___________________________________________ ) LAKHDAR BOUMEDIENE, et al. ) Petitioners, ) ) Civil Action No. 04-cv-1166(RJL) v. ) ) GEORGE WALKER BUSH, et al. ) Respondents.

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DECLARATION OF WOLFGANG PETRITSCH I, Wolfgang Petritsch, hereby declare: 1. My name is Wolfgang Petritsch. I am over 18 years old and could testify to the facts as stated herein if called upon to do so. I have not received any compensation or benefit of any kind for providing this declaration. 2. I am a citizen of Austria. I currently serve as Austrias Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, a position I have held since March 8, 2008. 3. I previously served as Austrian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (19971999). While serving as Ambassador to Yugoslavia, I also acted as the European Unions Special Envoy for Kosovo and as the European Unions Chief Negotiator at the Kosovo peace talks in Rambouillet and Paris. Between August 1999 and May 2002, I served as the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following my tenure as High Representative, I was Austrias Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva (2002-2008). 4. The facts described in this declaration unfolded while I was High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. I learned of them through my own observation and through daily direct consultations and interactions with senior Bosnian, U.S., and European officials. Structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina Government 5. The government of the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, usually referred to as the Dayton Peace Agreement, which was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. The Dayton Peace Agreement was the peace settlement that ended the brutal civil war that devastated the former Yugoslavia, and especially Bosnia, between 1992 and 1995. The United States took the lead in convening the Dayton peace talks and in brokering the final peace agreement. 6. Under the Dayton Peace Agreement, an international coalition of 55 governments, including the United States, established the Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR). The OHR was established to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina and its constituent peoples successfully implemented the peace agreement. As High Representative, I was charged with monitoring the implementation of the peace settlement; promoting full compliance with all civilian aspects of the agreement; and coordinating the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement.

7. The High Representative was and remains the top international civilian official in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As High Representative, I had significant authority over civilian institutions and bodies in Bosnia. I was authorized to remove from office any Bosnian public official who violated the legal commitments of the Dayton Peace Agreement. I was also empowered to impose laws as necessary if Bosnia and Herzegovinas legislative bodies failed to do so. My mandate covered virtually all areas of civilian administration, including economic issues and political institutions. 8. As High Representative, I regularly consulted with and was consulted by Bosnian officials and members of the international community, including senior U.S. and European officials, regarding matters bearing on the governance and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. 9. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, established at the same time as the Dayton Peace Agreement, recognizes two Entities within Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (often abbreviated Federation or FBiH) and the Serb Republic or Republika Srpska (often abbreviated RS). Each Entity has its own government. The Constitution also established a national government, often referred to as the State government, which sits in the national capital, Sarajevo. 10. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina occupies much of the Central and Western territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and has its capital at Sarajevo. The Republika Srpska occupies the Northern and Eastern territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and has its capital at Banja Luka. Although the population of both Entities is mixed, the Federation is primarily inhabited by Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Bosnian Croats, while the Republika Srpska is primarily inhabited by Bosnian Serbs. 11. The Entities possess primary authority in their respective territories in many areas, including law enforcement. The national State government possesses primary authority over foreign affairs. 12. During my tenure as High Representative between 1999 and 2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to be highly dependent on external assistance and support from the international community, including the United States. In addition, the central State government was relatively weak, as it was quite new, lacked ministers in many key positions, and was the object of suspicion by both of the Entities. One of my tasks was to encourage local ownership, namely motivating Bosnian officials to take responsibility for addressing and solving Bosnian problems. Events of October 2001 to January 2002 13. Following the brutal attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bosnian Government was under tremendous pressure to comply with United States demands in connection with concerns over potential acts of terrorism in Bosnia. 14. In October 2001, I learned that the Federation Police had arrested and were holding six men on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack. The six men were Belkacem Bensayah, Hadj Boudella, Lakhdar Boumediene, Mustafa Ait Idir, Mohamed Nechla, and Saber Lahmar. 15. Public media reports were unclear as to the precise nature of the suspected plot, although most allegations appeared to center around an alleged plot to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo. Around that time, the U.S. and U.K. Embassies were evacuated, as was the OHR. 16. I later learned that the Federation Police did not base the arrests on any evidence in their actual possession. Rather, they acted based on statements from the U.S. Embassy that the U.S.

government possessed evidence incriminating the six men. Federation Prime Minister Alija Behmen informed me that he was personally pressured by U.S. Embassy officials to order the mens arrest, notwithstanding a lack of actual evidence of wrongdoing. 17. Following their arrest, the six menwho were given the label Algerian Six, since all were originally from Algeriawere held in detention while the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted an investigation into their activities. 18. Bosnian authorities sought information from INTERPOL and also from the NATO Stabilization Force stationed in Bosnia (SFOR). The Supreme Court sought specific information from the U.S. Embassy to substantiate the charges against the six men. Senior Bosnian officials repeatedly informed me that the United States did not provide any evidence to the Court. 19. On January 17, 2002, the Federation Supreme Court, with the concurrence of the Federation Prosecutor, ordered the six men released due to lack of evidence of wrongdoing. 20. On the same day, at the request of counsel for four of the six men, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a domestic court established under the Dayton Agreement and staffed by Bosnian and European jurists, issued a decision on preliminary measures forbidding the State and Federation authorities from expelling the men from Bosnia. 21. Instead of being released, the six men were handed over to U.S. troops stationed in Bosnia as part of SFOR. Although it was not clear at the time what the SFOR troops did with the six men, I later learned that they were transported by the United States to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, where I understand they remain to this day. 22. I subsequently asked U.S. General John Sylvester, the commander of SFOR troops in Bosnia, to explain his official involvement in the affair. General Sylvester told me that his involvement occurred while he wore his U.S. hat as a U.S. general, as opposed to his NATO hat as a commander of SFOR troops. He refused to explain the basis for SFORs actions in taking custody of the men and transporting them to Guantanamo. General Sylvesters explanation was particularly unsatisfactory given that Bosnian institutionswhich I as High Representative and he as SFOR commander were mandated to support and upholdhad ordered the men released due to lack of evidence. 23. Shortly after the SFOR troops removed the men from Bosnia, senior Bosnian officials including State Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Zlatko Lagumdija and Federation Prime Minister Alija Behmentold me that the United States had placed extreme pressure on the Bosnian Government in connection with the arrest and handover of the six men. 24. As Messrs. Lagumdija and Behmen (and others) explained to me, the United States had threatened to withdraw all of its support from the Bosnian peace process if the six men were not arrested and, following their release by the Federation Supreme Court, handed over to the United States. Both Messrs. Lagumdija and Behmen expressed to me that, as Bosnian leaders, they had no option other than to comply with the U.S. demands, even if it meant violating Bosnian law and court orders. 25. The United States threat to withdraw from the Bosnian peace process, if carried out, would have endangered the entire peace process in Bosnia. Without U.S. support, the Bosnian Government would have lost significant legitimacy in the eyes of the Bosnian people, and the removal of U.S. personnel from SFOR would have imperiled SFORs ability to maintain order.

26. It is my considered opinion that, had the United States carried out its threat in late 2001 or early 2002, the international state building efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina would have been seriously jeopardized with likely renewed civil strife as a consequence. The Bosnian officials in power clearly recognized the enormous risk posed by the U.S. threat for their country. 27. It is my understanding that the Bosnian decisions to arrest the six men and, subsequently, to hand them over to the United States, were made solely as a capitulation to the U.S. threat of withdrawing from Bosnia. To my knowledge, the United States never provided any evidence that could have justified the arrest of the six men or their removal from Bosnia.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on September _____, 2008.

____________________________________ Wolfgang Petritsch