: Facts: A lot with an area of 17,311 sq.m. situated in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna and 20 meters from the shore of Laguna de Bay; was purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on 19 April 1909. The Deed of Sale evidencing said purchase is duly recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The land was declared for tax purposes beginning the year 1918, and the realty taxes thereon had been paid since 1948. When Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's share in the inheritance. Santos del Rio filed his application for registration of said parcel on 9 May 1966. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by private oppositors, petitioners. Petitioner Director of Lands claims that the land sought to be registered is part of the public domain and therefore not registerable. The CFI Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals, setting aside that of the trial court. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of said decision. Issue: Whether the parcel of land in question is a public land. Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment affirmed from, and ordered the registration of the land described in the application in favor of Santos del Rio, applicant private respondent. The Director of Lands claimed that since a portion of the land sought to be registered is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at least, a foreshore land, which brings it within the enumeration in Art. 502 of the New Civil Code quoted above and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration. However, the extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, as follows: The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth. The phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above definition has been interpreted in the case of Government of P.I. vs. Colegio de San Jose to be the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year." As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources. Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title.

The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Alagads from selling. been foreshore land reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna de Bay. on the other hand. disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the area.42 hectare northwestern portion on end of Lot 1 is concerned. or pools is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth. If the submergence.: Facts: On 11 October 1951.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2. where the rise in water level is due to the extraordinary action of nature. Demetrio. filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga. Issue: Whether the properties in question are foreshore lands. or Lot 2.8421 hectares. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion. No. was issued in the names of the Alagads. The natural bed or basin of lakes. of the land is due to precipitation. Held: Under Article 74 of the Law of Waters. insofar as the 1. and Antonio.1263 hectares. it does not become foreshore. which occurs always or most of the time during the year« Otherwise. mortgaging. A foreshore land. which sustained the trial court for failure to show in the record on appeal that the appeal was perfected on time. Carmen. and land capable of registration as private property. Librada. was declared public land.R. J. contending that said portion had since time immemorial. dated 18 October 1956. 1989 SARMIENTO. namely. ALAGAD G. continuously. despite its proximity to the waters. the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since 26 July 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. Lot 1 with an area of 5. rainfall for instance. ponds. has been defined as that part of the land which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. it forms part of the national dominion. which was amended after the land was divided into two parcels. By virtue of a final judgment in said case and supplemented by orders. The Republic opposed the application on the ground that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly. It appears that barrio folk also opposed the application. Appeal was made to the Court of Appeals. however. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court. the Alagads were declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining portion. common. natural. such depth being the regular. When Laguna de Bay's waters are at their highest ordinary depth has been defined as: the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season. And in which case. all with surname Alagad. with an area of 8. Decree N-51479 was entered and OCT 0-401. January 26.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Carlos. . Hence. Melitona. Pila. Laguna. The court dismissed the complaint. the appeal. 66807. The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The Republic filed a petition for ³annulment of title and reversion. Justo.

Moreover. and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this right from them. Having become the private properties of the oppositors. without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. Inc. . The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated. 1930. the claims were removed from the public domain. against even the government. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court. they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law. they had the right to transfer the same. the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws. The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935. to Benguet and Atok.: Facts: Jose de la Rosa filed application for registration of a parcel of land consisting of 9 lots situated in Tuding. the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land.. for all physical purposes of ownership.R. It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for. The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection. and recorded on January 2. who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14. 1931. The reason is obvious. 1909. arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. The Republic has filed a petition for review and argued that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and registerable. Issue: Whether the land in question is alienable and registerable. Atok also alleged that a portion of land were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25. his possessory right. 217.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. L-43938. The trial court denied the application. By such act. J. Itogon. for all practical purposes of ownership. 1988 CRUZ. Held: There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. as they did. While. DE LA ROSA G. invoking their superior right of ownership. April 15. by reason of its nature. The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering a portion of the land in question was sold to it by James Kelly. No. through the Bureau of Forestry Development. As the land had become the private property of the locators. is as good as though secured by patent. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. Atok Big Wedge Corporation and by the Republic of the Philippines. they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok. holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. THE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE Y. We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements of the mining laws. Benguet Province.

Dissatisfied with the said judgment. It is the submission of the Republic of the Philippines that there are no foreshore lands along the seaside of Pasay City. J. The trial court issued an Order refraining the defendants from further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession or dispoilation over any area within the Manila Bay or the Manila Bay Beach Resort. From the Decision and Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals the Republic of the Philippines. 1998 PURISIMA. "Foreshore") A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream). that what Pasay City has are submerged or offshore areas outside the commerce of man which could not be a proper subject matter of the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC in question as the area affected is within the National Park. City of Cebu (L-22669) that the term "foreshore" refers to "that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides. known as Manila Bay Beach Resort. Held: The Petition is impressed with merit. have come to this Court to seek relief.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. that its terms and conditions are violative of RA 1899. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. No. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages on the grounds that the subject-matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man. 103882. November 25. the Republic appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the Republic. Erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court that under RA 1899. the term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas. as well as Pasay City and RREC. In the Answers of RREC and Pasay City.: Facts: The Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation entered into an Agreement for the reclamation of the foreshore lands in Pasay City. of which area it has been in open. (Words and Phrases. Issue: Whether the petition is meritorious on the ground that the subject land is a not foreshore lands. the term "foreshore lands" refers to: The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. continuous and peaceful possession since time immemorial. To repeat. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION G. that the phrase "foreshore lands" within the contemplation of RA 1899 has a broader meaning than the cited definition of the term in the Words and Phrases and in the Webster's Third New International Dictionary and the plans and specifications of the reclamation involved were approved by the authorities concerned." ." We reiterate what was said in Ponce v. they averred that the subject-matter of said Agreement is within the commerce of man.R. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary) There is nothing in the provision of RA 5187 which can be interpreted to broaden the scope of "foreshore lands. the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.

the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Held: The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 1997. the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Ramos. foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. Issue: Whether the transfer to AMARI of certain lands. PD No. Petitioner Frank I. the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1988. 2002 CARPIO. Then President Corazon C. CHAVEZ vs. 7309. No. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI." Also.R. Aquino issued Special Patent No. invoking Section 28. Subsequently. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. Likewise. improve. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands. Article III. 141. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding which the Board of Directors of PEA confirmed. of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G. approved the JVA. the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed. Chavez filed the a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. 3517. and Section 7." and "to develop. Clearly.J. Article II. reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution. including foreshore and submerged areas. and 7312. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land.: Facts: Then President Ferdinand E. On June 8. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will . (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. 1085 was issued transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. July 9. The 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. in the name of PEA. covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. Parañaque City. much less patrimonial lands of PEA. then President Fidel V. much less patrimonial lands of PEA. 1995. 133250. PD No. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA. granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP. acquire. on April 9. 560 dated September 16. 7311. 1084 creating PEA. and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.FRANCISCO I.

any and all kinds of lands. . . . are alienable lands of the public domain.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands. now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA. This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire .sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations." The 157.

MMC abandoned the claims and instead applied for a prospecting permit with the Bureau of Forest Development.R. No. BMG accepted and registered SEM¶s MPSA application and the Deed of Assignment over EP 133 executed in its favor by MMC. hence. the proper procedure in acquiring mining rights therein is by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the BFD and not through a registration of DOL with the BMG. SEM¶s application was designated MPSA Application No. It also declared that the BMG Director. several mining entities filed applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement. Monkayo Integrated Small Scale Miners Association (MISSMA) filed an MPSA application which was denied by the BMG on the grounds that the area applied for is within the area covered by MMC EP 133 and that the MISSMA was not qualified to apply for an MPSA. Supreme Court rendered a Decision against Apex holding that the disputed area is a forest reserve. Camilo Banad and his group. the acquisition of mining rights thereto must be undertaken via registration of DOL with the BMG and not through the filing of application for permit to prospect with the BFD. the adverse claimants appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board. MMC filed before the BMG a Petition for the Cancellation of the Mining Claims of Apex and Small Scale Mining Permits. Undaunted by the PA ruling. INC.: Facts: Proclamation No. June 23.APEX MINING CO. vs. 128 (MPSAA 128). under Section 99 of the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order implementing Presidential Decree No. The permit embraced the areas claimed by Apex and the other individual mining claimants. MMC assigned EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation. The validity of Expoloration Permit No. MMC alleged that the areas covered by its EP 133 and the mining claims of Apex were within an established and existing forest reservation. 66 declaring areas covered by the Agusan-DavaoSurigao Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and open to small-scale mining purposes. Marcopper Mining Corporation filed mining claims for areas adjacent to the area covered by the DOL of Banad and his group. who claimed to have first discovered traces of gold in Mount Diwata. 128 are DISMISSED. The PA rendered a resolution that EP 133 was valid and subsisting. 369. 369 was issued to establish the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. However. Apex filed a motion to dismiss MMC¶s petition alleging that its mining claims are not within any established or proclaimed forest reserve. filed a Declaration of Location for six mining claims in the area. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP. BFD issued a Prospecting Permit to MMC covering an area within the forest reserve under Proclamation No. J. and as such. was authorized to issue exploration permits and to renew the same without limit. 133 was reiterated and all the adverse claims against MPSAA No. 2006 CHICO-NAZARIO. 152613 & No. A portion of the contested area open to small scale miners. DENR issued Department Administrative Order No.. It argued that the rules of procedure are not meant to defeat substantial justice as the former are merely secondary in importance to . 152628 . G. 463. Apex Mining Corporation entered into operating agreements with Banad and his group. In a Decision. the MAB considered erroneous the dismissal by the PA of the adverse claims filed against MMC and SEM over a mere technicality of failure to submit a sketch plan.

the State assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration. not only for national economic development. development and utilization of the natural resources of the country. Compostela Valley. SEM. development and utilization of the country¶s natural mineral resources. and proclaimed the same as mineral reservation and as environmentally critical area. With this policy. Balite and MAB. the State may pursue full control and supervision of the exploration. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.100 hectares located in Monkayo. 297. Thereafter. which declared 729 hectares within the Diwalwal area as non-forest lands open for small-scale mining.the latter. Dealing with the question on EP 133¶s validity. development and utilization. joint venture. 2002-18 can outweigh Apex and Balite¶s claims over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. or by entering into agreement with foreignowned corporations for large-scale exploration. the instant Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Apex. MMC. aggrieved by the exclusion of 729 hectares from its MPSA application. and DAO No. 297. Issue Whether the subsequent acts of the executive department such as the issuance of Proclamation No. were remanded to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition pursuant to Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Apex filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Petition for Intervention predicated on its right to stake its claim over the Diwalwal gold rush which was granted by the Court. but also for its security and national defense. the MAB proceeded to treat SEM¶s MPSA application over the disputed area as an entirely new and distinct application. Section 5 of Republic Act No. Recognizing the importance of the country¶s natural resources. 217 was issued by the President creating the National Task Force Diwalwal which is tasked to address the situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. The Court of Appeals consolidated the remanded cases as CA-G. This proclamation excluded an area of 8. The options open to the State are through direct undertaking or by entering into coproduction. 66. During the pendency of these Petitions. to establish mineral reservations where mining operations shall be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor. It approved the MPSA application. 61216. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the PA and declared null and void the MAB decision. These cases. was no longer a claimant of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve having relinquished its right to SEM. Executive Order No. SP No. 2002-18 was issued declaring an emergency situation in the Diwalwal gold rush area and ordering the stoppage of all mining operations therein. or production-sharing agreements. Subsequently. when the national interest so requires. the Villaflor group and Balite appealed the decision to this Court. Held Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. Dissatisfied. 61215 and No. 7942 empowers the President.R. After it brushed aside the issue of the validity of EP 133 for being irrelevant. DENR Administrative Order No. the MAB opined that said issue was not crucial and was irrelevant in adjudicating the appealed case because EP 133 has long expired due to its nonrenewal and that the holder of the same. however. . Hence. likewise appealed. excluding the area segregated by DAO No.

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