necessary 40 and 43. as we shall presently see. why What is books at all. cause. the reason why there why this world rather than some is other. Xonadobgy. You may where. in none of which do you find the sufficient reason. and as even any number . Aristotle s aXnov (which is wider than our cause ) and the German Grund. of worlds does not in the least help you to account for them. for permanent . it s evident that although we can account for the never reach a complete reason for because it. in some a . 4 By permanent things is meant things that are not contingent. the succeeding state is. reason of things. you never find in it the complete copy any world and to say. language. sufficient reason of . to say. nevertheless. sought one another from all eternity. &amp. that exists which precedes it. or contingent things is not changing olute principle. it is evident that the reason must be else indeed suppose the world eternal but as you suppose only a succession of states. the prevailing of inclinations 5 which con1 8 is F^M? be eternal cannot ha ve a cause in time. we could present we can existed. to whatever earlier you go back. whose opposite would be self-contradictory Cf. Therefore. in spite of certain laws of change. this way. but there must still ? some reason (other than a cause in time) for its existence Cf. is necessity itself or essence 4 but for the series of changing things. true of books is different states of the world for. things. even though there be no there must be a reason 3 which. going back through as many books as we like.

For the necessity . it one Being of whose essence has metaphysical necessity. the necessity which arising out of the natures on its members. the aggregate of which states or the series And thus we must go beyond constitutes the world. Cl. that things must happen in it just as they all must be in something root of fore. the opposite 6 but in inclining of which involves a contradiction it is manifest that even by sup From this reasons. according the the later things of the world are determined by or metaphysical of absolute earlier. different of things. . relative) or physical necessity. in the E reads p. of actual things. but over the bad or un a superiority of the good or desirable The balance or desirable in things which come to pass. or metaphysical ne something which is absolute Absolute or metaphysical necessity is a necessity that contrast with hypothetical independent of actual things. in an existing of any existing thing is to be found only which follows that there must exist one Being thing. that is to say. is Even though the world be taken as eternal. gives it. but not absolutely it follows nature of the world being such as it is. tho&quot. since the ultimate and since the reason which has metaphysical necessity. and it therefore presupposes some one whose will 6 cessity. to which the physical or hypothetical necessity. absolutely necessitating it) to create seems to have been omitted per incur lam. The word contradictionem Neither E. ultimate God 7 . present world is necessary physically That is to say. the world. its necessity not on that account absolute or compelling but merely inclining ed.ORIGINATION OF THINGS sist 359 not in necessitating reasons. is which is necessity (conditional. a system of compossible things imposes Introduction. that is to say. inclines the will of God (without preponderance of goodness these contingent things. to something which is 8 which a reason cannot be given. of or hypothetically. reasons of an absolute and metaphysical necessity. the There do. nor G. Part ii. we cannot escape the posing the eternity of extramundane reason of things. 67. or metaphysically. the world lie hid in some Accordingly the reasons of from the concatenation of thing extramundane. Z 2 .

the world. Part i. with equal right tend to existence 12 in of proportion to the . produced with the the place. cli. Cf. different 10 sity . and G. which is manifestly a slip for E. from the very fact that there exists something rather than nothing. so that. or in proportion to the degree of per fection which belongs to them. always in things a principle of determination according to maximum and minimum. 36 sqq. note 64. essentiam. and See 3 s. there must be loss or limitation. 41 and 54. see Critique of Pure Reason. read . . bk. Monadology. that is. out in the distinction between Substance as id Spinoza quod in se est and Mode as id quod in alio est. for essence or possibility is there the lay 9 14 maximum effect is And the time. instance. Transcendental Dialectic. Yet the world is the best possible world in the sense that it existentiam. ii. But if there is to be a world at all. 13 &amp. we must first observe that. there is a certain need of existence or. Indeed. in a word. Both E. arise temporal. a claim to exist. 40. minimum a word. 2 2. 10 For Kant s criticism of the cosmological proof of the existence of God. Ethics. contingent or physical truths. or. there would be no variety. things expressing essence or possible reality. deff. All would be one splendidly null perfec tion. s 11 12 Cf. which as we admitted and showed. most evident that out of the infinite possible combinations and series of possible things there exists that one through which the greatest amount of it Hence is is brought into existence. Monadology. possibility or essence itself. it follows that in or to explain more distinctly how essential or metaphysical truths there But from eternal or quantity essence or reality. Monadology. For perfection is nothing but quantity of essence 1! . has no metaphysical neces to exist . Cf. corrects the error in his Errata.lt. so to speak. that essence of itself tends to existence n From this it further follows that all possible things. in possible things. for if the elements of the world were not in different degrees limited. Fourth Antinomy. 14 Outlay or cost is in itself loss or limitation.34 it ON THE ULTIMATE is and thus there must exist something from that plurality of beings.

the it is 1G must pass into rather than nothing ). you you the end kept out of yourself in and compelled to leave empty some refractory spaces more spaces than you otherwise haw intended and some which you might which the Yet there is a definite method by filled most easily most complete filling up of the spaces may no So if we have to draw a triangle. the natural or essential ideal possibility. just possible order ay is to is superior to not-being (that given that being should exist that there is a reason why something over limitation or of the -reatost balance of perfection at the minimum i. easiest . the maximum of advantage to which Leibniz In this sense the principle of the best. no further So if once or shortest way will be chosen. it will be an other determining condition being given. and if a line is to be drawn from equilateral triangle condition being assigned.lv is to the individual Monad) might with its activity or or matter of the world. which has no units actual world may express an is to the world what This limiting receptivity or capacity (which be regarded as the the bo. passivity ! and of Grace. or that possibility is though nothing further actuality. to be built as fittingly [warn commodissime] to the fitness while the variety of forms corresponds the number and of the building and to [commoditas] The whole matter may be likened elegance of its rooms. to be filled up according find make use of some ingenious contrivance.may here receptivity or capacity which the world on sidered as the outlay or ground as possible. of cost of determination according to onstntly refers. one point to another. be accomplished. 7. discover among actual not merely the order which we order which is a condition ot possible things things. is a principle That the cost should be minimum s d over evif way of stating the law of parsimony limits within which the That is.e. unless to definite rules. but the Of i Principles of Nature &quot. there must of the the capacity of time and space (that is. are all the spaces on a board to certain games in which so that. it follows that. sidering 17 as tiles are put together of existing ).ORIGINATION OF THINGS 34 : be con of the world. in contrast taken as a i? nax mum Me and minimum. e . con exist as much as is possible determined.

So among all angles the determined [fixed] angle in geometry is the t angle-. so perfection or degree possible m . so in the case of the former there is produced a world in which the greatest number of possible things comes into existence. and as in the case of the latter there is produced a motion which involves the greatest possible fall of the heavy bodies. And thus we have physical necessity coming from metaphysical necessity for although the world is not metaphysically necessary. that of a sphere But best of all is the illustration we get in ordinary mechanics.342 ON THE ULTIMATE in such a way that as in a given area. so all weights by an equal right tend to fall proportion to their gravity. the determination of the greatest quantity takes place]. it is nevertheless physically necessary or so determined that its opposite involves imperfection or moral absurdity. For as all things by an equal right tend to exist in proportion to their reality. many as possible may be contained wonderfully made known to us how in the very origination of things a certain Divine mathematics it Thus is 1 employed and the greatest quantity is brought into existence [lit. f S me SUch ^&quot. the resultant motion is that which produces the greatest fall on the is etaphysical mechanics whole-.S-ent as we have in . so that its opposite involves a contradiction or logical absurdity. and so also liquids put into heterogeneous media take the form of greatest capacity. when several heavy bodies act against one another. where. And as possi the principle of essence.

for from a principle of wisdom or perfection. but that they exist call it) of ideas. in God. but to be sought in metaphysical necessities or eternal truths. Or ground. and the wiser a man is the more is he determined towards that which is He acts most perfect 21 But. and since existing things can come only from existing things. all things in the 21 Cf. but possibilities to existence or apart from it are imaginary or fictitious 22 and therefore no reason of existence is to be sought in them. the source and of the existence of other things. say. p. 46 and belongs to contingent things. Monadvloyy. you will . as distinct from existence in the acfual world. That this is not a mere gratuitous assertion of mine is shown by the existence of the actual series of things. as 5 we have already remarked. however beautiful may seem this me comparison of a certain metaphysical determining mechanism of heavy bodies. 44. in God Himself. eternal truths must have existence in some absolutely or* metaphysically necessary subject. 23 E. reality or existence in 22 - His un /crNlandiny. that is to say. through whom these things which would other wise be imaginary are (to use a barbarous but expressive 24 word) realized And indeed we actually find that . 47. chanism with the physical it nevertheless fails in this respect that heavy bodies or essences anterior really exist and act. 145. note 75. although He does all things determinately. roads and. 43. Indifference springs from ignorance. That is to say. Introduction. at the same time it is manifest how the Author of the world is free. that is. God gives them a certain . which Cf. For since of all essence the reason of the series is is not to be found in itself. as has been shown above.ORIGINATION OF THINGS of essence (through 343 which more things are compossible Whence the greater it is) is the principle of existence. Part iii. I reply that neither these essences nor what are called eternal truths regarding these essences are ficti in a certain region (if I may so tious.

&amp. and that they are even superior to the purely geometrical laws of as to is to . of eternal truths. Monadology. power. the state of yesterday rather than that of 28 to-day. Kirchmann translates from this source. was explaining the laws of motion. say. the actual system of things one and therefore from the On Janet s . since through Him not only the existing things which the world contains but also possible things have reality. p. are present in a wonderful way through out the whole of nature. astonishment I found when my great in the material view. which matter. 39. . That is to its ! Janet translates \T ! f/? world itself. since it does not appear why one state of the world rather than another. should flow from it It is also manifest all . higher. not only geometrical but also metaphysical. activity. that is. not only in accordance with material necessities but (which have just explained) why a world exists rather than not. that they are being and have been produced by it. and why it exists thus rather than otherwise reason (a also in accordance with formal reasons 25 . Accordingly we have the ultimate reason of the reality both of essences and of existences in one Being who is necessarily greater. and older [antcrius] than the world itself. instead of 26 27 reasons/ is See Appendix 351. source is one. so that. reads l necessities I. Of. And this is not only true in general as regards the reason we be found only in the tendency of possible things to exist) but also when we come down to par ticular things we see that metaphysical laws of cause.344 ON THE ULTIMATE world take place in accordance with the laws. as I have elsewhere more fully ex 20 I was ultimately plained compelled to give up the law of the geometrical composition of forces [conatus] which I had maintained in my youth when I had more belief I .lt. inter-connexion of these things 27 But it is manifest that from this source existing things continually come forth [promanare]. h r rence is not q uit e clear. But this ultimate reason can be found only in one source on account of the how 25 E.

29 30 Cf. 47. or. but it is also. the passage 1 . but also His wisdom and goodness in the constructing of it 29 . that that series of things has come into existence in which the greatest amount of reality is is actually manifested. but also that the world most perfect morally because genuine moral perfection is phy 30 sical perfection in minds [mentes] themselves. Felicity is to persons what per Paper without a title (1686) (G. while the world is most perfect metaphysically* means that the world as a whole is the most perfect possible.lt. and how He manifests not only His greatness and power in the mechanism of the world as already con structed. Thus (cf. and not from the world itself. in whose nature is to be found 1n sufficient reason of all and of each. iv. interpretation. the best commonwealth. how not efficient but also the final cause of things is in Him. Monadology. allowing the latter. that is to say. Physical here means natural or according to the specific nature (tpixn^ of the thing in contrast with metaphysical in the sense of absolute. Where fore the world is not only the most admirable mechanism. So also genuine moral perfection is physical perfection in minds them selves means that the specific natural perfection of mind is moral perfection. any one should think that we are here con founding moral perfection or goodness with metaphysical And lest perfection or greatness and. fection is to beings. the moaning would be that each state of the world comes from God by a continual creation. 31 Cf. it is to be observed that it follows from what has been said not only that the world is most perfect physically. Both inter pretations are possible but Janet s seems the more natural. On Kirchmann s interpretation. in which their physical perfection consists 1 . 48. metaphysically. . 86 sqq.ORIGINATION OF THINGS 345 God only the acts not only physically but also freely. 3\. because there is no reason why God should create one state rather than another. supra] the world is most perfect physically means that its individual members or elements are as perfect as the nature of each allows. which cannot supply the sufficient reason of any. 55. independent of the specific nature of the thing. through which there is be stowed upon minds the greatest possible happiness or joy. Moiiadology. would mean that all the states of the world must come from God. in so far as it is made up of minds [mcitt&amp. if you prefer it. should deny the former. 462).

seems rather a. judge unless which history transmits tousl Nevertheless from so slight an experience we rash y regardmg the immeasureable and eternal. we find that the opposite of this takes p ace in the world. for very often the best people Bar the worst things. confused chaos than anything directed by a supreme So. as the lawyers say. are afflicted and to I confess. especially if we . death even put with torture. it ^ seems at a first glance but And indeed.aider the government of the human race. brought up in prison or years. both rma s and men. for of a few thousand Sr rr r f r* what a proper to we have examined the whole law We of etern% whMi is imm little it is not thing is the record . But you will say. and indeed the world. like men whf having been born and who. . able in its extent. and those who are innocent.346 ON THE ULTIMATE wisdom.

the whole of it except a very having covered up picture. bined with them. to your sight. what present it thoroughly you examine (nay. howevei will it small part. the more closely and without art colours laid on without selection and look at the whole picture if you remove the covering will see that wb from the right point of view. even bitter things must sharp. to the top of the root. harmonies so as to stimulate often mingle discords with who becomes anxious and as it were. you inspect but a confused mass of . to prick the hearer. and the taste. On the same bringing him safely if we eat nothm sweet things become insipid King of Denmark - while still principle else. the anxiety of every one by then as in jest. and infant in swaddling-clothes. . . take pleasure in small clangers we of our power or our merely from the consciousness as of them or. so it). much the more. and is so much as to what is going order just as all is restored to pleased when presently or risks of mishap. the me to happen. tart. again or from a desire to make a display show of danger that is connected wit we delight in the the tight-rope or sword-dancing (sau performances on a 1 and we ourselves in jest half let go perilleuxr.ORIGINATION OF THINGS 347 which hardly suffices world than that of the feeble lamp look at a very beautii If you to direct their steps. like the ape which throw him from us. you been carelessly daubed on the canvas appeared to have art done by the painter with very great . boy as if about to carried Christiern. was really The experience of the eyes in painting corresponds t Eminent composers very that of the ears in music. so as to stimulate 33 A most interesting variant of this illustration occurs in IJosa Chrisern or KrUticrn being the of the name. relieved back to his cradle. .

r ?&quot. and that there is in the &amp. harm f7^ f&quot. thinking about for ^ite God.gt.lt. ^ iii call that Principles of i it rtain one man to the who e S S pede/oniZ were so. S aS is the - &quot.vhose / Care f r universe no regard &quot. &quot.gt.34 8 ON THE ULTIMATE has not tasted bitter things does not deserve sweet things and indeed. . t relation to us ^ th/wonn8. M m may r ^ for rS he inte interests r of : DOt is ^ individuals are attended ^^^ ^ ^ to.wWchwecsh SSfT any care for us we ln are sfnn Bu/tl i / cannot think of everythTnL things without labour by a kind of a conse q uenee of ^ JuT^ ^n^ aUS6 G d f without ?. aken as fai .gt. &quot. God P refer BU eVe &quot. part m *y Ie be this ny in the Wh f s&amp. observed that as i n a thoroughly well-constituted commonwealth care^ whiT . that pleasure does not . n Him to relati to God it.this who vir e nd. r s o *U-R so Bacon ^ I79 Augmentis &amp. P erfect for no while the this harmony preserved- And ~ &quot. it would not follow that the nte 6 d &amp. are in iS hke a man and ls lnfinite He does . This the very law of enjoyment. . meaning thn D aCC Unt is taken of the nr s o t t i gh f01 Ule World Sect although it T -rmay be that the as a whole to be t human race is wretched. Pf T.e P ini 1 judgment regarding the totality of things is ot quite For it is to be just. ^ ^ 7T &quot. will not appreciate them.

beyond the resolve which each of us has human race and even the smallest thing were not well governed. to produce our agree agreement. Nature. so . And Happier as kinder. Fourth Epistle. Pope. liquids which ferment slowly take also a longer time to purify. connects Man s greatest virtue with his greatest bliss. Now if the ment. for the whole consists in its parts. fulfilled that which in which alone. their constructor. So in physics. not (like other things) as machines to related it to appear . and this is true not only theologically but also naturally as the grain cast into the earth suffers before it [pJiysice]. Essay on Man. 31. in the opinion of wise theologians. 39 height of bliss but height of charity. no new action being required made. Cf. since they most closely resemble the image of the Supreme Author they are to Him. &quot.ORIGINATION OF THINGS better standard could be set 349 up than the very law of which declares that each should participate in the justice perfection of the universe and in a happiness of his own in proportion to his own virtue and to the degree in which and by this is his will has regard to the common good we call charity and the love of God. Self-love thus push d to social. p. Part ii. that it ? may \ be said that minds are whole parts [paries totales] But men. and in a manner they express and concentrate the whole in themselves. says Pope. in whate er degree . s Gives thee to make thy neighbour blessing thine. consists R8 Nor the force and power even of the Christian religion . wonderful that so great a place should ought be given to minds in the universe. ways to greater perfection. bears short And in general it may be said that afflictions the time evil but in the end good. . lines 327 sqq. but as citizens to their prince they are to last as long as the universe itself. the universe itself would not be well governed. to divine. it is as to the special question of the afflictions of to be held as certain that these afflictions good have as their result the greater good of those who are afflicted. since they are are for fruit. See Introduction.

Although many substances have i And to the Cf.eauty realize in its going o greater improvement [. so that profit by the loss itself&quot.gt. m And this is what you might ^ L nothing than more happy and pleasant than completeness the universal Further to &amp. yet this is to be understood in the way in winch affliction &amp.. 12. such that it is always forward that is to say. vii 568) &amp.gt. there ready answer.t more and more. note ei Sophie (1706) (G. while those which force. and nothing order that you may put more force into your leap forward ( qu on recede pour mimx sauter Wherefore these things are to be regarded not only agreeable and comforting. but also as most true And in general I think there is more true thus more qmckly ca 1 gomg back undergo a greater agitation certain of their ingredients with greater rectified. and perfection of the works of God. that this very destruction was explained and we degeneration leads to some greater end.. A . somehow possible objection that. Principles of Nature Of.]. if this were so the world ought long ago to have become a paradise.ove.35 ULTIMATE ORIGINATION OF THINGS throw off and are happiness. Lettre a la Princesse and of Grace. we must Jgnize a certain perpetual and very free progress of the whole universe. And although it is true sometimes certain parts of it grow wild again. or again suffer destruction or degeneration.lt. So even now a great part of our earth has received cultivation [cultura] and will receive .

APPENDIX I 35 l account of a great perfection. there yet remained f a geometrician. I put off these opinions.le sen What follows is a portion of part of statement in the Specimen Dynamicum. qualities of material things. thorn-brakes escaped from the prickly I was fields of later philosophy. aiterjoi &quot. that relics of a state of mind a while atoms and the void. in bodies. Phoranomus IN the second of two dialogues. yet which follow from motion in the there are innumerable parts but not only was I freed from this scruple plenum. for although revolt against the idea of the was in I wit in thought be divide crranted that every continuum can things the view that I did not really accept ad infmitum. whicl also I began to recognize something deeper m .lt. Leibniz gives and physics. and reduced all things to purely n but since I was not yet versed mathematical principles of poi that a continuum consists o-eometry. entitled an accoi Potentia et Legibus Naturae (1689). and and that a very slow motion is broken by which commend to other doctrines of this kind. when I became everywhere latent in things. . REGARDING FORCE THE GROWTH OF LEIBNIZ S THEORIES AND MOTION. in ease greatly taken with that fascinating all the which I saw a lucid imagination comprehending And which formerly were wrapped in dark notions. At last.forms I at length rejected the a similar I When first 1 and careful deliberation &quot. I was inclined themselves to those who seek to comprehend all things which it and who do not notice the infinite the imagination But although. his views regarding dynamics the progress of with this account. as infinite. combined &amp. APPENDIX I. whi remain in the abyss of things slumbering parts in size and woi have yet to be awakened. yet on already attained there always the infinite divisibility of the continuous. I was convinced little bits of rest. to grow a more perfect state and in a word. to advance to hence no end of progress is ever And meliorem ctrftoro]. reached. schools into the more pleasant of understanding.

. . Thi3 further showed that if in body there .35 2 could not be APPENDIX I comprehended by the imagination.

Hence it could be made. and I observed that my former hypothesis regarding the nature of body was not complete. and their changes or their tendency [coiwtus] to change at the very moment of impact. . in Specimen Dynamicum. principles and reasons of the laws of motion do themselves arise not from the necessity of matter. and one independent of mathematics. . tion of things I saw in what the systematic explana the explanation of things as they actually are] should consist. and therefore there would be action without reaction. . and thus the very largest body at rest is moved away by an impinging body. and no estimate of power motion. since anything might be accomplished by But afterwards. however small. possessing extension alone. I had been able to define absolute motion as change of this real space. But gradually I began to doubt whether there is in nature such an entity as is called space. and of inertia (or resistance to motion) in the matter [of the body]. . as we have explained: then it ought to follow that the impulse of the impinging body. figure. but from some higher principle than Besides imagination. Certainly Aristotle had said that place is nothing but the surface of what surrounds us called systematic. give rise to those very laws of motion which I had as well as other as having. For when formerly I regarded space as an immovable real place. 240). when combined with the laws of extension. of moving power [potential in the form. is communicated to the whole of the body impinged upon. . the metaphysical laws of which. namely. since matter. however small that body may be. and no account were taken of metaphysical notions. place. magnitude. having considered the whole anything. I began to have considerable doubts as to the nature of motion. . . arguments proved that body must be regarded addition to magnitude and impenetrability. A a . and that this matter more profoundly. and if it were thus necessary that the result of the impact should be determined by a purely geometrical composition of forces [conatus]. . vi. however large it may be. whence it followed that a doubt might arise about absolute motion. . thus understood. &c. [i. (1695) (^I am of opinion that the mechanical Math. without any retarding of the latter. e.APPENDIX I 353 were recognized only mathematical notions. to is not repugnant but rather indifferent would not be more difficult to move a large body at rest than a small one. something from which arises the consideration of forces [vires].

APPENDIX I motion (that and Descartes. hke the concourse of atoms or the blind force of nature. Accordingly I found no other Ariadne thread to lead me out of this labyrinth than the calculation of forces [potentiae]. 576. but in motive force [potentia matrix] itself. had defined change of place) as change of neighbourhood \mutatio viciniae]. geometry and numbers.) Leibniz says: As in assuming this metaphysical principle. as it were. p. Cf. Phil. 212* 20. 577. p. In the first of these dialogues (Pkomnomus. Gesch. cit. I was more confirmed in that the my Introduction to this book. so in mechanics. &c. principle of the equality of the effect to all its causes&quot. and if there is none of this. 4. 1 . and a kind of algebraic mechanics. through the principle of the equality of the whole to all its parts. \Quod effedus integer sit semper aeqnalis causae suae plenae}.354 [superficies amlientis] is. such as change of neighbourhood or situation. Whence it seemed to follow that that which s real and absolute in motion consists not in what is purely mathematical. following him. d. geometry is brought within the scope of an analytical calculus. A. Part 1 iii. we obtain certain equations. Phys. senseless [surdus] and purely mathematical.That the total effect is always equal to its complete cause&quot. through the opinion causes of things are not. . loc. i. so to speak. 107 note. see Arch. f. then there is no absolute and real motion. or of the cause to all its effects. but proceed from an intelligence which employs metaphysical reasons. When I discovered that this agrees perfectly with experience and satisfies all doubts. Phoranomus. &quot.

for he includes it in the titles of the first three books of the New Essays. 1 A a 2 . however. Locke. translated into French and published in Le Clerc s BiUiotlieque UmverseUe (1688). whose knowledge of English was somewhat imperfect. during scraps of G. OF PRE- PREFATORY NOTE. The book was written somewhat hurriedly and discontinuously.NEW ESS AYS ON THE HUMAN UNDER1 STANDING. prepared by Locke. wards published as the New Essays. 1 704. which Leibniz cannot deliberately have intended to omit. vol. 8. before it was actually published in English. quainted with the main outline of Locke s Essay. and his criticisms were expressed in When some of which were transmitted to Locke through Thomas Burnet of Kemnay. to make a thorough study of the Essay. This enabled Leibniz. 49 sqq. with over-accuracy. and in 1700 Coste s French translation of it was published. omits human. Meanwhile Locke s Essay passed through several editions. THE New Essays contain the fullest statement of Leibniz s Leibniz became ac appreciation and criticism of Locke. BY THE AUTHOR OF THE SYSTEM ESTABLISHED HARMONY. and after writing some papers on special parts of it. he set himself to the task of preparing the elaborate exposition and criticism of the Essay which was after various short papers. in 1690 the Essay itself was published Leibniz read it.. pp. by means of an abstract of the book. making notes as he went. seems rather to have disparaged Leibniz s criticisms and he did not count them worthy of a reply.

After some prefatory sentences. the differences between his view and that of Locke are not altogether in surmountable. Leibniz here connects his psychology with his ^ (G. understanding that he in his opinions. revised and who time. the identity of translation is made from Boutroux s text. Barbeyrac and Leibniz himself. the law of continuity. including the Intro duction. Accordingly the New Essays remained in manuscript until 1765. has thought it better to reconstruct the original text. while these corrections often improve the French style of the original. Erclmann (E. has in various points corrected the text made by that editor. by going behind the corrections. and Leibniz was strongly advised by Coste to delay publication until after he had seen this new edition. (6) This leads naturally to the question whether (as Locke seems to say) there is nothing in our mind )f which we are not actually conscious or whether (as Leibniz maintains) we have unconscious perceptions (pp. Locke died in the end of Leibniz. showing how the petites perceptions throw light upon the preestablished harmony. necessary truths. revised a considerable portion of it. submitted his work to Hugony and Barbeyrac corrected by Locke himself. Accordingly Leibniz. after all. and had made considerable changes own of little use to publish his criticism. 39 however. Meanwhile a new edition of Coste s translation. My sqq. Such variations as involve a change in translation are mentioned in foot-notes. when they were published by Raspe. 194 sqq. metaphysics by . and made numerous changes in its expression.) follows this text. they do not always so well express Leibniz s thought. 367-385). Gerhardt v. In the Introduction to the New Essays (which was written later than the rest of the book).35 6 leisure ESSAYS (the great jurist). was promised. on the ground that. 357-367). He printed the text in the form which it had finally assumed after the correction and revision of Hugony. Leibniz summarizes the main points regarding which he differs from Locke. including the question whether or not all our knowledge comes from the senses (pp. the Intro duction deals in the first place (a) with the question whether (as Locke held) the mind is tabula rasa or whether (as Leibniz thought) there are innate ideas. approving the course taken by Gerhardt. in view of publication. while he characteristically suggests that.). felt that it was now 1704. Boutroux.

to adopt a philosophy of unintelligible qualities or faculties. reads human understanding. while Stillingfleet and Leibniz deny it This gives occasion to Leibniz to draw a PP. thinking. qualities or faculties. not of the real genus). which would be even worse than the Scholastic theories of occult thinkers. (d) References to the criticism of Locke by Stillingfleet lead to a consideration of the question whether matter can think. not only in the way of lessening work (as in fact it is less trouble to follow the my thread of a good author than to work on entirely un 4 but also in the way of adding sometrodden ground) . 385 sqq. I have thought that this would be a good occasion for publishing some of my opinions under the title of New Essays on the Understanding. omits the clause in brackets. 394). because.)distinction between the physical or real genus of a thing and its logical or ideal genus (p. in the hope that my thoughts will obtain 3 a favourable reception through appearing in such good company. which is a mode of cannot be a mode of matter.39 sqq. I have hoped also to be able to profit by the work own of another. more favourable. As 2 works of the present time. 4 E. Locke maintaining the possibility of this. having for a long time given considerable attention to the same subject and to most of the matters with which the essay deals. we should have same physical or soul. (c) The next question con sidered is that of atoms and the void (in which Locke believes) as against a plenum (Leibniz s view) (pp. 2 3 E.e. . as well as their inseparability from bodies. if Locke s contention were true. is %ne of the best and most highly esteemed . except by miracle.). so justly derided by later INTRODUCTION. and that accordingly.NEW indiscernibles ESSAYS 357 and the indestructibility of souls. I have resolved to make some remarks upon it. and in the remainder of the Introduction he applies this distinction. reads E. maintaining that as matter and soul are heterogeneous (i. the Essay on the Understanding by an illustrious Englishman.

Leibniz is here thinking of that side of his philosophy which led the Scholastics to attribute to him the saying. we make t easier for the truth to be accepted. as E omits always and adds (after beginning ). I do him justice/ &c. But. besides.358 NEW ESSAYS thing to what he has given us. 8 E omits the remainder of the sentence. if approval have any weight 6 t is true that I often differ from him in being disposed to do justice and very far from wishing to lessen the esteem in which his work is I my denying the worth of famous writers. 3 ) The view that the soul is a tabula rasa is suggested by the passage! : point The main principles of Leibniz s philosophy are really much more akin to the philosophy of Aristotle than to the doctrines which are peculiar to Plato. and it is to be supposed that it is principally for truth that they are working. alone. omits from For I think to any weight E. In fine things of . 19. and workinon entirely untrodden ground. igh other passages supplement this by bringing in the work of vy*. . although the author of the Essay says a thousand which I cordially approve. which is always easier than making an independent beginning 5 For I think have removed some difficulties which he . in which l^err^ is traced to au^L. Nihil est in intellect quod non pnusfuerit in sensu. increase his reputation. vi. ii.lt. reads denying on that account the worth of this famous writer. nihil est in intellect qum prius fueritin sensu This phrase does not occur in ) any of Aristotle s writings but it serves as a fair enough analysis of several passages the Posfenor Analytics. . when we hink it necessary to prevent their authority from pre vailing against reason on some important and s from 7 opinion . our systems His has more relation to Aristotle greatly differ. but points . and besides would held. Thus his reputation left entirely is helpful to me . E. (See especially Anal Post. and Eth. in replying to such excellent men. and mine to Plato 9 although in many things both of us have fact. 3. from this 5 &amp. Super Universal^ PorpLii Ilia propositio Question 3 Aristotelis. (Cf. regards Aristotle. we bear witness to it by making known in what respect and for what reasons we differ from their opinion. Duns Scotus. .

Hist. especially when a living But I think that by introducing two language is used. Nodes Atticae. is a recollection or restoration of knowledge possessed by the soul in a previous state. Phil Grace.NEW ESSAYS 359 two ancient writers. Quid Leibnizius ii. which is from speakers. 4. but are put forward only as tion. 5 (quoted i. compelled to be a little more acroamatic the doctrine of these not of advantage to me. according to which our knowledge 8 OVTQJS wffTTfp v ypafj. infra. the exoteric which certain things are said without demonstra : and yet are confirmed by the consistency they have with various other things and by probable \topicae] reasons (or even reasons that might demonstrate. vor)Ta 6 vovs. this author s Essay. so far as we can attain to it. and not judge of his opinions except from his own work. it. while the other I show the relation between us in a way that will be my more satisfactory to the reader than if I had put down mere remarks. w of realities. 298). by Bitter and Preller. although I have usually retained his expressions. Leibniz is probably thinking mainly of the Platonic theory of reminiscence. . Nolen. vol. I have been unable even to think of achieving the graceful turns of which dialogue is sus make up for ceptible but I hope that the matter will the defects of the style. Nevertheless it will be well also to compare our writings sometimes. departed from is more popular. and I for my part am sometimes He and abstract. the reading of which would have been constantly interrupted by the necessity of turning to his book in order to understand mine. xx. iii. Leibniz himself defines the word phizing is is that in that in The acroamatic way of philoso which all things are demonstrated. where a distinction is drawn between the exoteric and the acroatic writings of Aristotle. and Trendelenburg. (De Anima. On &quot. esoteric. Beitriige.^aTfiy . one of whom expounds opinions taken adds observations. in a sense. irplv av vofj. Cf. Aristoteli dcbuerit. note 12. Hist. a\X li/reAex 6 ? ^rjQlv inrapxft ouSeV. innate in us. 429 30 on the other hand. the whole matter J cf. so that necessary and eternal truths are.e. It is true that owing to the limitations involved in following to the thread of another person s argument and making remarks upon . See Aulus Gellius. ei Sef TfAex 64 ? yeypappcvov b In regard to Plato. fivi dfAfi Truis earc TO. in.

The differences between us have regard some importance. however was e oic np6\ not an anticipation prior to. . iv 11 E. and whether everything that is inscribed upon it comes solely from the senses and experience. all e lu the common image resulting from a series of sens sense impressions which leads us to expect other similar impressions d t?n reads E grounds or sources.lt.gt. object . to ise Al i& tot e l VOW . and with all those who interpret in this sense the passage of St.^ which vovs is compared to the writing-tablet shows that mere y meant to protest against the view that An lt. is men s hearts. very different but reason ** opposed The context of the passage in SOU1 ^^^ reason has 13 dpxat. or presupposed by. in which he shows that the law of God is written the soul entirely empty. Mr ai. reads a. There is the ioul in originally contains the principles 13 of several cms and doctrines. and are illustrated by instances and similar cases sWopMosopMco Nizolii (x6 7 o) (E. oepses. fc d^. as I hold along with Plato and even with the Schoolmen.gt. The is. I4 6) &amp. (which is the opinion of Aristotle 2 and of the author of the Essay). The Stoic np6\^ ts. like a writing-tablet on which nothing has yet been written (tabula rasa). or whether in question whether the itself. ^ ^- is that *&amp. The expe^ all nt^li . S 1S meanin ^ n0t th6 sense. T they ailr. S&amp.36 NEW ESSAYS to subjects&quot. 63 G.lt. Paul (Romans 15). 54: * *& t n. which are merely roused on certain occasions by external objects. quoted by Ritter and Preller. fundamental assumptions or what De probable). And there is a . Stoics called these vrpoA^as that principles&quot. f the 393. * common notions after principles original has prolepses. m which the Stoics are represented as hold 118 Vii&amp. fVo. ^he Hist Phil ng a view .::^ d and are not deliberately constructed by us Thus C CteriStiC erSC iv.

Mights . TTOV a^iLKpa Plato speaks of dnrvpa TOV rwv thought. as much as to say. Lib. p. id est. Ixxvi-lxxviii Koival tvvoicu. In the Laws. Among his chief works (besides many translations from Greek into Latin) were a treatise on Latin grammar. and Bonhoffer. (sth ed. 211) Sunt in nobis insita zopyra quaedarn. iav etcdaTr/v TO/I/ tvvoiwv But the peculiarity of the Stoic Monism makes it hairoypdfpfTai.. the survivors of the Flood as (y Kopvtf&amp.NEW we them common notions ESSAYS Mathematicians 1 361 call 6 take for granted beforehand. 16 17 it appears to be. s Marcus Anrdius Anto ninus.lt. And not without reason whether there are some which have yet another founda tion. I 574^i PP- 79 ft nd 160 (EpisMaeet Orationes.TQj(T/jLtva -yfVouj.gt. thought that these flashes [eclats] indicate something divine and eternal. Julius Scaliger Iwoiai) - . flashes of light [traits lum meux\ u hidden within us but appearing at the instance of the senses. pp. possible to regard this as less inconsistent with Leibniz s view than dvOpcunos. arises another question. semina aoternitatis. For similar expressions cf. whether all truths are dependent on experience. Kendall . The reference : is to Pod-ice. bk. it is manifest that we contribute akin to that of Locke than to that of Leibniz u : of orav yfwrjOfi wairep yapTT]v evepyov T ^ rj^^p-oviKuv fj. like the sparks nitatis . iii. Zopyra is the Greek wirvpa. in 17 named them semina aeterparticular. cap. one of the great scholars of the Renaissance. p. 677 B. . cap. item zopym^. n.fpos rfjs els airo^patyriv ds TOVTO p. 18 Cardan. and Ad Arnoldum Fcrronum Atticum Oratio 427). which Hence there appears above all in necessary truths. (KOLVOL Modern philo sophers give them other excellent names and. living fires. De causis linguae Latiitae. Introduction. used for kindling fires. on induction and instances or . that is. and a book in opposition to the views of Exotericae Exercitationes de Subtilitate ad Hieronymum Cardanum.lt. Seeds of the eternal and kindling sparks. 1617.fx at first sight die Stoa. . l &amp. 19 Trait de lumwre is used in iii. Lib. iii. Epidd und 187 sqq. Cf. i and 20 Pocmata. which come from the steel it is when it strikes the flint.ats dvOpwirajv 5taaf&amp. pp. calls Euclid axioms Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558). For if some events can be foreseen before we have made any much more (paffiv trial of them. Poetice. Pars Altera . French is and probably Leibniz s phrase for an illuminating intended to suggest this.

Komans. as a pilot . And being people the nature of the magnetic needle which turns to the north. 506. &amp. since the senses never give anything but instances 21 that is to say particular or individual truths 22 Now all the instances which confirm a general truth however numerous they may be. are not sufficient to ish the universal necessity of this same truth for ioes not at all follow that what has happened will 23 happen in the same For the . the other peoples of the earth. sounds. and they make known to as their Queen Sophia Charlotte in 1702 (during the time when was working at the New Essays). day changes into night of our own 20 The senses. and all . It be said that sense-qualities are m fact occult qualities. . and on that account has almost ceased to wonder at it. i we do not on that account comprehend them * not understand better than other alone. &amp. we understand things of sense we understand least.NEW to ESSAYS . The senses furnish us with matter for something reasoning we never have thoughts so abstract that something of sense Is with them but mingled reasoning requires in addition some. has merely &amp. . . Greeks the example.on In a :tcn to e Lettre touchant ce qui est independant des Sens et de la Matiere particular objects. E.lt. and that may must be other more there manifest qualities.gt. although he has it always before his eyes in the compass.and all other peoples..) &quot. these are the very although they are familiar to better. Leibniz says: We use our rue that things 3. we should not think. and that. which can make them explicable. which are colours. special cases. necessary for our thinking.. reads VI i. odours. way. But hey do not make known to us what these sense-qualities are. And far from its external senses as a blind man uses his stick (after the simile of an ancient writer). Nevertheless I admit that in our present the external senses are state. if we had none of them. and touch-qualities.lt. as it was known to the ancients 24 always observed that before twenty-four hours have passed. them something . are by no means sufficient to give us the whole of our knowledge. nor m what they consist. although are they necessary for all our actual acquiring of knowige. But what * necessary for anything is not on that account the essence of the Air is necessary to us for life but thing our life is else than air.lt. tastes.. e. our part.. E.* Vi * 5&amp.

been experienced by people on a visit i: And he would still be wrong who should think that. MonacMogy. 28. . nor that which is absolutely necessary. proof does not depend upon the of the senses. that shall endure for ever.lt. the opposite everywhere else 2n to Nova Zembla. quoted : yield The senses and inductions be otherwise. hut way make known to us that be or which cannot cannot make known that which ought to they us truth never . But they would that the same rule is observed if they had thought . . Cf.NEW ESSAYS 3^3 have been wrong and night into day. This is a point which should that he and it is one which Euclid so well understood that which is evident enough often proves by reason J9 Logic through experience and through sense-images oi with metaphysics and ethics \la morale]. so^True metaphysics is hardly different from for in fact metaphysn to say from the art of discovery in general same God. logic. and that come a time when this beautiful star perhaps there will at least in its with its whole system will no longer exist. omits &amp. but only perfectly universal that which ( is and that which occurs in particular instances. has 25 for since that time. metaphysics and ethics iv. is also the principle of all parts true that is . also along so and the other which the one forms natural theology and con truths natural jurisprudence. *E. are full of such 31 can come only from the their demonstration it . since we must hold that the do not exist necessarily. a senses can indeed in a . (undated) (G. form present . 292). sequently 27 28 E. of them. 31 Princesse Sophie i. and eternal truth at least. else. although without the witness mathematics and especially in must have principles whose upon senses to think would never have come into our heads be carefully noted. who is the source of all goois natural theology. it is a necessary our regions that shall endure for ever earth and the sun itself 27 . and the Lettre c of knowledge. Cf the letter to Queen above Sophia Charlotte. 28 Whence it seems that necessary truths. things. instances nor. such as we find in pure arithmetic and geometry. . which is. reads seen. omits E.e. as sciences the certainty of logic. consequently.

human knowledge and as the edict open book of the praetor may be read on his album ? s without trouble or investigation but it is enough that we can discover these laws in ourselves by means of attention. so E.gt. P os ted up in a public 35 place. so far as we can judge.lt. inner principles which are called innate. libri. In this also lies the difference between .3 64 NEW ESSAYS that of the lower animals. on the other hand. for which opportunities are furnished by the senses. they never succeed in forming necessary proposi tions while men. hold good in both cases. = ad aperturam taWetS Wlth &amp. and so easy for mere empirics to make mistakes. . somewhat as in arithmetic proofs are useful in helping us to avoid errors of calculation when the process s a long one. The lower animals are purely empirical and direct them selves by particular instances alone for. That is why it is so simple a matter for men to entrap animals. have the capacity for demonstrative science. 32 a lime 6 ie that 34 L who ^ 6 Cf Monad lM. lit. when they trust too to their past experience. although they are incapable of judging whether or not the same reasons that who maintain the power of making concatenations [of ideas] which the lower animals possess is something inferior to the reason which is in men 34 The concatenations [of ideas] made by the lower animals are simply like those of mere . as affairs. It is true we must not imagine that we can read these eternal laws of reason in the soul as in an 32 . It is also on this account that . &amp. 26-29. . much t mistakes even persons who have become skilful through age and experience are not exempt.notices runs may read.lt. From this of what has sometimes happened will happen again in a case which resembles the former in characteristics which strike 35 them. adds for all that. making and military some have done in civil because enough consideration is given to the fact that the world changes and that ouvert. &amp. empirics. and the success of experiments serves also as a confirmation of reason.

vi. afford instances in usually happens no longer happens. reads E. Lettre a la Eeine Sophie Charlotte (1702) For instance. because . 505. a connexion 37 38 and a passing. if prolonged to infinity. the lower animals are only a shadow of reasoning. not a necessary and infallible truth our forecast may fail when we least expect it. so far as possible.) . that is 37 to say they are only connexions of imagination and from one image to another. and nevertheless. the reasons which have hitherto justified it no longer 39 And on this account the wisest people do not operate .NEW men become more trivances. that there will occur in the future what is in harmony with a long experience of the past. on that account. we have no E. as a rule. we know that we can make an iron pot so hollow that it floats. though we may have observed a thousand times that iron. but this is. Asymptotes} which. to get some hold of the reason of what happens. 39 Cf. and that it can even carry a considerable load. as if things were actually connected together because their images are connected in l)8 It is true that reason also leads us to expect. trust altogether to experience. because in new passings circumstances which seem to resemble others which have !? occurred before we 38 expect anew what we at other times found along with them. (G. And which that which even abstract sciences. and many people will be ready to take oath that this can never fail to happen. in order to decide is when exceptions alone capable of laying E. as do boats made of copper and tin. reads assurance that it must always be so. continually approach one another and yet never meet. down trustworthy For reason rules and 36 are not. Nevertheless geo metry makes known to us unusual lines (called. but try. we usually find that two lines which continually approach one another ultimately meet. memory. like geometry. For instance. And without referring to the miracle of the prophet Elisha who made iz-on to swim. goes to the bottom. while skilful ESSAYS 365 by finding countless new con on the other hand the stags or the hares 36 more full of shifts than of our time do not become The concatenations [of ideas] in those of former times. when it is put by itself on the surface of water. reads must be made. l : they.

unity. duration. understood in a certain sense. Metaphysique (1686) (G. and the senses do not give us what we already bring with us. innate to speak.365 of supplying NEW what ESSAYS is lacking in those which were not trustworthy. and since in ourselves there are being. For after having devoted the whole of his first bock to the rejection of innate knowledge [lumieres]. substance. Cf. and in short of finding sure connexions in the force of necessary and this often enables us to foresee the consequences event without having to experience the sense-connexions of images. change. may be called ideas but those which are conceived or formed may be said to be notions conceptus. 5 also Petit discours de . Monadology of Grace. pleasure and a thousand other objects of our 40 intellectual ideas ? And as these objects are immediate 41 objects of our understanding and are always present (although they cannot always be consciously perceived [aperfus] because of our distractions and wants). by stating the exceptions to them. since we me are. so that that which shows that the sources [principes] of necessary truths are within us also distinguishes man from the lower animals. activity [action]. are innate in us ? Accordingly I have taken as illustration a block of veined &amp. whether they are conceived or not. reads these objects are immediate our understanding/ and always present to . .gt. or images of sense. As distinguished from ideas and Principles of Nature and iv. he nevertheless admits. 41 Those expressions which are in E. at the beginning of the second book and in those which follow. that the ideas which do not originate in sensation come from reflexion. 30. to which the animals are confined. Now reflexion is nothing but an attention to that which is in us. Perhaps our able author may not entirely differ from in opinion. 452) : our soul. That being so. perception. ourselves. why should it be surprising that we say that these ideas. can it be denied that there is much that is innate in our mind so to [esprit]. along with all that depends on them.

reads we often . as natural inclinations. as im Cf. although these tualites] . as innate in it. pp. 126. habits or powers [vir4Z and not as activities [actions]. perceived. l: in us and even nothing of which we are not nothing But this cannot be understood always actually conscious in a strict sense otherwise his opinion would be too para . we are not always conscious 40. ch. &c. (Opera. 43 Cf. Part i. But if there were in the stone veins. on the other hand. Mctaphysica Vera. which should mark out the figure of Hercules rather than other figures. p. and 130. Monadology. . diate result of Cartesian principles. ii. See Introduction. &c. vol. that is to say. It is thus that ideas and truths are innate in us. 125 sqq. Land s ed. i. By a virtualite Leibniz means something between a mere potency or capacity and a fully-developed activity or actual idea. and Hercules would somehow be. 150) is Cf. Part iii. 44 E. nor. does the soul merely have a capacity for receiving or acquiring them. Thus necessary and eternal truths are not innate in the soul in a fully-developed form. rather than a block of perfectly uniform marble or than empty tablets. but they are innate in germ. If you do not know how a thing is done you do not do it. Our able author seems to maintain that there virtual. This position is an imme 5. when the block of marble indifferently capable of receiving this figure or any other. what is called by For if the soul were like these philosophers tabula rasa. . .NEW ESSAYS 367 marble. often imperceptible. powers to [virtualites] are always accompanied by some activities [actions]. bring. doxical. Locke s Essay. Geulincx. i. a thing . for instance 42 44 . perfectly perceived ideas with a tendency to become perfectly See Introduction. truths would be in us as the figure of Hercules is is in a block of marble. bk. since. empty tablets.. 43 and 54. the stone would be more determined towards it this figure. since. although labour would be needed to were. uncover the veins and to clear them by polishing and thus removing what prevents them from being fully seen. although we are not. p. with the notes. which correspond is them. It is impossible that he who does not know : how done should do it. dispositions. Part iii.

because v Ta the soul and if beginning any one maintains anans at h prior state has receded from another. i. be quite certain apperceptions nobody can far extended.3 68 of acquired habits NEW ESSAYS and of the things stored in our memory and. must E. prior to itself. 17 ^^ ^^ answer fs that it --e bjonged toVu E. i. Our author also limits his ot formerly.. reads Leibniz s the rest of it objection to the Platonic doctrine is that to make us remember implies . hw how our past why everything be acquired by us through apperception of external things and why should it be impossible to unearth in anything it &quot. something which it has not transmitted to those which the m thed follow. as we need only the beginning of a song in order to remember it&quot. which we But saying that there is in us nothing have not at least been conscious in addition to the fact that [apercusl through reason alone. for we may have forgotten them. 2 o 9 a G v 7 l did pre. especially i n i ight of the P]atonic doctrine of reminiscence. though a myth&quot. in part least nothing incompatible with bare reason-in . indeed. . contains. ch. is m other places. &quot. addition. which.. however far back that state miht in feet be innate. although we often bring them back ulyinto our mind on some slight occasion which recalls them to us. I say. to this fact.ex ls t). omits in part at least. 5 (E. k. .*** e tfates. they do not always come to our aid when we require them.

since bodies can exist without motion. viz. souls might also quite well exist without thinking 53 But here I reply in a way somewhat different from that which is usual for I maintain that. is interrogative : Is there ever. is 19 r In E. and especially that it is without perception when we sleep without dreaming and he holds that. p. naturally 51 a subhis opinion 2 . then. inas much as he recognizes two sources of our knowledge. 9 (Eraser s ed. . 53 r|1 Leibniz Essay. p. ii. . I am sure. beyond images borrowed from outside. *&quot. which implies that no real thing is an absolute unity. i. otherwise than by miracle. Part 54 iii.e. but that everything has some essential characteristic or internal quality. M If the mind is internal really tabula rasa. E. in the ordinary course of things. the sentence E. See Monacloloyy. &c. exclusive of all difference or variety. 127).. when he maintains that the mind does not always think. 9. reads without. . it is nothing? That. Locke is fundamentally at one with him in admitting at least innate dispositions. ch. the senses and reflexion 5 I do not know that it will be so easy to reconcile him with us and with the Cartesians. Bb . is not a view which our judicious author can Is our soul. vol. indiscernibles. not some variety in themselves ? For there is never 49 such a thing as a perfectly unbroken [uni] and uniform surface. then. or rather from the common opinion. Why. should not we also be able to 50 of thought out of provide ourselves with some sort our own inner being. accordingly. T. See Intro duction. when we deliberately try to penetrate its 51 depths ? Thus I am led to believe that on this point is not fundamentally different from mine. here applying his principle of the identity of that no two things are absolutely identical. . what are those operations or actings of our own minds. i. reads object. bk.NEW ourselves ? ESSAYS 369 4H empty that. and that. so And where shall we find tablets which have approve. which Locke regards as the objects of reflexion? Leibniz suggests that Locke may not really mean all that he seems to mean by the tabula rasa. 129.

But . the famous chemist and physicist. Conse quently the essence of body cannot be absolutely unmoved extension. . because the impressions are either too small and too numerous . 55 Robert Boyle (b. d. absolutely indivisible. in the book here referred to.] Opera Varia (Geneva. [Boyle s Works (London. but nevertheless in com bination with others each has felt. 1627. Boyle 55 against an absolute rest. He maintained that there is no such thing as absolute rest. under the title Of Absolute Rest in Bodies. 281. we take no notice of the motion of a mill or a waterfall when we have for some time lived quite near them. but these impressions which are in the soul and in the body. System. it. but must be force. so that each is not distinctive enough by itself. 1691). it being ideally divisible. and to be per suaded of it one has only to refer to the book of the illustrious Mr. which responds to it because of the harmony of the soul and the body. nor that something does not pass into the soul. New n. which is called the Boyle-Mariotte law. Boyle during his stay in London in 1673. changes in the soul itself of which we are not conscious [s apercevoir]. which is the source of motion. while the atom is only physically indivisible. 7. p. Thus it is that. Hence physical atoms are not the elements of things. Part i. and indeed is a body without motion. As rest is infinitely small motion. See Introduction. and this is one of the proofs which I use to overthrow the theory of atoms 66 Besides there are countless indications which lead us to think that there is at every moment an infinity of perceptions within us. Leibniz had some intercourse with 1680). but without apperception and without reflexion that is to say. London. Not that this motion does not continually affect our organs.37 NEW ESSAYS that there never is stance cannot exist without activity [action]. who (almost contemporaneously with Mariotte) discovered the law of the pressure of gases. 1744% vol. Lismore. It was also published in Latin in his p. But a force is a real unity. I think that reason also supports it. Experience already in my favour as regards this. or too closely combined [trop unies]. through being accustomed to it. Cf. its effect and makes itself at least confusedly. i. everything moves. in the whole.

57 i9 r E. so to quires memory. and we are con . however little they may be otherwise we should not have the perception of a hundred thousand waves. and we must have some perception of each of these sounds. apperception arising in this case only from our attention directed to them scious that being And for an even better understanding of the petites perceptions which we cannot individually distinguish in the crowd. and often and warned to take notice of some speak. l ** K. S1 E. omits E. reads after. I am wont after interval. busied with more engrossing objects. admonished of our present perceptions. M E. reads sound. in this case of our attention being directed to them only &c. In order to hear this sound as we do. omits in the moaning 2 of the sea. - that confused combination of all the sounds taken together. 13 E. 65 is to say. although say the sounds each of these little sounds makes itself known only in the to sea. makes it were alone.NEW lost ESSAYS 371 the attractions of novelty. we remember it. that is to G which come from each wave. we let them pass without 5/1 reflexion and even without observing them but if some one directs our attention to them immediately after wards co and for instance bids us notice some sound that has just been heard. For we must be affected a little by the motion of this wave. B b . in the and no one moaning of the sea of the sounds would be observed if the wave which . that is to say. omits for. we had some feeling of it at the time. often and admonished and. are not strong having 57 to attract our attention and our enough memory. omits which are husied only. 61 some however small. . afterwards. employ the illustration of the moaning or sound of the which we notice when we are on the shore. for a hundred thousand . we must hear the parts of which the whole sound is made up. For 58 all attention re when we are not. Thus there were perceptions of which we were not immediately conscious [s aperceuoir]. reads E.

for all that. how our perception of green results from our perceptions of the two colours which compose it nor how our perceptions of thcso colours arise from their causes We have not even nominal definitions of such qualities so as to explain the terms for them. it is utterly impossible that i should ever break. Essais. 14: If we suppose a piece of twine equally strong throughout. are each clear as a whole to say. effect. If I were to to some one You know say that green means a colour consisting of blue and yellow mixed. ii. Part iii. and we should never be wakened by the greatest noise in the world if we had not some perception of its beginning which is small. each can be perfectly distinguished from others they are not also distinct-. Sense-qualities. these images of sense-qualities.. p. say. Thus the only way to enable a man to in future is to show it to him Cognize green at : Such an analysis is possible but canU perform it. &amp. note E. if it were not strained and stretched a little We by less efforts. just as we should never break a cord by the greatest effort in the world. and that these two colours when mixed make green But we . For the blue and the yellow which are in the green are not distinguishable or recognizable.lt. and yellow are made. and it is only by chance.37 2 NEW ESSAYS though the small extension they produce is not apparent G \ These petites perceptions have thus through their conse 56 quences an influence greater than It is people think they that form this something I know not what these tastes. cannot perfectly L present . U We know by what kind of refraction blue Sophie Charlotte 170. For in what of it is the part breaking to begin the flaw to appear? And for it to break in every part a once is agaanst all nature/ See introduction. quality contains infinity. that is to we * cannot yet understand. G. clear in combination confused in the parts % these impressions which 64 nothings cannot make something. omits through their . for it has connexions with everything 1 th Cf **&quot.W analyze their elements.lt. but this . &amp..lt. so to speak. never sleep so profoundly as not to have some feeble and confused 3lmg. But this is the function of nominal dehmtu. reads Cf. Montaigne. bk. . that we have found this by observing that this mixture always makes green. for lfc would involve an infinite Each senseprocess. ch. r it consequences. he would not make use of this definition as a means of recognizing green when he came upon it. according to Leibniz. &amp.ns.

ventura futura would not scan. and these unconscious perceptions 73 may be known by made known to them at hand. as they connect his previous states with his present state 72 . infinity. note 114. all future states of percep tion. i. 27. who contain infinity this connexion which each being has with all the rest of the universe. in a germinal or confused way. of which we are conscious but of which we can give no account. . that there is a conspi- ration of all things (cn /mTrvoia Tmvra.) 08 E. E. surrounding bodies make upon us. and what future Virgil. ii. omits or expressions. because we cannot qualities discriminate nor unfold what they contain within them. so that the reference is the traces of previous states. they constitute his identity. . 500. What things are. Monadology. who is characterized by the traces or expressions of his pre vious states which these unconscious perceptions preserve. Virgil things may soon be brought forth. Leibniz misquotes futura for ascribes this knowledge to Proteus. (Passages combined from G. vi. 393. bk. 73 Leibniz merely says and they. as Hippocrates said 7U ). 71 : 70 . Quae quae fuerint. He may mean is meant is simply that as the unconscious perceptions are the development of previous states of perception and at the same time contain. e. Essay. although we do not have For this reason we are wont to say that the notions of sense-qualities are clear. and that in the least of substances eyes as penetrating as those of God might sint. What they contain is an I know not what. what things have been. note 97. iv. 493. is . 492.NEW ESSAYS 373 t:8 . These unconscious [insensible] perceptions also indicate and constitute the identity of the individual. reads See Monaduloyy. E. they give continuity to the individual possessing them. Cf. ch. Contrast Locke s view. It may even be said that in conse c9 quence of these petites perceptions the present is big with the future and laden with the past. reads 69 and which contain full of. read the whole succession of the things of the universe. Georyics. What doubtful. not necessary in the case of more distinct notions. . quae max futura trahantur 71 . for they enable us to recognize the but that these notions are not distinct. which can be people by description.

p. Thus the recollection of any former perception means that the system or group of which it is a member has passed from the crest of consciousness to the trough sur la Doctrine d : and so back to the crest again. . the unconscious [insensible] perceptions ex 79 that wonderful pre-established harmony of body and soul. &quot. in the opinion 74 What is meant is that. Principles of Nature and of Grace. Part iii.374 NEW ESSAYS a higher mind [esprit]. . Monadology. omits i. when it is needed. E. furnish also the means of re they [these perceptions] covering this recollection. but the order of nature requires that some day all shall re-develop and return to an observable condition. and cannot even last as a sleep. James s Psychology. for in animals 76 perceptions merely cease to be distinct [distingue] enough . though he But longer have a definite recollection of them. and which. 75 76 E. so that there is a kind of periodicity in our perceptions. distinct 7s Cf. The organs [of the animal] are merely enveloped and 535) reduced to a small size. enough to produce consciousness. See also Introduction. Considerations un Esprit Univcrsel Unique 1. but as one group or system of perceptions falls out of consciousness another rises into conscious ness. which con sciousness [aperception] is suspended. a sleep. vol. ch. . Gr. note 51 note 130. but which cannot 7T not to speak here of man who must have last for ever and are reduced to a state of confusion. which takes the place of the untenable theory of the influence of one upon another. with troughs and crests as in wave-motion. 9. as perceptions are not isolated but linked together. that is to say. Cf. 12. e. reads by the unconscious perceptions I explain. The remainder of this sentence is omitted by E. and of sub-consciousness &quot. that in these vicissitudes there be a certain well-ordered progress. 77 owing to these perceptions. and indeed of all Monads or simple substances.1702) (E. through 74 That periodic developments which may some day occur 75 can only be to these perceptions is why death. 116. which serves to mature things and to bring them to perfection. great privileges 7 personality \ in this regard in order to keep his plain Further. 181 a. 7it 82. i. in . owing may no . although the individual himself may not be conscious of them. they do not each independently rise and fall in distinctness by a kind of chance. vi. For a development of this idea cf.

any their objects seems to me . objection * E. to turn to the we were completely. iv. of the wisdom of the not very worthy who does nothing without harmony 85 . point out here.. and without reason w Pierre Bavle. 16. of Divine art. notes 28 nnd 29. Part Cf. the perceptions and essential relation between to [insensible] parts is of our conscious [sensible] . giving 84 It is also due to these unconscious relish stimulating . us on many occasions withou ceptions which determine the appear our thinking it. without regard the soul according to His good pleasure. sians. and which an opinion which surprises me. this &amp. omits completely/ Of. for instance. however. The makes Bayle. See Monadology. heat. Part . See Descartes. perceptions of a relation between these perceptions that there and the motions sensible qualities. U hatcan coved the power and intelligence remark by way of 82 83 8t E. - Part 14Descartes 196-198 and 204. if I were to say little.indifferent whether for me to It is also unnecessary leftright or to the that as I have done in the book itself. reads after this I ought also to add that.gt. Principia. ance of an indifference of equilibrium. what has ever been it is these petites per that&quot. regard the perceptions them t that is to say.NEW of the author of the most of the exalts the ESSAYS 375 &amp.lt. to consist which I show they cause that uneasiness only as the small differs from . as if God had given as arbitrary. iii. pain something which often constitutes from the great. ave . colour. I4 1 p. and which nevertheless to it a kind our desire and even our pleasure. and which deceive people by as if. to the system. excellent of Dictionaries Divine perfections beyond greatness After this I should add conceived. Author of things. Introduction.&quot. Introduction. p. and other while the Carte to them in bodies which correspond in spite of all his pene our author. iii. along with we have of these qualities tration.

elsewh an m enz .lt. and it is as unreasonable to eject the one as the other on the ground that they are beyond the reach of our senses&quot.lcs Lettres&quot.gt. derived from the has now ceased to have any connexion with the phiieop y of tiie bra E..l&amp. Part h the fir I SP ke f &quot.^ &quot. Nothing takes place at once. / &c mulated hii lawfor . r &amp.ao New ferment . Part p. . one among the most completely verified of maxims. and the use of this law in physics is i-eat .. omits imperceptible C [ . i.. and it is one of my great maxims. Pr0bak ii.37 6 NEW ESSAYS considerable: In a word. which I called the ?. 37 . of continuity * when I spoke of it in the first Nouvelks de la MepubliL .:SrtT Cf. unconscious [insensible] perceptions are of as use in pneumatics 6 as imperceptible [insensible]&quot. corpuscles are in physics. Introduction. ^ of mind OT S P&quot. that nature never mates leaps. it is to the effect that very we always pass from the unconsdous perceptions which in com b ination oar conscious sensation f a connecting link between the motions of om ^6.

99 . 93 &amp.gt. through 9 and that a motion as in parts intermediate in degrees is immediately never immediately arises from rest nor a smaller to rest. distinguishable it is true and diversity is not a matter of time and place. Part ii. 87 sqq. note 107.lt. and vice versa. . e. 27. out activity 112 must always differ more an end of the empty tablets This makes a soul without thought/ a substance with atoms. pp. G. E.NEW ESSAYS 377 that which is small to great. Also Monadology.lt. &amp. 65. Tart iii. ever perfectly alike. 96 9. than numero of the soul. &amp. but of course they are not substances or complete alike. [action]. [subtilite] [enveloppe] 91 an actual infinity 95 . in virtue of imperceptible cannot be variations. because they [i. ch. Introduction. 1 &amp. 213): i (E. and that they perfectly alike. See Monadology. and the void in space. the things are none the less readily distinguish by themselves. just as we never completely smaller line. ii.Jl in degree as in quantity. for in themselves they realities. and have thought that a body receive a motion contrary to that which 93 And all this leads us to before . although traversed a length without having of motion those who have laid down the laws hitherto have not observed can in a it moment had immediately this law.e. 277 b and Nouveaux Essais. about the thing. omits also. Thus although time and place which we do not external relation) enable us to distinguish things. and although there none of them are of the same kind. two individual things Dr&amp. To think from those which are too small to fineness otherwise is to know little of the illimitable which always and everywhere contains of things. come by degrees think that noticeable perceptions also be noticed. although that of time and that the diversity of things is accompanied by time and place] bring with them place. there must always are several things internal principle of distinction.lt. The exact determination of identity in themselves. [insensible] I have also noticed that. 15. i. Cf. pp. bk. v. Not to mention the fact different impressions we must distinguisl that it is rather by means of the things that are perfectly one place or time from another. Introduction.lt. Besides the difference of time and place. . traverse any line or motion. it is nevertheless true that that is to say. not Cf. but comes or goes through reduced . 3 6 sqq.

absolute rest. In a letter to icaise (1692) Leibniz speaks about the useless chatter regarding little bodies and the first. which are of as little value as the occult qualities (G.lt. as body is ultimately extension in three the original division of it dimensions. 130^ 32). perfect globes of the second element. philosophy as is done in statecraft [politique]. the planets and comets. The reference is to the vortex hypothesis of Descartes. (i) the detritus. and the detrition proceeds at an ever-increasing because the smaller original exceedingly minute globules. the body. . when no account is taken of ro/^oV 98 imperceptible [insensible] . which includes the sun and the fixed stars. ii. Principia. arising insensible]. the first element consists of luminous bodies. complete uniformity in one part of time. if we seriously meant this.v v.. Accordingly there are three primary elements of the visible world. Part iii. In short. Politics. give imperceptible but which cannot be made tolerable unless in the limited sense of abstractions of the mind. motion Descartes supposes to have been such as to make the parts revolve on their own axes and also in groups round fferent centres. (as the result of motion 17 rate. 8. (Aristotle. namely that the of which we are not conscious things [s apercevoir] are neither in the soul nor in the body. and which are made passable by our ignorance and the slight attention we to the 117 . TO piKpbv &amp. and (3) some parts of matter which have been less easy to move than the globules of the second element and consequently have not been rubbed down so quickly such as the earth. 2. the second of transparent bodies and the third of opaque bodies. we should err in Otherwise. ^ Aft . which protests that it does not deny what it sets aside and thinks ought not to come into any present consideration. As a result of this (matter being a plenum] the of the cubes are rubbed angles down. (2) the remains of the original cubes in the form of imparted by God) would result in perfectly cubical This parts. 534). 46 sqq. Ac cording to Descartes. .37 8 NEW ESSAYS even particles not actually divided in matter. See Descartes.pv\drTti. second or third element. of which element the sky consists. &amp. place or matter.lt. the larger (in proportion to its bulk) is the surface it exposes to the rubbing of other bodies.. which come from their incom plete notions and which the nature of things does not admit of. | from original perfect cubes and a thousand other fictions of philosophers.

and still less a sound pneumatics 104 which . omits and to see. expense i. Politics. more we are the conditions which we can : for the careful to neglect grounds [raisons] and all consequences. although matter (that is to say. a very poor idea of the beauty and greatness of the universe.iKpwv d\ tc piKpujv. provided .NEW progressions not an error. All that we can do as regards infinities is to recognize them confusedly. We and to foresee some of their consequences none of control. 102 Otherwise = hut if we entirely ignore the infinities in is That things. and also we cannot have a otherwise 10 2 we have sound physics. to say. 10. includes the knowledge of God.. serves also to explain This knowledge of unconscious [insensible] perceptions why and how no two souls. and to know at least distinctly that they are there . 4. the more does practice correspond to theory 10 But it belongs only to the supreme reason. . reads the infinite which surrounds us. human deals with The chapter maxims for avoiding revolutions. proceed thus in order to discriminate conditions [considerations] from one another and in order to reduce effects to their grounds \raisons]. E. as far as possible.lt. and of simple substances in general. reads 104 things. 101 E. : to the fallacy of the spendthrift Each fore the whole is little. ESSAYS 379 is but on the other hand an abstraction we know that what we ignore is So mathematicians make use of actually there. abstractions when they speak of the perfect lines which they ask us to consider. v. to 101 all comprehend distinctly all the infinite and to see . of souls. the inter mingling of the effects of the surrounding infinite ) &amp. the more do actual occurrences correspond to our explanation of them. See note 86. Cf. which explains the nature of bodies in general. 103 E.J9 always makes some exception. which nothing escapes. the uniform motions and other regular effects. is little. : 3 refers there b i3O3 18 yivovrai pti ovv at ordafis ou 99 10 irtpl ^.

and thus the past or the future state of the soul 3 as explicable as its present The slightest L state&quot.lt. &amp. aU Created sim k bstance P d I body. ajldente that superhuman spirit . ^^ \ kSa? i comb J lf th6 pmions ot 7 uthor. great difficulties and thi &quot. reflexion perpetual preservation.&quot. for the difference between one state of the soul and another never is and never has been anythmg but a difference between the more and the 1 conscious [sensille].gt. of one and the m n ^ same kind ai dS f - .. or vice versa.1-ays ft om the first . but also from hose of /. same 06 UnT Cf.3 80 NEW ESSAYS . ^ advantage in this respect. fofth s but it will also be . C 5l mbined readin mr a un corps. about their immortality and about heir working. that their difference ls 3 l ways nwre f!lm a or other. namely.gt.a reference to the : from point of view it will have the universe But this indeed follows already from what I observed regarding two individuals. the more and the less perfect. S UlS OT two s &amp. . makes it 18 &quot. ever come perfectly th6 Creat r and each h &quot. and that there S are always with a .* e and the Monadology. tW ^^ sqq&amp.* found that the doctrine all . I believe. intr x* ^&quot. with o . and that a leap from one state to another infinitely different state could not be natural am surprised that the philosophic schools have without reason given up natural explanation and have deliberely plunged themselves into very sufficiently &quot.. never are soul s ep rat ed fi : have a body j f S th ^ r &quot. that it solves sophical difficulties about the state of souls is of the philo about then- evident that this is in accordance with reason. the majority of modern writers.&quot.! ..e lor this. 1 .

and all in the case of rational souls. to the opinion that the soul continues to exist without anybody and none the less retains its thoughts and functions. as I think. is capable of reducing things to complete confusion in an animal. have already said that no sleep can last for ever it will last for the shortest time or almost not at I . than there is in the change of the caterpillar into the butterfly. which doctrine they could not perfectly right in as in conformity sufficiently justify. And I add further that no derangement of its visible organs to retain . note 25. that is to say. And in order to give a better proof of this they tried to show that the soul has already in this life thoughts which are abstract and independent of ideas of matter. 532. E. la Doctrine cTun Esprit Universe! Unique (1702) vi. or of destroying all its organs and depriving 12 Cf. contributed greatly towards of intellect believe in the doctrine of a single uni versal spirit is this. n. See also Considerations sur (G-. of the animal). . ESSAYS 381 given occasion for the apparent triumphs of freethinkers n2 all of whose arguments fall at once [esprit s forts] through this explanation of things.NEW . that ordinary philosophers have set forth a doctrine about souls separate [from bodies] and about the also. Monadology. 14. What has my making men functions of the soul being independent of the body and its organs. 179 b): in opinion. ver. in order that they may be more susceptible of punishments and rewards. and consequently memory and this is so. Now those who rejected this separated con dition and independence [of the soul] as contrary to experience and to reason were so much the more led to believe in the extinction of the individual universal spirit alone. and in the preservation of thought during sleep. according to which there is no more difficulty in conceiving the preservation of souls (or rather. 113 soul and the preservation of the St. they thought it necessary to have recourse to separated souls. but seeing that by death those organs in animals which we observe are deranged and ultimately corrupted. to which Jesus Christ has divinely likened death 113 But then . They were wishing to maintain the immortality of the soul with the Divine perfections and with a genuine morality. John xi. which are destined always to preserve the personal character [personnage] which has been given them in the City of God.

Metaphysica. Lib. Aristotle represents the planets as having motions of their own..e. p. who . different from that of the fixed stars or the sphere of the heavens in general.382 ineffaceable NEW ESSAYS its organic body and of the remains of all its former impressions 114 But the ease with which people have given up the ancient doctrine that the angels have ethereal [subtils] bodies connected with them (which has been confounded with the corporeality of the angels themselves). i. Considerations sur la Doctrine d un Esprit Universal Unique Cf. 3. and Aristotle actus purus. 23. separate It seems likely that Leibniz was thinking of the intelligences. cap. .. xi. views of Thomas Aquinas. Comm. On the Accordingly the heavens are not moved by intelligences. Aristotle cannot be regarded as meaning that the planets are l 110 moved by &amp. and therefore an intellectual one. These planetary motions are attributed to an activity (rrpd^is^) similar to that which exists in animals and plants (De Caelo. At the end of the chapter For our present purpose it does not matter quoted. by God. 12. Tract. 10 (Opera. p. i) also Heavenly bodies are moved by the substances which move them through apprehension not however a sense-apprehension . But even so. i78b Leibniz s G. vol. 374 b). other hand. who says heavenly body is moved : A and by some intellectual substance (Contra Gentes. iii. C. ed. he says whether a heavenly body is moved by an intellectual substance or conjoined with it as its soul. The theory mentioned by Leibniz is stated also by Albertus Magnus. 1651. Scaliger. New System. 12. in Hippocratis lib. 2. ii. : : : : : a suggestion of the Neo-Platonic influences to which Thomas Aquinas was necessarily subject. and by J. the soul of the whole of among troduction of supposed unembodied [separes] intelligences created things (to which Aristotle s theory of intelligences that 115 make the skies revolve has greatly con tributed) 114 . According to Aristotle the heavens are moved by the -npSirov KLVOVV or prime mover. Monadology. or by a separate substance whether each of the heavenly bodies is moved by God or none of them is immediately so moved. (E. but all through the mediation of created intellectual substances or whether the first heavenly body alone is immediately moved by God and the others by the mediation of created substances provided we hold that the motion of the heavens is due to an intellectual substance.as Leibniz also admits) is But this is an eternal (atSiov) motion. de Somniis (1539).. 72-77 . 7 and 8. iii. and finally the ill-considered opinion people Cf. .lt. 292 i). ii. Jammy. There is here . 286* n). describes the heavens as ow^a n Oetov (De Caelo. the in .

. ch. and this intelligence performed the function . vi. had spoken about it as wisely and as he for it is to be feared that a good many people who speak of immortality through grace. Leibniz s Considerations sur la Doctrine d un naOrfriKus is mortal. 4. where Locke seems to soul conditional on religious faith.NEW ESSAYS 383 have held that we cannot believe in the preservation of the souls of the lower animals without falling into metempsychosis and making them go [promener] from body to body. as I shall mention 117 But it were well if all those who are of presently . led to the neglect of the natural This of explaining the preservation of the soul. 240 note). while the vovs iroirjTiKos is . the Peripatetic philosophers did not regard this 530) for besides the intelligences which. bk. and the perplexity in which people have 110 been through not knowing what to do with them . vol. do so only to save appearances. 43o Developing a suggestion of Aristotle. of active understanding in the souls of Dictionary. spirit as absolutely universal according to them. in way opinion. Several people of Esprit Unirersel Unique (1702) (E. vol. with note). iv. (See De Anima. It is true. x The vovs iraOyTiKus is peculiar to the individual. 117 paragraphs). Essay. . iii. omits from and making to with them. pp. 178 a G. they had an intelligence for this lower world. have. animate the stars. vi. 3. iv. See Locke. iv. 195. and bk. ch. 389 sqq.. : . p. Cf. See also Bayle s E. 5. 529^ intellect have thought and do still think that there is only one spirit. relation Aristotle) Much or Ibii Roschd) was born at Cordova in 1126 and of his philosophizing was concerned with the between the vovs TTOLTJTIKOS (a phrase never actually used by and the vovs iraOrjTucos of Aristotle. my has done great injury to natural religion and has led a good many to believe that our immortality is only and our celebrated author a miraculous grace of God also speaks of it with some doubt. ii. a 10 sqq. article Ricius. ed. note C. also Locke s Reasonableness of Christianity opening p. 6 (Eraser s Infra. 15 (Eraser. Averroes regards the VGVS -rroirjTiKus as one principle appearing in all men. : . for the vovs immortal Cf. ultimately identical with the Divine Spirit and is thus but there is no individual immortality. 110 men. 18 make the immortality of the Averroes died in 1198. vol. ii. and are at bottom nearly of the same opinion as those Averroists 118 and some erring this opinion sincerely as .

8n HIT&quot. held thatlhere also i an *****^ f thes *&amp. two or Contaronus and others patetics. b ific vision of completely . death.gt. wmen nas been revived - He from outside of us. P. hilos P her _.NEW . i &quot. v I588 &quot. passive understand] the r^v^d^^^^^r? t ^f ^ man s ^ & &quot. ESSAYS who imagine with the the s lta mmion . a Protestant minister in a v&quot. 11 as H opinion of the Sa : ?S^^^ :2:: ^^ 1 om P ona tius. &quot.fhU n one book of his was ubu^ &quot. had an opinion of this &quot. as the of the universal spirit. He was OUgh .

536). 182 a insects.. but are reunited to their ocean after the destruction of the body s organs. when combined with the functions of the others. one thing is combined with another it retains never theless its peculiar functions. pebbles. If we hold that the souls. we fall into an opinion contrary to reason and to all good philosophy. motion in composed if the plenum would be impossible. For. that the author thinks there must be a void in it [matter] for the sake of motion. which are separated from it when they animate some particular organic body. are without any functions of their own. according to Leibniz.lt. and in place of saying that it is the only spirit. which. produce the functions of the whole. when reunited to God. ESSAYS 385 my system alone clearly shows to be also to differ as regards matter in this. And I admit if matter were of such parts. because he believes that the We seem m that particles of matter are indivisible [roide]. we should have to say that in itself it is nothing at all. and thus none can be lost in the ocean of the one spirit. if the parts had none.NEW which perhaps impossible 12 . 20 souls is which will still compatible with the functions of their glorified remain organic in their own way. . vi. . as a room were filled with a great is many little smallest place in it was not by any means granted. happy bodies. goes so far as to think that the rigidity or cohesion of its particles constitutes the essence of the body. omits in it [y]. vi. For when c c . G. 121 E. Esprit Universel Unique (E. somewhat in the same way as a swarm of bees is an but as the swarm assemblage of these &amp. Against this idea that the universal spirit is like an ocean composed of an infinity of drops. and that in nature there is nothing but individual souls of which it is the aggregate. other wise the whole would have no functions. 181 b G. it is clear that in this way the universal spirit itself would not be a genuine being. so that not even the But this supposition empty. Leibniz argues that as the ocean is a quantity of drops. Esprit . no substance can be without an activity of its own. Universel Unique (E. 535). as if any being with a continued existence could ever reach a state in which it is without function or impression. God would thus be an assemblage of all souls. is not itself a genuine substance. and indeed there does not seem to be any reason for it although this able author .. Space must rather be conceived as full of an ultimately fluid matter.

according to Leibniz. Two solid. would imply tnat one part of matter is for ever bound ( thirled ) to another and therefore always be dragged along with it.) But. according to the law of continuity. does admit that there is an apparent traction. there is no atom of invincible hardness. Consequently matter has every where some degree of rigidity as well as of fluidity. as in the same way I hold that there are none e. 11. would cause a traction. more with this difference that it is divisible and divided unequally in different places. and no quantity of matter [masse] completely indifferent to division 123 Thus the order of nature and especially the law of continuity make both 124 equally inadmissible. Explanation of the bk.lt. as &amp.NEW ESSAYS susceptible of all divisions and even subjected actually to divisions and subdivisions ad but neverthe infinitum . cannot exist any more than the perfectly fluid minute : a perfect fluid Of Third System. strictly speaking. : am 3 [subtile] matter of the counteracting forces. A traction. however. I a i so of opinion that all bodies haye gom ^ degree of cohesion. Also Nouveaux Essais. even though there be no visible contact between the parts which draw one another. v. (a) absolutely soft portion of o force of cohesion &amp. softness or fluidity. strictly 125 For if there were a speaking hard . p. tending division. simply a low de-ree of An extremes are both impossible (i) the absolutely hard or the absolutely soft or fluid. nothing to resist division. Leibniz. m by . because of the motions. less or less to I have also shown that cohesion. 21 i. 114. ch. if not itself the effect of impulse or motion. overcome it matter would be one in which there is whatever.lt. 65. so that it would be completely indifferent to division/ Hardness or solidity is. An absolutely hard piece of matter would be one in which the force holding it together should be so strong that no combination of other forces could : * Monadology. 4. 229 b . fundamentally 122 Cf. 4 which have not aome fluidity and of which the cohesion cannot be overcome and consequently in my opinion the atoms of Epicurus hardness of which is supposed to be invincible. and there is no body which is hard or fluid in the highest degree. . that is to say. which are already in the particular place. G. (E.lt. 335 with note. both a perfect atom and New &amp. traction or attraction is unintelligible unless the sense of a force or impulse which can be overcome 25 Cartesians.

17 sqq. author such as were formerly attributed to nature s abhorrence and he reduces them to impulses. is himself opposed to these philosophical tractions.. C C 2 Cf. 1699. ing. Nevertheless I must not conceal the fact that I have observed a kind of retraction regarding this matter on the part of our excellent author. His chief work was the Origines Sacrae (1662. 4. controversy originated which Toland Locke s Discourse in Stillingfleet published A Socinian Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity with an answer to the late there appeared a criticism of Locke s way of objections. with the moderns. that one part of matter acts it through immediately upon another only by impelling 127 I think they are right. Eraser s note. 113. it may not appear so to our senses. Dorsetshire. Eraser s ed. 8. 8. shape. straightforwardness in this respect much as I have admired his penetrating genius on as other occasions. which body. ch. 128 Edward Stillingfleet. in the anti-religious use to with Locke and bk. I refer to his reply to the second letter of the late Bishop of Worcester magnet and some 1 &quot. ii. n 98s b 13. bk.) (cf. whose unpretending I cannot but praise. s Essay. 1699. 126 According to Democritus. 118). concerned. when impelled would draw with it the rest that is to say. vol. 4 in 5 n . there is contact and impulse Cf. p. ch. the part which is not impelled and which Yet our able does not lie in the line of impulsion. in which To this Locke replied at great length and the controversy ideas. operation. 231 b Xoureaux Essais. in the case of the electrical But between the bodies any such case. (E. of Locke s . i. A. In 1696 continued until Stillingfleet s death. although G. arrangement and 127 See Locke (Aristotle. 229 a. one have a part projecting in the form of a hook (as should -c the hook we can imagine atoms of all kinds of shapes) of the atom. v. 171). ii. for instance. . ii. atoms position. maintain of a vacuum 1 . (in his Christianity not Mysterious) turned some of views. having for ten years been Bishop His Worcester. 1635. born at Cranbourne. differ in 4. 23. of died at Westminster. Metaph. printed in phenomena. 8 . because In this contact otherwise there would be nothing intelligible in the . ch. ch. bk.ESSAYS 387 of the atoms of Epicurus.

. xli . of Locke s Essay. ch. ch. 1823). Concepts of Modern Physics. vol. that bodies act upon one another by impulse and not otherwise for it is impossible for us to understand that a body can act upon that which it does not touch. ch. . also Stallo. iv. I writ it. Locke See Eraser s Locke s Works (10 130 See i. Newton. ii. And therefore in the next edition of my book I shall take care to have that passage rectified 129 I find that in the French translation of this book. 8 (Library ed. pp. put into bodies powers and ways of operation above what can be devised from our idea of body. by ways inconceivable to me. vol. 467. Tfie whole is greater than thepart: lish edition has merely : . 413 sqq. 31 Of course the Newtonian theory does not necessarily imply that a body can act where it is not. 408. bk. Stillingfleet s Works (1710). in this point.. The gravitation of matter towards matter. is not only a demon stration that God can. p. Prefatory Note. this section 1 1 reads thus : It is we can conceive it. narrow conceptions. . but also an unquestionable and every where visible instance. I say. bk. latest editions 13 . ed. 1 And so I thought when (Essay. vol. 52). The Works (1823). 5. how false all exceedingly true ! and calumnious ! Nature abhors a vacuum : how exceedingly Again. vol. s Also Eng The next thing to be considered is. Sartor Resartus. at least so far as . Principia. 171 note. Cf. which is as much as to imagine that it can act where it is not lsl evident. by my else &quot. i. the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in. that He has done so. how bodies produce ideas in us and that is manifestly by impulse. Prolegomena. vol. def. that it is too bold a presumption to limit God s power. and Scholium Oenerale-. 8. he says among other things It is that bodies operate by impulse and nothing true. Mr. p. The italics are by Leibniz. i. 29 i. only. Newton s incomparable book. Essay. ed.NEW ESSAYS p. p. WHERE is it ? Carlyle. iii. vol. in which. Nothing can act but where it is : with heart . doubtless made from the . and can yet conceive no other way of their But I am since convinced by the judicious operation. vol. by way of justifying the opinion he had maintained against the learned prelate. iv. 8. or can be explained by what we know of matter. namely that matter might think. if He pleases. : &quot. p. 1). my .

success of the observation that the largo bodies of the world exert among themselves and upon their own perceptible parts the attraction of this system. these people neither can reduce attraction to impulse or to explicable reasons (as Plato did in the Timaeus) nor do they wish they could. 1 18). or to try deliberately to mak&amp. that is to say. space and motion. he calls them vires centripetae Essais. time.lt. led on by intelligible. (E. the authority of his friends rather than his own judgment) he withdrew this opinion. and held that there may lie hid in the essence of matter I know not what extraordinary things which is just as if one were to think that there art[miral/lia~\ . and in accordance with the mechanical . Hobbes.. ch. 231 b G.lt. tance. know and make which not even the highest spirit [genius \ could thoroughly Such are they who. taken by them selves. without its being possible to - make them intelligible. . It is surprising that even now. I think. However that may be. Otherwise too great inexplicable powers a licence will be given to bad philosophers on the strength and if we admit those centripetal of what God can do 132 or those immediate attractions from a dis powers [vcrtus] in the ordinary course of nature . in the first edition of his Essay on the Under reason. standing. as if they had feeling. renovat tones qualitatum scholasticarum : et intelligentiarum chimaericarum And all who are not content to recognize with us (G. vii. declared rightly. clear things obscure. have supposed qualities which are perpetually occult. and their numerous followers.ii. Boyle. 8. n In Nouveaux n. ESSAYS 389 I cannot but praise the modest piety of our celebrated who recognizes that God can do beyond what we can understand. Cf. th&amp. which are unknown.. that is. in the great light of this age. as if one were to seek a knot in a bulrush [a difficulty where there is none]. inexplic able. dpprjToi. like feels like and delights in it even from afar. occult qualities in number. as it were. or whether God by a perpetual miracle secures that they shall strive towards one another. suppose that every body is attracted by every other through the very force of matter whether. that no body is moved except by the impulse of a body coming into contact with it. But afterwards (obeying. . 342) qualities which are so far occult.NEW author. physics established by his illustrious countrymen. bk. there are some who hope to persuade the world of a doctrine so opposed to John Locke. and that thus there . v. may be inconceivable but I would rather mysteries in the articles of faith that we were not compelled to have recourse to miracle and to admit absolutely and operations. Antibarbarus Physicus pro Philosophia reali contra .

hat Leibniz was deeply interested in the controversy appears from his letters to Thomas Burnet of Kemnay (G. and that at any limit to the sphere of its and he does this in order to activity support an opinion which seems to me 135 no less the inexplicable. I cannot avoid entering into it a little and exam ining their controversy 136 I will state the substance of . Ovid. do or under them attraction. tenebit iter : posse negabam.lt. &amp. el. may The question which he prelate who had attacked and. bk. and from maintaining their intentional species/ which go from objects to us and find it possible to enter even into our souls *\ If that is l I see nothing to hinder our Scholastics so. for he attributes great distances without .39 NEW ESSAYS from saying that everything happens merely through their faculties. namely. 8.} him giving to ladies that which is not even intelligible.^ &amp. in surpass my opinion. . goes here a too He much from one extreme to the other! raises difficulties about the operations of souls is when merely whether that which is not peris to be admitted ceptibte and here we have ^sensible&quot.^ ther6 n thing uotbeL ve 7 * E reads which is instead of which seems to me. Omnia jam so that it fient. &quot. as it is an discusses with the distinguished him is whether matter can think. and no part world will hold on its own way all the things will presently &quot. i. See Monadologij. Tristia. fieri quae posse negabam 13t . iii. fieri quae ibunt. 7.lt. to stand. attributing to them powers and activities which . seems little to me that our author. in 151 sqq Et nihil Parsque suum mundi nulla Omnia jam fient. note ro. the question all that a created spirit can. even for the present work. [A 1 of the ^ ^^ ^ ^^ &amp. judicious as he is. de quo non sit habenda fides. possibility that within the order of nature matter think.&quot. The whole passage is:Omnia naturae praepostera legibus 33 est. ver. W &quot. . 7. things by the laws of nature will go topsy-turvy. important point. All the things will presently happen.gt. which I said could not happen.

vol. own. criminate l38 what may be proper to the soul and what to the body. I give the words of the author not 139 Locke p. Lettres et Opuscules inedits de Leibniz. tion. reads investigate [discuter~] instead of disccrner. flexion can assure us of the existence of the mind [esprit] to matter the faculty of thinking. vol. iii. although the one of these substances of how re as the other. would become useless. which should enable us to dis thus the way of ideas. which he frequently with Arnauld. Introduc He . vol. think author replies in his first letter (p. 2i6. iii. 23. and having done justice to this excellent author. 28). who are the natural directors of the must be followed as much as peoples and whose formularies Leibniz also wrote two accounts of the (G. 32 sqq. with comments of his also Foucher de Careil. since ing to the opinion of our author (bk. 3). accord if God can known ) m give iv. x &amp. 387 Eraser s ed. Bohn s ed. and that the understanding along with the will makes this idea as intelligible to us as the nature of body is made intelli This is how our gible to us by solidity and impulse. 241 sqq. messieurs les ecclesiastiques. ch. . vol. iv. while yet it was said in the second book of the Essay on the Understanding of the soul 27. set himself to examine certain parts of it in his Vindication the Doctrine of the Trinity . re-translating from Leibniz. p. .gt. pp. possible. s Works (ed. E. of Worcester. Ixii-lxxxiii.lt. refers to it and likens it to his own controversy has no doubt that Locke will come well out of He [Locke] has too much judgment to give an advantage to it. 193 note.. in recognizing that he thinks the existence of the mind [esprit] as certain as that of the is as little body..) See controversy. ii. Here. (G. he asks (pp. that the operations (ch. fearing (in opinion without much that our author s doctrine of ideas was liable ground) my to some abuses prejudicial to the Christian faith. 223 sqq. pp. ii. and in other passages quoted. furnish us with the idea of the mind [esprit]. and will take the liberty The late Bishop of saying what I think about it. 1:17 138 Stillingtteet s Works (1710). 15. p. 505.NEW ESSAYS 39! the controversy on this subject. iii. 6$) m : &amp. 1823).I I have proved that there is a spiritual substance in us. of the Essay.

And therefore if your lordship means by a spiritual an immaterial sub stance. 142 13 Stillingfleet s Works. who condenses Locke s sentence. in which it is said that by the simple ideas we 143 have taken from our own minds 140 we are able to frame iv. and therefore has a necessary con nexion with a support or subject of inhesion the idea of that support is what we call substance. vol. . 10. as I think you do. For the . makes it it modification has. substance that has solidity or no. Yet I have shown (adds the author. 534. as a spirit.39 2 for this action or NEW ESSAYS The idea of thinking. as thinking. p. Leibniz Leibniz s italics. it will prove in the highest degree probable that the thinking substance in us is immaterial. The learned Bishop in his reply to this letter. . vol. ch. the modification of solidity is matter. . . 34. inconsistent with the : we experiment in ourselves mode of thinking is idea of self-subsistence. whether it has the modification of thinking or no. without 141 a necessary supposition that the soul is immaterial. which we experiment I give the : daily in ourselves. general idea of substance being the same everywhere^. Though I presume. 23. . in order to show that our author was of another opinion when he wrote the second book of the Essay. the modification of thinking. nor upon my prin ciples can it be proved (your lordship meaning. (p. or the power of thinking joined to it. knowing. that all the great ends of religion and morality p. 1823. . demonstratively proved) that there is an imma terial substance in us that thinks. which is as follows By the simple ideas we have taken from those operations of our own minds. p. 68) are secured barely by the immortality of the soul. from what I have said about the supposition of a system of matter thinking (bk. words as they are in Stillingfleet. ch. without considering what other whether it has the modification of As on the other side. s translation has from the operations of our mind. willing. iii. I grant I have not proved. 5 1 ) 15). 16) (which there de monstrates that God is immaterial). iv. understanding. quotes from it 142 tne passage (taken from the same book. H1 Ed.

and a power of . perceiving. 540. that is to say that it is immaterial. and which 147 148 I think prove iii. p. perceiving. we have the idea of an immaterial spirit and by putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts. and that thus (17) l4 * he indicates that these ideas constitute body as opposed to spirit [esprit]. liberty. it .. ii. iii. &c. Leibniz reads Stillingfleet here again shortens Locke s statement. it does not follow that their differences are and power we are able to frame the of beginning motion. and says 146 that the ends of religion and morality are best (p. we have as clear a perception and notion For putting of immaterial substances as we have of material. ception and notion of immaterial substances as well as 14 He also quotes other passages to show that material V our author opposed spirit [esprit] to body. liberty and 144 we have as clear a per power of moving themselves . 23. Locke s Essay. . 145 : 144 ideas of thinking. 54) secured by proving that the soul is immortal by its nature. iii. and that thus our author thought that the idea of thinking and of willing presupposes another substance. together the ideas of thinking and willing. or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion. 17 Stillingfleet. co-existing in some substance. 23. Leibniz reads our body instead of themselves. vol. ii. : we have no 146 I am of opinion that Stillingfleet s Works.NEW ESSAYS 393 And thus by putting the complex idea of a spirit. Stillingfleet. 540. positive idea. 535 the great ends of religion and morality are best secured by tbe proofs of the immortality of the soul from its nature and properties. joined to substance. 539 . of which we have no distinct idea. complex idea of an immaterial spirit. The Bishop of Worcester might have added that from the fact that the general idea of substance is in body and in spirit. 147 this passage that all the ideas quotes (p. though he gives a more exact quotation And thus by putting together the Locke wrote of it on p. and power of moving them selves and other things. 6. together the ideas of thinking. as of material. of which likewise we have the idea of matter. Essay. being moved. different from that which is presupposed by solidity and impulse. 7o) He also we have of particular distinct sorts of substances are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas. immaterial. joined with substance.

and solidity are attributes or perpetual and principal predicates [impetuosite]. impetus genus. or that two hours also have each the same matter as the other. the one merely logical. in general. p. But two heterogeneous things may have a common logical genus. reads &amp. and can often be changed one into another physical (or rather real) genus and logical or ideal genus. so to speak. 154 E. 127 . ground [sujet]. having nothing but continuous quantity from the modifications of which time and . and it would be a mistake to suppose I know not what real common . metaphysical or physical. and then their differences are not mere accidental 1S1 modifications of one and the same or subject [sujet] one and the same matter. Introduction. Cf. by changing their modification. like circles and squares. reads E. p. 392. the other real 154 and between . we ought to distinguish be . Part ii. but thinking. the one physical (that of bodies). space arise. &amp. Things which are of the same physical tween figures and motions are modifications of these attributes 15 Further. extension. are of the same matter. Monadology. gives this sentence these distinctions. . it. Nevertheless their common logical genus is continuous quantity 152 Some one will perhaps ridicule this distinction 153 of the philosophers between two genera. as our author quoted from his first letter 149 must certainly distinguish between modifications . . O. and they appear to be most 19 two matters. p. Thus time and space are very heterogeneous things. only but of things themselves. the other merely metaphysical or general. The faculty of having perception and that of acting. omits also real. E. . 14 sqq.lt. 51 3 Or ground.lt. or which are homogeneous. Part iii. 34 .394 NEW ESSAYS We and modifications of one and the said in the passage I have same thing. attributes. Yet these distinctions are distinctions not of terms 50 Supra. as if one were to say that two parts of space have the same matter.

and the notion of the real genus is common to the two matters. where confusion between them has pro duced a false conclusion 155 These two genera have a common notion. ESSAYS 395 pertinent here. I metaphysical merely. ii. the bond of union between them.NEW . but to plants vegetation. so that their filiation will be as follows ^Merely ences. 158 ? 397) God (he says. Ultimately.. on the other which less accidental variations of some real thing. of course. 150 : logical. 1823&quot.5 rp ne p i conflicting attributes. an infinite analysis would be needed hand. vol. 157 Matter here is equivalent to real genus. nearly in these words. n t simply is that no real thing can have two though it may at different times have or more modifica Nevertheless attributes tions which in themselves are conflicting. in a real thing. Modifications. i.. to show 150 this. which. In translating this passage I have used Locke s words as much as . vol. have not seen the second letter of our author to the and the answer which the prelate makes to it touches the point about the thinking of matter. 460 Bohn s ed. . in which there is homogeneity. / which are tions. hardly But our authors reply to this second answer returns to Bishop . and to animals feeling Those who agree with me so far exclaim [sentiment]. may abstractly or ideally be comprehended under the same concept or in the same class. possible. 390. physical. p. perhaps.-. on the ground that there is an essential (not merely accidental) community between them. real. would be impossible because conflicting. p. superadds to the essence of matter what qualities and perfections He pleases : to some parts mere motion. This l filiation as a whole is. They are thus species of a logical genus. 158 Works (ed. are more or is . an arrangement of logical genera and species. in is 1 matter I solid which there is a homogeneous mass. its variations consisting of mere differ the differences of that modifiedto say. the modifications may turn out to be species of a logical genus (it is probable that they are so in the mind of God) but. They are thus species of a real genus. iv. that P- point. for us.

God may give to matter thought. Works (ed 1823). 408) and the power of making abstractions 165 can (p. ii. . . See Introduction ii. They also urge that can think . 463 sqq.lt. Essay. p. s ed. on p. Newton (in words which I have quoted above). attributed to Mr. reason and volition.lt. He thinks (p.. Works. 392 sqq 51 Works (ed. vol. as if that were to destroy the essence of matter. Cf. p. Bohn Frasers ed. 240 note. 395. nay more. . Eraser s ed. for motion and life are just as little included in . to occult qualities we cannot conceive how matter but our conception is not the measure of God s 159 He afterwards takes as an instance omnipotency the attraction of lco but especially on matter.39 6 NJEW ESSAYS against me when I go a step further and say. iv. and self-consciousness [la 1(5 consdosite] (p. ii. but did not attribute to them any immaterial substance 1G4 He maintains that 1G3 . material and immaterial. The qualitates occultae Jrart iv. Essay. 409) liberty . 392. 99 ]cl where he speaks of the gravitation of matter p. .. 163 ed. 408 towards matter. ICii 159 &amp. ii.. 402) the soul thinks. 1823). ii.. Cf. 395 . . to inexplicable qualities.. Bohn s ed. 194 note.. 466 Bohn s ed. l62 He that we do not conceive how even stand. it is in the power of God to give to the one or the other the power of thinking. 468 Bohn s ed. And he endeavours to take advantage of the admission of his opponent. 156. . iv. 1823). which seems to be a slip for Works (ed. and (p. adds (p. iv. But to make good this assertion they say that thought and reason are not included in the essence of matter which proves nothing. 403) ^ that as the two substances. 394 Works.. vol. who attributed sense [sentiment] to the lower animals. This is practically to go back it. 467 Bohn s ii. &amp. of the Scholastics. . 463. . 399 . iv. 401) lc3 that nothing is more calculated to favour scepticism than to deny what one does not under . can be conceived in their bare essence without any activity. declaring that we can never conceive the how of it. iv. All the texts give 99. p. ii.

bk. ii. Regarding all this I will observe.NEW ESSAYS 397 be given to matter. taken from vol. 4. but I add that we have a right to deny (at least in the order of nature) that which is absolutely neither intel I maintain also that substances ligible nor explicable. (material or immaterial) cannot be conceived in their . 313^ . ch. died in 1729. derivative etre]. The book Locke s quotation is still ranks as an authority on its subject. de la Loubere 1G8 that the Pagans of the east recognize the immortality of the soul without being able to com prehend its immateriality. are merely modes [faqons which must be derived from substances. that it is not in the power of a mere mechanism to produce perception. also Monadoloyy. but as enriched by a 3G6 the observa Divine power. word. As the result of a three months resi dence in Siam he published two volumes Du Boyaume de Siam (1691 Eng. i. : . . sir. or that which is entirely passive. Cf. d powers. 109 6 (E. IBB 1(57 Works. trans. and they are not derived from matter in so far as it is merely mechanical. v. 19.. their history. this I think you will agree with me. 10. 360) Cf. ii. born at Toulouse in 1642. TO (Eraser. Essay. and institutions. 3. 1693% in which he gives an elaborate account of the Siamese people. iv. 346 b G. 434) tion of a traveller so considerable 167 and judicious as M. Finally he quotes (p. reason. Bohn s od. or if you like. . 485 . before coming to the statement of my own view. as it is of producing reason is . customs. Nouvcaux Essais. that activity is of the essence of substance in general and that the conceptions of created beings are not the measure of the power of . matter author admits and that I most certainly recognize that it is not allowable to deny what one does not understand. The primary powers constitute the substances themselves and the Locke s . iv. sensation. ch. 406. p. the faculties. bare essence without any activity. in so far as by abstraction we take account only of the incomplete And in being of materia prima. not as matter. 17. In 1687 Louis XIV entrusted him with a mission to Siam for the purpose of establishing diplomatic and commercial relations between that country and France. ch. bk. that is to say. iv. that it is certain that as little capable of producing feeling [sentiment] 169 as our mechanically. vol. 168 Simon de la Loubere. Locke.

ent. absolute original essence of some kind. or ability [force] to conceive. however. 4 J medlcatum what ruth ofm is / mv 7 m ^^ &amp.] for cmvenir. is the measure of the power of nature: for all that is in accordance with the order of nature can be conceived or understood by some created being 170 Those who will think out system will see that cannot wholly agree with either of these excellent authors.lt.gt. for.&quot.**y*o : &quot. is very instructive But. ad of which h and 7 sition and * ^ ^dation for to le otherwise I know not the con- found in their notions. we should believe that if we under stood the nature of the subject [sujet] and of the quality figures. but that their conceptivity.to a subject [sujet] must arise from the limitations or variations of a real genus or an original nature which is constant and absolute 172 is thus that among philosophers the modes of an bsolute being are distinguished from the being itselfr instance.lt. Spinoza s Letters. bodily limited gives nothing but motion. E. omits . For Leibniz this would follow a priori from shown in the fact that each Monad . .lt. figure and motion are manifestly limitations and variations of the nature my [ it is clear how an extension when we should understand a result of it-. 70 and that the change which takes place in it is And whenever we find any quality in a subject [sujet].gt.and representation of the whole 1 5: reads come Oem&amp. Cf. how of nature. V one of the corollaries a11 is P hi losophers must the common axiom. to explain myself distinctly. &amp.398 NEW ESSAYS God.^ ^ s so a P ssent &amp. 50. it is before all things to be considered that the modifications which can naturally or without miracle belong. [concevoir] Thus the quality can be in the order of nature (setting th&amp. we know that size. whose controversy.

is faincanfe. Appendix : Donee ad Dei voluntatem. is radically opposed to the view of Locke. 470 b probably thinking of the he frequently refers . (of }. in the Thcodia c (cf.. and to provide refuges 17 and idleness by a confused [sourd] system for ignorance which allows. Spinoza. Cf. of the thing took place so rather than otherwise. hoc ed. E. This distinc and tion. and to reject it would be to maintain some thing worse than occult qualities and accordingly to renounce philosophy and reason. Leibniz means . because things are fated one way or that the hypothesis of another. that is to say. 176 i. Accordingly this lazy hypothesis would equally destroy our philosophy. esf. to which G. vi. but also which the greatest mind [esprit God were to give it the widest possible grasp. that is to say to explain it mechanically : wiiile that which is according to nature [naturel] ought to be capable of becoming distinctly conceivable. if we were admitted into the secrets of things. Ethics. Asiles tie f ignorance. The French Leibniz is The fallacy is that which counsels doing nothing. why 175 that nothing happens without a reason. as explicable modifications of it. 30). course. which can be derived from we their nature. could not comprehend. between that which is natural and explicable that which is inexplicable and miraculous.NEW aside miracles\ ESSAYS 399 God is not arbitrarily free to give to substances one set of qualities or another indifferently and He will never give them any but those which are : natural to them. that is to say. not only that there are qualities we do not &quot. which can always be given This. removes all difficulties. Part i. understand that there are qualities even if which there are only too many). and will not of itself go in a curved line. because it is not possible to conceive how that can happen. Thus may hold that matter will not by nature have the attraction mentioned above. whatever we do. ignorantiac asylum confugeris (Bruder s 220). qualities whicli : would either be miraculous or without rhyme or reason and that God should usually perform miracles would certainly be without 176 rhyme or reason. fallacy of dpyo? yos or Ignava Ratio.

l &amp. &amp.r thing. 14. without reason perplexed regarding the souls of the lower animals. and the other to it. then.400 which seeks furnishes them. one of which is. 4. the mechanical combination of which could pro &amp.gt. Cf. I God should miraculously impart thinking natural to think. a mill. figures and motions. VCSUlgULe I E. which he is speaking is a lazy one. not knowing what to make of Cartesians. because acceptance of it would imply that it as futile to in ^ii^ u\j r * investigate the secrets of things. so that one might conceive sizes. ESSAYS and the Divine wisdom which it and our author cannot be a modification of matter that is intelligible or can be comprehended and explained matter 177 that is to say. 79 80 Monadology.lt.lt. a feeling or by thinking being is not a mechanical like a watch thinking is Now as to more than once allows certain. 4- I &amp. am entirely of the opinion of the Cartesians. See Monadology. contrary all appearance and to the judgment of mankind 180 r&amp. that God should unite with it a substance to which is. and that their souls are immaterial (properly speaking) and no more perishable than are atoms according to Demo1 critus or Gassendi while the . . have been compelled . New System.gt. omits from or pan Ho to v^^j-i llts ^ can be matter.gt. &quot. that it : duce something thinking and even feeling in a quantity t matter in which there was nothing of this kind which thinking and feeling would also come to an end in the same way when the mechanism falls into disorder 178 Accordingly it is not a natural thing for matter to feel and to think. NEW reasons. 78 Cf. except that I extend it even to the lower animals. and hold that they have feeling [sentiment]. and this can take place in it only in two ways. 17. it is that In this matter. who are them there itself is conservation of is them (because it has not to ccurred to in a them that there conservation of the animal deny even feeling [sentiment] to the lower animals. minute form). it.

matter so as to receive a power of which it is not naturally declare that God exalts fire capable as some Scholastics : so as to give it 181 the power directly to burn spirits separated . since He can annihilate them l &quot. acting in place of the fire/ Cardinal Bcllarmine (1542-1621) in his De Purgatorio. which are not modes [fa$ons d etre ] or modifications derived from what the Schools substances. burns souls. is to have recourse to miracles and to called obediential poicer. from their nature or 6. ch. and whether not Himself produce the effect. &quot. or in the annihilation of the soul. 183 181 i. matter of God could make our souls that the of power course. unless there is attributed to soul or rather a miracle. opinion he openly follows Augustine (De and a similar view is expressed by Thomas Aquinas (Summa TheoL is 12. iv. immaterial (or mortal. from the order of nature. 181 E. Q. 360.: Noureaux Essais.NEW But if ESSAYS 4 O1 some one should say that at any rate God can add for it.. through a kind of supernatural exaltation. Cf. e. im . 3. expounds material Suppl. without at the same time putting into matter a substance which should be the subject it) in which this same faculty (as I conceive is inherent matter (that is to say. without adding to an immaterial must needs have been miraculously exalted soul). ii. . 10). reads Cf. xxi. unless exaltation of it be by a miracle. the faculty of thinking to a mechanism prepared added I would answer that. oh. - 6 ( E 347 a G. To suppose that God acts otherwise and gives to things accidents. and that thus the immortality since of our souls follows from that which is natural 1 &quot. : we cannot maintain that they are extinguished. holding that the fire of purgatory 18a . iii. bodies. In this fire. bk. if this took place and God this faculty to matter. as when certain theologians hold that the fire of hell burns In which case it may even be doubted whether separated souls. And it is enough that we cannot maintain that matter it an imperishable thinks. but nevertheless miraculously Civitafe Dei. 70. although they may be quite 4 mortal by nature). bk. 3. Art. bk. from matter which would be entirely miraculous 182 . consisting either in the For we know. v. chs. &quot. P. God would it would be the fire which would do it. condusio}. Monadology. 10a view of this kind.

403 a * !j 37 . at considerable length. that Besides it has for some time been they do not die. p. vol. Eobert Fludd (Robertus de Fluctibus) was born at in Kent. 56 sqq. G. (See E. 194).4 02 NEW ESSAYS Now this truth of the immateriality of the soul is un For it is infinitely more helpful doubtedly of importance. ii. bk. Leibniz gives. 88 Appendix (vol. vi. ii. omits for. vol.lt. reads it has for some time been the case. especially at the present day (when many people have very little regard for revelation and for miracles. 10 (Eraser. with notes). an account of those who insisted on the opposition between reason and revelation. as reason taught us nothing about it. 1574 (or 1571). 306 sqq. by itself . have been counted suspect. 90 in every rational otherwise I do not philosophy. bk. v. and not always without reason 187 But our author is not of their number. to religion and morality. iv. and died at London Milgate. for see how we are to keep from falling back into fanatical philosophy. ch. E. such as the Mosaic philosophy of Fludd which 1&amp. founded on nothing but the promise of God. bk. 10. E. See Essay. stration of the existence of God 18 . G. 620. 185 to show that souls are natur ally immortal and that it would be a miracle if they were not.. p. ch. in 1637. iv. ch. which is fundamental certainty . II 6 Eclaircissemenf). under Leo X. 477. Dictionary. upholds and he attributes probability in the highest degree to the immateriality of the soul 189 which may accordingly be accounted a moral . in which he traces the origin of this view to the Averroists. iv. 1(9 )J pp. 483 sqq.) Cf. 3. having as much candour as penetration. also Bayle s 23 (E.J1 . Nouveaux Essais. and that it is in virtue of a miraculous grace. E. that those generally known natural religion and to reduce 18fi who have all to tried to destroy revealed religion. in 1512. iv. He approves of the condemnation of this position by the fifth Lateran Council. he could quite well agree with the doctrine I have expounded. After . and consequently it seems to me that. than to maintain that our souls would die in the course of nature. He the demon if . . 6 (Eraser. In his Discours de la Conformite de la Foi avec la Raison (1710). 191 See Essay. omits the passage in brackets. 17.

1577-1644). He attributes to the nymphs the pheno mena of water. i. 192 E. 47. p. spiritus familiar is of the Italian physician. who was In the Ityistola ad Tltomasium (1669). D d 2 . ch. i . which were pictured as being like little sprites or elves 191 who nowadays temned. reads which [philosophy]. a follower of n (E. absolutely rejecting Aristotle. and showed traces of the barbarous- are rightly con a ground for phenomena [apparences] by inventing for this purpose occult qualities or faculties. we return to as many little gods [fltunculi] as there are substantial forms and we approach the There may also here be a reference to the Gentile TTO \v0tiafius. here referring to his theory that all things continually produces the variations in phenomena by condensation and rarefaction of matter. like that of certain philosophers and physicians of the past. studying at Oxford lie travelled abroad and made acquaintance with the theosophical views of Paracelsus. which he sought to make known in England through his Philosophia Mosaica (1638) and his Hisforia Macro-et-Micro-Cosmi Metaphysica. Pygmae s et Salamandris. adds Leibniz. or into the barbarous ph ilosqphy. Van Paracelsus. who 19J still ness of their time. cf. Leibniz s vol. Physica et Technica (1617). who ascribes to everything an angel to bring it to birth [quasi obstetricatorem^ Thus. and one of his favourite ideas is that of the analogy between the universe (macrocosm) and the human body flow directly from God. See his De Vita Propria. All things are emanations from God and return into His absolute unity. In these writings he tries to find a complete philosophy in the Old Testament and more especially in the Pentateuch. who found . 23^ Leibniz speaks of Van Helmont along with Paracelsus and others as representative of the stupid [stolida] form of the In the reformed philosophy.NEW finds a directly ESSAYS 403 ground for all phenomena by attributing them and miraculously to God. On the whole matter. 44. Helmont. Sylphis. Fludd also adopted this view. His system. 1486-1535^. 193 Leibniz is probably referring to the elemental spirits of which Paracelsus (1493-1541 writes in his De Nymphis. and to the salamanders the phenomena of fire.. if so it can be called. to the sylphs the phenomena of air. Girolamo Cardano (1501 1575. i. is a combination of Neo-Platonic doctrines with those of the Kabbala. same letter he refers to the occult philosophy of Agrippa (Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim. Possibly Leibniz may also be thinking of the elder Van Helmont (Johann is (microcosm \ Leibniz who Baptista G. 52 b . to the pygmies the phenomena of earth. Opera (1663 . philosopher and mathe matician. Gassendi and Kepler wrote against the views of Fludd.

anying several peoples have readily pass part). Cf. pp.lt. 93. air. if it be no longer maintained that there are sub away (at LmaS ^ Those demons that are found In fire. ?2 1. reads &amp. all that ^ is ^. required See Introduction. Part iv. other than miraculously. Monadology E. . .4 4 NEW ESSAYS resembling millstones As to the difficulty had in conceiving an * substance it W ill . flood or under 394 ground. e. I5 6 sqq i.

The first of . The Leipzig papers are on the whole in the language of the Scholastics . which I have written here for : Prince Eugene of Savoy. and in this last writing I have endeavoured to those who express myself in a way which can be understood by are not yet thoroughly accustomed to either of the other styles. out of which the Monadology has been elaborated. 704 a. p. with a I now send you a little letter in course of which he says discourse on my philosophy. Nature and of Grace was first published in the French journal. 1718. L Europe Savante. and E. in common Principles of Nature and of Grace has much with the Monadology and. There are three different MSS. xxvii vi. 1714. . against the view of previous editors. 1714. Prince Eugene. The Principles of Monadology. it reads like a preliminary study. PREFATORY NOTE.PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND OF GRACE. Paris and the others are more in the style of the Cartesians. and afterwards. Leibniz sent him a copy of the Principles of Nature and of Grace. Kirchmann suggests that probably Leibniz p. asking for a condensed statement of his philosophy. that the Principles for of Nature and of Grace is the treatise which was written THE . 485 (Letter of Aug. in November. of this work. which he gave to the Prince. indeed. ideas better understood. worked it up into the . FOUNDED ON REASON. They seem to have been written about the same time and Gerhardt holds. to I hope that this little work will help make my with what I Holland. It has been shown by Gerhardt that when Nicholas Remond wrote to Leibniz from Paris in 1714.) wrote the Principles of Nature and of Grace for Prince Eugene. 26. when taken in connexion have written in the Journals of Leipzig. thinking it insufficient. quoted by Gerhardt.

The comparatively and of Grace will be found in E i. are unities.ther passed over or very slightly treated the Pr. is divided. And everywhere there must mple substances. Compounds or bodies are pluralities and simple [multitudes] lives . For instance. er *&quot. PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE which is the shortest. It is compound.. . in the Principles of Nature at. spirits. S f Tj* remaini e . where transition is made from Physics to In the other two MSS. In the Principles of Nature and of Grace the arrangement of the matter is much less clear and careful than it is in the MonadBut following the lines of the olog. note 2. See Monadology. simple substances.406 these. 1 for without simple substances there stance. originally by Leibniz himself. not into paragraphs.d of Grace there is nothini to correspond to the passage in the Monadology regarding the two great principles of knowledge. is not substance at aTl It is not . Simple substance is that which has no parts. souls.&amp. the Metaphysics. division made ?/ n f nature of God as eTr T S t0 . vi.. both in treatment and expression so close that the annotations to the Principle. Compound substance is the combination of simple substances or Monads. -^ Principles of Nature G. But the connexion between the wo writings. * Substance is a being capable of action. the point of division being the end of paragraph 6.j. Strictly speaking compound sub according to Leibniz. but into two chapters. 598 714 sqq.le s of Nature and of Grace. Monas is a Greek word which means unity. of Nature and of Grace may be brief. . it is not dwelt upon.nc. paragraph division and he text from which the appears translation is made is that of the last and most complete manuscript. sqq. and while the pre-established harmony is mentioned. we may say that paragraphs -6 inclusive five an account of the created Monads in themselves and in as considered lg P ara^aphs consider the Hultimate reason of the universe and the consequences which follow from His perfection in power wisdom and goodness. or that which is one. Some of the most important points in he Monatology are e.lt.

they last as long as the universe. Consequently there are simple substances or . in simple To say that matter is infinitely divisible is the same as saying for to be divisible that there is compound substance everywhere But compound substances are made up of is to be compound. . but as compound. For when there is perception of a whole.gt. outside . which cannot internal qualities and activities [actions] is to say. but compound. consists of partes extra part. There are :&amp. which are the For the simplicity of substance is principles of change. it is merely phenomenal.PRINCIPLES OF NATURE would not be compounds full of life 2. the represen be other than its perceptions (that . arid simple or Monads in general cannot be known [comprehendi] by the senses and imagination. But and hence they would not be everything extended is divisible. but merely substances a phenomenon bcne fundatum. they would be extended or spatial. successive perceptions but there are also simultaneous perceptions. 3 If they had shape. They can have no 3 Con otherwise they would have parts shape figure] one Monad in itself and at a particular sequently any moment can be distinguished from any other only by . because they have no parts. can neither be made can neither come into being Iformccs] nor unmade. 678 a. They nor come to an end by natural means. 6 The simplicity of a substance is by no means inconsistent with its having within it several modes at one time. Spirits. . AND GRACE all 407 is . 501). . no means inconsistent with the multiplicity of the by modifications which are to be found together in that same simple substance. simple 4 Tims we cannot perceive Monads by means of our senses. its tendencies to pass from one perception to another). having no parts. substances. and these modifications must consist in variety of relations to the things which are tations of the . Epistola ad Bierlingium i The compound.es . but which will not be destroyed. It is as in the case of a centre or point. 2 . or of that which is outside in the simple) and its appetitions (that is to say. What the senses give us is not the substance itself. living beings everywhere. as compound. and consequently nature The Monads. G. 4 compound. there are at the same . souls..1711) (E. vii. having parts. and consequently which will be changed.

. W simple substances are actual] y . reading each simple substance. although S is v^. the things which are outside of it This ody is organic. as if a kind of centre.v lt . . omits pat-tout. separated from one change their relation. is surrounded by a mass composed of an infinity of other Monads.^? intern. an infinite meet in it another by act. of an animal) and the principle of its oneness. there of angles formed by the lines which nature is a plenum. There are it is which. g. and according o the affections of its body the Monad represents. own and which continually and each specially \_dMnguee] simple substance or Monad. number .408 PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE perfectly simple.. andttey would have E. . e a ~&amp.es of their t .gt.omits didinuv. distinguished from one = another. -depen- . which constitute he Particular body of this central Monad. which forms the centre of a compound substance (e. though it forms a kind of automaton or important SESSS.

vi. on the other hand. Cf. i. which is a machine not only as a whole. lf Ultimately. and as subject to rule as is the And the perceptions in the Monad are universe itself. according its point of view. not setting before itself an end. viz. reaction. or irregular. . more or each to less. but also in the smallest parts of it that can come into observation n Since the world is & plenum all things are connected together and each bod)7 acts upon every other. produced one from another according to the laws of desires [appetits] or of the final causes sist of good and evil which con in observable perceptions. beatific vision. . which they made the object of the Lettre a Masson (1716) (G. it an end of good or &quot. but it is suitable has already been employed by theologians and philosophers. 626). or a mirror endowed with representative of the universe. a harmony pre-estab of efficient from the beginning between the system causes and that of final causes. substance. of motions . while the conscious appetition or desire does set before itself This &quot. while it is not possible for the one to change the laws of the other u . is affected according to their distance. that soul And it is in this way and body are in agreement and are physically united. 4. Monad-ology. through by every other. appetition. enough and is a figurative expression. with a particular body. Each Monad. 78 sqq. that is to say.PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE 409 natural machine. but there 11 12 is also Cf. regular. as. a final cause. when they spoke of a mirror infinitely more perfect. accompanied with members or organs. Hence it follows that 1 Monad is inner activity -. is Monad lished a perfect harmony between the perceptions of the and the motions of bodies. e. namely. a living mirror. appetition is motion or efficient cause. the mirror of the Deity. the changes of bodies and external pheno mena there laws of are produced one from another according to the ia Thus efficient causes. forms a living Thus not only is there everywhere life. and each. evil. motions and desires (appetits) are different degrees of the same thing. 64. Monadology.mirror&quot. or the passage from one con The unconscious scious or unconscious perception to another.

perception of which a certain ho long remains. it is something more sublime and among . by means of the form act with - . _ and consequently (as.gt. e eyes humours. to a perception accompanied by other words. 1. the rays of light are concentrated more force). this may lead to feeling [sentithat is to say. for reasons which I shall \_distmguQ remembered. But as happens sufficiently sharp to be . rse. &quot.&amp.rue spirits [esprifs]. m &quot. one dominating less over another. a lemwy. as its Monad is called a soul And when this soul is raised to id perceptions which reprewhen. . as will presently that animals are sometimes in the condition of mere living beings and their souls in the condition [sir^le] rf mere Monads namely when their perceptions are not is reckoned be explained. ma deep dreamless sleep or in a swoon. eason.. Such a living being is called an animal.The udn transition from the unconscious to the conscious any m0a S mad6 Clear Leib iz is of ordi &quot. so as to make itself heard on occa sion. to the sent these for instance. But when the Monad has organs so arranged that they give prominence and sharp3SS [du relief et du distingue} to the impressions they more or eive.410 PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE an infinity of degrees in the Monads. e M unconscious living beings and unconscious Monads . It perceptions which have become completely confused are sure to be loped again in animals&quot.

G. 156. following Scholastic Cf. with absolute death. in which all perception w ould T cease. The minuteness vl perhaps swimming in the fluid parts of these. ] of nature goes ad infinitum. 5oi\ Leibniz probably means what elsewhere. which comes from a great confusion of perceptions. cannot be seen. he calls forms. 22 Cf. p. soul. and apperception. perceptible parts of bodies arc expressed. (. . Why Through microscopes we see animalculae otherwise imperceptible. and the nerves of these animalculae. and the bad ideas of some who call themselves free-thinkers [esprits forts] and who have disputed the immortality of our soul 19 2 . which is consciousness or the reflective knowledge of this inner state. between perception.lt. I believe that there are bodies which do not fall within sight. and other animalculae. usage. 14. subtilita. [esprits] animals have no principles of life flict 21 . Epistola ad \ i Bierlingium (. vii. This has confirmed the ill-founded opinion that some souls are destroyed.E. . although we do not know what are the figures perceptible bodies so in the soul we hold that there is perception and appetition. Monadology. perceptions of which as ordinary It is bodies people ignore imperceptible [insensible] this also that has led these same Cartesians to believe are Monads. conformed too much to the prejudices of the crowd they in confounding a prolonged unconsciousness. m See Monadolocjy. im ceptible elements of the confused perceptions by which the You ask whether . and that still less are there other with the And as they came common opinion of men into too great con in denying feeling so on the other hand [sentiment] to the lower animals. .1711) &amp. should I not believe it 9 I think it impossible to doubt it. 678 a . Part iv. that the lower that only minds we are not conscious . and which is not given to all souls nor to the Monad same soul at all times. Thus it which is well to make dis is the inner state of the representing outer things. 13. we hold that there is uvrirviria and figure in of im general.PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE presently mention tinction ( 41 1 12). It is for lack of this distinction that the Cartesians have made the mistake of ignoring 10 . Introduction. although we do not distinctly know the imper As in body .

Monads have organic the ifast P At both 3 7 6P Af T 0*8*** e f e seres o bodies. because memory represents to it the pain which this stick has caused it And men.*&quot. E. do not come G.&amp. it. reads on ^ Cf. For instance. object of the All In th 3 /9 self-conscious soul. 5 Modern research has taught us. r &quot.lt. number. onad tinU USly from the lowest of Monads w UP to the Monad of God. G. V? &amp. and reason confirms that the living beings whose organs are known to .gt.* God added &quot.gt.substan &amp. in a word. 6.&amp. Cf &quot. ceases \ But genuine reasoning depends upon it. do not act otherwise than the lower animals.* beln8 W Monads. m : it is only the astronomer who and even his prediction will ulti mately fail when the cause of daylight. . of an indubitable connexion of ideas and infallible inferences. in so far as they are empirics. omits is it fobfTm&quot. &quot. The animals which these inferences do not appear are called the lower animals but those which know these neces [betes] m sary truths are properly those which are called rational animals. such of which as geometry.&quot. 26-28. that is to say. produce those of logic. plants effects and animals.412 5- PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE has always been so rationally foresees beaten. we expect that there will be daylight to-morrow because our experience There is a connexion among the perceptions of animals which has some likeness to reason but it is based only on the memory of facts or effects 2 and not at all on the knowledge of causes. Thus a dog avoids the stick with which it has been . T tou S nad betWee &quot. that is to say three-fourths of their actions. omits this.lt. ssary or eternal truths.lt. which is not 2 eternal. Monac7ology. immaterial things and truths And this it is which makes science or demonstrative knowledge possible to us 26 .d soul * . . and the series of Monads and .t . souls have the power to perform acts of reflexion and to observe that which is called ego. *&amp. substance 25 soul nnd [esprit]. a &quot. **&quot. and their souls are called minds These [esprits].

76. [fsc. and the union of a spermatic animal s body with a it has. by mistake) omits a clause following these words. 77. Thus. themselves. Monadology. (manifestly they the large animals] may be counted large. &c. spiritual or angelic. human body or impossible. nature of the body always have a rational soul 30 31 Consequently a rational soul must a body of some higher kind. of nature. Monadology. Monadology. for it is they entirely perish in what we call death reasonable that what does not come into being by natural means should not any more come to an end in the course . 74. and that . and consequently from the trans formation of pre-existing living beings. as the ancients thought. but from preformed seeds. 73. they merely return to a more minute theatre. is Cf. where they may nevertheless be as sensitive [sensible] And what and as well ordered as in the larger theatre has just been said about the large animals applies also 1 of spermatic animals to the generation and death&quot. they become so only when conception gives to these 29 And as in general animals are animals human nature born in conception or generation. : .PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE 413 from putrefaction or chaos. as all souls may be regarded For the rationality of a soul is merely as potentially rational). Cf. 75. they are growths of other It would be inconsistent with Leibniz s general principles to suppose that a spermatic animal could have a rational soul (otherwise than in germ. In the seed of means of large animals there are animalcules which by new outward form. which again determines its rank as a dominant Monad. A translation of his text would be: The generation and death of the smaller spermatic animals in comparison with which E. that 28 29 is to say. This . misses the point of the sentence. throwing off their mask or their tattered covering. But nothing else than its rank as a dominant Monad determines the 82. no more do not entirely . which they conception obtain a make their own and which enables them to grow and become larger so as to pass to a greater theatre and to 28 It is true that the souls propagate the large animal of human spermatic animals are not rational. Cf. a very high degree of clearness and distinctness in its perceptions.

but rarely. Or.we have spoken merely now we must rise to metaphysics. students of nature. in comparison with which they in turn may be counted large. 7a&amp. ( 7*). enveloped. Animals : : . .lt. unclothed 3 trans formed. portions. 4. parts only In nutrition this takes place and by little imperceptible gradually . but continually . v. 407&quot.gt. ception or in death. (3) that of the globe of the earth. as pure physicists&quot. (4) an infinite line. for everything in nature proceeds ad mfiniium \ Thus not only souls but also animals are ingenerable and imperishable they are only developed. these have smaller still to bite em. we must conceive (z) the diameter of a small element in a grain of sand. change in con gained or lost all at once.lt. ( a ) the diameter of the grain of sand itself. so proceed ad infmitum. take on and put 34 off. 13 E. Dutens i?i Cf-Monaddogy. For instance. (4) the distance of a fixed s ur from the magnitude of the whole us. On Poetry The idea of infinities of is a favourite one with infinity Leibniz id it is closely connected with the notions his diffe And And prey . 65-70. when [insensible] and on the other hand. naturalists observe. a flea fleas that on him being possible for Has smaller rential calculus. . that is to nothing happens without So. (3) an ordinary assignable line. (5) system of fixed stars as (i) a differential of the second degree. all is gained or lost at OI1C6. (a)a differential of the st degree. ?7 Aristotle condemns the theory of transmigration of souls in his De Anima. 36 i. Swift. Souls never put off the whole of their body. e. 17 ^ &quot. much Sft is 7. * ^^ &amp. 2 Corinthians. Accordingly there is no metem psychosis. L 3.4*4 PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE smaller spermatic animals. clothed. but there is metamorphosis. that making use of the employed. it takes place suddenly and in a way that can be noticed [notablement]. which affirms that sufficient its reason. 71. Thus far. Cf. /. omits beaucoup [ much ] and reads. (5) 1 nite * d An &amp. and do not pass from one body into another body which is entirely new to them. : great principle. usually little nothing takes place without say. 3J 3* Or Monadology. underlying m soo 500.

still less And although the the reason of one particular motion 9 motion which is at present in matter comes from the pre . must needs be outside of this sequence of contingent things and must be in a substance w hich is the cause of this sequence. for Leibniz. and that again from another preceding motion. however far we go Thus the suffi for the same question always remains. the first Why does some question we are entitled to put will be For nothing is simpler exist rather than nothing? thing is sufficient determine not otherwise. which has no need of any other reason. ?&quot. :!u Motion (which. 36-38. we are no farther forward. &amp. 338. we must be able to give a reason why r8 they should exist thus and not otherwise easier :&amp. and Ultimate Origination of Things. Now this sufficient reason of the existence of the universe cannot be found in the sequence of contingent things. that which Descartes substituted s Leibniz goes. . or which is a necessary being. of bodies and their representations in souls : motion and because. Monadology. granting that things must exist. while Descartes for the Peripatetic theories. otherwise we should not yet have a sufficient reason with which we could stop. Further. The point of view is . to give a reason which why things are so and This principle being laid down. find in it we cannot the reason of motion and &quot.S. And this ultimate reason of things is called God* 37 i.PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE one 415 who should know to things sufficiently. that it is simple and easy in comparison with other things e. Monadology. . must not nothing be something ? How can we say of that which is not at all. r . explanation. cient reason. Cf. matter being in itself indifferent to to rest and to one or another particular motion. more easily brought into existence. But if we can say even this of nothing.lt. is what we should now call an abstraction) is regarded as passing from body to body and as having no definite source in the phenomenal world. ceding motion. that is to say. and than something.gt.8 Cf. 40 point is that. bearing in itself the reason of its own existence.7 .. and s view is good so far as it it is insufficient and requires to be supplemented by a deeper p. 32.

* &quot. wif. The ~ fa any imperfection that remains and rii in have any perfection them comes from f the . the existence of things through Him makes them also depend upon Him for their continued ex.stence and working.. &quot..416 9. omniscience and goodness And as justice. that is to say. 1 *&quot. taken nothing bu very&quot. and they continually receive rom Him that which makes them Sht ut which has led ?vr to goodness in conformity with wisdom. Thus it will have power f. ini 5. PRINCIPLES OP NATURE AND GRACE knowledge and will in perfection.&quot.&quot. it will have supreme [sowerame] omnipotence. . This primary simple substance must include emithe perfections contained in the derivative sub stances which are its effects.&quot.&quot. there od supreme justicew - generally.i&quot.

He has chosen the best is the greatest variety along with the greatest order ground. otherwise it would be indis tinguishable from God.PRINCIPLES OF NATURE io. Ultimate Origination of Things. e. of bodies has a total absolute force. For as all possible things in the understanding of God claim existence in proportion to their perfections. note 30. 89 sqq. *7 Cf. 45 &quot. E e . place. Cf. i. its internal action. which is the force involved in the mutual action and reaction of the bodies constituting the system or aggregate. Monadology. These partial forces are (i. and finally the same quantity of force of direction 48 . or of activity [action]. . The whole matter and consequently its total same. as it is in the region of ideas. But total absolute force is always made up of two partial forces. relative force or force of reaction. See also Emanation of tke New System. or withhold His * Cf. the result of all these claims must be universe allowed 4(. which might increase or diminish it. in which there . i. And from this it would not be possible to give a reason apart 47 why things have gone thus rather than otherwise . And God cannot change the essence of any Monad. Introduction. forces which belong to the parts of the aggregate or system. Monadology. absolute force remains always the involved in the external action of the system. which is the force i of the universe is such a system. 340 sqq. inalienable imperfection. 53 and 54. u. Part iii. 55-58. i. e. pp. and (2) force of direction. He can merely create creation and preservation. know ledge. Further. pp. Cf. the most perfect actual world that is possible. The supreme wisdom of God led Him to choose specially the laivs of motion which are most fitting and which are most in conformity with abstract or meta There is conserved the same quantity physical reasons. essential. and support. It AND GRACE of 417 follows from the supreme perfection God that in producing the universe possible plan. happiness and goodness in created things that the . . of total and absolute force. also the same quantity of relative force or of reaction. e. a total force belonging to the system as a completely indepen dent system a total force calculated on the supposition that there 48 Every system or aggregate are no other total forces in relation to it. time being as well arranged as possible 45 the greatest eifect pro duced by the simplest ways the most power. which is His under standing.

but also that each living mirror representing the universe according to its point of view. An infinitely among 50 systems. 1 principle of contradiction. not as mere externality of parts to motion.rent phenomenally) independent forces (Monads). And this is one of the most effective of the existence of these things 49 . but as something which always has SL force of s own. it follows from the perfection of the Su preme Author not only that the order of the whole universe is the most perfect that can be. all possible good God must have chosen this system as the best Cf. all-wise. that is to say.418 PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE action is always equal to reaction. com patible with all the rest. and geometry. . and the whole effect is always equivalent to its full cause. As a result of this reference to experience we are compelled to conceive body. souls. E. that is to say. like the truths of logic. themselves. and that these laws are dependent not the upon principle of necessity. God for and remarkable proofs those who can go deeply into Again. all-powerful and 51 . And it is remark able [surprenant] that by the sole consideration of efficient causes or of matter it was impossible to explain these laws of motion which have been discovered in our time and of which a part has been discovered by myself. the laws of which we can discover * ta* 6 Suc h a s y stem could aever have come into existence . by a law of blind necessity. which differ from one another endlessly but are yet in such harmony that they form one perfectly regular system. Thus bodies are ultimately or really (as distinct from The laws of actual under the law of contradiction . elf. indifferent to good and evil like the . the Whence 5u it also follows that rather animals themselves most dominant Monads. that is to say. must have its perceptions and its desires [appetite] as thoroughly well-ordered as is 12. arithmetic. For I have found that we must have recourse to final causes. upon the choice of wisdom. but upon the principle of fitness [convenance]. each Monad. each substantial centre. or cannot fail to awake again concrete motion cannot be deduced a priori but a knowledge of them involves reference to experience. &amp. Monadologij. omits.gt.

and that not only do immaterial substances always their changes continue to exist but their lives. Thus. e 2 . AND GRACE 419 from the condition of stupor into which death or some other accident 1 may 3. Sens Cf. and it may have make a better leap forward. Lettw touchant ce qui est indcpendant dcs . And manifestly it is not essentially for the world is the best of all it must some day be conscious again.-reated Monads is to advance to higher perceptions. like lines which have bends in them. 507) the most beautif into the depths of any things. with a* order and mutual connexion as possible. the future harmony. from this is imposed. and I add that. not merely on the whole but as regards each of possible worlds. And although we approach it more and more. of perception arid appetition) which Leibniz elsewhere speaks of the with slight alteration. much For all is regulated in things. drawn back in can quite well become one yet. it may limited to the unconscious state. the We might get to know the beauty of the universe near. in each soul. Introduction.e. but extent advance each Monad is essentially limited to some which is independent of the essential . or rather to also are regulated so as to attain a as asymptotes do. once for all.gt. (G. if that i. their progress and certain end. its essential limitations allow. Ldtre a Bourgiiet (1715) ( E order to - HOT -i a Always when we penetrate de la Mature (1702. for a Monad has once been conscious. Cf. 51 Conscious Monads may for a time fall into unconsciousness condition would but that they should remain permanently in that of all le against the general order of things.PRINCIPLES OF NATURE put them 51 . 578). You are right in saying that our globe ought the individual soul. order and into the sciences are aware those who have gone deeply hold that the same is the case as regards all we : G iii. may accordingly other things. to saying that the world is so con its parts. Essays.. since can act only with perfect supreme wisdom and goodness The present is big with the future. no other permanent limitation be conscious again. to have been a kind of Paradise. distant is expressed in the might be read in the past. if it we could unfold all that is enfolded in and that is time. none the less prevails note 74. which is equivalent it shall rise to the structed that each of the Monads constituting highest point of perfection (i.part limitation. :&amp. vi. New in the end and gets the victory. if will of God. perceptibly developed only through . even beyond what wo imagined. he would apply to world in terms which. For the tendency In this . advance sometimes fall back. we find in them as all that could be desired.

the soul itself knows the things of which it has perception. The world is an infinite sphere. iii. which are not self-conscions. I hear the particular sounds which come it . and ultimately to Vincent de Beauvais in the thirteenth (early century) who attributes it to Empedocles. [T esprit]. It is not in any writing of Empedocles now known. i). but confusedly as when I walk on the sea-shore and hear the great noise the sea makes. pp. any 1 4. Monadology. to Gerson and \ Bonaventura. Cf. to say nothing of the wonders of dreams. Pascal. from the particular waves and which make up the total sound. 25. * . 13 thence The Monads here means bare or unconscious Monads. the circumference nowhere. 17 sqq. although in miniature. The mind [V esprit] has not merely a perception of the works of God. It has been very well said that as a centre He is everywhere. of which the centre is every . Our confused perceptions are the result of the impressions which the whole universe makes upon us. 4 where. Revelees (without the usual accents) looks like a slip of the pen and relevees is elsewhere used in a similar connexion. (Havet s ed. but it is even capable of producing something w Havet traces p. but His circum ference is nowhere 54 for everything is immediately pre sent to Him without distance from this centre.As regards the rational soul or mind there is all. but also an image of the Deity. It is not only a mirror of the universe [simple] souls \ of created beings. Pensees. the source of all. has perfection in proportion to its distinct perceptions. reads rcvdees. of for He knowledge is . Monadology. reads relevees G. while mere souls means conscious souls. For. knows all. 60 and 61. in which we E. which involve the whole universe.. i.420 But infinite PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE as each distinct perception of the soul includes an number of confused perceptions. Each soul knows the infinite. ch. only in so far as it has distinct 52 and heightened [or unveiled] perceptions of them and . but I do not discriminate them from one another. in it something more than in the Monads or even in mere 5 which resembles them. 53 Cf. See Havet s Pascal. It is the same with each Monad 53 God alone has a distinct . the phrase to Rabelais (bk.

brings 1 to perfection 60 . so that nature itself 59 leads to grace. 82. ch. G. formed and governed by the greatest and best of monarchs in which there is no crime with out punishment. mensura occurs in the remains of Ulpian. and grace. n. without even willing it. omits itself. all spirits [esprits]. (from whom I translate) has tnais aussi sans en avoir la volonte. in our waking hours. Cf. Monadology. discovering the scientific principles in accordance with which God has 57 . mensura. V. v. entering in virtue of reason and of eternal truths into a kind of fellowship with God. reads sans en avoir meme la volonte. 20). world 58 . our soul is architectonic also in its voluntary activities and.PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE 421 56 invent without trouble (but also without willing it) we should have to things which. are members of the City of God. it numero. v. 6. i. But by measure and number and weight Thou didst order all things (R. whether 15. 21. 58 Cf. is possible course of nature. The phrase pondere. 84-89. (frequently used in Leibniz s time) from the Vulgate. what God does in the great ordered things (pondere.) and in the little world in imitates. j between God as Architect and God as Monarch. 57 Sed omma in mensura. ch. think long in order to hit upon. It is for this reason that of men or of angels [gcnies]. ii. that is to say. fragment iii. &c. in virtue of the harmony pre-established from all time between the realms of nature and of grace. in its own province which it is allowed to act. A quotation Book of Wisdom. Instit. it by the use it makes to us of nature. and in short as much virtue and happiness not by any interference with the and this. as if what God prepares for souls were : . bk. of the most perfect state. numero. we can be assured by this same reason things are made in a way which exceeds our desires. et numero etpondere disposuistis. 56 E. but by the very order of j natural things. no good action without a proportionate as reward. 59 60 E. . Thus although reason cannot make known the details of the great future (which are reserved for that revelation). Monadology. to disturb the laws of bodies.

nmH 55 . Introduction. which 90. as some of his critics (e. is love See Monaddogy.gt. although beauty consists only in the harmonies [convenances] of numbers and in the counting (of which we are unconscious but which nevertheless the soul does inalfe) of the beats fi3 . if we know : confusedly known Music charms us. known by Nicholas of Cusa.422 PRINCIPLES OF NATUEE AND GRACE we Further.. although not be able to explain it so distinctly 64 . what is more even the pleasures of sense are fc ought. Kirchma * seem to have thought. that the pleasure we have in must ?n a matter f the senses what he wa *t s to fhowr/fh f 1 6 S6nse element artistic pleasure is really of an intellectual f kind. Part Leibniz does not mean.r vibrations of come together sounding bodies. and this he does by showing that it f&quot. when God 17- And [ is its object. He is none the less very lovable and He gives very great pleasure. 6lsewhere calls * measure * hidden [occute] iv arithmetic . oved in being known/ loo D. sures its really intellectual plea &amp. we d sinter ested In God IO. We see how much pleasure honours give to men.p 94 T25 SenSe ^ C nfuSed P erce PWon. although they do consist in anything that appeals to the external senses. The pleasure which ound ght finds in good proportions is of the same nature the pleasures caused by the other senses will be to amount to much the same thing. as God is the most perfect and most happy and consequently the most lovable of substances.g. love [amor] and is F iii&quot. which beats or vibrations at definite intervals. it is easy to love God as we have just said \ For although God cannot be perceived by our external senses. may &quot. note 142. Excitation* ex SerLonLl Cf. Martyrs and fanatics (though the emotion of the latter is ill-governed) show how much influence mental pleasure [fe plaisir de V esprit] can have and. is [cftortftM]. TV? i - ^ y . ? love. and as genuine pure love* consists in the state in which we find pleasure in the perfections and the of the beloved felicity this love is sure to give us the greatest pleasure of which are capable.

under His see. There {morale-} and that joy and be founded upon the perfection necessity. but also because you have to do with a good E. not as in the case to patience. 30. Theodicee. not only or the nature of things (which resist Divine &quot. It may God love of felicity. upon our own felicity/ Theodicee. their affairs. events. present 65 ness .PRINCIPLES OF NATURE 1 AND GRACE 423 8. if care. . It did not keep men as regard. . G. which produces of the Stoics. that it is impossible even : cannot providence would be enough And Master. G. real tranquillity of mind. or for ourselves) than to desire anything better (either absolutely Do your duty as if we were to say to men what He does. And besides the present pleasure can be of more advantage for the future nothing also love of God. the of the perfect order that is established in 65 it affords. The teachings of the Stoics our anxieties and regrets useless. patience sublime instead of which our Lord inspires us with more when B and teaches us even the way to have content. 470 b. to make us tranquil. vi. What is called Fatum Stoicum was not so E 580 b. much difference between genuine morality is between of the Stoics and Epicureans. vi. but not to make us content) this . thoughts and wise and takes all assures us that as God is perfectly good . . own time) of some famous philosophers of our (and perhaps also can only secure a forced being confined to this supposed necessity. we were able to comprehend it. so as not our confidence in Him even to neglect a hair of our heads so that we shou ought to be complete . even stitutes by itself our greatest good in it and though we may though we may not seek these the the pleasure it gives without regard to consider only confidence in us perfect advantage it brings for it gives the goodness of our Author and Master. than this and leads in virtue universe. Preface. but it tended to give them tranquillity which makes through the consideration of their necessity.&quot. but through who forcibly school themselves content which also assures to us a future happi a And . and . might be called Fatum Christiannm. for it fulfils our expectations because us in the way of supreme happiness. the even be said that from this time forth foretaste of future enables us to enjoy a it con although this love is disinterested. and interest. 268. It is because you and be content with what comes of it. as there for their tranquillity was founded only upon patience is as . from looking after black as it is painted. while ours should 254 the beauty of things.

3ivme government.t il progress to new pleasures and new perfections- ttT n should T &quot.424 PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND GRACE this belief and satisfaction characteristic of those who learned to love the Source of a all good It is true th t goo supreme felicity (by whatever ta vision or . . ii. And must inevitably be the everything is done as well as possible both for the general good and a.ght not consist) in complete enjoyment which would leave nothing more to be desired and would make our mi nd but it must consist in a [esprit] stupid pe. &quot. E 108 a) 7 Ught . bemg infinite. I3 6. ever consi consist and &quot.so for the greatest individual good of those who beheve in it and who are satisfied with the Jd. Lettre a Arnauld (1690) (G. cannot be entirely known SS PP PPSS WiU tag . it because that it may be accompanied) can never be complete God.

Astraea. 360 n on the motion of the skies. 267 n. 413. &c. 253 . 306 . &c. Leibniz s early liking for atoms and the void. 1 21 distinction between appercep tion and perception. 35 n. souls of. Association of ideas. 35 result of the principle of suf ficient reason. his criticism of atoms. 302. . Appetition defined. 37811. 229 11 293 n his description of place. Activity essential to substance. 370. are mere machines. birth and death of. Agrippa von Nettesheim. Alphabet of human thoughts. a necessarily conscious. sciences. 35.. 219 n . Animals. .11. 238 n. immortality of. 358 n. 6. 376 n. Arnauld and Leibniz. Animal 314 33n. dvTiTviria. 353 on the tabula rasa. 33 n metaphysical atoms of substance = Monads. 364. not soul a spiritual automata. ac cording to Descartes. 411. according to his ethics. n6n. 254. 232. to Alsted. 308. 183 n. 124. 231 . 306. 374. 34. 229 automaton. Apperception. 92.. 400 . sciousness. Anselm. 31 . . Dei. 32. (immediate) from a 94 sqq. 403 n. . 115. 259. organic body of. 11411. 76 . 29.INDEX Abstractions rightly used are not errors. 315. 389. 397Adamson (R. 335. 138. 23. 226. 32. 3UAttraction . Leibniz. Ci vitas Augustine. Leibniz Atomism. Locke s view. organs of animals Atomism Locke. 412. . .) on Fichte. . iSon. 52 . 155. &amp. 64 n. 223n. Atoms. on antecedent 9 on and consequent will of God. on sensible Aquinas. 243 n . So. of Descartes and 300 . 224. 26. 85. 302 of the planets. s relation to. See also Perception. Action motrice. Albertus Magnus. relation to other on the motions animals. nature spirits. 298 n. 255 n. 310. Algebra. 382 n. 384 n. . . 33. 126 sqq. Attributes to be distinguished from modifications. . 30. 394. 407. 260 n. degrees of. Angelus Silesius (Joannes). distance. 81 n. 325. 232 n. 238 n. its connexion with geo metry. 264 n Monads are .gt. 159. 385 atoms. 379. Achilles and the tortoise. not mere machines. Aristotle. 218 n. . resuscitation of. in relation to perception.. 322. on souls of lower 270 n . 71. .species. 277. 51. animals incomparably greater than ours may exist. Leibniz. of animal con n. 207 . indestructibility and 262. 382 n. in relation . 367 sqq. in Leibniz s sense. his explanation of eminent. Automata.

413 Body not a substance. discovery of the differen infinitesimal. 375 on pre-established harmony on 249 n multiplicity in th . 330. in flux like a river. Campanella. 226. See Calculating machines of Leibniz and Pascal. 198. Churches. Bruno. 268 n. 224. . -i -i Buffo n. 7. 109. E. Conduct. 409.lt. 6. 34. is momentary mind. s criticism 55- Cohesion of matter. and Soul. Buddeus. 236 n. 243. every paralogism an error of. .316.. 310. Choice of God V by others. City of God. 104 n. 80 sqq. 234 n. . 263. . the end of. See also Matter Boineburg. Compounds not of substances. applied to motion and thought. 130. Leibniz &amp. 155. 262 n. 84 sqq. Concours ordinaire of God. Benevolence. 3 24 n. . Continuity. 64 is sufficient reason. demand an infinite analysis. ii9n. real 1 74. 237 reason for the existence of j all Clarke and Leibniz on space and time. Cardano. infinite division of bodies. 112. Centripetal powers. 205. 302. each body affected . Birth of an organism. 114. an applica tion of sufficient reason. 85. Cartesians on the souls of the lower tial. Girolamo. (Jabbalists. 59. See also Truths. Clocks illustration lished 267. 37. Tycho. . 245 n effi cient and final causes. 286 82. Calculation. 272. Charity. io8n.293. Lotze s view. not absolute 259.421. 238 n. 4. law of. 347. 281. -Beautiful. Carneades. Eobert.gt. 284. 411 )t .f&amp. 171. 376. Geuof. 248 n. 198. 155 n. 284.&amp. 155. 97 among possible universes. Kant on final causes. 57. 269 n. 63. 401 n. Becoming.i^ 320. 43. principle Cell-theory of physiology. wTJ e 1? n 24. 331 . 176. 107. 1 &quot. Bayle. s n . . require proof. Compossibility. Fra^ois. 224 n. animals. of. perception. not dependent on organic structure. Cleanthes. . 260 First Cause. 418. 38. 98 n the mechanical cause of substance 107 . 230 n. 295. and Fenelon. 83. 5. 388 n. not essential to logical. 134. 321. of. 335. Bossuet and Leibniz. 107. 66. views Kant and Calculus. 303 n. Christianity in relation to natural law and the law of nations. 403 n. Boutroux. 389. Pierre. bodies. John. Brahe. 38. Giordano. 318 n. 96 n. Contingent truths. 386. explanation of. . also Possible. Christiern of Denmark. Bellarmine (Cardinal). cause and effect an ideal relation. 61 their final reason to be sought in God. Leibniz s view view of perception. 193 the world a system of final causes. 76 n. of.gt. Foucher of pre-estab 45. Bacon. Cavalieri. 71. 64 in rela . 243 n. 370. 258.INDEX Axioms may Averroes. 113 n. j use lincx s use ticus. ^ 115 birth and death. Cogito ergo ^m. 1 1 1 point oi view.. n. Cause. 331 n Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaof. Consciousness Leibniz. 146. 285 n. Boyle. definition Monad. Carlyle. n. Conception and perception. imperfection their See also Descartes. 43. harmony. projects for reconcilia tion of. &c. 97. without sou] i s soul s unreal. Thomas. 106. 174. tion to Kant s position. 204 sqq. Bernier. 102 n. 7 . 137. 383 n. ii. 251. 22 3n.

152 n. 303 n Locke. 241 n tend to existence. 1 7. 419 imperfections of. . principle of contradiction. . See Monads. inadequacy of. nature of 88 n. relation . Cordemoi. Descartes s theory of 314 n knowledge. 66 Eternal and necessary truths. 8. 374. Demonstration. according to Schopen hauer. 364. 243 n. 57. 128 sqq. 155. 157 affec tation of ignorance. of.lt. 427 . 119 n.. 414. 101 . 52 substance. 305 n. dis . Egypt. on the and eminent 238 n. . Contradiction. 149. 327 spirits. . Con way.. self-consciousness. 264n. eternal truths. 275 . 58 . 233. 1 .-mi-mentalia. of their reconciliation. Duns Scotus. 172 sqq. Equity. Desire. clear and distinct 52 . Empirical knowledge. Ernest. of . Diderot in praise of Leibniz. 4 J 2Enlightenment. 318 n. meittdlia and $&amp. Eduction of forms. 259. 152. . 48 . . Leibniz 17s l)e Diaeta quoted. sensation. 224 ideas. vortex hypothesis. 5 . 24. 307. 287.. Bois-Eeymond. no. 68. 184 according to Leib its conse niz and Lotze. 5. his views of matter and mind re jected by Leibniz. states. &c.. to transubstantiation. 240. 64 n thinking extended substance. his proofs of the existence of God criticized by Leibniz. vinculum siibstuntiale. 9 Descartes s criticisms of. n. 42 . 101. 310 n. 196 quences in Leibniz s philosophy. 93 199 n. ception. . 16. 229. 260 n. Entia tinguished from souls. and possible things.INDEX Continuous and indivisible.307 n. Essences or possibilities. I24n. instinctive. . 60 u. 37 n. 94 n. 20. of in matter. meaning is a sleep. 340. view of on the vinculum substantiale. principle of. 66. 233. 373. 115. 86 sqq. . Erdmann on Leibniz s space and time. 242 n . 56 n. . 138. Entelecbies. 225 n. Du 115. 365. 52 314 n analytical geometry. on Cyrus. 231. 375. . . 24 Descartes s use of the 378 n idea of cause. 308 - Deniocritus. Development and envelopment. 235 . 352 Leibniz s dissatisfaction with Leibniz s his philosophy. 243 n. . 219 n. his views on the immortality of the soul criticized by Leibniz. 161 species. . 243 n. Leibniz s project for the conquest of. animal 67 . . 247. . story 290. 35 2 secretary. method of formal. 187 according to Leibniz and Kant. . doubt. 155. of. 230. See also Sufficient reason. 96 301 compound substances. . 363. 160 of the idea attitude towards of God. 52. Countess of. 306. Copernicus. 155. 25 inten soul and body. 119 n. tional meaning . . 43 n. 60 . 358 n. Descartes and Leibniz 011 secondary qualities. 122. T56n. Spinoza. rela tion to Gassendi. Created beings pregnant with their future . 376 n on the seat of the soul. Eckhart. 342 essence and existence. 221 n. 27. 50. pro animals. . Landgraf of Hesse-Rheinfels. blem 21 sqq. 43 n. 416. 263. 37411. conditional. . 44 n. 413 n. emanation and fulguration. 220 n. 298 n. 54 n view of matter. 86 in relation . 311 . a principle of exclusion. 77 conservation of motion. earlier thought. 159. 264 n. Death. Creation. Regis. 250. Dillmann on Leibniz. Descartes. Epicurus. to sufficient reason. 259. value of. 58 sqq. . his view of per .

243.gt.: n rejected at first by Leibniz. fect per Extension. 331 n. the whole. not dependent on the wi of God. 57 . 75. 267 n influence . . tinct the ultimate sufficient reason of things. 9 n. 90 ! according Descartes. does not exist. 329. . 77. Feeling an element in every per ception. 312 n. 94 n indivisible. God 239 n. God not the only assistance of 385 n. Geometrical relations not merely quantitative. His perfection.. &amp. 314 n. . Forms. 423 . 178 sqq. Fichte and Kant 1 78 sqq. Explanation of the 319- 240 . Leibniz s view of. 77. idea of. 2 74 sqq. proof of His existence. 334 sqq. Fact and reason. 3 re-introduced by Leibniz. Force. Witness or choice of the best.. to other Monads. 226 n development of Leibniz s views regarding.. Fenelon and Eossuet. 402. elements of. 43. distinction between phy sical or real and logical or ideal 394 sqq. 351 distinction be tween absolute and . 242 understandin ot God is the region of. will. 141 degrees of. 94. Spinoza and Leibniz. 319. 304. no the essence of matter. 343 . &c. 240 His antecedent and 266. 242 . dis from Scholastic potency 9m. forms in matter. 252 n. problem of 416 n . 177. 156 sqq. including necessity.428 206 . Gassendi. Robert. Galen. Prince. Jcernel. Freedom. 94. conser vation of. 405. sqq. 215. New System dom accompanied by most knowledge. mate directing partial. 424 n. 422. connexion with algebra. 32O Leib niz s comments on his dispute with Hartsoeker. analytical geometry of Descartes. Fluid. 303^ 319. 26on. accidental. 145 highest free . 28. 27on. His compared with human . . leads to greate good. degrees of perfection. Figurations of the Divinity. 25= n Evil origin of. 146. 148. 247. Spirit. God. 418 Kant on the proofs. 241. 161 to Leibniz and . . proof from pre-estab harmony. 367 n use of the clocks illustration. 309 n. 202. 4i 7 . propositions of Facultas.. 328 n. J 45 freedom and determinati n is 343 spontaneity and intelligence. 57. 238. 91. 243. Ethics of Leibniz. notion of. Fichte. io8n. a form of appetition.gt. 423 n. Foucher. inconsistency of Leibniz s account ot. 288. 157 . 173. Geulincx. 139. 335 386. . 344. 159. 286. in Descartes s system. 300 n. &amp. synthetic and analytic. J Cosmological proof. essential to matter. 241. . 349 evil of individual not to be justified by good o 340 sqq. Fatum Stoicum. 66. . 259 sqq. 415 . 348.4*6. God. 302. on the spirituality ot the universe. 180 . Simon. the ulti reality. 257 n. See also Truths. n . Genus. 137 sqq Eugene. total and forces proportional to squares of velocities. lished . Fontenelle. 327 4 7 . . 243 n. 352. the source both of essences and existences. 136. 316. 270. Geometry. 175. Flucld. His relation to the world. substan tial. ot Leibniz upon. INDEX 301 . 92. perfect. 76. consequent justice justice. Euler s criticism of Leibniz. Fichte s Ego and Leibniz s Monad. force. 43 love of God. &c. 339. . origin and duration of.. according to Descartes. ontological proof.

identity of. 3&amp. Hypotheses. . modes of God. of. 46. in relation to ethics. 325. H. 146. Impenetrability. 21 sqq. . how can they form a continuum. and reals Herbart. 187 . 2 93- ethical 125 region of ideas in understanding of God. distinct. innate ideas. &amp. . shows that contradiction pre . 369 n. . 366 views of Descartes. 66. 307. 143. . . ments E. 82. . 289 n. error . . 291 n. 255 n 186. 116. 244 . . Hippocrates. 343. . Hartmann. 287 sqq. 66. Guhrauer. 424 Leibniz nothing more true than. Identity. . 332. Si cognition of the principle of Becoming. Indivisible elements. distributive. 26on. Inertia of body. his solution of the Hegel. His power. . 22on. 1 . Hobbes. Infinite. 259 vision of all things in God. 148. 293 n. . His understanding the region of eternal truths.. see Contra ideas.. 416 n. His possibility limited. Indeterminism. 290 n human justice differ only in degree. 7 101. 34 dualism in Leibniz. . . an application of supposes sufficient reason. 373 308. . 287 sqq. Ignava is a perpetual . 399 n. 37. views of Descartes Leibniz regarding clear and and metical and geometrical equality Divine and in justice. 198. Green. Indiscernibles. 225 n. Monad. 283 universal. His among possible universes. 116. 305 n s com 388. 188. 429 clearness dis 48 tinctness not the sole criteria of and knowledge and choice 66. 288. I37n. 287 sqq. . vidual. . Hartsoeker.gt. different - meanings of. 155 n. 264 n Leibniz. intercourse with 6 . 2i9n. 245. Immortality of the soul.. Hermolaus Barbarus. 85.gt. 251. physical and moral identity. 233 n. 287 n progress to . 387. Aristotle s sub-divisions of par arith ticular justice. influence upon definition of space. ratio. 74 His centre everywhere. 241. 36. 45 n. illustrated by block of veined marble. .gt. 95. . degrees of. Ideas. . 240. 79. geometry. 287 n . 189. 42. 377 n. on his dispute with Foucher. Herder.. a virtual re Infinitesimals. 53 n things not . 333Justice. un 241. 343 symbolizing of ideas. 3 l6 38 259 4 01 s qqof the rational soul. Grotius. diction. new perfections. the indestructibility of animals. will. Impulse in matter and bodies. 414^ on Influws physicus. notion introduced into . 292. Locke and Leibniz regarding innate truth. Infinitely little. sqq-&amp. 360 sqq. 377. 420 without body. Good and terms. 240 n. i68n. Infinity. Indifference of equilibrium.INDEX 416 n. relative how Identity of the indi constituted. 133 n. 131. 94 sqq. Happiness. pendulum experi ment. 190 his notion and Leibniz s sufficient reason. 222. 185 mathe matical methods in psychology. view of self-consciousness. T. 334 sqq. importance of the idea of God. evil. on Leibniz Kant. 186 sqq. 294 com mutative. 199. I72n. contributive. 293 n. Huygens. and not determined by time 373 and place. 75 . his Leibniz s Monads. . principle of. 332 n Leibniz. 375. definition of. 55 sqq. 350. 258 n. uses of. 71. circumference nowhere. Hermetic*.

Knowledge.j philosophy. . 6invented a calculating machine reason for writing in French 0. j 2o 128. 171 Kant s thing-inHself relation to Leibniz. volition. 126. 296 LEIBNIZ. philosophical. KerofKersland. n eclecticism. Charles VJ .22011. he misunder stands Leibniz s view of space 22 in. 16. 2 o6 knowledge. 168 109 n Kant received problem of space Wolff s form. residence in Archbishop of Mainz. 169 develop ment of Kant s view of space. 14. 17 . i. sqq. i_7o . residence in visit to Rome .his correspondence. nrst publication of his philoso phical system. Kirchmann. . 121 mathematics inrelation . to earlier thinking 151 sqq.-od Leibniz. Kant and Wolff. 158. three chief conceptions of his metaphysic 47. 53. study and . Leibniz s theory 121 sqq. 173. . visit to residence in I early rejection of substantial his account of his forms. 168 his own view of his relation Leibniz. 77. lo-ic. 147 n : 248. 4. Kant on intensive quan tity .i6. &amp. fans. on the ontological proof of the existence of God. 35 n. 7 Huygens. 7 . 6. m . his to his . 5 . I. 14 . 1 75 . 4. 12 writing and publication ofNouveaux Essah. cipation of transformation of . sqq . 2 gradua tion theses. . 15 su ffe r s from prejudices of George Liedeath and funeral. 168. 16 . intercourse with Pyle. on the relation of to the on world. boyhood. personal causes. u 8. intercourse . 4the service of the interest in energj. principal LEIBNIZ. . . 154 London. 18 sqq characteristics. 3 early philosophical views. I63n. 4. to . . 8 re garding clear and distinct ideas. theory of of Knutzen.. 259 n. 345 4I7f 42 on the ontological proof of the existence of God. holds that matter cannot think. sqq&amp. 23 4 n. 7 discovery of the Differential Calculus. early studies .Kant s of misunderstanding Leibniz. &c. relation to sqq. 4. 48 . 6mathematics. spirit. 5. 299 sqq. 271. 133. 2 Loineburg. 93 n optimism. a i microscopy 154.dependent know 133 how on ledge at once innate and experi ential. psychology . connexion with . logical principles of his philosophy. Kepler introduction of the notion of infinity into geometry. 12 . 7= s works and editions.43 Kant.gt. 229 n. growth of his views re philosophical writing. 58 sqq. 66. 85 sqq Law. growth of his system. 137 sqq. 74 S qq. critical 256 n . 176. of . advocated use of German for intercourse with study of higher . . garding force and motion aci misunderstood by his disciples. II. final and Prince Eugene. 208 sqq. . 7 . his mam principles. PetertheGreat. university life. INDEX translation . n- ac quamtance with Tschirnhausen 9 Newton and the 8 personal relations with Spinoza 9 10 librarian to the Duke of . JNIurnberg...lt. I5S fore. projects of Church re-union. residence at Franktort. foundino.. his criticism of Leibniz. m .o f ac * de ies *4 J 5. 400 . his view of self-conscious ness. Ins ethics. Hanover. Calculus. Kant and -Leibniz on perception and con ception. dissatisfaction with Descartes s J difference from Descartes philosophy. Language. anti . 103 accused of borrowing clocks illustration from Geulincx 43 . 3. of Plato. T 3? 355 j of Thtodicee. Brunswick. positive Divine. relation to liobbes. . 275 sqq. shadows the . u with 177.relation to Plato and Aristotle. 142 n sqq. secretary to society of Rosicrucians.

tinct from substance. 300. 256. on mechanism. Leibniz s theory of. 402 holds that matt aiic may think. 190. mathematical points 28. tabula rasa. 192. to toHerbart. 93 not mere extension. Logic Leibniz.lt. 149 n the immortality of the sou 383 n on the immateriality the soul. 260 n. criticism and Leibniz Ethics. 342 mathematical s . 5. 194 5 . 386 100 inseparable from qualities. niz. relation to Fichte. an 25S secunda. 305 u. 409. 208 lation to Kant. S( Locke. 6 with in which Leibniz agrees him. Schopenhauer. 28. 104 n. . Leib Divine 1 points. 158. stantiale. I? 8 *V\. 190 sqq. 168 sqq. sqq. Spinoza to Newton. first 208 &amp. 141 sqq. discussion in the Bayle on multiplicity Monad. 97. .309. 198. 206 sq&amp. n.lt. possessed by secunda. 369 via media between on Descartes and Locke. 128. 416. 269. n. oubere. . 397. 97. l&amp. Limitation. . criticism of Leib on innate ideas. . XIV. 355 inLeibniz s relation to and cnt cism of. 96 Mathematics in relation to &amp. . of.INDEX and Descartes on 48 n Leibniz secondary qualities. 195 sqq. 256 n n. lachines of nature are machines have an throughout. re 39 5 sqq. criticism . Des exaltation of matter. in. 357 sf Locke s theory of knowledg his view that mind ma 122 exist without thought. phenomenon. niz philosophy. 305 does not Liberty of indifference exist. . mathematics. . 105 Materia 109. Leibniz. 305 n. from 148. infinity of organs. 392. 256 n.gt.. 285 : 122 n. on empirical knowledge. 401 cartes s view of matter. Life 44 n. he might approve . . . 254. necessity of. 250. 194 teleology. Mechanism. everywhere in nature.l- every created Monad. of the . can miraculous think? 390 sqq. 43 T s Leibniz otze. 13. disinterested selfish. 340 Limitations of created things. correspondence with 102 n. his monadology. 97. 114. 192. _ . Mattria prima. relation on Hegel. 86.. opposec his account by Leibniz. 123. 119 Leuwenhoek. .gt. 375 of Spinoza s 376 n. Leinoine on Lessing. 80 70 relations with Clarke. 95 and matena no. to Hegel. 5 &amp. 1140 S(li- . Malebranche. sense course with Leibniz. 272 Leibniz s account of his relation to Locke. . Stillingfleet. 112. the n. in logic.. 240 n. employs inter Leibniz principles. 39 n. 74. 260 n. : mis ove. 395 Locke a Locke . 86. the controversy between Locke Divine. 123. vincutum s the pre-established harmony. 126 n. 8. 24 n.gt. Divine and human. 300infin as well as finitely divided 335 itely divisible. 39. Malpighi. 286. Matter. Mechanical philosophy. Descartes. 255. cohesion living throughout. 36 n his Essay. 13. 97 . 387 sqq. 9 6 a mere aggregation. Stillingfleet.gt. to Herbart. Archbishop 4. 29. 53 n. 419 are Limits. 5 . . . of I24n. 3 ! . Kant s s discussion ot lainz. . 423. . Simon de la. in 94 a mere aggregate. 357 criticisms of Locke. . 237. &c. and 398 sqq. matter mind. 140 o of virtue criticised. 191 193. in flux like a dis ~ &amp. 312. early interest relation to Leibniz. 256 and secondary primary of. 2 5 8 262 n river. . as distinct sqq. . : . 183 to Lotze. 129 his accou uneasiness. 1 184. . 309.

218. 34 account of. . gination. 224 n. 2 2 1 n not perceived by the senses. 2 17 sqq. 307.or enfolding itself. 250. 264. . 222 sqq. 420 each represents most distinctly its own body. 105. 372 n minism. absolute and relative motion. of a number. according to Descartes it is . 219 ingenerable and imperishable.307. 1 Metempsychosis inadmissible. 215. 229 sqq. . 216 Kant s discussion of. changes in Monads. 40 and Leibniz 327. Molinos.417 Descartes s view of motion. 93. 38 production. 228n. 87.43 2 2 54&amp. . . 50. 245. appetition. 209. 259 n. . continually unfoldino. activity and passivity . 246. 2 20. 256 n. 407 . 37 37 compared to . 45. 257. their progress towards 416^ per fection. Metaphysical laws in nature. 7o. 313 sqq. 109 sqq. 474. 69. 88 and that its direction is variable. 219 mutual exclusiveness. Monas Monad urn. in relation to Fichte s Ego. Motion. 215 relation to Principles of Nature and Grace. More. nature full of Mind always Milton quoted. 344. of the term. ordmates infinite series.322 364 412. (rational). 258. their mutual 246 agreement. in animals.. . of. correlativity of their changes. 2