Page 1 of 11As Published in

 

the PV Newsletter. Vol 4, Issue 1. (June 20, 2011) : 1-9.

By Alejandro Vega, P.E.

 

ABSTRACT:

This paper reviews the continued use of ASTM A-212 steel pressure vessels. Itprovides a discussion of the embrittlement phenomena, methodology behind Minimum DesignMetal Temperature, issues with continued use of A-212 pressure vessels, and limitations on useimposed on post-1988 ASME design rules.

ASTM A-212 Pressure Vessel Steel

 – 

A Case Against Continued Use

ASTM A-212 was a specification for a high tensile strength, Carbon-Silicon steel plate for use inboilers and pressure vessels. The standard was withdrawn in 1967. In the case of pressurevessel manufacture it was specified as a Fire Box Quality steel and specified to be processed perASTM A-300, Specification for Notch Toughness Requirements for Normalized Steel Plates forPressure Vessels (withdrawn in 1975)

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, if specified for service at low temperatures. Today it iswidely recognized that the older carbon steels, such as A-212, have reduced low temperaturetoughness, meaning that these types of steels have a low resistance to low temperature brittlefracture. Because some pressure vessels constructed with A-212 are still found in service, or areconsidered for service, it is not considered good engineering practice to use original editionsASME Code that was in effect at the time of construction to determine minimum designtemperatures when performing Fitness-for-Service (FFS) evaluations.Review of older ASME Code material specifications reveal that it was common for such oldersteels to have been exempted from impact testing to temperatures of -20



F, but these same steelsevaluated to the current ASME Codes would actually have minimum design metal temperature(MDMT) near 100



F. Up until the late 80s most carbon steels less than 4-inch thick wereconsidered good for use at temperatures down to -20



F. With the 1988 ASME Pressure VesselCode changes, a re-evaluation of pressure vessels under FFS methods identifies carbon steels,such as A-212, as not adequate for service at ambient temperatures. Since the withdrawal of theA-212 Specification and the introduction of Specifications for ASTM A-516 (fine grain) and A-517 (course grain), it has become a common practice, though not recommended, to comparethese metals to A-212 in MDMT evaluations.One problem with the continued use of pressure vessels made from A-212 is that some have beenin operation for an extremely long amount of time and may have both a high pedigree anddocumented history and show no signs of temperature embrittlement. Every so often a vesselconstructed with A-212 will be evaluated for continued use and the pressure vessel blog spherewill abound with questions as to how to approach the MDMT evaluation process. All of thesetypes of vessels

’ construction

pre-date the revised 1988 Code requirement for MDMT and asstated previously, were designed with a default minimum temperature of -20ºF. The nameplateinformation on the vessels may even list a minimum temperature of -20ºF. For example, a case

 

Page 2 of 11

of a 1960’s vessel

investigated by the author calculated an MDMT 114ºF for the shell and 102ºFfor the heads. To rerate such a vessel would drastically reduce its operating pressure and thusmake it inapplicable for use.The concern for A-212 steel is the onset of brittle fracture and subsequent catastrophic failurewhich can cause injury to personnel or effect damage to infrastructure; therefore operation abovethe MDMT is instrumental to avoiding brittle fracture. Compounding operational issuesassociated with MDMT are unforeseen events during operation, such as isentropic freeze up orother upset conditions occurring that may introduce temperatures less than MDMT, which if notplanned for may precipitate brittle fracture. There are generally three conditions that contributeto brittle fracture

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: 1) the presence of a flaw, 2) stress at great enough levels to induce flawgrowth, and 3) the presence of temperature below the Nil-Ductility Transition temperature(NDTT); the temperature at which the material will transition from being ductile to becomingbrittle.The onset of brittle behavior need not have visible flaws, and any presence of flaws may be theresult of upset conditions, construction, corrosion, or service fatigue, such as micro-cracking.This type of scenario combined with normal stress at operating conditions or elevated stress atupset conditions, in combination with temperature below the NDTT, can lead to catastrophicfailure. Therefore, one of the goals of the MDMT Code changes is to control and monitor thelow temperature operation within the ductile operating region of the metal. In other words, therationale for MDMT is to gear pressure vessel design toward avoiding brittle fracture andrestricting operating temperatures within a ductile material regime of the Impact EnergyTransition Curve (Reference Fig 1).

Figure 1. Charpy Ductile-to-Brittle Temperature Transition Curve for A-212B

 

Page 3 of 11To address the impacts that changes in Code requirements have had on regulating agencies, theNational Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has specifically addressed MDMT withthe following example, within one of its mechanical integrity, pressure systems guidelines

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:

Code PV/S

[Pressure Vessel/Systems]

for which current Code requirements havechanged from the original fabrication Code shall be reassessed and re-rated asnecessary to assure an acceptable risk level. Note: For example, the 1988 changes to fracture toughness rules for prevention of brittle fracture could significantly increase the assessed risk of continued operation at theoriginal design limits. Thus, a 4 inch thick vessel fabricated from A-212 Grade B(Firebox) material is now known to have an allowable minimum design materialtemperature (MDMT) of 118 degrees F. The vessel nameplate likely shows an MDMT of 

 – 

20 degrees F. If the vessel normally receives ambient compressed gas at 60 degrees F,the vessel would require risk reassessment and likely additional hazard mitigation toassure continued safe operation.

Origin of MDMT Code Changes

In the 1988 Code revisions, ASME Section VIII, Division 1, Section UG-20 requires theestablishment of an MDMT based on the lowest temperature experienced during operation, upsetconditions, auto-refrigeration, ambient conditions, and any other ancillary sources of cooling

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.Sections UCS-66, 67, and 68 grant exemptions for impact testing based on operating conditions.Service failures due to brittle fracture in pressure vessels are the result of tri-axial states of stressand temperature acting at the notch tip. It has been empirically determined that steels having nearidentical properties when tested in tension or torsion at slow rates of strain will show markedvariances in their propensity for brittle fracture during notched-impact testing. From this it canbe understood why attempting to use the MDMT of replacement steels, such as A-516 and A-517, for A-212 would be strongly discouraged.MDMT criteria is indirectly derived from Impact Energy Transition Curves. The Charpy V-Notch curves have been used in engineering for the purpose of identifying materials that areresistant to brittle fracture over a large range of temperatures by determining the amount of energy a material absorbs during fracture. The results of the Charpy test plots provide thematerial temperature curve to identify the Ductile-to-Brittle Transition. This locus defines theDuctile-to-Brittle Transition-Temperature curve (DBTT). This high strain-rate test correlates

the absorbed energy to the material’s toughness and trends the material’

s temperature dependentbrittle-to-ductile transition. One specific example of a Charpy DBTT curve for A-212

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is shown