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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLERK FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA JAMES B . STEGEMAN, JANET D .

MCDONALD, Plaintiffs CIVIL ACTION FILE NO: 1 :08-CV-1971 vs. SUPERIOR COURT, et., al., Defendants PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE 59(e) AND/OR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE 60(b) Comes now Plaintiffs, who file their Motion For Reconsideration pursuant to and in compliance with Fed . R. Civ. P. Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) within ten (10) days of this Court's Order and Judgment dated August 26, 2008 . BRIEF BACKGROUND Plaintiffs filed their complaint' in this Court June 9, 2008 . Service perfected upon all Defendants June 10, 2008. Judge Becker dismissed Plaintiffs Superior Court action dune 11 , 2008 in retaliation for being named Defendant in this action. This Court Dismissed the case August 26, 2008 . 1 This case was brought to US district Court due to illegal acts, fraud upon the Court, and conspiracy in a Superior Court action between Plaintiffs and Georgia Power Company that resulted in Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Superior Court complaint and leaving only Georgia Power Company' counterclaim . AUGUST 26, 2008 OPINION AND ORDER Superior Court and Judge Becker (Superior Court Defendants) Moved to Dismiss June 17, 2008 ; Georgia Power, Brain Watt and Scott Farrow (GA Power Defendants) moved to dismiss June 27, 2008 ; all defendants claimed RookerFeldman, and Younger Abstention . This Court Dismissed the case August 26, 2008 on the grounds of lounger . Plaintiffs address the Court's Opinion and Order in the same sequence as addressed by this Court. Plaintiffs had asked that irrelevant and immaterial matters be disregarded (Response to Superior Courts Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (doc.8, pg.2) and Response to GA Power Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (doc .9, pgs.2-3); Nevertheless, this Court addressed several of the issues, and made incorrect statements, which must not be allowed to stand as stated . Concerning Stegeman v. Georgia, ef., aL, No. : 1 :06-cv-02954-WSD (fnl pg. 2 Order and Opinion) see the following: Page 2, fnl, l " : "Plaintiff claimed he improperly was charged with elder abuse and financial fraud . . .wrongfully revoked his Power of Attorney . . ." * The statement is incorrect, see the following : Plaintiff showed through undisputed documentation that without having been charged, tried or convicted, Stegeman was found guilty of Family Violence 2 Order and Opinion dated August 26, 2008 referred to hereinafter as "Or."

_2_ and financial fraud by the Probate Clerk Jeryl Rosh, who lacked jurisdiction over criminal matters, and lacked power to do so, revoked a special Durable Power of Attorney with an interest . Concerning Stegeman, A, aL, v. Wachovia Bank et. , aL, No. : 06-cv-1065-8 Fnl, 2d : "Wachovia Bank filed an action in DeKalb County Superi or Court against Plaintiffs Stegeman and McDonald for accounting and damages . . ." * The statement is incorrect, see the following: Wachovia Bank has never filed suit against either Plaintiff Stegeman or Plaintiff McDonald. The case being referenced is Superior Court case : Joyner v. Stegeman, and vice versa No . : 02-cv9732-8 . Joyner, the County Probate Court appointed Guardian of Property of Jean Caffrey, filed suit against Stegeman onl y for accounting damages . Plaintiff McDonald wa s not named in the suit. Attached is a copy of the Docket Report for the case Exhibit A Fn1 2"d continues : "Plaintiffs refused to conclude the settlement, . . . Plaintiffs Stegeman and McDonald brought a separate pro Se action. . . against Wachovia. . ." * The statement is incorrect, see the following : When 02-cv9732-8 concluded, neither attorney would file the agreement with Superior Court ; Stegeman upheld his part of the agreement and Withdrew the Caveat to the Will . The opposing party refused to honor their part of the agreement, that's why the case continued . That case finally ended, by Stegeman -3obtaining new counsel to file the agreement ; the new attorney conducted a legal investigation. After completion of the investigation, Plaintiffs Stegeman and McDonald filed a pro se action against Wachovia, No . : 06-cv-1056-8; which Wachovia improperly removed to this District Court; this Court remanded to Superior Court. Docket report is E xhibit B I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs' complaint clearly stated that this case is brought due to illegal acts, fraud upon the court, and conspiracy that plagued the Superior Court action, 3 and resulted in Plaintiffs' Superior Court action being dismissed with prejudice, due to a fictional discovery dispute . 4 The Defendant's counterclaim is still pending and Plaintiffs' property has never been brought under jurisdiction of Superior Court. "`Georgia Power filed counterclaims . . . for declaratory judgment and 3 Stegeman, eL, al., v. Georgia Power Company No. : 07-CV-11398-6 A Judge Duffey, Jr . claims not to be bias or prejudice against Pro Se, disabled, and/or Plaintiffs in particular . Reading the Order and Opinion, shows the contrary . The Order quotes not what the complaint said, but what GA Power defendants said in their Motion to Dismiss . Clearly, when deciding a Motion to Dismiss, all allegations in the complaint are accepted as true ; see Bush v. Reeves, Jr., et., al., N.D.Ga. No. : 1 :05-cv-13 1STWT page 2 citing Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Dep. Corp., S.A. 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1983) which held : "In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." -4 injunctive relief. . .Georgia Power possess a valid easement . . . "(Or. pgs . 2-3) Plaintiffs have

shown through undisputed, documented evidence in this Court as well as in Superior Court, that GA Power made fraudulent claims of a valid, legal easement, granted by "Dr . R. F. Wells, R F . Wells, or Mr . R. F. Wells" . In Superior Court, Plaintiffs provided undisputed evidence that the document was a fraud (Comp . 's 11-14,19, 25-29,36-41), filed Motion to Strike on that basis March 5-8, 2008 .(Comp . 's 31, 32, 64) and filed Motion To Stay Discovery and All Other Processes March 20, 2008 staying the action (Comp 's 64965). Plaintiffs have provided this Court with the same and additional evidence . Dr., Mr., and/or R. F. Wells never existed (dots . 8 & 9), the document was forged/manufactured . Georgia Power is guilty of fraudulent claims to both Courts . Under both Georgia and Federal law, the use of a fraudulent/manufactured/forged, land documents is a crime . Plaintiffs have researched the matter thoroughly, failed to find anywhere that the laws do not apply to GA Power, the Superior Court defendants, or the GA Power defendants . GA statutes : O.C.G.A. 44-2-43 Any person who : ( 1) fraudulently obtains or attempts to obtain a decree of registration of title to an land or interest therein ; (2) d . . .offers in evidence any forged or fraudulent document in the course of an proceedings with regard to registered lands or interest therein; (3) makes or utters any forged instrument of -5transfer . . . or anv other paper, writing, or document used in connection with any of the proceedings required . . .or the notation of entries upon the register of titles ; (4) steals or y fraudulently conceals an owner's certificate, creditor's certificate, or other certificate of title provided for under this article ; (5) fraudulent) alters, chi, or mutilates any writing, instrument, document, record , registration, or register provided for under this article ; (6) makes any false oath or affidavit with respect to anj matter or thing provided for in this article ; or (7) makes or knowingly uses anv counterfeit of iny certificate provided for by this article shall be guilty of a felony and s hall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years . O.C.G.A. 44-2-44 Any clerk, . . . or other person . . . who: ( 1) fraudulently enters a decree of registration . . . ; (2) fraudulently registers anv title; (3) fraudulently makes any notation or entry upon the title register ; (4) fraudulently issues an r certificate of title, . . .or other instrument . . . ; or (5) . . . does any act of omission or commission under color of his office in relation to the matters provided for by this article shall be guilty of a fe lony and s hall be removed from office and be permanently disqualified from holding any public office and s hall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years. See also: The State v. Johnson S97G1681 ; (269 Ga . 370) (499 SE2d 56) (1998): "OCGA 16-10-20. That statute sets forth three ways to commit the crime of false statement : (1) when a person : . .falsifies a material fact ; (2) when a person makes a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation ; or (3) when a person "makes or uses any false writing or document, knowing the same to contain anv false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry ." Id. This appeal involves the third way of violating OCGA 16-1020." " . . . the Court of Appeals erred when it held . . . "using" a false document under OCGA 16-10-20 applies only to a person who uses a false document that was prepared by another . State v. -6Johnson, supra at 837. . . .the person who makes a false document conta ining the false statement has already violated the statute, id .," "[Statutes should be read according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, w ithout resorting to subtle and forced construct ions, for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation, [cit .], and this principle is particularly

compelling when interpreting criminal statutes . [Cit.]" State v. Luster, 204 Ga. App. 156, 158 (1) (a) (ii) (419 SE2d 32) (1992) . Even construing OCGA 16-10-20 strictly against the State, see generally Dowers v. State, 225 Ga. App. 809 (2) (484 SE2d 803) (1997), the language therein unambiguously prohibits an s individual from making or _using Any-false writing or document, without regard to the identity . . . who initially made or subsequently used the false document. . there is no limitation placed on the prohibited conduct of "making or using" false documents in OCGA 1 6-10-20, the statutory language does not support the Court of Appeals' holding that prosecution for use of a false document i s limited to those situations in which an accused uses false documents prepared by another . State v. Johnson, supra at 837 . "Where statutory language is plain and unequivocal . . ., the court has no author ity to place a different construct ion upon it. See generally Holders v. State, 187 Ga. App. 597 (2) (370 SE2d 847) (1988). It thus follows that under OCGA 16-10-20, all individuals who use a false writing or document . . ., may be charged with violating the statute ." d "'Anv pp rty to a crime who did not directly commit the crime may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished for commission of the crime . . . ." Id. It is not necessary . . . allege 16-2-20 and 162-21 in the indictment . State v. Military Circle Pet Center, 257 Ga. 388 (360 SE2d 248) (1987); see also Jenkins v. State, 172 Ga. App . 715 (4) (324 SE2d 491) (1984)." See also : Avery v. Chrysler Motors Copr., et., aL, A94A 1408. (214 Ga . App . 602) (448 SE2d 737) (1994) citing See Robinson v. State, 198 Ga. App. 431, 433 (401 SE2d 621) (1991) . : -7"Theft by deception is committed when a person "obtains property by any deceitful means or artful practice with the intention of depriving the owner of the property ." OCGA 16-8-3 (a) . "A person deceives if . . . : ( I) Creates or confirms another's impression of an existing fact or past event which is false . . . ;[or] (2) Fails to correct a false impression of an existing fact or past event which he has previously created or confirmed ." ""A fraud may be committed by acts as well as words ." OCGA 51-6-4 ." (a) Superior Court violated Georgia law concerning land procedures . Superior Court, once noticed that the case about real estate, and an easement document was being challenged as not pertaining to the property in question, the Court was obligated to perform the following tasks : a) have the Sheriffs Office bring the property under jurisdiction of the Court b) have an examiner of title appointed a): To Brim under Jurisdiction of the Court : O.C .G.A. 44-2-64 ,(, . . .shall contain a full description of the land, its valuation, . . . show when, how, and from whom it was acquired, a description of . . ., and an abstract of title ; shall state whether or not it is occupied; . . . Full names and addresses, . . . who may have any interest , . ., including adjoining owners and occupants, shall be given. The description of the land . . . in terms which will identify . . . fully . . . . in which land is divided into land districts and lot numbers . . . shall state the number of the land district and the lot number . . .Upon the recommendation of the examiner, . . ." O.C.G.A . 44-2-67 (a)(1) . . . the clerk shall issue a process directed to the sheriffs . . . (2) A copy . . . shall be served . . .upon each party who is named (3) The clerk . . .shall also cause to be published . . . O.C.G.A. 44-2-72 -8(a) A notice . . . shall be delivered by the c lerk to the sheriff . . . shall, within 30 days . . ., post the same upon the land . . . (b) If . . . one or more . . ., the sheriff shall conspicuously post upon

each . . .the notice . . . in subsection (a) . . . he shall state this in his return to the court. (e) After the sheriff . . .has entered upon the land, posted the notices provided for in subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section, and made his return to the court . . ., the land shall b e deemed . . .seized and brought into the cu stody of the court .. . and the court's jurisdiction in rem and. quasi in rem. . . for ... purposes of land registration d proceedings . . ." b): Exam iner of titles O.C.G.A. 44-2-77 "While . . . pending . . .before the examiner of titles . . . before final decree, . . . may require the land to be surveyed . . ." This Court continues with the dismissal saying: "On June I 1, . . .dismissed Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint. . . failure to appear at a duly noticed motions hearing . . . failure to appear at depositions as ordered by the Court ." Plaintiffs respond that the complaint they filed in this Court shows dismissal of their complaint was for a fictional discovery dispute, and failure to appear at an unscheduled hearing . Motions Hearings are scheduled on the Motion Calendar . Plaintiffs were only provided a tentative date for a hearing, they requested more than once that if the hearing is in fact scheduled, it needed to show on the Motion Calendar and/or in the "Scheduled Events" on the Docket Report . The hearing never showed in either place . Plaintiffs have stated that they tried numerous times to contact Judge Becker's calendar clerk, left messages for her, she never returned -9any calls . Uniform Superior Court Rules clearly show that if your name does not appear on the Calendar, you do not have a hearing scheduled , see the following : Rule 2.4. Calendar clerk. ". . . "calendar clerk" . . . responsibility of setting and scheduling all hearings and trials . . ." Rule 8. 1. Scheduling trials. "The assigned judge . . . sole responsibility for setting hearings . . ., for the scheduling of all trials . . .and for the publication of all necessary calendars in advance . . . ." Rule 8.3. Trial calenda r. "The calendar clerk shall prepare a trial calendar . . . The calendar shall state the place of trial and the date and time . . .trial calendar shall be delivered to the clerk of the court . . .published a sufficient period of time, but not less than 20days, prior to the d session of court . . ." Rule 8.4. Trial date. "The parties and counsel in the first 10 actions on the published . . . calendar shall appear ready for trial on the date specified . . ." See also : Green v. Green, 437 S .E.2d 457, (263 Ga. 551)(1993) the Supreme Court discusses whether the first five or first ten listed on the calendar must appear for hearing : " . . . in Fulton v. State of Ga., 183 Ga. App . S70 (359 S.E.2d 726) (1987), that only the first five *fn2 cases on the published calendar were required to be present . In this case, as in Fulton, which we believe to state the better interpretation of USCR 8 .4, judgment was entered against a party who was not required by the rule to be present; in this case, as in Fulton, the judgment should have been set aside" "In addition to the purely legal question regarding presence at calendar call, the role appellee's counsel played in procuring the judgment must be examined . . . "

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" . . . on the federal and state level, courts . . .have sought to encourage professionalism among lawyers . . . In furtherance . . .of these goals, . . . this court established the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism . . . to maintain . . ., a sense of civility and courtesy among lawyers . . . ., Chief Justice Clarke has often said that "ethics is that which is required and professionalism is that which is expected ."" This Court states : "When the Superior Court ordered Plaintiffs to appear at their depositions, the Court warned that their failure to appear would result in the action being dismissed." (Or. pg.3). Plaintiffs received the Order past noon on the day t he depositio ns were scheduled for 9 :00 or 9:30 a.m., Notice of Deposition did not have the Order attached ; Plaintiffs provided this Court undisputed evidence see the fo llowing: 77. & 130 . Apparently Judge Becker presided over a hearing May 27, 2U08 which was not on the Motion Calendar "Exhibit 9" 80. Plaintiffs left a message that the Motion Calendar did not s how a hearing set for Ma y 27, 2008, Plaintiffs have attached Judge Becker's May 27th Motion Calendar as "Exhibit 10" 83. Defendants Notice To Take Video Depositions5 were in violation of Georgia Codes . . . Superior Court Rules . 84 . Plaintiffs filed Objection to Depositions June 2, 2008 . . . they would be unable to attend on June 4, 2008, see "Exhibit 11" . 5 Although Plaintiffs believe the Notice to Take Deposition MUST have the Order attached, the Order was not signed until the following day, and could not be attached to the Notice; since the Court mailed the Order in the afternoon the day before the Depositions were to be held, Plaintiffs had no way of knowing what the Order said . - 1 i85 . The Plaintiffs were unable to hand deliver the Objections . . . U.S.P.S. ExpressMail . . .tracking shows . . .delivered and signed for by the Court June 3, 2008 . 86. Plaintiffs' Objection . . . was returned by Law Clerk Hash, postmarked June 6th as shown by "Exhibit 12" 131 . Watt sent Notice of Video Depositions see "Exhibit 10" Plaintiffs also showed Notice of deposition mailed by GA Power was dated and mailed May 27, 2008 , before the Order was signed, and made no mention of an Order (Comp . 131 & Exhibit 10) ; Judge Becker signed the Order May 28, 2008 and mailed it to Plaintiffs June 3, 2008, see complaint "Exhibit 1 3". It would be impossible for Plaintiffs to have known "the Court warned that their failure to appear would result in the action being dismissed" . II. A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Recusal Although Judge Duffey may believe that Plaintiffs' Motion to Recuse or Disqualify was based only on past issues decided by the Court (Or . pgs. 7-8); and that "plaintiffs argue, confusingly, that the Court did not fully address certain unspecified issues . . . even though the Court found it did not have jurisdiction . . . and remanded it to the state court, as Stegeman requested ." Before this case was dismissed, Plaintiffs filed Response to Motion to Stay Discovery . Plaintiffs' Response to the Motion, page 5 and Exhibit 1 show that

when the Wachovia case was in this Cou rt, a Ruling was made concerning -12Discovery, the same Discovery that none of the current defendants filed . This Court, said that should Plaintiffs not file the discovery within fifteen days, their complaint would be dismissed ; Plaintiffs filed the material on time, the Court decided it did not have jurisdiction . Was the Order not an exercise of jurisdiction? Why would the Plaintiffs in Wachovia be different than any of the defendants this Court just granted dismissal? Further, the Court stated that the case had been improperly Removed, but did not say how . Facts clearly showed that Removal was filed to the wrong Superior Court Judge ; Wachovia was in default, etc . This Court allowed numerous filings, Remanded the case in mid April, Wachovia had been in default since February 5'~ . (3r- page 8, " . . .Stegeman claims . . .granting Defendant's . . . Summary Judgment the Court denied Stegeman's disabilities . . ." Stegeman is not aware of a Summary Judgment in the Georgia case, this Court dismissed on statute of limitations and immunity and ignored that Stegeman is one a of a protected class . Pacer fees, Stegeman stated he does not own a car. Perhaps this Court Clerk's Office has free Pacer access ; this Court would have a person with a physical mobility impairment, in constant pain go from Stone Mountain to -13downtown by bus to view Pacer for free? 6 Obviously this court deemed Stegeman undeserving . Free access to Pacer would cost neither this Court, nor the public anything . Denial warms bias/prejudicial. B. Motions to Dismiss The Younger Abstention Doctrine The following paragraphs shows why Younger fails . (1) "the state proceeding is `an ongoing state judicial proceed ing"' The only remaining "state proceeding" is Georgia Power's counterclaim . Since Plaintiffs' case has been Dismissed with prejudice, they are estopped from ever being able to properly defend against Georgia Power. (2) "proceedings implicate important states interest s" This Court cited RPD Long Beach v. Tranter Hare Inv. Bldg. Corp., No. 1 :07cv-00475, 2005 WL 269444, at *4 (S .D. Oh. Jan 30, 2008) "(Younger abstention applies to dispute implicating state law on the validity of easements) ." Plaintiffs address the relation of RPD Long Beach and "state interests" . RPD Long Beach had to do with validity of easement granted by a lessee: "Younger abstention applies here because Plaintiff's claims involve important state interests in a property dispute implicating . . . lease i nterpretation . ." The case shows nothing to indicate that the dispute between Plaintiffs and 6 Stegeman wantedd only to view his own case, to make sure he met all the deadlines, etc, just an attorney would do . Nothing more . 14 GA Power creates implications of Georgia's law and their private property . Younger is not applicable . This Court also cites Crown Point I LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Assn 319 F .

3d 1211, 1215 (10"' Cir. 2003) "(condemnation action against easement implicates important state intere st)". In counter to that, Crown Point proves that Younger is not applicable . Crown Point was a condemnation action to gain an easement in which a Land Development Code special use code was amended giving a state interest . Again, Crown fails to show that the case before this Court has a showing of state interest . Georgia Power used a forged easement documents to prove they have an easement . Under Georgia law, one uses condemnation to gain an eminent domain unless easement is granted by the property owner ; it is illegal to take land then forge documents to show that you were granted easement by a person that never existed. Crown Point also states : Younger abstention "is the except ion, not the rule ." Joseph A . v. Ingram, 275 F .3d 1253, 1267 (10th Cir . 2002) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U .S . 689, 705 (1992)) . In determining whether Younger abstention is appropriate, a court considers whether : "(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings involve important state - 1 5interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies ." Amanatullah v. Colorado Bra of Med. Exam 'rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th dir . 1999) (internal quotations omitted) . Georgia Power has no rights over Plaintiffs' property, they committed fraud upon the court; their acts are illegal : theft by deception, false statements, fraud and forgery . In Superior Court, Plaintiffs disputed the validity of the easement document, GA Power refused to address the document, claiming the need to depose Plaintiffs . Until such time the Court would appoint the necessary examiner of title, and bring the property under jurisdiction of the Court, and the examiner of title confirm or deny the validity of the document, nothing else could happen . Superior Court allowed the creation of a fictional discovery dispute . Six months after filing of the suit, Georgia Power filed an Amendment to their Verified Answer and Counterclaim, hidden within the Amendment was Motion for Reformation attempting to make the document legal . Plaintiffs showed a reformation could not be performed . Both The United States and Georgia Constitutions prohibit the taking of private land for public use without just compensation being paid . This did not happen in Plaintiffs situation, Georgia Power asks the state Court to just give them Plaintiffs' land . Once illegally taken, the Court cannot just give them the property they stole . Superior Court, having failedd to abide by Georgia law, allowed GA Power to -16commit fraud upon the Court, thereby making a mockery of the Court, and manipulate the judicial system, Judge Becker then dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs case, forever preventing them to properly defend themselves and their property from GA Power . Having shown all of these facts to this Court, this Court then states that it has faith that Plaintiffs will be able to address their constitutional challenges in State Court . "adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges" Plaintiffs have shown that the State Court refused to follow Georgia statute, (3) then dismissed their complaint with prejudice without a hearing. Plaintiffs will not have an adequate forum to raise their federal claims in the state proceedings .. Crown Point goes on to state : "However, we find that plaintiff does not have an adequate

opportunity to raise its federal claims in state court ." " . . .the state court found that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from raising its due process claims due to . . . dismissal . . ., did not have an opportunity to raise its federal claims in the state court proceedings. . ." This Court also cites Wexler stating " . . .abstention may be appropriate . . . where the plaintiff in the federal case chose not to assert a constitutional defense as a defendant in state court ." Plaintiffs in this case were also Plaintiffs in Superior Court , not defendants; furthermore, the Wexler Ruling by District Court was vacated and remanded : -17. . .The comity Justice Black wrote . . . between state courts and federal courts . . .does not offend the respectful relationship between state and federal courts, nor would it place the district court in the role of supervisor of state litigation or the state court . . . ., an exercise of jurisdiction by the district court merely preserves the federal forum for federal claims raised by plaintiffs in a federal proceeding, although a similar state action was also filed . Most important, if the injunctive relief Plaintiff-Appellants request is granted, the result will not be the kind of federal takeovers at issue in 3l Foster Children or Miller." "But there is no doctrine that the availability or even the pendency of state judicial proceedings excludes the federal courts ." NOPSI, 109 S .Ct. at 2521" "Thus, the parallel proceedings brought by Appellant Wexler do not present the "undue interference" in state court proceedings necessary to apply Younger. NOPSI, 109 S.Ct. at 2513 . Nor would a federal injunction of the kind sought in this case, usurp the state courts' ability to "perform their judicial Functions ." Id . at 2518 . See also Pennzoil Co., 107 S .Ct. at 1526. We, therefore, vacate the district court's dismissal and remand the action for a determination of Appellant-Plaintiffs' claim ." Wexler goes against this Court's decision: "First, we find no federal authority supporting the proposition that federal claims that might be supported by the same alleged facts must be raised by state plaintiffs in cases arising under state law in state courts. Instead, we recall the Supreme Court's reasoning from 1964 : "[t]here are fundamental objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal constitutional claims can be compelled .. . to accept instead a state court's determination of those claims ." England v. La. State Bd. of Mere Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S .Ct. 461, 46413 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964) .5 We recently wrote that "generally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning -18the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction ." Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368 F .3d 1320, 1328 (llth Cir .2004) (quoting Colorado River)." "Other circuits have reached the same conclusion on the same issue before us that we do today . The Younger doctrine does not require abstention merely because a federal plaintiff, alleging a constitutional violation in federal court, filed a claim under state law, in state court, on the same underlying facts . See Rogers v. Desiderio, 58 F.3d 299, 301 (7th Cir .1995} ; Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 882 (3rd Cir .1994); Crawley v. Hamilton County Comm'rs, 744 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir .1984) . As recognized, the exercise of federal jurisdiction in such a circumstance would not prevent the state court from exercising its jurisdiction just as a state court's ruling against the

parties who are federal plaintiffs would not offend the federal courts ." Further : In Younger, a federal plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a state statute under which he was being prosecuted as a defendant. The Court abstained from hearing plaintiffs claim, concluding that a sufficient state forum existed for the plaintiff to raise his constitutional defense . Younger, 91 S.Ct. at 755 . The Plaintiffs before this Court are not being prosecuted, are not defendants in state court, are not challenging state statute, and are not raising a constitutional defense . They are suing for Civil and Constitutional Rights violations for illegal acts committed under color of law or color of authority to obtain a judgment against the Plaintiffs, having Plaintiffs' state case dismissed with prejudice. This Court indicates that the "central question is regarding the application of Georgia real property law, especially the existence and scope of rights within an -19easement ." (Or . pg. 19) And "the DeKalb Easement Case concerns . . . literally effect the welfa re and well-be ing of the commun ity". Neither statement is correct . Plaintiffs fully understand and accept Georgia Easement Law, and has nothing to do with Georgia Power's use of a fraudulent document signed by a man that never existed . Moving a power pole to it's proper location, prohibiting theft of private property, prohibiting Georgia Power's use of forged documents when claiming easement rights would be much better for the welfare and well-being of a community. Georgia Power is not above the law. This Court then states that "Plaintiffs . . . have an adequate opportunity to raise their constitutional challenges in the state court . . ." Plaintiffs have shown that this is also incorrect . They have had their Rights violated in the state court, there has been conspiracy, fraud upon the correct, a fictional discovery dispute and unscheduled hearings that lead to Plaintiffs' case being dismissed with prejudice . This Court has now barred Plaintiffs from ever raising their constitutional challenges using Younger Abstention which does not apply by this Court's own caselaw . CONCLUSION Plaintiffs Move this Court to reconsider it's dismissal of their case . The Plaintiffs must not be prohibited from using the Federal Court system in the -20a manifest injustice to dismiss this case thereby denying the ability to be able to ever again protect their private property . Plaintiffs can hardly believe that this Court or any Court would be willing to allow violations of Federally protected Rights when a party has been barred by the State Court from being able to protect themselves due to fraud upon the Court . This Court has stated that Plaintiffs may refile the case if Plaintiffs claims are not precluded by state court decisions , including res judicataa and collateral estoppel . In other words, Plaintiffs can file later, but that will be dismissed too . Respectfully submitted this 5 h day of September, 2008

By J S B. o 821 Sheppard to e Mountain, GA 30083 (7q U ) 879-8737 By: ANET D. MC NALD, Pro Se 821 She axd Rd. Stone Mountain, GA 30083 (770) 879-8737 -21 TE OF In compliance with LR 7-11), N.D. Ga., I certify that the foregoing Motion has been prepared in with Times New (1 .5"') inches and a left ity with LR 5 .1, N.D. GA. This Motion was prepared (14 point) type, with a top margin of one and one-half of one (1") inch, is proportionately spaced . This 5 6 day of 2008 Stone Mountain, GA 30083 (770) 879-8737 DIET D. MCDC3 ALD, Pro Se 821 Shepp d Rd Stone Mountain, GA 30083 (770) 879-8737 -22IN THE UNITED STATES DISTR ICT C OURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, Atlanta Division JAMES B. STEGEMAN, JANET D. MCDONALD, Plaintiffs vs. CIVIL ACTION FILE NO: 11 971-WSD :08-CV SUPERIOR COURT, et., al., Defenda nts CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I Certify that I have this 5th day of September, 2008, served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration upon Defendants , through their attorney on file by causing to be depo sited with U. S . P. S ., First Class Mail, proper postage affixed thereto, addressed as follows : Daniel S. Reinhardt Troutman Sanders, LLP Devon Orland Bank of America Plaza - Suite 5200 600 Peachtree Street, NE State of Georgia Dept. of Law 40 Capitol Square, S .W. Atlanta, GA 30334-1300 Atlanta, GA 30308-2216 821 Sheppard Rd Stone Mountain, GA 30083 (770) 879-8737 -23-