The Explosive Ordnance Disposal assets comprise a very small portion in comparison with the total FORSCOM strength. However, it is quite evident that these small detachments perform a vital, necessary and valuable service to our Active and Reserve Components as well as to civil authorities throughout the entire command. The countless letters·which flow into the headquarters from appreciative military and civil officials provide tan9ible evidence of these detachments' responsiveness, professionalism and unique expertise. This historical summary is an endeavor to recapture the significant and noteworthy events of the past year and preserve them for immediate and future use. r believe that each reader will agree that the facts and events contained in this summary are worthy of such review and retention. summary to all members of the FORSCOM EOD Program whose conscientious and dedicated efforts resulted in the compilation of this enViabl~ ;:;;;;;::__

r take great pride in dedicating this first historical

ROBERT HALDANE Major General, GS Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

18 April





Staff Sergeant Christopher O'Reilly, Jr., 149th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)

Sergeant Major Kenneth Foster, 63rd Ordnance Detachment (EOD)




Grateful acknowledgement is made to the Commander and personnel of the 44th Military History Detachment for their invaluable assistance in compiling, editing and preparing this historical summary for publication. Their expertise and interest proved invaluable in this initial endeavor.




Page INTRODUCTION General Objectives PERSONNEL Strengths Morale Tragedy Strikes OPERATIONS AND TRAINING Operations Support to Other Agencies General Interservice Cooperation Reserve Component Support VIP Support Support to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Training General EOD Training EOD as Instructors Exercises EQUIPMENT Communications Transportation EOD Peculiar Equipment
2 2 2


4 9



15 15 35 35 35 38 39
42 42 42


45 50


53 53 53


GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND FUTURE OBJECTIVES 56 Observations 56 Women in EOD 57 Influence of FORSCOM 57 FY 78 Objectives 58




2 3 4

FORSCOM Eon Organization FY 77 FORSCOM EOD Officer Strength FY 77 FORSCOM EOD Enlisted Strength History of Explosive Incidents - CONUS FORSCOM Explosive Ordnance Disposal Education Program PLATES



16 46

Number 1 2

Letter to Spouse of EOD Member from 548th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) Certificate of Achievement ILLUSTRATIONS

11 12

Caption Part of the arms cache recovered in New Baltimore, Michigan. Note BAR Mockup A detailed view of the arms recovered New Baltimore, Michigan A cylinder of uranium amidst train wreckage in 22 28 36


hexafloride lays near Rockingham, NC stands by to

A FORSCOM EOD Team Member render assistance.

A team member of the 43rd Ordnance Detachment (EOD) stands prepared to search the Louisville sewer system.



The commercially purchased waders needed reinforcement to combat the corrosive effect of the "hexa" in the Louisville sewer system. The unofficial logo of the ERDA's Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) exercise conducted in August 1977. Poster warning munitions. troops about "dud"





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INTRODUCTION GENERAL The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments of the United States Army Forces Command, not being organic to their larger, more visible field units, go about their day-to-day activities largely unheralded by official recognition. Their accomplishments constitute but a footnote in the official histories and all too frequently are relegated to back pages of the media. Yet the men and women of these elite organizations face dangers routinely that their counterparts in other branches merely train for. All train for that eventuality which will place them in armed confrontation with an identifiable enemy but, in addition to that eventuality, the EOD Detachments face a constant threat from a faceless enemy -- the terrorist, careless, and thoughtless -- people who dabble in explosives for reasons known only to themselves. The total picture of their accomplishments, then, is buried in a myriad of local press releases, official reports, and briefing notes. This publication, it is felt, will bring their endeavors during 1977 into proper perspective. Also, by being aware of the accomplishments of their kindred units, all may reap some satisfaction and pride in knowing that their cumulative efforts have now been officially recognized. OBJECTIVES To insure that the major events of Fiscal Year 1977 are retained for future reference, FORSCOM has published this history which is also designed to satisfy the following objectives: (1) Promote a sense of pride in the accomplishments achievements of the EOD detachments of FORSCOM. and


(2) Identify problem areas applicable possible solutions to them. (3) Recognize during the year. single individual

to all and present

and unit achievements

(4) Familiarize prospective EOD volunteers with the wide ranging missions and situations confronting the EOD detachments. (5) Provide the military and civilian communities with a greater knowledge and a more factual understanding of the FORSCOM EOD program so they may gain a greater appreciation for it.




Fiscal Year 1977 (FY 77) began with FORSCOM having only eighty-seven percent of its authorized strength in qualified EOD technicians. While this percentage reflected an actual shortage of seven officers and sixty-eight enlisted, it was most keenly felt at the unit level where these small detachments continued to be confronted with a workload which steadily increased. Although eighty-seven percent was considered to constitute initial shortage of personnel, the situation continued to deteriorate until late FY 77 when it was revealed that only seventy-four percent fill was being maintained. This dismal statistic reflected an actual shortage of 15 officers and 134 enlisted -- almost twice the number of personnel shortages with which EOD entered the fiscal year. The reasons for this downward trend are manifold and therefore difficult to isolate and rectify. A careful analysis of the many factors bearing on the problem has revealed some identifiable causes. It must be borne in mind also that like a wave approaching a shore, many problems tended to build on themselves until they grew to almost insurmountable proportions. The 1976 presidential campaign and its heavy demand on EOD assets seriously deterred recruiting efforts by the detachments themselves. Long hours, frequently far from their home stations, and temporary "gerrymandering" of areas of geographic responsibility kept the units from actively seeking recruits.


The flow of replacements was also impeded by the unusually high attrition rate during Phase I training. At times the number failing reached staggering proportions, sometimes exceeding thirtyfive percent! This rate of failure, coupled with a drastically reduced input of EOD candidates, could not keep pace with those leaving the units. There was also competition among the major commands for those who did successfully complete training. Often FORSCOM had a lower priority for the personnel available than did other commands such as USAREUR. The early and untimely departure of many commanders often left the responsibility for command to senior non-commissioned officers within the detachments. They willingly assumed this added burden and performed well until the new commanders arrived on station. The EOD field, by the nature of its mission, has little flexibility in filling the voids within its ranks. Other skills can be "juggled" and personnel retrained to fill initial shortages, elsewhere. Not so with EOD. Acceptable volunteers who demonstrate responsibility, stability, and physical attributes necessary for EOD must undergo an intense training period which, as previously noted, has a high failure rate. Often those who have the necessary prerequisites do not desire a career with EOD and opt for some other skill. By being a volunteer field, EOD cannot draw a percentage from a pool of qualified personnel. This extreme shortage of personnel has manifested itself in other areas. A lack of qualified personnel has impeded unit training and evaluation of the state of training of those units. More importantly, however, the personnel shortage has detracted from overall operational capability. In all fairness to the units themselves, they have fought to overcome this liability, but without replacement personnel for their continued losses, success has been limited.





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When FORSCOM recognized the problem as acute, efforts were begun to bring the situation under control and arrive at a viable solution. FORSCOM initiated a series of messages directed toward the Department of the Army, Director of Personnel, MILPERCEN, and TRADOC calling attention to the problem. Interim solutions were arrived at to both keep the problem from getting worse and providing immediate solutions to obtain personnel for the units. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialities (55D MOS series) were exempted from involuntary reclassification; installation commanders were urged to expedite school applications; Army quotas for Phase I and II were significantly increased for FY 78; preliminary training and preparation of accepted volunteers for Phase I training was implemented in an effort to reduce the attrition rate of Army students; and detachments established procedures for tracking students through the entire training period. These efforts began to show encouraging results during latter FY 77 and early FY 78. The long range solution adopted to allay any recurrence of the problem was a FORSCOM initiated recruiting campaign to keep the units adequately filled. Several alternatives were carefully considered to enhance the recruiting of volunteers for initial EOD training. One consideration was to procure volunteers through recruiting channels, that is, the Recruiting Command. In essence, this solution would have made the EOD program an enlistment option. The other proposal considered was to continue with the existing recruiting program. Based on the past experience with volunteers obtained from Basic Combat Training (BCT) during the late 1960's, and the stringent prerequisites for entry into the EOD program, the decision was made to continue in-service procurement. The perennial difficulty bearing on obtaining suitable replacements remains the "quality not quantity" process of selection. This attitude admittedly increases the difficulty in recruiting suitable volunteers. However, there is optimism at all levels that the personnel picture will have improved by the end of FY 78.


Morale Eon units are routinely faced with a heavy mission workload, often requiring an inordinate number of hours away from their home station. The routine pressure associated with mission tasks likewise takes its toll. Often, under the pressures and workload demands of day-to-day activities, it is easy to subordinate concern for the most important part of the program -- people. Because Eon units are small and closely knit, there is ample opportunity to demonstrate a genuine concern for their members and their families who jointly comprise the basis for a successful EOn program. Some routine efforts at maintaining the elan of the detachments themselves were associated with ensuring the service member was provided fast, efficient personnel services. Personnel were also encouraged to pursue educational goals, both civilian and military. Concentrated efforts were made in many units to assist those preparing for their MOS tests. Recognition of the soldiers' long arduous hours, particularly during the November presidential election and January inauguration, was undertaken. But perhaps of equal importance was the recognition of the families who had also had to endure long hours of separation while the service member performed presidential security missions, training, testing, and other mission-related tasks. The dilemma posed by the long hours forced many service members to choose between mission and family. Many, of course, chose to go to a less demanding field in order to improve family relations. This difficult but understandable act was, in part, a reason for the rapid decline in strength during FY 77. For those who remained the pressures continued unabated. These pressures posed a serious threat to morale which seemed to steadily decline.


The 548th Ordnance Detachment (EODCC), Presidio of San Francisco, recognized the problem posed by the long hours. Anticipating the flurry of activity accompanying the presidential campaign and inauguration, it attempted to alert the families to the rigors and demands which they would have to face. A letter was addressed to each family which, it was hoped, would soften the impact of the anticipated protracted separations (See Plate 1). The 547th Ordnance Detachment (EOOCC), Fort Gillem, Georgia, pursued a similar course. A certificate was awarded each family in recognition of "the dedication and support you showed your husband ••• during a very trying period for EOO -- the 1976 election year."l (See Plate 2) Of more far reaching consequence was the support of the EOO Memorial Scholarship Fund, a joint service endeavor administered by the Naval EOO School, Indian Head, Maryland. This fund provides academic scholarships to deserving dependents of EOO personnel of all services. It is supported by subscription and other fund raising projects by EOO activities throughout the EOD community. FORSCOM, in response to a request from the EOO school, assisted in selling raffle tickets to raise money for the scholarship fund. The enthusiastic response from FORSCOM units provided over $1,000 thereby increasing the number of scholarships available. These actions, and many others like them, illustrated a genuine concern for the people who comprise EOO. It is but one form of recognition for the routine sacrifices made by the members of EOO and their families. It likewise portrays to the rest of the military community the elan and esprit de corps of an elite organization -- EOO.


of Achievement,

547th Ord Det (EODCC)



CENTER) 94129


5 March


Dear Mrs. Your husband is a dedicated, professional soldier who is a member of a very elite group of men. This group possesses talents that are very much in demand by every element of the Military and civil law enforcement community. I expect the demands on your husband will increase tremendously during this Presidential Election Year. Already this year your husband has probably been away from home more than you would normally expect. The reason that your husband and other EOD men are so respected in both the Military and civilian community is that the support provided ,is always a very professional team effort. Everyone giving their best for the mission.
I am writing you to let you know that I am your husband and his family. I would like your husband will not be away from home so is not possible. Your husband is required Service during this election year with his

very much concerned about to be able to say that frequently, however, this to support the Secret special talents.

I will, however, promjse that each request will be closely reviewed to reduce the number of men ~equired and that every effort will be made to reduce the amount of time that your husband will be away from home. In closing I would like to commend you as an Army wife for your dedication, perseverance, patience, and foremost your support and loyalty to your husband. Since ely,




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Plate 2




Accounts in the public media, official correspondence, and post operation reports are generally cold, statistical, and objective. But to the men and women who routinely form the basis for these accounts, there is a very real, personal involvement. Each must sally forth to the next mission with the full realization that tragedy could await them. Tragedy does not necessarily stalk just the unwary -- it can strike anyone. The untimely death of a member of EOD casts a pale over the entire EOD community. Such was the case when two of our comrades-in-arms died in the performance of duty. Sergeant Major Kenneth R. Foster of the 63rd Ordnance Detachment (EOD), Fort Leonard Wood, was completing a VIP support mission in Quincy, Illinois on 28 September 1976. The Adams County Sheriff's Department had been experiencing some difficulty with explosives being used to damage facilities at a local manufacturing plant. During the preceding evening, 27 September, three explosions had wrecked the plant. A fourth device, unexploded, had been found during the morning. As SGM Foster wound up his one mission, he was called on by the Adams County Sheriff's Department, to assist in the removal of the device. SGM Foster and an Illinois State fire inspector entered the area where the device was found. Shortly after 1030, as the two men approached the device, it detonated. SGM Foster was killed instantly and the inspector was seriously injured. Subsequent investigation revealed that the explosion was caused by six to eight sticks of dynamite actuated by a 6-volt battery and cheap alarm clock. SCM Foster was buried with full military honors on 2 October 1976 in Salisbury, North Carolina. Over twenty-five members of nearby EOD units attended and paid their last respects. Staff Sergeant Christopher J. Detachment (EOD), Aberdeen Proving destroy an ignition mix by burning O'Reilly was assisted by two other Matthews and SP4 Janet Miller. O'Reilly of the 149th Ordnance Ground, was detailed to on 21 September 1977. SSG members of his detachment, SSG


After arrival at the range, they performed a visual inspection of the range to see if any residue remained from the previous day's destruction. They then used two smoke grenades to determine wind direction. They then prepared the ignition mix for destruction. As Sergeants Matthews and O'Reilly prepared to ignite the mixture, Specialist Miller insured the team vehicle was ready to move. As Sergeant Matthews ignited his fuse, he saw a fireball form at Sergeant O'Reilly's ignition point. The fireball moved down the train of ignition mix charring the team vehicle and burning Specialist Hiller. Immediate first aid was provided Sergeant O'Reilly who was badly injured. He was then evacuated first to a Baltimore hospital and then to Brooke Army Medical Center. Despite the intensive efforts of the medical staff, Sergeant O'Reilly succumbed three days after the accident. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetary where he was lain on 29 September 1977 during a military funeral attended by 100 members of nearby EOD units. Although of small consolation to their families, these tragedies do illustrate the ever-present danger facing the soldiers of EOD. The threat may be intentional, as in the case of SGM Foster or a perversion of fate, as in the case of SSG O'Reilly. The quiet courage of these two men) who faced the challenge unflinchingly, exemplifies the highest standards of EOD personnel everywhere. The 549th, to provide a tangible means for EOD personnel world wide to express their sympathy to the family of Sergeant O'Reilly, created the Christopher J. O'Reilly, Jr. Memorial Fund. After announcing the creation of the fund) the 549th received a deluge of contributions. When the Memorial Fund ~"as finally closed out, the 549th was able to present $2,800 to the O'Reilly family. This kind and selfless act by the men and women of Army EOD truly illustrates their elan and esprit de' corps.





The missions performed by FORSCOM Explosive Ordnance Detachments during the past fiscal year have run the gamut from the bizarre to the mundane, the serious to the ridiculous. The results achieved sometimes we re not all that was expected. A case in point occurred on 21 December 1976. The strange chain of events began around 1100 when a Soviet employee with the Soviet Embassy, found a plastic 'ITapped manila envelope Dutside the apartment complex housing the Soviet delegation. Seeing that the package was rather bulky and therefore suspecting it contained an explosive, the employee handed it over to a guard of the Executive Protective Service. The guard then summoned assistance and the Washington police bomb disposal squad and the 67th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) responded. As the EOD team member carefully examined the package and gingerly opened it, he saw not an explosive device as suspected, but a sheaf of classified documents. Maintaining his aplomb, he started to remove the package. When queried by a group of Soviets standing close by as to what was going on, the soldier replied with contrived nonchalance, "Oh, there's nothing in here that would concern you fellows," and turned and left with the documents. Investigative sources, recognizing that the EOD team had been confronted with a diplomatically explosive situation later stated of the soldier that "He's a hero in my book."l

IThe Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Washington Post, 23 Dec 1976, A-I.

25 Dec 1976, p. 6-A;






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Based on the quick-thinking response of Staff Sergeants Richard Stickle and George Collins, an investigation was launched resulting in the arrest of a former Central Intelligence Agency logistics expert. As one agent involved in the investigation revealed, "The Soviets bungled this thing -- not Moore (the ex-CIA agent).,,2 The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Clarence M. Kelly, lauded the two soldiers stating: (They) were directly responsible for the subsequent actions which the special agents were able to take, leading to the arrest of an individual whose activities would have had an adverse effect on the national security interests of the United States. The 67th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), due to its close proximity to Washington, often finds itself committed to crank attempts to disrupt the processes of government or assassinate prominent officials. The intensity of the government in this regard is revealed by an incident occurring on 1 December 1976. During the early afternoon a pick-up truck was rammed into the northwest gate of the White House. After the security officers secured the driver, Eon support was requested to ascertain whether or not the vehicle contained explosives.

A preliminary search of the vehicle by members of the 67th failed to reveal any explosives. They then retired from the area and permitted an explosive sniffing dog to investigate the wreckage. They then made a final inspection which revealed that the vehicle was clean. Although it could be stated that the security police "over reacted", nothing can be taken for granted. The ingenuity and cunning of bomb cranks leave little margin for error.

2"An Offer

the Soviets


Time, 3 Jan 77,

p , 53.


Many of the situations rcqua r i ng EOD support are generated from the civilian community. Calls are generated by private citizens seeking to rid themselves of a potential explosion or local municipalities seeking guidance and assistance in a situation which poses a danger to life and property. Whatever the source, EOD is expected to respond. Unexploded ordnance, usually of older vintage, crops 1~ at unexplainable locations. The 147th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) was called when Richmond, Virginia maintenance crews unearthed a four-by-one foot projectile at the intersection of two streets. The round had no rotating band but was fuzed at its base. The projectile, having lain so long underground, was rusty and muddy and no markings were evident. Tentative identification as a 10inch naval armor piercing shell with a base detonating impact inertia fuze was made. Due to its extreme weight, between five and six hundred pounds, the team had to request a tow truck to lift the round into the EOD vehicle for movement to nearby Fort Lee. While the operation was in progress, and at the suggestion of the EOD team, the area was cordoned off by the police to keep bystanders and traffic at least five hundred meters from the area while this effort was in progress, another worker reported that a similar round had been found in the nearby canal. The team from the 147th informed city officials that in order to effectively search for additional rounds in the canal, it would have to be drained. Arrangements were made to return the following day. Research, once back at Fort Lee, revealed that the round was a high explosive lO-inch seacoast projectile (MK 4) with a MK 5 base detonating fuze. It was then attacked by two shape charges and found to be empty. The search of the canal, conducted on 1 June, revealed no additional projectiles. How it came to be at that location remains a mystery.


A similar event involving the 40th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) occurred in Gulfport, Mississippi, on 26 June 1977. The detachment received a call from the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division of the Internal Revenue Service stating that a shrimp boat captain had recovered what appeared to be a projectile while fishing. The 40th responded, but while enroute to an alerted Coast Guard vessel, the latter was diverted to another mission. The detachment then resorted to boarding the yacht of the mayor-elect of Gulfport to finish the journey to the shrimp boat. Upon boarding the vessel, the EOD team was shown an 81mm mortar high explosive round. The round was returned to Camp Shelby for disposal. Extremist groups, ostensibly in preparation of fielding a para-military force, obtain and often store substantial quantities of munitions. Often the difficulty in disposing of these caches is compounded by the diversity of the equipment amassed and often by its instability through prior handling or obsolesence. On 6 December 1976 law officers of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office discovered a cache of approximately eight tons of ammunition, explosives, and military equipment in Antelope Valley, a barren and unpopulated area some twenty-five miles from Lancaster, the nearest major town. Further investigation revealed additional caches in a home in Ontario and a foundry in Pomona.3 Realizing that such a quantity, with more being discovered, posed a handling and disposal problem, the ATF and 70th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) were called for assistance. Preliminary investigation of the caches, capable of "equipping a 200-man company," revealed that the individual sites constituting each cache were protected by an extensive and sophisticated network of landmines.4 In all, three sites were uncovered which yielded nine to twelve tons of explosives and hardware. 3"Military Hardware is Found in Apparent Nazi Stockpile", Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 11 Dec 76; and "Paramilitary Uni t May Be Linked to Arms Caches", Los Angeles Times, 11 Dec 76. 4"Two More Arsenals Unearthed in the Desert", San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, 12 Dec 76, p. A-4.


Included in the hardware were German, Japanese, Russian, and United States machine guns, submachine guns, anti-tank weapons, mortars, and a varied assortment of rifles, shotguns, and pistols. One of the last caches even yielded a World War II vintage "half-track." Explosives, munitions, and other supplies were likewise turned up in quantity. Explosives, including dynamite (a lot of it badly deteriorated), ammonium nitrate, picric acid, detonating cord, C-4 (an explosive compound), primers, MK-2 grenades, and assorted chemicals in excess of ten tons were destroyed. Stored was an extensive quantity of smoke pots and grenades, signal flares, grenade fuzes, small arms ammunition, and a myriad of other items including training devices, protective masks, and detector kits. At the final tally, the total yield of the caches was thought to be the largest discovered in the United States. The vast assortment of propaganda, mostly hate literature, revealed potential danger of such equipment in the wrong hands. Halfway across the nation, in New Baltimore, Hichigan, the Detroit Office of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms received a report of suspected arms cache in a local apartment. The unnerving aspect of the arms cache was that it was reportedly booby-trapped. They then contacted the 75th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) for assistance. The EOD team provided by the detachment gingerly entered the two-bedroom apartment where an extensive array of munitions and other military equipment was stacked. In places the stacks of ammunition, ordnance, and equipment were stacked four feet high. Still wary of explosive antiintrusion devices, the EOD team moved the items to the door where the ATF and FBI waited. There the items were tagged, cataloged, inventoried, and removed. Among the munitions were found 60mm mortar rounds, 90mm recoilless rifle rounds, smoke and fragmentation grenades, and small arms ammunition. Explosive and detonation devices such as C4, fuse lighters, blasting caps and a blasting macnin~ were also recovered. Among the items of equipment found were mortar tubes, rifles, shotguns, and pistols. All were successfully recovered without an incident.



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Another unit, the 14th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), Fort Devens, was called in in the wake of a bizarre extortion plot. Unfortunately a misunderstanding between federal and local officials resulted in some adverse publicity about their involvement. Equally unfortunate was the fact that the EOD personnel participating were forced, by circumstance, to bear the brunt of the misunderstanding. A family owning a chain of food markets and liquor stores in the Boston area had been the target of an extortionist who threatened the family with some undisclosed bad publicity regarding their retail operations. Likewise, he had reinforced this threat by mailing several "bombs" to the family which resulted in at least one injury to a family member.5 ~fuen the family representative, following a complicated set of directions provided by the extortionist, attempted to leave a $10,000 payoff, a bomb was discovered at the drop site. Two postal inspectors who were involved in an attempt to catch the culprit, summoned the 14th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) for assistance. The bomb was discovered beneath a bridge on the Massachusets Turnpike. When the EOD team arrived at the site, they discovered a message affixed to the bomb container, "There is enough controlled explosives in here to blow off the back of your car."5 Recognizing that the bomb could be radio detonated and the ever present possibility of its detonation, the EOD team of five members proceeded to disarm it. The first step, of course, was to gain entry to the container which was locked. While in the process of setting a .50 calibre explosive device to rupture the container, the Massachusets State Police arrived and accused them of endangering passing motorists (the alternative, attempted "blind" evacuation could have injured far more people). The device's container was ruptured by the well-placed charge and the bomb defuzed.


Drop Under the Pike",

The Boston Globe,

1 Mar 77, p.



Newspaper accounts, however, misrepresented the procedure and stated that the bomb had been partially detonated: The detonation (the .50 calibre round) destroyed the bomb, separating it into Sainto (a Massachusets State policeman) was making its third attempt to destroy Trooper Brown stopped and began asking Postal Inspector, Irvin Peterson, inspectors, later acted as an official cident in its proper perspective: only partially three pieces ••• said the Army team the bomb when questions.6

who was one of the postal spokesman and put the in-

The military experts (14th Ordnance Detachment (EOD» put a .50 calibre cartridge next to the lock on the box, and, using an electronic device, exploded it, opening the box. The bomb inside was not destroyed. It did not explode. It is now in the hands of the Massachusets Police.7 Characteristically the EOD personnel remained non-committal taking solace only in the fact that they had successfully accomplished their assigned task -- unappreciated as it was. Not all situations in which EOD detachments find themselves are related to explosive ordnance disposal. Their in-depth knowledge of explosives and munitions at times places their skills in demand as demolition experts. These tasks can take the form of actually supporting an activity by the use of demolitions or advising other agencies on the degree of potential danger involved with explosives although they may not be required to participate in explosive removal. In December 1976, the Argo Merchant, a large oil tanker, ran aground in the Cape Cod -Nantucket Island area. Its ruptured hull began leaking oil which rapidly formed into a major oil slick threatening the coastal area off Massachusets. The Coast Guard, in appraising the magnitude of the slick and its danger, called for Army support in reducing the spill. 6"Bizarre Extortion Globe, p , 34. 7"$10,000 p. 4. Drop Under Plot Leads the Pike", to Turnpike Bomb", The Boston 1 Mar 77,

The Boston Globe,


The initial proposal involved the use of Tullnex 500 (super hydrophobic fumed silica). Initial experiments by the 14th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) involving this compound mixed with kerosene ignited by smokeless powder and time fuse proved unsatisfactory. Another test conducted on 24 December using a thermite grenade proved successful. It was determined that the latter method would be used to attack the oil slick and helicopter pilots and government officials were briefed and prepared for the mission.

At 1215 on 27 December an oil slick encompassing some 14,250 square feet was sighted 90 miles east-south-east of Otis Air Force Base between Faulworth and Hartha's Vineyard. The incendiary devices were loaded aboard helicopters and then, once on target, dropped from the helicopter door from a height of approximately fifteen feet. Box 1 ignited after two-and-a-half minutes; Box 2 was smothered by a wave, and boxes 3 and 4 were successfully ignited. Following the drop of Box 4, flames erupted from the vicinity of Boxes 1 and 3. The fire grew in intensity and soon the area was a mass of leaping flames. The fire produced a dense cloud of black smoke some eighty feet high. The cloud was observed as far as twenty miles away. The flames lasted for fifteen minutes, then died. Two days later the 14th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) was released from further committment due to the dimunativeness of the remaining oil slicks. Again, on 30 January 1977, the detachment was called upon by the Coast Guard to eradicate an oil slick discovered in Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts. On the following day, ten incendiary devices similar to the ones used previously were employed. The oil slick began burning and burned for approximately ninety minutes. The Coast Guard estimated that one-to-two thousand gallons of oil were consumed by the fire.


Military aircraft often are carrying explosive ordnance when they crash. Such ordnance presents a real threat to recovery operations. Even unarmed military aircraft often have explosive ejection devices which can also pose a threat to resource and recovery operations. Normally Army participation ends with the arrival of Navy or Air Force investigative teams who, of course, exercise proponency over the recovery of their own aircraft. Several instances serve to illustrate this form of support. On 11 October 1976, the 17th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was notified that a Navy F-4 (Phantom) had crashed on take off and their assistance was requested in recovering the wreckage. Both crew members had activated the jet's ejection mechanism, but were killed in the mishap. Still, the EOD team was able to recover five MK-13 illuminating flares and three impulse cartridges. Still later, the Navy investigation team requested that the EOD team destroy some classified components recovered from the wreckage. The 61st Ordnance Detachment (EOD), Fort Sill, Oklahoma, responded to a request for assistance on 22 December 1976 from the Shepherd Air Force Base. An F-I05D had crashed while bearing some ordnance. Two teams responded, one by helicopter and one by vehicle. Both teams recovered the impulse cartridges from the auxiliary fuel tanks and bomb dispensers and fifty-eight rounds of 20mm ammunition from the M-61 weapons (gun) system. The Disaster Control Group at Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base, Kansas, requested that the 74th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) , Fort Riley, Kansas, assist in recovering parts from a crashed B-57 bomber. On 5 April 1977 an EOD team was flown by helicopter to the crash site and assisted in the recovery of four electric squibs, one catapult, one hot gas generator, six cartridge actuated items, and three engine starters.


A similar event occurred near Nicklesville, Georgia, on 5 June 1977 when an F-IQ5 from Warner Robbins Air Force Base crashed. The 89th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) , Fort Benning, Georgia, was summoned to assist an Air Force recovery team which had been dispatched to the crash. The services of this unit were of signal assistance, in that, some one thousand rounds of 20mm ammunition, an ammunition drum, and an initiator were recovered from the wreckage. The civilian community, casionally faced with similar airplanes carrying dangerous quire the same attentiveness particularly common carriers, is ocproblems. Vehicles, trains, and cargo are subject to mishaps and rethat military mishaps do.

A freight train traveling near Rockingham, North Carolina on 31 March 1977 suffered an accident where twenty-nine rail cars had derailed and caught fire. The North Carolina State Highway Patrol and the Seaboard Coast Railroad Company simultaneously requested EOD assistance from the nearest military installation -Fort Bragg. The 18th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) responded to the call and arrived at the accident by helicopter a short time later. On arrival visual surveillance of the site was restricted by smoke from the burning wreckage. On landing, the EOD team learned that the situation was compounded by four cylinders of uranium hexafloride located someplace amid the wreckage. Each cyiinder contained 4,040 gallons. Picking its way through the initial confusion of the on-site officials, the EOD team began searching for the missing containers. A short time later the two cylinders were found at the base of the railroad embankment. Each produced an acceptable reading of 1.5 m/r and 200 and 150cpm, respectively, when checked by the unit AN/POR-27 and AN/POR 60. A third cylinder, located a short distance away, when checked, produced a reading of 1.5 m/r and 1500 cpm -- almost ten times the reading of the others! Due to the high alpha count, an unseen container leak was suspected. The fourth container was located amidst the burning wreckage, but efforts to monitor that cylinder, for the moment, proved futile. Burning wood, truck tires, and ammonium nitrate kept the flames from being easily extinguished. Dry chemical extinguishers proved insufficient to subdue the flames.







At this juncture on-site communications emerged as a difficulty in expediting recovery. A shuttle service was initiated whereby members of the EOD team would move to a local airport to use a commercial telephone. Based on the severity of the enterprise, the 48th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), Fort Jackson, South Carolina, was alerted to dispatch a backup team to the train wreck. Along with the additional EOD personnel there arrived teams from the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), Oak Ridge, Tennessee. These teams included a health physicist, chemical engineer, information officer, and photographer. The chemical engineer, upon being queried regarding the high alpha reading of the third container, replied that possibly the high reading could be attributed to residue from the loading operation. He further stated that a highly pungent odor would accompany a real leak and that, if a leak were present, the uranium hexafluoride itself would form a leak sealing crust when exposed to air. While preliminary investigation was underway, additional representatives arrived from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and ERDA facilities at Savanna, Illinois. Later, once the ERDA officials were present and cognizant of the situation, the EOD teams began to disengage from the incident. Twelve hours after the initial call, the EOD teams had returned to their home stations. A potentially dangerous situation had been avoided by the timely reaction and cooperation of representatives from several government agencies. The layered command structure, however, inadvertantly injected some operational hurdles in the path of success. The information that the accident involved radioactive materials generated high level interest in the incident, which in this particular instance, reached Department of the Army. This interest also manifests itself in the demand for first hand information and immediate response to its queries. The impetus behind the need is often so great as it was in Rockingham, that the individual in charge at the site becomes so preoccupied with the requests for information, that the mission itself suffers.


In this instance the EOD commander quickly realized that he was unable to supervise the task at hand and provide the technical assistance required. He therefore requested the assistance of the Nuclear Accident Incident Control Officer (NAICO) and a Public Affairs (PAO) representative from Fort Bragg. FORSCOM, the responsible headquarters approved this request and the designated personnel were placed on alert. With the arrival of representatives from the other agencies and the improved control at the accident site, the additional personnel were not dispatched. Another difficulty which re-surfaced during this incident illustrated the paucity and inadequacy of communications in a remote area. The delay generated by the need to "shuttle" information, exasperated those headquarters attempting to monitor operation. Had a more timely means of relaying information been available, much of the uneasiness of the headquarters would have been allayed and normal command channels would have continued to function. Lastly, it has almost become an axiom of EOD operations that in the majority of major incidents, the EOD teams find themselves in charge of the operation. Whether this situation occurs by default or design, it matters not. The- rapid response capability probably contributes to this situation by making EOD the first "experts" on the scene. Initially confusion prevails amid the sudden concentration of local, or occasionally national, agencies -- all of whom have some vested interest in what is transpiring. To avoid damaging confusion, someone must be in charge. Frequently, until the situation is understood, this responsibility temporarily falls upon EOD. After the situation calms down somewhat, the civil command structure usually emerges and EOD can assume a "behind-the-scenes" role. All EOD detachments should prepare their personnel for this possibility -- no -eventuality.


Recognition of these practices prompted an intensive review of EOO's role in civil incidents. This review analyzed the procedures used in responding to requests for assistance. Likewise the review sought to analyze the sources, both civil and military, of qualified organizations and the capabilities and limitations. The incident at Rockingham was used as the primary illustration. The 547th Ordnance Detachment (EOOCC), Fort Gillem, Georgia, met with a representative from the Hazardous Materials Division of the National Transportation Safety Board on 19 April 1977. The representative obtained the 547th Ordnance Detachment's after action report and recommendations on how to commit qualified Army personnel to such a call. As of this time, no major accommodation has evolved. A similar incident, occurring in February 1977, illustrated the effectiveness of a closely coordinated civil/military response to an incident involving the illegal use of explosives. The 64th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, was requested by the FBI to assist in a kidnapping incident. A kidnapper, fortified in an Indianapolis apartment, was being held at bay by the Indianapolis police, which included a Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT) and bomb squad. The kidnapper stated that he had wired all entrances to a "bomb". Any attempt to force an entry would detonate the explosives. The SWAT team was able to discern wires and magnetic switches affixed to the entrances, but could not observe any explosives. When the EOO team arrived on 9 February, the kidnapper's brother, who was acting as an intermediary between the police and the kidnapper, stated that his brother was annoyed at hearing a radio broadcast that an "Army bomb squad" was attempting to enter the apartment. Recognizing the possible effect on an already volatile situation, the police obtained an official retraction from the radio station which stated, over the air, that the news item was without foundation. The EOD team, meanwhile, had requested, at the behest of the FBI an Air Force explosive detector dog team from nearby Grissom Air Force Base. After receiving official approval, two handlers and a dog were dispatched to the operation.


On the following day, 10 February, the kidnapper left the apartment, but it was suspected the bomb had been left intact and, therefore, still posed a threat. The EOD team and the dog team reconnoitered the apartment. The wires, nylon wires, and switches were connected to an incendiary device which could have been activated had an effort at forced entry, including breaking glass window panes. The incendiary device was made of gasoline. While the more spectacular missions involved incidents where someone intentionally misuses explosives, many of the EOD missions involved the unintentional misuse or illegal possession of explosives. The explosives involved range from unstable or deteriorated blasting materials to war souvenirs collected over a number of years under a variety of circumstances. The 61st Ordnance Detachment (EOD), Fort Sill, Oklahoma, was alerted to an incident involving fifteen gallons of nitroglycerin stored in Holliday, Texas. A former oil field worker had stored the explosive in a cellar in the 1940's just previous to his death. Just prior to the death of his widow, the old building had been caved in and additional fill dirt placed on top of it. A relative, fearful that subsequent construction might ignite the explosive, informed city officials that the nitroglycerin might have been left in the cellar. After the arrival of the EOD team, efforts were begun to clear the hole. An explosive sniffing dog had indicated there were explosives in the vicinity of the caved-in shed. In an effort to expedite the excavation, and unknown to the on-site officials, a backhoe was dispatched to the area and began digging. After a hasty recovery to the initial shock, the operator was informed of the nature of the task and cautioned to dig more carefully.8

8"150 Evacuated at Holliday," Wichita Falls Record News, 7 Apr 77; and "Sill Team Digging Out Nitro Cached in Holliday, Tex.," Lawton Morning Press, 8 Apr 77.


By late afternoon, 8 April, it appeared that no explosives had been buried but it was determined that a final search was necessary to ascertain this fact. Accordingly, on 9 April, excavation operations were resumed. The former cellar was dug out and searched from wall to wall. Included was an area beneath the steps descending to the cellar. By midday it was determined that no explosives had been stored in the cellar. Although a approach to the munity. No one been attempted, construction in false alarm of sorts, the careful and methodical operation did much to allay the fears of the comreally knew and had only a cursory exploration it could have spelled disaster during subsequent the area.

A similar incident occurred in July near Glennallen, Alaska. The Glennallen Resource Area, Bureau of Land Management (ELM) discovered approximately 10,000 pounds of decaying dynamite in a dilapidated cabin. The 176th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) , Fort Richardson, responded to a call for assistance from the ELM. Rather than risk moving the unstable explosive, the Detachment detonated the find on-site destroying the cabin in the process. The explosion left a crater 100 feet in diameter and 4 feet deep. Another incident involving deteriorating dynamite resulted in near miss for the 48th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) , Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Some ancient dynamite was discovered stored in an old barn near St. Matthews, South Carolina in an exuded and crystaline state and reported to the ATF. The ATF, in turn, contacted the 48th Ordnance for assistance. The EOD team found some 150 sticks of 40% DuPont ditching dynamite which had to be destroyed. The dynamite was carefully placed in plastic bags containing a desensitizing mixture of alcohol and acetone. The bags were sealed and placed in a 1-1/4 ton truck sandbagged for it~ sensitive cargo and readied for movement to a land fill seven miles away.


Approximately a quarter of a mile away, the driver noticed that a fire had started around the dynamite. The team members continued to the landfill, selected a deserted area, and attempted to douse the flames using carbon dioxide and dry chemical fire extinguishers. They were unsuccessful. They then evacuated the area and, with ATF assistance cordoned the area and requested civil assistance. They permitted the fire to burn, and two hours later, were able to resume operations. The fire destroyed the dynamite, but in the process, it also destroyed the vehicle and its mounted radio. The team, displaying consumate intrepidity and coolness, followed accepted procedures thus minimizing the potential danger to nearby civilian establishments. They had selected the nearest site available for the explosive's destruction; functional fire extinguishers were available for use; escorts we re present; and evacuation and notification procedures were followed. The "lessons learned" from this incident fully illustrate the necessity for following established procedures.


Support to Other Agencies General. Explosive ordnance disposal support to other agencies~ in many instances~ is a routine occurrence. EOD support to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Alcohol~ Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau (ATF) and local law enforcement agencies account for many of the non-service related missions assigned the EOD detachments. Conversely, some missions necessitate other agency's support of FORSCOM requirements. Interservice Cooperation.

Explosive ordnance detachments of other services often possess unique talents which place their skills in demand in certain situations. The other services have also shown a willingness to support FORSCOM when called upon. The Navy, for example, has a diving capability not possessed by the Army. Therefore, this skill, coupled with their EOD skills, has placed them in demand in certain situations. One such situation occurred in August 1977. Children playing about the shores of Eagle Lake, Michigan, on the Fort Custer Recreational Area discovered two Stokes mortars which had washed up on the shore. An EOD detachment, duly notified, investigated the area for additional rounds. Several additional rounds were discovered in the shallow waters just off-shore. It was further revealed by the park security agency that civilian divers had reported additional rounds in the thirty-five foot depths of the lake. The Army then called upon a Navy EOD diving team based in Crane, Indiana for support. The Navy, in conducting an underwater sweep, discovered twenty-one rounds in the lake. These additional Stokes mortars were subsequently removed by the Navy and disposed of jointly by the two on-site teams.




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Occasionally when Army EOD units are overcommitted or find a task too vast for them, they are compelled to seek additional assistance from other services. When faced with the requirement to clear a range at Fort Bragg, the 547th Ordnance Detachment (EODCC), found itself shorthanded due to personnel shortages. To ensure the mission was successfully accomplished in the time available, a Marine Corps EOD team from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, was requested to assist. The 547th Ordnance Detachment (EODCC) coordinated the effort. The marines responded with a seven-man team and the joint effort permitted a timely and successful completion of the project. Reserve Component Support.

FORSCOM routinely is tasked to provide evaluators to United States Army Reserve (USAR) and National Guard (ANG) units undergoing the annual two-week active duty training tour. Heretofore, FORSCOM had tasked only those individuals with skills comparable to those of the evaluated reserve component units to fulfill the evaluator requirement. Since there are no reserve component EOD detachments, FORSCOM EOD personnel were exempted from this task. As an experiment, FORSCOM directed four EOD detachment commanders to perform evaluator duty with reserve component ammunition units during the latter's annual training. The officers selected had either attended the Ordnance Advance Course or were scheduled to attend on completion of their EOD tour. The reason of assigning them to this duty was twofold. The officers would, of course, fulfill the evaluation requirement. But of equal importance, the officers would become aquainted with conventional ammunition operations and the exposure to these operations would broaden their professional prospectives. The participating officers felt, with sufficient notice so they could study on their own, that they could effectively fulfill the evaluation requirement. Likewise, it was determined that the officer had to be committed solely to the evaluator task -- he could not be expected to concurrently fulfill his EOD support mission.


As noted previously, there are no reserve component EOD detachments; therefore, any EOD support provided RC training has to come from Active Army sources. The magnitude of this support continues to grow. During FY 77 some 30,000 man-hours were dedicated to the RC training program by FORSCOM EOD detachments. Where possible, the EOD detachment on the training installation provided the required support. But because the location where much of the training was conducted was on state military installations, two and three-man detachments were sent to support the training. Some of these outlying areas were Camps Ripley, Grayling, Atterbury, Roberts, and Blanding; Forts McCoy, Irwin, and Chaffee; and Puerto Rico. The EOD support provided the Reserve and National yet another illustration of the "Total Force" concept. VIP Support. The U.S. Secret Service requires a significant amount of EOD support. The support provided runs the gamut of protecting foreign diplomats and missions to support of the President of the United States. The Presidential Campaign of 1976 placed a heavy demand on EOD assets. The end of the campaign and election of President Carter significantly reduced the number of missions dedicated to the national government. Yet, during FY 77, EOD detachments still provided 174,981 manhours to executive and diplomatic protection. Major undertakings which contributed to this high number of man-hours were the Presidential Inauguration, signing of the Panama Canal Treaty; and the United Nations' Thirty-second Anniversary.9 Guard is

9A complete after action report on the 1976 Presidential Campaign was developed and distributed to the major agencies concerned. Resolution of the problems encountered during the Campaign is being addressed and will be implemented prior to the Presidential Campaign of 1980.


Support ~

the Environmental




In March 1977, Louisville, Kentucky, officials discovered that a highly toxic chemical, hexachlorocyclopentadiene ,(hereafter referred to as "hexa ") was present in significant quantities in the Louisville city sewer system. Seventeen workers, supposedly exposed to the chemical, had become ill. All suffered from the same symptoms -- stomach and breathing disorders and skin rashes. The matter was subsequently reported to the EPA. The sewer system was shut down because there was no way to filter the substance from the sewage prior to its discharge into the Ohio River.lO Although no explosives or military chemicals were involved, a team from the 43rd Ordnance Detachment (EOn) was dispatched to assist. The Army protective clothing and equipment used by Eon personnel was superior to any then in use in the civilian sector. Consequently Eon personnel wearing the M-17 protective mask and M-3 Toxilogical Agent Protective (TAP) suit were introduced, at predetermined points, into the sewer system to obtain samples of the contaminated sewer sludge. The effort was directed and coordinated by civilian agencies. City officials who at first were to accompany the Eon personnel, subsequently were found unable to work for extended periods in the unfamiliar garb. The Eon effort in this instance materially contributed to the success of the removal and neutralization of the highly toxic "hera". Although an unusual task, Eon responded to the call with typical elan and professionalism.

lOThe Courier-Journal,


p. A-I.


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Training General. Training can be catagorized into three loosely defined categories. First is the emphasis on EOD training which, for the most part, is insular and applicable solely to EOD. Secondly is the training provided other segments of the military and civilian community. Such training ranges from warnings about explosive materials to training assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies. Lastly is the training support provided by EOD elements to large or medium scale field training exercises. Hhile it is recognized that the latter category is operational in nature, it is also recognized that EOD activities are, to some degree, included within the mainstream of the exercise. EOD Training. In August 1977, A composite team of the 548th Ordnance Detachment (EODCC) participated in an Energy Research and Development Administration (EDRA) sponsored exercise held at Idaho Falls, Idaho. The priricipal objective of the exercise was to evaluate the capabilities of ERDA's Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). Of greater import to the EOD participants was the opportunity afforded by the test to examine the interface among other elements most likely to be called upon to respond to a suspected improvised nuclear device (IND). The other agencies most likely to be called to search for an IND were the FBI and ERDA. Prior to the exercise, in June 1977, a Department of Defense program board concluded that FORSCOM's nuclear weapons disposal support detachments should be the EOD element to respond should an IND be confirmed. To ensure adequate expertise on the part of these units, the program board also directed the Naval EOD school to develop a special training program for individuals assigned to these detachments.



Once 'an IND was located, FORSCOW s EOD support team mission was three-fold. First, the team was to prevent a full scale nuclear detonation of the device. Secondly, clear and neutralize any area denial booby traps surrounding the device. Lastly, di":; sarm or diable the device. The exercise was well planned and conducted. The EOD team participating found the exercise to be realistic and challenging. Much of the information gleaned from the post exercise reports have been provided to the Navy EOD School for inclusion in the special training program being conducted in support of the program. NEST 77 exercise was timely and addressed a growing concern about a possible new terroristic tactic -- the improvised nuclear device. Past actions by terrorists of all ilks, and aspiring extortionists have proven them capable of employing such a device should they develop the capability. Growing public concern, manifested by extensive media coverage, has increased the awareness of all agencies of our society1s vulnerability. This threat poses a new and challenging dimension to EOD operations. Although a new dimension has been added, EOD cannot forget its more basic responsibilities. And like units of all kinds, EOD units periodically must undergo unit and individual proficiency tests. The maintenance of a viable training program poses a real challenge to EOD unit commanders. The training h<:is to be interesting, informative, beneficial, and useful. Furthermore, it must be dovetailed with real world operations and commitments. Nuclear and conventional munitions training continued throughout the fiscal year. A great deal of emphasis was placed on nuclear training. Facilities at Picatinny Arsenal, the Naval EOD School, and USAMMC&S were used to improve Army EOD proficiency. Likewise the EOD control centers have made local arrangements with installation nuclear weapons support sections (NWSS) to use their facilities for training. The facilities and expertise at Sandia Laboratory were also extensively used by FORSCOM EOD detachments.


The success of the training program is supported by statistics compiled during the fiscal year. All seven of the EOD detachments tested successfully completed the nuclear surety inspection. Thirty-one of the thirty-three detachments successfully completed their operational readiness training tests (ORTT). Continued success in training programs and training tests will assure the continued maintenance of the high degree of readiness posture enjoyed by FORSCOM detachments. Some of the training was a departure from normal EOD related training, but nevertheless sharpened the physical and mental skills of the participants. The 57th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) . of Fort Belvoir, Virginia, spent a week in July learning mountaineering techniques. The detachment learned appropriate basics such as knot tying, rigging, and proper use of equipment. They then went to Great Falls, Maryland where they put these techniques to good use by climbing, "beloying", and rappelling .11 EOD personnel also have not neglected other academic pursuits. Military correspondence courses, degree programs, and other forms of academic endeavor have been diligently pursued (See Chart 5). These efforts do much to round out the individual and, in some cases, place him in an environment where he may influence a segment of the population not frequently encountered in the normal course of a duty day. EOD as Instructors. EOD has been compelled to react to situations as opposed to controlling them. This has been especially true in the civilian sector when civilians-, unfamiliar with explosives or military ordnance experiment with such devices when they are found. Although the threat to life and limb is unintentional, the threat remains and is often as dangerous as the intentional threat. Military ordnance dating back to the American Civil War is often handled, transferred, and abused with as little regard as are less dangerous artifacts. Likewise more recent war souvenirs are often mishandled with disastrous results. Many injuries could have been avoided had just reasonable care been exercised. lIThe Castle, 3 Aug 77, Ft Belvoir, p. 6.



NO. ENROLLED IN DEGREE OFF 542D 543D 546TH 547TH 548TH 549TH TOTAL* 6 2 3 3 2 1 17 ENL 19 15 16 21 41 23



3 4 4 4 19

*Chart does not account for personnel enrolled in two programs, e.g., military correspondence and degree program. Chart 5


Headlines in local ~ewspapers attest to the lethality of much of this ordnance. The Fayetteville (NC) Times had emblazoned across its headlines, "Teen Hurt as Bomb Explodes," and the very next day "I Dud I Shell Explodes -- Hurts Two Youths. ,. In Tacoma, Washington, The News Tribune announced, "Grenade Mangles Fingers of Girl, 11." And so it goes -- issue after issue, locality after locality. Many of the incidents occurred near large military installations and involved children. Therefore a concentrated effort was initiated to inform possible souvenir hunters of the dangers of unexploded or "dud" ordnance. Feature stories in post newspapers, largely initiated by local EOD detachments, warned of these dangers. Features with captivating lead-ins appeared such as, "Bang!: Explosive Items Are Killers, Let Us Take The Chance," and, "Duds: A Quick Way To Die," were published in hopes that it might stop the dangerous collection of duds.12 Unfortunately, the warnings, more often than not, are relegated to back pages. Public media were likewise aware of the dangers, but were reluctant to feature warnings unless they were published in the wake of a mishap. An article entitled "Army Begins Explosive Program" was buried on page 3-A of the Alexandria, Virginia Gazette. Other approaches such as feature articles on women members of EOD served to get the message to the general public. Although such efforts are a beginning, continued efforts are necessary to keep this danger in the general public's mind without disasters being needed to remind them.

12Soundoff, 4 Nov 77, Ft Meade, 77, Ft Leonard Wood, p. 9.

p. 3; and The Guidon,

25 Aug


Safety bulletins, posters, and classes or lectures have been employed to illustrate the dangers. The effect of such efforts are difficult to quantify, but there are indicators of success. One detachment, for example, was called upon to dispose of what turned out to be a shot-put. Nevertheless, it was illustrative that the publication of "dud" mishaps and the public education effort had borne fruit. (Static displays at public gatherings such as shopping malls, gun shows, and similar locations can do much to keep these dangers in the public eye -- and hopefully reduce the number of tragic mishaps.) Public contact in the form of classes presented to school age children, those most likely to be injured, have likewise been a method to force public attention on the danger of "duds." The 55th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) conducted a seminar-type program to 4th, 5th, and 6th grade students at Evans Mills Grade School, New York. The avowed purpose of the presentation, as stated by a member of the presentation team, was "We want to scare them,,13 The program was later expanded to other schools in the immediate area. The 94th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) conducted a similar program in the Fountain Mesa, Colorado area. The people of EOD, more than anyone else, recognize that they cannot unilaterally change public opinion regarding explosive war souvenirs. Public media and the San Antonio Police Department bomb squad and the 546th Ordnance Detachment (EODCC) conducted a concentrated drive to dispose of these souvenirs which range from 1861 to 1974, a span of well over a hundred years. The police, in an effort to overcome the souvenirs holder's fear of legal prosecution, stated "We're not interested in prosecution ••• (we) just want to check them (to see) if they are safely (un)loaded." This effort illustrates a close working relationship between the civilian and military units. And, from the civilian side, did much to allay fears of prosecution -- one obstacle in dealing with unauthorized explosives within the public domain.

13Fort Drum Sentinel,

12 May 77, p. 3.


'i. •
Poster warning troops about "dud" munitions.


Explosive Ordnance Disposal units and their civilian counterparts also cooperated in other areas. The 14th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) of Fort Devens, Massachusetts, demonstrated the effects of makeshift and military explosives for the Massachusetts State Policy Academy. The stated purpose of the demonstration was not" ••• to make experts of the students, but just show them what they may run into one day."14 Hembers of the 149th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), Aberdeen Proving Ground, in the course of a bomb recognition seminar, exploded "two strips of plastic explosive, about enough to fill one business envelope" in the top drawe r of a metal desk. The desk was disintegrated before the eyes of eighty onlookers from civilian law enforcement agencies, industry, and military organizations. The demonstration proved to be a "resounding success.,,15 All efforts oriented toward instilling in the general public an appreciation of the dangers of "duds" may do much to ferret out these potential killers and place them in knowledgeable hands. Explosives in the hands of a novice are just as dangerous as an automobile or firearm in the same hands. All efforts, whether they be through the media or public contact can do much to keep these dangers in the public eye -- and hopefully reduce the number of tragic mishaps. Exercises. Frequently exercises are conducted over active or former firing ranges. Normally, local arrangements for EOD support are made when an EODdetachment is colocated with the maneuver unit on an installation. Longer exercises, often employing troop elements from other installations, sometimes create difficulties of a greater magnitude. Also, a lack of understanding by the maneuver units of EOD's mission, capabilities, and limitations compound the normal problems of coordination.

14The Dispatch,

Ft Devens,

p. 4. Del., P. 4.

15Evening Journal,

26 Aug 77, Wilmington,


The United States Readiness Command (REDCOM) sponsored exercise JTX BRAVE SHIELD XVI conducted at 29 Palms, California, illustrates, to some degree, EOD's difficulties in supporting such an exercise. Although the basic EOD mission remained unchanged, it was a valuable learning exercise in operating with maneuver units in a medium scale exercise. Due to prior commitments of the 49th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) it was unable to participate.16 The 548th Ordnance Detachment (EODCC), therefore, organized a provisional EOD detachment of thirteen people from six EOD detachments. The provisional detachment had the capability of fielding six two-man teams for deployment anywhere within the maneuver area which encompassed several active firing ranges. The United States Marine Corps, expected to provide an equal number of teams, never provided more than two. The provisional EOO detachment also provided its own internal logistic support in the form of transportation and mission essential equipment. Due to the necessity for supporting two divisional elements, the 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions, the provisional detachment was assigned to the 43d Support Group in a neutral status. Safety briefings, later to pay dividends, were conducted for approximately 10,000 participants or 95% of all Army units participating. The detachment later performed a "sweep" of the maneuv~r area to uncover as much unexploded ordnance as possible thereby minimizing delay and interruption of the exercise due to troop discovery of unexploded ordnance. In the course of the exercise, over 350 live items, ranging from 1,000 pound bombs to 60mm mortar rounds, were located and destroyed. Approximately 5,000 additional items were investigated and found to be harmless. Al though considered necessary to the safe conduct of the exercise, the EOO detachment was neither troop listed nor reflected under the task organization of the other participants. Had it not been for the preliminary briefing, this omission could have inhibited the detachment's operations and resulted in serious personal injury to some of the participants.

16Unless otherwise stated, the following is based on the 548th Ordnance Detachment (EODCC) after action report on BRAVE SHIELD XVI, 23 Aug 77 (Unclassified).


In a field training exercise conducted over rugged terrain like that at 29 Palms, the MI51 vehicle with trailer outperformed the less ruggedly constructed M88G series of vehicles. This mobility differential which the Army enjoyed over the Marine Corps enhanced the former's effectiveness and responsiveness. One major lesson learned was that the selected EOD detachment should "participate" in the exercise thereby gaining a better Lde a of what it would encounter in a real-world environment where it would have to operate with maneuver units. Likewise, it could seize upon the opportunity to "show the flag" and inform the maneuver units how it operated.




A carefully mixed system of communications equipment has greatly expanded and enhanced the flexibility of EOD operations while concurrently retaining the readiness posture of the detachments. Both military and commercial communications equipment are in use. The military communications equipment enables the units to net with other military organizations possessing the same family of communications. The commercial versions, on the other hand, facilitate intra-detachment operations at a lesser cost than the military version would cost. The commercial systems also, to some degree, provide a system compatible with civilian agencies. For the most part, through careful planning and budgeting, these items have been received on a timely basis. Transportation. Operations conducted in field locations have revealed that the M880 series of vehicle are somewhat fragile and unreliable for extended field operations. An exchange system was initiated in 1976 whereby the N880 series was to replace current tactical vehicles. To date this exchange program has been all but accomplished. The major difficulty appears to lay in excessive tire failures. EIR's have been submitted to define the problem thereby hopefully accelerating a solution. The tactical vehicles, in order to achieve greater compatibility with the EOD mission, will have enclosed shells for greater safety and security.


Commercial vehicles continue in use by EOD detachments and will be used for quite some time to come. Careful monitoring of vehicle mileage, age, and availability have enabled the FORSCOM Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG) to program timely replacements. The branch of DCSLOG controlling the commercial vehicle program has responded admirably to EOD vehicle requirements. EOD Peculiar Equipment.

There has long been a need for an expeditious but safe method of clearing dud rounds from an impact area. The most obvious long-term solution is greater ordnance reliability, but a need exists now for clearing former ranges and currently used ones. A "rock picker," developed by the Navy and currently still under development, possesses great potential for use in sandy or non-compacted soils. It was to have been used at Fort Blanding to search for 40mm grenade rounds. Also, at this time, FORSCOM has requested use of a new ordnance locator having a capability to locate sub-surface ordnance to a depth of five feet. Hopefully, it should be available for testing during FY 78. After some delay, the MK 32 "Golden" X-ray has appeared in the field. Timely production and procurement of the machine have been impeded by a myriad of difficulties. But two accepted machines were finally distributed in late FY 77. More are expected as soon as the production line is "geared up" and hopefully will satisfy a dire need for confirming an improvised explosive device (lED). Aquisition of these MK 32's should significantly enhance EOD elements in conducting their assessments. The rise in criminal use of explosives and their inherent lack of reliability and myriad of form have prompted greater industrial interest in EOD equipment and personnel protective devices. Unfortunately, the so-called state-of-the-art has not been as responsive as we would like. Perhaps it is significant that the British, who have had extensive EOD experience in Ireland, have made the greater achievements in the commerical arena.


All major countries in the free-world have been plagued to a greater or lesser degree by terrorists and the United States is no exception. Coupled with improved techniques of detection and disposal is greater sophistication of the explosives themselves. The International Defense Review, international catalog of military equipment, has addressed the progress made in EOD operations. Included are sophisticated methods of removing ordnance, such as a Hunter robot; detecting it, and protective equipment for those who must handle it.17

17"Bombs and Bomb Beaters", 9, Oct 76, pp. 817-823.


Defense Review,






Observations. Fiscal Year 1977 has been a highly successful and productive year for the FORSCOM explosive ordnance disposal program. The demands have been great and the hours long and arduous, but all EOD personnel have been equal to the task. Whether examined individually or collectively, the results clearly illustrate that timely and responsive support have been the rule. But, as in any team effort, there are those who provide the support for those actually performing the mission in the field. Staff sections within Headquarters, Forces Command have served behind the scenes, without fanfare, to resolve problems and be responsive to the needs voiced in the field. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER) has taken prompt and positive action to reduce personnel shortages and continues to monitor the problem. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller (DCSCOMPT), has fully supported efforts to obtain the funds necessary to sustain the EOD program. They likewise have displayed equal enthusiasm in providing assistance on budgetary and other fiscal matters. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG) has resolved numerous supply and maintenance problems. The Administrative Transportation Management Branch has exerted laudatory efforts to maintain the transportation capability of the detachments. The Inspector General has not only conducted inspections of the units themselves, but has also visited units to insure they were being adequately supported. The desire and ability of the entire FORSCON staff to help the EOD field detachments merits full recognition. It is anticipated that this support will continue unabated during the coming fiscal year.


Women In EOD. Women in explosive ordnance disposal became a reality several years ago and have become fully accepted members of the fraternity. At the end of FY 77, there were ten women assigned to FORSCOM detachments -- five officers and five enlisted. They have been readily absorbed into the units and have proven themselves dedicated and technically proficient. They continue to increase in number and, judging by those currently in EOD, will be fully expected to perform any and all tasks. Indeed, they have shown they will accept nothing less. Influence of FORSCOM.

FORSCOM controls nearly eighty percent of the Active Army EOD detachments and in excess of sixty percent of the personnel assets. FORSCON's role, therefore, is a dominant one in determining the direction the EOD program will take. But, as in any other major headquarters, its true strength is in the field. This position of influence, therefore, is felt and assumed at all levels and is accepted by all echelons.


FY 78 OBJECTIVES On 23 August 1977, FORSCON provided guidance and direction to subordinate EOD control centers on the major objectives for FY 78. These objectives were quantified where possible to measure success or failure. While several objectives only restated commonly accepted missions or tasks, their inclusion as FY 78 objectives reinforced and assured their continuing prominence in the FORSCOH EOD program. These FY 7S objectives are: 1. The number of in-service EOD volunteers accepted for training and assignment will be increased by a minimum of 10% over the FY 77 number in each EODCC. This will be accomplished without any sacrifice of quality. Each EODCC will establish a system to track volunteers from acceptance; processing of applications; receipt of school quota; attendance at Phase I and II; and ultimate assignment to an EOD unit position. Another adjunct to this monitoring system is proper orientation and preparation of volunteers for training and assignment in EOD. 2. Each EODCC should achieve a 10% increase in support to Reserve Components. This includes support to National Guard, Reserve and ROTC elements. Support to annual and weekend training and assistance to the ROTC program is a vital element of the "total force." 3. Timely response to requests for assistance is essential to the EOD program. Proper reporting and documentation of these responses are vital extensions to the actual assistance rendered. 4. Personal and professional educational development of each officer and enlisted member of FORSCOM EOD is a necessity. Military and civilian educational pursuits should be fully encouraged. Assistance to enlisted personnel in undertaking and satisfactorily completing the skill qualification (SQT) is an additional command responsibility.


5. Unit training and testing programs are continuing requirements. Such programs must not only be challenging. demanding and informative but. above all. must be realistic. Innovation and use of local training opportunities should be encouraged and exploited. The so-called "adventure" training. while not specifically job related, can be effective in building soldierly qualities and can break up the monotony of technical training. 6. Each commander should wisely. efficiently. and realistically employ the resources available to him. The judicious and prudent use of personnel, money and materiel is inherent in command. All the above objectives can be summed up by one word readiness. All FORSCOM EOD detachments must be capable of performing their day-to-day training and operational tasks as well as their contingency missions. Individual and unit training, status of personnel and equipment. results of inspections and adequacy of facilities all combine to reflect a ready detachment. An effort was made to summarize these objectives into a slogan that would give meaning to their accomplishment. Such a slogan would have to typify the outstanding accomplishments of the past and provide the motivation and commitment to the future. The slogan selected for the FORSCOM EOD program and a fitting reminder in closing is: "PRIDE IN PROFESSIONAL PERFOfu'1ANCE"





The EOD Activity and Status Report (DA Form 4149-R) is a tool used by each detachment to document its mission activities. This report illustrates the workload, current personnel status, equipment shortages and significant problem areas. Also, each activity requiring receiving EOD support reflects the number of manhours expended by EOD personnel. This appendix recapitulates those major mission activities performed by the FORSCOM EOD detachments during FY 77.


FY 77

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL MISSION ACTIVITIES 1st Qt 115 65 180 13828 1600 1992 1060 3052 203365 19199 Total 6397 376 1016 71747 7262

I Incidents I

On Post Off Post Total Miles Traveled II Manhours Standby & Spt Missions Chemical Standb It Manhours HE Standby II Manhours Nuclear Standby II Manhours Secret Service Support II Missions II Manhours Other VIP Spt tlMissions IIManhours Bomb Threat Spt If Manhours Classes Conducted Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance flClasses IITrained tlManhours Improvised Explosive Device flClasses tlTrained ilManhours

2 2 79 78 7865 1 383 76 9 403 27 3713


352 127

40 36 724 166 17501 4 697 299

130 33 2919 1 124 54

1105 267 30003 15 1293 632

3 107 67

4 1887 140

81 2737 1767

64 2616 1058

22 831 407

2 64 59

3 94 91

4 937 100

24 789 587

11 331 310


RECAPITULATION FY 77 EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL MISSION ACTIVITIES 1st Qt Basic Demolitio IIClasses {{Trained f!Manhours Explosive Safet I{Classes IITrained flManhours Bomb Threats IIClasses ItTrained I!Manhours EOD Recruiting Program It Interviewed IIAccepted IIManhours Public Demonstrations II Given IIAttending IIManhours Public Display~ IIGiven II At tending IIManhours Improvised Explosive Device Recovered lIOn Post IIOff Post 17 598 263 79 3219 775 89 2750 1144 Total 8 250 247 45 5364 406 37 1622 636

20 13 5 516 32 61 226 117



228 91 743

76 32q 2451


20 6142 380 2 540 16

5 13351 94



5952 100










I Range

Clearanc~ fiConducted tlManhours

1 1061

4lJ 57 454lJ 10150

138 1750

Reserve Component Support fiMissions IIManhours



IlJ 118 507 12396

62 17217


3037 lJ



The disc horizontally divided blue, white, and red is suggested by the shoulder sleeve insignia, U.S. Anny Forces Command. The eagle, which is a symbol of freedom, refers to part of the Comnand's motto and is also the national emblem. The sword, a symbol of proteclfon and guardianship, alludes to the motto, and depicted unsheathed with point up denotes readiness for combat. The three swords signify Reserve. the three components of the Army: Active Anny, Anny National Guard, and Army


The shoulder patch is a disc 2112 inches in diameter consisting of three horizontal stripes of equal width of blue, White, and red, the blue uppermost. This blue, white, and red shoulder insignia was personally selected in World War I by General John J. Pershing for wear by all personnel assigned to General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces. The source of the design is said to have been the red, white, and blue horizontally striped brassard worn as a distinguishing mark by staff officers when moving about on duty in congested areas at the front in World War I. In 1941, the brassard prescribed for General Headquarters, AEF consisted of three stripes of blue, white, and red, the blue uppermost. Therefore, the shoulder sleeve inSignia was authOfized to be worn with the blue uppermost to conform to manner of weanng the brassard.

Army Ft McPherson Ga 858/78



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