38 PEOPLE V JOLLIFFE

Facts:
 The accused Jolliffe, a Canadian residing in Hong-Kong, while boarding for his flight was
apprehended.
 A search yielded 4 pieces of gold bullion tied to his waist.
 CFI convicted him of violation of CIRCULAR 21 (requiring a license to export gold,
pursuant to RA 265) prescribing the penalty for violations of said circular.

ISSUE: W/N circular 21 grant authority to Monetary Board to issue the same
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power?

Held: No
 There is a distinction between the power to determine what the law shall be from
delegating the power to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set
out in the law itself.
 If the law authorizing delegation furnishes a reasonable standard, such is valid.

 In this case, sec.74 of RA 265 conferred upon Monetary Board the power to subject to
licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange;
o “in order to protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an
exchange crisis.”
 Sec. 70 authorizes the MB to:
o “Take such remedial appropriate measures to protect the international stability
of the peso when the international reserve is falling.”
 These powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objects of the law
creating the CB which are:
o “to maintain monetary stability” and “to promote a rising level of production,
employment and real income in the Philippines.”
 These are sufficient standards laid down.

39 LACUESTA V HERRERA

FACTS:
 In an action for specific performance, partition and accounting of a 125.5hectare
fishpond area, CFI Davao found that herein petitioner as plaintiff was indeed a partner
with defendants (Spouses Doromal) in the said fishpond,
o Having contributed money, property and effort in pursuance of their partnership
agreement.
 Armed with the explicit finding of the said court as to his right as a partner to ½ of the
fishpond in question,
o Petitioner instituted with the Philippine Fisheries Commission, the
administrative protest against Doromal’s fishpond permit over the whole area
and
 o filed his application over ½ of the area and asked for the partition thereof with
accounting.
 Commissioner of Fisheries denied petitioner’s protest and application.
 On timely appeal, however, Sec. of Agriculture and National Resources favoring the
petitioner. Citing the CFI Davao’s findings.

Issue: W/N There was abuse of discretion in the findings of the Secretary of Agri and
Nat. Res.

HELD: No.

 The court held that a mere reading of the facts and findings of record which are
undisputed by respondent and of the legal basis of the Secretary’s action and decision in
diving the fishpond area into 2 equal parts and awarding ½ to petitioner,
o Suffices to show that respondent court exceeded its authority and acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned injunction in derogation of
the administrative authority legitimately exercised by said officials.
 D
 As stressed in the case of Deluano v Casteel, the court held that:
 “the Sec. of Agri and Nat Res possesses executive and administrative powers with
regard to the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or
disposition and management of the lands of the public domain and more specifically,
with regard to the grant or withholding of licenses, permits, leases, and contracts over
portions of the public domain to be utilized as fishponds.
 F
 The court then held that the petition must therefore be granted on the strength of the
established doctrine that where as in the case at bar, there is no showing that there
was:
o Fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of the
Office of the President or a department head, in rendering their questioned
decision or
o of a total lack of substantial evidence to support the same, such administrative
decisions are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered with
by the courts.

40 GONZALO SY TRADING V CENTRALBANK

FACTS:
 CB granted petitioner a special import permit authorizing it to import fresh fruits from
Japan on a “no dolar” basis.
 In Nov. 19, 1968 Petitioner then made importation.
 Its June and September 1970 importations were seized by the customs authorities.

ISSUE: W/N the permit has expired?

Held: Yes.
 The court held that:
o A license permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or
permittee, and
o is not a property in any constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional
prescription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend.
 A license is rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a permission or authority to do
what is within its terms.
 It is not in any way vested, permanent or absolute.
 A permit is not, by its very nature, a contract but a mere special privilege.
 For it to be impressed with a contractual character,
o It must be categorically demonstrated that the very agency, which is the source,
would place such a burden on itself.
 H
 The State has power to revoke or recall a license or permit.
 A license cannot last beyond the life of the basic authority under which it was issued.
 It was petitioner itself which established the terminal date representing that the
“main purpose of this importation is to serve the requirement during the
“Christmas season” of 1968, upon which representation the Board finally granted
the permit.

 The case cited by the petitioner (Ramos v CB) cannot be relied upon. That in the given
cited case, “a contractual obligation in favor of OBM was expressly assumed.
 In the given case, no such contractual obligation have been perfected.
 That the permit can hardly be constitutive of a contractual obligation by CB.
 And that for such to be so, it must be categorically demonstrated that CB has placed the
burden on itself.

41 EVANGELISTA V JARENCIO

Facts:

 Pursuant to Sec. 64 of the RAC, the President created the Presidential Agency on
Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under EO 4--
o Charging them with functions and responsibilities and vesting it with all the
powers of an investigating committee under Secs. 71 and 580 of RAC,
 Including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena duces tecum,
 Administer oaths and take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation.
 Whereupon, Evangelista, as sec. of PARGO, “issued to respondent Manlastas, then acting
city Public Service Officer of Manila,”
 o A subpoena ad testificandum commanding him to appear as witness at the office
of PARGO.
 Manalastas filed action in CFI and assiled its validity.
 CFI (judge Jarencio) ORDERED that
o “upon filing of 5,000 bond, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for be
issued retraining PARGO from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the
fact-finding investigation to the petitioner and form instituting contempt
proceedings.”

ISSUES:
1) W/N PARGO has the power to issue subpoena in the given case? (yes)
2) W/N the subpoena is a violation of the right against self-incrimination. (no)

Held:

1 YES
 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial
nature may be taken and may require attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a
purely investigatory nature.
 It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings
to appropriate bodies and make recommendation for actions.
 S
 Subpoena power of PARGO is not confined to quasi-judicial function but may be used to
meet the very purpose of its creation,
o To forestall anomalies in the civil service.
 Administrative agencies may issue administrative subpoenas in the course of
investigation w/n adjudication is involved and w/n probable cause is shown.
 Administrative subpoenas differ in essence from a judicial subpoena.
 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement of the
inquiry is:
o 1 within the authority of the agency;
o 2 the demand is not too indefinite;
o 3 the information is reasonably relevant

2 NO
 The court is mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in
administrative investigation,
o Generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings.

 Nevertheless, in the present case, the court fin that respondent Manalastas is not facing
any administrative charge.
 That he is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of
anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of
 submitting the assembled facts to the President of the PH or to file the corresponding
charges.
 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action,
o Any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise.

 However, by all means, respondent Manalastas may contest any attempt in the
investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.

42 JALANDONI V DRILON

Facts:

 Petitioner Mario C.V Jalandoni filed a complaint for the crime of liner before the
provincial prosec. of Rizal against officials/directors of Oriental Petroleum and Minerals
Corporation.
 The publication in question was the July 16, 1992 full-page advertisements
simultaneously published in 5 major dailies.
o These advertisements contained allegations naming Jalandoni who was then a
PCGG commissioner of having committed illegal and unauthorized acts, and
other wrongdoings constituting graft and corruption,
o relative to the dacion en pago financing arrangement entered into by Piedas
Petroleum with Rizal Commercial Banking Corp.

 Sec. Drilon issued the questioned DOJ resolution No. 211-94

o Instructing the Provincial Prosec of Rizal to withdraw the information filed in
court against respondent Robert Coyiuto et al.
 A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied in a latter-order.

ISSUE: W/N the Sec. of Justice had the power to withdraw the information filed before the
provincial prosecutor?

HELD: YES. The power of supervision and control by the minister of Justice over the fiscals
cannot be denied.

 As stated in the case of Noblejas v Salas, sec 79 (c ) of the Revised Admin Code defines
the extent of a department secretary’s power.

 That the power of control by the minister of justice over the fiscals therein
contemplated means the power (power of the department heads) to alter, modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
 The power of control implies the right of the President (and his alter ego) to implies in
the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.
 For, while it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons who, according to evidence
received form the complaint, are shown to be guilty of crime,
o the minister of justice is likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent
persons from groundless, false or serious prosecution.
o
 He would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he orders or sanctions the filing
of an information base upon a complaint where he is not convinced that the evidence
would warrant the filing of the action in court.
 As he has the power of supervision and control over prosecuting officers,
o The minister of justice has the ultimate power to decide which has between
conflicting theories of the complainant and the respondents should be believed.

 Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and
prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which
holds that—
o Mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an
administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by
higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts.
 As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be
allowed.

43 TOMALI VS CSC

FACTS:

 Petitioner Mona Tomali was appointed Development Management Officer II (DMO II) in
the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA).
 The appointment was extended by then OMA Executive Director Pundato.
 She assumed the duties and functions of the office 4 months later, at which time, the
appointment had not yet been transmitted to the CSC for approval.
 F
 The new Director of OMA, Dr. Lucman revoking the previous incomplete appointment
of petitioner, and
o Appointed respondent Rocaina Lucman to the position in question (DMO II.
 Petitioner sent public respondent OMA a letter protesting her replacement.
 The chief of the HRM division of the OMA communicated to petitioner the
disapproval/expiration of her appointment.
 Forthwith, private respondent (Rocaina Lucman) took her oath of office and assumed
the duties and functions of DMO II.
 G
 Petitioner reiterated her protest with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSBP)
which then dismissed such protest.
ISSUE: W/N

HELD:
 Appointment to a position in the civil service is required to be submitted to the CSC for
approval in order to determine, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the
position and w/n the rules pertinent to the process of appointment are followed.
 F
 Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil service position is
essential in order to make it fully effective.
 Without favorable certification or approval of the commission, in cases when such
approval is required,
o No title to the office can yet be deemed to be permanently vested in favor of the
appointee, and the appointment can still be recalled or withdrawn by the
appointing authority.
 Until the appointment has become a completed act,
o It would likewise be precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure.

 In this case, petitioner faults public respondents for their failure to have her appointed
properly attended to and timely acted upon and for, in effect, allowing her in the
meanwhile to assume the office in question.

 The court held that petitioner herself would not appear to be all that blameless.
 She assumed the position 4 months after her appointment was issued or months after
that appointment had already lapsed or had become ineffective by operation of law.
 That petitioner knew, should have known or should have at least verified considering
the relatively long interval of time between the date of her appointment and the date of
her assumption to office.
 And that the CSC, such as to be expected, disapproved the appointment in consonance
with PD 807.

 The court then ruled that it was well within the authority and discretion of the new
OMA director, therefore, to appoint private respondent and such prerogative could not
be questioned even on a showing that petitioner might have been better qualified for
the position.

 The rule has always been that an appointment is essentially a discretionary act,
o Performed by an office in whom it is vested according to his best judgment, and
the only condition being that the appointee should possess all the qualifications
required therefor.
 That there is nothing on record to convince that court that the new OMA director has
unjustly favored private respondent nor has exercised his power of appointment in an
arbitrary manner.
SULU ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF MASJID LAMBAYONG V MALIK

FACTS:
 Imam Hashim Abdulla, Imam Hadji Tambing, Hatib Illih Musa, as officers and members of
the Sulu Islamic Association of Masjid Lambayong
o Filed an Administrative complaint against Judge Nabdar Malik, the presiding Judge of
MTC Jolo, Sulu. “charging him with serious misconduct.”
 He was charged for nepotism for recommending the appointment of his nephew, Omar
Kalim,
o The son of his older sister for janitor in his court.
 He falsely certified that Kalim was not related to him by affinity or consanguinity within the
3rd degree.

ISSUE: WON Judge Malik as the appointing authority is obliged to disclose his true relationship
to the appointee? /won liable for nepotism.

HELD: Yes.

 The prohibition against nepotism in the government service is found in sec. 59 chapter 7 of
the Admin Code.
o It prohibits the appointing or recommending authority form making any
appointment in the national, provincial, city or municipality governments or in any
branch or instrumentality thereof, Including GOCC, in favor of his relative within the
3rd degree of consanguinity or affinity.
 The court cited the case of LAYNO V PEOPLE,
o Where the incumbent Mayor of Lianga Surigao was prosecuted criminally and
punished for falsification of public document when he appointed his legitimate son
as Meat Inspector, but certified that the appointee was not a relative by
consanguinity or affinity.

 Thus, in order to guarantee that the law is duly observed, it is required, among others,
o That the appointment paper should be accompanied by a certification of the
appointing or recommending authority stating therein that he is not related to the
appointee within the 3rd degree of consanguinity or affinity.

 That although the law (Sec. 49 (a) pd 807),
o Does not explicitly provide that the appointing or recommending authority shall
disclose his true relationship with the appointee in the form of a certification,
 Nonetheless, in the light of the rulings in the aforecited cases,
o The legal obligation of the appointing or recommending authority to state the true
facts required to be stated in the certification is inherent in the law on prohibition
against nepotism and the nature and purpose of such certification.
DEBULGADO V CSC

FACTS:
 Petitioner Rogelio Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros
Occidental.
 Petitioner Mayor appointed his wife, petitioner Victoria as head of the Office of Gen.
Services of the City Government.
 G
 The basic contention of the petitioners is that—
o The prohibition against nepotic appointments is applicable only to original
appointments and not to promotional appointments.
 they believed that because petitioner Victoria was already in the service of the city
government before she married petitioner Mayor—
o the reason behind the prohibition no longer applied to her promotional
appointment.
 Petitioners also affirm that petitioner Victoria deserves to be promoted to Gen. Services
Officer, considering her long and faithful service to the City Government.

Issue:

Held: petition dismissed for lack of merit.

 The court ratioed that a textual examination of Sec. 59 Book 5 of EO 292 reveals that the
prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms.
o First, it explicitly covers “all appointments” without seeking to make any distinction
between differing kinds or types of appointments.
o Secondly, Sec. 59 covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city, or
municipal governments, as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all
GOCCs.
o Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set out in Sec. 59 but it is a short list:
 a. persons employed in a personal capacity;
 b. teachers;
 c. physicians; and
 d. members of the AFP.
 The list has not been added to or subtracted from for the past 30yrs.
 The list does not contain words like “and other similar positions.”
Thus, the list appears to the court to be a “closed one”, at least closed
until lengthened or shortened by Congress.

 The court held that the purpose of Sec. 59 which shines through the comprehensive and
unqualified language in which it was cast and remained for decades, is precisely—
 o “to take out of the discretion of the appointing and recommending authority the
matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative.”
 In other words, Sec. 59—
o Insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by preventing
that objectivity from being in fact tested.
 That the importance of this statutory objective is difficult to overstress in the culture in
which we live and work in the Philippines, where family bonds remain, in general,
compelling and cohesive.

 The court then concluded that Sec. 59 BOOK 5 of EO292—

o Means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: it refers to “all
appointments” whether original or promotional in nature.

 The public policy embodied in Sec. 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court
has neither authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a
qualification here or a distinction there.
 It then follows that the promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria by her husband
(mayor) falls within the prohibited class of appointment:
o The prohibited relationship between the appointing authority and the appointee
existed at the time the promotional appointment was issued.
HILARIO V CSC

FACTS:
 Petitioner was appointed as City Attorney by then OIC Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr at that time
the OUC of the Office of the Mayor of QC. Under the Freedom Constitution of 1986.
 The newly-elected Mayor, Ismael Mathay Jr. took over from Mayor Simon.

 Mayor Mathay issued a letter dated July 24, 1992—

 Informing petitioner Nescito Hilario that he is considered resigned as of June 30, 1992
pursuant to SEC. 481 (a), Art. 2 of the LGC of 1991 providing that “the position of City Legal
Officer is co-terminous with the appointing authority.”
 F
 Respondent Vice-Mayor Planas of QC filed a complaint with the CSC against petitioner and a
certain Jose Pecson—
o Praying that respondents be found administratively liable for usurpation, grave
misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, gross insubordination, and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

 The CSC resolved “to hold in abeyance any administrative disciplinary action against Atty.
Hilario. However, Atty. Hilario should not be allowed to continue holding the position of
the Legal Officer of QC”

ATTY. HILARIO (PETITIONER) ALLEGES:

 That when he was appointed City Attorney, the applicable law governing his appointment
was BP 337 and therefore, “his position should not be considered confidential.”
 He argues that although the said position was considered confidential under RA 5185, BP
337 impliedly repealed the confidential nature of the position when it expanded the
duties of City attorney.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether Petitioner’s position as city legal officer is not confidential; and
(2) Whether Respondent CSC has no authority to remove or terminate the services of
petitioner.

HELD: Petition dismissed.

 An examination of the provisions of BP 337—
o “reveals no intention by the legislature to remove the confidential nature of the
position of city legal officer.”
 What it does is—
 “to merely specify the various qualifications, powers and duties of a city legal officer which
were not enumerated under RA 5185.

 The court consistently held in previous cases that—

o “the position of City Legal Officer is a confidential one.”
 As in the case of Griño v CSC where the court held that—
o The position of City Legal Officer has its counterpart in the position of provincial
attorney appointed by the provincial governor, both positions involving the
rendering of trusted services.

 Petitioner next questions the validity of CSC Resolution No. 93-40667 and 94-3336--
o “For having been issued without authority.”
 He argues that the CSC—
o “usurped the power, functions and prerogatives of Mayor Mathay to exclusively
discipline and decide on matters affecting the conduct and employment of QC
employees and officials who are under his control and supervision.”
 Petitioner maintains that—
 “the mayor is the only one who may remove him from office directly and not the CSC, which
only has appellate powers to review the decision of the mayor”

 The court held that—

o “nothing in the Administrative Code that precluded the CSC from deciding a
disciplinary case before it.”
 That although respondent Planas is a public official--
 there is nothing in the law to prevent her from filing a complaint directly with the CSC
against petitioner.”
 Thus, when the CSC determined that petitioner was no longer entitled to hold the position
of City Legal Officer, “it was acting within its authority under the Administrative Code to
hear and decide complaints filed before it.”

 Petitioner further claims that he is not covered by RA 7160, otherwise known as LGC of
1991-
o “which explicitly states that the term of the legal officers shall be co-terminous with
the office appointing authority.”
 He argues that the “co-terminous” provision applies only to future appointments of the
legal officer but does not apply to incumbents.

 The court held that—“such provision is but a “reiteration” of the principle that since the
position of City Legal Officer is a confidential one, it is perforce deemed to be “co-
terminous” with that of the appointing authority.
PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC (PTFCI) V BATARIO JR.

FACTS:
 Petitioner Provident tree farms, is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree
planting.
 It grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro—
 Which supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of matches.
 In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial
tree plantation,
 Sec. 36, par. 1 of the Revised Forestry Code confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives
among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and “wood-derivated”
products.
 G
 Private respondent AJ international Corporation (AJIC) imported 4 containers of matches
form Indonesia—
 Which the Bureau of Customs released on