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The science
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present work is a translation by Mr. A. E. Kroeger from the original edition of Das System der Sitfenlehre nach den Prindpien der Wissenschaflslehrc, von Johann Gottlieb Fichte (Jena und Leipzig, 1798) together with an appendix containing a chapter on


Ascetism, or practical moral culture, translated from the

volume of Fiehte's posthumous works, published in Bonn, 1835, the same being a lecture given by Fiehte in 1798 as an appendix to The Science of Morals, published in that year. This work, together with the J'hilosphy of Bight, translated by Mr. Kroeger, and already pubthird
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necessary truths psychology. .vi EDITOR'S PREFACE.of The two modes categories. is not a substitute for objective observa- nor is the latter a substitute for the former. and ethics. or ideas. Introspecits tion thinks in the form of self-activity. such as plants. nature. for this operation enters as a factor in knowing all living beings. There is no possible way of giving the results of introspection in the form of objective observation. of thinking involve different fundameiital Objective observation thinks in the form time and space and external causation. While objective observation sees things and dead results. It is evident enough that a knowledge of nature as it is is not completed without introspection. By rational psychology one understands the necessary truths which are founded on the nature of the mind itself. and does not vary : Introspection tion. activity depends upon the logical structure of the mind. is to be found in his complete works is an example of the Kantian method of introspection. Pichte was singularly gifted for the work of acquiring Almost every Kant's methods and perfecting them. Kant made an epoch by his in the history into of philosophy subjective searching of investigation the co-efficient knowledge. . There is everywhere an attempt at a separation of the transient and variable in the mental operation from the formal This formal and permanent and permanent activity. but the method of thinking eludes one. and objects take the shape of feelings. and by this discovery was able to make a large contribution to rational psychology. He discovered what belongs essentially to the constitution of perception and thought. and it is not easy to make an inventory of the facts of consciousness. writing that it furnishes us with the universal and which lie at the basis of metaphysics. intro- spection thinks persons and living beings. volitions.

In so far as the amateur follows the mathematical demonstrations of Newton or Leibnitz. that word. arrives at convictions of his own. . candid student of the History of Philosophy. Those who attain to any mastery of the critical system of Kant. difference of opinion. with its higher character of scientific system. or animals. To anyone who obtains a of the history of philosophy it first and superficial view seems absurd to think of approaching the introspection as affording anything There seems to be endless Every thinker. order of introspection. Any will testify that the agreements of these thinkers are numerous. reach a series of necessary truths belonging within the sphere of rational psychology. he is forced into agreement. or who have attained to a famihar acquaintlove to speak of it ance with sense of as scientific in a higher Looking upon mathematics as systematic and strictly scientific. however. is it But this use of introspection is The Kantian and Fichtian introspection conscious and systematic. although he combats the convictions of his fellows. the higher introspection: will discover to sufficient care and attention the reader the philosophical necessity which the insight of a Kant or a Fichte had attained.EDITOR'S PREFACE. vii unconscious. much. who has given much time to understand the different systems. he sees the insight of So it is in the mathematical author he is studying. so there comes a place in philosophical introspection where the student stops. and those who have used it. and men. and of such a character as to demonstrate the claims made for the scientific character of the higher introspection. they would claim for the philosophic introspection a precision and strictness which exceeds that of mathematics. But just as there comes a point in the study of mathematics where the mind of the student stops before a realm of unexplored quantity.

they are seen as the necessary presupposition of results. until further strength comes to him by further discipline. Hence pure reason furnishes the ground for time and space and for the realms of nature. We are not responsible for that which we do not originate. Reason to see that his doctrine of time and space. as objects of philosophy. at the same time establishes the transcendence of mind over nature for space and time are the necessary conditions for the existence of nature. being unable to take the next step. freedom. He is able to describe this as a clear that the will can It is not a fact of consciousness. are reached in the ontology of Plato and Aristotle almost with the first . and all manifestations of life in plants and animals. which makes them to be subjective forms of the mind. One needs only Kant's Critique the first hundred pages of of Pure.viii EDITOR'S PREFACE. Perhaps the greatest merit of the present work is . speculative insight . and for all material existence. The same to read very soon as the logical condition for the facts of introspection. are seen the world. and immortality. To him it is originate new determinations in the world. results it is true the positive are attained in some form even in the elementary stages of thinking. God. great as with mathematics. With that philosophy. It can modify the chain of causality in which it finds itself. Human beings are conscious that they are authors of deeds for which they are wholly respon- . The idea of responsibility is the key to all questions relating to freedom. Fichte's clear setting forth of the will in the first third of the book. and initiate new forms of existence for which it alone is responsible. link in a chain of causality necessarily determined by what has gone before it. Fichte sees clearly the autonomy and self-activity of the ego. too. But space and time themselves are forms in pure mind or pure reason.

this became on clear. effect. that of external tion. Without a causality that originates in self-determination there could be no perseverance of causal influence. but he did not that the necessity belonged quite as. cause there could be no Kant found see that he was obliged to acknowledge this in his Critique of the Practical Reason. and consequently no chain of causality. as the condition both of the intellect and of the will. of the Wissenschaftslehre. The institutions of Even those who civilization are founded on are agnostics or sceptics in will. Kant shows in his Third Antimony that he admits equal validity to the two categories first.EDITOR'S'^ PREFACE. the science rights and the science Fichte's insight into freedom. these of especially in its and works morals. ix this fact. Everything would to the side of and nothing This would be self-contradictory. hence. It and. They regard to the freedom of the act are partly of the conviction that their mental difficulties are merely subjective. and later hence forms. was only necessary for another thinker to show that the category of external observation has the foundation of its validity in the category of higher introspection to refute the Third Antimony. is the foundation-stone of the subsequent . iatelleetual conviction with their — observation. that of higher introspection. do not go so far as to on any other principle than that of freedom and responsibility on the part of their fellow-men. sible. well to his Critique of Pure Beason. They are unable to square their common-sense convicand they are almost willing to admit that the practical position is the correct one. belong to the side of cause. events A causality of deterrests mination of for its succeeding by prior events of validity upon a higher causality freedom. and that the intellectual sceptism is due to weakness of insight. second. for without a effect. To Fichte too.

T. in which the by Kant completes its union with those of Plato and Aristotle.X EDITOR'S PREFACE. Deceviber. German philosophies of Schelling and Hegel. . both reach the same highest principles.C. HARRIS. individual immortality in an eternal church invisible. 1896. human freedom and responsibility. Washixoton. D. namely. the personality of God. The psychology movement comes into harmony with the ontology movement. initiated movement W.

) Book II. Systematic Application op the Moral Pkinciple OE. Concerning the Material Conditions OF THE Morality op our Actions . Deduction op the Reality and Applicability OE the Pkinciple op Morality 67 (Original pages 71-202. Deduction of the Peinciplb op Mobality 17 (Original pages 1-70.. 167 (Original pages 203-271. Concerning the Formal Conditions op the Morality of ouii Actions . .) 254-365 Book V. . . G.) 206-253 Book IV. . 1 (Original pages 1-18. . . Edition. Morality in its more Ebsteicted Meaning.B. Theory of Duties . 1-12 Inteobuotion . 157-205 Book III. .. . Book 63-156 I..) Part II. —The work is translated from the edition of 1798. 217 (Original pages 272-339. .) Part 13-62 I.CONTENTS Pages in J. Fichte. 269 (Original pages 340-494. Werter Band.. 373 (Printed pages 469-550.) Appendix — On Ascbtism . N.


am I at all The whole mechanism of consciousconscious of myself. With the realization of actual consciousness. . Only in so far as I distinguish myself. ness rests upon the manifold views of this separation and retmion of the subjective and the objective. the conscious. we always have the diremption.. and made the starting- our system. or First. as if the su bjective resulted from the objective . Cognition. This absolute identity of subject and object in the Ego can be shown up only through mediation. as The subjective and objective are viewed harmoniou s. It is the business of theoretical philosophy to show how we come to assert such a harmony. This view called Knowledge. the object of this consciousness. and cannot In telligeii ce^ Reason or whatever may be found immediately as part of actual consciousness. even though it be self-consciousness. such a point point of. in the following manner : as united . INTRODUCTION §1- an objective can ever become a subjective. This point it is the ^Egolwod. the be named. as if the former conformed is itself to the latter. but are altogether one. is established by. l*row. or how a being can ever become an object of representation this curious change will never be explained by anyone who : How does not find a point wherein the objective and subjective are not distinguished at all. from myself.

§ 4- I find myself as active in the sensuous world. has been entertained in previous philosophy. how we come at all to consider some of our representations as being the ground of second. As it the province of theoretical philosophy to represent the system of necessarily thinking that our representations conform to a being. as if if the objecti ve resulted from the subjective. and. namely. This view is that of a moral It is the business of practical philosophy to show how we come to assert such a harmony. ii becomes our duty to enter upon this last-mentioned question. It has been considered quite a matter of course that we can influence nature. so practical philosophy has to exhaust the system of necessarily thinking that a being conforms to results from our representations. Everyone knows that we do it every moment it is a part of consciousness so why trouble ourselves about it. and to show. A § 3- The doctrine is of morals is practical philosophy.2 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. and in part actually represented in this very same independent nature. assumed to have independent existence. but not the second point. how we come to assert the harmony of our representations with things. whence we get particularly that system of those conceptions from which a being is absolutely to result. Hence. how we come to think some of our conceptions as representable. Second. first. The object of this Introduction is to gather into one short statement what the subsequent investigation is to elaborate in detail concerning this matter. a being resultea trom a coneeption (from the con- as ception of activ ity. a being . : . From this self-finding this aU consciousness proceeds. a purpose). The first point. and without consciousness of my activity there is no self- . namely.

which my activity changes. I say. for the present. all knowing. that / myself am to be the last ground of the change which is to occur. the subject of consciousness and the principle of causality are — one. as soon~aR mere form of knowing generally contains The active. u pon which my activity is and which remains permanent and unchanged by this activity and the representation of the gualities of this matter. that which I this I can have derived from no other knowing it . assert it as At present we merely for the an immediate fact of consciousness sake of connecting our argument to it ? What activity contain. but my activity lie which cannot be externally . r am the ground of this change signifies: that that which knows of the change is that which effects it. in other words. of the subject of this knowing. . . namely. are given me externally although I confess T do not understand what this may mean— even granted that it is empirical perception. which continues until that form is realised which I purposed to realise even when we admit. must in me which I cannot empirically perceive or learn. it nevertheless remains quite clear that there is something else besides in the repre- _sentation of given. manifoldness does this representation of my and how do I arrive at this manifold ? Even when we admit. I know that I am Hence. — to express this not-thought. 3 . itself at the origin of or. which are involved in the representation of my activity. that all these representations. Whoever desires a proof of this assertion will find it in the second book of this work. and the representation of this progressive change.— INTRODUCTION. know because I know . that the repre- ' of the matter. or whatever other words may be used sentation directed. consciousness. as without this self-consciousness there is no consciousness pf another. But that which I assert. at all I know immediately know at all. which I myself am not. but which I must know immediately. I posit 1 it absolute ly.

as mentioned before. "a't th6 gaiae CiaieTljagw both as absolutfiiv one Bow do . and. in the course of our deduction. does not know. and commence our deduction with it.4 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. now is that the same contained in. and our investigation is closed if. We will attempt to decide whether such a deduction possible. . Hence we proceed from the form of consciousness in general. . hence. consciousness in general. If this should turn out to be so. since we should be able to explain it in Such an explanation would show how we come to ascribe to ourselves a causality in an external sensuous world by deducing the necessity of such an assumption immediately from the another and more natural manner. pre-supposed consciousness. it might well he that the same mere form of knowing does alone if not immediately. The and necessarily posited together with. Its is plan is as follows : We have just now seen is what the representation pre-supposition of our causality involves. at any rate — through the just discovered immediate contain all the other manifold which is involved in the representation of my activity. as such. I do not know without knowing somewhat . which. posits myself as such. Now. we should at once be relieved of the very vexatious assumption that this manifold is given to iis — from without. § 5- T posit myself as ^tive^ signifies according to the above: I distinguish within myself a knowing and an actual power. I come to make the distinction ? How to determine the distinguished in precisely this second question will find first its manner? Probably the answer in the answer to the I do not question. the consciousness of myself as an active principle. but is] but. we arrive again at the representation of our sensuous activity from which we started.

know of myself because it is possible ^ and I am because I k now of that all other agreements of bocn —whetner the objective myself. We I am. Being is to be through itself. know of myself without 5 . as a _mere^ subjective knowing having its being for its objac t." am I already compelled to separate but . is to exist itself independently of the subjective. whereas knowing is depen- through us. is to be dependent upon and receive its material determination through the latter. : at The important insight thus obtained is the following Knowing and being are not separated outside and independent of consciousness. possible at and without it. There is no being except through the media tion of consciou sness. which is separated. . The latter. and in consequence whereof the subjective and objective in consciousness are immediately posited as one. and can. of the subjective and objective. If a consciousness is posited. arise in no manner in consciousness. as such the relation must appear to anything appears to us.— INTRODUCTION. consciousness is not But this diremptio n posits immediately likewise the relation of the dirempter. as such simple one. is absolutely = X.^ Even if I try merely io say ''"1. whereas the former. which is the same. except through^ (^ ffns^iousness. this distincposited. is The one. the subjective. or. ' likewise also does this separation arise " I. because this separation a condition of the possibility of all consciousness. or if we have consciousness all. without distinguishing within" myself a subjective and objective. and which therefore at the basis of all consciousness. but are separated is only in consciousness. and it is only through this separation that both those separates arise. all." only through my saying thus. discover here an immediate agreeme nt between i ^ the subjective and objective. the objective. if dent upon being. a s there is likewise no knowing.^^gfei2g an tion is becoming precisely through thi s i^hat for myself.

6 is THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. as free and determining. through the mediation of a synthesis. indeed. to investigate therefore necessarily a perception i. and harand since those the this diremptions all and harmonies exhaust total content of possible consciousness. At present.e. signifies not : I ascribe to myself activity in general activity. since that immediate diremption mony other be. activity in general. and the repreis which we have . for it appears as abstracting . How may we shall doubtless see in the course of our investi- gation. in this representation the . be. does not lie in itself. in which case it may very well at least freely describe. where the separation of the subjective and objective is complete. as when the conception of cognition is applied are but particular views of that one immediate harmony. If this could really be proven. but I ascribe to mysel f a determined this activity and no other. it would also prove that everything which may occur in consciousness is posited through the mere form of result — consciousness. The subjective appears as a mere cognizing of a something which it perceives. i. to result from the subjective. Thus it must.. of its determinateness in regard to the what thereof. its material . becomes quite dependent and necessitated and the ground of this. but in the objective. as when the conception is of a purpose is realized. however. We determinateness. but on no account as an active producing of the representation.e. we stand at the origin of sentation all consciousness. But in the progress of consciousness the subjective also appears. §6. through its mere separation from the objective. as described above.. is the form of consciousness itself. or whether the subjective to from the objective. have seen how the subjective. I posit myself as active. . at the origin of all consciousness. though not perceive.

and from the absolutely posited relation of the former to the latter. therefore. perception of my activity. you also perceive necessanTy resistance JSTo appearance of resi. as established previously. that 1 must regard myself as merely a cognizing subject. an immediate consciousness. and this again is conditioned by the positing of a resistance as such. That such a resistance does appear is purely result of the laws of consciousness.INTRODUCTION. 7 subjective appears as altogether and completely determined through an external other. opposinp' it thrmigh jdeal activity: in other words. which merely strives to remain in and which.. Hence this . something. is conditioned by the sciousness of myself. mere objectivity.stance^ nn appearance of activity. The law itself. Again. let tiie characteristics of this representation of a resistance be developed in their genesis. whic h. but which can in no wise attack freedom upon its own ground. which gives rise . Now And how what does this signify ? A determined activity. through opposing to it a resistance. again. may be deduced from the necessary separation of a subjective from an objective. This consciousn ess of th e resistance is is the ground why and the not"" a m ediated. in short. as some- thing quiet and dead. | to it for us. ^t " .does not arf. and in this cognition utterly dependent upon the objectivity. merelj existence. Let not this be overlooked. Wherever an djD so far as you perceive activity. and hence the resistance may properly be regarded as a result of those laws. h ence. matter. does certainly resist (with it is) all a measure of power to remain what of influences freedom upon it. Next. This resistance is represented as the opposite of activity. all consciousness is conditioned by the conThis. solely through thinking and imagining a resistance as opposed to it. Such objectivity is called with its familiar name. as "t's. does it become a determined activity ? Solely . It Ts mediated thro"ugli this.

as an (^ilityj to express mobility.Tna. that subjective is to be determined by the objective. Rcbp. extends necessarily throughout the whole sphere of my Nor can consciousness. versd. And thus the principle and the problem of all theoretical philosophy have been deduced. because if it had. has thus been deduced from the laws of consciousness. The representation of a matter. and not vice. at the time. or whatever words you may choose it in we presuppose in strated to no one. . resistance. their diremption. same and the determined relation. namely. and their original relation to We cate which is attached to the one But we have not yet investigated the prediand inseparable Ego. One of our chief questions has been answered. and remains along with it. is. the necessary consequence of our separating in our consciousness a subjective from an objective. and yet. arises from the absolutely posited relation of the subjective as such to the objective as such. namely. an objective. a conception which is to result from. What does it signify to be active ? and what do I really each other. their union. being. activity in general. itself and all con- become annihilated. have said enough concerning the subjective and objective in this positing. since it can be demon This does not find himself. posit when I ascribe activity to of myself ? The it in.8 THE SCIENCE OP ETHICS. which cannot be in any manner changed through my causality. §7I posit myself as active. and which we sciousness and all being would discovered above to be contained in the perception of our activity. regarding both as one . and to by a This assumption be determined by. with the characteristic just ascribed to it. freedom ever be posited as having the slightest influence over this resistance. who the reader. as we have shown. how we come to assume a subjective.

the only possible manifestation oT'^this "acEvil^r m'ade In this latter necessary by the laws of consciousness. naving distinguished within myself a subjective and an objective. I cannot posit this activity in any other manner than as We how do m a causality of the conception. .— INTRODUCTION. so concerned. which conception cannot in so far be again determined through another objective. my activity can also be posited as proceeding from the subjective and determining the objective in short. but is determined absolutely in and through . itself. Considering all this. the one inseparable Ego. as is g way as it is be ascriLed to the we have just seen. Representing. have thus also replied to our second question I come to assume that an objective results from a subjective. the real power. is doubtless this objective in me. in its form. which acts upon the object. and causality^ through the conception is . far as the and remains only what and form of its activity This agility. is therefore contemplated as freest internal motion. for. is the Through representation of self-activity. Now I. we have shown above that the material or the content of the deter- minedness is to be in another relation determined through the objective. internal agility cannot in any objective as such. a being from a conception ? and in doing so have deduced the principle of all practical philosophy. I say so far as the form is concerned. absolutely For this assumption arises because I a bound to posit myself as actiyej and" because. for the objective is. as a causality of the mere conception upon the objective. and that. am to be active. Freedom. in so far as we relate the sensuous the latter to ourselves. form absolute activity is also called freedom. to the intelligence as such. appertains only to the subjective. Absolute activity is the'one predicate^ which immediately and absolutely "belongs to me. and arises opposition of ourselves as intelligence to the determinateness of the object.

at consciousness. . a characteristic which it was not necessary to point out before. and where this activity is -but this origin absolute. and pertains only to the sensuous view of our self-activity. is not itself determined again by an objective. that in the course of connected consciousness the conception of a purpose appears as cond itioned determined being. the material substance in consequence of the which the objective has upon the subjective. that I presuppose a conception originated through myself. which the subjective has upon the objective. ^ — through of all — no t the co gnition 'd'f^some objective "the view cannot be entertained here. is only possible on condition. precisely as we asserted an absolute and self. otherwise I should no t be absolutely active. deduced. at the same time. which my causality is to accept as a guide. nor im- mediately posited as almduteiy 'active. and mediated through. whichconception Hence the Ts then called the conception of a purpose. that I find myself active.posited follows: being of causality. which is against our presupposition. is to reslut. fact which was assumed above. and which we have here. that this previous originating of a concep tion is only posited. but is For if it were absolutely determined through itself. where we take our starting-point from activity. The conception^ from which an objective determination and which we call the conception of a purpose. and to be as well formaliter based upon We thus obtain a new as materialiter determined by. But it is to be well observed.Tut "Tny activity would be dependent upon. I posit myself as fre e in so far a s I explain a sensuous acting or a beiiig th rough my conception.— lo THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. already mentioned as involved in characteristic to those the representation of our activity. It is true. The most important result of this consideration is as There is an absolute independence and selfdetermination of the mere conception by virtue of the causality. an objective being.

matter except through what likewise matter Hence in so far as I think. / who am to have causality we have is upon the sub- stance or matter. which it is described in its origin. and only so far as this immediate causality of the will extends does the — body. impossible for me to think a causality upon that itself. only for the sake of becoming conscious of our activity. (Whosoever has but properly seized this self-determining of the conception. as a consequence. take of my absolute activity. causality. I become matter for myself. and in so far as I thus regard myself.. Hence the will and is also separated and distinguished from the body. and what can it signify ? Nothing. I call I. am an articulated body and the representation of my body itself is nothing else than the representation of myself as a cause in the world hence mediately as simply a certain view I of matter . the will is to have causality and immediate causality— upon my body. regarded as principle of a myself a material tody. or the articulation extend. INTRODUCTION. myself as matter. as tool. The spiritual within me. Nevertheless. viewed immediately as the principle of a becomes to But and it is me a will. having causality upon this and must think. sentation of a will called a willing. an unshakeable conviction of its truth. regarded objectively. causality in the world of matter. has thereby attained the most perfect insight into our whole system. . but that the conception itself should appear to me a as some- thing objective. How this possible. and.) § 8- From is the conception there results an objective. ii Both ends of the whole world of reason have thus been connected by us. Now is is the conception of purpose. nothing but this and the reprenecessary view if of the conception of a purpose posited.

I evidently represent myself to myself as having changed. . started. when viewed from two sides. this and again into a certain modification of my body. and what is the sensuous world which is changeable through this causality ? If a subjective within me is to change into an objective. when viewed altogether and merely objectively. same as the body. only viewed from different sides. a familiar vievi^ of this original separation. and the body the appears. or the same as the unchangeable thing. as regarded as having changed. Both are the same. my substantial body. is the subjective. as follows and is closed. But to my final appurtenance. is. But and distinction is nothing but another separation of the subjective and objective. when viewed subjectively. The thing. and we find as the last link of our conclusions the very same from which we . : Its result The only absolute. itself. the active intelligence the unchangeable thing is that same Nature.e. Our investigation has therefore returned into in short. still more The definite. and it is hence. The changeable thing is Nature. or mere matter. as was required. a conception of a purpose into a resolve of the will. in this relation.— 12 THn SCIENCE OF ETHICS. i.. as not the this diremption objective. therefore. precisely the which the conception exercises upon the objective appeared to us. All that was involved in the perception of our sensuous causality has now been deduced from the laws of consciousness. § 9- But what is my actual causality. or. will. and. what is the change which it is to produce in the sensuous world. is be connected with the whole material world. as will and as body. which my causality is can change. the world is necessarily also so regarded. as connected with me. precisely as the causality qiMlitativeness of Nature.

that the active can only be considered as united subject and object (as Ego).nrl all being is based. and particularly of the fundamental law of consciousness. 1 . The only purely — — true is my self-determination.3 INTR OD UCTION. This activity appears by virtue of the laws of consciousness. upon which all p-nnsfinnanpRR a. . i s _pure activity. and hence are themselves appearances. As a causality upon something outside of me. all which is contained in this appearance from the end or purpose absolutely posited through myself to the raw matter of the world are but mediating links of this appearance.




his moral nature. It of is asserted that there to manifests itself in the soul do certain things utterly independent of external purposes. Firstly. to leave undone other things equally independent of external purposes. DEDUCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY.The power of cognition. or ordinary. is may rest content to have discovered that thus. as sure as called his moral natu re. merely for the sake of doing them. and actually to think. if he but closely observes himself. perhaps even to act constantly in conformity with this faith. far as . and. nay. man may simply accept it as such it fact. such an impulsion is within him. on the other hand. Peeliminaey. Perhaps he may even freely resolve. within him the_coinmon. as his highest destination. relate in a twofold manner to this. which belongs to man.as a — and discovered by him it certainly is assumed that each rational being will thus discover it. as well of his moral nature in C 17 . what that impulsion represents Thus there arises to him as such. from inclination. may When that impulsion fact is in his self observation. without inquiring in what it becomes thus. knowledge. and merely for the sake of leaving them undone. in so to manifest is itself he is a rational being. The condition necessarily of man an impulsion man. to place unconditioned faith in the requirements of that manner and from what grounds impulsion.BOOK FIEST.

Secondly. or for us. whether it be withm us. But man may . our Egoness. from the highest"^and j. but likewise how it arises If he obtains this knowledge. a speculative knowled ge. but desire a genetical knowledge^or he may desire to know not only that such an Impulsion exists within him. is not nearly as expressively correct as the former. and is sufficient for the generation of moral sentiments and his a moral behaviour. which latter wo rd. a s The it is.8 — THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. or how are the moral nature of man to be discovered? The only matter which excludes all asking for a higher ground is this that we are we. know he may not be content with a partical. in which somerationality. whereas it.b solute principle sho"wn to be a necessary result thereof. like the external world which we assume. also not rest content with the the immediate perception he may desire to grounds of what he has thus discovered. or. problem to be solved. therefore our present task to furnish a deduction of the moral nature or principle in man. it will be within him. is of Egoness and It is a deduction. also— if he carefully attends to the dictates conscience in the particular phases of his life particular duties. however. it is sufficient to remark that only . in other words. 1 general. Instead of enumerating at length the advantages of such a deduction. or Eationality. or for that precisely the speculative and scientific knowledge of the grounds of this something whereof we speak. is thing connects within. as of his of which common knowledge is possible from the standpoint of ordinary consciousness. and to attain it he must rise from the standpoint of ordinary consciousness to a higher standpoint. is only thus within or for us because we are in general. development of these grounds being deduced. as can indeed be easily proven Now. how is this ctrounds of the : ' the particular insight into the manner us. like the irdpulsion above mentioned. EveryI" thing else.

for we do not in any manner receive change anything in it. extends so far. 19 — through it does a science of morality arise.2LJaiosde. it is the theory of the consciousness of our moral nature in general. This deduction is derived from principles of the latter science. so also morality does not manifest itself ISTor is differently in man before and after its deduction the science of morality a science of wisdom as. a remark made necessary . . If. its^ manifestation. as IS iMlntainedT-fche-JiiQraliiy-e^'tnir nature follows. Hence the deduc tion generates nothi ng else.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. in accordance with necessary law^f the mentioned impulsion is itself primary and immediate perception. the — science of morality is connected^ with the . and of our determined duties in particular.r so&ver. and not our power. since only our cognition. the present deduction. the power to — . — — So much concerning the significance and the object of our intended deduction. through our freedom in any manner what. indeed. were impossible.££i|S£§~.dge^ t^jrough. In its peculiar characteristic.^ lB gonoraJij3gJfalTrigh-ar4edTBrtf5irai^^ . And science no matter whereof is end in itself. In relation to a scientific complete philosophy. science but morality is' like all philosophy a science or Knowledge. and we cannot change this. from our rationality. present becomes a separate philosophical '' science. and thus . and must •not be expected to generate anything else than simply theoretical cognition. Just as we do not place things differently in time and space after we have obtained the insight into the grounds of our doing so at all. One more preliminary remark for its proper comprehension. that is to say. however. than we did previously. since wisdom is rather an art than a thff 'grounds thereof. and since the whole relation is necessarily our own unchangeable nature itself. it will manifest itself/ without our interference. and shows how the particular science of morality proceeds from the general science of knowledge.

a science of morality. to think ourselves unde r a certain specified characteristic. are compelled to think ourselves under s uch condition From our thus discovered nature we shall deduce the moral impulsion before mentioned as necessary. The procedure of our deduction will We shall make it be as follows: our problem. and hence vou can not s av Thus aw. that all your thinking to proceeds according to certain inner laws of this thinking.t Qjat3se£S&. The attempt may succeed or not. Some one may Very well but . signifi- cance of your result. The objection. and . at first. and the correctness of the assumption will not have been proven until the required science has actually been established by its means. of trans- by the general ignorance regarding the nature cendental philosophy. you always remain conscious of this true if : Now. that heuce all that you think is modified by the manner of thinking. outlook over condition to all philosophy.. simply because you think I thus. that the condition assumed is arbitrary would seem to be of little weight. would be the following. and over the connection of the several philosophical sciences in a system. by its means. therefore. and more instructive in be necessary . Now. it -would seem arbitrary that we think ourselves But he who has an precisely under such a condition. 1 in and for myself— since you never can know that unless you have some means of knowledge besides thinking but you can : the case in the present instance _in thinking — merely say Thus must I necessarily thinle myself. " You are going to think yourself. and limit yourself to it. no objec- . be " j yourself you will become modified according to your th inking. say. will also . A more important objection. This. and that everything it is for you as it is. or it can at you.— 20 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. knows this whereas anyone else may temporarily regard it as a mere assumption for the purpose of constructing. doubtless. as a critical philosopher least you ought be easily shown to know. its consequences.^a^we .

" To this we reply : This we pretend to do on no transcenthat such account. there is no being at all. \ . seem to limit yourself to this. is also a thinking. You do not.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. of while the former lies within a It is whereof we become conscious. being in considered to be thinkable. The only difference between this mediated and immediate thinking is this. however. but find it to force itself upon us with immediate necessity. or to pass from the region of thinking into the utterly different region of actual being. see yourself 21 tion can be raised against your procedure. itself is still is still required. and immediate. th e very object of philosophy to discover that within our_ reason which remains unknown to us on tlie standpoint We cannot speaF of a~Belag '^f ordinary conscicmsness ' . else is it and that a That impulsion within whictTTorcfeS itseli: us. thereby receiving the predicate reality or perceivability series of grounds. for reason cannot go . We remain altogether in the region of thinking. than that we must necessarily think that there is such a requirement within us ? The result of our conclusions and that which is in the deduction is a thinking within us. beyond itself. what upon us to than a thinking a consciousness —than a necessary consciousthe object itself? ness? of Can we then ever proceed from mere consciousness Do we then know anything else concerning this requirement. for the^ intelligence there is no being and since there isa being "only for the intelligence. independently of all conclusions as primary . there in itself. of : and the ever-continuing misapprehension dental philosophy consists precisely in this a transition from the region of thinking to that of being is still considered possible. hence to deduce something actual from a mere thought. that in regard to the latter we do not become conscious of its grounds. . You pretend to deduce from it that moral impulsion which manifests itself in us all. its significance. but you can how much it will be worth.

only a n ecessary coasciousness consciousness forces itself This necessity of immediately upon us on the . would be taten to signify any- .24 is THE SCIENCE OF £THICS. standpoint we as investigate its The following deduction. well as the whole system of morality which a is to be erected upon it. furnishes only part of this necessary consciousness. on the transcengrounds. standpoint of ordinary consciousness dental . and if very incorrectly apprehended thing else.

but yourself sure as you do this. But the object which you think is not to be the thinking itself. What does this mean : I find myself ? The easiest manner to guide anyone to the correct thinking and understanding of the conception / is as follows Think. but is to be an opposite somewhat.: CHAPTEE Problem. thinking in this. nd myself. think again not a wall. which thinks in this thought. You therefore think the conception Ego or I. as you did in the previous case . I find myself would signify is . First. A. whatever arises in such a thinking the conception of the Ego. as self. and this thinking You are immediately conscious of your your thinking. you posit the thinking and the thought. and the thought are assumed in thinking as one and the same. of which oppositeness you are also immediately conscious you are yourself. when the thinking . You doubtless assume a thinking. I would say to him. Now — As . all To think myself as s elf. Applying this to our case. Solution. but as one and the same and you are immediately conscious of it in this manner. apart from I. Explanation. not as opposites. and vice versa. in this your thinking. not as a twofold. _thiswall. for : — instance. any object. that which i s not myself? I fi is to say. only as w illing. this desk. however. is not to be identical with it.

Each one must become conscious in himself. I add in thinking to this willing something which exists independently of my consciousness. assume that which I find to be the same as that which the finding and the found are to be the same. independently of my taking hold of it. It is to be. and at present we are merely con- than that of a mere taking hold of something I take hold of being neither in showing cerned in establishing the facts of consciousness. from the highest standpoint of speculation. nor does it need any. as to what it signifies. In short. i.M I finds . i. that which produced nor in any manner modified by my taking hold of it. we do not discuss here.e. and can find myself only as willing? : What willing means is This conception is presupposed as well known. in our case he is to recognize as himself. and will doubtless be able to do so without The fact which the above words suggest become conscious of a willing. capable of no real explanation. to the perceiving subject he is to be purely passive. My taking hold of it was altogether accidental for it. and what are the grounds of it. Thus. which. Third. TMS SCIENCE OF ETHICS. do I appear to myself in finding. at least. and which I assert to difficulty. and to be precisely as it is. How we come to add such a substance in thinking. so far as I find I am conscious of no other activity . through intellectual contemplation. What does this mean I fin d myse lf ? The found is here opposed to" that which ifs produced : through our free activity and more particularly the finding is here determinefl as that which finds. and did not change it in the least. in . and would have remained as it was although I had not taken hold of it. "What does this signify I find myself as willing. and something is to force itself upon him. or to be that which to have this will. something is given .. It was without having been taken hold of. but not how it may be in truth. in which this will is to be.e.. We is . is any as follows: — I be the willing subject in this will. Second.

to another objective does itself become objective in this opposition. I have not an immeindeed. I also become become conscious now is of this consciousness. but it consciousness itself. In short. me the same which has the will. all. and relate it also to a substance for and self. which is to be object of perception at a manifestation of the substance.— The significance conception has just been established through That each one does truly proceed in the genesis. no diate perception of substance. never itself a thinking. but is merely that which is added through thinking to an object of perception. Having thus explained the above proceed to establish First. but always only the thought manifestation of self-activity.: TifE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. Hence I find the willing subject to be my or I find myself I find myself onli/ as willing. this 25 merely assert here that it does occur. objective of that substance there remains only the the willing. each I But . this will. remains always only objective. . or perceive. that substance: Now there are only to two manifestations which can be immediately ascribed the word. as original Hence. is and indeed. in the widest significance of The former all is is originally and in not at an object of a special new consciousness. this. and of one must convince himself by self-observation. I can immediately perceive only something. Only so far as is related and opposed manifestation latter. its proof. or of this perception. itself Thinking. the manifestation which alone I originally ascribe to myself is the willing. Substance is. and immediately for willing. Proof. proposition. and I become conscious of myself only on condition of becoming conscious of myself as a willing. is we now This proof based of its this On the conception of the Ego. this conscious substance willing. conscious of.

26 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. to him. The truth of this assertion each one also must find in the self-contemplation of his procedure. hence something actual and in and through itself existThis also each one must convince himself of ing. is On the character of the original objective. and it cannot be specially proved . This is the case when the Ego thought is the same as the thinking do I hold the thought to be my self.. for although this relation to of the objective to the it subjective is science of knowledge. since the latter only becomes possible through that self-contemplation. It is true that afterwards we become conscious of our thinking as such. as a doing. and it cannot be proven to him from conceptions. and thereupon make it an object and the ease and natural tendency to is what constitutes philosophical genius. Third.e. of an On the necessity of the original cyppositedness objective and a is subjeciive in consciovsn^s. of our thinking. such a proceeding gives rise to no other thought than that of his self this each one must find in himself. through internal contemplation. and which is not that consciousness thinking there a thought which itself. that it be something existing independently of thinking. in all consciousness there is something of which we are conscious. i. described and that. that the acting and that which acted upon be is and the same. without which no one will grasp the significance of transcendental philosophy. Second. The proof may be one stated thus: It is the character of is the Ego. But even this is only possible if we imperceptibly subsume under that thinking as merely thought. for only on this condition do we really think do this a thinking. on the other hand. nor can it be so proven. its is developed in a by no means proven from conception. But so far as the thought. is —In all not that thinking itself. Only in in the present case we are to have nothing to do with . manner when endeavouring to think his self.

i." This self-conto be sciousness is proved. but in its connection with all other consciousness. and willing we only think as such an acting. Hence. I is to he am the thinking and the myself the thinking. and these its future results. is . But such an acting we call willing. in so far as it is to be merely the objective and never the subjective. or in other words. since the thought is to be merely an a mere con- an actual acting upon itself (not templating of itself like the ideal activity). which. an actual self-determining of itself through itself. so certain as I am that I. for our proposition asserts that it is found as Ego. to willing. the objective. Hence the proposition. and is to be recognized in this manner as Ego. to find my find self. Eemaek. to wit: "I necessarily 'find myself. is absolutely identical with the proposition. It is clear that the proposition here proved.e. science of knowledge and hence our present proposition. may be said of this proposition.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. thinking. my self I willing do find myself. it in fundamental flow from it." in order productive of categorical results must be preceded by another one. become necessarily conscious of myself. but our present proposition asserts that the thought. or as I am self-conscious. for as such a it is imme- diate. And thus it l/ . since 27 thought are one. and as reciprocally determining . It is true that.. in the thought as such. not as fact. so certain does this or necessarily exist in and for me. Ego simply ly itself and independently of thinJcing. "When I find myself I necessarily find myself willing. there must be an identity of the acting and that which is acted upon object. Only in and in so far as I find myself so far as I find myself I necessarily find myself willing. together with will itself all the results which It may become a necessary result as well as a con- dition of self-consciousness.

C. only Proof. But more than this. In other words. is necessarily a determined willing. That which remains after this abstraction pure being. able Solution Continued.28 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. but a perceiv- ing —shall become actual object of a perception. All my wilUng is therefore conditioned by the perception of an external object. all willing involves the postulate of an external and the conception of willing involves something which is not our self. I istic is must abstract from this foreign characterin willing. The possibility of postulating in the willing an external object presupposes already within us the conception of an externality in general. but merely as I may become in a certain relation to external things. requirement. my . Hence. and this conception is only possible through experience. how our present common ground of science of morality is based all appears on the B. and in willing I do not perceive myself as I am in and for myself. Hence. It is true that in philosophical abstraction we may speak of a willing in general. Solution Concluded. such as we speak of here. object. which something it is is willed. But this experience likewise is a relation of our self to something outside of us. in . philosophy. which on that very account is undetermined but all truly perceivable willing. But willing itself is thinkunder the presupposition of a something distinct from the Ego. therefore. clearly refers us to the external. in order to find my true essence. that which I will is never anything else than a modification of an object which is to be actually existing outside of me. To will something is to require that a determined object. which in the wilKug of only thought as possible — for if it were thought as This actual the act would not be a willing.

but only immediately through itself. therefore. 29 that is is the immediate result of the previous Hence. which remains when we abstract from all foreign elements. This absoluteness it is. I can certainly have immediate perception of its movement. we have only to investigate what which remains after having undertaken the required abstraction. conditioned. mediately. if a ball is set in motion. the point where it rests. as such. It is what it is because it is so. upon which all depends here. it therefore. and the force of the stroke with which it is set in motion. and absolutely grounded in itself signifies merely not grounded in any- — thing else. Hence the motion of the ball is considered as something dependent. in so far as it is thus. far.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. is a first. . This proposition propositions. Thus. In so primary. Let us make clear this conception. as the willing is absolute and cannot be explained in any manner from something outside of the Ego. although I had no immediate perception of the motion whatever. An absolute first. and which can only be negatwely comprehended and explained since a first signifies merely that which is derived from nothing else. or conditioned as not primary. but only from the Ego itself. and in itself grounded somewhat. is absolutely grounded in itself. but I could likewise obtain a knowledge of all this if I were merely made acquainted with the conditions under which the ball rests. is dependent. of the point from which it starts. for Whatsoever instance. and the celerity with which it moves. namely. from a cognition of that upon which it depends. must — therefore be of such a character that it cannot be cognized mediately through another. Willing. Explanation. and in nothing external whatsoever. or in which it is grounded. or grounded through another may be cognized.

knows it. that certain things exist independently of us in time and space. Nevertheless. as truth. makes the same assertion. in the significance here attached to is it. as absolutely inexplicable that is to say. here to be stated. Such a resolve is called Hence our philosophy starts from a faith. for reasons not It is true no one furnish such an explanation of willing. but generally does not know it. although it likewise can also prefer no ground in its favour. the thing in itself). The truth is that when we resolve to consider this appearance as no further explicable. and as our only truth. any theoretical insight.30 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. In a similar manner it also appears to us. In our philosophy each one makes himself the absolute . consider myself independent. and which cannot externally proved to anyone be who has not it this immediate is knowledge of it as a fact. there can be no theoretical rational ground objected against the assertion. and absoluteness will itself to be absoluteness. as an immediate fact of consciousness. although does not change will be able to that appearance into a mere semblance. rather. starts also from a faith (in — — — . Eemark. Nevertheless. according to which all other truth must be judged and accepted and upon this resolve our whole philosophy In that case. does appear as absolute a fact of consciousness which each one will find "in himself. logically carried out. it quite possible that this appearance of as absolute may be further explained and deduced. Dogmatism. That willing. we make this resolve not from is erected. if anyone should say that willing has an external and to us incomprehensible ground. or. the appearance thereof yet transcendental philosophy further it explains and deduces this appearance. but in consequence of a practical I will be independent: hence I resolve to interest. and Faith. which. whereby the appearing be further explained and cease changing into mere semblance.

could contemplate the consciousness repel the pressing force. the most difficult of all conceptions in philosophy. that they will never find a basis elsewhere. in advance. men do we think this absoluteness in willing ? In order to assist the reader at the very beginning obtaining some insight into this conception (which probably. as a real and determined manifestation Doubtless an inner action of the spring of the spring? upon itself. For no one surely will say that the outward force which presses the spring is the ground of the spring's reacting against it. Let the reader imagine a steel spring. a will to Both together would produce in the itself. as the state or condition Let of a rational being. starting-point. This self- determining spring. But all these moments are possible only on condition that is such an spring. Such a spring is the picture of an actual willing. bent together. of if it is the same as the mere act of willing in the rational being. It is necessary that our philosophy should say this openly. external pressure actually exercised upon the . the whole object of which is we make use merely to further determine this conception). so that it may no longer be called upon to demonstrate externally to what each one must create within himself. hence a tendency outwards. but of it I do not speak here. of an Illusteation. unless they are satisfied with this.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. There is doubtless in the spring a tendency to repel the pressure. a self-determination. But we can also assure all these. although it will doubtless receive the highest clearness in the progress of our present science. in the abstractness it How in is has received here. or 31 basis. me now ask what is the first ground (not condition) of this tendency. of his philosophy: hence our system appears as without a basis to all those who are incapable of doing so.

and remainder ? Evidently that. by which I judge the steel spring to have a tendency to repel any outside pressure as soon as it occurs hence the own inner tendency thereof to determine itself to react. essential distinction In the same manner in which we removed all foreign elements from the conception of elasticity in the steel spring. whenever thing whereby is what this . through which it is to be comprehended and characterized in this thinking. In the same way the rational being cannot determine an actual willing. must be an essential and permanent. and hence we do not speak here of this moment any more than of the first-mentioned one. and thus to arrive at a comprehension of its pure absolute- ness. Now if we abstract from the external pressure altogether. be abstracted from. the conditions of (The very between this original tendency in the steel spring.) its manifestation are given. . we now proceed to remove all foreign elements in the Ego comprehended through its willing. that be the ground of an absolute . and the same in the rational being. it is a problem to think the Ego in the required abstraction as a permanent. and hence that. unless it stands in reciprocal relation with something external (for as such the rational itself to being appears to itself). or the real essence of elasticity as the final and no further explicable ground of all the appearances of the spring. So far as the contint which is to be thought of the is to problem is concerned.32 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. but that which manifests itself under aU these conditions remains always the same. will appear in the following investigations. because the conditions under which it manifests itself change. does there yet remain any- But this is also to we think the steel spring as such. Its manifestations and appearances can change. So far as the form of this problem is concerned.

cerning the Ego. Only thus can the required knowledge be infused into him. It is not only a is . what it is that he still thinks. is it? Each one must have truly thought. .fendency absolutely to determine itself without any external perfaculty not actual. A name cannot . that which we required him to think must have undertaken. and see what it is that remains. consists tendency to self-activity for the sake of self activity and it is this tendency which is thought. an imvulse. make we it clear. Eesult. in order to be able to receive it in a series of our thinking. when . jyilling. the prescribed abstractions. a bsolute itself xindeterminab ilitv through anything not suasion. but is mere power. we know as yet nothing in relation and are not allowed to' make hasty judgments in advance of the investigation. to be that which constitutes_the essence conception of a facultv is of the Ego. and must now observe himself internally.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. it is in this relation the Neither is i t faculty or power of such manifestation. in advance of our actuality. after having removed all those foreign elements.) What. then. to this point. And it^ also involved in When related to the actual manifestation. will call it. absolute tendency to the ahsoluie. as one might call the ground of the elasticity^ in the steel spring. and But conoperates in a matetially determined manner. much named. 33 (All willing is absolute. for the whole conception has never been less thought before. and that which is we have yet this to think here is to be s omething actu al. The in its essential character of the Ego. for an impulse operates necessarily when the conditions of its operating are given. D . through is which it distinguishes itself from all that outside of it. or faculty for a merely that which we think .. together with us. together with us. But to give it a name. which is only possible on condition of a given object.

the without relation to Eemaek. but n ot as Ego in general In the latter . . ' case. itself Ego is thought in and for anything external.34 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. It must be remembered tha t the Ego is here considered only as ohjed. our above result would be utterly false.

CHAPTEE ir. being and cm^pcinn. if . knowing is not posited in the thing. But in the case of the thing this of this existence. knowinpr of being in the whereas . t he Ego must thought solely as object But the Ugo is something only in so far as it posits itself (contemplates and thinks itself) as such. All being relates to a consciousand even the existence of a thing cannot be thought without adding in thinking an intelligen ce which knows ness. of a thing. which is. a proposition taken from and proved in the science of knowledge. Jbhe i s nothing so far as it does not posit itself. as sure as that 35 is its essence. and vice versa. and only in so far as this immediate connection of consciousness and being is posited can it be said the Ego is this or that. A least. the Ego. and the utter opposite is. j. are distinguished by its this. have just shown what the Ego to is. or a rational being. no consciousness of the it Ego without a being of that whereof becomes conscious. and which we need therefore only Ego is This explain here in a few words. We or.'^ness join of the Ego not being without self- consciousness of the Ego. it is how necessarilY be thoudht.n together self - the being the Ego. it follows that the Ego must know of that which we have established as . . which is. thing. that the thing merely without. Applying this to the present case. but in whereas the knowing^ of the an external intelligence being of the Ego is posited in the same substance. in and for itself. the essence of the Ego. and it express more carefully.

Peoblem.. then an original consciousness thereof exists. not merely to state this result generally. The rational being is constituted in such a manner as rarely to observe its own thinking when thinking. in the same abstraction in which we it have just established it.36 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. since the we have ? just now this How were and since the philosopher has surely no other subjective form of thinking than the common and original forfil of thinking of is same to be its objeet.e. But at present we i. assert that the same object exists independent of all philosophisiog. then. and necessarily forces itself upon us as sure as we have any consciousness at all. as of a single object. To become definitely conscious of the con- sciousness of our original being. in and together with another thought. Now let us ask Is. It is self-evident that speak. universal reason? we seek what we already possess ? We without knowing it and at present we only want to produce this knowing of it within us. upon a par- We now proceed to undertake this task. this original consciousness — from that which produced in us through philosophizing differently constituted possible. Explanatory.was duced through free self-determination of our thinking faculty by means of an arbitrary abstraction. . is Here there necessarily a consciousness of the described It absolute tendency. we are conscious whereof we whether we speak philosophically or otherwise. may be of advantage. but only the Why. as a determination of that thought. If this is true. but to enter ticular description of this consciousness. it then. though perhaps not precisely for us originally. Perhaps may always occur in this original consciousness. we became conscious of -J^ro- Thus in the preceding chapter something. do have . The oT^ject of our consciousness .

A. the Ego can and must contemplate what it is. 37 or as usually to lose itself. for only through it is it Ego. . The Ego has the absolute power of contemplation. ridiculous to require anyone to become conscious of but this would only prove his ignorance philosophy and his inability to philosophize. and upon his close observation of that which will arise within him when he thus generates. so far as regards the mere fact. the is. requires likewise no deduction or mediation through external grounds. it may seem curious and. in doing which we shall and must calculate in each reader upon his own self-active generation of that whereof we speak. This power can be no further With the deduced. itself as independent. positing of an Ego this power is posited. subject. philosophy To the non-philosopher a consciousness of .THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. here postulated. and posits of real activity thus intelligence. This can only be done if the mere reflection is made the object of a new reflection. that absoluteness becomes the true essence of the and is brought under the authority of the conception. whereby alone it first becomes true freedom: absoluteness of the absoluteness. above anxious to know the subject as such in order to obtain a judgment concerning its influence upon the determination of the object. N"evertheless. The contemplating intelligence posits the above described tendency to absolute activity as itsdf. the intelligence. object of its thinking. Again. in the object. Genetical Description of the Consciousness of OuE Original Being. absolute power to make Through the consciousness of its absoitself absolute. The Ego contemplates itself because it does. and needs no further deduction. all. per- haps. luteness the Ego tears itself loose from itself. The peculiar determination of contemplation. Now let us proceed to determine this fact. or as identical with itself.

The Ego. upon something existing independently ing precisely as absolute it is to be directed it. apart from all contemplation of it. but which rather resists the direc- spring. which may seem somewhat longer upon this chief difficult to many. Let the reader once more think of an elastic steel It is true that the spring contains within itself the principle of a peculiar movement. power. Here the contemplated not immediately as such. It is well to dwell thought. as absolute power with consciousness. and from the circumstance of an external pressure upon it with inevitable necessity. our the instance. but upon the direct comprehension whereof the possibility of understanding our whole system depends. EXPLAITATOEY. " properly called freedom hesitation ? to Whence this Because the resistance follows from the nature of the spring. but it is same one plating. and substance as the contem- Hence the intelligence is in this instance not merely a passive observer. and this absoluteness to constitute its independent being. but rather becomes for itself absolute real power of the conception." I am willing to remove this inevit- If you should . less hesitate to ascribe that Nevertheless you will doubtwhich you have hitherto very the spring. say.38 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. Such is not to be the is itself it is true. It is the and existsame with the contemplation whereof is to we speak here. the intelligence its is altogether passive in case in observation. Now. the contem- plating . of contemplated. where the contemplated is something outside of the contemplating. Let me explain this expression: it tears itself loose is from itself. essence. tears itself loose from the Ego. as the given absolute without power and consciousness. tion given it from without. which is not given to the spring externally. it have had existence before is The Ego as was seized in contemplation. All coatemplation. as such.

nor found it. or discover new nature to resist external pressure. rather asks you to think something absolutely unthinkable. resists the pressure from an unknown reason. you posit that under ~a. for such "a^ positing is precisely thinking of a thing.'* . not be called free. then. and does not dete rmine. and you have always thought it. and I merely ask that you shall make clear to yourself what you really think. you think at this moment.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. You said. The con- ception of freedom. without iTitAmai' mnvfiment. even very before you resolved to philosophize. or that you shall but understand what you say. blind chance and you will persist in saying that although you do not know through what the spring is determined to resis t. steel spring. at 39 I will permit you to assume that the some time. able necessity. Now. Now. quiet and dead. the steel spring is determined hy its does this mean? askitig. and that the spring can. The nature of the thing is its fixed being. what do you think when you thin k "to be determined "In opposition to " selt'-deterImned and what is it you require for the possibility We will try to make this clear and of the latter ? . What does it mean ? I do not propose that In thus you shall acquire an external knowledge. since you found it impossible to do anything with the thought of a free thing as a thing dependent upon blind that thought to facilitate the confreedom with a thing. results knowledge. and such a fixed being you posit necessarily when ^ you posit a thing a nature thereof.nd . Are you now going to call such a steel spring free ? I do not believe it. together with this unthe changeable permanency of the thing. and at another time from an unknown reason cedes to the pressure. instead of facilitating the connection freedom with the spring. What by progressive conclusions from an acquired That which I ask for. it self to resist. ^youare sure that the spring is thus determined. let me ask you. we shall commence with nection of chance. namely. of : Therefore.

— — . since the thing is itself its own nature. Express- ing it subjectively. Now. through what it is you require in order to think freedom. and determines from a"being its own nature. all being which flows itself from a bein» is a necessary being. and you will surely not say that the thing exists in advance of its own nature. which you surely can think. fixed and unchangeable is the nature of the thing. and there is a ste ady series of bein g. When you think the one. discovered the groimd absolutely impossible to why you think freedom in our Expressing it present case. We it have. and not a product of freedom .nature under certain c onditions). deny find freedom to the object of such thinking. you necessarily think the other also. and this which you and through which you . But having once posited the thing) to this nature of the thing. therefore. I you will now be able to conclude. we only hav e Jjhinking Hence. From this opposition. contempMim when it is~always tied down. and its nature is the thing itself. the conception of a necessary being arises in us through the connecting of one being with another being. and t his progression of your thinking desCTi5e s "your Expressing the same subjectively. You require a being which shall have. besides being. and in all similar cases. is always merely not a moment in the passively observing.40 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. objectively. which does not depend upon the thing. ( of you proceed in your thinking the nature of anot^r ^ei^Tof the inanifestation of this . a certain condition a change will result in the thing. For that which you have posited as. a being which you may be able to think as product of freedom must proceed from a thinking. .. series might become is self -productive condition of your thinking call precisely that the thinking of al l necessity. not no ground for such you cannot think at all but a ground in jomething which is not again a being. and always have thought. Let us see whether this presupposition makes freedom comprehensible.

but determines. Something which itself. is in advance of that real being. is is 41 not determined. that only the intelligence can be thought as free. and that the intelligence becomes free only through thus seizing itself as intelligence. assertion is. Somebody might object that in our own argumentation (in the preceding chapter) the absoluteness is presupposed and that the reflection which is now to achieve such great wonders is evidently itself conditioned through that absoluteness. provide d we are but able to _t hink thinking itself. To be posited as free. or of the system of its determinedness. and as a being. But the intelligence. of the intelligence. Is this active determining comprehensible when presupposed as occurring through a thinking? Undoubtedly. The reason why we could not derive freedom from a being was because the conception of a being involved that of a fixed permanency. with its conception of real being. having it for its object. permanent being does not hinder us when we derive freedom from thinking. being. A thing cannot be thought as determining itself precisely because it has not being in advance of its nature. (It must not only be not determined through an external other. and do not again make a thing ou t of our conception.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. the conception. But such to be called fOTge. is to le before it is determined it is have an existence independent of its determinedness. since thinking is not posited as something permanent. Our therefore. etc. remaining. something must be posited as determining itself. and only as agility. The conception of a certain being precedes that and the latter is dependent upon the former. .) What does that Itself twofold. namely. but also not through its own nature.. Such was your assertion. but as agility [ Agilitat = producing activity]. to mean ? The It doubtless involves the f re e thought of a . for only thus does it subsume its being under something which is higher than all being. and the former contains the ground of the latter.

according to Kant. or from the acting of the intelligence in general. as a power to have causality through the mere conception. explanation. 'by which answer a genetieal conception of freedom wouM have been generated before our very eyes. to absolute activity as itself. The absolutely beginning condition is not connected with nothingness— for the finite rational in effecting a better insight into freedom. Freedom is. from the contemplating and thinking. and to be able to walk. an intelligence is necessarily results from.42 is THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. the possibility of and free. B. and to start from that which is higher than all being. being necessarily thinks through mediation and connection. Now this we have just done. path of the science of knowledge.. Explanatory. The same path. to be able to abstract from all being. unless an object in general and this particular object are presupposed. and yet it This is an excellent nominal little seems to have been of value For that explanation did not answer the higher question _how_ a CMidition or b eing could h ave an absolute beginning or jiow such an absolute beginning could be thought. posits itself as free. it certainly necessary to walk.e. neither reflection in general nor this particular reflec- tion. which alone leads to the right end in the theoretical philosophy in . The Ego. — ' In order is to establish the conception in this manner. But it begins with thinking itself not with a being but \nt!iThmJ^ing. how this absoluteness itself is required general. in contemplating that tendency i. : . the power to absolutely begin a condition or being. To this objection we reply that it will appear hereafter for. as such (or from the fact). an intelligence in and that hence the above proposition may also be reversed as follows: only that which is free can be thought as an intelligence.

to which an actuality can. is 43 the practical philosophy . the Ego must first make completely." The first view of this proposition. after all. and posits itself as a faculty or power. as merely a conception. as is the intelligence. and when the intelligence is the mere passive observer of the external world. when the conception becomes cognition. activity. in thinking. Whatsoever the Ego is to become.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY.e. although there is not in it the least datum to show what sort of an actuality it will be. impulse. in contemplating be demonstrated —as each one must discover himself as and as cannot to anybody — absolutely determining intelligence. tendency to have absolute activity comes For the under the seen. itself through a tendency. however finely conceived. . be strictly proven. itself to Ego will be in the future \ it self be through the conceptionTand whatsoever the it most surely will ha ve mad e through the conception. however finely conceived. also such an inclination. originally depends. path which also alone makes This likewise makes more : clear our previous expression " The Ego posits itself as independent. Hence the Ego is its_ in every respect. is not possible in that power of activity which is under the control of the intelligence. in opposition to aU permanent and posited being. can. hence it is capable of no determination throu gh its nature or essence. be connected as to its ground. namely. But the Ego only This must. we have But a mere 'pure. authority of the intelligence. i. in so far as it is under of Hence such control. For all that the Ego can be in actuality.. as such. which active power is therefore to be thought as a mere pure faculty. explaining being.possible. own ground and absolutely postfe itsdf even in a practical significance. or inclination in it. upon the conception. "The Ego gathers up all that it originally is and originally it is nothing unless free — —in the contemplation and conception of itself" we have already explained But that proposition involves something more.

since and an intelligence unconditionally contemplating itself. conscious of To its see in what manner the Ego becomes . not at all whether such a consciousness does occur in the Ego. we proceeded by absolutely upon the objective Ego under undoubtedly justified in so doing. — this consciousness may be constituted in its form ? We obtain the required insight best by causing this consciousness to form itself under our very eyes. According to the principle upon which our argument. therefore. but simply how . which has no similarity to a tendency at all. its character The question is. therefore. In our previous chapter postulating a reflection consideration. the Ego is necessarily intelligence. were mere spectators of the original Ego. the philosophers. in the preceding chapter. such tendency. was based. of a self-conteWlation and that whichWe established on the part was . We.CHAPTER III. tendency to absolute self-activity as i"«»i«^i«M«i«^Bi^fc_ Explanatory. haVe this character preceding chapter. It must have appeared strange to the reader that. in the we deduced from a reflection of a tendency a consciousness. Hence shall it is our Peoblem. The Ego must. Now the Ego is to be originally a tendency. for %tself must become conscious of this. the Ego is only that as which it posits itself. and that we thus appeared to lose sight utterly of the real character of this tendency.

The posited tendency necessarily manifests as itself impulse in the whoU ^ Ego. chapter. A. the a reflection.e. or impulse. . without But as mere tendency it is impulse. Eemaeks. the consciousness of a mere faculty. namely. and ineradicable. as soon as the external conditions are given precisely as was the case with the steel spring. activity.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. real internal explanatorv ground of an actual selfi. but on no account of a tendency. our philosophizing. what has The tendency is posited as the essence of the Ego. Now an impulse which is posited as essential. and found to be insufficient. to the Ego. For the mere postulate of a reflection results in nothing further than what we have already discovered. impels. manifestation: both expressions express precisely the same. as it does. of resulting. in which the impulse is. but we cannot well take our starting-point from it. as and cannot be abstracted from. permanent. and hence belongs. To state we can — — the distinction briefly. the reflection of our previous chapter was absolutely possible. which grounding we now undertake through Solution. not our 45 own thought but was object of our reflection itself a thought of the Ego. The act will follow . or power. then the working of the impulse is comprehensible easily enough it will effect a self-activity .. Now. In the present chapter we likewise calculate provided solve our problem at all upon arriving at such an original reflection of the Ego.. A particular proof of this assertion is not needed. from a mere analysis first been established in our such. merely if we think the Ego. but the one of the present chapter must first be grounded in its possibility. and this is its cancelling the Ego. objectively .

but. but at present this repeated separation which we have composed already would systematical progression requires serve us nothing.46 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. in the absolute union of being with consciousness. think the Ego thus merely objectively in and will be forced to think it in a conception thus hereafter. as we have established it in the preceding chapter. the one after the other. the whoh Ego. and of consciousness with being. use of above. Now. and the impuls e will be accompanied by a yearning. A further determine our last result as that we should we found it. from the impulse. no thinking whatsoever is possible. but an identity. and we mention the lormer ( twofold only to designate the empty spot of this identity. the intelligence. Nay. we may even add. with the same necessity — if the conditions are but given — ^with which the deed resulted from the impulse. . for in order to think himself must make the very disHndipn between the suhjeciive arui objectiv e. ? Of course not. like the effect from its cause. or the deed by a resolvQ. Perhaps it may be well to state this The Egoness. that one should ask. am I because / think myself. is which' not to be made in that conception of this distinction. and only tend to distract our attention. Hence it is very natural. can anyone think that this identity as himself he. "is the essence of the Ego. significance of the term. and through this very thinking of Without we always think the one as dependent upon the other. Hence we never think both (the subjective and the objective) together. indeed. and hence we must not think the Ego here objectively. to be sure. which we made still clearer. Neither the subjective nor the objective. in thought. This is the objectively and subjectively together. then. consists in the absolute identity of th e subjective and objective. identity. but always one after the other. hut in such a manner as to have it dependent upon the objective qualitativeness. "We may relation to the impulse.

and since its thinking is not determinable through anything external. For the Ego in reflecting upon itself. j points out an empty place in our investigation which we shallcaJlJL^The Ego cannot. in the main. comprehend it self it is absolutely = X. has placed its power of activity under the authority of its thinking. ns itself^ even in so far as it is reflecting or subjective. and ^ changed through the reflection into an and since the Ego consists. . has. particularly as even that this impulse is impulse. of both. in its subjectivity. but ^subject. we can easily remove that doubt now.. . . . if separated from the jio absolute self-activity substance itself. but absolutely one and you are this unthinkable one absolutely because you . . you are not twofold in any manner. in itself. Now this whole Jigo. which is permissible here. but only through itself. But how this impulse can manifest itself in the whole Ego cannot be determined here. This conception. by a separation of the Ego. which problem itself. is an impulse which impels it Should anyone still doubt our authority to relate this impulse to the whole Ego. '^are_it. is only to be described as the but which can never be thought . and thought as ground of its activity. . a tendencY_ which. THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. for the reason stated. it becorhes an impulse directed upon the whole Ego. posits that which is involved in its objectivi ty. 47 or do I think myself because I am ? But such a "because and such a therefore does not occur here at all. Now the obj^gctive doubtless contains an impuls e. in s6 far as it is neither subject nor object. ' of a thinking. You are' neither of the two because you are the other.nDQiLJth e subjective upon which it is directed is absolutely incomprehensible. We can only say negatively that it cannot manifest itsel f with necessity and mechanical action^ since the Ego.object. according to the preceding chapter.

. whereas in representation this conscious- ness form of the do not produce the represented. . it is true. (For in so far as the objective is considered as dependent upon the will. and even the distinctions specified here have no meaning. objective Ego is determined. any action of its own. the point of union of both is the This can be in the made clearer as follows: — The . Feeling in general is the mere immediate relation of the ohiective.e. merely passive. but I certainly produce the whereas in feeling I produce act of representing it neither the felt nor the act of feeling. impulse there does not result a feeling Eemakks. unless made clear by each one to himself certainly arises in regard to the representation. and precisely like the mere thing But since the Ego is never merely objective the subjective always being united with it in the same one and undivided essence. or changed without . Prom this manifestation of th e . though only in so far as the subas appears from our above description — jective is considered as dependent upon the objective. I certainly . there necessaiily arises with the change of the objective a change of the subjective.48 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. when the representation is directed upon any actual external being. in the Ego. i. and hence a consciousness of that change in the objective but this consciousness appears as if it were produced in the same mechanical manner as that in which the change is proThis is the peculiar characteristic of feeling. moved. la^jepresentation. to the subjective in the same^ "ofits being to its consciousness is . B.. but in feeling there is no consciousness on the part of the subject of any inte rnal agility. the representing subject is also. In duced. It is impossible to determine these distinctions more closely through conception. and the power of feeling — the true point of union of both. representation.) subjective.

But at present we any determinateness of the merely but of the whole Ego = X. and Now since it is the Ego whereof we speak. but that no . it brings forth thoughts. or into which this one necessarily separates. is incomprehensible to us. and have been determined as thus absolutely one. according to our description. we can only begin with one of the two parts into which we necessarily separate. absolute agility is not capable of its any determination whatever E . ? from this determinateness presupposes. the latter dependence has not been posited at all as possible. that. Hence C. In the present case. but rather as absolutely one. 49 through contemplation of himself in these various conSuch descriptions as we have attempted here are not to replace but merely to guide self-contemplation. ditions. What this one may be. begin with the The Ego as intelligence. and that we shall moreover deduce also feeling from are not speaking of objective. as we have seen. Can a feeling re sult this determinateness. it will be most proper to therefore. and what may be its determinateness. for both the subjective and objective are not to' be considered as distinct. It is true that we shall soon m eet a determinateness of the merely objecttve Ego througlTtEe impulse of absoTiTtp. as . partly the dependence of the merely objective upon an partly the dependence of the subjective upon the objective. in so far of the as its objective is to stand under the authority subjective. the intelligence is A determination of a thought. From the manifestation of the impulse there results ~~ necessarily a thought^ (It has been previously stated that the intelligence. self-activity.: THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. But in order to comprehend at least something. subjective. A feeling impulse. is immediately determined through the impulse.

it in regard to its form. it follows correctly from the established premises. but absolutely through itself alone.) to ments may well go I. which absolutely commences with a thought. Strange as such an assertion may appear at the first glance. . Neither case thought is occui's in our present instance. Hence and determined through anything outside of neither through a being nor through a thinking. — it ddermin ed thinking. It must be carefully noted therefore. For the fact its . itself all is not conditioned by any other thinking. and connected with nothing else. because in this thought the Ego thinks itself. does simply because the thing is A in which case the thought results in our consciousness as as it_is — or as deterOur mined through another thinking. in which latter case we say it results from this other thinking. We therefore proceed and in doing so first investigate determine this thought. to be a contradiction of that previous but it will be apparent hereafter that both statetogether. because we do not think an objective determinateness. when the thought is to be an actual object.50 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. but of the whole Ego and it is not determined through a thinking. such as we reflect upon at present/appears' either "'as determined through a being namely. thinking of the Ego. . this thought is not conditioned it. not even that of the objective Ego. but rather conditions other thinking. it. but not with derived predicates and because this . not determined through a being. It is a first immediate thinking. and is rnost important as well for the particular philosophical science which we establish here. Through it. as for the whole transcendental philosophy. and we then attain an insight into a series of rational grounds. particularly in this respect. and thinks itself in its fundamental essence. thinking is rendered absolute in regard to form we obtain a series. which itself is grounded in nothing besides. thoughts can be brought forth in The present state- ment might seem result.

which begins with it. to attempt a further explana- tion and deduction of the consciousness of our duties (for as such the described thought will soon be). purely as such. in the Ego is : and that the opposite posite d as wherein the thought it. to as. a determined consciousness. It is.. for thinking is precisely this immediate consciousness of the present case of since and in the determinateness of ourself as intelligence An an intelligence. the . lest some should be induced. ^bec ause it_is it is also absolute in regard it is thought as thus thnugl^fc^ This thought simpl y particular impor- is of tance for our present science. though we shalTalso have to recur is to it hereafter. it is called very properly intellectual contemplation. as that o f lifeless things. show itself to which attempt is is futile. dependent is grounded in branch of this first relation. but rather a_consfiiQa^ess. moreover. as has occurred frequently. this deduction phjlospphy . but rather upon the only one intelligence immediately as such. and is this thought. has no influence upon common consciousness. THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. upon the__beingj is and must be derived from the business of another (To establish. that 51 we have jast now in our philosophizing grounded an impulse. That we think this thinking we know immediately . and moreover principle of our being tute7 and in consists. is immediate consciousness external being by called is contemplation and ) the contemplation here not directed upon an- means of feeling. we have proven. and also derogatory to the dignity and absoluteness of the moral law. in indeed. involving an impossibility. indeed.) But the described thought to its content. It is also be remarked that this relation of the is subjective to the objective trulv^the oripinal relation relation . For the essence o f our being is not a material permanent. . it In short. not a consciousness of the established grounds. through it we absolutely constiour being. this thinking is the absolut e .

. at a necessary thinking. likewise. we shall now Let us first think the subjective determined through of objectivity is an absolu te Applying this to the subjective. thought : that the intelligence jnust give to . and condition the described objective. We now proceed to describe that thought in regard to its content. But the whole Ego cannot b e comprehended. or. Without this actual contemplation. a law of thinking Now. . and it is this determinateness wEicE" is thought "in our present thinking. and hence. originally which and actually occurs in every man The without the freedom of philosophical abstraction. with utter abstraction from its determinateness. . and attempt to do so. we arrive at a permanent unchangeable. to produce.52 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. intellectual contemplation. which the transcendental philosopher requires of all students. not immediately a determinateness of the whole Ego. unchangeable permanency . in other words. This is to determine. there results as content of the deduced the objective. is originally determined 2. but think the objective determined through the subjective is the positing of an absolute completely undetermined power of freedom. itself an irrevocable law to realize absolute self-activity Let us subjective. the thought just now established (that the intelligence must propound to itself a law to realize . the determiniQg impulse is an impu lse to absolute selfactivity Hence. The whole Ego is determined through the impulse to have absolute self-activity. The essence . as now The described in our previous chapter. the philosophical contemplation were not possible our thinking originally and not abstract. In other words. is the mere con- templation of the inner absolute spontaneity of the same. is the mere form of this actual intellectual contemplation. It is only through reciprocal determi natian of the subjective and the objective that we can approximate the determinateness of the whole Ego.

But each is to is reciprocally to determine the other. absolute self-activity). indeed. itself occurs necessarily. be observed that this thought grounds and hence must retain the is character of an impulse. Strictly speaking. since in that case thinl^ing w ould c ^^se to be thinkin g (there being no freedom) and the subjective would change into an objec. the described self -legislation of the only when the Ego thinks as free it itself as free. Epo occurs but if the Ego thinks Thus. Such necessity is not absolute necessity. therefore. (This is very important. That say. since all thinking from a free thinking of our self. the admitted difficulty of conceiving a determinateness . which character postulate.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. that we are to determine ourselves through conceptions with consciousness. tive . such still is altogether the character of necessity in thinking. forced to be described. is 53 possible only on condition that the Ego thinks itself as free. this thought is not a particular thought.) It is the same with all other necessity of thinking. and this thinking is the very consciousness of our original tendency to absolute self-activity which for. anything. that of a The content of the deduced thought may. then. but merely the necessary manner of thinking our freedom. starts is not possible. and to determine ourselves thus according to the conception of absolute self-activity. then we must necessarily think in it is merely If we think this or that manner It itself is . as follows: We are think. which. but conditioned by our thinking anything at all. but it occurs necessarily only as thinking thinks with absolute freedom that very freedom. we were looking . in short. therefore. to upon an impulse. of the thinking is likewise removed for the described thought does not occur nece s sarily.

is The chief point of our deduction may as follows: The rational being. Its real object was.CHAPTER Strictly speaking. It is . also. by manifold and freer views. But such a deduction involves many other advantages Apart from the fact that we comprehend besides. the darkness which may still rest upon our own deduction. of systematic development. it is all the more important to dissi- pate completely. it is likewise to be considered that the comprehensibility which this deduction throws upon the categorical imperative of Kant will remove from it the appearance of an occult. quality which it has hitherto borne (though without the positive fault of Kant). and that hence we can attain complete insight into the morality of our being only through such a deduction. o r to manner from the system show that the supposition of a rational being involves necessarily also the supposition Such a deduction that such a being thinks this thought. nothing truly and well which we do not see arise from its grounds. which science is itself its own end. our deduction that IV. and will thus be the surest means to annihilate the dark region which that part of Kant's system to left open hitherto for various visionary theories in. is absolutely required for the science of a system of reason. to deduce the thought we are to act in a certain of reason in general. as our readers know. but which we could not thus dissipate well so long as we were confined by the chains I. its considered absolutely S5d independently ow n ground. be also stated as such. is now ended. take refuge Hence.

The rational being is itself to bring forth whatsoever it is actually to be. therefore.lf hv own is activity. or faculty. we have this . In your present conception of a rational being you must. indeed. for the very sake of discovering a : In one word in your conception of a rational being you have thought precisely what we have deduced in our second chapter under the nanle of freedom. .e. does each reader thin k himself Now tell uie.. .origina lly (i. But now tell m£ for upon this consideration everything depends how much have you gained in making your conception of a rational being conceivable to you ? When you thought the described characteristics. moreover. what is it really that you do think when you think what I have required of you? For I do not ask you to go beyond that conception. did you think self-determination as essence of the E go ? By no means you merely thought an empty undetermined power of self-determining. as. but does not make it actual. some sort of an existence. This thought merely makes possible the thought of an independent seLf-debermined being. . as which you certainly thought it first. nor can it be proven. have thought it as an intelligence. since you presuppose it as intelligence of being. absolutely demanded that each rational being should itself. In shown already in the previous chapter. is something to which you merely can connect an actual being as to ground — — . This proposition not proven. in advance of all actual (objective) being thereof. For a power. therefore. You must. but merely to make it clear to yourself by pure analysis. Hence you must ascribe to the rational being. have ascribed to this intelligence the power of producing a being through its mere conception. <i<i lutely nothing without any activity on its part) absoand whatsoever it is to he it must first'' its make It is it^^p. This sort of existing can be none other than an existence as intelli- gence in and with conceptions. thus find and accept manner.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY.

or an interrupted self-determination. in- and the law to uninterruptedly and you cannot think your conception without thinking these both united. (on the part of the intelligence) of self-determination. It was not in this manner that you thought the selfdetermination of the rational being in the conception I have asked you to analyse. which is a contradiction. will result from it. you must. have thought it in such a manner as to make . nifies to posit What it sig- something as essential has been sufficiently explained. for . to posit something as necessarily and inseparably involved in the conception as posited together with the positing of the conception. The conleast ception of a power. gence determinateness was a determinateness of the free intellibut such a determinateness is a necessary thinking . would not constitute the essence. namely. in which case you would receive either no self-determination. have possibly thought. ground — if such actual being were. therefore. then you posited self-determination and freedom as necessity.determining might never be used. and thus it will appear— since you philosophize according to volves both the power . Your .. or faculty. or might be used only at times.S6 its THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.possible at the same time the thinking of freedom.e. and which you cannot. which would not be permanent. as the rule by which the intelligence must necessarily resolve freely to determine itself. But if you thought self-determination as the necessary essence of reason. but as categorical. involves not the indication that an actuality. You did not posit that independence of the rational being as problematical. i. and what sort of an actuality. therefore. Your conception exercise this power. Thus it has appeared to you who freely resolved to philosophize. externally given to you derive such actual being but you it are not compelled to its from as ground. Perhaps that power of self. or as the essence of reason. therefore. In nevertheless thinking this permanent character of reason. of self-determination. instance.

My subjective. but both are to it is But finite. and more especially to that rational being which we have here posited as representative of reason in general. nor my subjective dependent upon my objective. since I can only think objects. results in the conception of freedom as of a power of self-determination. also. which thought. is an immediate first and absolute thought. I think myself as subject and object. and the system of thinking whereof we are about to itself establish. Let the rational being think itself free in the above merely formal significance of the word. Hence. Or. it is If the Ego thinks self-determined that and this —which its is we start — then — and it from this presupposition necessarily thinks itself as free. and then separate a subject from them. ISTow. This the significance of our deduction. results in the thought of the necessity to determine myself through my freedom only in accordance with the conception of self-determination. is of chief importance to us of here— it thinlcs freedom under the law self-determination. I unite both by reciprocally determining each through the other according to the law of causality. My objective. determined through my subjective. its freedom becomes limited or determined for it. Now. under the name of the original Ego. not my objective dependent upon my subjective. since it is the thought of my original determinateness. limited or determined for . are other ways of showing the necessity of our deduced thought.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. let me express it from the profoundest depth of the system of transcendental philosophy. determined through my objective. I am identity of subject and object = X. I cannot think such an X. But what is a determinateness of freedom as such ? We have just seen it. Hence. universal laws of 57 reason— to every rational being. neither is to be thought alone. and in the most decided and comprehensive manner. But there and each object of its reflection is it through the mere reflection.

Nevertheless. Freedom does not follow from the law." ( according to the law of reciprocal determina- indeed. free. derives the conviction of our freedom from the This to be understood consciousness of the moral law. their think it as one by reciprocally determining the one through the other in stated determinateness. therethe faith in the objective validity of this appearance which is to be deduced from the consciousness of the . which practical reason is the firm resolve to recognise practical reason as the superior. nor does the law follow from freedom. Both are not two thoughts. and is on no account derived Irom another thought.e. One is is i. by thinking free and the law as determining . reason why we should not attempt any further explanation. each of which were thought apart from the other. as follows: The appearance of freedom is an immedia te fact of consciousness. I appear to myself as being fore. Kant. It is a complete . in various is places. but both are one and the same thought. I am free freedom is the only true being.. Now. and the ground of all other being— is a very different proposition Tfom — the one. but only a practical. I be thought as absolutely one. and the moral law as the true and final destination of our being.S8 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. synthesis tion). Por the proposition. and thus to turn it into a mere seeming. someone might want to explain this appearance again. and when the one thought the other is also thought. jreedom. It is. as. and announces itself to be a law for your freedom. as is certainly possible to a free imagination. as determining the law. there is no theoretical. was stated above. by not going beyond this appearance of freedom in us. Now.biTiV this law YOU are forced to think yourself as free since it presupposes your freedom. and not to turn this moral law again into a mere show. you are forced your freedom as acting under a law: and when ynn t. to thin k "When you think yourself as free.t he not thought without the other. that appearance becomes reality for us.

and I must not hold it for a seeming. oppression of others. and we must think freedom also 'thus if we want to think it correctly. The Ego is not to be deduced from the N'on Ep. This faith is.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. in opposition to being. un all determinable through anything other than Hence. but containing in itself alone the ground of its determinedness. which is to embrace both worlds. hence. 2. all it is from the Ego that philosophy must proceed. It has been shown that we can think freedom as standing under no law. 59 moral law. Hence. reality which being gains thereby does not detract from our true destination. the free intelligence might. The takes its starting-point. and Life'^nor from death: but the Non Ego on the contrary. We shall show how these same views proceed from our deduction.o. and since thinking it is absolutely itself. The deduced thought has been called a law. and the manner in which we think in this thought has been called a. tor instance. Doing cannot be deduced from being since the former would thereby be changed into a seemmg. It has been called by Kant a cateuorical imperativ e. —and might follow these I maxims uninterruptedly and without excep-| full tion. on the contrary. . proposs_to itself very different rul es maxims — as. . in we can think freedom possible manners — —under a or being determinable iixed rule. but is rather a gain for it. the point of union of both worlds. . etc. ol egotism. and. and determine itself according to that rule. is to be deduced from the Ego. although with freedom. f or i nstance. aU being is to be derived from doing. and prepares a firm basis for it. and common sense has found itself surprisingly well expressed in these designations. I am truly free is the first article of faith which opens us a path and transition into the world of reason. the conception of which rule only the free intelligence can produce in Thus itself. at the same time. since its essence consists in thinking. shaU-ing. and from it our system. laziness.

is not mechanically necessary." is an absolute and categorical shalling and that rule is a rule valid without exception. which freedom does not involve the thought of any . . or should be . and consider the Ego merely as free intelligence. the real acting always remains cbnflict ing with it. this " ought " or " should. Now. whereas the opposite acting improper. but merely determined in the necessary conception -thereof. having nn external p-round whatever. ' inclination. an absolutely first unconditioned conception. Hence. How. because. 3. Firstly. we cannot yet explain it. or self-legislation. the conception of such a rule is.: a certain anting ought to is 'pmne. The deduced thought has also called autonomy. Hence this shalling. since we relate it altogether to absolute freedom at present. In this manner the intelligence would think a certain acting as agreeing with its rule. 'clepenaent upon absolute freedom. since the acting of the intelligence is not aotwally determined. such an acting is not to occur "from this or thai reason. when we presuppose the law in general. fcio tar as tnis absolute siialling is. chought as involving an imperative command. is this necessity in the mere conception to be designated. since its validity is subjected to no possible con dition. but it is simply to occur because it ought to occur. and a ^nthpr actincr as True. It shall [or ought to'\ be absolutely because it shall be. as we have shown above. not because something else is willed or ought to be. but having it s ground in itself.6o THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. or by actively making .rj is as it is be. It been very properly may be called so the thought of in a threefold significance. and should hot be. since it is no actual It seems to me that it cannot be better necessity? designated than thus. suppressing all othe r inclination adv erse to it. then. the law becomes a law in aenerai for the reflecting Ego only by the Ego / upon and arbitrarily submitting itself to that law. moreover.

nothing is determination of the will through the law is taken from out of ourselves and all heteronomy all borrowing of grounds of determination from something external is . seems to me that it also appears very clearly how reason can be yractica U and how this practical reason is incomprehensible thing as which viewed. i.e. as a doing. otherwise than as is finite. and exists. it At the present place. Hence the Ego places itself in whole relation of a lawfulness. by no means the curious and it has sometimes been indeed. through its free judgment. Thirdly.determining. but rather Eeason contemplates itself is it is this reason can and does do simply because itself reason. so far as the content o f the law is demanded but absolute independence. . simple doing.w ^may require in that case Thus the whole moral existence of the intelligent being is nothing but an uninter. The deduced thought does not force as self. and reason remains in its every respect own law. 6i that law the irrevocable principle of all its actions and becomes a law in a 'particular case only by the F. and when this self-legislation ceases th ere immorality begins. ^Becbndly. but rather the very same reason which theoretical reason. Hence the material concerned. the necessary manner this of thinking freely. which would be absolutely incomprehensible. b ecause the whole conception of our necessary subjection to a law arises solely through an absolutely reflection of the freei Ego upon itself in its true essence. — — absolutely in violation of the law. rupted self-legislatinp or self-determining of the same. . and would cancel the conception of an intelligence . absolute self-determination. because. but reason cannot contemplate wba t it is hence. and is. we all recognize as For r eason a doing is not a thing which — pure. but it is rather the condition.. Now reason aud . not at all a second reason. THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY.P-n discovering.. itself upon us immediately. what the la.

or by some requirement of our nature. that reason absolutely out of itself and through itself proposes a purpose to itself. and in so far. In a certain sense of the word. in so far as reason is means for realizing some external purpose. which ^^^ to be practical. whatsoever reason represents becomes for reason. which cannot put itself in motion until objects are given to it from without. in Thus reason determines itself its activity. it has always been conceded that reason is practical. determined and finite.62 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. a shalling. and to determine an activity is an equivalent term with - contemplation it involves. A. namely. and will always find it incomprehensible how reason can be absolutely practical. since he cannot cease to believe that the conditions of — the executability of a law must be recognized before the law can be accepted. But we assert here. Reason determines through it self its own acting. either proposed^ by _jp4ir free arbitrariness. but in an ought. itself and througn nothing outside does not recognize this absoluteness —and Whosoever each one can only find it in himself through contemplation will always regard reason as merely a faculty of argumentation. The practical dignity of reason is its own absoluteness. in so hence also its it. Eemakks. But in this sense of the word. The views which present themselves from this standpoint in regard to a whole system of philosophy are of a manifold character. and I cannot refrain from mentioning at least one. . its determinability solely throug h of itself. reason is merel y technical practica l. reason is ahsolutely practical . doing becomes a determined doing through this very representing self ^ and the law of determinedness But the determinedness of a pure doing does not result in a be i np.

Now. or the absolute Only on this presupposition is the conception admitted. but it does. because kw addresses itself ^'^^^' t6 its freedom. reason. all Thus in our theory parts join together. of a philosophy rational. the acting in Now.. or all denials of the possibility of a system of reason. consciousness .thinking being. recognized as acting even on the standpoint of willinci common . and the necessary presupposition is Either the results arrived at. to that which shall be. it is In a science of morality chiefly related to the so-caUed acting which is accompanied by the consciousness of freedom. is active but not freely active Hence the whole system of reason as wellTn regard .— THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. and hence ^reason necessarily can comp letely know itself In other words: an analysis of the whole procedure of reason. All doubts. discovered to be an acting only from the transcendental point of view. in contemplating that law._ necessarily ol}R_prvp- ^^i"^ it proposes to itself as a . therefore. because it is self -contemplating 63 or finit e. likewise. Beason ought that which it certainly to be able to dissolve has composed according to its own laws by those same laws. and that which is postulated as being in consequence of this shall. reason does not _ n ecessarily observe the law which that it proposes to itself as a moral being. to and working But this proposition holds. and which is. in other words. are grounded on the presupposition of an heteronomy. as necessarv through Beason itself.i^ prAdptpymined. This proposi- tion has a double significance. or a complete system of . is possible. possible only on condition of all philosophy must be autonomy of reason must be abandoned. is good in regard to that acting which thinking. or on the presupposition . because the intelligence. since the acting of reason VR ?* may be regarded in a twofold manner. namely. as also in regard to that which is found as immediately T^oinrf—.

of ' The-content thought is. ratner. with which not the least particle of feeling or sensuous contemplation can be it is mixed up. -&• C. that the free being shall determine its freedom by a law. since the immediate conception which the pure intelligence itself has of it is is as such.^?'s^and dbsolate thought. the. It is a thought. It is a necessary thought. 64 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. pure though t. The principle of morality is the necessary thought ought to determine its freedom without exception in accordance with the conception of of the intelligence that it self-determination. and that this law shall be none other than the conception of absolute self-ddefmination (absoliite undeterminability through anything this externaij'. and not a feeling or a contemplation. and. that the free being shall act in a certain manner. finally. that this "it law shall be vali d without any exception. since the form in which the freedom of the intelligence It is thought. by something outside of But such a presupposition is absolutely irrational. moreover. it does not ground upon any other thought as its sequence or as conditioned by that other thought. in its tendency to " self-determination!! . because involves the original determinedness of the free being. for the shalling is the the thought of the thinking expression of a determinedness of freedom. B.. itself although this thought grounds It is a upon the intellectual contemplation of the absolute activity of the intelligence. The content of this thought is. that reason can be determined itself. since thi s self-determination can be thougnt as actual only under certain conditions not yet established. In our tion that the essenc e of the argument we proceeded from the presupposiEgo consists in its self-deter- mination or. W? . is a contradiction of reason. for since it is itself itself.

the following: We known do not assert that on the standpoint common is consciousness we become conscious of the connection of its the deduced thought with consciousness belo ngs to grounds. for our not dogmatic. we started from an objective being of the Ego. whilst partly subordinates its__ freedom to the law of self-determination. These two self- conceptions are involved in the conception of the determination of the Ego. itself. of the assertions of reason an original connecting" with each other. We do not claim t o evolve a thinking from a being in itself. But is the Egoi n ? itself objective. Our claim. for the Ego is only for and in the knowledge of the Ego. in so positing i n the above signifiit cance of this word.same. under this presupposition. it is in subject-object = X. and self-determining because relation posits itself as such. or without relation to a consciousness Was in our not the Ego whereof first we commenced speaking related chapter related to a consciousness? doubtless it to our own philosophizing consciousness. or the conception of self-deter- mination involves these conceptions: both are one and the. it posits itself partly as free. 65 have investigated how. and is possible only from the transcendental point of view. itself The rational being posits it is it as absolutely selfit is determining this because self-determining. the Ego must think itsfilL. occurs Nor do facts we assert that this thought amongst the F .— THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. for only thus do transcendental we get a correct view from the of our deduction. For it well that the insight into the grounds of facts of philosophy. on the contrary. Hence. moreover. Certain objections and misunderstandings of may render necessary. But us relate it We now let to the consciousness of the original Ego. but transcend entaUy idealistic. D. is to establish an standpoint deduction is original system of thinking itself. Now.

it will be easy enough to show him. as"^r7act of his con scioiisne ss. he can do so. and it_cannot be proven to him.66 of THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. we feel constrained to thi nk. there occurs only a determined common consciousness and never an abstract thinking as fact. this : We ^cts as free. Were he not a fool to get angry at the man. therefore. for instance. common words. so fajasji^jown_gerson concerned. but he does at the man who set the house on fire. perhaps. that he always does make use of that application. consciousness in the generality and . But if he denies the application of this moral law to separate free acts. at least in his judgment of the acts of others. con- It is scious of such a law for our freedom in general. that they ought to be do ne in a certain sam e manner . and this abstraction is order to be able to establish the problem only presupposes a free acting o^the intelligence. own because they are actuated. by passions and desires. and never become clearly conscious of their own freedom. N^o one. since a universal morality ^^cann ot exTst as immediate fact "of consciousness by lis very concep tion. if anyone^ (l enies the pr inciple of morality. at the time. When we think determined actual assert. but everyone will certainly discover the truth of this assertion in judging those acts of other persons which he considers to be free acts. abin straction wherein that other we have represented it we can become immediately or. unless he presupposes that the man could have acted and ought to have acted otherwise ? is . for all abstraction this generality. gets angry at the flame which consumes his house. that we arrive at only through philosophical abstraction undertaken in In definitely. Hence. Sonie~nien~may never be in a position to experience the truth of this our assertion in the thinking of their acts.

and hence think freedom. What does the reality^ or applicability of a principle. as it were.BOOK SECOND. or free beings. ? or of a conception. for through it The conception there arises in the manifold objects of my world a certain connection. It belongs to objects. by virtue of which I must proceed from the one to the other. for only on this condition do I occupy the standpoint of lawV I necessarily thiak my sphere as limited. The conception of Law has sphere of freedom (ie. Preliminary.e. To hunt up the : a conception. make by some examples. the world of our consciousness- —is deter those mined bv it in a certain respec t.. reality. of causality has reality. DEDUCTION OF THE REALITY AND APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. accompanying : the thinking of the other.f of heing free as objective. signifies. I. For in the infinite "o utside of me^ with whom I 67 come in contact through . because we think reality of them through in this conception. and from a known cause as to the effect the thinking of the one always. and can conclude from the effect as to the cause. therefore to inyestigate how and I will what manner this clearer objects are determined by it. conceptions through which we think it and there are certain characteristics in for us. signify And what reality does attach ? : in particular to our present conception of morality A conception has reality and applicability signifies our world — i.

to which I desire to call attention. in practice. The object of this concep- self-determination.^ This conception has been~3ec[uced as a determined form of thinking. through conception of a first the mutual limitation of our freedom. only the one is absolutely valid. as such. and is The conception is to be. without any foreign mixture. can . of mm-oM^j. does not relate to anything that has shown. have legal rights. . as its deduction is. i. of morality. Nevertheless. whereas I cannot have even the desire to deprive. does so. it But mediate. present we speak of the^raociple. that which arises in us when we think it. to treat men as if they had no rights. this conception. in practice. tion. there flows the absolutely valid theoretical propositions that every cause has its effect and that all men. an effect of its cause. that" conception I arnvea^tne community of free beings. I n other words whereas the theoretical conviction that men have rights does not compel physical acknowledgment the theoretical conviction that every effect has its cause : . but rather contradicts all determination through objects of experience. mainly. I _can not only Jiave the desire. From these two concep- tions. Hence. since it aptly prepares the solution of the question we have here chiefly at heart.. but to something that It proceeds purely from the essence of reason. and requires nothing but it pays no attention to experience. we cannot mean that the mere thinking of it realises results in the world of appearances. but likewise the power. when we speak of its reality. Hence. o r conception. Por. But in the determination of our world through these two conceptions of causality and legality there is a remarkable distinction.e. or as the only possible manner of thinking our freedom hence the consciousness of our freedom has certainly been already determined through .68 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. At this determination was only imvery possible that the conception of our freedom determines something else mediately.

. in. must always have an object of my activity. is the idea of what we shall do. I shall my external actions work so as constantly to draw nearer to that end. is this sphere of the sensuous world. That which we think in /virtue of the conception of morality. is. 69 only be an idea. and through what is it ? I determined I shall [ought to] do something signifies: I shall produce it externally. Let It is immediately clear that that act us explain this. of Moreover. since and hence I cannot produce what I am to produce out of nothing. then. a mere thought in us. since ideas cannot be taken hold of. The first question would." THE PRINCIPLE OP MORALITY. seem to be: what. therefore. all as it never but always merely shall he. since it proposes to me an infinite end. What.sensnmi s Whence this object. or the object determined by that conception. therefore. ? then. But I I am finite. is this idea? or. -/' 2. to which the requirements of the moral law in relate ledge. But we can do nothing I unless world.^ we have an object of our activity in the . The sensuous world must. me themselves How am I to arrive at a know- this sphere? and particularly at a systematic knowledge. this me to act in regard to each special object sphere? upon which I am to must be of such a nature that I can act upon it. of which we do not at all pretend that something in the external world corresponds to it. how am I to know how this law requires in. or that I must have the physical power to mould it. or. contain something which is to be the object of my activity in my endeavour to approach the realization of that infinite and unattaiaable idea. what is the manner in which to describe them? that we shall do In popular language: "You tell us something wjiat is it that we shall do ? .

wherein to look for that which is physically possible to our power of causality. and which we can never think. I can very well think a thing in another place in space than that which to it occupies hence I also can will change its place. For instance however. appears to us as accidental I cannot will to posit any thing out of . or. at the same time to fix the sphere and . the then choosing between the being or not being thereof. which conception exists in advance of the production of The free the effect. A thorough and complete philosophy has to show up the ground why some things thus appear to us as accidental and by doing this. Here we have immediately a limited sphere of the general sphere of sensuousness.. In making this investigation we may. for representation. ^o . the limits of this accidental.. is held . and can be so thought as either being or not being intelligence {i. At present we have not even proposed these questions to ourselves. as accidental in regard to its being).e. on the other hand. being acts as an intelligence. at least. i. For there is a large sphere in our world which appears to us as necessary. be guided by the remark that the characteristic of accidentalness is usually a proof that we think something as product of our freedom. of knowledge). when related to the being of the represented object. much less answered them. perhaps. according to a conception of the efifect to be produced. — — world". that we think all the products of o ur freedom as accidental (a proposition established and proved in the general science instance. Thus.. : space. and hence also not will since our willing is conditioned by our laws of thinking. THE SCIENCE OF rational ETHICS. since I cannot think it out of space . and is always preceded by a conAnother sphere of "Jjur ception except as necessary. by producing its conception of the end to be achieved. Hence the object of its activity must at least ' be of such a nature that it can be thought by the intelligence.e.

but in its content a product of the necessity of thinking. to signify. Hence the assumed proposition from the fundamental science of knowledge. for this contradicts the presupposition that they are regarded as things actually existing independently of us. freedom. ihat our our itself is a theoretical determining principle o f Let us explain but the Kon Ego. is Oar world is absolutely nothing posited solely to explain the limitedall its ness of the Ego. but also to those which thought as necessary. might well be. in its form.. Perhaps it may result. would be a determining principle of the opposite to the Ego. to^ 71 be accidental. THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. Certainly not that these objects are posited through the ideal activity of the intelligenc e in its function as productive power of imaginatio n. Now have the exclusive predicate of freedom. and hence receives determinations the Ego is to only through opposition to the Ego. that all that _is accidental in the world of appearances is to be in a certain sense deduce d from the conception of freedom. we judge. ISTor can it signify that they would have freedom "world . and this judgment we make because we find the representation to be. for this. this same predicate of the Ego. about this. If the assumed proposition should be confirmed. in a science of morality. this. although there were no representation of it. and does apply merely to the objects of our world which thought as accidental. a product of the absolute freedom of thinking. and to be regarded as the product of freedom Let us assume this proposition to be coniirmed. is signify? presupposed as well known not are are are posited as products of our actual practical causality in the sensuous world. therefore. perhaps. what can it . The being of the object. from an analogy. the external world and thus the conception of heing free would furnish a theoretical law of thinking which rules with necessity over the ideal activity of the intelligence. .

regarded practically. the sphere wherein it rules. It will have determined for and through itself. it cannot utter anything it now in its present quality its which This has not already uttered in previous quality. etc. law of freedom has first determined somewhat in general. we th en po sited in our science of rights. Treat your body only as a means of realizing your . ception of my : : The same says : proposition. theoretically the con freedom involves the pro-position All rne^ n T he same connentioTi. and now it also preserves this somewhat in that same qualitativeness thereof by means of our practical freedom which that law controls. assunied other rational beings like ourselve's. . practical then the law of freedom will but have continued. Hence the content of this law in its practical function might also be thus expressed act in conformity with thy cognitio n : of the original determinations (of the final ends) of tE e . If the assumption that a part of our external world is determined through freedom as theoretical principle should be confirmed. But in the present instance our investigation will have to go still further back. are tree. the theoretical proposition says: Jky free being.7-' THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. as a law addressed to consciousness. what it has itself as theoretical principle without conscious- commenced itself. body is instrument of my activity in the sensuous world. ness of the intelligence.. since we have now arrived at the very ultimate and primary of all reason. etc. Examples of this sort of a determination of we have already met we are free. external things. and ascrilDed to ourselves bodies moveable through o ur mere will. regarded as practical command. and if it should appear that this part constitutes the sphere of the objects of our duties.For instance. and has posited this somewhat as constituted in this or that manner. results in the command You shall treat every man as a Again.. and establish the proofs of these assertions still more exhaustively. an object Because objects of our world a s the mt)difiable.

and we should thus receive a complete and satisfactory system from one point. (Somebody might interrupt us here and say. it 73 as an Now if "all these assumptions should be"^ confirmed. ately conscious of the reality and of an actual sensation of the object (which previously we only thought in the con- ception of the end) as a given object in the sensuous world. hnt. What does the conception of when we believe to be conscious of our causality in the can this immediate consciousit not involve ? We are immediately conscious of our conception of an end. and at the same time are to approach the realiza- objects signify. and What what can . w hich as such furnishes itself its own content (the determined content of the law). become immediit were. The moral thus return into of us has this or that final end. Something outside own /orm.-]j f?Yr J^'eat end in itself. and we are to treat it thus because has this final end. principle. a physical power to mould and how does this conception arise in us ? Let us first ask: Of what are we really conscious 3.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. and the question which we proposed above: whence do we ^et the objects for the proposed activity. as We. sensuous world? ness involve. because it we are to treat it thus. and how are we to arrive at a knowledge of them? would be completely answered. freedom and self-determination. We should thus have arrived at the desired idea of that which at the substrate. moreover. we owght we to do. itself. The principle of morality would show itself to be principle of morality both a theoretical principle. that of a command. we are also conscious of our labours in the production which . in which tion of this idea. through which our whole soul is gathered together. or as object of an enjoyment.s itself its principle would and stand in reciprocal relation with itself. into one point. the would receive quite another significance yet than the one previously established. and a practical which as such f urnishe. or of our real willing of an absolute self-determining.

its realization it occurs between the resolve of the will and in the sensuous world. transcendentally spoken how may we come to assume this conscious harmony between a conception of an end and an actual object outside of us. that is not a particular consciousness. How may this be ? Or. but the conception of an end.m^^^^^^ CONCEPTION ARE ONE AND THE SAME. But I reply. the conception (as secondary) primary) so in the case of the latter conception of a purpose we ask for the ground of assuming a harmony between the thing. This consciousness begins with the forming of the and successively continues as the willing is successively continued. for this would be nonsense. and the conception. the willing and the willed. PROVIDED IT IS A NECESSARY CONCEPTION OF REASON. is to be a preconstruction for an external somewhat. our will is to be the cause of this reality.) But we are on no account conscious what we of the connection between our willing and the sensation of the reality of willed. ONLY VIEWED I N DIFFEKENT WAYS. According to our assertion. is completely realized. In the case of the concep tion of cognition t hat question was answered in this manner: both the thing andthe . until the whole conception of the end resolve. as an activity.74 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. but) of the assuming of such a harmony between . Hence this consciousness is only the synthetic uniting of the two established kinds of consciousness. THE CONCEPTION. And as in the case of the former conception of cognition there arises very properly a question concerning the ground (not of the harmony in itself. but simply the already pointed out and gradually realized consciousness of our satisfaction. or purpose. the thing (as II and . the ground of which harmony is to lie in the former and not in the latter ? Let me clear up this question through opposition. The conception of cognition is to be a reconstruction of an external somewhat. since unity and harmony between : opposites exists only in so far as an intelligence thinks it. as primary. as secondary. IS ITSELF THE THING.

t herefore. in the present case. or transcendentally expressed: How do we come to assume such an extension? reality ou tside of me is a W6tld a'cEange of my woria' ^further Setermi hTltfon ot my JNow. must. an Hence a determine d_feeling must object occur.IN 4. willing. Every assumption of a new . " . "This we can not do. since all reality occurs for me only on this condition. ff. AND THE THING IS 75 NOTHING BDT THE NECESSAEYjCOJf~ CEPTION OE ITSELF." . there occurs a to transition from a limited to a less limited condition. that that WHICH WE BELIEVE TO HAVE PROnnOBT) TN TTTff. of us.Y TF. but not of what occurs outside solely in the Ego. is. in virtue whereof it is posited. if we were to receive the same answer in the case of the conception of a purpose. WORLD. We thus : are now able is to express our problem more 011/r definitely How an actual extension of limits connected with self-determination through freedom {or willing). " This we can do " but of whatsoever does not stand under it we say. that which I willed My . case there is a transition from a it is feeling related to the object as us. namely. CpT|T. to independently of it is another feeling related to the same object as be modified through our activity. IS NOTHING BUI QUE CONCEPTION OF A PURPOS E ITSELF.pyTAT. my world is determined in my cohsciousness..ATN MANNE R ? "with this dis" tinction. How.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. REGARDED . Hence. that the harmony in this case occurs only under . when it becomes real. be accompanied itself to by a feeling relating and by this result we gain is at least so much that the sphere of our investigation and that we have to speak only of what occurs in ourselves. a certain condition. characterized in this manner: Of whatsoever stands under this condition we say. since the latter is to be a product of our freedom. That which I willed of a sensation. Feeling is But in our special always the expression of our limitedness.

as we have just stated. this wo uld . signifies: J am changed my world is determined differently. and i. as I find it independently existing. ? Now. : reflecting itself has torn itself . signifies 2 am determined differently.. there another Ego According to what we have said undoubtedly. M. in other words. the its Ego which is solely is dependent upon still conception. that Ego which through absolutely therefore. loose from itself." tlie possibility of the latter were explained at the same time. The problem. Hence a change in (a changed manner of viewing) my world must have a change in (a changed manner of viewing) myself as If its basis. namely. namely. my original through opposition to myself. as find myself necessarily existing. through oppoI sition to myself. the objective tending and impelling . is to be put into this shape What does this signify I change myself ? If we only answer this question. change something in necessarily also changejg^^mtrpanS if the possibility of the former were "demonstrated. then the other question. jhe Ego from which th e former Ego (wherein the intelligence "has precedence) lia"s torn itsel f loosein order to posit itself as indep endent or. which Ego is the former Ego ? This we know from our second chapter. is answered at the same time. Hence the Ego which is to be changed by every act of the will. and posited itself as independent or in other words. I determine myself concentrate my whole essence away from everything indefinite and merely determinable into one solitary determined point.U world \s changed.. : : . a ble to myself thr ouglir my" will. and from a determination of the former a determination of the latter must not result necessarily. Now. At present T change myself. Whenever I but will. Iw^. world. 76 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. must be different. and that Ego through the change whereof our view of the world changes likewise. but not all willing results in the occurrence of the willed. : .e. at present. How I can change the world.

A part of the Ego would be changed. or with freedom itself as a theoretical principle. and through this principle more specially our world would receive the character of accidentalness. of \^ p: impuls e. let us glance back at what we have said above.. . on the contrary. mined by this change. the condition of its will. Through this freedom as theoretical principle our world would. or is not required by this impulsion or tendency. and therefore theoxiginaLand essential tendency of all reason. of my mere empty willing. therefore. and hence of the possibihty to change it through free resolves. In this case the Ego would remain. will determination to be in harmony with the impulse then that separation no longer occurs. that our world itself be determined in a certain respect. so to speak. but rather an If we posit. since the tendency would remain in the same condition. divided. But that in accordance vdth which another (the world) is to be determined must be itself determined.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. In order to unite all the views thus obtained. the impu lse or tendency would not harmonize with the will and I would be conscious merely of my willing. It is very possible. i. as less is. Hence in this connection we have freedom as objective. and our world also is now to be deter. not having acquired the will which did occur. . certain determined determination of the will. and to posit this is certainly since it allowable.e. but not the whole Ego. be determined. in accordance with the just mentioned original tendency of the Ego. the utterly different one. . 77 Let us assume this impelling to be directed upon a it doubt- can only be thought as a determined impelling. unsatisfied. as we have assumed. the whole united Ego is changed. namely. since the J reedom of the will stands absolute ly under no condition except that of thinkability and has expressly torn itself loose from tbp inflnenpp. Now let us posit a free determination of the will which does not harmonize.

and not through an external prinall ciple (not heteronomically)./ cannot ao tins without at the same tune determming its worl'd~"tBeoretically in a certai n manner. occur through^ the same ing . however. The rational being which. . according to the previottg' bqok. we add that this impelling of our iiature which determines our physical faculties need not be the moral law itself. be this: the ground of the connection of the appearances with our wiUing is the connection of our willing with nature. Fpepdoni. It is clear that our deduction must establish the proof of the following :— A. which our first book alsp showed to be tion^. For we also have the physical power to execute immoral acts. "of 'lE^'gSlfr'gEQ 'this thinking of its world. The result of all we have problematically established would. nature impels us. therefore. it will probably be necessary to line of distinction. It is to be the moral law itself remarked that the possibility of fulfilling is here determined through the moral law (automatically). therefore. but which we resolve to do by- unrestrained freedom of imagination. and are absolutely one and the same thinkboth are integral parts of one and the same synthesis. This object we have attained. relates itself to those world-determinaand requires their maintenaiice and completijoii. and nature does We can do that to which our we can not do that to which our not impel us. and by saying this we have at once removed the objection that it is impossible to satisfy the requirements of the moral law. Here.. that the commands of the of our physical moral law must fall within the lines power. a practical law. xnai Lhiniil'Ba. act. -'-' ^Fiseedom is a theoretical principle — B. The object of these preliminary remarks was to see what our present deduction has to accomplish. To remove misapprehension. is to posit itself as absolutely free and inde penden t. draw a new We may say. so much. 78 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.

etc. All the propositions advanced in our first book are merely formal. we have described a reflection. DEDUCTION OF AN OBJECT OF OUR ACTIVITY IN GENEEAL. and since we were well aware all the time that the mere establishing of these formal propositions would not finish our labours. we have established abstract but not concrete thought. since systematic progression compelled such a procedure. undertaken in our first book. deter- mining it. and have no material significance. nor wherein to represent what we shall. and that again upon another.CHAPTEE I. in general.. without. and that we shall thus arrive at a series of conditions. We see that we shall. We have now to establish the condition of the possibilitj^ It will of the reflection. appear that the first condition we shall need is again dependent upon another condition. as such. but do neither comprehend what we shall. indeed. however. FiEST Proposition. This arises. The rational being cannot ascribe a power of activity to itself without at the same time thinking an external somewhat upon which that activity is directed. or establishing the conditions of its possibility. This remark points out definitely our present task. — Preliminary Eemark. . from the same circumstance which gives rise to all formal philosophizing. This was not a fault. which we propose to gather under the form of a series of prepositions. but rather compel us to proceed further.

In that book the assertion was. Doubtless everyone first who hears the words of the above proposition will understand them to signify: It is simply impossible that anyone can think his power of freedom without at the same time imagining an objective somewhat upon which he acts with this freedom. etc. But apart from the intention to show the freedom of our method. indeed. but in a gradual pragression of systematic argument. that the proofs about to be established in this book require the same inner contemplation of the activity whereby we originate the conceptions here investigated. and by its means with immediate self-consciousness. as sure as we become conscious of ourselves. which was required in the first book. since of it. Thus. although sphere. the words . we ascribe to ourselves an absolute power of freedom. that. into the problem: To definitely think our power of freedom. book just as well into the form of and our present first proposition. as will soon appear. although it be no determined object. At present we ask How is this possible ? and thus connect the conditions about to be ascertained with the consciousness of freedom. and to protect our system against too monotonous an arrangement. but merely the form of objectivity in general. and that our present book takes up the thread precisely where the first book left it. Hence we might certainly have shaped the propositions of this. It is true. for instance. there are various conditions and determinations Explanatory. we likewise had in view to state with precision the point upon which attention is to be directed in determining that thought. problems . we enter in the present book upon a diiferent we do not do so by a leap. likewise appears from this consideration that. which latter : connecting does in reality constitute the essence of a philosophical deduction.8o It THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.

able thus to originate possession of it as given we should not have been at all unless we had previously had or found. or the condition under which it is to be valid. whereas the thinking of the object is a this distinction. you cannot find yourself as free without finding at the same time in the same consciousness an object upon which your freedom is to be directed.if the one were in time prior to the other. even if we look merely to the fact that both are thought. primary and and our meaning is. N"ot. and determined thinking on the standpoint of The conception of freedom. or through analysis but it. as.: THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. the possibility whereof is itself conditioned through a pre- vious experience (for our begins with life and not with philosophy). for both are the thought of the same moment. So far as the former is concerned. But if we look to how both are thought. Now at present we . and in this respect they need no explanation. arose for us through abstraction . there is. it is to be observed that we assert an absolute synthesis of thinking. consciousness being rather irresistibly impelled from the one to the are speaking of this very condition of the not of the philosophizing Ego other. of a power and of an object. someone might say You have first book required us to think the mere power of freedom without any object. So far as the latter is concerned. I reply : The abstract thinking life in philosophy. 8i are to be understood. hence a reciprocal conditionedness of one thinking through another. nay. in virtue of an intellectual contemplation. as entertained first by us in the book. then we meet freedom is an immediate thinking. original is quite a different thing from the experience. But in another respect some explanations are certainly necessary as well in regard to the form of our assertion. that the thinking of . as also in regard to the content of the same. no dependence of the one upon the other to be assumed. and if we were not able to do so all your teachings have been lost just now in the on us.

: 1st. but we do see the latter through the formerFreedom is our vehicle for the cognition of objects. however. is is thought and. 2nd. We do not see the former through the latter. but the cognition of objects is not the vehicle for the cognition of our freedom. an object. signifies I think a number acts as equally possible through my activity. is absolutely nothing but a product of mere thinking. made in order to connect with it since finite reason can only think discursively and mediately an actuality. not posited originally. have to establish two things sition. both are identical. but thinking as the first dition the may be well done in other rather to begin with the power and immediate. or faculty. Yet even under this conof activity. ' mediated thinking. activity through the object. power. two things have been asserted. In our present case we are. vice versd. : freedom to myself. that free activity related to it. Firstly. Finally. that which is to be external to the intelligence. secondly.— 82 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. Proof. as is power cannot be thought without at the same . not to draw a conclusion from the actuaUty as A — to the power cases. therefore. . The latter part of the proposition first advances nothing I ascribe of different further than the part . the Our proof will. A. The rational being cannot ascribe to itself a power freedom without thinking at the same time many of actual and determined acts as possible through its freedom. An insight into the truth of this proposition requires nothing further than to analyze our conception of a power of freedom. To think anything else under that conception is not to understand one's self. the necessity of oppo- and. the necessity of relation and of this determined relation. and related in such a manner that the object is determined through the activity and not. but originating in time.

How does a rational being proceed in order to think such a free power ? can only describe this procedure. i. the manner of manifestation whereof would be involved in its own in the present case of activity. without actually being such or finding itself as such in point of fact). provided I determine myself through the will to produce it. whether the Ego chooses either of these determinations. but simply as possible. so express myself) as real. for instance = for instance =X . which we find already determined independently of us. leaving A as it is. as choosing voluntarily amongst opposite determinations of actuality. I say expressly: actuality must be thought (not immediately perceived) must be thought. not in its essence. The Ego it only represents itself as such. Now nature. as is the case in objects. Eor instance. But whichever I choose will surely arise for my perception in the sensuous world. 83 time thinking the actuality. to and not the actual deed. or none of them. but merely in its form. sensibility. At present it suffices that we can think this form. or also still otherwise. This perceptibility is posited as necessary. and by its means a faculty or power. Only in so far as I thus posit myself. do . this object = A. might also be deter- mined otherwise. not (if I may . how reason may originally come to this mere know mere hereafter. leaving it to each reader to convince himself of the correctness of this our descrip- We tion by his own inner contemplation. -X. Now. posits itself (but only idealiter. wiU be explained we are to think a free power and not a determined power. We ascribe to the Ego the power to produce sensibility. since both conceptions are synthetically united. but only the power form. depends solely upon the freedom of its thinking.e. or still otherwise ad infinitum..THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. through a mere ideal function of the imagination. and since without the thinking of the latter we can neither think a faculty nor anything else. Actuality is perceptibility. The question.

leaving In other words. do I think actuality as dependent upon actual power. as each one must acknowledge. as we usually say to express this relation objective. hence in choosing But" it we only ascribe ideal activity to also surely it thinks something. i. which is to be produced. The rational being cannot think an act as actual without assuming an external somewhat. for only by means of such a relation ideal. which are ascribed to the Ego through the . This objection This objective not the Ego as belonging to the is not the Ego. and make it its end. or.. Ego. to select this or that from the range of the accidental. B. and cannot be held Ego neither to the Ego as intelligence. since to this Ego it is expressly opposited. the Ego at present merely determining its choice and not its actual will.. which holds enchained There is an .e. and only thinks. upon which the act is directed.: 84 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. since this Ego is not yet in action. Ego represented it. floats over something. is the Ego subjective is and . posit I myself as free. as such. the mere power of the Ego.e. its reality or perceivability. i. but is some- what. who but clearly thinks this thought. but merely the general form of determinedness. it is undecided Non This objective somewhat is necessarily posited as continuing to exist. We said: I think myself in this conception as choosing. Let it be observed that in this thinking we do not think a determined somewhat = X. itself. Let us now direct our attention altogether to this It doubtless thinks. nor to the Ego as the willing and realiter active Ego. a somewhat which exists outside of me independently of my activity. as choosing. Let us once more attentively observe the just described manner of thinking freedom. and as unchangeable in all these modifications. a an object of representation in general. which is controlled by my mere thinking. and yet It is it also is not nothing.

hence that I unite these. and actual is activity is related to it and this substance in truth nothing but the means to think that activity. in one and the same thinking. is Now through possible. is 85 conception of freedom. Hence there exists outside of us an originally given (i.e. then. or from creating or annihilating it to everything which limits actual Here.. and hence precisely the Non Ego shown up.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. through thinking itself in its form is posited) infinitely modifiable substance. This Non Ego thought as unchanged in all possible determinations through freedom. in fact. . and we have proven what we had to prove. unless in this thinking of the we also think the same as that which is permanent in the opposed thinking.. opposite deter- X minations. exists a real object of our activity outside of us.e. limits actual causality to it modifying. For the conception of freedom based upon this. . which substance is that upon which activity Finally: This substance is is directed. thinking relation in form becomes the oijectivity in general. for only on this condition can freedom itself be thought. related to actual activity. this identical somewhat itself to nothing but that its which i. just as mere forming. Hence we we ascribe ascribe reality also to this substance. But this is not possible. that I ascribe to myself the power to realize or-X. It. as opposites. and excludes matter. causality. and to which the opposites identity of consciousness may connect.

it. that an object of free activity must be posited. and should they nevertheless involve any ambiguity. that of our own state. that will doubtless be sufficiently removed in the proof itself. Our deduction still stands at the same point where it commenced. wherein alone it possible. Second Proposition. namely. Neither can the rational leing v ower of freedom without fi nd ing in itself an actual exercise <ff this power. or an actual free willing. ascribe to itsel f a — Preliminary. this second proposition does not words are clear. that the power of freedom cannot be thought and is never thought unless there arises in one and the same state of mind of him who thinks it an actual exercise of that power)— this is presupposed aS 'wullIts An explanation . That the connection asserted in this and in all future propositions signifies a synthetical connection in one and the same thinking (the above proposition signifying. therefore. DEDUCTION OF AN OBJECT OF OUK ACTIVITY IN GENBKAL (Continued). The question at present is: How is this ascribing of it to ourselves possible ? Its one external condition. It has been proven that we ascribe to ourselves a power of freedom. has just now been shown up We have now to establish an internal condition of namely. is require.CHAPTEE II. for instance.

Now. Hence willing can only be . ' and what the one signifies can only be comprehended through opposing and relating it to the other. since actual willing • also to appear consciousness. ifsubjective. is my thinking (taking the latter word in its : widest significance as embracing all the manifestations of the intelligence as such). as we know. The conception of a power of " freedom is. clearly we must -above all explain the characteristic distinction between representfitJon is. all we have said before. but that which is common to both and absolutely determined in itself is self-activity. Hence we assert the necessary connection of a mere representation and a willing. Neither is determined through itself. Peoof. and therein does my essence consist is my free activity. and willing. between the mere As fflere subfectivity in general is related tn nbj pctiv itv.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. if objective. known from g. so_ . etc.. they are determinable only mediately. my willing . the subjective being that which relates itself to the objective. Only when we shall have done this will it be possible for us to prove that the former is not possible without the latter. Now I am absolutely self -active. to state the distinction ideal representation from the perception of a willing. and in so far as both are distinct. immediately as such. representation as snn. etc. since we cannot weU understand their connection without knowing their distinction. the conception or the purglv ideal 'representation of a free wilhng. and will hereafter always be presupposed by us as well known. in. and the objective being that to which the subjective is attached. and the same free activity of mine.1 find-mysfelf as subject and object at the -same time. At present we assert that this purely ideal representation is not possible without the reality and perception of a willing. and next proceed.h is related to willing Origin- ally.

The subjec- . It is the links. the conception of an end is to be the prototype of an existence. Hence the objectivity. for the conception of the The Ego represents: represents end purely product of the representation. wUls that end. Thus in cognition. My willing is not itself to be a knowing. is this character ? Evidently the relation to a knowing. is now becomes objective. as it were. or as preceded free. but does only represent. ohjective. out of the absolute fulness of self-activity. an.rded as the reconstruction of an existence.. as arising from thinking. distinctive character is the character of mere That. Meanwhile the Ego actually wills. ideal and with is absolute self-activity. a state.: 88 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. but / am to know my willing. well to observe the change in the sequence of Originally the Ego is neither subjective nor but both. for otherwise the conception would not be the conception of an end. and becomes objective because a new it. for the conception of cognition is rega. A tion of willing. Now what is there contained in this willing ? — Absolute self-activity as in thinking. On the other hand. desoxibed through opposition to thinking. an objective (the thing) is changed into a subjective. subjective. This identity of both we cannot j hence we only think both in succession. and represents in relation to a future willing. therefore. and thinking genetic descriponly through opposition to willing. a representation. and does not will.d through this thinking make the one dependent upon think. however the otheir. Whichj then. active compreby an absolute creation In this production of the coneeptioa of the end. which was previously subjective. can be thus given We of this think willing as preceded by its hension of end. the state of the Ego is purely end through thinking. but with another character attached to it. which each one easily distinguishes in ordinary consciousness from the mere representation of what he might will. subjective added to or leaps.

subjective itself. on the contrary. change into an objective.e„ of a willing is the same repre- we have just now produced in ourselves. this consciousness contemplation. i. the willing as given in actuality and itself in its representation thereof tied to this its given form. this consciousness a willing? Evidently an immediate contemplation activity. But in the latter the ideal activity does not posit itself as producing this form. is this . which latter is. The perception of the actual.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. of the actually existing object. the. then. in the case of But it is different the perception of an actual willing. And now we proposition. willing is that very activity itself. now. conscious of the act of this producing. The mere representation sentation that i. for this is the general How.e. 89 tive must. subjective. therefore. I cannot say that I feel my willing. and not as. What of sort of con- sciousness is. as the . but as an object of the. So much in regard to the distinction between representation and willing. the only immediate object of our consciousness. but my . feeling. merely ideal representation of a willing to be distinguished from the perception of an actual willing? In the former the ideal activity itself produces that form of willing through freedom and I am objective. usually proceeds from a and it is only in virtue of this feeling that pro- ductive imagination posits something. the representation of an absolute (through absolute self-activity effected) transition of the subjective into the form of all free willing. In short. One more remark. therefore.. and this change must commence in the Ego. not of my own contemplated as is intellectual self-active. a subjective. in a careless use of language. do say so for I only feel the limitation of my activity. finding. can easUy furnish the proof of our second is originally The subjective for only thus is the subjective not without an objectiv©. although there are philosophers who.

the subjective. and is the subject of willing identical with the subject of the perception of this willing. which. already presupposed in philosophical but originally it is not possible. assert we most decidedly' the synthetical union of both the thoughts just now distinguished. of the form of willingj and that.p t. The production must have already been accomplished. Strictly speaking. or. of freedom is npcpssaTJIy accompanied by an actual . the w ilb'ng is noh pnssib lp. but rather it and the willing occur in the . lest .tinn of mir poyer possible. mce. But in the mere we only have a definitely. representation of a willing Consciousness necessarily begins with the connection of both. willing. if a reproduction is to be "gp.perception of a now finished but it is we should lose what we have gained in our previous investigations. therefore. shown thus: and ness end.hp. is not possible. it is is I am to become conscious but this is a willing solely in so far as it is posited as free posited as free solely in so far as its determined- derived from a freely-produced conception of an The form of all willing must be ascribed to this . for only thus am I the willing. whereas of its objective.epresentation of a power of freedom . that the production of conception of an end must then be posited in a moment previous to the moment of willing. This can easily be of a willing. mrsd. gence reproduces one of if its determined of states. which signifies the same. without the ideal -i. nnginal rpprp. that.a. as we have shown. first mere form through that very produced if the' intelli- subjective This state is certainly possible.. our proof is well to remember.' This production of the conception is not prior in regard. 90 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. and hence is the actual (existence) the intelligence abstraction. itself. conception of the Ego shows. particular willing Let no one be confused by this.sent.np. since I have neither being nor comprehension in advance of the perception of a willing. is or more the objective. to time.

all is This contemplated activity is that called willing. We only think the determinedness of the willing dependent upon the conception. being is made possible solely through a willing. which in and which human languages is tersely well known to all men. but is to be solely grounded in my self. and since all objective can well be minedness of the activity deduced from a thinking. Originally I contemplate my activity as object. and to show.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. full as not all the activity I know well I might ascribe to myself. as the philosopher has ness starts. able willing solely in so far as the contemplated deteris to have no external ground. and my willing. then it is necessarily grounded as we have shown in my thinking. explained.. and in so far neces- sarily as determined. There is no priority of time here. But it and an immediately perceiv- from which. as soon as a willing. and it is in this. since besides willing we have nothing but thinking.e. But if it is thus grounded. but as merely a limited quantum of that activity. as such. all consciousit. manner that the determinedness of mj willing is necessarily thought. is persevered in. but merely a logical priority —a priority of thinking. . 91 absolutely the same moment.. To state tersely all we have now i.

So far as we see as yet. Or to state it in other words Whatsoever may be possible in : : the course clearly of consciousness by free means of previous ex- perience and abstraction. Thied Proposition.CHAPTER III. conditions self-consciousness. without at the same time ascribing to itself an actual external caus ality. 1 cannot ascribe to myself a power of freedom without finding myself as willing. Thus it appears that the conception of freedom is mediately conditioned by the now to be deduced perception of an actual causality. — Preliminary. cannot find myself as actually willing without finding also something else in me. DEDUCTION OF THE ACTUAL CAUSALITY OF THE RATIONAL BEING. But now we add moreover I cannot do this. . consciousness originally of commences no more with the representation a mere impotent willing than with the representation of our power to will. This causality we deduce from our and the determinedness of this our willing from a freely created conception of an end. Our deduction advances a step. Such was our first assertion. self-consciousness must also . and since that conception sensuous willing. consciousness begins with a perception of our actual causality in the world. The rational being cannot find in itself an application of its jreedom or a willing.

this limitedness must have existence (of course. Proof. as But in the mere is pure activity. and yet must be determined if consciousness is to be possible. At present the Ego is to be posited as active. and not in itself). for me. and thetical latter. I find myself willing only in so far as my activity be put in motion through a determined conception. but are on no account separated in original consciousness. as has been sufficiently established. not to be determined through itself. all we have hitherto one and the same syn- consciousness. limited. But that which fills up a time moment is itself an infinitely divisible manifold. Now is everything that is sensuously to be con- templated necessarily a quantum. It must. be posited as removing and breaking through a manifold of limitation and resistance in a succession (for even in the single moment there is succession. of and only under or hence through the mode of its this condition is a mani- activity. 93 Hence is may yet deduce. the separate parts whereof can certainly be separated in philosophical abstraction. at present only a quantum filling up a time moment. signifies: Activity is to be determined through and by —mere inner is the simplest contem- Activity means fold of its opposite.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. activity. therefore. are many and particular acts possible. and if its lunitedness is to be felt. plation agility. is to My activity in willing is necessarily a determined activity. as such. be conditioned by the deduced. and hence the perceivable limitedness must be itself a manifold. limitedness. It is enough to have stated this once for all. nothing Activity is distinguish- able or determinable. But the manner of my limitedness I cannot absolutely and intellectually contemplate through myself. but only But if an activity is to be feel in sensuous experiences. and nothing else. .

no . we must from It remember that the which we started. Kemaeks. an utter misapprehension and reversion of our system to charge us with the opposite But neither is the latter possible without the assertion. as an absolute power. Our existence in the world of intelligence is the moral law: our existence in the sensuous world is the actual deed and the point of union of both is the freedom. I cannot be. without being a somewhat. The Ego is to be posited as actual only in opposition But a non-Ego exists for the Ego only on condition that the Ego acts. 2. which opens to my eyes by means of intellectual contemplation. Hence. siace. for myself. . and this I am only iu the world of intelligence. think. is not also intellectual contemplation. would arise from the mere joining together of single moments). for myself. since otherwise the Ego would not act. no causality directed upon a non-Ego. otherwise it would be beyond all time. 3. former. As part of the result of our investigation. regulated by a conception. which we cannot even to a non-Ego. : the former. The point of union of both worlds lies in this that I am.. In other words The Ego must be posited as having causality in an since otherwise no duration of time : external sensuous world. It is only through the means of a resistance that the activity of the Ego becomes perceptible and of a duration in time. and the latter not without a feeling. therefore. 1. however. and in this its acting feels a resistance which must be surmounted. possible without a seiyious con- templation. only through absolute self-activity. 94 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. what I am already in the sensuous world. to determine the latter world through would be. and this I am only in the sensuous world but neither can I be for myself without being an Ego.

It is not the non-Ego which penetrates of itself into the Ego. in order to go out of posited as the Ego must be overcoming the resistance. the primacy of reason. is the absoluteness of the Ego. The non- Ego does not but affect the Ego as has been generally supposed. again.. 95 This causality is not accidental. as its essential character. from the inunediate consciousness of our activity and only by means of it do we find ourself passive. with abstract thinking. . but necessarily belonging to the Ego. hut the into the non-Ego. Consciousness begins with sensuous perception. viz. it should be expressed: We find ourselves originally limited not through our limitations drawing in upon us for in that case the cancelling of our reality would also cancel our consciousness of it but through our extending — and in extending our limits. 4. indeed. Again.— THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. and by mistaking that which was to be explained. and were to accustom themselves to look upon it as a completed whole. activity of the Ego. which is throughout determined. vice versa. as an organised reason. but on no account does it begin cal abstraction. Our consciousness • starts . Here. and as it appears on the standpoint ordinary consciousness independently of all philosophi- and is indeed not at all. in so far as reason is practical. so to speak. transcendentaUy. retained. Would that people were to cease combining to reason out of a number of accidentally joined forces. Ego which proceeds out Thus we have to express this relation through sensuous contemplation. Either the Ego is everything that of. whereas. or it is nothing. itself. By trying to begin consciousness with abstraction (as philosophy. actual consciousness. does begin). it is. Only through such a statement of the matter as we have just given. The Ego is the first principle of all . the latter science has been turned into a tissue of . is Everything starts from activity and from the asserted. absurdities. Ego. for the explanation itself viz philosophy. like everything else in the Ego.

It does not attack us. of all life. it does not do so within our sphere. movement. . but we attack it. It affects us through resisting us. If the non-Ego influences us. and it would not resist unless we first directed our activity upon it. but within its own sphere.96 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. of all deeds and events.

to stand under various restrictions and conditions. and will shortly show itself. the first glance it is by the certain determinedness which conditions immediately the perception of our causality. But we have in our method itself the It must be the surest means against all confusion. The conditions which again determine this determinedness we shall show afterwards.CHAPTEE IV.) It has already been stated that we cannot will or effect H 97 . Our proposition is unclear and ambiguous. and on hard to say which of these is meant manner of determinedness mentioned in our proposition. let us first try to guess from common consciousness what this determinedness may be. whereof we really speak. which is meant. DETERMINATION OF THE CAUSALITY OF THE RATIONAL BEING THROUGH ITS INTERNAL CHARACTER. manner through its — The rational being cannot ascribe causality to itself without determining the same in a certain own conception. Fourth Proposition. and to give a thread for the direction of our attention. But in order to know from the beginning. and what sort of a determinedness this is will appear from a deduction. The causality of the rational being in the sensuous world may well be supposed. Preliminary. but merely to prepare the proof. (It is scarcely necessary to mention that this guess is not to prove anything.

onnect it. perhaps. and that we cannot likewise create or annihilate matter. "What does this assertion signify.98 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. for instance. but must make use of various means. .. assert that nnan cannot do it ? I will not suppose that an age like ours considers itself mankind !) The assertion of common consciousness is. existing previously and independently of us. end be = X. Let our place. a feeling always accompanies perception. since we cannot even think it. through a series of mediating ends. man cannot fly immediately as he can walk immediately. but in a certain order of proceeding. should not be able to do it? that in the execution of our ends man we are tied to a certain order of means. signifies the same as the condition of my : feelings changes. but through the means of a balloon he can certainly rise into the air. and move about with a certain degree of freedom and purpose. I will to have external causality. merely looking to the imminent changes and appearances in the Ego. etc. compelled to realize A first as the only means as the only means to get to C. when looked upon from a transcendental point of view. shall we. we can do all that we can will to do. and utterly abstracting from external things ? According to previous explanations. (It is said. mutually conditioning each other. therefore. at our final end X. Why Of course. something in violation of the necessary laws of thinking. until Instead of directly realizing X. and the only difference is that we cannot always do it immediately and at once. the ground whereof is also stated in its proper But even in this separating and connecting of matter or substance we are bound to obey a certain In most cases we cannot immediately realize our order. and to say: I perceive changes outside of me. that man cannot fly. end through our will. and B we arrive. to get to B. as the only proper means to effect our purpose. because our age cannot do what it has not yet discovered the means to do. Moreover. but merely separate and t. we are. In fact.

I have become cause. each occupies a separate moment must also fill up a time. signifies a determined required feeling follows a determined other feeling. whereof we have to treat at present. as perception. trans- Hence the assertion of common consciousness. And to say that this relation is a necessary one. 99 signifies: I will that a determined feeling within me should be replaced by a determined other feeling. But each say. A. signifies between the feeling. and the feeling actually entered me. signifies: this required feeling has Hence to say: I attain my end through a series of means. to the use of certain means. from which I proceeded to willing. our causality being limited. number. Peoof. in the attainment It is this deterof its end. : required by that willing. a series of other feelings enters. and sequence) enters between them. My causality is perceived as a manifold in a con- tinuous series. since. we again problem ascribe causality to ourselves ? This is the of our present investigation. I feeling is expressive of signifies my : limitation. signifies: that this expanding of our limits can only proceed in a certain manner of progression. by the . and to have causality. and hence. which I require in my conception of the end to be attained. moments. cendentally expressed. But through the union of many arises a duration or filling up of time. necessarily.: THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. This part of the deduction is a progress in Our series of conditions. I cannot posit myself as free without Such was our ascribing to myself an actual causality. mination and limitation of our causality. The perception of my causality. there moment. as has already been time remarked. only on the condition that a determined series of other feelings (determined in their kind. But under what conditions can last proven proposition. always I expand my limits. as our deduction will clearly show.

does this sequence depend upon the free- ternally. the manifold which is to be distinguished. etc. but. the same as: the possibility in general of making the is . •is That which occurs in the perception of our causality the synthesis of our activity with a resistance. looking at the matter in general. To say that the moment is posited as filling up time. for the perceived causality of the Ego is something the altogether necessitated. nothing can arise. or was it necessary to dom put in that particular sequence. and is itself to be characterized only through relation to the resistance. or a discrete manifold. for only up a time. on no account. then. that this distinction is actually made. But our activity. actual. which not in the many as separates. since. each moment Jills up a time ? this moment a manifold might be distinguished. my causality happens in time. to change it for 6 c a or for cab. but rather absolute pure identity. does this Simply. intelligence is in the representation of the actual. This manifold does it fill is necessarily a manifold separated ex- on this condition thought as a series. signifies. on the contrary. Hence. etc. union of many of the same kind. would it be a proper matter. then. "What. must be a manifold of the resistance. is not a manifold. and that this distinction might be continued infinitely but.loo THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. it is of the intelligence as such.. and never free so far as the context of the representation is concerned. it becomes a moment only through not distinguishing. or is it regarded as determined independently of the intelligence. b following a. necesseiirily Indeed. How. is it in regard to the sequence of this manifold in a series. ? It is clear that the latter is the case. For instance. and c following 6 and b only possible on the condition of a having — -been preposited. distinction just described is posited. as we have seen. since it cannot be my . that in signify . assuming this manifold to be a 6 c. for the freedom of thinking. therefore. not separating it any further.

a limitation of my We have in just seen that the sequence of the manifold is it my causality is is. This the least of what belongs to is my activity. is the perception of an and in perception nothing depends upon the thinking as such. if it should be impossible. but neither activity.. by which it again is not conditioned. however. actual. my thinking. and immediately. causality unless it is idj thought. wherein the Ego proceeds out from its original limitedness. and has for the first time. which point of must beginning. but independently of B. The first idea of the deduced series is as follows : There be a point of beginning. it there is whole relation activity. a limitation of my Eemakks. a series. the manifold whereof tance. I do not produce it. and in . THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. immediately clear. hence. but pure unity. and hence. the sequence of is the manifold of a resisr which is not determined through it. causality. The sequence of this manifold is determined indeis itself pendently of causality. and conditions another one. but the opposite of my I do not produce it. from some reason or far. as not determined through my thinking determined or produced through my indeed. I desire the end. itself is. The occurs in time. to trace our analysis back so might also . Let us explain more clearly the result of our present investigation. I. another. The acting. wherein each moment is conditioned by another one which it does not condition. and. and since all my thinking But time is a determined series of successive moments. and nothing but the end and the means I only desire because the end cannot be attained except through them. That which I produce neither manifold nor sequence of time. resistance is not my acting. therefore. Hence my causality is represented as thinking of our causality. me .

which originate from the forms of contemplation are nothing but their relation 'to us. Ego can become cause in a manifold manner through means of the first series. These points. proceeding from myself to the object in space. our articulated body. in which space each point can be thought as connecting with an infinite number of others. this necessary view of our causality the world and the world as a manifold. and this body is nothing but these points represented and realised through contemplation. since no other relation exists for or to express this thought transcendentally they are the relations of our determined finity to our desired us .* In so far as these points are to be points of beginning. AU the qualities of matter excepting those. arises for us. that acting would not be free. appear as a 'plurality of points of beginning.I02 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. but merely a construction of the first. : infinity. an infinite circular space is described around a fixed central point. and there are no mediating links necessary in order to attain this causality. Let us call this system of the first moments of our causality the system A. With each of these points many other points connect. I must first seize and posit these and these is The object X in space thus far removed signifies idealiter: in * Trmislator's Note. as will appear soon. of course. With each moment of this system B are again connected many points of a third system C. Through generally. Such first points there must be. Let us call this system the of acting and it system B. thought together. would indeed be not a second act. and thus to put if in — the shape of an illustration. if the Ego is ever to become cause. the Ego is in them cause immediately through its will. were possible. from me. we call. and more especially their — — relation to our causality. I say With eacA one many connect for if from each one only one manner wh'erein the : . . Qr as a plurality of first men.

a line. not immediately connected. and give rise to a changing consciousness. Thus there arises for the reflecting Ego a series. This restriction of our causality to the use of determined means. without a change appearing to occur in the next adjoining point. as identical with the space wherein I am myself. or through determined laws of nature. in order to attain a determined object. objects in order to posit I it . although we may well think them) imper- ceptibly join each other. or on that standpoint which . signifies: In a certain series of of it a determined resistance. The real active line. the identity of consciousness being again made possible through their likewise remaining always the same. series. wherein you proceed impera continuous ceptibly to the opposite. must be explained from the point of view of common consciousness. certain 3. cannot suffice on the standpoint of transcendental philosophy. it signifies penetrate this and that amount of opposing space in order to be able to consider the space X. however. but only at some points' distance.: THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. signifies I feel the resistance diminished in the same place of the same 2. (Keflection proceeds by leaps. This explanation. and feeling Ego describes in acting wherein there is no disruption or -anything of the kind.) is true. It is thus in regard to all the predicates of things in the sensuous world. It as it were. consisting of points. whereas sensation is steady or continuous. and thus they are distinct moments. The object is softening. The reflecting Ego seizes of this continuous line as separate any number of facts moments. and in so far that is which is contained in both the separated moments the same. through a determined qualitativeness of the things. first must The object Y is my activity I feel between two determined hnks Aartj. both the extreme end-points of the successive moments (if such things could be in an infinitely divisible line. But the reflection only seizes that wherein they are opposed. 103 and viewed realiter.

Now. then. How. not in regard to its form. There however. which as such occur only in time. Tprior to all time and leyond oil time. {i. nor natural laws as the laws of an external nature. why should precisely these and no other means lead to the attainment ? of this or that determined end Now. this limitation can only be conceived as of this character The Ego limits itself.. then we think absolute limits to the primary impulse It is an impulse which can only be directed upon only upon a causality determined in such or such a series. are gathered together and thought as an original arrangement.e. of the original limitation of that rational being. though a natural law of its own (finite) nature. such an impulse absolutely. beyond cannot proceed with its activity. explanation would be to contradict one's self. and thinks the in its purity.. and upon no other caiisality whatever and it is itself. not why such a limitation in general is to be posited. This determined rational being is arranged in a manner that it must limit itself precisely thus. Our whole internal.e. not arbitrarily. since in that : we could not say. as well . To demand such an it which are. From this standpoint it appears utterly absurd to assume a non-Ego as a thing in itself Ego with abstraction from all reason. this. I04 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. and this arrangement cannot be explained any further precisely because it is to constitute case . and with freedom. however. In other words. i. if these separate limitations. other limitations of the rational being. is that limitation to be explained in this connection. for this is precisely the question we have answered in our deduction) but in regard to its content. the Ego is limited but in virtue an immanent law of its own being. why this limitation should be thought precisely in the particular manner in which it is thought. since we are here not to assume things in themselveis. and hence likewise not with its cognition. whereof the grounds can be shown up. separates all the non-Ego from the Ego. .

in is joj actual world . i. is not pre-established. . is acFual. tEe selt-aetermmation. a s .external. in so far as the former i s.. all eternity.e.THE PRtNCtPLE OF MORALITY. I so far a s the internal world . an dBjective something in us For the merely subjective. thus pre-established for us throughout s ay. world. and hence we act with freedom.

The general proposition. Common experience. But this objectivity was in that chapter deduced only as mere raw matter. but also by the positing of a determined form of the objects. teaches that we never find an object which is only matter.CHAPTER V. Fifth Proposition. that the consciousness of is our causality conditioned not merely by the general posit- ing of an object. if so. and.) that the thinking of our freedom is conditioned by the thinking of an object. which we must assign to the objects of our causahty in advance of our causality and to show up this may . might be proven easily enough. But we do not care for this alone. according to what laws of reason is it thus necessary and universal ? The solution of this question might have some influence upon the system. DEDUCTION OF A DETEEMINEDNESS OF OBJECTS INDEPENDENTLY OF US. and which is not already formed in a certain has . respect. require a much profounder xo6 investigation. It been shown already (Chapter I. therefore. Even the . to which we have referred. necessary and universal. The rational being cannot ascribe a causality to itself without presupposing a certain causality — ~ " of t he object. however. but more particularly for an insight into the determined form. It appears. But is this common experience. that all matter is necessarily perceived in a determiued form. Peeliminaey.

that the material determinedness of the will is grounded upon a conception of an end. I find the object only as limiting.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. 107 words of the proposition established cannot yet be explained by us. and it is simply the result of our previous investigations. Peoof. in so far as I perceive myself as free. and we must wait for a complete unravelling of their meaning until we have finished our investigation. Now. apart from this fact of mere common consciousness. But this foim of freedom consists in this. I find myself only as free. a causality. which conception is freely produced by the intelligence. it is at least certain that we presuppose But only is the cognition of such a conception of an end for the possibility of a perception of my willing.-—But something in that being itself. the rational being as such has no self-activiiiy except as a consequence of a cognition. willing causality. yAestg. but absolutely posit and I do posit it thus absolutely in positing the form of freedom in general. I do not and cannot perceive. at . apart from the fact that the possibility of such a conception of an end seems itself to be conditioned by the cognition of an external object. and of a form thereof existing independently of us. and yet as overcome by my self-activity.--The rational being has no cognition except as a consequence of a limitation of its activity. have previously This proposition has been abundantly proven by all we said. is iadeed no consciousbut this self-activity can itself not be the it is object of a consciousness unless limited. firmed. and I find myself as free only in the actual perception of a determined self -activity. A w<t<7tms. my . of which we do not know yet whether it will be conleast a cognition of . therefore. Without consciousness of a self-activity there ness at all. That something is product of my self-activity.

That conception would but merely thought. once obtained. the true solution of the difficulty. no choice is to precede the williag. as not possible without the conditioned. can easily be conceived —consists in an abso- lute synthesis of the production of the end-conception and of the perception of a willing of this end. thus be. which we apprehend.) And this is. and the conditioned not possible without the condition. which explaiu. well-known rules of our is to be solved through a synthesis of the conditioned and the condition. The only question would be this: Whence. the above antithesis therefore. since in the progress of consciousness the choice in advance of the will-resolve. indeed. But rules of a systematic procedure. both being posited as one and the same. since here all the same) explained by the philosopher? the Ego itself explains it come from. as well as other discoveries. and the present remarks are only intended to point out the direction of our investigation. as produced immediately together in and with the willing. not produced. force us to seek a more thorough basis.io8 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. does the determinedness of the end or of the willing (which is then. and all conscious- . through freedom and a cognition of the end-conception by means of previous experience. and the cognition itself the desired activity. The activity is. we were to (It were perhaps an easy matter to solve this difficulty by the presumption that the first moment of aU con- sciousness — for only the first moment presents the diffi- culty. will also solve the last-mentioned question. which doubtless is a defective circle of explanation and a proof that we have not yet explained The we see. to the Synthesis. is the consciousness of our freedom. for the sake of finding the willing itself to be free. condition. and how can it be (For we have seen that through the thought of a pre- viously produced end-conception. to the desired cognition. —According be itself synthetical method. which.

but is. and the contradiction is actually solved. a thing). and nothing but activity. so much . task would. to think anything clearly when thinking our According to the rules of synthetical elaboration. on the contrary. For we know already.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. we shall pursue this easier method. we think the Ego originally objective as it is found advance of all other consciousness its determinedness in cannot be otherwise described than by means of a tendency or impulse. taken activity. 109 ness must start from something. now be to immediately analyse the established synthetical conception until we should have succeeded iu understanding of it. Let this union be thought. from which all consciousness proceeds. it : the most difficult is way particularly as our established synthesis one of the most abstract occurring in the whole science of philosophy. as we have sufficiently established at the very beginning. ' . more specially in my Science of Bights). therefore. The objective state of an Ego is by no means If — — a being or permanency (for in that case it would be its opposite. " objectively. the same as the other reversed. this is the very difficulty. since we are at present concerned more about the results themselves than about getting a knowledge of the origiaal synthetical procedure of reason (which. The Pkoof by another Method. absolute Now. from previous investigations in regard to that primary point. There is an easier method and. This method is and whether they also involve the synthesis just now established. activity. has been amply exemplified in other instances. which absolutely unites in itself both predicates. and that our investigations ascertain whether they will also solve our present difficulty. is Impulse. hard to under- stand this thought. moreover. we can very properly proceed in from these known characteristics. It is so But it.

But I feel only so far as I am.. or of this impulse and since this immediate knowing in the is . i. but also of a thinking taking the latter word in its widest significance as embracing all utterances of the intelHgence. without any self -activity a. A never thing merely is finishes the is something or another. is called feeling (as we have shown in Chapter III. a moral law for freedom. necessarily posited as having a feeling of this impulse. if the Ego is originally posited as objective being an impulse. of that which it is. does not presuppose anything. . Ego Ego. all other consciousness: reflection. The being of the Ego necessarily and immediately relates to its consciousness. it But the Ego is not merely objective. its original : is not only the determinedness of a being. if the original determined- ness of the characterised as impulse. But such a mere determinedness of the in- determinedness telligence. And in this manner we arrive at a necessary and immediate consciousness. feeling which again presupposes many other things. and. as it is its subjective determinedness. have said : if we think the Ego originally objective. hence. hension. contemplation.e.. Hence.. This feeling of the impulse is called yearning: an un- determined sensation of a need. This mere determination of the being and the Egoness is called feeling. and that determinedness of the thing. in this relation to the subjective or to freedom. after the subjective in the Ego has been separated and . to which we can attach the series of all other consciousness. for in that case would be a thing and not an Ego.our previous description in thought (according to II. compreof presupposes an application freedom. the objective in' is the Ego. is called feeling. then it is also necessarily posited as knowing of this its being. or freedom on the part of the intelligence. for. But the Ego merely something or another it must also know .no I THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. of Book 1). Chapter Book 1) as absolute power of freedom. In other words. etc.

In . It is not I. since all activity was found to presuppose a freely-produced conception of an end. rather. the activity itself also posited.— THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. and in relation to that impulse appears as a freely. immediately knowable. is a satisfaction of that impulse. namely. II. or as law of reason. is also If the activity is posited. We could not assume an activity without cognition. act it. we could become an feeling. but. who posit myself when I feel. the cognition thereof if immediately posited. for only by holding it thus does is it In other cognitions the objective objective. but both objectively as impelled: and subjectively—. this original feeling of the impulse synthetical link. and this cognition is not (like other cognition) an image of the activity of the impulse. . In feeling I am utterly. since the Ego is to be regarded as the absolute ground of its impulse. both are absolutely united a feeling (noun) is clearly nothing without feeling (inf. verb).as — .jn every representation. which is But at present we have something. is that very activity itself in its immediate repredescribed above. and distinct from the subjective. is always merely a subjective. independent of its cognition or representation. always still held to exist. namely. This original feeling solves the above difficulty thoroughly. Again. that 1 can abstract from the object of it. we an activity. whether it be so held a thing in itself. produced conception of an end and this is very correct. in a certain respect. enI have not even t hat freedom which occurs . and in every respect. our original The first impulse. since all cognition was deduced from the perception of our limitedness in acting. N"ow. and is that feeling itself. and this cognition is posited is in its foi-m as feeUng. sentation. which is is iii precisely the The impulse which in the Ego necessarily becomes cognition (feeUng). not assume any cognition without presupposing an activity. chained. I feeUng this impulsion am I posited.

although my first act. and is not at all without freedom. but I myself who determine myself. The ground of relation of these predicates is as follows Although a part of that which pertains to my Ego is to be possible only through freedom. yet the Ego. am the same I. is merely and purely product . and freedom has not the least control over it the latter. can be none other than a satisfying of the impulse. is nevertheless as having such an end-conception determined otherwise than as mere im- For as mere impulse the act would be viewed as necessarily constituted in this or that manner. of freedom. it is still not the impulse which determines me. that act pulse. I.: 112 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. and another part of the same Ego is to be independent of freedom and freedom independent of it. to the Ego. and I. and I who think I. of distinction of these is The ground my predicates in the described relation as follows : I. . only the consciously free and active is posited as Ego. whereas it is utterly a matter of my freedom how I think or act. my product of freedom. impulse. in so to it. as has just been shown. and although the end-conception for that act is given through the impulse. in so far as I am free. however. whereas with the characteristic of being directed upon an end it is viewed as an act. then the object and subject is of the impulse does not belong. The former is not not the ground of exerted by the impulse. moreover. to which both parts pertain. as is always done on the standpoint of common consciousness. who freely resolve. the or. who feel. are to have no causality upon freedom. who am impelled. can myself contrary to accordance with if I do determine myself in it. Now. far. is only one and the same. and is posited as one and the same. am impulse and of the feeling It is not a matter of my freedom how I feel or do not feel. which might have laeen otherwise than . In spite of it. if Now. but rather opposed and it is only my thinking and acting which constitutes my Ego. I The imdetermine pulse and feeling.

since it is a law for freedom. cisely feeling the utterance or manifestation of the limited in us. And since whatsoever is fixed and determined indepenoriginally determined system of dently of freedom is called nature. in so far as a determined impulse is originally and a feeling deduced from it. on the contrary. and consciousness in general. — Both are distinct in this. whereas the moral law does relate itself to freedom. the feeling of the impulse presupposes. is not felt and does not at all exist independently of free reflection. I follow the impulse. the feeling of the material impulse. and hence there exists an impulses and feelings. determined system of our limitedness in general. forces itself — upon us. being pre- and and impulse. we have established the conception of an original. arising rather from a reflection of freedom. We have already distinguished this objective view of posited. is possible. that whereas the moral law cannot be derived at all from an objective determinedness of the impulse. but simply from the form of the impulse in general. Formaliter. 113 To be sure. Both are distinct in this. or from the form of absolute independence and selfdetermination. on the contrary. a determined material need. of this limitedness. it is only on this condition that self-consciousness. according to the above. as the impulse of an Ego. it is. is that system of impulses and feelings I to be thought as . that whereas the moral law does not absolutely force itself upon us. Materialiter. In what we have said above. and from the relation of the above-described form of all impulse to freedom. from another objective view of the law. but with the thought that I also might not have followed it It is only thus that the manifestation of my power becomes an acting. the just- described impulse does not at all relate to freedom.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. Finally. so far as the relation is concerned. same Ego. which appears as moral This distinction can be made clearer at present. the Ego.

and deduction. upon nature. itself Moreover.e. and partly in so far as this matter must have. which thinks or wills with freedom. Concerning this assertion. Now. in so far as both are to be nature. sufficiently explained in let my other philosophical works. my nature must be originally explained. I also assume other nature outside of my own. and since the Ego or substance. wherein this system rests. In other words. . opposites. therefore. they are Both. In other words I myself am to a certain extent. i. are thought as necessarily opposited.— 114 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. at least that form which forces me to pass through determined links in order to attain my object. and the other an external nature. is to be the same. as (MT nature. which the Ego standpoint of common speak of an explanation itself produces on the consciousness. III. well known from and of the other. and this my nature : is an impulse. But not only do I posit myself as nature. in order to explain it. and without an iafringement upon the absoluteness of my reason and of my freedom nature. The latter explains all the occurrences of consciousness from the ideal acting of reason as such. or derived from the whole system of nature and shown to have its groimd therein.. also independently of my activity. and which we posit as ourselves it foUows that we must think that system of impulses and feelings . while the posit objects outside of what is to be explained. they are necessarily thought as equal . since the consciousness thereof forces us. but in so far as the one is to be my nature. partly in so far as I am compelled to relate my causality in general to an external and independently existing matter. mediated. me say a few words. the one is thought through the thinking which is indeed the general relation of all which are equal in one characteristic. but not of the We explanation of the transcendental philosopher.

we cannot think it all as a link in such a series. How can an impulse as such be comprehended. and hence. Whatsoever lies within a series of causes and effects is easily comprehended by the laws of natural mechanism. ing. in other words. by the opposite mode of thinking. In such a series. is our nature to be explained ? Or. at each link in the series. Whence this power may come sively We can we never learn. penetrating the series. as sueli. or that which is mediately cognized by means of the cognition of my own nature. and not from the nature outside of me. what else does the assumption of a nature in us involve ? Or.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. is the power by means whereof we think the each separate link in the series. then. in beings thinking altogether discurand through mediation ? make very clear what we speak of here. or. i. How.e. 115 Again: The Ego never becomes conscious of its explainbut only of the products thereof. Whereas the standpoint of reality proceeds reversely from external nature.. why our nature is constituted thus and not otherwise. through the whole series. This power. and directs this its activity to a third external link. a quantum of power is only passed over from link to link. and never arriving at an original source. which latter external nature is the mediated (my own being the mediaUTig). Let us assume an external cause directed upon the substrate of the impulse. it is clear that perception starts from the nature in me. to proceed further upwards. ? This investigation we have now My nature is an impulse. Each link in the series has its activity communicated through it by another link external to it. being forced. which is held to determine our nature and to contain the ground. activity and passivity of But in such a manner we cannot comprehend the impulse as working. under what condition is it possible to ascribe a nature to us to undertake. as it were. how is the thinking of the impulse mediated. then there .. and passes.

beyond which fact that standpoiat does not transcend. in order to become conscious of it. But that an impulse exists at all. and of their reciprocal determination (through is which alone time. our Kant calls subsuming. there arises a check and doubt in our minds. . my impulse. the of the impulse. and in the latter calls reflecting. It is only the it transcendental philosopher to look who goes beyond in order up the ground of this fact. and identity of consciousness in the progress of time. is simply fact of consciousness on Hence. in so far as it is to consist ia an thought as determiuiug itself through itself for only then can an impulse be conceived. which neither comes from. impulse. . of cognition . impulse is something. transferred to external The understanding. The matter is comprehended without any activity of freedom or consideration: it is comprehended through the mere mechanism of the power and this procedure is justly called subsuming. what he The law of natural mechanism nothing but the law of the successions of reflections. arises for us). iu this sort of thinking. Self-determination is the only conception by means of which we can think an also results . the external world substrate directed upon itself. there results nothing at all. is the standpoiat of ordinary consciousness. objects. proceeds its ordinary way mechanically. . an external causality upon a third link but if this external cause has no influence over the substrate Hence.. But in the second mode of proceeding the comprehending cannot at all occur in this mechanical manner and hence. ii6 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. nature. COROLLAEIUM. nor goes it is an internal activity of the into. and our free power of judgment has only to reflect upon what it actually does as mechanical understanding. distinction is this: judgment is what mode. In the first mode The of proeeediag.

reflective IV. is — at : present as yet only is my nature. Now. Hence. and judgment prescribes itself its own law. however. as such. My nature of me. signifies mode of thinking must be reversed is (precisely as the proposition: the ground of something in the Ego. nature. therefore. determine itself materialiter. as a free being well has. not to be found . Now. to proceed itself from an absolute being. Again. all being of nature is. But nature. but which. nature determines itself. The impulse belongs . through a conception. the is determinedness of my nature all as an impulse. on the contrary. There is nature outside and this external nature is posited for the very my sake of explaining the determination of my nature. in its essence. result' of the determinedness of nature. signifies that ground the non-Ego). This function of the reflective power of judgment arises where subsumption is not possible. whereas all being of freedom is to proceed from a thinking. is not all nature. as . Nature determines itself signifies therefore nature is determined to determine itself through its essence is determined formaliter to determine itself in general. as a free being may well be. having no choice between a determination and its opposite. be explained. in fact. nature is described as an impulse and this impulse . that the : 117 comprehension achieved. and explained from that other nature. In other words. cannot determine itself like a free-being. or nature can never be undetermined. nature is determined to : . only. or precisely in such and such a manner. and yet there must be a ground is va. namely. accompanied by the cannot succeed thus.— THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. Nature such. thus reflection. the comprehension cannot be and yet must be achieved must be — embodied in the unity the of self -consciousness. characterised through opposition to freedom or through this that. is originally. must. the law to reverse the law of subsumption.

and a deteris mined impulse. separate parts of that external nature from other parts. however. In X is there is impulse. is thought as impulse. thus that nature existing. and leaves to it only determined through X there is precisely so much rest only such a limited quantum of an impulse. as a separate part. of this the ground exclusively in your free reflection. : Or still more clear Abstract from your own nature because your nature involves a characteristic distinction from all other nature. The part thus separated must be through itself what it but the whole must contain the ground of its thus determining itself. The whole. separate parts of nature. as self- determining. and hence. through its existence. the necessity to limit it precisely so far and no further and reflect merely upon — external nature : separate from that nature whatever part you may this chose. and to he explained from it. me in so far as I . namely. not in so far as I am intelligence for the intelUgence. i. reality. to am nature. the conception of the impulse is synthetically united with the conception of nature. as we have Hence. separate part X. limits the impulse of that separate part to be the totality. imdecided whether there are actually. seen. has. and giving to it for the . leaving it undecided whether there may be still another ground of this separating than the freedom of arbitrary thinking. since nature is a general manifold.. not the remotest influence upon the impulse. but that impulse determined impulse.— ii8 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. That you happen to consider precisely Call this quantum lies of nature.) is. is nothing but the reciprocal action of the sum of all the parts upon each other.e. As I must separate my nature from all other nature. and hence. and independently of our thinking. so can I also. everything which is thought in the conception of nature. as such. assert here only (We an ideal separation. outside of precisely a this. which nature.

it. But since each is only a part. each thing is. through itself. what it is. having posited nature as impulse. and a precisely thus-determined something else. each lacks all the reality of the other parts. in this mode of procedure there is I can make absolutely no primary and no ultimate. I itself. This Z will be related to Y as Y was related to X. each part again a totality. nothing prevents me from separating from Y another part Z. and has only an impulse left for them. impulse. determined through all that exists outside of Again. is and yet likewise that . because outside of the part there is still something else. Te can illustrate this conception in another way. and eac h totahty a part "" That which is constituteci in such a manner as forces us to say of each part that it is determined through this X — — . and . what it is. Now.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. In short. therefore. and only the highest cannot be of the . if 119 we had not been forced to characterize nature we could have posited all that X is not in X only as negation. in X. we posit all that X is not as impulse as an impulse. solely because I have made it such through freedom of thinking. Nothing prevents me from again separating from it. such an org anic whole. regarded as a part. each thing is. That remainder is only impulse. Natv/re in General is is. by the same freedom. For the general tendency to have reality peneand is in each part of the whole. including that which I previously called X. and posited as such. Now at present is a separate part for me. this its self-determinedness again the result of the determinedness of all other part^ through themselves we call an organic whole. According to the conception of natural mechanism.. . Each part whole can again be considered as an organic whole or as a part. trates the whole. But at present. has its ground therein. through another. and manifests its According to the conception of an existence in a third. another part Y. and is precisely a thusdetermined impulse. In Y also there is impulse.

then the general character of nature. I must posit my nature as a closed whole. V. as the transcendental philosopher. does explain nature is totality itself is nature. and is in nature as mere mechanism (or the causality-relation) and freedom as the opposite of mechanism (or the substantiality-relation). without the least modification — ception of an impulse. Something = A. namely. indeed. to which is much and no naore: such the result of our proof. and this consciousness. indeed. in all possible . The conception of this synthesis is clearly the conception just developed by us. indeed. . synthetically joined together by which means we shall receive a mediating link between ism. but the conception is simply given. must be retained. and we have no longer the simple thread of causality. Thus. as a mechanism.A). from any reflection of that it . which third link we. but the closed A A -A A sphere of reciprocal activity.e. My determined and fixed in this manner. Freedom is directly opposited to natural mechan- no manner determined thereby. Now. has its ground in itself. : i2o THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. but as conception of absolute freedom. together with the character of an impulse. very much need to explain the causality of freedom in nature.. But when we speak of an impulse of nature. necessity and independence are united. is. and both characters. The conception of this totality cannot be explained upon the standpoint of common there appertains precisely so consciousness. therefore. then this conception is valid in all its not as constrictness. through itself what it is. but that it is precisely this through itself has its ground in the other {i. being to be thought. upon which we have placed the Ego in our whole latter investigation. since on its part becomes through what it is. and that is precisely thus determined. its manifests is existence in itself.. Again" that the other is precisely this. if a free.

and the mere reversion of the former. to limit the totality arbitrarily. have said: its A it rmX whole. If my whole is to be a real totahty. but simply because I had made totality. it might well happen that our power of judgment. 121 Let us ask first: How do I comprehend at all. which. again to separate this part into ever so many parts. I had an ideal totality. as we have seen. after I only a part of the whole of nature. to grasp each part as a whole. is determined thi'ough a compulsion of reflecwhereas reflection is free in the representation of the ideal. the case. Now.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. of thinking may this necessity a determination of the limits arise for us ? Wherever we can no longer comprehend through mere subsump- Now. we have only deduced we think at least our the totality . but by no means a real totality. once safely tion. to become a real totality. is own nature. it a and there was no other ground of determination for its limits than the freedom of my thinking. but not any part thereof and yet it is a fact that all. was completely a matter of the free- dom of reflection. Let me first explain this conception In the manner in which we regarded nature just now. and this determination is the chief point. I had an aggregate. I had a totaUty. since this something is itself only a part of nature in general ? This question is asked very properly.. of nature as a real whole. a collective unity. and not a compositum. as yet. Reality tion. must if therefore be cancelled. with reference to the representation of my nature as a fixed whole. and according to what law do I think something in nature as aj real organic whole. This freedom. for. then its parts must unite in a whole of themselves and independently of my thinking. there the latter is a . by opposite. and etc. and the intelligence be com- pelled to gather precisely so it is much and no more Such is within it. through what law of law of reflective judgment enters. as a complete whole.

measure of reahty. and mutually exhausted each other.122 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. (We are to comprehend something. and in itself. This mode of consideration we were able to continue or stop at pleasure. . and everything was perfectly uniform. But at present a determined = X is asserted to be given. and each conception of reflection.) part of nature is through itself. nor a lack. and for all other reality an Impulse and reality were in reciprocal causality. In none was there an impulse to have a reality. and if we cannot even comprehend by this new law Each of reflection. which cannot be comprehended by this sort of conception. hence we have to reverse it again. into a totality of totalities. but only the totality is through and for itself. Hence each part of the totality is determined through all other parts of the same totahty. can no longer comprehend even by means of the law which arose from and hence it a reversion of the law of subsumption would have again to reverse that law. which it possessed. which latter. —Tr. arrived within the sphere . According to our previous result. what it is. So says the simple conception of reflection. each had impulse. HoWj then. Thus there would arise a composite law of reflection. . therefore. which arose by reversing the simple is through and what it is.* a system of real totalities. changes from a totality of parts. of reflection. a reciprocahty of reflection with itself. and hence we reverse that law. But accord- ing to the conception. it fitted whatsoever came to our notice. and thus connect our present argument with what we have previously said. which it had not an impulse to replace. and obtain the law of reflection now we are again to comprehend something else. We cannot comprehend it by the law of subsumption. must it be constituted ? Let us consider any its * Leibnitz's Monads. no part of nature for itself complete totality is itself to be regarded as we regarded the whole universe. Let us now analyze these conceptions still further.

a lacking in B : then my consideration of composite law of reflection. If in A impulse and from the not impel to have a reality which lacked. since I could. if the impulse did reality could not be reciprocally explained each A A and which did not belong to A. other. but each part has this pecuharity. and. and vice. Thus should I be compelled to consider the matter once more. I can divide A in 6 c c^. and it would be evident that I ought not to have arbitrarily separated the part A from X. generally is also organic nature. A composite reflection would thus arise. and is. A Moreover. 123 and call it A. impulse and reality are concerned if it were likewise to appear that the impulse in B impels to have the reality which A lacks. in so far. e . has reality and impulse. in like manner. independent. and since I should would thus be forced to synthetically unite both: become a real and not merely an ideal totahty. it X X is infibttitely and again Hence. and thus limit my reflection. If B. and hence. not comprehend except through B. the impulse in A impels to have the reality B would lead me back to A. then A could not be explained and comprehended through itself. in order to ascertain whether A really lacks that reality for which I discovered impulse in B. considered in and for so far as the relation of were to result just as A did. particular part of X. In so far. whereas... or if the impulse did impel to have reality which lacked not. on the but other hand. the But general law of that nature must apply to it. and which belonged to A. etc. ad infinitum. Each part. that the relation between its impulse and reality cannot be divisible. since it is governed by necessity. My comprehending would be shut oi3f. Now let us consider the remainder of itself. g. versa. THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. and whether there is really in A an impulse for the reality I discovered lacking in B. X = B. I should not have comprehended anything. or to reflect upon. as nature f in general.

indeed. necessity. it Is Jjjrstiy. need of all. ETHICS. in the assumption of for. Neither let anyone attempt to explain organization from mechanical or architect of the world . and that the rational being can think nature only in this manner. an organic whole. which latter process presupposes an internal power in nature herself. Each part tends to satisfy the hended in perhaps. which. from pure laziness of an intelligence as the creator amongst other things. perfectly unthin kable that an intelligence shou ld create matter and. therefore. No part can be explained before all parts of X are gathered together. let an intelligence be ever so able to compose and connect. we cannot at present decide. and one of the I myself qualities itself into am absolutely appertaining to nature. and not of moral. it explained out of itself.. take refuge. it is as yet ^cnrnp rehensible how reason can have any influence upon nature. the result of this will merely be aggregation and alligation. we require that it shall be explained to us from a law of physical. re ason. Hence. and not otherwise. By requiring that something shall be explained out of nature. find a better name for it: an actual at least such organic whole. 124 THE SCIENCE OF for. (Let no one. tend to satisfy the need That which can only be compreof each single part. to organize actual totalities. we shall call for the present. we are at present endeavouring to explain. seconcLlY. until. but never a melting together. The decision will depend upon this: whether I can comprehend myself as such an organic whole without assuming others outside of me or not ? But at present. this we can manner. by merely asserting the possibility of such an explanation. Whether there are more such outside of me. the only question is: how such an actual whole may be explained out of nature. — . we assert that it is necessary for nature. on the other hand. otherwise. For. would not be a part of the actual totality X. and what new predicates may be ascribed to nature by means of this explanation. and all.

and this There is in each an impulse for another. that this law remains a final absolute. e. But from the standpoint of transcendental philosophy. that which it is no thiag is anything to another. Of course it is only from the standpoint of common consciousness. it is easily explained. which rational beings must think when thinking the conception of nature. it is not a foreign ingredient without which nature might get along just as If there is — . then the impulse thus determined rules throughout nature.. it since that science explains all nature and deduces The only question is. and no other thing is anything to it. each needs another. such a new principle.. 125 Those laws involve an everlasting repelliag and moving away of matter. but nothing more. and of common science. may be. and to dissolve together with it in space if we think This impulse we call the organizing these parts in space. and it is necessary in nature. and for itself.) what sort of a law this This is the principle of substantiality. according to our present principle. The law of organism is an immanent law of nature. involve attraction and repulsion. and unexplainable. whereas that of is natural mechanism the principle of causality. Hence this law of nature may also be then expressed: each part of nature is impelled to unite its being and its working with the being and working of a determined other part of nature. itself no element it. THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. to which that principle of substantiality may apply. is Now. laws. from the Ego. and in the science of knowledge. is self-sufficient. word. and for and through other needs independent. each thing which is a thing of nature is. in order to be able to explain itself but which law can itself be no further explained. . there no possible element. principle in the active and passive significance of the It is the impulse to organize and to be organized. To explain it would signify to deduce it from mechanism.g. through itself. and what determined process of nature must necessarily be asstmied in assuming it ? According to our previously established law.

and an accidence well. since I can posit myself only as the product of nature. though by no means yet completely analyzed. for I myself am such. we have at least gained so that we find the organizing principle throughout nature. of materiality in space. We do not speak. Now this uniting is product of the organizing power of nature. although it might be easy to deduce it but it is at least sure that the ideal manifold within me unites to form organization. or. We . By much all thus positing the organization of the Ego as the result of a law of nature. Only let care be taken not to think the seat of impulse as either here or there. but an accidence. our second point gained — this impulse has certainly causality. have therefore proven. have united themselves to produce one being and one causality. that which we called an actual whole of nature may more properly be called organized product of nature. Hence the result of our present investigation is this As sure as I am. There are such products. Certain parts of nature. I must ascribe causality to nature. But me — we is this are not as yet to decide. as yet. that which was to be proven. result in . It is no substance at all. and of the being and working of nature. In this respect. for whether this impulse has causality also in outside of our bodies. to think this impulse as itself a separate part.: 126 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. this pertaining to all parts. which would an actual manifold. still worse.

namely. I FIND myself as an organized product of nature.. and the comprehending of the same is completed and. it It preserves itself. everthing . which are mutually conthe parts taken together. an impulse to maintain certain other parts in unity with which impulse. whole but that which is in for it is a whole. the above established conception applies again to it in ditioned through another. . Hence. If either is cancelled. in so far as a complete whole is to exist. in so far. feplf self-preservation I is simply the preserva- To see this clearly. : . relation to all other nature. is called the impulse of self-preservation. But in such a product the essence of the part consists in itself. RESULTS FKOM THE FOREGOING.: CHAPTER VI. For since the essence of the whole is nothing but a uniting of certain into i pants. and.. Now. signifies preserves that reciprocal causality between its its tendency is and causality. nothing can be in the the parts. Its essence consists in a reciprocal causality between this tendency and this causality. the whole is nothing but tion of this uniting. this desire must have causality. when attributed to the whole. But this tendency can have no causality unless parts that mutually support each other are united for only on this condition does an organized whole exist. let the reader consider the following Each possible part strives to unite other determined parts with itself. a desire to gather certain parts into itself.

a^tendency which desires existence in general. at the same time. rational beiag never desires to be in order to he. impulse In irrational products of nature. as I do meat and drink through digestion. .. The tendency to self-preservation is not. but in tence . There is in me an It is in like manner with me. nor the pear tree apples. A Neither does an irrational product of nature ever strive and work to be. itself. absowithout all mediating cognition. A product of nature. and a pear tree a pear to order to he this or that.. the apple is. but which desires a particular determined exi san impulse of the thing to he and to remain For mere general existence is simply an An abstract conception. the and hence. of the preservation of myself as this . and sooner or later results in its destruction. calculation. originated through nature. to The relating of those means my lutely impulse and object is done immediately and. because it belongs to my preservation the impulse my preservation. this impulse is the a certain relation with myself. but rather to relate them in general to my natural necessities. in order to unite them with my being not exactly to gather them into myseK. because the impulse craves it and whatsoever belongs craves. as seems generally to be assumed. for the character of organization consists in the continuing of the process of organization. The con- . impulse of self-preservation in the above specified significance of the word. particular product of nature. which no longer organizes ceases to be an organized product. 128 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. To change kind in this manner is a check of the whole organization. impulse having it for its object does not exist at all. tree. belongs to my preservation. but always an apple tree strives to be precisely that which it is be and remain an apple tree. impulse. or consideration. cancelled. That upon which to this impulse is directed. and relating itself to objects of nature. . moreover. and not anything concrete. effect tree can never bear pears. it is that which it is. or to put them into Now.

viz. nay. is This nature has to exist for me. and the neglect whereof has been of great disadvantage as well to philosophy in general as to the science of morality in particular. A plant is not impelled by the existence of substances which belong to its composition to gather them up into itself.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. even already determined. occurs again in a more important law when it.. But it does exist and must exist. exist in nature at in nature. Does perhaps the attraction proceed from X. to develop the it will not be understood part. and if these substances did not that plant could also not exist In short. . Here already we meet an important fact. all. but always from myself. in advance. nectiou is 129 not made through freedom. by virtue of the completedness of nature as an organized totality in itself. but is involved in nature's law of organization. [ — — is overlooked here. what and my actually does exist and affect me. impulse craves the object X. It is the same with all organized products of nature. everywhere is harmony and reciprocality. and would never be satisfied without it. I do not hunger because food exists for me. The impulse —My solely proceeds out from my nature. for mechanism produces no impulse As sure as I am I. my desires and tendencies never from the even in my most animal needs proceed If this remark external object. would even though it could not exist for me. the results whereof extend very far. but rather before it crave it the internal construction of the plant demands the existence of precisely these substances independent of their actual existence. impulses and tendencies are directed upon all that which is thus determined to exist for me. when we come of morality. and taking hold of my nature. thus determine my impulse? By no means. not mere mechanism. but certain objects of nature become food for me because I am hungry.

must also be dependent of only upon self-determination. i. the Ego distinguished from all result in nothing at other products of nature. II. I do not of it at all. But the impulse enters consciousness. This my impulse is. a feeling of a one's this. I say. We lack we do not know first need not known to Even through is as the very result of reflection. and there is no third result as the effect of their natural impulse. and hence as subject is of consciousness. self. Now this reciprocal causality not my causality as intelligence. for me an object of my As reflection. and the necessity to attend to this object. it is become immediately conscious itself is The impulse likewise not my product. immediate object of consciousness. upon my selfHence my nature in so far as it is also. as certain as / reflect. am absolutely free and dependent only determination. is an effect of nature. no product of nature. and all it effects in this region depends upon . or all. Im- pulses in the latter either result in being satisfied. am I necessitated to perceive and to posit it as mine. and form occurs with absolute spontaneity. one will seriously assert that in dry weather plants experience a yearning.. moreover. this reflection directed upon the impulse there what. and only the object of the reflection. They either drink or wither. No III. all. But of in how far is it assigned to me. given and does not depend upon my freedom. certain as I reflect at this impulse. arises firstly a vearnina. for reflection itself is Itself in its cannot be such. Through . As I intelligence. as sulject consciousness? The product is of the reciprocal causality my natjare is the impulse. This my character. and ttiis necessarily as described above.e.I30 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. in so far as it is assigned to me . caused by the absence of water.

But the satisfying of our . the impulse has no effect in this region at all. object of my yearning.>n-r. Here. &c. concerning the reality or non- we do not as yet trouble ourselves. Or. abo ve They are not under our control. I reflect on sciousness my on it ^-earning. We merely posit it here as an object yearned for. are not matters under our they are the processes of nature in us. then.. as intelligence. 131 me. But a 'earning determined t. what at first and thus raise to clear conwas only a dark feeling! ^But I it cannot or. the change of our food into nourishment. it being I who do or do not effect something in it by virtue of that impulse. without distinguishing it from another But one yearning can be distinguished from another only through its object. hunger or thirst is under our control. here the determined and sharpdrawn limit between necessity and freedom. is there anyone willing to assert that he eats and drinks with the same mechanical necessity wherewith he digesta In short. reality whereof 11 . or the circulation of our blood. them for that which physiologists or doctors know of them they know inediately. The satisfaction of the impulse in plant or animal its occurs necessarily wherever conditions arise.. B^^^jJ^K^^ THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. or rather. But Our digestion. man is not at all impelled by his natural impulse. because we do not immediately become conscious of control. alluded to. it is not within mv control t o feel or not feel an impulse within me.ncfb it. reflect without determining as a yearning. in consequence of the universally valid law of reflection in other words. lies the transition to self-determination on the part of the rational being lies .a obiect ia called |7mgg. but it is withm mjy control to satisfy it or not. Hence through this second reflection I also become conscious of the possible yearning. since we have immediate consciousness of our desire for food and drink.

the free act of reflection. clear weather). impulse accompanied by consciousness has . etc. smce a free reflection enters between yearmng and desiring. not however in external nature. the lowar desire. by not reflecting upon. Now must also exist in space since there is no uniting which has space. and is considered. which we presuppose as well known from the science of knowledge.132 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. in the nature of objects. of that . things of nature exist firstly in space for me. and hence that wherewith they are to be united. all. . Hence ii is weii possible to suppress inordinate desires.e. particularly with mental labour. investigation — — The form of this desire as such. by ignoring them. My to desire has for its object things of nature. or by busying oneself. has its ground in nature. as Kant has indeed called it.. that its ) and that this impulse or this desire is directed upon such an object. and hence it is an immanent ground. to place them into a certain relation me (like free air. which is absurd. Now relation. by not precisely " giving way to them. or it would not be a relation. desire. . Thus even in desire does freedom already^ manifest itself. it is an ground in But that an impulse exists at i. fine prospect. called If we should in the course of our the manifold meet with another desire whereof we could also unite into a faculty it would be proper to call the present faculty. of desire united into The manifold faculty of one conception. but in my own nature. or to which they are to be placed in a certain. either with a view to immediately unite them with me (like food and drink) or. as a faculty grounded in the Ego. ia short." as the theological moralists very properly express themselves. which is against the presupposition. and no relating of it except to that which also is in space for otherwise it would either not remain in space.

e. since here parts as parts. forming a fixed totality. If I am to be free. a relation to me. simply u^ Qrderto/prga^ thus. and which craves to satisfy itself merely that it may be nature . it must be a manifold movement." Not as if we wanted to say that the irrational product of . There exists in us an impulse for things of nature. Satisfaction for the sake of satisfactio n is called mere enjoyment.t. We have arrived at one of those standpoints from which we can comfortably look around us. or not. therefore. me or. must be^ movable and my rights. Moreover. I am. these in their relation to the totality of my must be movable in its relation to the totality of nature. and observe whether our investigation has been somewhat cleared up. and. to h^ y. Each organised product of nature is its own ol^ect. body) Again.) Eemark. But it is. whether I will unite things with. it organizes simply for the sake of organizing ~ and organizes thus. matter.r. Hence these parts must stand under the control of my will.hm thp. It is of importance to us that the conviction of the absoluteness of this natural impulse should force itself upon everyone. organized matter. We call this our hodiy. secondly. i.: of relations in space. 133 that which is in space and fills space we call matter.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. in order to bring them mto a certain relation to our own an impulse which has no object except itself.e. pnntrnl nf my yyill. my body must be articulated. we speak . indefinitely modifiable. Such an arrangement of the body is called articulation. i. satisfied. (Compare the first part of my science of body itself body. according to the above. place them into . as product of nature. and this (my the immediate instrument of my will. since this movement is to depend upon a free produced conception. relates Now this uniting and relation to is parts of my organized body. .

that even an intelligence outside of such product cannot without being illogical. this satisfaction produces enjoyment. may propose to and. in the case of d^jiakaEda. but because hunger is painful. was required of by the nature rational the rational being. teleological nature . particularly Mendels" the feeling of enjoyment a!s arismg" an improvement of our bodily conThis is quite correct if mere sensual enjoyment dition. in the growing worse. as. '. Again. same with the rational being in so far as it is It satisfies itself simply in order to satisfy itself. for instance.rft }ia. have explained of trom the feeling as a state of organization. is.rfifi-haa-. Several analysers of our feelings. and explaining ascribe any other or external object to utterly wrongly such products.bR Rta. execute in nature. — — hnt hv no j means a relative. perhaps in part.t34 I'HE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.jhe state of the organ i- better at the time. of aTtipii]j^. and food pleasant being to him . The natural man does not eat with a^yiew to preserve and strengthen ^ his body.t. since the latter oniy arises arrangement in through the manifold itself. objects to this theory. But in all examples of this kind it will be remarked that the growing wo. and this enjoyment is its last end and object.tinn. that enjoyment is felt even is growing worse. nature never thinks another object than itself for this is self -understood. Jersusalem. since the becomes conscious of its yearning.n rp. nay. the play land the reciprocal action of the several parts more perfect. but we wish to say. .n internal and absolut e. exists simply because precisely such object and every determined object which satisfies it. it necessarily also becomes conscious of the satisfaction of this yearning. when they are becoming intoxicated.to when our bodily condition of this immediate feeling t. and if the bodily condition is accepted merely sohn.ant1y_growing . is meant. in his Philosophical Essays.Qnljurefe£fi3iES. There is only a. purposes which a free being It is the TTif.tp. U'^tijftff whfirea s. since it does not think at all.?o^?§t^.

In so far as man has mere enjoyment for his object. but rather of practice through freedom and the bad results. If I regard completely determined through the laws of sensuous perception and discursive thinking. could it reflect. will manifest itself in him. if consciously undertaken. the tendency of reason to — ahsolutely determine itself through itself. becomes my . herein a mere plant. shown. From the transcendifferent impulses ? dental point of view. and hence. zation may be threatened with.— THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. is account. as we have . commumcation with surrounding nature more But all sensuous enjoyment. Each satisfying an impulse. we have reflects and thus becomes subject of consciousness shown above. and in the and inseparability of both consists my true beiag. as subject of con- sciousness. both are one and the same original impulse. then that. is necessarily done through freedom. of it is within our power of freedom to either follow this impulse of mere enjoyment or not. only regarded from One important and nature. question. which constitutes my being. he becomes Ego. the plant grows it would But the plant might also overgrow. which is in part my only impulse. has reference to the organization of the body whereas the articulation ^. my two different sides. he is not and the attainment of his purpose depends But. . and yet not be disturbed in its feeling of satisfaction. hence. and our body is so arranged that we can work through it with freedom.s such. upon the existence of the object of his impulse self-sufficient. as tool af our freedom is n ot truly product of nature. and thus hasten on its destruction. . namely. When Now. myself as object. that he necessarily reflects on the impulse. Man feel well. he is dependent upon something given. identity For I am subject-object. in so far as man but also in part upon nature. and their 135 unchecked. My impulse as a being of tendency as pure spirit: are they two By no means. which the organi. since the future is we do not take into never immediately felt.

embraces it hence. for the mere sake of enjoyment. but raised above all nature. The reflecting is opposed it. as result. All the phenomena of the natural impulse. absolute indeits abandon pendence of nature. of the is properly called the higher . of n«^ ntiA the same impulse This expiaTns. It will appear that in this union the higher impulse must abandon its purity. at the same time. is directed upon absolute self-determination to an activity for the mere sake of the activity.136 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. and hence. which to be absolutely one and the sai»e. But both constitute only one and the same Ego hence. \ both impulses must be united within the sphere of consciousness. Hence. higher than the reflected. ness through an object. the recijfi^'lf ^TOat^^Iation self-relation. is called th e higher faculty of desjra. also one. the impulse of the reflectiug.. but the whole Egoness based upon their appearing as two opposites. subject of consciousness. never can only be our problem . oTilv tn tw o I't'S jmpvilRPs a. and hence. as that is which contemplates in the re- flection.mpulse. But if I regard impulse becomes for me a purely spiritual impulse. then that point of view. there will appear an objective activity. and a faculty of desire. rises above and . it is opposed to all enjoyment which is a mere passive to surre ndering to nature. The higher impulse. But this it attainable end.- utter opposites as the two impulses can occur in a being. is how two such Both are.^y n reciprocity ot tnese in fact. am nature from this myself as subject. as the impulse of the purely spiritual. determinfed by it. or a law of my self-determination.e.TP. is no nature. the final end whereof is absolute freedom. i. its non-determined. because I myself 1^0 are based simply upon the impnlapg w>^ip}i t. is indeed. Hence. Only the reflected is nature. whilst the lower impulse must enjoyment. is an infinite. The liitiit between both is The reflectiug.

To take cognizance merely of the higher impulse would mere metaphysic of morals. to I37 state how we must act in order to approach that final end. . Only through synthetically uniting it with the result in a lower impulse do we attain a science of morals which is real.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. which is formal and empty.

we must examine 1st. also. common consciousness does not even ask. as follows: in so far as I to am necessitated I. ness it From the standpoint of common conscious- would merely be said: "I happen to be such a being. an Thus Concerning the ground of this connection. to assign somewhat is. the — corunection of both. of my reflection. the natural being (for at the is am same time for That natural being the substance.e. we have already shown that this is our natural impulse. The connection of both that both are to be one and the same. posits the reflection about to be described. myself the reflecting. everything depends upon our completely determining this reflection. That the reflection occurs. / reflect on myself.CHAPTER VII. as such. 2nd. its form. me as the reflecting. So far as its content or object is concerned. another I does not exist for me). or it s form. is an absolute fact it occurs because it does. In order to do so. as immediate object pulse . and 3rd. is nothing but an im- Now. we have already answered of that reflection. and the only question is. on this my given nature. i. is expression of the freedom of the natural being. and the reflection is an accidence of that substance. which. I. and the consciousness 138 . Th e final production of my nature. how far our nature may be the immediate object This. or becaus e I am I. with such a given nature. . CONCERNING FREEDOM AND THE HIGHER IMPULSE. its content. is an impulse..

that is. be Idealism whereas harmony. indeed. which indeed that standpoint also does not propose to comprehend. its part. we have already^^lved as nature (by] There is no such thing other nature. determines and limits something in the manner in which my nature is deter- mined and limited. I am merely a peculiar manner of limited only in the world of and through this limitation of my original impulse my reflection is most certainly limited to myself. or ask for its ground. for me. no independent twofold at all. since we is limited cannot speak of any other limitation of myself than for On the standpoint of transcendentalism we have myself. is utterly incomprehensible.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. but an absolute simple. in their independent actions. and follow its path. itself. The former assertion"wouid. But how both. that the intelligence. to be outside of it. on its part. through my reflection of myself my of course. 139 thereof. From I the standpoint of transcendental philosophy this problem. should harmonize and arrive at the. how such a harmony between complete and mutually independent opposites is at all possible. Through the described reflection the Ego tears itself loose from all. . at present we occupy the standpoint of common consciousness. and only dependent upon itself. reflecting is self-sufficient. the system of fore-established takes cognizance of neither side. leaving altogether uncomprehended. regarding myself. and places For the itself before itself as absolutely self-sufficient. nor j nature to the intellige nce.: my is nature and all posited to explain mine. vice versd. as usually taken. of a But . and likewise. on forms a certain representation and determines it in a certain manner. intelligence. and leaves the question unanswered. since neither the intelligence gives laws to nature. and that suffices". and the latter Materialism . same result. and where there is no diiference it were absurd to speak original impulse . haJmonv. gets itself under its own control. and. can be comprehended. That nature.

The reflected brings the actual power. is. be ascribed to the Ego. Bu t a series of freedomdetermination consists of rieaps^ and progresses utterly irregulajcly. from this point inwards. be it according to Jhe law of mechanism or of _organization. There is no law according to which free self-determinations occur or may be calculated in advance. Think one link of such a series as determined. ail Hence that the free from that point onwards. and to is our once the theory of freedom. Each link in a series of nature is a predeterminer.140 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. activity. Not. and the law which governs it. except as a con- sequ ence of the Ego's the Ego is own conception thereof. and the reflecting brings The person hereafter can consciousness. From A many other links are possible.Jrom th e stated point. nay. Hence if we know. is IJo actuality caa. ground in a conception. ~" absolutely free and altogether pare A ^-^ ^ajly . but the reflected is the same as the reflecting. simply observes itself. But that which it occurs in the Ego. . as if we merely meant to say that the Ego. it indeed the important point. united. commencing at the point where became an Ego. and is absolutely imdeterminable. the nature of a thing. and is Ego henceforth does This present is product of this freedom. as might seem at the first glance. free conceptions . series of nature is Each link in it ejBfects wholly whatsoever it can effect. which has its called a product of freedom. since they are dependent upon the self-determination of the Intelligence. into the person. not predetermined. as such. and providing the Ego truly remains Ego. do nothing except with consciousness and according to miiiing of the intelhgence. and callit A. we can tell for all time to intention clear up at come how the thing will manifest itself. An actuality. is which. we distinctly assert that from this point nothing can occur in the Ego without the active deterEeflecting and reflected are and represent one single undivided person.

now if any causality beyond the limit. is each free resolve what it is absolutely tbrnup-h itself. it must be that of another power. we should have to m him in the above significance of the word. 141 but not all possible links. since it is under the control of a principle utterly removed beyond the authority of nature. and yet. In series of nature the law of causality is valid but evp. formal freedom. Hence whilst in a series of nature all links connect closely.ry \\r\\ . "produce this result. The causality of nature has its limit. nocausalit v In a spiritual being . only one of them = X results. but only an impulse. for each is a primary and absolute.1ps. .=i thp root of all freedom. I do with formal simply being conscious Hence a inan might always toUow merely 'freedom.Tip. I am no nature longer a link is The last link of an impulse .e. itself substantial . in which it is n»vprt. if he only acted with consciousness. Whatsoever I do^ so aomg. natural necessity can no it longer control me. for the last ground of his act would be his consciousness of the impulse. Beyond the stated reflection. and not the natural impulse (I am not aware that any writer has as yet itself. We shall call free- dom in this respect . series is the law of substantiality rules. having. under her but under yiy contro l. but which is no longer. in such a series of freedom the connection breaks off at In a series of freedom-determinations no link can be explained. his natural impulse. ascribe freedom to treated the conception of freedom in this respect. therefore. and thus we can maKe ireeaom com- prehensible even from the standpoint of a philosophy of nature. Perhaps most of the errors and . true by means ol a power which T get from nature. since nature exhausted It is I who herself in the production of the impulse. and not mechanically. in the freedom i.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. with care and attention. for beyond of nature's chain. That which results from an there is to be " impulse I is not a result of nature. namely. of the Conception.

but merely that we are not conscious of them. although we are not conscious of these causes. But I am something only in so far as I posit myself as such. They are only discursive thinkers. . I outsiae 01 me. According to the foregoing I posit myself as free. But the sharpwitted of these opponents say: "It does not follow from that fact that those states have no external ground at all." Now here they become at once transcenden t. to cultivate them. if possible. signifies for us." Here they clearly presuppose what was to be proven. One must not enter into dispute with them. freedom can deny that No opponent he is conscious of states. but do no t am free. but one ought Such causes an not. those states have no causes.) CORoLLAEIUM. We are abso- lutely unable to posit causes. that the Ego belongs to the series of nature and is subject to the laws their proof is. he has on his side a contemplation whereof they know nothing. of complaints the incomprehensibility our doctrine have their origin in this.142 THE SCIENCE OF respecting ETHICS. the . have also their causes.^ .cannot ao and moreover. for which he can assign no other ground than themselves. namely. therefore. wEip]^ ^hBy . tor "an intelligence myself." And they proceed: "It does not follow that because we are not conscious of the assertion of of those grounds. . the defender of freedom can on hi s part also only presuppose that Egoness. which we believe to be our own. I trust: 1 For everything and nence those resolves. .conception whereof involves that it does not belong tOJiatuxfi^ But he has the decicfedadvantage over his opponents that he is able to actuall y build up a system of philosophy. II. an evident circle. and utterly lack intuition. of nature Of course. perEaps. not for am free. They continue : " kas its cause.

In the reflection on this condition it is expressed by my power of imagination floating between opposite determinations. by a blind produce. we do not speak. Those were quite in the right who denied that freedom could be object of consciousness Jrp. which is this deterDoubtless the one Ego. and in the same view. With this commences transition my determinedness. There are inbut always leave themselves to be driven and impelled consciousness. of course. impulse. and this same determining Ego is in the same undivided act. I I mining I ? the union of the reflecting and the reflected. and direct their representations. To these. find myself undetermined. when we speak of consciousness of freedom. but merely dream a long dream. who. Consciousness of my undeterminedness is. the deed. What myself as free conscious of 143 appertains. which resulted from reflection at the / ception (cognition of my freedom). for that reason.p. In the consciousness of freedom object and subject are completely ona xne conception (of my purpose) grows immediately into the deed and the deed immediately into the con. in so far as I have a the perception of myself. and choosing a definite purpose. is But now also I determine and the determined. I. and who. fact. same time determine myself. have also never clear since they never self-actively determine. dividuals.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. But this consciousness requires energy win and intensity of contempMion. It is true that we become immediately conscious of our freedom through . particularly if is this purpose runs contrary to of our inclinations. my freedom. because we choose all it. let us ask firstly.dmn is not object but subject-object of consciousness. to this positing I posit myself as free when I become ? from undeterminedness to power of action. determined by the dark association of ideas. therefore. likewise the determined. by self-actively tearing ourselves loose from a state of indecision. in point of never will. . and nevertheless chosen for duty's sake.

tmt is an . This consciousness of freedom is the condition of Egoness. an inclination whereof the free being as such does not. and would be nothing . that there are many impidses working at_the same time — though we have no reason to assume this reason on our present standpoint. become conscious. be said. there is no why freedom should not foUow it. that a rational being . but strongest impulse will decide. but may unhappily be too truly an acquired state. inclination. not something accidental. But I am I only. we justly call it a blind inclination. then the and we have again no an undeterminedness. But undeterminedness is not merely no tdeterminedness = 0. therefore. as I am free and self-determined. that . At present. possibility of if there are. and hence without the conditions of freedom.undecided floating betwee n many' possible determinations ( = & negative). and cannot. in so far as I am conscious of this my I that is to say. nor a foreign ingredient. In so far as the free being occupies this state. but it IS an essential condition of rationality.144 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. (It is thus that that which we are about to deduce obtains universal validity. namely. And there True. we are as yet unable to tell how freedom can be directed. which is not an original state. Morality is. That this consciousness of freedom and morality may at this belongs to these conditions. however. by our showing. and posited as thus directed upon many possible determinations. we say that the free being follows an and since this inclination is preceded by no reflection and no undeterminedness. There is no other object of the application of freedom than the natural impulse. Whenever this impulse occurs. a rational being is not at all possible without c onscious- ness of this freedom. my free-active self- the condition of the consciousness of determining. and since the consciousness of morality is not at all possible without this moral consciousness. since otherwise it could not be posited. it might is reason why freedom should follow it.

be clouded. is that no man can be thus sink absolutely without all moral feeling. material freedom.(lip' from the A ^J( . Formal freedom arises when a new formal principle. there Ego is explained out of_an must be an impulse to become conscious. although the material in the series of It is not eiiects does not experience the least change. acts.oi' this freedom. Hut such an impulse.^ distinguished by this. Undeterminednes s is not possibl e if the Kgo solely follows the natural impulse. previously described formal freedom. enters. But the condition of such a consciousness is undeterminedness. 145 and down to be a mere machine.) man impulse.. new power. effects precisely the but the free being. I will call this freedom. but The also a wholly new series intelligence does not merely work. We have to deduce the impulse.. perhaps. Since all that occurs in the hjAt * without regard7"n aY^iTOrYOTOOsitio^to the naturaJr impulse. The free same as nature would is have effected.fT-^ j ^ ^. a • •/« new power. since we are here speaking of the consciousness of freedom. would he craving for freedom for the mere sake of fi-ccdnm.. *^ nature any longer that being. to distinguish it f K. It is our it. since the consciousness of ..THE PRINCIPLE OF MOLALITY. In our forgoing we have proven that unless such an impulse exists selfconsciousness is not possible. to a great extent. and to show how next duty to deduce this impulse. and hence also of the conditions of that consciousness. however. is certainly possible. enters. Whereas material freedom that not only a of material acts. III. at present. and we shall hereafter show the reason for it. All we mean to assert. and. times. Hence" there must be an impulse in the Ego to determine itself. to describe it may manifest itself. but works out likewise something utterly different from what nature would have worked out.

which consciousness. All I need now is to this proposition and the direct proof required will be furnished. They are.ivity. Ego gets itself altogether under its own make control through the absolute free reflection of the itself. and which is certainly held to is say. merely to make their description. -^ree Now must let it be firstly observed. as a primary reflection.possible. although we had thus to describe. An act. and existing independent of that i^. reflecting of first an act. this second object only the pure absolute and this activity alone is the real and true Ego. activity of the first reflection. although it is in the Ego. Let us consider this first reflection as —the natural second reflection. without which. belong to the Ego.. This self-reflection of the Ego. which. one and the The Ego becomes immediately conscious of absolute activity through inner self -contemplation. This was an indirect proof of that impulse. Now these two reflections are not in any way to be thought as separata and distinct reflections. clearer. an Ego were completely incomprehensible.them. is an undeterminedness. But for the sake —not of the certainty but of the results which will show themselves. Ego on as a natural being.. indeed. is not the Ego. of the matter. an act absolutely grounded in the Ego.t.(. or from the conception of the I have said that the Ego itself. same its act. I whereas the natural impulse upon whicB^he reflection is directed. genetically.. to which the impulse is opposited as something foreign. 146 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. i. is is a passivity in relation to that act a something given. . Since the object of the impulse — first reflection is reflection clearly has for its abstracted from.e. is the condition of self- not possible. we must furnish this proof directly. on the contrary. that in order to explain the consciousness of posit a that new the reflection. we having for its object the reflection.

and if it is. as it must be. changes into activity in general.ivit. JNow this impulse of the Ego. I particular resist the impulse. 147 For let it be well observed. with the reflection enters a new power.. which otherwise would have remained simply the determined activity of reflecting. if I think that power as torn loose from the hold of the impulse. and thus perhaps clearer. it is only through the second reflection (it seems I must continue thus to describe them as separates) that the activity. Eegarded is from the transcendental point of view. The distinction between mere i^fql g. in order to see how both manifest themselves. this impulse the . considered as immanent and essential in the Ego. ijL ^ would be actual causality. which merely occurs in the Ego as pure activity. as yet. we shall call. Indeed which throws a flood of light on this proof from another side it is through this. name already We only need now to consider the relation of these two impulses to each other. if I assume that it may not follow but can enter for me. the fmre given—natural impuls impulse and leave to the other impulse the e.y^ the reflection of a gimn somewhat.e. but particularly how the pure impulse.p. as impulse determined in precisely such or suck a manner' is accidentdlJio the Ego. This is only possible. therefo re. to our present investigation. the object thereof having been abstracted from. as a — — ^ very impulse of resistance that the influence of natureupon us remains merely an impulse. Now this resisting is. and the real absolute determining of a given somewhat. the most important itself. may manifest The natural impulse. posited mere power to resist..t. i. it is posited as an impulse. At present this new power is to am to become conscious thereof as of a and new power. To state it more concisely. This is what we have shown above. THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. which transmits through itself the tendency of nature. occurs later. since without it.

Again. utterly independent the impulses of Through this higher impulse. nature. separated from. which. but that we are limited in precisely such or such a manner. and I stand . and requires of me. according to the higher impulse. I should surrender myself. and shall not. True. when directed upon my purely formal freedom. and is a power in relation to me. and I do not~ esteem that which does not demand such energy of me. above nature. more- In perceiving the power of nature to lie below me. Por I only esteem that which arouses me to exert all my energy in order merely to counterbalance it. on the contrary. Hence the impulse exists ia all rational beings.n. an impulse which claims my and invests me with . If. This is the case with nature one resolve. have control over me. C9. The pure impulse. and hence its results are valid for all rational beings. nature produces an impulse within me. Hence. utters itself as an inclination But m . I also can no longer esteem myself from the higher point of view. but likewise elevated above nature I am not only a link in the series of natural. For nature h as causality. necessary that we are limited at all. it is result of oiir limitation. on the other hand. since otherwise consciousness it is accidental. self-actively interfere in this series. superior impulse an impulse which elevates me in my pure essence abov e time.— 148 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. this powe r of nat ure has not. but I over. is essential to th e EsoT smce it is grounded in the Egoness as sudi. that power becomes somethiag which I no longer esteem. and become a part of that which I cannot esteem. the pure impulse is a higher. arouses as me to esteem myself. the higher itself impulse manifests esteem. as an empirical being to elevate myself above nature. I am of to deter- 'mme myseit nature. would be impossible. in its relation to the inclination which would drag me down into the series of natural causality. I am thus not only .

The higher impulse makes enjoyment. and. contemptible. which consists in absolute self-determinedness and self-sufficiency. It never has enjoyment on the contrary. for mere enjoy- ment's sake. despises enjoyment. It has for its object solely the maintenance of my dignity.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. 149 all nature. a dignity superior to for its object. .

this harmony or . That which interests me. : independent of all reasoning. must have an immediate relation to my impulse. and. What does this signify: something has immediate relation to an impulse ? The impulse itself is only object of feeling hence. it has only a remote relation to my impulse. it becomes almost necessary for us to step out of the systematic connection. through which we hope to spread a clearer light over the important but difficult investigation to which we now have to pass over. in order to furnish a preliminary description of a conception. some events are utterly indifferent to and it is to be supposed that these expressions are understood by all. signifies therefore its harmony or disharmony with the impulse is felt in advance of all reasoning. and It is a fact that us. In opposition to our usual habit. an immediate relation to it could also "only be felt^. CONCEENING CONSCIENCE. All mediated interest (interest is something as aTmeans to attiiin a certain object) is grounded in an immediate interest. That which is indifferent to me has apparently no relation but since this is impossible. and cannot be produced by any arguments.CHAPTER VIII. But I feel only myself. on the contrary. An interest in something is of an immediate character. — — . while others arouse our interest. No one can cause you to rejoice or sorrow by the power of his demonstrations. hence.

from an impulse.^ which.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. as determined in the mere idea. as a pure and empirical being who haye become one. Whence arises this interest in myself ? Simply from an impulse since all . only through means of that impulse. yearnmg. is directed upon someNow. dis- satisfaction ensues. \ enjoyment. and \t arises in this manner: my fundamental impulse. Now. posit . that is to say. but in the subject of consciousness. whenever my thing in an immediate manner. and both enjoyment or are but the and suffering or dissatisfaction. Where lies this parning ? Not in nature. determined being. Let us look at the matter from another side. and my actual empirical Ego. All interest i s mediated through the interest I have in myself. namely. all interest arises — — actual condition agrees with this direction or requirement of the original impulse. a material involved relation of the external world to my body. or must be simply a or disharmony of myself with myself. is nothing but the organizing impulse of This impulse directs itself to the selfour nature. harmony 151 disharmony must be in myself. I suffer in all suffering. is an impulse craving harmony between my original Ego. . and it is only a modification of this self-interest Whatsoever interests me relates itself to me I enjoy in . or disharmony of my immediate sensation of harmony actual condition. and whenever satisfaction. enjoyment arises . for it has been Yearning has for its object liothing that is not reflecteH! in the natural impulse. out of these two very different components of myself. which is necessitated to unite that impulse with itself synthetically. with the condition required by the nothing original impulse. in truth. my actual condition contradicts that requirement. Now this original impulse namely the pure and the natural impulse in their union is a determined impulse. The lower faculty of desire arises from an impulse. or to posit itself as The impulsg manifests itself through a bein g imyelled.

and hence its results. but it impels thus impelling itself. since it is formaliter free. is the harmony of the actuality with its requireor ments. but . there m one —for it is not directed upon anything which is is expected as a favour from nature. Now. independently of the natural impulse. JeV^y^^/t^e-^'^d'*-*' 152 / r) THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. a pt proper to say that this impulse is a yearning— ]ike the lower fore. of course. _itself. Doubtless. It determines itself. This pure impulse rather an It manifests itself in consciousness with it is all the^mqre vigour so to use this expression as grounded not upon a mere feeling. why do we not content ourself with the cold judgment of cognition. It is. or of the requirement of the higher impulse. whether by accident or through free this satisfaction is perceived. we will leave undecided activity. or which does not depend upon ourselves. in which case both the subject of the impulse and the actually active are in harmony. Now there will either result a determination such as the higher impulse required. which we should apply to a plant. and contemplates itself The pure impulse craves to find the acting^ Ego selfsufficient and determined through itself. but upon a con- — — templation. and which arises through the Ego contemplating internally its absolute power. moreover. through itself. Here. and causes the enjoyment. The pure impulse does not occur as an affection . and say. "Our body grows and prospers". my fundamental impulse has such a judgment for its immediate object.. enjo yment "? J? say. Cause the Ego to act.so far as the pure imp ulse js an impulse to be active for the sake of being active. 'THHT^FEich satisfies this impulse. is that this yearning satisfied. and a feeling of approval results . the Ego is not bein^ impelled.a contemplation. . This is does not occur a mere feeling of the impulse. there- But it is quite difyerent concerned. _absolut^ ^^jjT^c^^j^^. why do we. "We experience mis reason.

or disapproval. whether we must despise ourselves or_not.THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY. free. estranges me from perhaps. Hence the en] oy men?" whic h a~EInd which tears me away trom myselfj and "wherein I forget myself. for that requirement of absolute self -activity^ and harmony I of the empirical . iJT'so far as"T"am arises self. and which.lincf m^gajent — —a mere of the or must it necessarily be con- nected with a I nf inf. the best characteristic for all sensuous enjoy- . be cold of cognition fop. But determinedis n ess or But in the present case there nothing but activity."^^*'y^n involiLntarii enjoyment (which is.e.. and that disapproval w ith diss atisfac tion^ it cannot be indifierent to us. as it does. Thus it is. It is th e harmony of the contemnlaJion with the requirement"oitn^mpulse. resulting. from it is of myself. is felt. without our active co-operation. the natural impulse does_not _dgpend upon myself. may a feeling result ? of both. which is not an act. an impulse remains unsatisfied hence that approval is necessarily associated I with satisfaction. but a determined condition. therefore. i. we (This possibility of sesthetical feeling.prpst? Evidently the latter. and a feeling of disapproval will combined with contempt. For the harmony of actuality with itself tke original . and if it does not harmonize with it. feeling arises only as the result of limitation. ia this kmd "of satisfaction nothiag which has the character of ordinary enjoyment. clear that we must not be understood as if Through th e harmony asserted the feeling of a contemplation. 153 or the reverse results. Ego with this reguireinent^ is imyulse Now if the latter harmonizes with the former. moreover. How then. of an important remark. since it explams^e which is also the feeling a contemplation. however. in the requirement as well as in the fulfilling of the same. and lies between the two feelings is here described. which would be contradictory.) Now can this approval. an impulse is being satisfied. a. arise. which i s felt. There is.

ani pecLce of conscience put tnere is no such tmng as ment of conscience.n d sp. this satisfacand the grouncTomn^atisiaetion. without which no consciousness wBatever wer e the im med iate consciousness of our higher possible ' nature and aDsolute ireedom.1 f-con tem p t. if it were not that this unceasing requirement of conscience. but rather back into myself. usually named . the feeling that self -contempt. Hence myself. however. as it were. In the same manner it is ment). but somethiag which depends upon my freedom. There is rest or unrest of consci ence reproaches of Conscience. but more intense. is not something foreign. The ter conscience i s admirably chosen. also the opposite of this satisfaction it —precisely because was dependent upon our freedom produces disgust which latter never accompanies sensuous sel f-reproach pam. Hence it does not conduct me out of tion. and if it were not that this self-contempt were lessened by bearable. with the opposite sensuous pain. as such a. ^ . m . This feeling of self-contempt would be absolutely un- — — the if it were not that the requirement of moral law. i sffi. . we are still capable of entertaiaing Jvi^lier feeling. In relation to the pure impulse. . which arises out of our own self. infuses again courage and esteem in us. continuing to be addressed to us. again would raise us in our own esteem.'><^ii. ana infuses new courage and new strength. It is.r-f. the immediate conscuyiisness of that.— 154 — THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. Jhis described is feeljag. something which I had cause to expect in accordance with a rule. I 1 ' which might weU be called conscience. It is not so jnuch which never is the characteristic enjoyment as sat\ of sensuous enjoyment It is not so turbulent.

. Hence I am. which — proposition has. as such. as will appear hereafter. as those mystics hold. simply for the sake of that material. in a reflection. who have treated the science of morality in simply a formaliter way. . except the internal act of self- determining. The natural. which addresses itself the subject of consciousness.CHAPTEE IX. • — . upon enjoyment simply for the sake of enjoyment whereas. The higher impulse. for at the requirement just to determine it. requires that I shall be able to posit myself as free. indeed.j5 i. its basis something true and if sublime. impulse is directed upon a material somewhat. the "pure unpidse craves absolute indepenaence of the active. but not A. . . causality. ought to have arrived at nothing but a continual self-denial utter abnegation and vanishing of self. FUNDAMENTAL PEINCIPLE OF AN APPLICABLE SCIENCE OF MORALS. simply for the sake of freedom nevertheless. in any positive doiTig. it cannot as yet be conceived otherwise than a mere negative causality. or craves freedom If the pure impulse has. who teach that we ought to dissolve our self into God. But we look closer now established. indeed. AU writers. from that natural impulse. as resulting merely in a haviing undone. with a we shall find that it will vanish view under our to very hands into a nothing. preventing the accomplishment of what the natural impulse craves and hence.



my freedom, as a positive somewhat, as the ground an actual doing, and not of a mere leaving undone. I, the reflecting, am, therefore, to relate a certain determination of the will to myself as the determining, and to
to ^os,it

be forced to attribute this will solely to



Hence, the willing, which. is to be related, is to be somethiQg objective, perceptible, in us. But everything objective belongs to us solely as sensuous and natural



in fact, through this





ourselves posited for oiirselves in this objective sphere.










and elsewhere abundantly proven, in

its special



actual willing

necessarily directed


upon an acting, but all my acting an acting directed upon objects. Now, in the world objects, I always act by means of natural force, and


given to



impulse, nay,

nothiiig but

through the natural impulse as it exists

simply nature's own causality but which is no longer within nature's own control, as a dead and unconscious nature, having passed under my control, as an intelligence, through means of my free reflection. Hence, even the most immediate object of all possible willing is necessarily something empirical, is a certain determination of my sensuous power, given to me through my natural impulse, and thus something required by that natural impulse, since this impulse only gives by requiring. Each possible conception of an end tends, therefore, to satisfy a natural In short, all actual williag is empirical. impulse.



in other words,


upon nature



pure will

no actual will, but a mere idea, a something absolute from out of tM intelligible world, which we thiak of as the explanatory ground of someis

thing empirical.
It is scarcely to be a;pprehended, after all

we have


previously, that anyone should understand us as asserting

that the natural impulse, as such, produces the willing.


It is I


w ho

win, and


nevertheless, so far as the

n ature that wills within me; s ubstance of vxj wil l is con-

had she the power

only will that which i;^,t,i:(re would also wjll, ! to wlU. 1 the im.invl&p. tn \^'^;^i^^\^x^^^^r^m^^^A^^^^^A^r^

but, at least, the causality of that cancelled.

impulseseem^itterly" In truth only Yrirma/ freedom remains to me

Although I am impelled "do something, which might have its material ground solely in myself. I. nevertheless, do never and can never do anything, which the natura.



impulse does not require, since




possible acting

exiiausted "through that impulse.


But the ^ausaUty of my pure impulse must never be smce i posit myself as Ego only in so far

as I posit such causality.


are involved in a contradiction which




more remarkable

what both

of the propositions, just

now mentioned,


as this contradiction, is also
self- consciousness.

established as a condition of



this contradiction to be solved


to the laws of synthes is, only in the following

pur e

the materia,!
in one


the act" must be at the same time, and
acting, conformable to the

and the same

impulse, and to the natural impulse.
in the original impulse, so
actuality of acting.

As both

are united
in the

must they be united

The purwhich directs the act, has for its but that the act object complet e liberation from nature is, and remains nevertheless conformable to the natural
This can only be comprehended as follows.
pose, the conception



the result, not of our freely produced con-

ception, but of our limitedness.

The only determining

of our

of the

matter of our acts

to relieve ourselves

dependence from nature, although the required The pure impulse crave s independence never results. for absolute independence, and the act is in conformity with that impulse if it also is directed upon such inde-


is to say,

pendence, that


it lies

in a

series, the


whereof would result in the absolute independence of the Hgo. Now, according to the proof just established the Ego can

be Ego and end of rational beings lies necessarily in iT]finit,nrlp^ and i s an end which can never De reali^ecr completely, but to which the Ego can incessantly draw nearer by virtue of its spiritual nature. I must here take cognizance of an objection which I would not have considered possible had it not been raised by men of good minds, and who are even well initiated
never become independent, so long as
it is to

hence the

in transcendental philosophy..
they, to




possible, sav

draw nearer




end? does not







were speaking of infinitude as a thing in itself. ^J draw nearer; for But I never can grasp infinitude, and hence myself "have always a determined end before my eyes, to which I doubtless can draw nearer, although, after having attained it, I may have removed my true end just as far, partly through the greater perfection my whole being has acquired, and partly through the greater perfection of my insight and although I may thus be as much removed as ever, in this general sense, from the infinite, and may never get nearer to it, my end hes in infinitude because my dependence is an infinite dependence. This dependence I never seize, however, in its infinite character, but only in its determined sphere, and in this determined

This question sounds as



sphere I doubtless can

make myself more and


There must be such a whereof the Ego can think




itself as

drawing nearer to

absolute independence, for only on this condition is a causality of the pure impulse possible. This series is
necessarily determined from the first point, upon which nature has placed a person, into infinity (of course only ideally), and hence in each possible case it is determined



what the pure impulse may require under such conditions. Hence we can call this series the moral determinedness of the finite rational being. Now, although this series is as yet unknown to us, we have clearly shown that it must necessarily occur. "We are, therefore, safe in basing

and may

establish, as

the fundamental










at each time,

what mm, art determined




i^r> t




I determined














thy destination

is general,


at once the infinity of the end established for us, since

that end can be fulfilled in no time.



error nf the





based on their representing this



no time completely attainable end, as an end attain -

The utter annihilation of the individual. and submersion of the same in the absolute and pure form of reason, or in God, is most certainly the final end of finite reason, but it is also not possible in any time.) The possibility to fulfil at each time, singly, one's destination, is certainly grounded through nature herself, and given in nature. The relation of the natural impulse
able in time..
is as follows at each conformable to our moral destination, and this same something is also required at the same time by the natural impulse (provided nature is left to herself, and has not been made artificial through a

to the principle here established




corrupt imagination).



by no means follows that

that which the natural impulse requires should also



conformable to our moral determinedness. let the series of the natural impulse









e tc.


the moral

determinedness of the individual may, perhaps, take and realize only a part of B/ where by the natural impul se resuitmg from a will certainlv be altered but even in

this, its altered

form, the moral determinedness of the




may take and realize only a part of it; and ad infinitum. But in each possible determinedness so on both impulses partly join. It is only thus that morality

possible in actual acting.
It is possible to explain still


clearly the


relation of both impulses.


higher impulse


as the just


describe d moral, and on no account

does not manifest itself as an impulse which craves absolute independence, but as an impulse craving determined acts, which acts, however
as a pure imnulse:

brought to consciousness show themselves to lie For in that series of absolute independence of the Ego. it has already been shown, that the impulse, as a pure

the impulse craving



and they are examined



impulse, as

one directed merely upon a negation, can never enter consciousness. We never become conscious Experience, of a negation, simply becaiise it is nothing.
moreover, proves this


feel Jmpellfid, to

do this or

and reproach ourselves
All this






or that.


state here to

correct those


deny consciousness of the categorical imperative (of the moral impulse), and do not admit a pure impulse. We show here that a thorough transcendental philosophy


not assert such a consciousnfess.


|,h pi



all consciousness,



transcendental expla,natory ground of
scio usness.


in con-

The moral impulse


a mixed impuls e, as

we have


the natural impulse

receives the material,

in other wordgrTRe natural impulse is upon the same act, which it craves, at least in part. But its form it has solely from the pure impulse. It is absolute, like the pure impulse, and demands, without any external end, simply because it does. It has absolutely no enjoyinent of any kind for its object. In short, what it craves is absolute independence. But has this independence then no end again, no enjoyment, or or its object_;



something of the kind, for its final object? No; absolutely no such end. That absolute independence is simply its own end. I am to crave it simply because I


to crave it;

simply because I



The internal


which accompanies


thing accidental.
it arises

The impulse does not




from the impulse.
appeals to esteem: and obedience, or

Th e moral impulse
disobedience to
satisfaction, or
is 'positive;

excites approval or disapproval, self-

most painful self-contempt.
relates itself

The impulse
It is


impels to a determined activity.



to all possible free acts, to



the natural impulse, which

brought to consciousness. It is self-suffijcient, always proposing to itself its own aim it craves absolute causality, and stands in reciprocity with the natural impulse, borrowing from it its matter, and giving it its form. Finally, it commands categorically. What this impulse requires is

imperatively required, and as a necessity.


The moral impulse demands freedom

for the sake










used here in two different meanings ? In the latter instance it is used to designate an ol^ective condition to be produced or the final absolute end. namely, complete independence from all externality;




first instance, it signifies an acting as and not any real being, signifies, in short, something pi^dysuhjectiva I am to act free in order to

whereas, in the

become free._

But even in the conception


freedom as


occurs in

When instance, a distinction is to be observed. a free act occurs, we may ask (i^ fTfion it nmfjt be done in order t,n he. a. frse a.o,f, and (2^ what must be done to



a free act.



we may

inquire after

both the form and the cnntent of freedom. Now the content we have already investigated, and


; ;



have found that the act must be one of a series, through the infinite continuation whereof the Ego will become absolutely independentr'We'Eave" now, therefof&i'tolook
finally at the form.



to act free, that is to say, I as posited Ego, as



tcT determine myself, or


to act with

consciousness of


absolute self-determining character

with considerateness and reflection. Only thus do I act free as intelligence and otherwise I act Mindly, a s chance impels ine. I, as intelligence, am to act in a determined manner that is to say, I am to become conscious of the ground, why I act precisely in this manner. Now this ground cannot, because it must not, He another ground, because this precise act lies within the described series^or since this is a philosophical view and not the view of





act is duty.



conformably to the conception of my duty am t o determine.mysel f sn1p.1v t-,hrnn|yT^ he thought tHat this act is my duty^ and through no other thought or
to act solely

motive A few words concerning the last remark. Even the moral impulse is Hot to determine me as mere blind impulse; indeed, the very thing is contradictory, and morality can never merely impel. We touch here again what we have already said when it appeared that the impulse, to be


addresses itself to the intelligence as such.;

the intelligence

to be self-determined as intelligence;

but an intelUgence, as such, is only self-determined when it determines itself through conception, and absolutely
not through mere impulse.

The impulse,

therefore, both

craves and does not crave causality, and has causality

simply through not having
intelligence _ he free
it is is



If the



demands of the mere impulse

not moral, but altogether natural impuls e, for

altogether immoral to be blindly impelled.

for instance,

the case with the impulses of sympathy.


1 1
' ^

humanity, &c ^hese impulses


It will appear, in the proper place, that aaiifest^^^j^ jjyi nf thp. moral impulse.



mixed with

tlie "a.tnra.1 iTnpTiJRR

Hnpi|1sp. is

always TmivpH

moral 11 Now, the man who follows '»



inrlPA d the

these impulses may act very charitably, humanely, &c., but he does not act morally, on the contrary, jw so far as he Uindl.'^i fnllnwa tbpsjQ irnpulses, he acts immorall y. Here, therefore, arises for the first time the cateyorical imperative, as being a concevtion and not an impulse. It is not the impulse which is itself the categorical imperative, but the impulse drives us t o form such an im erative; p impels us to say that sometmng snail be done it is our own product; our product in so far as we are intelligences, or beings capable of producing conceptions.


then, the rational beiag, in determiuing its will,

is not itself Matter does not determiiie the rational being, nor does the rational being determine itself through the mediation of anything

in form, torn loose from ail which

material, but solely through the formal, and, in itself, generated conception of an absolute imperative. And, in

manner, we indeed receive back again the rational
its actuality, precisely as

being in


originally posited


namely, as the absolutely self-determined; as, indeed, everything that is original must represent itself in actuality, only with further additions and determinations.
It is only in the act impelled

representative of

by duty that we find such a the rational being, for all other acts

have a determining ground which is foreign to the Hence, Kant also says that it is intelligence as such. only through the power of morality that the rational being manifests itself as something in itself, namely, as something independent, self-sufficient, existing through no reciprocity with anything external, but simply existing
for itself.



the inexpressibly sublime character

of duty, since all that is external sinks

down so low under and vanishes into nothingness, when compared with

our destination.






th e. form of morality follow these two results to act, in fieneral, with considerateness and

pnlses, anH



and in obedience"


nm. ^nff.o'ridri.r^

yfifh fhf. conscjousness of

mere imdutv


never to act without first having related mv act t o Hence, there are no indifferent acts at _this conception. The moral law relates to all acts if not materiatiter, ail.


at least surely formaliter


are truly acts of the


Formaliter: for




inquir e

whether the moral law relates to them or not, and
vfery inquiry

establishes already a relation.

But even

am never to obey the sensuous impulse as such, but all my acts are result of that impulse; hence I must relate each act to the moral law, or I cannot act at all.
materialiter the relation can be proven: for I



I am



act against




To do

so is

completest perversity and wickedness.
nevertheless possible, and that



that such a perversity, which in itself seems impossible,
is it loses,

at least, that

horrible character



has for every uncorrupted


in its true appearance,




Both these results gathered into one might be expressed; Act always in accordance with your best conviction of vour 'I'hiH ia t.hp duty ; or, act according to your annxriemrA

_formal condition of the morality of our acts, which, for that reason, has been pre-eminently called the morality

of those acts.


shall discuss these formal conditions

bf morality

iii the first chapter of our Applied Science of Morals, and establish in the second the materi al co nditions of the morality of our acts.



A willing. moreover. what is acts. both are united. and as I myself intend thus to characterize first it behoves will. systematic deduction of the formal conditions of the morality of our But since this formal morality. by consciousness of the object of this inclination. the desire. is accompanied ^^f^nclmation.^ This act has been abundantly described before. and the Ego which contemplates itself ln"^Sswansitioii^ and which is called the subiective Jjjgo. .BOOK THIRD. all that which belongs to this investigation has been already said under other names. 167 . with consciousness of this t ransition. and yet. is n gmi^will. me to give an account of my conception of the True. Buty in willing itself. and which is called The objective Ego. for that very reason. The impulse the yearnin g. is an absolutely free transition from undeterminedness to determinedness. I MIGHT begin immediately with a synthetic. is also called good will. . . indeed. pre-eminently termed morality. and "the desire. CONCERNING THE FORMAL CONDITIONS OF THE m MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. in order to connect what will follow with what has been previously established. in tiie distinction examination of this willing we may draw a between the Ego which proceeds from jin - determinedness to determinedness. it. it is necessary to say it also under the present name. concerning the will in particular. Peeliminary. The impulse to be sure.

etc. and an unfree wUl is . and if he is not free. it has also never been made. because it is not necessary to make it in ordinary but in philosophy. The fact that the object may be given through the natural impulse does not contradict this result. If man wills. we shall arrive at the conception of willing in general. he does not will. An it actually perceptible is But a wilUng is not complete d. by choosing from many possible objects one particular object. strictly speaking. no wilhng.1 68 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. of the word. transition gives a willing. proposes to itself as intelligence tne object of its willing. If we look at the general yower of making that transition consciously and the laws of theoretical reason force us . as a power to will. he is free. The will is free in the material significance. but is impelled. object. Nature produces no will. nothing actually perceptible. this distinction between this general conit is it is when determined no lono-er called willing. nature cannot even produce a yearniag. as a de termined expression of this general power. and is indeed. . unless determined. where it is very necessary to make this distinction. the will an absurdity. not a fact. my will your will. as. In this respect the will In short. this will. for instance. in so far as it wiUs. into a likewise contemplated and comprehended determinedness. a power an abstract conception. and a will. But but a will. but not as an object of the will or of the determined resolve to realize absolutely gives itself its is it. The Ego. It is only through willing that determinedness results. as to will. and by changing the undeternunedness. made. nay. is never life. a power in thinking This is to the act of transition. For the natural impulse only gives it as an object of yearning or desire. which the inteUigence contemplates and comprehends. own absolutely free. ception of willing. to addsoSa. but neither is accompanied by a determinedness of the Ego? Desire would well like its object to come to it. In common life. but cannot itself move hand or foot to reach it.

without the latter perceiving Let us posit a natural force = X. it necessarily works mechanicall y. contradictory to Now is this law applicable to the will ? Let me first state again what I have already insisted on. i. know the opposite Now if the will proceeds from undeterminedness to determinedness and it has been strictly proven that this is a condition of the consciousness of freedom.e. THE MORALITY pF OUR ACTIONS. Ego does not yet beeome conscious of itself as of a reflecting. as 169 we have seen before. or the Ego generally. since yearning presupp oses a It is true that in this retlec'tion the jeflection. In other words. enters on the stage.A. and hence of the Ego itself. Let us see at once what the former preit. .o when the characteristic of the will is insisted on. and hence assumes that the yearning within it is a product of nature. that it y C i must choose from several equally possible acts. If the production of "* and it were assume it to be some . from the transcendental point to be the case. and which is the most important: as soon as the will.. and we ourselves. for the final such a force then it i s necessarily = A. Ebmaek. produces at all times only that which it can produce conformably to its nature under such condition. . although external observers. supposed. is = A. Some philoso phers have discovered a contradictio n in tiiat it is the assertion equally possible for freedom to seize opposite resolves. will is nnMnA arbitrary called n — A ' -^ ^ *• +-1^ -iw e. nothing at all. natural force is utterly at an end. What force can these produce? neither A nm. Since it is a natural force. and that the wiU is determined as above described then the will must be a power to choose. n vhii inTt nw a 00 U'r\-n a xir^ 11 \K7^ -hit without a rbitrarine ss. -either A or -A and other philo- sophers have been puzzled to refute this assertion of a contradiction. and can produce.. of view.-A. For the.l-ii •J-v. whereby it has at the — same time been proven that there is a will. in fact. flo wifl ^ \\\f\\^. as such.

instead of doing so. But it is also asserted that the will does not work it in a mechanical manner. Now those who hold that it is a contradiction to assert the will to be able to work out either or . They assert the will to be itself a natural force. cannot surmount. it may determine to effect either the former or the latter without any external grounds. therefore. then the will is . and i. and an impulse has is no causality both it is .A is asserted to be equally possible. and hence. much higher than they It is a contradiction to their whole individual power of thinking. indimechanism. in such a manner that if its total sphere embraces both and -A.A.I70 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. is product of that force an impulse. their results are correct enough. namely." in is not which form their statement may well be allowed lies to pass. to conceive another series than the series of natural They have never elevated themselves to the higher manifestations of thinkirig. but simply through itself. Hence it not for nature." but rather "it contradicts onr assertion that the will free. and with A A this presupposition.e. ought to accept this presupposition. and hence their absolute presupposition which they. namely. that the will is not free from the presupposition that the will is not free. is For if thereby asserted to be the primary or the commencing link of a series and hence to be not determined by any previous asserted that the will free . vidually. But. that the will is a link of the chain of natural forces. But the true contradiction believe. " Their absolute principle is: everything happens mechanically.. for the will. of course. to speak properly. they ought not to say "the proposition that the will is free contradicts itself. but for the absolute opposite to nature. t rather caw effect." for in their clear . They prove. they presuppose that which we deny to them. does not eifect all that hence is able to limit itself through itself to any particular work. but does consist in a power to work or not to work. that A and . or o^er link.

the upon the natural impulse manifestations. is 171 merely mechanical nor is the matter changed by placing the ground of our moral resolves in the spiritual world. and I may well become conscious —not originally. ness has been developed. moreover. but after self-conscious. become conscious merely of formal freedom I thereby. and of the unselfish moraTI jmgTJsa^ Let us now examine this further determination. according to statement that our will determinations are the effect of an influence from the spiritual world (or God). we only drag down that world to the level of the sensuous world. sacrifice. but likewise formal. : continue to manifest itself in a manifold manner. detennination . choose one of them. when the category of causality since all is applied also to the spiritual world. I only to another enjoyment. since I choose with the consciousness of self^ but I do not enjoyment to morality.— THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. In the latter case. the ground of our will determinations is asserted to be lq something spiritual. and to I choose. applies is. among the mamf possible ways of satisfyinp it. and in doing so act with full power I attain is one to reflect iQ the manifold bearings of its freedom. attain first and foremost the power to and ^postpone the satisfaction of the natural impulse since the natural impulse will. in such case. during this postponement. and experience been gathered If I not only of the former but also of the latter. cbrnVe between the satisfaction of the ( ^ which that category Kant sensuous world ? (By the to Egotistic (natural) impulse. consciousness nothing but what occurs. determined as being a. sacrifice one enjoyment . as intelligence.) This necessary choice of the will is. but which determines us precisely in the same manner as a physical power. But how can a ground of distinction be applied between such effects and physical It is thus with all fatalism : effects. according to a distinction deduced above . Freedom is not merely m aterial. and the e.ffect whereof are our will determinations.

. worn-out voluptuary." it might he ohjected. fore. &c. Thus the virtue. but the opposition would only be between morality and immorality. of men who are on the way to culture. to an imaginary enjoyment. and can now choose to sacrifice all the present cravings of my nature to this artificial one. (This is the usual procedure of merely refined men. which is nothing inore than a discreet choice from amongst various means of satisfymg the natural impulse. had I not checked myself. Hence even if the objection were true. When a certain amount of experience had already been acqtdred by me. postponed my resolve. I would still have determined my wUl through self-determination. should reply: "This stronger impulse would not be. to Of course do not sacrifice my present impulses which would result from satisfying my actual impulses. and reflected with freedom on the totahty of my impulse. there- give to myself in these cases the objects of I my wiU. the coxcomb. their true physical enjoyments to .. and thus my will would remain materialiter free. I must certainly. " vn so doing you only cede to the strongest impulse. I only sacrifice the real enjoyment. through imagination. and the products of imagination that craving did certainly exist in in are surely products of freedom. According to the above conception of will. and resulted an actual enjoyment. rigorously applied. sacrifice merely imaginary ones." I Now this objection were true in general. Hence mere imagiaation impels me to choose. " Nevertheless. prudence were not at all possible. Formerly my nature. only in this manner iaja^-itdence possible.J72 THE SCIENCE OE ETHICS. This enjoyment I now endeavour to reproduce through imagination." But that objection is not true in general. the miser. would not have entered my consciousness. represent an enjoyment which my nature does not crave at present. I can. and foolishly imagine yourself free when you only even if follow one impulse amongst many.) Indeed.

-fv^ti*. if my convic - I have not done my duty. look either ai tne tprm or the content of this or. since I am to convmce myself. A. Such a comparison and examination is If it is not a a duty. In that case tion is a wrong one? calm in this ? How it. in so far as I can represent it to myself in the 'present moment. the formal law of m orals "J is as follows Act absolutely . but of all my possible ' . as we have seen: At all times trv to convince yourself as to what vour duty is. do and do it solely because you are convinced it is your : .CHAPTER I. in conformity with your con- viction of your duty We may law-. hold Hence I do not apply it to have been a wrong one.: in regard to the latter. impossible that my my act merely to the conception of my present convic- tion but I again apply this conviction to the conceptio n conviction—to the whole system of my co nviciion. at the condition which may here be a and the conditioned. But how ? somebody might object. So far as the former is concerned. CONCERNING THE FORMAL CONDITIONS OF THE MORALITY OF OUE ACTIONS. in an infinite existence. impossible that I shall ever. f^i^^^^'f' duty. but have acted in violation of How can I be Evidently only in so far as I consider it conviction might be a wrong one. As we have : seen. it involves Whatsoever you are convinced is your duty. nay. clearer expression. rather the highest ""matter" of indifference to me. it involves.

the development whereof whole theory. subject of life. unless there is an absolute criterion of the which jigainst conscienc e. . then such a criterion must exist now the moral law says such behaviour is possible: hmux such a criterion does observed. of the correctness o f our convictions respectinpj duty viction must be absolutely corfect. IS a very important remark. Let the manner of our drawing this conclusion be We say. Hence accident. appears to me. whether my conviction is true or erroneous. . then * it the correctness of my conviction in any particular case is . As I may err in judging any particular case. or ia my conviction of the total ity of absolute self-sufficiency and all this my conviction. If dutiful will bring a firm connection tato our conduct in life is to be at all possible . alwa ys remain depen dent upon an When T consider it — and it is my duty consider is I must either act trusting to chance . Hence a certain conand which we must accept for the sake of duty. to my ^ morality . or I pass my i correctness of (^I'liis my conviction of duty. Tut whole life in a state of undecidedness. if dutiful behaviour is to be possible. I 1 whether I act in conformity to duty can also not be a matter of indifference to me. This is the onl y alternative. guaranteed by is itself its agreeing with all thinkable conviction this and the investigation. my repose of conscience.) B. and gain for us an easier transition from the formal to the material conditions of morality. whether a duty. my or not.— 174 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. always wavering between doing and not doing. / must not act at all. Hence. so may I also er r in judging my judg- ment in general. harmony exists or not . there must be an^bso]^l^CTS^!on . But the whole system of my conviction cannot be given to me in any other manner than through my present conviction of it. never yet sufficiently it considered.

and it is duty to consider it as true. it cannot itself establish this conviction. i. The theoretical faculties pursue their even tenor until they arrive at what meets our approval but those faculties do not contain in them. 'ground in the moral law itself. as moral law to theoretical reason. is absolutely true. . "We thus assert a relation of the We or the vritnacv of the former. 175 therefore conclude from the existence and the necessary causality of a moral law as to the existence of something else in our power of cognition. since the practical activity of the Ego is not the theoretical activity. Kant expresses it. same as already established previously.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. all would. selves the criterion of the correctness of their result. The opposite would indeed lead . exist. This criterion is to be found in the practical faculty. let the following be observed: the moral law assuredly requires a certain determined conviction = A. holds that the in itself contradictory. and make it our duty to hold to it. But such an assertion is partly to a material belief -morality ^TiftrgJ . with only a the moral law is viz. But since the moral law is not a power of cognition. moreover. That without which duty in general were impossible. but expects the power of cognition to establish and determine it through its reflecting power of judgment and only after it has been thus established through cognition does the moral law authorize it. which is the first and highest faculty in man.e. : . . open the door to suppression of manner of deceptions and to the conscience. . ^ to a theory whigh law contains certain theoretic al do£mas which must be accepted as true without any further examination as to whether we can or not convince ourselves of their truth. and must receive its content from another i But that something is its content must have its I Source. and authorizes it. constituting Our present assertion is the indeed his true essence. Lest this proposition should be altogether misapprehended. further determination added purely formal.

difficult question. something or leave something undone. not This X X must therefore be discovered by the free reflecting power of judgment. manifest ? itself. if not materialiter to give this X. as is always the case" according to what we have said above in this circumstance. however. namely. absolute liberation from aU limitation and it has finally a completely determined way to reach this end. and it may be said that the moral law. said. at least formaliter to Hence the moral impulse here manifests discover it. Hence it as has been cannot give this to . The much more however. a theoretical is it judgment respecting duty. in its application to empirical Let us designate this deterbeings. postulates this duty. there is an impulse to act generally. hijaasU^ it has moreover a determmed although never to be attained end. is itself. has a determined beginning point of its sphere. this impulse determines the power of judgment. is Hence for each determined man there to do in each point of his life a determined duty. Now the practical power theoretical. Let us assume that the power of judgment finds X. itself as an impulse to realize a determined cognition. and recognised — man. . be. and the impulse to realize the cognition will agree with the fact that the Ego and the empirical Effl will be in h armony and there results a feeling.— 176 : THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. mined doing or leaving undone = X. namely. The only question is: what sort of a feeling may this cognition has been found: the original and how is it to be distinguished from other feelings? All sesthetical feelings are like the present one in this. the law. which the power of judgment cannot do. arises now of how how does the confirmation by the moral law. the determined limitation wherein the in dividual finds himself by first finding. Since. in its relation to empirical : : The moral order of nature. which seems to depend upon chances. and moreover to realize the determined X through this action. namely.

that I other things. How do I know it ? Surely not from the objective is — my judgment. like its opposite. o. pjiitp. importSt. there cannot arise here as in the case of those other sesthetical feelings an enjoyment which unexpectedly surprises us. that there i8 a_£eelinsiof truth and ' . and there arises — undertaken at the ingtigation„Qf. there results in the 'cogmiion immediate satis/action. which has. above all (I know. realize a .^doubt.. therefore. wTiPr eof we Speak h ere. compulsion. as sure as reason is reason. binds me^ quality of as is th e cas e in every feeTSg! certainty. So long as th e power of judgmen t is still searching for the cognition. certainty. certainty.\r\r>. which could not fail to manifest itself.) As soon as the power of judgment discovers the required cognition. that the impulse which lies at their basis does not absolutely demand its satisfaction. in cognitions true. the fact that it is the cognition which was required appears from a feeling of agreement which The power of imagination is now manifests itself. necessitated as through all reality. Thus. Ijimbt is some thing subjective. a feeling of. not yet been satisfied accompanied byanxiet^ because the matter is. That which excites this approvaLis called in actions 'jitst.rinn and that of ||ie this feeling is the feought-for absolute correctness of our conviction of duty We shall describe this important feeling somewhat more at length. doiibt. \-j-j that they arise from the satisfaction of an impulse to determined representation but they are distinct from the present one in this. nay.an impulse.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. necessity. — — but merely a cold approval of that which was to be expected. I cannot view the matter in any other way. for instance. But thg impulse to rpaliyp a. accompanied by peace and . but merely expects it as a favour of nature. Hence. It appears. IS the absolutely c ommanding moral impulse. the free power of i magination float s between from the facttnatthe search opposites. therefore..ryj]\\. and can only be felt.

proper. says Kant. This is the greatest evil. thou wouldst insist on these propositions of who seeth into all hearts. In like manner. were he ever so zealous a dogmatist. " ? Jjut is there it ? such a consciousness possible and how do I recognize Kant seems as is. that they are. " The consciousness that an act which : I undertake is just.178 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. do wrong in condemning him. after all. for dissenting to death this heretic?" : : : . and an evil wliicii no maiT'fea-n seriously entertain. indeed. can never be sure that he does not. indeed. faith. and staking all that from which thou art about to condemn he would most surely hesitate and tremble. also Kant." ought surely to have faith enough to add " but if it is not true. we might say he who is quite sure of his matter must be willing to risk eternal damnation for it. we ourselves will agree to be eternally damned". not so very firmly convinced of dogmas which they want to force upon others. This might convince them. Should he ask himself "Art thou confident that. and this done. those who get up and say " Whosoever does not believe all that we tell you will be eternally damned. ia the presence of Him : what we have just now by an instance which is what we have said. says Kant. who condemns a heretic. however. and yet how few would be willing to do it. EEMAEK. and if he is not willing to do so he betrays his uncertainty. should anyone ask what this might signify: to b e eternally damn ed? one could certainly give no other rational answer than :_ to give up all one's mora l improvement throughout all eternity. Kant § 4) excellently says {Religion Within the Limits of Pure Eeason. Using this analogy. is dear and holy to thee. but transcendental philosophy is obliged to show up the ground of the possibility of is such a feeling of certainty. is ^ unconditioned duty. to leave this to the feeling of each individual. perhaps. Now. illustrates admirably fitted to illustrate The judge of an inquisition.

This Ego is elevated time and changes in time. that all his freedom on that point is lost. as we have seen.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. It is. Hence. the unshakeableness of fixed conviction The result of the foregoing was this whether I doubt. least. and. infinitum. that he will be evermore confirmed in those>^» principles. indeeS. and posits itself as absolutely unchangeable. could not Ego. Only this is the safe criterion of true con'''?} ' ^ viction. is a matter which I become anxious of. the serious thought whereof would annihilate everyone. "which govern his actions. at considers it possible to change his mode of . or only for so and will amend in the course of therefore. This feeliag never deceives. 179 nay. explained. Only in so far as I am a moral being is certitude possible for me. ad. a sure sign that one's conscience is it and that they not clear. not above all harmony with .kg o. 'A^ : The proof is as follows Such a conviction places us in harmony with the original Ego. it only exists where there with the nure *is complete agreement o f 0TiiL. new proof of its correctness. since the criterion of all theoretiCT-F truth cannot be again theoretical. and —but through immediate feeUng. indeed. only this time. The theoretical power of . the empirical Ego also rises above all changes in time. Those who most wilfully sin against their own conscience comfort themselves secretly with the assurance that they intend to do so long a time. action at is some future time. in that it. and hence. '^ 'v. as a state of the mind. as. for. origmai It is only in this manner that subjective certainty. so at the risk that he never can change the principles u. and only the latter is our sole true being. all possible being and all possible truth. so long as he either fixedly determines. or am certain. may be But the feeling of certainty is always an of our consciousness with o:iir be otherwise in a pniiosopny wnich starts from the Ego. still or. Whosoever is sure of himself / / . : through argumentation —since that would need again a so on.£iiaiaikaL_ imme diate agreement . time.

since the Ego ob jective here. moreover. our final task. cognition cannot again criticize and confirm itself . mediately related to our have seen that the criterion of the correctness There is no external of our conviction is an internal one. in consequen ce Now^it is clear of thipj IJTnit. We of convictions these will be. and can be none other it Let usefulness of a thing . without definitely characterizing the impulse. because I place myself and the thing into a state of mutual quiet. purposes. But this does not prevent us from stating what kind 0. This criterion. criterion nor can there be such. .atinTi^ do T p n sit an objec t. and to state this at present.. then the limitation through the object changes into something which may be expanded regularly and in a certain order and such an expansion of my limits will also change the object. which this criterion will approve . . that I cannot posit and characterize the object. we observe the following My im pnlsR is b'mited. I determine its usefulness : its utility for various ' exist for us at all : : . indeed. must be utterly self-sufficient and independent of everything external. since it does not only apply to the immediate cognition cognition which duties. i8o THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. where we consider it as moral Ego. _the criterion must be practical. and. I receive the given qualities of the thing. It is only through the practical impulse that objects this is a proposition which has already been abundantly demonstrated. But I may also refiect upon my freedom therein. as. At present. of our duty. is universal. is. which limits it for a determined object is nothing. If I do so. be well observed that this determination of the is none other than of the internal unchanging qualities of a thing. is not. there no at least. If I posit this modificability of the object. and cannot be described otherwise than as somewhat limiting a determined impulse. but to is all possible cognition in general. and it must be duty to accept it. Thus.

But. and these cognitions are. that I have deduced the conception of usefulness from the relation of an object to freedom in general. . What I must. ' . moral behaviour. the latter thought. nor through opposition to myself the thiag. at the same time. of course. requires that each thin g should be treated according to its end-purpose. but not exactl y to my own freedom Something may be thought as useful. ^wlrhoui. perhaps. but onlv some arbitrary purpose for which it may also be My whole impulse craves absolute independence used. until I have apprehended it as such. I have Q iw« cog nitions of the end-purpose of objects and conscience 'does not approve a conviction vrntii this insight into the . impulse. have not recognized its true purpose. let it be well remembered. but. is at the . therefore. tne clear conscious additional thought that I. i8i is that it is regarded from a different In either case the object is determined through the impulse which it is to limit. I have not determined myself completely. If the latter is completely determined in the described manner. For. in the second case it is considered. the only difference view. basis of all conception of utility. end-purpose of the thing has been obtained. can apply this usefulness. whereas in the first case the possible liberation from its limitation is not considered. In the former case the impulse reposes in the second it is placed in motion. Th e m oral law. those which govern. — qualities and its uses are concerned. This result has opened to us the easiest transition to the scientific establishment of the material of the moral law.— THE MORALITY OP OUR ACTIONS. both so far as its utility of a thing . I only become partly conscious of my In that case I have grasped only partly the . or some other free being. In an imconscious way. moreover. a perfect synthesis. call attention to is this : we have just now established a complete finished system For moral impulse and of cognition. and self-sufficiency and.

Hence. as we have Hence.nd form nf a. and all morality — X regarded as primary. Thus. for X through the completed determination of the object. which manifests itself in "" the feelmp '" ^'' of certaiSWfaslve have shown. The only firm and final This duty is the Jjasis of all my knowledge is my Ju ty.brnngh itsp. m To mto herself and the reciprocity just established truth a reciprocity within the moral impulse itsel f. and.Jl its priRsiblp Tf now1edp.. the moral impu lse.ter a. . through nothing external in any manner whatever. That which we have otherwise asserted as simply the result of the conception of Egoness. that we . or. cognition determines the moral impulse in consciousness.lf . which. that is to say..). state "it aU as concisely as possible. The formal their condition of the morality of our acts. regarded objectively as a seen. etc. returns is. by means of the whole primary impulse..t. is. consists in pre- this. system. demands a determined conception = and through this demand deterinaccessible to itself mines. throughout. also determines materialiter the power of cognition in regard to the conception X.al THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS: knowledge stand in reciprocal relation to each is conditioned through this reciprocity of both. by givinig to it its object. it impels the reflecting power of judgment to hunt up tiiat conception. since that is its highest. eminently so-called morality. through the laws of sensuous representation. But the moral impulse. through a genetic deduction. when other. is its practical essence. the power of cognition /ormaZifej* . which determines all its cognition.n its filt " f thing m itap'if substance. through the mediation of cognition. the rational being even in respect to bntb Tna.d t.— i82 thegretifi. in so far. we here meet again. all cognition.rminP. . in so far as it occurs in consciousness. changes itself into a sensuous world. its own self -rela tion. On the other hand. The moral impulse. Tor that in the Ego.e is arises — — absolutely dRtP. in a more determined manner. intelligible " J. predetermined through the moral impulse.

the '^. The above destroyed the subterfno-e of an erring conscience. This is only to be understood as has been explained. COEOLLAEIA. Conscience never errs.^£. that consciousness in is nothiag but a consciousness of duty. that law wlucii prescnbesmat law shall be estiablished. solely for But conscience is the. which most of the present systems of morality still retain.^^\^^ "^"^ mS^T? namely. is an imineaiate . for it is the immediate consciousness of our pure original. 183 do that which conscience requires. but conscience furnishes the evidence . that it is absolute duty to acquire thi s consciousness. resolve to MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. immediate consciousness of our determined duty.THE. says : Conscience is a consciousness which ! 4^ J j It involves a and sublime statement twofold first. ment . . as it were. Ego. is itse lf Kant ^dutv . beyond which no other consciousness penetrates. to wit the consciousness of a determined somewhat is never immediate. and the sake of conscience : hence. cogpciou^ nesR a s soon as the deterinined is given. A : correct This is. our consciousnever immediate but the conscio usness that this determined somewhat is duty. and each one can so convince himself in every case. that each one is bound to convince himself as to what his duty may be. or. that is to say.^M^^j°^.^nd this is formal part of consciousness a mere feehng. and this sort of evidence occurs only in the consciousness of duty. so far as ness of duty is its material is concerned. which no other consciousness can test or correct. which is itself judge . deduction has for ever cancelled and I. The consciousness of (iuty is J'ormai&er uninediate . and conscience is no power of judgthat condition . as we have stated it. but can only be found through an act of thinking. and cannot err. It involves secondly. conscience does not furnish the material of our duty which it is the business of the power of judgment to furnish.

There is no excuse for sin. which always looks for the final ground of whatsoever is in and for the Ego. iand Before men are whetherjjjjjiafiiaBfi^Jiai^^ggkgji^^jij^ No sure on this point. he has determined he acts without being . for this . and remains sin. but it is surprising that he should be bold enough to confess it to himself and 2.thinking |i is an it illoglc aL. A but theoretical proposition is itie not and conviction certainty and sure which is felt. for tlie sake of its importance for morality itself. the power of judgment cannot err as to of all conviV. Lest the "word feeling should lead to misapprehen- sion. thus try to reach beyond it. Let proceed in its own manner. Its appea l. guilt is clear. to separate oneself from oneself. Thp. I hold it important to insist on this point as well. j any higher judge admit of no than itself. as for the science of morality. accompanies proposition anxious to think in thinkmg of such must not. 'which habits end marked out for strictly in advance. what obliges them to act at all ? act results through man unless If himself to achieve this act.ini ^. outside of tbp Y'?^ Such moral systems are possible only through inconsequence. he acts unconscientiously his and he cannot escape the responsibility. Sin is. To try to reach beyond it is to try to~go All out of oneself. when thinking. nnnngifft . and are therefore enveloped in the fundamental error of all dogmatism. for logical dogmatism admits no morality.t. to others. in^e wpvp r-mnn. but acknowledges simply a system of natural laws. Whosoever says the opposite may find a reason for it in his own heart (the fault cannot be in his understanding). but does not recognize decisions are final. Moreover. be such a manner as to make it conthe We formable to conscience.thinking..'riJ^L pendently of cnnScieTICP. sure of his conscience. material systems of morality which seek some other end for duty than duty itself.1 84 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. I add the following: cannot be felt.

of : diction. that the subject itself makes Hence certainty and conviction can this judgment. flagrant contra3. To do so were an evident. not in our original totality. it !N"o fanatic would act on the certainly lacks sureness. and to furnish them with the premises wherefrom form their judgment. may be recognised by this. which premises they may preliminarily accept This is more or less the history Through education th ey receive that which all previous mankind has established up to their time. which there is great need Hence. promptin|g_of his feelings at the risk of having a change m his convictions made impcSs'iWe for all eternity. as premises from whicJti to ii5me~TE"eir own upon mere of all authority. however. and conscience cannot aUow itself to be absolutelv governed through authority. . The pretended of objective teachings of feeling are products disorderly imagination. we may guide the investigations of men. the person acts necessarily to estabhsh in all its strictness. It is true. '^ The feeling of certainty arises from the harmony an act of the power of judgment with the moral impnls R hence the exclusive condition of the possibility of such a feeling is. and the feeling which unites the feeling of the free self-activity of our power of imagination.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. intensity. A proposition thus produced through feeling to be recognized by this. and could augur little 185 confidence in one's conscience. It is the feeling of our self. who acts on the strength of authority u nconsidentinush^ ^ for he is uncertamT^A. and the feeling which accompanies it. that it is in opposition to the laws of thinking. that though it may not lack depth. and which has now become the common faith of mankind. very important proposition. but only of part of is with them our is self. men. which can not be the case with any conviction confirmed by conscience. which cannot withstand the tests of theoretical reason. and sublimity. never relate to the judgment of others.

thereby mediately also establishes the pracfa'ca^ ''"' iJ^^V o^hgggj^jgjjUaSggpthough. in their limited practical results. origin. the theoretical element be disapproves those altogether wrong. to draw premises accepted . man is in con - forrfk^his own MdSMMLtj'^'^^ those upon faith in other words. is unconditionally obligatory. and whatsoever is true must have But for some men. man must form his own judgaLent. That from which no practical residts follow is an adiaphoron. they are annihilated. Nothing can be urged against this categorial" and unexceptionally valid result of reason . and compare this judgment with his feeling for otherwise he acts immorally and unconscientiously.^ No inoral command and if it were asserted to be of divine . which shows it .tnriTiPiS!^ of "a moral comma. It is only the true philosopher who accepts nothing without examination. If his conscience and it is absolute duty to give them up.. a matter of utter indifference all their lifetime. obligatory only on condition that our it. Hence there is absolutely no external ground and criterion of the oblip-a. But before the science bound to act takes place. and whose thinking star ts from the most . perhaps. If bis conscience confirms the result of those premises . because this or that person utters it is it. judgments. or because it is written here or there.validity for the moral element in them. a great part of the theory may remain premises. True. each . We must first test it by our own conscience.ndment. i86 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. although approved through conscience. and it is absolutely unconscientious to pass over this examination. himself the final conclusions which determine his acting. no knowledge whatsoever is indifferent to mankind in general.absolute doubt of everything . not their theoretical . condition in life. itself in itselfin the result and is may be correct. . which may be safely left to itself. For the sake of his conscience. own it conscience will confirm it. and only because our conscience confirms Nay. it is absolute duty not to obey without full self -investigation/. .

7//^ '=C^ '^^^ . ACTIONS. perhaps. 187 all subterfuges. o r from the confirmation of our o wn conscience. but because it showed itself to be true. That which does not proceed from faith." For this or that was true. sin. It is not allowable to and hence something else" (which occurs. "I have found r> t^/ P " . exceptions. . and it were unconscientious to risk something else on the mere chance that it may also be true. at the same place) "must also be true. or modifications thereof are to be invariably repudiated. not because it occurred in such a place. is absolute this or that to be true. .. THE MORALITY OF OUR and say.

and something conceived. is that' this will * 1 Henc e the folly of the attemEt_toi_taaca_a-a6fi£SSg?: liistory. /i) Whatsoever appertains in general to a rational wholeness and without lack in every individual. precisely always appears as accidentally because these all depend upon freedom. since otherwise such individual would not be rational. require a duration time raise everything which constitutes an original Ego to clear consciousness. is necessarily in its foreign fragments. THE OAUSK OF EVIL IN MAN. each being limited of and that to it must. therefore. But it is clear that this positing. and if you cancel a necessary component thereof. . must form a successive of reflections. occurs in it it only in so far as it is consciously posited iu through a free act of its own self-activity. constitutes series the original Ego. The one thing to be observed.CHAPTER II. successive reflections or positings. and not upon any mechanical law of nature. It cannot be too often reiterated that a rational being is not composed arbitrarily out of Being. this reflecting upon that which . At present we speak of the rational being as originally The moral law demands that empirical timecreatures become an exact copy of the original Ego. development in human Trwnslaior's Bemarks. of the To describe is this process of the reflections Ego in time to furnish the history of the em- pir ic al ^rati onal being. you cancel it altogether. This time-being is the subject of consciousness. * however. but is a totality .

it is true. is to be chosen. Let us consider this possibility of choosing a little. 189 Of something man must become clearly conscious. A. indeed. <J (^ > — ^ c — . for then the choice would be undertaken not with . . ._ihis reflection. but without cons ciousness_ of this freedom. — — . is to have consciousness at all and to be a rational beiug. . can do so without any intelligible ground ? Clearly not. through this very and the postponement of a resolution. him - away from it and places himself free intellig ence. but he is not free for himself for himself he is only if he can be said at all to be anytmngfor himself on this standpoint a mere animal It is to be expected that he will reflect upon himself in this condition. but it need not occur necessarily. or (!J. in the formal significance of the word. or of instance. U. which manifold arises. <rgduce.THE MORALITY OF OUR ittie ACTIONS. and hence also the power to choose between various ways of gratifying his natural impulse. is free an intelligence which is outside of him and observes him in his acts. it Supposing that the free being chooses C. This reflection does not occur necessarily according to a law. It ought to occur. The free being determines himself solely in acco rdaiige with and by means of conceptions. He then elevates himself above himself. and enters upon a higher grade. First in time he becomes conscious of the natural impulse the ground whereof has already been indicated and he acts in conformity with this impulse with Jreedom.) Now self >«" througB~EliiS~reflection the individual tears his natural impulse. because the empirical Ego ought to correspond to the pure Ego. It occurs through absolute freedom it occurs because it occurs. He . (The society wherein a man moves may occasion. of l^or this choice. independently before liimself as "a through the individual obtains for Gu^elf the power to defer self-determination. but cannot for T A. Hence ^his choice reflection must be based upon a conception what is to be chosen. and hence we said only that it is to be expected.

lutely something in C. We will call this somethin g X. and since there is no true principle of action except the moral law the . aU other freedom would be cancelled since all other freedom necessarily and in a fixed order But. since it does not devend uvon Something becomes mediately conscious. is it is absolutely contradictory to hold that anything to the Ego. Such a rule is it which Kant has very happily designated as a jamxim^ (In a theoretical syllogism it nature ( ^^^ : would be the major. Moreover. through blind according to conceptions. reason. Tinw J! ia of this nature hence. it is to be explamed solely from the freedom of man. o f which the rational being is already There must be a major of a syllogism in possessed. and man 6an never remove the responsibiKty from himseTf. but freedom. But another question: how happens it that it is precisely X. which determines the choice ? The ground of this can be sought for only in a^ general rule.. maximum. Freedom acts chance. moreresults from it. T he major contains the rule.X. externally given Ego. his proposition as its ground. disonv^red. Hence if an evil maxim pbanld hp. it is a maxim If it did not exist through an act of my own freedom through freedom. of the following nature tjiis : whatsoever is of this or I X). but the theoretical is not the highest for man. and every possible major has still a higher But the highest for man. over. This is Kant's argument. musL be preferred to everything els e. is his rule of action.) little Let us dwell a Firstly. Hence there must be abso- which causes i t to be preferred. . and not some possible . thereof object of the the Ego could never Whatsoever was given externally to the have become im- But the maxim is certainly the most immediate consciousness. concerned. 190 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. etc. so far as its on form this conception of a is maxim. and what I should chiefly urge. a mere principle is not a maxim.moral law is not a maxim. — — .

is also his own fault. is his own fault. and can so That he does not do it. But it is not at all from the presupposed standpoint. animal. not to be foretold what standpoint the individual will occupy since that Hence it is does not follow from any theoretical law. necessary. that this maxim is determined by a theoretical law. cannot be otherwise than that he should be ruled by Hence the maxim was theoretically deduced this maxim. Now. a 191 maxim for me only when I. which results from it. what could possibly be the maxim of man on the standpoint of reflection. How can these two assertions be I propound this question at this early stage reconciled ? of our investigation. but since in such cases it is after all only the satisfaction of those sympathetic impulses. which we seek. it man remains on this standpoint of reflection.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. if . and has lust for its motive power. he^pught to raise himself to a higher one. that he should remain on that standpoint nay. and may be deduced by But just now I stated that the maxim is its means. hence I assume. than the natural impulse which only craves enjoyment. make it through freedom the rule of my acting. where we left him? Since no other impulse occurs in consciousness. as an empirical subject. On this standpoint _mBnJsji^^_^j£ulating. theirefore. Sometimes indeed it may happen. the enjoyment ": maxim of one's own happiness. I said. that this must be the maxim on the present standpoint. as yet. this maxim can only be as follows : " I must choose that which the greatest intensively or and in <^\Jn o Uh extensively' promises " other words. although it covers the whole ground ' thereof. determined solely through the absolute spontaneity of the empirical subject. that through means of our sympathetic impulses we seek our own happiness in the ^ ^<^^ happiness of others. and hence the improper maxim. It is. have proved. — . our motive power is always after all our own I' happiness. ledse himself.

application to the empirical subject. if quite right.t]aa. It is solely from not considering this point. When such a mediation is possible. If it could be comwould not be freedom.d. and is an absolute first. only an idea. In other words : I ought to do is it in respect to my original character.''''Ee''coTri3'noritct'"oth e than he did . and to de ny that he could . gi. who knows this point. since it depends altogether upon his freedom to do so. . it. as it could not well be otherwise. cannot excuse myself before. For. nor explained from. There is something incomprehensible here. that . since an act of freedom is absolutely lecause it is. on that very account. namely with reference to another observer. when they arrive at this point. accuse myself for not having done it always. which strike so many. ne of freedomin its For this reason so : long as I do not yet occupy the higher standpoint of standpoint does not exist for me and hence I cannot have a conception of that which I ought to do. the conclusion runs thus: i. with having been powerless to do it but on the contrary. which. which cannot be connected with. since we have arrived at the hmit circumstances." But it would be wrong to confine''!^ conclusion to this asser tion. to think the former through the mediation of the latter. it prehended. then there is no freedom. To desire to comprehend an act of freedom is therefore absolutely contradictory. indeed. that all the difficulties arise.QiCiki.. to be sure. until I actually do it. Nor could it. 'aiid he can do it. anything else. of all comnrehensibility. or. Nevertheless it remains true. and reflection. To comprehend signifies to connect one thinking with another.have another character than he has He absolutely ought to form 'another one. that I absolutely ought to do it.e. be otherwise. whenever I shall I come to know shall. but only mechanism.192 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. "Under such with such a character and mode' of tiiinking. in reference to myself. whenever I come to know it.ti. . if his present character is of no account.

" Man acts only t'r'oni_s elhgh other motive power Mn his charQ0tiv?t^aii3 there is no raHerT This is his destination. of his own accord. if he is only left to himself. and experience certainly In so far. He cannot.that man should remain upon this standpoint since there is also absolutely nothing. conscious on this standpoiut of this his fault. the principle of earthlv happines s and perfection amongs t us Germansj for with them it is more a defect oTexpression and misapprehension. morality It is This is rendered a improper maxim is much more difiicult matter if that raised through sophistry into a principle. which keeps him all his lifetime lack on that standpoint. I do not a Hufe-tP-tbe point. as has been done by so many so-called philosophers. evil is proves such to be the case. or corruption of. . 193 In Kke manner all the particular reflections. far the evil has its ground in freedom. But at the same time it is certainly not necessary. This of : upon what TCant-. which are here required. The deduced maxim is and if he lies with his freedom. to be hoped and expected that the man wUl.. but is not yet positive hostUity to. therefore. THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. say a that the radical evil is inborn in man^ and that nevertheless For it may well be foreseen it has its origin in freedom man should remain awhile. that clearness . or and comprehended. to that higher . are absolute starting-points of an utterly new series. and ought ^ Ivetius. their meaning defenders ^ being usually much more innocent than their words atheistic "Fallude to like tlie'loreign' materialistic and But mqrajMg^ . who say: . regarding which one cannot say whence they come itself — since throws iu fact they come no whither.' which he although he may not become And iu so certainly lawlessness. sooner or later. It is quite as possible for him to raise himself at once to the highest point. raise himself. inborn in man. much perhaps reflection. since there is absolutely on the lower standpoints of nothing which drives him to a higher standpoint. does not do so the fault does not make use of.

The possibility. and not enchained the example of his age or a corrupt philosophy. gives rise also to the prejudice that those who. ETHICS. unless. should be better. i. even without such a false philosophy.194 THE SCIENCE OF to. calcuand make impossible aU desire for the higher standpoint.e. The ground is . this mode of thinking may be confirmed.. indeed. may. be otherwise. and whoever pretends to be better is who ndsapprehends the limits of nature. have in their inmost hearts the same low mode of thinking. in their external acts. us. but is only raised to a higher point. But. He will thus elevate himself to quite another sort of freedom. and we always remain on the standpoint of the culture we have thus received. for under the previously-described maxim he is onlj formaliter free. which alone can be observed. Society /5>But tk«mgh it is if inan is left to himself. appear better. and materialiter altogether dependent . and iudp^es of wbg miifJij Jo be done from what is actually done. though without merit of our own. not his either a fool or a fanatic. were better we. which is probably the same in all ages. of course. either through general habit and through the experience. nevertheless. borrows his maxims solely from that common or which to him appears most common custom." own lated to suppress Such an argument is. we rise the word. also. — — — — -t. Moreover a not unimportant observation it is natural for man to exist on this low standpoint. that most men do not rise beyond it which. through a free act. however. to be expected that he will always become more and more conscious of the impulse to be absolutely selfsufficient. this : it is only through education in the widest sense of are through the general influence of society upon first cultured for the use of our freedom. without an act of spontaneity man remains upon that standpoint. to have merit of our own is not cancelled thereby. that we above If it. That is to say. which continues to manifest itself within him.

i. must develop s^lf-determination." Each one sees that. put se lf-determination and he who would develop virtue phizings. in occurs through a particular act of spontaneity. In analogy with a prebe eminent intellectual ability it might be called a genius for virtue. as something which happens to exist in us.e. rise : . this — ter of the individual. rise higher. nor as obeying a law. Now. For all those external circumstances have no causality upon him. if. The distinguishing characteristics to be noticed in this The impulse appears only as a blind impulse. to be self-determined a rises in consciousness this —but impulse as mere "Blind impulse.. and non-essential to man's nature. This transition But. as some writer says. he shall and can above his standp oint. He has no other object than the enjoyment which these objects furnish. and it is always his own fault if he does not do so. himself he will. there is no steady transition to the consciousness of thatljQpulse. perhaps. spite of all evil examples and of all erroneous philoso- man is stiU capable of this act. they do not work in and through him. from the thoughtlessness and inattentiveness wherein that impulse absolutely does not exist for us. and not as a law.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. it is a fact that. can only themselves. in some incoinprehensible manner. I have said: " If man i s_jHit. Moreover. in spite of all those obstacles. many men do so elevate The how remains inexplicable. and it is this determinedness of character which we have now : to investigate. Moreover.-left to. and without any higher reason. because the reflection of it does not occur and is not undertaken intentionally then impulse naturally appears as something accidental. our nature having already been determined investigation are as follows . but it is he himself who determines himself by means of their influence. it appears as accidental. It is to be foreseen that this manifestation wiU further and otherwise determine the characconsciously. 195 upon natural objects. It is not sentimentality. explained through freedom.

likewise. ^ An act which done merely and hence. and this he does from absolutely no other possible ground than because he so wiUs. they mistake for pure morality. to an j)bserver from the higher standpoint. to account for the Mind impulse is an exception when men seek. _at the instigation_of_ a to the rule. as — — of the unlimited and lawless supreme rule over all that is external to us. there thus arises the not consciously thought. wronging ourselves. he has no —but he he acts as if the authority of his will. explained from we do not act according to a must be maxim. latter of being absurd. and which appears to be contradictory. noticeable maxim thereby. it were. So far as the material of the desire to will is concerned.196 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. the defenders of the former utterly sensuous mode of acting appeal to the contradictory character of this mode of acting. the second mode The previous maxim of selfishness remains. It is had the will to subjugate everything external to immediately clear that such a mode of acting must result . also. Firstly. demn dition. which. as. manner.indrndiial does not and cannot explain to himself. From these chaby the above maxim of selfishness. but according to an impulse. the ruling maxim is in this con- and all conscious acts on this standpoint are done conformably to this maxim. indeed. and it is equally not necessary that he should remain on it but if anyone occupies this standpoint it is necessary that his character should become determined in a certain racteristics . and establish an connection with that maxim. will at Man has not the will all. we must draw our conclusions. indeed. on this standmotives of these acts. biit is blindly impelled —indeed. Hence. but. we usually that seek to derive to them from artificial maxim of selfishness. the This characteristic is. point. and thus accuse. there arises a mode of_a£tingjEhicliJie_acting . on this standpoint. in so far as our acts it. It is not necessary that anyone should arrive at this point at all. of itself sufficient to conof acting.

and is therefore an absolute empirical will. the maxim whereof we speak now. or if circumstances require no sacrifices . and very common manifestaThe men who hold it. this mode of thinking necessarily retains the character of impelling esteem. which again depends only upon their will. easily recognizable The tions of this mode of thinking are as" follows : . desire certainly to have a good will. but a causality which remains under certain restrictions. but desires to attain it only gradually. but absolutely determined through the will. and that this improper end is not merely made a pretence to cover The the still more improper end of mere enjoyment. from the blind and lawless impulse to be absolutely determined. In short. mode However. demands unconditioned and unrestricted causality. not want to hear anythin g said of their duty or of law They like to be generous and forbearing everything b ut just. and wish that all other men should let everything "depend upon their good will. is to be law for all the rest of the world. They are benevole ntly disposed towards others. it desires no" unconditioned and lawless. To carry it out if may require no sacrifice of enjoyment. THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. Hence. whereas. their empirical will. provided only. and does not accomplish what it purposes to accomplish. but the y do. and conformably to CCTtain law s. that the happiness of others is really desired. Every one must see that these characteristics cannot be explained from the mere craving after enjoyment. both irrational and free. but have no respect or ^steem" for tEeir rights. i^f self- To properly appreciate it this maxim we must compare with morality. Each such attempted explanation is forced. object of our will is not at is all determined through a possible enjoyment. for instance.. one has no passions. Morality also demands freedom and independence. in form precisely like the genuinely moral of thinking. .

And yet the assertion argument.igS THE SCiENCM OP ETHICS. we likewise do not discover until afterward. and since it is a good act the doing it remains an inborn goodness. if it is not successful. self-denial. hold forth about violation of justice. appears from the following we act in accordance with a blind impulse. Human nature is originally neither . through absolute self-determination. as a sorrowful depressing sentiment. that ' — mode of thinking may also very possible to carry it out with the greatest. there arises if not pain and woe. is utterly false. as a permanen t. precisely because it expects no favour from nature. and accuse particularly men of ingratitude and want of recognition. Thus the act is and remains a given and not a self-made act. This characteristic its . Whereas. That it must be thus. and on "the above kind of experience.ing. precisely because it is higher than the impulse to attain mere enjoyment. For then we heUev e we had a right to demand that everything should suhimFToTnd obey oiir will. reposeful he. appears often. but merely demands that nature should do its duty. in which case we approve coldly. and hence not properly with freedorq and matureness we did not weigh our action in advance of the acting. occurrence and the rule according to which it might have occurred. at least disgust. when it is successful. for the very reason that we were impelled by the craving to be self-sufficient. but now find it as a given act only by of our free acting rather an esteeming of : . as an active passion. as our character. There is no true joy and gladness connected with this mode of thinking. in ordiaary life as well as in philosophical For instance: the assertion of an original goodness of human natu re is based on experience. We rave against God and nature. and hence nothing occurs but what was to "be expected. In this case there results se^AjoZMO^JOT^ This is not so much an esteeming But to carry out this It is require sacrifices. We enjoy to find ourselves better arid nobler than we should almost have credited.

but whatsoever we do for them If is graciousness and kindness. That it must be in accordance with a blind impulse. but is connected with joy. to We all will not refer particular individuals. For us there exist none but great. already a superfluous merit. in its character pass for very honest and virtuous men. noble and meritorious acts. which always proceeds from the unexpected. We have acted and have not required any sacrifice from ourselves. moreover. act wrongly. But now we suddenly find ourselves raised above this common standard of humanity we have clear merits. joy over ourselves because we are so good. — to find ourselves as ixie ought to be. will probably not be denied by anyone. irrationa l. but we find ourselves incomparably better than we hav^ any_need to be. and nothing but the exercise of our wellIf we deny ourselves enjoyment but in it is the slightest degree. and that those persons occurs frequently clear consciousness of who and. To characterize this mode of thinking in one word: everythiag which God. ' 199 It becomes good or bad only through i'reedom. servants . We do not find ourselves as the moral law wants us so. "We have made up our miud that all men are selfish. but to mankind. Moreover. this self-valuation is not a cold and quiet approval like moral self-esteem. — —though without will also be denied is by no one who knows mankind and able to penetrate into their inmost heart.— THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. it is all right. . when reduced to its principle. . ' . men and nature do for us is nothing but their absolute duty they never can clo anyt hin g more than what they are bound to do for us and are always good-for-notmng . The common line on which we place ourselves with the rest of mankind is selfishness. good nor bad. none but opera superogativa. However we may act we can never we sacrifice everything to enjoyment founded right. appears clearly from the following: . and that nothing else is to be expected of them. That this is mode it of thinking.

such a character inspires admiration whereas the man who first calculates how much enjoyment he may get out of an act. shall be law . all the misdeeds. "which have ever dishonolired mankmd how are they to be explained ? "What induced the subjugator to pursue his object against danger and labour? Did he hope thereby to enlarge the sources of his sensiipu s enioYment? By no mpans. shall : This was the only " which moved him it has already been acknowledged that this kind of character has not enjoyment for its object. It might be called the heroic character. The egotistic self-merit which accompanies it is based on the consciousness of sacrifices. Almost the whole history of mankind is simply a proof of our assertion. wars ot conquest and of reUgion. is a self-sufficiencv. is regarded as a natural being. is. the satisfaction of these sacrifices an enjoyment afterwards. We sacrifice our enjoyment to this purpose. Subjugation of the bodies and souls of nations. ! principle in our opinion. this over the one mode of thinking described has one advantage previousl y which estimates everything according to the it furnishes. is this. affords True. and history becomes comprehensible only through the present position of such a mode of thinking. For this character. independence from all the external world. man . that our lawless arbitrariness may govern everything. namely. and then If flatter ourselves at our unselfishness. In fact. what I saY. not the motive power of our acts. after all. "That which I will. and remains. The real object which governs our acts. but this enjoyment was not the end we had in view. although it is never clearly thought and raised to consciousness. Viewed from this "standpomL. which enjoyment is not sensual. which we need not have made be done. . inspires contempt. in shorT. mode "^ of thinking of the heroes of history. the enjoyment of these caresses which we lavish upon ourselves. it is the usual sensual enjoyment which .4oo THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.

this mere reflection. which. as being the highest and absolute rule. man an d which duty demand s. must make maxim in every c ase. the judgment material acts emanating from that priuoiple. which recognizes no higher for himself.The morality of our actions. — of it if exist for this not the principle of morality. for both have no value at all but it is easier to consider that accustoms men as something noble . indeed. when working as a bhnd impulse. and in into clear consciousness. precisely because duty aemands it. That he should revolt and refuse obedience to ^j. not to do what his Such a maxim . thus the reflected impulse is also limited through this reflection. since that does not mode of thinking at least. It is absolutely impossible and contradictory that anyone with a clear consciousness of his duty should. For it falsifies and soils standpoint. former than the latter. is already involved in the conception of a maxim. that he shall (ought to) do something Now if this it knowing a is to change into acting. True. consciovsb TMOlvCi '""^ ^-^ ^o M^ duty. As every reflection limits the reflected. that one. as has already been shown. and make it his maxim dut^is precisely because it is his duty. to do always. the law. has nothing further to do than to raise that craVmg for absolute self-sufficiency. But when we regard it ! 2ot this character from the moral has no value at all. The latter condition. virtue of this hmitedness it changes from a blind craving for absolute causality into a law of conditioned causahty. it is more dangerous than the former sensuous character. since — which is merely duty and meritorious. through change in consciousness into an absolutely imperative law. Man now knows absolutely. in the moment of action. since it does not proceed from morality Nay. /i^^X^yAasi. the publican and sinner has no more value than the self-conceited Pharisee. produces a very immoral character to convert the and the impulse will.

and hence leaves open room for lower impulses. of that act of (It vanishes. Now. Hence. but the conception of a devil contradicts. it is equally impossible to act conformably necessity. signifies certainly a self -annihilating proposition. and the most very possible to darkATn in one' s self th e For of the requirement of duty this consciousness arises only through an act of absolute spontaneity.pnBP. absolutely requires of himself to do something. in one case. In either case there and we thus to fall into an int. which is act against his duty. and remains only through the continuation it is . This we prove as follows Man as is clearly conscious of his duty. impossibl e for us not to act in conformity with it : impossible to resist sight of to it. and keep it in view. and. acts in conformity with it. as well as case. consciousness of itself. in the same undivided moment. in man. it his causes. to say man : consciously resolves he requires of himself in the same undivided moment. is we lose it. the same intelligence in him must require contradictory acts. with many conceptions of transcendental As soon as we descend from the higher upon which alone they are possible. signifies: Man. not to do that very thing.t. For according to the seem ordinary exists intellectual fatalism. b ut of a lower kind than the ordinary one. without the moral any co-operation law of which own. But clear consciousness . to an intelligence. and tiius cancels itself. We have already done away with this sort of fatalism by showing that the moral law is not something which exists within . when we cease to reflect it the same with this consciousness as philosophy. if.) The matter therefore stands in this shape if we continue to reflect in accordance with the requirement of the law. is freedom. in another does not produce such consciousness or such acts.— — 202 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.na1 fi taHsm. on the contrary. it. they vanish into nothingness. : were devilish. standpoint. flagrant contradiction. itjg.

If it did. that we grow accustomed to this thoughtlessness. Or. even where I did not intend to abstract. in which case moral acts are impossihl^ Hence the appearance of fatalism vanishes altogether as soon as we observe that it depends upon our freedom whether that consciousness shall continue in u. But the present kind of fatalism holds that eith er the moral law continues in our consciousness. 203 independently of first our co-operation. simply because it occurs without any higher ground. is of the latter kind. for instance. to represent the matter from still another side: the vanishing of the consciousness of duty is an abstraction. there are two very different kinds of abstraction. through an undetermined thinking. or allows it to be darkened. and a violation of duty because the determined consciousness of duty is itself duty. Again. absolute first.itseil. which we have shown to be a contradiction. wherewith our life necessarily begins. such as. It occurs. or it vanishes. produces . created by ourselves. the allowing that consciousness darkened would be precisely that conscious revolt against the moral law. and hence . and to be according to a rule. when it occurs. being. it necessarily produces moral acts. it is an undetermined thinking.HP.^. Either I make the abstraction with clear consciousness. But this and thus drift along in our usual current. us. It occurs. and not with a consciousness of the freedom wherewith I do it. which either retains that consciousness clear.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. Now the vanishing whereof we speak here. unexplainable act. or the abstraction arises in its me of own account. is also an. all formular philosophy. it IS the same with this consciousness as with the above-mentioned standpoint of reflection. let it be well noted that this act of freedom. on the contrary. or shall darken . not according to a maxim and hence not with accompanying consciousness of what I do. It is through thoughtlessness and that inattehtiveness to our higher nature. Now. in which ca.

so far as in goodness. and that the object is again held merely by the power of imagination. or in obedience the blind impulse everywhere. but only an Here it is important. no finite beiag is confirmed clear consciousness of the The determined vanishes. consciously whenever we form a general conception in arhitrary abstraction we drop the particular determinations. on the other hand. ' /<. the very fact that it is. This we do. we cannot. constituting sciously. becomes fixed and determined. of his morality No one sure for one moment nay. as yet. has no outlines. . it may easily happen that the sharp outline is lost sight of. for instance. without continued exertion. Either this con- sciousness vanishes altogether and no thought of duty remains until after the act. for it begins with the power o f imagination which is a power o f floating undecidedly over two opposites. we can No man. We ) to have our lawless will rule have already described both of these ' indisti nct consciousness. moral law Two cases are supposable. the conception remains determined in this to note iato .5o4 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. in a certain degree. without this habit becoming a necessity for us. careful watching of must be in- cessantly continued. first of^U. conditions. habituate ourself to mature Practice and attentiveone's self. that freedom. But. Or there remains a consciousness of duty. its determinedness. All our consciousness begins with undeterminedness. undetermined. now a determined consciousness may change itself an undetermined and wavering consciousness. True. Uncon- we do it when we are thoughtless or distrait. It is only through the understanoing that tlie product of this^oatins^hich. see. we may. nay. is consideration and attentiveness to the law. even after it has been determined. . by any means. in which case according to the to we act either maxim of selfishness. and thus raise the conception to a general one. instance. get out of this current. ness. through In the same manner does not imply.

since we have already lost the We then deceive. or no consciousness at all would have been possible. if we kad but held firm to our m . Now. for it is very well possible that some one should only try to make others believe that he does from motives of duty. in each special case some particular act of all possible actsis duty and all others of itself .'"" ^BoSS^ot have erred and thus to hold it firm was a matter . which we thus possessed before. Objects only float vaguely before their minds as in a dream or as covered by a fog. There is a self-deception here. of our freedom. although of duty remains.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. simply because I do not hold it fixedly. Now. "if we go honestly to work". and act^^^Hlff^ldly But this error is. the form of the conception of the act escapes us. insight into our duty. should be sure to find it impelled and determined through s ome inclination or anothe r. are absolutely not duty ! It is only the conception of this ' accompanied by the above described This determinedness feeling of certainty and conviction. nay. a conception held in this manner is undetermined. and said^'i^ro an erring conscience remains. Firstly.^ourselYes^ true tkread of conscience. It wavers between more or less undeterminedness without co-operation of the power of judgment. We take hold of something else as our duty. this is the presupposed case with the conception of duty it darkens . although. By far 205 the fewest men seize things determinedly and closely defined. if we went honestly to work. one act. perhaps even suppose this something else to be our duty. our guiit. which is concerning that which is our duty. (I said above. involves a threefold determinedness which may lose its determined character. we. The conception of duty. against which we cannot be too much on our guard. as thought in a given case. was their understanding then altogether inactive? Certainly not. the determinedness immediately escapes its them again. what he knows well . But and passage through the region of the understanding is very quick. Even in regard to its undeterminedness.

instance. there is involved it is the conception this determinedness. Such a character would be that of a miserable hypocrite.. We do this determinedness to ~ . perhaps. will never come for man has always wishes. If we allow darken within us. The time when we shall have no more cherished plans. he does only from motives of selfishness. minedness of the present time may escape us. .Almighty cannot do what the cure of this : . for if we have once learned postponing. the thought. and which we need not be in a hurry to obey. 2o6 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. though it certainly requires obedience. that precisely we have to act in' a determined manner in the PX^s mt cas e. Even the . but demands. does not demand it precisely at the present time."'regardless of ail other impulses. laziness requires. because the moral law allows no time for consideration. class. we are very likely to continue it.) may and is not included in the above in Secondly t hat .q determined in its form. Inis deter. if necessary^'^m"TTitnerTn this condition we frame for ourselves a mixed maxim. Thirdly and finally. Such a character is lazy. whenever it speaks. partly utterly wicked. but which we may also. as good advice which we may follow if we so list an d if it does not cost to o much self-denial. For enough. that we will enjoy only yet this or that delight. and requires to be removed by some outside power from the standpoint which he occupies. implicit and immediate obedience and partly very dangerous. or carry out this or that reprehensible plan. but such a power does not exist. as duty it demands absolutely o]3edieiice. the commands of duty will no longer appear as commands. in which case the command appears as one which is not determined by time that is as one which. comes the postponement of reform. but only. and then seriously This mode of thinking is consider about reforming. Hence. he be utterly indifferent as to duty. the requirement of duty i. being a dogmatic unbeliever.

does this assertion speak ? That we often cannot realize our firmest will in the external world on account of external obstacles. this if we want to retain this or that enjoyment. we cannot do our duty. : do our duty. we make a compromise between conscience and lust nay. we 11. ^^ . the ambitious man lusts which might iaterfere with his ambition. Such is our opinion. and all that is dear to man. but we retain those enjoyments which are dearest to us. But. that the punctual practice of that law is an impossibility: an assertion which is very frequently heard in ordinary life. life. but we will not do . — spendthrift sacrificiag avarice. perhaps we even sacrifice to duty those enjoyments which are naturally not enticing for us the .: THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. The latter are to be sacrificed. Hence the truth is not. is true enough but neither does the moral law The moral law unconditionally demand this realization.. &c. And why should we not be able to leave that undone ? What power can force us free beings to act ? What that assertion really means to say is we cannot . of what impossibility. II — l»llll requires only that "do all . in every case duty and the satisfaction of selfish impulses could co-exist. retain them. I ask. III! iiiiii. 207 not always hunt after the greatest enjoyment and care only for it. beheve to have satisfied both at the same time. but which has also sneaked into philosophical and theological systems. etc. It is this mode of thinking which impudently asserts that we cannot live as the moral law requires. honour. snouxa we can do and why should we not be able to do what we can do ? The moral law requires only that we should not do the opposite of our duty. or that possession. But we cannot both sacrifice True enough but who has said that we ought to retain these enjoyments or those possessions ? Everything. Duty demands that we and should sacrifice them. should exert all our powers. is to be sacrificed to We have never asserted that duty. but often content ourselves with having to do our duty nay. Thus. .

a . The existence follows: each explained as one to be called a man. which even teachers of morality have accepted and seriously discussed. bility in relation to when men speak . unless indeed some severe external concussion stirs us up to repent. of impossi- what pure reason requires to be The ^^^we_ realized in a technical -practical respect. proves the wide extent of it is human corruption and its shamelessness. must arrive at of evil in man we have .2o8 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. CONCLUDING REMARKS. they are im practicable . than a conceited just man of the of the latter sort. for instance. we shall likely remain all our lifetime making such compromises. sacrifices. In order to place the doctrine of freedom in the clearest and to prosecute fatalism into its extremest hidingcorners. If anything. and in so far indeed it is much easier to reform a sinner." old abuses are to to remain?) Of course they are impracticable. (It is precisely the same. we append some remarks more specially referring to Kant's assertion 0/ a radical evil in man . our duty. If we have once persuaded ourselves that we can make a compromise with the strictness of morality. as if there really were a grain of rationality in it. nay. We cannot make up our will to make those It is our will. if th e remain But who says that they are . men cry " those propositions cannot be realized. indeed. which is at fault. cannot" always signifies the same If. light. and put forth and defended even by the most sensible men. which is put forth again and again. but the latter condition is undoubtedly of greatest danger to mankind. not our power to do. this contradictory and utterly irrational subterfuge. These three different modes of evading the severity moral law may be united. 'thorough reform of Statei organization is demanded.

man can remain on this standpoint. But how do we come to make the statement categorical and positive how do we come to say it is certainly not . for the mere natural impulse is by no means selfish or blameworthy it being rather duty to satisfy it. man frpp dom in the choice This consciousness arises already. and since no necessity whatever compels him to reflect according to the maxim may certainly. This would. 209 Now this f>f involves simply that he should become co Tipmnna of his action s. therefore. upon his higher nature. when learns to make a choice between the manifold which h\s^ the mere natural impulse demands of him. as it has hitherto seemed to appear. and which he his nature as to do. whibh is is not absolutely necessary. that he has made himself selfish only through a voluntarily chosen maxim. — \ of selfishness and in so far we Beinhold does. if his understanding is somewhat developed consciously and clearly — . It was indeed necessary that it should be had need of a positive. were it but to explain thus. and what is the posiiiveness which it is to ? be expected that is it What we presuppose unwittingly It is this: ""' ? man man will not do anything. Now if we had merely said. We th e negative "^"^^ . what P justifies such a presupposition? Is it . since nothing impels him onward. It would be an altogether problematical statement. ascribe to man a selfish impulse. but on that standpoint in this man will remain which we really do assert statement. as lO^o .THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. and what to act in accordance with such simply the result reflection. necessary. not compelled by We therefore presuppose an is original laziness to reflect. and not merely a negative evil. . self -consciousness. there would be no difficulty about the assertion. In this case he will act unconsciously and darkly or. as we shall show in time Upon this standpoint man remains very readily. of it. Now. be a true positive radical evil. although be remembered.

if left . through relation to an opposite power. In short. the very purpose of thus remaining. generates necessi jiy. merely experience ? Kant seems to assume this. indeed. that what was before inertia becomes activity. on the indicated standpoint we ourselves are nothing but nature. True. We ascribe to nature as such a power of inertia (vis inertice) This results. and it is only requisite that we should understand ilTHititl^'^i it flif properly. But giere experience would never justify such a universal presupposition. were it not posited as resisted by external objects.power to remain ij^ha. but one which renders explicable that universality of experience. 2IO THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. is which signified and it is by a power of inertia.it ia nature would not retain its form for a moment. nature must have a quantum of tendency or Tf if. yet the direction direction nature came to an end in the is absolutely no other than the which nature itself would have taken. both conceptions are this synthesis synthetically united. and although it is freedom which gives them vitality. has onlv repose. nature would not be nature. the conception of a power of inertia seems contradictory. It is thus that nature. from the conception of the causality of a free being. Our powers are powers of nature. which we shall immediately arrive at. . f"^ '^^'^^ frPPflnTn wnnlrl necessarily occur in time if it is to be perceptible. ""^^as ipe re Ep^o and Object in general . and in so no active power whatsoever is to be ascribed to But for. or reposing. N"ow if an opposite power influences nature. only far bems it is what it is. be cancelled. Hence there must be a rational ground for it not one which . but nevertheless it is a real one. nature neceasa. and which could not so occur. Now. would change incessantly and thus have no form at aU.t..rUy resists with all its power. Vikg VinfThia prlrrQ'. in order to remain as it is and it is only now. although he arrives at the same conclusion. which must . . since the causality of impulse.

we nevertheless fall back into our old laziness as soon as we cease to watch ourselves. and wUl have to fight against it all his lifetime. has his " Schlendrian. and there is no weight of the moral law to counterbalance it. in his original essence. . Thus we are nature in every respect. undisturbed. through a pressure upon himself . an^^he stirring up holds on awhile. It always costs labour t o tear loose from^ . in general. Since certain he is. It is only thus alone that we explained a universal : . even the most powerful and active.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. This is the power of inertia in our nature. and . since it is a necessary fact. although not in is actuahty. phenomenon amongst men." to use a low but very characteristic expression. as a result of natural mechanism. m it Even if we are successful for once. . and that he can at each moment. described standpoint. ought to decide that step it is likewise true that man has the actual power within him to give himself sufficient weight to overbalance his inertia or laziness. Even the regularity and order of most men is nothing but this tendency to repose and habit. which is illustrated in all human actions: the possibility of habit. but he must be free . Now it is true enough that man absolutely ought to place himself in the other scale. and the ten- dency to remain the oia beaten track. Let us consider man in the described condition. Each man. 211 Moreover. There the weight of nature drags is no equilibrium. It is precisely his freedom which is enchained the power which is to help him is in league against him. we regard him as absolutely free and can do so. no balance him down. the fact that we do occupy the is also to be taken into consideration. But that which appertains to all nature must also appertain to man in so far as he is nature a reluctance to emerge from his present condition a tendency to remain in the old accustomed pathway. before he can tear himself thus loose through freedom. he to tear himself loose if from this condition. free and independent of nature.

. not to arise from his natural state. this first pressure it. inborn evil which has its ground in human nature itself. is the true. the second fundamental vice of man. of whose weakness he is already convinced. through his own power. then. power. and logical. body. Man is by nature lazy.) Laziness. who cannot. and subject my at the trouble of self-thinking. Cowaraice*i^asmess to m aintain our frp. but absolutely from his self-activity. reproducing itself infinitely through long habit. to be achieved by himself. this first pressure upon himself It by no means a result of his condition. therefore. (Hence those who assert a sei'vum arbitrium and . which. in his natural condition.dnm. -'' From this laziness next arises cowardice. if he comes in contact with a man in whom he presumes more strength no matter of what kind than he himself possesses. — — I am terror-stricken in view of the bodily exertion of resistance. But where. If we view the matter contrary. I am terror-stricken which somebody else . and indevendence in our contaci'With others Each one has courage enough when opposed to a man. and can be easily enough explained from it. rather retards is from a natural point that of view. and hence gives way. it is absolutely impossible man should help himself. but if he has not this conviction. raise this he to get this is will. he gets afraid at the exertion of power which he will need to maintain his independence. but must be impelled by a higher power. can help him. amongst men to be explained: subjection and authority worship. move himself. Only a miracle.212 THE SCIENCE OF of the ETHICS. says Kant very correctly. is the point from which he might raise that power ? Absolutely nowhere. and soon changing into utter impotency to be good. physical as well as moral slavery.p. but how ? by means is mere will. are altogether in the right. characterize man as a piece of log or a stick. if they speak of the natural man. or should grow better. on the Moreover. Only thus is slavery.

and which they hope they shall be able to bear. There he would but here he should have to act. submit to these few ? Thus the trouble which it would require of them to resist. man lies not. in order to be relieved of the Hence he only shams in order to espy a better opportunity. it pretend to do. is^^Zsewess. (There are always men who wish to rule. In suffering he at least remains passive and q uiet. The least exertion of power is far more then. and I rather submit to his authority. and gets"" accustomed to it. fewer and more energetic men. arise from the tact tnat" there are _oppres^d!fS. the ordinary natural man. the position of . does it : How. I say for the extraordinary man.rd falseT Only the coward i. by means of falseness and deception . who. united. all lying. so utterly as Man cannot deny his selfhood and sacrifice it to another.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS.''aha everYO^^S^^Ppressesmustexpec t . for the third fundamental vice of man. and he would rather bear everything than act once. me by making and asking me to see into we have stated the reason above. requires of 213 bold or intricate statements. would be much stronger. them. which sufficiently to better himself in this naturally arises from cowardice. painful to ordiaary man than thousandfold suffering.) The coward comforts himself in this subjection. at least is he false from pride and strength This is of character. nature Ordinary.s false^*T!i?T5uragiSBb if not from virtue. strong character. nor i. and that he may oppose his oppressor when the same shaU no longer have All falsen e ss. than exert himself life. so as to get soon rid of his demands upon me. willing rather to comfort himself with the hope that he should be able to stand only suffer. he may trouble to defend himself openly. But these They have are the a bold. it in hell. all cunning and treachery. which after all is not heartfelt. happen that the others. Thus the sailor of the anecdote was . his attention directed upon him. is more painful to them than the slavery lo which they submit. whom .

shown up for only for the can hold them valid only to the human race they were foreign. and precisely because it is impossible for you to consider of nature. what were virtue unless it were the actively acquired product of our own freedom. But no one set up the customary groaning and ranting who may about the imperfection of fact human and it that these characteristics nature. nor false of those . and becomes master and subjugator let This description chooe^e to be slaves. has specially favoured. There is but One who is holy. as a free and supersensual being. human as if rather valid for all finite. has a powerful character. Moreover. you find this to be all in order and proper. although from a moral point of view he is no better. but he tramples overbear- ingly upon everything around him. and as if they were not these characteristics. who that has remarked fhe grounds we have race. you. man as a mere product as a being above all nature. The very fact that man is capable of vice shows that he is destined for virtue. appear ugly and disgusting. He is neither lazy. the nobility find sublime if character of Do you disgusting the stronger animal devours the weaker. as we have peculiarity of our nature. But not so in the case of man. and all created being is by nature necessarily unholy . having been engrafted upon it through some hostile demon. or if the weaker animal overpowers the stronger through cunning ? Doubtless not. the elevating of oneself into an altogether different order of things ? You are forced to regard man Finally. Let us ever so much try to conceive conceive cherubim and seraphim.214 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. in a characteristics are not grounded. Precisely the appear so disgusting to proves humanity. but rather in the conception of general finity itself. but not as so differing in their general characteristics. we may certainly them as differing from man in their more particular determinations. For these seen. nor cowardly. rational beings.

and consciousness and impulse. however. consideriag that this involved laziness cripples the only power through which can help himself ? What does he really lack ? ITot the power. Their age and general usefulness may. own freedom. The individual must learn to see himself iu his contemptible nature. particularly in .. It will necessarily be the aim of such men to influence their fellow-men. for this he has but the consciousness thereof and the impulse to make use of it. that amongst the whole mass of men some individuals have actually thus elevated themselves to morality. — 215 THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. way to experience disgust with himself he must likewise be brought in contact with exemplary men. There is no other way of ^culture. and very properly may assume. we must assume. which certainly is capable of culture. which may be very useful to those who need them. But this only furnishes what is lacking . and to influence them in the described manner. and thus inspire him at the same time with a desire to become himself worthy of such esteem. have invested these institutions with a peculiar authority. This impulse cannot come to him internally. But whence are these external impulses amongst mankind? Since it remains a to be brought possibility for each individual. and for the is man who makes no use of this freedom there no help. moreover. and can elevate through its itself to morality only own freedom. If it is not to arise through a miracle. tions arranged Now. and impure. man must come In this externally. depend upon our Improvement and elevation. it can come to him only through the understandiag. in spite of his laziness. something like this is 'positive reliaion instituby pre-eminentl^gooa men. and through the whole theoretical faculty. to elevate himself above it. but naturally. from the reasons stated above. it . who would elevate him and teach him how he ought to be. But how is help to come to man. with a view to cultivate the mo ral sensibility of others .

a s has been shown above.(Je. 2i6 tH£ their :^i.a. and each one may hold whatsoever he chooses regarding this matter practically it is of no significance to most men. ti. It is very natural that those men from whose inner consciousness this moral sensibility developed itself as by a real miracle and without any external cause ^not meeting with this same sensibility in their fellow-men.TjytTn'Tipr exciting foy attention. fa.ifj^i SCIENCJE Ofi ETHlCS. if meant . It is possible that this interpretation has descended down unto our times. they doubtless were right.p.j)f to en force Mind obedience .. to indicate and even. if not exactly so explained. stated. is utterly without danger iProa. in authority. what we have just .!^. It is a institutions cannot — — theoretically true interpretation.. th ose have in view without making ^^^' Tiind utterlv immoral.^j".trfei^ it is not m.^ata. or blind obedience. ^J^f»^ . but n.Re. should have interpreted it as having been effected in them through an external spiritual being: and if they meant ihdr empirical Ego as signifying thiemselves.np.

separate the object of the impulse into an infinite manifold. Preliminary. concerning the material conditions of the morality of our actions. with an original impulse. If I determine myself to do something which my original impulse actually demands. actually occurs seen. my original True. we can again. as determined through absolute spontaneity. through free reflection. that this agreement of perception with the will is. Now the original impulse it is matters. In other words: the . it can only be satisfied gradually. BOOK FOURTH. nothing but an agreement of our empirical being. in its highest ground. am being in is placed in harmony with my original self. a perception. me a feeling. A. I. as we know : proposed to myseH. signifies. by means of passing through various middle stages and even in those cases when it is satisfied. for has been given eternity throughout perience is all my upon manifold and whole existence and exdirected me for all eternity. consciousness of mine. I HAVE causality ' . and impulse.. as it exists without any Thus there arises and this feeHng fo r I feel myself whole as has been shown more at length above. That which I We have . from the transcendental standpoint. . as the empirically-determined time -being. as end. nothing but an analysis of this.

I do not will does not occur through my impulse. but That which likewise. X — — occur. which yet.. since it is a quantvmi.nded by the or iginal' impulse it are likewise possible. others are opposed to duty (Let of me observe moreover. need not go any further. and conscience . then. But in order that something should occur.. and only that amongst aU possible acts.. and again It is only thus that a manifold &c^SJ'Sn. original impulse craves at all times a determined end = X. would be suf&cient for our actual acting. that I determine myself to do it. and can close his this point.' in eacn case infinitely many actions are possible. make it possible. can never err if we only attend to its voices. is possible as such. whether they exclude or include each other. c. upon is which the moral law is based. called conscience Whatsoever conscience will confirm is always duty. does .e. for within the sphere of what the original impulse. through free reflection.wufj /. b. &c. which. The popular teacher. can again. absolutely onl y is one (a determined part of the manifold) to XLuty. Amongst and here. that the command duty it lies always within the sphere of the possible. let us not look at the relation of these acts to each other. lies this possible manifold. demanded through duty? In the previous chapter we were referred for this one to an internal feeling. The impossible never duty and duty is never impossibl e. moral teachings at . Let us linger over the conception of the manifold. an X determined through all that has passea before it. and we need . demands. <^9-i is possible acting is possible.8 21 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. nothing more to for instance.) N'ow which then is this One. ail conformable . for this does not concern us as B. . and through its own nature but nevertheless also an X. it is necessary not only that it be possible. But since the whole all parts of it being dema. i. which I will. be i nfinitely divided into a. This.

which certainly cannot be""an object or consciousness "on the standpoint of it is common understanding. but philosophical teaching is philosophical or scientific only in so far as it rises beyond the former. but which may. Namely the final end of the Moral Xaw is -. our duty ? "We might give a preliminary answer which. but. perhaps. or we must confess that a science of morality. 219 But it is not sufficient for science. at the same time. doubtless. the question: is What C. If such a law. it is identical. grounded in reason. Hence whatsoever reason. standpoint Hence there must be possible from the first . but so far as nnr whnle beincr is c9ncerned^ Now this^ end is unattainable . Eeason is throughout determiae d. answered in advance the immediate decision of conscience. will conffr. may. be a guide to us in our investigation.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. must also m be determined. which manifests itself in feelings. as an applicable science . since iu consciousness as a feeling . for the will' is always independent. it can Be steadily^ and uninterruptedly approached. Let us look at Qie matter from another side. at the same time. true enough.p. shall find still of In the course of our investigation we other external grounds for the necessity reason. is impossible. Either we must be able a vriori to determine what cnnscip. upon which the feelings of conscience are based. and as a consequence the whole system of lives conscience. be disseverable from Mere popular teaching and* remains~ui the standpoint of' cbmmo hence everything which takes place on the transcendental standpoint does not occur for it. nevertheless. of we succeed in discovering this we shall have. law.absolute independence and self-sufficiency not merely so far as "our will IS concerned.np. only manifested the transcendental point of view.. This decision. : . bases itself on a law. Feeling decides. although and hence not decisive.

it I were unable to how I '11^. oi: our conscience aft e r the \ deed. in the first chapter of the Third Book found such a criterion. namely. a straight this line else. Only that which occurs as point in can he approved^ by conscience. it is true. would have been almost utterly done away with. the feelinsj of conscien ce. lie What is then are in their substance these acts which in the series of approach to absolute self-determination? This our present problem. at least in philosophy a highest uniting ground of these feelings of conscience Our investigation has. D. and had no other criterion jhan the approval or chsap. Let us figure this. every individual a steady and uninterrupted series through which he can approach that Te n d. The moral law..: 220 of TI/£ SCIENCE OF ETHICS. Conscience can always s^pprove only those acts which occur in this series. We. At present the question is. then. and could only have collected a few moral principles through long experience and after many mis-steps. and thus we secured the practical applicability of ttie moral law. and we may hope that it will succeed in penetrating where hitherto we have been see.prpval. in the shape of o|_acts. We have already shown . as an essentially practical law. and would have been changed into a mere regulative principle of judgment. then. this was not sufficient for science. as a law determining the acts. unable to pass. therefore. We should always have been lorcea to^mi tne risk. and nothing Hence our question may also be" framed thus ? What are the acts which occur in the described series To promote insight into the general connection of our method. line. '^'^ II I °We ' I '^M were possible o^ jpnort to determine our duty. whether there is still a higher principle. . at the end of tlie second iJo ofc. concerninq the applicability of the moral prmciple. evenly pursued its course. Our investigation connects h ere precisely with where we^aropped ii. But although sufficient for acting in life. if not in consciousness. : .

in short. as the impulse in fm'm. If this impulse itself is posited as impulse (as a yearning or desiring ) and related to the object. hence the impulse in itself absolute self-sufi&eiency.- E. and not that it is a limitedness of a n an actual causality (a power to that we speak here. It is only in consequence of a determined limitation of the impulse.no . iinal or clearer. but if I comprehend my whole impulse in its relation to an object. and by end and aim such object. ever^ arbitrary purpose is also an original end and aim of me ans arbitrarily to be posited. that _the impulse. is we know. or what it would like to use it for . hence limitea. according to our aboVe remark. It is. quite well possible that I am conscious only of a part of my original impulse as directed upon an object ' which case I also comprehend only part of the purpose of the object. execute no purpose which is not demanded by an original impulse. toiahtv completea. cannot cravfr certai n things at ail What sort of of a limitedness might this be? its By no means one craves. THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. that and in order a determiaed object at all posited. absolute self-sufficiency . '^T^eTWTe'^o^eTTwever. that these acts are such. .. '"'"" ' ' I . to is explain this limitedness. as original impulse. then we have that which the Ego would like to produce in the object. But.in an infinity and can never be attained. 'tihe ihus" kir oiit^fflal'— limitedness 0! inxpulse reafize)!' impuls e of is asserted. Thus the assertion signifies. then i also com preJiena tEe~~whoIe purpose or the final end of such in object. . through which we treat objects conformably to their purpose or end. however. i can. at least. I Let to it be well considered what this totality o f may mean Every am comprehend the is^ my impulse. we have the originally determined. for as such it But this an end which lies. 221 above. "We recapitulate in a few words.

wherever positively no limitedness thereof occurs beyond that which results from the Egohood itself. craves the But there itself . We have only to establish all the conditions of the Egohood as such. In short. is no original limitedness. which does not result immediately from the Ego. and" to end : . shall an"cr be a self-determined Ego . the impulse of the Ego would be to annihilate itself. We have contented ourselves with so much less than we can demand. anS the impulse is comprehended in its totality. There can be no impulse in the Ego to cease to be Ego. to relate them to the impulse of self-determination. But again.: : 222 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. must evidently be a material limitedthe impulse must not be able to crave certam thmgs It Ko w one : this limitedness is to be an original and necessar y hence grounded in reason itself. absolute self-determination of an are to be synthetically united. and by no means accidental and empirical. viewed in its totality. that reason is to be reason. is the Timi^eSnes^wmchresults from the Egohood itself. the impulse. that the Ego is to be Ego. is no other limitedness of reason through than the one which results from the identical proposition. or to become non-Ego for if there were. Ego as such. thi s is my final and whatsoever external things promote this my self-sufficiency. which is contradictory. to that use I am to put them such is thdr final end and aim We have thus opened to us an even way mto our investigation. The con- ceptions of Egohood and of absolute self-determination and through this synthesis we I shall receive the material content of the moral law. aim . cannot cease throughout limitedness be ? Where then can the ness at all. but simply a limitedness which we have appended to ourselves through our imperfect reflection. all infinity. every limitedness of the impulse. Thus it would seem that the original limitedness of the impulse which is grounded in the Ego.

in a certain respect. It is now mine in so far as I am .kgo^ There results from the impulse a mere yearning which I can or can not satisfy. For although I must relate that impulse to myself. we shall have exhausted the content of the moral law. precisely because it is only found as given. it becomes mine in quite aneitttsy ylymiicance. must necessarily be a closed system of manifold impulses. remains always outside of it and under me intelligence. as it In this respect we have shown above. is separated through free reflection in the before-described manner. As power. as i chooseTwIuSfflTfTereI . being finite. Ego must. objective to me. in short. I. I cannot look upon these impulses If the natural impulse. and reflecting The Ego must find itself as . that it finds itself with an impulse. be itself given to itself. or this impulse as somethmfi foreign. etc. 223 determine this impulse thereby. is posited as natural impulse. which impulse.. it remains foreign to me. reflection. fore. there arises a manifold of impulses. as motive. is necessarily a private That which has been thus found. however. "which freely thinks and wills. . being the object of a and limited quantum. were. it yet.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. there results from for me as only the knowledge that this determined yearning is in me. Now if I determine myself through freedom to satisfy this yearning. which. evinces no self-activity in this finding. to me as thetn^ free and self-sutrmmt J \. and it as remains ^ posit it as w/y impulse. b ui m ust relate it_^ ^ myself and place 1 an accidence in the same substance. which in itself is one. THE BODY AS CONDITION OF THE MORAL CAUSALITY ^'•*''"""^ OF THE EGO. We now proceed to do so. "When we have achieved this. in so far as am free.

tnat i do"naETr3ly appropriate as mine that which I find in me life in the first-mentioned respect. I when 'What actively to satisfy it? 1 determine myself selfanswering this question we shall make clearer the distinction just drawn. etc. The natural impulse belongs to the original impulse. signifies exercise causality I feel it as a tendency in nature to All me). and that whidh we are through Ireedom. determiue myself to do it through freedom. through theoretical cognition. Even on the standpoint of common consciousness 1' regard assigned to me myself as double. et quae is non/ecimiis if si. etc. At present this case occurs. but the result of is my self-determination is in truth It my working. for mstance. the nature of the plant . and causality in nature is nothing but nature (in me) upon herself (outside of Now my nature stands under the control of freedom. and nothing can result through it without the direction of the latter. and is ^ not ours th^^^i^QUJi. In the plant. extent.224 free.. et proavi. the causality of which nature is precisely at an will be the result. Now that. demands. if By end in that impulse.ii^^^^^^7^'^rior^^tM^^g^^2^^^ genius. The result of the natural impulse is a mere working of nature. and have appropriated it through freedom . wUl occur experience. in grounded in me : as a free being. vix ea NOSTRA "^Mifo. and am solely tha t 'i'his holds good to sucn an as which I posit myseli.. get iuto dispute with myself. In the latter case I posit myself. but only that which I posit in me through self-determination. lont ^ealiter. THE SCIENCE OF ETHTCS. to occur in experience. it is not only idecditer. enter into judgment with myself. when the poet says: gemis. which I posit as mine. through self-determiaation. Even in common we ^ distinguish very clearly between that which Jjelongs to our personality. my power the causality of upon herself. which the original impulse always.

Self-determination fur nishes to thepowerof first my of nature the reouisite princip le. immediately completely in our power. siace we have posited the system of our natural impulses as product and part argumentation based. in this region causality. to attention of nature. centrates itself.. which is already known and proven. is it is true. and thus our will becomes immediate cause in our body. this. but nature to produce a That which. on the part of nature. Our body has sensation. It is thus that the system of our natural impulse becomes In this our body is contained. or not satisfy as we Q . . namely. without any free co-operation of our own. th e it is motive power. likewise. something else. and thus that the doing nature now becomes my itself to doing as actual Ego. and we may satisfy. as matter.e. and that which we is will results iu the body. all nature is posited necessarily as contained in and filling up space. all that which. is . the natural impulse concentrated in it is necessarily posited as ours and approit. and cona material body. Now. hence. which. has made is be that which it is. nature can only affect herself by passing through the mediation oJ: a _yoluntarily-prodjaced conception Previous to the selfdetermining. I ( has no causaUty in itself. The act of is self-determining supplies and now all that which necessary for a causality is complete. we must necessarily posit it. ' necessary to success has been given.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. priated by us. as matter. which . that working of nature. however. and need be subjected to our will like all other external Nature has placed the body alone in our power. i. is necessary to success has not been given previous to the itself not in sufficient self-determining. on the part of the subject. but in me. We only need to will. 2'Z5 works immediately upon itself. however. In consequence of the reflection. But it has causality immediately. The body not first nature. which nature lacks. This to call the first is and primary matter on which our It will be necessary. in consequence of our will.

and is possible for us in nature. in substance. since all cognition is based on perception.226 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. for this impulse is itself our body in its materialization. and Tience. of all in causality. But the natural impulse goes no further. This relation is a ment . the satisfying of that impulse. as well as all. the Again: the whole system of our sensuous cognition. upon conservation. since it results simply frora self -reflection. I must . but our nature is encircled in our body. but all external nature exists for us only in consequence of the natural impulse. Our nature has our nature for its final end and aim. For all and becomes actual demanded through the natural imour acting occurs in nature. and is to me only through my only realized in the world outside of me through the causality of my body. for nature cannot rise above itself. which alone makes the Ego to be an Ego. and has causality upon nature. choose. precisely such a one. condition of Egohood. Such a body. This I can approach only through acting. an acting pulse. My aervation and highest perfection of the bodj On the other hand. Hence. subordinate the former end to the latter. its All possible acting is. Hence. but I c an act only through my body. From this alone arises. and hence. is condition of Egohood. body is placed in motion immediately through the will. self-sufficiency. as we have shown. our. as sure as it is an impulse and is directed upon itself. highest impulse is to have absolute self-deDendencp. nature has only the body for its final end and aim. likewise. The natural impulse appeals body. of all our cognition it is instrument. The natural impulse is directed and the general well-being or perfection of our body. The body is instruof all our perceptions. We develop the further results. Nature's end is itself. or all morality. is to be the only consciously posited object of my acting. must jreserve and cultivate my body solely as tool for moral acting and . culture. or morality. is conditioned through the pr^.

THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. in short. or must never "become object of an enjoyment for the 6ere enjoyment' s sake. a^ai. which may not with cleare"St conviction. for moral aims. is absolutely against duty.) The third a limitative command all enjoyment 3. 2. which requires a certain necessary reciprocity in this subject. a _ condit ion of the su bstantiality of the subject of morality and that there a third condition. for there is no . o f p ur body. be related to the development. " We 1. —*-"— . Eat and drink for the of God If anyone thinks this morality to be austere and painful. appear that there is a second is condition of Egohood. for conscience' sake. All care for my body must be induced solely by the purpose to make it a proper tool for morality. and to preserve it as such. is conmake this remark to show the progress It will method. we cannot help him. ' and thus we shall complete the external proof that all the conditions of Egohood have been exhausted. The thus receive here three material moral comm ands. ditioned. By this established condition of ality o f the Ego. is not permit : . . and in violation of the moral law. or. of the We Egohood the causwhich the moral law requires.. The second is a positiv e command: the body is to be cultivated as much as possible for all possible pur poses 6f ireedom. The internal proof appears from the is systematic connection of what to be established. (To kill o ff sentiments and desires or to dulf "' our ge neral -powers. namely. it is absomtel^m^ moral to take care of our body without the conviction that it is thus cultured and preserved for moral activity. 227 not as end in itself. first one is negative its character ourTbdy m : I must never be locateda^nd in itself.

and the forirfer is the vehicle of the ifalffier. II. must not give way to many inclinations or lusts of the body. the substantiality. whereas. the causality thereof. It is we have calle d ideal activity . is at once clear that this activity a condition of Egohood. therefore.moiaL. in this respect.228 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. isnor possible I must not wish not to know something. The present one starts from the same statement. Ego must have a power of reflection. The Ego must find itself as Ego: such was the assertion. from which our last mvestigation took its startmg. the rule of my law and" my action. . am it intelligence.law exists onlv in so far . \ for fear it migfet be against my duty . in the former we conitself. we now view the activity of the Ego in it. sidered the passivity of the Ego in that reflection of or the object of the reflection. of the moral law and not merely. in order An to reproduce the given internally through freedom conception! i i n a The activity of the' Ego. conditions the whole being. The intelligence. Hence^' jaw^uch I a material subordination of the intelligence to the^rno ral as of the natural impulse to the moral lawj. and in so far as I am intelligence is th^re a moral la w: the latter extends no further than the former. certainly. or the moral • related. in so far ag I adopt it as make . am I to approach A ^ . The jonral law appeals self-determination. ^TBo^^he law impulse to be self-determined. from the same fear. as I. THE INTELLIGENCE AS CONDITION OF THE MORAL SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE EGO. Only when. that. to this condition of Egohood ? . or the subject of the reflection. The Ego is necessarily intelligence. .point. but with this distinction. and with mature reflection. is Self-determinedness (morality) our highest purpose. like the body. as I to the intelligence as such Consciously.

In your thinking be clearly Investigate from duty. and without regard to anything outside of vour" (Do not. to be formalite r final fKat "Is'lo of say. inasmuch as the science of morality is higher than any other particular philosophical science. tion a s much you can . In our Science of Rights the proof has already been established that the Ego caii onl. The oretic al cognition s'uEo>-dinaE'ecrto"'4B|£ " is.^ posi^^ Hence. the consciousness of indiyidu ality is a condition of Egohood But. it is A. 229 therefore. think. f ' is object of a reflection is necessar y and becomes limited by merely being sucn obect. ?) cognition. the enK and aim of all my cognition. in advance. : " —— . and not from mere curiosity or in order to employ your mind. positive as : jJultivate your learn. conscious of this purpose. INDIVIDUALITY AS CONDITION OF THE EGOHOOD. thinking and investigating. Hmitation : Eelate all your thinking all formaliter to your duty. must be cognition one. of all my duty.: - THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. — — III. The second. principle. The Ego is to become object of a reflection. this result the following three first moral laws The Never subordinate your theoretical reason as such. as you possibly can. resolve upon an end which you would like to arrive at in theory for where ^ c ould you get this end. power of cogni and investigate as much 3. negative : my From I. The third. "' 2. . but investigate" with ahsi^ute freedom. we must here est ablish that proof from a higher . Do not regulate your thoughts so as to find this or that to be your duty for how could you recognize your duty in advance of your cognition ? but always merely with the view of recognizing what your duty is. Hence. Whatsoever limited.

and hence.hp. I must'^m^nysel^free. the Ego means.. as a purely ^ossifi^e activity as. positing another free activity which. itself is This would of individuality.r^ deny that act to all other free not determined^ but merely p ossible fre e beings. in so far. But the following is decisive Originally.aiLa£t Jo myself I thereby bein^sT w hich ars bnwfivp. at the same time and immediately together with that thinking. or is must be intelli- order understood. does not belong to it. reflect. . I find myself as natural impulse. by any In short. smce 1 am itso only so far as I am free. the free activity also must a be limited. t. : All mere possibility is based known "actuality. through mere ideal activity. very often happens in actual consciousness. . I cannot determine myself through free ideal activity. i M at C.230 TNE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. be given to myself as free first. as product and part of nature. ascribe free activity to itself without this free activity being a quantum. the consciousness of "We add the following method and conviction I : to promote insight into our find myself as obj ect. to other free activity cannot. necessarily limited. of manner in so far. must : m curious as this may appear lor i can posit something as possible only in opposition to something already known to me as actual. the Ego is Free activity .rqnf is limited signifies: quantum k opposited to free activity in pceneral. 'is an im-portant proposition of a real and hence. since it . but must d myself as determined object: and. signified above g'ence . freedom. actually' — AlF consciousness upon abstraction fr om proceeds from an tins philosophy. "Whenever I ascribe B. characterized through a free activity as such. likewise. but this . indeed. lead to no result respecting very possible that the Ego may posit that free activity outside of its own. Now. and. and hence. without. in That I must to find this.

The morality of our actions. jeal. of all the conditions of my finding myself existence as free. even the myself exist already.. ? is I to whom J am . active Ego. and how the is it possible ? - Firstly. As ^^ sure as I comprehend this appeal. or. although all the conditions of my finding For since I am free. a new it occurs. given to me a . 231 in fact. time perhaps. and hence I must also find myself as free active. I must give .. does not enter consciousness. in an appeal is addressed to me to "cTetermine myself '"As^ure^as' 1 understand this appeal. as something which. Not the intelligence as such. Now I am to ascribe it when that natural impulse to myself. true self determination through self- spontaneity T c!^. but will find myself at another or not. But my self-determination exists without my only co-operation signifies short : : it exists as a conception . . I am to posit it. then there arises find myself as yet. as I am to find myseii as natural product. I must also find myself as free active. then. reflection. does not enter consciousness at all without reilection directed upon it. find certain through ideal activity through reproducin on e which exists already mclependently of p me. for otherwise the first finding is not possible. no matter" do not comwhether I use and fill it up no consciousness I do not prehend it. I ascribe to myself a determined sph ere for my freedom If i . therefore. does not this constitute essentially to ascribe Which. As sure. I am to find myself generally.nnot find as .the natural impulse The substantial. although it appertains to me. yet myself. nay. The former is determined through the latter. therefore. What may this signify. and thus am given to myself as free in the conception of that appeal. 1 also think my self-determination as something given in that appeal. as we have seen in § I. as we have just shown. but rather th e free. true Ego. ittomjggjif d eterminatipn j I can. cannot compel me thus to find myself in .

hence an 1j]^o. here deduced.) This rational being I opposit" to myself. is Namely. my Egohood and self-sufficiency generally conditioned . unless it air these conditions were given. I . for that comprehension is always rational cause outside of us. (This furnishes the only sufficient ground for concluding the existence of a and such ground is not furnished merely by the comprehension of the influence exerted upon us. Hence it may be strictly d priori proven that a rational being does not l become rational in an isolated condition. or appeal. — »i.. ' assume an actual rational being outside of myself. a being positing as Ego. there follows already a limitation of the impulse to be selfdetermined. therefore capable of is a conception of the conception. " ^ of Egohood " . self . to say. make is this reflection absolute spontaneity on my part requisite. which intended to "< M m ^. could not make the reflection in spite of all spontaneity. being. I posit myself as individual in relation Hence is an individual in relation to me. I.|ir ough whjch it might elevate freedom. possible. I I . and more than one other individual. K> ^ „ r„ «!-^ «— comnuaaicatg to me_ _such a conception i_... condition o f to - co nsciousneas. as we shall soon see more closely. which we shall state at once. ! 1 I' D. [See Science of Bights. On the other hand. From what we have and hence a further determination of morality. cannot be thus proven.I 232 reflection . and which is self-active7 I " . Thi s requirement. Inf Tniii'^fi litself to h° °"°"TT^pd |-. .i 1 II . THE SCIENCE to Ofi ETHICS.} ' ' It is a. and myself to it . addressed to me to be cannot comprehend without ascrildng it_ of to an actual being outside '-''••me. however.^ » . that to it is it. but that at least one other individual outside it-. . condition of Egohood to posit itself as it and individual. . But such a being itself a rational. — . E. But further influences.

) "Wh o am I 1 am I in traJiLL-J^iiaJi-isJa-SaZi. I must not be. is taken possession of not through actual. se1 /. and the absolute as self-sufficient. i | act.-. some of aU . nam ely.) F. But even in the progress of acting I must always choose some from all that which is possible to me. removes a very great diffi- culty in the doctrine of freedom. The theoretical power is not subordinated to it materiuliter .hp. but at least through possible. But it is subordinate to the freedom of the other. (The natural impulse was subordinated to the self. concerning which I explain since it still clearer. individuals and under this presupposition I determine my individuality still further through each .Y THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. iJ^ow.determining impulse. 233 through the freedom of the other individual. (An important myself conception. the freedom of the nt. ^qtermined at the expense of tne' ~ ( itreedom of others. that which I do not choose. why i am : individual tfits mdithat viduai' and none other ? I reply have arrived at consciousness From the moment / am that individual . hence my craving after self-determination cannot possib ly have^ for "its "~ object to annihilate the condition of its I absolutely lility. Through my positing even but this one other indi- vidual outside of me.y Now own possiI 'am only to act in obedience to this impulse of and in obedience to no other impulse. command to consider the other and never to use him as means. but neither is it to the theoretical power. all those which condition the freedom ascribed by me to the other. our presupposition. which my freedom excludes from my actions. other. Hence the present limitation of this impulse involyes the absolute prohibition to disturb the freedom of the self-determination. my possible free acts have become impossible for me namely. what And what is the ground. according to in consequence of my freedom. .

But there may be m. i. that the first condition. They can exist. all this makes me materialiter the one who I am. but there is no external ground T should not select every other amongst all possible G. as we But can I perceive • ^ fi^^^ Ji ave a ctual eristence for me.e. I moment) but the future which amongst all still possible things in the future I choose to be. which must.. be anyhow limited. and how ? . being such cannot be certain things in moment. as . but through my connection with another rational being whereas all following conditions depend absolutely upon - my why acts. compels me. But all this determines my individuality. we cannot owe the proof The essence . at least in its final determination — not is Through being again my being in the future in the present moment . A priori.ppssible free beings the possibility also to" act free . amongst many In each future moment I must select acts. freedom. and I am is it it "'TT'eadbmomSitor'my being through freedom. 234 THE SCIENCE OF ETHlCS. we have seen.any individuals outside of me that influence me.a . appears at least at present. I make mysdf I make myself to ' which because he with freedom. of freedom seen. and that only one free influence is directed upon me. to say. which might be called the root of my individuality. freedom. as we have and hence to leave 'beings to other . can This 5iem as actually existing. depends again upon my freedom. is not determined through my freedom. limited the possibility of (that is existence my this being — if in its conditions. but we. at itself least. prove that this must be so that it can be so. so it without detriment to my have seen. But there it is only under the present presupposition that is only one individual outside of me. to limit myself in each free act. Nothing prevents these free from actually existing.

now that I have the conception of actual rational. in itselt. there conception. but you cannot show up a conception of a conception. — assumption does not proceed from the perception of product of art which would be a circle of explanation but from the above described requirement or appeal — to free activity. leings outside of me^ ~ Originally this conclusion would have been impossible for me. which we have shown to fee tiie criterion ot reason.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. Such a work evinces a con ception of a conception. As sure as I recognize something to be a product of art. necessarily thought the conception he intended to represent. and yet I will be able to conclude from the manner of the influence as to the existence of a rational being. but can only be thought hence a mere conception. But whosoever produced the work of art. For the end and aim of the product of art lie s not. you presuppose creator. it in a world I have said "as sure as I recognize of art. True. but oirtside d'f'itseil:. . according to the above principles. perhaps. its conception is something which is not involved in the mere contemplation." it as a product But this itself is only possible that I think already a reason outside of latter me on condition and this . is that mode through which a work of art is produced. They may merely influence nature. or means for an end. 235 question might be easily answered. I necessarily posit its originator. hence he had necessarily : a conception of a conception. freely by requiringjne ™"^ to be' a ctive-^ But it is not at all necessary that they should immediately influence me. unless. an a actually existing rational being as It is is not thus with a product of nature. as in t he product of na. as follows: they can influence me as free being g^ influenc e f£ge _bgin£s. The mode of influencing nature here mentioned.tuxe. It is thus on the standpoint of common consciousness. It is always tool.

I am no longer a 'i'iiis I am still mere rational being in general. " Wherever my moral power finds page 281 resistance. If it does happen. iv.(ffl. ' Here is man ! ' speaks a voice to me. _^hellin£ ex- excellently : in the PMlosopnMcaJournal. this and hence we assume presses vol. but on which that existence of things outside of us. It is the same with W hatsoever the art-product. It is to and me bu t . If it does happen. that posited This leads us to infer a special. I miiM [not go furtner. however. acjit^^ there is even a l imitation of our desire to freeoLom outside of us. which is said to be external to us must first be explained from something in ourselves. consciousness must itself be explained from the transcendental point of view. further limited than through mere Egohood.:^. peculiar the impulse. in so far as as art-product it is object. tnere is not merel y a limitation of our heing but also limitation of . as we have seen. is posited through a limitation of the impulse.: 236 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. Shudderingly 1 1 stop. Hence the higher question is to be answered: |iow do we come to assume products °f art outsid e ofus? is held to be outside of us. there cannot be mere tiMure.'. which I could be if there if existed only one other individual outside of me. (Mr. as we have seen. : . he I am this particular limited- . of. can Happen. for it was not involved in the conception of Egohood. In the present instance. TO acting repelL'ed iiiternally. had only uttered himself once in relation a particular rational being. But whence it is comes the particular determination ? of it. in us is upon which perception explained through the But that which is assumed on the standpoint of common.r & eco»mw. Let me say it concisely through the object in general our being is limited or better from thfi-Iimitation of our heinq we as sume an object in general: but the impulse may desire a modi fication of the object. on which it is not permitted to proceed from the assumption of anything external.

which in its possibility. however. itself. philosophy must content and in treating a science which is influenced by this presupposition. and place ourselves on the standpoint of facts. and hence the It : may be material part of this science contains something conditioned. therefore. For instance. it does arise in Individuality we shall immediately see. There itself in am not to go even with my freedom. Such a science is the science of morality. through original limitednessf which. If_^we give up our claim to pure philosophy. ^ me through the existence of other free beings a nd their tree ettects m my sensuous world. say: it is so. since there are othe rs who "are also free Jjut on the standpoint of pure phiiosopny. Let it not be supposed. we can. and this Tion-shalling evinces I expIaT^t!ies^pSnt5*T(? me imm ediately. cannot be deduced. however. I can and mus t not be and become everything. How. since in that case it were not a particular one. nevertheless. ""^^^^ . 237 ness which cannot be d 'priori deduced from the general limitedness. . philosophy must always establish the results derived from it as conditioned propositions. but being a particular limitedness is in this respect accidental for us on the standpoint of experience. the Egohood. but likewise materialiter through something which does not necessarily belong are certain points beyond which I to Egohood. Nevertheless this limitedness is an original one.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. U^on it is based the purely emyirical. of course. thus With this. HEis^and others always remain conditioned propositions "Originally I am limited not merely formaliter through . must also be grounded d priori. in a certain respect. of the The result above proposition is this: may also else in its progress be determined througiTsome thing" . that it originates in time. time. than freedom namely.

But does not it is this cancel my and are not determined in time. who live together _with me. pre- destined from all eternity. this theory . free or rational beings cease The solution is not difficult. and. those rational beings themselves. H. remain inexplicable but neither can we abandon . for me. The other established. for if we drop it. as for me the perception of upon me is predestined. for to be. beings in the sensuous world. in order to be but able to express myself. Hence.238 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.exist with this ? The matter stands thus: predetermination cannot be dropped. although an important remark will have to be made respecting for me. as we have fully But let us rise to a higher point. For me (I shall say so at present. the reciprocal relation of rational beings. how I shall react and the freedom of choice amongst all possible acts remains always mine. But how can freedom co. partly to promote clearness. upon whom / act. all the influences of free beings are it). freedom ? By no means. and hence. do their acts appear tn t. as the limitative points of therefore. and to I me predetermined. if we do. They make use of this popular expression. The free acts of others are originally to lie within me are. are also rational beings.heTn self-determined. I will enter upon their discussion. and the perception of my influence upon upon those them is their influence predestined for them. in like manner. my acts are not predetermined. But seems to have enveloped us in a and led us to very dangerous results. I perceiving of them as tne result my absolute self-determination^ but for ail others. and partly because it decides a difficult philosophical dispute. to my individuality. and places the doctrine of freedom. in the contradiction complete light. if not at the same time predestined free acts . my free actions are certainly predestined. freedom. a vriori deter- . which is all-important in a science of morality. they are predetermined.

mined. no one exerted such influence repeat upon them. assertion. and hence. no one after another. likewise. that I. others certainly determined for what influences of other free beings are to be directed upon them. but it was not predestined. and from each of these there points of stretch out an infinity. What free. and hence. and I did not exert them. those influences which I have exerted upon them were predetermined. series a. but everything simultaneously (an improper but necessary e xpressigi^ Hence. Who am I then. an infinity of predestined acts stretch out before me. therefore. my life^J s of determined. the individual which had these and those original determinations. My reason. but not from whom it is The others outside me remain In the same manner. or if to them they exerted it in their own freedom. us recollect what d "pi-iori A no time and no succession. and reality by no means. again : I am only that which I far. I did not exert them. be that which I am. series. outside o f ail timeT through and each free individual is placea in narmony with . make myself a. and it depends altogether upon its own freedom which of all the still possible individuals it precisely the one becomes.e. : ^11 free acts are pre destined from aU eternity.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. whom appertain the acts Prom again.. of The possibility aU these acts is predestined. There are first determined and so on ad infinitum. it is not at ail determmea now i priori is cause the events to follow each other in time. I am the in- dividual to. should exercise these influences. that which I now choose should follow the which constitutes now my individuality. _ But let 239 signifies. b. c. c. h. but. If another one if exerted them before I did. is this i. by any means. from which I can choose. I am to experience in . how I connect this series with that other determined individual &c. I have now acted so or so c. to be. after all ? We &c. perhaps another one exerted after me. . individuality.

person as is such a even before it is born. No man in ^the world can ad otherwise than he does act. cure himself of the fundamental of dogmatism cannot see into the theory of freedom. The makes difficulties which might stiU seem to linger here are based on the fundamental defect of dogmatism. he evil determined until I have acted in this respect. Irom the sutncient reason that time is not somethjng eternal and pure. sepaif it does recognize acting at other. namely. Now. merely an identical proposition.. this But he ought not ai^f^^jtjipr to be man and . and what are our relations in life. giving to an individual his cedure. But what is our fate. althcmgh. in a certain respect. could be quite man: nav. by a little attention. perhaps. in fact. who cannot . otherwise than the ob-jective ' view of our acting ? If our actions denend upo^n our is a person rely so does our fate. 1 am. I a m only what I act . it is it man said: in the world at that all. not True. But the succession and content of time is not predestined. By this proif one thinks determinedly enough. from the day of its birth to its death. the apparently unanswerable question has dissolved of its own accord : jjredeter mination and freedom are completely united. are. all which all and acting— —altogether from each rates being being primary and original. predestined. reason there extends an mnnite manifold of freedom and perception. For the totality of in respect to perception. tli&re ought not to he such a Nevertheless.240 ^(|lP°° flf ts THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. the time in which something is to occur: neither are the actors predestined. and hence. freedom and all real acting are certainly cancelled. only not its actions. he acts badly. that its relations and fate. being the man he is. as it were. all. if I think myself in tiliie. whole being independently of his acting. There is nothing truer than this proposition. And thus. but merely a form of the contemp latioa_ _of Unite beings. and all individuals share in it. which is.

our final end and aim. Tiref.dv is. I Nor still does it hinder my freedom. so as to always treat it everything in the make a means for this final end and aim. and I not dependent upon anything. consists.iselv a. | ^ my possihTe'p atli o r fffigBTM'ffii-ough ._gJiaJL-ms_bD. JJiis object is unattainabl e. as we have often said.s ia t. which might limit me. and that nature thus. I Self-sufficiency. as it J^jjj^.hp. if am forced to assume other free and rational beings outside of me. ABSOLUTE HARMONY OF ALL EATIONAL B KIN GS AS CONDITION OF MORALITY. that in my whole sensuous world that which I will happens simply heca. but altogether a spiritual conception. Finally it is no . and before I have freedom my freedom cannot be interfered with.CHAPTER HI. nasp ir. True.^yjg^Jgg^Jh^^jgt^Jg^fo^m^OT^hismywa^nto N"or does it interfere with my freedomTthat a t the very commencement there was given to me a sphere ior fa±ir} |^a. for their freedom and rationality. . I will j|. is is not an object of perception. in this. as such.fiiTij{„ ou tside ot me tor only thus do i attain freedom. ^hi^ggroachin^^m^ea^nd. my hnrly (the beginning point of my absolute causality. that everything is dependent upon me. The world must become for me. but I shall always endeavour to approach ""ll^^fflTnence shall sensuous world. It is no hindrance to inyfreeaom^naO was set down upon a certain point by nature. anotBgr i|j.usp.

second. . That I should not subject certain things^ which limit m ^i absflhijjp ^ irr in ^'^ piOTi suous world. to my absolute end and aim (2) that i shoufS make it a means to draw nearer to absolute self-sufficiency. and hence ot' the moral law with itself. curtailing of if I must choose amongst is many . . : whatsoever lies . and we have seen that the moral law absolutely forbids my doing so. my freedom. but should leave them as I find nr "'^^"''" them. But if I change the products of their freedom I disturb their freedom itself for those products are to them means for other purposes. the Both are immediate commands of the moral law. I am not to disturb the freedom of rational beings. The moral law requ ires Ci) that I should subject whatsoever limits or. They would not limit me thereby. which is the same. when we consider it in a particular manifestation. acts which I did not choose. however. ^ and with general experience. my freedom. first.242 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. this would not limit my self- suf&cieney. Moreover. and if I take away from them these means they cannot continue their causality in accordance with their first purpose. the matter of the choice control.we therefore seem to have hit upon a contradiction of the impidse of self -determination. . when we consider this law generally and the . Here . but 1 them. because all possible free modes of acting are under my control and even if other free beings should then choose amongst those possible is always under my . and hence conditions . if I may no longer modify this object myself according to my purpose. in accordance with our last presupposition. that which falls within my path and into the world of my experience should already be modified through free beings outside of me in that case my freedom is certainly checked. . fa) my end-purpos e. in my sensual world. If. possible acts for such a choice the condition of the consciousness of that freedom itself.

purpose in so far as an individual reason. 243 The contradiction can be the moral law with itself solved. reason as such. that J. THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. B. the peculiar acteristic of our science of morahty depends the answering of this question. Only through A can I work in obedience moral law. namely. B. me it the original accidental or. the Ego alone is to be the subject of self-sufficiency. II. Now it is certainly. as we have seen. that each Ego should be an individual. But I. 0. Since all the determinations. but of reason in general. we shall discuss it "^^ ntillfirP — parti- cularly — char- upon more thoroughly. the individual A. and not this particular individual A. is our ultimate and hence not the self-sufficiency of our reason. but only an individual in general.. as such. this A. &c.. &c. the is Egohood in general.. depend upon our freedom. iL beinas have necessarily the Is this so? Since everything everything to us. so far as I am concerned. can only signify to limitation of freedom . to the so far as I am Hence A is my . except the original and first one of our individuality. as we have seen that A.^ If this is so. is to and since the impulse of self-sufficiency be an impulse of the Egohood in general. then the end of the one individual is at the same time the end of the other and the liberation of one from dpr)endence the liberatio n ftf can be restored only. and the harmony tof we presuppose that all fre. to the what we have Hence since called above. it is this impulse certainly does not crave the self-sufficiency of the particular individual The self-sufficiency of . The impulse to be self-sufficient is an impulse of Egohood.. only in empirical . root of all individuality. since I can only work through^A at all. A. involved in Egohood. and has only Egohood for its end. same dual md and aim.e. and self and that law of only it becomes conscious of that impulse consciousness. am precisely this A. am A.

Hence everyone who wills the latter must also will the .nrnlhi But he and through freedom may also act immorally. and particularly nf for the science of morals. all causality of cancelled. At first only the body was such tool. and there is no such demand at all. but now it is the whole sensuous empirically determined man . or C represents i^ ^for. since this is the proper place for doing so. and thus for we have here for once separated the empirical and the pure Ego in the strictest manner. If the impulse of self-sufficiency in sufficiency reasmi general. Eeason is to be self-sufficient. is A me. since all belong eauallv toTne^one A. and hence my impulse satisfied.p. it is always reason in general which \ I is represented. unctividea empire of reason. If it is all individuals. or B. w hether A. nor any (material) self-sufficiency in fact.. end is attained. all causality. &c. A is for me the only tool and vehicle of the moral law. I desire morality in general this is ail the same. but deduce it here anew and thoroughly. the exclusive condition of the causality In one word. 1 desire it ot ' " myseit only. if the other a. Have I not then the r ight and the obligation to destroy the effect of hj s Jreedom ? 1 do not appeal to the above negative proposition.. My except by means of the formal freedom of Hence the latter is exclusive condition of reason in general. and hence also the causality to be self-sufficient. In the latter case my end is not attained. is free. A is not ohjid.244 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. but reason appeals with this demand to the determined individual B. C. is cancelled. so f ar in so far as icappertamst o me arid (tf Others m as ilt^lJe'ifl'A'SliS'To themi'm v end Is attained eauallv " in the one or the other manner. &c. is always wi thin or outsid e of me . B. which is very important for all philosophy. but of this moral impulse. C.tH m. paveg and if the tnis self- self- sufficiency can only be represented in the individuals and through them. then it is necessarily altogether indifferent to me.

and allow each t^e morality. for each viction. and not to be convinced by the other. Freedom is absolute condition of all morality. he is as c onvinced that /act immorally. and can only desire. and we can say also: I desire. the same. for otherwise he must have acted immorally in following it.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. In other words. as I am cQjud Tifprl that he acts I'mmorall fr*" vv nose conviction Neither. arrive at the same result. But this leaves the contradiction unsolved. and unless 1 do so desire. is to act solely according to Ms con- and therein consists the formal condition of all Can we then separate. 245 former. so long as each one acts at all conscientiously. Of course. other to p ursue his own course? ADsolutely not. Thus the absolute prohibition of the moral law becomes confirmed. not Here Hkewise there exercise of freedom is arises the further question : What and ~ If the in violation of the moral law. whiisii I act under the^same circumstancgs differently. _I_jaiist absolutel y desire any use made of freedom is to cancel the moral law. the wish that the moral law should reign supreme. on condition that he uses his freedom to promote the end of reason. his best conviction. so long as both are in is now to be the rule ? other asserts that dispute. the y must finally after aU. UBj^ess we crimm aiiy renounce all ourinteresnFoF^ii lVj^kl 'mofaIi^^OEfi^^^SS3a30§I^S^^i6nS?w'en!u'st endeavour to make our judgment agree. ann until then it is the since all reason is . and under no pretext. and without it no morality is at all possible. while the freedom of to cancel the other must on no account be disturbed. each one will presuppose that his own opinion is the correct one. that the other should be free. and otherwise I cannot desire him free at all. be disturbed or cancelled. But in doing this. ? who can be the universally valid judge thereof he has acted in acc ordance with. that the freedom of the free being must under no condition. and hence each one will endeavour to convince the other. controlling me.

that the maxim ot your wilLaaP ^ ww^ii ^w^^**'"*—iMwawi^il— aBfe M m twiyi^j—WHM—Mwailyii w * ""y he trl^ip yfrht hvLvou a. The judgment proceeds legislation. 246 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.thaJL^we and must in part act as if it were Kan t's shape.~orf'6ur part.e. because something is to be a maxim of my will. th e other. but not to physicaiiy is ttie mffuence i^^rrff^tirst moae only permitted. not a principle which Kant enuncia^. Moreover. _actual harmony We shall . ii^-s ufficiency ot re asoS^Jlieinference^^s not stand in Kant: because something can be principle of a universal ought to be maxim of my will but the very contrary. " Act insucha manner.. the self-sufficiency of reason in general. latioall StUl the following is to be observed in regard to Kant's standpoint: a harmony. absolute duty of each to respect the eternal freedom of Each can and must only desire to "det er^ mine the conviction of the ot her. that this idea has real use. I can use it very well for the purpose of examining whether I have erred in judging my duty but on -no aceouat is it constitu tive. i A. the proposition is_ merely heuristic i. But according to what principles do I form this judgment ? Undoubtedly accord. as is indeecRlBarii^Sit's proposition for who judges whether something can be principle of a universal legislation? Doubtless I myself. . but not of Kant speaks only of the idea o f STreaZ. way free by which beings. The final moral end of each rational being is. and hence the morality of all rational being s. free beings may exercise compulsion upon We shall examine this matter more carefully. namely. in (fai fact. show. to realize it. but m^ relv the result oi a true principle.l . namely. as we have seen. We must all Hence Jiant's proposition act in the same manner. of the absolu te must try realized. It is. ii j ' i Miii> il i i " . . therefore it can also be t he principle ot a universal legislation.s„the principle of a universal leg is: iii ii l li lii ii iii i . in . therefore it from me. III. m .

B. Without becomi ng unconscientious we cannot abandon him. manifests life of itself amongst us yet in various ways. and holds the extension of morality to be utterly indifferent. It is not made our duty to seek or create ourselves society. and have most certainly made a mistake in concluding that I ought to do it. is false. does not even take care ot nimseit. through" tiia't ve ry acqu aintan^ m orally obliged to take care of them°aIso! He becomes gtir neighbour and belongs to our world of reason. Now absurd that I. satisfies duty. a more meritorious one's duty. Kant's pronamely. lor^is end ought to be to take care of all mankmd. might perhaps remain there. each one shall live in a cominu5ffiy^ for otherwise he cannot produce as is absolutely self harmony with himse: commanded. JUis virtue is no virtue. ought certainly not to do it either. li:' 1! cannot think this. VTOosoeverseparates himfrom mankind. for oniy -on 'conditio n is of this harmony all. who was born in a desert. This does away at once with the opinion. but only perhaps a slavish merit -seeking egotism. ing to those which position has. he himself free and independ ent. X. however. he. as the objects of our experience belong to our world of sense. ought to do that. I. Whosoever wants to take care only of himself. 247 my own a reason holds.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. renounces his final end and aim. nay. which . a Hving apart from men. and hence. X. It is only Such conduct by no means through acting. even in a moral respect. same circumstances'. but everyone who becomes acquainted with others is. and indulgence in mere sublime thoughts and of speculation. and nob through . which I canno t think that . Each one is to produce absolute harmony with him- self in all others outside of him. . that the\ a recluse. is is enough for the requirement of fulfilling duty. First of therefore. a it is which results in an absurdity.all others ou^ht likewise to do under ^The proposition. heuristic use.

such discussion in order opinion. will each one is • convictions to these principles.* Jjurthe svmM must unless the Church fif the Church community is to be utterly fruitless. to lie ^ Iconvince the Iconvinced. Each one ought to be member . and for society. This C. end and aim is not the exclusive characEach of^an individual. but also trying to persuade others to do so. all the more hi s duty to enter into. as sure as he desires to promote universal moral culture. but is common to all one shall have this same end. . ' unites men . convinced in this dispute. himself to Jbis reciproca l mtiuenceT'NVllosoever flies froia^t "perhaps lestne snoTncTn^^sturbed in his belief betray s a want of self-conviction.248 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. that fulfil speculating. he would be uncon- scientious in not only acting himself according to his uncertain principles. concerning which all agree. other. and not in to This certain is the nature of or He ' must be in himself. Each one must be ready to OTJen. is called a. be constantly changed for that. is "oin^possiWeinsoTi^iSTrstar^onrTon^ such as necessarily exist in order to connect their further Such a reciprocity. ) to attain this cdhviction. only through acting in we duty. This final teristic . to induce each other one to make this his end. which bound to enter. which ought absolutely to tfSI^"^TTSsTence^an^which makes it. minds continue to influence (The symbols of some . and that about whicl^hey all agree. It likewise follows. This reciprocity amongst all rational beings for the purpose oiproaucing common practical convictions. each only tries to convince the other of his and yet becomes himself. and it is thedutyof each. IS called their lymSo /. that each one will o ul allow Jiimaelf the case.GJvmcL an ethical coi^mggglth. therefore. perhaps. necessarily increase as the each other more and more.

has not The Moral Lawinma but universal reasontov Us object .the same practical convic- and the uniformity shall closely of action resulting therefrom. understanding. and which is doubtless exposed to many doubts.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. that I shall become a fit tool. gate-it it is f urth^. roTTOubt everythin^S. nor must the Church t^'meit is unconscientious. because not a single one can even think it. ' It has of me alone. cultivate. therefore the necessary end of all virtuous men. I alone responsible for their The development of my understanding depends altogether upon my own conviction.) D. It is not duty to act in this matter as others do. and for which is holds me responsible. The agreeing of tions. I have absolute freedom of thinking. anc a violation of duly to leave matters of this kind 'in regard to my body. best to preserve keep it healthy. is all in. and not to the common and of conviction. which our science. and what not a single one believes in his heart. upon the opinions own.rr^^Zrhis am am possessed of a bod^ investigation is abs_Qlute_dut y . We is examine characteristic of this important point. according to my conviction. referred solely to my own private convictions. as individual. I may hope. and take care of it. 249 Churches seem rather to contain that. and I as tool in relation to the Moral Law. me for its its it objeCTSoMyinso reaUzation in the requires of far as lamone the tools of sensuouswOTlallence^ilOhat it me. as individual. concerning which all are at variance. therefore. it is immoral to let the preservation of my body depend it. of others without conviction of my . I have absolute freedom to nourish. nay. As mdividual.Ji2wever holy it mav ?]?]DSSit*i P-^^ t° inves culture. as undecided.. and make it a useful and good tool. Con- cerning this cultur^o^nwself I am. I must not deem it uncon scientious.

is impossible. and hence without infriiiging upon freedom. nevertheless. he having refused to declare his will and his rights. tiiaFis to say. and which are conformable to their m common conviction. follow. a State.250 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. cannot act before a State is is erected. the agreena^nt" concernin gthen^ommM^toAfe in the sensuou s world. a s to how each of influence Che other. if But from this it would seem to such a common conviction and harmony of all. „ ft^ jj pifit>]nn t '^'^gftut accordance with principles which QtaIl!T and Jtience all have approved. which jj^|p- affects all. because no one can conscientiously enter into relation with him. not to be tolerated at all in society. Whosoever refuses to do so.jn]H| p |. concerning the manner in which each may influence the sensuous world. is dutv to unite with others into. and hence the whole sensuous world. for cannot influence this their will. and in taking part to in this cultivation must not proceed according I my private conviction. that which to is contradictory to the Moral Law. if my influence does not suit their own j^fl . harmony. Since men. and the cultivation thereof accordmg to the dictates of reason. I am not alone responsible for it. It_is absolute moral an agreement. therefore. That which is outside of my body. I posi tiyeIs:. Hence it must be an the Moral Law to produce such This agreement of all men. is common to all rational beings. all. all acting is impossible. but to all rational beings.. Still it is also against that Law of to act otherwise than according such universal absolute command a harmony. the more cultured man is . sensuous world without influencing other rational beings. and it.. That. being difficult to obtain or of only a considerable the express agreement of portion. is called the State (7imm»m ora7ancnh'e community all one may of men which have established suBh called the State. is not only assigned to me. to a constitution. is thus always exposing others to the risk of treating him against his wiU and his rights.

for in this matter I do not influence myself alone. I am inwardiv convinced ^ that the constitution is a violation of right and justice. if only by my acquiescence. progrS't^a to tegai and rational concLitionallY to the subnut unof iaw^ one's tor these laws contain the presumptive common wiii. first Nay. It is immoral toover throw the State ^^l^^s^m firmly convin^dT^Z|^^^^^^Teane||^^^^^^^^^^^^ tBiwI wmchcanonL^De the case under Sjcumstances ^"wSnall hereafter develop immoral to do so. for pure reason. but the whole commonwealth. at least. many some imperfections in the will since not give their consent to a system ^f order unless they obtain great all. concerning the illegality of the constituis. Ought I not. of 251 others to certain measures.t. and yet I help to maintain it. in violation which no one has a right to influence the other. What Some Plato s ays about it is not correct. I ought to hold it and must not withdraw from the State. Nevertheless. if conviction. i.. My tion.& pnnvip.J£2stnotactjn matters relating to the whole commonwealth.e. I "am not" alio wed to withdraw trom my country. while others will submit to manner state as arises. perhaps I even hold an office under this unrighteous constitution. perhaps. lit I is only my private conviction.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. . and their submission distribution of to the same. Each one attains moral permission to influence others only through their consent as expressed in the laws of a State.. for acquiescence. according wto mv pTivgt. There is a pnntradip. Nay. forced to take the silence. of is first condition It ot graauai ciuty latate . . even if I am convinced of the illegality and irrationality of the greatest number of its institutions. to resign the latter ? On the contrary. nay. contradiCTufy. for it is better that the wise and " just should govern than the unwise and imjust. but |.tji nTi here. there will probably be at rights. very correct in itself. we could obtain her in visible shape. the and has state. arisen.inn as has been shown above. In this compulsory n eedt he advantages.

! at least. which has the opposite object in view. your conviction. in so far as it neverthe- promotes that object but formaliter it is immoral. may then quietly it. An the State. Both must be united. "But in that case. If some men have for a certain lengljj of time. ^tate tuinmes down'oritseli. namely. and can will only look at the different kinds of conviction both cases. and a rational torm of ment laEes^ rf^^'lrlyiut!. to and you only act according so treat him. You speak of the conviction of . Will you then let others If you see that wrong-doings occur." 252 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. easily be united. acting. is certainly both materialiter and formaliter. of a condition to be produced of the conviction of an actuality to which I belong myself as member of the State. : one says " But But this is commit it? commit no injustice a selfish spirit. upon his conscience to completely overthrow . it is no injustice to treat another as he has expressed his will to he treated in the law. of I must regard the present condition this view! our nggjj^jgjj^as a means to produce th^a^on^state. it less . ment (becomes li-LegaTTyranny and oppression. which has not this object in view. acted in accordance^ wxtb these principles. I and must always act only with take are. if you You ask may this of in contradiction be reconciled? Easily enough. must not acting in my measures so as to let let things remain as they but rather so as to them get better. may be materialiter legal enough. you I. I act against my better conviction. . if how we spoken what whereas I speak shall be. But an ." But is it not likewise your correct and moral conviction that in matters of common concern you should act only in conformity to the at all common will ? Hence. who has but common will. evil and unconscientious." take it '"" convinced himself of the gSflHP Dseh honest man. will ought to prevent them.

for this faith is I^ot is there any contradiction based not upon natural disposition. but always retrogressed nay. if it could be proven that the human race. ha^ never progressed. we must decide for or against this perfectibility. more dangerous ano more calculated to to Shake their empiretoT^very louriBStiSnytRan this tins JaU is: ^The only plausible reason which and which it does not tire to not be treated otherwise than it plead. tyranny can assign. sort of people but upon freedom. is that men can treats them . Let us set our investigation in the proper point of view. even if.'j a. ineradicably within us. that nothin g is I the tyranny of despots and priests. . so as to put for ever a stop to this idle late. Hence it is one of the first articles of fantb wnich we cannot doubt even without renouncing our whole moral nature. from the natural disposition of men. cry. The infinitely extending moral law comnr^aTid. very irrational. We may put this question altogether aside. raised a terrible unmeasured perfectibility talk. that men . and the source of God only knows what wickedness. "We cannot obey this command unless we believe in perfectibility. and positively prohibits treating them in a different ' manner. (I 253 append here a remark : Some men — I will not call them unconscientious.fjy -cyprp and alwavs remaiaed. Let us observe firstly. their of for this they must determine in own conscience. very stupid men — have.h. from merely theoretical reasons. in this. the mechanical law could be shown that they must necessarily retrograde (which is certainly far more than ever can be shown). from the beginning ok the world to the pres ent day. therefore. as if the belief in an were something very dangerous.bsolutelv to treat me n r^R j^f f. What who would make must there it is be. but. Hence. capable of perfection .THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. that it is not at all the next question. us believe that foolishness ? to hold a faith which the moral law absolutely commands «But this is certainly true. whether. we still ought not and could not give up that faith implanted ^ . at least.

it should not consist of abstract propositions. however. sentation is symbol. are desirous to infuse their t!h is convictions into all others. each one speaking his part to himself without the other hearing him. We repeat: is all. Hence. and hence that it determination of that individuals disagree. even the least cultured. must always remain as E. therefore. but very general it is in its statement. It is involved in the cSnception of such a symbol. that should be not particularly determined. for precisely concerning the further But the conception Likewise involves that this symbol should be proper for all. Both remain isolated. there must be som ething which can be pre supposed and which may be regafded'as the confession ' ofTmhof it all. they are and must ever so remain. . according to our demand. ) ' But. and the unio n of all jor purpo3eJs. Now. as are their it is. as sure as their destination dear to them. the conception is the real That precisely this representation was a matter . both neither understand nor influence each other. or as their symbol. (In the sci ence o f_ philosop hy. but of sensuous representations thereof. necessarily.called is \he> if possible only Mutual cohviction. which is to rise ^to the standpo int is jftranscendental . it must be easy enough to unite on one common point. thecGsagreeing parties proceed from Church. diverge considerably in their individual is How he to discover what they all agree upon ? Certainly not by going around and asking them. each oneis to influence all who probably opinions. The sensuous repremerely the hull.254 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. consciousness. something wherein they agree for. this c[uite possible not always possible and m itlt^s that • phil^Rophizin^ individuals do noFagree o nasingle pomt. where there are only two or three who are to explain mutually to each other their opinions. otherwise. and that whole position. since they all occupy the same standpoint of common sense.

every symbol is a svmbol of necessity (Noth. ^^^^^^^"^ and will always remain so. Mohamed. and images.— THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. the true holy and sanctifying spirit. and to agree more and more upon. as nations for we do not speak of their sages—were first elevated to a clear consciousness of the supersensual through the Jews. Another author of a religion. of necessity. Unhappily the nation of his faith met the misfortune of coming to a standstill from want of a learned public. Now what do these images say? Do they determine . The essential of every possible symbol is the proposition: there is something supersensual and elevated above all nature. gave to the same supersensual another form. who. It was very natural that they should shape that proposition according to these images. Whosoever does not believe this in all serious- ness cannot be Church. only in the same images in which they thought themselves. In so far. modes of thinking. But the same purpose had previously shaped itself already. likewise the purpose and content of our Christian Church symbol.Symbol). since 255 no common discussion was possible without an agreement about something. and lie did well to do so. This for instance. more conit formable to his nation. which the conception had accidentally revived amongst them. or the true moral way of thinking may be this is precisely of a : member what the Church seeks to determine. from the essence of the conception. I shall make this clearer through an example. who had cate the supersensual to other nations. and is totally incapable of all morality and moral culture. community amongst members of the Jewish their own usages. It was natural that they should have been able to communiactual visible nation. they not yet being able to distinguish the huU. But what this supersensual. indeed. and as confession of faith of an is. and since it was not possible to make men agree about anything higher. as realized symbol in the sensuous world. through reciprocal communication.

. therefore." '"Blle'^who" acts otherwise does not the sake" of moral culture. And here. indeed. in other words. For it might be said " Now if I am not convinced of the truth of those symbols from which I am to start.gall is not merely_ a requirement of . there is not possible any reciprocal action for the production of common convictions. and throughout all eternity to be further determined. as at something to be proven. is absolutely commanded. I cannot infiuence all without from what they all agree upon. and since the latter as the conditioned.^mscientious duty. under our presumption. do I not then speak against my better conviction and how can I be allowed to do so ? Let : as : . further to determine the exists. which is quite a different business. but . which has no other object than . 5s"OTTe"as I the "end. By the supersensual in a universally valid manner? no means for what need were there otherwise of a Church community. These enwrapping are. solely the manner in which the Church community. so also is the condition. and not from what they are in starting dispute about. so sure this supersensual is not determined. I also will th e lieacli for ^Jy^mea ns. Moreover. same ? As sure as this Church and this Church exists as sure as man is finite but perfectible. it be observed that I say I shall start from it. from something presupposed. appears the objection which may be raised against this doctfine. . but perhaps in order to show off his learning. and hence I shall start from what they are all agreed upon. But since without agreement concerning something.. it This is prudence. as well symbols as may be." 256 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. but on no account: I shall try to arrive at it. Hence it is absolute duty to fix at least something upon which at least the most agree. but is to be determined. and makes himself a theoretical teacher. gives expression to the proposition: there is a supersensual. But I shall infiuence them. to build up a visible Church community. or. as symbol.

The symbol is the point of connecfor to teach it is priestcrait tiqft Ip^ is not taught 'we start from it in teaching: it ^""oSffBBBTO pre ^ «. cannot. nearer to my conviction. I should be more satisfied but since there is none other I can only make use of '•• 1 — — 1 1 II " ' 11 this. . but it can be done only gradually. from which to start. But against one's con- an object to keep others in this belief is immoral. and is constantly to be changed through good and proper teachings. THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS.—. and the true priestcraft. is the true and real despotism. of chMracterizing it as a Hence it can only be this manner But who fimd determination.. and ought not. his teachings . all You are to start what they can agree upon with you.. to start from this your determina- held in dispute. You wUl always be teaching conformably to your conviction so long as you regard in your heart the symbol as a means to raise them to your conviction. viction to it.£ RnppnR^tmn If it were not necessary to presuppose it. But what conviction is ? 257 it I really which runs against your better hope not the conception of a supersensual. since it is you from is. Hence it is the conscientious duty of everyone who has to work for the spreading of a common conviction ahlongst a Church. ? says that it is an actual determination You.. for your person. to treat the symbol as the basis of "We jiot inwardly to have faith in them have already shown the very contrary. which lies at its basis. and this presumptively. or if there were a higher poiat. It is ignorance to insist that this hull shall be a determinedness. s . To raise them to your conviction is your end and aim. precisely as our actions in the necessity -state must be regarded as means to conduce to the rational state. but tion. and by always remaining in accord with them from the first starting-point. 'i'ne symbol is changeable. precisely as the endeavour to retain man in the need-state. the Church symbol. determine the supersensual otherwise.

this if not quite sure of my matter. but I am even in cons pience bound to cultivate this a.ill universal reason to is the spirit of .Fo pery . but only through the powers of the individual. I am not only allowed to have my private convictions respecting State government and Church system. it is my true. nevertheless. my convictions.. The grouncl is tbe following There is no other criterion for ^ the objective truth of my sensuous perceptions than the agreement of my experience with the experience of others It is different though not much with respect to argument. .inTi Trnip. True. Now. should reject account immediately abandon I would not on that conviction. of my : soul.andaf-._ tending to bring « I'^t. — — individuality is ? True. the fact that I am. The Protestant proceeds from Popery pro ceeds to the '^symbol soever does the latter is the symbol into the infinit e. I assert and stand up for it that this likewise from a ground involved in my nature. I argue according to universal laws of reason. : Let us remark here [ this further progression is and this elevating of testantism. ^ut such a cultiv ationi^^jjossible its-'flrofress — at least the course of absolutely ^TOl^nroug^mtercommunication : with others. I am a rational being only through being an individual. as its ultima^ spirit. and the.b as T am able to do.|-. how can I be sure that the result has not been falsified through my . a Papist in form and P. unon the old. How should I come to do so.a my in con- ^ vir. it the symbol this precisely the spirit' of Pro- I The insisting word has indeed any significance at all. to whom I communicate it. if I had been before quite certain least but I would at of the matter ? How could the other through his doubt. in the inmost depth not so. & c. Calvinistic. become staggered and would investigate the subject again and again. betrays itself in one person after another. But. Who- even though the symbol s which he proclaims as ultimates be genuinely Lutheran. 2S8 THE SCIENCE OP ETHICS.

whether or not individuality may not have influenced my con- To remove this doubt the agreement of all is not necessary. I may well bear it if the other cannot foUow me in all the conclusions which I draw. it is not the exviews about which I care. for instance. and actually suffices me. This fear is removed as soon as but a single other person agrees with me for it would be very curious. or respecting a certain view matters.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. conviction. always indiis The dress in . philosophy. representation thereof vidual. it. which I clothe it them the best fit only for me but even in me would better the . until he observed the same elevation in others. conviction by the honest agreement An agree- when I cannot presuppose a to internal conviction. viction. if such an agreement between two individuals should happen by chance. so utterly contrary to nature. even though lies this I do not become clearly conscious of doubt. remains. imiversally valid. It is general logic. proof that my suspect this. the only criterion left to me to confirm my my Deep in my spirit. Nor is agreement concerning everyihingr neces: sary. If we are only agreed concerning of the first principles. that my individuality might have been the ground of my conviction. after all. if I were quite others with self-sufficient? On ing. The sincere agreement of a single person may suf&ce me. that the first man who rose to it surely did not trust himself. for this reason : my fear was. because it makes me . does not satisfy ternal me it mere agreeing On the contrary. the other hand I am of confirmed in my it. a state of mind. Thus it is only through intercommunication that - ' I attain certain ty and security respecting 'my "con "ygBmisr^^unf^a^TonvictTons were really universally the particular rationaI7 and hence universally valid. 259 and conduct. iufluence. which no rational For these are guaranteed by man will doubt being Let us take. annoys me.

it is But we have just now seen that How ! to refrain Jrqm comm unicating spectT^^Church '^affiSrs and I'deduce priva te convictions reState 'gove riinieSt. But according to positively not to start in the what we have said first. 7 "am not only to obey but even. I correct my conviction. This it will obtain. The communi cation of my private also is con viction is absoliite duiv. because in doiag so I would conspire to overthrow the State. as modified by all. that a^r'TiSd'-to be We it from ''the"''presuppositTon . exclusive condition of the further culti- vation of my particular convictions. I am also not allowed to communicate my private convictions if they are opposed to the presupposed conviction of the people at large. '"i"* contrary to duty. the more does truth (objectively considered) gain. if I communicate it to others. and I likewise. can this contradiction be solved ? It is solved as soon as we observe. I am Ch urch community from my private conviCL'tOllJiuronlxIirQ m £he is common "s'y'ihLI Bf. and correct I am not When my convictions through communication. communication. and hence shall be allowed to start from them. hence also its condition. if it is the duty of my office. and thereby make my own representation even more universally comprehensible for myself. general if it It is. throw off their individual mode of thinking.26o THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. the condition viction commanded. who enter upon the subject and oppose their own reasons against it. The more extended this intercommunication is. since allowed to communicate them ? the conditioned is commanded. "and so far as the State government concerned. if the view is correct. that I shall be enabled to communicate them. But how am I then able to cultivate its laws. had less of an individual form. and common conviction. from what we have deduced the duty. Hence. and who. The former cultivation of my conis demanded of me. therefore. help to execute them.

limited number. We called such therefore. qv scholars^ mmmmmmmmamm^ himself II ^^ffT^Tfi?"^u?3^?eacr^ne7wno raises to absolute unbelief in the authority of the common conviction of his age. and in so far separated from them and par£IyTr*is '£6 represent and externally to . For it is the very purpose and spirit of this society to investigate beyond these limits. but. or the State exercises them. influenced. not member of such a society. formaliter e.— THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. but whosoever holds them to be limits does not investigate beyond them. of their convictions 261 and from the impossibility to obtain knowledge by asking everyone. " involves the following: It is to be partly linii^^.mi^cimiHnPRR^ hp. so " a society the learned public. Hence if we had not to influence all. I freedom which each one has for himself and for his own consciousness. to establish such a public of scholars. The synthetic link of union of the contradiction would be such a society The conception of such a society . lis As each one he free on this sphere.. and is.fnrp which everyjlling realize the possible can be thought I and investigated wiS^IEsoIulEe!^ is {unJimiied freedom. coTmrnnn p.g. and to investigate everything freely. . and to start from them. the convictioni" whereof it were~qmte possible to become acquainted with. but a certain namber chosen from amongst all. for he may consider much of what Church or State holds as final and highest determination of truth.d and determined. . and hence not to embrace all. to doubt everything. at least. — free for himself. . because they also could coiDjnunicate their views. Finally which indeed follows from what we have said heretofore each member of this society must have thrown ojBLthe fetters of the Church "s ymbols^ and of the legal conceptions sanctioned by ine "State not precisely matenaHter. bat a determined. Such a society is a forum of a. he must not ascribe to th ese symbols or conceptions any autKoritv must not hold i}hem as true and correct because the Church teaches them. it would no longer be prohibited to make them known. .

which always influence morality more or less. and has found in him a confirmation. but. indeed. will find it their duty to join these two. it without guidance. own thinking.fi1y cnnimunicate them to all. who like' him has thrown off the belief in authority. must not iTnTijRdia. to base one's self in all matters T)urely upon one's ffwn thinking and to absolutely repudiate whatsoever is not confirmed by one's . done so. as appears from the above. to communicate to these scholars all new discoveries. thenot-scholar in this has. perfect certainty. he can never attain Add to this. and at the same time a means to deposit his convictions until he shall be enabled to make them useful to all. and he cannot be quiet in his conscience until he has found this man. all particular lie which consciousness. of "its ~conatitution is the rule to HnbTm't Jn no authority whatsoever. of is. and through" their union establish a public of scholar s. that his system concerning State and Church is the result of the current opinion All that he has himself convinced himself . who get into the same position. and dissenting beyond the sphere of common which each one may believe to absolute freed o principle positively The distinguishing characteristic of such a body is m and independence in thinking and the . such a man is As sure as he thinks morally.t. cannot be indifferent to him whether he errs or not. as we have shown above. Others. and thus to make them of common use. but anyone who can look immediately. Hence he must hunt up one of similar views. It is moral duty. The scholar .262 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. that such are the opinions of his age his premises . Por having repudiated that authority. They will soon find each other. sees and he further. but in respect to theoretical propositions. and convictions entertain. distinguishes himself from the latter certainly beUeves also to have convinced himself through his own reflections. that it is his duty to communicate his convictions. at the same time. of his age.

they would try to compel conscience. admittance to investigation.p ermittecnyTBscuss Hence in every^ I tmng whereof one. and it is his moral duty to join the scholars. is Hence he looks for the premises and from establishes consciously. have drawn himself. or hurtful. It is not the business of the others. . whose mind lits bim it. scholars. and incapable of learning to do so. for they act according in to their perfect is discussion universities discussion in learned books in of the method.s_. convince(^£m^tnerei^^yinUaL *f3r'T'1S3lversity!^Tiws^errgreaffl!y^w^ pFfiftaution^aSSTiold that one ought not to say everything in the university rooms but first consider well. should bear the guilt on his own shoulders. The State and Church must Jolerajgjihe otherwise. or liable to misrepresentation. acts criminally in further believing in it. from the nothing but in the form right distiaguished As so the scholarly investigations are absolutely free. no withho lding. whether it may be useful.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. free resolves. versities.^sia|^^ symbols^ no prescribed direction.n^matters_ol conscience. and no . are formed by his age. The members of this republic must be allowed to discuss everything. Whoever can no longer in his heart believe in authority. without his knowing his co-operation . Forthflregu^Jjg^jj^^g]jj^gjgjUj£a6. precisely they believe they have convinced as they dare to think it for Universities_are_schppls for the learned. perhaps. Whosoever is unable to investigate for himself. must also the attendance at those discussions be free to everyone. The and duty. The scholar. themselves. 263 it and without well aware in himself. for having obtruded into uni. universities als o_it_inaaL-b£^. whereof themselves. JsTo earthly I "and for power has a right to cj3jmnand^. for.i. the results he may. his reason for himself as the representative of reason in general. of this. on the other hand. it is immoral to deny to anyone.

progress toward s if he should begin to doubt. In so far alone can the scholar also receive a salary from and be under the supervision of the State. but not »?—"iii—i^ an absolute democracy. .gJi£h cannot support or further scholarship^ as such this is only done through free investigation. and hence they must be more advanced than the public at large. Evei^thing. I say : State and Church must tolerate scholarly culture More indeed they cannot do for it. must be an allowed subject o f d i scussion. whereof each one believes to have convinced himself.'^w are others to be prevented from straying into the same errors._it as such. since both occupy utterly different spheres. and yet "TTls-p^sible. e.g. for he is the educator of the popidar teachers and immediate officials.g. however.^ig«. btate. .. Each one does what he if and in the right this right. must tolerate that distinctive essence. e. indirectly a State State's. Teachers of relipion and State officiala avf- to work in Ihe cause of the perfectibility of men. TJj^^Jaifi. " HencrChurchliM-'SlOTrmu^ tolerate scholars. IS ttie true. absolute of which constitutes their and unlimited communicatio n thought. There is he has the might to maintain no other judge in it than time and the progress of culture. perfection would be impossible in such a btare. of scholars is I ^Pn^epublic more do. In so far the professional scnoiar is "himself official. or rignt'*1oF*^ffflkial can- definitely expresse37"raIyT]ie is is strength valid in it. and the St ate is not to investig ate. Of course the State cannot prescribe what he is to teach.^^^ must be scholars^and must have received a scholarly ^ education. dangerous and outrageous it ma y appear For if anyone has entered upon errors. support "^scholarship as inamduals. if he is not permitted to communicate his errors ? . for that were . Statesmen or State qfficiais may. one could any longer conscientiously live in such a Church or such a State for there would be no remedy for him Moreover.264 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.

but a scholar. is the total end of individual. he is justly punished.THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS. I^j^n oppression of conscie nce to prohibit the greater from When 'cotj\iWIIHtBgtTBy*HIFT(isienting cjpnyictionl'^^^CDolany w^^^^^^^^^jm^^^^^^^^^^M^^^^ftom* preachingCDeni in the puIpi^^iayTinieisonlywell aware or what neooesTnewill himself know that it is immoral to do so. but to teach it const itutes quite anothe r order of teaching. G. The State and the Church have the right to prohibit this to the scholar. all his all shall all agree but men working in society is: men agree only about the purely . Moral Law. Scholarly schools are not such wherein the the future profession of common school-teacher. man of in so far as he considered as The final end . . Hence he both. Thus the idea Church and science this of of a public of scholars alone solves the contradiction which occurs between an established each individual. he will necessarily reprove himself. in as few words as possible. to separate both in his conduct. that he do communicate in the best manner what he believes know. True. or of the State'official. he. according above principles. teacher to the is The State is official andpunic schoolalso to be not only a pr ofessional man. we state. and to prevent him from realizing his If he does so. whatever he may think in himself about these laws nay. he is public teacher or official he is not scholar. and when he is scholar he is not the former. contradictory. for instance. violates the laws of his State. really to 265 but the State can see to it. if convictions in the sensuous world. is taught. for he has done an immoral action. these professions must also be taught. In conclusion. but it is his duty. Idea in and the absolute freedom of conHence the realization of the sensuous world is commanded by the State.

It is so even now already. What each one did would thus. ought to tend. because each one wills of himself that which he ought to do. since all would will the same. according to that common will. 266 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. and as well as he were able. . and even our individual culture. all our thinking and doing. each one would be allowed to do everything he might will. of all. although unattainable. Under the presupposition such an agreement the distinction between a learned and unlearned public falls away. All have the same convictions. but only in Idea. for it is common to them all. because all others will the same. but all are this end. since their end is the same in reality. power. modify nature for the use of reason. that which of is rational. But if this Idea were real. and what all did would in reality turn to the advantage of each. therefore. his what would happen ? Each one would with individual power. Each one is to think in everything he does that it is for all and this is the very reason why he is not allowed to do many things. Not we ourselves are the final end.puls(yi~y The will of each is universal law in truth. since he does not know whether they will it also. Now all if this end. and no compulsion is needed. Church and State fall away. and the conviction of each is the conviction The State falls away as a legislating and com. be of equal advantage to all.. were thought as attained. To this end.



We have already indicated the definite separation between the purely rational of the rational being and its individuality. the understanding (in sentation). and hence of . or that wherein it desires to have its end and aim represented. the widest of the word. in a certain sense the Moral Law is its own end. The object of the . The manifestation and representation of that pure reason in that being is the Moral Law. whereas the individuality is that through which each individual distinguishes himself from the others. of rational beings outside of me is their representation. but Eeason in general. in virtue the Moral Law. Now after this externalizing of pure reason has been . The uniting link both is this. This universal reason has been posited by me. that a rational being absolutely must be an individual. The empirical sense is the will.BOOK FIFTH. of empirical origin. is absolutely nothing individual. 269 as theoretical principle. as repre- equivalent to intelligence or general power of Moral Law. as intelligence outside of me and the whole totahty and the body. DECISION OF THE DOCTRINE OF DUTIES. CHAPTEK I. Hence I have posited universal reason outside of of me. THE THEORY OF DUTIES. but not necessarily iMs or that individual which latter fact is purely accidental. A..

Whosoever looks lies an end sees not himself. All others are.270 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. and in i. contemplated end.e. Let us remove some to this proposition. but its end lies outside of me. using them as tools.. as person. not tools. whenever I hereafter use the word Ego. Moral Law ? and to whom assigns its execution. but has them for end. hold me member of the communion of rational beings. and not its end. but final end and aim. I to am only a tool in its hand. . relate myself to the me that this law addresses itself. Impelled by the Moral Law I forget myself I in acting. Hence. vanishing the contemplated. For all the other rational beings. ^"^(^fi difficulties which might be opposed ifflfff-^yT^imsey-'eau^says . only the instrument. embraced in end. to as a whom the Moral Law addresses equally as to 4ne. addresses its for my consciousness. or the is the totality of communion of saints. or for my own consciousness. signifies person. therefore. and how the pure Ego is finally altogether externalized from the individual person. it always (Our Science of Morals is therefore very important whole system. For my conscious- others are not means. hence I am to them end. so in the subject loses its here.) How It is to it do I. for myself. the Moral Law. or I. and only I its am all not. the Moral alone ness For me. as they are end to and To me. in the Science of Morals. but the end outside of me. Kant with universal approval mine. Law itself not to other beings. am. only the empirical or individual Ego is to be called Ego. the tool of. itself As in every contemplation. since in it is shown up how the empirical Ego arises out of the purely genetical Ego. From the present point of view for our the representation of the pure Ego rational beings. achieved in me. itself " This proposition of if mine is Kant agrees well enough with only carried out further.

and final end .. so far as 'he can become so . and "^e alone is independen t of everything. . and is the point of view from which the consciousness ot all rational ^ .isp ly Vionaiigp liig -iininlp a. in acting for the totality. prftP. . ^six'h nnpi to_be himselfTand this «!«» Tngy hp admittod a means to realize reason. each rational hping is ia a. and in devout brooding over their and-^ who expect from such practices the annihilation of their and a flowing together with God. as ob.*i.lii'niiub iciJlIa!n7r HpH--darp. Iicuc feJ he-poiBfej view of God. all others outside of him are end but no one is his own end.. Butn o. This is the . Each one becomes like God. into One - ..nH rlpgfrnyo. I shall be compelled to recur frequently to this important point. The point of view from lies which alT ^ I'TK^^Hf^iTjig^ witVinnt n"nopfir)T.bRohite end expressly for Ho~^i(i end as final aim of its ggiblenue. Those who place perfection in piou^ self. ^\\i>^ for this alone he exists and i r]g~"Were not for this he ^leed not to "exist at al L This d oeTnot lower. —fRarjr_nnft. iadrridualB.(^yTifia pnrp represen tative of the Moral Law in the se nsuous world fi'i'n becomes triTP_pn-i:Q-J<igii l. acting each forgets himself utterly. in respecting the freedom of^all it is said. that this forgetting of self occurs only in actual acting in the sensuous world. consists in acting. ' THE THEORY OF DUTIES. in error. ^^^^ final end beyond all-individ nal consciousness. are much is and remains egotism they True virtue want to make perfect only themselves.«. —\ ^^^^^2=^ f^^e^-POwy HEt-itas''aEready been sufBciently observed aooVe.iect. be ings of is united. 271 each rational being. for his consciousness.a. meditations. Their virtue .r-t minationT \____===. in which individuality. bu t rather elevates the dignity of maS To each~ one is assigned. For Go d.^ ]^pf. ij- di^HJTali<v£_iH/arinihi]atiPd. the task -of attaining the universal end of rpasnn TTTe ^ghrJT ft" c ommunity of ra tional bm ngs becomes dependent up on his care and his labour.

. than myself. reflect and forced to upon myself and I am in this manner made my own object by means of the resistance. there can be. therefore iiSiL^^igs ^Eo*OTirselves. therefore. strictly speaking. there arises the con ception of a duty — nf^t exactly which IThusI owe remain mere of a duty. But when this condition occurs. and makes me its object. cgMM^^^^uties object the I bu t mediai ed an d mediated because they have for their . am to not means. am thereby driven back into myself . but must observe in regard to myself. of a to myself. whereof 1 myself am the immedi ate " : bbjeet. the duties towards the Whole. hence I am make myself means. In the moral state of mind. end and aim then this care is duty. . iL. as the highest and absolutely comIf the of the -. In opposition to them. I shall call tnese duties. but I I. for the end outside of me. the realization supreme rule ot rea^on'5Tn!51fl^'6t meTBrougEl^e. be means. is usually said. The care that I in so as I myself out conditioned by this. wherein I am to be always and uninterruptedly. I can forget myself in it labour only in so far as stands unhindered.because they can only be deduced from the following proposition I I I Moral Law desires th e conditioned. as is__th£_Jiaaal_p hrase. of I become object solely for of reflection far is and can the not commanded acting. for I always meaii's which I moral acting. desir e s^^ the condition. as. The Moral Law addresses itself immediately to me. If it is checked. cannot carry my outside of me. because the check occurs. means of all our acting coijdiJiiQaai. I am to be means. and as I am.alaQ. Let the condition here established be well remarked. B. namely. no other mediated duties than those towards myself. : 272 THE SCIENCE OF my ETHICS. truly means to accomplish the desired purpose. that 1 shall ^e lit and proper mean?^ for tbaj pirpnsR Since for me there is no other means to realize the absolutely to be realized law of reason.

. and unconditioned C. and it is There must be. and many things will not be done at all. It is the duty of each one. is addressed to each individual. An agreement of this kind is an agreement concerning the various vocations of all individuals. Hence it is the duty who perceives this hindrance (and each one. vocation for himself one.. to establish such an agreement. and in his turn surrendering to all others his part. can only be effected. There is still another division of the duties from The command to promote the independence of reason. the duty of each individual to labour for their establishment. But the Moral Law requires that of each one. and the steady promotion of the final end of reason will not be achieved. various vocations. chooses a peculiar final Each manner of . each one accepting a certain part for all others. but some can not general duty . The effects of the acts of many will check and cancel each other. Hence there is. who perceives th is. shall be achieved. many things will be done in a manifold manner. are established who chooses a vocation. must perceive it). if many individuals divide amongst themselves the various things that must be done to promote the final aim of reaso n. Now if each one does in this respect that which first occurs to him. who will but look close. promoting the end Some labours of this kind can be transferred to others. however. it the following reason. i syarticular duty of him to T whom it is transferred. and to choose a_ _fixgd~. a distinction between general and particular . which can be transferred. or which appears to him pre-eminently necessary. that which cannot be transferred. This remedy. . are to be duties. is That. to remedy it. manded duties. 273 called immediate. . moreover. s o far as possible. This can o nly be accomplis hed by an agreement through the 'uniting of many tor tHe purpose of such a division.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. when they of reason.

274 duties. . shall we and combining this division with the previous one have to speak : Of Of Of Of the general conditioned Aatiss. THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. the particu lar condition ed duties. the gene ral unconditioned or absolute duties. the particu lar u nconditioned or absolute duties.

in order to arrive at the general duty. Moral Law in the sensuous world. I refer to it as the proof of what is averred here. (This proposition has been ^cience of proTenTH my and as I would have merely to repeat that proof here. I find myself comnamely. on tool of the I AM I am tool in the sensuous world solely . condition of a. • . whereof we ourselves are the immediate object. Eiffhts^ will appear clearly enough. .' CHAPTER II.) If I am to be this tool of the Moral Law. and to relate the Moral Law . me and them. then the condition under which alone and if I think myself as I can be it. is This reciprocal relation to be continuous . the manded to realize this its condition continued reciprocal causality between myself and the world of both rational and sensuous beings. continuou s rec iprocal causality between. to its several parts. But on condition of a continuous reciprocal causality between me and the world the way and manner of which is to be determined through my will and since we speak here chiefly of a causality upon the world of rational beings. CONCERNING THE GENEEAi CONDITIONED DUTIES. so far as for the Moral Law can never it is in my power to do so Hence all we have to do is to req uire the impossible analyse this conception. the Moral Law commands our preservation as 27S members of a sensuous . must take place under the rule of the Moral Law. Nor will this mere reference infringe upon the clearness and completeness of our present science. . for what this postulated reciprocal causality may signify. or at the general conditioned dtities.

and provided I may presuppose that it will thus sometime become actual. Under it. . is not a duty to me for the sake of experiencing the realization of my end and aim. as sure as I will this experience. me my end. I will my continuance only I expect for the sake of a satisfaction. X is to be absolutely wiffiouTany refCTence to myself. whether / experience something or not. necessity. The attainment of my true end would be . and is possible only in future. which in the The will of a free being. we furnished the proof of the necessity to will : our continuance in the following manner thing (X) signifies : I will someshall it. .yo^ 'will never participate in it annihilation is awaiting you belore it will be~realized I would. respecting my wUl. but establishes only the will of a free being as determinedJhTaugh_natTgal world. is always the demand of an enjoyment But from the standpoint of morality. which knows nothing Moral LawTnd i ts commands. it is to be utterly indifferent to me. as determined through the Moral Law. has not this ground to will the continuance of the individual. enjoyment. If I were told with more absolute certainty. From this point omew future. that which you intend is certainly going to be realized. Hence. never-tbelflsaJje forced to work with the same exertion for its realization. IJflder_the_directiDii. that the object be given to him.this_la^_T^ J^ngt care -.aiILJJhat_jomeJhing_^a^be in a future experience. of a ^ In the Science of Bights. that I. I also will. ^ is never end. and its consequent preservation. How then may it become my duty ? . as s uc£. _the existence of this o bject b e given to it is me inTexperience.ai. provided it only becomes actual in general. shall exist as the same identical I in a future moment. But as sure as I will not so given in present experience. .. assured to to be and the enjoyment thereof ought never Hence the continuance of my life. the experiencing I. of . The above demand of jjjg-j^ural man. 276 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. ^^* .

our body is an organized product of nature. is Moral Law. if checks are opposed to the regular ^progress of occur if the fasting. I consider myself solely as a tool of the Moral Law. to we now have This duty of sel fdetermine more closely.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. is : hia luLure existence from the present.ua b u Jxaw-iiBiiie Hence the first end of -air my actions is a new acting in the future but whoever is to act in the future must live in it. I Hence have the will to continue and to continue to . test conviction promotes this preser -^ vation of yourself I. "tKe" progress natural development.the__ empirical self. or. is required. of both internally. by checking and externally. as a command Do whattheir object of the : : ever according to your . positively. negatively. wh ich is regarded both as gence. exist solely for ihe sake of acting^^ It is for this reason that self-preservation is a preservation duty. and secondly. and the continuation of unchecked mutual influence upon each other. Hence bothTEe health and regularly progressive ^development of soul and body considered in themselves. ^Iie now itself must regularly develop Inspired by moral sentiment. The requirement of the Moral Law in this respect is to be regarded. its preservation is endangered. intelli- The preservation and regularly progressi ve development o£^. might endanger the preservation of yourself in the stated meaning of_ the word . and if he is to act in pursuance of a plan toced out n ow already. if This would the organization. as a prohibition Undertake nothing which. in pour own consciousness. and cerned. Whatsoeve I may /'hatsoever ever" the tii 377 realize in the sensuous world is l»aa^tude. firstly. The preserva tion and the well-being of our empirical self may be endangered. body were denied proper food through the body were overfed through intemper- . but oul_y a mea. or so ul. So far as the former is conthrough external force. and as body. he must be and remain the same i .

When that law does require it. The whole mind must be cultured in all directions. namely. intemperance.278 ance. since .. the welfare whereof depends upon the well-being of the body. which can be developed only through practice It is likewise disturbed through too much exertion. It is absolutely immoral. but rather suppression oi the niind. danger from external causes. for all who attain an insight into the end of their empirical existence. with neglect of the .a mere mem orizing of the thoughts of others without y own judgment . no matter how great the danger and risk may be for it is my absolute end to do what duty requires. or body. m a dry puzzli ng of the brain without living contemplation. hody. unchastity. body.e. So far as the latter is concerned. and life. They disturb the development of the mind. and. Exposition to such danger is unnecessary whenever the moral law does not require it. or if THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. O ne-sided culture is no culture. and takes away from it the ability to duty of self-preservation. jaceservation is only a means for this end. and my self. the prohibition of the moral law is as follows: do not unnecessarily endanger your health. . opposed to some arbitrary^ end). for the mind is a power. All that we have here mentioned is noc merely ijnprud ent and unwis e {i. but on no account one-sidedly. and this insight all ought to acquire. Fasting weakens and makes drowsy the body. to the whole tendency 6t unchastity nature_^to preserve 'tEe''macBineriiErough All these dissipations are in violation of the more specially in regard to the. above all. gluttony."T)ut'ir"opposed to the absolute final end and aim of reason. sinks the body ^deep into matter. Likewise through an irregular occupation of the mind as a blind indulging in irregular fancies. to risk one's How such a command 6T"Hu^ self-preservation may . au opposite direction were given . ele vate itse rhe development of the mind is directly disturbed through its inactivity . I am absolutely obhged to do so. it is the body which must support the mind.

Now the command is addressed to I me absolutely: to realize the law. according to life presupposition.t. from the rule of the moral law but this that law can to live. the absolutely myself. THE THEORY OF DUTIES. so far as this . . Rftlf-dsRt. shall take up the subject on this point in the doctrine concerning absolute duties. indeed.inn own your own one's as it certainly does require. duty requires suc h life . Hence am absolutely conimanded depends upon me. Somebody might " my own add. to endang er mvj ife . of however: Unless. commanded which I am to forget directed upon something outside of me. To destroy my life by my own hands is directly contradictory of this and hence is immoral. this is 279 not the proper place to explain. power. arise. t he command still of duty. must.rnp. not withqut it now.e. Hence no immediate command: endanger\ thyself but only a mediated and c onditioned comniStl : "i^^-tihat But an act of suicide which might endanger thyself "would immediately touch" myself. the exposure of one's to danger!" Hence the thorough solution of our problem rests on the answering of the following question _[a it possible that duty can ever require me to kill myselfj Let us first observe the great difference between a requirement of duty to endanger o n e's life and^ one to : ^ fake away that to life. belongs. i.! . however. be more prohibited to destroy my life with and intentionally. therefore. and hence must oe based upon an immediate and unconditioned comfliand. \ We shall see at once whether such is'prasilBli!^ The decision rests upon the following: My life is^the exclusive condition of the realization of the law through there is ! me. I cannot destroy my own life at all without withdrawing myself. in duty. Moreover. not to esteem my self-preservation anything is counterbalance action. The investigation concerning the morality oismcide. We and we shall settle it I am not unnecessarily. to the subject in the present place . The first command only requires me as to forget myself.. so far as I am concerned.

it . I and hence. in this earthly life. by killing myself. and ask Does t hen the moral law p ermit you arbitrarH y to change VQiULrDOsrEion oFpIace on earth. . I will not live any longer. would. I shall adopt the simile.. considered as moral agent. of which alone we are speaking. as if it were the same whether you did or did not'"(Io "so or is such a step not rather always e ither your duty o r agamit your diity? Ulearly the latter. is never command. however. for according to ""all our previous proofs the moral law leaves no playIgroiin d for arbitrariness. do not end my life in general. Under its rule there are jo^ rmcLiTOrent actions at ^alT. 28o THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. . because — — for me not the only exclusive condition of my duty. and thus do not withdraw myself from the rule of the moral law I only change the manner of my life proceed only from one place to another. law tn leave this life anS pass into another one. but an explic it command. . it would in doing so contradict and this I itself. out living. Hence you will TiSve'to show up not m£ielv a j:iermis6ioi^ of that. For the moral law does never imbelieve in a life after death. and am allowed to do. An objection could only be raised against the major of this syllogism. be strictly proven. It might be said: But this present earthly life of ours. me to live for the sake of life. in each position of your life ea ch_ act is either moral or immoral. as I often do. (Considered as a 'imtural agent I will to live not for the sake of life but for the sake of some determination of life . In replying to this objection. always commands me to live. / shall will to live not for the sake of life. : mediately c ommand neither in this . when my ought to be and must be actions are judged of then I will to live solely to do my duty. which alone I know. If I am influenced by the moral law considered as being. That this is impossible can. therefore signify: I will no longer do my duty. nor in any other possible life but the immediate object of its command is always a determined action and since I cannot act withlite.

it can never be my duty to leave this life unless I had a determined action to undertake in-jbh e life hereafter. If the wish to leave this world signifies the mere of a command another life. character. wherein I am to do it.) Hence the transition to another life could not be commanded of me in an immediate. and all our cognisable duties transpire in the present life. that I continue it. which in advance. paints and determines the future world But such a determining has no basis. For we are forced bv the laws of thinkiag to determine our duties through what is already known to us an d the state of life beyond the present is utterly. demands always.— THE THEORY OF DUTIES. Moreover. . therefore. connection with beings of another world. altogether a just for life character. readiness to leave life as soon as the ruler of the world. for such a Mesire is a wish to work no longer in the manner in which alone we ca^wiink our work it is a n inclinn. then such a desire becomes an unwholesome indulgence. is the present world. and the sphere. no rational being will be. shall so order. for how can a can only be imaginary. and in every hour of my present life. : — j^ . and it the data for immoral. unknown to us. through the determined act.tinn nttp. it is truly moral character have time . but only in a mediate manner. but even th e desire to live no longer^ which is immoral. which would transpire in In other words I could only be permitted to leave this life and since there are no actions merely permitted.rly opposed to a moral mode of thinking it is a tiredness and a weary disgustedness. which a moral man should never allow to move him. and to But if come into wish. ~ willing to assert. far from referring me to another life. Hence it is not only actual suicide. 281 but of an action for which I need life. This. however. in it whom we is believe on this standpoint. The moral law. inseparable from a moral has no value in itself to such a it signifies an inclination to die. for in every such hour there is something for me to do.

If you only have the true will.282 THE SCIENCE OF for visionary meditations? it ETHICS. ileft True virtue does every it is. i. The first motive. and almost our own second nature. Hence in this case the confession is clear that the suicide cannot tolerate life without vice. there is "no aimculty about the cann ing. sacrificed all other considerations to virtue. and rather would compromise with virtue by the easier means of death. since he does because not commit any sin himself. What. But this very despair is an jmmoral feeling. and both parties have only necessary to consider it from . . as he ought to have done. He kills himself. It is men. all the rest to the care of him. of which instances are said and conquer which have become a habit. But in that case lie has n&t deniedminself. is a despair to get rid of certain vices. violence. others have celebrated their courage. or disgrace. life. a nd leaves all of the correctness of these views. sides. indeed. if he cannot resist with the exertion of all his physical forces. in motion. and has not. He a guiltless himself vicious. then it is not any crime of his. an enjoyment is taken away ^om him. Another possible motive to is that a person should kill something infamous and becoming thus the object of another's vices. ISome men have accused suicides of cowardice. than conform to its requirement of does not will his duty. as is usually the case in disputes of rational The matter has two looked -each at one. inflicted upon him. without which he cannot tolerate life. that which he is made to undergo. Both parties are in the right. whose care To convince himself let the reader examine possible grounds of an act of suicide. but in this case he does not kill himself to escape vice.. He escape suffering only escapes through death the injustice. but not sin.e. for if he only suffers in the matter. could have compulsory power over our will ? Or what could put the power wherewith we sin. except our will ? to have occurred. hour wholly what has to do in that hour.

impulse to preserve — a condition nothing can rationally be said tion of t his Ri^pp. In comparison a coward . This courage the suicide lacks. when reviewed from this side. and goes to meet this life with the firm resolve to fight or bear whatsoever that life shall have in store for him. is an illustra- prnnf nf g reat Strength Of aoul. But whatever strength of soul it may require to resolve to die. since the suicide annihilates we cannot ascribe true courage he assumes a life after death. itself we have superiority of the we have here superiority of the the conception conception absolute over conception: autonomy and independence of thought.riqrity n. unless indeed in the first instance over nature. the purest representation of morality for nothing higher can be asked of life man than that he should continue to bear a which has grown to be insupportable to him. In nature lies' the and the resolve to die is the exact opposite of this impulse. is the triumph . and concerning such itself.— THE THEORY OF DUTIES. of its law. which we esteem as worth nothing in itself. this to me. Whatsoever lies outside of the thought lies outside of myself. It proceeds from the above-described blind impulse to be absolutely self-determined. committed yith cool considerateness the most of suicides are committed in a fit of senselessness. If all future for himself. Courage is resoluteness to mee t an unknown future. since thereby only contradiction is excited. Each suicide. The resolve to die is the purest repre sentation ot the superiority of thought over nature. both 283 sides. to him. even though it could be made the most joyous life. and is indifferent If the former is the triumph of thought. and in so far he can be called cowardly. for injustice must not be done even to what is most horrible. with the virtuous man he is but in comparison . and to bear it nevertheless merely so as not to do anything unworthy of ourself. and is ooly met with in an energetic character. and necessarily excites ^teem. it requires far more courage to bear a life which can only have sorrow in store for us hereafter. Now.

Hence I must tak e care of my posse ssjgflg. who submits to disgrace and slaver y merely so as_ttx-iMatiiij.|>]p. cannot provide his own means nf ivinia-^ ia guj^-ty. and prmnnte its health and wp. ita. In regard to the uninterrupted mutual influence of body and soul upon each other. this belong aesthetical enjoyments and the fine the moderate and proper use whereof cheers body and soul. has also.ifl_Jpr a tew more years the wretched feeling of his existence.^ prnrnntVvirnf the^ great'^l end of rea son.Ti tnnnflf-J. and in so far is positive duty to occupy the mind continually but regularly. If each is only properly taken care of by itself. if its preservation with this end.n-hfiiTig i n aU possible manner T3VP. be economical. In so far it requires of us that we should nourish our body. It is not merely advisable and prudent to do so. as ditioned duties. of course so far as the particular duties of each permit him to do so. . For me. and in Hence. and strengthens them for new exertions. as we have seen. but duty. But Ij the requirement is also addressed to the well-being of it our min d. from a fault of his own. for the forum of my conscience. if I am to nourish my iJooy and promote its welfare. He who. I must be in possession of the means to do so. nothing is opposed to the end of reason except my acting adverse to conflicts so far as it can be such means. All the above duties are only. Eemark. The requirement of the moral law.284 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. a positive character. he is a hero. we have is said. with the wicke d. Moreover. con- My empirical self only a means for the attainment of the end and aim of reason. and is to be preserved and cultivated only as such means. it must be abandoned. we can do nothing directly. To arts. —of course for no other purpose than to live and jj. 2. and regulate my* monetary affairs with prudence and order. this mutual influence will result of itself. which relates to our self.

n Jl0. and since the accomplishment of duty is the final end of reason.^a. nor the particular duties which he desires to do hereafter. if only the moral law ruled him. fri'ncifU. and C0m «ta.Q. nnrlnnp. and which we would like to leave undone. But those who urge this objection forget that the choice of the good works which of others we would like to do. if the moral law takes away from ^ JnMgjj^ me its permission for me to live before I can achieve certaiti future good actions. is when I can retain life only through the violation of such a duty.nf1 mnst. It might be. by making just this once an exception fro m fee severity of th elaw.nd thus preserve myselTTor the futur e achievement o f much goo d which otherwise would be left undone ?" This is the same pretext which is made use of to defend the evil. they forbid him to do.vp. not . for I shall no longer under the conditions of this sensuous Nay. he has only invented But on the other hand. what. me to achieve. does not hold duty ra general. 285 an unconditioned duty. Now. 1 can_ s ave Tny life. it would be impossible for him at least world. to be the absolute final end of reason. which his position. then those actions are assuredly not for exist. Hence. I must not do anything immoral for the sake of life. since life is an end only for the sake of duty.cl. means. which is for a good end. and the pretext that he desired yet to accomplish good works hereafter. for. I am tool of the law as active. and nothing else. it is in itself clear enough. Each person is absolutely bound to do that. to excuse himself. and not my death. and sometimes is. just as it is impossible for the moral law to contradict itself. It was life which was his final end and aim. if duty alone were his end.n(^ hii. objected " But how if. I afterwards. a. for the good which is to result from : it. must also not consider and permit my death as a means It is my Hfe. is not left to our discretion. Ipa. that to him who commits immoral acts for the sake of preserving his Ufe. to act in violation of it. he art. the only case wherein I can give up self-preservation.THE THEORY OF DUTIES.

as is tojd o f Oodrus though 1 might believe that the salvation of the world would result therefrom. in myself as. that I must not have already shown. for instance. must forget the care for my self-preservation. as a thing. to expose my danger whenever duty requires it that is to say. But I must absolutely never fhink my death as an emd and aim. means thereof We kill this respect.a kipri nf Hnif.irlp. opportunity to die. Such conduct is alwaYS.Let the distinction be well observed.286 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. otliers to kill . — the suicide of Lucretia might be considered as a liberate means to Rome —but neither must I voluntarily permit my me. but commanded. . death if I can prevent it. or excite Still less must I seek the I am life to not only permitted. I .

The particular duties are the duties o f th e vocation. or. This we prove as follows If no vocations were established. Hence.: CHAPTER III. but a ccording to the best conviction that it-4s fittest for one's*^owers. and thus.. doing something superfluous and idle. to promote. CONCERNING THE PAEIICULAK CONDITIONED DUTIES. Wherever particular vocations have been established. to be observed: In regard to these duties. culture. Hence. it is still more duty to choose a particular vocation where they have already been established. we deducecmT^Bresffly of The particular conditioned duties are those self for object. which is equally immoral. it would be the duty of each who comprehended the necessity of establishing as the exclusive condition of a complete and regupromotion of the end of reason. i. and other external con ^ Jj'or tiie end" of our life is not to satisfy our di tiong. he must select a particular vocation. in so far duties as which have our empirical it is we belong I. to establish them. jt is absolute dut y of _eyery indivi dual to have a vocation. the final end of reason. at least. 2. duty to select a vocation.e. since. not according to JngiinatiQn. It is 287 . no one can do any general work without doing what others have already undertaken to do. and make this choice known to his fellow-men lar them in a universally valid manner. without either hindering them and opposing the promotion of the final end of reason. when vocations. to this or that particular vocation. in a particular manner. as has been stated above. where this has been done.

Prom a moral point of view all occupations have the same value. for. from the vocation which tills the soil for the production of those fruits from which the sensuous preservation of our race depends. to it. circumstances must begin to conform to the . but have it selected for them by their parents. Perhaps this is the place to add that the subordination and rank of vocations. &c. if it could. On the contrary. indeed. We do not deny that.r thingH in hnma. if this is to be so. many ntbp. or of . But neither is it to fit itself according to circumstances. the legislator^and wise regent . and that each one who sees that it should not be so All men ought to ought to work to make it otherwise be educated.Ti a. and before they are disposed to serious meditation and susceptible the most advantageous manner.288 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. reason. if they do select them themselves. and not till then ought they to choose a 'vocation. or. to that of the scholar. and to educate themselves in the same manner until humanity in general has become develqi^e d and ripe in thepi. who realizes the thoughts of the scholar in his institutions for the welfare of the . and in like manner those who carry them on must be subIordinated. . This. who thinks the future ages and works for them. In each one the end of reason is promoted. incHnation. that this should not be so. it woidd itself be wavering and indefinite. they do so in advance of the proper maturity of reason. but to promote the end of Each end in force in the sensuous world is to be used for this It might be objected: But the fewest men choose their own vocation.ffairs must be different from wna t they are." I reply. " moral law. as means to end.. although exclusively a civil institution. But a science of morals establishes always the ideal. it cannot be. circumstances. is also a necessary one The manifold occupations of men are subordinated to each other as conditioned to the conditioning. even though the ideal should not be realizable under all circumstances.

no proper institution has whether there is still room yet been established for this purpose. vocation requires This. Most visible this is the case with the theologian s. strength and endurance of body. it is necessary for for me to inquire me. above all. of pure reason. It is he who has to proffer himself. If. Hence the vocation is only means to support and maintain the mind in the In this respect the scholars s eem to have had a pernicious influence on the opinion j}f sensuous world. all who seem to like to make u men as good theologians as they are them- . however. the people. The agriculturis t needs. I shall have to judge myself. which reciprocity emanates. it is duty to study. 289 all If each one does from duty that he can do.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. and^ of" their doctrines seems to be that'-^ li make a ougtit to become scholars . whether my assistance is required. It is duty to cultivate mind and body pre-eminently with a view to usefulness for the occupation chosen. according to my best conscience. 4. and whether my assistance is required where I intend to apply it. and to him the body . many desire Jhe meaning "men still to general duty of mankind. they are all of equal rank in the court But I cannot select a vocation without the consent men. and society has a right to reject them. of each individual is determined through his reciprocity with society. remotest generations. andto for their systematically cultivate their understanding. the artist d exterity and mobility of the same. and theoretical culture of mind is for their vocation only a means whereas the jcholar h as universal culture of the mind for his end. labours necessary for first it. the duty of one vocation. For the end of reason must be followed completely and in steady progression and all the others having already divided amongst themselves the various of all other . from the individual. For them this. however. I have the right to proffer my services. 3.

In the scholar even in his case only in communicate his studies. . culture of the understanding is not so much necessary as culture of the will. and for this. and that in extreme cases salvation. Other vocations need of theoretical culture only sufficient to enable them to judge and understand what belongs to the labours of their vocation. that they elevate themselves moral acting. art to . persons have even asserted virtue and godliness to consist in solitary meditation this certainly is a virtue. and the perfecting of their but the chief point is. but so far as his end is to and speculation.290 selves. THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. . and who consider their science as necessary for Hence it has chanced that far too high value has heen put upon theoretical culture even wken' it~ lacked other good qualities.

through freedom.nla. morally good flioiv : man .rl y "f qH p-yf. ^HE final end of all actions of the.w t. in accordance with the Moral Law. as we shall instance in the proper place. But no act is moral which is not the result of freedom. This is a chief point is which not to be overlooked. ph ysical power is to be subord inated beings. so are there no duties towards jt To act upon nature becomes duty solely for the sake of the . As there a. It is desires that reason and rule in the community of rational rational should not merely the desire that the good and the occur. concerning the geneeal unconditioned duties.re no rights in regard to irrational nature. at least mediately to rational beings. sensomiia ornrht — -All to reason. for the neglect of it has had a very pernicious and hurtful effect upon the theory of morals.l rA STiUa^ maj^TTe gath ered into this formula _ . f. — JNow reason can rule solely in and through rational Hence moral acting relates itself always. even though immediately it should be directed upon irrational nature. but also that it should occur or that true morality should rule. and thus also upon life. He desires that reason. gener ally and parti p. .ke.CHAPTER IV. Preliminary. Hence the morally good man morality should beings. and only reason shmiM tiiIp. rational beings. and has only them in view.prna.

and we shall. positively I. rational beings. . The formal freedom of an individual consists in the continuous reciproca l relation between his body. Hence it will be our next task to what duty may requii-e in such a case. without exception. Concerning our duties in others. ^ as a^mmand-ij . to speak We shall therefore. negatively as a prohibition and secondly. to the immediate A. conflicts with the formal freedom of Finally. in conclusion.: : : — 292 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. . therefore. and the sensuous world. of Hence the formal freedom of all rational beings is the end eve^mSrally good man. Concerning our duties in regard promotion and extension of morality. firstly. and we have. 2. —— formal AH But it may happen that someone may use his freedom. detery^nied and *^etero]jij|^able solely through the freely-created c onception of thejhdividual respecting t'Be'maii'ner of thfarecip rnnn] This freedom involves a twofold: i. therefore. that each one should exert his freedom to do his duty and it is his end and aim to promote morality amongst ajl' . have to speak investigate B. The conrelation . are to be formaliter free. it is the will of the morally good man. as a tool and a sense.' lirst of ail things to speak ^ A. Concerning our duties in relation to the freedom of others. have C. The continuation of its freeinfluence upon the whole sensuous world (See the Science . with the purpose of suppressing the freedom of others. bodies of rational beings outside of us . which belongs to himself. T'he regulation of the moral law respecting the may be regarded. tmuation of the absolute freedom and inviolabilit y nf thp lody so that it cannot be at all immediately influenced by physical power.

and is likewise free and when we perceive him. I do not addressed to him. for~soitreeHe whether this or that body . respecting this deter/ mined body. asa means for will.'' end and qim of reason will be realized anyhow and one body more or less makes no difference I reply This does not concern us in the least. may But I my own must not use his body as a tool. or deprivation of freedom. this without add " might say exist. I will of the person. the moral law commands us to regard him as such a one. by means of rational argument. ^ the can only be on the condition that it remax and dependent only upon the free will q Immediately upon perceiving a human boi of command is the moral law.. I must not seek to influence his will through physical forces blows. hunger. (Thus even here already do we catch a glimpse of the idea of a ruling of the moral law in the nature whi ch exists independen tly of us. utterly free. but which we have not to discuss in this place. knocks. Th e remlative to realize 293 is principle of this is judgment as follows: Each human Body such a tool it for the morally-minded man a tool ""Bui. the : What matters it good reason. 1 The theory of duties. Mediately I am allowed to determine determine the person. imprisonI am permitted to ment. and it is not : at all permitted to us to think so. force. that this ." the moral law in the sensuous world. — . _single_body^e_xists also. to cause his will to produce through his body these or those modifications in the sensuous world. never immed iately to influence the body o f is"~to depend and absolutely upon another rational being. and of an adaptability of nature for the m6ral~"law7 an idea which finds its realization in the idea of a Godhead. and to the tools for the realization of the moral law. solely A human body upon the ie.) (a) Considered negatively.. no external the body. the person. who necessarily belongs to the com munity of rational bein gs. It suffices. this regulation is an absolute ^prohibition.

ininor of this syllogism. The moral law absolutely requires the faith that each man can be bet tered!^ JNow if this faith is necessary. But this I cannot. For the law absolutely binds me to infuse [moral culture into him. which alone might need a I make something my . am not allowe d^ even to kill anyone intentiona lly: the death of a human is being must never be the oBje^ of : my life action. that he may be or become such a means. and hence I also must not thus hold him. to me The proof. do jiot consider it possible. without refusing obedience to. or I do not consider it possible. and absono other means. Hence. Now I either hold possible. &c.^ Jlence wnen i •farmly resolve in my own mind that fie is irreclaimable. I permitted to oppose in an immediate manner solely influence lutely through Nor am physical resistance to the causality of upon the sensuous world. and to assist in making him Ee tter. in ? my own If I conviction. him through rational grounds. We have argued in this manner it is absolutely destroying the end of reason in : required of promote morality in every individual. prohibitions cease I another person In what cases these general we shall see hereafter. in the case of a certain man. annihilate the person its who is. But this I must not do. I abandon a work assigned to me by that law. then the first part of our argumentation again receives validity.294 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.the moral law and making myself indifferent to its realization. can be thus proven. " then my immorality consists precisely in mv taus holclmg him. and him as much as lies in my power. If I do consider it possible. if I hold anyone to be a n irredeema ble villain. of The strict proof of this is as follows The each man a means still for the realization of the it moral law. without assuming the possibility of such morality. how can I. and I cannot destroy destined to assist in realization mom a human life without abandoning my end and aim. Whosoever is to become moral must live.

mere by makmg tJtie criminal ah outlaw and a mere Death may be the result of this annihilation thing. and for the verv same reason. of all the rights of the criminal. but simply to drive them away or disarm them. so can neither the premeditated murder of another. In another case a possible tool of the moral law is being annihilated. and as not a moral but merely a legal body. me to think everything involved in the necessity of race. end and object reform in signifies: 295 (here. lawful. which may not only be : . The object of war is by-jao means I- to kill the cifizen^ of the hostile State . and hence it is not at all an act of the judicial. but Government has not the same right in regard to the security of all. can only can cel the ci vil agreement between it and the crimma i. but as a means of securitY_. so concerning a pretended right of the State to take away the life of a criminal as follows that the State as judge. In my Science of Rights I have expressed myself danger. Now the moral law absolutely requires hence it. for I instance. thus rendering . it me to have that end and object. We shall see in what cases. But it is very well possible that as it might become allowable to expose one's own life to it may also become a duty to expose the life of another to danger. In the same work I have also expressed myself concerning the kiUin g of armed enemies in times of war. Hence. but even a duty.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. : . not however as a punishment. so Precisely as we demonstrated above faith in the perfectibility of the human do we here prove the necessity of faith in the reform of every particular individual. as premeditated self-murde r can on no condition co-exist with true morality. but simply of the police power. A single individual can and ought even to expose his own security for the sake of his duty never to attack a human life. I posit requires it but postulate as possible . the reform of I an this it individual) signifies: postulate the actuality of some future moment.

The strict proof of this is as follows Each human body is tool for the promotion of the final end of reason. (6) The disposition of the moral law in regard to its the bodies of rational beings outside of us in character. and moral law. and this not by virtue of a right conferred by the State to kill. and compelling him to enter In hand-to-hand into a legal relation with our State. if I really am impelled only by the moral law. then the preservation and highest possible adaptability of the body for that end must be also my object. a. I can The ground of it has been stated : to wit. The preservation of each other the ground person must be as dear to ' me as : my own. poailiye and as a command. is the same and take care moral law. a proposition which will hereafter be regulative in all positive duties against others. . a right which the State cannot confer.th.nd preservation of the body an d We must not life of others is to be an end to us.p "c. single soldiers kill each other. if the latter is indeed my highest final end. but in virtue of his own right and duty to defend himself. f>iQ -nrolfpii-o r. only oppose no obstacle to this preservation.f m^T own bodies. Here we meet for the first time with the proposition of myself solely as a tool of the : take as much care of the welfare of vour fellow-men as o f _your own. If it is moral far as I am allowed to am tool of the take care of myself solely in so likewise. not to kill each combat the other but each to defend his own life. strenp. Now. but must promote it in the same dparf. for I cannot desire the conditioned without desiring the condition.: : 296 THE SCIENCE OP ETHICS. but all others are so In this manner we receive at the same time an infallible criterion as to whether the care for ourself is a moral or merely a natural impulse. involves the following The health. love thy neighbour as thyself. Hence I must have the same care for each body. since I preserve why I desire either. But each body is also such tool. the hostile State powerless.

it exclusive. until I am reminded of myself by a feeling of weakening and losing of strength. I say. indeed. for the natural impulse refers only to us. indeed. I am to for my the care for the preservation of others. but one of us I have done my duty. self-preser- vation when the other one is in danger self-preservation has ceased to be a duty. There occurs here no might be apprehended. as not my intention that either of us should perish in If nevertheless it . whether the danger comes from irrational physical power of Nature.ji v which is also a natural impulse exciting fellow - feeling in the fate of others. even at the risk of life. or through some danger It is the same with threatening my self-preservation. : to save a human life. we always first think of ourselves. that Both are indeed altogether of the other through mine. at the risk of collision of duties. (It is an idle plea to appeal to the duty of . that both should be preserved. such is my to save persons' health and life special vocation. My preservation is conditioned through that of the other. and next of our neighbours. or from the attacks of rational my own life. we is 297 shall have the same care for others . and Rvmpat. perishes I am not responsible for it. that I It does not mean do nothing else than seek opportunities unless. of the same value and from the same reason. danger to ourselves. THE THEORY OP DUTIES.. nor think. ^s by far weak er in its effects than the immediate natural impulse of self-preservation In sympathizing. my own beings. at all of myself. where we could do so without any Nor would be evident murder. Now according to the above I do not care for my own welfare. have the same care for the welfare of others as own. Correctly translated that plea means we will save the other one if we are safe in doing Not to wish This is certainly noble and great! it. It is equal. But as soon as anyone is in danger am to — I am absolutely required to assist him. if it is natural. .

which the late Duke Leopold spoke. and governs itself according to the natural laws of the thing.. which the moral law requires us to respect and promote. and whose preservation of most importance. involves a great and : secondl y. precisely in the same measure as the correctness of my own of practical cognition is an This disposition the Moral lie Law considered negatively results in the prohibition^ absolutely not to to him. and hence I must also will the condition. This correctness of their practical cognition object to must be an "end to me. sufficient for their causality. the free causality of my fellow-men in the sensuous world. and the end I have in view is is he Such a causality free. not to . and hence I free in am my causality. for only on this condition is I. determined by this my knowledge of the actual being and independent quality of the thing. The formal freedo m of an individual. as life some moralists might be of greatest value. and when one human life is endangered all other human beings have no are hold. It is moral word. the continuation of his free influence upon the sensuous worlds The act of the individual is to result in that which he had in view when he began to act. human life in general is of equal value. or deceive lead the other into error. Before the moral law.298 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS we in such cases first to calculate. a. If I have an incorrect conception of the object of my act. when he said. me . The end I have in view proceeds from the present quality of the thing. my act will result in quite a different end not than that which I had in view. "Here a human life is at stake what am I more here than you ? ") 2. I must will the conditioned. whose longer a right to be secure until the one truly is saved. conditioned firstly by a correct understanding of that which the act of the individual has for its object. that they shall have a correct cogniti on of the same. I cannot work on anything unless I have a knowledge of it.

as if I had committed the act induced him to commit through But eveg.. The latter is as much words which I straightway. not from error. in accordance wherewith he acts. whether I actually have or have not the intention that he should thus infer it. we shall_seg_he reafter. . I consider my fellow-man as a tool of the Moral Law that is to say. I If I intend to deceive I or must decide : before my own . conscience. if am the true culprit. but he has been made a means for niy end. or whether the ambiguity of my statement may not result accidentally. In short I positively owe every man absolute frankness and truthfulness I must not speak anything against the truth. is. — ' The s'SncT proof of our proposition is as follows : I have moral sentiment. as one who is always to choose after his own insight and from his owjl ^ood will. I had real ly calculated is right. Whether and in how far I also owe all men openness. and have used the other of thinking —perhaps tool. an d had "attaitfen "it thus through means of the other. am a liar. 299 him._ E"ow if I produce in him an incorrect knowledge. upon a legal act.™ THE THEORY OF DUTIES. but from love for the good. then that which results has not been selected through himself. a lie giS f'hfl ^OTIT^^n-^"^ not the but the intentions. JTshouljL have acted immorally The other is to do that which misrepresentation. contrary to his own mode —as a But apart even from this abuse of the other. — presuppositions supplied by I me —my guilt is evident. neither directly by categorically asserting what I myself do not consider true nor indirectly by making a mbiguoTj_s statements which ^intend shall deceivejiim. use. whether I must also~say all the truth "* which 1 know. and this is immoral. whether I tell the lie merely induce the other to infer it. which If thereby I induce him to commit an illegal act may be moral for him because he starts from incorrect . constitute the lie. I . had an immoral end in view. the guilt is as much my own which I I in person. Of course.

physical resistance still remains open to him. He should hate and prevent a wrong. is for ever annulled . do you clearly show yourself to be actuated in that good deed. t. and otherwise it is not good. Thus the the truth of a matter with evil intentions. my end should be morality. unless you had made the misrepresentation in question you would be utterly innocent in the matter. he may tell the truth. he ought to convince the other of the wickedness of his intentions. the results of a are never ^ood The suBject-matter my statement may be either . distrus t of the other's rationality is immoral. not by interest in the cause of morality. not for the sake of the act as such. These same arguments are to be applied to him who perhaps seeks to defend a lie by the plea that he intended to prevent an evil by it. and to do this is immoral. and that the other had not done the good deed which you claim to have had alone in view.. he tell a lie." Ireply This you J^y ca nnever know. He has not a right to suppose that these remonstrances will be of no avail. "But.h^ Efood is to be realized ithrough moralitv. Precisely l)y abandoning the form in which alone the essence of the good consists. : supposing even it had happened so. and should not believe. all all yniif mnraL Hnf. but by some advantage or another. LFor itJs^Tiot-. but for the sake of its immorality.y tn re alize the pood — without re p. for only the latter is satisfied by the content of the deed. and by having only the content in view.ard to the mp ana . and if pretext that the lie was of for a lie good intention . If anyone asks him for must not he does and knows the evil intentions of the other. am not at all permitted to intend mere legality.306 tHE SCIENCE OF ETHtCS.: for such a Moreover. and I cannot have the former alone in view without abandoning the other. but even if they really do no benefit.grifid 4eed." objects a defendant of that immoral doctrine "I k new that the other couldLpnly be induced this TTiPpna tio d" thfi. of morals.

A good advice from promises respecting matters about which one may apprehend a change of views. hence it would seem that I must do no promised action whenever I have changed my views regarding it. and which depend indeed upon future events. Hence I fulfil the promise for the other's sake. For everything is immoral for me. disposition . or become dubious as to whether I am able to fulfil it." it might be objected. I must' do for the sake of the other. . I said I must keep my word unless I have promised it. This needs a more particular specification. unless indeed I have promised an immoral act. though I might do better so far as my own Only that which person is concerned. I am no longer dependent merely upon myself. and thus induce him to relieve promise. world. to which in this respect the disposition of other my own . or concerning which 1 am merely indifferent. or 301 nature. and hence without annihilating his causality in the sensuous. In so far I am in his service. but likewise upon the other. The reply to this is as follows : whatso- ever does not absolutely contradict morality. absolutely opposed to morality must I positively not do. although I might do better for is my own person. free beings does also belong." We reply When I have promised and thus induced the latter case I make a promise i : jin other one to shape his calculations in accordance with my statement. and hence whatsoever lies on the road to the attainment of the final end of reason. which I know to be not the best. In must hold my promise. and I cannot withdraw in my word without destroying those actions of his which he has undertaken view of my promise. " I may change my opinion and my measures respecting that which I have promised. with.. but only in so far as he thus releases He makes me a present of the difficulties which I may remonstrate me of my promise me am I quit of my concerning arise : : an immoral action. THE THEORY OF DUTIES. is this not to make promises too easily. " But.

which necessarily leads to the so-called white lies. and beatify this they world according to their individual co nceptions of happiness. their internal mode of thinking. Secondly whence comes that internal shame for one's self. unless they are philosophers capable from the absolutely highest principles. This. nevertheless. . is explained by this : something else a fact in them. when it comes to carrying the theory into action. protect. want to jnake happy. from their impulse to lay down the law. but too deeply to influence their arguing. the same time At we shall here reply to questions occasion. namely. aim. which manifests itself even stronger in the case : of a lie than in the case of conscience? The ground is as any other violation of follows: The liar has . who wish to pass for honest and not unreasonable men. the It comes from this. however. their feeling of honour lies which also as prevents them from making use of their theory. and their lack of courage to do so by force. They from the facts within them. ^Firstly : which force themselves it upon us two other on this how comes lies. BuF" and misery 'I'his is their chief with the weakness which our age is not unjustly charged with. some of them. depart from it.302 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. and hence they conclude to realize them through cunning. is not the culture through freedom upon that standpoint which we have described more particularly above. gloss them over ? minds and their natural character men who form their in accordance with that age. are placed by this sort of culture— which." that so many men. and from the basis of these facts they of starting start proceed logically ^ough. in their character they lack the strength of resolution to realize their arbitrary ends by force.. defend and seek up all possible arguments to In our age. ^Thfiir-fimpiri cal Ego is t o rule "necessary — the world without regard to the freedom of othe rs . Why. of course determines also their theoretical system. beatitude.

most absurd and. and whether your assurance. he can no longer . Of whomsoever it is known that he possess it." or. by seemingly entering into the other's plans.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. it.a iiut nothing so much dishonour's us before ourselves as want of courage.t man's secret purposes. deceivingly and for He wants to subject the other to his views and purposes. but only to Por this maxim. It is the most absurd. the defence of " white lies. I . rationally no trust can be any more entertained by any man for no one can know tha. Now maxim it is doubtless absurdity demand belief in a which. believe you. nor carefully guard for himself. As for the rest. am to same time also not believe you for I cannot know whether in saying so you are not prompted by some laudable purpose or another for who can know all your purposes ? and that you do not make use of your own maxim against me. of lies in general. A person who really had is not itself a necessary lie. and is a coward. doubtless. You tell me you have convinced If I yourself that necessary lies are permitted. is. that you consider necessary lies allowable. indeed. when is believed in. and judge whether he is not But when no one at the moment telling a necessary lie. and pretending to promote them. has any longer confidence in him. the this 303 mode of thinking above described. But the defence of necessary lies also the most . subjects himself to the man whom he does not trust himself openly subjecting himgelf to resist. annihilates itself. He does by again appearance's sake to the purposes of the other. cancels itself. by being communicated. deceive anyone by to lies. The lie i s always and in every case accompanied by cow ardic. the no matter for what good purpose. at the same time. approving his views. at the must — — such a to maxim could neither desire make it the maxim of anyone it to else confess . the most wicked arguing ever heard amongst men. He thus places himself in contradiction with himself.

struck by the justice and ! no answer. his thoroughly corrupted is mode of The true seat of your wickedness precisely that you could hut think of a lie as a possible means of escape in certain difificulties. A who conclude thus. for the defender wicked argument possible amongst men. that your opponent. nature goes straightway towards enjoyment. lies in the Science can explain man. and that. and to defend him at the risk of your own life. "if I do so all his rage will turn against me " I pray you. that you advise him to desist from it kindly. which lies between. after all. An honest man does not even think of such a means of escape. pursued by his enemy with drawn sword." you reply. because we do not like to go the straight one before us. conceals himself in your presence. thereby discovers thinking. to think a lie it needs a positive an intentional loohing-oitt for some crooked road. that you owe to have an evil intention. and that you can now consult whether not be allowable so to use it. you must lie about it. neither the conception of a lie would have entered into the system of human conceptions. if he will not do so. hence. and if all men were honest. illustration of the schools The customary our thoughts. where he is. evil.304 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. If you tell the truth an innocent person is murdered. and a moral it may Naturally there is mode of thinking knows not lying. only your absolute duty? "But. that you only consider this case as possible. How do those. no impulse in man to tell a lie. get over so many possible means which the straight way before them holds up to them. which latter is. whereas the second case. conclude some. you are resolved to take the part of the persecuted. nor an investigation concerning the morality of necessary of Morals. His enemy arrives and asks you. how does it happen. that he seems . into the crooked path? Firstly: why are you obliged to tell the questioner either the truth or the lie ? Why him not the third.

not to mention that death saves you from the danger of a lie. and. Hence death precedes the lie. does also belong amongst the possibilities ? But let us assume even that he does attack yourself. You desist may cution of his enemy. X . how can you be so very sure that you will be defeated ? Do you then count as nothing the power which fixed resolve to suffer no injustice. let him attack you! Does then this mere attack of itself overwhelm you. but merely to escape yourself with a whole skin and. for as soon as human life is in danger you have no longer a right to think of the safety of your own life. moreover. and it is now his general duty. concealed himself within your proximity. This fact alone is enough to show that the first object of your lie was not to save the life of your neighbour. At present you are in danger. may cool off . his particular duty as a matter of gratitude. moreover. in a case where your danger was not even real. Hence you resolved to lie merely to escape the remote possibility of coming to grief! Therefore. Where do you get the decided^ presupposition that he will not dq^jo ? But supposing he does not come to your assistance. THE THEORY OF DUTIES. In that case you have gained time for assistance. boldness of your resistance. as you seem again to assume without regard to all possible other cases ? He who was first persecuted has. as we have assumed. But even assuming that all this should not occur.. Why do you absolutely wish to avoid that? It is anyhow vour duty to defend the per secuted man at the risk of Your ow n life. and a lie is never to be spoken. to come to your assistance. 305 from the perseand become tractable. but merely one of several possibilities. and others may happen to come to your assistance. and the enthusiasm for your good cause. must infuse into your body ? nor the weakness wherewith confusion and consciousness of his injustice must overwhelm your opponent ? In the worst case you can die and after you are dead you are no longer obliged to protect the life of the attacked.

even without his request. as a thorough transcendental philosophy shows. The proposition. necessary end for me in myself. which for another individual or for another age is pracmade altogether relative. I am bound and hence I am bound to all possible first without such relations. Certain things tical.. The knowledge of the object of his acting is immediately practical to him. &. lie because you have an eye only for the crooked path. or in so far as it is immediately practical Hence a di stinction should be made between to him. since it may be can be valid only within limits. . indeed. fellow-man act.. immediate practicai cognitions and purely theoretical cog nitions. and the straight path does not commence with the even exist for you. to know what first truth we owe to an indiis ? vidual. It follows How is this possible for us immediately from the acting of each individual. We only need to point out the ground of this command in order to see at once how far it extends. But in how far? Of course. and nothing else. in so far as his cognition has immediate influence upon his acting. is Hence the distinction may be purely theoretical for one individual and for one age. Hence. or if I know for certain that he has if I see my that he is . and have rea son to assume not well cogniza nt of tne state oi circumstances' respecting such act. But a result corresponding to his conception can well foreseen that it follow only in so far as he has a correct cognition of the to promote his causality. and a theory is not at object of his action. when applied positively. I am obliged to regard the other as a tool of the Moral Law. which we know.3o6 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. command to promote the correc t and to actually communicate to them the truth. Hence. we must be able to determine what truth practical for such individual. communicate correct knowledge To do so is. But all theory relates to practice. to him. that the correctness of the cog- nition of others must be our end and aim. results in the insi ght of others.

and stores up. vocation truth is to become practical. for this is To hunt up and make known — . is the duty of a particular This theoretical f the vocati on of a scholar. 'l^lie latter causality we have just seen of adventures. I cannot morally permit him to remain in I have always spoken of immediate practical truth. virtue should. Of the duties of these scholars we shall speak hereafter. as it were. the absolute freedom of the body and (2) the conti nu ation of its free influen ce upon the whole sensuous world. It is. which is merely theoretical. a n d not. THE THEORY OF an incorrect view DUTIES. positively. treasures which can only be made use of in those future ages. be natural what it is always do requested to do. latter But the causality has yet another condition. e ither for the age in general or for most of the individuals of that age. as has already been remarked in regard to another duty. 307 of the same. to"' dispel his error for he is in a sort of danger to" do something which will not achieve his purpose. truth. The formal freedom o f an individual involves. it becomes my duty. why it should be my duty to communicate it. but cannot become so immediately and all at once. moreover. if we always do what first occurs to us andour . or without awaiting his request. lie. of course. over. go in search — should no truly virtuous sentiment. . negatively. without further ado. and have presupposed that it is precisely because I happen to be the first and nearest. perhaps. that we should hunt up opportunities to lead erring men into the right path. not to be understood here. for on the way to the perfectibility of the human race no step can be leaped This class of scholars works for the future ages. to be condition ed by correctness of cognition. 3. error. To do this we have not time. which gave us the moral duties. and it is not indifferent to a moral mode of thinking whether this occurs or not.o . as we have seen'ti). not to to correct errors of practical cognition.

all jiBzosnizi and guarantee for assure me a. I refer to which the rational being of all that. with good conscience. who has reached this insight. can only be as part of that sensuous world. It is. can all.jected to my purpose and intentions. then the effect of that act also changes. is not sure whether he may not disturb the freedom of others. the premise of all it my acting. It is. die duTv of each to acquire Dropertv.) That. therefore. and this he cannot do. the duty of everyone. proof of this. for his it is duty to act with freedom. to introduce right of property. and hence I could never act with g ood conscience. and tt me This that my actmg within such sphere 1. Jias been shown in my Science of Bights. live I This determined part o f the world thus _sub. but must be introduced intentionally. very evident proposition. is called.. amongst other necessary). ihaX. For if it changes during the act of the individual. and which is. being is to If the rational be free in its causality. when recognized and guaranteed by society (and this recognition and guarantee is legally and morally free beings. moreover. will not. firstly. acLja t recogmta^ occurs immediately through the "State wherem 1 live. unless he has property. and (For further the result is not as had been intended. my property . "How it occurs mediately from the whole human race.e. must continue to remain precisely as it was known to be and calculated upon in the purpose and intention of the rational being. in -itself. Only on the condition. This we say here preliminarily. i. and accord ing to a fixe d conception.3o8 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. which indeed does not come of itself. which has my Science of Rights. as a closer determination of the probecause he . sphsilfe for my free acting. . disturb their freedoni. as my acting in the sensuous if world. then the state reference to and which influences this causality. Without such recognition I could never be^sure that my acting did not limit the freedom of others. which thus relates to were. if the causality is to result in that had intended.

and has taken his measures accordingly. theft. namely.— THE THEORY OF DUTIES. cheating. If he is deprived of it altogether. might object to the above^g?roposition. does object to the following " Provided the goods thus taken are not destroyed. nor ' to render more difficult Its utuity to ike proprutor. results in the prohibition never to infure or diminish in end. continued possession. the former. that a state 309 must be erected. he is at least retarded in the course of his activity. in fact. and that each individual must become a member of it. as the condition of my is also itself such end. The freedom of each individual is to me an absolute end. because of the other's property. his Firstly: I must not use all property for my own purposes. they interfere with the freedom of the person thus He has calculated upon its deprived of his property. commanded by the moral law. regarded negatively. indeed. but merely made temporary use of.^-" '^^mMu^ Tiarl mpgna a-nA which has been called Jesuitical m oraUtv (although we do not mean to say that all Jesuits hold to it. cunning. Hence the latter. nay. and that none but Jesuits hold to it). position already established. a. : any manner anyone's property. through robbery. his sphere of and the measure of his physical power is diminished if he has to acquire it again. causality . is perhaps aided. and is forced to do again what he had done already once before. and. the final promotion of the end of reason is not checked. But at present we look merely to the content of these acts. because they involve an attack upon the body and life of the other. . That immoral doctrine of morals which generally prrtrnrl'i^gffiftd pnrlFi. and the latter because they presuppose falseness and lying. This freedom is conditioned by his having property and retaining it inviolable. or of overreaching which acts are. if for : . This disposition of the moral law. prohibited for the very sake of their forms. that they constitute a deprivation They are prohibited.

according to your own instance. I must not damacfe the property of the other. which have the preservation of property at heart. neither intentionally. and himself intends a very laudable use to the greater glory of God and greater service of his neighbour would he not act very morally.. which I take to preserve my own. Finally. namely. The ground of for the sake of pretended . because the free use of his property. and have placed severe punishment on its violation. namely. have differently formed our modes of thinking concerning this matter. and hence his freedom generally. and from the same reason. as we live for good purposes. Secondly. who took the goods employs them than the old proprietor would have employed Supposing the one who takes them knows that them. the party better principles ?" I reply to Ta. in so far as it comes within mv sphere ing to I me : and staSds within the power rightfully belongbut to interfere with the fr eedom of the other "~" am unconditionally prohibited.e : To promote the good is a command addressed conditionaUy. So far as intentional damage is concerned. for it is an end to me from the same reason as my own. for whom civil laws have not done the same. it is my duty to take the same care to protect the other's property. namely. above all other things. nor from carelessness. is thereby checked. as a means to promote the rule of reason. theft and the overreaching of the other good purposes. The New Zealander. The reason why . it is prohibited to render more difficult th e utilizing of his property to the owner." arises from the fact that our civil laws. the original proprietor is going to make a bad use of them. and with evil purpose in view. So far as damage through carelessness is concerned. are not defended with the same obstinacy as "necessary lies. not even a sophistry can be produced in its defence it is absolutely immoral.: 3IO THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. doubtless steals for good purposes.

it. i. a single individual lacks property. to certain arts (professions). ha^ but they cannot have thus recognized J t jmless he in return has recognized their property likeHe who has wise. and thus the act annihilated and in obedience to this desire I must do all in my power to . that the owner should freely use it to promote his ends. one owns his property only in so far as all others recognized it .. and hence not merely objects. As sure as I therefore return to a moral mode of thinking. where but ^. but likewise .. But this damage continues in its consequences until the complete restoration has been accomplished. because it is a condition of their formal lawful The freedom. m the truest sense of the word. which I must assume as tending to realize the rule of reason.e. He must be" able to act freely. It is no excuse that I intended thereby to prevent an evil and injurious use of it. The strict proof is as restore To duty. realize 6. the prohibition 311 is clear. For each exclusive rights. first the State Strictly speaking. : THE THEORY OF DUTIES. To check the free use of his property is therefore equal to cancelling the end of all property. I desire to have the consequences cancelled. Jlence they must possess property.e. The object of the property is. . fore. involves the following Firstly: commands Each man who attains the use of his reason ust have property m The proof has been turnishea "above. provide to for . is always Without restoration there is no forgiveness. Now there is 'the care of to all. essentially what has been taken or damaged. that the property of the others shall be an end to me. therethe same as robbery. and is. . iio reconciliation with myself. follows: He who thinks morally does not desire to damage the other's property. as signiiying tne exclusive sphere for free activity.. positive application of the requirement of the moral law. everyone's property belongs. no rightful property at all in a State.

to the needy so that they may again resume their work. &c. if possible. . some property or. offer you this gift. I . has not relinquished his claim to that of the others. or many. none. property. labour for the labourless give. educate. The duty life of of almsgiving results from the duty to preserve the our fellow-men. will perceive. The imploring of help from our fellow-men can have no other object than to find a vocation and property from individuals. can rationally only have in mind to say I cannot help or will not help you hunt up others to do it and so that you may be able to make your living until then. and therefore very justly claims it. The proof lies in the conception of benevolence each one is to have ^ : . and not merely put a little patch here or there. The usual p^iving of alms is a very doubtful good work. : He who gives an alms which does not . This is the legal aspect of the case. it would not need to act if the State did what it ought to do. alleviate altogether. and for all future time to obtain situations for those who have none. .t. or assist in educating. &c. . in other words. or loan. Hence it is the first duty of anyone who ~}iis has con vinced himself of this truth. ~~But once ? done — —and why should . however. it ishis Bcnevolence. in short. is a conditioned duty. orphans. it not be done the duty of each one to give to him who has no property. ^ Now that meg should have no other end in beg ging alms. Only thus is our benevolence rational and considerate.312 TltE SClENCn OF ETHICS. since the State refused it to us. We should try and help one. or in securing to them a certain and continued livelihood.'hi>mj>. as everyone duty to \\p. . we should do wholly as many works of benevolence as possible. thoroughly.'»^Un. is positively not to be tolerated. and should^ make beg^mg a vocation.. Let it be well observed Benevolence consists in procuring property for those who have none. to do what is power to have it recognized and carried out in his until this it is is m state.

it is the di]l-. so that the faithful ones may not lack opportunity to do good works As if such opportunities could ever lack How far. How far do those depart from reason and truth who make the giving of alms a religious exercise. and I 313 if the State tolerates it. or whether higher duties may. ' has a claim uponTurptoperty^^ ^^^^^ "^Cestthi^^m^S^urnecraround. merely pretending that higher principle and whether this is so or not will easily appear by noticing whether such a person does carry out the prescribed works of a rational benevolence. . Secondly. in order to b e able to do more ciiarity for he who is withojiLJ3£2E£lfc£L . Each one must is retain wise his formal freedom disturbed. what is his. and who tolerate and promote beggary. I add the following.not restrain pna'o finfj^ or whether that one them. its duty. does the duty of benevolence extend? Is it sufficient to practise it so far as it does not become troublesome to us at all. It is understood that each one must be sure in his conscience that he does not refuse benevolence from avarice and natural hard-heartedness. and drawn that the poor have therefore a the conclusion right to compel Those who are without support. ! . Hence it for otheris duty to protect the property of the other against every attack. But so far as individuals are concerned. become more economical. ana labour more. and to give away only that which we cannot make use of ? By no means we must take away from our selves. then. . and it is the business of both poor and rich to labour and bring the State to a recognition and execution of this. vidual to do as much to as possible to defeat this and by no means promote it through inconsiderate weak-heartedness and wrongly understood duty.y of each indiend". property have certainly a right to compel it from th£ atate.! THE THEORY OF DUTIES. whenever an opportunity offers. retre nch our own expenses. "Ehe pocirmaircafl never kjioaLwhe ther it is precisely this is in a position to extend charity to him.

In short. To accomplish much. in the Since the safety of his property is to be as dear to me as my own. than it would benefit us. It is not a large. and. and immediately applicable for every purpose. duty because it is a end and aim ot a morally-minded man. it is not a large property. in order thus to promote the final end of reason. and also to allow to our . It is a duty assistance to others. How far this how life. Hence it is also a duty to increase the utility of the property of others. must never be inconsiderate goodheartedness. it is not so much necessary to possess a large amount of means. It is the — it is now our duty to have the same intention respecting the property of others.e. . which makes us free and independent. and by the latter through violence or cunning. for . as much as possible. as to have thorough control over those which we possess.the defence of both is means to promote the rule of reason. . completely under the domination of the will. in his position. but a well-arranged property.— 314 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. and as it is our duty to fthirdly : Tj^r-nperty is an obiect of condition and tool of freedom. readiness to oblige is a duty its motive. that others shall have as much freedom i.of my we shall see in the following. but a well-trained body. Thus we should be ready to give advice and bring our property into this condition. and without waiting to be requested and so to defend it same measure as we would defend our own. power and causality in the sensuous world as possible. which is easily handled. others . whereby we grow independent. far I am obliged to defend it at the riskevga. and in my own. or by the injustice of rational beings. it is immediately evident that I must undertake the defence of his at the risk of extends. in like manner. but the clearly-thought intention to promote the causality of reason. however. and whether the attack be made by irrational forces of Nature (fire and water).. so that we may effect by them all that we desire to effect. so though never forcing them upon neighbour that which will do him more good.

This is the end proposed to us. Fourthly : The whole sensuous world . not only for the use of his own property. that many beings in the same sensuous world should be free. and for the attainment of his private ends. according best insight. That everything and Smce it Can be put to proper use only in becoming property. . would do our neighbour more injury than good. is the dominion of reason in the sensuous world put upon the most solid basis. and becomes one and the same wiU in the minds of all. : this here. but such refusal should be accom- panied by rational arguments to correct the other's conceptions. As every man is to have a property. however empirically different they may be. to our own the granting of which. pnh nsp- : B. is to be brought und er the rule of reason.n useful ^'t. the wnrl^j mngh Vip.st. it is m general. Eeason is a unit in itself. anc( to become its tool m ttie Jiands of rational bemgs But in the present sensuous world all things are connected with each other. Through the third.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. it results in the command t.. and gathered together under. that each one should care. so shall also each object in this world be the property of some one man.i. all Nature is comprehended by. and the sensuous world is subordinated to it. and induce him voluntarily to desist from his entreaties. There being s i . and hence no part thereof is wholly and unlimitedly under the dominion of reason unless all parts are so. become property. There is no conflict between the freedom of rational not a contradiction. Applying . and promote their activity as they all should promote his Eeason is united into one. but likewise for the proper utilizing of the property of all: should work for. to 315 refuse entreaties. that evervthin cf Tnn. Particularly through the practice of these third and fourth commandments. It is the end of the morally good man to bring this about.e. Through the fourth and last. this one will.

dividuals frpp. and hence the duty of each to promote 1}he co-exis£ence of the freedom of all.3i6 is THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. where the pos sibility of freedom for of many. such conflict to the State. by assisting in the establishment of a State.h nnp. All of which A and of conflict' between will ajppear hereafter. . fully in advance. is cancelled by Nature this case we shall speak hereafter.( 3Jid leaving on his part to the others all the rest for* division amongst themselves. it is the duty of the State to settle such conflict and it is the duty of each individual to leave the settlement of . for the present. and it is in such cases that the duties of the private individual arise again. The State thus keeps it _us bv compulsion in the order which has establisKM amongst the indivicluals. of Iwo rational individua ls. Hence. But this co-existence is only possible through each person limiting with freedom for each is to be and remain free the use of his freedom to a — — certai n sphere. What each one's duty is in respectTo"' the State we have already shown. or the the co-existence itself .^ The USB of freedom in many inmust not mutually check and contradict itself. it is not at all to be seen how individuals can have duties in conflicts of their freedom. k eeps each individual within his limits. which. and subjecting himself settle But it happens often that the State cannot such conflicts immediately.p. i n his part without checking the jreedom of anyone el se. determined free acts of rational beings arises only when one person m«s his freedom illegally or immorally for the suppression of the freedom of the other. Ml This it is is shall bp. This ir^ea is realized in the ^tate. is frp^p. Thus in the same sensuous world Rfl. to its laws. alsolute requirement of the moral law. It rather seems as if each one had fulfilled this duty. Hence if a conflict arises amongst them respecting the use of their freedom. which all others exclusively leave to him . pJjssibiiity only one c ase. moreover. since Jihe good will oi the in dividual cannot be counted upon.

of the property of different per sons The preservation in conflict.K^^yfetsptllg"^ase has been . since truth is between the cognition same. : 317 Thus we have gained for the present this proposition all duties of which wp. saniR degree. or the freedom of one of fellow-men. shall spRalc at. seen. may be in conflict. as has often heen stated. as we have . and the of another. but is one and the and since there is not for each individual a separate truth. and the preservalife tion of _property I. is endangered through the illegal use of freedom on the part of another. The preservation the. but simply through Kature apparen tly withdraws a disposition of Nature. it appears. tb«-^ossib^ity of the co-existence of botE Instances"! will not cite^ In the Science 'of .: THE THEORY OF DUTIES. mere is no aisnncfJon between the duty of self-defence and that of the defence of others. as there is for each an own body and separate property: hence the following common equally to all . of my own or of the other. ~~ ' The preservation of body and of life. It is all the same whether my own freedom. life . may be in conflic t.n mv car e the same ground as my own. for. ancTprope rty! True. both are the same duty of the defence of freedom in general. body. conditioned by life. in certain cases cannot eo-exist together and this not through any preservation of injustice. Firstly. my mm. present can only arise ~ ^in ca ses where the State cannot assist. What this may mean will appear in the separate instances. But we must preface another remark. and hence is end f or me to ||hp. the freedom of the other is entrusted t. may be 3. not divisible like bodies and goods. my Aom Freedom is. cases of possible conflicts arise 1. the use of freedom also requires cognition of truth but there never can arise a conflict of different persons. an d only in so faf ~as the atate canii^E &S5l^t. The preservation of the bodies and lives of different persons 2.

In our proof this proposition occurs: we are both . and I. differently. who am impelled only by it. and decided as follows case the question of that in such a all. except at the expense of the life of the other. But the moral law decides quite preserve my own life as tool of the moral law skall likewise preserve the life of the other trom tne same ground. . who may be the best tool of the moral law.: 3i8 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. and this the moral law prohibits. of the moral law. . since in that science only rights are taken cognizance the matter is left to the arbitrariness o f each. I cannot fulfil the command of the moral law to preserve myself. &c. Each command of the moral law is in this case opposed by a prohibition hence both commands annihilate each other the law i s utterly silent. as such. Hence this decision should be left to the world's government of reason. rights does not occur at and of. is ' I reply : It " absolutely impossible to judge from whose preservatio n f or finite understanaing Kas "no possible way of deciding what may be of greatest advantage in connection with all other things. I cannot save the life of the other. wherein finite the most good would result. objects of a duty. but must quietly await the issue. : . since in the face of this law we are both equally means of the same reason. must do nothing. leads me to prefer myself but that impulse is not to be counted on at all^ and. upon this standpoint we hav e faith The understanding knows only that it ought to do in . and simply. unconditionally. accoi^ding to the moral law. neither of us has advantages. : treated at length. of course. equally tools the less talented for the more talented. This proposition has been attacked. except at the expense of my own and this the moral law prohibits likewise. according to our presupposition. that the older one should sacrifice himself for the younger. and the theory established that it is proper to consider. The naturaLLmpulse. of the The moral law commands both equally We are both to be regarded as tools moral law.

good may result Whosoever is from it it. at least. if we can speak of responsibility in is certain that good . Though we see no means of escape. or. to save all. Cases may occur wherein tnany of my fellowmen are in danger of life and body. and in what manner. such means may nevertheless appear. wait quietly for the result. THE THEORY OF DUTIES. How am I to select is. for all are tools of the moral law. Whosoever perishes. sick. : . for instance. r. and our end is attained. that this neither of us knows. and for the rest the moral law which rules the world is responsible. whose welfare is more specially object : My I I my individual care who are mine. danf? p. and there is herein no distinction to be made. what then ? Our preservation is not end and object at all. to him no blame attaches he has done what he could do. or from their own weakness and helplessness as. every caring 319 moment of life. It is my duty to save but I cannot save all. Secondlv. preserved. Now if I desire to save all. ~^ or from care for my own happiness ^^such motives are to be condemned but because their preservation is my entrusted to theifTihese — — — — . whereunto duty impels. if we perish. whether their danger be thus most imminent from the state of matters. this connection. not all at once.. It is fulfilled. But secondly. own must have the preference: but let it be well observed. from his preservation wiU result." Let me tell you firstly. since the world is governed by the highest wisdom and love. not from any natural pathognomonical affection. ? i and must necessarily be. I will first of all render assistance to those who are in t he mnst im mfidiatp. if " But we both shall perish. supposing we both do perish. since they cannot preserve themselves any longer without foreign assistance. we both whereas otherwise one of us might be saved. and old pefsonsT If amongst them there are such. such has been the will of the moral law. but the fulfilment of the moral law is that object hence. without how much. ch ildren.

though chance and I are object. to call for the help^ol they are near. ' ' h^'m harmlPi^^^ others. therefore. Here the question arises In how far may I endanger the life of the aggressor in defending my own ? It is absolute duty to defend the life of the attacked party. Now. whether it be I or another but this does not cancel the duty to spare and preserve the life of the aggressor. of hostile and unjust possible and body. life. I ought likewise only to repel the attack as well as I am able. if the matter only concerns and yourself are the attacked. precedes general duty. yourself. so that his death be not it results against my it. If my not responsible for It might : be objected. why do you not rather die than expose the other to danger ? " In order to thoroughly and clearly refute this objection. he does get killed. intention. I shall considered. If I cannot do this.n never be to Ml the aggressor. and thus of the State. for I cannot know anything respecting this point. save whomsoever I can whomsoever To consider the relative importance of this or that life in such a case. I should rather maim or wound him anything . first save. but in the supposed case it . still objected " But if and many moralists have you have exposed the life of the aggressor to danger. not allowable. or upon the body of someone else. is. but merely to re nder'' Thirdly.320 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. particular and because particular duty always then I must I see first. if I ought. If no such grounds of preference exist. Cases may arise attacks upon my : life . Now great distinction: In that case the conviction was before me that my self-preservation must firstly this entail the death of the other . duty. preserve there is it at the expense of the life of the other. for that must be the same to me. compare the presupposed case with the one just In the latter it was my duty to preserve my and so it is in the supposed case but I was not to . without endangering the aggressor himself. Hence mv object ca.

into whose hands he is now transferred. where there is nothing immoral to be prevented. sure. is. thus it . first receive the command of the moral law to save and whosoever has already a determined duty to fulfil. namely. it must not leave property. these are matters for the State to settle. in my own science. for I naturally first observe its danger. for another. . hands of Nature. not I as an individual. but as part of the common Whether Y . in my conviction. as mine. have nothing else for him but rational arguments. As soon I as the aggressor is disarmed. to promote general security. at the same In that case the preservation of mine time. murder. is 321 not necessary. my defence ceases. But in the supposed case this rests within my own power. and the property of another. or to prevent himself from doing similar things. nor do I foresee be killed. Now this does not happen in the above case.: THE THEORY OF DUTIES. based not only upon the duty to preserve my own life. and it is not my will to kill him. My property. and 2. the of the other was in the In that case. in conflict. the moral man cannot allow to happen at any price for his will is the will of the moral law. and not I must save mine not property of reason. and would surely. comes first. What the moral law absolutely forbids. to establish an example for others. and presuppose that he will But secondly. not proposed to kill him life moreover. If there is anything more to be done in his case. but at the same time upon the duty to prevent something evidently prohibited by the moral law. I also naturally suppose that the other will do the same in regard to his own con- Of course I must be of selfishness. be taken from him the moment I preserve my own. The State is his judge. and which is the decisive point is the duty to act here in self-defence. that I thus prefer my own from reasons of duty. in danger. is The preservation of the property of diiferent persons and seems mutually to cancel itself. a power which is controlled by my free will.

worth more than pronerty for life is the condi' and not property the condition of-HS. shall see directly. except where duty commands. does not absolve me from the duty to save that of For so long as actually in danger. merely possible. but to do nothing and to rest. I have nothing to do. Now. it has happened not to him. but an immoral and illegal action which is to be the to be prevented. but he does not try to make another one suffer what providence my neighbour which is the danger to mine is . he would have been forced to bear it. with The mere possibility that my property may get into danger. in whole or in patrt. whether I am ready to serve and with it. whenever the danger to that property comes from irrational forces of Nature. For such a case it is not merely the property which is to be preserved. My property. sent to him. 3. tion of propertY. the will of the moral law is the . The moral man sees in this a dispensation of providence. but to us. I really do so regard will easily appear afterward it from the fact whether I so apply assist or not. upon our neighbour's. if the danger arises from the injustice of rational beings. that which I have saved. or the property of the other. and to divide. my other unfortunate neighbour am able to do so. It is absolutely inimoral to protect one's own property ^t the expense of the other's or to parry a danger which threatens our property. it. The preservation of body and life may conflict with the preservation of property. is immoral. we Life is . so far as I him. He grapples with the danger as well as he can. . If it had happened to him.32^ THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. may be attacked by rational beings. How the relation may be changed. which ought same to me. must prefer the safety of our and their lives to that of our and their property. Hence we must save the lives of our fellow-men before saving their property. and we to help him to bear it but now. by putting it.

it is necessary. and the life of the other. therefore. therefore. and as each can categorically assert it thus to be. and when the State has guaranteed its possession. Let not this last clause be overlooked. in as much as it is absolutely against the moral law. . the moral law does not It is. . and in how far may I expose my own life. since the other one does not recognize his authority. or when the person of the. therefore. no one has the power to assume the decision of this point. to danger ? Firstly. It is. will of the moral 323 man. ful so force but with the same precaution enjoined in resist by . and hence he cannot permit what suffer. property taken is of a nature that case arises when the least hereafter. and to expose neither myself nor the aggressor This to danger. absolute duty to prevent robbery. . I must prevent robbery this is an absolute command. and it is problematical in law what side may be in the right hence. For in the latter case there is a law dispute between the States at war with each other. to provide Secondly. But what means may I use for the purpose. in so far as he is a member of the State. the unjust act becomes success^ do not In such a case it is duty to far as I can foresee. and to us. duty to do nothing immediately.aggressor is known In the latter case. it hence duty. solely in so far as the aggressor has recognized it as property. absolutely illegal and immoral when it is committed by one citizen of a State upon a fellow-citizen of the same State. . the case may be of a nature which permits of a remedy on the part of the State if not at once. the case resist may proper proofs for the State. at — In such a case the State can an nihi late the unjust ac t and it is. . however. in how far may I use force. or of a State at peace but it is not absolutely illegal and with his State immoral when committed by an avowed enemy.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. be of such a nature that if I on the spot. An attack upon the property of the other is absolutely against the moral law. can be known. but to notify the State of the matter. Hence.

for I must always assume It that the moral law will be followed. it the defence of life and body. we still must submit to it. understood that I have attempted to dissuade him by death : rational arguments. is. But when it is to whether has its I choose to prefer such or not —and my free will. not bound to assume that the aggressor would resist my attempt to drive him away. and was resist the robbery of my property. It is altogether the fault of life the aggressor that the affair has become one of and he ought to have been deterred by my resistance. for^Jhe Stat e treats rational being. — 324 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. but my such a case. becomes a fight for life and death. My life is attacked. and that I myself have changed a fight for mere property into one I reply: Morally I was bound to for body and life. or do not acknowledge. notification of such my duty to give since "obedience to the left State is duty. but as a force ot l^ature restricted to its limits I man not as a wbich must be so. but the moral law prescribes as follows: generally — — Whenever the State violence it is requires it. as follows : The State does not convince. and at the risk of my life. moreover. and the matter comes under the rules established for I no longer defend my property.. Now. the justice of decision. and it is carried out with physical force. the State limits in this respect: for instance. in private affairs there is which happen in one's own house the rule is. Thirdly. since it and the State is right in doing was established for this purpose. and not violated. in cases of complaints preferred before the State and not merely in the present instance. If the aggressor resists. It might be objected to this that I have myself brought affairs to such a pass by offering resistance. where no plaintiff there is no judge the moral law it at requires that I should not prefer is once. I could not. life. in the State acts in private. for it does not act unless I my name when it does empower and call upon it . affairs act. The ground Whether we its acknowledge.

point. to confess his injustice. that he ought to have done voluntarily what now he is compelled to do. before preftferring f. . Hence. This gives us occasion to speak.: THk THEORY OF DUTIES. fight of life even if I have become involved with him in a and death. what the State does is to be ascribed to me. both pending and after opponent as a rational and moral person. In the same manner I must likewise. I am therefore bound. then it becomes duty to prefer suit for his unjust act must not succeed. through rational representations. no avail. I must regard and the my seen. since can be said about already involved in the and it is merely to remove some misunderstandings that I touch upon this previously established principles. treat. If my suit before the courts force him to restore and make good the damage done. it good. about love tmuards our enemies. concerning which otherwise all that we should have nothing it is particular to say. and see whether I cannot bring voluntarily to my opponent. 325 and would not act if I did not do so. as we have already Hence trial. : If these representations are of and thus to subject his will to the law. as weU as his external action has been so subjected through compulsion. This must be done within a certain time. hence I cannot fix a determined time either for myself or him. through remonstrances. in the present place. but as a rational being. to try arguments. and how can I ever know that they will be of no avail ? Does it not therefore remain my duty always to presuppose that they might be successful ? " I reply The point here is to make restoration. but be defeated.pa-j pst him. Nature. I shall still be able. and to resolve make . It might be objected " But from what point of time do I know for certain that they will be of no avail. if I can possibly thus 1 arrange with him. a.man not as mere force of \. seek to preserve him as a possible tool of morality. and it will still remain my duty. snil-. to convince him. But / am required to treat my fellow. to do so.

merely because this inclination is not reciprocated ? No this tion.Tirl those are also mista. The solution is as foUows From the standpoint of morality there is only one view from which to look upon our fellow-men. on thp. the moral man has no personal enemy. simply because it is not a moral will. The same holds good of my enemy. I must never abandon the hope that he may become such. This assertion is false. other ha. I must assist with all my power in his reform. because no act is moral which does not emanate from an internal disposition. Why should it not be possible ? Might we not feel a particular inclina- from some natural ground. as has been abundantly proved above. T^^^. namely. is not commanded. which the moral law immediately never commands. and recognizes none. only the ground assigned is not correct. is not something dependent upo n our tree dependent upon a natural impulse. not moral^ but merely uatnral" towards Tt ^^ '^ must neverj^be^tbe motive_2gwg'^-0|—2!IL-g£^- is ^fnerffljagreeaTnarsucr^ov^Eowara^ou^^ not commanded by the moral law. and because such a command would merely require legality towards our enemy. I must regard them as tools of reason. But as such I must regard all without exception. : . I must love him: that is to say. arising person that love love • . love. Moreover. ""jslothing. but Vet. no matter how much we may hate him in point of fact. and this love I must evince in deed that is to say. which should be well observed. must believe him capable of reforming.326 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. conclude the contrary. as if we did love our enemy. no matter how much their present actions may lead me to : Even if he is not such now.rpiy ^]^ ovfomfi] and that cient to act. and if some say it is not so commanded simply because it is not possible. or a separate inclination is Pathogaomonical th is or that person.Ven requires not at all pi^j-^- who assert that this command any intern al it is suffi- jjffpnfi'/^yi^l^nt. towards any perhaps hates and persecutes us.

something nevertheless results from it. namely. is 327 hateful to nothing except the evil. conditions our influence which and contempt of. evil. in a moral sense. is all the same to him. This opinion each one should have of the other. consist in this That others should believe us to be possibly actuated in our actions generally. We only need to look a little closer at the defend it. and should sooner despair of him than of one who stands in the way of some good cause or it another.abandon the hope of future reform. indeed.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. contrary opinion which others entertain of us. and hence it is a very immoral mode of thinking. and even then he should not. seen. This tool of morality is . It needs no particular self-control tp become. . to which we must refer in few words Honour and good revute. for each one should consider the other as a possible and should thus entertain it until the proved for the present. indifference to. the men upon whom we are to work. indiiferent to the judgments of others. and particularly in our relations to them. Concluding Eemaek. Whoever feels an offence deeper is because egotist. upon them. may be sure that he an and very far yet from true morality. as we have here. as a mere tool of the moral law. by a regard only for the good and the just. has touched is Mm. Although the duty of truthfulness is not to be discussed no collision can arise concerning it. and he seeks to overthrow and this simply because it is Whether such evil be directed against him or against anyone else. him. Honour and good repute. since : : . 'There is "no reason at all why he should think worse of the man who happens to stand in his way. and hence it Decided indiiference is is our duty to retain and to all evil reports may be scattered against us. and to our own moral destination. for he holds himself as absolutely nothing more than anyone else. in a natural way.

already evident that we should promote the general accepta- and should aid in having their freedom It is applied to the promotion of the ends of reason. for hurt his character. and their freedom in particular. we him what must to be subjected to our arbitrary ends. it is our duty to do so. necessarily seek to realize this. indeed easy to prove this. great as they generally are. and become thus that which they actually are. therefore. powerless will. But his will cannot be an impotent. if anyone has attacked this our honour. bound. Hitherto we have seen that it is our duty to spare and promote the formal freedom of our fellow-men. tion of this view. generally. But a moral man should not let this indifference grow upon him he should always men . and . upon them. even in an immediate manner. risk of the aggressor. prove that the other has instance. as a tool of the moral law. From this. He will. since we are morally bound to regard each one who bears a human All men outside of us face. to treat them as and only this view of them determines our we act manner it is of acting in relation to them. C. Now the moral law wills the morality of all rational beings. since he is a tool of the moral law. the relation as when we defend our life and property We must defend it even at the against an unjust attack. see in men rather that which they shall be. as an individual having power in the sensuous world.328 THR SCIEMCR OF ETHICS. The will of the moral man is the will of the moral law itself. We are. in so far as we presuppose that they are such tools for otherwise they would be merely irrational objects. as sure as moral beings . his necessary will. to be treated according to our own pleasure. and can only defend it by communicating of It is. with all . Now. and hence the moral man must desire the same. to learn not to place too a value upon their judgments. our duty to say and to The matter stands here in precisely told the untruth. are objects of duty to us solely. therefore.

his power.


The proof that

it is

absolute and general
of us, offers

promote and extend morality outside therefore no difficulty. It is a little more



state in

what manner



be possible.

For that

alone can be called moral which proceeds from our
free resolve without the least compulsion,


and without

the least external motive.

It seems, therefore, impossible

communicate morality,

or to furnish the least assist-

ance in this communication.
morality seems,


The command to extend empty and im-

practicable, and nothing seems to remain to us but impotent wishes; for how could we promote morality except through sensuous causality, and how can sensuous causality ever awaken freedom ? This is, indeed, undeniably true in many respects, which we shall proceed
to state.

First of


a morally-minded


can never think

by compulsory means— as threats of punishment, or promises of rewards, whether held out in the name of the State and some powerful ruler, or in the name of an Almighty Being. All acts, which are impelled by such motives, are absolutely devoid of morality. It being still customary to attempt to weaken and limit this proposition, and to hold up the system of a virtue of punishments and rewards by various pretexts,
of bringing


to virtue

I shall prove


assertion with greatest strictness.

All impulse after happiness

I desire this or that object because

based upon the natural my nature
desire it because there

has an impulse for

and I do not


nature an aversion against





made use






thus become conditions of the satisfying such impulse and in this manner the satisfying of my natural impulse evidently remains the ultimate end of my acts, and my acts themselves are merely the means, and are merely considered by me as means for such end.
acts, these acts

But therein

consists precisely the essence of immorality,



that the satisfying of our natural impulse

the ultimate


whereas the law requires that I utterly subordinate this impulse to a higher prompting. Hence, by inducing me to these acts, I have not been made moral but have, on the contrary, been deplorably confirmed in my immorality, since this my immorality has been authorized and cultivated through something which has been preached to me as a doctrine of morals, and


which has been held up to


as the highest



All hope of morality has been thus annihilated, by substituting immorality in its place,


all inclination


presentiment of

morality has been utterly rooted out.



men in this manner is to treat them as brutes. make use of the brute's instincts to develop in it the qualities we have in vievi ; and, in like manner, we would

train instead of cultivate man.


us, therefore,



those equally indefinite and

shallow,injurious,and all true morality-eradicating pretexts,

do not want the rewards to be the only end of the we merely want him to have it also iu view"; or, " The reward is not to be the chief, but merely one of the ends." By no means. Eeward is not to be an end Ev^;)r^act dnnp jEEtUft--^"]? ^- °l yeward. or fear of at al



punishmeiji t ,,


.abaolutelv immoral.



not be

the beginning, until

"We only want to use this means in we have made men more open to pure


the use of such means you do not at

begin true moral sentimen t, but continue the old immoral



which you thus, moreover, carefully preserve In fact, your whole pretext, that men are
pure in-

for pure morality in certain states, is a

vention, and your distinction between a pure and a not

pure morality

moralities; there is simply one morality:



There are no two and that morality not pure, which does not proceed altogether from
is is

downright absurd.

the idea of duty,

no morality at


For here we speak

altogether of ihe,moT?S^disposition, and not of the com-

this disposition in actual acting.


pleteness or incompleteness of the external realization of

Nor can morality he compelled through





selves cannot be compelled

a true proposition,




in men, but which the prophilosophe rs rarely take to heart, because it would disturb them in their phantasm, that tliey can

many phenomena

improve or reform men through syllogisms. No one "becomes convinge d'unless he neneiirate intoTiimself and
mternallj^ feels th e agreem ent o|
liip self

jsitb the trutfiT"

uttere d; which agreement

heart and on no account a conclusion drawn by the un^Sstanding. This attention to_our self depen^ds^ upon freedom, and hence conviction is always freely given, never forced. I do not mean to say that we can freely convince ourselves of anything we choose to, for we can only convince ourselves, and desire to convince ourselves, of truth but it is not necessary that we convmce ourselves of^ the Con JirillltLL.t''^''^-"""^^^^^ ^Pp^da_ui^n our free will. yiction is an ac^ of reason- reason suljectinci herself, t.hrnngh an ant, nf her self-activitv. to truth and is not


effect of the


a passivity of reason.

To convince

ourselves of propo-

sitions which check our passions, pres'ujaposes a ruling good will, and hence that will cannot first be produced^ by our conviction. 3. Since, nevertheless, we shall probably be compelled to exercise moral influence only through reasoning, which

can only be done in the way of theoretical argumentation,


have, at least, gained so
evil in the subject to


for the present that

this influence presupposes already the principle of



addressed, and

that thus all promotion of morality would be impossible,


we not everywhere

confidently presuppose this



ineradicable in


be shown that there is something nature, with which moral culture



can always be connected. This is the sentiment of^esteem^ This sentiment may lie undeveloped in the soul; but it can neither be eradicated, nor directed upon an object foreign to it. We may love, seek, and desire sensuous

enioyment and may feel delight in experiencing it, but we can never hold it in esteem; esteem does not Again, wherever this sentiment finds apply to it at all whatsoever is its application it results without fail: esteemable is sure to be esteemed.. Hence, the first rule for the extension of morality will be as follows Show t o vour fellow -men eatep.mable things, and in this respect we can scarcely show them anything more to the purpose than our own moral mode of thinking and moral behaviour. Thus there results the duty of a qooA .example to which we shall return hereafter, at present The first step in moral proceedings, our logical way. culture is, therefore, the development of esteem. 4. As soon a s man is forced t o esteem something outside of himself the desire to esteem himself awakens in him. This impulse of self-esteem, as soon as it has once been awakened through some external motive, is as ineradicable from human nature as self-love No man can bear to coldly despise himself, and quietly to regard himself as a wicked and miserable wretch. But it is equally impos^sible that he should esteem himself, if he is contemptible. Of course, this does not improve the moral condition pf man in the slightest decree, but often rather.inakes it considerably worse. For in order to escape the insufferable torture of self-contempt, man falls into two ways, and often into both together. He seeks t o escape himself because he fears himself he takes care not to look into his inner soul, because this shows him nothing but terrific objects. In order to get rid of himself, he dissipates all








the more in the object of the external world.



his conscience..
seelss to


as this



not a complete

remedy, he

get rid of the forced esteem of some-

thing outside of himself, and the self-contempt which






results therefrom, by tryinp; to persuade himse lf that that esteem is all humbug aad foolishness that there does not exist anything that is esteemable, noble, and sublime that it is all only appearance and deception that no man is better than himself, and that human nature in general is no better. It is idle to try and refute this system b y rational arguments. Jor its ground lies not in reaso n, but in the he art and it would be necessary first to root out this ground in the heart, or to relieve such a man from his self-shame and self-fear, jffe is thus at variance with ^all that is f^ood. simply because he is in conflict with himself Let us first try and reconcile him to. himself let us show him that he himself is not so utterly devoid of all good, as he would himself believe let us first lead him back to the good principle in himself. Immorality is, therefore, either complete brutishness, and this must first be cultured by the above means (Jr teaching man to esteem something outside of himself or it is despair of one's self and this is to be cured by showm^ucn a man that at .least others do not despair of him, by showing him confidence and making him acquainted, on particular occasions, with the hidden good
; . ;

He, in whom others evince confidence, will soon also have some confidence in himself; but he, of whom all others dp.spair must certainly begi n to despair
in himself.
of himself.

Thus, oar theory, everything is connected, and each We have already shown that link attached to the other.



absolutely immoral to despair internally of


any man. That which we there showed to be reform internal duty, and a regulative of our external acts, an now again shows itself to be a means for the promotion of our ultimate end and it becomes a duty to manifest








external actions.

The good principle which exists in all men, and which can be eradicated in none, is precisely the possibility to




be able to esteem something unselfishly, and hence without all regard to advantages and thus absolutely d priori and without any ground. It is also the impulse to desire one's self-esteem, and the impossibility to sink down to
the infamy of being able quietly and coolly to despise



be led back to this principle.

Let them

be shown that

it lies

at the basis of all their behaviour.



be said, for instance, to those


abs olutely deny

the poss ibility of a n unselfish"~ impul se


man, to men

like Helvetius, &c. r^'"?ou'say you have discovered that

men '"are
this is a

only impelled by selfish motives; that they

deceive themselves

they report otherwise.



good thing for you

make use

of this discovery

much as you are able to do, and go your ways. But why do you communicate this matter to us ? _Whatjio_

.you gain, since

men, and you amongst them, can only motivesby communicating°it" to us; or" act from whab danger do you thereby turn away from yourTieads ?


If the deception to believe otherwise does

produce any

you assure what does that matter to you? What do you care whether Eather be glad, and draw as much others sufiPer injury ? gain from it as possible. Nay, it_would seeni as if it must, be jt,pQsiJave advantage to you, if all remain in this error and if you were logical you would do all in your power to keep up and extend this error. Por it affords you a means to gain us over to your secret projects, under the pretext of virtue and unselfishness which it will not be so easy for you to do if you boldly announce your private advantage as your ultimate end. In short, since you can gain nothing by communic ating your discovery, your as sertion contradicts itself. JSlay, what is more, you not only communicate it to us, indifferent as to whether we accept it or not, but you make it your special business to convince us of it, and defend your proposition with all possible zeal. Whence may this interest arise which you

certainly causes none to you, since

us that you do not believe


as for our damage,





that belief


really so contemptible as


assert it to be,


warmth and energy ? itself? Your conduct

do you oppose Why not let it

with so



to pieces of


therefore, absolutely incompre-







What, then, may be your motive ? It will not be ditticult to show it to you. You are so. verv concerned to convinc e us of your opinion, not that we may govern ourselves
according to it in our actions for such would be very inopportune for you but that our conviction may assist in suiDportinpj your conviction. You are not yourself very

sure of your assertions and desire to complete, through

our agreement, the conviction which you lack yourself.
I ask you further Why do you desire to be so very certain of your matter ? If mere selfishness is the motive of your acts, of what profit can this complete

And now



certainty be to you
to be certain of



are again illogical.

You wan t

because otherwise you must despise

must look upon yourself as worse than otter men, as more wicked and infamous than you are naturally. Hence you wish to esteem yourself, and have a higher principle upon which to act than mere selfishness; and you are better than you yourself think. Or you others', who are not in this case, who do not

openly confess your heart's opinion, but carefully lock


up in your soul, pleading esteemable intentions, which you do not possess, for your acts, why do you do this ? If you merely intend to deceive your fellow-men by it, in order to be able all the more to use them for the promotion of your ends, you certainly recognize, through your acting, that there is a higher and nobler motive than selfishness, since you make use of it, calculate on it, and
take your measures according to it. Here, again, your opinion that there is nothing higher in human nature






which pre-

supposes something higher, and fares well in such preand the Hence, in your acting at least supposition.




man discovers itself most surely in his you cannot refrain from recognizing a higher principle in man, and this you certainly could only have discovered in yourself, and in your own sentiments, therefrom transferring it to others. Hence you also are not so empty of goodness as you have believed. In one word there is no man of even the least culture I do not speak here of the original natural man, whom we have dwelt upon elsewhere already who does not at times commit actions, which cannot be explained from the mere principle of self-love, or, from the presupposition Hence the necessity to call of mere selfishness in others. attention to such actions, and to the principle which lies
inner heart of


at their basis.

In order






meet the

objection which

we have

ourselves proved above, to wit

"that theoretical convictions cannot be compelled; and that hence it is impossible to convince the other that there is still some goodness left in him"; I add the following: In the present case we can be sure of it, because the heart of the man to be convinced is inclined in favour of us from the very beginning. Each one would like to esteem himself, if it were but possible; this may be taken for certain. Hence we may be certain
of his assent

are worthy of

we show him that at least esteem. Upon such a

his dispositions


a moral

character can be built

We return to the point which we touched above, when
we must show him something esteemable


said that in order to develop the sentiment of esteem

in man,


there being no better occasion for this than our example, we have the duty of a pood examvle


This duty has often been viewed very incorrectly, as if we could be obliged to do this or that, which otherwise we would not have needed to do for the mere sake of a

good example

(as, for

instance, going to church, taking

the Lord's Supper, &c.).



has been already shown,

that within the sphere of



ac^t ipps;

morality there are no inthe moral law embraces and deter-

mines absolutely all possible acts of freedom. That which I am commanded to do I must do absolutely for its own sake, without any regard to the example it may set and that which I am prohibited from doing I must absolutely leave undone, likewise, without any regard to the example. Something which is not duty necessarily sets a bad example; no good can ever result from the immoral. But to do more than I am commanded to do is impossible, since duty disposes of all my strength and all my time. Hence there can be no actions, the ultimate end whereof might be to establish a good example, and which ought to be done mptrfily feua-a np li a .n*p]g'fi fjfjj^P The duty of setting a good example has no reference to


the substance o f our acts, but only to th e

Arm thereof.

do what


the moral law merely makes
to be done, regardless


it my duty to whether publicly or

and whether with a statement of the principles upon which it is done or not. But if we look to the fact that we owe a good example which truly neither can, nor is intended, to do any other good than to spread

esteem for virtue
difference to us.

— this


no longer a matter of


the contrary, the highest publicity

our acts and principles


of us.








Its intention is to excite

intention to

esteem for what is but esteem can be neither compelled nor
but manifests

artistically produced,

voluntarily and

Hence the virtuous must not suffer such an be remarked in his acts and since he is to

give frank expression to whatever
since others are moreover likely to
if it exists,

in his heart, and remark such intention

reference to particulars.

he must not cherish this intention at all in He allows the inmost depth of

his heart to reveal itself externally, without doing any-

thing else to attract attention to

talks and acts as his heart prompts him. he does not conceal ponder over secrecy conduct is subjected to criticism. and as he considers it to be his duty. for he has also . for the very same reason. which are not at all necessary for his purpose. It is just as contemptible to give another . and without listening and inquiring what people may say to his actions for he has no time to do this. this motive. but he who is secretive has a secret fear of truth. is Such the external character of the frank man. if they are it not.time to if no and concealment. and none m^re dangerous than secretiyeness. whereas the frank man does no more than is needed for the attain- ment I of his object.. from —which The pretentious man usually indulges in preparations. and he is not willing to be reformed before he does not cast off himself. his — that fear of truth. duty. Perhaps there is no more beautif ul trait in human character than frankness. He pursues his path straightforward. So. Frankness and openness at least lead to uprightness. which he would not like to have discovered. does he reply to criticism does he defend himself if he holds himself wronged. and to the universe. —in ourselves. has some deep fault. is very con- temptible. by ought to be the most important to us the following marks. A pretentious^ man intends to be observed. is without looking to the right or left to see whether he observed or not. and which hence can only be intended to call attention to his acts. his time is fully occupied by fulfilling his . if he has been convicted of wrong. This publicity the frank man maintains both in his ami acts and principles. to do his duty's sake and he makes no secretof Of this subiection to To be ashamecl the some- thing higher and greater. likewise. He does not try to smooth over his actions. 338 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. as of make oneself God of a superstition. This character can easily be distinguished in others. or frankness. dut I duty merely for His ruling principle is. But.

duty's and thus for instance. name sake. In this respect the frank man shows himself particularly logical. The same his acts . publicity the frank man. His acts are like his words. since it confirms unbelief in virtue. of course. &c. . generosity. motives of of particular affection and friendship. . asserts in for principles are nothing unless realized in acts. Mere virtuous talking amounts to nothing and furnishes no good. but rather a bad example. and since we can convince no one that such principles are really ours except by realizing them in actions.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. to that 339 for which we have done merely to claim for it.

concerning. but absolutely not itself. but does it now how he ought to. ambition. To promote the end of reason is the only duty and this duty emhraces all other duties particular . but not morally. Hence everyone ce^n only decide before his own conscience whether he truly fulfils his duty in . and for the sake of duty. and i do my duty in the fulfilment of as end my particular obligations. for instance. of all. . I am commanded so. the following is still to be said. Concerning the relation of the particular to the general duties. &c. fear of blame or punishment. to exercise the life. Preliminary. duties are duties only in so far as they relate to the attainment of that chief purpose. P or there might be' other motives inducing man diligently to practise these duties. The proposition that each one shall fulfil his duty through honestly fulfilling m the obligations of his particular condition in fore to be understood with this restriction : life.do it he acts correctly. particular duties of my vocation and condition in not absolutely because I ought to do but for the reason that I thus best promote in my place the ultimate end of reason. only in so far as I fulfil them for the sake of duiy in general. does certainly what he ought to do. as. Whosoever is impelled by such motives.CHAPTEK V. I must regard the particular duty as a means to carry out the general duty of all men. the particular duties. is there- that he must carry out those obligations solely from dut y. a natural predilection for his vocation.

the ultimate end of reason. will carry out those obligations. vocation of man. the duties prescribed by such vocation. to sacrifice virtue to one's condition and vocation. om love of duty such condition or vocation is not absolutery end ifi itself. which clearer light. most assuredly not carry them out. and who therefore fulfils obligations from another motive than love of duty. in a cerned. which are based upon an accidental and free The former relations we may "tletermination of the will. have to add another remark concerning the subwhich will. which we have called vocations. can frequently be in opposition to the ultimate end of reason. but rather condition in For. We stance thereof. but merely means for the attainment of an end. in such case. because they no longer promote. is So far as the division of the particular duties con- must base itself upon a division of the various human relations. In the course of our present investigation. because he knows no higher standpoint than the obligations of his vocation. Now the man to whom his vocation is his its ultimate end.CONCERNING THE PARTICULAR DUTIES. and the rights which may condition their possibility. even if they are opposed to the ultimate end of reason. 341 his vocation. which rest upon our arrangement of Nature. and artificial r elations. thereby placing it. then it being cgntradictory to place the means higher than the end— it is not allowable. at the same time. I shall apply this general remark to the duties of the various particular vocations. will. But the man who regards his vocation merely as a means. furnish us with a criterion whereby each ^fulfils TBe'cl'u ties ot his may recognize whether he life ^jf ^or not. subsume under the general name of the natural condiand the second under the name of the tion _ of man . Tiiis remark relates to the necessary form of the will in the particular duties. if — positively immoral. but rather oppose. Namely. we can divide these relations into natural relation s. at the same time. .

There are onlytwo natural conditions amongst those whom we call men. The The relation of relation of parents husband and wife. and children. but to eradicate or put itself in its place— as if the act were immediately grounded in the conception of the end. have treated both relations extensively in' our At present we condense what we have there said. Science of Bights. as everyis The means made use its . permit the impulse to become an act. We detail. by Nature where. 2nd. sufficiently described The impulse can neither be generated no r . which are based upon the arrangement made by Nature for the rational. We shall speak here of the duties of man in regard to his particulaii natura l condition. of this a natural is impulse that of above. as we have of ment sexes. Only — and is tnis rule iias stricter application to the natural impulse the union of impulse —only the sexes than to any other natural in so far as the act of the free being immediately produced by the impulse. and refer the reader to that work for further I. sensuous beings propagation of the race: 1st. of Nature to propagate the race in on an arrangetwo different here. annihilated through freedom for it is f^ivep. said.342 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. to attain object in free beings. and the relation itself impulse to freedom all other natural impulses. and not simply . is the object of The conception can only prevent or Nature attained. This relation based. The relation of husband and is wife.

CONCERNING THE PARTICULAR DUTIES. we should relate to our highest ultima'te end. only the one sex should be active and the other altogether passive. The impulse produced be artificially "^ the T. (See my Science of I^igliisJ^^TLis simple ground gives rise to the most delicate relations amongst men. Hence it would seem. But we shall touch upon quite another much less physical aspect of this impulse: and hence the command to permit o urselves Its satis ffiftinn^ anlply f).the impulse — The human race is in general. as reason rules in woman. Our investigation would be at an end. the supremacy of reason. The peculiar arrangement of Nature that in the union of the sexes for the propagation of the race . .pj m eans to propagate the race^ia even at this point to be Sstrictedbv the consideration j that it must at least not be our fault if that end is not attained thereby. is not the case here. mediation in . reciprocal action of two persons permissible. and there would be no marriage relation and no duties of such relation. if the end of Nature in the sexual union required merely two persons. and haTs just under what conditions it is permitted to act upon an impulse of Nature. This. however. utterly contradict s reason and annuls As sure. therefore. through can not its 343 this the conception not propagated according to conceptions and free resolves of the -will. at the first glance. provided both have consented to it. is this. It is well known. It is impossible that in a rational being there should^ be"an impu lse to keep purely passive. activity of now been restated. and must not ^end. as if we could say of the satisfying of the impulse nothing more than we have said concerning the satisfying of natural impulses do. again. t o merely surrender lEseii to an external influence as the mere object passivity of its . namely. use. Mere it. permit ourselves its satisfactSn solely as" a means for the which end is here the propagation of our race.magina^iTr~"TVe" must mu st really exist. This end. and there is just as little difficulty in thinking a free.

the morally necessary result Firstly. with with her whole empirical Ego. a marriage. but it is proper to say that. at the same time. She gives herself wholly fo r she gives her personality and if she excepted anything from her submission. that the sexual impulse shows never as such impulse. For woman. wherever there is but the least inclination for morality. the natural impulse can appear only under the form of hv& The sexual impulse of woman in its mere prutisnness is the most repulsive and repugnant of everything Nature and. . but always in the form of love^is the source of all that is noble and great in woman. the sexual impulse cannot appear as an impulse to be 'purely passive. and not herself . moreover.. her will. If the above arrangement of Nature is to co-exist with such an impulse. with her : . but must change itself into an impulse to be likewise active. to surrender herself. indicates the absolute absence of all morality. and. the latter can be only aajmpulse in woman to satisfy a man. 344 THE SCIENCE OE ETHICS. m . not for her own sake. chastity a is the principle of all When woman surrenders herself to a is man from love. she gives herself wholly. Love Nature and Reason in their most original union.. It is not proper to say that it is woman's duty to love for love is mixed with a natural impulse which does not depend upon freedom. morality. in short. The unchastity of the heart in a woman which shows itself in this. — — she may never allow that impulse to break out in acts) whereas. on the part of the woman. and has had influence in the development of her character. she gives herself for ever.sa ke of t ne other! is Such an impulse is called lofoe. on the other hand. womanly purity and chastity — which itself consists in this. that the sexual impulse manifests itself in her in an immediate manner is the basis of all vices (even though from other reasons . that strength. . but for _th e . all By giving herself. this excepted something would seem to have more value in her eyes is hers.

than her own person. on submission of the which alone woman can make the surrender for otherwise man would treat woman not as a moral being. but Even if a woman should voluntarily as a mere thing. and that she has lost her life and her will in the beloved. . man could not accept and the rule of law^ volenti non fit her submission We cannotr injuria has here no application whatever. which contradicts the presupposition and annuls morality. in marriage the stated significance of the word. -disre gard of her^ in of mo ral character. she would not feel herself thus impelled to surrender herself. From these premises is it of the sexual impulse appears that the satisfaction permitted only in marriage. and that outside of it involves in woman utter. and that she can not be otherwise than his. woman only on these conditions. But if in the hour of submission she could think herself at any future time as not his. such as could not co-exist with a moral mode of thinking. Between . no man has a right to demand the sacrifice of a The man can therefore accept the 'characte r. and co-exist with a moral way of thinking. Secondly. The mere conception that a moral of love involves that of marriage in the explained significance of the word. — — ourselves guilty of it. which certainly would constitute the utmost derogation and contempt of her person. character of woman rests The whole moral upon the above conditions. can her submission arise from love. on the part of the man. make use of another one's immorality and in the present without making case it would be absolute corruption Now human . offer herself on other conditions. 34. She gives herself for ever. For only on the presupposition that she has given herself without any reservation. and to say woman can give herself up only to love is the same as to say that she can give herself only on the presupposition of a marriage.CONCERNING THE PARTICULAR DUTIES. and and the making use man participation in this crime an animal inclination.

receives quite another character worthy of a rational being. in her own eyes. utterly incapable of reform There is only one result. and its intensity grows with the The wife can never cease to utterly cling to her husband.o ong unconperfect and indissoluble marriage. if she did. which I shall moral rules."marriage relation. pjedges man. which depends upon the husband's behaviour. however.346 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. may well enough confess to — himself —receives mutual quite another form. which in itself : ditioned surrenderiDg_p n the part of the ol intensest woman . the sexual union. Physical man is neither man nor woman. Woman surrenders herself always only to love. a commandment to itself . and would be force continuation of the marriage. . tend erness and genero sity on the part of ffi e Womanly purity remains inviolate even inmar- and only in marriage. it is connected crime. and even in man the natural impulse which vnan. : to believe that her own sexual impulse. . had led her to surrender herself. she would have to give up. It is the absolute destination of each individual of both sexes to marry. her dignity. point out. and to be esteemable and noble for it is not only the temporal fate of the wife. is persons of different sexes there no union for the satis- faction of their impulse possible except the union of a In marriage. the husband cannot cease to return to her everything and more than she has given to him. Moral commandments cannot be specified regarding th^ . riage. instead of love. It become s_the utter melting together of two rational individnalR int. and to be lost in him without resprvation for. if it is not so. over. one through . but both and it is the same with the moral man. but the confidence which she has in her own character. it is it that relation is as it should be. On the other hand. morebears the impress of coarse brutishness. and becomes Ime This relation of husband and wife extends throughout all their affairs.

You shall be loved.the for the end. \yhich can be cultivated only in marriage. to the service of the Stat e to or of th e Church. There are traits of the human character. such as the surrendering love of the wife the allto-hfs-wife sacrificing generosity of the husband the necessity to be venerable. is iiig!ie^"£han any other end. . ana wnoie man. J^t is not allowable to sacrifice this end to . the true friendship between both friftj^ ^I pihip is nossi ble only i n piarria^e. You shall love nor any man. and the marriage union of both sexes is the only way in which man can An unmarried person is be ennobled through Natur e. tendency of mankind is egotistic.. The clearly-resolved intention never tomarry is absolutely immoral. . or quiet of aspeculalive life family considerations. and moreover the very noblest. . and there it results The original necessarily th e parental emotionsT& c. only half a man. this absolute command can be established: it must not be knowingly our own fault if we remain unmarried. and shall love in return But for this does not depend altogether upon freedom.— CONCERNING THE PARTICULAR DUTIES. at least for the wife's sake. &c. or io. 347 . in marriage even Nature leads man to forget himself in the other. but purposely to remain so is a great guilt. to other ends : as. to be a complete . To remain unmarried without one's own fault is a great misfortune. . if not for his own. True we cannot say to any woman. for instance.

without freedom and consciousness and there does not arise from it any of generation. In her ' "By consciousness. Its birth is. at the same time. as . it is absolutely against the dignity of a rational . . which the former feels as much need to give as the latter to receive. The mother preserves her child because she needs it and it is so even in regard to animals. scious and freely. The act from which some philosophers attempt to deduce rights and duties. for ^the mother. object she wastes this continuous.. THE RELATION OF .PARENTS AND CHILDBBTJ TO EACH OTHER. . The child is borne by the mother at the risk of her life. This relation between them does not result from any freely -created conception. Now. an end to her pain necessarily a sight to gladden her heart.directed natural connection. care . of her . accompanied between mother and child. mutual duties of parents uneducated and inexmight. occurs. be but°^hat we have to investigate at present is the relation between parents and their own children in regard to their mutual duties. cognition of the generated child. womb the fruit and the preservation of her own life is connected with the preservation and health of the child and she is conscious of this. in order thereby to develop this moral relation. and thus becomes accustomed to consider its life as part own life. . which it IS necessary to show up. it is jperienced 'rational beings Much true. 348 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. ever returning. as such. Between father and child there is absolutely no con- on this subject . The animal union of both continues even for some time after the birth and in the mother is prepared the food of the child. and under great pain. but is based upon an arrangement of J^ature. We said do n ot speak here of the in geiieral towards children. But there does exist such a natural con nection. AND THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN. B. She knows upon what generates itself.

or of imagination love. be eradicated consciousness and freedom. it is rather the ne cessary result of the original union of the natural impulse and reason^ But it is proper to say of both. and is accompanied by a command of duty. and to suppress whatsoever might tend to deaden them. and thus there arise within him love for his child and care for its preservation. Of a woman who is not capable of feeling motherly will . What may this form be ? According to the mere arrangement of Nature. be driven by a mere natural instinct neither can. rise it may doubtless be said that she does not above brutishness. But if we assume it to be a being with True. joy and a duty to him to share her feelings. . the need of the child was also a physical need of the mother. as we saw above in the case of woman's sexual impulse. this . It is only after the affection has manifested itself that freedom enters. The care for its preservation. in -another form..CONCERNING THE PARTICULAR DUTIES. any case. will be replaced . tenderness. This affection is the sentiment of fiiy and sympathy It is just as improper to say of a^BSther 's that it is her duty. as it is to say so ot' a wife's love . on the other hand everything which It arises is the result of our civil legislation. the mere impulse of Nature change into sentiment and affection the physical now by a need of the lieart on the part of the mother freely to make the preservation of the child her own. truer to first duty of . — is only from the father's love of the His tenderness towards Ins wite makes it a mother. in . and could be. of public opinion. pity. to nourish them within her. being that it 349 should. how both parents towards their child is In saying this. The mother is in duty bound to give herself up to these sentiments. instinct should. I speak as to matters would be if we were. nor but when united to reason and freedom it will appear. that they condition the possibility of morality. —deducting a mediated The love of the father for his child.

hence. it is a duty to train children.3SO THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. Such first is the it first conception of education. it is their duty to subordinate the use of the child's freedom to their highest end in the child. but every free being is capable of morality. to assume reason in plants. or. as this might be named separately.tion for morality — — ^is manifested. to be the property of that externality itself— for instance.reason child. In this case the parents since man is but too much inclined to transfer reason and freedom to everything outside of him* would transfer their own conceptions And hence to the child. they cannot wish to deprive . the child would always be under their eyes. therefore. would soon exhibit them. if husband and wife would always live and work together and if. and demanded of it by this reciprocal causality. It is the duty of parents to preserve their child it is also their duty to spare and favour its freedom. between itself and its parents. ca. the whole world itself. its But since. same time. they can favour and admit this freedom only in so far as it is possible to co-exist with altogether of freedom. But soon the duty of a higher education of an edu part of . This for the following reason : The parents have discovered the freedom — for the present only th e formal freedom—of the child . and would treat it accordingly. . — — — According to the necessary conceptions of free beings. an end demanded both by Nature and duty. of the training of children. when reflected from some external thing. in so far as the latter might hurt the former. brutes— nay. In other words. to consider his own reason. and ought to be educated * That is. and live together with them. Nature namely. it could not fail that traces of the reason assumed in the child. it is attached to it : and since the parents love their and desire its welfare. fyppdnm Viplnngg to onr welfare in the same way tha t . as over the preservation of the child.— Translaior. at the they watch over preservation. namely to its preservation.

But they must not restrict their children's freedom for the sake of morality. This duty of a moral education involves the following: Firstly. whatever does not promote sake of developing their would only occasion a loss of time and strength. to develop and cultivate the free faculties of the child. This is. the child. since all this freedom. . partly for the sake of their preservation for they cannot allow a use of freedom life be injurious to the and health abilities. also. since it cannot be our purpose here to exhaust the theory of education the true end of ahilitu — this — education. cate the child into a moral being. and prevent them from doing whatever might retard it. to 351 become a moral being . For actions are moral only in so far as they are done or left undone with it. Now. the duty to develop properly the faculties of the phild w ith a visw to enable it to become a good tool for the promotion of the ultimate end of reason. which can be done only in the general manner previously indicated namely.— CONCERNING THE PARTICULAR DUTIES. or. hence. is necessary that the child should at first live together with the parents and hence the parents alone can edu. It is scarcely possible that a question should arise concerning the right of parents to restrict the freedom I respect the formal freedom of every of their children. —and partly which would for the In the latter respect they must cause the children to do what will promote this development. by leading it to work for the promotion of itself. indeed we say merely in passing. What is the relation of parents and ? children to each other in this education It is often the duty of parents to restrict the freedom — of their children. it for the sake of the physical preservation of the child. and hence the duty to produce on the part of the child. at least. Next comes the duty to give to this thus cultivated freedom of the child a moral direction. morality outside of Now let us ask. in so far as it depends upon art and rales — namely.

Parents must not prohibit anything to their children ft. a mere object of the action of its parents. Hence. therefore.^1 pgnab'tv with me. man. for it is opposed to the end of such restriction. The acts of the children within this the parents. and not will-less machines for the use of the first-comer who chooses to take possession of them. . as they are. since the moral end of their education can be attained in no other manner. compulsory. which runs in opp osition . being. and have to settle the matter with their general. It has freedom only within the sphere where the compulsion ceases and this freedom is to be considered as the result of the action . should be m own conscience. to Only that will. however. since he is on 3. because I must regard him as a morally cultivated being. I rather regard it as a being which still has to be so cultivated. Concerning this. It is their freedom which is to be cultivated hence they must have freedom to make this culture possible. ^f- obstinacy. pi-|ypnap--Qf brPftki'ng -tbAJy Tgjjj^ as the saying goes. no morality. and precisely as to educate such a being it is given to me through the duty it. must I restrict the freedom of the child. Will broKen have. to accomplish the same end. .352 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. the children ought to th e end of education. of . for which I must respect the freedom of these who are my equals. and remains.nn^ WT . I cannot be his judge. the parents have the right of compulsion. sphere have. or for tb p. for they are to become free beings. and must look upon his freedom as a means to promote the end of reason. If no other means can be found to subject children to the end of education than compulsion. It is the du t x_g_f the parents to restrict the freedom of the children. the parents are the only judges. case it and in that becomes their duty to force the children. in so far as its u se might be injuno'ui~|o Every other restrictim their education but no further is immoral. But my child i do not . it is. regard as a morally cultivated being. If the child is forced.

then it is no longer obedience. Nevertheless. This voluntary obedience consists in this that the child does volnntn rilv. and or all this prohibited Obedience is based. morality of is 353 to be developed in the child. with predilection. the obedience has once taken root. treatment of children for it is based only upon respect and submission to. but insight. and so much convinced that their own inclination prompts them to do it. which impels them to do it. Even afterwards. and this something is voluntary obedience. a duty. undone what tbe parents prohibit. . does obedience become a duty which children owe to their parents. as to say that the love or svmnathv of the wife^ s a duty. the not clearly comprehended. Hence something must remain its in the child as the result own freedom . joined to participate in it This is thing proves that goodness it is this the source of obedience. When . surrender itself to the considerations and sentiments which heighten it and then. and in this respect only. but upon the higher wisdom and goodness generally It is as improper to say that this childish obedience is. same manner. dimly superiority of reason to a love for the same. It is the only duty of children. but felt. and develops itself in advance of all other moral feelings. in the what the p arent s command. generally. for. For if the children themselves are convinced of the goodness and propriety of what has been commanded. when morality has become 2 A possible within the sphere . without compulsion. and leaves. and if anyis inherent in human nature. and and a desire of morality. it may be strengthened and increased by freedom the child may. This obedience results from a moral disposition and will manifest itself always under a correct . likewise.— CONCERNING THE PARTICULAR DUTIES. obedience. upon a particular insight into what has been commanded. merely because its parents have commanded it. not the wisdom of childish faith in of the parents. or fear of compulsio n. since it is the root of all morality.

without speculating about the consequences. like various other evils. For as the cultured man is related to the moral law in general.ood account in t. Beyond that sphere the child should not insist on being free. moreover. prevailin g eiidaemonism. The question still remains to be answered : How far . p.3S4 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. This is excellent. I n the^sam e" its important. hence a moral disposition on most emphatically It is a very duty to teach their children obedience. way the child is related to the commands of its paren ts. turned to a. But we should not content ourselves simply with ever and ever talking about this goodness. but particularly in courageous execution of our duty. it still remains the highest duty. In the Christian religion God is represented under "tffi image of the Father.bp. without speculation and doubt. But in order to be able to do so. the absurdity of assuming that the child has a good deal more reason than we have ourselves. so the child is related to the commands of its parents and to It is an absolute duty to do those parents themselves. which. not in mere sentimentality and self-comforting. Besides other reasons of its wrongness it involves. Jalse maxim. Obedience on the part of the child gives direction to Hence it is allwhole moral mode of thinking. and the childish resignation to His will. set apart by the parents for the child's freedom. The cultivation of this obedience is the only means through it is which the parents can their call forth the part of their children . ^ will hp. and to its executor— God. no matter what results our shortsightedness would appear to discover in that duty. we must necessarily assume thafj Ijfag-fSe re^ nlf-. tha t we owe to a we should make our ch ildren do our behests through rational argument and according to their own insight. since even grown persons act mostly from inclinations and not from rational grounds. what the moral law commands. which we owe Him and which we ought to exhibit. We should also consider our moral obedience to Him. bands nf ftnrl.

hoiv far does Secondly. and the child parents. cannot be the judge.dip. since it obediently submits to them.'Tnwn in. CONCERNING THE PARTICULAR DUTIES.." is a A does not obey at allj. ^Every requirements on the part of the parents. only in " fair " things. for it involves should have a view in the matter as to what is~ that he " fair. for it is _otherwise not obediei^pe. and jibt from obedienc e. we may ask for the . the solution of the problem for the child ought to be obedient. as such. and its very obedience consists in that it should not wish to be free beyond the sphere fixed by the raised either — — Only the parents can be the judges concerning the necessary limit of this obedience. extend ? nhp. signify a twofold. " for it A blind may obedience in general not possible IS necessafilynEased upon our convictio n of the higher wisdom and goodness of the person we obfisJ. protension of this obedience or. an d also blind. the parents must settle with their own conscience. " complete self-contradiction. it may be by the parents or by the children. . " But how if the parents should command I reply: the child to do an improper action?" The immorality of the command can only . may and its 355 the conditioned obedience on the part of the children.si. how long does the child owe obedience time when the point ? to its parents? Is there not a point in child becomes free? And where is this So far as the first question is concerned. We may the extension of obedience so far as relates to the sphere within which the child owes obedience to or. If he cloes only what is fair. he does it Whether "frmr^ hi. parti cular. jle who obeys fair. ask for its This question of acts. ? the child owe obedience we may ask.e ia unnnnditinnerl.np. It is blind is for the . ' it is proper in particular cases to insist upon obedience or not. The chUd must not raise this question and this is. but they cannot allow themselves to be placed before the judg- ment-seat of their own children. child ought to obey in all things that are The phrase.ght. parents in other words. indeed.

. it thereby pronounces that son's education completed. that they will promote. the end You have no internal moral right to of education. If the second question is asked. away. immediately The first case cannot occur here. are impossible. the higher morality of the parents. that the end of education Externally the State is a competent utility is attained. obedience of the children. as is fairer. its faith in the second falls case occurs. at the first glance. freedom to the child or the result itself decides. therefore. : require further obedience. the parents themselves decide. 3S6 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. &c. is How long does the dutv of obedience last v^Firstly. or. the child itself cannot decide. the ground of the child's obedience. and education through their parents. then the answer is this Give no commands whereof you are not convinced before your own conscience. namely. and further obedience would be immoral. . obedience is ? the answer as follows required for the sake of education to but education is means is an end when the end attained. namely. for it end has been acknowEither is ledges better insight on the part of the parents. It is the same in regard to cases where the existing immorality and wickedness of behaviour on the part of parents becomes In such cases. that the end attained. according to your best conviction. "utility of the child's faculties for the promotion of the ultimate end of reason in some specific branch and for some special department. appear either after a careful investigation. judge in this inatteii— Hence. immediately manifest to the children. Whether this attained. the parents raise the above question. and the means cease s The end of education is: .: — . since the obedient child does not presuppose that If its parents will enjoin an immoral action. If. and this judgment of the State binds the parents both legally and morally— for the parents must submit themselves to the State for the sake full and voluntarily allow — . if the State confers an office upon a son.

for they have seen eyes. and can. the children the duty to venerate their this. the particular _£[uty to in their parents ttieir guides* The children thus preserve assist "and . therefore. the education of . upon whose wUl she depends. and to consider it more maturely.f-. no longer depend upon the will of the parents. They know the Hence they remain the child's best advisers and for this reason it remains the duty of the parent pre-eminently and before all other men —this is the important point —for otherwise . The parents retain the duty to care persons. The son undertakes to care for the fate of his wife wholly in accordance with her wishes. longer possible and this occurs . but merely the general relation (which makes it a duty to give good advice to all men) to give advice to their children and it is the duty of the children to listen more attentively this — to the advice of their parents than to that of other True. would be no particular relation. a peculiar moral relation continues between them and their parents. what the other says. CONCERNING THE PARTICULAR DUTIES. there remains parents an d children support each other. and hence he can no longer allow himself to be determined by the wishes of his parents. of veneration consists in rejecting. they were the educators of the children to cultivate — know it. arise their whole under their very and have helped child's character better than the child itsel f. duty. for their children . obedience is no longer a duty to them they are released from it. But even after children have been set free.wep. of 357 the child is no through marriage The daughter submits herself to her husbani. Or.) j^ip. finally. (Veneration consists precisely in in the other. parents. as we have been it presupposing.— . all his that we presuppose higher wisdom to find wisdom and goodness in and take pains Lack counsels. character. and can act now according to their own convictions but it is their duty to attentively consider and weigh such advice. without examination. The parents also if. . .n Finally.

but duty. which they have fulfil their in order to death.T In how many ways is it possible to act upon man as a rational being ? The first and highest. shall now speak. This is the vocato speak tion of the scholar firstly : and we shall therefore have Concerning the duties of the scholar. do not conduce to a realization of the end of reason.358 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. does not exist. insight is. . and remefins. is his vocation. Upon this the chief division of all possible human vocation is based. The true object of reason is always the community of rational bein gs. of unless the cognition is correct. and the primary substance of his whole spiritual life. Nevertheless. or upon Nature for their sake. and the best intentions. of the duties of man in his particular vocation. in man. Through it are his actions directed. . not inclination. the ultimate end of all acting is always mankind. and that part of this end. for human beings may . though they retain their moral First of all: value. merely for the sake of Nature. We means. is cognition or intellect. the sake of cultivating their theoretical insight. be acted upon. It has also been stated what maxim should govern us in selecting our vocation. even after their own work. my thus divide directly all mankind into a higheraHTJ lower/class. We might call the former the higher vocation and the latter the lower and we ht involves . An acting upon Nature. Hence the community firstly. It has already been explained what vocation generally The promotion of the ultimate end of reason many things. Without a good will it has no internal value. only means for an end. and . in conclusion. Our actions may either be directed upon them immediately. and advisers their and the parents preserve in their children cultivated for the world duties to the world. the promotion whereof a stagle individual assumes in particular. although not the noblest.

the so-called clergy- men. connected with the promotion of the ultimate end of It relates itself to the preservation and free reason. Thus there remains the particular task of working immediately for the improvement of the will in the community of men.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. must be produced. this object is called the State. We as which union for the intellect and therefore. so far as they are under the control of man. Concerning the duties of State so tar concernin g the higher class_of life is The world. The which achieves therefore. they men are to cultivate them&elves into and the conditions of this life. and his causality in the sensuous conditioned by certain connections of his with of If coarse matter. therefore. : Concerning the duties of the instructors of ' Between both the scholar. have officials. of man tlie as a point shall. : We shall. ^ 359 little good to the community of rational beings. add a few words Con: cerning duties of the cesthetical artist. whose duty it is to cultivate the intellect. same as the highest occupation. who should rather be instructors of the people. institution the condition of to speak all society. whose duty it is to cultivate the will. man. this most important proposition we have established most clearly above. This task is the problem of the Church. . whose duty serves is to cultivate the sesthetical sense. called. their legal relation must. through its servants. moral have to speak secondly the people. In this manner is the most unseeming occupation. mankind. and the popular instructor. in material Nature. activity of moral beings. morality. As soon This is men come together under a reciprocal all. But itself does not produce necessarily a good will. the We shall. and is thereby sanctified the must live. which is itself this very community of does rational beings. above be secured. and be. the will. there stands the sesthetical artist. influence. usually held to be the very lowest.

of professional men. however. as we are them morally. and whose to vocation. expanding and Like the individual. Nature may be left to herself. the whole race grows wiser in the course of years. artists. teaching men merely gather and hunt up her self-produced products. aU of which. there must be amongst men an exchange of they need. Concerning the duties of the Scholar. &c. But the raw products of Nature must also. But the duties of these various branches of the lower class are nearly the same. I should like to caU-flaZis^. manufacturers. there may system of cognition. only generally and hence we have to speak. In the production of that which serves to our nourishment. as a single the well be assumed that. and develops itself through experience. This furnishes the vocation : . since they sesthetical artist. I. and to tools of our activity. &c. exists also only one perfecting itself from age to age. or is a sublime one.36o THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. for this family. be remoulded for the purposes of men and thus they become products of art. ^ If we regard bound to regard gradually to family. it human race upon earth. hunter. and as what they are become in actuality. who direct organic life. all . fisher. to a cei'tain extent. in Concerning the duties of th e : lower class. which furnishes the vocation of the agriculturists. namely. men who This furnishes the vocation of merchants. Nature either may be directed and assisted. from the the various things which Moreover. distinguishing them. These several classes might be embraced with the agriculturists under the general name of The producing class. which furnishes the vocation of the miner. conclusion. . It will be very expedient to establish a particular vocation of exclusively carry on this exchange. covering. looked at from this standpoint. produce works of art.

and are this correction is impossible unless the known from which that cognition is From this there results. possessed of the principles. and it is only thus that his labour becomes a moral labour. or. higher . at the same time. since he. This is to be answered by what we have already stated. with reference to the mere results. if he pursues science truly from love of duty. that his mode moral in its form only. as it were. corrects. and partly to further. principles derived. of thinking can be called : He is the culture of his age. and with the insight that. who has been relieved of an error. he satisfies a duty to the human At present we only ask What ought he to do ? race. not merely for himself. and that he fulfils a duty. results of his investigation spread over the community in the well-known way.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. partly to know. which involves its is correction. raise this spirit of which is also an expansion of knowledge. the depositaries. first of all. the object of He must really try to further it. but for the whole community. being the servant of the community in his vocation. that a scholar should know the progress of science to his own day. the scholar is to further and it. . This necessary for them. . It is scarcely necessary to add expressly. firstly. but they are. how man arrived at this knowit is ledge. The scholars are. and how connected with his other knowledge. because they are to develop such cognition to a higher degree. is. either through correcting The scholar investigates. His immediate sphere of labour is the republic of scholars and from them do the . has had his knowledge increased or through further conclusions from what is already known. in doing so. 361 The knowledge of every age is to increase and mount and to effect this is the duty of the scholars. but. and should historically know the principles it has made use of. and invents. and this they are not like the others. Again. at the They not only know that something is as it same time. the archives of the culture of an age. his age.

forget himself service his What indeed. or. The Church. virtuous person. to do it. All men together constitute a single moral community. and the zeal. since each one necessarily holds own to be the best . to produce harmony respecting moral objects. In so far as society is regarded from this standpoint. He in should. however. but merely . This is the final end of all reciprocal activity amongst moral beings. of investigation Strict love of truth is the real virtue of the scholar. for otherwise it were immoral reason. not be able to do so. the fault must. we call it a Church. and energy. to retain it. he acquire a true value of his own. however it may glitter at first. is also a true To bring life into the spirit and important science. But this the moral law utterly condemns and prudence likewise should condemn it. opinion to But each other one also holds be the best. and has been a link in the chain of the transfer for only thus does . To do so 2. It is the moral disposition of each one to diffuse morality outside of himself. for only the true and good remains amongst mankind. Concerning the duties of the Moral Instructor of the People. and the false. — of culture. it. lips which have escaped his . as well as he is able. is not a separate society. in other words. as the collective object of the whole moral community. kept alive science in his age. and for the same his conflicting Thus there results. at least. be accomplished asserting and ? by propounding defining errors. therefore. at least. Only thus has his existence not been an idle one has he. Should he. a^^wten represented. not be his he must have had the fixed will. and knows how to do his it . like every object. and not merely play with can. He should actually increase the knowledge of the human race. or would be merely to support his egotism.362 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. glittering paradoxes. perishes. to make all others of the same disposition as himself.

with freedom. and of itself. It cannot be produced scholars. oiScials. but they are also to remain united during their progress and hence he must advance so that all can follow him. and hence those to whom this duty is transferred. in so far as they have the correct moral disposition. . They must proceed in their teaching towards shall that end. society. in so its necessity from another reason. . or servants. a scholar in this particular branch of All are to become agreed. may This general duty of all. They must start from what all are agreed upon. and propounds the results of his own reason but where he speaks as a servant of the Church. he advances . Now.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. he is to rise higher as soon as possible. or as a member of the republic of wherein he also speaks in his own name. further than the others surest results of The moral teacher must therefore see he must possess the best and the moral culture of his age. to be. and all ought to belong to it. and ought science. he represents not his own body. concerning which all be agreed. in his teachings. in the heart of man. Those who assume this far. do as a private person. beyond the culture of all. 363 a peculiar view taken of the same one great human All belong to the Church. and through the mere rational education of sociable communion. All are to influence all. but the community. but rather in his own name. which we have already discussed when we showed vocation are. namely. if this transfer relieves for the reform of others. he is certainly allowed to all. anyone from if an oppor- tunity offers this his particular but merely that he no longer needs to make end in life. He is therefore. this latter. and must — lead them to it. educate in the name of all. to influence each other morally. True. and is transferred to a particular vocation. Whenever. but not sooner than it is possible to carry along all with him. Morality develops itself alone. he no longer addresses them and speaks no longer in their name. the symbol. be transferred. of the Church. the duty to Not as work .

unless there is to of a God. The object moral teachings can. and no representative in regard to their duties to 'the Church. and that there necessarily results a progress in goodness. . be none other than to enliven and strengthen that already existing general inclination for morality. or prevent it externally from manifesting itself in acts. This faith of the Church is a fact and first principles. or whether this whole sentiment is not rather a phantasm nor is there anything which can enliven and strengthen this moral disposition beyond the first faith that the promotion of the end of reason is possible. to . as we have Inclination for morality is pre- supposed in those public institutes of moral education and the clergyman must necessarily presuppose it. except the doubt whether it is really possible to promote the ultimate end of morality. . since it alone makes his office possible. and system of morals or. the good does not progress regularly. Immoral men have no Church. and has given rise to it. It follows from this. about The Church does not establish these proofs. THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. seen above. to speculate . . it is the business altogether of the scholars (not of the to develop that faith of these public Church) A priori from principles.— 364 artificially. which has no relation at all to freedom. . Again. when more closely investigated. because finite beings can work only with forces of Nature. as sure as it is a Church. because it believes them already. But there is nothing of this kind. This faith. To say that progression occurs necessarily. and to remove whatsoever might make it internally wavering. clearly through theoretical conviction. therefore. that it cannot be at all the intention of those public religious institutions to to establish a propound theoretical proofs. and in regular order. The promotion however. for it is involved neither in the laws of Nature. indeed. shows itself be a faith in God and immortality. nor is it within the power of finite beings and from the same reason namely. is to say there is a God. and whether there is really a progress in goodness.

as they all would speak if they could be united into one person. and thus referring men to God and eternity. 365 we is to say progress in regular order towards our ultimate we are immortal . . for this follows immediately from a moral disand he presupposes the one. and that everyone who appears in it does It men — utterly opposed to the end he has in view. He does not deduce them d 'priori. — eternity. more particularly of the articles of faith. therefore. as well as the other. that they become accustomed to relate their lowest occupations to the most sublime thoughts which man can think to God and faith position. say that end. and a good moral disposition already existing. and cal- culated for immediate contemplation. How must we proceed to bring ourselves into this or that disposition which duty requires of us? Such and similar questions he ought to answer. indeed. In short is altogether practical.— THE THEORY OF DUTIES. —and these are his chief for rules he. who have an external Church. mined application — His instruction. to terrify obstinate sinners. or to address the Church as a herd of such is ought to be assumed that such people will not come to the meeting. In like manner to give the it is the duty of the moral instructor instruction concerning the deter- community the love of the conception of duty whereof he very justly presupposes in them. faith as well he presupposes the articles of known and as generally accepted. for our ultimate end can be reached in no time. Such is the presupposition from which the instructor starts and he speaks in the name of all of them. neither proves nor polemizes. To denounce wicked infidels in the meeting of the faithful. but he puts life into them precisely by presupposing them as well known. It is a great advantage of these men. . They all would like well enough to lead a rational and moral life but they only do not know well how they have to proceed to do it. . The moral instructor treats.

but which is the chief point always with modesty and with respect for the dignity and selfdetermination of every man. and it is when strictly To not much more than a faith in his faith. In such a manner should the moral instructor deal with the particular moral requirements of individuals. and in their name but by no means in God's name. and teach them to esteem themselves more than they may have done before. There is always a secret self-contempt and These are despair of oneself at the basis of unbelief. who do not to be rooted out. not as a lawgiver. whose representative he to the greatest extent taken — The faith of this community rests upon his. and with them falls what is built upon them. thereby already good Again. is. To give advice in particular cases of conscience is only required when he is specially He has no right to force himself upon appealed to. — them he is not this determined individual. for he is as much under G-od as they. the moral instructor has nothing to do with them in public meeting. make public confession of his faith and will. So far as decided unbelievers are concerned. This he sets not only for himself. His duty with them is of a as has already been said. and not from of the — name — . He should hunt up even those hunt him up. arguments. but he is to them in truth the representative of the whole community . pardcular and private nature. but for the whole community. and is before Him but a miserable sinner like the others he ought to speak precisely as they speak as an adviser. from experience. Let him lead them back into themselves. or men recognize and respect duty. He should always be ready to give advice on all these matters.366 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. others. — who do not — The essential and characteristic duty of the moral instructor is the duty of a good example. The manner how to deal with such characters has been stated above. since the teacher speaks in the community.

composed both : Perhaps the best way to manner in which the fine arts operate. . they do not believe in point of fact anything he may say. and after a fixed But the soul of the artist occixpies that standpoint it. They appeal neither to the unaer-" standing nor to the heart. . Since I have spoken of the relation of the scholar and of the moral instructor to the culture of mankind. it without determinedly thinking standpoint. express the rule. who ha s an influence upon that culture equally greatr though not so immediately perceptible and partly it is a need of our age that everyone should do what is in his power to do to effect a thorough discussion of this matter. it is partly on my way to speak also of the aesthetical artist. 3. That which he propounds he is to propound not as something which he has committed to memory or invented through speculation. . because everything in this perience. is to say: fa^/ make the transcendental yoint of view the commo n point of view. and as they can only have faith in it. that they do not become conscious of the transition. add theoretical reasoning. or of the whole Church. nor ought to.. field is only result of exstatements. Concerning the duties of the JSsthetical Artist. since he neither can. but as something discovered in his own internal experience and it is precisely in this that they have faith. but to the whole soul of man in the union of all its faculties to a third. 367 of men. to it who give themselves knows no other up in so imperceptible a manner. and elevates those to his influence. The faie arts do n ot cultivate the head like scholarship. others to this standpoint laboriously. The philosopher elevates himself and of heart and understandiag. Now if his life contradicts his they do not believe in his experience. nor the heart like moral instruction they cultivate tlTe whole united man. THE THEORY OF DUTIES.

and make him at home with hiTnF}p. They tear him loose from given Nature. only obey our. as manifestation of its own internal fulness of power. sees everything free of the grace and full of life I do not speaknCTe to our and cheerfulness whicHTthis view gives ' whole life. the second view. . But where is the world of the artist ? It is internally in mankind. it £Esthetically. from the second point of view everywhere free. The artist regard s ever ything from beautiful side j he. oppressed and frightened forms whereas he. and when we obey it we. and place him self-sufficient upon his own feet. the Ego slave.1f. but it can also be looked upon . after all. sees everywhere energetic fulness of It is the Nature. and suppresses all inclinations of Nature. beauty . And selfsufficiency of reason is our ultimate end. He who looks at it thus. itself it comes from out of the inmost depth of our own being. life and growth in short. and nowhere else. The moral law commands absoHe lutely. given world. Every form in space. The first view the second sesthetical. I here call attention only to the cultivating and ennobling effect which it has upon our ultimate end. iVa<M?'6 in short-^or I only speak of her has two sides she is both product of our limitation and she is product of our free. therefore. .— 368 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. who follows . . selves. the transcendental point view we make the world from the common pomt ot view the world is given to us from the aRsthetioal poin t of view the world is also given to us^ but only accordm g The world. . I of From . Whosoever follows the first view sees only caricatures. can be regarded as a limitation through the adjoining bodies. of "nmfaa V/^f^fy/ ^f^i-i\f^'f\\j no means of an actual causality). at the same time. is common for instance. same with the highest. From the first point of view Nature herself is everywhere limited. the actually to the view in which it is made. looks at its . . The fine arts. who holds this view is related to the moral law as its But the moral law is. make myself clearer. lead man back into himself.

d t. already ^sthetical culture has. but must come altogether of itself. and cannot be formed through conceptions. and not to help to niake it impossible by spreading a vitiated For everyone can have taste Taste can be taste. our liberation from sensuousness. a very efifective relation to the promotion of the this respect duties end of reason.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. and do it simply by the compulsion of some arbitrarilyrace. we do not leave men in that indilference wherein they await their future Two rules can culture. so that a preparation for virtue. not to check this culture. and not freedom in view. ° 3 B . precisely because they are rules. and repres ent The artist should inspire himself forget everything else. for the moral law requires self-sufficiency obtained through thought. produce genius. We cannot anyone's duty to take care of the aesthetical may culture of the aesthetical we have seen that the depend upon freedom. for human sense does not . for all men against the will of Nature and you always do so against Nature if you do it without a special natural impulse. and hence everyone can know what is a violation of taste. conceived notion. Do not make yourself an artist Firstly.s te of vour age from selfish Eather strive to motives.a.p. But we can enjoin on everyone. By spreading a vitiated taste for aesthetic beauty. and predisposes the soul when the morality enters. in the name of morality. selves^ and. J5sthetical 369 sense is not -virtue. or desire for present glory. be established in reference to this subject. the ideal w hich floats before your mind. cultivated through freedom. half of its is work. but we misdirect their culture. have limitation.""•ppt-. and in make it be prescribed to it. therefore. for the true artist: Take care not to fawn upon the '-. : . achieved. It is absolutely true that the artis t Eules keep genius in bounds. whereas the aesthetical sense comes to us of its own accord. therefore. but do not themis bor n. Secondly. namely. but it is for virtue.

and at the same time a better artist. a State constitution to be Regarded as the result of the common will manifested in of. x^f Jihe others. since all other citizens their own freedom. is Cccording to the above. he will soon look upon his art with quite other eyes. as thus the representatives of all. Concerning the duties of State Offidcds. for it is only within the sphere of this form that they can act with a good conscience. ^an expressly created. The State officials —I speak here chiefly of the higher who participate in the legislative department. If he does so. and alone is beautiful. permission. that it would interfere with the freedom order. he does not serve man.37° THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. yet developed the sense wherewith to seize it. that we common have agreed so far to restrict Unless the State had given this should have to fear. he will become a better man. of his vocation. 4. There is a phrase injurious both to art and morality Tliat whic hvleas^ us is ^^ffl^^ It IS very true that that which pleases the completelycultivated mankind is beautiful. each one common sphere may conscientiously do. administrators of this common will^ They all citizens. at every free act within sphere. . by the sanctity and should learn that by applying his talents. but duty. or in a tacitly-understood. and from whom there is no appeal — are nothing but the are elected by and have not the right to alter the constituIt is their duty to consider themselves tion one-sidedly. WhatsoeverTBeofat^ermits within of the I "the freedom of all citizens. compact. established institutio nsn^qiia'l to express consent as we have shown. Th e tacit submission to. because the age wherein it was made has not : - — . If they arbitrarily alter the constitution in . but until mankind is so cultivated^ and when will it ever be ? the most tasteless works mav p j g p fif b^p^nsp they are in fashion and the greatest work of art may not find favour. and acceptation .

How has the State official to conduct himself under such a case? For the greatest part we have already answered this question. in his conviction. or the ideal. or obey the duty which they owe to the freedom of all others. and this is Mence this tfite state officials. . and hence the State official must be i Plato says: No prince Qsm scholar in his profession. according to the above. t ime. may be opposed to this d priori law. they oppress the consciences of all citizens. therefore. which officials may be appointed to administer. if he so chooses. latter form. at the same taaa~madp.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. and the express. Firstly. it firstly. compacts whereupon rests. the way which mankind . Ifow there exists an a priori rule of law. if it is duty to For there must be some sort of law and constitution. provision. \^?^ tiiogQ^ejtg^. !N"ow.b le to reason. He know. thirdly. able to reason. or tacit. morefrom the rights conferred upon him by law. are called scholars. it is his vocation. the privilege to desist and each one has. since otherwise there would be no State. and ature. The positive law of the State. the State constitution. as it ought to be.^ and no progress for sake whereof the State exists. the present existing constitution all . the official may very it is well undertake the administration of this positive law and constitution. must know Those who rise from common experiences to conceptions. secondly. is presumptively conformable to the will of over. Second ly. who govern a State. nay. 371 such a manner as to induce opposition to this alteration.n nfnrma. in course of the only form ot "pp^^nr^ rnn rp anrl more to *^'''^°i government. not perfectly conform- although. may be harsh or unfair. reason demands. p. and cause them to doubt whether they ought to obey the State. precisely what we say. and. the constitution which he must. govern who is not possessed of the ideas. administer it. necessarily is chosen to administer.gnvftrMyffiT^l^ M shall.

or natural law. must proceed to in general. est. and without mildness or tenderness. propose to determine them more (State. can carry it out conscientiously. demands but that which only the written positive law requires. opposition manifests of itself. let them . Law is. attain the latter.) But it is absolutely illegal to compel him thus to desist. and to select for themselves other vocations. that. would . utterly illegally abrogate such an arrangement. no matter those how much the who derive advantage If cry about violation of contract. and a regent who should one-sidedly. then it is the absolute duty the lawgivers to repeal such law. . is _In a in the exclusive "possession oi the highest State offices. for those other citizens agree to leave those offices and lands to the nobility. the manner of administering : government may be concisely stated as follows Let the officials carry out absolutely. Thirdly. {Volenti non fit injuria.372 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. and without request. where the nobility I specifically. because it is: it is I and if no one were benefited by it. it is not unlawful for anyone to desist from -Iiis rights for the benefit of another one. In this manner things remain ^act in order. if an unjust law exists which could only be just if approved unanimously 'and if against this law it must be carried out. for instan ce. mltiS populi suprema lex absolute . that which absolute right. the nobility hold such title almost altogether by virtue of a tacit understanding w ith the other citizens.) Agam. officials from injustice may no objection is raised. . a nd of all landed property. (Fiat mstitia et mreat muTidus. (Since these principles are liable to misinterpretation. Hence. is It is a very government instituted for the benefit of the {yoverned oy in other wnrds. this clearer. and particularly his people. I shall endeavour to false proposition that make : . carry out only in so far as it may be considered the continuing result of the will on the part of the interested parties.

and not afterwards. he. whether the nobility would be willing to If the favoured class of nobles were consent or not. and despotically. are absolutely illegal. how can he now if Previously he took advantage of the appeal to a law opposed a single citizen applies to the Grovern::_ them ? ment for to his But his natural rights. mufet not be denied to him. arises. then . own that compact with the He demands by making his application. for^t his is'^e only means to make good to them the injustice [about which they comp lain '"'and ievery State which does not grant this permission to change class. and re- it becomes the absolute duty of the Government to alter the constitution upon this point. in point of fact. by this very application . the right to carry on trade. certain classes of people from attending school. and the prohibiting . since he ought to have appealed to this law ia advance of his act.: THE THEORY OF DUTIES. positive laws. But when the whole class of citizens a decided majority thereof. promise having through his conduct. since they nobility. on his part. and the of such nobility has submitted to him only on condition a single citizen. or. to be admitted into the class of the nobility. namely. It must be permitted to the singl e individuals. he becomes liable to punishpreviously. and must be satisfied to lose ail tlie advantages which previously it conferred upon him. to change their class. 373 He is sworn If to carry it out. makes an attack upon these presumptive rights of nobility. for instance. and law. _abrogates his compact with the nobihtv nay. claims its natural rights. at least. who prefer complaint about the injustic e of such an arra ngement. class of citizens. is absolutel y illegal. and by no means according to the natural law. is justly punished according to the positive which he has hitherto tacitly recognized. At the same time. even with have entered into thus withdraws altog ether from the State compact. as. ment. &c. iSertdom [glebce adscriptio). approved of such a State government. that which he.

this responsibility. As . all Culture is the foundation of duty to promote reform. cannot actually acquit himself of this responsibility. and could always give an account of his acts. and it is. they should cease . but would. official is bound to the letter of There nothing so injurious to a State as when the sub-official assumes to be the interpreter of the law. these privileges cekse iNature ana reason demand that. hp pjjta. culture a nd expands. duty to govern as if he were held responsible. gradually give up their Fourthly. Fifthly. there whom he can deliver this responsibility. culture. This always results in injustice. or cause it to advantage from the ignorance of the masses. that a complete equality as to lirth establishing a — Both and tor only in this respect can equality exist.b- lished amongst all men.374 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. person. the regent of such a State. who governs according to ideas. or conferred strictly The subordinate the law.) own accord. through his interpre- . All that power is of we have here said is valid only for the highest government. as they do. the vocation chosen in after life _ distinction a. their ignorance their' rights.g-ain^shmilrl It is. of privileges. one ofthe chief requirements of the rational form of government is that government sh ould be reits and immoral to place obstacles be checked by the classes who (ieriv e sponsible to the people . and their awkwardness how incre ases to exercise those rights. whether it be in the hands of one upon many. therefore. most of the actual States and it is precisely in this that deviatefrom the ideal ol reason^ It is true that lacking. their wise they would not await this general reclamation. absolutely illegal in way. whenever being no one to but it is his required. for the losing party is thus con- demned by an ex post facto law —by a law which the judge creates only after the fact. the continuation of such compacts has basis in the ignorance its and awkwardness of of the oppressed classes. therefore.

"the disposition whlcT isloTBeawakened in the m.t'. indeed. legislative power. I describe only those who ha ve to elevate them. It is th e This the lower classes oftlie Will ot God which I do. and whether he is able to say to himself. . — upon whether he relates end of reas"on. In fine every form of government is legal. as we have already work directly upon irrational ISTature for the sake of the rational beings. 375 It is true that laws should not be written so as to be capable of various interpretations. How live ? can the scholar investigate. the sub-official should. For if they are not the highest of empirical mankind. hig-'oc cu'lBfLlon to tlie-uISinate is^TItp. Qnlx that i^orm^_M_g2Sg£Biaga. If objections are raised to the positive law from reasons derived from natural law.Sq^^iVil^^^ i_-^^^ 5. KTR^^ap^^^eiBT^ with it Tt}eiiigmty _"f °YP^y """^ — his morapy^aepends samp. peDplrcan say to themselves with the greatest justice. its support. and may be administered with good conscience. but with Hence. to The lower classes have the vocation. in order to prepare it for the ends According to my presupposition. the indefiniteness of laws is. the it is true.^i§-t2Mly whicbjpmpflafia. a great evil for the State. not to deal here with those classes immediately. the instructor teach. or which to the end which Grod has injQfi m ainly — iflan . they are. not execute the former but neither should he himself do anything at all in such a case. seen. them can first of all The dignity of these vocations increases when we con- . individuals illegal is It . tation of the law. the State official govern. I have of the latter.rH& Theory of Duties. He ought to refer the whole matter to the highest authority. at unless all of least. Concerning the duties of the Lower Classes. which doesliot make impossible progress__as well for tne whole as for the .

as related "^ cae Ultimate end of reason. to attempt to satisfy this requirement. Neither of the two invention s. much greater merit than. the inventor of a purely theoretical proposition in geometry. at least. Only thus can he pay position in the ranks of rational beings. about equal value.) But _^ie lower classes cannot well fulfil their duty to therefore. but by the sentiments. and hence it is their duty to respect the memhersylhe higher I do not speak here of the submission which they owe to the admiuistrators of the law. For if mankind is to improve considerably. Nature must become mild. Both inventions are. and that it need no longer be the most imsider that will depend. nor of the faith and obedience which they owe to their moral instructors as .i^n<q fKnyp^^y^ t uroaress oi ig hghUma tjig duty his of each individual in these classes. upon them always has depended. much opposition has been manifested against this proposition._their value is altogethe r relative. whilst otherwise he is merely a link in the chain of the history of his of the trade.'376 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. as little time and force must be wasted in mechanical labour as possible. and so far as the inventors are concerned. For this re ason is it the absolute duty of the lower Lh(j Jf. classes to perfect tneir profession. (Some authors have asserted that the iuventor plough "has Recently. not by the success. matter pliable. bmiauijti n rapa 1° nrvTirliMr. or to what they belong mechanical labour and science have — — absolute value . as appears to me. their value is determined. the progress portant business of man to fight Nature. the opponents have shown themselves rather scholars than men. and everything so that it needs little exertion for men to obtain what they need. and always and improvement of mankind. of — raise their professions — unless classes. Both parties are equally in the right and in the wrong. for instance. but unjustly. which actuated them. they are directed by the higher classes. In doing so.

and see further. the higher classes should lower themThere is no vanity so improper for its purpose selves. of honour. but in the of. than they do. The rule of conduct in all conversation with rule of all them is the same which is the first popular addresses— not to start from . as their offices. to cherish for the scholar and artist men of higher cuLtuxe. this although the sentiment. of education. they cannot command.. of family hfe. mere attention counsels as and preliminary acceptance probably rational. dumb obedience. and at least worthy of further examination. not in a this or that profession. since. blind faith or to. and even outside of This respect consists. all propositions reform which the higher classes suggest. not be it. &c. They do not know how to value it. To influence them. evince for the lower. insight. Nevertheless. classes almost exclusively . not in external shows nor in a dumb and slavish veneration. In short. on their part. such 377 — for these are generaL duties . it as the desire to appear learned before the unlearned. their occupation. which we have above described as proper in their grown-up children towards their parents. This veneration depends upon free conviction and reflection. Let them show respect for not being their lawgivers. but of a respect which they ought generally. but in the presupposition that these men understand more. made which the a direct duty. higher classes respect the freedom of the others. it is to be well considered that this reverence is denied to the higher from their own fault and that depends largely upon the reverence which the higher Let the classes. reject. and can. only in a less degree. if thinking classes over prompts is certainly a duty. but only advise them. and that the advice and suggestions of these are probably based men upon respecting the improvement of It consists. they will never make great adTances. after all. and not seem unaware of its dignity. It is very evident that first the lower for at notice. therefore.THE THEORY OF DUTIES. it is the same sentiment.

follow but to lead back everything to their relation own ex- perience. which the ultimate end of a Science of Morals. . If the lower of the will classes make proper if progress in their culture. nor in one and the same person. and the so-called clergymen be in conflict. with anything more to the purpose than this indication of the chief is point upon which the improvement of our race. classes. is based. then the statesmen will no longer look driven. 378 THE SCIENCE OF . as they must do they listen to the advice of the higher. for these they do not understand. ETHICS. indeed. The true is. for the common man will always become more able to keep the statesman. the latter the executing part. It is the same in the community of men. the true basis between the higher and lower classes upon which the improvement of the human . neither in various. I could not conclude this book weU. down upon the scholar as upon an idle dreamer. as scholars pace with the culture of the ages. race rests. The higher classes are the spirit its of the one great. the relation between these various separate classes will soon become correct of itself. the others are the former are the thinking and projecting.. If that relation between the higher and lower classes is only as it should be. members whole mankind. and cannot principles. That body is a healthy body wherein the determination immediately results in its intended movement and it remains healthy in so far as the understanding always takes the same care for the preservation of all members. to realize the ideas of the scholar. for he himself will be by the progress of the age. and to find them confirmed in experience nor will the scholar any longer look with contempt upon Nor wiU thoughtlessly empirical.

object solely PBBLIMINARY CONCEPTION OP ASCETISM.— APPENDIX TO THE SCIENCE OF MOEALS ASCETISM. that i?. considers its EvEEY pure Science to its in regard a priori conception. in their relation tq^eaelf In proponndibg ntihiPTi. OR PRACTICAL I. —does not . It posits a man in general . without giving attention to the accidental distinctions. f^ip^s proceeds. involved in the conception of the object. or existing institutions amongst men.! fill"1llfl ]? " ^^^^ t° exercise freedom this question that Science takes no account of previous agreements. That Scienc e assumes men to be generally mere natural beings. propositions and thus pure Science appears 379 . MORAL CULTURE. and asks how it is possible that they. and this is the reason why life. a rational being with a natural impulse acting habits. theory and practice application it in fit or between theory and its immediate Pure Science when we try to apply life . which latter uses and abuses may have been caused by certain inclinations or The Science of Morality must proceed in the same manner. Morality in the Science of Morality. and to it this man it relates the Moral Law without assigning to him any particular disposition towards this morality. which is most my conception —the Science of . into life does not fit into its theoretical to be impractical. In the same manner apt to explain — to use illustration. posits man an as coming purely from the hands of Nature. whether be a favourable or averse disposition. upon it. which are based either upon the original differences of the separate individuals. and our science has done so. or upon the use and abuse of freedom on the part of those individuals. there arises that oft-noticed gap between .

and must therefore have a determined object. the pracmust always rely on his sound judgment after all to promote culture. and which. and. You want everything to he as it is. and only pure unreason. Keep your in and -do not bother philosophers with your questions. which solves this problem. that a pure life into it be introduced into life. and the science. why let things go to those fit the world: their way. Now this is not iu any manner derogatory to Science. stands midway between pure science and mere experience or history. and what can practice is. knows nothing Science. which knows not what theory is. what Science did not take into must not take into calculation as The theoretical teacher replies very who complain that his results do not "I never spoke of you and your world. and if this is what you want. whom show- ing him only the bridge which leads from the world of theory But the gap always remaining. to Hence show how the requirements of reason can be realized in a determined empirical given connection of presuppositions . It is this science which fills the gap between theory and practice. and to go its way as it best may. which artistically is precisely the problem of the theoretical and mediating science. There condition. fur you and your world are not worth much any way. in so far as it can be filled scientifically. The science which mediates between the pure Science of Bights and existing State institutions.— 38o THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. science as a means to sharpen your wits. and which is sure as correctly it Science. indeed. since of Nature is perhaps nowhere to be found now ' some determined empirical condition of becomes a problem for the philosopher life. make this a reproach to It is very true that Science does not into it calculation. which its form can exhaust can pay no attention to the accidental and the undeterminable.rnB philnsnp TiPr." it is Nevertheles s science should the desire of the t. I am careful in stipulating this latter For that mediating science in so far as it must retain the character of a science. titioner . fit at all. is called the Science of to that of practice. practical man. Since your eyes it cannot after all serve any other use. moreover. — — is always a large field remaining open for the judgment of the this mediating science only guides.

But here appears a great diflFerence. Politics or of Statesmanship 381 . Quite different Morality. In the same way would seem to be the problem 0^ Ascetism to show how it is possible to lead a given individual character towards a moral disposition. and the science which mediates between 'the Science of Mor sli'ty gnH tiia oTmpjriVal fliary.. ^i|^^^ I l [f om it a ^iven determined Stat e is rational organization to that form of government which alone _and law ful. For acts it does not matter from what motive a establish citizen according to law. but with this will as it may be impelled by natural motives j in other words. and cannot be produced in by external means as we certainly can produce through . —whereby at all. not with the really free will of man.^. is it also possible with the object of its the Science of Morality has freedom as such for its object. absolutely Primary. for there I say.n is to show how itj^ ^ effect ^b e tra p . &c. as it were. to control the will of men. . and that which attributed to the Science of Ascetism establishing this distinction.j:pr of the indiv idual — in so far as this is possible— is called the is Science of Ascetism. of itself it from the soul of man. If we presuppose merely is that rational self-love. or providing injurious results for amongst them the art of means in its hands such as direct — — illegal acts.The problem of the Science of Politics possible t. may be clearly and it is by that we shall best explaia our conception of the latter science. which man can not capable even of living amongst and certainly not be tolerated statesmanship has sufficient compulsion. APPENDIX TO THE SCIENCE OF MORALS. and not at all morality. provided he does act according to seeks to only legality The art of politics it. in so far as this possible is'^T^ST distinction between . the problem. For the art of statesmanship has to do. The good other is to be done absolutely for own sake. It must proceed as an effect is connected with a cause. and from no Now this resolve is something cause whatever.. it means to be used in effecting it. ^. a link in the chain of natural mechanism. and cannot be connected with anything. without other. which the Science of Politics has to solve. is to calculate the There being thus possible a legal compulsion. in so far as this will \'.

of the existing government.. utterly opposed to our natural In that sense. and from the latter to a still more just form. that the former is a manifold and a progression from a not quite just. To make more clear the former. whereas the morally just is absolutely one. in the legal sense.e. punishment the resolve to do what the law requires Neither can not to do what the law forbids. within which there is no distinction of a more and less just. that some sort of government must be established. Hence the very first requirement is. we can state of things call only a wherein there in is soever . Biit this progression towards the better must never be carried on in such a manner. Nay. . Hence the worst form of government is and it becomes the duty of men then But it is science there the better. even though. man does not even it. from no commission of crime. it it man himself produce because within himself according to a fixed is rale. a Science of Ascetism would Eeem to be impossible. therefore. after what has been established in our Science of Morality. In that no permission to do the worse where we know Either we must be altogether moral. may be the very reverse better than none at all to approximate it as much as possible to the only rational form of government. so far as conscience. to a more just form of government. and. as to risk the overthrow In other words. although it stale of things wherein men are deprived of all their rights from no fault of their own. that disposition is attained only through a leap into an absolutely other sphere. 1 will add has no connection here — order —a no form of government wha tto be very strict. it is legally just. or we are not is not thus in the Science of Morality. i. Under such government the law exists at least in form. but rather altogether unjust. precisely absolutely primary. know it this moral resolve until he possesses does not even exist for him. THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. The latter assertion needs no proof. I append the following remark disposition. . Moreover. and until then Hence there is no straight line at all proceeding from previous conditions to a moral disposition. that the present unjust form of government should remain. there is between the legally Right and the morally Eight this great difference. : Absolutely unlawful. such law of just law. 382 threats of or..

as Whosoever subjects himself Nevertheless it such. simUarly as the Science of Politics is related to the Science of Eights? The question position t : How shall we elevate others to a moral disif has no meaning at all.APPENDIX TO THE SCIENCE OF MORALS. standing under conditions of time like other sensuous resolve this time. The other Ascetism : question. he would not have the Whosoever it were would he do his duty. which characterizes only the ideal of against it — evil. namely. He who propounds that question to himself. How can I elevate myself to a moral disposition ? has also no meaning. necessarily subjects himself to duty for ever. in that one fulfilment necessarily resolves to remain true to duty for all his future existence. For this reason the motive of duty is not an empirical ground. if we still consider better it as related to Morality. but once. to the Science of fulfils his duty in life for the mere sake of duty. as we have . that moral disposition is looked upon as a product of our acting. or the devil. to rebel against duty and act this resolve. If he resolve never to do his duty only this time. But the following consideration remains. to a pedagogical science. £ut what then remains for such a science. His act could might be legal. for instance. whatsoever is to But all this belongs and not to a Science of Ascetism. when we cause their feeliug of rever- ence and esteem to turn upon themselves. moral at : 383 all. and from the very same reason. There is here no progression from the good to the and hence even in this respect a Science of Ascetism would seem to be impossible. duty. though : it motives. but is valid absolutely to without relation to time. and furnishes an important and honourable place leading Ascetism. we can we can inflaence them This to determine themselves to rise to that moral standpoint. may happen : not. that in future he should resolve the opposite. and be said on this point we have already stated at which might constitute the problem of length in our Science of -Morality. is absolutely impossible to reason. give others assistanc e in attaining it. we do. has already raised himself to that disposition. nor not be moral. that Nevertheless is.

turns into willing it is . There can in reality be only two reasons resolve to do our duty why with the firm it . that he may forget this resolve in his future acts to a greater or less degree.p mnalce in us at all tim es . dead. and hence the empirical motive. we may either in an immoral act not think of our duty at all. since the only determining impulse. becomes the power. little is . it is very we do not think of our duty we only take hold of our duty with our imagination for only half-way as in a dream It is a cold. to be remedied. how the first . cendental point of view. but it never and hence the natural impulse always It is decides. : the tTw ught of Duty. II. therefore A systematic establishment of the means which may tend tn Ti-AP. may forget that resolve altogether. or does not prevent the immoral act. Now. and that his old merely empirical character. wbich is impelled only by sensuous motives. an impotent thinking . which determines the act.. fulfil his Whatsoever man is serious in the resolve to uninterruptedly duty. and knows this danger from a knowledge of the empirical human character or from his own previous experience. to be said. namely. can also not be eflfective . we always float in opposite directions. may E^ain usurp the place of his moral character. but only in such a casual and unenergetic way. . MORE DEFINITE DESCRIPTION OP THE CONCEPTION OP ASCETISM. which we have proposed to establish. — but. that the resolve does not become a deed. it can have no result . true that From . we nevertheless may neglect namely. or we may have that resolve in mind. A conception. That science will be. that standpoint. and we can But the second case must be explained definitely reorganize it only by seizing it from the trans- Concerning the first case. 384 seen THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. powerless sentiment. must necessarily propound to himself the problem to remedy this evil and the solution of this problem is the task of the Science of Ascetism. which does not arise. how can is this state of things be remedied 1 The reply case to this question will also solve the question. the natural impulse.


First of all


his imagination

man can know, whether or not, it was which took hold of the conception of duty. For whenever he decides himself and acts carelessly, without determined and full conviction, and without the previously described feeling of conviction, he may be certain that it was his imagination which took hold of the conception of duty.


it is

altogether a matter of freedom to elevate this

conception at


times to full clearness, and to refrain from

acting until that conviction has arisen, which manifests itself

through the above described feeling. Hence we not only ought to, but can in each particular case, elevate the conception of duty to decided and energetic consciousness ; and it may,
therefore, be said, that it is our duty to It appears, therefore, that the final

do it. ground of such immorality is the same in both cases. In both cases we forget to do our duty; we forget, either the thought of our duty, or to raise the indistinct thought of a determined duty, as it floats in imagination, to full and clear consciousness.
It would, therefore, be the

more determined problem



Science of Ascetism to find means hy which



remember our duty.

Now, it is to be remembered, that in either case it is not a matter of natural mechanism, but of freedom, whether we thus definitely remember and cause ourselves to be determined by
our conception of duty.

we think

the intelligible


under time conditions, as should not be done, but as here we may well do, then each moral resolve must be something altogether new and primary ; not the link of a chain, but the
beginning of a
sufficient to

new one. Hen(6e no external means will be make sure that such a resolve is determined upon
sufficiently explained

for this resolve is something absolute, absolutely entering the

world of time from the world of reason, as
in the previous section.

claim to

Hence the Science of Ascetism cannot furnish such a theory, and in so far that science is still
will is always presupposed


But the good


has arisen once

and if it could vanish there would be no natural means whereby to restore it. All that is requisite is, therefore, that we should be reminded
forever together with the

moral resolve




It is not the resolution to do our duty do nothing before we have clearly investigated whether it is our duty or not, which is to be produced by the science we seek, but merely the remembrance of that resolution. When we have been so reminded, it still depends upon our freedom to make use of this remembrance or not.
of this moral resolve.


Hence the


whether a Science of



Are these means meehanieaUy operative (we speak here of a mechanism of reason, or of



compulsory consequence) which can eff&i the return of a
determined conception according to an vdermd rule
I reply, there

certidnly such a law, equal to that of a

mechanism, and this law
I shall explain myself.

the law of the associalion of

There are laws of sTnthesis of the

necessary connection

of tepiesentations.

The laws



and occupy a middle ground between necessiiy and freedom. They belong to the power of memory. "We need not necessarily remember
of ideas are different


that which we have perceived at the same time, but we may so lemember it, if we choose. Memory depends upon freedom, and hence upon practice. That which makes possible this

memory we
Hence the


the law of the association of ideas.

chief principle of a Science of Ascetism would

be as foUows

Connect in advance


your representation of

your, future acts the representation of moral acting

means of this rule there would arise between the an acting and the thought of duty, precisely that connection which consists in the manifold of our representations when we have cultivated our memory.
conception of

But the purpose is not that man should be enabled remember the conception of duty when reflecting upon some previous action, as suffices in the memory of reprearbitrarily to

On the contrary, if he merely wished to recall sentations. that conception to memory, he would already have remembered



means of


would be




rather, that together

with the conception of the

act to be done, there should arise in


the conception of

duty in generaJ, and


him with

living power.




short, the matter is to be thus


the conception


I will

and the conception


I will always act morally

are to


inseparably united,




always united.
that person


this is attained in

any one person, then

governed by the moral law, and he

perfect in


the object which the Science of Ascetism

proposes to achieve in man.

But the operation of the
mechanical- nature;

association of ideas


not of a

we may, but we do not



at the

same time, a

certain connection of thoughts.

This association depends upon no determined law, but upon freedom and practice, and hence upon something which may
exist to a greater or less degree,

and which

for that very reason

can be increased.




possible only to approximate

that described condition, wherein both of the above conceptions
are synthetically united.



will remain the

duty of


to evermore increase the efficiency of that conception.




problem of




therefore, to associate in advance

and forever

conception of duty with the conception of our actions.

But the rule of association is, that one conception can only be connected with another determined one, and not with an undetermined conception. Determinations reproduce themselves Hence it would be of no value whatever if only mutually.
means whereby to and This generally we never think, and by this in abstract. generally we never remember anything
a person were to resolve to
discover a

remember the conception of duty in

his acting generally

It would, therefore, be necessary to connect the conception

of duty with determined acts.

with such



Of course, we would connect it which we know that in them we are
the conception

particularly exposed to forget



very important occasions we are least liable to fail, since they of themselves call upon us to consider maturely and involve an exercise of power and results, such as are not usual every day.

Bat on


important occasions there

is this










examination of our own character, to discover where we are most exposed to danger; and a firm and strong resolution to


It will also be

thiuk of ourselves on precisely such occasions.
examination, &c. &c.

well to adopt fixed principles for certain cases, rules of

A "man

of principles" will then be

called a man who has developed within himself this judgment and who allows it alone to control the acts of his freedom. But the association of ideas does not operate mechanically, and hence it always remains possible that we may forget the

very best resolve,




of action approaches.


this state of things continues, the

man, who was already good,
necessity arises to

again becomes wholly corrupt.

Hence the

examine ourselves repeatedly, and see whether we have conformed to our good resolutions j and if not, what was the reason, and what measures will be best suited to prevent a
recurrence of such a danger.

Such a self-examination


necessary, indeed, at all times, for

we always

get into


conditions, and, moreover, advance in

cognition and in perfection of moral acting, whereby



compelled to make higher demands upon ourselves.

The moral man


be much aggrieved to find that he gets

better, in spite of his firm resolutions.

Let him surrender

himself to such regrets and reproaches, for nothing


stirs up Such continued self-examinations bring man always nearer to the end assigned to him. He does not become holy, for he is not infinite, and his natural impulse will always continue to move him ; but he will become good. But this determination, which provides a very worthy reality for Ascetism, as an art to be practised by every


well as pain.


seems again to annul the conception of


as a

be a priori ascertained to what extent anyone is in moral danger, and through what means he can This each one must decide for himself. protect himself!
Ascetism would, therefore, consist only of those three

For how can



must be

left to

each individual to apply them to himself

through his


morally inspired judgment.

dangers, which and certain general These we can at least reasons why we forget our duty. establish, and assign the principle through which we can



threaten the resolve


do our


protect ourselves.





This I propose to do. I shall mention not the ordinarydangers to moral acting, which may threaten very coarse and uncultured persons, but only those dangers which threaten the

more cultured



course, Ascetism thus loses the rank

of a systematic Science, siace

we cannot


from a common

and becomes






Otherwise, indeed,

cannot be treated.


it is



our task




up more
put us ia
out no I deduce

definitely the origin of those rnclinatinTia.


[^danger of


our duty,




remedy loTaneviruntirweTnow

its precise origin.

inclinations, affections, passions, &c., in the following


Nature produces in man a determined tendency, such as in the plants and in the animals has causality. Bat in man, as sure as man is free i.e., as sure as he has that freedom which in our system we have hitherto called formal freedom, and the neglect to distinguish which has produced so much evil in




only a






(or free), (for instance, as



an unconscious chUd, &c.) this natural tendency has causality,

precisely as in animals





has this causality until
elevates himself to"

the _natural impulse has been hrohen through the individnaJJ
^or through freedom.

But the moment man

consciousness, he tears himself loose from the chain of natural

mechanism and organism that which he does thereafter he must do altogether himself. Man as such, i.e.. as free, as consciousness has no natural incEnations, affections, or passions at all. He depends altogether upon his freedom. An important

It is


in reason

to my readers what a synthetical connection That which the synthesis involves, is not in

developed into consciousness; only through analysis.

we can







possible, that

may produce

man, through the application, or non-application of freedom, a connection amongst the manifold objects of

freedom in himself very like that synthetical connection in




synthesis really does





the representation

x involves



a whole manifold of
each of

other representations, a,

as a successive series,

which is, in this connection, in itself dependent upon freedom, and did actually depend upon freedom in this particular individual at first, hut has now through repeated realization of the same synthesis become connected with a; in a manner equal
to the synthetical connection in reason.

sider every stroke of

For instance: when yon write, you certainly do not conyoui pen and eTsiy letter separately and

definitely, determining yourself to produce it thus. Ton merely think the word and at the same time you write it. But when you first began to write you had maturely to consider every pen-stroke and every letter, and to determine

yourself to produce



This connection not

we have



association of ideas,


shall hereafter so call it


such a connection


syniliefiiaJ, for it is arasidental, changeable,
is it

but neither


and individual a product of conscious freedom it is associacan iUnstraie it likewise by the theory of dim


Sucb conceptions

are dim,


they are

unconsdous premises of our judgments; and they are conceptions because they are universal, and can be elevated to
eonstdous universality through freedom of thinking.

The angry man soon
certainly depends

Let us take an example from our own Science of Morality. flies int« a passion, and immediately

begins to scold, kick, &c.


this scolding, kicking, &c.,

upon freedom.
depends in


course; for us others,

nay even

for himself it

upon his own freedom,

or, at l^ist,

did at one time so depend; but at present he cannot

well act diffiarently.
difiierentiy, if


would, however, be easily able to act

he could


upon himself and

his freedom.



very mediating act of considerateness
ideas deprives

what he


him of

that freedom.

But through however long a series this association may extend, and however deeply-rooted the habit may have become, it nevertheless always starts
his free control.

from a first point, which man has under Hence, even if we admit to the angry man,


now when

his anger deprives



all consideration,


•well act


otherwise than he does,


you ought

we still should say have been on your guard against the


outbreak of your anger. In short, through the passions, which have arisen in an



and rooted


according to the law of



utterly loses


and considerateness whenever

any oecasion

they arise in him; and in such a condition the thought of his duty cannot take hold of him. But the very first emotion,

which involves
take hold of

irresistibly all these passions, is certainly


the control of his freedom.

Hence the thought of duty can
It will, therefore,
to look


previous to this emotion.

be the problem of Ascetism,
balance-weight, a


these acts of

their various possible emotions^ in order to connect

freedom i n with them a


to stir

up the

free wiU,

and thus


arouse a remembrance of duty.



the various possible emotions generally.

But this justifies no ground of division, and no particular and separate rules; and for that very reason only a very
slim content remains for Ascetism.
Principally in order to


and to attach some not uninteresting considerations, I have brought this matter into discussion, and have expressed

myself in the way I did.

Nature produces a tendency in man; was our statement.
the word Nature has quite another significance


when we speak

human -beings, than when wo speak
The nature
of man,

of unconscious products

of Nature.

his essence or his positive

character (talent, indoles)
these unconscious products

twofold, whereas the

nature of


only onefold.




one nature, which


Nature as such, and one nature which


a tendency of reason (not yet elevated into con;



latter tendency, in so far as it operates as

a mere blind impulse,

of no more value than the





merely Nature.

To speak
to preserve

Nature, as such, tends in

all its


the individual through

sexual propagation; and

same manner Nature operates in man, and operates thus man is still in the hands of Nature. But as develops which here is formal freedom soon as man's
in the

alone so Jong as




— which


does (since considerateness and hence natural

freedom do not rule here as yet)
also precisely as

through an impulse or

instinct of reason,, the impulse of this formal

freedom operates an impulse of Nature ; that is to say lawless and under no rule; and thus it becomes an impulse towards absolute independence, and hence towards supremacy over the whole external world. (A mode of thinking which I have described at length in my Science of Morality.)




surrenders himself to these two impulses com-

pletely, there arise

passions, such as lubricity, gluttony,
passions, such as injustice, love of

from them two kinds of passions: (i) Bruta l &c. ; and (2) Unsocial
oppression, anger, hatred,

Both of these impulses the natural impulse and the impulse of formal freedom however unite; and may thus unite in two ways. The natural impulse may unite with habitual love of oppression, and then there arises (3) Oppression from selfishness. Or the impulse of wild independence may unite with the natural impulse, and then there arise (4) Voluptuousness and other manifestations of brutiahness which here are all the results of pur e vanihj




All truly vicious inclinations belong to one of these four

not so

common but

with the exception of a certain corruption, which is all the more dangerous, and which as the

one completes the synthetical period.

one I

shall treat in a separate section.

The treatment of these passions in Ascetism is altogether the Each is based upon association and habit; each deprives the person given up to it of his freedom and considerateness,

which condition he is incapable of remembering his duty. Each also starts from a first act of freedom, of surrendering to that passion, in which act free considerateness is therefore still possible. Hence in each case it is our problem to connect with this state of considerateness the remembrance of duty- in equally sure association. Hence we only need to answer the

question in a general manner.

seems easily enough answered.


good will



supposed, for without

we cannot even speak


only forgetfulness, or the being dragged into a con-


where consideratpness

no. longer





to be feared.



chief rule

give yourself up to such a condition

would therefore be this never ; watch over yourself, and

habituate yourself to control


your acts with considerateis

This uninterrupted attention to ourselves

a self-observation,

an act of continuous reflection, undertaken not with a view to learn, but to Tiold ourselves in our own hands. Hence always observe yourself Whatever you do, do resolutely, and

only with considerate freedom.

Such would be the


would be both unsafe and Eor an association, as I have shown above, is absolutely necessary in man. It is only the first impulse of this association, which our freedom controls, all the other links
rule, if strictly applied,

maxim. But this

very dangerous.

follow of themselves.


either this association remains,

and then our

evil habits

continue, and

we can never master them

or that strict con-

siderateness enters



paralyzes as


were our whole mind,

prevents us from

all acting,

and wavering.



and makes all our resolves unsteady of doing wrong we shall condemn

ourselves to lifelessness.
abstract considerateness.


the dangerous element of pure,

But there is a middle way, very much to be recommended. Each individual in his quiet hours of necessary and continuous self-observation, which must not be neglected, since the neglect thereof will induce a reaction in goodness, will easily find what his most prominent passions are, how they become excited, and where the point lies, which must, therefore, be watched, and where he must remember himself. For instance, the man who

passionately angry, and


thereby shows a disorderly


love and injustice towards others (empirically



may have

the best intention), will

know what

excites his anger

His experience,

therefore, should

more pargrow more special

through self-observation, and more fruitful through practice He should never proceed to act, without of considerateness. having first considered what may happen to him, and without In short, he having made definite resolutions for such cases. should have resolved upon a definite plan of acting under all

He may

then be at

least sure that

he will not

little time to reflect meditation I % : everyone ought absolutely to have time with himself. and who upon himself. and the person would remain as corrupt and wicked as ever. who precisely on that account is always carried away in his acting. No one should have so much live spiritually. carries on more solitarily For the man.. self-forgetfulness cautions against such dangers. having its origin in duty. For that would be merely expelling one sin through another. is adopt rules for his rare practical collisions with the But how does the matter stand in regard who has. THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. and he should take prepersons do this for the sake of mere prudence and advantage. No amount of business will excuse a neglect to do to do as not to be able to ho do correctly and well what he has to do. should enter upon no opportunities faults new day of life without having calculated what kinds of husiness he may have to settle on. so. enough to consider his reform. 394 forget himself. . and what ifc may hring him forth to relapse into his old . and forgets all the excellent principles which he adopted in his hours of therefore. would not suffice to balance that impulse of passion. a speculative life. permitting ourselves to be impelled by Every other impulse. and to frame resolutions and work out plans for reply firstly. but the gr^at question it is. If this opposite impulse is to be a moral impulse. of course. and impelling to duty. his will rememher his good resolutions He strong and pure enough. Many : then should it not he possihle to succeed in it for the sake of dutyl The given rule remains in force. with holy meditation. it may he easy to him. enough world. to reflect upon his moral condition. If this is called prayer. and that he will is provided. how who to keep to effective under aU circumstances. always in reciprocal causality with others. it can be none other than one taken from the contemplation of his consciousness imless the at the the wickedness of passion. it is a most excellent and holy thought. which will prevent the former from entering remembrance of his duty enters same time. an impulse of semuous motives. and succeed in it why through . for only thus will Secondly : let him connect with that impulse of passion an opposite impulse.

or whether he has taken hold of the good for his whole life by a moral resolution. to Thus the essence of Ascetism is exhausted. 395 Every loss of freedom which passion always produces and a man who has once elevated himself to morality sins only from passion is contemptible. whether he be utterly corrupt and without any sense for morality in general. and hence if he reformed internally. indeed. and has given himself wholly up recall the to this feeling. and as if his will and thinking had no other end in view than to realize We have through them something in the external world. is most covery. argued as if man considered the internal. and is merely weak and in danger of forgetting it. This then esteem is the only means to effect morality through means surely. will doubtless painfulness of to such feeling whenever he f orgetfulness . Whoever gives himself up to self-reflection and self-punishment will experience this — — contemptibility strong enough. a repeated self-examiacted nation as to how we have up to our resolutions is absolutely necessary. Whoever has felt this contemptibility. which does fit not under the above established chief rule. as. REMEDY AGAINST TBS COKRDPTION OP A MERELY SPEODLATIVE STATE OF MIND. we have considered man altogether as occupying the practical standpoint. may is be not again tempted similar and hence wholly. In our previous investigation we have always presupposed man has an interest in realizing his wishes in the external world. In short.— APPENDIX TO THE SCIENCE OF MORALS. manifest all Such a man wDl that is is within him in his external works. the external acts will follow of themselves. the impulse of selfaccording to Kant's very correct dis- of the empirical character. and as if he had in view that only the connecting with the external. . not undignified. IV. the only one which induces morality from sensuous motives. We have only pay attention now to a particular state of mind. Hence. but absolutely necessary to court the punishment of conscience. the theory and all mediation generally as merely means.

as the mere disposition of the mind to be the end in view. so far as I know. asking what may be the external results of these determinations The object in cultivating this disposition may be twoin Tis. is produced not through which holds the internal Nature. hut through itself. or subjecting himself to strict self-examination when he does act. is from which a person has interest only and from which this I shall call it the ultimate end in view. and this word seems me the best designation. and which never allows this internal to manifest itself in Happily this disposition is not common to manexternal acts. This is no old name . to be when knowledge is not end of all knowledge. without relating them and without either acting much at all. that the first interest of the investigator should be only formal. and that hence both of these states of mind unite there. there can be no other end in view than the enjoyment and satisfaction which result from it. do I now propose to consider it. It cannot be often enough reiterated. observed. The former and the latter the sesthetical state of mind. and I frame to it because that which it designates has never yet been designated before. "With such a disposition a person merely watches the internal to mind and character. and in so far the disposition of both is a3sthetioal. the speculative state of mind. whereas the former enjoys himself in the knowledge and the detailed understanding of this play. that even in the former case. kind . His only object is . It is the standpoint for internal reflection.396 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. It is. nay. fold art : either to attain knowledge. The latter enjoys himself in the mere looking on at the internal play of his thoughts. art and culture. and partly because no philosophical moralist has as yet taken notice of it. or. actual life by close observers . or to attain perfection in that results which from this continuous and ever manifold play I shall call the pure speculative. determinations of his life. in the progress of mankind upon the road now taken it is even likely to become more and more common. related to life as the ultimate however. Partly from this reason. Hence both have only enjoyment in view. but at any rate it is possible. indeed. and is even to be found in But there another disposition. for the theoretical. of thoughts.

or without intending his investigation to confirm any previous opinion of his own. and to amuse himself at the appearance of harmony. Such a man may perhaps know himself thoroughly. It would he a petty and dishonest pro- know he has once. as it were. he does not intend at all to better himself. on the contrary that which constitutes his character. but cal coldness : because it is the nearest and most attractive play-toy. affords to him. and philosophers as well as theologians are also in very great danger of giving themselves up to it. think at But it is quite frequent amongst artists. for the whole interests him for his own enjoyment's sake . &c. to 397 thoroughly. found the truth. the greatest amusement. which they excite. may be thoroughly aware of his good and bad qualities and inclinations but he neither loves the former nor hates the and longs for anything only in proportion as it latter . he has no serious interest in it.. no interest lying beyond himself. But he is and remains corrupt . without having any result in view. that knowledge is not its own ultimate end. this truth culture is his own ultimate end. they were not forced to act they never would. and his self-censure has no such end in view .. in an impartial must also be related to life. In fact. He causes good and noble sentithat play of thoughts. But discovery. Now of all such a man. ments and thoughts to arise in his mind . . the rules of who has acquired an excellent knowledge may even apply them. but he does so only for the purpose of -thereby producing another play in his mind. APPENDIX TO THE SCIENCE OF MORALS. always immediately related to acting. and because he knows play thoroughly through long observation. censure himself very honestly. He may it is with the same sesthetiwith which he would censure an absurd piece of furniture or the tasteless dress of a stranger. Hence it must be equally reiterated. he loves give is likely to more satisfaction to that spiritual play within him. of sublime emotions. This disposition the conception is is impossible in uncultured men. which he its has always under his control. in whom If all. but merely in order to observe himself in doing so. but that the whole man in his whole after cedure to act otherwise. in order to make these senti- ments themselves an object of his enjoyment.

would never ask what its results in life might be. and to dive deeper so that it may begin to become really those energies which to them. thereby exciting in them the wish. and in the results of their mode of thinking.398 THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. for the virtue devoted to It is true. but . which of to that all men entertain.. remark may be drawn. From what we have that the contemplative of an artist. nothing more than a means to promote that spiritual play. such co-exist with their old state of This remedy is and deeper into interesting : to enter into active life. indeed. great vices and produces. which will put an end itself empty self-observation. For even if they are made to see how dangerous and corrupt their state of mind is. the general life. may Hence even the rule of that remedy and its They application would become mere play to such persons. it. since no human art can produce it. But even in their cases the good will must be presupposed . and perhaps to afford additional zest to it by from. whether it be that of a thinker or connected with great danger for the welfare of said. It is only those.e. since life is for them. who have the good wiU. as aloof we have described. who will take advantage of the only thorough remedy. and made to wish another manner. Hence Ascetism would have to treat such persons in They must first be toned down to the practical standpoint . is i. an insight and wish may still miad. and honesty and it is the of those who are result of the quiet which it requires likely to lead to great crimes. must first be infused with interest in life. that they may succeed in what they have undertaken. nay. furnishing a contrasting background. since calculates in all by the above cases upon a expressly hold mode of thinking. •which such persons. which here does not exist. there is no help for them. this Now practical disposition cannot be reformed it suggested remedy. it. for a better disposition. and to claim ordinary all previously slumbered in useless play. Not till then will they be in a position to apply the other rules of Ascetism to themselves . the soul. that speculative life is not and dissipations. and unless they take that first step and return to the standpoint of misdirected humanity.

taking equal interest in the latter. shown that reason — but merely to same time a or. if a part of the necessarily to be realized end of call which is necessary for those. chosen all his him.APPENDIX TO THE SCIENCE OF MORALS. and recommend myself your remembrance aad good wishes. . and that he shall always be well conscious latter. in the ahove for even in the present work I have your attention to the devote themselves to care. who Either a person should devote himself not altogether to at the it. or if the particular branch of speculation. He will thus preserve the purity of his and carry on his science or art with all the first more also success. it. but carry on the practical business. requires energies of this his intention. because every thing is play to him. character. it 399 is all may easily lead to a deeper internal wickedness. to be careful that this speculation or artistic cultivation shall always be directed upon the morality and improvement of himself and of others. and take care to carry on the speculative itself as somethmg practical . Now persons nothing is further from my intention than to terrify away from it is general significance — a speculative life generally. whereas a character of the description is easily inclined to turn his speculation or art into a mere empty play. he should at least pay uninterrupted attention to himself. in other words. which the more dangerous. I could not close these lectures with a remark more important to young students and beginning philosophers and scholars to : I therefore close them with it. his position in life excludes him from by and time.



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