h.

hD JL

-

NEWS

N

AL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, QL 20546

TELS

WO 2-4155 WO $6925

.November 12, 1968

NW BRIEFING l S

ON
APOLIX) 8 MOON ORBITAL FLIGHT

PARTICIPANTS :

DR. THOMAS 0, PAINE, A c t i n g A d m i n i s t r a t o r , NASA
LT. GENERAL SA
L 6 , PHILLIPS, Apollo Program D i r e c t o r , NASA

MR. WILLIAM C. SC

, Apollo

Miasion D i r e c t o r , NASA

MR. ALIPR&D P, ALIBRANDoz Public Affairs O f f i c e r , NASA

2
Good ~ r n i n t h e press conference on t h e Apoll
ALIBRANDQt
The part i e i p a n t s t h i

e ready t o begin

ion,

ill be D r . Thomas Paine, Acting Administrator; Lt. General Samuel P h l l l l ~ s ,A P O ~ ~ O Program Director; and B i l l Schneider, Apollo M i @ i o n Director.

Dr, Paine.
PAINE: Good morning. After a c a r e f u l and thorough e x a s i n a t i o n o f a l l of t h e system and r i s k s involved, we have concluded t h a t w e are now ready t o P l y t h e most advanced m i s s i o n f o r o u r Apollo 8 launch i n December, t h e o r b i t around t h e moon.

Frank Bornan and h i s crew and a l l of o u r engineerrs are unanimously i n f a v o r of s e l e c t i n g t h i s mission.
W have reached t h i s conclusion a f t e r a long series e of i n t e n s i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of t h e s t a t u s of o u r program, t h e f l i g h t hardware, ground s u p p o r t equipment, s t a t training.
The timing for t h e December 21 launch is conditioned by t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e earth and t h e moon and t h e sun. It is designed t o g i v e u s d a y l i g h t i n t h e launch area and t h e recovery area and then designed t o g i v e u s t h e r i g h t kind of photographic

and o b s e r v a t i o n l i g h t on t h e s u r f a c e of t h e moon.
The outbound t r i p w i l l occupy about three d a g s , t h e t i m e i n o r b i t around t h e moon w i l l be about a d a y i n v o l v i n g t e n o r b i t a l swings around t h e moon, w i t h about a three-day r e t u r n , a c t u a l l y adding up to something j u s t s l i g h t l y o v e r s i x d a y s t o t h e recovery.

To t e l l you about t h e d e t a i l s of t h i s d e c i s i o n and now t o i n t r o d u c e t h e Director of n e r a l Samuel P h i l l i p s .
od morning, ladies a cided t o f l y w i t h Ap as designed. And i it won't know t h e d i

ntlemen. The 8 is t h e mission

a r landing mission.

I

3

And f o r which t h e
The e x c e p t i o n i n t h e c

respects t h e mission
1 spacecraft, 0 e aboard, and t r i p t o the
t h e exception,

of coume, is that there is not t h e command and s e r v i c moon without having t h docked, and t h
i n m s important respec ot knowledge w i l l gain, it is t h e d e s i Apollo-Saturn V space s y s t e m , Now, w e have concluded, as t h e t o t a l Apollo space y s t e m w i l l be a t t h e scheduled launch t i m e on the 21s
e some t i m e t h i marize t h e important elemen of t h e back t o t h a t d e c i s i o n and t o d i s c u s s also t h e clusian,
I would l i k e t o t
Let m e start w i t h Ago110 4, which consisted o and t h e 017 spacecraft, Th being t h e f i r s t S a t u r n V f l i g h t , less mission. The launch v e h i c l e of t h e maneuvers and perf0 t h e u l t i m a t e l u n a r landing
A s far
t h e launch v s h i c

of t h e for the

when we flew

t ~ a completely a l l t ~ ~

o u t its design mission,
The spacecraft 017 flew for n e a r l y 1 hou 1 on-board program c o n t r o l and under remote c o n t r o l f ground, and performed flawles l y , Among i t many demonstrationrs , it demonstrated the high-speed r e e n t r y t h a t is r e q u i r e d f o r t h e r e t u r n f r o m 8 l u n a r mission,

Now, you can draw many c o n c l but one of them is t h a t it showed t h design is a good design,

m t h a t missfon,
Saturn V
t h e second t 020, t h e

Now, i n A p r i l of t h i S a t u r n V, No. 502, which carried t h e btpac

4

sister s h i p o i n most impor

e c ect

d i t Apollo 60 I t w a s designed a r e p e a t of t h e Apollo 4 mission.

There were on t h a t m i s i o n s e v e r a l important technical f a i l u r e s and malfunctionsl. You w i l l recall t h a t during t h e second-stage o engines failed. During t h e o r b i t a l coast an t i o n for restart far t h e simul a t e d trans n a r i n j e c t i o n , t h e upper stage f a i l e d t o restart for the tra lunar injection.

I n t h e post-mission a n a l y s i s w e determined t h a t w e had l o n g i t u d i n a l oscillations on that v e h i c l e which are c w o monly called POGO, W observed also there w a s abnormal p e r e formance of t h e p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n s y s t e m which c o n t r o l l e d t h e d i v i s i o n of f u e l and o x i d i z e r i n t h e engine during t h e p r o p u l s i v e maneuver.
We also d i s c u s s e d i n t h e b r i e f i n g t h a t fQl1QWed t h a t mission an apparent s t r u c t u r a l f a i l u r e i n t h e spacecraft L?d adapter area of t h e s t r u c t u r e , W also o erved a t t h a t t i m e , e I w i l l recall a g a i n , t h a t i n s p i t e of these d i f f i c u l t i e s , which were s u b s t a n t i a l and important, t h e spacecraft w a s cow manded off i n t o an a l t e r n a t e mission by t h e f l i g h t control o r g a n i z a t i o n and it f l 8 flawless a l t e r n a t e mission, ree n t e r i n g i n t h e P a c i f i c as intended.
Now, t h e q u e s t i o n t h a t one can raise t h e n from t h i s series 501 and 502 r e a l l y concerns t h e t o t a l adequacy of t h e design and of t h e proce 88s of manufacture and therefore of t h e margins t h a t are a v a i l a b l e i n a piece of equipment,
A f t e r t h a t mission we very r a p i d l y a s s e s s e d t h e t e c h n i c a l data, determined by t h e latter p a r t of A p r i l of t h i s y e a r t h a t w e understood s u f f i c i e n t l y t h e reason f o r t h e malfunctions t h a t occurred, t h a t w e f e l t w e could proceed w i t h confidence t o p r e p a r e t h e next S a t u r n V, No. 503, to carry o u t a manned f l i g h t i n t h e l a t t e r p a r t of t h i s c a l e n d a r year.

S i n c e t h a t t i m e there has been one of t h e m s ot a g g r e s s i v e , thorough and determined e n g i n e e r i n g tests and e n g i n e e r i n g a n a l y s i s programs conducted t f have e v e r seen. And i n t h e c o u r s e of these months have i d e n t i f i e d

5

f o r t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s , W have designed e t h e correction^. We have tasted a t great l e n g t h t h e corrections and, in parallel w i t h a l l t h i s , conducted a very elaborate engineering a n a l y s i s .
Oris

i n d e t a i l t h e rea

T i culminated week before last on the 7 t h of Novemhs b e r i n a design c e r t i f i c a t i o n review which concluded by v a l i -

d a t i n g and c e r t i f y i n g t h e S a t u r n V No. 503 as ready f o r manned f l i g h t .
L e t m e recall also that l a s t August i n a press conference and briefing t h a t w e had on t h e 1 9 t h of August, t o be specific, I o u t l i n e d t h e e v e n t s t h a t l e d u s t o t h e d e c i s i o n t o drop LM 3 from t h e 503 f l i g h t which w a s being made ready f o r f l i g h t i n t h e l a t e part of t h i s y e a r . That d e c i s i o n w a s reached because w e were encountering d e l a y s i n t h e checkout of t h e l u n a r module a t t h e Cape which i n o u r judgment w a s leading us t o a f l i g h t w e l l i n t o t h e s p r i n g of next y e a r i f w e were t o w a i t u n t i l we r e s o l v e d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t were del a y i n g t h e checkout,
A t t h a t t i m e w 0 concluded that it w a s i n t h e best i n t e r e s t of t h e progressl of t h e program t o prepare t h e 503 launch v e h i c l e t o f l y w i t h command s e r v i c e module 103 but without t h e LM i n order t o get t h e Apollo-Saturn V s y s t e m i n t o space o p e r a t i o n s a t t h e earliest t i m e and to m a k e t h e

gains toward o u r u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e of a manned l u n a r l a n d i n g by f l y i n g y e t t h i s year w i t h a command s e r v i c e module only.
That d e c i s i o n then i d e n t i f i e d a range of a l t e r n a t i v e e missions t h a t w would prepare to conduct w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n t o be made after a l l of t h e pmgram e v e n t s had occurred, inc l u d i n g t h e f l i g h t of A p o l l o 7 , which would t h e n be t h e b a s i s for a d e c i s i o n to select from among those range of a l t e r n a t e missions, which included l o w earth o r b i t , high earth o r b i t , many thousands of m i l e s i n o r b i t , circumlunar or i n t o l u n a r o r b i t and r e t u r n as t h e range of o p t i o n s .

Now, Apollo 7 , which of coup88 f l e w between t h e 1 1 t h and 22nd of October, w a s launched on a Saturn-IB and carried t h e f i r s t Block I1 spacecraft, No. 101. That mission, as we a l l know, m e t its o b j e c t i v e s , and I have classified i t
as a p e r f e c t mission.

6

took off been reducing t h e data from you know, w e carry many hundreds of i n e l s aboard each of o u r f l i g h t s i n or nalyze t h e performance down s e v e r a l l e v e l s i n a l l of t h e important subsystems, That a n a l y s i s h a s been i n g very hard a t t h e q u e s t i o n I asked after 1 mentioned 501 and 502 sequence namely, a t t h e design margi e8 of i n c i p i e n t f a i l u r e s which careful revi Is of t h e data might i n d i c a t e , and a c a r e f u l re f t h e performance of t h a t spacecraft i n its p r i m a r y mode p e r a t i o n such as t h e environmental c o n t r o l , where it w a s exercised thoroughly, as w e l l as looking caref u l l y a t t h e perfo nce i n t h e s e v e r a l what I w i l l c a l l a l t e r n a t e o r backoff or degraded modes of o p e r a t i o n which w e have b u i l t i n t o t h i s equipment through redundancy of design and by providing backdown f e a t u r e s t h a t t h e crew can select i n case any of t h e pieces of equipment i n d i c a t e abnormal perf ormance *

--

As I s a y , w e have concentrated many thousands of e n g i n e e r s ' manhours i n s t u d y i n g t h a t data i n order t o assess and understand d e s i g n margins and t h e possibilities of kncipie n t f a i l u r e s . Bec e you recall, t h e way i n which t h i s program h a s been organized from t h e beginning, w e have a l w a y s known t h a t w e would never be able t o demonstrate in a classical, s t a t i s t i c a l r e l i a b i l i t y s e n s e t h e performance of t h e equipment and t h e r e l i a b i l i t y which r e q u i r e s t e n a o r even hundreds of o p e r a t i o n s t o demonstrate,
So w e have b ad o u r program from t h e beginning on c a r e f u l design, i n c o r p o r a t i n g redundancies and degraded mode o p e r a t i o n , and t h e n a very, very e x t e n s i v e ground test program culminated by a minimum of f l i g h t demonstrations t o v a l i d a t e t h e design,

Now, 1% going t o d i s c u s s i n a few momenta two or three of t h e f e a t u r e s of t h e work t h a t h a s been done s i n c e that t i m e u s i n g some vu-graphs, so I won't s a y any more about it r i g h t now.
How, we i n the Apollo Program have been working now for many y e a r s toward t h e o b j e c t i v e of a manned l u n a r l a n d i n g a t t h e earliest practical and safe t i m e , W e concluded back i n August and have devoted much energy t o t h e p o i n t s i n c e t h a t there is much t o g a i n by going as deep i n t o space w i t h

7

t h e second manned Apollo f l i h t as w e would be able t o judge prudent, W are able by going i n t o l u n a r o r b i t t o make an e early f l i g h t d e ~ ~ t r a t i o n t h e design mission of t h e of S a t u r n V and of t h e Apollo command and s e r v i c e module spacecraft and t o understand t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e spacecraft i n t h e thermal environment of t r a n s l u n a r space and i n t h e environment surrounding t h e moon, t o assess o u r communications capab i l i t y , and very importantly t o e v a l u a t e and work on o u r navigation capability,

I n t h i s connection, o u r a b i l i t y t o i d e n t i f y and track landmarks on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e is very important t o t h e precise o r b i t d e t e r m i n a t i o n which w e expect t o be able t o accomplish i n order t o w i t h s u f f i c i e n t accuracy make t h e landing w i t h t h e l u n a r module and t h e n make t h e rendezvous between t h e l u n a r module and t h e command s e r v i c e module a f t e r t h e l u n a r landing,
W e are also very aware of t h e g a i n s t h a t w e can make by e a r l y development and e v a l u a t i o n of t h e procedures t h a t are i n v o l v e d l i n t h e l u n a r mission, those concerned w i t h f l i g h t c o n t r o l i n o u r Mission C o n t r o l Center as w e l l as around t h e w o r l d , and, very importantly, o u r i n f l i g h t procedures.

Now, w h i l e w e have known and given much a t t e n t i o n t o t h e g a i n s t h a t can be made by proceeding o u t t o l u n a r o r b i t , w e have also recognized t h a t i n c a r r y i n g o u t such a mission w e take on some a d d i t i o n a l r i s k s o v e r and above those t h a t one exposes himeelf t o or t h e f l i g h t crew t o o p e r a t i n g i n a l o w e a r t h o r b i t . But w e have been able to-- I t is o u r conc l u s i o n t h a t t h e progression of riskrr which w e have known from t h e beginning t h a t w e have t o undertake as w e take on more and more of o u r complex s y s t e m l e a d i n g t o t h e l u n a r landingW have judged that t h e p r o g r e s s i o n of r i s k bee tween t h e A p o l l o 7 mission which we have flown and t h e Apollo 8 mission which w e have designed is a normal progress i o n of r i s k s i n a l o g i c a l l y stepped development, f l i g h t test
program. I n t h e case of t h e l u n a r o r b i t mission, you can summarize these new r i s k s i n two categories. 3n t h e one category, t h e spacecraft propul i o n s y s t e m m u s t operate p r o p e r l y i n order t o propel t h e spacecraft back o u t of l u n a r o r b i t and on its way back t o earth. And t h e other category of r i s k s are those t h a t are i n h e r e n t i n being some three d a y s away from t h e earth as oppoaed t o somewhere between a h a l f

8

an hour and three hour earth i n a l o w earth o
So

i c h t h e crew is away from t h e

i n t h i s case w e have t o place i n c r e a s e d r e l i a n c e on t h e d e p e n d a b i l i t y of t h e l i f e s u p p o r t s y s t e m and t h e electric power s y s t e m i n main. Now, what I would l i k e t o do now is summarize for you u s i n g some vu-graphs some of t h e high p o i n t s of t h e techn i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l reviews which have gone on d a y after day i n great d e p t h o v e r t h e last s e v e r a l months t o g i v e you some feel f o r t h e depth of t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t h a s gone i n t o t h i s decision.
I * m going t o j u s t show two charts t h a t concern t h e launch v e h i c l e . And l e t m e p o i n t o u t i n t h a t connection t h a t t h e launch v e h i c l e per s0 is r e a l l y n o t involved i n t h e d e c i s i o n procese of whether w e go i n t o earth o r b i t or carry o u t a mission involving o p e r a t i o n s around t h e moon.
The d e c i s i o n that w e j u s t laat week v a l i d a t e d is t h e one which s a y s t h a t t h e S a t u r n V is indeed r e a d y t o conduct a manned f l i g h t . And t h e two m s important t e c h n i c a l f a i l u r e s ot on 502 were t h e f a i l u r e s of t h e 52 engine o n t h e second and t h i r d stages and t h e l o n g i t u d i n a l o s c i l l a t i o n for POGO. What w e d i d following that w a s t o set up a test program i n which w e were able t o very precisely reproduce t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e f a i l u r e o n t h e engines, which 6 1 1 down to a f a i l u r e 818 of t h e s m a l l l i n e whiph feeds hydrogen i n t o t h e s t a r t e r cup of t h e 52 engine.

T i i a J t h e o l d l i n e deerign and t h e weakness w a s i n hs two f l e x i b l e j o i n t s t h a t were g u t there to absorb v i b r a t i o n s and t h e changes involved as t h e engine operated.

I t took some f a i r l y b r i l l i a n t d e t e c t i v e work t o i d e n t i f y t h e fact that a f l o w v i b r a t i o n phenomenon w a s s e t up i n these l i n e s under d r y vacuum c o n d i t i o n s which had n o t been discovered i n t h e ground t e s t i n g , because i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s it turned o u t t h a t t h e ground test s e t u p conducted i n either ambient a i r c o n d i t i o n s o r i n t h e blowdown t y p e vacuum f a c i l i t i e s i n which one tests b i g engines allowed m o i s t u r e f r o m t h e a i r t o freeze out on these f l e x i b l e j o i n t s and t o change t h e s t i f f n e s s therefore t h e v b r a t i o n character-

istics.

9

Operating i n t h e vacuum of pace, t h e m o i s t u r e condensation on t h e extremely cold l i n e s d i d not occur. The v i b r a t i o n characteristics were s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t . The v i b r a t i o n caused c r a c k i n g , and under t h e p r e s s u r e s involved i n feeding hydrogen i n t o t h i s u n i t , these j o i n t s cracked and broke and r e s u l t e d then i n t h e f a i l u r e s of t h e engine and t h e f a i l u r e of t h e restart of t h e 5-IVB stage.
T h i s l i n e was redesigned and I might Bay overdesigned i n t h e process, The flexible j o i n t s were t a k e n o u t , and bends i n t h e t u b e were s u b s t i t u t e d t o take up t h e motions. These were s u b j e c t e d t o e x t e n s i v e overdesign t e s t i n g , were v e r i f i e d as more than adequate t o correct t h e problem. The new d e s i g n w also i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e oxygen s i d e of t h e engine s t a r t s y s t e m , and it d i d f l y on t h e S-IVB stage of launch v e h i c l e 205 which propelled Apollo 7 into orbit.

So i n a d d i t i o n t o e x t e n s i v e ground t e s t i n g , it has now been used once i n manned f l i g h t .
The n e x t chart is a summary of t h e POGO s i t u a t i o n i n one of t h e impcrtant ways i n which one measures t h e margins of t h e equipment. And t h i s is one of t h e summar$es which w a s u s e d i n t h e design c e r t i f i c a t i o n review on t h e 7 t h of November

t o summarize s e v e r a l hours of t e c h n i c a l d i s c u s s i o n , and i t is t h e r e s u l t of many thousands of manhours of work i n v o l v i n g many companies t h a t w e called on t o h e l p us,
The mode that got u s i n t o d i f f i c u l t y on 502 w a s t h e first l o n g i t u d i n a l mode of the v e h i c l e aa i t crossed t h e W X l i n e frequency which w a s up very close, and a c t u a l l y o u t around 90 seconds it became marginal as far as s t a b i l i t y is

concerned.
The c o r r e c t i o n t h a t h been made i t o use t h e pres v a l v e c a v i t i e s of t h e W X l i n e s 88 accumulators, and w e i n j e c t helium i n t o those to provide a s p r i n g - l i k e characteristic t o t h e UIX column, And those accumulators are i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e f o u r outboard c o n t r o l engines on the f i r s t stage of t h e S a t u r n V,

And by so doing, t h e first mode t a t got US i n t o t r o u b l e on 502 is completely off t h i s chart. This ordinate is t h e loop g a i n i n phase measured i n d e c i b e l s , and t h e criteria w e have set f o r o u r s e l v e s a f t e r the 502 f l i g h t W a S

J

10

t o achieve a s t a b i l i t y margin of approximately 6 d e c i b e l s .
Now, a8 I s a i d , t h e mode t h a t got u s i n t r o u b l e on 502 is completely off t h e chart. I t is more than 30 db's of margin of s t a b i l i t y .

And w e p l o t t e d here a l l t h e h i g h e r modes up through And here is t h e s i x t h , s e v e n t h , e i g h t h and n i n t h tract along here, The f o u r t h comes i n here a t t h i s p o i n t . T h i s is f l i g h t t i m e i n seconds.
t h e n i n t h mode.

And as t h e v e h i c l e p r o p e l l a n t s deplete, t h e mode gains change. And you can see here t h a t t h e t h i r d made comes i n l a t e i n t h e f l i g h t and t h e n tailed o f f . And t h e second mode starts up s i g h t a t t h e outboard engine c u t o f f , This was t h e shutdown of t h e stage. T h i s s y m b o l is where t h e S a t u r n engine c u t s off, and a t about 150 seconds t h e stage has f i n i s h e d its job.

So by combination of much t e s t i n g t h a t w a s acccompl i s h e d i n s e v e r a l facilities, a great deal of engineering a n a l y s i s work, and f i n a l l y s y s t e m t e s t i n g on S I C test stage No. 6 and 7 i n Mississippi, i n which t h i s d e s i g n change w a s incorporated, w e have concluded beyond doubt t h a t w e have a very adequate margin against POGO r e c u r r i n g on any subsequent flight,

Now, I recalled t h a t one of our t e c h n i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s on t h e 502 f l i g h t w a s an apparent s t r u c t u r a l f a i l u r e i n t h e spacecraft Lllil adapter area of t h e ~ t r u c t u r e . That s u b j e c t too has r e c e i v e d a great deal of test and a n a l y s i s , and w e have concluded beyond any doubt t h a t t h e cause ofWe have concluded beyond doubt that there w a s a sheet of aluminum t h a t peeled o f f , t h a t that w a s one of t h e f a c i n g sheets o f t h e bonded s t r u c t u r e , t h a t t h e r e w o n it peeled off w a s because of an area on t h e o u t e r f a c i n g s h e e t where t h e aluminum s k i n bond t o t h e honeycomb w a s not adequate, an area of something e q u a l t o or greater t h a n about t e n s q u a r e inches, and as t h e v e h i c l e climbs i n t o t h e upper atmosphere it is s u b j e c t e d t o aerodynamic h e a t i n g which raises t h e temperature, and, of course, it i s s u b j e c t t o p r e s s u r e change of t h e o u t s i d e air. And w e have concluded t h a t moist a i r trapped i n t h e honeycomb heated a it climbed, t h a t there s w a s a p r e s s u r e rise i n s i d e t h e honeycomb aa you measure it

1 1

t o t h e o u t s i d e ambient c o n d i t i o n , t h a t t h e p r e s s u r e rise w a s s u f f i c i e n t to c a u s e f u r t h e r debonding, which had started w i t h a s m a l l debonded s e c t i o n , and enough debonding occurred t h e n that t h e aerodynamic forces peeled off a sheet of
aluminum. You w i l l recall that the s t r u c t u r a l margins of t h a t design were adequate even so, t h a t after some load relief occurred when t h e f a c i n g sheet peeled o f f , t h e s t r u c t u r e rebalanced itself and t h e v e h i c l e continued without subsequent failure.
I t h i n k that is one of t h e meaeures, i n c i d e n t a l l y , of design margins t h a t w e b u i l d i n t o t h e s y s t e m i n many waya

.

Since that tine, f r o m a great deal of t e s t i n g , w e have now gone to an u l t r a a o n i c inajlpection of t h e honeycomb s t r u c t u r e a t t h e Cape, v e r i f y i n g t h a t there are no debonded areas i n that s t r u c t u r e t h a t are 88 b i g as one s q u a r e inch, which is w i t h i n t h e t o l e r a n c e allowable. And i n a d d i t i o n t o t h a t , w e have d r i l l e d q u i t e a number of holes on t h e i n n e r f a c i n g sheet to vent t h e honeycomb. And i n a d d i t i o n t o t h a t , w e have p u t a t h i n l a y e r of cork around t h e o u t e r s t r u c t u r e t o minimdae t h e temperature rise. So I t h i n k that t h a t probl e m is more t h a n corrected, and I won't s a y any more about it.
I would l i k e now t o go on t o diecussl a facet of t h e Apollo 7 mission that is critical and important i n t h e d e c i s i o n w e have made t o carry o u t t h e l u n a r o r b i t mission. namely, g e t t i n g t o t h e margirw w i t h which w e b e l i e v e w e have covered o u r s e l v e s i n o u r spacecraft sysltems. The n e x t chart. Many of you w i l l recall t h a t a t three t i m e s d u r i n g t h e Apollo 7 f l i g h t there were r e p o r t s of AC bus dropoute, This occurred a t something l i k e 19 hours i n t o the mission for t h e f i r s t time. Of those three i n c i d e n t s of AC bus f a i l u r e s , i f you want t o use that term, in two cwes one bus dropped In all off or failed, and i n one case both buses failed. three cases t h e crew w a s able t o reset t h e breaker t h a t had t r i p p e d , and t h e AC power came back on. I w i l l only p o i n t o u t that t h e way the spacecraft is designed there are two AC busses, bus No. 1 and bus No. 2.

--

12

There are three i n v e r t e r s , Nos. 1, 2 and 3,

Now, t h e i n v e r t e r s are d r i v e n from t h e DC bus, and t h e i r f u n c t i o n is t o c o n v e r t 28-volt DC i n t o t h r e e phase l l 5 v o l t AC. Any one of t h e three i n v e r t e r s can be on either of t h e buses. The normal o p e r a t i o n is t o have one i n v e r t e r on bus 1, a n o t h e r i n v e r t e r on bus 2, and a t h i r d i n v e r t e r o f f t h e l i n e and i n standby s t a t u s .
These i n v e r t e r s power t h e r o t a t i n g machinery of t h e s p a c e c r a f t , and a l l of t h e s y s t e m s t h a t are powered are powered off of both buses. So you have got redundancy i n terms of supply equipment from either bus and from a n y one

of three i n v e r t e r s .
The spacecraft can be operated w i t h only one bus and only one i n v e r t e r , so you have got a three-mode degradat i o n t h a t is possible here. I would p o i n t o u t t h a t s e v e r a l c r i t i c a l system operate o f f AC f o r example, t h e s t a b i l i e a t i o n and c o n t r o l system and you do have t o be able t o stabilize and c o n t r o l t o carry o u t t h e maneuvers t h a t are involved i n an earth o r b i t a l mission o r i n any of t h e more ambitious missions,

--

-0

The d r i v e for t h e gimbal motors on t h e spacecraft engine is powered by AC, so you have got to have AC t o c o n t r o l t h e spacecraft and t o carry o u t s e v e r a l of t h e kotat'ing machinery d r i v e n f u n c t i o n s l i k e pumps and so on.
W i l l you put on t h e next chart?

Our people were able during t h e f l i g h t t o corelate bus dropouts i n t h e AC s y s t e m w i t h s w i t c h i n g f u n c t i o n s of t u r n i n g off t h e heat i n t h e cryogenic tanks. T h i s is symbology that shows t h e cryogenic oxygen tank t h a t is carried i n t h e s e r v i c e module. There are two tanks, and there is redundancy. You have t o supply heat i n these t a n k s i n order t o maintain t h e p r e s s u r e which expels t h e oxygen for u s e by t h e f u e l cells and for d r i v i n g it up i n t o t h e command module f o r l i f e support. The heat is s u p p l i e d by redundant means, i n t h e one case by an electric heater which is powered off of t h e DC bus, and t h e redundant s y s t e m is a f a n which also can f u r n i s h heat. I t is p u t i n there t o avoid s t r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e cryogens, but i t also p u t s i n heat. Now, t h a t f a n is

u; ;

I

m

13

d r i v e n off t h e AC bus.

In t h e automatic s y s t e m , which is t h e normal mode of o p e r a t i o n and t h e mods t h a t Apollo 7 took off i n , a press u r e sensor i n t h e cryogenic tank s i g n a l s a motor switch i f t h e p r e s s u r e drops below a c e r t a i n l e v e l . That motor s w i t c h then closes and b r i n g s when you are i n t h e automatic p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h e cockpit b r i n g s DC power off t h e DC bus t o t h e heater, b r i n g s AC power off t h e i n v e r t e r bus t o power t h e fan. This is t h e redundancy f e a t u r e s .

--

1 -

Now, when t h e p r e s s u r e is b u i l t up to prescribed l e v e l , t h e motor s w i t c h is s i g n a l e d t o t u r n off and drops t h e load both from t h e DC bus and from t h e i n v e r t e r .

Now, one of t h e f e a t u r e s of t h e AC s y s t e m is an AC voltage sensor t h a t is p i c t u r e d here which powerre a t r i p relay which i n t h e case of an o v e r v o l t a g e coming o u t of t h e i n v e r t e r t r i p s t h e i n v e r t e r off t h e bus so you have an AC f a i l u r e . And t h i s then is f e d t o t h e c a u t i o n and warning panel so t h e crew is aware immediately of t h e AC bus f a i l u r e .
And i n t h e three e v e n t s i n Apollo 7 t h e crew reset t h e breaker and AC power picked up.
Now, t h i s c o r e l a t i o n W ~ E Imade during A p o l l o 7 , and t h e s u s p i c i o n a t t h a t t i m e was t h a t as t h e AC load w a s dropped off t h e bus, t h e o v e r v o l t a g e t r i p sensor s e n s i t i v i t y w a s such t h a t t h e v o l t a g e r+se\that occurs when you drop load off t h e bus w a s enough t o t r i p t h i s and drop t h e i n v e r t e r off t h e bus.

So for the balance of t h e Apollo 7 mission w e set up such t h a t one of t h e systew was l e f t i n automatic, t h e other w a s set up i n manual, so t h a t w e d i d n ' t have a dropping of both loads a t t h e same time. And after s e t t i n g up t h a t way, t h i s d i d not r e c u r i n t h e Apollo 7 mission.
Now, after t h e mission w e got back t o t h e command module, of course, which included t h e i n v e r t e r and t h e s e n s i n g c i r c u i t s , d i d n o t i n c l u d e t h e motor s w i t c h or t h e cryogenic tanks which are i n t h e s e r v i c e module and therefore d i d n ' t come back t o us*
The n e x t chart shows a p o s t - f l i g h t test s e t u p where w e took t h e 101 spacecraft a t Downey, set it up w i t h its

4

z a LL
0 "

14

i n v e r t e r s and its electrical s y s t e m i n a normal mode, put a direct c u r r e n t pmer supply on of impedance characteristics t o match t h e f u e l cell supply, and put t h i s motor s w i t c h , a motor s w i t c h , i n t o a vacuum b e l l j a r , because it is i n vacuum i n t h e f l i g h t environment, and s e t up a s t i m u l a t i o n of t h e f a n and t h e heater.
W were able i n t h i s test s e t u p t h e n t o f i n d t h a t e t h i s motor s w i t c h which is protected a g a i n s t m o i s t u r e i n t r u s t i o n but is not vacuum protected, has t h e motor open t h e c o n t a c t s , i f t h e c o n d i t i o n s of o u t g a s s i n g were exactly r i g h t i n t h e

vacuum environment, would cause a r c i n g a t t h e switch c o n t a c t s , a corona discharge t y p e effect i n a n e a r vacuum, and under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s t h e a r c i n g would occur t o t h e case, put an e x t r a load on t h e i n v e r t e r and thereby cause t h e dropout.
The next chart shows some of t h e r e s u l t s of t h i s t e s t i n g where, depending on t h e d e t a i l s of t h e number of hours t h a t t h e s w i t c h had been exposed t o t h e vacuum and therefore t h e o u t g a s s i n g of t h e p r o t e c t i v e materials and therefore t h e e x a c t state of t h e vacuum i n t h e case, i n one case a t one p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l t h e t r a n s i e n t t h a t occurred w a s very small, d i d n ' t h i t t h e o v e r v o l t a g e t r i p . Under a s l i g h t corona d i s charge there w a s a s l i g h t o v e r v o l t a g e and then recoverye This is a t t h e time t h e corona discharge o c c u r s i n t h e s w i t c h c o n t a c t s i n t h e case. I t d i d n ' t d r o p i t out.

But when the vacuum c o n d i t i o n s and t h e number of molecules a t t h e switch case were j u s t r i g h t , t h e n a more s e v e r e corona discharge occurred and cawed actually t h e AC v o l t a g e i n t h e corona discharge t o t h e s w i t c h case t o p u t on overload on t h e i n v e r t e r and t o drop I t off t h e l i n e .
Now, we're f o r t u n a t e i n this case t h a t w e were able t o p r e c i s e l y reproduce t h e Conditions a9ter w e had got t h e bulk of t h e hardware back from t h e f l i g h t . W are also e f o r t u n a t e t h a t i t is no p r o c e d u r a l d i f f i c u l t y to not use t h e automatic f e a t u r e of t h i s cryogenic tank h e a t i n g s y s t e m t h a t these motor switches were p u t in there t o d r i v e . So w e have introduced i n t o o u r procedures already for t h e subsequent f l i g h t s manual c o n t r o l s of t h e p r e s s u r e of t h e heati n g and therefore t h e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n of t h e cryogenic tanks and have e l i m i n a t e d t h i s problem as a problem.

Now, other t h a n t h i s , which w a s s i g n i f i c a n t and important, on which w e have been able t o reach an e n t i r e l y

c U
LL

c t

z

v

v)

n

0
0
0
W v)

z

1
T
0

15

adequate t e c h n i c and t h e AC s y s t cated very c o n t r o l chara

he i n v e r t e r s

over t h a t one only t o s h o w you an example of an abnormal c o n d i t i o n t h a t occurred on t h e Apollo 7 f l i g h t which ere able to c o r t h a t f l i g h t ' s purn able t o reso ofar 88 t h e r e l i a b i l i t y erations is eo
which w e re

an example, I have mentioned, and it's o b v i o u ~ , t h a t t h e spacecraft engine, t h e some 20,000 pound t h r u s t s e r v i c e propulsion s y s t e m engine on t h e service module, is used t o provide t h e engine f o r l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n and t h e n for transearth i n j e c t i o n t o g e t u s back o u t of l u n a r o r b i t on t h e way home, If it d i d n f t work t o g e t us i n t o l u n a r o r b i t , we would l i k e a l u n a r pass, But once w e are i n l u n a r o r b i t i t has g o t to work t o g e t us out,

l d like to talk a ed i n great depth

t h e r class of t h i n g

t

In an earth o r b i t a l mission, as you know, we have during m s of Gemini, and w e d i d i n Apollo 7 , maintained ot t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o provide retrograde energy for deorbit u s i n g t h e reaction c o n t r o l s y s t e m . Once you get o u t i n l u n a r o r b i t , you don't have t h a t fallback or backup c a p a b i l i t y , and you are depending on t h e s e r v i c e p r o p u l s i o n s y s t e m .
Now, from t h e beginning, t h e importance of t h i s s y s t e m w a s recognized and was provided for i n t h e design, The design is a simple design and is h i g h l y redundant, There ie only one part of t h e engine which is r e a l l y a s t r u c t u r a l part t h a t is n o t redundant, T h a t is t h e t h r u s t chamber and t h e i n j e c t o r t h a t p u t s t h e p r o p e l l a n t s i n t o t h e t h r u s t chamber and t h e engine nozzle, And because it's n o t redundant, it has wide factors of s a f e t y and s t r e n g t h margins which have been tested elaborately and e x t e n s i v e l y o v e r t h e y e a r s i n

many normal and many abnormal o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s ,
Now, t h e reat of t h e s y s t e m is h i g h l y redundant. ressurizes You obBerve here t h e pr0 t h e p r o p e l l a n t is redund s which are each isolatable f r o m t h e other i s o l a t i o n valves.

--

U

16
d check v a l v e s are a l l e check v a l v e s are quad-

redundant.
This h e P i f u e l tank by e and pushes fue

r i z ~ t i o ns y s t e m pre s u r i z e s t h e area which p r e s s u r i z e s and i n t o t h e engine,

t h e c o n t r o 1 s a l v e is also redundant, quadis e % e m p l i ~ i e d e r s , h

schematic of the p r e s s u r i z a t i o n s y s t e m , dundant c o n t r o l v a l v e s which opermight p o i n t o u t here i n o u r ne h i g h = t e ~ ~ e r ~ c o n~ i t i o n t u de ator operated marginally, T h i s w a s found some t i m e ago i n ground t e s t i n g , and reason w e d i d change o u t the engine and its v a l v e sy which is called i n t e ral on t h e 103 spacecraft, a f t e r o u r d e c i s i o n t o prepare o ~ r s e l ~ e ~h e range of o p t i o n a l m i s for t s i o n s t h a t 1 have described,
1 guss t h e most important t f o n t h a t w e too , I t is the cover o u r s e l v e s f o r a l l options, h a t e d o u r i t u a t i o n back
e
-0

i n August,
NQW, t h e s

f u e l and o x i d i z e r i n t p t series-redundant ih each shown here a n o t h e r p o x i d i z e r , which therefore

hieh controlled the n j e e t o r and t h r u s t chamber are e, and t h e n i n a loop t h a t i s n * t s ~a~~~~ for each f u e l and

ad-redundant.

So you can s u ~ ~ v a r v e failures of open or closed e l i n t h i s quad-redundant s e h p and still be able t o e i t h e r s t a r t or s t o p t h e engine,

Next chart,
"here is a 1 T h i s summarizes eng?lne o r b i t Gprima m i s s i o n where t w i l l require for a lunar o
i t h t h i s engine now,

n t o u n i t s of a l u n a r

0 Lu 0V
I -

> A 6 > Z
PL

111

2 6

I :

- e

-43 -

'5

V 3 PL
QL I UJ
v)

cn UIJ

-I > :
II

x
0

51 "

I

U

!

!

17

On

me for t h i

a minute i n duration. we c o ~ d ~ c t e d

f l f g h t twtg

-- three uni
ten we are

In a ground ta going to f l y e have 86 m opesating t i
In the ground t a back into the Block I s i g n i f i c a n t deaign chang of 135 u n i t s of rniererion o p ~ ~ ~ t tii n eg, m t h e next ohotr
atwe6 of hyper s a t i s f i e d w i t h the s t ~ c t u r a ~

--

1y i f i t a t a r t e

i t will run. For the G p r i aa a nominal ~ ~ s s i o ~ , ther started eight times, You

5
v Le ,
U

CI

v)

>-

n

> bl
Lu

P
v)

) .
v)

18
t h e SP8.

Review of a l l the data from Apollo 7 indicate8 a b s o l u t e l y flawless performance, not an anoParly anywhere. I n t h e unmanned test preceding Apollo 7 , w e had t h e equivalcbnt of two and a q u a r t e r t i m a miesion d u ~ a t ~ o n .
fa I d e n t i c a l s y s t e m tmted on the ground, w e have starter. And aimilar aystema which i n c o r p o r a t e t h e applicable parts of Block I experience, 517.
280

One of t h e messages here is what I 8 a i d i n the beginnang that o u r design coneepts lean h e a v i l y on d ing w i t h t h e necerssary redundancy and i n t e g r a t e d mode f t h e n thorough testing on t h e ground, and minimum f l i g h t dentoms t r a t i o n . This e x e m p l i f i e s that.
0-

--

Next chart now.
One oi t h e thin- about a rocket engine that one ha# t o be a u r e of 16 aombustion e t a b i l i t y , W have in t h e spacecraft enginerr and 1 say "theme" becaw. it applies a180 t o a l l of the launch vehiclerr 81 well arr the lunar m d u l e engines

-- demonstrated rutable engine.

--

I n r e c e n t montha we have conducted 167 bomb terrt w i t h t h i s engine. "hie i t h e mean8 by which teeters i n t s i n t o an engine rhAle it i running to s dace pressure sp he engine gounutable or t h e premrrure see whether o r uced dmps itrelf Out, md if it dapaPr, spike t h a t is i itself o u t in a m i l l i a e w n d s , which is t h e apecifi then you have got a stable en$ine, became you t r y t o it u n s t a b l e and it recover&8.
It under a variety o f t c w t c o n d i t i v e chamber M Well M t h e .tee1 c has been proven to be a m r o r-nominal mixture ratlorr, t and prerserures, and it l a a stable engins,

r

t'

--

For t h i s reason w e don't have t o have a f l i g h t eo bustion s t a b i l i t y monitor nor a rough cornbutution c u t o f f s y s t e m i n thiru t ~ y s t e m ,
Next chart.

Lu

z z 0
v)

w QL 3

G QL
W

W

v)

> v)

p:

e" E W
p:

QL

3
v) v)

m Ia
0
W

I -

W

5 I
a
w

5 a
e" 0
Q?

e

Q?

. J

4

tii
U IC
v)
QL
CI
v)

n

6 W w > I - =E 0 m
06

4

z
n
I 4 c3 U I
0
0

0

m

z a

ti
Lu

19

Now, that l a s t a s to say Apollo

asion here t
receded t h i

control facil-

~ ~ ~ e ~ s a r be sure to y

--

hat X have s

of t h e things

Dr. Pailne

-- major functio
er computer

T h i s complex can

~ j @ c t i om na the ~ i d c o u r unctions invo e nominal m I t computes t f l f g h t path, m to p r o ~ 9 ~ r free return i ~a ~
ye

I t can p

moon.

The lunar orbit

dL
W
0
v)

%

> =>
W

z
W W

U

W

e 2 + o

z a
iiii

ii z

3 e
a

9

Q

z
I + 2

> =>
z
4

ILy:

> 2 s 0 0 ! > z Iii2 W
z

I-

I

a
0

1:
0

3 z

d U
v)

a
e.

s
z
W

2 W .

W

e

e
0 W

. I I

n
v)

ILy:

rn
QL

LL

G W e
v)
v)

v)

a
W
2

3 0

> 3

0

a
W W 2

U
A

>
2 W
Ly:

z
A

> W 3 z

!=> s

a

r;: n
I-

>
u ,
Ly:

rn
I

0

W 9 E 9 s f Ir. 3 I-

s z
QL

3

n

s s
.

z Q?
I -

I-

0

I

a
4
W

8
0

z
z
4

o W a
0

o
W
v)

0 2 0 &-

z
Q?

t
W

3

z a
W
p?

2

IW W

3

a
W
p?

3 b

t
W W

e
W W

3 0 0

e
cp

a
lL

a Ir. Ir. a 4 z
Q?

m

a

0

5
0
0

3
d

a c
a a
W

d

c
A

3

ff
v)
(y:

CI

2 W J

m

W 0

v)

3

3

v)

2
A

v)

n
w

si
W

a

z
w

3

k

z

e
v)

r
W
W

a

z

i 0
0

0 2

i= 5 i=
0
0 0 LL

W

a
I

cu
I

a
00

a
I W W

a

0
0
Y

W

oc

I

> 3

c
Qc

I '

c. a W z

W 2

1
I

W

a
v)

z
a ii-

oc
Pd

40

z
A

0
0

2

-J

a

oc e
W

.. c z
Q: 0
0

% c
W W

0 iv)

e

I 0

e

z

oc

0
0

s
(3

m
W 0
W

2
J

I

0

a
0

> 3

i = e
(3

z
a z

a

*

c
5
W

W

z 2 a a I z. i2 a c 0 u m
W

z F
e
Q: 0 LL

2
. I

s
w

v) v)

z

a
W

A

W 0 0

I W

W

0

z

a e

5

a J

oc
(y:

a
W

z

(3

I
i-

3
v)

-

0 0

a

1 z a
0 LL

a c a a
J

(y: a 0 e e I e 0

a c.
3

a

0

v)

c

*

e

I

a

a P 0 s I- 5 e
e

v)

:
W

(3

a c 2 W
v)

a

0

t

a a c
X

z

3

a
W
Qc

a J

I 5 0 a a
t
W 0
W W

I

W

A

5

1
OL

a e

c

d

c

4

0 LL

2z e

(3

W

I .

U

a

5 z 5 5 0 t 0 a Qc QL Qc e e e e a 5 0
0 0

a

W

a

W 0

W 0

20

i n t h e ground-based comp t h e spacecraft t o be exec maneuvers

.

8s. I t h injeey maneuvers.

one has t o w i l l have m

a l u n a r mission ccurately Bill

.

spacecraft where t o p for its own on-board p l a t
And i t can

s a r y it can par~sup t o t h e e platform f o r i n e r t i a l space doesn't have t o go through t

of t h e m i s s i o n using a v a r ~ e t yof dopp ler da
d three-way

F l i g h t network.

Now, ve gone t h gh h a s been I t h a s been r e f i n e d now for in development i s s i o n . Formal t e s t i n g w i l l u s e on t h e Gpr be complete on t h e 9 t h of D e c ~ b e r .
They have by t is t i m e completed s i m u l a t i o ~ s i n g u acecraft and crew of a l l of t h e computer complex and t h e t h e maneuvers t h a t are i n v o ~ i n t h e l u n a r o r b i t mission.

The next -chart.

Now1 t h i s is t h e 8 a r y of t h e major f u n c t i o n a l capabilities of the an-board computer program. T h i s is t h e d i g i t a l program t h a t is tored i n t h e on-board guidance and n a v i g a t i o n computer. W e c a l l it t h e Colossus Program. I n

.o
<)r

00
A

G d
v)

W

ol

Q)

v)

W

a

> 3

E a
35

0

m

c o
0
0 W

.o * * * cv
d

W 2
Qc

0

c z
0

z
W

a 3 c z a 0
W
. I . ) .

2 c v)
c
I

v)
(3

9
-. .

a
W 0

W

Qc

0

m

(5

z
Qc

c z
0 0

s 2 I3 m 0
I
W
0
(3

E! c SL o o

E c
W

z F=

A

0
0 0
QL

c

I

z
(3

W

a c z c 3 a a
a
4
v)

o z 2 2

s 2 v) z
2 !!
2 0

v)

W

Q 0

0

a c a I W
9
A
0.

0 lA

I -

v)

13

3
4
0

z
I
3

o z

a z a I - a o & * I z z s c
Q

2
W

3

Q I -

(3

B a
lA

i= c
4
(3

2 a

lA
v)

3i

4

A

0

Qc

W W

i-

v)

Qc

e

A

4

5

1

c U c v)

3

0

e .

0

0 . 0 0

21
t h a t program are the f e a t u r e s t h a t allow t h e crew on t h e i r on-board d i s p l a y s t o monitor t h e launch, t o n i t o r t h e transearth i n j e c t i o n maneuver, and t o be able t o execute i f r e q u i r e d t h i s is t h e inde t h e spacecraft from t h e earth if fallbac sary t o execute and monitor midcours maintain t h e p a t h t o t h e moon o r back, on board t h e l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver^ p l a n , target, and monitor for t h e t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n ,
00-

So there is on-board c a p a b i l i t y i n ependent of t h e ground t o compute g e t t i n g i n t o l u n a r o r b i t o r coming back o u t of l u n a r o r b i t .

In a d d i t i o n , crews have chart t h e y have carried on a l l t h e manned f pendent of computers t h e y can g e t a

block data l i k e i t h which inde-

The on-board computer can a guidance and for platform alfgnment u f o r n a v i g a t i o n u s i n g s t a r o r horizon landmark t r a c k i n g ,
Now, t h e f l i g h t ropes i s m t h a t a11 of t h i s d i g i t a l p d e l i v e r e d t o t h e Cape on t h e 1 4 t h of i n t e g r a t i o n test between t h e space v f a c i l i t i e s w a s performed oh t h e 2 9 t h f l i g h t r e a d i n e s s review and t h e c u s t review were concluded s a t i s f a c t o r i l So t h e on-board program has been d e of time and f u l l y checked out and d

e for reentry t a r s i g h t i n g and ngs and l u n a r
t h e piece of mechan-

v e r a long p e r i o d

Next chart.
fore w e g i v e a Now, l e t m e j u s t supuaarize f u r t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e mission it a t w e have concluded are t h e g a i n s t o be made toward our o b j e c t i v e of a manned l u n a r l a n d i n g f r o m a l u n a r o r b i t mission,

are many t h i n g s w e c a n ' t do i n earth o r b i t . W e have got to get o u t i n t o space and g e t i n t o t h e l u n a r environment t o do many of t h e t h i n g s t h a t are r e q u i r e d i n connection w i t h t h e l a n d i n g i t s e l f , One of these is n a v i g a t i o n , going out,- i n o r b i t , and coming back. And
As I said before, there

Z 0 -

v) v)

3
ow z 2
L , 1

RmJ

3

m
(s 1

e v)

0

0
OL

W
v)

z 0
LI

a z 3
9J .

ar

kt!
W

C Y

u )

Z -

0
t3
I #-

0

t

z I
0
. J

(s 1

(3

s - >
c3

x -

a

z

4

S 0

w
t -

I

e

22

involved there are ' t h e l i g h t i n g c o n s t r a i n t s which are an important element of determining o u r launch window, I n other word@, w e need t h e l i g h t i n g on t h e l u n a r surface where w e i n t e n d t o land a t a f a i r l y Xow s u n a n g l e t o e v a l u a t e o u r on-board computation a b i l i t y of t h e guidance and n a v i g a t i o n s y s t e m and o u r a b i l i t y t o track a c c u r a t e l y t h e targets on either horizon o r s t a r o r on l u n a r surface, These are a l l unction u i r e d i n t h e n a v i g a t i o n process.

a t l u n a r d i s t a n c e , It's t o een t h e spacecraft and t h e of s i g n a l g a i n , d i s ~ a n c e s ,pointi n g a c c u r a c i e s , and so on. And t h e d i r e c t i o n a l antenn nee of o u r h i ~ h a g a i nand of o u r nonined, i n c i d e n t a l l y , and discussed gain antenna d i d n ' t evelopment d i f f i c u l t y f i c i e n t s t a t e of
h t h i s mission w i t h cow ~ ~ e i n tn e ~case i t n h

d do if t h e h i e have had som

nt, you will recall i n e e ~ ~ l u a tthe so-called ng or tumblin ate, insofar
only by o p e r a t i n g i n t h a t experience t h a t is d i r e c t l y ng mission t h a t w e o b t a i n and p toward t h e more complex ylng t h e l u n a r module and w i t h more h, w e ' l l have less t i m e and less proe margins and so on t o be able t o very importantly v e r i f y t h a t o u r mission computer programs, t h a t o u r crew procedures

~ ~ a n n i, g n

both on t h e ground and i n f l i g h t and o u r crew t i m e l i n e s provide adequately f o r more complex operations ahead.

Next chart.

Now, as I have s a i d , there are added r i s k s as w e get away f r o m proximity t o t h e earth. The minimum r e t u r n t i m e is considerably l o n g e r t h a n it is f o r an earth o r b i t a l mission. W e w i l l be of t h e order of three d a y s away from land as compared w i t h t h e prior manned f l i g h t where w e have been of t h e order of h a l f an hour t o three hours away f r o m r e t u r n t o earth.
T h i s then places need for i n c r e a s e d r e l i a n c e on t h e p r i n c i p a l l y two major s u b s y s t e l i f e s u p p o r t , which s u p p o r t s p r e s s u r i z a t i o n and oxygen for human s u r v i v a l , and electrical power which provides for t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e many systems aboard. And t h e s e r v i c e propul i o n s y s t e m which must work t o come o u t of l u n a r o r b i t . Next chart.
W e have done a caref are involved i n t h i s mission in I have s a i d many t i m e s , and I r e m i ed f l i g h t there are r i s k s ars be able t o r l d , without ha ~ a ~ you can't r ~a l l y t e ~ e anymore without t a k i n g e in each ne of o u r f l i g h t s .

--

of t h e r i s k s t h a t

rds, t h e d e l t a r i s k . a g a i n , t h a t on n ' t f o r some nue rocket, t h e b e s t lved. I guess, d your car and go But there is r i s k
d on rassessing t h e x t s t e p toward

So w e have therefore d e m e n t s of i n c r e ed r i s k t o o u r d e s i g n mission.

I p o i n t o u t h4re t h a t o u r spacecraft w a s designed for t h i s mission. W e provided redundancy t o recognize t h e f a i l i n g s of both people and equipment, and w e have had very good experience i n o u r ground and f l i g h t test programs. Our spacecraft When i t f l i e s h a s performed exceedingly w e l l . Our ground test experience i n t e s t i n g a l l of t h e s e subsystems has demonstrated t h e proper margin of design condition.

Z

0

CY W t3 7

C Y

0
LL

9

t CY 0

5i n

0
W

Z
A

n 3 n
4
00

a Lu

w r0

r n

7 0

t OL C Y
I -

0 I

e z
a
5:

0
CY

a .
w
0

6

>
cy:

w

v)

P ,

6

e

0

v)

c c
2 IL

t;; w
I

t i

a QL
e

(3

-

0 W 0

a

( 3

v )

z <
7 0 CIL c3 7
3
II

CI

?3 e
0
0
W

5

7 0

Y 7

f
(3
. I

> Lu
v)

w

7 0
v )

I;
w

w

CY

v)

W

e
X w

n
v)

3

0

0 0
(3

n

E >- If v)
(3

s

0

3

> z
d LL

24

Now, w e have got a large margin f o r unknowns o r errors on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 6-prime mission. As B i l l Schneider w i l l show you, w e have c o n s i d e r a b l e margins of consumables aboard, and o u r s y s t e m s have design margi which w e w i l l i n no way tax on t h i s mission. Because w e don't have a LM aboard, w e have a very c o n s i d e r a b l e s e r v i c e p r o p u l s i o n s y s t e m p r o p e l l a n t margin which can be used i n t h e event t h a t w e have t h e o v e r n o m i n a l c o n d i t i o n t h a t would r e q u i r e e x t r a p r o p e l l a n t f o r example.
W e t h i n k it is f o r t u i t o u s f o r u s t h a t w e are able t o carry o u t t h i s f l i g h t and take one s i g n i f i c a n t b i t e o u t of t h e w h o l e series of t h i n g s w e have t o do t o g e t u p t o a f u l l l u n a r landing c a p a b i l i t y , b u t a b i t e t h a t d o e s n ? t involve swallowing a t a l l . And t h a t b i t e involves one complex

spacecraft namely, command and s e r v i c e module w i t h which w e have c o n s i d e r a b l e experience now but without t h e l u n a r module. W t h i n k t h a t t h e added r i s k s t h a t are over and e above those t h a t w e undertake f o r any manned f l i g h t are e q u a l t o those g e n e r a l l y i n h e r e n t in the progre s i v e f l i g h t test program as you go from one s t e p t o t h e other, as w e d i d i n Gemini, as w e are i n Apollo,
0-

--

And w e know t h a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of s u c c e s s f o r a l u n a r landing is enhanced by g e t t i n g t h i a element of crew and o p e r a t i o n a l experience and t h i element of added demons t r a t i o n and data g a t h e r i n g as regards, t h e n a v i g a t i o n and performance of o u r whole s y s t e m .

Next chart.
F i n a l l y , w e have done i n designing af est possible t h e G p r i m e l u n a r o r b i t mission mission t o meet t h e o b j e c t i v e s t h a t w e have established. W w i l l launch i n d a y l i g h t . W vi11 mai e e i n a l l t h e way to lunar orbit i n s e r t i o n a free-return t ectory. Now, what t h i s means is t h a t from t h e moment of tr lunar i n j e c tion onward u n t i l w e reach t h e p o i n t of i n s e r t i n g t h e spacecraft i n t o l u n a r o r b i t t h a t i f no f u r t h e r maneuvers are performed w i t h t h e main spacecraft engine w e can m a i n t a i n the course which w i l l f l y past t h e moon and come back t o t h e earth w i t h small midcourse corrections which are w i t h i n t h e capab i l i t y of t h e small thrusters, t h e c o n t r o l s y s t e m , f r e e - r e t u r n trajectory. And t h a t tsmphwizes t h a t .

cn
9

h

t t

tf) UCJ

V V

0
UJ

z

c

I
V

z
3

z

< 111
8-

0
0

z
0

0

r
0

0

* U
a

z Q z
111

U

z

P

3

25

Translunar midcourse c o r r e c t i o n can be accomplished w i t h t h e small t h r u s t e r s and w i l l keep u s on a c o u m e t h a t b r i n g s u s back t o an acceptable earth landing,
This mission is designed w i t h a two-burn e n t r y i n t o l u n a r o r b i t , The f i r s t burn p u t s us on a 60 x 1 7 0 - m i l e o r b i t around t h e moon, and t h e second burn t h e n c i r c u l a r i z e s a t 60 m i l e s , Those are n a u t i c a l m i l e s ,

W have minimized t h e t i m e i n l u n a r o r b i t , t e n revoe l u t i o n s , approximately 20 hours. W e have minimized t h e r e t u r n t i m e . Our nominal mission d i s c u s s e d o v e r t h e y e a r s has contemplated about 72 hours, about three d a y s , r e t u r n t o earth from t h e moon. W have s u f f i c i e n t p r o p e l l a n t margins on t h i s e f l i g h t because w e don't have a LM aboard and s u f f i c i e n t res e r v e demonstrated i n t h e heat s h i e l d t o come back a l i t t l e b i t faster, so w e have b u i l t t h i s trajectory t o 68 hours r e t u r n t i m e , That minimizes t h e t i m e back t o earth from t h e moon.
There is a midcourse c o r r e c t i o n provided i n t h e t r a n s earth leg t o maintain e n t r y i n t o t h e r e e n t r y corridor. And w e have provided for a short-range, non-skip r e e n t r y which provides u s about three l e v e l s of backup for being able t o make t h a t r e e n t r y r e t u r n , B i l l Schneider w i l l describe t h a t ,

Nay, w e can p u t t h e l i g h t s on now. What I have t r i e d t o do is t o remind you of and summarise for you t h e background of t h e last year t h a t h a s l e d us up t o a s t a t e of r e a d i n e s s f o r a f l i g h t to l u n a r o r b i t and r e t u r n w i t h Apollo and describe f o r you some of t h e more s i g n i f i c a n t technical factors t h a t , w e have examined, many of them i n great depth, i n t h e la$t severaS. months o r t h e last few weeks and s e v e r a l days i n particular,
With t h a t I would l i k e t o t u r n i t o v e r to B i l l Schneider who w i l l describe for you t h e Ago110 8 l u n a r o r b i t mission. B i l l Schneider is t h e mission director f o r t h i s

8

mission.
B i l l,
SCHNIIEIDER: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I would 1Ue t o take, t h e next few minutes t o describe f o r you what we're going t o be doing on Apollo 8 mission, I w i l l be s t e p p i n g through 8 l i t t l e b i t f a s t because it is a

26

long mission. Of course, as f a r as w e are concerned, t h e mission has just about begun.
If I may have t h e first s l i d e , please, j u s t t o b r i n g you up to date and t o p o i n t o u t t o you what o u r a c t i v i t i e s are going t o be i n t h e upcoming d a y s , I prepared t h i s s l i d e here t o show what t h e coming e v e n t s are, W e w i l l s t a r t off o n t h i s F r i d a y , t h e 1 5 t h a s l i g h t error i n t h e s l i d e here w i t h o u r f l i g h t r e a d i n e s s test. T h i s is our last b i g electrical test of t h e spacecraft and launch v e h i c l e t o a s s u r e t h a t it is ready f o r f l i g h t .

--

0-

T h i s is a crew p a r t i c i p a t i n g test, and t h e crew sits i n t h e c a p s u l e i n t h e i r s h i r t s l e e v e s ,

W e t h e n have a reasonably l e i s u r e l y pace on through o u r normal (checkout procedure u n t i l w e come t o o u r countdown demonstration test, The countdown demonstration test is going t o be run i n t h e same sequence t h a t w e r a n t h e Apollo 7 . That is, w 0 w i l l f i r s t have a w e t countdown demonstration test t h a t i s , a complete s i m u l a t i o n from beginning t o end of t h e countdown without t h e crew. W w i l l use a l l t h e proe p e l l a n t s on board and a l l of t h e procedures w i l l be just as if t h e crew were there. However, t h e c a p s u l e w i l l be unmanned.

--

W w i l l t h e n recycle, and t h e next d a y we w i l l d r y e a t which t i m e t h e crew w i l l be i n t h e f i n a l test, W e go throygh t b f i n 4 1 d a y \ w i t h o u t t h e p r o p e l l a n t s on
T h i s is 8 reasonably l e i s u r e l y schedule, ample t i m e i n here t o accomplish a l l of these.

W have e

W do repergve t h e r i g h t for o u r s e l v e s t o s h u f f l e e dates around a l i t t l e b i t here and there, although I don't a n t i c i p a t e t h a t there w i l l be anything major come up between now and then.

However, on t h e 7 t h , i f w e f i n i s h on t h a t date, w e then have a recycle t i m e may I have t h e next s l i d e , please for o u r countdown.

--

-0

Now, w e have a long countdown, which begins on t h e 1 6 t h of December. You w i l l n o t i c e w e have about n i n e
d a y s i n cas0 w e come up w i t h any problems i n t h e countdown

CY

w

m z w

0

>

z

~0
0 N

I -

E >
w

v)

t

2s
c

yt

a

1

s
I
V

s
w
V

demonstration test before w e pick up o u r count. And it is a long Apollo count, 101-hour count, which w i l l be picked up about 9;45 p.m. on t h e 1 6 t h of December, and w e w i l l go through a l l of t h e checks t h a t w e normally go through leadi n g up t o our f i n a l count.
May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.
This begins about 10:45 on t h e n i g h t of t h e 19th. I t j u s t 80 T h i s i s n ' t an empty space i n here, b e l i e v e me. happens t h a t these are t h e only bars t h a t have been picked out *
hold, a t 4:45 p.m.

W do e n t e r o u r no e on t h e 20 a t minus n i n e hours a t about f o r a launch on the 21st a t

a l b u i l t - i n hold, a six-hour I p i c k i n g up a g a i n t h e count :45 pm .. t h a t evening, aiming

W have not completely determined t h e precise moment e of l i f t o f f as y e t . I t w l l l be a t 7:45 i n t h e morning, g i v e or take a few minutes.
May I have the next slli

have e s t a b l i s h a daylight lau

criteria for launch window@, f i r s t w e n e r a l criteria. P r i m a r i l y , w e desire That is, we would launch, W have set e ave a f r e e - r e t u r n trajectory, i g h t i n g i n t h e Apollo

zones.

W are e imuth t h a t is, d i r e c t i o n s from t can launch by range safety and by per 108 degrees. And w e w i l l i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y u t i l i z e t h i s f u l l range.
0-

And w e have set up o u r launch windowa rjruch t h a t w e have t w o o p p o r t u n i t i for any launch time for a transl u n a r i n j e c t i o n , t h e first o p p o r t u n i t y being a t t h e second r e v and t h e second o p p o r t u n i t y b e i n g one r e v later. Looking a t t h e p r i m a r y windows t h a t w e are aiming f o r , w e are p i c k i n g up, as I stated, t h e launch window on t h e 21st a t about 7:45, and w e do have approximately a

B

U

E

J
I -

n
0 I -

W

QI

m
V

5 V

cu
cu

W

v) ) .

s
W

0

n

a

I 3

2

t3

z
F=

. *
v)

Y

v)

0 121

0 0
0
2

z

c3

I

z

3 W e

c

I

W

i= c ac 0 e e
0 0
W

z
2

3

0
2

I

c

z a
0

3 c

W I -

<
=E
9 .

i=
0

z

2 0
0

S c3

3

z g: 0 W a
W

z

(Y

s

) .

a
l L

e

a

P I -

28 five-hour launch window, These are a l l E a s t e r n Standard Times, I might add. W have about a five-hour launch window e t h a t w e w l l l be aiming for t h a t day.

On s u c c e s s i v e d a y s t h e launch window moves down through t h e time period as you can see here, w i t h on t h e 2 6 t h here p i c k i n g up a t i t looks l i k e about f o u r o'clock, We do desire, as I s a i d , a d a y l i g h t launch, both p i c k i n g up t h e count and ending t h e count, If we do go on t h e 2 l s t , w e w i l l be going f o r t h e Apollo zone, t h e e a s t e r n most Apollo zone, W w i l l have a sun e l e v a t i o n a n g l e a t t h e e s e v e n t h l u n a r r e v o l u t i o n of about 6.7 degrees, which is j u s t about what w e desire,
May I have t h e next s l i d e , please,

Looking a t t h e launch phase, I might s t a t e a g a i n t h e launch of t h e S a t u r n V comes off from t h e pad 39A. Nothing unusual i n o u r launch phase. I t ' s a t y p i c a l S a t u r n V launch phase, and w e do have o u r normal abort capabilities t h a t you're a l l f u l l y aware of i n case of malfunctions i n t h e launch v e h i c l e on t h e way up,
W do have a l t e r n a t e missions e s t a b l b h e d i n cases e where we have e a r l y t e r m i n a t i o n of t h r u s t on one of t h e stages, and i n g e n e r a l t h e y lead t o an u l t i m a t e earth o r b i t a l mission, although i f w e got an, e a r l y c u t o f f of t h e S-IVB j u s t prior to i n s e r t i o n w e would probably hgve enough SPS c a p a b i l i t y t o go on w i t h t h e mission, Im s o r r y , I mean 5-11 stage. The ' S - I n , of course, is needed for t h e t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n .

So i n g e n e r a l i f w e have an e a r l y c u t o f f and m u s t use t h e SPS engine in going iqto a l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n , o u r first a l t e r n a t e miss$on t h e n is a repeat of t h e C mission, approximately t e n d a y s i n earth o r b i t ,

Next s l i d e , please.
Just b r i e f l y summarizing w h a t t h e mission looks l i k e , j u s t t o o r i e n t you before I go through t h e phases, t h i s is an artist's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of what t h e mission looks l i k e , I t begins, of c o u r s e , a t t h e Cape w i t h i n s e r t i o n , and t h e n w e go i n t o o u r one o r b i t for systems.checkout,
and f i n a l l y o u r second o r b i t for o u r l u n a r o r b i t i m e r t i o n

--

26

--t h a t o u r tt rhaen ssecondr ii n snei rt ti ioonn .of Wedo o u r -for luna e is, g t h 5-IvB a t t h i s p o i n t ( i n d i c a t i n g ) and go on o u t on o u r coast, midcourse corrections -- 1'11 go i n t o a l l of these i n a l i t t l e more d e t a i l -- and t h e n f i n a l l y o u r l u n a r o r b i t ins e r t i o n on t h e back s i d e of t h e moon.
I ' m sorry TLI burp
-0

29

A s Sam s a i d , a two-phase l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n , t h e first being p u t t i n g us i n a 60 x 170, and t h e n f i n a l l y a c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n a t 6 0 , Ten o r b i t s t h e n i n l u n a r o r b i t . Followed t h e n by a tramearth i n s e r t i o n , come back, and t h e n f i n a l l y s p l a s h down i n t h e Pacific. A t each one of these p o i n t s w e do have s p e c i f i c

g o h o go p o i n t s and specific go/no go decisions, and w i t h i n which w e have preplanned a l t e r n a t e s t h a t I w i l l be d e s c r i b i n g t h a t w e w i l l u t i l i z e i f necessary a t these v a r i o u s p o i n t s .
May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

Turning t o t h e f i r s t phase, which is, of course, t h e l i f t o f f , s y s t e m s checkout, and f i n a l l y t e r m i n a t i n g i n t h e second S-IVB urn, t h a t p u t s u s i n o u r coast phase on o u t t o t h e moon.
W e have an earth trajectqry t h a t looks l i k e t h i s ( i n d i c a t i n g ) , Now9 o u r g o h o go p o i n t is stet up o v e r Australia for t h e large burn, and w e w i l l g i v e t h e "go" providing w e have s u r a n c e t h a t t h e S-IVB w i l l satisfactorily complete its nd burn t h a t is, p r o v i d i n g w e know of no f a i l u r e i n t h e S I V B , p ~ o v ~ d t h a g t h e consurmables i n t h e S-IVB are i~ t s u f f i c i e n t t o not only start t h e burn but also t o f i n i s h t h e burn, and t h a t w e have no known reason t h a t the S-IVB would s h u t down.

--

Also on t h e s p a c e c r a f t s i d e , t h e "go1' d e c i s i o n w i be given only i f t h e spacecraft is completely operable w i t h

ll

a l l redundancies,
If w e have an e a r l y c u t o f f of t h e S-IVB a t t h i s p o i n t i n t i m e , w e have some preplanned a l t e r n a t e missions t h a t b a s i c a l l y take advantage of what are on t h e impulse w e have imparted t o t h e spacecraft. If w e are on an o r b i t t h a t w i l l lead to a 4,000-mile apogee before w e g e t premature c u t o f f of t h e S-IVB, w e w i l l c o n t i n u e on o u t and do a high earth

X

8

8

R

R

U

8

c3 c3 7 7

cx 0 Qf

SL

3

a n

0

o r b i t a l mission, t h e n d e o r b i t t h a t is, up t o 4,000 miles, s t a y there f o r two r e v s , then deorbit and s t a y up t e n d a y s i n earth o r b i t , r e p e a t i n g those p o r t i o n s of t h e C mission t h a t w e feel w e need to.
There are a series of other a l t e r n a t e s i f w e g e t on o u t .

--

30

S u f f i c e it Yo s a y i f t h e 5-IVB c u t s off prematurely and o u r apogee is over 60,000 m i l e s , we w i l l assess t h e s i t u a t i o n and i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y go on a c i r c w l u n a r f l i g h t u s i n g t h e SPS engine t o provide t h e a d d i t i o n a l impulse t h a t would be necessary.
If w e f a i l t o i n j e c t a t t h i s p o i n t , w e w i l l i n j e c t one r e v later over a t t h i s p o i n t here ( i n d i c a t i n g ) ,

Next s l i d e .

QUESTION:
IDER:
QUESTION:

What p o i n t ?
One r e v later.

Over what p o i n t d i d you s a y ?

: I t would be roughly r i g h t around h e r e , B i l l , one rev later ( i n d i c a t i n g ) .
May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

Now, when w e m a k e t h a t t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n burn w i t h t h e S-IVB, w e are as Sam has s a i d , on o u r way home. That is, w e w i l l be i n s e r t i n g i n t o a f r e e r e t u r n trajectory. W have set up o u r f l i g h t dynamics such t h a t a t a l l t i m e s w i t h e o u r s e r v i c e module R S s y s t e m w e can p u t whatever impulse might C
be necessary t o correct any deViatiQIW.3 f o r a free r e t u r n trajectory t h a t would g e t u s back down t o t h e earth without any need for t h e SPS engine.’
T h e o r e t i c a l l y , of course, w e are a t the end of end of t h e 5-IVB burn theoretically w e are on a f r e e - r e t u r n trajectory without any c o r r e c t i o n whatsoever.
t h e first burn

--

--

During t h i s t r a n s l u n a r coast period, as w e go on o u t t o t h e moon, w e do have t h e p o i n t s a t which w e p l a n t o

tx
W

I -

m a .
u ,

W

z a
tx

m

C E 0
W

> I

a a .

Z E

z N
0

R-N

+ u
I
c4

a

m*
I

0

m

W

OI

cv

c);
\o

0

c);

I -

W

7

z

0
W

>LL

w

>w c-W

z

31

assess t h e s i t u a t i o n , and w e would abort t h a t is, w e would come back either circumlunar or h i g h apogee i f w e lost redundancy i n some of o u r on-board spacecraft s y s t e m s ,
S p e c i f i c a l l y , if w e lose redundancy i n t h e environmental c o n t r o l s y s t e m , t h e s e r v i c e module and p r o p u l s i o n s y s t e m or t h e electrical power s y s t e m , w e would elect t o abort t h e mission. A l s o , i f w e lost selected portions of t h e guidance and c o n t r o l s y s t e m , communication s y s t e m or t h e sequential system,
May I have t h e n e x t s l i d e , please.

--

Looking a t how long it would take uet t o come home, t h i s s l i d e here s h s t h e minimum t i m e Prom abort to landing as a f u n c t i o n of t i m e , of elapsed t i m e , of making t h e d e c i s i o n to abort, For example, if we decided a t 40 hours o u t t h a t w e wished t o abort t h e mission, w e would be back i n something on t h e order of 20 hours. S i m i l a r l y , i f w e go on o u t t o t h e moon, t h i s p o i n t here, we'd and up doing a circumlunar mission and not a h i g h a l t i t u d e abort.
W have, a ~ t h o u g h e don't have t o uBe i t t o abort-e w f l a b l e for abort during t h a t period of t i m e 10,000 r o p u l s i o n s y s t e m , and, as I rt on o u r normal f r e e - r e t u r n

r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n , after t h e l u n a r o r b i t t o come home ra Nominally, as General 72-hour r e t u r n , For h l y a 55-hour r e t u r n , If we decided t h a t o g e t home fast and wanted t o use t h i s 4,000 foot have a v a i l a b l e , w e could have r e t u r n times running along t h i s l i n e here ( i n d i c a t i n g ) .
May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

One p o i n t t h a t I d i d n o t m a k e is roughly i n t h i s tiane period here, approximately f i v e hours i n t o t h e mission, w e w i l l do a p r o p e l l a n t dump on t h e S-IVB, which i n essence p u t s us in t h a t is, a r8trOgrade dump which g i v e s u s about 90 foot per second, which b a s i c a l l y p u t s t h e S-IVB behind t h e spacecraft and because of f l i g h t dynamics and

--

--

t

t

a

0 0

ut

/

b

m

23
W

> c> > a
t
W

a

0 1

z

1E
J

U

u -. .. e
I -

>-

0 0

0

m

0
CN

0
A

0

u

32

o r b i t a l mechanics and w e end up w i t h a s l i n g s h o t mode w i t h t h e S-IVB on a nominal trajectory going on out i n t o
0-

solar o r b i t

0

A t t h i s p o i n t I would l i k e t o t a l k about communicat i o n s and p o i n t o u t to you t h a t w e do have preplanned i n our mission t h e a b i l i t y t o provide t e l e v i s i o n back t o earth. W e are providing f o r two methods of t e l e v i s i o n coverage i n our f l i g h t p l a n , one a t about 31 hours and one about 55 hours i n t o
the flight.

Now, t h e TV does r e q u i r e t h e u s e of t h e high-gain s antenna. And, as General P h i l l i p s s a i d , t h i s i t h e f i r s t f l i g h t for t h e high-gain antenna, and so there is a f i n i t e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t w e might n o t be able t o g e t t h e TV for you. However, as General P h i l l i p s d i d state, t h e u s e of t h e omni antennas provides a l l of t h e communications t h a t w e need opera t i o n a l l y . The loss of t h e high-gain antenna would cause us t o lose Ty i n t h e o u t e r f r i n g e s as w e l l as biomedical data and h i g h b i t rate data.
W r e t a i n a l l t e l e m e t r y data t h a t g i v e s us t h e w e l l e being of t h e s y s t e m . We r e t a i n a l l v o i c e communications and a l l track, but what we do lose, 88 I s a i d , i f w e lose t h e s y s t e m , is TV, biomedical, and h i g h b i t rate.

W do have t h e d e c i s i o n pointsr f o r midcourse correce t i o n s . These come a t about s i x hours, 24 hours a f t e r TLI., and about 20 hours a t e i g h t hours before l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n . W have f o u r d e c i s i o n p o i n t s where w e w i l l decide whether or e n o t w e are going to m a k e t h e burn.

W w i l l m a k e a l l burns t h a t w e p o s s i b l y can u s i n g e
t h e s e r v i c e module R S s y s t e m . C

Xf t h e ground computation t e l l s u s t h a t a delta-V of less t h a n one foot per second is required, w e w i l l m a k e no attempt t o make t h e burn. That is, w e w i l l n o t correct that. If t h e ground t e l l s u s t h a t c o r r e c t i o n is more on t h e order of f o u r feet per second, w e w i l l use t h e SPS s y s t e m t o make t h e burn.
May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

e.

33

--

How a c c u r a t e l y do w e know Where we are going? T h i s s l i d e here shows o u r p r e d i c t i o n on p e r i l i n e or 3 sigma K t h a t is a high p r o b a b i l i t y case as w e go on o u t i n t o t h e mission.
-0

Here w e have t i m e from a r r i v i n g a t t h e moon as a f u n c t i o n 0 % u n c e r t a i n t y i n where you t h i n k you are going t o be. You can see t h a t 70 hours t h a t is, a t t h e beginning of t h e mission o u r 3 sigma Uncertainty is about 13 m i l e s , 12 o r 13 m i l e s , and it r a p f d l y decreases down t o about f i v e m i l e s , and then when w e g e t close t o t h e moon w e g e t down t o t h e order of one m i l e .

--

-0

The spacecraft, t h i s on-board s y s t e m , roughly h an u n c e r t a i n t y of about s i x m i l e s , so w e know p r e t t y w e l l where w e are going.

Next s l i d e , please.
The l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n burn, as w e stated, ias a two-burn and is a burn for 60 x 170 followed by 60 x 60 burn, both of which are on t h e back s i d e of t h e moon.

Our fixed a t t i t u d e burns--

And w e a g a i n have specific

I n essence, w e g o h o go c r i t e r i a for conducting these burns. w i l l not conduct t h e burns if w e have had t h e loss of some selected s y s t e m s . And there is a complete list of t h o s e s y s tems t h e loss o f which would r e q u i r e t h a t we not go i n t o l u n a r o r b i t but do come back on a circumlunar f l i g h t .

A t y p i c a l example of t h i s is i f w e lost one e n t r y b a t t e r y w e would elect not to go i n an W I burn.

Next s l i d e , please.
When w e get i n t o l u n a r o r b i t , t h i s is t h e t i m e l i n e - better take a moment t o e x p l a i n what these are. T i hs chart o v e r here begins w i t h r e v 1 and goes through t o r e v 10 w i t h a d a y b i g h t cycle as you go on through, w i t h t h e a c t i v i ties t i c k e d off on bars down here.
I'd

T h i s chart o v e r here s t a r t s w i t h t h e W I first burn a t t h i s p o i n t here. The earth is down i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . The s u n is up i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . And t h e n t h e o r b i t t i m e l i n e is d e p i c t e d i n t h e spiral.

0

LIL
W

a

0

b

o

v)

x
0

x
0

a
rn
W

2

3

s
#

a a I F:
8-

4.

f

a W

4

m

a
I I

* O

LI I,
I )

34

You recognize, of course, t h a t w e s t a y i n t h e 60-mile o r b i t throughout , I n g e n e r a l , t h e first pass, t h e first a c t i v e pass here, is t a k e n up w i t h s e q u e n t i a l photographs t h a t is, photographs wherein w e wish t o determine what t h e moon looks l i k e , what o u r landing sites look l i k e ,

--

W e t h e n go i n t o a series of stereo photographs and go on i n t o t h e mission w i t h some landmark t r a c k i n g .

W do have a t t h i s pointe T h i s is t h e easternmost Apollo landing s i t e . W do have f o u r separate attempts or e f o u r separate t i m e s a t which w e w i l l track t h e Apollo landing s i t e . W have scheduled also three a d d i t i o n a l sites on t h e e back s i d e of t h e moon t h a t w e wish t o track i n order t o see what o u r a b i l i t y is t o track, both t o track on board as w e l l as todetermine from t h e ground how good o u r t r a c k i n g accuracy

is

.

W have a number of requests from s c i e n t i s t s t o cone duct some s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s p r i m a r i l y looking a t t h e solar corona, looking at d i m s k y . Most of these a c t i v i t i e s take place i n these dark periods back here.

I n g e n e r a l , t h e crewmen w i l l be s l e e p i n g o r resti n g I guess I should s a y i n two-hour cycles throughout t h i s period, l e a d i n g us then t o transearth i n j e c t i o n a t t h e appropriate t i m e ,

--

--

I might s a y r i g h t here t h a t w e are c a r r y i n g a number e 0f photographic equipments on board. W have two Hasselblat cameras w i t h a number of r o l l s of black-and-white and color f i l m , as w e 1 1 aa a 16 m i l l i m e t e r ( a u r e r ) camera,

We are planning hopefully and 1 c a n ' t t e l l you prec i s e l y when r i g h t now i f t h e high-gain antenna is up t o have some periods of W . And, of course, it w i l l have t o be i n t h i s g e n e r a l area here i n order t o get the l i n e of s i g h t back t o t h e earth. We are looking a t r e v s 1, 2 and 9, although I c a n ' t specify for you which r e v o l u t i o n of t h o s e w e w i l l select y e t ,
0-

--

--

The l u n a r o r b i t phase would be aborted f o r c e r t a i n specific losses of equipment, p r i m a r i l y for loss of redundancy

35

i n t h e guidance and c o n t r o l s y s t e m s o r i n t h e electrical buses o r i n any of t h e r e d u n ~ a n c i e s SPS s e r v i c e module on propulsion s y s t e m .
Next s l i d e , please.
Transearth i n j e c t i o n , w e said, is nominally a t t h e end of t h e t e n t h r e v o l u t i o n . We do have t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o maintain o u r s e l v e s i n l u n a r o r b i t f o r one or t w o more o r b i t s if there is some overpowering reason f o r doing so. However, t h e nominal p l a n t h a t w e w i l l attempt t o maintain is t o come back a t t h e end of t e n r e v o l u t i o n s .
W have targeted o u r landing l o n g i t u d e a t 165 degrees e west t h a t is, almost i r e c t l y s o u t h of H a w a i i . And a l l of o u r landing zone f o r a l l of o u r l i f t o f f times and a l l of o u r l i f t o f f d a y s are on t h a t l i n e . W do n o t c o n t r o l o u r l a t i e t u d e u n t i l t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n . A t t h a t p o i n t w e d e c i d e what l a t i t u d e w e w i l l be going to.
0-

We are t a r g e t i n g f o r t h e m i d d l e of t h e corridor, and w e are t a r g e t i n g f o r maintaining o u r c a p a b i l i t y w i t h a r e e n t r y
speed.
i d e j u s t sh ed w e d i d come back i n

o v e r Asia. Next
9

e.
d , a g a i n have t h e c a p a b i l i t y 1 be conducting midcourse COP 1 obably be conducted u s i n g t h e

rections. These ag s e r v i c e module reae t h e trajectory for Corr
Thoes corr t i m e s , and t h e y I spoke about before.

1 s y s t e m , and w e w i l l direct n t r o l only, and w e w i l l maintain

w i l l be made a t t h e morat convenient s u b j e c t t o t h e same delta-V restrictions

May I have t h e n e x t s l i d e , please.

Just t o g i v e you an idea of what kind of u n c e r t a i n t y w e have i n r e e n t r y f l i g h t p a t h a n g l e , t h i s chart w a s o r i g i n a l l y set up f o r one of t h e longer r e t u r n t i m e s , and for o u r [iO-oddhour r e t u r n t i m e you j u t squeeze i t up a l i t t l e b i t .

0

I W
7

z

Q W

A

o

s
fn

J

z
S
ps

>
W

I 2 0 0

a a
t

(5

4

0

3 I 0 W

2

i
W

+
z a
w t A
U

A

W

aL

(3

W W 0

E

9
w x W

i3
O
(3

t
W
c)

2 I
t

L3

W

+ 3
0

z
2 . c) 2

a e

e 3
e
W
fn

2,
OI

V

ps I -

4
W

B-

z

0 W
p:

c
(5

5

t c
2 W 0 W

a a
H

c W
aL

G

(3

J-

U

B-

a

3 CI
W

z a

z
p:

a

c W a

3

e

e

P

8

R

0

R

s

I v)

a 0
0

I CY

a w v ) z a CY
I -

>
a
0
v)

S

0 A

e
I
0

S

2

f-

E

6

i!i
0 0 0

a

a
lL v)

s e
w

2

0

0 0

a a

e

a

a

36

You can see t h e manned space f l i g h t network i t s e l f without any assistance on board w i l l g i v e us a l i t t l e o v e r a degree of u n c e r t a i n t y a t TEI, and t h i s very r a p i d l y converges down t o t h e one degree which w e feel is most desirable, very quickly comes down t o a very, very nominal l e v e l , m o s t satisfactory f o r r e e n t r y ,
"he spacecraft i t s e l f , w e believe t h a t is a r e e n t r y guidance u n c e r t a i n t y , 3 sigma, of about t h a t order of magnitude (indicating) w e l l , w i t h i n what is necessary. What is necessary is something on t h e order of a degree,

--

May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

Entry itself looks something l i k e t h i s , T h i s is a s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n from t h e skip r e e n t r y t h a t you may have been familiar w i t h , i n t h a t w e are f l y i n g what w e are c a l l i n g a c o n s t a n t g r e e n t r y . We have d e c i d e d t o u s e only 1,350 m i l e s of o u r nominal r e e n t r y range, although t h i s range is a v a i l a b l e t o u s by our l i f t i n g r e e n t r y . W d i d select t h i s short range e i n order to g e t t h i s t h i r d backup I might s a y mode of c o n s t a n t g,

--

QUESTION:

Is t h a t what w e called "footprint" i n
: Yese And I w i l l go i n t o t h a t a l i t t l e

earlier f l i g h t s ?
b i t further.

or weather avoidance, if w e aremore t h a n one day o u t e r v i c e propulsion s y s t e m t o a d j u s t o u r nominal e are less t h a n one day o u t , w e w i l l retarget o u r e n t r y p o i n t and use o u r f o o t p r i n t for weather avoidance.
This is what t h e trajectory w i l l look l i k e , Entry i n t e r f a c e a t 400,000 feet, And w e do e n t e r S-band, w e e n t e r t h e blackout region, and begin f l y i n g o u r c o n s t a n t g r e e n t r y ,

In contrast to the skip reentry, a l l y have t a k e n u s much f u r t h e r o u t i n t h e t h e n come back i n , w e p u l l t h i s c o n s t a n t 4 l i t t l e d i p , come o u t of blackout, and t h e n This whole a c t i v i t y here takes about 14 or

which would nomin-

atmosphere and g s and do a ', come on back i n . 15 minutes.

0 W

W
‘) I

e .

W
v)

=>

0
W

a e a
LL

CI

W

0

> E
U

z

3

a o
W

m
0 0

I
W

v)

a

m

z
0

m

a

(v

0

c
0 0
rl
I

r
z 0 m
I
e

0 I -

6J

0 l W
W

$
a
W W 0 0

LI?

W
v)

3
I -

t
z
W

E

2
W
(3

n
W

v)

3
ziii a e
0 W
(3

a

z

t-

o
W
v)

4

d
W

A

I -

t
z

z

W

z

d

Y d
l -

t c
2 W

z

8
v)

a

0

0

e . .

a

.

6

0

*

0

0
( u

0

9

m

m

03

0

0
0 N

N

d N

0 9
A

0
rl
(v

0

a

l

37
QUESTION:

How many g's,

Bill?

SCHNEIDEFt:

About 4 g t s scheduled.

One t h i n g I should mention a t t h i s p o i n t is w e are going t o g i v e t h e crew "go" f o r t a k i n g off t h e i r s u i t a t i n j e c t i o n i n t o o r b i t , back on one of t h e earlier slides, and t h e y w i l l conduct t h e mission, t h e remainder of t h e mission, without s u i t s . That is, r e e n t r y w i l l be without space s u i t s .
W have provided t h e crew w i t h heel r e s t r a i n t s and e a l s o w i t h a head r e s t r a i n t , which, if you recall, were t h e two areas of concern on Apollo 7 .

QUESTION:
SCIINBIDER:

Does t h a t i n c l u d e r e e n t r y then, B i l l ?
Y e s sir.

Next s l i d e , plea80. Footprint. This is o u r r e e n t r y coverage. We do cone i n , as I stated, o v e r Asia. W have very good t r a c k i n g e e of Guam. W have s t a t i o n e d a Mercury s h i p a t t h i s p o i n t , e and then w e come down and touch down here. W have t h e Yorktown i n t h e recovery area.
A s I s a i d , recovery is along 165 l o n g i t u d e and f o r a nominal mission w i l l be approximately a t t h i s p o i n t (indi-

cat ing 1.

Next S l i d e , please+
I would l i k e t o summarise for you t h e mission by t i n e BO t h a t you w i l l get an idea of when t h i n g s occur. And t h i s s l i d e o v e r here shows t h e nominal mission times t h a t t h i n g s w i l l occur, plus delta times, for d i f f e r e n t l i f t o f f days. That is, nominally, for example, a nominal t o t a l mission is s i x d a y s and four hours approximately. W e could conceivably be as long as one day l o n g e r or f o u r hours shorter i f w e l i f t e d off a t a d i f f e r e n t l i f t o f f t i m e . I guess t h e b i g numbers t o p o i n t o u t are t h e TLI burn, which is roughly about 311 seconds and s t a y s p r e t t y close t o t h a t no matter what o u r t i m e is, and t h e f r e e - r e t u r n circumlunar tine, which is a n o t h e r k e y number, is about 130 hours

CI

0

a
I .

n

z

U

1

I

t

38

and 37 minutes. I t can i n c r e a s e some 17 hours or be as l i t t l e as one hour shorter.
The fx)I burn is almost independent of l i f t o f f t i m e . There are some d i f f e r e n c e s because you do a p l a n e c o r r e c t i o n a t t h a t same t i m e , and t h e p l a n e change does change w i t h l i f t off day.

I guess t h e t r a n s e a r t h r e t u r n t i m e of 58 hours p l u s nine minus two is t h e other important p o i n t ,

Again t u r n i n g t o t o t a l delta-V, as f a r as t h e launch v e h i c l e is concerned, w e have p l e n t y of delta-V a v a i l a b l e , W use approximately 10,000 feet per second o u t of t h e e S-IVB f o r t h i s second, t h e TLI burn. W have approximately, e if I remember correctly, about f i v e seconds of burn l e f t , very comfortable margin.

In t h e spacecraft, as I s a y , w e expect t o do most of o u r midcourse burns u s i n g t h e SPS s y s t e m . W e have plentyI ' m s o r r y . Using t h e R S s y s t e m . We have p l e n t y of SPS C s y s t e m a v a i l a b l e i f w e need it i n there. W e u s e approximately We have about 4,000 feet per second 7,000 feet p e r second. f l o a t i n g around, and w e haven't used t h a t .
J u s t to show you where w e s t a n d i n consumables, may I have t h e next chart, please? RCS consumables. Those of you who have been follow i n g manned space f l i g h t know t h a t consumables have a l w a y s been something t h a t w e have had t o p l a y very c a r e f u l l y , and here w e have a s i t u a t i o n where I t h i n k a t least i n RCS f u e l for nominal mission w e have very l i t t l e w o r r y about t h e f u e l q u a n t i t i e s . W e have a v a i l a b l e t h a t much, w i t h u n c e r t a i n t i e s as shown up here, and you can see w e probably use about 30 p e r c e n t of i t .
May I have t h e n e x t s l i d e , please,
The SPS budget runs l i k e t h i s . Beside these, as I s a i d , we have about 4,000 foot per second l e f t over. These are t h e k i n d s of d i s p e r s i o n s t h a t w e a n t i c i p a t e , 3 sigma d i s p e r s i o n s , You can see w e a n t i c i p a t e about 120 feet per second 3 sigma maximum d i s p e r s i o n for t h e midcourse corrections.

t

m oc 0
I -

a
CIL

z 5 3
v) W

8
s-4

X

0

E!

L i
v)
0

1L
0

m OI
00

r
0

>*
a=

sm
+
I

e 4

.-

. .

' z z

n

r
8 8
0

m c. ? cu
0 .
0

0
+ + I
I

W W

-- I

+ +

m

cu
W

I-+

d

N

e u ,

v)

3

0 0

n

II

E

4 n
cc
d

n

I

cn

n

4
b
@#

b rn
0
0

0

a

a

39

And t h e contingencies. w e have run l i k e t h i s : 500 feet per second i n case w e wanted t o come home as soon

as possible, And w e have allotted these amounts of numbers, d e l t a - V ' s a v a i l a b l e f o r weather avoidance and t h i n g s of t h a t nature

.

Out of t h e 4,000 w e a g a i n appear to have no problem
there.

Looking a t t h e other consumables, electrical power, food and a l l t h e rest of it seem i n very good shape.

Next s l i d e , please.
One p o i n t I would l i k e t o m a k e very c a r e f u l l y are t h e g o h o go p o i n t s t h a t w e do have i n t h i s mission, and t h e y are l i s t e d here, and you c a n see t h a t w e have a number of d e c i s i o n p o i n t s t h a t w i l l be made, and d e c i a i o n p o i n t s either t o do something o r n o t t o do something. And t h e y begin, of course, w i t h o u r normal go/no go on launch where t h e F l i g h t Director w i l l be making t h e u s u a l d e c i s i o n s w h e t h e r o r not w e m u s t abort t h e mission o r go i n t o one of t h e contingency modes. Then +e have o u r "go" after i n s e r t i o n , which is rcgo'' for t h e first o r b i t , and t h e n so on throughout t h e mission u n t i l f i n a l l y , as I s t a t e d , o v e r A u s t r a l i a we do g i v e t h e "go" f o r t h e TLI burn.
W have some very quick d e c i s i o n p o i n t s t h a t w e w i l l e make namePy, one approximately t e n minutes a f t e r TLI, w i t h a review of t h a t d e c i s i o n about 90 minutes after TLI, for a q u i c k assessment of any d i s p e r s i o n s t h a t w e may have had, t o see i f there is'any reason f o r not going on o u t .

--

W e t h e n have t h e d e c i s i o n p o i n t s 88 stated here for midcourse c o r r e c t i o n , ' The first midcourse c o r r e c t i o n de' c i s i o n p o i n t is p l u s s i x hours f r o m TLI.. And t h e n on here a t 24 hours f r o m TLI, And t w o a t LO1 minus 20 hours and W I minus f o u r hours.

I n l u n a r o r b i t itself w e w i l l m a k e a conscious g o h o go d e c i s i o n approximately one every hour,
May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

3
I z a H H

0

cn

UI
H

5:
ffi

EI U
z
H

z

2
N
4 p:

P ;
0 h

cn
H

z
w
! A

0 F

2
2 2
€+
H

w
z

3
H

N

cn
E3

w 3
z
E-c

3
H

E.1

h
H

!2 2 2
3

3 0

z 0
U

w

H
h

c4 ffi

0

0

4
v

3:

4

H

1 4

c

g
c7
n

F
(

.. 2 > z Q 0
z

2
PI

E+

cn

z

z

0

H

2
cn

h

z 0
3
h

H

E.1

2
ffi
3
0

z 3
r-l

U

0 €+

p:

c E

c

i2 0
a
H
(0

h

z w a z 1 4
PI

0 U
;l r
(] I

3
N

F

a
CJ

U U

P;

B

2

U

W

s:

u I U ! z L .

m U

v

E . 1 3
H

5 : m
O

z 0
3

H

!
c
E C
F

4

i P

W

a

:I; 0

u

0 5 U

I

E %

z

L
[,

c

C k

u w
Q

H

0

u
1

0 0

\

z

E z
0

0 h

c7

p:
r-i

3:
I 4

r-l

2 3:
I

H

N H

0 4

0

4

€+

i
0
3 :

cn
J H

€+
H

9:
0

m

E

2

p:

40

touch on t h e a l t e r n a t e m i ~ r s 88 o I~went ~ I would l i k e t o q u i c k l y run t h through. t h a t w e do have preplanned a l t e r n a t e mirs we have established a philosophy that s a y s w e can do these preplanned a l t e r n a t e s w i t h a minimum of a d d i t i o n a l work and also t o g e t a maximum of r e t u r n t o the program. And these are t h e g u i d e l i n e @ t h a t l e d uo3 up t o i f I might have t h e next s l i d e d e c i s i o n t o come up w i t h these a l t e r n a t e missions.
-0
0. .

If w e have an e a r l y s e p a r a t i o n for t h e S-IVB d u r i n g t h e f i r s t i n s e r t i o n i n t o o r b i t burn, w e w i l l i n g e n e r a l r e v e r t

t o an earth o r b i t a l mission.
If w e have enough SPS f u e l on board, w e w i l l t r y to for a 4,000 m i l e elipse, And t h a t w i l l be a real-time d e c i s i o n depending upon what k i n d of d e l t a 4 w e have had t o u s e i n order t o get i n t o orbit.
go

If w e have XUD S-IVB i n j e c t i o n burn t h a t i a the, a, &IVB first burn w a s Batisfactory but for some reason o r other w e i n h i b i t t h e second burn of t h e S-IVB w e w i l l use the spacecraft SPS t o p u t u s i n t o a high-apogee orbit and remain i n t h a t o r b i t for two to f o u r r e v o l u t i o n s and t h e n come baok down and b a s i c a l l y do a m a x i m u m ten-day d u r a t i o n mission t h a t is, repeat those elements of t h e C mission t h a t w e feel necesssry t o do a t t h a t t i m e ,

--

--

--

t h a t is, If w e have an e a r l y c u t o f f of t h e 8-IVB t h e S-IVB begim t o burn but for some r e a s o n or other w e are forced to c u t it off or it c u t s off itself w e have a number of mission a l t e r n a t i v e s whioh b a s i c a l l y Bay w e ' l l taka
0-

--

advantage of whatever a l t i t u d e w e have.
If w e are i n t h i s range here up to 4,000 m i l e s , w e go i n t o the high apogeer If we are 4,000 t o 22,000 m i l - , I'm @ o r r y e w e w i l l have t o come back i n as soon aa w e can-

Xf w e are 22,000 t o
a direct reentry.

different

.

60,000, w e w i l l have t o come back i n on W don't have enough SPS t o do anything e

If w e are o v e r 60,000, w e w i l l have t o come back e i n on a direct r e e n t r y . W don't have enough SPS t o do anything d i f f e r e n t .

If w e are o v e r 60,000 m i l e s , w e w i l l do a circlual u n a r f l y by.

W

E

L

5

Q

gd
n
U

d

Q

fli

3

41 Again, a l l of these a l t e r n a t e plans w i l l be real-time d e c i s i o n s , and t h e d e c i s i o n 88 t o which one w e w i l l e x e r c i s e o r whether o r n o t w e w i l l exercise it w i l l be dependent upon t h e circumstances a t t h a t moment. However, w e do have these a l t e r n a t e s a v a i l a b l e .
May I have t h e next s l i d e , please.

J u s t a brief reminder as t o who t h e crew is. Frank BollDan, J i m Lovell, and Anders. Backup crew: Armstrong, Aldrin and Fred b i s e . I n a d d i t i o n to those you w i l l see t h e normal cast of characters a t t h e Cape and a t Houston:
Rocco (Petrone) is a g a i n t h e Launch Director a t KSC where a l l t h e a c t i v i t y is for t h e next month and a h a l f or so, and h e is backed up by Paul Donnelly, Launch Operations Manager

.

C h r i s Kraft, t h e Director of F l i g h t Operations a t Houston, has nominated C l i f f Charlesworth as t h e p r i m a r y F l i g h t Director on t h i s f l i g h t . H e w i l l be backed up by Glen (Lundy) and also by a new Flight Director, ( M i l t L i n d l e r ) . The Department of Defense recovery forces and s u p p o r t forces are headed up by General (Vince Huston). The DOD manager f o r manned space f l i g h t w i l l be backed up by Rear A d m i r a l (Bacudas) who is t h e Commander of Task Force 130, P r i m a r y Recovery Force

.

Admiral (McManus) w i l l head up Task Force 140 i n t h e e a s t e r n recovery forces, w i t h General Jones, Davy Jones, heading up t h e E a s t e r n T e s t Range. The recovery v e s s e l , as 1 s a i d , is t h e YORKmWN.

Thank

YOU.

QUESTION: On t h a t a l t e r n a t e mission, t h e circuml u n a r , how f a r o u t conceivably could t h e y go? They go beyond t h e moon and how much farther beyond? SCHNEIDER: around t h e moon.
We'd be t a r g e t i n g for 60 n a u t i c a l m i l e s

e
0
X

e

0
v) v)

Z

1

42

farther t h a n t h e moon?

o i n g t o be s h i r t s l e e v e

a l l t h e wag?
e l i f t o f f phase. We go t , and a t t h e same t i m e '*go*' f o r i n e e r t i o n w e w i l l g i v e them t t h e same t i m e , contingent e had on ApoX10 7 ,

: D r , P a i n s la t o l e a v e i n a few moment, so if there are any q u e s t i o n s you w i s h t o direct t o him, w e w i l l take those first.
ALI

Okay e

e8 anyone have a q u e s t i o n for Dr. Paine?

B i l l Hines,

TXON: Y e s . I)r. Paine, w e have heard t h a t t h i s was i n t h e t h i n k i n g stage and i n t h e review stage for a long, long t i m e , and SO f o r t h , but when d i d you r e a l l y m a k e up your mind t h a t t h i s was "go"?

PAXNB: F i n a l d e c i s i o n w a s made y e s t e r d a y a f t e r n o o n about four o'clock, Bill,
QUESTION:
What sort of
8

meeting d i d you have j u s t

prior to t h a t ?
PAINE: This w a s a c t u a l l y the clfraax of a series of meetings, The meeting y e s t e r d a y w a s a rather large meeting involving t h e e n t i r e e x e c u t i v e establishment a t NASA, both manned and unmanned, and t h a t w a s fallowed by a srnaller meeting i n which w e had t h e top people i n Manned Space F l i g h t , and George Mueller, Wernher Von Braun, t h e C e n t e r Directors, and s e v e r a l of o u r c o n s u l t a n t s , Tomray Thompson, Eberhart Reese, and t h e d e c i s i o n w a s made a t t h e conclusion of t h a t meeting by D . Mueller and nyself and o u r Associate Administrator, r

H o m e r Newell e

QUESTION: voting? f i n a l decision?

O r by a consensus?

Hmms t h a t made? By t h e three of you What w a s t h e m ~ c h ~ ~ f o rm t h e i s

43

y a v o t e , although t h e

ere unanimous t o go
f o r t h e l u n a r orbiter

TION: D r , Pains, has P r e s i d e n t Johnson and President-Elect Nixon-Have t h e y been t o l d and/or were t h e y consulted before t h e d e c i s i o n ?
: Y e s , t h e y were informed y e s t e r d a y a t noon a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n w a s made,

QUESTION: unanimous ?

J u s t f o r t h e record, was t h a t v o t e

ALIBRANDO:
QUESTION:

Any more questiona for D r . Paine?

Yes. I n view o f Zond 6 and whatever else you may know about t h e Russian program, how do you feel now about o u r chances o f being around t h e moon before t h e y are? PAINE: I r e a l l y don't know whether t h e Russians are going t o make a manned circumlunar attempt before December o r not. T h i s d i d not p l a y any part a t all i n o u r d e c i s i o n on
t h i s flight.

QUESTION: S i n c e t h e earliest d a y s of t h i s program there w a s a l w a y s a p l a n t o carry t h e l u n a r excursion module on any m i m i o n which would involve a commitment for l u n a r o r b i t on t h e t h e o r y t h a t you could u s e t h e engines of t h e LM s y s t e m , i n case of one o f these s e r v i c e propulsion module breakdowns, t o d r i v e t h e spacecraft back home.

Now you are goAng to commit t h e a s t r o n a u t s to l u n a r o r b i t without 8 f u n c t i o n a l LM, Could you t e l l us why you t h i n k t h a t w e should do t h i s i n December, when i f w e waited u n t i l next s p r i n g w e would have a LM and w e would n o t be p u t t i n g these a s t r o n a u t s i n t h i s p o s i t i o n where t h e y have no redundancy f o r t h e i r s e r v i c e propulsion engine?
I believe that adequately covered i n o u r p r e s e n t a t i o n s , We feel t h a t t h e backup s tern redundancy and t h e p l a t e a u manner i n which e are undert mission, on a step-by-step b a s i s , g i v e u s a great deal of
PAINE:

44

assurance, and t h ~ t , ct, I believe t h a t w e a c t u a l l y have more t f l y i n g t h e LM o u t t o t h e moon on t h i s m i i t h a l l t h e a d d i t i o n a l power t h a t t h i s g i v e s u s on umables, so t h a t w e feel t h a t a t t h i s t i m e w e are ready for t h e mission and t h a t t h i s w i l l be w i t h i n t h e normal h ards of test pilotrs f l y i n g experimental craft ,

QUESTION FROM ~ O U S ~ I n t: e event t h a t you d i d ~ h have reason t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e o v i e t Union w f l y a manned l u n a r f l i g h t i n December about t h e same t i m e we are t r y i n g t o do so, or i n t h e event t h a t t h e y d i d s t a r t one j u s t p r i o r t o t h e t i m e w e p l a n t o start one, would t h i s have any impact on o u r own f l i g h t ?

PAINB:

No.
W w i l l proceed w i t h e

ALIBRANDO:

u e s t i o n s f r o m here.

QUESTION: Dr, Paine, can t h i s mission now be cons i d e r e d t o take t h e place of t h a F Mission?

ALIBRANDO:

Dr. P a i n e has l e f t ,

W e are going t o proceed w i t h q u e s t i o n s from Washington,

QUESTION: General P h i l l i p s , if you are ready, you are probably t h e m s prominent s y s t e m s i n t e g r a t i o n manager ot w e have, and I am s u r e t h a t you p l a y t h e odds a good b i t . What do you t h i n k t h e odds are of t h e f u l l l u n a r o r b i t mission t o be completed s u c c e s s f u l l y ?

PHILLIPS: 1% not going to t r y to c a l c u l a t e a set of p r o b a b i l i t y numbers or odds for you. I feel t h a t we're ready for l u n a r o r b i t mission and that we have every reason t o expect t h a t w e w i l l be able t o carry o u t t h e f u l l m i s s i o n and t o succeed w i t h i t , If I wasn't convinced of t h a t , I wouldn't have recommended such a mission i n t h e first place.
Q-TION: One other q u e s t i o n is how n e a r t o f u l l space s i m u l a t i o n do you achieve on earth w i t h a l l of t h i s SPS t e s t i n g ? What is the closest you t h i n k you get i n earth t e s t i n g on t h e SPS t o s i m u l a t e t h e space environment?

45

P f o u r s y s t e m s and w i t h t h e SPS i n p a r t i c u l a r , w e are able t o s i m u l a t e t h e

environs on earth i t h one important 8x68 t i o n , and t h a t ' s zero g f l i g h t of any s i g n i f i c a n t d u r a t i o n .
A s you know, w e can s i m u l a t e zero g f l i g h t f o r only a matter of s e v e r a l seconds by 135 a i r c r a f t , and up t o about 30 seconds of ero g f l i g been performed. Of c o u r s e , w e c a n ' t test p ~ o p u ~ i n t h a t environment,

Except for t h e zero g environment, w e are able t o s i m u l a t e a l l of t h e important environments I t h i n k rather well.
QUBSTION: Would you plerise share your o p i n i o n on And could it be t t i t is j u s t a r e p e t i t i o n Zone 6 w i t h us?

of No. S?

PHILLIPS: I d o n w t b e l i e v e I know any more about Zond 6 t h a n you do from having read t h e news accounts, The news accounts s a y t h a t it is an unmanned probe l i k e l y t o be a f l i g h t s i m i l a r t o Zond 5. I r e a l l y don't know any more about i t t h a n t h a t . When you m 8 t h i s accelerated r e t u r n , t h i s 58-hour or is it 5 S h o u r returnNow, as I u n d e r stood one of you gentlemen t o s a y , are you going t o be burning your SPS engines t o get t h i s q u i a r e t u r n ? And what does coming back t o t h i s do t o your speed, t o your t r a n s l u n a r
QUESTXON;
1 -

earth speed?

--

PHILLIPS: Well, t h e r e t u r n t o earthp coming o u t of l u n a r orbitThe energy is added by t h e s e r v i c e pro-

p u l s i o n s y s t e m engine. I n o t h e r words, you c a n f i n d y o u r s e l f i n l u n a r o r b i t and t h e spacecraft p r o p u l s i o n s y s t e m , t h e s e r v i c e p r o p u l s i o n s y s t e m so-called, is burned t o add approxim a t e l y 3,000 feet per second t o your v e l o c i t y i n l u n a r o r b i t , which adds t h e energy that take you on t h e way back t o earth.
The d u r a t i o n of t h a t m and therefore t h e energy added, t h e number of feet per second t h a t is added t o v e l o c i t y , p l a y s t h e b i g g e s t part i n determining t h e r e t u r n t i m e .

lon and an even l o n g e r burn t h a n w e p l a n would a shorter r e t u r n t i m e .
A shorter burn would provide a

eturn t i m e , lish a

46

on t h i s m i

second

.

a1 r e t u r n t i m e , V e r y Close t o

e get off on t i m e u r s . And t h e r e e n t r y u t 36,300 feet per

QUESTION: Well, now, on your r e t u r n t i m e , is i t going t o be 55 hours o r 58 hours?

IPS: The n o ~ i n a l e t u r n t i m e , i f w e get o f f r ning of t h e 211st-The r e t u r n t i m e I t h i n k i n d e t a i l is 57.8 hours. So I have a i d approximately 58. I t is a few minutes short of 58 hou

, i f you d i d n ' t burn your SPS, you would be i n a roughly 80-hour or $&hour r e t u r n t i m e , wouldn't you, and a f t e r you l e a v e l u n a r trajectory o r l u n a r o r b i t you would more or less be going about 3,500 m i l e s p e r hour u n t i l . you get i n p r e t t y close t o t h e earth and t h e g r a v i t y started p u l l i n g you i n there?
Now, i n t h i s long h a u l between t h e moon and near earth, do you know what i n m i l e s p e r hour your speed is going t o i n c r e a s e to?

PHILLIPS: Y e s . 1 haven't r e a l l y broken i t down i n my own mind i n s t a t u t e m i l e s per hour. W e tend t o m a k e m s of o u r measurements i n feet per second. ot
W e n t e r t h e earth's atmosphere a t about 400,000 e feet a t a v e l o c i t y of about 36,300 feet per second. Now, if somebody can t e l l you what t h a t is i n s t a t u t e m i l e s per h o u r I t h i n k it's about 25,500 s t a t u t e m i l e s per hour. W l e a v e t h e moon's o r b i t -= I n other words, t h e burn e t h a t w e make t o t h e so-called t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n puts I t h i n k w e have got it on a table here. u s a t a velocity-I j u s t don't have t h e f i g u r e i n my head.

--

SCHNEIDm:

YOU go on t o something else and 1'11 g e t

it.
PHILLIPS:

Let

US

look t h a t up and come back.

ALIBRANDO:

Can we have a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n ?

47

Q
t h a n t h e y would
t r i p back?

0

ter w i l l t h e y be r e e n t e r i n g t h e long t r i p back, t h e slower

PHILLIPS: Well, it is a few hundred feet per second. If you come back i n a y 90 hours, which is a very long r e t u r n o p t i o n , your r e e n t r y v e l o c i t y is of t h e order of 35,700 feet er second. If you come back i n l i k e 55 hours, which is a l i t t l e faster t h a n w e are planning t o come back, you would be a t l i k e 36,400 feet p e r second,
Sob you vary o v e r a few hundred feet per second i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r t i m e regime,

Q ~ S T I O N : And you can still f l y a c o n s t a n t g coming

down? PRILLIPS:
Yes.

QUESTION: So you are not overloading them because of t h i s d i f f e r e n t speed?

PHILLIPS: No, Under any of t h e v e l o c i t y c o n d i t i o n s t h a t w e would expect t o encounter, w e p l a n t h e 4 g, c o n s t a n t g , r e e n t r y deceleration,

: I guess I should state t h a t t h e r e e n t r y p a t h t h a t w e are f l y i n g was a l w a y s one t h a t w e may have found o u r s e l v e s i n i f that's what t h e computer had called for. I t is j u s t t h a t ' s t h e one w e are t a r g e t i n g f o r a t t h i s t i m e .
I n response t o t h e q u e s t i o n of what o u r v e l o c i t y is a f t e r your transearth i n j e c t i o n burn, nominally it w i l l be 8,865 feet per second a f t e r w e have added t h e 3,520 foot per second burn on w i t h o u r SPS, Of course, then o u r r e e n t r y speed of 36,300. General P h i l l i p s , g e t t i n g i n t o t h e area of r i s k a g a i n , can you get i n t o t h e matter of a t t h e end of t h e f l i g h t i f you m i s s t h e window can you t e l l us what happens?
QUESTION:

PHILLIPS: The q u e s t i o n i if w e m i s s our launch window what happens? AB w a s described here, t h e launch window, which is set by

--

48

I mean t h e r e e n t r y windaw. I n other words, i f you bounce o u t o r if you f a i l t o come i n i n t h i s corridor, what happens?
QUESTION:

PHILLIPS: A l l r i g h t . The q u e s t i o n , a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t , is if w e m i s s t h e r e e n t r y corridor. The corridor is set on t h e upper l i m i t o r t h e high s i d e by t h e skip-out boundary, and i f w e m i s s t h e corridor on t h e h i g h s i d e and i n fact s k i p o u t , t h e n i t 8 s a s p a c e c r a f t and crew loss kind of s i t u a t i o n .
The trajectory t h a t t h e spacecraft w i l l follow i f it d i d s k i p o u t is a large ellipse, a large e l l i p t i c a l traj e c t o r y around t h e earth, and t h e t i m e back t o eaqth is a matter of s e v e r a l hours depending on t h e d e t a i l s of t h e cond i t i o n or t h e s i t u a t i o n . And there is n o t s u f f i c i e n t electric power nor oxygen on board t h e command module, because you no longer have t h e s e r v i c e module w i t h you a t t h a t p o i n t t o sust a i n l i f e nor t o provide f o r a subsequent r e e n t r y .

The lower l i m i t of t h e corridor is set by t h e h i g h d e c e l e r a t i o n l i m i t t h a t t h e spacgcraft would be s u b j e c t e d t o if it came i n too s t e e p l y . And i f t h e spacecraft e n t e r e d below t h e low s i d e of t h e corridor, t h e decelerations would exceed about 20 gs '. The h e a t i n g rates w i l l be i n excess of those for which t h e s p a c e c r a f t wz& designed, and there would be a s t r u c t u r a l breakup and l o s s of t h e spacecraft and t h e crew.
These r e e n t r y c o n d i t i o n s i n t h i s corridor have been defined and described going way back s a r l y i n t o t h e program. This r e e n t r y corridor was dsed on t h e S a t u r n V f l i g h t s , 501 and 502, because, i f you w i l l recall, there w e boasted t h e spacecraft up t o an apogee of about 11,000 m i l e s , and it w a s necessary for t h e s p a c e c r a f t w i t h its on-board guidance and n a v i g a t i o n equipment t o e n t e r w i t h i n t h a t corridor or it would have experienced t h e same t h i n g s t h a t I have des c r i b e d here.

B i l l showed a couple of curves that showed what w e have determined from o u r a n a l y s i s and test work is t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o h i t t h a t corridor. We don't feel t h a t i n t h i s respect there is r e a l l y any r i s k . QUBSTION; I b e l i e v e t h e mean d i s t a n c e of t h e moon t o t h e earth i s about 238,000 m i l e s . On t h i s f l i g h t w i l l t h e

49

moon be on t h e close s i d e o r t h e f a r s i d e of t h a t mean d i s t a n c e ? And does that d i s t a n c e have any weight i n your determination for t h e December 2 1 launch?
PHILLIPS: The d i s t a n c e of t h e earth-moon s y s t e m is n o t a p r i m a r y deciding factor on t h e launch window, The deciding factors on t h e launch window are t h e l i g h t i n g c o n d i t i o n s a t t h e Apollo landing s i t e o v e r whic'h w e i n t e n d t o f l y where w e want l i g h t i n g a n g l e s of approximately or less than seven degrees, by a requirement for a d a y l i g h t launch, t h e requirement for a d a y l i g h t recovery, And a l l of these c o n d i t i o n s taken together set up t h e t i m e of t h e window t h a t w e have e s t a b l i s h e d ,
The d i s t a n c e between t h e earth and t h e moon is i n c i d e n t a l i n t h i s set of c a l c u l a t i o n s ,
QUESTION: Do you have there a f i g u r e f o r t h e elapsed t i m e f r o m l u n a r i n j e c t i o n from earth o r b i t u n t i l t h e t i m e you a r r i v e i n l u n a r o r b i t approximately?

SCHNEIDER:
QUESTION:

W a s t h a t from TLI t o UII?
Right.

SCHNEIDER: You can do some s u b t r a c t i o n , a t 2 p l u s 55, and U)I 1 begins a t 69 plus 1 . 1

TLI ends

QUESTION:

If t h i s f l i g h t is completely s u c c e s s f u l ,

how much t i m e could it s a v e you i n your scheduling?

PHILLIPS: Well, t h e q y e s t i o n is i f t h e f l i g h t is completely s u c c e s s f u l how much t i m e can t h i s s a v e u s i n o u r schedule? That's a hard q u e s t i o n t o answer i n a b s o l u t e terms, The mission sequence t h a t w e now p l a n is t h i s C-prime l u n a r o r b i t mission on Apollo 8 , t h e so-called I) mission on Apollo 9 t h i s i 504, S p a c e c r a f t 104, and LM 3, which w i l l s p u t t h e e n t i r e spacecraft i n c l u d i n g t h e l u n a r module i n t o earth o r b i t for e x e r c i s i n g a l l of its s y s t e m s , Now, beyond t h e I) mission, w e p l a n for an F mission, which is a l u n a r , o r b i t mission w i t h t h e e n t i r e spacecraft, i n c l u d i n g t h e l u n a r module, i n c l u d i n g a descent t o about 50,000 feet, but n o t a landing, rendezvous and r e t u r n t o earth.
-0

And beyond t h a t

w e feel t h a t w e ' l l be prepared for

t h e lunar landing itself,

50

D, F, and t h e n a l u

uence ahead is 6-prime, t nimum sequence.
t l y how it goes,

n t f o r subsemore t h a n one i n earth o r b i t re t o i n d i c a t e I n t h e weeks n t h e present ave e v a l u ~ t e ~ mission our s t h a t w e can accomplish nding itself have deeration t h a t ill not e t o fly the mission w e
thin^,
as a mission i n r a f t i n t o earth s the e n t i r e 4,000 miles1 where i n conduct s e v e r a l t h e command e n t l y and together,

sequence t o c o n s i i n C-prime, D, F c i d e d on t h e bas%
used t o c a l l a E mission,
which t h e S a t u r n V bo o r b i t , and t h e n t h e t

spacecraft i n t o an

evaluations i n ~ o l v i n ~ t s e r v i c e module

We have L g and ~ Q ~ ~ ~t he obe r ~ n g j e c t i v e s w e can acc met those t h a t w e can reprogram t o F o r t o n i t s e l f , concluded t h a t w e w i l l n o t r e q u i r e an S m i s ~ i o n ,
I don't want to s u b s t i t u t e s for E, ~ e c it. ~ a C-prime w i l l accomplish c had planned for E, I t j e c t i v e s which w i t u n t i l F,

nclusion t h a t C-prime ~ o t~ i n its t o t a l i t y , n b j e c t f v e s t h a t we e r t a i n of t h e obave accomplished
together has l e d u s G p r i m e , D, F,

~ d ~ up a1 g ~ n t o Pay o u t a mainline ~ i s s i o l u n a r landing as t h e mini

--

- 1 1

So, when you t h a t w e have s u b t r a c t e d one

i o n from t

ou can s a y viously

51

planned sequence, t h e 16 mission, added a n o t h e r which is t h e C o p r i m e , but t h e y are not d i r e c t l y a o n e - f o r o n e tradeoff. O t h e r swaps of o b j e c t i v e s were involved i n t h e t o t a l process. Now, if I could j u s t s a y one more word, I f e e l w i t h the t e c h n i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l experience t h a t w e w i l l g e t on t h e C - p r i m e l u n a r o r b i t mission t h a t w e w i l l , i n fact, have shortened t h e t i m e t o a manned l u n a r landing by a m e a s u r able amount, but it's very d i f f i c u l t t o demonstrate t h a t i n temns of d a y s or weeks or months or discrete missions p l u s

or minus
QUESTION: General P h i l l i p s , presuming you g e t off on schedule on December 21, what w i l l be t h e d i s t a n c e of t h e moon from t h e earth a t t h e p o i n t of l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n ? And w i l l t h e moon be going away from t h e earth or heading toward i t ?

PHILLIPS: W e l l , t h e q u e s t i o n is how f a r w i l l t h e moon be from t h e earth a t t h e t i m e of l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n if we get off on t i m e ? And I ' m going t o have t o get somebody t o look a t a chart and f i g u r e t h a t o u t .
SCHNEIDER: I ' l l g i v e you t h a t afterwards.

QUESTION: General P h i l l i p s , some Russian s c i e n t i s t s have s a i d t h e y prefer t o see an animal go around t h e moon before p e r m i t t i n g manned f l i g h t i n order t o check on r a d i a t i o n l e v e l s once again. Is r a d i a t i o n , either local o r s o l a r , 8 specific r i s k i n t h i s mission?

PHILLIPS: Well, t h e q u e s t i o n bears on t h e r a d i a t i o n l e v e l s t o be expected i n t h i s f l i g h t and t h e n e c e s s i t y for an animal f l i g h t t o precede.
W e have a great deal of information, a l l t h a t w e

b e l i e v e we need t o understand t h e r a d i a t i o n environment of t h e earth-hoon s y s t e m , and these r a d i a t i o n environments have been t a k e n i n t o account i n t h e design of our equipment.
The command module, for example, provides a very good s h i e l d a g a i n s t r a d i a t i o n , and as you p a s s through t h e so-called Van Allen belts around t h e earth, for example, where t h e r a d i a t i o n l e v e l 8 are f a i r l y high, t h e command module by reason of t h e s t r u c t u r e and its heat s h i e l d i n s u r e s t h a t

52

crew is exposed t o only v

1 ~ o u n t of r a d i a t i o n . 1 s
t h e v i c i n i t y of h a t t h e numbers are. t h e possibile n s e s a predictable rce o f h i g h l e v e l s of

There h a s been much i t y of solar f ~ a r e ~ ~ and i n some s e n s e s an u r a d i a t i o n energy,
een NASA a we have developed a t h i n k are r e q u i r e d from s o l a r f l a r e s t e n t l y f i n d i n g himse
A l l 02 t h e energy

E ~ ~ A v e r r e c e n t years and months, o, Live techniques t h a t w e a r n i n g of r a d i a t i o n levels one t o do anything d i f f e r -

s v e l s t h a t are concerned w i t h s o l a r flares are of e u r s e l f o u t s i d e of t h e spacecraft o r i n h as t h e l u n a r module. Those t o which t h e crew would be exposed i n a command module are not r e a l l y of concernc

So X guess t h e brie r is w e understand t h e environment, our s y s t e m has psfovi for p r e d i c t i v e techniques with s u f f i c i e n t arning t i m e solar f l a r e event don't f e e l t h a t t * s ~ ~ ~ ~ nfrnaP t y p e frl s ~ a any way e v a l u a t e t h e e n v ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~
QUESTION: Bi d e r , could you te ill be and a t t h e o r b i t a l speed aroun t u d e above t h e m o ~ n wha ill It look l i k e t o t h e three crew members t h e moon, t h a t i s 3

--

3. speed is a ut 5,300 feet what it w i l l look ending them o u t 11 look l i k e t h e Lunar
Orbiter pictures e

QUESTION: Canst you t be too b r i g h t t o look a t , for i n

uess, B i l l ?

W i l l it W i l l t h e y have t o

use sunglasses?

w e do have you are i n

you n o t i c e d o u r or 8 t o look a t t
t h e sun r i g h t

53

and also t o be a t t h e e t h e back as
on t h i s m i

unli~ht might k a t it from
i s h to accomplish

tion

We
t h e b e s t kno

ures, and t h a t is
like t o stress i ~ ~ of o ~ n to o u r naviss c o n c e n t r a t i o n s

which d i d n * t

near the lunar s

-

and much

The a b i l i t y L i n a landing mi know your posit descent p l a y s a grs And we are very most concerned a a t t h e t i m e we s also i n t h e l a t e r t i o n accuracy vous w i t h t h e life-critical

ve t h e s u r f a c e
jlth t h e naviga-

And i n t t h e variables also a l t i t u d e and the a t r a c k i n g accuracy
the a l t i t u d e to t h e or want t o be

sned among e know t h e

t navigation

orbit

--

Now, by trac in o t h e r

ce o v e r an the rates of

54

change of t h e a n g l e can be computed such as t o determine w e t h i n k q u i t e a c c u r a t e l y t h e a l t i t u d e of t h e o r b i t .

We also w i l l be making many measurements during these t e n o r b i t s t o e v a l u a t e how a c c u r a t e l y w e can determine t h e local v e l o c i t y and v e l o c i t y change s i t u a t i o n s , a l l of these being important.
Now, w e expect by t h e exercise t h a t w e w i l l be c a r r y i n g o u t on t h i s mission t o r e f i n e s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e techniques t h a t w i l l t h e n be a v a i l a b l e t o u s f o r l a t e r miss i o n s , and w e w i l l be doing so on a mission where w e have q u i t e a margin of p r o p u l s i v e c a p a b i l i t y , margin of t i m e i f we need t o use i t , t o be able t o m a k e these k i n d s of measurements.

On l a t e r missions, l i k e t h e F mission or t h e l u n a r landing mission, w e ' l l need t o know these n a v i g a t i o n parameters very a c c u r a t e l y , because t h e y w i l l be l i f e - c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s at that t i m e . They are not l i f e - c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s on t h i s mission, But I t h i n k most of u s are convinced t h a t w e are going t o be able t o r e f i n e o u r n a v i g a t i o n techniques i n very important w a y s t h a t w i l l g i v e u s a great deal more confidence a n d probably a great d e a l more c e r t a i n t y of c a r r y i n g o u t a s u c c e s s f u l mission when w e go o u t there w i t h t h e f u l l spacec r a f t and therefore have t o be able t o do these t h i n g s for real
QUESTION: B i l l o r General P h i l l i p s , no r e f e r e n c e was made t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a s t r o n g solar flare being one reason for a b o r t i n g t h e mission. Is t h a t because you have confidence i n t h e t h i c k s h e l l of t h e spacecraft being able t o withstand even s t r o n g s o l a r event? SCHN33IDER: W e w i l l have our solar event s y s t e m up. I don't t h i n k t h a t w e a n t i c i p a t e anything t h a t would be b i g enough t o abort. However, it is a l w a y s a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t it would be an abort cue,

QUESTION: would be involved?

W e l l , what l e v e l of t h r e a t e n e d r a d i a t i o n

SCHNFXDER: Im a f r a i d I don't know r i g h t now. I ' can g e t you t h e number. I don't t h i n k w e have a r u l e on it

55

r i g h t now. I t h i n k t h e spacecraft is adequate, but I w i l l have t o check t h a t for you.

QUXSTION: W i l l one of you gentlemen l i t t l e b i t more t h e photographing of t h e easter zone? Does t h i s i n d i c a t e , first of a l l , t h a t t h i s is t h e most promising area f o r landing? And, number t w o , could you c i t e any specific areas t h e y would photograph i n t h i s zone?

PHILLIPS: W e l l , w e have selected f i v e sites across t h e face, t h e earth s i d e , of t h e moon aa t h e Apollo landing sites. You w i l l r e c a l l t h e Apollo landing zone is along t h e e q u a t o r of t h e moon as you look a t i t from t h e earth p l u s or minus 5 degrees i n l a t i t u d e , and from t h e c e n t e r of t h e f r o n t of t h e face as i t s t a n d s o u t p l u s o r minus 45 degrees

.

These measurements were set up by t h e e a r l y require-

ments of f r e e - r e t u r n trajectories and communications and navigation requirements.
The f i v e sites t h a t w e have picked are one t h a t is very close t o t h e e a s t e r n edge of t h i s rectangle. It's very near 45 degrees. And t h a t ' s t h e p o i n t o v e r which w e w i l l fly on t h e s e v e n t h r e v o l u t i o n i n t h i s C - p r i m e mission, There is a n o t h e r about 15 degrees toward t h e c e n t e r or t o t h e w e s t , a n o t h e r very n e a r t h e c e n t e r of t h e moon, and then there are t w o i n t h e west, one a l i t t l e above t h e e q u a t o r , and one a l i t t l e below.
A s t h e year progresses, o u r v e l o c i t y s i t u a t i o n lets u s g e t more r e a d i l y t o a l i t t l e n o r t h of t h e l u n a r e q u a t o r on t h e w e s t q i d e t h a n t h e other h a l f of t h e y e a r when w e can get more e a s i l y t o t h e s o u t h e r n s i t e on t h e w e s t s i d e .

Now, t h e photography t h a t w e w i l l be c a r r y i n g o u t on t h i s mission i n c l u d e s photography on t h e back s i d e , i n c l u d i n g landmark tracking. One of t h e purposes of t h i s t h e r i g h t word is t o provide geodetic selenographic t i e - i n of t h e geographic p o i n t s on t h e

--

--

O r b i t e r got a great deal of photography and mapped t scales t h e e n t i r e ba we don't h h e data w i t h which t o v a r i o u s p o i n t s t o a map.

56

Now, t h i s photogrRphy w i l l l e t u s do a great deal more of t h a t . The photography i n c l u d e s stereo pairs and a close-time c o r e l a t i o n as w e track v a r i o u s sites, W w i l l e be t a k i n g a number of oblique photographs as w e l l .

As you know, i n o u r experience o r i n t h e operations from O r b i t e r , w e got a s m a l l number of o b l i q u e s h o t s , but on t h i s mission, w i t h t h e judgment and s e l e c t i v i t y of t h e crew, w e ' l l be t a k i n g q u i t e a number of shots t h a t amount t o t h e approach paeh or t h e o b l i q u e shots as you look forward or s i d e w a y s or a f t , and t h i s w i l l be I t h i n k a n i n v a l u a b l e a i d f o r t r a i n i n g f u t u r e crews i n what t o look f o r and what t o expect,

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h a t , w e w i l l be g e t t i n g c o n s i d e r a b l e photography o f t h e approach p a t h t o t h e moon. I have a l w a y s thought t h a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r maneuver would be a f a i r l y e x c i t i n g one i f you v i s u a l i z e t h a t t h e moon is moving around t h e earth i n t h i s f a s h i o n ( i n d i c a t i n g ) , and you are coming a t it i n t h i s f a s h i o n ( i n d i c a t i n g ) , and you are going to approach it w i t h s e v e r a l thousand m i l e s per hour of v e l o c i t y d i f f e r e n c e , and you are aiming f o r a p e r i l u n e of 60 n a u t i c a l m i l e s which you reach on t h e back s i d e of t h e moon. I t h i n k t h a t ' s going t o be q u i t e an e x c i t i n g period i n t h i s mission, And t h e crew on t h i s S l i g h t w i l l be t a k i n g photography of how t h e moon looks as you come on down t h i s trajectory.
I t h i n k t h a t it's p r e t t y hard t o put a price on t h e v a l u e of each of these elements of o p e r a t i o n a l experience and on t h e r e t u r n t h a t w e w i l l be able t o b r i n g back i n t h e way of photography t o make t h e way easier f o r eubsequent crews who are going to be concerned w i t h doing a l o t more t h i n g s l i k e g e t t i n g a L checked o u t and s e p a r a t i n g and going down M

with i t , a n d so on,

ALIBRANDO: Okay. now and come back here,

W are going t o go t o Houston e

QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: General P h i l l i p s , you covered in some d e t a i l t h e SPS s y s t e m and t h e AC bus s y s t e m , A t t h e end of Apollo 7 you mentioned t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e AC bus f a i l u r e there w a s one other anomaly t h a t gave you some concern, and t h a t was t h e b a t t e r y charger. Can you go over t h a t a b i t ?

57
PHILLIPS: The q u e s t i o n is t h e battery charger experience, Apollo 7 , I emphasized t h a t t h a t w a s one of t h e many t h i n g s t h a t w a s covered i n great d e t a i l i n o u r reviews of t h e l a s t weeks and d a y s , The a b i l i t y t o p u t energy i n t o t h e batteries on t h e Apollo 7 mission w a s less t h a n p r e d i c t e d , The charge r a t e i n amperes w a s lower t h a n t h e planned charge rates. I t was determined r e a l l y before Apollo 7 landed, but then v e r i f i e d by t h e spacecraft itself, t h a t t h e impedance of t h e t o t a l c i r c u i t involving t h e b a t t e r y and charger i n t h e spacecraft, was a f r a c t i o n of an ohm h i g h e r I have f o r g o t t e n t h e e x a c t number than expected, This hadn't been properly taken account of, and it was a p l a i n o l d Ohm's l a w matter i n t h e end t h a t detemnined what t h e charge rate w a s ,

--

--

W subsequently have made t h e necessary adjustment e t o t h e charge rate such t h a t w e w i l l have no d i f f i c u l t y i n maintaining t h e batteries a t a h i g h charge l e v e l on t h e Apollo 8 mission,

QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: General, what is t h e approximate t r a i n i n g time f o r a f l i g h t of t h i s n a t u r e , crew t r a i n i n g t i m e , and approximately how does t h a t compare t o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e l u n a r module?
PHILLIPS: The q u e s t i o n is what is t h e approximate crew t r a i n i n g t i m e for t h i s mission as compared t o t h e mission involving t h e l u n a r module, I t h i n k for t h e record I ' l l get an a b s o l u t e number f o r you from Deke Slayton. As I recall, f o r t h i s mission we set up approximately 200 haurs of command s e r v i c e module s i m u l a t o r t i m e as t h e t r a i n i n g p l a n , and w e are very close t o having accomplished a l l of t h a t planned t r a i n i n g ,
As I remember it, t h e increment t o provide f o r l u n a r module is somewhere between 50 and 100 hours a d d i t i o n a l .

But let u s g e t i t from Deke and g i v e it t o you you w i l l have i t a c c u r a t e l y . QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: i n t o work-week t i m e ? PHILLIPS:

SO

How does t h a t break down

I d i d n ' t understand t h e q u e s t i o n .

QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: How does t h a t 200 hours work o u t i n terms of a work week?

58

PHILLIPS: W e l l , t h e Apollo c has been working six dags a week, and I t h i n k t h e i r number o f duty hours per week has been running 65 or 70 hours. mat ' 8 not unusual. I t h i n k It i s t o be expected, I t is about t h e kind of t r a i n i n g s c h e d u l e t h a t t h e crews through Gemini and OUT crews i n t h e Apollo now have always followed,
I t h i n k t h a t t h e nwnber ofYou me, t h e command s e r v i c e module s i m u l a t o r t i m e per week runs about 20 hours per week f o r t h e prime crew and about 20 hours per week for t h e backup crew, if I remember* Wa are running to f i v e hour s c h e d u l e s a t t h e Cape i n t h e last weekrss, The crew t r a i n e d from s i g h t i n t h e murning u n t i l one i n t h e a f t e r n o o n , t h e prime crew or t h e backup crew u s e s t h e s i m u l a t o r s , and t h e n from one u n t i l six i n t h e a f t e r n o o n t h e other crew usee t h e s i m u l a t o r s . And t h e y are on a sfxl-day schedule.
I would gather i n part from t h a t you are g e t t i n g vary cloe3s t o t h e p i n t where you are going to have to s t a r t t r a i n l n g crews for miemions p a s t Apollo 10, Can you t e l l w what those crave w f l l be?
QUESTION FROM HOUS!ZDNt

PHILLIPS! W e l l , w e have s e v e r a l crws who are i n g e n e r a l t r a i n i n g beyond Apallo 1 . You know w e have 0 three CSM s i m u l a t o r s , one a t Houston and t w o a t t h e Cape. He? have two LM s i m u l a t o r s , one at Houstonand one a t t h e Cape, And then there are a v a r i e t y of other t r a i n i n g d e v i c e s t h e crew procedures s i m u l a t o r and several (Park) task trainers on which o u r cram t r a i n ,

-a-

The crslrfs beyond ApoZlo 9 and there are s e v e r a l are t r a i n i n g for a l l of t h e elements t h a t c o n s l t i t u t e a full l u n a r landing missfon,
I -

We are, 88 you sayt very close t o t h e time when specifgc mission t r a i n i n g beyond Apollo 9 i e going t o have t o be undertaken aa a specific mission #et o f t r a i n i n g ,
w e a i 2 1 in t h e f a i r l y n e a r future be announcAng t h e specific crew s e l e c t i o n for A p o l l o 101
So

TION F O HllUElTQPit During Apollo 7 there RM was some problem wfth t h e biomedical h a r n e s s t h a t caused loss of data, and w e were told at t h a t t i m e i f a similar

59

t h i n g happened during t h e mission t o t h e l u n a r v i c i n i t y t h a t t h e mission would be aborted and t h e y ' d be called back, And y e t today you t e l l u s t h a t i f you lose t h e highg a i n antenna, i n which case you could lose biomedical data, t h i s would n o t be t h e basis for ending t h e mission. And, number t w o , what f i x have you g o t t e n on t h e
biomedical harness?

PHILLIPS: L e t m e s a y first of a l l t h a t t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e biomedical harness were mainly involving w i r e breakage, The small leads from t h e s i g n a l c o n d i t i o n e r s t h a t t h e crew wear around t h e i r b e l t up t o t h e t r a n s d u c e r s t h a t are taped t o v a r i o u s parts of t h e i r upper anatomy were I t h i n k o v e r d e s i g n e d i n terms of f i r e p r o t e c t i o n ,
W redesigned t h e biomedical harness, among t h e many e t h i n g s t h a t w e redesigned, t o reduce any possible f l a m m a b i l i t y . And t h e i n s u l a t i o n on t h e w i r e t h a t w e p u t i n t o t h a t r e d e s i g n and t h e n e t by which t h e connections were made I t h i n k turned o u t t o be an over-design i n reducing f l a m m a b i l i t y and i n t r o duced wire s t i f f n e s s t y p e s of problem. So t h a t w e had a couple of i n s t a n c e s i n Apollo 7 where these wires broke.

Now, t h e d e s i g n of t h i s s y s t e m w a s e s t a b l i s h e d such t h a t you c a n ' t get s u f f i c i e n t electrical energy i n t o t h a t biomedical harness t o cause a f i r e problem. T h a t ' s been v e r i f i e d and r e v e r i f i e d many t i m e s . So there is no real d i f f i c u l t y i n going back t o r e a l l y t h e Gemini t y p e harness which is much more flexible. There is n o t a f i r e problem w i t h it. And I t h i n k t h i s r e d e s i g n w e went through was r e a l l y much more over-cautious t h a n w e needed t o be.
So w e have fixed t h a t w i r e breakage problem i n t h a t way ,
The other t h i n g was Don E i s e l e r e p o r t i n g one of t h e s i g n a l c o n d i t i o n e r s t h a t he had a t t h e b e l t w a s w a r m o r w a s hot t o h i s touch. S i n c e t h a t t i m e w e have done a number of t e s t s , h a v e concluded t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of moisture on a resistor as one possible example could c a u s e a l i t t l e h i g h e r amount of energy t o go i n t o t h a t s i g n a l c o n d i t i o n e r but only t o raise its temperature by 10 degrees, and t h a t would r a i s e it up t o something l i k e l l b o r s o degrees, which would feel hot o r w a r m to your touch,

W e have r e v e r i f i e d t h a t you c a n ' t g e t enough energy i n t o t h a t s y s t e m to cause a f i r e problem.

60

So w e have changed t h e leads, W have rev e t h e basic safety of t h e design features i n t h e harness and i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t s y s t e m t h a t s u p p l i e s it.

Now, t h e biomedical data does come down on t h e FM p o r t i o n of t h e u n i f i e d S-band s i g n a l , and i f t h e high-gain antenna is not working w e would not expect t o be a b l e t o r e c e i v e and adequately decode t h a t data,
recall s a y i n g nor do I remember it being s a i d t h a t w e would abort a mission i f w e d i d n ' t have biomedical data. W e have given t h i s very careful considerat i o n i n t h e previous d a y s and are c o m p l e t e l y s a t i s f i e d to conduct t h i s mission w i t h v e r b a l communication w i t h t h e crew t o determine t h e i r s t a t e of being, i f w e have t o f a l l back on t h a t mode because w e don't have biomedical data,
I don't

And, accordingly, w e made t h e d e c i s i o n t o c a r r y it o u t t h a t way i n case w e have d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e high-gain antenna and therefore r e c e p t i o n and recovery of t h e biomedical data,
With t h a t summary, I guess B i l l wants to s a y some-

thing,

SCHNEIDER: Yes, 1 recall what you are t a l k i n g about, and t h a t w a s a f l i g h t surgeon's recommended f l i g h t r u l e on a l u n a r landing mission. And I h a s t e n t o add w e haven't w r i t t e n those r u l e s y e t ,
QUESTION FROM HOUSTON: Earlier, General P h i l l i p s I b e l i e v e you s a i d t h a t t h i s mission i n t o t h e l u n a r v i c i n i t y would s h o r t e n t h e t i m e f o r l u n a r landing by a measurable amount. Could you t e l l u s what t h a t measurable amount would be?

,

PHILLIPS: I t h i n k I have a l r e a d y t o l d you I don't know how t o d e f i n e it i n dollars, c e n t s , d a y s , weeks, or months ,
J u s t t o s a y a g a i n b r i e f l y , w i t h t h e t e c h n i c a l data w e w i l l ob n on t h i s mission t h a t h a s t o do w i t h t h e perany of o u r s y s t e m s and maneuvers, w i t h t h e n a v i g a t i o n information w e w i l l get, w e w i l l be able t o proceed

61
w i t h much greater confidence and assurance w i t h each of t h e missions ahead, where i n an F or G mission, for example, w e don't expect t o have t h e margins of t i m e and p r o p e l l a n t s t o be able t o do some of t h e e v a l u a t i o n s and o b t a i n some of t h e data t h a t w e can o b t a i n here.

I t may be p a r t l y i n t u i t i v e or judgmental, but I am convinced t h a t t h i s mission w i l l s h o r t e n up o u r series, and I suppose i f I had t o p u t a t i m e on i t I ' d s a y by t h e order of three months. QUESTION FROM CAPE XENNEDY: This is t h e Cape. W e have some q u e s t i o n s here. General P h i l l i p s , t h i s is Sue Butler. Could you t e l l u s , please, whether o r n o t t h e a s t r o n a u t s i n Apollo 7 monitored t h e e n t r y monitoring s y s t e m where t h e range c a l c u l a t i o n w a s n o t working? D i d t h e y monitor? And t h e n when you got it back and examined i t , j u s t what w a s wrong w i t h i t and how d i d you f i x it?
PHILLIPS: The e n t r y monitor s y s t e m on Apallo 7 , t h e range-measuring f e a t u r e of i t , w a s n o t o p e r a t i n g p r o p e r l y on t h e r e e n t r y on Apollo 7 0 I t turned o u t i n post-mission e v a l u a t i o n t h a t t h e s c r o l l p o r t i o n of t h e e n t r y monitoring s y s t e m w a s working properly. W have had t h e 101 spacecraft e a t Downey under v a r i o u s s y s t e m tests involving being i n a power d e p t h mode s i n c e w e got it back, and a t least as of y e s t e r d a y w e had not y e t removed t h e e n t r y monitor s y s t e m box from t h e spacecraft t o d i g i n t o i t and f i n d o u t i n d e t a i l what t h a t malfunction t h a t w e reported before w e took off r e a l l y w a s .

I expect w e w i l l f i n d t h a t it is an open of t h e t y p e w e theorized before w e f l e w .
The s c r o l l can be t a k e n o u t of t h e EMS separately. I t does look l i k e a t t h i s t i m e t h e scroll p o r t i o n was working properly.

'

We have an e n t r y monitor s y s t e m i n t h e 103 spacecraft which is i n good condition. W e t h i n k one of t h e reasons w e had t h e t r o u b l e w e d i d w i t h t h e 101 Elbps is bec a u s e i n t h e months preceding t h e f l i g h t there were q u i t e a few m o d i f i c a t i o n s p u t i n t o i t , reworks, and w i t h complex e l e c t r o n i c equipment one can m a k e problems w i t h m u l t i p l e reworks, and t h a t is one of t h e reasons w e t r y t o avoid i t .

62

The one i n t h e 103 h a s n o t been reworked i n t h i s way. And, b e s i d e t h a t , it h a s been checked o u t properly i n a l l t h e checkouts, 60 w e t h i n k w e have got a good one.

But w e are s a y i n g now for some t i m e t h a t w e do n o t require mandatorily t h e e n t r y monitor s y s t e m f o r 103 mission, The p r i m a r y mode of r e e n t e r i n g is w i t h t h e spacecraft guidance and n a v i g a t i o n s y s t e m , The f i r s t backup mode is w i t h t h e e n t r y monitor s y s t e m , The t h i r d backup mode is optical s i g h t i n g s and the c o n s t a n t g r e e n t r y t h a t B i l l described. With these series of backup modes w e are r e a l l y not concerned on t h i s +prime mission whether t h e EMS works or not.
I don't want t o s a y t h a t too negatively. W expect e i t to work. W t h i n k t h a t t h i s one w i l l , W e are protected e a g a i n s t a f a i l u r e , however, i n case such a f a i l u r e occurs,

QUESTION FROM CAPE KENNEDY: Question for General P h i l l i p s or B i l l Schneider. Two q u e s t i o n s a c t u a l l y , One, I understand there is no s k i p r e e n t r y as you describe i t , but the q u e s t i o n is why are you choosing t h i s r o u t e i n s t e a d of what w e understood t o be a direct s k i p r e e n t r y ?
The other q u e s t i o n , you have mentioned s e v e r a l t i m e s t h e high-gain antenna, t h i s being t h e f i r s t t i m e . Do you t h i n k i t w i l l work o r h a s t e s t i n g shown you may have t r o u b l e w i t h it?

PHILLIPS: Let m e answer t h e second q u e s t i o n first, W have had some d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e electromechanical c o n t r o l e p o r t i o n s of t h e high-gain antenna i n our q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t ing a t t h e vendor's f a c i l i t y , These d i f f i c u l t i e s d i d lead u s a 9ew months ago t o i n t r o d u c e some design changes t o overcome those q u a l f a i l u r e s .
Those design changes were n o t a v a i l a b l e t o be p u t i n t o the equipment t h a t is now aboard t h e 103 spacecraft for t h i s mission,
The high-gain antenna and a l l of its c o n t r o l equipment were i n s t a l l e d a t t h e Cape back i n September as I recall, I t was checked o u t f u l l y i n a l l of its c o n t r o l modes as w e l l as its RF modes. It worked properly. And a t t h a t p o i n t t h e equipment w a s stowed, because, as you know, it takes o f f i n s i d e t h e s k i r t of t h e s e r v i c e module. So i t w a s stowed. The next t i m e we w i l l see t h a t equipment is a f t e r t r a n s l u n a r

63

i n j e c t i o n when t h e spacecraft separates, and t h i s antenna can be checked out.
W expect t h i s equipment t o work because it h a s e passed its checkout and w a s working properly a t t h e t i m e w e stowed i t after checkout.

Now, w e are mindful of t h e p o a s i b i l i t y of f a i l u r e s , because w e d i d f i n d c e r t a i n small but important design de= f i c i e n c i e s during t h e l a t t e r part of t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n testi n g which are being f i x e d i n l a t e r models. And a l l of t h i s is one of t h e reason63 why w e have given c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t r a a t t e n t i o n t o t h e high-gain antenna and have been able t o provide for an adequate and s a f e mission all t h e way through t h e mission even i f i t doesn't work.
The o t h e r q u e s t i o n is why are w e f l y i n g a c o n s t a n t g r e e n t r y ? I answered it i n part before namely, t h a t t h a t provides us a simple, e f f e c t i v e , reliable t h i r d backup f o r t h e guidance and c o n t r o l r e e n t r y mode or t h e e n t r y monitor system r e e n t r y mode.

--

You know, i t is obvious as you proceed through is developing equipment and o p e r a t i o n a l techniques t h a t you l e a r n a l o t . That is one of t h e reasons you do i t , one of t h e reasons why w e go through a l l of these p r o g r e s s i v e steps. I t h i n k one of t h e t h i n g s t h a t w e have i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e reasonably r e c e n t p a s t is t h a t w e have got a c o n s i d e r a b l e margin i n o u r r e e n t r y
a major development program which

system. I won't g i v e you a n exact figure, but I t h i n k o u r heat s h i e l d is capable of r e e n t e r i n g a t probably up t o o r maybe even greater t h a n 40,000 feet a second. T h i s mission is programmed a t 36,300 roughly. So there is a great deal of margin there.
The r e e n t r y g's can go w e l l above 4 without r a i s i n g any reason f o r concern. The design l i m i t as you know is
20

.

I t h i n k i n s t u d y i n g t h e e n t i r e o p e r a t i o n and t h e r e e n t r y regime i n p a r t i c u l a r o v e r t h e last s e v e r a l months, our people have come t o t h e conclusion t h a t t h i s c o n s t a n t g r e e n t r y which gets you down t o s u b - c i r c u l a r speeds f a i r l y

64

r a p i d l y so t h a t you c a n ' t s k i p o u t is maybe t h e way w e w i l l go on a l l o u r missions.
The previous technique of s k i p p i n g w e l l , not s k i p p i n g o u t but coming i n t o atmosphere t h e n going back o u t for a period of c o o l i n g r e a l l y i s n ' t required. So w e are able i n t h i s mission t o i n t r o d u c e what w e on balance feel is a t h i r d backup mode t o o u r t o t a l r e e n t r y s y s t e m which doesn't b r i n g w i t h i t any other problems o r concerns, and i n t h e whole p i c t u r e it's probably a safer r e e n t r y s y s t e m .
-9

--

And it may w e l l be t h a t t h a t w i l l be what w e w i l l u s e on a l l of o u r deep space r e e n t r i e s ,

QUESTION FROM CAPE KENNEDY: Question f o r General Phillips. How long is t h e crew s u b j e c t e d t o t h a t 4-g environment, and are t h e y capable during t h i s t i m e period to manually c o n t r o l t h e r e e n t r y i f necessary?
PHILLIPS: They are capable of manually c o n t r o l l i n g the r e e n t r y a t any p o i n t d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e r e e n t r y . The period a t which t h e y w i l l be a t 4 g's is of t h e order of oneand-a-ha.lf minutes.
QUESTION*FROM CAPE KGNNEDY: If you for some reason d e c i d e n o t t o go i n l u n a r o r b i t and you c o n t i n u e i n t o freer e t u r n circumlunar f l i g h t , how close w i l l you come t o t h e moon? And a n o t h e r t h i n g I wasn't q u i t e clear on is how many of t h e f i v e sites do you p l a n t o photograph?

W p l a n t o photograph one of t h e f i v e e Apollo landing eites. You remember t h e l i g h t i n g f o r t h i s mission w i l l be correct f o r t h e easternmost of these sites, so w e w i l l photograph one.
PHXLLIPS:

I'm s o r r y I f o r g o t t h e first h a l f of your q u e s t i o n . Would you repeat it?

QUESTION F t M CAPE KENNEDY: Y e s , If you c o n t i n u e FO j u s t on f r e e - r e t u r n circumlunar f l i g h t , how close can you come t o t h e moon?

PHILLIPS: S i x t y n a u t i c a l m i l e s is t h e p l a n f o r t h e nominal approach d i s t a n c e on a circumlunar t y p e mission.

65

I p o i n t o u t thatWell, t h a t would be t h e approach d i s t a n c e or t h e closest w e would come i f , for example, t h e d e c i s i o n were made t o n o t m a k e t h e l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n burn as a last-minute d e c i s i o n , because t h a t would be t h e p o i n t a t which you would approach,

But 1 would p o i n t o u t t h a t i f w e made t h e d e c i s i o n some hours or many hours earlier, t h e t o t a l set of circums t a n c e s might cause us t o raise t h a t p e r i l u n e t o some greater h e i g h t which would be f a i r l y e a s y for u s t o do, So t h a t f l e x i b i l i t y is one t h a t might be e x e r c i s e d i n real-time depending on t o t a l circumstances,

hours.

ALIBRANDO: Okay. W have been going f o r three e Does anybody here have a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n ?
What is t h e i n c l i n a t i o n

QUESTXQN: One quick one, of t h e i r o r b i t around t h e moon?

SCHNEIDBR:

Twelve degrees.

ALIBRANW: Okay. W e have a q u o t e from Frank Bornan i n t r a i n i n g a t t h e Cape, If you w i l l bear w i t h us, w e w i l l read t h a t . H e s a y s :
' W e have been t r a i n i n g very hard for t h i s f l i g h t , and wetre happy t h a t t h e performance of Apollo 7 and other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t l e d t o t h i s d e c i s i o n permit u s t o go."

So much f o r t h e press conference. The t r a n s c r i p t w i l l be a v a i l a b l e tomorrow morning i n t h e newsroom. If you want i t mailed t o you, f i l l o u t an envelope, The photographs showing t h e Apollo 8 o r b i t a l plannfng are a v a i l a b l e i n L e s Gaverts office,
Okay,

(Whereupon, a t 1:10 p.m,, was concluded.

t h e press conference

***

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful