A. Intro a. §1983: i.

³Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer¶s judicial capacity«´ ii. §1983 came after this initial wave of federal civil rights legislation, and was designed to open up the federal cts by giving litigants a direct federal cause of action against those who, acting ³under color of´ law, deprived them of their constitutional rights iii. Unlike the statutes that preceded it, it gave private litigats a federal court remedy of first resort, rather than a remedy that would be available only in default of or after state process b. Before there can be an action for 1983, there needs to be UNDER COLOR OF LAW--; any const violation---14tham, you nee STATE AXN; 31 supp c. State of Mind and §1983; i. 1983 has no independent ³state of mind´ requirement of its own, apart from the underlying constitutional (or statutory) duty that is being enforced 1. FOR EX: proving a violation of the equal protection clause of 14tham requires a showing of discriminatory intent 2. 4tam: reasonableness 3. 8tham: deliberate indifference B. ³Under Color of´ State Law a. TYPICALLY, liability will attach if: i. The defendant has acted ³under color of´ state law; and ii. The defendant¶s action deprived the plt of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constiution b. Monroe v. Pape p 32-42 i. Facts: 13 chicago police officers broke into petitioners home and among other things, made them stand naked in living room while they ransacked every room«officers had no search warrant or arrest warrant ii. Issues: 1. Does §1983 provide a private right of action under federal law? YES 2. Does §1983 exclude acts of an official or police officer who can show no authority under SL? NO 3. Can police officers as individuals be liable under §1983? YES 4. Municipalities? NO iii. Holding: Congress in enacting §1983 meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official¶s abuse of his position

1. Monroe¶s §1983 remedy is ³supplemental´ to any remedy he might have under SL 2. Police officer¶s axn was axn ³under color of´ law within meaning of §1983, even if what they did also violated SL iv. Monroe means that state offiers act under color of law whenever they are carrying out tasks they ordinarily perform, as well as when their actions are ³rendered possible or efficiently aided by the state authority´ lodged in them v. The SC in Monroe concluded that a party injured by the unconstitutional action of police officers could sue the officers for damages in federal ct under §1983 c. Note p. 48-52 d. Badge Effect e. Private Actors as Public Actors i. One traditional way in which private actors can engage in state action is by acting in concert w/state or local officials 1. SC has held that a private physican who treated inmates in a state prison engaged in state action and action under color of law when he acted w/deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates ii. Symbiotic relationships iii. Public functions: has to be a function that the government traditionally and exclusively presumes 1. Best example is private prisons iv. Conspiracy: if private individuals join w/officials, private indivds act under color of state law²and no immunity for them

C. ³Rights«Secured by the Constitution´
a. Search, Seizure and Excessive Force²4tham
i. 4tham STANDARD: 1. Objective inquiry: whether the officer¶s action was ³reasonable´ when judged by an objective standard in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case and confronted by the officer 2. Risk to the officer 3. What a reasonable officer would do 4. You don¶t have to use most reasonable force, just force that is reasonable ii. Safford Unified Sch. Fist v. Redding, handout 1. Facts: Redding, an eighth grader, was strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip by another student that Ms. Redding might have ibuprofen on her person in violation of school policy 2. Issue: a. Does the 4tham prohibit school officials from strip searching students suspected of possessing drugs in violation of school policy? Sometimes/fact dependent

b. Are school officials individually liable for damages in a lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C Section 1983? No 3. Holding: The Supreme Court held that Savanna's Fourth

Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers. the Court reiterated that, based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used by school officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Here, school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of Savanna to her underwear. The Court also held that the implicated school administrators were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment." It reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right.
a. **BS²agree w/dissent²how could you not know?? b. Yes²violation²BUT²have qualified immunity iii. Graham v. Connor, handout 1. Facts: Petitioner Graham, a diabetic, asked his friend, Berry, to drive him to a convenience store to purchase orange juice to counteract the onset of an insulin reaction. Upon entering the store and seeing the number of people ahead of him, Graham hurried out and asked Berry to drive him to a friend's house instead. Respondent Connor, a city police officer, became suspicious after seeing Graham hastily enter and leave the store, followed Berry's car, and made an investigative stop, ordering the pair to wait while he found out what had happened in the store. 2. Holding: The Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" inquiry is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in a particular situation. 3. Eighth Amendment standard applies only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. 4. "All claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force deadly or not - in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard.

a. courts must identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force and then judge the claim by reference to the

The deliberate indifference standard in 8th am failure to protect cases is a subjective standard²even though the inquiry of whether the risk of harm was sufficiently serious is objective a. b. Sexual assault case by officer 2.. which guarantees citizens the right 'to be secure in their. against unreasonable seizures. STANDRAD: cruel and unusual punishment²³deliberate indifference´ ii.8tham i. Objective (punishment has to be serious) 4.. Subjective (intent of officer/ ³meanness´/intent to cause harm) 3. investigatory stop. Ct held that he acted reasonably² v. without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Cook v. City of Bella Villa.' and must be judged by reference to the Fourth Amendment's 'reasonableness' standard. NOTES: 1. or other 'seizure' of a free citizen are most properly characterized as invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment. A lot of the speeding and ³plt maneuver´ cases and person for ex. Just to note: also requirement special/unique to prison cases that may affect the remedies of procedure in prisoners¶ litigation 2. You don¶t have to use MOST reasonable application or use of force²just needs to be reasonable b.. Becomes a quadripalegic²ct says that this is NOT excessive force 2.specific constitutional standard which governs that right. not just state actors." iv. (b) Claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force in the course of an arrest. Needs to be an objective deprivation of human need²serious need . It has also been read to impose an affirmative duty on the giovt to provide for the ³serious´ medical needs on inmates and other necessities iii. c. The 8tham has been held to impose affirmative duties on government to protect incarcerated persons from the violence of other parties. The test applied by the courts below is incompatible with a proper Fourth Amendment analysis. (c) The Fourth Amendment 'reasonableness' inquiry is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.. Cruel and Unusual Punishment. handout 1. Officer will not be liable for prisoner-prisoner violence unless the officer disregarded a serious risk of which he was ACTUALLY aware²farmer case b.

Facts: While detained at the Hocking Correctional Facility in Nelsonville. Filing an action under Bivens v. Narcotics Agents. Ohio. Small bits of deprivation can add up b. and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 2. and alleged that respondents had acted with "deliberate indifference" to petitioner's safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment because they knew that the penitentiary had a violent environment and a history of . Six Unknown Fed. the prison officials had to exhibit intentional cruelty. Wilson v. Gamble to establish that cruel and unusual punishment required the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.C. 1983.S. Wilson sought financial awards and an injunction against the prison under 42 U. Sieter. Therefore the Court of Appeals should have considered this aspect of Wilson's grievances. The District Court ruled against Wilson. He filed suit in a federal district court against two state prison officials. Petitioner claims to have been beaten and raped by another inmate after being transferred by respondent federal prison officials from a correctional institute to a penitentiary--typically a higher security facility with more troublesome prisoners--and placed in its general population. Issue: Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit err by holding that prison officials must have a "culpable state of mind" in order to establish cruel and unusual punishment of an inmate? Did the Court of Appeals err by overlooking an inmate's claim that prison officials showed "deliberate indifference" to his conditions of confinement? 3. sometimes in the general prison population but more often in segregation.S. warmth. One single human need include²food. Petitioner. handout 1. Pearly Wilson claimed he experienced cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." For this to occur. "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's conditions also constituted abusive treatment according to this standard." However. The Court referred to its earlier decisions in Francis v. Brennan. it has to be a risk that the officer actually knows about iv. 4. Holding: No and Yes. a preoperative transsexual who projects feminine characteristics. petitioner sought damages and an injunction barring future confinement in any penitentiary. 388. Richard P. has been incarcerated with other males in the federal prison system.a. Seiter and Carl Humphreys. handout 1. hygiene 5. 403 U. It held that Wilson had to show that the prison officials had a "culpable state of mind" when inflicting harm upon him. which would result in a "culpable state of mind. v. Farmer v. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Resweber and Estelle v.

inmate assaults and that petitioner would be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack. it is the equivalent of acting recklessly. is the appropriate test for "deliberate indifference. and medical care. It does not matter whether the risk camefrom a particular source or whether a prisoner faced the risk for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation faced the risk. Seiter. shelter. this does not establish the level of culpability deliberate indifference entails." not "conditions. and the official has acted with "deliberate indifference" to inmate health or safety. e. nor require a prisoner to suffer physical injury before . b." Permitting a finding of recklessness only when a person has disregarded a risk of harm of which he was aware is a familiar and workable standard that is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as interpreted in this Court's cases.. (b) Deliberate indifference entials something more than negligence. (c) Subjective recklessness. at 299. while no cause for commendation. and a factfinder may conclude that the official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that it was obvious. (d) The subjective test does not permit liability to be premised on obviousness or constructive notice. and it is no accident that the Court has repeatedly said that the Eighth Amendment has a "subjective component. cannot be condemned as the infliction of punishment under the Court's cases. This Court's cases "mandate inquiry into a prison official's state of mind. 7 9. for the term recklessness is not self defining. Petitioner's invitation to adopt a purely objective test for determining liability--whether the risk is known or should have been known--is rejected. even if the harm ultimately was not averted." d. Thus. c. (a) Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to provide humane conditions of confinement. However. However. and can take subjective or objective forms. a constitutional violation occurs only where the deprivation alleged is. (e) Use of subjective test will not foreclose prospective injunctive relief." and the failure to alleviate a significant risk that an official should have perceived but did not. "sufficiently serious. But prison officials may not be held liable if they prove that they were unaware of even an obvious risk or if they responded reasonably to a known risk. 2. Nor may an official escape liability by showing that he knew of the risk but did not think that the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the prisoner who committed the act. However. Pp. clothing. this does not mean that prison officials will be free to ignore obvious dangers to inmates. They must ensure that inmates receive adequate food. objectively. as used in the criminal law. and must protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Held: A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with "deliberate indifference" to inmate health or safety only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk ofserious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. but is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result. The Amendment outlaws cruel and unusual "punishments. a." Wilson v." id. Whether an official had the requisite knowledge is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways.

". Housing Corp. ex: employment. then no 14tham right i. S. A Court that finds the Eighth Amendment's objective and subjective requirements satisfied may grant appropriate injunctive relief. Sovereign: does it eminate from legislature/laws. Metro. proprietary interest a. Acting on behalf of itself and several minority members. (MHDC) contracted with the Village of Arlington Heights ("Arlington") to build racially integrated low. McKinney. is person asking permission to do something? i. Issue: Was Arlington Height's denial of a zoning request. Arlington's planning commission denied the request. difference between state being a participant and controlling the market iii. Discretionary v.14tham i. handout 1. govt owner of something 2. 509 U. zoning ii. and may compel a prisoner to pursue them. Just bc there is revenue. MHDC challenged Arlington's denial as racially discriminatory. deliberate indifference.to a multiple-family classification. Facts: The Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. STANDRAD: discriminatory intent. not just effect ii. License. though it should approach issuance of injunctions with the usual caution.obtaining prospective relief. does not mean its proprietary²could be a fee b." Helling v. 2. Soverign interest v. if acting as a market participant. the subjective factor.and moderate-income housing. if not a participant²more n more like soveren stating the rules ii.and moderate-income housing. . ___: their attitudes and conduct at the time suit is brought and persisting thereafter. Class of one²EP cases 1. In a suit for prospective relief. A court need not ignore a prisoner's failure to take advantage of adequate prison procedures to resolve inmate grievances. c. When MHDC applied for the necessary zoning permits. authorizing a switch from a single. necessary for the creation of low. as prison officials may rely on such developments to show that the prisoner is not entitled to an injunction. "should be determined in light of the prison authorities' current attitudes and conduct. In making the requisite showing of subjective culpability. the prisoner may rely on developments that postdate the pleadings and pretrial motions. Equal Protection. nondiscretionary iii. Arlington Heights v. The subjective test adopted today is consistent with the principle that "[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. 3. ___. Proprietary: look at market participant.

since it acted on behalf of black plaintiffs who stood to suffer direct and measurable injuries from Arlington's denial. and intentional interference with employment claims. Facts: Grace Olech asked the Village of Willowbrook to connect her property to the municipal water supply. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck those jury verdicts." 2. Although Engquist asserted numerous claims. Oregon Department of Agriculture. In a per curiam opinion. In reversing. claiming that the Village only required a 15-foot easement from other property owners seeking access to the water supply. Olech. the U. the evidence did not show that this was Arlington's deliberate intention. a woman of Indian descent. handout 1.On appeal. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly. "Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one. Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court had .S. substantive due process. After finding that MHDC had proper federal standing.racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? 3. a jury in the federal district court only found in her favor on her equal protection. The Village conditioned the connection on Olech's granting of a 33-foot easement. Holding: Perhaps. vi. the Court held that it failed to establish Arlington's racially discriminatory intent or purpose. Village of Willowbrook v.' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. brought this action against the Oregon Department of Agriculture alleging that a co-worker at the Department harassed her and eventually engineered her termination. the Court held that Olech's allegations were sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis. Issue: Does the Equal Protection Clause give rise to a cause of action on behalf of a "class of one" where the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group 3. the Court reversed and remanded for further consideration iv. Olech sued the Village claiming that the Village's demand of an additional 18-foot easement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Olech refused. Engquist v." v. the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff can allege an equal protection violation by asserting that state action was motivated solely by a "spiteful effort to 'get' him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective. Facts: Anup Engquist. Holding: Yes. While indicating that Arlington's zoning denial may result in a racially disproportionate impact. handout 1.

Roe v. TX. Village of Willowbrook v. The government enjoys significantly greater leeway in dealing with employees than it does with the public at large in its capacity as a regulator. involving a village resident suing the village for unjustified zoning decisions. two-page opinion to Engquist's claim. Wade. Olech. Life.14tham i. 2. Govt cannot take away a fundamental right w/out compelling interest Procedural 2. 3. With respect to nonfundamnetal rights the ct has suggested that it can only be protected by procedural due process clause Incentive to make claim one based on a fundamental right or a substantive due process claim²b/c that way. 562 (2000). Oregon would have qualified immunity and Engquist would necessarily lose. Liberty and Property 1. In seeking Court review. d. Complaints alleging violations of the Bill of Rights and most other non-due process provisions of the constitution are immediately actionable under 1983 w/out regard to state remedies Problematic when the liberty or property interests protected by the Due Process Clausae that plts seek to vindicate aren¶t fundamental rights a.previously dealt with such "class of one" equal protection claims eight years ago in a case.S. Make tort a substantive due process claim if its² outrageous or shocking!!! Substantive: Loving. while Oregon claimed that Olech should be construed narrowly so as to avoid a deluge of petty cases against the government. vii. it does not. 528 U. Lawrence v. Oregon also pointed out that even if the case were to be heard. Griswold a. Issue: Does the Court's ruling in Village of Willowbrook v. 5. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Olech opinion may only apply when the government is in the role of regulator and did not clarify whether it would also apply in an employment context such as this one. Deprivations of Liberty or Property. you have immediate access to 1983 a. Engquist noted the pervasive splits in the circuits regarding the proper allocation of the Court's decision in Olech. Olech. allow so-called "class of one" equal protection claims against government bodies in the context of employment discrimination? Holding: No. 4. . The Court ruled 6-3 that the "class-ofone" theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context. it refused to apply that short.

The central holding of Paul v. Paul v. family relationships. ³stigma plus´ i. procreation. Davis alleged that the distribution of the flyer had stigmatized him and deprived him of his constitutional rights. did not fall under the rubric of privacy rights. 2. The Court also emphasized that constitutional privacy interests did not cover Davis's claims. iii. need to show a liberty or property interest in order for procedural due process to be triggered ii. Facts: 4year old was beaten by his father and went into a coma requiring brain surgery and he suffered brain damage so severe that he would be in an instiution forever. Holding: the Court held that Davis had not been deprived of any constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause. what the state must do before taking something away b. the Louisville chief of police. who had been arrested on a shoplifting charge.a. Davis III. contraception. The Court argued that the constitutional right to privacy was limited to matters relating to "marriage. Davis p259-73 1. conclude that a state¶s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause . Kentucky area. and child rearing and education. in violation of his rights under 14tham. notice and opportunity to be heard c. The court¶s motivation for taking that position was clearly the desire to avoid making the 14tham a font for tort law a. by failing to intervene to protect him against a risk of violence at his father¶s hands which they knew or should have known 2. 4. such as arrests. Social services had been contacted previously about the incident and placed boy back with family²authorities refused coercive intervention. Facts: A flyer identifying "active shoplifters" was distributed to merchants in the Louisville. When the charge was dismissed." The publication of records of official acts. Holding: this is a cliam invoking a substantive due process claim. Issue: Did the distribution of the flyer violate Davis's right to privacy and liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. The flyer included a photograph of Edward C. Davis brought an action against Edgar Paul. stigma plus´ test requires that a plaintiff suing the government for a due process violation arising out of injury to reputation show an ³additional injury´ such as loss of employment or the foreclosure of future employment opportunities. Davis is that Davis has no cognizable ³liberty interest´ in his reputation. as a general matter. Winnebago County p277-81 1. DeShaney v. Mother brought a 1983 cliam. The complaint alleged that the respondents deprived Joshua of his liberty interest without due process of law.

Facts: plt was a prison inmate who ordered $23.´ P281 4. State created harm iv. Parratt v. He took the kids and she called police couple times asking for help. After Deshaney. Gonzales p281-5 1.50 worth of hobby materials. he was in segregation and was not permitted to recive them. the state is under no affirmative obligation to spend its resources to protect indivs from harm 5. In Deshaney. Castle Rock v. State is liable when the danger of an injury at private hands is ³state created. Issue: whether state post-deprivation process was sufficient to remedy the loss? . Taylor p287-90 1. Even if statute made enforcement mandatory. When they arrived. A well established tradition of police discretion has long co-existed with apparently mandatory arrest statutes« a. A duty to protect may arise out of certain special relationships created or assumed by the state w/respect to particular individuals 3. not sure that it arises to a property interest for purposes of due process clause v. Making the actions of government employees obligatory can serve various legitimate ends other than the conferral of benefit on a specific class of people b. Court went on to say that even if there was some sort of entitlement. **Absent a state-imposed. He claimed that they negligently deprived him of property without due process of law 2. When Taylor was released and packages were no where to be found. Govt is responsible when the injury occurs while the plt is in state custody or when the govt has a special relationship with the plt p281 b. or involuntary. Holding: the provisions of the law of the restraiing order don¶t make enforcement mandatory. Limits on Deshaney: a.a. custodial setting. the court declined to consuder the question of whether Wisconsin¶s child protection statutes had created a state law entitelemnet to protective services. The materials were therefore signed by two employees of the prison hobby center. he sued. there remain two theories for holding governments or public officials liable for not preventing tortuous acts by private parties: a. Facts: woman had a restraining order for husband to stay away from her and the kids. it does not mean that respondent had an entitlement to the enforcement. the denial of which would give rise to a PDP claim²cts decides issue in Gonzales 2. They refused²kids found dead²murdered by husband 3. Special relationship b.

3. liberty. If however. when an official¶s deprivation of such nonfundamental rights is not random and unauthorized. But. post-deprivation procedures adequate c. or property vii. during unannounced shakedown of prison and the intentional destruction of personal property. Parrat¶s reasoning only applies to non-fundamental rights only. and state court post-deprivation remedies are all that the constitution demands 8. Facts: prisoner in a city jail tripped over a pillow 2. ct held that even intentional deprivation of property would not violate the DPC when the state provided a meaningful postdeprivation procedure to make good of loss vi. but pursuant to some ³established state procedure´ or is otherwise systematic. then the Paratt requirement of resort to post-deprivation state remedies is said to be inapplicable Zinermon 7. it was impossible to predict the ³random and unauthorized´ behavior of the officials who had failed to follow established state procedures and who were responsible for the loss of the hobby kit. Palmer. The SC backtracked from one of its subsidiary conclusions in Parratt. Parrat involved a negligent deprivation²but same rule applies even for intentional deprivations 4. ³it is practical and feasible for the state to provide pre-deprivation process for the aggrieved party´ Moore v. In Hudson v. Distinguished from Monroe b. No pre-deprivation process would have been possible. then the deprivation becomes effectively random and unauthorized. Holding: court overruled the part of Parratt that presupposed that negligent actions could constitute official deprivations and said that ³the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life. Holding: Prisoner who was seeking a post deprivation hearing could not go forward w/him 1983 claim but must pursue his state remedies a. Board of educ. when it later held that the Due Process Clause was not violated by the merely negligent behavior of governmental officials 5. The deprivation in Monroe was a 4tham fundamental right** 6. Cannon p291 1. Davidson v. but that state officials merely failed somehow to follow it. Here²this is a PDP claim. By contrast. Daniels v. **Parrat¶s rationale is limited to cases of random and unauthorized actions. Extended reasoning in Daniels to deprivations of liberty too . Distinguishing it from Monroe²the deprivations at issue are different. the claim is that constitutionally required state deprivation was in place. Williams p290-1 1. When a deprivation is pursuant to established policy and is not random and unauthorized.

HOLDING: Respondent¶s complaint was sufficient to state a claim under Section:1983 for violation of his procedural due process rights. Parratt and Hudson come into play in special cases of the general Mathews v. administrators and staff (Petitioners). a predeprivation process was not impossible here. Third. The Florida statutes did not direct any facility staff to determine whether a person was competent to give consent.2. victim sent authorities a note. Facts: 2 boys on a motorcycle speeding and police chased them²boy was killed. considered in light of the private interests that coyuld be affected. Because Petitioners had state authority to deprive persons of liberty.S. Facts: Davidson sued state prison officials for failure to protect him from another inmate. County of Sacremento v. x. because an error will occur. According to Matthews v. Prior to assault. ³Rights«secured by the«laws´ . Burch p295-314 1. First.C. Pre-deprivation Procedural Due Process: pre-deprivaion process is appropriate only in ³extraordinary´ circumstances in which even postdepriation process will not adequately safeguard rights 1. alleging they deprived him of his liberty without due process of law by admitting him as a ³voluntary´ mental patient when he was incompetent to give informed consent to his admission 2. but they failed to take action. Dissent !* viii. SDP claim 1. Darrell Burch (Respondent) brought this action under 42 U. Parents filed 14tham substantive due process claim for a deprivation of life 2. the Constitution required them to concomitant duty to see that no deprivation occurred without adequate procedural protections. the deprivation of liberty was not unpredictable. Eldridge analysis where postdeprivation are all the process that is due. outweighs the govts interest in promoting the axn D. simply because they are the only remedies the State could be expected to provide. Ct rejected this claim on the authority of Daniels 3. Zinermon v. Second. Holding: proper standard here was ³whether the deputy had been guilty of an abuse of power which µshocks the conscience¶´ In the specific context of high speed chases. This case was not controlled by Parratt and Hudson for three basic reasons. in the admission process. it required an intent to harm the suspects ix. Eldridge: predeprivation notice and hearing available when the risk of an erroneous deprivation. if at all. Lewis p293-4. Section:1983 against 11 Florida State Hospital (FSH) physicians. Petitioners¶ conduct was not ³unauthorized´ because the statute delegated broad authority to them to effect the deprivation complained of here.

Not only are the Brooke Amendment and its legislative history devoid of any express indication that exclusive enforcement authority was vested in HUD. Plts claimed that pollution violated federal statutes ii. 1. they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under 1983´ d. and that private actions were anticipated. Neither are the remedial mechanisms provided by the statute sufficiently comprehensive and effective to raise a clear . Maine v. Benefits terminated for the 5 children that are not legally his.) statute creates enforceable rights in indivs ii. 331-32 i. SC held that there are already available remedies. Ct held that ³the remedia. Wright v.´ iii.) Congress did not include its own remedies to sub for 1983 b. Roanoke Redevelopment: 1. Nothing in the Housing Act or the Brooke Amendment evidences that Congress intended to preclude petitioners' § 1983 claim against respondent.a. but also both congressional and agency actions have indicated that enforcement authority is not centralized. A 1983 action will be unavailable to redress violations of federal statutes unless Congress has unambiguously created judicially enforceable rights. Issue: can you use §1983 to enforce a statute? YES iii. ³it is hard to believe that congress intended to preserve the §1983 right of action when it created so many specific statutory remedies. even if the underlying statute does create such rights. 2. Issue: whether the federal rent ceilig could be enforced by 1983 3. mechanisms provided are not sufficienly comprehensive and effective to raise a clear inference that congress intended to foreclose a 1983 COA«´ 5. 1983 provides a remedial cause of action unless the state ctor demonstrates by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement´ 4. In addition. Natl Sea Clammers p. §1983 COA permission slip c. 1983 will be unavailable to enforce it if the statute has its own enforcement mechanisms from which it can be inferred that Congress meant to displace the 1983 remedy i. Thiboutot p. Facts: man has 8 kids²gets benefits for children. ³when the remedial devices provided in a particular act are sufficiently comprehensive. but whom he is legally obligated to support. Statute states that they are not qualifying expenses under the statute. Facts: an org of commercial fisherman sued various govt authorities to stop the discharge of sewage and other pollutants into NY Harbor and the Hudson River. Plt claimed he was denied law secured by the state ii. 316-27 i. Holding: ³if there is a state deprivation of a µright¶ secured by a federal statute. Facts: low income tenants overbilled for utilities 2. NOTE: i.

Under section 602. just want dist ct to state which rights they are asserting²and complaint unclear f. The Court of Appeals affirmed.inference that Congress intended to foreclose a § 1983 cause of action for the enforcement of tenants' rights secured by federal law. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race." g. Facts: an attempt by 5 mothers to enforce Social Security Act provisions through §1983 pursuant to title IV-D. James Alexander. Sandoval argued that the English-only policy violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. Ordering the Department to accommodate nonEnglish speakers. e. 337i. or national origin? iii. Blessing v. color. Issue: Does Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provide a cause of action to enforce the Department of Justice's regulation forbidding federal financial assistance recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods that have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on race. 334-6 i. "Title VI itself directly reaches only instances of intentional discrimination. Alexander v." wrote Justice Scalia. Doe p338-40 i. Holding: No. Martha Sandoval brought a class action suit to enjoin the Department from administering state driver's license examinations only in English. plts claimed that the state systematic failures violated their federal rights under §1983 ii. SC reversed Ct App stating that indivs didn¶t have rights in title IVD²don¶t foreclose that some provisions of title IV-D give rise to individual rights. the Court held that there is no private right of action to enforce disparateimpact regulations promulgated under Title VI. Sandoval p. the Director of the Department. "[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under [section 602]. the Department of Justice issued a regulation forbidding funding recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods having the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on the prohibited grounds. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia. the District Court enjoined the policy. Facts: case concerned the FERPA which prohibits the federal funding of schools that permit the release of students¶ records w/out written consent iii. or national origin. In this case the SC sought to align the tests for determining when there is an implied right of action and when 1983 provides for an express remedy: ii. the Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department) is subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. color. Freestone p. Issue: May a student sue a private university for damages to enforce provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974? . unsuccessfully argued before both courts that Title VI did not provide a cause of action to enforce the regulation. ii. Gonzaga v. Facts: Because it is a recipient of federal financial assistance.

gave Mark Abrams a permit to construct an antenna on his property for amateur use. and they serve primarily to direct the Secretary of Education's distribution of public funds to educational institutions´ 1. The court said Congress intended for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act to include only remedies specifically found in that act. Court held that such an action is foreclosed because the relevant provisions of FERPA create no personal rights to enforce.´ not ³benefits´ or ³interests´ may be enforced under that section. "FERPA's nondisclosure provisions contain no rights-creating language. But even where a statute is phrased in such explicit rights-creating terms. Abrams applied and the city refused to give him the permit. Facts: Rancho Palos Verdes. focus. Holding:No. they have an aggregate. Abrams sought damages under a federal liability law that allowed people to sue for damages for federal rights violations.The district court agreed with Abrams and ordered the city to give Abrams the permit. not individual. Abrams p340 i. Abrams then sued in federal district court. which FERPA's confidentiality provisions did not contain. The Ninth Circuit . a city in California. In clearing things up the ct states: a. But when the city learned Abrams used the antenna for commercial purposes. Once the plt demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right. the city forced Abrams to stop until he got a commercial use permit. ** ³whether a statutory violation may be enforced through 1983 is a different inquiry than that involved in determining whether a private right of action can be implied from a particular statute´ c. The question of whether Congress«intended to create a private right of action is definitely answered in the negative where a statute by its terms grants no private right to any identifiable class.´ b. The Court reasoned that the creation of individual rights required clear and unambiguous terms. i. ³we now reject the notion that our case permit anything short of an unambiguous conferred right to support a cause of action brought under 1983«accordingly. the right is presumptively enforceable by 1983. a plt suing under an implied right of action still must show that the statute manifest an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy d.iv. only ³rights. But the court refused Abrams' request for damages under the separate federal liability law. the express purpose of which is to determine whether or not a statute confers rights on a particular class of persons h. But the initial inquiry²determining whether a statute confers any right at all²is no different from the initial inquiry in an implied right of action case. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. alleging the city violated his rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

2. ³Shall be liable´ a. tension between the Eleventh Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. which prohibits states from being sued by citizens.Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that because the act did not contain a "comprehensive remedial scheme. Facts: The state of Minnesota passed laws limiting what railroads could charge in that state. The federal court issued an injunction against Young enforcing the law. and establishing severe penalties. Issue: May people whose rights guaranteed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are violated seek remedies other than those allowed by the act? iii. The following day. Soverign Immunity i. Louisiana. Young filed suit to force the railroads to comply with the statute. and Young reiterated his 11thAmclaim-judge held Young in contempt of court. The Eleventh Amendment had recently been held in Hans v. 8-12 1. Issues: a. Conversely. The federal judge ordered Young to explain his actions. Could a federal court entertain a lawsuit seeking to enjoin a state official from carrying out state laws that were purportedly in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment? . The shareholders sued the railroads to prevent them from complying with the law. Congress could not have meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by the Telecommunications Act to co-exist with an alternative remedy. to prevent him from enforcing the law. 134 U. because the act provides its own judicial remedy. E. including fines and jail for violators. Young argued that the Eleventh Amendment. and also sued Edward T. Holding: No. Young. the Court held that Abrams could not enforce the limitations of the Telecommunications Act on local authorities through federal liability law. then the Attorney General of Minnesota. Ex Parte Young p. 1 (1890).S. meant that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from violating the due process rights of their citizens. to prohibit federal courts from hearing suits by citizens against their own states." Abrams could seek damages under other federal laws. ii. Some railroad company shareholders filed a suit asserting that the laws were unconstitutional as violating the DPC of the 14thAm as well as the Dormant Commerce Clause. Is statute unconstitutional? YES b.

if the order to restore the funds is in the form of an injunction requiring the state to stop its wrongful possession of those funds. Edelman v. Wanted payment retroactively from date of initial eligibility bc claims that officials failed to process AABD apps in timely fashion 2. The 11tham does not bar such suits b. the Supreme Court would have to examine whether a federal court can require a state to restore money wrongfully withheld from citizens by the state. Persons acting in a judicial capacity are accorded an absolute immunity from 1983 suits for damages for all of their judicial acts² no matter how erroneous or objectively unreasonable²at least if they are acting within their jurisdiction . The official is ³stripped¶ of any ³official or representative character´ if enforcement of SL violates the federal constitution. or Disabled Act. Blind. that citizens could seek injunctive relief against state officials to stop them from carrying out unconstitutional state policies. because of the sovereign immunity recognized in the Eleventh Amendment. US atty alleged to have secured jobs through payment.3. Holding: held that. the 1908 case of Ex parte Young had allowed an exception. 54-60 1. Melo p. a. 3. Jordan p12-20 1. Hafer v. b. Holding: allows suits in federal courts against officials acting on behalf of states of the union to proceed despite the State's sovereign immunity. Facts: during campaign. Issue: whether state officers may be held personally liable for damages under 1983 based upon actions taken in their official capacities 3. Official Immunity. when the State acted unconstitutionally. a federal court could not order a State to pay back funds unconstitutionally withheld from parties to whom they were due iii. Issues: a. even though official¶s conduct is still regarded as ³state action´ under the 14tham ii. Since the 1890 decision in Hans v. Won election and dismissed 18 EEs 2. Facts: class action to challenge the practices of certain Illinois officials in administering federal-state programs under the Aid to the Aged. the Eleventh Amendment had been held to recognize the sovereign immunity of states from suits by their citizens. Abrogation of Immunity p 52-4 iv. Holding: state officials sued in their individual capacities are ³persons´ within the meaning of 1983. However. Louisiana.Absolute i. In this case.

82-96 1. Facts: Petitioner. Daniel Bogan. voting for. a court of general jurisdiction under an Indiana statute. The acts at issue here were clearly legislative. the mother's attorney. and petitioner Circuit Judge approved the petition the same day in an ex parte proceeding without a hearing and without notice to the daughter or appointment of a guardian ad litem. Holding: The Indiana law vested in the Circuit Judge the power to entertain and act upon the petition for sterilization. immune from damages liability even if his approval of the petition was in error. when acting in an ³investigatory capacity´ they may assert only qualified immunity iv.S. unsuccessfully petitioned for state habeas corpus on the basis of respondent prosecuting attorney's revelation of newly discovered evidence. The operation was performed shortly thereafter. Facts: A mother filed a petition in an Indiana Circuit Court. vi. Scott-Harris p. alleging that the elimination of the city department in which ScottHarris was the sole employee was motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights. Marilyn Roderick.C. the Circuit Judge. but affirmed the judgments against Bogan and Roderick 2. and the hospital where it was performed. seeking damages for the alleged violation of her constitutional rights. 1983 against her mother. and others. Issue. Stump v. the doctors who performed or assisted in the sterilization. the city's mayor. for authority to have her "somewhat retarded" 15-year-old daughter (a respondent here) sterilized. Bogan and Roderick liable on the First Amendment claim. Bogan v. Prosecutors have quasi-judicial immunity. The jury found the city. therefore. About two years later she was married. Are actions by local officials introducing. state and regional legislators. Judges are absolutely immune. Facts: Janet Scott-Harris filed suit under 1983 against the city of Fall River. Imbler v. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act itself. 74-82 1. and charged that respondent had knowingly used false testimony and . Legislators and those who act in a lawmaking capacity are immune from damages and injuctive relief under 1983 for their legislative acts iii. rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. and he is. and her inability to become pregnant led her to discover that she had been sterilized. Massachusetts. and the ordinance itself bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation. and signing an ordinance outside the scope of legislative activities because of the motives of the government actors? 3. Holding: No. 2. Pachtman 96-100 1. As a result she and her husband (also a respondent here) filed suit in Federal District Court pursuant to 42 U. the vice president of the city counsel. the daughter having been told that she was to have her appendix removed.ii. Sparksman p. v. The First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city. Local legislators are entitled to the same absolute immunity from civil liability under Section 1983 for their legislative activities as are federal. convicted of murder.

and ultimately obtained his release. 2. as here. manufactured. may not be held liable for damages under § 1983 for the performance of . Section 1983 does not authorize a damages claim against private witnesses. Imbler v. and fabricated evidence did not fall within "a distinctly prosecutorial function" and thus the prosecutors were not immune to the claims. Iowa. 2. seeking damages for loss of liberty allegedly caused by unlawful prosecution. McGhee²handout 1. coerced. Similarly. 2. The district court found some defendants immune to certain claims. Pottawattamie County v. Petitioner thereafter filed a federal habeas corpus petition based on the same allegations. He then brought an action under § 1983. Briscoe v.governmental or otherwise -who were integral parts of the judicial process. Held: A state prosecuting attorney who. Harrington's convictions were reversed because the prosecutor at their trial improperly withheld evidence of an alternative suspect. § 1983 (1976 ed. The U. McGhee's and Mr.The Eighth Circuit held that the prosecutors were not immune from claims that they violated Mr. and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Mr. but the District Court held that respondent was immune from liability under § 1983. and the prosecutors and officers involved in their prosecution.C. In 2002. and Terry Harrington were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Iowa state court. Supp. LaHue p100-102 1. Pachtman.S. Issue: May a prosecutor be subject to civil prosecution when he allegedly violated the criminal defendants' substantial due process rights by fabricating evidence and then introducing it at trial against the defendants? viii. Held: Title 42 U. McGhee's and Mr. Ray. Harrington filed civil claims in an Iowa federal court against Pottawattamie County. Pierson v. V) does not authorize a convicted state defendant to assert a claim for damages against a police officer for giving perjured testimony at the defendant's criminal trial. Facts:In 1978. Mr. but denied immunity to other defendants on the other claims.suppressed material evidence at petitioner's trial. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that they were absolutely immune to civil prosecution. acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the State's case. The common law provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all persons -. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted interlocutory appeal on the question of whether the prosecutors were absolutely immune to civil prosecution.S. Subsequently. McGhee Jr. McGhee and Mr. is absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983 for alleged deprivations of the accused's constitutional rights. Curtis W.. judges. vii. The court reasoned that allegations that prosecutors obtained. and prosecutors. Harrington's due process rights.

Alternatively. Look to SC cases. willfully and wantonly´ caused an unnecessary deployment of the Ohio Natl Guard on Kent State campus²resulted in the death of plts decedents 2. Facts: defs are alleged to have ³intentionally. he may reasonably be viewed as acting like any witness sworn to tell the truth. Official Immunity²Qualified i. Reasonable grounds for the belief formed coupled with good-faith belief v. Issue: whether the district ct correctly dismissed civil damage actions brought under 1983 on the ground that they are barred by the 11th amendment a. When a police officer appears as a witness. in which event he may seek the benefit afforded to other governmental participants in the same proceeding. Rhodes p105-15 1. This²state and local officiers will be personally accountable in 1983 actions only when their unconstitutional acts violate ³clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable official would have known´ 1. recklessly. and cases in the circuit iv. Law enforcement and most other officials.their respective duties in judicial proceedings. Strickland p119-20 1. he may be regarded as an official performing a critical role in the judicial process. Nothing in § 1983's language suggests that a police officer witness belongs in a narrow. special category lacking protection against damages suits c. have qualified immunity if they can show that they acted in objective good faith²that a reasonable officer would not have known that their actions violated the constitution ii. the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all circumstances that reasonably appeared at the time of action a. Facts: two high school students sued school board members who expelled them for spiking punch served at a school event . Pelzer a. Acts of which the officer will have ³fair warning´²Hope v. Whether the officials have absolute immunity of qualified immunity 3. Wood v. This is an affirmative defense that must be pled by the officer in his answer to the complaint²crawford-el v. in which event he can make a strong claim to witness immunity. Scheuer v. Holding: the dismissal was inappropriate at this stage of the litigation²officials here have qualified immunity²in varying scope a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government. britton iii.

The home was actually the parents of the guy. Holding: there was a violation of a constitutional right. (3) presidential aides are entitled to application of qualified immunity standard that permits defeat of insubstantial claims without resort to trial. Holding: both²in specific context of school discipline. Issue: whether good faith is subjective or objective 3. Police arrived with the media and allowed the media in the home to take pics. Britton p152-66 d. ³Bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject govt officials either to the costs of trial or to to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. Facts: Fitzgerald was a notorious ³whistle-blower´ in the Dept of Defense. STANDARD FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY!!!!* 2.2. Wilson v. We therefore hold that govt officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or const rights of which a reasonable person should have known´ vii. He was terminated and brought a Bivens action against a number of people 2. and (4) government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would not have known. (2) aides failed to establish that their official functions required absolute immunity. Hope v. Facts: police arrived where they believed to be the home of someone they had an arrest warrant for. Pelzer p142-47 ix. Fitzgerald p120-23 1. Was not clearly established that bringing in the media was a violation of the 4tham 5. Layne p124-32: 1. Holding: (1) presidential aides generally are entitled only to qualified immunity. ³Every Person´: Muncipailty Liability . but the violation was not clearly established and the officers therefore had qualified immunity a. Harlow v. a. Whether there was a constitutional right b. Issue: whether the police had qualified immunity a. Claimed a violation of the 4tham 3. Dissent: it was clearly established viii. Whether the right was ³clearly established´ 4. school board members are not immune from liability for damages under 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that he action he took would violate the const rights of a student²or if he took action w/malicious intent to deprive of const rights vi. Crawford-El v.

b. Instead. In addition. an entity¶s failure to train its officials can subject it to liability. Pape . If city or county liable²cannot claim a defense of good faith²NO IMMUNITY!! vi. Plt has to show the EE¶s background made specific risk a plainly obvious risk of being hired. Holding: cities were among ³persons´ who could be sued under 1983²in doing so. Usually claim is that with duties assigned to officers. and so can a failure to properly screen at the time of hire 1. Issues with these cases is usually: what constitutes governmental custom or policy? 1. Cities. SC has held that not just formal legislative enactments. plt has to show that there is a direct causal link between the policy makers fault in hiring and the particular deprivation in constitutional rights viii. Policymakers can subject local governments to monetary liability. reversed a portion of Monroe v. but also the individual decision of those who are final ³policymakers´ can subject local governments to monetary liability 2. counties. Monell v. Fault in Hiring: a. a 1983 plt has to do more than show a generalized risk. ³standing operating procedure´. The unauthorized. NY City Dept p173-85 1. In the hiring context. random unconstitutional acts of a local official are therefore not ordinarily attributable to the entity for which the official works for purposes of liability under 1983. that the policymakers of the city deliberately indifferent to the need i. As a matter of statutory interpretation. SC has held that failure to train EEs can provide a basis for municipal liability ³only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the officials come in contact´²objective standard a. the need for more training is obvious and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights. or policy of the government entity iv. although the official herself may still be personally liable herself²subject to immunities that may be raised v. Local governments are not liable in damages for the constitutional harms inflicted by their officers on a vicarious liability or respondent superior basis iii. and other local governmental entities are suable under §1983. damages action under §1983 for the unconstitutional acts of one of its officials only if the plaintiff can show that the official acted pursuant to some law. custom .i. Ex: use of deadly force by police 2. they are among the class of suable ³persons´ to which 1983 refers ii. ³persistent and widespread´ vii. Custom and Informal Policy: a.

or policy Will v. City of Canton v. failure to train . By making cities sueable persons. who told them to go in. Holding: those who retaliated against the plaintiff were not policy makers²they did not have the delegated power to make employment policy so much as to implement it.ix. policy could be made by those individuals. 3. Local government would be liable under 1983 only when its ³custom´ or ³policy´ was the ³moving force´ behind the unconstitutional action of one of its officers 3. City of Cincinnati p 215-19. Praprotnik p219-36 1. decisions of policy makers 1. unconstitutionally. Claim arises out of Stegald which held that this would be a violation of 4tham 2. xii. Monell was significant b/c it gave plts a real shot at significant monetary recovery when municipal officials (who might be able to invoke personal immunities for their good faith actions) have acted unconstutioally pursuant to local law. City of Indep p. 2. Held: yes-a. xi. custom. violated his procedural due process rights 2. x. who told them to call county prosecutor. 188-208 1. Michigan Dept p186 1. xiii. and the county may therefore be held liable under 1983 4. ³whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy´ City of ST Louis v. as Monell states. Holding: municipalities have no immunity from damages liability Pembaur v. and he also sued the city for which it worked 2. They called supervisor. Harris p237. Significant about Praprotnik was the plurality¶s conclusion that state law determined who was and who was not a policymaker. In ordering the deputy sheriff to enter the petitioners clinic the county prosecutor was acting as the final decisionmaker for the county. the city could not be held liable under Monell. Held that ³person´ in 1983 does not include state or state official acting in their official capacities Owen v. Facts: city held liable when the city council voted to fire the city¶s chief of police and in so doing. Facts: claim arises from officers trying to serve a warrant and when they arrived they couldn¶t get in. Facts: the employee-plaintiff brought 1983 action against the individual who retaliated against him. Rather. Issue: whether the county is liable for the actions of police officers--yes 3. Even if they implemented an unconstitutional policy. Significant about Pembar is the plurality¶s recognition that policy making could take place outside of lawmaking bodies and did not have to involve rules of general applicability.

should just find for city xiv. Plt needs to prove that the failure to train amounts to ³deliberate indifference´ and that the deficiency in training actually caused the police officer¶s indifference to her medical needs a. Issue. Among these claims was one seeking to hold the city liable under 1983 for its violation of Harris¶ right under DPC of 14tham to receive medical attn while in police custody 2. Even adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes. She makes state law and constitional claims against the city and its officials. She was diagnosed w/suffering from several emotional ailments. However. (3) A pattern of constitutional violations by officers may indicate that a lack of proper training. Ct remanded and let Ct App decide whether she could get a new trial or find for city 4. Which is to say. Dissent: agrees w/everything²except. e. Failure to train notes: i. officials charged with the responsibility of formulating policy for the agency may be put on notice that a new program is needed and a failure to address the problem may constitute . focus is placed on the adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks particular officers must perform. rather than a one-time negligent administration of the training program or factors peculiar to the officer involved in a single incident. Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County p246 1. the fact that they do says little about the training program or the legal basis for holding a city or county liable for that mistake. is responsible for the plaintiff's injury. She was asked if she needed medical attention and responded w/an incoherent remark«she received no medical attn.1. Rather. for failure to train. Holding: Yes. Facts: she alleged that a county police officer used excessive force in arresting her and that the county itself was liable for her injuries based on sheriffs hiring and training decisions. policy-makers were deliberately indifferent to the harm that would likely result from the failure to train ii. (4) If a training program does not prevent constitutional violations and a pattern of injuries develops. "Deliberate indifference" is a standard of fault that requires a showing that government policy makers acted with conscious disregard for the obvious consequences of their actions. a plaintiff must establish that government policy-makers either were or should have been aware that a training program was inadequate and did little or nothing about the problem. A city or county will not be liable simply because it employed the officer whose actions resulted in a deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights. it is not enough to merely show that a situation will arise and that an officer taking the wrong course of action in that instance will result in injuries to citizens. whether municipality can ever be liable under 1983 for constitutional violations resulting from its failure to train municipal employees²yes 3. Facts: Harris was brought to police station in a patrol wagon.

Balisok p508 1. seeking damagesbut not injunctive relief or release from custodyon the claim that respondents. S. deliberate indifference may be inferred from the policy makers' continued adherence to a training program that they knew or should have known would fail to prevent violations in usual or recurring situations. the exhaustion of state remedies the dismissal of Heck's § 1983 action was correct because both courts below found that his damages claims challenged the legality of his conviction ii. SC reaffirmed. and that this Court has long been concerned that judgments be final and consistent and has been disinclined to expand opportunities for collateral attack on criminal convictions. had engaged in unlawful acts that had led to his arrest and conviction. Facts: While petitioner Heck's direct appeal from an Indiana conviction was pending. Handout b.257-258. 435 U. S. Holding: In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment. Humphrey p. 28 U. and perhaps extended Heck . 491 1. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.deliberate indifference. Abstention i. see Carey v. or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid. C. expunged by executive order. Handout ii. Piphus. F. a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal. The foregoing conclusion follows upon recognition that the common law of torts provides the appropriate starting point for the § 1983 inquiry. Heck v. therefore. (5) In the absence of a pattern of violations. C. § 1983. which provides the closest analogy to claims of the type considered here. (6) In such cases. requires the allegation and proof of termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused. Habeas Corpus i. or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. that the tort of malicious prosecution. declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination. acting under color of state law. S. 247. he filed this suit under 42 U. Edwards v. Although the issue in cases such as this is not. §1983 and Criminal Proceeedings a. the constitutional violation must be a highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of the failure to train. 2.

exactly what the federal law was designed to prevent. 4. 2. Nelson v. Issue: Is a prisoner's appeal of the proposed procedure for his execution functionally equivalent to a habeas corpus petition and therefore barred by Title 28. However. Holding: No. Nelson was rescheduled for execution on October 9. a federal law designed to limit the number of habeas corpus appeals by death row inmates) but rather a freestanding lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the proposed execution procedure. The federal district court agreed with Alabama. 3.S. holding that Nelson's appeal dealt not just with the procedure but with the sentence itself. and should therefore be thrown out. Facts: David Nelson was sentenced to death for murder and scheduled for execution in 1997. because of damage done to his veins by previous intravenous drug abuse. Code Title 28. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. the Court ruled unanimously that Nelson's suit dealt only with the proposed method of execution. Nelson had a right to challenge the necessity of the procedure for his execution using the same legal approach he would have used to challenge the conditions of his prison. the Court declined to rule on whether the execution would be constitutional if the district court found that cutting .2. Section 2254. Alabama had notified Nelson that.S. Facts: prisoner claimed that unconstitutional proceedings were used to take away his good time credits 3. Nelson filed petition in federal district court alleging that the method of execution proposed by Alabama violated his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. A series of appeals and habeas petitions in federal court delayed the execution until 2002. and was therefore different from a habeas corpus appeal. He claimed that this was an inhumane method of execution and should therefore be barred. Section 2254 of U. After the final appeal was rejected. Code? 5. the execution procedure might require corrections officers to cut through muscles and fat in his arm to get access to a vein that could carry the toxins. Holding: the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the disciplinary action taken against him iii. Campbell p508 1. he argued that the petition was not an appeal of his conviction or sentence (appeals of both were prohibited by U. when an 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously rejected a claim dealing with the alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. 2003. Further. not with his conviction or sentence. Alabama countered that Nelson's appeal was intended only to prolong his life through procedural delays.

he sought federal court redress for the alleged constitutional violation by bringing a suit for damages under § 1983 against the officers who had seized the evidence in question. has given the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims. Powell. and directed the trial court to allow him to proceed to trial unencumbered by collateral estoppel. was to the particular three-drug sequence used in FL¶s lethal injection protocol. holding that collateral estoppel prevented respondent from relitigating the search and seizure question already decided against him in the state courts. Holding: The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent's inability to obtain federal habeas corpus relief upon his Fourth Amendment claim renders the doctrine of collateral estoppel inapplicable to his § 1983 suit. iv. Nevertheless. Nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983 discloses any congressional intent to deny binding effect to a state court judgment or decision when the state court. certain evidence that had been seized by the police. noting that Stone v. and thereby has shown itself willing and able to protect federal rights. respondent's motion to suppress. Full Faith and Credit Act: commands federal cts to give the ³same´ preclusive effect to prior state ct judgments that the judgment rendering ct would give them ii. Similarily. and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. ³the compaint does not challenge the lethal injunction sentence as a general matter but seeks instead only to enjoin the respondents ³from executing Hill in the manner they currently intend´ c. Arg that the protocol was painful« 2. 1983 lawsuits may be precluded as to some issues or claims b/c of prior adjudication 1. acting within its proper jurisdiction. Powell. in part. Nor does anything . leaving that question for a case in which necessity had already been determined. Hill v.through was indeed necessary. Res Judicata i. There will be preclusion if the plt was previously a def in criminal proceeding in issues that are now subject of 1983 challenge²and issues decided against plt in criminal proceeding 2. there will be claim preclusion if plt previously brought suit in state ct on state law grounds. Initial pursuit of state admin remedies may comprise a later filed 1983 claim 3. barred respondent from habeas corpus relief. Allen v. Facts: Case raised the Nelson issue in a different context. Because he did not assert that the state courts had denied him a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate his search and seizure claim. ROL: 3. Facts: At a hearing before respondent's criminal trial. McDonough: 1. Hill¶s challenge. Holding: this was controlled by Nelson and thereore appropriate for §1983 a. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. McCurry: 1. therefore. respondent's only route to a federal forum for his constitutional claim. a Missouri court denied. on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. respondent was barred by Stone v. 2. and that the § 1983 suit was. from seeking a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court. filed four days before his scheduled execution for a 1983 murder conviction. District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Respondent was subsequently convicted.

Facts: Petitioner's complaint alleged that respondent agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. acting under color of federal authority.in § 1983's legislative history reveal any purpose to afford less deference to judgments in state criminal proceedings than to those in state civil proceedings. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the basis of res judicata. which was not litigated in state court. Facts: Petitioner was employed by respondent Warren. iii. Prosise filled a §1983 action against the police officers who had searched his apartment. Civil Rights Actions Against Federal Officers a. but the Supreme Court disagreed. Prosise: 1. 3. made . its members. and Fourteenth Amendments. the Board members determined not to renew her contract. Thereafter. Six Unknown Officers p. Board of Education (Board) as a supervisor of elementary education on an annual basis under written contracts²terminated. Here.527 1. bc the fourth amendment claim was not litigated or resolved in the stat ecriminal prosecution. The district court held this claim barred. 60-9 i. The only issue determined by the guilty plea was whether Prosise had manufactured a controlled substance²which is irrelevant to 4tham issue G. Holding: the issue under §1738 was whether state law would regard the conviction as preclusive. Haring v. petitioner filed action under 1983 against the Board. Migra p. it would not. 2. Bivens v. alleging that. and dismissed the complaint. Fifth. petitioner's state court judgment has the same claim preclusive effect in federal court that the judgment would have in the Ohio state courts. Section 1983 does not override state preclusion law and guarantee petitioner a right to proceed to judgment in state court on her state claims and then turn to federal court for adjudication of her federal claims²no claim splitting!! iv. She requested injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. The United States Court of Appeals affirmed. 2. The complaint alleged two causes of action -. Federal Officers are not ordinarily suable under 1983 but the Supreme Ct has instead created an implied right of action for damages directly under the Constiution and the general federal question statute--1331 b. She won in state ct. inter alia. Ohio. and the Superintendent of Schools. and that the Board's actions violated her rights under the First.a breach of contract by the Board and wrongful interference by the individual members with petitioner's employment contract. Holding: With respect to petitioner's § 1983 claim. Facts: after pleading guilty to a charge of manufacturing a controlled substance. because of her activities involving a desegregation plan for the Warren elementary schools and a social studies curriculum that she had prepared.

or 2. the Court reversed the lower court's conclusions. because no charges are pending against Bivens. c. ii. All of the acts were alleged to have been done without probable cause. Relying on Bivens. For all of these reasons. Bivens was allowed the right to recover from the Federal government. Where congress created an alternative remedial structure e. searched the apartment. Green p. Passman p69 i. Facts: administrative assistant to congressman alleged dismissal because of sex ii. AN alternative remedial action foreclosed Bivens action ii. with back pay. Issue: whether federal agents can be sued for constiutioal violations iii. For Bivens. the remedy was damages or nothing. ³special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress´. and arrested him on narcotics charges.a warrantless entry of his apartment. made a series of public comments critical of the Center. SC again upheld Bivens action permitting the plt to sue on behalf of the estate of her deceased son for damages under the 8tham. Bush v. Marshall Space Flight Center (Center). Finally. 69 i. While his administrated appeal was pending. In this case. demoted Bush on the ground that the comments were false and misleading. Bush brought suit against . if he proved his case. Holding: Yes²Petitioner's complaint states a federal cause of action under the Fourth Amendment for which damages are recoverable upon proof of injuries resulting from the federal agents' violation of that Amendment iv. Carlson v. a facility operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). an aerospace engineer at the George C. Lucas p69-71 i. Davis v. a common remedy for 4th amendment violations. Ct noted that there were two instances when Bivens can be foreclosed: 1. the Center_s director. Passman violated Davis's rights through EPA of fifthamendment-sexual discrimination. There would not have been any vindication of rights through the exclusionary rule. nor had it imposed any other remedy. She alleged that federal prison officials caused the son¶s death by failing to provide adequate medical attention ii. The Court also observed that no Congressional legislation curtailed money damages for violations of Constitutional rights. it did not find any "special factors counseling hesitation" in this case. The Federal Employee Appeals Authority upheld the demotion. d. the Court noted. Both cases affirmed a citizen's right to bring suit against federal officers for constitutional violations. Facts: Bush. NASA accepted the Board_s recommendation that Bush be restored to his former position retroactively. Lucas. but the Civil Service Commission_s (CSC) Appeals Review Board later found that the demotion had violated his First Amendment rights.

or to supplement. pursuant to its common law authority. is in the best position to regulate the employee relations. Grant of supplementary judicial relief would disrupt this balance and is therefore inappropriate. which granted summary judgment for Lucas. NOTE: this case is similar to Sea Clammers case in 1983 action b/c theres already a remedy in place²statute provides remedial scheme Where Congress has provided a remedy that will provide meanigful relief. be extended to allow recovery against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons? iii. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 403 U. and had a heart attack. not the judiciary. Congress. and (2) to ascertain whether the purpose and comprehensive nature of the statutory scheme precludes judicial remedies where statutory relief is available. The federal judiciary. Facts: prisoner in fed prison had heart condition and exempt from taking steps.iii. statutory remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated its relief is to be exclusive. although one which does not fully compensate the employee for the harm suffered? Holding: No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Issue: Can a federal employee sue for damages for the violation of his First Amendment rights by his superior where Congress has provided a comprehensive remedial scheme. it is enough ***THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A BIVEN ACTION TO ENFORCE A STATUTORY RIGHT!!** Correctional Svc Corp v. has the power to recognize new causes of action in absence of. Issue: Should the implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights. One day he was forced to. first recognized in Bivens v. Lucas in Alabama state court. Narcotics Agents. holding that Bush had no cause of action for damages under the First Amendment in view of the available remedies under the CSC regulations. f. Rehnquist. The Court also noted that the purpose of the Bivens decision was to deter individual federal officers . not under the CSC regulations. Lucas removed the action to federal district court. The administrative scheme in this case reflected Congress_ attempt to balance the competing interests of protecting the First Amendment rights of federal employees and maintaining a disciplined and effective workforce. He filed an 8tham violation ii. The Court reasoned that the threat of suit against an individual's employer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated by the Bivens decision. vii. Malesko p71-73 i. Holding: No. vi. iv. 388. federal courts are (1) to pay particular attention to special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. In determining whether judicial relief should be granted.S. seeking to recover damages for violation of his First Amendment rights. v. Six Unknown Fed. the Court held that Bivens' limited holding may not be extended to confer a right of action for damages against private entities acting under color of federal law.

though it acknowledged that these amounted to a difficult-to-use "patchwork. the Court declined to extend the availability of Bivens actions to cases of retaliation for the exercise of the right to exclude the government from one's property. and no." so he could not sue the government for retaliation. unanswered. because extortion has not normally been understood to encompass the actions of government officials seeking to obtain . the Court would not add a Bivens remedy to landowners' toolkit. "In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice. Robbins alleged that BLM officials harassed him with threats and meritless criminal charges. The Court noted that Robbins had other administrative and judicial remedies for the government's various violations." Robbins's RICO claim failed as well. to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally. Facts: Harvey Robbins owned a private dude ranch which was intermingled with federal lands. Issues: 1) Can government officials acting pursuant to their regulatory authority be guilty of extortion under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for attempting to obtain property for the benefit of the government? 2) Is a Bivens claim based on Fifth Amendment rights precluded by the availability of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act? 3) Does the Fifth Amendment protect against retaliation for exercising a "right to exclude" the government from one's property? iii. or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer's unconstitutional conduct. Where such circumstances are not present. In an opinion by Justice David Souter. but after Robbins bought the ranch he refused to re-grant it. and that the BLM agents had retaliated against him for his exercise of this right.. The government can be expected to engage in some hardball tactics during land negotiations.] worse than the disease. Robbins: handout i. and inviting an "onslaught of Bivens actions" in an effort to counter the occasional overreach would be a "cure [." Because of the impossibly of devising a framework to separate constitutional violations from government actions that are merely borderline improper. we have consistently rejected invitations to extend g. Robbins sued the BLM officials for extortion in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). the majority held.from committing constitutional violations. The Court ruled 7-2 that "neither Bivens nor RICO gives Robbins a cause of action. The previous owner had granted the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) right-of-way across the private land. Robbins argued that the Fifth Amendment protects a "right to exclude" government officials from one's property. ii. Holding: No. Wilkie v.. He also brought a Bivens action (an action seeking monetary damages from a federal agent for a constitutional violation). with the aim of forcing him to grant the government right-of-way.

Court held that federal courts were without jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctive relief. The fact that Lyons had been choked once did nothing to establish "a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped. Remedies For Constiutional Wrongs a. Along with damages against the officers. Punitive damages are available against individual officers. FDIC v. Suing entity H. Holding: No. 2. seized Lyons and applied a chokehold. Issue: Did Lyons's injunction against the use of police chokeholds meet the threshold requirements imposed by Article III of the Constitution? 3. Facts: In 1976. Lyons: 1. Military. feelings of unjust treatment. humiliation. Carey case²ct said damages didn¶t exceed $1 (boy suspended for allegedly smoking marijuana. In order to recover more that nominal damages from a 1983 def. Compensatory damages: 1. Although Lyons offered no resistance. The hold rendered Lyons unconscious and damaged his larynx. and ct found PDP violation) b. without provocation. but not local govts.property for the government rather than for themselves. Put on proof of mental anguish. or when the def was motivated by bad intent ii. Would mess up the scheme of things iv. personal indignity« c. Need to show harm.by an officer who would illegally choke him into . . The basic purpose of 1983 is to compensate people for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights a. MUST PUT ON PROOF OF ACTUAL INJURY b. Special Factors: i. Comprehensive remedial scheme ii. Against public policy iii. and only when there has been ³reckless or callous indifference´ to constitutional rights. 3 THINGS WOULD PRECLUDE BIVENS AXN: i. Lyons sought an injunction against the City barring the use of such control holds. City of Los Angeles v. h. the victim of an unconstitutional injury must put on proof of actual injury i. Special factors iii. The Court called the cases that Robbins cited in favor of his claim obscure and off-point. Injunctions i. Meyer²no such thing as entity liability bc it would be costly i. Separation of powers issues v. police officers of the City of Los Angeles stopped Adolph Lyons for a traffic code violation. Stanley²given LSD²ct said there were special factors here vi. It would cost a lot ii. the officers. .

or 2) that the City ordered or authorized officers to act in such a manner. Conclusion: The Court held that the District Court "abused its discretion" by imposing a specific tax increase. Question: Did the court order to increase property taxes violate Article III. After determining that the District did not have alternative means of raising revenue for the program. When a constitutional justification existed. courts had the authority to order tax increases despite statutory limitations.. The Court also held. Lyons would have to show either 1) that all Los Angeles police officers always choked citizens with whom they had encounters." The majority found that court orders directing local governments to levy their own taxes were "plainly" judicial acts within the powers of federal courts. Jenkins p872-94 1. 5. federal district judge Russell G. The KCMSD's ability to raise taxes.. Damages i. public schools. 4. Michigan. Dissent: Whether Lyons can show that the City¶s chokehold policy is unconstitutional? Lyons¶ claim for damages gives him standing to sue. **idk what the ct wanted him to show²another bs case!* ii." c.. but ruled that the courts should enjoin state tax laws that prevented the District from raising the necessary funds and allow the state to set tax rates. however. Facts of the Case: In order to combat segregation in public schools in compliance with court directives. or principles of federal/state comity? 3. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision. however. as the findings of the District Ct show. to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them. Lyons was thus limited to suing the police and the city for individual damages. Missouri v. Stachura p343 1. Missouri School District (KCMSD) sought to enhance the quality of schools and to attract more white students from the suburbs. the Kansas City. Clark ordered an increase of local property taxes for the 199192 fiscal year. the Tenth Amendment. Lyons suffered an actual past injury." The Court held that in order to establish an actual controversy. The U. Standing under Article III is established by an allegation of threatened or actual injury. success therein depends on his proving whether the conduct was unconstitutional.unconsciousness. a tenured teacher in the Memphis. Memphis Community School Dist v. The Court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise would fail to take account of the obligations of local governments. Facts: Respondent. was limited by state law. that the modifications of the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals satisfied "equitable and constitutional principles governing the District Court's power.S. 2. was suspended following parents' complaints about . under the Supremacy Clause.

Alleging.state law.his teaching methods in a seventh-grade life science course that included the showing of allegedly sexually explicit pictures and films. 3. The court also expressed a belief that the challenged instruction might not have been error at all. and moreover are an unwieldy tool for ensuring compliance with the Constitution. The city moved for a new trial. The instructions at issue cannot be squared with Carey. Fact Concerts p.S. not a supplement for an award that fully compensates the alleged injury.C. also awarded punitive damages against both the individual officials and the city. they cannot be justified as presumed damages. 371-80 1. (b) Since such damages are wholly divorced from any compensatory purpose. Although noting that the challenge to the instruction was untimely under FRCP 51. and . school administrators. The basic purpose of § 1983 damages is "to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights. a. The Court of Appeals affirmed. ii. He sought both compensatory and punitive damages 2.C. before being reinstated. finding that the city's failure to object to the charge at trial. § 183. inter alia. Holding: Damages based on the abstract "value" or "importance" of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in § 1983 cases. that the city's cancellation of the license amounted to a violation of their constitutional rights under color of. and a promoter of the concerts) brought suit in Federal District Court against the city and city officials. including the city. the court gave an instruction authorizing the jury to award punitive damages against each defendant. as required by Rule 51. could not be overlooked on the theory that the charge itself was plain error. While respondent was later reinstated. arguing for the first time that punitive damages could not be awarded against a municipality under § 1983." Carey v. alleging that his suspension deprived him of liberty and property without due process of law and violated his First Amendment right to academic freedom. Damages measured by the jury's perception of the abstract "importance" of a constitutional right are not necessary to vindicate the constitutional rights that § 1983 protects. respondents sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U. Verdicts were returned for respondents. and parents. City of Newport v.S. he. Piphus. which are a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages. Board of Education. Without objection. § 1983 against petitioner School District. the District Court considered and rejected the city's substantive legal arguments on their merits. or with the principles of tort damages on which Carey and § 1983 are grounded. brought suit in Federal District Court under 42 U. Facts: Respondents (an organization licensed by petitioner city to present certain musical concerts. Board Members. which in addition to awarding compensatory damages.

ROL: Muncipalities are not subject to punitive damage awards. and the Court of Appeals did not disagree with that adjudication. no interests in fair and effective trial administration advanced by Rule 51 would be served if this Court refused to reach the merits. even when their officials act pursuant to official policy. and even when that policy shows ³callous or reckless indifference´ to constiutional rights 3. Because the District Court adjudicated the merits. and appears likely to recur in § 1983 litigation against municipalities. . In addition to being novel. Holding: The city's failure to object to the charge at trial does not foreclose this Court from reviewing the punitive damages issue. and the very novelty of the legal issue at stake counsels unconstricted review. The contours of municipal liability under § 1983 are currently in a state of evolving definition and uncertainty. the punitive damages question is also important. 2. Nor should review here be limited to the restrictive "plain error" standard.identified the "distinct possibility" that municipalities could be liable for punitive damages under § 1983 in the proper circumstances.

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