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International Security Politics Prof. Chris Ritter April 27, 2011
Intelligence has been an important feature of war since before the time of Alexander the Great. On his vast campaign that established his empire, Alexander relied on a strategy of divide and conquer, which is dependent on regional intelligence that provides an accurate strategic picture complete with the strengths and weaknesses of adversaries. The Roman Empire included several categories of reconnaissance troops that provided valuable tactical intelligence while on the campaign.1 Today the United States has satellites, radars, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at its disposal to collect intelligence. Images and other data collected by these platforms are transmitted to a communications satellite which is then sent, possibly via a relay satellite, to a ground station, all practically in real time.2 Similarly impressive, Special Operations Forces (SOF) that identify enemy combatants can communicate with the command center to request an airstrike, provide specific coordinates to a B-52 bomber using Global Positioning System, and within 20 minutes of locating enemy forces precision-guided munitions will fall from the sky on their precise location.3 The advent of these capabilities is now referred to as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), although this is a bit of a misnomer as there have been several periods in military history referred to with this or another similar moniker. Many of these ³revolutions´ have had significant implications for intelligence whether it is new reconnaissance platforms like airplanes during World War I (WWI) or advances in communications like the radio during World War II (WWII).New capabilities allowed for better and faster intelligence collection, which was crucial given the changing nature of warfare following these revolutions. WWI saw the end of cavalry as
Keegan, John. Intelligence in War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003. 7-9 Ferris, John. "A New American Way of War? C4ISR, Intelligence and Information Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom : A Provisional Assessment." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (2003): 155-174. 3 Chizek, Judy G. "Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance." Congressional Research Service. 21
machine guns easily repelled their charges; WWII refined the mechanized warfare introduced in WWI and as a result trench warfare became virtually obsolete.4 Much like how previous revolutions in military affairs changed the nature of conflict, the current revolution in military affairs has transformed how wars are fought. Modern militaries now rely on advanced C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems to provide instantaneous information throughout the battlespace as well as allow the complex coordination of various capabilities. The success of the United States in this regard during the opening campaign Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates the potency of the new technologies.5 However, the U.S. military does not operate in a vacuum; the enemies of the United States have adapted to fighting against a technologically advanced adversary by using asymmetric tactics. As a result, it seems that modern conflicts consist of either modern militaries with advanced C4ISR networks fighting fast limited wars or asymmetric conflicts in which the weaker side uses tactics designed to limit the effectiveness of the advanced C4ISR networks.6 The relationship between revolutions in military affairs and the nature of conflict was explored by Thomas Hammes in his book The Sling and the Stone. New developments in society and technology led to new forms of conflict divided into what he called ³generations of warfare.´ The fourth generation of warfare, the one that is currently ongoing, is concerned with the necessity of operating on the political will of the adversary directly.7
O'Hanlon, Michael. "Can High Technology Bring U. S. Troops Home?." Foreign Policy 113 (1999): 72-86. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149234. 5 Ferris, John. "A New American Way of War? C4ISR, Intelligence and Information Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom : A Provisional Assessment." 165-7 6 Pirnie, Bruce R., and Edward O'Connell. Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003 2006). Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, 2008. 5-9 7 Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone. 51-3
This concept offers an explanation for why some modern conflicts are less technologically-driven than wars during the middle of the 20th century. Enemies of the United States face an adversary that is highly advanced and capable of rapid power projection; facing U.S. forces in a conventional manner, as Iraq tried to do during the First Gulf War, can spell defeat in a manner of days or weeks. This leaves insufficient time for U.S. adversaries to operate on the political will of the United States while exposing their own political bases to the United States. An alternative is to resort to asymmetric tactics which drag out a conflict and present a variety of new challenges for the United States to face, such as counterinsurgency (COIN), nation-building, and regime maintenance. The revolution in military affairs that transformed intelligence into a component of the integrated C4ISR network has now resulted in conflicts in which intelligence must play a vastly different role. Satellite surveillance that provides target location information for precision-guided munitions has little value in a COIN operation in the center of a city. Investigating the new role of intelligence will benefit from briefly tracing the evolution of its role in the previous generations of warfare; intelligence has generally become a more complicated endeavor over time as intelligence requirements grew more complex with each subsequent generation of warfare. Once the precise role of intelligence in the fourth generation of warfare is understood, the missions necessary to fulfill this role can be examined and applied to the current conflict in Iraq. The First Three Generations of Warfare The first generation of warfare was brought about by the advent of two key developments: the invention of gunpowder, and reliable firearms to use it, and the creation of nation-states capable of supporting massive conscripted armies. Both of these developments took hundreds of
years to reach fruition. Gunpowder itself was not a new technology by the time of Napoleon, the height of the first generation of warfare, but firearms capable of harnessing the power of gunpowder consistently were fairly new. Nation-states required a host of developments including the end of feudalism, increased wealth, and the advent of nationalism. Warfare of this generation consisted of massing direct fire against the enemy¶s forces in pitched battles.8 The role of intelligence in this generation was fairly simple. Commanders had two basic intelligence requirements: the location of the enemy and the lie of the land. Scouts were the primary means of fulfilling these requirements. Due to the constraints created by distance and the lack of long range communication, little more could be expected of intelligence providers than those two basic questions. Often times even these requirements were not met and golden opportunities missed.9 Second generation warfare was brought about by the rapid industrialization of Europe and North America. Industrialization led to an increase in wealth and the growth of industry necessary to mass produce new weaponry, and the introduction of railways, telegraphs, and radio that vastly improved the logistics capabilities of states. WWI epitomized second generation warfare. Massive armies supplied by the industrial might of the states faced each other in the trenches of Europe. Long range artillery, made possible by reconnaissance provided by aircraft communicated through telegraphs, was massed against enemy positions instead of the direct fire experienced in the previous generation of warfare.10 The role of intelligence expanded in this generation of warfare to include theater awareness. It was no longer sufficient for commanders to know the location of enemy troops, in fact, the cruel irony of trench warfare was knowing precisely where the enemy is without being
Ibid. 16-8 Keegan, John. Intelligence in War. 13-7 10 Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone. 18-22
able to do much about it. Likewise, the battlefield was often readily apparent to the commanders. Now commanders needed to know where the enemy¶s railways, telegraph lines, and supplies were located as well as the plans of the enemy so reinforcements and artillery could be directed as needed. Intelligence services began accomplishing this last requirement through their nascent signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities, which basically consisted of eavesdropping and cryptology.11 Advances in communications equipment, aviation, armor, artillery, and motor transport and the fully-fledged industrial societies capable of producing those capabilities in large numbers led to the third generation of warfare which was embodied in WWII. The blitzkrieg tactics of Nazi Germany were only possible because of these advances; the same is true of the large-scale naval battles of the Pacific Theater and the amphibious assaults on Sicily and Normandy. Battles during WWII were far more complex in terms of capabilities due to the combined-arms tactics in which ground, air, and maritime forces fought jointly. The focus of the war shifted again with the new generation of war; the industrial might of the state was the chief enabler of combined-arms operations and thus became the focus of enemy operations. Strategic bombing of industrial and population centers became widespread practices as both sides sought to undercut the other¶s capability to continue the fight.12 Once again the role of intelligence expanded. The earlier missions still needed to be fulfilled; theater awareness was still crucial to winning battles. The Battle of Midway, a narrow but critically important victory, was won in part by the ability of the United States to intercept and decode Japanese transmissions which revealed the plan to seize Midway as a staging area for
Kahn, David. "The Rise of Intelligence." Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006): 125-134. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032075. 12 Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone. 23-8
attacks on Hawaii.13Nevertheless, the role of intelligence expanded to now include the responsibility of locating strategic targets like factories, refineries, and even the site of Germany¶s V-1 and V-2 program.14 The Fourth Generation of Warfare ± Political Terrain Mapping The biggest transformation that led to the fourth generation of warfare was the advancement of information technology. Information can be transmitted around the globe virtually instantaneously. This has allowed a growth of the number of international actors besides states as organizations can have their voices heard on a variety of media. Information is now widely accessible, even to citizens of developing countries albeit less so than for citizens of developed countries.15 One other factor has played a crucial role in the formulation of the fourth generation of warfare: nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have effectively prevented developed countries from fighting total wars like WWI and WWII because the potential costs are too high. As a result, wars between developed countries have been of a much smaller scale and the focus is no longer on destroying an adversary¶s industrial capacity.16 Rather these conflicts are fought to influence the political willpower of the people. Hammes argues that it was this realization by Mao Zedong, and the strategy that he developed following that realization, that led Mao and Chinese Communist Party to victory during the Chinese Civil War.17Simply put, conflict in the fourth generation of warfare is about the imposition of political will on others, which heralds back to
Keegan, John. Intelligence in War. 191-220 Ibid. 275-85 15 Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone. 38-40 16 Keegan, John. Intelligence in War. 295-6 17 Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone. 47-8
Karl von Clausewitz¶s argument that war is used to achieve political ends.18 Ultimately, whether these political ends are achieved through winning hearts and minds or by imposing a cost deemed too high to resist, conflict in the fourth generation is focused on the political will of the people. This leads to the biggest evolution of the role of intelligence in warfare. In the previous generations of warfare, intelligence was responsible for enabling operations that achieve the objectives of the conflict. During the first generation this meant simply providing the location of the enemy whereas the third generation required providing information about strategic targets like industrial sites. If conflict in the fourth generation of warfare is concerned with the political landscape of the people, then intelligence will need to map the political terrain of the conflict. This is a fundamentally different mission than those seen in previous generations of warfare. Moreover, the previous missions are still important requirements that need to be met. There are several ways for intelligence to fulfill this new mission that will be considered here: intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), community intelligence, and human intelligence (HUMINT). Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace IPB is an analytical framework for assessing the various important factors, such as terrain, threat, area of operations (AO), and associated areas of interest (AOI). Although it is currently limited by assumptions regarding the types of threats and likely AOs U.S. forces will encounter, this analytical tool could be valuable when considering the political aspects of the battlespace. IPB has four steps: define the battlespace, describe the battlespace¶s effects, evaluate the threat,
von Clausewitz, Carl. What Is War? In On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret 75-89. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
and develop enemy courses of action (COAs). Each of these steps is valuable for mapping the political terrain of a conflict.19 The first step of IPB is defining the battlespace. This may sound like a simple task, but actually can rapidly become a complicated endeavor. The point of this step is to identify specific aspects of the AO that will influence the COAs available to commanders. Including politically important features, such as infrastructure, religious centers, etc., as areas of interest to ensure that they receive due consideration could prevent insensitivity and mitigate backlash against operations.20 Describing the battlespace¶s effects, the second step of IPB, deals with features of the battlespace that may influence the success of operations. In the typical understanding, this would include information about the weather and terrain of the battlespace. While these are of course important features of the battlespace to consider, operations in fourth generation conflicts should also include population analysis. Basic statistical data as well as cultural intelligence and any other aspects of the population that may influence success need to be considered. One particularly beneficial inclusion to make would be perception analysis. Perception analysis examines how actions will likely be interpreted by the local population, an important consideration when trying to influence the population¶s political will.21A dilemma does arise from this consideration: the time-sensitivity of intelligence about enemy location and plans encourages a fast and often overwhelming response, but this is likely to upset local populations that have to endure these responses and bear the cost of collateral damage.
Medby, Jamison J., and Russell W. Glenn. Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation for the Battlefield for Urban Operation. Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, 2002. xvii - xix 20 Ibid. 40-1 21 Ibid. 51-5
The third step of IPB is to evaluate the threat. The normal analytical approach is to examine known adversaries based on the assumption that its doctrine and tactics are known. This can cause two problems. First, this approach engenders assumptions about the behavior of the enemy because it forces categorization based on supposed doctrine and tactics, a dangerous habit in any conflict but particularly treacherous when fighting in an asymmetric conflict. Second, in asymmetric conflicts there is a good chance that enemies will remain unknown; evaluating only the threats that doctrinal and tactical information can be provided for does little to help locate the unknown threats of a region. Defining threats based instead on interests and capabilities not only provides a means to try to find unknown enemies, but it also reinforces the concept of fourth generation conflicts being fought to achieve political ends.22 The final step of the IPB is to develop enemy COAs. The reasoning behind this concept is that creating a list of potential COAs and then proceeding to use collected intelligence to disprove possible COAs is analytically more rigorous and less likely to succumb to the confirmation bias of the analyst. An analyst that considers a single COA at a time will subconsciously try to fit evidence to confirm that his hypothesis is accurate while disregarding any evidence that contradicts the hypothesis. The practice of disproving hypotheses was developed by Richards Heuer and is known as the analysis of competing hypotheses. The better the analysis of enemy COAs, the better prepared U.S. forces will be to defend against the potential threats.23 Community Intelligence In the United Kingdom, authorities faced a severe lack of operable intelligence for counter-terrorism. Highlighting the shortage of intelligence was the fact that many of the
Ibid. 89-94 Ibid. 123-6
counter-terrorism cases it was pursuing were originating from neighborhoods that were not at all expected of harboring terrorists; the lack of intelligence was not just at the tactical level (individual cases) but permeated to a strategic level (sources of possible terrorists).24 A study of the issue made two conclusions about why counter-terrorism intelligence was in such a poor state. First, police agencies¶ efforts were not widespread enough to acquire a complete picture of the situation that was being faced. Part of the cause of this behavior is that police agencies are adept at using known intelligence sources, but are far less skilled at searching out new sources of intelligence. Second, police agencies are over-reliant on ³professional´ (i.e. criminally-connected) police informants. Like the first conclusion, this is partially due to the expertise police agencies have in using known intelligence sources. There is also the association of ³professional´ informants with higher credibility and better quality intelligence.25 The study proposed the solution of community intelligence. Community intelligence is a strategy of engagement with local communities to utilize the groups or ³communities´ found in the cities as information networks. These networks are inherently widespread and are much more attuned to the nuances of the various communities in their local area, a skill that the police forces lack. The police agencies seek out community leaders to make these connections. Two results ideally occur. First, the entire computer becomes an intelligence network that feeds information, not just about terrorism, to the police agency via the relationship developed with the community leader. Second, information can be spread to the community from the police to counteract rumors and misinformation.26
Innes, Martin. "Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic Policing." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 605 (2006): 222-241. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097806. 25 Ibid. 230 26 Ibid. 232
Community intelligence is not limited to just counter-terrorism, but would have applications in COIN and development missions as well. The nuanced intelligence that communities could provide would potentially be incredibly valuable for three reasons. First, U.S. forces do not have the intimate knowledge of the local area or the people and as a result insurgents hiding within neighborhoods could for all pragmatic reasons be invisible to U.S. forces. The community, assuming it does not wish to directly support the insurgents, will be far more likely to notice strangers and strange behavior. Second, community intelligence provides a mechanism for communities to convey their needs to U.S. forces. Meeting these needs would be an important reciprocal action to build up trust with the community, which is necessary for strategic relationships to work, and would also help win ³minds and hearts.´ As the strategic relationship deepens, the members of the community will likely be more and more inclined share information and become invested in the U.S. mission. Third, it provides a way for U.S. forces to share information to community members through the trusted channel of community leaders. This is beneficial because it can help counteract the propaganda of the terrorist and insurgent groups. Preventing propaganda victories for an insurgency or terrorist cell is just as critical as victories on the battlefield when the focus of conflict is the political will of the people.27 Of course, for the community intelligence arrangement to work, mutual trust must be established.28 Human Intelligence
Jackson, Brian A. "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a 'Long War': The British Experience in Northern Ireland." Military Review(2007): 74-85. 28 Innes, Martin. "Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic Policing." 232-4
HUMINT is nothing new to warfare; in fact, it¶s the oldest form of intelligence there is and has been around as long as there has been war and conflict.29Nevertheless, given the nature of asymmetric conflicts, HUMINT offers the best potential of acquiring detailed intelligence about the location and plans of the adversaries of the United States. Enemies are not operating from base camps but rather from within the local population, severely reducing the effectiveness of U.S. IMIGINT capabilities. Insurgents and terrorists quickly learned good signals tradecraft to counter U.S. SIGINT or were captured.30 This does not play to the strengths of U.S. intelligence capabilities. U.S. intelligence for most of the second half of the 20th century was designed to collect intelligence about the Soviet Union. The difficulty of running HUMINT operations behind the Iron Curtain led the United States to rely on its other intelligence arms, in particular SIGINT and IMIGINT. Moreover, what HUMINT capabilities the United States does have were also focused on the Soviet Union; HUMINT operators with expertise on the Middle East are a limited commodity.31 Currently the United States is taking steps to bolster its HUMINT capabilities. Military units with intelligence training are being deployed with ³front-line´ troops and SOF have been used to a great extent for reconnaissance and tactical intelligence collection. Once collected, this intelligence is exploited, analyzed, and shared. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is developing a HUMINT database to facilitate access to valuable HUMINT.32 Iraq Before delving into the specifics of the asymmetric conflict taking place between the United States and various insurgency groups, it is important to point out an analytical lapse that
Keegan, John. Intelligence in War. 7 Jones, Seth G. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, 2008. 99-100 31 Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009. 90-103 32 Chizek, Judy G. "Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance." 24-5
appears to be plaguing much of the discussion about COIN, namely that COIN operations are on the whole treated as being the same problem regardless of differences in population, conditions before the insurgency, and the challenges that must be overcome. Overlooking differences like these leads to false conclusions about what strategies and tactics will and will not work in COIN operations. This is not to say that there are no important lessons to be learned from Vietnam that can be applied to Iraq or Afghanistan, but it is analytically lazy to lump all three conflicts together just because they involved fighting insurgencies. A complete discussion of the role of intelligence in the COIN in Iraq goes far beyond the scope of this paper, but two important aspects must be covered by intelligence when mapping the political terrain of Iraq that would be a key enabler of successful COIN operations: population groups by interests and the conditions before Operation: Iraqi Freedom began, namely repressive state that brutally stomped out dissension. Lastly, how community intelligence can be a valuable tool in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people will be discussed. Combatants It is easy to simplify the conflict in Iraq by dividing combatants into two broad groups: U.S. and allied forces and the insurgency. Doing so misses the complexity of the several different groups that have different goals and interests that they pursue. If the fourth generation of warfare is about acting on the political will of the adversary, then the United States intelligence system needs to provide an accurate picture of the political motivations of all combatant groups. This follows the model of IPB that has been expanded to include interestbased threat evaluations based on population information. The Kurds are primarily motivated by a desire for autonomy. Their loyalty belongs to Kurdistan, a geo-cultural area with territory that spans Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and not to
Iraq. This has not prevented them from taking positions in the Iraqi government, although it appears that this is motivated out of a desire to protect the autonomy they currently enjoy and out of a politically astute decision that it is wise to be involved with the big game in town. Nevertheless, the Kurds, or at least a subset of them, continue to participate in separatist activities in Turkey meant to further the realization of their ultimate goal of the formation of Kurdistan.33 Sunni Arab insurgents are fighting to oust the United States from Iraq and remove the Iraqi government. The interests that motivate this desire vary and in some cases are difficult to determine as there is no clear leadership or overarching organization for the Sunni insurgents. Some insurgents have negotiated with the United States and Iraqi government and have disarmed following fulfillment of some political demands, such as the dissolution of Shi¶ite militias. Other insurgents seem highly unlikely to ever negotiate or cease fighting. Important to note is that not all Sunni Arabs support the insurgents and political participation has risen dramatically among Sunni Arabs.34 Violent extremists only represent approximately 10% of the active fighters in Iraq, but the scale of violence in their attacks gives them disproportionate influence and attention. Most extremists appear to be motivated by sectarian discord and anti-West sentiments. Unlike the Sunni Arab insurgents, the extremists do not appear to desire any kind of control or political power in Iraq, not surprising given that large portions of these extremists are foreign fighters. Using terrorist tactics such as suicide bombs, they attack crowded Shi¶ite gatherings like
Pirnie, Bruce R., and Edward O'Connell. Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003 2006). 24-5 Ibid. 25-8
weddings, markets, and even mosques. Like the more intransigent insurgents, it is highly unlikely that individuals in this group will negotiate or agree to cease fighting.35 There are two primary Shi¶ite militia groups: the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Mahdi Army. Smaller Shi¶ite militias also exist; these groups are formed out of security concerns caused by Sunni insurgents and extremists. SCIRI and the Mahdi Army maintain an uneasy truce as both seek to further their own ends. SCIRI has become the chief political party for Shi¶ite Arabs and supports the Iraqi government. The Mahdi Army is Islamic and opposed to the U.S. presence in Iraq and wants U.S. forces to withdraw although it too has a presence in the government which provides funding and jobs for members of the Mahdi Army. Small militias would likely be willing to disband if convinced of their safety. SCIRI works with the United States. The Mahdi Army¶s interests place it in a position where negotiation and cooperation are unlikely.36 The last groups to be discussed are the criminal organizations responsible for drugs, smuggling, arms sales, and basically any illegal venture that bears a profit. These groups are interested solely in making a profit. The ongoing conflict provides them with a variety of moneymaking endeavors so it is in their best interest to continue to enable the various groups mentioned above to continue fighting.37 If U.S. forces evaluate the threats represented by these various groups by doctrine and tactics, most of these groups will be lumped together under the term ³insurgents.´ Doing so would be a grave mistake. Some of these groups will be intractable and violent conflict will be inevitable and continuous. Some of these groups, however, can be approached by appealing to their interests and conflict can be avoided. The United States has already done this to an extent;
Ibid. 28-30 Ibid. 31-32 37 Ibid. 32
for example, the Kurds enjoyed a great deal of autonomy during the invasion of Iraq as their militia, the PeshMerga, was recognized as a legitimate militia and the United States gained an ally.38 Conditions Before Operation: Iraqi Freedom Saddam Hussein imposed a Sunni Arab-dominated dictatorship that controlled every aspect of society. His regime viciously stamped out revolts by both the Kurds and the Shi¶ites. He also embroiled Iraq into disastrous wars with Iran and NATO forces following an invasion of Kuwait. Infrastructure suffered and the economy was distorted by massive subsidies for basic essentials under his corrupt government. His regime was toppled following a rapid campaign by the United States and its allies in which only sporadic resistance was offered.39 On the face of it, it seems reasonable of the United States and its allies to expect a warm welcome, and for a brief window that was the case. Very quickly the situation deteriorated with looting and riots although the insurgency did not begin in earnest until the fall of 2003.40 The United States suffered a rude awakening about the situation of Iraq that was caused by missing important aspects of Iraq that political terrain mapping might have avoided. Better intelligence leads to better informed decision-making and a more realistic understanding of what to expect during a conflict. First, following the First Gulf War, Shi¶ites in southern Iraq revolted with the encouragement of the United States. Hussein ruthlessly put down the revolt, even going so far as to cause an ecological disaster by draining the marshes between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The United States did nothing to prevent the brutal suppression of the revolt, and as a result
Ibid. 22-25 Ibid. 2-6 40 Ibid. 9
Shi¶ite Arabs came to distrust the United States.41 This distrust now undermines U.S. efforts in COIN and nation-building in Iraq. Analysis of the political interests of Shi¶ite Arabs and previous interaction with this group would likely have drawn attention to the mistrust Shi¶ites had for the United States. Second, it seems that the United States greatly underestimated the difficulty of forming a government that would be acceptable to Sunni Arabs, Shi¶ite Arabs, and Kurds. It is possible that part of this underestimation is the result of Hussein¶s effective albeit brutal repression of sectarian violence. Another possible cause is that the Kurds had relative autonomy in the northwest Iraq and this dampened their efforts to revolt against Hussein¶s regime. In any case, an evaluation of the various actors in Iraq as determined by interests would have quickly indicated that conflict between the groups was not only likely but would be difficult to resolve. Community Intelligence in Iraq In an article examining the British experience in Northern Ireland, Brian A. Jackson extrapolates several lessons for COIN in Iraq. Two of these recommendations are joined under the header of ³low-grade intelligence,´ that is intelligence that when aggregated provides an accurate picture of the insurgency. The first is that every soldier should be a collector of intelligence and the second is that U.S. forces should think ³people first,´ basically that the local population can be an excellent source of intelligence. This approach makes troops more effective as they gain familiarity with an area. It also allows locals the opportunity to become familiar with the troops, which led to the realization by the troops,³that the way a battalion behaved made a big difference to its overall success. Toughness was acceptable; roughness was not.´ Asthe
relationship between the two developed over time, locals would provide intelligence that the soldiers never would have had access to otherwise.42 Community intelligence mirrors this approach. As soldiers develop strategic relationships with community leaders, they also become familiar with the community. Repeated exposure to a community creates a baseline of experience that can foster similar realizations about the value of respectable behavior like those British troops had in Northern Ireland. Moreover, it can result in intelligence being collected that U.S. forces would never have had access to otherwise. Locals know what is and what is not normal for the community. Likewise, they know who and who is not from around the area; that can be significant intelligence considering most violent extremists are foreign fighters.43 Community intelligence provides a source of intelligence that helps protect not only U.S. troops but also the people of Iraq. Protecting Iraqi citizens from suicide bombers and developing actual relationships will go far in winning hearts and minds. Conclusion The Revolution in Military Affairs has brought about the fourth generation of warfare in which conflict is focused on the political will of the combatants. U.S. intelligence services have always had to evolve with the new generations of warfare and the latest was no exception. In order for U.S. intelligence services to enable U.S. forces to effectively fight its adversaries, they must provide political terrain mapping that reveals the interests that the adversaries of the United States. The COIN operation in Iraq demonstrates that failures to fully understand why combatants are fighting can lead to wasted effort and costly mistakes. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace, community intelligence, and a renewed HUMINT program are the new mission
Jackson, Brian A. "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a 'Long War': The British Experience in Northern Ireland." 77-
9 Innes, Martin. "Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic 229-34 and Pirnie, Bruce R., and Edward O'Connell. Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003 2006).28
of U.S. intelligence services meeting the intelligence requirements of a U.S. military involved in fourth generation conflicts.
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