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ECC based Contributory Group Key Com-

putation Scheme using One Time Pad

S. Maria Celestin Vigila and K. Muneeswaran

Abstract— Secure group communication, in recent years has rapidly devoured the attention of researchers’ world over. With

the advent and the perceptible growth of the Internet, secure group communication has become a significant feature of Internet

technology. This paper proposes an efficient and secure key computation scheme, accumulating the advantages of logical-key

tree structure and one time pad to achieve an overall effect. For secure group communication, a group key is needs to be

shared among legitimate group members for encrypting group messages. The group key is computed based on Tree-based

Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm, which is then distributed to all group members using one time pad scheme. The

performance of the proposed scheme is compared with that of the existing schemes. Comparative studies show that the new

scheme performs better than the existing schemes in terms of both security and efficiency.

Index Terms— Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Discrete Logarithm, Access Control, Group Communication.

——————————

——————————

1 INTRODUCTION

The all-pervading nature of communication networks has

paved the way for the development of wireless and Inter-

net applications, making communication possible all over

the world. Group-oriented applications like video confe-

rencing have already taken its hold on the world and will

be an essential service that provides real-time information

exchange among a large number of users [1]. The main

assurance of these services lies in information security, a

crucial factor for distributed and collaborative applica-

tions. Among all security requirements of group commu-

nication, access control is vital as it prevents illicit access

to the group communication and protects application

data.

Consider a scenario where there are n users in a

network, of which some t (t<<n) of them would like to

discuss on a common concern. These t parties (called

privileged users) must communicate among themselves

over a public channel in a secure manner in that others

must not be able to listen in to the conversation between

these t parties. Therein, lays the need to find new tech-

nology for such confidential communication which is ef-

fectively called secure group communication or secure

conferencing.

An adolescent solution is to have a shared key

between every pair of users, which leads to storing (n−1)

keys with each user. In addendum, to send a message, the

sender must encrypt the message to each user in a group

separately. This augments the amount of storage for re-

spective users, along with increased computation and

communication costs. Hence, the general aim of secure

group communication is to construct a common secret

key or secure group key among legitimate users for con-

fidential communication.

Once the group key is functional, members in a

group can communicate with each other in a discreet

manner. The group being dynamic, members in the group

may vary, i.e., new members may join and existing mem-

bers may leave the group. Group membership can change

when a single member joins/leaves the group or a set of

members join/leave the group simultaneously. Whenever

this occurs, group key must be changed to prevent a new

user from reading past communications, which is termed

as backward secrecy and a departed user from reading

future communications termed as forward secrecy[2].

The issues of establishing and updating the group keys

are addressed by group key management schemes [2]–[4].

Encryption and key management together ensure data

confidentiality. Unauthorized entities should not possess

the group key and cannot intrude upon group secrecy.

In key management methods, an opponent may

try to eavesdrop on the discussion of the privileged

member set. An opponent could be an insider (member

among n parties, but not a member of privileged set) or

outsider (member other than n parties). A group of mem-

bers, termed malicious parties may collude with each

other and try to obtain the group key. The security of the

group key management method is based on number of

————————————————

- S. Maria Celestin Vigila is with the Information Technology Department,

Noorul Islam College of Engineering, Kumaracoil, India, 629 180.

- K.Muneeswaran is with the Department of Computer Science and Engi-

neering Department, Mepco Schlenk Engineering College, Sivakasi, India,

626005.

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colluding parties. Method is termed as k secure, if it is not

possible to obtain the group key even after k non-

privileged group members collude with each other,

where k is termed as threshold.

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) based securi-

ty offers a similar level of security that can be achieved

with shorter keys than existing methods which are based

on the difficulties of solving discrete logarithms over in-

tegers or integer factorizations. The use of Elliptic Curves

(EC) in public key cryptography was independently pro-

posed by Koblitz and Miller in 1985 [5] and since then, an

enormous amount of work has been done on elliptic

curve cryptography. ECC uses elliptic curves which are

not ellipses in which the variables and the coefficients are

all bound to elements of a finite field. The elliptic points

are used for key generation and whenever new members

are added or existing members leave, the keys are regene-

rated by considering the meticulous elliptic curve alone.

This paper proposes an ECC based effective key

computation protocol for secure group communication in

distributed environments. The group key is computed

based on Tree-based Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman

(TECDH) algorithm, which is then distributed to all

group members using one time pad scheme. Group access

control is attained by encrypting the group messages us-

ing the group key that is shared by all legitimate group

members. Since the mentioned scheme uses ECC which

has a low computational cost and small key size, its per-

formance in terms of these considerations is quite com-

mendable. Therefore, it can be safely anticipated that its

use will extend to wireless communication in the future.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-

tion 2 summarizes the related works. Section 3 describes

the mathematical background to understand ECC. Section

4 proposes an efficient key computation protocol for se-

cure group communication using ECC. Section 5 gives

experiments results. Section 6 and 7 evaluates the security

and performance analysis and finally section 8 concludes

this paper.

2 RELATED WORKS

In the literature, numerous number of group key man-

agement schemes have been proposed for network group

applications. As a result of the accelerated growth in se-

cure group applications, the need to establish a group key

becomes a vital requirement. Several solutions have been

proposed to solve the problem of the group key manage-

ment. These approaches can be classified into three cate-

gories; Centralized, Decentralized and Distributed ap-

proaches [6] – [9].

In centralized approaches [9] – [11] it is the entity

that plays the role of the group manager and is responsi-

ble for generation and distribution of the group key to all

members in the group. The centralized approaches are

generally based on the idea of Logical Key Hierarchy

(LKH) which maintains a key tree. The root of the tree

plays the role of the Group Controller (GC) and shares a

group key with all members in the group, the internal

nodes of the tree represent intermediate keys and the

leaves represent the group members. Each member has a

thorough knowledge of all keys from its leaf to the root.

This effort attains scalable rekeying, which requires

(2log(n)) rekeying overhead for member joining and de-

parture, where 'n' represents the size of the group.

Afterwards, an algorithm suggested in [12] im-

proves the member joining operation such that new keys

can be computed through a one-way function without

conveying rekeying messages. Another enhancement is

the One-way Function Tree (OFT) focused in [13]. In this

approach, the keys on the key tree are generated through

one-way functions which reduces the rekeying overhead

from (2. log(n)) to log(n). Subsequently, a slightly differ-

ent scheme that achieves the equal communication over-

head is presented in [14]. Instead of using one way func-

tions, the Efficient Large-group Key (ELK) protocol ex-

plained in [15], uses pseudo-random functions to con-

struct and manipulate the keys on key tree. This will re-

duce the complexity from O(n) to O(log n). It has to be

illustrious that centralized schemes endure from the sin-

gle point of failure problem, also for a large tree and the

GC throughput can represent a bottleneck.

In decentralized approaches [16] – [18] the whole

group is split into small subgroups. Each subgroup is

managed by Subgroup Controller (SC) which minimizes

the problem of concentrating the work on a single point.

The failure of one SC will not escort to the failure of the

whole group. Mittra suggests Iolus [16], a framework

with a hierarchy of agents that divide the entire group

into smaller subgroups. Iolus exploits independent keys

for each subgroup which means that re-key of a subgroup

does not reflected in other subgroups which solve the

scalability problem. Although Iolus is scalable, the SC

may become a bottleneck because the SC must decrypt

the group messages and then re-encrypt it using the sub-

group key.

In distributed approaches, the group key is gen-

erated in a contributory fashion, where all members con-

tribute their own share in computing the group key. Ex-

amples of this approach can be found in [19] – [21]. Nu-

merous contributory schemes are enthused by the Diffie–

Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol. To extend two-

party DH protocol to the group scenario, the schemes

discussed in [22] use logical tree structures such that the

number of levels for the creation of the group key is

shrink to the logarithm of the group size.

Elliptic curve cryptography is effective for power

saving due to the usage of lesser number of bits for secure

communication [23]. Already we have implemented the

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text based cryptosystem using ECC over the field GF(p)

in [24] along with the results. In this paper we have se-

lected tree-based schemes as the vital building block in

developing the effective key computation protocol for

secure group communication using elliptic curve crypto-

graphy.

3 MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND

The hardness of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm

Problem (ECDLP) enables ECC to operate on groups of

points over EC for security. While sub-exponential algo-

rithms are suitable for solving the integer factorization

problem, only exponential algorithms are known for the

ECDLP. Hence ECC is able to achieve the same level of

security with smaller key sizes and higher computational

efficiency.

3.1. Elliptic Curves

An elliptic curve takes the general form as:

b ax x y E + + =

3 2

:

(1)

where x, y are co-ordinates of GF(p), and a, b are integer

modulo p, satisfying

) (mod 0 27 4

2 3

p b a = +

(2)

Here ‘p’ is modular prime integer which makes

the EC of finite field. An elliptic curve E over GF(p) con-

sist of the points (x, y) defined by (1) and (2), along with

an additional point called O (point at infinity) in EC.

These points are said to be affine points.

3.2. Elliptic Curve Arithmetic

Point addition and point doubling form the basis for EC

operations. ECC primitives [25] require scalar point mul-

tiplication. Let P is a point with the co-ordinates x, y on

an EC, and one needs to compute kP, where k is a posi-

tive integer. This scalar multiplication can be done by a

series of doubling and addition of P. For example, given k

=13, entails the following sequence of operations, by

which the efficiency of the scalar multiplication of the

points is improved.

P 2P 3P 6P 12P 13P

Doub

ling

Addition Doub

ling

Doub

ling

Addition

Let us start with P(x

P

, y

P

). To determine 2P, P is

doubled. This should be an affine point on EC. Use the

following equation, which is a tangent to the curve at

point P.

( ) | | p y a x S

P P

mod 2 / 3

2

+ =

(3)

Then R=2P that has affine coordinates (x

R

, y

R

) given by:

( ) p X S X

P R

mod 2

2

÷ =

( ) ( ) p Y X X S Y

P R P R

mod ÷ ÷ =

(4)

In order to determine 3P, we use addition of

points P and 2P, treating 2P=Q. Here P has coordinates

(x

P

, y

P

). Q=2P has coordinates (x

Q

, y

Q

). Now the slope is:

( ) ( ) | | p X X Y Y S

P Q P Q

mod / ÷ ÷ =

(5)

R Q P ÷ = +

( ) p X X S X

Q P R

mod

2

÷ ÷ =

( ) ( ) p Y X X S Y

P R P R

mod ÷ ÷ =

(6)

Therefore we apply doubling and addition depending on

a sequence of operations determined for ‘k’. Every point

(x

R

, y

R

) evaluated by doubling or addition is an affine

point (points on the Elliptic Curve).

4 PROPOSED SCHEME

The intent of this work is to design a robust secure group

communication scheme by combining the advantages of

logical-key tree structure and one time pad. For secure

group communication, a group key is required to be

shared among legitimate group members to encrypt

group messages. The group key is computed based on

TECDH algorithm, which is then distributed to all group

members using one time pad scheme.

Each group is organized in a logical key hierar-

chy as in the LKH protocol which reduces the complexity

for a member who join or leave from O(n) to O(log n). The

members in a group coordinate with each other to gener-

ate the group key. The intermediate keys and the group

key are generated from bottom to up as follows.

In the first level, members are grouped into pairs

and perform two-party ECDH. Thus, two members form

a subgroup. In each of the following levels, the subgroups

formed in the previous level are once again paired and

this pair performs ECDH after which they are merged

into a larger subgroup with a shared key. Finally, all

members are merged into one group that share the group

key. Then the group key is encrypted using one time pad

enciphering scheme and then distributed to the entire

group to maintain confidentiality.

The main aim is to establish a symmetric key

among all group members in order to preserve the secu-

rity of group communication. In case of a change occurs

in the group membership by joining or leaving the group,

the group key should be updated to maintain backward

secrecy and forward secrecy.

4.1. Key Structure

Our group key management scheme uses a TECDH algo-

rithm for computing the group key from the contributions

of all group members using a binary tree. A binary tree T

is a key tree in which every node can be denoted as <h, i>

where h is the height (level) of the node and i is the index

of the node at level h. Thus, every node is uniquely iden-

tified. Each node <h, i> is associated with a private key,

P

R

<h, i>, and a public key, P

U

<h, i>. The P

U

<h, i> is com-

puted from the private key P

R

<h, i>, from Equation (7)

where G is a base point of an Elliptic Curve Equation E,

'•' is the scalar multiplication operation, and both E and

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G are shared by all group members in advance.

P

U

<h, i> = P

R

<h, i> • G. (7)

The key at the root node, i.e. P

R

<h, 0> represents

the group key shared by all group members. There are

two kinds of nodes in a binary tree T. One is the leaf, <h,

i>, which is associated with one and only one group

member M

i

. The private key of the group member (leaf) is

defined by

P

R

<h, i> = r

i

(8)

Where r

i

is a random integer assigned by the group mem-

ber M

i

. The other is the intermediate node, < h, i >, which

has two siblings <h −1, 2i> and <h −1, 2i +1>. It

represents a subgroup in which every sub-group (leaf or

nonleaf) member hosts it. The intermediate node’s private

key is considered as the subgroup secret key. It can be

calculated by the following rule.

P

R

<h, i> = P

R

<h−1,2i> • P

U

<h−1,2i+1>

= P

R

<h−1, 2i+1> • P

U

<h−1,2i> (9)

Where P

U

<h−1,2i> = P

R

<h−1,2i> • G

Fig. 1: Binary key tree

For example, the subgroup secret key at height 1

and position 1 is computed as:

P

R

<1, 1> = P

R

<0, 2> • P

U

<0, 3>

= P

R

<0, 3> • P

U

<0, 2>

Fig. 1 depicts an example of a key tree. The

members M

i

and M

i+1

at height h and position i are

represented by <h, i> and <h, i+1> construct a subgroup

<h+1, i> at height h+1. The members may be at leaf level

or at intermediate level. The subgroup is either at inter-

mediate level or at root level.

4.2. Algorithm

To compute the group key for secure group communica-

tion, initially the EC points are to be generated first. The

algorithm ‘genPoints’ describes the process of generating

the EC points for the given parameters ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘p’.

Algorithm genPoints (a, b, p)

begin

x=0;

While(x < p)

y

2

=(x

3

+ ax + b) mod p;

if( isPerfectSquare(y

2

,

GF(p)))

output(x, sqrt(y)) (x, -sqrt(y) );

x=x+1;

end

The algorithm ‘secureGroupKeyComm’ describes the

process of secure group key communication for the given

EC.

Algorithm secureGroupKeyComm( )

begin

// Let M

i

be set of legitimate members 1≤ i ≤ n

L = log

2

|M| // No. of levels

for every level h and position i

begin

computeSecureGK(h, i);

distributeGK( );

for each join and leave operation in <h, i>

begin

computeSecureGK(h, i); //Rekeying

distributeGK( );

end

end

end

The algorithm ‘computeSecureGK’ describes the process of

generating the group key for the given parameters lev-

el(height) h and position i.

Algorithm computeSecureGK(h, i)

begin

// Let M

i

be legitimate members 1≤ i ≤ n

M

i

= {P

Ui

, P

Ri

} //Key pair for M

i

P

R

<h, i> = random ( );

P

U

<h, i> = P

R

<h, i> • G;

for every level h

begin

P

R

<h, i> = P

R

<h−1,2i> • P

U

<h−1,2i+1>;

= P

R

<h−1, 2i+1> • P

U

<h−1,2i>;

G

k

<h, i> = P

R

<h, i>; // except at leaf

// G

k

<h, 0> is group key for all members.

end

end

The algorithm ‘distributeGK’ describes the process of dis-

tributing the group key for the given group members.

Algorithm distributeGK( )

begin

G

k

<h, 0> = P

R

<h,0>;

for every level h in L

begin

G

k

<h, i> = G

k

<h, i>.uLink © P

R

<h, i>;

end

end

<0,0> <0,1>

<1,0>

<0,3> <0,2>

<2,0>

<1,1>

M1 M2 M3 M4

h = 1

h = 2

h = 0

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5 IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS

For testing purposes, a typical Elliptic Curve is

represented by:

y

2

mod 487 = x

3

-5x+25 mod 487

where a=-5, b=25 and p=487. Base point implies that it

has the smallest (x, y) co-ordinates which satisfy the EC.

The base point G is selected as (0, 5).

The algorithm for secure group communication

can be illustrated using a simple example of a subgroup

of eight members. Fig. 2 depicts the logical key tree for a

group of eight members. From the sample hierarchy, we

can see that the number of the group members is n = 8

and the levels (height) of the tree is h = log

2

8 = 3. Number

of nodes in each level of the tree is 2

level.

For e.g., the num-

ber of nodes in level 2 is 4. The node 7 to 14 represents the

group members

.

M

1

, M

2

, …, M

8

. The keys of this group

are calculated as follows:

Fig. 2: A binary logical key tree for a group of eight members.

The private key P

R

of the members M

1

, M

2

, …, M

8

is randomly chosen as {719, 967, 631, 857, 523, 379, 281,

401}.

In level 3, consider the two members M

1

and M

2

and compute the public key as

For member M

1

Public key P

U

= P

R

. G

= 719.(0,5)

= (213, 351)

For member M

2

Public key P

U

= 967. (0,5)

= (114, 364)

In level 2, the members M

1

and M

2

form a sub-

group and compute the subgroup secret key as

= 719(114,364) = 967(213,351)

= (195, 469)

Similarly, other member’s subgroup secret keys

are calculated and finally the root node i.e. node 0 private

key is considered as a group key for all members in the

group. In this example, the group key (G

k

)

as 433.

Then the group key is encrypted using one time

pad enciphering scheme and then distributed to the entire

group. In our example,

G

k

<3,0> = P

R

<3,0> = 433.

Consider node 1 of the tree,

G

k

<2,0> = G

k

<2,0>.uLink © P

R

<2,0>

= 433 © 372 =197.

to obtain the subgroup key 197. Now node 1 computes

197 XOR with 372 to get the group key 433 for the node 1.

Similarly the group key is distributed to all other group

members. The node 1 to 6 represents the subgroups. The

subgroup keys are {197, 311, 6, 89, 500, 159} respectively.

Table 1 shows the keys generated and distributed

as a result of the above procedure for group of members

as shown in Fig. 2.

Table 1: Group Key Generation and Distribution

Node No. Private Key

(PR)

Public Key

(PU)

Group Key

(Gk)

0 433 (70,72) 433

1 372 (427,200) 197

2 134 (103,285) 311

3 195 (275,25) 6

4 156 (295,147) 89

5 195 (275,25) 500

6 424 (134,436) 159

7 719 (213,351) 433

8 967 (114,364) 433

9 631 (345,153) 433

10 857 (439,173) 433

11 523 (101,42) 433

12 379 (207,108) 433

13 281 (443,149) 433

14 401 (213,136) 433

When a member leaves the group, all keys on the

path from this member to the root needs to be changed in

the similar fashion except that some existing intermediate

keys do not need to be recalculated.

Table 2: Member Leave

Node

No.

Private

Key(PR)

Public

Key(PU)

Group Key(Gk)

Before redi-

stribution

After redi-

stribution

0 74 (95,361) 433 74

1 427 (44,452) 197 481

2 134 (103,285) 311 204

3 213 (457,272) 6 308

4 156 (295,147) 89 381

5 195 (275,25) 500 15

6 424 (134,436) 159 356

7 719 (213,351) 433 74

8 User is leaving from the group

9 631 (345,153) 433 74

10 857 (439,173) 433 74

11 523 (101,42) 433 74

12 379 (207,108) 433 74

13 281 (443,149) 433 74

14 401 (213,136) 433 74

0

1

2

3 4 5 6

7 8

9 11 10 14 13 12

4

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For example, if member M

2

i.e. node 8 wants to

leave from the group, the keys for the nodes 3, 1, 0 are

updated to maintain forward secrecy. The regenerated

group key as 74 and the subgroup keys are {481, 204, 308,

381, 15, 356} respectively. According to our scheme, to

achieve an elevated level of security, the regenerated

group key must be updated to the remaining group

members using one time pad enciphering scheme to

maintain the forward secrecy.

Table 2 shows the keys generated before and af-

ter the member leave procedure for group of members as

shown in Fig. 2.

If a new member wants to join a group, first

place is assigned in the group. Then the new member

randomly chooses the private key value and calculates its

public key value. Then the group key regenerated in the

similar manner as 4. All group members obtain the new

group key as 4 by replacing the old group key 74. Simi-

larly, the regenerated subgroup keys are {97, 130, 4, 253,

65, 298} respectively. To attain a high strength of security,

the group key should be altered after each join so that a

new member has no access to earlier communications.

Table 3 shows the keys generated before and af-

ter the member join procedure for group of members as

shown in Fig. 2.

Table 3: Member Join

Node

No.

Private

Key(PR)

Public

Key(PU)

Group Key(Gk)

Before redi-

stribution

After redi-

stribution

0 4 (63,457) 74 4

1 101 (291,91) 481 97

2 134 (103,285) 204 130

3 101 (291,91) 308 4

4 156 (295,147) 381 253

5 195 (275,25) 15 65

6 424 (134,436) 356 298

7 719 (213,351) 74 4

8 101 (291,91) - 4

9 631 (345,153) 74 4

10 857 (439,173) 74 4

11 523 (101,42) 74 4

12 379 (207,108) 74 4

13 281 (443,149) 74 4

14 401 (213,136) 74 4

To ensure secure data transmissions among the

group members the message to be communicated within

the group is always encrypted using the group key G

k

and the ciphered message is distributed to the group.

Only authorized group member possess the group key

and can decrypt the ciphered message. Hence, confiden-

tial communication can be achieved using secure group

key between the legitimate group members.

6 SECURITY ANALYSIS

The Security of ECC is due to the discrete logarithm prob-

lem over the points on the elliptic curve. Cryptanalysis

involves determining x given Q and P where P is a point

on the EC and Q = x P that is P added to itself x times.

The best known algorithm to break the elliptic curve

points is the pollard – rho algorithm which is a fully ex-

ponential algorithm and difficult to solve. Forward and

Backward secrecy are maintained as each session. In this

section we address the possible types of attacks. Security

tolerance of the proposed scheme in response to the vari-

ous attacks is discussed in the following subsections.

Attack 1: Exterior Collecting Attack

The first potential attack is from an outsider. If an

attacker is outsider, it means no idea about what EC or

base point is being used is known and hence more diffi-

cult to attack. Therefore, the proposed scheme restricts

intrusion from outsiders.

Attack 2: Contrary Attacks

The second possible attack is from a successor,

who might desire to acquire the group key of the imme-

diate or any prior predecessor through the public pa-

rameters and his own secret key. The unauthorized user

can generally solve this problem by the given plaintext.

However, both the ECC and the one time pad enciphering

scheme can resist forced attack in the proposed scheme

because their time complexity is placed at a reasonable

computational security. An unauthorized successor can-

not acquire the group key even after years of attempting.

Hence, the proposed scheme is extremely secure against

such an attack.

Attack 3: Interior Collecting Attacks

If a group member has many ancestors and if it

negotiates with one parent also by knowing the key as

there is no relation parameter among any of the ancestor

nodes it is not possible to obtain the key.

Attack 4: Collaborative Attacks

The collaborative attack is a type of attack where

several members collaborate to launch the attack. We as-

sume that if there is a subgroup member i.e. node 3 as in

figure 2 and there are two descendant members M

1

i.e.

node 7 and M

2

i.e. node 8. Members of M

1

and M

2

cannot

perform a collaborative attack as the secret key of any

subgroup member is calculated only from the contribu-

tion of the respective members of the level. Therefore,

attackers cannot invert the procedure to derive the sub-

group secret key.

Attack 5: Sibling Attacks

Members that have same parent also cannot

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break the key of a sibling member due to the absence of

any related parameters among them. To maintain the se-

cure scheme the following things are necessary.

1. The immediate parents should be faithful and the de-

scendant list should be updated.

2. The leaving/joining members from the tree hierarchy

should update their ancestor list.

3. The selection of private key by joining the new member

should be done by selecting a random value for finding a

new group key.

The EC parameters and the mechanisms along

with the private key decides the strength of the security

of the group communication. Though the EC parameters

and the mechanism may be revealed to the public over

the time, the private key owned by each member is capa-

ble of protecting the group communication making it vi-

able for commercial applications.

7 ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE

On computational complexity, key generation requires

executing EC addition operations and key distribution

uses one time enciphering scheme. In terms of computa-

tional overheads, Vanstone [26] had abridged that the key

sizes and bandwidth needed by ECC gives superior effi-

ciency with order of magnitude approximately 10 times

that of integer factorization systems and discrete loga-

rithm systems. In addition, Stallings [23] estimated that

the 4096-bit key size of the RSA gives the same level of

security as the 313-bit one in ECC. That is, the length of

the prime p in E

p

(a,b) is secure adequate with 300 bits.

The logical tree structure has storage overhead as

O(n). The key storage required for each member is very

minimal because each member has to store its own public

key and private key. ECC based approach takes very less

memory even the members get increased. The logical tree

structure has communication overhead as O(log

2

n). The

communication cost of TECDH depends on trees height,

balance of key tree, location of joining tree, and leaving

nodes. For member join and leave operations our ap-

proach takes less communication and computation time

as the key size for ECC is small compared to other ap-

proaches.

The major issue with the group communication

is the rekeying cost and the distribution of the public key

to all other group members in the path of change. At the

time of rekeying during the join and leave operations, the

consistence of the key usage has to be maintained.

From the above analysis, we can conclude that

the proposed key management scheme enhances the

group performance in terms of security, storage, commu-

nication and computation overhead.

8 CONCLUSION

Secure group communication plays an important role in

the area of research and has captured the attention of mil-

lions of users worldwide. In this paper, we have pro-

posed and implemented an efficient and secure group key

computation using elliptic curve cryptography along with

one time pad enciphering scheme. Here, each group is

organized as a logical key hierarchy and the group key is

computed based on TECDH algorithm. Then the public

key counter-part of the secret group key is distributed to

other sub group members. Using the dynamically com-

puted group keys both forward and backward secrecy is

maintained. The results have elucidated the fact that the

proposed protocol enhances the group performance in

terms of security, storage, communication and computa-

tion overhead. Use of EC ensures that group key is pro-

tected and intruders cannot decipher the message. Differ-

ent EC parameters can be generated and optimized for

better performance.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors are grateful to the principal and management

of Noorul Islam College of Engineering and MEPCO

Schlenk Engineering College for extending their facilities

and constant encouragement in carryingout this research

work.

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S. Maria Celestin Vigila completed the B.E. degree in Computer

Science and Engineering in 1996 and the M.E. degree in Computer

Science and Engineering in 1999. She is currently pursuing her re-

search in the area of Information Security under Anna University,

Tiruchirappalli. She is presently Assistant Professor in the Depart-

ment of Information Technology, Noorul Islam College of Engineer-

ing, Kumaracoil and a member of ISTE and IET. Her research inter-

est includes Cryptography and Network Security, Wireless Networks

and Information Hiding.

K. Muneeswaran is Professor and Head of the Department of Com-

puter Science and Engineeering, Mepco Schlenk Engineering Col-

lege, Sivakasi. His area of interest includes image analysis, comput-

er networks, neural networks, security, grid and cloud computing.

Seven research scholars are working under his supervison. He con-

tributed to many funded research projects. Also he is the reviewer for

the peer reviewed International journals.

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