1

IN THE F_ED~Rft.L HIGH COURT

IN THE LAGO!i.1!.J DICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT LAGOS, NIGERIA
ON WEDNESDAY THE 19TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2022
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE
JUSTICE T. G. RINGIM
JUDGE

SUIT NO: FHC/L/CS/616/2019

BETWEEN:
YORKSHIRE LIMITED } PLAINTIFF

AND

1. POLARIS BANK LIMITED } DEFENDANTS

2. ASSET MANAGEMENT CORPORATION OF NIGERIA

RULING
This is a Motion on Notice of the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant dated
and filed on 04/03/2020. It was brought pursuant to the provisions
of Order 26 Rule 1 of the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules
2019, Sections 33A and 34 (1 ), (4) and (6) of the AMCON
(Amendment No. 2) Act of 2019 and under the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court. The 2nd Defendant/ Applicant principally
sought for the following relief:
"An Order of this Honourable Court dismissing
the Plaintiff/Respondent's suit in its entirety as it
relates to the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant, by reason
of the fact that this Honourable Court lacks the
jurisdiction to entertain same and the Plaintiff/
Respondent lacks the locus standi to institute
the instant action against the 2nd Defendant/
Applicant as presently constituted."
r

The 9 grounds upon which this application was brought are as

follows:
1. The Plaintiff/Respondent ("Respondent") commenced
the instant suit against the Applicant and 1st
Defendant/ Respondent vide an Amended Writ of
Summons and Amended Statement of Claim sealed
out of the registry of this Honourable Court on the
14th day of October, 2019.

2. The Respondent by the aforementioned Statement

of Claim primarily seeks to restrain the Applicant
from exercising its rights in the capacity of creditor in
respect of all the assets used as security for the
credit facilities which were granted to the
Respondent by the 1st Defendant/ Applicant.

3. The aforementioned credit facilities remain outstanding

and have since crystallized and become an eligible
bank asset within the meaning of Section 24 of
the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria
(Amendment No. 2) Act, 2019 (11 the AMCON Act").

4. The Applicant has since acquired all of the rights

of the 1st Defendant/Respondent in respect
of the outstanding credit facilities, pursuant to
a Loan Purchase and Limited Services Agreement
dated 30th November, 2018 which was executed
between the Applicant and the Applicant
and the 1st Defendant/Respondent by virtue of
the provisions of Section 25(1) AMCON Act.

5. The Respondent by its action also challenges

the said acquisition by seeking an order setting
aside the acquisition by the Applicant of the
Respondent's outstanding obligation to
the 1st Defendant/Respondent.

6. This Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to

entertain this suit by virtue of the provisions of
Section 33A AMCON Act, which prohibits the
r 3

institution of an action against the Applicant in

respect of the acquisition of an eligible
bank asset.

section 34(4) of the AMCON Act vests all the rights

7.
in the assets by which the eligible bank asset is
secured in the Applicant, upon the acquisition of
the eligible bank asset.

8. The Respondent's rights in relation to the assets

mentioned in (2) above ceased to exist by virtue of
the Loan Purchase and Limited Services Agreement
dated 30 th November, 2018.

9. The Respondent has no locus standi to institute

the instant action against the Applicant by virtue
.of the provisions of Section 33(A) of the
' AMCON Act.

In support of this application was a 21 paragraph Affidavit

deposed to by Ayomipo Akinsehinwa, a Legal Practitioner in the
Law Firm of Messrs Aluko & Oyebode of Counsel to the 2nd

Defendant/Applicant, with a Loan Purchase Agreement and

Limited Service Agreement attached and marked as Exhibit AM 1.
Accompanying this application was also a 12 page Written
Address.

In further support to this application, the 1st Respondent filed a 1O

page Written Address urging the Court to not only dismiss the
instant action against the Applicant but terminate the suit in
whole.

In opposition to this application, the Plaintiff /Respondent filed a 28

paragraph Counter Affidavit on 06/05/2020 as deposed to by
 4
11

oreofe Salako, a Legal Practitioner In the firrn of w·

1seview
consultancy of Counsel to the Plaintiff. There were co
PY of the
Judgment of the High Court of Lagos State .
1
n Suit
No:LD/402/CMW/2018 - YORKSHIRE LIMITED V. SKYE BANK PLC
(Exhibit OS/1 ), copy of Letter of the 2nd Defendant/Applicant to
the Plaintiff/Respondent dafed 03/09/2019 (Exhibit 0S/2), and
copies of 2 letters of the 2nd Defendant/Applicant to the Plaintiff/
Respondents both dated 12/02/2013 (Exhibit 0S/3 and os;4
respectively). This was accompanied by a 9 page Written Address
of Counsel.

In reply to the Counter Affidavit of the Plaintiff/Respondent, the 2nd

Defendant/Applicant filed a 14 page Reply Affidavit on
15/06/2020 as deposed to by Olamide Sholabomi, a Legal
Practitioner in the Law Firm of Messrs Aluko & Oyebode of Counsel
to the 2nd Defendant/Applicant. There was, also, an
accompanying Reply on Points of Law of 13 pages.

In the Written Address which accompanied the Affidavit in

Support of this application, the 2nd Defendant/Applicant
nominated the following lone issue for determination to wit:
Whether this Honourable Court ought to
11

dismiss the Respondent's suit against the

Applicant in the circumstances?

The 2nd Defendant/Applicant argued this lone issue by first

submitting on the determinants of jurisdiction to include the proper
constitution of Court, the subject matter and absence of any
preventive to the exercise of jurisdiction and initiation of a case by
r due P
rocess of Law and upon fulfillment of any
condition
edent Reliance was placed on MADUKOLU &
preC · 0~
NKEMDILIM (1962) NSCC 374 @ 379 - 380 and ECOBANK (NIGERIA)
LIMITED V. ANCHORAGE LEISURES LIMITED & ORS (2016) LPELR _
(CA) to appreciate further that the Writ of Summons and
40220
Statement of Claim form the main focus in determining the
jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a suit.

The 2nd Defendant/ Applicont, then, went on to argue on the

provisions of Section 33A of the AMCON Act, 2019, which
mandatorily provide that no action or proceedings shall lie, be
instituted or maintained against the 2nd Defendant/Applicant by
reason of its acquisition of an eligible bank asset. To appreciate
the mandatory nature of the said section, reliance was placed on
NWANKWO V. YAR'ADUA (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt 1209) 513 SC.

The 2nd Defendant/ Applicant further argued that the Plaintiff/

Respondent failure to comply with such mandatory provision of
law exposes the feature that prevent this Court from assuming
jurisdiction over this matter.

Arguing further the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant submitted that the

Plaintiff/Respondent, also, lacks the requisite legal standing/locus
standi to institute and maintain this suit against the 2nd Defendant/
Applicant. To appreciate the concept of Locus Standi as legal
capacity to institute an action in a court of law, reference were
made to the cases of THOMAS & SONS V OLUFOSOYE (l 986 ) l
NSCC 323 @ 333 - 334 and OPOBIYI & ANOR V MU
· NRIU (2011)
LPELR - 8232 (SC). It were the submissions of the 2nd De f endant/
Applicant that the Plaintiff/Respondent, who's unable to show any
evidence of liquidation of its indebtedness to Polaris Bank through
whom the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant acquired the title to the assets
used as collateral in securing the facility granted the Plaintiff/
Respondent by the Polaris Bank which the 2nd Defendant/
Applicant still possesses, cannot attempt to deny the 2nd

Defendant/Applicant the right to deal with its own property.

The 2nd Defendant/ Applicant argued further that the provisions of
Section 34(1) (a) of the AMCON Act, supra is also laudable to
prevent the Plaintiff /Respondent from seeking such restraining
orders against the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant.

I was urged to dismiss this suit against the 2nd Defendant/

Applicant.

In its support of this application the 1st Defendant/Respondent

nominated a single issue for determination in paragraph 3.1 of its
Written Address. The issue was:
Having regard to the clear and unambiguous
provisions of section 33( a), 34(1) (a) and ( c ) of the
AMCON Act, 2010, whether this Honourable
Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the
instant suit.

st
It was the central argument of the Learned Silk for the 1
Defendant/Respondent that since by clauses 2, 3 and 4, as
contained in Exhibit AM 1, the interest of the 1st Defendant/
Respondent in the Plaintiff/Respondent loan portfolio has been
r 7

divested or transferred to the 2nd Defendant/Applict. .

an in line with
section 34(1) (a) and (b) of the AMCON Act 20
' l 0, the
consequence of that is that the clear and unambiguou 5 prov1s1ons
..
of section 33A of the said Act proscribe the insritut·ion or
maintaining any action against the 2nd Defendant/Applicant 05
long as such action is rooted in 'the acquisition of on eligible bank
asset by the 2nd Defendant/Applicant. The 1st Defendant/
Respondent critical submission on this was that the instant action
amounts to abuse of judicial process. Reliance was placed on
ONYEABUCHI V. INEC (2002) 8 NWLR (Pt. 769/417 @441 to 442, OJO
V. OLAWORE (2008) 6 - 7 SC (Pt. 11) 54@ 70, DINGYADI V INEC (No.
2) (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 154@ 195 and 196, among others to
submit that the Court ought not only dismiss the instant action
against the 2nd Defendant/Applicant but terminates the suit
because the 1st Defendant is merely a desirable party in the suit
unlike the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant who is a necessary party.

Arguing per contra, the Plaintiff/Respondent nominated 3 issues

for determination to wit:
/
f

,. Whether at this stage of proceedings before the

Honourable Court, it is permissible in law for the
Applicant to bring a formal motion challenging
the jurisdiction of the Court?

ii. Whether upon the facts before the Court, the

Plaintiff is vested with locus standi to institute this
action.

iii. Whether upon the facts before the Court, and the
provisions of section 6(6) of the Constitution of
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)
the Provisions of section 33/-\ of the AMCON '
 .. . '\J\J

2019 c?~o~e~ate to divest this Honourable C

of the 1unsdlct1on to entertain this action. ourt

On the stage of filing the instant motion, the Plaintiff/R

espondent
referred to the provisions of Order 29 of the Federal H'1 h
9 Court
Civil Procedure Rules, 2019 to centrally submit in one breadth that
the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant's failure to file the motion within the
prescribed 30 days but almost l O months after being served with
the Originating processes, makes the Motion liable to taken at the

conclusion of trial.

Yet, in another breadth, the Plaintiff /Respondent submitted that

such violation of the Rules of Court constitutes abuse of process
making the instant motion liable to be dismissed. Reliance was
placed on AFRICAN REINSURANCE CORPORATION V. JDP
CONSTRUCTION NIGERIA LIMITED (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt 838).

On the locus standi of the Plaintiff /Respondent, the Plaintiff/

Respondent counter argued that the court should confine itself
with the Statement of Claim in line with the holding in ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF FEDERATION V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ABIA STATE
(2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 689 SC@ 742.

It was the forceful submissions of the Plaintiff /Respondent that not

being aware of the purported Loan Purchase Agreement of the
nd
2 Defendant/ Applicant untill when served with the instant
motion and not being indebted to the 1st Defendant, as amply
averred in the Statement of Claim, makes the provisions of
sections 33A and 34(1) (4) and (6) inapplicable on the
 9

. tiff;Respondent, who is fully vested with th ..

p101n
. t' e requ1s1te 1
ocus
t th
di to institu e 1s ac 10n.
5tcin

on the constitutionality of section 33A of the AMCON Ac,t the

Plaintiff/Respondent submitted that such draconian piece of
legislation that prevent a party whose property has been
improperly acquired from seeking redress in Court and leaving
such person with no remedy is in conflict with section 6(6) and 252
(sic) (1) ( r ) of the Constitution and to extent of such inconsistency
be invalidated. Reliance was placed on KALANGO V GOVERNOR
OF BA YELSA STATE (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 139) 80, SENATOR ABRAHAM
ADESANYA V. THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
& ANOR (1981) LPELR - 147, and PLEATEAU STATE OF NIGERIA &
ANOR V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FEDERATION & ANOR (2000) LPELR
- 2921. I was further urged to invalidate such odious provisions of
the AMCON Act as rightly done by my Learned Brother
Honourable Justice Jose of the High Court of Lagos State in a
decision rendered on 24/10/2019 in Suit No:LD/3148LMW/2019 -
SHITU & ANOR V. KNIGHT ROOK LIMITED & ANOR where section

34(6) was invalidated by the Court.

I was urged to d'i sm1ss

· th e 2nd Defendant/Applicant's motion with
cost.

Replying on point of law the 2nd

Te i
picking h ' Defe nd ant/Applicant began by
o1es on the Plaintiff /Res ond ,5
respect to the a . P ent Counter Affidavit with
pparent ,nconsistencies and contradictions in
 10 I
thereof and paragraphs 11 - 13 thereof
orogrophs 15 and 21
P . d xtraneous matters.
hovin9 conta1ne e

. . g this motion, the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant

the stage of fI1in
on d that since in a plethora of judicial decisions the
counter argue
istent on the fundamental nature of jurisdiction
courts are co ns
. t be ·1ven priority and determined first, lest the Court
which mus 9
embark in exercise in futility, this Court ought not to apply the Civil
Procedure Rules slavishly. To appreciate the position of law that
it's never too late to raise an objection as to the jurisdiction of the
court, I was referred to ABUBAKAR & ORS V. JOS METROPOLITAN
DEVELOPMENT BOARD & ANOR (1997) LPELR - 5301 (CA), BUREAU
OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE V. REINSURANCE ACQUISITION GROUP
LIMITED & 2 ORS (2008) LPELR - 8560(CA), GALADIMA V. TAMBA
(2000) 6 SC {Pt. 1) 196@ 206 - 207 and NASIR V. KANO STATE CSC
(2010) 6 NWLR {Pt. 1190) 253@ 269 - 270 among others.

On the issue of locus standi, the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant critically

submitted that knowledge/understanding of the Plaintiff/
Respondent in relation to the Loan Purchase Agreement at the
time of filing the su1•t .1s .1mmatenal
. to the applicability of section

33A of the AMCON Act, supra, since the documents, i.e. Loan
Purchase Agree men t speaks for itself. Reliance was placed on

CHINWUBA & ORS V. MORAH (2016) LPELR - 4104 (CA). Moreso, it

was the Counter submission of the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant that
there was appa ren t con t ra d'1ct1on
. .1n the Statement of the Plaintiff/
Respondent in paragraphs 15 and 21 with respect to such
knowledge of the Loan Purchase Agreement or the Plaintiff/
Respondent loan portfolio which appears to have be
en What th
Plaintiff/Respondent sought to set aside in one of the r r e
e iefs sought
by the Plaintiff /Respondent as set out on the face of th .
e Wnt of
summons.

The Learned Counsel to the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant went on t 0,

also, distinguish the heavily relied case of PACERS MUll I

DYNAMICS LIMITED V. THE M.V. DANCING SISTERS, SUPRA, which he

submitted having being cited out of context when the facts of the
two cases at variance with each other and the Plaintiff in the
cited case found not to have locus standi.

On the constitutionality of section 33A of the AMCON

nd
{Amendment No. 2) Act, 2019, the Learned Counsel to the 2
Defendant/ Applicant counter argued that such provisions of the
AMC ON Act is in no way in conflict with section 6 (6} of the
Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 nor does it divest
this Honourable Court from the performance of its judicial function
as contemplated by the Constitution. The Learned Counsel to the
2nd Defendant/ Applicant submitted that the absence of locus
standi of the Plaintiff /Respondent is founded in common law and
not in the section 33A of the AMCON Act, supra, which makes the
decision of the High Court of Lagos State 1n Suit
No:LD/8148CMW/2019 - SHITTU & ANOR V. KNIGHT ROOK LIMITED &
ANOR, inapplicable.

The Learned Counsel to the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant further

referred to the provisions of section 410 of the Companies and
 Allied Matters Act, 1990, to draw inference th
atforsu
Companies and Allied Matters Act having b orred c ch section of
. . ert 0 ·
of persons from presenting a winding up P t· . in classes
e 1t1on it
.
preposterous to suggest that the provisions of the C will be
omponies a
Allied Matters Act are unconstitutional. nd

I was urged to grant the 2nd Defendant/Applicant's motion.

Having gone through -the legal arguments of Counsel, it's my

humble view that issues are joined on the following facts namely:
The competence of this belated motion;

V The locus standi of the Plaintiff/Respondent; and

The constitutionality and applicability of sections
33 and 34 of the AMCON Act.

Before I delve and deal with the above identified issues, let me
gloss over the evidence so far laid before me in favour and

against the instant application.

A critical look at the 21 paragraph Affidavit in Support of this

application suggests that the depositions contained in paragraphs
1S(ii), (iii), 16 (a), (b), (c ), (d), 18 and 19 are legal conclusions and
quite offensive to the provisions of section 115(2) of the Evidence
Act, 2011. They shall accordingly be expunged. Reliance is
placed on APC V ADP & ORS (2021) LPELR-54280 (CA) 15 - PT F-s.

Yet, the facts remain that by the Loan Purchase Agreement

Exhibit AM l, the l st Defendant sold, transferred and assigned
• to
 13

the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant all its right in respect of all credit
facilities granted the Plaintiff /Respondent to which the 2nd
Defendant/ Applicant informed the Plaintiff/Respondent of such
acquisition of the latter's loan portfolio by a letter dated
03/01/2019 (Exhibit AM2). Since the Plaintiff/Respondent is yet to
liquidate the debt, the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant is still in possession
of the title documents in relation to the eligible assets which the
Plaintiff /Respondent itself listed in its Amended Statement of Claim

as:
1. All that property lying, being and situate at Plot
13 Zone L at the Federal Government Layout
at Banana Island Off Onikoyi Road, lkoyi, Lagos.

11. All that property lying, being and situate at Plot 14,
Zone L at the Federal Government Layout at
Banana Island, Off Onikoyi Road, lkoyi, Lagos.

111. All that property lying, being and situate at Plot 13

Zone Lat the Federal Government Layout at
Banana Island, Off Onikoyi, Road, lkoyi, Lagos.

1v. All that property lying, being and situate at Plot 13

Zone L at the Federal Government Layout B '
Island, Off Onikoyi Road, lkoyi, Lagos. anana

For the Counter Affidavit of the Plaintiff /R

espondent, let me agree
with the submission of the Learned Cou t
. nse I o the 2nd Defendant/
Applicant that the depositions made b th . .
Y e Plaintiff /Respondent
in paragraphs 15 and 21 are contradict
ory. The law on thi . t.
clear and laudable that "contradictio d s poin is
n efeats the inter t O f
party, it is a house divided with its If . es a
e , it cannot 5t
INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF UNITED VISIO and. See:
NARY YOUTH OF NIGERIA
~
-
?L..
V SU
·
KUBO (2021) LPELR 52916 (CA) 39E
·
the 2 depositions of the Plaintiff/Re
In the .
instant
7.,
circumstance spondent stat d
(p aragraph 15) that it only became e
\n one brea dth aware of the
fer of its loan Account with the 1st Def
purported trans . endant to
nt/Applicant v1de the letter of the 2nd Def
the 2nd Defen d a . . . endant /
. t ·t (Exhibit OS/2) which 1t received on the same d t
Applicant o I ae
i.e. 0310112019 . Yet, in another breadth, (Paragraph 21 ) the
Plaintiff/Respondent stated having become aware of the
agreement between the Defendants regarding its loan when it
was served with the instant motion on 04/03/2020. Since
knowledge appears to be material to the fact in issue that the
instant application ought not be granted; and since the Plaintiff/
Respondent was not aware of any Loan Purchase Agreement
between the Defendants at the time of filing this suit, such
contradiction in the Counter Affidavit becomes material.

Furthermore, I observe that paragraphs 24(i), (ii) and (iii), 25, 26

and 27 of the Counter Affidavit are replete with legal arguments
and conclusions which are offensive to the provisions of section
115(2) of the Evidence Act, supra. They are, thus, hereby
expunged. See: ODEY V. ALAGA & ORS (2021) LPELR _ 53408 (SC)
63 - 64E·B.

Yet, the fact remains for the Plaintiff/Respondent th t ·t

a I never had
any loan balance transferable to the 2nd O f d
. . e en ant/ Applicant
having fully repaid the credit facility of N8 B·ir
I ion and the interest
thereon between 2008 and 2013 which the 1st D f
e endant failed to
produce Statement of Account of even a .
ga1nst the judgment of
 15

the High Court of Lagos State in Suit No:LD/402CMW/2018 -

YORKSHIRE LIMITED V. SKYE BANK PLC.

For the Reply Affidavit of the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant, I observe

that paragraphs 9, 11 , 12 and 13 thereof are replete with legal
conclusions and prayer which offend the provisions of section
115(2) of the Evidence Act, supra, and shall on the strength of the
holding of the Supreme Court holding in BAMAIYI V. THE STATE
(2001) 4 SC (Pt. 1) 18 @ 29 as rightly referred to in LAGOS STATE
GOVERNMENT & ANOR V. NDIC & ORS (2020) LPELR - 49781 (CA) 15
- 17A-c, such offending paragraphs shall be expunged.

Yet, the facts as maintained in the Reply Affidavit suggest that the
nd
Plaintiff/Respondent is still indebted to the 2 Defendant/
Applicant by virtue of the Loan Purchase Agreement dated
30/11/2018 which the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant notified the
Plaintiff/Respondent vide letter dated 03/01/2019.

Having analyzed the facts as placed before me let me proceed

to resolve the issues joined.

As regards the competence of the belated motion of the 2nd

Defendant/Respondent, I find issues not joined as to the fact that
the instant Motion on Notice of the 2nd Defendant/ Applicant that
was filed on 04/03/2020, was filed outside the 30 day period
prescribed under Order 29 Rule 4(a) of the Federal High Court Civil
Procedure Rules 2019. Such Motion on Notice of the 2nd
Defendant/ Applicant was filed almost 11 months after the 2nd
 Defendant/
, Applicant had filed a Conditio no 1 Memorandu
Appearance. rn of

If maY, then, ask what is the effect of filing such 0 belated

I
rocess? contrary to the submission of the Plaintiff/Re spondent
P t such a belated process constitutes an abuse of court Process
tha
and liable to be dismissed, the Extant Rules of this court treats
same as mere irregularity that may simply attract suspending
hearing of same till the conclusion of a trial. For ease of reference
the relevant portion of the Rules i.e. Order 29, provides:

t 11
1. Where a Defendant wises to-
(a) dispute the court's Jurisdiction to try the claim; or

(bl argue that the court should not

exercise its jurisdiction

he may apply to the Court for an order declaring

that it lacks the jurisdiction or should not
exercise any Jurisdiction which II may have and
the court may take the application with the
Plaintiff's substantive suit in so far as the substantive
suit does not involve the taking of oral evidence.

4. An application under this order shall be -

(a) made within 30 days after service on the

defendant of the originating process; and
' A'

5. where the defendant.. .. does not make

such an application within the period specified
in rule 4 of this Order, the application can onl
be taken at the conclusion of the trial." y
 17

cursor)' look at the provisions of the sa1'd Order 29

A . C rt . t b of the
uies of thts .ou JUS a ove quoted and ·th
w1 respect t relevant
0
R
at hand suggest to me that: the issue

The penalty for late filing of objection to

the court's jurisdiction is that such objection is to b
taken at the conclusion of the trial; and. e
11

In the context of the use of the phrase can •••

only be taken ... " without the use of the traditional

words of either "may" or "shall", appears to me to
be more of a directory than mandatory.

In this context and in consideration of the circumstance of this

case, I do not think delaying this matter that was filed since
15/04/19 for hearing to conclude before this Honourable Court
hear and take a decision on whether it's jurisdictionally
competent to continue with any proceeding in this matter would
be more injurious to our judicial space and time if turns out at the
later part of the day that the whole exercise is done in futility and
without jurisdiction. See: IDOMI V. ABAYA & ORS (2021) LPELR -

55681 (CA) 5-7D.

With ease, I resolve this issue that the 2nd Defendant/Applicant is

not only competent to have brought this Motion on Notice to
dispute the Court's jurisdiction at a time the sa·,d M o t·ion was filed
.
but
. this Honourable Court is also compete nt to t ake this
. Motion
. at,
this stage of the trial given the circumstance 0 f th·1s case.

As regards the constitutionality and applic a b'l't

' ' Y of sectio 33
the AMCON (Amendment No . 2) Ac,t 2019, let me be n . A bof
gin y
 18

reproducing the said section for ea

se of ref
t. erence
provides tho . . The sec:tion
"No action or proceedings shall lie b ·
I e
Instituted or maintainable against the c
.
or any of Its direc tors or officers orporatlo n
by reason
acquisition of an eI.191"bl e bank asset by theon IY of
Corporation under this Act, and any action or
proceeding already existing shall cease and
abate except where the eligible bank asset
become vested in the corporation as specified
under this Act."

In my humble opinion what's clear, plain and unambiguous from

the wordings of the said section 33A of the AMCON (Amendment
No. 2 Act, supra is that litigations are proscribed against the
Corporation for acquisition of eligible bank asset. See:
TRANSMISSION COMPANY OF (NIGERIA) PLC V. MOBANK SERVICES
LIMITED (2021) LPELR - 55723 (CA) 10 - 11 F-E.

If I may, then, ask does such proscription qualifies to being

draconian, odious and unconstitutional? In my humble view, I
answer this in the negative. It's trite law that the right of access to
civil Courts can be ousted by statute. (See: WAHAB & ANOR V.
ALIYU (2015) LPELR - 40395 (CA) l 9C·E); even though courts will be
reluctant to allow such provisions of enactment to be read in such
a way as to deny access to court by a citizen pursuant to sections
6(6) and 36(1) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria
1999 (See: FIDELITY BANK PLC V. MONYE & ORS (2012) LPELR - 7819
(SC) 34C·D).
 I
19

1
yet , in the context . of the said section 33 A o f the AMCON A t
uch statutory dental of the Plaintiff /Respondent to access the
c ·
S
court is qualified to the followings:
The claim touching on an eligible bank
asset as acquired by the Corporation: and

The claim not falling within the vested asset

·.RR.R.)
r as specified under the Act. (for such exception
of vested assets elaborate provisions were 726
made under sections 34 (1 ), (a), (b), (c ), (6), (7)
of the said Act which makes such denial of
access not absolute.

1am thus, of the humble view that section 33A of the AMCON Act.

supra, is in no way in conflict with the provisions of section 6 (6) of

the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, supra.

As to whether the said section 33A of the AMCON Act. supra, is

applicable in the instant circumstance, I with ease found the
Relief (fl as sought by the Plaintiff/Respondent on the face of the
Writ of Summons in head on collision with1 the provisions of the said

section 33A of the AMCON Act, supra.

For ease of ref erence, Iet me reproduce the said Relief

11 lf) An Order setting aside the purported
agreement between the 1st D f d
and 2nd Defendant w . e en ant
purported t . herein the 1st Defendant
existing lo o assign _the Plaintiff's non
an portfoho to the 2nd Defendant."

In my h um bl e view since th .
t t e instant suit
ea ure that touches o th was instituted with a
n e acquisition of the eli gi"bl e bank asset
 20

nd
by the 2 Defendant/ Applicant,
on issue th
proscribed under section 33A of the said AMco at has been
the said provisions of section 33A of the N. Act ' th·is makes
said AMca
applicable and the suit not maintainable. N Act

As a corollary to the above findings that section A f

33 o the
AMCON Act is applicable in the instant matter to make th· .
1s suit
not maintainable I simply found that the Plaintiff/Respondenl
ought not to have instituted this suit in the first place for the
Plaintiff/Respondent had no legal capacity as at the time when
he filed same. It's trite law that where there is want of locus standi,
it goes to the jurisdiction of the Court, as same denies the Court
the requisite jurisdictional competence. See: ECOBANK NIGERIA
LIMTIED V. ANCHORAGE LEISURES LIMITED & ORS (2020) LPELR -
52128 (CA) 44c-F.

On the final note having resolved that the belated Motion on

Notice of the 2nd Defendant/Applicant is competent, and th e

Provisions of section 33A of the AMCON Act, supra, is applicable

th
in is instant matter alongside the Plaintiff /Respondent having no

locus to institute the instant action, I find that this Honourable

Court is jurisdictionally incompetent to have proceed further wi th

this matter.
 21
-
thUS, decline jurisdiction and this matter shall accordingly be
1
. . sed not only against the 2nd Defendant who is a necessa
, d1srn1s ry
but wholly terminates.
po rtY

This is mY Ruling.
11")
HON. JUSTICE T. G. RINGIM
JUDGE
19/1/2022

Ruling read and delivered in open court.

APPEARANCE:
Plaintiff represented by Yomi Adesida, Director

1st Defendant absent

2nd Defendant represented by

Mohammed Usman Legal Officer

G. M. 0. Oguntade (SAN), with him Gbenga Ajala, Esq

learned counsel for the Plaintiff

Oluwahuwa Sonni-Lawal, Esq, learned counsel

for the 1st Defendant

~l;m~~De Sfholabami, Esq, learned counsel for

2 e endant