Honorary Editor: P. SUPPES

Editors: S. ABRAMSKY, London S. ARTEMOV, Moscow D.M. GABBAY, London A. KECHRIS, Pasadena A. PILLAY, Urbana R.A. SHORE, Ithaca



D. M. Gabbay
King’s College London, UK and Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel

V. B. Shehtman
Institute for Information Transmission Problems Russian Academy of Sciences and Moscow State University

D. P. Skvortsov
All-Russian Institute of Scientific and Technical Information Russian Academy of Sciences


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If some 30 years ago we had been told that we would write a large book on quantification in nonclassical logic, none of us would have taken it seriously: first - because at that time there was no hope of our effective collaboration; second - because in nonclassical logic too much had to be done in the propositional area, and few people could find the energy for active research in predicate logic. In the new century the situation is completely different. Connections between Moscow and London became easy. The title of the book is not surprising, and we are now late with the first big monograph in this field. Indeed, at first we did not expect we had enough material for two (or more) volumes. But we hope readers will be able t o learn the subject from our book and find it quite fascinating. Let us now give a very brief overview of the existing systematic expositions of nonclassical first-order logic. None of them aims at covering the whole of this large field. The first book on the subject was [Rasiowa and Sikorski, 19631, where the approach used by the authors was purely algebraic. Many important aspects of superintuitionistic first-order logics can be found in the books written in the 1970-80s: [Dragalin, 19881 (proof theory; algebraic, topological, and relational models; realisability semantics); [Gabbay, 19811 (model theory; decision problem); [van Dalen, 19731, [Troelstra and van Dalen, 19881 (realisability and model theory). The book of Novikov [Novikov, 19771 (the major part of which is a lecture course from the 1950s) addresses semantics of superintuitionistic logics and also includes some material on modal logic. Still, predicate modal logic was partly neglected until the late 1980s. The book [Harel, 19791 and its later extended version [Harel and Tiuryn, 20001 study particular dynamic modal logics. [Goldblatt, 19841 is devoted to topos semantics; its main emphasis is on intuitionistic logic, although modal logic is also considered. The book [Hughes and Cresswell, 19961 makes a thorough study of Kripke semantics for first-order modal logics, but it does not consider other semantics orgintermediate logics. Finally, there is a monograph [Gabbay et al., 20021, which, among other topics, investigates first-order modal and intermediate logics from the Lmany-dimensional' viewpoint. It contains recent profound results on decidable fragments of predicate logics. The lack of unifying monographs became crucial in the 1990s, to the extent that in the recent book [Fitting and Mendelsohn, 19981 the area of first-order modal logic was unfairly called 'under-developed'. That original book contains



interesting material on the history and philosophy of modal logic, but due to its obvious philosophical flavour, it leaves many fundamental mathematical problems and results unaddressed. Still there the reader can find various approaches to quantification, tableaux systems and corresponding completeness theorems. So there remains the need for a foundational monograph not only addressing areas untouched by all current publications, but also presenting a unifying point of view. A detailed description of this Volume can be found in the Introduction below. It is worth mentioning that the major part of the material has never been presented in monographs. One of its sources is the paper on completeness and incompleteness, a brief version of which is [Shehtman and Skvortsov, 19901; the full version (written in 1983) has not been published for technical reasons. The second basic paper incorporated in our book is [Skvortsov and Shehtman, 19931, where so-called metaframe (or simplicial) semantics was introduced and studied. We also include some of the results obtained after 1980 by G. Corsi, S. Ghilardi, H. Ono, T. Shimura, D. Skvortsov, N.-Y. Suzuki, and others. However, because of lack of space, we had to exclude some interesting material, such as a big chapter on simplicial semantics, completeness theorems for topological semantics, hyperdoctrines, and many other important matters. Other important omissions are the historical and the bibliographical overviews and the discussion of application fields and many open problems. Moreover, the cooperation between the authors was not easy, because of the different viewpoints on the presentation.1 There may be also other shortcomings, like gaps in proofs, wrong notation, wrong or missing references, misprints etc., that remain uncorrected - but this is all our responsibility. We would be glad to receive comments and remarks on all the defects from the readers. As we are planning to continue our work in Volume 2, we still hope to make all necessary corrections and additions in the real future. At present the reader can find the list of corrections on our webpages http://www.dcs.kcl.ac.uk/staff/dg/ http://lpcs.math.msu.su/~shehtman

The second and the third author are grateful to their late teacher and friend Albert Dragalin, one of the pioneers in the field, who stimulated and encouraged their research. We thank all our colleagues, with whom we discussed the contents of this book at different stages - Sergey Artemov, Lev Beklemishev, Johan van Benthem, Giovanna Corsi, Leo Esakia, Silvio Ghilardi, Dick De Johng, Rosalie Iemhoff, Marcus Kracht, Vladimir Krupski, Grigori Mints, Hiroakira Ono, NobuYuki Suzuki, Albert Visser, Michael Zakharyaschev. Nobu-Yuki and Marcus also kindly sent us Latex-files of their papers; we used them in the process of typing the text.
'One of the authors points out that he disagrees with some of the notation and the style of some proofs in the final version.



We would like to thank different institutions for help and support - King's College of London; Institute for Information Transmission Problems, VINITI, Department of Mathematical Logic and Theory of Algorithms at Moscow State University, Poncelet Mathematical Laboratory, Steklov Mathematical Institute in Moscow; IRIT in Toulouse; EPSRC, RFBR, CNRS, and NWO. We add personal thanks to our teacher Professor Vladimir A. Uspensky, to Academician Sergey I. Adian, and to our friend and colleague Michael Tsfasman who encouraged and supported our work. We are very grateful t o Jane Spurr for her enormous work and patience in preparation of the manuscript - typing the whole text in Latex (several times!), correcting our mistakes, reading multiple pages (with hardly understandable handwriting), making pictures, arranging styles etc. etc. We thank all those people who also essentially helped us in this difficult process - Ilya Shapirovsky, Alexey Romanov, Stanislav Kikot for correcting mistakes and typing, Ilya Vorontsov and Daniel Vorontsov for scanning many hundreds of pages. We thank all other peopie for their help and encouragement - our wives Lydia, Marina, Elena, families, friends and colleagues.

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Quantification and modalities have always been topics of great interest for logicians. These two themes emerged from philosophy and language in ancient times; they were studied by traditional informal methods until the 20th century. Then the tools became highly mathematical, as in the other areas of logic, and modal logic as well as quantification (mainly on the basis of classical first-order logic) found numerous applications in Computer Science. At the same time many other kinds of nonclassical logics were investigated. In particular, intuitionistic logic was created by L. Brouwer at the beginning of the century as a new basis for mathematical reasoning. This logic, as well as its extensions (superintuitionistic logics), is also very useful for Computer Science and turns out t o be closely related to modal logics. (A) The introduction of quantifier axioms to classical logic is fairly straightforward. We simply add the following obvious postulates to the propositional logic:

where t is 'properly' substituted for x

where x is not free in A

where x is not free in A. The passage from the propositional case of a logic L to its quantifier case works for many logics by adding the above axioms to the respective propositional axioms - for example, the intuitionistic logic, standard modal logics S4, S5, K etc. We may need in some cases to make some adjustment to account for constant domains, Vx(A V B(x)) 3 ( A V VxB(x)) in case of intuitionistic logic and the Barcan formula, VxOA(x) > UVxA(x) in the case of modal logics. On the whole the correspondence seems to be working.



The recipe goes on as follows: take the propositional semantics and put a domain D, in each world u or take the axiomatic formulation and add the above axioms and you maintain correspondence and completeness. There were some surprises however. Unexpectedly, this method fails for very simple and well-known modal and intermediate logics: the 'Euclidean logic' K5 = K OOp > U p (see Chapter 6 of this volume), the 'confluence logic' S4.2 = S4 f OOp > D 0 p and for the intermediate logic KC = H ~p V 1-p with constant domains, nonclassical intermediate logics of finite depth [Ono, 19831, etc. All these logics are incomplete in the standard Kripke semantics. In some other cases, completeness theorems hold, but their proofs require nontrivial extra work - for example, this happens for the logic of linear Kripke frames S4.3 [Corsi, 19891. This situation puts at least two difficult questions to us: (1) how should we change semantics in order to restore completeness of 'popular' logics? (2) how should we extend these logics by new axioms to make them complete in the standard Kripke semantics? These questions will be studied in our book, especially in Volume 2, but we are still very far from final answers. Apparently when we systematically introduce natural axioms and ask for the corresponding semantics, we may not be able to see what are the natural semantical conditions (which may not be expressible in first-order logic) and conversely some natural conditions on the semantics require complex and sometimes non-axiomatisable logics. The community did not realize all these difficulties. A serious surprise was the case of relevance logic, where the additional axioms were complex and seemed purely technical. See [Mares and Goldblatt, 20061, [Fine, 19881, [Fine, 19891. For some well-known logics there were no attempts of going first-order, especially for resource logics such as Lambek Calculus. (B) There are other reasons why we may have difficulties with quantifiers, for example, in the case of superintuitionistic logics. Conditions on the possible worlds such as discrete ordering or finiteness may give the connectives themselves quantificational power of their own (note that the truth condition for A > B has a hidden world quantifier), which combined with the power of the explicit quantifiers may yield some pretty complex systems [Skvortsov, 20061. (C) In fact, a new approach is required to deal with quantifiers in possible world systems. The standard approach associates domains with each possible world and what is in the domain depends only on the nature of the world, i.e. if u is a world, P a predicate, 6 a valuation, then B,(P) is not dependent on other 0,~(P), except for some very simple conditions as in intuitionistic logic. There are no interactive conditions between existence of elements in the domain and satisfaction in other domains. If we look at some axioms like the Markov principle l--dxA(x) > 3 ~ 1 7 A ( x ) ,



we see that we need to pay attention on how the domain is constructed. This is reminiscent of the Herbrand universe in classical logic.



(D) There are other questions which we can ask. Given a classical theory I ' (e.g. a theory of rings or Peano arithmetic), we can investigate what happens if we change the underlying logic to intuitionistic or modal or relevant. Then what kind of theory do we get and what kind of semantics? Note we are not dealing now with a variety of logics (modal or superintuitionistic), but with a fixed nonclassical logic (say intuitionistic logic itself) and a variety of theories. If intuitionistic predicate semantics is built up from classical models, would the intuitionistic predicate theory of rings have semantics built up from classical rings? How does it depend on the formulation (r may be classically equivalent to I",but not intuitionistically) and what can happen to different formulations? See [Gabbay, 19811. (E) One can have questions with quantifiers arising from a completely different angle. E.g. in resource logics we pay attention to which assumptions are used to proving a formula A. For example in linear or Lambek logic we have that

(3) A -+ (A -+ B). can prove B but (2) and (3) alone cannot prove B; because of resource considerations, we need two copies of A. Such logics are very applicable to the analysis and modelling of natural language [van Benthem, 19911. So what shall we do with 'dxA(x)? Do we divide our resource between all instances A(tl), A(t2),. . . of A? These are design questions which translate into technical axiomatic and semantical questions. How do we treat systems which contain more than one type of nonclassical connective? Any special problems with regard to adding quantifiers? See, for example, the theory of bunched implications [O'Hearn and Pym, 19991. (F) The most complex systems with regards to quantifiers are LDS, Labelled Deductive Systems (this is a methodology for logic, cf. [Gabbay, 1996; Gabbay, 19981). In LDS formulas have labels, so we write t : A, where t is a label and A is a formula. Think o f t as a world or a context. (This label can be integrated and in itself be a formula, etc.) Elements now have visa rules for migrating between labels and need to be annotated, for example as a:, the element a exists at world s, but was first created (or instantiated) in world t. Surprisingly, this actually helps with the proof theory and semantics for quantifiers, since part of the semantics is brought into the syntax. See [Viganb, 20001. So it is easier to develop, say, theories of Hilbert &-symbolusing labels. &-symbolsaxioms cannot be added simple mindedly to intuitionistic logic, it will collapse [Bell, 20011. (G) Similarly, we must be careful with modal logic. We have not even begun thinking about &-symbolsin resource logics (consider ~ x . A ( x )if there , is sensitivity for the number of copies of A, then are we to be sensitive also to copies of elements?). (H) In classical logic there is another direction to go with quantifiers, namely the so-called generalised quantifiers, for example (many x)A(x) ('there are many

correspondence between axioms for modal or intuitionistic logic and semantical conditions and vice versa. see [Gabbay. [Peters and Westerstahl.. Chapters dependency structure Let us now briefly describe the contents of Volume 1. It consists of three parts. 19941. All the material can be found elsewhere.e. 19961. Chapter 2 contains the necessary syntactic background for the remaining parts of the book. Reynolds and Finger. 0. Some of these can be translated as modalities as van Lambalgen has shown [Alechina. [van Lambalgen. Part I includes basic material on propositional logic and first-order syntax. so the proofs are either sketched or skipped. Now the era of the quantifier has begun! This Volume includes results in nonclassical first-order logic obtained during the past 40 years.g. i. 20001. Even for such seemingly simple questions we have our hands full.A ('A is true in n possible worlds'). van Lambalgen. Our main concern is the precise notion of substitution based . Such quantifiers (at least for the finite case) exist in natural language. Figure 1. Volume 1 of these books concentrates on the landscape described in (A) above. It is time for nonclassical logic to pay full attention to quantification. The table of contents for future volumes shows what to be addressed in connection with (B)-(H). The main emphasis is model-theoretic. and there remains enough material for future volumes and future authors. Thus many interesting and important topics are not included. 20061). or (uncountably many x)A(x) or many others. They are very important and they have not been exported yet to nonclassical logics (only through the modalities e. and we confine ourselves with only two kinds of logics: modal and superintuitionistic.xii INTRODUCTION x such that A(x)'). Chapter 1 contains definitions and results on syntax and semantics of nonclassical propositional logics. Up to now the focus was mainly propositional.

Chapter 3 considers the simplest kinds of relational semantics.) Now variable substitutions (acting on schemes or congruence classes) can be easily arranged in an appropriate congruent version. After this preparation we introduce two main types of first-order logics to be studied in the book . Glivenko theorem etc. (Schemes are quite similar t o formulas in the sense of [Bourbaki. The first one (for the intuitionistic case) is due to [Dragalin. 19931 (where they were called 'Cartesian metaframes'). 1990]. We also prove results on Lowenheim . Our a p proach is based on the idea that re-naming of bound variables creates different synonymous (or 'congruent') versions of the same predicate formula.INTRODUCTION xiii on re-naming of variables. 19681. but the proofs have never been published so far. but do not directly follow from them.Skolem property and recursive axiomatisability using translations to classical logic from [Ono. 19811: "It e would require further research t o be able t o present a general theory [of topological models. but rather easy. [Goldblatt. In the intuitionistic case this semantics was studied by many authors. Here the main objects are Heytingvalued (or modal-valued) sets. which are equivalent: Kripke frames with equality and Kripke sheaves. such as deduction theorems. see [Dragalin. Their predecessor in philosophical logic is 'counterpart theory' [Lewis. . Further incompleteness theorems are postponed until Volume 2. In 2 ~ h first author is happy t o fulfill his promise given in the preface of [Gabbay. 19881. 19731. 19721731 and [van Benthem. These versions are generated by a 'scheme' showing the reference structure of quantifiers.5) we describe different semantics for our logics and prove soundness results. In Part I1 (Chapters 3 . We begin with the standard Kripke semantics and then introduce two its generalisations. We also show that for the case of topological spaces the same semantics is given by sheaves and can be defined via so-called 'fibrewise models'. 19681. Chapter 4 studies algebraic semantics. The crucial difference between frames and metaframes is in treatment of individuals. We begin with two particular cases of Kripke metaframes: Kripke bundles [Shehtman and Skvortsov. which are a many-dimensional generalisation of Kripke frames from [Skvortsov and Shehtman. We mention simple incompleteness results showing that Kripke semantics is weaker than these generalisations. 19901 and C-sets (sheaves of sets over (pre)categories) [Ghilardi. Nevertheless. Then we show that algebraic semantics can be also obtained from presheaves over Heyting (or modal) algebras. second order Beth and Kripke models] possibly using sheaves".modal and superintuitionistic. because in some semantics soundness proofs may be quite intricate. Soundness proofs in that chapter are not obvious. These results were first stated in [Shehtman and Skvortsov. This classical topic is well known to all students in logic. while in a C-set instead of an inheritance relation there is a family of maps. and prove syntactic results that do not require involved proof theory. [Fourman and Scott. and the second version was first introduced in [Shehtman and Skvortsov. 19791. However none of the existing definitions fits well for our further purposes. 19891. 19831.2 They resemble the well-known results in topos theory. our soundness proof seems to be new. 1990]. In a Kripke bundle individuals may have several 'inheritors7 in the same possible world. In Chapter 5 we study Kripke metaframes. 19841.

Then we apply soundness theorem to Kripke bundle and functor semantics. Then we prove general completeness results for subframe and cofinal subframe logics from [Tanaka and Ono. In Chapter 6 we study Kripke frames with varying domains. 19961. cf. The detailed exposition of this semantics is postponed until Volume 2. Simplicia1 semantics Chapter 9. [Shimura. we introduce different types of canonical models. Applications of semantical methods Chapter 16. 19891. those with a fixed frame of possible worlds). 19961. Hyperdoctrines Chapter 10. We prove completeness for intermediate logics of finite depth [Yokota. Completeness in algebraic and topological semantics Chapter 11. Definability Chapter 13. Axiomatisable logics Chapter 17. Then we elucidate the methods from [Skvortsov. Simulation of classical models Chapter 15. Skvorstov). 19991. In Kripke semantics many logics are incomplete. The proof of soundness for metaframes is rather laborious (especially for the intuitionistic case) and is essentially based on the approach to substitutions from Chapter 2. Fragments of first-order logics Chapter 19.. linear frames [Corsi. directed frames [Corsi and Ghilardi. 19951 for axiomatising some 'tabular' logics (i. and there is no general powerful method for completeness proofs. Part I11 (Chapters 6-7) is devoted to completeness results in Kripke semantics. [Shimura. Further results on Kripke-completeness Chapter 18. 19921. Propositional quantification . The last section of Chapter 5 gives a brief introduction to an important generalisation of metaframe semantics .so called 'simplicia1 semantics'. 20011. This proof has never been published in full detail. Chapter 7 considers logics with constant domains.xiv INTRODUCTION Kripke metaframes there are additional inheritance relations between tuples of individuals. First. Translations Chapter 12. Takano's theorem on logics of linearly ordered frames [Takano.e. 19891. but still we describe some approaches. but the others are original (due to D. The simplest kind is rather wellknown. [Hughes and Cresswell. Here are chapter headings in preparation for later volumes: Chapter 8. Incompleteness Chapter 14. We again present different canonical models constructions and prove completeness theorems from [Hughes and Cresswell. 19871 and other related results. 19931.

. 2 if necessary. and next to 2.1. Proof theory Some guidelines for the readers. Quantification in resource logic Chapter 25. but they cannot be understood without Part I.1-2. After that they can read Part I1 and sometimes go back t o Chapters 1. An experienced reader can look through Chapter 1 and go to sections 2.3. then move t o sections 2. Parts 11. 2.16. the beginning parts of sections 2.5. 2.7. we recommend to begin with sections 1.1-1.6. We do not recommend them to go to Chapter 5 before they learn about Kripke sheaves.5 and the basic definitions in 2. Free logics Chapter 21. 2. Skolemisation Chapter 22.6. Those who are only interested in Kripke semantics can move directly from Chapter 3 to Part 111. Reading of this book may be not so easy. For the readers who only start learning the field.INTRODUCTION Chapter 20. Conceptual quantification Chapter 23. I11 are the most important. Quantification in labelled logics.2. Then he will be able to read later Chapters starting from Chapter 3. Categorical logic and toposes Chapter 24. Chapter 26. E-symbols and variable dependency Chapter 27.

. = correspond to the metasymbols &. i..H. {Y I 3x XRY}. In this case we use the notation f : A ---+ B. V denotes the restriction of a map f to V. for a relation R on a set X R. . =+. 3. i. or just RV. A function from A to B is a binary relation F C A x B with domain A satisfying the functionality condition (xFy & x F t =+ x = z). denotes the image of a set V 5 W under R. denotes the range of a relation R.e. 11 denotes the cardinality of a set X. R(x) or Rx abbreviates R({x)). B) is then called a map from A to B. for a relation R W x W. i. 3. (Xi I i E I ) (or (Xi)iEr ) denotes the family of sets Xi with indices in the set I. is I d w is the equality relation in a set W. W)).:= R .. the triple (Idw. R . .xvi INTRODUCTION Notation convention We use logical symbols both in our formal languages and in the meta-language. denotes the domain of a relation R.y) 1 3 t (xRz & zSy)).e.~ the converse of a relation R. and the triple f = (F. for a subset X C Y there is the inclusion map jxy : X usually denoted just by j ) sending every x E X to itself. or prl(R). W. n). R R - Y (which is 1 V denotes the restriction 1 V = R n (V x V). I. S denotes the composition of binary relations R and S: R o S := {(x. R(V). so the formal symbols A. idw is the identity map on a set W (i. Here is some other set-theoretic notation and terminology. . {y I 3x E V xRy). icI U Xi denotes the disjoint union of the family (Xi)iET.Idx is the 'irreflixivisation' of R. In our terminology we distinguish functions and maps. and the formal symbols V. we use R o for inclusion.e.e. := 0 . i. {x I 3y xRy). dom(R).. A. X M denotes the set of all finite sequences with elements in X . C for proper inclusion.e. x I denotes the set (1. or prz(R). I J iEI Xix {i}. and f of a relation R to a subset V. i. 2X denotes the power set of a set X . The notation slightly differs. V are also used as metasymbols. rng(R)..e.

for 0 5 m < n is defined by the table for m 2 0. . is the abbreviation for T. In (for fixed n) is presented by the table - - We use a special notation for some particular maps. > 0. Facet embeddings S E Tn-l. . xvii - In (for m. := a? is the empty map I ---+ In (and obviously. a?" E T. T. : : ' In particular. 1 5 i < j 5 n. := a for 1 < i 5 n. n E w ) . Tmn denotes the set of all injective maps in Em. Standard embeddings (inclusion maps). f )(x) = g(f (x)). Con = (0.n for n .INTRODUCTION w is the set of natural numbers. denotes wm. Standard projections a?" E Cmn for m > n > 0... In particular..)).#Oiffn>m. Trans~ositions E T n for n 02 2 2... 6 =a:-'. In particular.. Obviously.L := + 0. In particular. . simple transpositions are a. Cmn = (In)Imdenotes the set of all maps a : I . f or f o g. Cmn#Oiffn>Oorm=O. the set of all permutations of I. A map f : I . simple projections are a := a" for n > 0. So sition of f : A --i and g : B (f og)(x) = (9 . . there are simple embeddings al. Tm. Note that we use two different notations for composition of maps: the compoB C is denoted by either g . and T.

) is a composition of simple transpositions and simple embeddings. cf.a. every injection (from T. denotes the void sequence. and every surjection is a composition of simple transpositions and simple projections. .ai := ai := a . . Every map a :I . j < i. tai-l. So we write down a tuple (al. In the particular case.e. Let also AT E El. a. x. ...) (especially if n = I). . and simple projections. We usually denote the range of this function. Sometimes we write b E a instead of b E r(a).) as r(a).) also as a1 . . . we define its simple extension a+ E Em+l. i. ifi=n+l. C . ..n+l such that a+(i) := a(i) n+l for i E I. ck : = c . is a composition of simple transpositions.. be the map sending 1 to i.:. One also can easily show that every map from C .xviii INTRODUCTION It is well-known that (for n > 1) every permutation a E T. : Sn Sm sending a to Thus every map a E C a ..we also use the notation ~1 ng... The identity map in C. simple embeddings. and := nla := a . =a.rr.) E Sn can be regarded as a function In S . We do not make any difference between words of length n in an alphabet D and n-tuples from Dn. E Cn+l. . when a = 61 is a facet embedding and a E Sn.an). w k For an arbitrary set S. and also a x or ( a . . In acts on Sn via composition: - - . 6 for i E I. every tuple a = ( a l . bn = (al .a. . p. (a ) a p denotes the join For a letter c put (the concatenation) of sequences a. and it is obvious that id. let A E Can be the map with . . . ..ai+l. . for any n we have (a. we often write x1 . := id^. . 19671. is a composition of (simple) transpositions.n+a: In particular.x) rather than the dubious notation a(%). gives rise to the map .a.. .4" = a". . the table ( :) For every a E C . .)+ =. oayi whenever n 2 2. the set {al. ifi=m+l. a. xn rather than (xl. ZI 1 (or lal) denotes the length of a sequence a.. A - Hence we obtain . = a. In particular. . [Gabriel and Zisman. . . is id. ...

S Proof .rr. The other way round. j (a(i) = a ( j ) + ai = aj).)-l. - w Hence we obtain L e m m a 0.2.2.~ > 1. we have a . cf.(%) := ai and add arbitrary bk for k @ r ( a ) .i r . then for any a E Sn. T ) = ( a . Then a # b a n d . L e m m a 0.1 (1) . a .. if I 1 = 1.0. 7 E Ck.3 For IS/ surje~tive. a E Em.0.a # nub.5 For I 1 > 1.b differ a t the j t h component.. if a sub a . a is surjective iff r.0.rr.2 Let S # 0 . let a E Em. whenever a E Sn. Let .rng(a). b =cf-'den-j.. is surjective.4 For I 1 > 1. T a k e a = cn. ( a . then a = b .0. On the other hand. j E I .INTRODUCTION L e m m a 0. : Sn + Sm is Proof If a is injective. n.0.. a E C.rrT xix . a is injective iff ..rr. S bijective.rr. Then r. c # d..a and a($)= j . where a s u b a denotes the property Vi. Proof In fact. a is bijective ijf -ir.e. a E Em. In is surjective and a.To = then T. d E S. (2) I a is a permutation (a E T.e. a = n . then S T. We use the following relations on n-tuples: L e m m a 0.. by L e m m a 0.. f To-1 = (r. a E Em.0.0. a for some b. a 9.a ( i ) = a ( j ) + i = j + ai = a j . take a E Smsuch that ai # aj. (a). . is injective. r. i. c . if a = b . Suppose a : I . if a(i) = a ( j ) for some i # j. b E Sn.rr. Then a sub a is not true. a ) . If . b = c m . then ai # bi for i In such that On the other hand. : Sn + Sm is is bijective for every a E C. i.). is a permutation of Sn and Proof (1) Since composition of maps is associative.. [Sn] 0. just put b. Hence by Lemma 0. a E Em. be non-surjective. a sub a. 3Clearly. then obviously a ( j ) = a(k) implies a j = ak.[Sn]= {a E SmI a s u b a ) .

( r . T : I . Let also T I: := ran. We say that a sequence a E Dn is distinct. b E Sm.. so : facet embedding 61 eliminates the i t h component from an n-tuple a E Sn. f ~ Proof Put a(i) = j for some j such that bi = a j . L e m m a 0. o for some a E Em. T? (al. a E Ekm.an+l = ( a ~. . where a? E Thus is a simple projection. a n . (2) Moreover. Then b = a ... ~ . 71.(i). z b is d i ~ t i n c t .I.. . . Let T := .. := T ~ . u + .6 If a.an) = (al. distinct a E Sn.0.) for n > 0. (2) For a E Em. a+-a+m=a. ( a )= a . u ) + = r +. n . b is obtained by renumbering a subsequence of a. . . .an+l) E Dntl.8 (1) Let a E S n .0. > 0. .then u is an injection. . a n . . .rrs.7 (1) For T E Em.. then a. a. . then a . a. a# T and I 1 2 n.. . if all its components at are different..(i) ) # a. ~ ( i # a ( i ) . 41n other words. . a S # a . L e m m a 0.0. 7 for any If for some i. r ( b ) C_ r(a). E is a simple embedding.a Proof Straightforward. Proof ---. a n ) for a = (al.xx INTRODUCTION We further simplify notation in some particular cases. . . ¤ L e m m a 0.

. . . . 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. . .6 General Kripke frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Neighbourhood semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. . . .16 A-operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Splittings . . . . .3 Main constructions . . . . . . .3 Relational semantics (the modal case) . . . . . . . . . . 1. . . . . . . . .1. . . . . . . . .1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Introduction . . . 1. . . 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. 1. . . . .5 Modal counterparts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Subframe and cofinal subframe logics . .4 Relational semantics (the intuitionistic case) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. .2 Algebraic semantics . . . . . . . . . 1. . . . . . . .4 Conical expressiveness . . .15 Transitive logics of finite depth . . . . . . 3 3 5 11 19 19 19 24 30 32 37 38 40 44 47 48 52 58 65 68 70 72 76 xxi . . .10 Trees and unravelling . . . . 1. . . .1 Formulas . . . . . . . . . . 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. . . . .14 Tabularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. . . . . . . . . . 1. . .11 PTC-logics and Horn closures . . . . . . . . . . . .3. . . . . . .7 Canonical Kripke models . . . . . . . .2 Kripke frames and models . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. . . . . . . . . . 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. . . . . . . . . . . 1. 1. . . . . .3. . 1. 1. . .1 Propositional syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Logics . . . . . .8 First-order translations and definability . . . .Contents Preface Introduction v ix I Preliminaries 1 3 1 Basic propositional logic 1. . . . .9 Some general completeness theorems . . .

. .9 Perfection . . . . . .16 Semantics from an abstract viewpoint . . .11 Godel-Tarski translation . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Adding equality . . . . . . . 2. . . . . 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Formula substitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Strong morphisms . 239 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Propositional parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Predicate Kripke frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 3. . . . . . . .11. . . . . . . . 219 3. . . . . . . 281 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Examples of Kripke semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 3. . . . . 199 3. .7 Morphisms of Kripke sheaves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 3.5. . . . . . . . . 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Formulas with constants . . . . . . . 268 3. . 2. . . . .6 First-order logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. I1 Semantics 191 Introduction: What is semantics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. . . . 234 3. . . . . .4 Constant domains . . . . . . . .2 Kripke frames with equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 3. . .11. . . . . . . .12 Translations into classical logic . 193 3 Kripke semantics 199 3. . . .5. . . . . . . . 277 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 First-order theories .5. 2. . .3 Morphisms of Kripke frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 3.9 Simulation of varying domains .5 Kripke frames with equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 The Glivenko theorem . . . . . . . .1 Preliminary discussion . . . . . . . . . . 234 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Transfer of completeness . 235 3. . . .4 Main constructions . . . .5. 2. . . . . . . . . . . .6 Kripke sheaves . .10 Intersections . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Introduction . . . . . .2 Intuitionistic case . . .8 Deduction theorems . . . . .11 On logics with closed or decidable equality . . . . . . . 241 3.2 Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Introduction . . 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Variable substitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xxii CONTENTS 79 79 81 85 102 105 119 139 142 146 151 153 157 158 172 180 185 2 Basic predicate logic 2. . . . . . . . . . . . 279 3. .13 A-operation . . . .1 Modal case . . 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . 465 5. . . . . . . . . . . .1 Modal and Heyting valued structures . . . . . . . . . . . 356 5. . . . . . . . . . . .2 Kripke bundles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Representation theorem for modal metaframes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Monotonic metaframes . .12 Modal soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Intuitionistic forcing and monotonicity . . . . . . . . 515 6. . .3 Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Canonical models for superintuitionistic logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 More on forcing in Kripke bundles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Presheaves and Sl-sets . . . . .4 Natural models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 4. . . . . . . . . . . 328 4. . .CONTENTS xxiii 4 Algebraic semantics 293 4. . . . . 469 5. . .18 Some constructions on metaframes . 333 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14. 422 5. . . . . 319 4. . . . . . .1 Canonical models for modal logics . . . . 386 5. . .4 Morphisms of Kripke bundles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501 6. . . . . . . . . .1 Intuiutionistic forcing . . . . .19 On semantics of intuitionistic sound metaframes . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Sheaves . . . . . . 419 5. .8 Bundles over precategories . . 345 5. . . . . . . . . . . 493 6. . . . . . . .4 Morphisms of algebraic structures . . . . . .5 Intuitionistic Kripke bundles . . . 381 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388 5. . . . . . . . . . . . 339 4. . .7 Morphisms of presets . . . . .10 Permutability and weak functoriality . . . . . . .3 Intermediate logics of finite depth . . . 422 5. . .6 Directed frames . . . . . . . . 341 5 M e t a f r a m e semantics 345 5. . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Modal metaframes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 Morphisms of presheaves . . . . . . . .14. . .6 Functor semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Fibrewise models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452 5. . . 429 5. . . . . . . . 516 + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Maximality theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Simplicia1 frames . . . . . . . . . . .15 Intuitionistic soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 5. . . . . . 473 I11 Completeness 481 6 K r i p k e completeness for varying domains 483 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Examples of algebraic semantics . . . . . . 359 5. . . . 409 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Kripke quasi-bundles . . . . . 351 5. . . 432 5. . . . . . . . . 293 4. . . . . . . . .9 Metaframes . 374 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Algebraic models . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Preliminary discussion . . 338 4. . . . . 504 6. . . . . . . 311 4. 483 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404 5. . . . . . . . .5 Refined completeness theorem for QH K F . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .5 Predicate versions of cofinal subframe logics . . . . . .2 Intuitionistic canonical models with constant domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553 7. . . . . . . . . . . . Trees of bounded branching and depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 6. . . . .xxiv 6. Properties of A-operation . . . 573 7. . . . .7 Remarks on Kripke bundles with constant domains . . . . . . . . . . . .7 6. .10 6. . . Logics of uniform trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 558 7. . . . . A-operation preserves completeness .4 Predicate versions of subframe and tabular logics . . . . . . .11 CONTENTS Logics of linear frames .8 Kripke frames over the reals and the rationals . 563 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 6. . . . .6 Natural models with constant domains . . . . . . . . . . 555 7. . . . . 524 528 532 536 539 7 Kripke completeness 553 7. . . . . .1 Modal canonical models with constant domains . . . . . . . . . . 577 7. . . . . 565 7. . . . . . . . . . . 579 Bibliography 593 Index 603 . . .3 Some examples of C-canonical logics . . . .

Part I Preliminaries .

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. so. [van Benthem. r instead of pl. For more details we address the reader to textbooks and monographs in propositional logic: [Goldblatt.e. B > C stands for (A > ( B > C)). If a = k k. i. . . To simplify notation. 19871. We also use standard agreements about bracketing: the principal brackets are omitted. V .1 Formulas We consider N-modal (propositional) formulas1 built from the denumerable set P L = {pl. . w 7 ' Similarly. . For a seq. (A = B) := ((A > B ) A ( B > A)). 1997]. Ok. ) of proposition letters.g. p3. 19881.(for r 2 0 ). We give all the definitions and formulate results. . 1981]. abbreviates Okl . q. [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. .1. '1-modal formulas are also called monomodal. the classical propositional connectives A . tives are introduced in a standard way as abbreviations: 7 A : = (A 3 I). from I F . [Blackburn. . also see [Gabbay. 1. [Dragalin. we write p. 0.. 19831.Chapter 1 Basic propositional logic This chapter contains necessary information about propositional logics. OAA= A for every formula A. . Some authors prefer t h e term 'unimodal' t o 'monomodal'. I and the unary modal connectives 01. UA denotes the identity operator.p2. which is stronger than > and -. .. de Rijke and Venema. . 2-modal formulas are called bimodal.1 Propositional syntax 1. we use the notations O. := (I> T I). ON. . . but many proofs are sketched or skipped. A is stronger than V. e. Sometimes we use dots instead of brackets. 0. pz. . A 3. k. OiA := l U i l A for i = 1 . 0.. N . is also denoted by 0. 2001]. >. the derived connec.uence of natural numbers a = kl ..

Sub(r) (or S u b ~ ( r )if. the empty conjunction is T and the empty disjunction is I. A r denotes its conjunction and V I' its disjunction. d(A A B ) = d(A V B ) = d(A 1B ) = max (d(A).e. . . i..Ak/q17. An N-modal (propositional) substitution is a map S : LPN -+ LPN preserving Iand all but finitely many proposition letters and commuting with all connectives. we want to specify the language) denotes the set of all substitution instances of formulas from I?. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC As usual. It is rather clear that every substitution can be presented as a composition of simple substitutions. For a set of formulas r . We also use the notation (for arbitrary r ) 1 If n = 1. 2 ~ this book intuitionistic and classical formulas are syntactically the same. . LPN denotes the set of all N-modal formulas. . A substitution S such that S(qi) = Ai for i 5 k and S(q) = q for any other q E P L .4 CHAPTER 1.. we write q instead of 0 and 0 instead of O1. An intuitionistic substitution is nothing but a O-modal substitution. . . such that { k I S(pk) # pk} is finite. Later on we often write SA instead of S(A). they are called classical (or intuitionistic2). . The degree (or the depth) of a modal formula A (denoted by d(A)) is defined by induction: d(pk) = d ( l ) = 0. for a finite set of formulas r .d(B)). . qk be different proposition letters. . A substitution of the form [Alq] is called simple. this formula is called the substitution instance of A under S. d(OiA) = d(A) f l . or the S-instance of A. LPo denotes the set of all formulas without modal connectives. .qk]. Let ql. is denoted by [Al. the only n difference between them is in semantics.

recursive) set of formulas.. > OOp. A (normal propositional) N-modal logic is a subset of L P N closed under arbitrary A. A 3 B N-modal substitutions. necessitation ( ) (&) and containing all classical tautologies and all the formulas AKi := Oi(p 3 q) 3 (Dip > Oiq). A + A is an abbreviation for A+{A). := OOp > Up. Here is a list of some frequently used modal formulas and modal logics: + AT A4 AD AM A2 A3 AGrz AL A5 AB Ati At:! :=Op>p.1. recursively axiomatisable) if it can be axiomatised by a finite (respectively. The smallest N-modal logic containing a given N-modal logic A and a set of N-modal formulas I? is denoted by A I?. := OOp 3 p . whenever A1.2 Logics In this book a logic (in a formal sense) is a set of formulas. := OOp > OOp (McKinsey formula). .l.A. A logic is called finitely axiomatisable (respectively. modus ponens . We say that the logic K N +r is axzomatised by the set r. : = 0 0 p > Up. E L. := O(O(p 3 Op) > p) > p (Grzegorczyk formula). := 0 2 0 1 > p.1. if N is clear from the context. Sometimes we call N-modal logics (or formulas) just 'modal'. and K denotes K1. := O(Op > p) > Up (Lob formula). We say that a logic L is closed under the rule (or that this rule is admissible in L) if B E L. where 1 5 i 5 N K N denotes the minimal N-modal logic. :=O(pAOp>q)VO(qAUq>p). . PROPOSITIONAL SYNTAX 5 1. := OOp > OOp. . := OlOzp 3 p. ~ := Op . for a formula A. It is well-known that a logic is recursively axiomatisable iff it is recursively enumerable. A logic A is consistent if I@ A .

3 := K + AT. := S 4 AB. An m-formula is a formula without occurrences of letters pi for i > m. so for example. (Godel-Lob logic). A formula A in the language of a logic A is A-consistent if 1 A @ A.1 S4. and so on. + + + := K 2 + Atl + At2. := S 4 AGrz (Grzegorczyk logic).t := D + A 4 . := D 4 + A M . CHAPTER 1. An N-modal propositional theory is a set of Nmodal propositional formulas. and containing the following wellknown axioms: (Ax81 (P 3 r ) ((9 r ) 3 ( P V 3 r)). The corresponding N-modal versions are denoted by D N . := S 4 AM. := K AL. TN etc. LPN[m denotes the set of all N-modal m-formulas. DN:=KN+{O~TI~<~<N). moreover. := K 4 A3. := K A4. are used for superintuitionistic logics as well. Members of a logic are also called its theorems. Grz GL K. etc. := K 4 + A T . := S 4 O(Op > q) v O ( 0 q > p). The notation A l? and the notions of finite axiomatisability. := K A5.. The sets A [m are called bounded logics. ~ The smallest superintuitionistic logic is exactly the intuitionistic (or Heyting) propositional logic. An extension of an N-modal logic A is an arbitrary N-modal logic containing A. we use the notation A -l A as synonymous for A E A. Such a theory is A-consistent if all conjunctions + . it is denoted by H.6 := K + OT. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC + + + + + + T D4 D4. := S 4 A2. extensions of a logic A are also called A-logics. A r m denotes its restriction to m-formulas. If A is a modal or a superintuitionistic logic. A superintuitionistic logic is a set of intuitionistic formulas closed under intuitionistic substitutions and modus ponens.

i=O IG. p n V ( p n > A P n .. I . Let us fix names for some particular intuitionistic formulas and superintuitionistic logics: EM AJ AJAPl APn K P := := := := := . In the intuitionistic case we also consider double theories that are pairs of sets of intuitionistic formulas. For a superintuitionistic logic A. := H E M (classical. ( 7 p > q V r ) > ( i p > q) V ( ~ > r) (Kreisel-Putnam formula).7 7 p v ( 1 1 p 3 p). c L e m m a 1. PROPOSITIONAL SYNTAX 7 over its finite subsets are A-consistent and A-complete if it is maximal among A-consistent theories (in the same language). C A. := H AZ (Dummett's logic). HJ LC CL V (pi pj).1.1. A) is called A-consistent if for any finite sets G r. or Boolean logic).1 (1) Some theorems of K N : . V V p j > j+i p j > i=o pi (Gabbay-De V (i~o j+i := ( P > 4) v ( 9 3 PI. EM. A superintuitionistic logic C is called consistent if I6C. O<i<j<n := K C := H+AJ(Jankov7slogic).-. Pi 3 n ( ) ) n Jongh formulas). It is well-known that every consistent superintuitionistic propositional logic is intermediate.1 ) (for n > 1). C is said to be intermediate if H C CL. p p V 7 p (the law of the excluded middle). A A-consistent double theory (' A) is called A-complete if r U A = LPo.p V 7 l p (the weak law of the excluded middle).1. . := + + The following inclusions are well-known: HcHJcLCcCL.. A. A Y A r o 3 V A. a double theory (l7.

2 Some theorems of H : - onpi. To formulate the next theorem. (Op v Oq) = u p v Oq. let . Lemma 1. (4) A theorem of S4.2: i oo(Api) Lemma 1.e. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGlC (2) The following rules are admissible i n every modal logic: Monotonicity rules Replacement rules A>B OiA 3 OiB (3) Some theorems of S 4 : A-B OiA s O i B o o p = Op.8 CHAPTER 1. r 0.3 (Propositional replacement rule) The following rule is admissible in every modal or superintuitionistic logic: We can write this rule more loosely as i.1. we introduce some notation.1. let > for a finite set of N-modal formulas A. For an N-modal formula B . i (5) i=1( ( P i 3 q ) 3 q ) - A (A i=1pi>*) 3 9 ) . in any formula C we can replace some occurrences of a subformula A with its equivalent A'.

~ u { A a set of intuitionistic formulas. is not necessarily an SPmodality. But . ( AO V A3 A) E A for some r 2 0 and some finite - A 5 Sub(r) provided T ( AA A UA 3 A) E A for .1. A 3 A t A for some r 2 0 and some finite A i Sub(I'). Then (11) Let A be an N-modal logic. Then A E ( A+I?) i f f (1) ( (2) (3) k=O ( AU k A ) 3 A) t A for some r 2 0 and some finite G A.provided K 4 C Sub(I') 2 A.1. n > 1 .4 (Deduction theorem) (I) Let C be a superintuitionistic logic. some finite A A Sub(r) . K ~ Nor S4N. A E ( A + r )is not equivalent Corollary 1. PROPOSITIONAL S Y N T A X 9 Theorem 1. (3) For 1-modal logics: i f formulas from I? and I" do not have common proposition letters. T r U { A ) E CPl. we leave this as an exercise for the reader.i n the general case.5 (1) For superintuitionistic logics: i f formulas from I? and r' do not have common proposition letters. 1 (111) Let A be a 1-modal logic. and it may happen that for any A. Similarly one can simplify the claim (2) for the case when A is an N-modal logic containing T N .1.1. let us point out that for the case when S4N A. 0. I n some particular cases this presentation can be further simplified: . (4) ( ACIA 3 A) E A for some finite A c S u b ( r ) .provided S 4 2 A . A E ( A + r )ifl ( r U { A ) a set of N-modal formulas. ) Then: A E (C + r ) i f f ( AA 3 A ) E C for some finite A 5 Sub@). (2) For N-modal logics: i f formulas from I? and I" do not have common proposition letters.

19971. this is still the case for finitely axiomatisable extensions of K4.9 If A E CL. (b) for logics above K4: (c) for logics above S4: Therefore we have: Proposition 1. The set of finitely axiomatisable and the set of recursively axiomatisable superintuitionistic logics are sublattices of S . 19831. both parts of the equality are axiomatised by the same set of formulas Remark 1.47. (2) The set of N-modal logics M N is a complete well-distributive lattice. A E C L implies --A theorem. so we can apply the Glivenko .€I is the smallest logic containing their union.1.1.CHAPTER 1. the set of recursively axiomatisable N-modal logics is a sublattice of M N . cf. . E CL. then 1 1 A E H .8 (Glivenko theorem) For any intermediate logic C 1 A E H iff -A E E iff 1 A E CL. A' E I". r 2 0). Corollary 1. [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. for example. Proof In fact. Theorem 2. Proof In fact. For another proof using Kripke models see [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev.7 Although the set of all finitely axiomatisable 1-modal logics is not closed under finite intersections [van Benthem. Theorem 1. For a syntactic proof see [Kleene.6 (1) The set of superintuitionistic logics S is a complete well-distributive lattice: Here the sum of logics C A.1.1. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC (a) for logics above T : ( A I?) + n ( A + r') = A + {OrA v OrA' I A E r . 19521. in the intuitionistic case. 19971.

for any a. 19941. a--+b=liffaIb. (St. Actually this semantics fits for every propositional logic with the replacement property.e.2 Algebraic semantics For modal and intermediate propositional logics several kinds of semantics are known. Algebraic semantics is the most general and straightforward. [Rasiowa and Sikorski. so Kripke semantics is reducible to algebraic. 0). /\ a j := max{b 1 V j E J b 5 aj). b. V) is a lattice with the least element 0. A.. i.2. A. here formulas are interpreted in relational systems. j € J 3Cf. i. i. a 5 b iff a A b = a. and + is the implication in this lattice. A lattice is called complete if joins and meets exist for every family of its elements: V a j := min{b I b'j j€J J a j 5 b). More precisely. Neighbourhood semantics (see Section 1. Note that (*) can be written as 0 and 1 = a --+ a is In particular. or Kriplce frames.13 A Heyting algebra is an implicative lattice with the least element: fi = (0.e.2. it interprets formulas as operations in an abstract algebra of truth-values. Let us begin with algebraic semantics.) --+ Recall that negation in Heyting algebras is l a := a the greatest element. c (Here I is the standard ordering in the lattice. Borceaux. +.e. 1963.17) is in between relational and algebraic. j€J A complete lattice is implicative iff it is well-distributive. (a A b) V c = (a v c) A ( b v c ) . V. Relational (Kripke) semantics is nowadays widely known.1. Also recall that an implicative lattice is always distributive: ( a V b) A c = (aA c) V (b Ac). Kripke frames correspond to a special type of algebras. . ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS 11 1. the following holds: aA (v aj) = v j€J (aAaj). Definition l. completeness follows by the well-known Lindenbaum theorem.

1(*). The latter holds.1(*)) to But this follows from ak A j E J (aj + b j ) < bk. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC So every complete well-distributive lattice can be turned into a Heyting algebra.3 Proof (I) hence and thus (2) hence .2.12 CHAPTER 1.2. Lemma 1. it is equivalent to Lemma Proof We have to prove which is equivalent (by 1. Let us prove two useful properties of Heyting algebras. since by 1.

Eventually A ( v i -+u) 5 V v i t u .2. n. -. are usually denoted by U. We also use the derived operation (equivalence) 7 in Heyting algebras and its analogue in Boolean algebras. n. l (and even U.4 A ( v l -+ u ) = ( V v i + u ) .2. --+. -. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS and thus Lemma 1. In this case V.-. A. where a V i a = 1. iEI w A Boolean algebra is a particular case of a Heyting algebra. . Then we can consider U. 0 . 0) as basic and define a 3 b := -a U b. iEI iEI Proof ( 2 ) vi 5 V vi implies iEI v v i + u SVi iEI + u. it follows that for any i E I Hence (V vi) A A ( v i iEI iEI +U ) V (vi A A iEI iEI iEI ( ~-+ i u ) )5 U .1. hence ( ) I Since A(Vi iEI ' ) 5 vi u ) U. 3.

19631 Definition 1.5 A n N-modal algebra is a structure 0 = ( 0 . O N ) . n . u. n l . 19631. n .2. i f fl is complete then f1° also is. [ ~ c ~ i nand Tarski.7 The open elements of a topo-Boolean algebra 0 constitute a Heyting algebra: a0= (a0.t satisfying the identities: Oil = 1. [Rasiowa and Sikorski. b). Moreover.b = O(a 3 . u.2. .ll N-modal formulas such that . O1 Definition 1.1). 0.14 CHAPTER 1. such that its nonmodal part -. 19791. Section 1. A n element a is said to be open i f Ua = a and closed i f O a = a.) algebra is a 1-modal algebra satisfying the inequalities I n this case CI is called the interior operation and its dual 0 the closure operation. s e ~ W Following [Esakia. Proposition 1.2. The valuation cp has a unique extension to a. . and Proof Cf. i n which a . 0 rather than 01. is a Boolean algebra.6 A topo-Boolean (or interior. . l .8 A valuation i n an N-modal algebra is a map cp : PL -+ 0. S2 is called complete i f the Boolean algebra fib is complete. or S 4 .1.2.It is known that every Heyting algebra is isomorphic to some algebra no [Rasiowa and Sikorski. (cf. 4. o). 19441. . and Diare unary operations in I. we call S2O the pattern of a. We also use the dual operations For 1-modal algebras we write 0 . BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Definition 1.

L e m m a 1. I which implies U ( a 3 b) 5 (Oa 3 Ob). because they hold in any Boolean algebra.2.e. we have < b.2. by induction on the length of B. (5) ~ ( n i A = n i ~ ( A ) . Finally. O ( a Z b) n Oa 5 Ob. 7 be valuations i n S1 such that for any B E PLrk (4) 7(B) = cp(SB). Proof First note that ML(fl) is substitution closed. Proof Easy. The validity of AKi follows by a standard argument. . A is called valid i n the algebra f l (notation: S k A) i f it is true i n every model 2 over S2. (*) x Y because x 5 y implies < * < nix Now since = Oi(x n y) = n i x n Oiy. Then (4) holds for any N-modal k-formula B . ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS (4) cp(A 3 B ) = c p ( 4 3 cp(B). This yields the validity of AKi.9. assume f l ! A.2. note that in a modal algebra Oi is monotonic: n i x Oiy.9 Let S2 be an N-modal algebra. S a propositional substitution. ) The pair ( a . Let cp. cp) if cp(A) = 1 (notation: ( a . and consider a new valuation 7 according to (4) from Lemma 1. cp) k A). To show that S k SA. In fact. L e m m a 1. cp) is then called an (algebraic) model over f l . So we obtain := {A E LPN 1 f l k A) i.2.10 (Soundness l e m m a ) The set ML(S2) is a modal logic. ( a a b) n a by monotonicity (*).1.and O i l = 1. = and let S be a propositional substitution. S i= SA. 2 The classical tautologies are valid in f l . modus ponens and necessitation preserve validity. since in a modal algebra 1 < a implies a = 1. A n N-modal formula A is said to be true in the model ( a . In fact. take an 2 arbitrary valuation cp in f l .

Similarly to the modal case. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL L O G I C D e f i n i t i o n 1.15 IL(52) is called the superintuitionistic logic of the algebra $2. the pair (52.14 ( S o u n d n e s s l e m m a ) For a Heyting algebra 52.2. p ) if pl(A) = 1 (notation: (52. iff 0 # 1 in 52. i. S a propositional substitution.e. 77 be valuations i n f2 such that for any B E P L ( 4 ) rl'(B) = cpl(SB). We easily obtain an intuitionistic analogue of Lemma 1.16 C H A P T E R 1.11 ML(52) is called the modal logic of the algebra 52. A n intuitionistic formula A is said to be true i n (52. A is called valid in the algebra 52 (notation: 52 k A ) i f it is true in evenJ model over 52. Then ( 4 ) holds for any intuitionistic formula B. Let cp. A s i n the modal case.12 A valuation in a Heyting algebra 52 is a map cp : P L It has a unique extension cp' : LPo 0 such that - -- 0.2.2. .2.13 Let 52 be a Heyting algebra. the set is a superintuitionistic logic. D e f i n i t i o n 1. cp) b A).9: L e m m a 1.2.e. D e f i n i t i o n 1.2. Similarly we have L e m m a 1. W e also define the modal logic of a class C of N-modal algebras ML(C) := ~ { M L ( s ~ 52 E C}.16 A valuation cp i n an S4-algebra f2 is called intuitionistic i f it is a valuation i n i. cp) is called an (algebraic) model over 52. I) Note that ML(52) is consistent iff the algebra 52 is nondegenerate. we define the superintuitionistic logic of a class C of Heyting algebras D e f i n i t i o n 1. i f its values are open.2.

17 Godel-Tarski translation is the map tic to 1-modal fomulas defined by the following clauses: from intuitionis- IT = I . ( A AB ) = A A~ ~ .2. Proof (1)By induction. By (1) and our assumption.2.1. (2) For any intuitionistic formula A.2. Lemma 1. be valuations in Then for any intuitionistic formula A.1. I n particular. 2 k AT. Lemma 1.2. qT = Oq for every proposition letter q. for any valuation cp in (If. Consider only the case A = B > C.) Assume nok A. Let $ be an arbitrary valuation in be the valuation in a0such that a. for the cases A = B V C. ~ ( A3 B)T = O(AT 3 BT). +(cT) +(cT)) (2) (Only if.1. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS 17 (-)T Definition 1.18 (OAT F AT) E S 4 for any intuitionistic formula A. and let ip for every q E PL.) Assume ip(AT)= 1. Hence a0FA. a0we have ipl(A) = ¤ . w be an S4-algebra. cp'(A) = p(AT)7 if ip is intuitionistic. A = B A C use Lemma 1. we have: Hence f k AT. i p ' ( ~ )= * ( A T ) . Suppose Then we have i p ' ( ~ >C) = ipl(B)-+ ipl(C)= + ( B T ) -+ = 0(+(BT) 3 = +(O(BT> C T ) )= $ ( ( B 3 C ) T ) .19 Let (1) Let ip. ~ B ( A V B )= A ~ v B ~ . By ( I ) . such that for any q E PL 1C. Proof Easy by induction.

0 := [ I ] .24 A set of modal formulas (notation: f2 k r ) i f all these formulas are valid.2.2. Definition 1. Definition 1.2. The set oJ all r-algebras is called a n algebraic variety defined by r .20 The Lindenbaum algebra L i n d ( A ) of a modal logic A is the set LPN/ -A with the operations [A] n [B] := [AA B]. .18 C H A P T E R 1.22 The Lindenbaum algebra L i n d ( C ) of a superintuitionistic logic C. [A] 4 [B] := [A > B]. Let [A] be the equivalence class of a formula A modulo -A. For an N-modal or superintuitionistic logic A. (1) L i n d ( C ) is a Heyting algebra.2. -[A] := [iA].21 For a n N-modal logic A (1) L i n d ( A ) is a n N-modal algebra. [A] u [B]:= [A v B].23 For a superintuitionistic logic C. similarly for intuitionistic formulas and Heyting algebras. the relation between N-modal (respectively. I n this case C2 is called a r-algebra. T h e o r e m 1.2. [A] v [B] := [A v B]. T h e o r e m 1. i s valid i n a modal algebra f2 Definition 1. B A S I C P R O P O S I T I O N A L LOGIC Let us now recall the Lindenbaum algebra construction. is the set L%/ -c with the operations [A] r\ [B]:= [A A B]. intuitionistic) formulas such that N~ A-AB iff ( A = B ) E A is an equivalence. 0 := [ l ] .

2. For more details. the truth of every formula is inherited in all later stages.3. Since every logic is complete in algebraic semantics. For polymodal formulas we need several accessibility relations corresponding to different necessity operators. with the accessibility relation 5 'before' (nonstrict).26 T h e poset M N of N-modal propositional logics (ordered by inclusion) i s dually isomorphic t o the set of all algebraic varieties of N-modal algebras. 19731 for further discussion. Here worlds represent stages of our knowledge in time. In relational (or Kripke) semantics formulas are evaluated in 'possible worlds' representing different situations. According to Brouwer's truth-preservation principle.1. worlds can also be called 'states'. 1. due to the wellknown Birkhoff theorem [Birkhoff. RELATIONAL SEMANTICS (THE MODAL CASE) 19 Algebraic varieties can be characterised in algebraic terms. For the intuitionistic case. A > B is true at w iff the truth of A implies the truth of B a t w and always later. there is the following duality theorem.3 Relational semantics (the modal case) 1. . 1. See [Dragalin. 'pieces of information'.3. Depending on the application area of the logic. Every world w is related to some other worlds called 'accessible from w'. iff A is not true at w and always later. possible worlds are moments of time. Theorem 1.3.25 A class of modal o r Heyting algebras i s a n algebraic variety iff it i s closed under subalgebras. 20001. [van Dalen. i. etc. similarly for superintuitionistic logics and Heyting algebras. Kripke semantics formalises the 'historical a p proach' to intuitionistic truth by Brouwer. and a formula O A is true at w iff A is true at all worlds accessible from w. homomorphic images and direct products.2.e. 'moments of time'.2 Kripke frames and models Now let us recall the main definitions in detail. 19881. 1 A is true at w iff the truth of A can never be established afterwards. OA is true at w iff A is true at some world accessible from w. dually.1 Introduction First let us briefly recall the underlying philosophical motivation. This corresponds to the ancient principle of Diodorus Cronus saying that T h e possible is that which either i s o r will be true So from the Diodorean viewpoint. 19791 (which holds also in a more general context): Theorem 1. Similarly. we address the reader to [Fitting and Mendelsohn.

R N ) . . u + B V C iff ( M . . The elements of W are called possible worlds (or points).. a map 0 : P L ---+ 2W. (3) M .0 ) . . u k C ) .3.R N ) corresponds t o an N modal algebra where n.2.are the standard set-theoretic operations on subsets o f W . Definition 1.2 A valuation in a set W (or in a frame with the set of worlds W ) is a valuation in MA(F). Ri 5 W x W . . and say that A is true at the world w o f the model M (or that w forces A). The above definition corresponds t o the well-known inductive definition o f forcing in a Kripke model given by (1)-(6) in the following lemma. ) For a formula A.. u + B or M . u k q z f f u E 0(q) (for q 6 PL). where 6 is a valuation i n F . (5) 0 ( 0 i A ) = Ui0(A)= {U I R ~ ( u2 B(A)). (3) e ( A V B ) = @ ( AU 6 ( B ) . is a void sequence.uI=C). ) (4) 6 ( A > B ) = 6 ( A ) 3 6 ( B ) . A Kripke model over a frame F is a pair M = (F. Lemma 1. I d w is the equality relation. . . .3 (1) M . . i. . according to Definition 1.e. For a Kripke frame F = ( W . u ~ B A C iff (M.1 An N-modal (propositional)Kripke frame is an (N+l)-tuple F = ( W . on W : k (Recall that . .8: (1) 0 ( 1 ) = 0 . and OiV := { X I R i ( x ) V).) Every N-modal Kripke frame F = ( W .. (4) M . (2) 6 ( A A B ) = 0 ( A )n 0 ( B ) . . M A ( F ) is called the modal algebra of the frame F . Quite often we write u E F rather than u E W .R N ) and a sequence a E IF we define the relation R .ukBandM.3. 0 is extended to all formulas in the standard way. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Definition 1.R1.R 1 .20 CHAPTER 1. Ri are the accessibility relations.3. we also write: M .R 1 .U. see the Introduction. such that W # 0 . w k A (or just w k A ) instead of w E 6 ( A ) .

at F.uI$B.3. v k B . we have Lemma 1.8 ) . u b O . (10) M . . A formula A is satisfiable at a world w of a frame F (or briefly. Definition 1. .2.ubC). in which 8 : { p l .R1. u k U. according to Definition 1.3. u k O i B (9) M . The (Kripke frame) variety of I? (notation: V ( r ) )is the class of all r-frames. similarly for a set of formulas. the set is a modal logic.10 implies: Lemma 1.3. u k B > C iff ( M . (7) M . A nonvalid formula is called refutable (in a frame or at a world).6 A modal formula A is valid in a frame F (notation: F k A ) i f it is true in every model over F . iff Qv E R. v k B.2. ) -+ 2W.3. Since by Definitions 1.. In this case 0 is extended only to m-formulas.3. iff 3v E R.5 A modal formula A is true in a model M (notation: M k A ) i f it is true at every world of M . 8 ( A ) is the same in F and in M A ( F ) .2. u k i B iff M. x k A) if it is true at x in every model over F . . .3.(u) M ..2.(u) M . A set of formulas is valid in F (notation: F != I?) i f every A E is valid.8 (Soundness lemma) (1) For a Kripke frame F . . v k B . p . B Definition 1. A is satisfied in M i f it is true at some world of M . A formula is called refutable in a model if it is not true. A formula A is valid at a world x in a frame F (notation: F. (8) M . RELATIONAL SEMANTICS (THE MODAL CASE) (5) M .4 An m-bounded Kripke model over a Kripke frame F = (W. In the latter case we also say that F is a r-frame. Definition 1.3.8 and 1.3.1. u b B impliesM.7 For any modal formula A and a Kripke frame F F k A iff M A ( F ) k A. w k A. R N ) is a pair ( F . w ) if there exists a model M over F such that M . Thus 1. . 8 is called an m-valuation. .B i f f 3v E R i ( u ) M .

it is closed under M P and 0-introduction but not necessarily under substitution. V ( S 4 ) consists of all quasi-ordered (or pre-ordered) sets. M L ( C ) ) is called the modal logic of F (respectively. 1 ) consists of all S4-frames with McKinsey property: V ( S 4 .~ O R GR O R . ' n ' + Let us describe varieties of some particular modal logics: Proposition 1. In particular. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC (2) For a class C of N-modal frames. R . For a Kripke model M .t.10 For an N-modal logic A and a set of N-modal formulas I?.R) such that Vx3y x R y . i. the set is an N-modal logic. V(KN + I ) = V(r).y .e. of C). or piecewise directed): V x . 2 ) consists of all S4-frames with Church-Rosser property (or confluent. V ( T )consists of all reflexive frames.3. . of the frames (W. The following is a trivial consequence of definitions and the soundness lemma. i. V ( K 4 ) consists of all transitive frames. reflexive transitive frames. Lemma 1. + 3t ( y R t & z R t ) ) .22 C H A P T E R I .r. V ( A I) = V ( A ) V ( I ' ) .9 M L ( F ) (respectively. Definition 1. V ( S 4 . M T ( M ) is not always a modal logic.11 V ( D ) consists of all serial frames.3.3. F (C).' . z ( x R y & x R z or equivalently.e. or complete w. the set is called the modal theory of M . or the modal logic determined by F (by C).

cf. i n a countable/finite A-frame).x z R.e.p.^ The following simple observation readily follows from the definitions.3. z ( x R y & x R z + ( y = z V y R z or equivalently V zRy)).m. All particular propositional logics mentioned above (and many others) are known to be Kripke-complete.1. L e m m a 1. . However not all modal or intermediate propositional logics are complete in Kripke semantics. J. [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. serial. of those without infinite ascending chains xlR . in general one can expect that a 'randomly chosen' logic is compete. 19971.) i f it is determined by some class of countable frame^. 4See Section 1. i. Section 1.r.m. V ( K 4 + AW. 3 ) consists of all piecewise linear (or nonbranching) K4-frames. . Kripke-completeness was proved for large families of propositional logics.3. Shehtman.y. K ~ N ) . 6'countable' means 'of cardinality &'.) iff each of its nontheorems is refutable i n some A-frame (respectively.9.5 V ( S 5 ) consists of all frames. But incomplete propositional logic's look rather artificial. < .p.) i f it is determined by some class of finite frames. 5Recall that x R .4 : V ( G r z ) consists of all Notherian posets. counterexamples were found by S.. Van Benthem. A has the finite model property (f. RELATIONAL SEMANTICS (THE MODAL CASE) 23 V ( K 4 ./ f.12 Let A be a modal logic.) consists of all transitive frames of width I n. transitive) if it contains TN (respectively. D N .3.f.x3 . A is called Kripke-complete if it is determined by some class of frames.f.13 (1) A logic A is Kripke-complete (respectively. K. i. Due to these characterisations.e. R-~ORLI~URUR-~.p. where accessibility is an equivalence relation. V.p. Definition 1.t. (2) M L ( V ( A ) ) is the smallest Kripke-complete extension of A . an N-modal logic is called reflexive (respectively. Thomason.9 gives a brief outline of these results. Kripke models' in the following sense. see Introduction. has the c. so A is Kripkecomplete i f fA = M L ( V ( A ) ) . Fine.y iff xRy & x # y. Nevertheless every logic is 'complete w. such that Vx. A has the countable frame property (c.

3. M be the same as i n the previous definition. then the frame is called a subframe of F (the restriction of F to V). respectively.3. . the same for submodels. = v. R1. . . M' = (F'.um) such that uo = U . C.19 WTu = R*(u).j o .jm-l.18 Let F. In this case the subframe F 1 V and the submodel M 1 V are called generated. see below. R1. . . . R i . A frame F (respectively. . then f M 1 V := ( F 1 V. .14 A n N-modal Kripke model M is exact for an N-modal logic A if A = MT(M). the corresponding subframe F f u := F 1 (WTu) is also called the cone (in F ) generated by u. c. weak subframes.15 Every propositional modal logic has a countable exact model.16 If F = (W.. This follows from the canonical model theorem by applying the standard translation. . a Kripke model M ) is called rooted (with the root u) if F = F f u (respectively. and full weak subframes.subframes. . and uiRj. 8 V).. . generated.3. i..3. The smallest stable subset W f u containing a given point u E W is called the cone generated by u. similarly for the submodel M f u := M 1 (Wfu).- Definition 1. If also W = V. . RN) is a sequence (uo. . Then for a Kripke model M = (F.1. Q).8 /' V) is called a weak submodel. V 2 W.uifl for i = O . 2 to denote subframes. . or the subframe generated by u. is called its submodel (the restriction to V). c We use the signs a.3. . . u. R * = U R. m .3. . .17 F' = (V. . .24 C H A P T E R 1. I M = (F.3. . A set V C_ W is called stable (in F) i f for every i. where (6 1 V)(q) := Q(q)n V for every q E PL. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Definition 1.RN) if R b Ri for every i and V c W. R h ) is called a weak subframe of F = (W. where R* is the reflexive transitive closure of (R1U . .3 Main constructions Definition 1.e. Proposition 1. .RN) is a frame. Definition 1. R1.20 A path of length m from u to v i n a frame F = (W.. Ri(V) & V. We skip the simple proof of the following L e m m a 1. 1.€IF Definition 1. . F' is called a full weak subframe of F. M = Mfu).3. URN). 8) is a Kripke model. . . u l .

. Definition 1. Now Lemma 1. (2) M L ( F ) M L ( F 1 V). .3. M = (F. .3.3. . . Proof (1) Readily follows from Lemma 1. .'). .22 The temporalisation of a propositional Kripke frame F = (W.3.3. .. . . for any modal formula A. Then (1) For any u E V . R N .. R1.R. N. We also have: L e m m a 1.e.R1. .25 (Generation lemma) Let V be a stable subset in F.u1. RELATIONAL SEMANTICS (THE MODAL CASE) 25 For the particular case N = 1 we have ji = 1 for any i . . .1..26 (1) M L ( F ) = UGF n ML(Ffu).. A nonoriented path in F is a path in F'. A cone in F* (as a subset) is called a (connected) component of F.23 Let F = (W. 6 ) a Kripke model.R. (2) MT(M) Proof = uEM n MT(M TU) .24 (1) The component containing x E F (i.3.21. .3.21 x E FTu iff there exists a path from u to x in F .RN) be a propositional Kripke frame. (2) Follows from (1) and the observation that {(x. A subset V E W is called connected (in F) i f it is stable i n F*. Definition 1.. . (2) The components of F make a partition. The same holds for bounded models.3. the cone F' T x ) consists of all y E F such that there exists a non-oriented path from x to y. L e m m a 1.urn). The following is well-known: H L e m m a 1. with obvious changes.'-stable for every i = 1 . F itself is called connected if W is connected i n F .3.y) I there exists a nonoriented path from x to y ) is an equivalence relation on W.R N ) is the frame F' := (W. i. both Riand R. R1. so we can denote a path just by (u0.'. .19 can be reformulated as follows: L e m m a 1. .e...

3. which implies the main statement. By Lemma 1. .26. Then.then M .j ) .25(1).25(1) MTu. .. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC ( 1 ) By Lemma 1. Obviously. thus A # M T ( M f u ) ..3. there is a Kripke model M over F and a world u such that M .) = n0 j€JuEFJ ML(FT(u. hence M f u . and so F f u !+A. Definition 1. jGJ U Fj.M T ( M ) 5 M T ( M MT(M) u ) .26 CHAPTER 1.3. u I+ A for some u E M . u I+ A. . By Lemma 1.3.R N ) .25 ( I ) . j ' ) iff j = j' & x h j y . . for j€J where W = j€J u W j := U(wjx { j ) ) . But the embedding of Fj in F yields an isomorphism FjTu 2 FT(u. h j ) .3.26. . if A 6M T ( M ) . H . (2) By 1..28 Proof Let F := U F! (j€J ) = n ML(F').j ) ) .j ) R i ( y .R 1 . is the frame U Fj := ( W .3. j€J ( x . so c n uEM MT(M . u). by definition. .27 The disjoint sum ( o r disjoint union) of a family of frames Fj = (W.! := of U Fj isomorphic to Fi. j€J ML(F)= n vEF ML(F. u I+ A by 1. jcJ Hence we obtain ML (i€J U Fj 1 (Wi x ( 2 ) ) ) is a generated subframe L e m m a 1. U Y A .3. M L ( F ) C M L ( F f u ) for any u E F . in this case F. . and thus Now let A # M L ( F ) . On the other hand. j E J . R l j .3.25(2). hence by Lemma 1.

3. A surjective morphism is called a pmorphism (notation: f f is called an isomorphism from F onto F' (notation: f monotonic bijection and f-' is also monotonic. (4) 2 i s an equivalence relation between Kriplce frames. similarly for Kriplce models. . Q). . R1. . f (u) I= q. jGJ One can ML(Clj) for a family of modal algebras (f2j)jEJ .3. F') i f it i s a As usual. this yields an alternative proof of 1. F. 0') be two Kripke models.7.28. R h ) be two frames. v E W tJi (uR. Together with Lemma 1. .29 One can show that MA also show that M L CGJ ) U Fj 2 n MA(F'). A (p-)morphism (respectively.3. .3. : F ++ :F F'). L e m m a 1. an isomorphism) from M (on)to M' if for every q E PL. A map f : W + W' is called a morphism from F to F' (notation: f :F F') i f it satisfies the following conditions: E (1) Vu. F' = (W. u E W M. Definition 1. (3) A restriction of a frame morphism to a generated subframe is a frame morphism and moreover.31 Let M = (F.3. similarly for Kripke models. As in the case of frames. F and F' are called isomorphic (notation: F 2 F') if there exists an isomorphism from F onto F'. RELATIONAL SEMANTICS (THE MODAL CASE) 27 Remark 1. E W' Vi ( f (u)Riv' + 3v ( u R i v & f (v) = v')) (lift property). an isomorphism) of frames f : F F' i s said to be a (p-)morphism (respectively.R N ) . M' = (F'.3. . the same for Kripke models.1. . . We write F + F' if there exists a pmorphism from F onto F'. a restriction to a cone is a p-morphism onto a cone.30 Let F = (W. Note that the conjunction (1) & (2) is equivalent to 'cone preservation': Definition 1. Ri. .3. p-morphisms (1) The composition of frame morphisms F F' and F' F" is a F".32 - -. - - - F is generated ifl the inclusion map is a morphism (2) A subframe F' F' +. similarly for p-morphisms of frames and for frame morphism F (p-)morphisms of Kriplce models. morphisms of models are denoted by by +.v (2) Vu W Vv' + f (u)R: f ( v ) ) (monotonicity). u I= q iff M'. isomorphisms by 2.

28 CHAPTER 1.j . (4) Trivial. since a composition of isomorphisms is an isomorphism. (3) Follows from (1) and (2). BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Proof (1) Easily follows from cone preservation. . (2) In fact. the cone preservation for j is equivalent to R1(x) = R ( x ) for x E F'. F is The image of a cone is a cone by cone preservation. note that the restriction of f : F ---t G to F' F is the composition f . where j : F' ---ithe inclusion map.

W R e m a r k 1.generated subframes correspond to homomorphic images of algebras. T h e n F U Fi. The implication f (x)Rji f ( y ) + xRj y is trivial. Proposition 1. Exercise 1.34 Every variety V(r) is closed under generated subframes. [van Benthem.3.3. 1. RELATIONAL SEMANTICS (THE MODAL CASE) L e m m a 1. the joined m a p f := morphism F - U fi iEI is a G. However the converse to 1. We shall return to this topic in Volume 2. i ) whenever x E Fi.3.3. i ) = f ( y ) . Proposition 1.34 is not true.35 This proposition resembles the 'only if' part of the Birkhoff theorem 1. (2) for a n y family of morphisms fi : Fi ---+ G. then for a n y modal formula A. u != A iff MI. M . (3) If F ++ then M L ( F ) C ML(F1).3. SO f (x) = ( x . then (2) I f f : M ++ MI.3.e. f ( u )k A. This map is well-defined. Then (1) for any morphism f : F -t G. The analogy becomes clear if we note the duality between Kripke frames and their modal algebras .33. - MI. F1 Proposition 1.25. and disjoint sums. if f : M for any u E M .24. . de Rijke and Venema. then y E F as well. Proof Follows from 1.38 Let (Fi I i E I ) be a family of all different components of a propositional Kripke frame F . 20011.37 Let (Fi I i E I ) be a family consisting of all different components of a propositional Kripke frame F.3.2.33 (Morphism lemma) 29 (1) Every morphism of Kripke models is reliable.3.2. i If xRjy and x E Fi. [Blackburn.28 and 1.25. p-morphic images. every fi := f 1 Fi is a morphism.3. i. 19831.3.i)Rji(y.3. and disjoint sums to direct products.3. cf. iEI P r o o f An isomorphism is given by the map f sending x to (x.1. since different components are disjoint by 1.36 Show the following analogue of 1. pmorphic images to subalgebras. A precise model-theoretic characterisation of Kripke frame varieties (using ultrafilter extensions) was given by van Benthem. for a n y modal formula A.26: the poset of Kripkecomplete N-modal propositional logics is dually isomorphic to the poset of all N-modal Kripke frame varieties.

. For x E Fi we have Rj ( x ) C Fi. degenerate) i f u is reflexive (respectively. and S4-frames are quasi-ordered sets. f (urn))is a path from f ( u )to f (v) in G. ~ " )I u R v ) . R").3. so f [ R j(%)I = fi [Rj( x ) ] = sj( f i( x ) )= Sj ( f ( x ) ) . K4-frames are transitive.3. for any u E M .then G is connected. the corresponding C ( p ) is p A Up.11. irreflexive).jo.3.42 A n N-modal propositional logic L is called conically expressive i f there exists a propositional N-modal formula C ( p ) with a single proposition letter p such that for any propositional Kripke model M with M t= L. an extension of a conically expressive logic (in the same language) is conically expressive. its equivalence classes are called (R-)clusters. ~. urn)is a path from u to v in F .39 Let F = (W. . BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC ( 1 ) Since every component is a generated subframe. Let W" := W/ = R be the set of all R-clusters. . and let u" be the cluster of u . " A singleton cluster { u ) is called trivial (respectively.and S4-frames. (2) Let Rj be a relation in F. . L e m m a 1. and we can consider the quotient set as a frame.. . R) be a K4-frame. Obviously. . where R := { ( u " .3. Then the frame F" := (W".32(3).3. since f f Fi = fi and fi is a morphism. (2) The map u ++ u" is a p-morphism from F onto F" Proof Straightforward. this follows from Lemma 1. u t = C ( p )@ M f u t = p . Definition 1. Sj the corresponding relation in G.40 (1) R" is transitive and antisymmetric..4 Conical expressiveness Definition 1. then ( f ( u O )j.3. A simple example of a conically expressive logic is K4.3. then R is a partial " order. M . In this book we are especially interested in K4.41 I f f : F Proof G and F is connected. is called the skeleton of F .30 Proof CHAPTER 1. 1. -+ L e m m a 1. by Lemma 1. If (uo. R) there is the equivalence relation %R:= ( Rn R-l) U Idw in W . For a K4-frame (W. if R is refiexive.

t + O 1 0 2 p > O z O l p is conically expressive. any A. But this readily follows for from 1. (a) Show that K Now given C from Definition 1.3. Proof Similar to soundness of the substitution rule.3. for a formula A E LPN put Show Let us show that 0*behaves like an S4-modality in logics containing L.3.46 If a n N-modal propositional logic A is conically expressive.44 For any N-modal Kripke model M such that M ! A for any = u E M . M k A implies M 'F O * A . such that for any u E M Then by induction we obtain for any propositional formula X ( p ) for any u E M. is (b) Recall that K4. Hence for any u E M and for C from 1.3. then the following formulas are in A (for k < N ) : .1.3.42. Lemma 1.13. Lemma 1.u O * A != Hence the claim follows.45 If a modal logic A i s conically expressive and O* i s defined as A above. that K4.3.3. Let Mo be a Kripke model over the same frame as M .43 + Ci2p> 04p conically expressive. Lemma 1. any N-modal formula A for where R* i s the same as in Lemma 1.3.19and the choice of Mo M.44. But by Lemma 1. it suffices to show that for any Kripke model M . then the rule .3.t = K 2 + 0 1 0 2 > p + O l O l p > p + O l p 3 0 ? p . Moluk p. A has an exact model.3.i s admissible i n A O*A Proof Since by 1. RELATIONAL SEMANTICS (THE MODAL CASE) Exercise and so by 1.19.3.

2. : W 1. 8) is also called intuitionistic.B & M . M. This easily follows from 1. A n intuitionistic valuation i n F is defined as a valuation in HA(F).e.44. u I q t iff u E 8(q) (for q E P L ) . the reflexivity and the transitivity of R*. R.4. 6' is extended to the map 6" : I F + HA(F) according t o Definition 1. Now we readily obtain an alternative inductive definition of intuitionistic forcing.72.4 Relational semantics (the intuitionist ic case) Definition 1. as a valuation in W with the following truth-preservation(or monotonicity) property (for every q E P L ) : The corresponding Kripke model M = (F. equivalently.3.ult. and the inclusions R* 2 Rk o R*.3. 6') we define the intuitionistic forcing relation between worlds and intuitionistic formulas as follows: M .ulFBvC M.3.ulkC. MA(F) is a topo-Boolean algebra. Then the algebra of its open elements (or.4. of stable subsets of F ) HA(F) := MA(F)' is called the Heyting algebra of F .1 Assume that F = (W. Lemma 1. u l k C . M. i.2 For an intuitionistic Kripke model M = (W.32 CHAPTER 1. Rk C R*. Definition 1. S4-frames are also called intuitionistic propositional. i. iff . R) is an S4-frame. u I k A := U E ~ ' ( A ) .uII-BvM. Lemma 1. cf.3 Intuitionistic forcing has the following properties: M.e.ulk B A C iff M.4. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Proof Again we can consider an exact model and show that these formulas are true at every world.

one can reformulate the definitions of satisfiability.14 and the trivial observation that F I I.3. H Together with Lemma 1. u I= Oq. ¤ Definition 1.2.19. for which we need the following Definition 1.uIt7B M 7 u 1 tB .3. etc.2. MT changes to IL. (1.9 is obviously transferred to the intuitionistic case.1.vIYB.5.4.e. Obviously.4.19.4.vIF B e M.v~F(uRv&M. 1. We also have a relational analogue of Lemma 1.4. Similarly.~ltA+M. the reader can easily formulate them. we have (1) for any u E F and intuitionistic formula A Mo. This logic is called the intermediate logic of F and denoted by IL(F).4.u It. iff V V E R(u) M. Trivial. if A is true i n every intuitionistic model F over F.uIF B 3 C M. Proof Obviousfrom1.3. in which I? is intuitionistically valid. The pattern of M i s the Kripke model Mo over F such that for any u E F. RELATIONAL SEMANTICS (THE INTUITIONISTIC CASE) 33 M.6 Let F be an S4-frame. an intuitionistic I?-frame is an intuitionistic propositional frame. since @(A) is stable. IT.4.10 and 1. y this implies L e m m a 1. The class of all these frames is called the intuitionistic (Kripke frame) variety of I? and denoted by V' (I?). u k q i f l M . U I= A ~ . M a Kripke model over F .C i f f VV E R(u) ( M . q E P L M o .15 also have intuitionistic versions.13 and Proposition 1. Respectively the notation M L . i. L e m m a Let F be an S4-frame.3.6) for the intuitionistic case.vIF C). For a set of intuitionistic formulas I?.2. L e m m a 1. Then the set of all intuitionistic formulas valid i n F is an intermediate logic.A. Mo is an intuitionistic Kripke model. v It.6.A iff M .C). v I B J M .7 Under the conditions of Definition 1. Mo = M if M is itself intuitionistic.5 A n intuitionistic formula A is said to be valid in an S4-frame F (notation: F I A) i f H A ( F ) It. . F iff V V E R(u) (M. Lemmas 1. Definition 1.4 I n intuitionistic Kripke models the truth-preservation holds for any formula A: (TP) Proof Vu.vlkA).

26. f ( u )IF A. 1. u IF A iff M ' .7(2).3. .4.25(2) and Lemma 1.11 For an S4-frame F L e m m a 1.3. then f is reliable: for any u E M . rn The three subsequent lemmas readily follow from Lemmas 1.33.9 Let F be an S4-frame. u E M I (2) If Fl is a generated subframe of F then Proof ( 1 )From the generation lemma 1. for any intuitionistic formula A.13 ( M o r p h i s m l e m m a ) Let M .4.7. take a valuation 6 in F such that B(q) = R(O1(q))for any q E PL.4. (2) I f f : M - M ' . 1.34 CHAPTER 1. L e m m a 1. and let F.3.28 and 1.12 For S4-frames Fi. i E I L e m m a 1.A.1). ¤ ( 2 ) From Lemma 1. (3) If F + F'.A iff M' I!. then M1 also is intuitionistic. L e m m a 1. M . F' be S4-frames. and for any A E LPo. M' be intuitionistic Kripke models.4.4. then I L ( F ) E I L ( F 1 ) . M an intuitionistic model over F .10 Let F' be a subframe of a Kripke S4-frame F . then M I!. Then every intuitionistic valuation 6' i n F' can be extended to an intuitionistic valuation i n F. Proof In fact. (1) If M I is a generated submodel of M . BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC L e m m a 1.25 and the definition of intuitionistic forcing (1. (1) I f f : M + M ' .

4. (3) Every Kripke-complete intermediate logic i s determined by some class of posets: L = IL(V1(L) n Posets). and let Posets be the class of all posets.34: Proposition 1. To complete the proof. So instead of V1(I') we can use the reduced intuitionistic variety V " ( r ) := ~ ' ( r ) Posets.14.4. and thus (F. p") k A by Lemma 1. . Proof (1) Follows readily from 1.3. it follows that the map sending u to u" is a p-morphism of Kripke models.14 Let F be a n S4-frame.3. and disjoint sums.4.4.4. (2) In fact. note that an arbitrary intuitionistic valuation in F" can be presented as cp".1.4. := It is clear that p" is well-defined and intuitionistic.4.14.40. By Lemma 1. then G 2 G" E V1(r)". F IF I? e F" IF I? by 1. 1 F E C) under Lemma 1. The other way round. so ~ ' ( r ) " C V1(I?).15 (2) VJ(I?)" = V1(r) n Posets for any set of intuitionistic formulas I?.13. if a poset G E V' (I?). (2).16 Intuitionistic Kripke frame varieties and reduced intu- itionistic Kripke frame varieties are closed under generated subframes. with + For a class C of S4-frames let C" be the closure of {F" isomorphism. n Now we obtain an analogue of 1. T h e n Proof If cp is an intuitionistic valuation in F. consider the valuation cp" in F" defined by ~ " ( 9 ) {u" I u E ( ~ ( 9 ) ) . RELATIONAL SEMANTICS (THE INTUITIONISTIC CASE) 35 Lemma 1. p) k A iff (F". (3) Note that L = IL(v'(L)) for a complete L and apply (I). p-morphic images.

F'" such that h N ( u " ) = h(u)" . M' = ( F ' .4. h ( x ) I A.4.I d w ) .4. frames of the form (W.8 V W ( A G n )consists of all posets F . n Definition 1. IHA(FT $)I I.4.13. Quasi pmorphisms are reliable for intuitionistic formulas: L e m m a 1.17 V" ( E M ) = V " ( C L ) consists of all trivial frames.8 ) . sSee Section 1.R') is a monotonic map h : W W' with the quasi-lift property: V x E W Vy' E W' ( h ( x ) R ' y l + 3y ( x R y & h ( y ) =R. (2) If there exists a quasi-p-morphism from F onto F' then I L ( F ) C I L ( F 1 ) .20 (1) If h is a quasi-morphism from M to MI.9.? V W ( A I W n )consists of all posets of width 5 n. 3 ) " consists of all nonbranching posets.4. y')). 8') a quasi-morphism from M to M' is a quasi-morphism of their frames such that for any q E PL M . t M . for any intuitionistic formula A .14. V " ( A J ) = V " ( H J ) = V ( S 4 . 1. . BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Proof For intuitionistic varieties this follows from 1.15. For reduced intuitionistic varieties we can also apply 1. i. Proposition 1. For intuitionistic Kripke models M = ( F . x IF A iff MI. 2 ) " consists of all confluent posets.4.e. The following is clear: L e m m a 1.18 A quasi-morphism between S4-frames F = (W. Let us describe reduced intuitionistic varieties for some intuitionistic formulas. then for any x E M .9. V" ( A Z ) = V" ( L C ) = V ( S 4 .R ) and F' = (W'.4.19 A quasi-(p)-morphism of frames h : F ---t F' gives rise to a quasi-(p)-morphism of their skeletons h" : F" -t. where for any x E F .15(2) and note that the class of posets is closed under the same three operations.4. x I q iff MI.36 CHAPTER 1.4. Proof By Lemmas 1.12 and 1. 7See Section 1. t t - A quasi-p-morphism is a surjective quasi-morphism. h ( x ) I q.4. V W ( A P n )consists of all posets of depth 5 n.20 and 1.

8 If a modal logic A > S 4 is Kripke-complete. Then S 4 t. . Lemma 1 5 1 Let S = [ C / p ] be an intuitionistic substitution.5.5. ST := [CTIp].5. I n particular.4 The above defined logic TA is called the superintuitionistic fragment of A.5.5.5. Theorem 1. m L ( 5 2 ) = 1 ~ ( 5 2 ' ) Proof This is a reformulation of 1. + r has Theorem 1. More precisely.(SA)T = s T A T for any intuitionistic formula A. [ ~ s a k i a 19791.3 For any S4-algebra 52. For a set of intuitionistic formulas let rT:= {AT I A E I?). lo[Maksimova g[Dummett and Lemmon.5. then TA is also Kripke-complete.2 For any I-modal logic A 2 S 4 the set T~ := {A E 13% 1 E A) is a superintuitionistic logic.7 (as well as 1. and Rybakov. MODAL COUNTERPARTS 1. the greatest modal counterpart of H is Grz. (2) The correspondence between superintuitionistic logics and their greatest modal counterparts is an order isomorphism between superintuitionistic logics and modal logics above Grz. . 19591. See [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. the logic A is called a modal counterpart of TA.5.5. Theorem 1. The greatest modal counterpart of L is denoted by a ( L ) . Definition 1. 19741.7 (Blok-Esakia) (1) u(H + r) = Grz + r T .6" Every propositional superintuitionistic logic has the greatest modal counterpart. Proposition 1. This lemma implies Proposition 1..1.2. Lemma 1.6).5 and 1.19(2).5-5' Every propositional superintuitionistic logic L = H the smallest modal counterpart: r ( L ) := S 4 + rT.5. %L(C) = I L ( C ) . .5 Modal counterparts The following lemma can be easily proved by induction. 19971 for the proof of 1.

%IL(c) = Proof n WL(F) n IL(F) = IL(C).7.4. i n which 8 is a valuation i n @. ''In that paper it was called 'first-order semantics'.9 For any intermediate logic L . R1. W Lemma 1. Instead of Oione l can use its dual OiV := RL'V. also [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. i. Definition 1.e) over F. 19971) is an extended version of Kripke semantics.its elements are called interior sets of @. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC In fact.11 Unlike r . The second = FEC F EC equality follows from 1. .preserves Kripke-completeness so if a n intermediate logic L i s Kripke-complete. W Theorem 1. . . W & HA(F) is a Heyting subalgebra.its elements are called interior sets.2 A valuation in a general Kripke frame @ = (F. Proof An exercise. 19971 Remark 1. where F i s a n intuitionistic Kriplce frame.RN). A modal formula A i s valid i n @ (notation: @ b A) if it i s true in every Kripke model over @.e. W should be a non-empty set of subsets closed under Boolean operations and E i : V H OiV (Section 1.1 A general modal Kripke frame is a modal Kripke frame together with a subalgebra of its modal algebra.6. So for F = (W.6 General Kripke frames 'General Kripke frame semantics' from [Thomason. Definition 1.5.10 (Zakharyaschev) The m a p I.38 CHAPTER 1.3).5. where W MA(F) is a modal subalgebra.W).6.3 A general intuitionistic Kripke frame is @ = (F. @ = (F.. 19721'' (cf.6. similarly for a set of formulas. a counterexample can be found in [Shehtman. W is called the Heyting algebra of @ and denoted by H A ( @ ) . W i s called the modal algebra of @ and also denoted by MA(@). then For the proof see [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. Analogous definitions are given in the intuitionistic case. 19801. Definition 1. the map a does not preserve Kripke-completeness. which is equivalent to algebraic semantics.w ) . .W) i s a valuation in MA(@). 1.5.A Kripke model over @ is just a Kripke model M = (F.

for an intuitionistic Kripke model M = ( F .O). analogously. (2) Similarly. Obviously we have analogues of 1.6.8: L e m m a i f the frames are intuitionistic.1.IL(@).4 A n intuitionistic valuation in a general intuitionistic Kripke frame @ = (F. 1. A E CPo) is a subalgebra of H A ( F ) .6.7 and 1. if @ is intuitionistic. similarly for a set of formulas. W h = {@(A) I Proof (Modal case) In fact.8. for intuitionistic A and @ @ IF A iff HA(@) k A.O). then is an intermediate logic. GENERAL KRIPKE FRAMES 39 Definition 1. W ) is a valuation in HA(@).3. 1. then IL(@):= {A I @ IF A) is a n intermediate logic. A n intuitionistic formula A is valid i n @ (notation: @ I A) if it is true in every t intuitionistic Kripke model over @. by definition .5 For any modal formula A and a general Kripke frame @ @ k A iff MA(@)k A. and IL(C) = %fL(C). where 0 is an intuitionistic valuation i n @. (2) For a class C of N-modal general frames the set is a n N-modal logic.4. A n intuitionistic Kripke model over @ is of the form M = (F. L e m m a (1) For a general modal Kripke frame @ the set i s a modal logic. and moreover. IL(@)= ?h. L e m m a 1.7 (1) For a n N-modal Kripke model M = (FIB) the set of all definable sets WM := {O(A) I A E CPn) is a subalgebra of MA(F).3.

x R i . L e m m a 1. L e m m a 1..7 Canonical Kripke models Definition 1. The following is a trivial consequence of 1. cf. w&) i n the intuitionistic case) i s called associated.) For M = (F.9.26. RN).6.6. (1) i f V i s a stable subset. . (Only if. because W 1 V is a modal algebra of subsets of V with modal operations OivX := OiX n V. where . and OiA E x implies A E y.. .. O(SA) = v(A) for an appropriate valuation 7 in GF(M). Proof (If.6.40 CHAPTER 1. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC So we define the corresponding general frames Definition 1.1 The canonical Kripke frame for a n N-modal propositional logic A is FA:= (WA.8 For a Kripke model M = (F. r V i s called a generated (general) subframe. Definition 1.6.10 If = (F. 1. An easy inductive argument shows that for any n-formula A.n).7. ~ y for any formula A.25 and 1.2. let 77 be a valuation in F such that q(pi) = O(Bi) for every i . Exercise 1. ~ . .6. The cone generated by u i n a is the subframe @Tu:= a (WTu).12 Define morphisms of general frames and prove their properties. F = (W. R l . V W.O). If V is stable. similarly for the intuitionistic case. . RN. the general frame G F ( M ) := (F. where WA i s the set of all A-complete iff theories.3. The definition of a subframe is obviously sound. Lemma 1. then ML(Q) E ML(@ V).9 GF(M) b A iff all modal substitution instances of A are true i n M. e).O h ) .11 For a general frame a . The canonical model for A i s MA = (FA. then we define the corresponding general subframe: where w~v:={XflVIX€W). .) The same equality shows that for any modal (or intuitionistic) W substitution S.3. R1.W) i s a general Kripke frame. WM) (or GF'(M) := (F.

The canonical model for C is M e := ( F c . de Rijke and Venema. 20011. By 1.2 The canonical frame for an intermediate propositional logic C is F e := (We. [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. the latter is equivalent to S A E A ..21 and the following observation: Proposition 1.7. cf. CANONICAL K R I P K E MODELS 41 Analogously. Since A is substitution closed. Re). i f ffor any m-formula A. An alternative proof of 1.4 The general canonical frame of an N-modal (respectively. 19971. Ox). where The corresponding definitions for bounded intermediate logics must be now clear. where WAr. where OArm(pi)= OA(pi) for i m. t u i t i o n i s t ~ ~ ) A is cPA := G F ( M A ) (respectively. The canonical model for A lm is M A r m := (FA[. logic Theorem 1. < Definition 1.7. . in.7.7. Proof By Lemma 1.6. OArm). The following is well-known.3 (Canonical model theorem) For any N-modal or intermediate logic A and m-formula A (of the corresponding kind): (2) MA[TTL.7..Y A i f fA E Y .7. where We is the set of all C-complete intuitionistic (double) theories. The same argument works for the intuitionistic case. RN. Theorem 1.9. intermediate) propositional logic A M L ( @ * ) = A (respectively.3. [Blackburn.1.2. Definition 1. x R c y i f fx C y. I L ( Q A ) = A ) . the canonical frame for a bounded modal logic Arm is FArm := (WAF. H A ( @ = ) L i n d ( C ) for an intermediate logic E. .7.Arm.5 (General canonical model theorem) For a modal (respectively.6 M A ( @ A ) L i n d ( A ) for a modal logic A . is the set of all maximal A-consistent sets of N-modal m-formulas.7. b (3) M A r m k A i f f M A k A i f f A ~ A . so we skip them. U i A E x implies A E x.5 can be obtained from the algebraic completeness theorem 1. @ := G F 1 ( M A ) ) . . it follows that ML(cPA) = A..R1. ML(cPh) consists of all formulas A such that M A k S A of any modal substitution S..Arrn).

since M A k A F B whenever A -A B by Theorem 1. y is obviously surjective and preserves the modal algebra operations.20 and 1.) T h e map y : L i n d ( A ) ---+ M A ( @ A )sending [ A ]t o OA(A) is well-defined. V x .7. W e use the same notation as in 1. itionistic) is called descriptive if it satisfies the following conditions: is differentiated (distinguishable): for any two different points x . .7. y E V ) t o (2) VU E W ( x E OiU =+ y E U ) . then X $Z I Y (in the intuitionistic case). J n n A differentiated and tight general frame is called refined. (2) implies xRiy.e. which means tightness o f @ r V . i (VU E W ( x E OiU + y E U ) + x R i y ) (in the modal case). .7. R N ) W ) (modal or intu. such that x E U ++ y E u. Let us check tightness in the modal case. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Proof (Modal case. R1. x . Y ) of subsets of W is centered (i. i f a pair ( X .1 and the definitions.. i. Finally.7.7.8 A generated subframe of a refined frame is refined. note that y ( [ A ] ) y ( [ B ] ) f fOA(A) = 8 a ( B ) iff M A k A = i = B i f f ( A = B ) E A i f f [A]= [B] by 1.7 A general frame @ = ((W.1. and similarly for the other operations. Definition 1.42 C H A P T E R 1.e.7. I f @ is tight.2. according t o Definitions 1. Proof Distinguishability is obviously preserved for subframes.y. such that n X l # 0 for any finite XI C X ) has a non-empty intersection (in the modal case). Suppose V C W is stable. Lemma 1. y there exists an interior set U E W separating them. y E V and This is equivalent t o and thus (since V is stable and x . . Y I c Y ) . compactness: every centered subset X C W (i. . Xl Uyl for any finite XI C X . tightness: V x . So y is an isomorphism. In fact.2.y (VU E W ( x E U + y E U ) + x R l y ) (in the intuitionistic case).3. therefore ( 1 ) also implies x R i y .e.

. In particular.7.11 For a Heyting algebra fl. CANONICAL KRIPKE MODELS 43 Remark 1.10 For an N-modal algebra fl. then MA(O+) S a .7. R1.7. consider the set R+ of its max- imal filters with the accessibility relations: and with the interior sets of the form for all a E f l . These frames resemble canonical frames of modal logics..7. The resulting general frame canonical or the dual frame of f l . a+:= ( a + . (2) If f l is a Heyting algebra..7. Recall that a (proper) filter in a Boolean algebra is a <-stable (proper) subset closed under meets.7. Definition 1. Theorem 1.R) is called the canonical or the dual frame of a . Theorem 1. .RN) is called the Recall that a (proper) prime filter in a Heyting algebra is a <-stable (proper) subset X closed under A and such that Definition 1.9 Compactness is not always preserved for generated subframes.11. Descriptive frames can also be characterised as canonical frames of modal algebras. for the Lindenbaum algebra we again obtain the frame isomorphic to cPA (with an obvious notion of isomorphism): Theorem 1. A required isomorphism is the Stone map h from Definitions 1. The general frame a+:= (R+.13 For a modal or intermediate logic A This is because the maximal (prime) filters of Lind(A) exactly correspond to A-complete theories. .14 A general Kripke frame is descriptive iff it is isomorphic to some frame f l + .12 (Tarski-Jonsson) (1) If 0 is a modal algebra. then HA(fl+) r f l .1.7. consider the set R+ of its prime filters with the accessibility relation xRy iff x y and with the interior sets h ( a ) = {x E R+ I a E x) for a E a. the reader can try to construct a counterexample. A maximal filter is maximal among proper filters.10 and 1.7.7.

3 below. (2) A s u m of d-persistent (respectively. 19761 and earlier in [Esakia. L e m m a 1. r-persistent) set. W). r-persistent) logics i s d-persistent (respectively.17 (1) A modal or intermediate propositional logic i s d-persistent (respectively. W) in the intuitionistic case). 19741 for S4-frames. . BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC This result was proved in [Goldblatt. Thus for propositional modal logics d-persistence implies canonicity and canonicity implies Kripke completeness. but also has an independent proof based on the properties of MA.WA) is descriptive by 1.8 First-order translations and first-order definability Let elN the classical first-order language with equality and binary predibe cate letters R1.f o r m u l cp corresponds t o a n N-modal propositional a formula A if for a n y N-modal Kripke frame F .15. see 1. (F. The converse implications are not true . . W) I= r + F I r. in many cases these two logics coincide. .5.7. = The following observations are trivial consequences of soundness: L e m m a 1. Definition 1.8. for intuitionistic formulas.W). . and therefore Kripke complete.7. refined) general frame (F. c Definition 1. r-persistent) if for a n y descriptive (respectively.15 Every general canonical frame cPA i s descriptive.7. The classical truth of an tlN-formula cp in a frame F is denoted by F k cp as usual. Proof (Modal case) an C= A by 1. 1.1 A n t l ~ . So classical tlN-structures are nothing but N-modal frames.18 Every d-persistent modal or intermediate logic is canonical.7. The subsequent lemma follows from the above. r- persistent) iff it i s axiomatisable by a d-persistent (respectively. Proposition 1. by the Fine-van Benthem theorem.. and cPA = (FA.however. For a more available proof see [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. M L ( F ) ML(F. similarly.16 A set of N-modal formulas r is called d-persistent (respectively.8. Moreover. 19971. RN.7. So for a d-persistent A it follows that FA k A. all three properties are equivalent for elementary logics. W) (or IL(F) IL(F.7. r-persistent).44 CHAPTER 1. From the definitions it is evident that for any general Kripke frame ( F .

. quasi-elementary)... elementary). a b A iff M* F ~ * ( a ) . P2.x ) > A* ( x ) ) . . .cp)* c k MA* ( t ) ..e.cp) be a Kripke model over a frame F = (W.14 Every Kripke model M = ( F . R-elementary. . . t o L I N .4 (1) Let M = ( F . for any N-modal formula A F k A ifl determined.8. For the proof see [van Benthem.8.-structure M* = (W. l 2 Theorem 1. elementary) class of frames is called quasi-A-elementary (respectively. (OkA)* ( t )= V x ( R k(t. i f necessary). R-elementary. [Chagrovand Zakharyaschev. Let us recall the well-known 'standard' translation from modal formulas into first-order formulas. finite). cf. a quasi-A-elementary logic is called A . c p ( p ~ cp(pa).8.3 (Fine-van Benthem) Every quasi-A-elementary modal or intermediate logic (in particular. 1*(t) =I. Every N-modal formula A is translated into an ~ 1 . ( A 3 B)*(t) = Ak(t) 3 B*(t). Q. (2) For an9 N-modal frame F . every Kripke complete A-elementary logic) is d-persistent. quasi-R-elementary.el. A n N-modal or intermediate logic A is called A-elementary (respectively. .13 Let t l . F I t A F k cp. .f o r m u l aA*(t) with at most one parameter t . e ~ )Then for . 19831. elementary) if the class V ( A ) (or V 1 ( A ) ) is of the corresponding kind i n the language LIN (or L l l ) . be t h e language obtained by adding countably many monadic predicate letters P I . responds t o a classical ~1. M .) clearly cor).). etc. . A modal or intermediate logic determined by a A-elementary (respectively. .cp) over a frame F = (W. . 13A . . 1983]. A Similarly. this class is called R-elementary (respectively.2 The class Mod(C) of all classical models of a first-order theory (i. 19971.e l e m e n t a r i l y similar translation for intuitionistic formulas was first introduced in [Mints.e l . if C is recursive (respectively. vp ( F . [van Benthem. an L 1 -formula cp corresponds t o an intuitionistic propositional formula A i f for any intuitionistic Kripke frame F. a set of first-order sentences) C is called A-elementary. . 12According t o another terminology.e.. for any N-modal formula A . .8.1. 19671. Lemma 1.e l . 14Variable substitutions for first-order formulas are considered in detail in Chapter 2. according t o the rules: "P Pi(t).. FIRST-ORDER TRANSLATIONS A N D DEFINABILITY 45 F I= (modally) H F k cp (classically). any a E W. Definition 1. ..where A* ( x ) is obtained from A*(t) b y substituting x for t (together with renaming o f bound variables.

Next.p).5. we obtain that A E ML(C0) iff for any countable LIE-structure M.5 (1) For any L ~ -theory C. + c On the other hand. (3) Every finitely axiomatisable (quasi-)A-elementary modal or intermediate logic is (quasi-)elementary.4 and Godel's completeness theorem. Since A can be uniquely restored from A*. In particular. For an L~N-theory C. and thus ML(Mod(C)) = K N + A C ML(Mod(cp)). (2) F k A H H . this proves the 1-reducibility. and thus (by (#)) to A E ML(Mod(C)).X)~B*(X))UM*~(O~B)*(~). every quasiR-elementary modal o r intermediate logic is recursively axiomatisable. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Proof (1) Easy by induction.p)* k MA* (t). then ML(Mod(C)) is RE as it is 1-reducible to the set of theorems of a recursive classical theory. Proof (1) Since all ~1:-models of C are exactly the structures of the form (F.46 CHAPTER 1.akA @ H H b'b E &(a) M .8. which implies El t. so A E ML(Mod(cp)) (by (#)). Proposition 1. note that by 1. then by (#). where F I= C. ML(Mod(C)) N [C]. which proves (2). the latter is equivalent to C t. Similarly to the above.WA*(t) for some finite C1 C. by Lemma 1. hence ML(Mod(cp)) C ML(Mod(C)). [Boolos. M*~=VX(R~(~. (3) (Modal case) If ML(Mod(C)) = K N A for a formula A. E.8. Mod@) Mod(cp). [C[ denotes the set of its LlE-theorems (in classical first-order logic).b'tA*(t). (2) Let Co be the class of all countable LlE-models of C. where p = AX1. In the next proposition we use the following notation. C t VtA*(t) in classical logic. and Jeffrey. Burgess.8. To prove (1) in the intuitionistic case. (M b C + M l= VtA*(t)).akA~Vcpb'a(~. 20021.p. we obtain (#> A E ML(Mod(C)) H H C b VtA*(t) (in the classical sense) C t. Therefore ML(Mod(C)) = ML(Co). .g.p)*b~*(a)(by(l)) V p (F. Hence p k WAf(t). The intuitionistic version follows readily. Now (1) follows by the well-known Craig's lemma. By the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem. Therefore ML(Mod(C)) = ML(Mod(9)) is quasi-elementary. u l k B b'b E ek(a) M* != B*(b) (by the induction hypothesis) VpVa(F. if C is recursive. sI (2) Every quasi-A-elementary modal or intermediate logic has the c. IL(C) = T ~ ~ ( C ) l so IL(C) is 1-reducible to ML(C).b'tA*(t) (in classical first-order logic).p)*. in the case A = O k B we have: M.f. cf.

5 n is an extension of K4 + AW. Definition 1. All these are called the logics of finite width..4 For a finite n. T . Then A is d-persistent and A-elementary.the Sahlqvist theorem and the Fine theorem. mi). an intermediate logic of width < n is an extension of H + AIW. C t. The width of F is the maximal cardinality of finite antichains i n cones of F i f it exists and m otherwise. 1. + + w Some general completeness theorems In this section we recall two general results on Kripke-completeness . F is of width < n iff This property corresponds to the modal formula AW.) Assume that L is finitely axiomatisable and A-elementary.9. So for a finite n.1 A Sahlqvist formula is a modal formula of the form O. B is a positive modal formula (i. Oi. (cf. built from proposition letters using I .e. where cu E I F . Definition 1. Since by 1. a modal logic of width . v l ( L ) = V(r(L)). Then (as we have just proved) T(L) is elementary. so by (#).5. (Intuitionistic case. SOME GENERAL COMPLETENESS THEOREMS 47 The case when KN A is A-elementary is left to the reader. so that subformulas of A of the form C V D or OiC containing negated proposition letters are not within the scope of any O j .9. then AT E ML(C). Theorem 1. A.3.17). in the intuitionistic case (cf.2 (Sahlqvist theorem) Let A be a modal logic axiomatised by Sahlqvist formulas. r ( L ) is also finitely axiomatisable.11) and to AIW. [Blackburn. de Rijke and Venema.vt(AT)*(t). and A is built from proposition letters and their negations using the same connectives.3 A subset V in a transitive frame F = (W. Now the equality V1(L) = V(r(L)) implies the elementarity of L. 19971.(A > B ) . Definition 1. Then we can replace C with a single cp and obtain that IL(C) = IL(Mod(cp)). it follows that r ( L ) is A-elementary.9. For the proof see [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev.1. It remains to consider the case when an intermediate L is finitely axiomatisable and quasi-A-elementary. 20011..9.9. 1. if IL(C) = H A for C = Mod@). y E V(xRy + x = y). V. R) is called a n antichain if its different worlds are incomparable: Vx. In fact. Then by definition. Then we can argue as in the modal case.

3 A strict path in a transitive frame F = (W. the strict depth of u i n F (notation: s d F ( u ) or s d ( u ) ) is the maximal length of a strict path from u i n F i f it exists and co otherwise. A DNA.5. 1. .10. sd(u) = s d ( u ) = s d ( v ) if u GR v .5 (Fine theorem) Every logic of finite width (modal or intermediate) is Kripke-complete and moreover. dd(u) = 0 . . and s d ~ ( u= s d ~ (u").. Definition 1. Respectively.10.1 The depth of a world u i n F (notation: d ~ ( u or d ( u ) i f ) there is no confusion) is the maximal length of a path from u i n F i f it exists and co otherwise. A maximal cluster i n a K4-frame F is a maximal point i n F". So quasi-maximal points in a K4frame are exactly the points of the maximal clusters. quasi-maximal) i f d ( u ) = 0 (respectively. has the c. 1 .5. Definition 1.5. Dead ends i n a tree are also called leaves (as well as maximal worlds i n reflexive or transitive trees). in for any i < m (or equivalently. The distinct depth of u in F (notation: d d ~ ( u or d d ( u ) ) is the maximal length of a distinct path from u i n F i f it exists and co otherwise. where OA := 01A A . all the worlds are i n different clusters).R) is a path (uO. which ~ .48 CHAPTER 1. ..10 Trees and unravelling Recall that a path in a frame is a sequence of related worlds together with indices of the accessibility relations (Definition 1. i n which all the ) worlds are different.8 and 1. 19971. The intuitionistic case follows from the observation that L I.10.AIW. Obviously. Definition 1.20).10.f. T h e o r e m 1. s d ( u ) = 0). Let us introduce two other kinds of 'paths' and 'depths' in Kripke frames.4 Show that d ( x ) 5 n iff x k O n l . implies T ( L )t.2 A distinct path in a frame F is a path.p.Awn together with 1.5 A world u in a frame is called a dead end (respectively.urn). maximal. ) - Exercise 1. Definition 1. .10. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC The width of a transitive modal logic A can be defined explicitly as the least n such that Awn E A (and co if Awn 6A for any n). 19741.3. for a shorter proof see [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. This result (for the modal case) was first proved in [Fine.similarly for the intuitionistic case.9.

we may assume that F is transitive antisymmetric. zfl for any x E F there exists Definition 1.7 A frame F is a tree with a root u a unique path from u to x i n F . From the definitions it follows easily that FNT. sets we can also define the height of x as the minimal length of a 'successor-path' from the root to x .10. . where u Q v := 3w ( v = u w ) .0.10 Let Tw = w m be the set of all finite sequences of natural numbers. . For rooted successive p.The branching at u in F is I. if The intuitionistic universal tree is the p. Every finite p.0. . The 1-modal universal tree is the frame where u ~ v : = 3 k v =w k . set is clearly successive. .11.10.( u ) = R ( P F ( u ) ) . .9 A successor of a world u i n a poset15 F = (W.BF(u)1. F is called successive i f for any u .. Definition 1.1 (mod N)). or h t ( x ) ) is the length of the (unique) path from the root to x . Q ) . is just P(u) = c ( u ) .R) is a minimal element i n the set R-(u) of all strictly accessible worlds.10. - i . is really a tree with the root A.10.10.. Definition 1. I6This is a p. y Hence we readily have Lemma 1.8 The height of a world x i n a tree F (notation: h t F ( x ) . ISMore generally. TREES AND UNRAVELLING 49 Definition 1. set16 IT.6 A frame F = (W.OF(u)(or P ( u ) ) denotes the set of all successors of u i n F .10. := (T. R.10.R1. and the set of immediate successors of u in IT. ) such that yRix.1.0. ~ u The N-modal universal tree is where u C ~ v := 3k E w ( v = u k & k N Sometimes we drop N i n FNTw and C ~ N it is clear from the context. So Q is the reflexive and transitive closure of C.R N )with a root uo is called a tree (or an N-tree) i f a for any x # uo there exists a unique pair (i. tree according t o Definition 1.0.

l ( u ) = ht(u) in FNTw. A svbfrarne G F is called greedy if for any u E G either PF(u) G or PF(u) G = 0 . Definition 1.R1. 1.10.11 A subframe F C FNT. .. Let us fix the following standard trees: the universal n-ary trees. := { U k E T.R?.. under all 7i. that is stable under 3 (or equivalently. Obviously. or the universal trees of branching n.. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Definition 1. where W # is the set of all paths in F starting at uo and a R j # iff 3v fi = ( a .j. 1 T N n . F2T: Sometimes we also use the notation T" rather than T. . := FNT.1. Figure 1. .50 CHAPTER 1. ITn := ITw T.R N ) be a frame with a root uo.. . ~ . v ) ..n .. for 0 . or F C IT. A greedy standard n tree is a greedy standard subtree of FNT.R$). l ( u ) is the length of sequence u. universal trees of depth (or height) k : where ~ .1)-sequences. . n 5 w.13 Let F = (W. for finite n > 0: FNT.. or IT. is called a standard tree (or a standard subtree of the corresponding frame). < n 5 w. Definition 1. . T: contains only the root A.10. I l(u)5 k ) . The unravelling of F is the frame F# = ( W # . where Tn is the set of all (0.1 5 i 5 N ) . In particular. .10..12 Let F be a successive poset. .

.. w' W such that . later it was used by many authors. RL)is called the (w-)thickening of F Informally speaking. is either empty or denumerable.RN)be a tree. we also add the root ( u o . is a p-morphism Now let us show how to increase branching in a standard way.n) H a is a p-morphism from F' onto F . Proof Let Fk be the restriction of F to the worlds of height 5 k. R& be the relations on W' such that ' The frame F := (W'. cf. TREES AND UNRAVELLING 51 Unravelling was first introduced probably in [Sahlqvist. Lemma 1. W .1.10. If uo is the root of F ..16 (1) For any x E W'. 19751. . . Definition 1. .17 Let F = (W. (2) The map . [van Benthem.10. . . Lemma 1.1517 Let F = (W.10. . [Gabbay. 19761.-1)). . U Let R:. R:. R1. 19981. R (x)is either empty or denumerable. The proof of the following lemma is straightforward. 19831.rr(uo. we make w copies of every world of Wl and connect all the copies of two worlds if the original worlds are connected in F . From the definition we readily obtain Lemma 1. 19981. [Gabbay and Shehtman.-1). . .10.R N ) be a frame with root uo. . Then F is isomorphic to a greedy standard tree..{ u o ) otherwise := (Wl x w) { ( u 0 .. i n which every set Ri(x) . .10.rr : W# from F# onto F..14 (1) F# is a tree. . . : (2) the map y : ( a . we put l7 [Gabbay and Shehtman.urn) = urn. We define by the embeddings f k : Fk++ F N T ~ induction. Put Wl : = iw i f there exists a path of positive length (a 'loop') from u0 to uo. R1. .

then by Its image rng(fk+l) is greedy.10.16 we have pmorphisms By 1. is FNT. so f k + ' is well-defined. By definition. k>O (1) Every countable rooted frame is a p-morphic image of a greedy standard tree.17.i(j) for a unique triple (y. If htr(y) = k and Ri(y) # 0 .10.11 PTC-logics and Horn closures Definition 1.10. and thus it is isomorphic to a greedy standard tree. every serial greedy standard subtree of FNT. (FV)fl a tree. (2) If F is serial and f : G -N F .i. j ) . every world of height (k 1) is e. By 1. by our assumption.11.17. Proof (1) Let F be the original frame. is Since by 1. then &(y) is denumerable. Then put Since F is a tree. then G is also serial.18 U fk.1 A modal propositional formula is called closed (or constant) if it is a 0-formula. Since ey.i is a bijection. it is clear that f k + l is an embedding.F1are N-modal frames and f : F + F1. if it does not contain proposition letters. every R I ( x ) is either empty or denumerable.11. by 1.16.14 and 1.10.i : w --t Ri(y) be the corresponding bijective enumeration.10. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC If f k is already defined. So let ey. then f F' l= A for any closed N-modal formula A. Lemma 1.52 CHAPTER 1. we extend it to fk+' as follows.. itself.10. 1. the same property holds for (F')fl.e.2 I F. the required isomorphism is f := Proposition 1. due to the lift property. our construction. if u = f k ( y ) and Ri(y) # 0. FkA u . (2) Every serial countable rooted N-frame is a p-morphic image of FNT. f k + ' gives rise to a bijection between &(Y) and + Eventually.. i. In fact.

P r o o f By Theorem 1. This implies F k A +=+ F' k A since f is surjective. B. e. we write cp(x.3 Every logic axiomatisable by closed formulas is canonical. K.x and uRpv in terms of the basic predicates R1. a . etc. S4.1. Further on arbitrary lists of individual variables are denoted by x. Later to the well-known transitive closure. As usual. A PTClogic is a modal logic axiomatised by a set of PTC-formulas. y. y. the following formulas are pseudotransitive: Thus many well-known logics are PTC. etc. K 4 . where p E PL. f (x) k A. every axiom of the logic is true in the canonical model. z) is a (non-empty) conjunction of atomic formulas. there exists a 'closure' under pseudotransitivity. x k A iff MI.11. .3. By induction it easily follows that M. . This formula is called one-way if a = A. A PTC-formula is a formula which is either pseudotransitive or closed.Okp 3 Opp. from the Sahlqvist theorem and Proposition 1. For example. Since every pseudotransitive formula is obviously Sahlqvist. F'. M' be arbitrary Kripke models respectively over F. .t. w Definition 1. D 4 . y . S5. RN.11. this is equivalent to validity in the canonical frame. (2) Every PTC-logic is canonical and A-elementary.6 A n L I N -sentence of the form is a called a universal strict Horn clause. Hence F.5 (1) A pseudotransitive N-modal formula A = O. x != A iff F'.z) to indicate that all parameters of the formula cp are among x. . and arbitrary lists of individuals by a.4 A pseudotransitive N-modal formula has the form O.3 we obtain Proposition 1. Definition 1. 18Strictly speaking.11. this becomes an LIN-formula after writing uR.f o r m ~ l a ~ ~ AO := Vx. f (x) != A for any x E M and closed A. y. z.t.Okp 3 Opp corresponds to the L l N . but still let us recall its proof briefly. b. PTCLOGICS AND HORN CLOSURES 53 Proof Let M.I 1. . p E I F . v(3u(uRax A uRpv) > xRkv).g. W Proposition 1.11.7. One-way P T C - formulas and logics are defined similarly. This is a rather simple fact from classical logic. For a closed formula.11. D . K4. T. if cp(x.

(i)+(ii) easily follows from and : Pmj P(m+~)j P = UPmj. we + Then F o have: 2 . ik = j.-. then the following conditions are equivalent: (i) (ii) (iii) F I= cp(a).54 CHAPTER 1.e N ) be an N-modal frame. . beginning with Fo= F Namely. Furthermore. let: . . cf. . 3m FmI= cp(a). tonic f : Fm G preserves the truth of positive formulas. Proof We construct F as the union of a sequence of frames Fm= (W. and thus (a.. To make the step. : (4) if cp(z) is a conjunction of atomic formulas.e~).. + l ) ~ bThen there are two cases. and the truth of positive formulas is preserved by monotonic maps. .e:. zk). Now G != qjk implies G I= R j (f (a). 1.ck) for some m. since monob. f (b)). .. . (iii)+(i) holds. e l . Fmb cpk(a. (3) If G k I? and f : F monotonic. since Fm2 F. Assume != cpk(a. and thus (1) holds. m ~r+=(~. $ F . f : F ---+ G is monotonic and show by the induction that f : Fm G is monotonic for any m. - G is monotonic.ck).11.17. . If Fmt= 3zk(~k(a.f (b)) by induction hypothesis. zk). b) E Q ( ~ + by) definition. (ii)+(iii) is trivial.b. Then by (4). : 3mVk 2 m Fk I= cp(a). ej+= Uemj. . : e . f (b). . . : To check (3).I. Hence ~ ~ Frf I= R j (a. @. . ~r+ - IgRecall that 2 denotes a full weak subframe. . In fact.7 Let F = (W. assume ~ e ( . Therefore F t= qjk. then G i= 3zkpk(f(a). ~ ) . . then G t= Rj(f (a). BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Proposition 1. ik = j. b. . b).Fm5 F m + l .3. If aemjb. . I? = {$k k E I) a set of universal (strict) Horn clauses I : Then there exists a frame F such thatlg (2) F i= r. m Now let us prove (2). then f : F : - G is also We can say that F is the 'smallest' full weak extension of F satisfying I?. . we assume that G t= I?.

p .11.1 1. K4-trees (respectively. where I? is the set of pseudotransitive axioms of A. with a set of pseudotransitive axioms I?.11 (1) Let A be a PTC-logic.11.5 every pseudotransitive modal formula corresponds to a universal strict Horn formula.11. with a set of pseudotransitive axioms r.8 is called the : pseudotransitive closure of F (under I) or the I?-closure of F . by Lemma - - G is monotonic. (2) Every serial PTC-logic A is determined by the full standard A-tree. - - Corollary 1.8 Let be a set of pseudotransitive N-modal formulas. then F: is also called the A-closure i f it validates A.10. (2) By Proposition 1. S4-trees) are also called transitive trees (respectively.11. F an N-modal frame..11. then Definition 1.. is called the full standard A-tree.9 The frame F described i n Corollary 1. IT.10.f. . If A = K N ?. By Proposition 1. ~ . (2) If A = D N I?. + Proof ( 1 ) Let F be such a frame.18. PTC-LOGICS AND HORN CLOSURES 55 By Proposition 1. there exists f : @ F for F is some greedy standard tree a. + Definition 1.11.trees).7 yields Corollary 1. (3) Every countable rooted S4-frame is a p-morphic image of IT.1. the r-closure of FNT. (3) In fact. So Proposition 1. the map f : monotonic. The lift property F. then the A-closure of a tree is called a A-tree. i f G i= I' and f : F f :F : G is monotonic. Then there exists an N-modal frame F ' such that (3) for any N-modal frame G . in this case we can take @ = FNT.10 If A is a PTC-logic. + Proposition 1.11. By Proposition 1. is the full standard S4-tree. In the particular case when A = D N I?. Finally note that all closed axioms of A are valid in a:.12 (1) Every PTC-logic A is determined by the class of greedy standard A-trees. since it holds for f : @ image of @.18(2). Then every countable rooted A-frame is a p-morphic image of a greedy standard A-tree. then every serial countable rooted A-frame is a p-morphic image of the full standard A-tree. So F is a p-morphic obviously holds for this map. r + A is a PTC-logic with the set of pseudotransitive axioms I and a set of ' closed axioms A.11.

11. Then by Proposition 1.11. so by 1. It remains to note that T sends the root to the root. is the full standard SPtree.Y n ) . Now put - * n f ( a ):= ~ ( n l ) ~ ( n . i s a p-morphic image of IT2.15 A standard I-tree i s called strongly standard if together with any sequence an it contains all the sequences am for m < n.13 IT.0. In fact IT. we construct a required isomorphism f . T ( n k ) 7 ( n )= f (a)m= u. since IT. 7(nk).11. . which implies the W surjectivity of f .13 and 1. (Of course this definition depends on the chosen ordering of P ( x ) .2 ) . onto IT2. By the construction of r . every A $ A is refuted in a greedy standard A-tree.11.11.11. If f ( x ) is defined and p ( x ) = { y o . If x is the root. ) W . Since is the transitive closure of the lift property now follows easily. then u = f (a)mfor some m. so it has the c. suppose f ( a ) c u . Proposition 1. > then f ( P ) = 7 ( n l ) . ( 3 ) By ( 2 ) .. Proof By Propositions 1. .t. similarly if P ( x ) is countable.11. Proof Let T : w w be a map such that every set ~ .11. < c. and On means 0 . it suffices to check monotonicity of f w. since H = T ~ 4 . ..5.5. But this is the case.56 CHAPTER 1. is a Horn closure of F. .r.11(1) and the morphism lemma.11. put f ( y i ) := f ( x ) i .l ( nis infinite (such ) a map obviously exists.. W Definition 1. The claim about H follows by 1.n k + l 2 0 . and obviously.7.14 Every countable rooted S4-frame i s a p-morphic image of IT2.B. .7. . . . f ( x ) is defined by induction on h t ( x ) .f.p by Proposition 1.OnklOnl. and f ( a l )= f ( a ) ~ ( n k + l ) .T. . there exists n n k + l such that ~ ( n ) m. Next. Corollary 1. Lemma 1. .8. a 4 . For the lift property. C. . Proof Given a tree F. since there is a bijection between w x w and w ) . BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Proof ( 1 ) A is complete and A-elementary.11. So we can = take p = onll. .16 Every countable tree is isomorphic t o a strongly standard tree. put f ( x ) := A. n1. where every a E T2 can be uniquely presented in the form O n l l . ( 2 ) By the same argument using 1. We claim that f is a required pmorphism from IT. since f ( a 0 ) = f ( a ) .Onk1Onk++'. .11 (2).

and h(x) has at least two successors. L e m m a 1. g(x)l = g(xl) and a branchy standard H tree always contains x0. f Propositiolr 1.19 and Proposition 1. g is obviously monotonic. The lift property follows. Definition 1. If yRx. the monotonicity is obvious. 57 Definition 1. since g(x)O = g(xO). since h(x) = h(h(x)). Now h is a morphism.h(y). Thus xR-y. L e m m a 1. The lift property follows since To show the latter.13.11. h(x) clearly exists. we obtain yRh(x)R-h(y). then by Lemma 1.21 I F is an efSzlse countable tree. Let F = (W. tree is called effuse if it has a cone without linear subcones. The converse inclusion is trivial by soundness.1 PTC-LOGICS AND HORN CLOSURES 1. since this set has a minimal element.11. which must be unique.19 If every cone in a countable S4-tree F is nonlinear. The image G of h is a branchy tree.12.18 If F is a strongly standard branchy tree. i.. In fact. and thus M L ( F ) C_ ML(IT. For x E W let h(x) be the least element in {y E R(x) I IP(y)l > 1).17 An S4-tree is called branchy if for any u I. then F -+ IT2. Proof By 1.18 and 1. it follows that x.11. . and thus &(h(x)) = h[P~(h(~))l.11. Proof If a cone FTu does not contain linear subcones.11.20 A p. a p-morphism onto its image.0. it is sufficient to pmorphically map F onto a branchy tree.11.11.1. then F -+ IT2. Proof We define the p-morphism g as follows: where E is the remainder of n modulo 2.11. the morphism lemma and Corollary 1. Since yRh(y) and xRh(x)Rh(y). then M L ( F ) = S 4 and thus I L ( F ) = H.e. R). y are R-comparable (remember that F is an S 4 tree).16.B(u)l 5 1.11. FTu -+ IT2 + IT.) = S 4 by the generation lemma. suppose h(x)R. Every branchy tree is clearly infinite.11. which contradicts the choice of h(y). x l together with x.

T h e o r e m 1. cofinal subreductions). A reduction is a subreduction defined on a cone.2 For a transitive Kripke frame F = (W. 19971.12. Thus for a subframe (respectively.7 A modal or intermediate propositional logic A has the finite embedding property if for any Kripke frame F . The well known Tarski-Los theorem states that a class is universal iff it is closed under substructures.31. we say that F is reducible (respectively. if it is a class of models of a set of universal first-order sentences. By the morphism and generation lemmas every variety V(A) or VW(A)is closed under reductions. F validates A whenever every finite subframe of F validates A. Definition 1. 19971. for the proof see [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. cofinal subframe) A it is closed under subreductions (respectively. a subreduction.12.3 A transitive modal or an intermediate propositional logic A is called cofinal subframe i f its Kripke frame variety V(A) or V"(A) is closed under taking cofinal subframes. The following result yields a criterion of universality for subframe logics.12. A subreduction of transitive frames is called cofinal i f its domain is cofinal.12. If G is arbitrary we also say that F is reducible to G i f it is reducible to every cone i n G.12 Subframe and cofinal subframe logics Definition 1. . G be Kripke frames of the same kind. If G is rooted and there exists a reduction (respectively. Definition 1. cofinally subreducible) to G.4 Let F.5 A class of first-order structures is called universal.12. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC 1.12. Definition 1. c W Definition 1.58 CHAPTER 1.6 A modal or intermediate propositional logic A is universal.12. Definition 1. subreducible. A subreduction from F to G is a p-morphism from a subframe of F onto G. Definition 1.12.R) a subset V and the subframe F' = F 1 V are called cofinal i f R(V) R-'(V). i f V(A) (or Vw(A)) is universal. or [Wolter. Theorem 11.1 A modal or intermediate propositional logic is called subframe if its Kripke frame variety is closed under taking subframes. So a A-elementary propositional logic is universal iff it is subframe. a cofinal subreduction) from F to G.8 (Wolter) For any subframe modal logic A the following properties are equivalent (1) A is universal and Kripke-complete.

since A is subframe. 19741. For (3)+(4). 19891. the cofinal subframe. and the frame formula of F. so let us give some comments on its proof. (2)+-(3) is the Finevan Benthem theorem. .R) with root 0 put SM-(F) :=PO A aRb A n ( p a > Opb) A -aRb O ( p a > l o p b )A ORa /\ OpaA X M . [Fine. In this definition we assume that pa are different proposition letters corresponding to worlds a of a finite Kripke frame F .( F ) . 2 0 ~ M ( Fis) also called the Jankov-Fine.12. (2) G +i S M ( F ) iff G is subreducible t o F .( F ) := S M .1. (1)+(2) is obvious.( F ) . X M ( F ) := 1 X M .12. Theorem 1. Their main new feature is axiomatisability by special 'subframe formulas' defined below. Definition 1.10 Let F be a j n i t e rooted transitive Kripke 1-frame. see [Zakharyaschev. 19851. note that every refined A-frame (F. the conjunct A a#0 7 p a is redundant if the underlying logic is S4 and all frames are reflexive. On the other hand. 19971. W) has a descriptive extension (F'. W') also validating A (the so-called 'ultrafilter extension').9 For a transitive frame F = (W. [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. or the chamcteristic formula. However an example from [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev.( F ) A / \ CSM-(F) := S M . C S M ( F ) := 7 C S M . (5) A has the finite embedding property and is Kripke-complete. SUBFRAME AND COFINAL SUBFRAME LOGICS (3) A i s d-persistent. (4) A i s r-persistent.( F ) A 00 S M ( F ) := 1 S M . subframe intermediate and K4-logics enjoy better properties. Later on we will need the implication (1)+(4) from this theorem. X M ( F ) are respectively called the (modal) subframe. C S M ( F ) .12. [Zakharyaschev. 19891. These formulas as well as the next theorem originate from [Fine. T h e n for any transitive Kripke 1-frame G (1) G v X M ( F ) iff G is reducible t o F . 19971 shows that subframe monomodal logics may be Kripke-incomplete. and thus F k A." Obviously. S M ( F ) .( F ) . By d-persistence it follows that F' I= A. They are particular kinds of Zakharyaschev canonical formulas.

cofinal subframe) formulas of Ao-frames above A o . cofinal subframe) iff it is axiomatisable by subframe (respectively.12.p. A is subframe (respectively. For example. It can be presented as S 4 + CSM(FC2). we have A hence =K4 + {SM(F) I ( F ) E A ) .12. The other way round.12. 19891 are also specific for the transitive case: Theorem 1. we construct a countermodel M for C S M ( F ) by putting M. Theorem 1.12.13 Let A. Similarly the logic K4. the case of cofinal subframe logics is quite similar. The next two theorems from [Zakharyaschev. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC (3) G Ij C S M ( F ) i f f G is cofinally subreducible t o F . suppose A is subframe. cofinal subframe) iff it i s axiomatisable by subframe (1 -espectively.1 = S4+OOp > OOp is a cofinal subframe logic (McKinsey property is obviously preserved for cofinal subframes).12. cofinal subframe) formulas above K4. and since A. = S4.12.Ao).12~' Every cofinal subframe modal logic has the f.11. Theorem 1. since A. x t= pa. if f is such a subreduction. Now S M ( F ) $ A. x k p. Let us recall the idea of the proof.1. if M = (G. By 1.12. Corollary 1. is Kripke-complete by ! 1. Then G is subreducible to F by 1. To prove 'only if'.10. there exists a Ao-frame G such that G Ij S M ( F ) . then we obtain a cofinal subreduction from G to F by putting f (x) = a iff M. be a subframe K4-logic.m.12.11 A transitive 1-modal logic is subframe (respectively.:= K 4 + 0 1 V 0 0 1 is cofinal subframe.14 S4.12. implies F t= Ao.60 CHAPTER 1.12.12. 19851. where FC1 is a reflexive singleton and characterised by the (first-order) condition Thanks to completeness stated in 1. .8 has the following transitive version: 'lFor subframe transitive logics this fact was first proved in [Fine. Proof 'If' easily follows from 1.one can check that an S4-frame has McKinsey property iff it is not cofinally subreducible to FC2. Example 1. where FC2 is a 2-element cluster . it is presented as K 4 + CSM(FC1). We shall use this corollary especially for the case A. In fact. is a subframe logic.12. iff f (x) = a . 8 ) YCSM(F).11. it follows that F I= Ao. A0 = K 4 + {SM(F) 1 S M ( F ) E n o ) A =A 0 + {SM(F) I SM(F) E A . T h e n for a n y 1-modal logic A 2 A o .

Given a subreduction f : G' -+ Fi.13. (5) A has the finite embedding property. By 1.12.12. : G!. This G" is the + v€8(u) required one. it is sufficient to check the finite embedding property for K4 {SM(Fi) I i E I). (2) A subframe S4-logic is A-elementary if above S4 it is miomatisable by subframe formulas of posets. Otherwise.3. For every v E P(u) there exists a cone G!. and let f ( a ) = u.this follows from 1. By applying 1. This is done by induction on IFi/. Then by the induction hypothesis. where Fi are irreflexive K4-frames.15. (as a subframe of GI). for G' C G. everything is trivial.32(3).12.1.12. Hence we obtain a sufficient condition for elementarity of subframe logics above K 4 or S4.15 (Zakharyaschev) For any subframe modal logic A 2 K 4 the following properties are equivalent: (1) A is universal. ++ Fi f v . If Fi is an irreflexive singleton.12. Proof We prove only (1). Proposition 1. it is sufficient to construct a finite G" G' such that f 1 G" : G" ++ Fi.. (3) A is d-persistent. monotonicity is preserved by restricted maps. a is irreflexive.the proof of (2) is similar.12. in fact. For subframe logics axiomatisable by a single subframe formula the converse also holds: Proposition 1. Obviously. 2 G'T a such that f G!.10 to subframe logics A = A0 {SM(Fi) I i E I}described in 1.. there is a finite G i 5 G such that f G l : Gc + F f v . L i Finally put G" := { a ) U U G. SUBFRAME AND COFINAL SUBFRAME LOGICS 61 Theorem 1. let u be the root of Fi. we find a finite subframe subreducible to Fi.16 (1) A subframe K4-logic is A-elementary i f above K 4 it is axiomatisable by subframe formulas of irreflexive transitive frames. and the lift property easily follows from the construction. we can reformulate the finite embedding property as follows: + For any Ao-frame G. then i some finite subframe of G is subreducible to some Fj (jE I).17 .. So for a K4-frame G subreducible to some Fi. (4) A is r-persistent.12. i f G is subreducible to some F (i E I ) .

Thus K 4 + S M ( F ) does not have the finite embedding property in this case. For example. so it is not reducible to F (e. personal communication.16 is not true. (2) A is quasi-A-elementary.g. A cofinal subreduction f from F to G is called a cofinal quasi-embedding i f f . if F contains nontrivial clusters. Proof (1) If F contains reflexive points.12. <). <).12. The restriction of a frame F to inner worlds is denoted by F .12. . Every finite subframe of F' is a poset. because it is a Grz-frame). Definition 1. Definition 1. since a reflexive singleton is a pmorphic image of (w. since a pmorphic image of a finite irreflexive K4-frame is always irreflexive (e. every formula S M ( F ) for a nontrivial F . G be K4-frames and suppose that G is finite. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC + S M ( F ) is elementary iff F is irrejlexive.12.15 has an analogue for cofinal subframe logics. since G is not subreducible to F . The resulting frame F' is reducible to F .12. Zakharyaschev.62 (1) A subframe logic K 4 CHAPTER 1.g.19 A world i n a transitive frame is called inner i f its cluster is not maximal. If such a subreduction exists. T h e o r e m 1. the converse to 1. we say that G is a finite cofinal quasi-subframe of F .18 In general. finite subframes of F' are not reducible to F. In fact. there is a conjecture that elementarity of a logic axiomatisable by a finite set of subframe formulas is ~ndecidable. we can replace each of them by (w. Definition 1. is valid in every S5-frame G (which is a cluster). Moreover. (2) A subframe logic S4 + S M ( F ) is elementary iff F is a poset.20 Let F . 5).' ( x ) is a singleton for any inner x .21 A modal or intermediate propositional logic A has the finite cofinal quasi-embedding property if for any Kripke frame F . However. we can replace each of them by the chain (w. the trivial logic S4+p > U p is obviously subframe and elementary.'~ Theorem 1.22 (Zakharyaschev) For any cofinal subframe modal logic the following properties are equivalent: (1) A is elementary. Then we obtain a frame F' reducible to F .12.12. (2) Similarly. 22M. because finite irreflexive KPframes are exactly finite GL-frames).. F validates A whenever every its finite cofinal quasi-subframe validates A. but it cannot be axiomatised by subframe formulas of posets. R e m a r k 1.

we obtain a reduction f from G to F by putting Iy The formulas from 1. 19891.23 Note that S I ( F ) is an implicative formula and C S I ( F ) is built from propo. C S I ( F ) := C S I . is .12.23 For a poset F = (W. we have (cf. (4) A has the finite cofinal quasi-embedding property. 19891.g.12. sition letters and >. [Zakharyaschev. C S I ( F ) . 19971 and [Shimura. cofinal subframe.23 can be simplified.12.10.24 Let F be a finite rooted poset. 1. The idea of the proof is quite similar to 1. ifl G is subreducible to F. X I ( F ) are respectively called the (intuitionistic) subframe. 2 3 X ~ ( F ) also called the Jankov. A qb occurring in the second conjunct of X I P ( F ) Other versions of these formulas are described in [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. 19971. [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. cf. Then for any poset G (1) G v X I ( F ) if/ G is reducible to F.22 does not include r-persistence. 19971): Theorem 1. X I ( F ) := X I P ( F ) a /\ i ) > go.( F ) := SI. Definition 1. For example. The next result is also due to [Zakharyaschev.( F ) we can replace the conjunct 7 /\ qa with 1 gal where max(F) is the set a€ W a€max(F) of maximal points of F. /\ b<a S I ( F ) := S I . 19931.B) X I ( F ) . and frame formula of F. also can be replaced with /\ a€O(b) b<a qb. if M = (G. in C S I . S I ( F ) . SUBFRAME AND COFINAL SUBFRAME LOGICS (3) A is d-persistent. Note that unlike the previous theorem. or the characteristic formula of F . Now we assume that qa are different proposition letters indexed by worlds of a finite poset F .( F ) > go. (2) G '$ S I ( F ) (3) G I$ C S I ( F ) iff G is cofinally subreducible to F .12.(F)A 7 XI-(F) := CSI-(F) A /\ a€ W gal /\ qb > qa V a@ qb . <) with root 0 put a<b C S I .12. 1 Then similarly t o the modal case. E. [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. Let us now consider the intuitionistic case.( F ) > go.12.1.

(2) A cofinal subframe K4-logic is A-elementary if above K4. CHAPTER 1. (2) A is axiomatisable by subframe (respectively. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Theorem 1.12.22 for intermediate logics.28 Every cofinal subframe intermediate logic is A-elementary and d-persistent. 19681 and 1.1.15 and 1. (3) A i s axiomatisable by implicative formulas (respectively.25. Moreover.26 Every cofinal subframe intermediate logic has the finite model property.12.it is axiomatisable by cofinal subframe formulas of almost irreflexive transitive frames. So suppose GYA. Theorem 1.1. and thus Go is finite.12. A n S4-frame is called blossom if all its nonmaximal clusters are trivial. cofinal subframe) formulas. 1 . Proof ( 1 ) By 1.12..) . we can choose Go so that f [Go] F . also see [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev.29 A transitive frame is called almost irreflexive if all its nonmaximal clusters are degenerate.12. where OF is the root of F . To formulate a modal analogue of this result.1 it is axiomatisable by cofinal subframe formulas of blossom frames.25 For a n intermediate propositional logic A the following properties are equivalent: (1) A is a subframe (respectively. cofinal subframe) logic. 19971. Theorem 1.12.30 (1) A cofinal subframe S4-logic i s A-elementary if above S4.12. Theorem 1.12.12. so let G b S4. Then there is a finite rooted blossom frame F such that C S M ( F ) E A and a cofinal subreduction f from G to F .12.12. Let us now formulate analogues of Theorems 1. Theorem 1. For every a E OF). This result follows from [McKay. it suffices to check the finite cofinal quasi-embedding property for our logic A. I)-formulas). we need Definition 1. Let us show that then there exists a subframe G o G such that f Go is a cofinal subreduction to F and f is injective on f ( F . choose an r . (2. If G y S 4 . The proof is by induction on the cardinality of F . Let u be an element of G with f ( u ) = OF. the further proof is easy.27 (1) A n intermediate logic i s subframe i f it i s universal. (2) Every subframe intermediate logic is r-persistent.

for a n y I-modal formula A If F i s reflexive.0.13. M L ( F ) ) K 4 is either below M L ( F ) or 'splits' the set of extensions of K4: every A above K 4 X M ( F ) . L e m m a 1. T h e n where {pa I a E a) is a set of distinct propositional variables corresponding t o the elements of S1 and w is the subgreatest element of 52. S1 = HA(F). + > + Definition 1. Put Then Go obviously has the required property.5 ) be a finite p. .3 Let F = (W. then the latter i s also equivalent to S 4 + A I. T h e n for any modal algebra 0 the following properties are equivalent: (1) fl k' X M ( F ) . (2) M A ( F ) i s a subalgebra of a homomorphic image of $2. 19691 is defined as follows. T h e o r e m 1.2 For a n y I-modal logic A frame F XM(F) E A i f l A > K 4 and ML(F). Note that if a is maximal in F and G has McKinsey property. Then fa := f I (GTv). there exists a finite subframe Ga of G such that fa 1 G.13.1 Let F be a finite rooted Kripke frame. 1. 19691. The original Jankov formula [Jankov. Hence by the induction hypothesis. we can choose a maximal v . is a cofinal subreduction from G T v to FTa. is a cofinal subreduction from G to F T a. (2) is proved similarly. a finite rooted transitive in particular.13.X M ( F ) R e m a r k This lemma shows that the pair of logics ( K 4 X M ( F ) . since f is cofinal.arbitrary v E G such that u 5~v and f ( v ) = a. set.13 Splittings The following result is a modal version of [Jankov.

i n particular.13. 1.13. set. Lemma 1.0. ! Proof Note that H + AJ = H + XI(F2). H + A J .7 Let A be a propositional fomula. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Figure 1.13. Corollary 1. F2 Theorem 1. Then apply Lemma 1.6 .4 Let F be a finite rooted Kriplce frame. 1. Lemma 1.3.5 Let F be a finite rooted p.0. for any intuitionistic formula A XI(F) E (H Hence for example. 1. Then: (1) AJ E ( H (2) A J - + A) i f f A $! IL(F2) (Fig.13.4).2). we obtain + A) iff A $! IL(F).2.= H + XI(F3)A XI(F~). 6 (H + A) iff A $ IL(F3) and A $! IL(F4) (Figs. Then for any p. Then for any Heyting algebra 0' the following properties are equivalent: (1) 0' v XI(F).13.CHAPTER 1. (2) HA(F) is a subalgebra of a homomorphic image of 0'. y (2) there exists u E G such that GU+ F.6 For any superintuitionistic logic A XI(F) E A iff A g IL(F). set G the following properties are equivalent: (1) G l XI(F).

F3 Figure 1.13. SPLITTINGS Figure Fq .

These formulas have the following first-order characterisations. dd(u0) i s finite and R(x) i s finite for a n y x E F . Proposition 1.5 . (2) F . since W d d ( u ) < dd(u0). o r equivalently. .14 Tabularity Definition 1.68 C H A P T E R 1.R) Hence we obtain a characterisation of tabular modal logics similar to that in [Chagrov and Zakharyaschev. . Lemma 1. For intermediate logics we have the same characterisation with different formulas.14. x I= A H k iff d d f ( x ) < k . every W T u for uORu. t h e n F is finite. Lemma 1.10.. Proof By induction on k = dd(uo). U R N . . v O N A . Lemma 1. The statement is trivial for k = 0. B A S I C P R O P O S I T I O N A L L O G I C 1. .2 In the notation of 1. by a finite Kripke frame.14. . x k A l t k iffIR(x)I < k.2.R N ) put R := R1 U .14. For the step note that By the induction hypothesis. 19971. .14.14. Then (1) F. R 1 . Hence W is finite.3 For a frame F = (W. .4 For a poset F = (W. if F has a root uo. uo # u is finite. Consider the following N-modal k-formulas where O A := O I A v .1 A modal or intermediate propositional logic i s called tabular if i t is determined by a finite modal o r Heyting algebra.

L e m m a 1. hence @ ! Altk A AHk. Since F is finite. (Intuitionistic case. so Altk A AHI.14.7. A t. @ T u is finite.6 If @ = (F. ML(G) reducible t o F. @ u is refined and by it follows that F k A. So by 1.Altk A AHk for some k. W) validating A.) Suppose F = (W.3.4. F have the same valuations.8 For finite modal frames G.. use the canonicity of AHk.5.12. Moreover. E w.14. P r o o f The claim 'only if' follows from 1. By 1. Altk.9 Every tabular modal or intermediate logic is finitely axiomatisable.. .. P r o o f (Modal case) Consider a tabular logic A and a refined frame = (F... E W be such that z E V.7 Every tabular modal or intermediate propositional logic i s r -persistent.11.14.. so the valuations in and F are the same. (2) A n intermediate propositional logic A is tabular i f fA I.3 and 1.8 and thus valid in F and therefore in every cone F f u.6.. In the intuitionistic case use the same argument and 1. F 1' u != A by 1.8. @ f u != A .14.IGk for some k.3. r w Proposition . Therefore. the classes V(Altk). P r o o f (Modal case) For x # y let U. ¤ Proposition 1.14. Therefore valid formulas are the same.14. F . = According to the characterisation given in 1. Since u is arbitrary.14.5. by Lemma 1. a transitive modal o r intermediate logic i s finitely miomatisable by frame formulas. TABULARITY 69 (1) A n N-modal propositional logic A i s tabular i f fA E Altk A AHk for some k..4 instead of 1. V(AHk) are universal. I G k and the observation that every rooted frame validating Altk A AHk (or IGk) is finite.14. M L ( F ) iff G is T h e o r e m 1. y # V. U. R) is an intuitionistic frame and for y # R ( x ) let V. W) i s a f i n i t e refined frame. is r-persistent by Theorem 1. Then R(x) = So for every R-stable U we have n vx. be an interior set such that x E U. it follows that y $? Thus all subsets of F are interior. similarly for the intuitionistic case. then ML(@)= M L ( F ) ( o r IL(@)= I L ( F ) in the intituionistic case).14. yeR(x) and again it follows that @. To show 'if'.1. By 1.

15. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC 1. so H AP. + + APl is a classical logic Proposition 1. is a subframe logic.m. c IL(Z. APn-frames are S4-frames of depth 5 n . L e m m a 1. 19691.70 CHAPTER 1.p. = I L ( I T Z ) . if for every m there exist finitely many non-L-equivalent formulas in m propositional letters.) [m = IL(IT. It remains to note that every poset of depth < n is a generated subframe in a poset of depth n . is locally tabular. 19671. Thus it is determined by finite posets of depth 5 n.15.15. L e m m a 1.7 Every logic H + AP. Proposition 1.2 Let Z.15.) [m. Definition 1. be an n-element chain. where I L ( I T t ) is the tree of depth n and branching k .5 For every m.15. + AP. m letters can distinguish only finitely many successors of any point. [Hosoi. Corollary 1.15.9 H + =H + AP.15.15. Hence by induction on n we obtain Corollary 1. IL(Z1)= H and H AP. n E w there exists k E w such that ( H + AP.3 H depth n . in other words.15.) for n 2 2.1 For a poset F Proposition 1.6 A logic L is called locally tabular if all its finitely generated Lindenbaum algebras Lind(L [ m ) are finite. is determined by the class of finite posets of Proof As we know. So to say.15 Transitive logics of finite depth The results of this section are based on [Hosoi. for n 20 .4 H+AP. Then for every infinite chain F . W Hence by unravelling we obtain + Corollary 1.8 Every locally tabular logic has the f. In particular. where IT: is the standard tree of depth n and branching w .

C L c LC). (2) SnnSm= 0 for n # m. But this logic is subframe. . Proposition 1.6 we obtain Proposition 1. i. implies Proposition 1.1 5. otherwise (4) the slices S1 i s one-element: S1= { H + APl) = CL.15.). since the class of frames of depth 5 n is closed under subframes. Hence by Lemma 1. (5) the slice Sz i s a decreasing (w + 1)-chain. E L IL(Zn)). then L E Sn.13.15.10 .13 For a finite n . are of cardinality 2 N ~ Proposition 1.15.m. and it remains to show that the latter logic has the f. + Definition 1. + the wth slice is S := { L I H . This proposition shows that the structure of superintuitionistic logics splits into an (w 1)-sequence of slices.)) if V n L E IL(Z.15. Let S be the set of logics of slice n (for 0 5 n 5 w). and H + have the same finite frames.15.10 For a superintuitionistic logic L L IL(Zn+l) i f f H + APn c L.12 (1) S = U n<w Sn.p. the nth slice is the set of superintuitionistic logics S := {L E S I H AP. where = { zax{n E w / L i IL(Z.e. So contains only the logic of the empty 'chain' Zo.1. (3) i f L is a superintuitionistic logic. So we can apply Fine's theorem. (6) for n > 3 all slices S.11 For a finite n. TRANSITIVE LOGICS OF FINITE DEPTH Proof 71 A frame F is of depth 5 n iff F is not reducible t o iff F ItThus H + AP.

+ 6A = H + S'A for any formula A.2 H 6 A unique. < < P r o o f Note that L1 L2 iff Xmn(L1) C Xmn(L2). Therefore all logics of finite slices have the f.. W In this section we study an embedding of S in . but we f x p t o make i .15. since L = Xmn(L) APm = Xmn(L) (H AP.14.) (and IL(Z. this readily follows from Proposition 1. . Every finite slice S i s embeddable in all slices Sn for m n w by maps .15 Sn are sublattices of the lattice of superintuitionistic logics. where 6'A := > p ) > p) (the 'A-version' of Peirce's law).14 Sn = { I L ( F ) I F i s a poset of depth n ) . The set is a decreasing w-chain. 19691 is A L := {S'A I A E L).(L) = X.. in [Hosoi. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC P r o p o s i t i o n 1.) = LC). P r o o f Local tabularity is clearly inherited by extensions.24 + The original definition [Hosoi.16.(L) + Xmn(Lf). moreover..p. X. Let us show that both definitions are equivalent. for L E S. 240bviously. P r o p o s i t i o n 1.72 CHAPTER 1. (A-operation) introduced Definition 1. Every logic of slice S i s determined by a disjoint union of finite posets of depth n.p.again by distributivity. ((p > A) L e m m a 1.m. since IL(Zn) = L C APn is a simple extension of L C in the n t h slice.by distributivity.: L H L n IL(Z. L C = nEw IL(Zn).1 For A E I F put 6A := p V ( p > A). Also H = ( H APn). Also + + + + + + and A .15. ( L + L') = X. and every finite poset is of finEw n + + nite depth. so it holds for all logics of finite slices.. the definition of AL does not depend on the choice of p.k(L) APn = Xmn(L) ( H AP. A. where p is a proposition letter that does not occur i n A.16. and ¤ hence the proposition follows.15. 19691. As we mentioned.. For a superintuitionistic logic L put A L := H {bA I A € L).). since H has the f.m.) for k 2 n.

u Iy A for some u # OF.) Suppose F t u Iy A.1.16. The next lemma shows the semantical meaning of 6A. obviously hence and thus by the deduction theorem 1.) Suppose F Iy &A. 0). By truth preservation it follows that M . (If. (5) implies (0). On the other hand. SO M Iy A for some Kripke model M = (FTu. and M . obviously QH k 6A us prove > &'A. hence M I OF ly p.1 6. Lemma 1.e. thus FTu Iy A.4 This implies hence by the deduction theorem. since p does not occur in A. W . u I t p and MI. u Iy A. Now since is a substitution instance of 6'A.3 Let F be a rooted poset with root OF. M Iy 6A for some Kripke model M over F. Then consider M' = (F. OF Iy SA. Proof (Only if. let In fact. Now from M'. By the generation lemma it follows that M l u . M . Then by truth preservation M I OF Iy 6A. Also MI. Then FIt 6Aiff Q u # O F F T u l t A.1. thus F Iy 6A. u Iy A. u # OF.i. u I t p. J ) such that Obviously M ' is intuitionistic. u Iy A. OF Iy p it follows that M'. A-OPERATION 73 Proof On the one hand.

C AL2. Then SBi E Sub(&?).4). = AL2. In fact.5. Proof An easy exercise.16. Hence Proof In fact.16.74 Hence we obtain CHAPTER 1. then by 1. . SA E AL iff A E L + Proof We consider a particular case.5 will be discussed later on in Section 2. . The claim easily follows from Lemma 1.13.16. .16. W Note that (2) means that A is a monotonic embedding S L2 also implies AnLl E AnL2 for any n. thus F Iy A by the generation lemma. Proposition 1. + + + + I A E I?). (2) H t.16. rn L e m m a 1. (1) A L c L.L2.16. 2 w + + A predicate analogue of 1. and thus AL1 AL2. then 1 F It.5 For any superintuitionistic logic L. if A $ L = I L ( F ) for a poset F. then 6A E AL1 . By (2)) L1 L e m m a 1.L. (2) L1 C L2 iff AL1 (3) L 1 = L2 iff AL1 Proof (1) AL L follows from H t A > 6A.4 If F Il.bA. AL. where 1 adding a root below F .3 (and Proposition 1. BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC Proposition 1.AL2 by 1.16. also see Chapter 2.8 A ( H r ) = H S r . Now the deduction theorem implies ---+ S.6 (1) H k A > 6A. then AL C I L ( l F ) and SA $ I L ( l F ) .7 For propositional superintuitionistic logics L1. F l u Iy A for some u E F . (3) A trivial consequence of (2).16. To show 'if'.6(A1 > A2) > (6A1 > SAz). B . and so H H +sr. if L = H + I ' k A then HISub(r). L e m m a 1.16. where 6 r := {SA A n ( H I?) = H P I ? .16. suppose L1 L2 and A E L1 . where b n r := {bnA I A E r ) . + + F is obtained by Proof In fact. when L is Kripke-complete. . La. if 1 F Iy SA. (2) 'Only if' is obvious. Thus AL = H + 6L c w . /\ Bi 3 A for some B 1 . i=l m E + dl? t.3.

so bnAPm = APm+. then L C H Iimplies L C A n ( H all n E w. C ACL =H + AP2 for L C CL. its analogue for predicate logics will be discussed in Section 2. n # H. S o AL c L for any L P r o o f If AL = L. for all logics of finite slices) this readily follows from Lemma 1. > 0. - Lr). and thus for any n A(H+APn) = H + A P n + l .) = H . = b m l .) for n The inclusion is proper.16. A"L=H nEw (*I in other words. n E w. (*) readily implies Proposition 1. Hence L n ( H AP.soA(L1+L2) = H 6L1 U 6L2 = ( H 6L1) ( H 6L2) = AL1 AL2. since AL AZ = ( P 3 4) v (4 3 P ) @ AL.16. then &A1V &A2E P r o o f For Kripke-complete L1 and L2 (in particular.16.13 A similar argument shows that for any superintuitionistic logic L.7.16.A(L1 n L2). The lemma actually holds for arbitrary logics. + + I ) = H + APn for R e m a r k 1. the 'w-iteration' of A is trivial. + Proposition 1.9 AL E Sn+1and S. in itself. and thus for L E Sn. T h u s A embeds Sn in Note that A is not a lattice embedding. it preserves joins not meets.16. Hence we conclude that A n ( H AP. (2) follows from 1.16. 75 Obviously APm+l = bAPm. L2 (2) A(L1 n L2) = ALl n ALz iff Ll and Lz are g-comparable..1. Namely.12 and (*) do not transfer to the predicate case. P r o o f (l)followsfromLemma1. in particular AP.16. . AL = L iff L = H .11 For superintuitionistic logics L1. + + + + + + Proposition 1.La) and A2 E (La f ALl n ALa . + + A(IL(Zn)) c IL(Zn+.1 A-OPERATION 6. So we obtain Proposition 1.10.) = H APm+. Also by Proposition 1. more precisely.5: L1+L2=H+L1UL2. L e m m a 1. In Volume 2 we will prove that 1.3. and H+APn = A n ( H + I ) = An-'(CL) for n > 0.. then the frame 1 Fl u F2 separates 6A1 V bA2 from ! n A(L~ L~). if A1 6 L2 = IL(F2) and A2 $ L1 = IL(Fl).10 I A1 E (L1 .16.16.

.and say that A is tme at the world w of M (or that w forces A). . .. . or may even be empty. according to Definition 1. in all the worlds that are 'rather close' to w . . ..3 A neighbourhood model over a neighbourhood frame F is a pair M = (F. n. . 0 . Here is a precise definition. . Obviously. R l . O N ) . So we have: - M.R N ) corresponds to a neighbourhood frame N d ( F ) = (W. In this case 'possible worlds' are regarded as points of an abstract 'space' or a 'neighbourhood frame'. such that M A ( N d ( F ) ) = MA(F).17 Neighbourhood semantics Neighbourhood semantics is a generalisation of Kripke semantics. The basic identities mean that the intersection of two i-neighbourhoods of u is also an i-neighbourhood of u. 0 1 . in which 0 : P L 2W is a valuation.76 CHAPTER 1. an N-modal neighbourhood frame F corresponds to the N-modal algebra M A ( F ) := (2W.17. .4 A modal formula A is true in a neighbourhood model M (notation: M k A) if it is true at every world of M. . BASIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC 1. Definition 1.UN).17. Section 1. L e m m a 1. The following is a trivial consequence of definitions.2 Every Kripke frame F = (W. that is. cf. . A is valid in a neighbourhood frame F (notation: F k A) if it is true in e v e q model over F. u E UiV is read as 'V is an i-neighbourhood of u'. We use the same terminology and notation as in Kripke semantics.2. A set of formulas l? is valid in F (notation: F k I?) if every A E l? is valid. . Definition 1. For a formula A. -. So in neighbourhood semantics 'necessary' is interpreted as 'locally true'. x b OiA iff 0(A) is an i-neighbourhood of x.. the elements of W are called possible worlds.1 An n-modal (propositional) neighbourhood frame is an (n+ 1)-tuple F = (W. U. Definition 1. or points. 0). 19 is extended to all formulas. However a neighbourood of u may not contain u. such that W # 0 . and OA is true a t w iff A is true in all worlds in some neighbourhood of w. Oi are unary operations in 2W satisfying the identities: As in Kripke frames.3. In such a frame every world has a set of 'neighbourhoods'. w k A (or w k A) instead of w E @(A). . O1. O1. we write: M . .17. W. every extension of an i-neighbourhood is again an i-neighbourhood and that W is an i-neighbourhood of any u.17.8.ON).

[Shehtman. A modal logic i s called neighbourhood complete if it i s determined by some class of neighbourhood frames. 20051. 19741 ).1 7. From Lemma 1. Definition 1.17.6 (1) For a neighbourhood frame F the set is a modal logic. Lemma 1.m o d a l logic. M L ( C ) ) i s called the modal logic of F (respectively. 20051. NElGHBOURHOOD SEMANTICS 77 Similarly to Lemmas 1.17. (2) For a class C of N-modal neighbourhood frames the set is a n N . 1975b].7 T h e logic M L ( F ) (respectively. 19751. [Shehtman. The converse to the previous Lemma is false [Gabbay.8 we obtain L e m m a 1. [Gerson.1. .17. The question of whether all intermediate propositional logics are neighbourhood complete (Kuznetsov's problem [Kuznecov. 19801. [Shehtman.8 Every Kriplce-complete propositional logic i s neighbourhood complete. [Shehtman. 1975a].2 we have: L e m m a 1.5 For a n y modal formula A and a neighbourhood frame F F k A iff M A ( F ) k A.17. is still open.7 and 1.17. 1980]. or the modal logic determined by F (by C ) . There also exist examples of modal logics that are incomplete in neighbourhood semantics [Gerson.3.3. of C ) .

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Similarly to the propositional case. Here the crucial point is the substitution rule. we define a logic as a set of formulas that contains some basic axioms and is closed under some basic inference rules.Chapter 2 Basic predicate logic 2. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. On the one hand.the set of all theorems. Usually theories are supposed to collect properties of a certain kind of objects. we may be interested in theories that do not depend on 'application domains' and express the basic 'logical laws'. For example. On the other hand. is a specific property of humans that does not hold for all living creatures. were developed for that purpose. x)) also expresses a true property of humans. which is important because we would like to distinguish between logics and theories. . Tarski's elementary geometry.its truth does not depend on the meaning of the predicates H. which does not hold in other cases. such as Peano arithmetic. Many well known theories. F. every axiomatic logical calculus (postulated by a set of axioms and inference rules) generates a 'theory' . The formula B = Vx(H(x) > 3yM(y. x) A 3zM(z. the proposition Every human has a f a t h e r and a mother expressed by a formula A = Vx(H(x) > 3yF(y. x)). M.1 Introduction The main notion of this chapter is first-order logic. But the implication A>B (allowing us to deduce B from A) is a logical law .

. 'Some authors still use 'semantics' that are not sound in this sense [Kracht and Kutz. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC So the laws of logic should sustain replacing of predicates by arbitrary formulas. . . x... . In this respect there is a big difference between the classical and nonclassical cases.] relies on the definition of a correct variable substitution [yl. . But in our nonclassical studies we deal with rather exotic types of frames and the proof of soundness may be nontrivial. [Goldblatt and Maynes. 19771. More exactly.) (using other variables yl. .. yn/xl. . . h .). x.%. . . and they are usually not discussed in textbooks and monographs. . .. . . [ ~ 1 . From our viewpoint. In the nonclassical area there is a great variety of logics deserving special attention. with yl.x. . . In classical logic we may not care about formula substitutions./xl.. . Unlike the classical case. one should replace every occurrence of P(x1. and especially at the substitution rule. . . 3 ~ i t few exceptions. . .. Numerous classical theories contain it as a fixed basic part.x. . .2 Thus to check soundness. . 20051.]C is obtained by a 'correct' replacement of parameters XI. . and define a logic just as a substitution closed theory. we postpone it until Volume 2. and soundness is proved without mentioning substitutions. Our approach to variable substitutions is rather nonstandard and resembles [Bourbaki.. . .x. see Section 2.) with C and every occurrence of P(y1. .3 Classical predicate calculus is traditionally formulated using axiom schemes rather than substitution rule. .)]A obtained by substituting a formula C for an atomic formula P(x1. C) should include the notions of a 'frame' and 'validity'.x. because it may be difficult to describe all 'frames' characterising a given logic.. Its intuitive meaning is clear: given a firstorder formula A we can deduce every formula [C/P(xl. This is not so convenient. and there exist examples of 'logics' that are not substitution closed. . But it is convenient from the technical viewpoint.80 CHAPTER 2... A semantics S is 'sound' for C if the set of all formulas valid in any S-frame is a logic from C. such a s [Church. 19961. [Novikov. but due to the lack of time. to obtain [C/P(xl. . Therefore let us first take a closer look at the syntactic notion of a logic. Study of nonclassical logics in this volume is closely related to study of different semantics.) . it is necessary to prove that the substitution rule preserves 'validity' in a 'frame'.3 for further details. .y. In its turn [yl. .yn/ 21. y.. .x.. . l0f course this definition is rather conventional. 19681. 20061.y. . . . . . . We can regard them as schemata for producing theorems.' A standard example is classical first-order logic.]. Thus the definition of a formula substitution [C/P(xl. a semantics S for a certain class of logics (say. . ..)]A. Of course study of nonclassical theories (such as Heyting arithmetic or modal set theories) is also interesting and important.. . with the corresponding version of C. . the set of all theorems of classical predicate calculus.. there are many options here.xn]C.y.

R.2.. x # y abbreviates -(x = y). and B = B'. and n-ary predicate letter^. Classical (or intuitionistic) predicate formulas (with or without equality) are built from atomic formulas using the propositional connectives A. A.). . slightly different versions in [Shoenfield.. we use the letter N instead of n.) for some n > 0. p. v2. . B .1 The (modal) degree d(A) of a modal predicate formula A is defined by induction: d(A) = 0 for A atomic. a list of variables x = XI . LA=. 1 5 i 5 N . . .=) (basic) classical (or intuitionistic) first-order language. I F . >.x. LE) Lemma 2. 19681). T. The elements of Var and PLn are respectively called (individual) variables. . we will return to these matters in Volume 2. or P?(xl. d(A A B ) = d(A v B ) = d(A d(VxA) = d(3xA) = d(A).Q.5 Note that our basic language does not include constants or function letters. in N-modal predicate formulas6 the unary connectives Oi. (sometimes with subscripts) as names of predicate letters. . and Nmodal formulas without equality. we omit the subscript N if N = 1 or if N is clear from the context. y. > ) binary connectives such that A * B = A' *' B'. r. but we shall consider its uncountable expansions with constants. . QxA denotes &xl . . 5'=' is also used as a metasymbol. AF.2. B' be formulas. The abbreviations -A. . FORMULAS 81 2. The and called the (basic) N-modal first-order set MF~=) is also denoted by language. {Pr Definition 2. A = B . For a formula A. . y E Var and '=' is an extra binary predicate letter.x. intuitionistic.2 Formulas The expansion of a propositional language to a first-order language is defined in a standard way.. 31. and the quantifiers V. *' E {v. MFG. PLn = I i 2 0) (n 2 0) be fixed disjoint countable sets. 19671. .xn and a quantifier & E {V. where x. 3. or Pf (a proposition letter). + So d(A) = 0 iff A is a classical formula.2. MF$). A'. can also be used. *. . Sometimes we write IF(=).2 (Parsing lemma) Let A. q. Atomic formulas with equality can also be of the form x = y.^ An atomic formula without equality is either I. [Bourbaki.. because in many cases n denotes the number of variables in a list. Let Var = {vl. . &xnA. E Var. etc. Then A = A'. in order to combine the cases with and without equality in a single statement. is We skip a routine proof of the following standard statement (cf.d(B)). . V. . d(OiA) = d(A) 1. Also note that the language is countable. .. .2. > B ) = max (d(A). M F N denote respectively the sets of atomic. 6To avoid confusion. 4We also use the symbols P. . OiA have the same meaning as in the propositional case. the corresponding sets of formulas with equality are denoted by AF'. * = *I. as names of proposition letters and x. . I F = . . 21. as names of variables.

i. But such a definition is a priori ambiguous. All occurrences of y i n B are bound.y. one can take the parameters in a certain order. with {VA I A E I?) instead of r.x) is free (bound) and x # y. .2. Definition 2.x) is free (bound). x) is free (bound). i Let C = (A * B). If ( A . The set of all universal closures of formulas from a set I? is denoted by Note that in all the logics considered in this book the universal closures of the same formula are always equivalent. The standard universal closure VA of a formula A is the sentence VxA. To fix a unique notation for the universal closure. If (B. IAl = 1. If (A. then (C. N-modal (respectively. y) is called strongly bound. i + 1. For any ordering y = yl . i. i .e.2. where x is the standard list of parameters of A. . Free and bound occurrences of variables in formulas are now defined by induction. then (OjA. then (B. * is a binary connective. i . If (A.e. Definition 2.2. then (C. x) is free (bound).x) is free (bound). x) is free (bound). where + 1. Recall that a universal closure of a formula is usually understood as the result of the universal quantification over all its parameters. We also use the notation MSE) A variable is called new for A if it does not occur in A. 2. /3) such that P is a subword of a starting from the i t h letter of a . of all variables having free occurrences in A.x) is free (bound). A closed formula (or a sentence) is a (respectively. vsriables having bound occurrences in A). of FV(A) the sentence VyA is called a universal closure of A. . an occurrence of a word p in a is a triple (a. Definition 2.i .i .82 CHAPTER 2.c ) such that c is the i t h letter of a. BV(A) denotes the set of bound variables of A (i. so we can deal only with standard universal closures. intuitionistic) sentences. i. r. but we shall now give it in a more formal way.4 All vanable occurrences i n atomic formulas are free. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC The definition of free and bound occurrences of variables in formulas is wellknown. FV(A) denotes the set of parameters (free variables) of a formula A.e.i .i 1 2. for example as follows.3 A n occurrence of a letter c in a word a is a triple (a. I S ( = ) ) denotes the set of all formula without parameters. ++ Let B = VyA or 3yA.5 The standard list of parameters of a formula A is the set of its parameters FV(A) ordered i n accordance with their first occurrences i n A.x) is free (bound). i + 2. The occurrence (B.

Q).8 Let be a new symbol.2. FORMULAS 83 For a subformula QxB of a formula A (where Q is a quantifier). For example.7 Let A be a formula of length n. QxB) be an occurrence of QxB i n A.obtained by replacing every bound occurrence of every variable i n A with a. i. x)) the reference function is pictured as follows: and the scheme as follows: (Note that the stem itself has a different reference function!) . i . j. More precisely: Definition 2.i j 2. := (-4-7 T ~ A ) Thus BV(A-) {) a . Definition 2.6 Let (A. The stem of a formula A is a formula A. Definition 2. But the following definition is more convenient. every free occurrence of x in B.x) is a bound variable occurrence for some x) such that r f ~ ( i = j whenever (A.A. W e also say that an occurrence of a quantifier binds all referent occurrences of variables.2. i . + + + Now the reference structure of a formula A can be defined as a function sending every bound occurrence of a variable in A to the occurrence of a binding quantifier. i 1. All variable occurrences i n A referent to the same occurrence of a quantifier are called coreferent (or correlated). is called referent to the first occurrence of Q. by connecting occurrences of quantifiers with referent variable occurrences. j. regarded as an extra variable ('joker'). x) is referent to (A. If (B. x) is an occurrence of x referent to (A. Reference functions can be represented graphically. i . for A := Vx(P(x) 3 3yQ(y. then ( A .2. FV(A-) = FV(A).x ) is also referent to (A. The reference function of A is a function r f A defined on the set {i I 1 5 i 5 n & (A. (A. i. Q). The scheme of A is a pair . Q) (for some variable ) x and a quantifier Q). as well as the first occurrence of x.2. x) is a free occurrence of x i n B .2. So r f sends positions of bound variables to positions of their binding quan~ tifiers.

A.2. [Kleene. Schemes can also be defined by induction without appealing to formulas: ~ ) Definition 2. 19681. Sz are schemes.12 Every atomic formula is a scheme. - O j A := Dj & (for Q E rence of x with Remark 2. cf. the scheme of a formula can be defined by induction as follows. It is obvious (a strict proof is by induction) that for any scheme S in the sense of this definition.. then there is a scheme obtained from QxS by replacing every occurrence of x with and connecting it with the first occurrence of Q. So in our syntax we can deal with schemes rather than formulas. * {V. then OjS is a scheme. one can number quantifier occurrences and add corresponding superscripts to referent variable occurrences.A.' One can even argue that schemes better correspond to human intuition about first-order logic. we prefer to keep to the traditional notion of a formula and use schemes only incidentally. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Remark 2.84 CHAPTER 2. ( A* B ) := (A* for * E {v. If S is a scheme. l cf. T) . A. If S is a scheme. Alternatively. In terms of functions.11 Strictly speaking. there is a formula A such that S = .A. Such an explication does not seem useful however. 3 ) . by replacing every occurand connecting it with the first occurrence of &. x E Var. it means that ~ f ( ~ is ~ ~ the union of r f and r f with some shifts.A. 'with minor differences .:= A for A atomic. 8 ~ a t u r a language does not use bound variables and hides them in the reference structure. for technical purposes. .2. this definition shows us how to reconstruct * a graphic representation of . 3)) is obtained from Qx.2. 19671. and so on.8 But in our book. If S1.10 .2. Definition 2.9 Instead of this graphic representation. then (S1 * S2) is a scheme. the sentence Every triangle has at least two acute angles. In a systematic way this approach is developed in [Bourbaki.instead of quantifiers Bourbaki uses the E-symbol (denoted by and defines 3xA as an abbreviation for [ T % ( A ) / X ] A .

[Y/x]A is a 'good' substitution if free occurrences of x are not within the scope of any quantifier over y. . Many authors consider such substitutions as 'bad' and simply do not allow them. A well-known way to solve the problem is renaming of bound variables.^ We regard [y/x]A not as a single formula. it is incorrect to define [y/x]A as 3y (y # y). A formula is called clean if all its quantifiers bind different variables and none of its bound variables is free. if A is 3y (x # y). without bound occurrences of x or y. cf.z and define [y/x](3y (x # y)) as 32 (y # z). . we also denote the list ( x l . . .. 19971. [3yQ(x. which is unique up to adding a constant. For example. 20051. But this definition is technically inconvenient and rather unnatural . Let x = (XI. x. [Kleene.3.2. Since there are no variable collisions. the latter substitution is made by a straightforward replacement. but as a member of a certain class of formulas. 1°1f there is no confusion. x. we have to fix one of these options. But this restriction does not help for defining formula substitutions. in the formula 3y (x # y) we can rename the bound y by . But this variable z can be chosen in many different ways . Every formula A can be transformed into an equivalent clean formula AO. and we want the formula VxA > [y/x]A to be (classically) valid. If the result of a substitution should be unique. . .. due to possible variable collisions. because the alphabetical order of variables is not related to logic at all. cf. . This resembles the well-known mathematical notation f (x)dx of a primitive function. the result of a substitution is unique only up to congruence (correct renaming of bound variable^). Now we pass to the details. [Kleene.) by X I . . Using schemes instead of formulas simplifies all the details: two formulas are congruent if they have the same scheme. formally. because e. So we propose another approach. y is free for x in A.y)lP(x)lP(y) should be [Y/xI~YQ(x. we can always take the first variable allowed for renaming (in the list of all variables) [Kolmogorov and Dragalin. For example. .3 Variable substitutions It is well-known that a 'logically correct' variable substitution is not a simple replacement of variables.1° Later on we use the following notation: gCongruence corresponds t o a-equivalence in X-calculi. . Then we define [y/x]A as [y/x]AO. [Kleene. as they say.) be a list of variables (n > O). and the latter substitution [ylx] is 'bad'. VARIABLE SUBSTITUTIONS 85 2. 19521. 19671.g. Y).x. endel el son. For example.it can be arbitrary except for the original y. 19631. A substitution is considered as a relation not function.

BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC r ( x ) for the set {xl. Let A[x H y] be the result of simultaneous replacement of all (both llThis notation is only occasional. but x sub y. . .x.yl).y are lists of variables and all x l . A list is said to be distinct if all its members are different.1 A variable transformation of a (distinct) list x to y is the finite function (the set of pairs) { ( x l .. i. .ll xy for the concatenation of the lists x. We also use the abbreviations A transformation [xH y]is called proper if xi # yi for every i . 12Sometimes transformations are also called 'substitutions'.x. [x H yIs denotes the restriction of [x ++ y] to r(x)n S . .3. . for z E r(x).. . .}. Of course a variable substitutior. . If x = ( x l . .(x. x n S for 'the sublist of x containing the elements of S'. . which is the identity function on V a r .. this function is denoted . . z. Definition 2. [x H y] is called a variable renaming in A.S for 'the sublist of x obtained by removing the elements of S'.. is nothing but a function V a r ---+ V a r that changes only finitely many variables. x . . So a composition of substitutions is a substitution. but we avoid this terminology.e. If also V ( A ) C r(x) for a certain formula A.} by [xI-+ If a transformation [x H y] is bijective (i. ) are distinct. It is easy to describe how a transformation [xI-+ y]acts on (modal) predicate formulas. put We also use the dummy substitution [/I.x. is For a set of variables S. . we define the variable substitution [y/x] the following function as Var Var: - Note that the same definition can be given in the case when some of the xi are equal. y is distinct). etc. y). ..12 Obviously. but only one of them is proper. For a list of variables z = zl . y = (yl. .86 CHAPTER 2. y. it is called a variable renaming. . . .e. We say that a transformation [xH y] represents the substitution [y/~]. YI. . every substitution is represented by infinitely many transformations. Note that [xH y] is a variable renaming iff the corresponding substitution [y/x] a permutation of V a r . .). z E x for ' z occurs in x'. . A bound variable renaming in A is a variable renaming in A fixing all parameters of A.

. and the claim is trivial.3. Then for any predicate formula A. Then (1) free (respectively. and next [y +-+ Z] sends to (2) Also obvious. .3. Lemma 2. If A is atomic. Later on we will describe 'admissible' transformations that do not affect the truth values of formulas. i.13 Lemma 2. . . We denote A[x H y] by A'. (A[x H y])[y H X] = A if Proof [X H y] is a variable renaming in A.2 Let [x I-+ y']. i. this is the case for A = 3x1 (P(x1) A -P(yl)) and 4 x 1 H yl] = 3yl(P(yl) A TP(Y~)). Then (2) for any predicate formula A such that V ( A ) r(x) (A[x H yl])[y H Z] = A[x H z . The formulas A and A[x ++ y] may be not logically equivalent in classical logic.3.3. We can say that A[x H y] is obtained from A by a 'straightforward' renaming of variables.(i).3 Let [x H y']. so all variable occurrences are free.4 Let A be a predicate formula. formally. [x H y] a variable renaming in A. (1) Trivial: [x H y'] sends xi to y. then A' is atomic. [y H z] variable transformations such that r(yl) 2 r ( y ) .n). (2) r f A =rf~[x++~]. a for some sujection u . Lemma 2. a ] . w In a more general situation the following holds (the proof is similar). In particular.2. one should argue by induction on the length of A. cf. Proof By induction. xj) is free (bound) iff (A[x ++ y]. see below. 13The notation [y/x] is reserved for a 'correct' variable substitution with renaming of A bound variables. bound) occurrences of variables in A correspond to free (bound) occurrences of variables in A[x H y]: (A. [y H z] be variable transformations such that y' = y . yj) is free (bound).19. VARIABLE SUBSTITUTIONS 87 free and bound) occurrences of xi in A with yi (for i = 1. For example. . Lemma 2.3.

since [x ++ y] is a bijection. k 1.2. xj) is referent (B. The case A = O k B is also left to the reader If A = QxkB. xj) is referent to (A. Variable occurrences in A coming from B are of the form (A. xj) is free (bound) iff (B'. then A' = (B' * C'). a bound occurrence (A.4).i l . xj) where (B. xj) is referent to (B. i. i 2. we leave formal details to the reader. then as above. k. i 2. + + + By the same reason. i 1. = Since r f ~ r fB' by induction hypothesis. i 1. Then + (A. xj) is free (bound) iff (B. Now if j # k.i. i . xj) is free (bound) (by Definition 2. xj) is a free occurrence in D). BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC If A = ( B * C). yj) is free (bound).Q) iff (B.5. A. according to 2. QxjD) is an occurrence in A and (D. it follows that A similar argument applies to variable occurrences in C. this happens iff either i = k 1 or this occurrence of x j in A comes from a free occurrence in a subformula D starting at position k 3 (more precisely.i . Q ) : + + In fact. yj) is free (bound) (by induction hypothesis) iff (A'. xj) is an occurrence in B. A bound occurrence (A.k. yj) is free (bound) iff (A'.1.k . Q1): + + + + . k 2. i. i. i 1. yj) is free (bound) (by 2. we obtain: (A. Note that yj # yk. xj) is free (bound) iff (B. k 1.88 CHAPTER 2.2. x j ) is referent to a quantifier occurrence (A. i 2. then A' = QykB1. i. i.2. + + Moreover. Q1) iff (B.4) iff (B'.

rfA.(i)=. So this is a bijective transformation [ xH y] such that V ( A )C_ r ( x ) and xi = yi for xi E F V ( A ) . VARIABLE SUBSTITUTIONS and similarly.3.i . A and A. 6FV(B) . A and A' = A [ x H y] also differ only in bound variables. Lemma 2. Now consider bound variable occurrences. then A y].3.= (A1)-. it is bound. Lemma 2. We have: occurs in A. Thus strong congruence implies congruence. B are called congruent (notation: A B ) if they have the same scheme. Then r f ~ ( i ) 1 ~ r f ~ = l(.4) iff ' occurs in (A1)-at position j .3. As for the stems.xk) is an arbitrary occurrence.5 Two predicate formulas A. as well as (A'.3.3. A[x H Proof By Lemma 2. And if ( A .a t position j iff some xi occurs in A at position j iff some yi occurs in A at position j (by 2. Definition 2.7 We say that B is strongly congruent to A (notation: A B ) i f there is a bound variable renaming [xH y] in A such that B = A[x H y].2.(i+2)=k+2@rfB. A bound variable renaming in e A is a variable renaming in A fixing all parameters of A. k Hence ~ f A (+ 2 ) i = rfA'(i + 2 ) . Definition 2.6 Let A b a predicate formula.2 shows that is an equivalence relation on formulas.4 the reference functions coincide. Thus A.yk). Lemma 2.3.and eventually A A A'. (2) If A = QyB A A' and y 6 B V ( B ) . then for some variable z and formula B'. C' C.3. Since xi = yi for xi E F V ( A ) .3. then A' = (B' * C') for some B' g B . i ) = ~ Definition 2.9 (1) If A = ( B * C ) A A'.3.8 If [ x++ y] is a bound variable renaming in A.i . A = QzB' and B' B [ y ct z].may differ only in bound variables.

[y ++ z]. * = *'. then A' = A. Again we denote A[x H y] by A'. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC (1) Let A = ( B * C) A A'. * E { A .2 (or strictly speaking.3. then QxA is clean.3. B' A B[y H z ] . Definition 2. then A[x H y] i s clean. (2) Assume A = QyB A A' and y 6 BV(B). Lemma 2. In this case. 2.*'. it must have the form = (B' *' C').C'. Since A' begins with (.(a formal proof is routine by induction). B are clean.2 implies the coincidence of the corresponding stems. hence & . then (A * B ) is clean.A'. = it follows that A' has the form QzB' (otherwise A' does not If begin with Q) and . is obtained from Q y a by replacing y with and adding connections to the first Q. Then . + + where . If A is atomic. If formulas A. By definition.by 2.2. and BV(A) n V(B) = BV(B) n V(A) = 0 . x E V a r . . the reference functions coincide.2. Proof By induction. C are clean.B'. [y H z] means (B. r f ~ ) and also z $? FV(B). & = . then A' is atomic. because they are inherited from A and A').].. = (. V >). Since ~ It is also clear that B-[y H z] = (B[y H y # BV(B). B .10 A formula A i s called clean if there are n o variables both free and bound i n A and the number of occurrences of quantifiers equals the number of bound variables.3.C'). If A i s clean.90 Proof CHAPTER 2.e. 21). if [x H y] is bound for A. a.B'.11 Every atomic formula is clean. and x 6BV(A).A.. r f = rfB[.12 If [x H y] i s variable renaming i n a clean formula A. Suppose A = ( B * C). (U) A. therefore FYom ( 9(flu) we have t.=&[y 21. = ( a * and . i. diflerent occurrences of quantifiers i n A bind different variables i n A. This is equivalent to the following inductive definition: Definition 2.

r(z) = V(C). and by induction hypothesis.11. A' = QzB'. we may assume that r(x) = V(B). C' are clean by induction hypothesis. and thus [x H y] U [z H t] is bijective. B[y H z] is clean by 2.12 ([y H z] becomes a variable renaming if we prolong it in a trivial way . xi # BV(B). yi $ BV(B1). Then [x H y] U [z H t] is a function.3. B is clean. B is clean as a subformula of A. The same argument shows that [y ++ x] U [t H z] is a function. So we obtain a bound variable renaming that transforms A into A'.3.3. for B' A B[y H z]. Both functions [x H y].4.4.9(1). Suppose A = QxiB.3.3. L e m m a 2. similar to the previous lemma.{y)). A' = (B' * C') for B B B' and C & C' by the induction hypothesis. z do not have common bound variables. By Lemma 2.3. B'.e. Note that B' is clean as a subformula of A'. i.3. Then A' = QyiB'. By Lemma 2. since A is clean.as the identity function on V(B) . then A' = A. then A Proof & A'.14 If A A A' and A. the lists x. [x ++ y] a variable transformation such that BV(A) n r(xy) = 0. B' is clean. Thus A' is clean by 2.9(2). We leave this as an exercise for the reader. C A C'. If A = QyB is clean. Obviously. . By induction on the complexity of A. In fact.2. Hence BV(B1) n V(C1) = 0 .3. Similarly we obtain BV(C1)n V(B1) = 0.13 Let A be a clean formula. y does not have bound occurrences in B. Proof By induction. and the claim is trivial If A = ( B * C).3. [z ++ t] accord on free variables as they fix them. [z H t]. So by the induction hypothesis B ' g B[y ++ z]. So for some bound variable renamings [x H y]. we prove the claim for any A' If A is atomic and A A A'. L e m m a 2. Then by Lemma 2. then by 2. VARIABLE SUBSTITUTIONS B'.A1 are clean. and thus A' = (B' * C') is clean.Then A[x H y] is clean.

+ OiBo and If A = ( B * C )and B A Bo. then B1 := Bo[xw y] is clean by Lemma 2. If A is atomic. Proposition 2. [ xH u] fixes z.15 For any clean formula A.3. then obviously A OiBo is clean.12. but we can make it clean by an appropriate bound variable renaming. and let [ x H y] be a bijection such that r ( y )n V ( C o ) 0 .14. it is already clean. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC for some bound variable renaming [ x I--+ u] in B f . I--+ H Hence by applying [ z w y] we obtain (I) ( Q z B 1 ) ( [ x U ] 0 [z I--+ Note that [X I--+ y ] ) = QyB. C A Co for clean Bo. Immediate from 2. ' z @ BV(B1). H (2) U ] 0 [Z H y] = [ ( x Z ) Z - (U . let BV(Bo) = r ( x ) . 2. so Thus (&zB')[x u] = &z(B[y z]). By induction hypothesis. B 2 B'. Proof By induction on the complexity of A. which easily implies A & A'.12. then A A (Bo*Co). If A = OiB and B A Bo for a clean Bo. g ( A )= Proof A (A) n (clean formulas).Co. 2. (Bo* Co)may be not clean.3. Proposition 2.Z ) Y ] is a bound variable renaming in B'.3. In fact. then A = OiB1. so ( 2 ) implies If A = OiB 4 A'.3. and = Similarly there exists C1 Co such that .3.8.CHAPTER 2. ' and B A B'.3.16 Every predicate formula A i s congruent t o some clean formula (called a clean version of A). Since A is clean.

Hence the H formula Qy(Bo[x y ] ) is clean by 2.2. ! QxA B - &xB for & E {V.3. by 2. ( 4 ) follow from the inductive definition of schemes 2. y q V ( A ) . So we prove that for any B Proof - . Proposition 2. First note that congruence really has properties (1)-(4). Finally. it may be that x E BV(B0).then also x E FV(B0) (since free variable occurrences in a formula are at the same positions as in its stem. If x E F V ( B ) . and it transforms QxA into Qy(A[x y]).8. The next proposition gives us a convenient inductive definition of congruence that does not appeal t o schemes. QxBo is clean.11. thus &xBo A &y(Bo[x y ] ) by 2. if x @ F V ( B ) . there are two cases. and we have proved that it is congruent to A.12. In fact. If A = QxB and B A Bo for a clean Bo. B1 A Bo and C1 Co implies (B1 * C1) A (Bo * Co) A A. So H these formulas are congruent.2. V A N A B L E SUBSTITUTIONS Since B V ( B l )n FV(Cl) = r ( y )n FV(Co)= 0 .3.3. So we rename x into a new variable y @ V ( B o ) .11. Then [x H y] can be prolonged to a bound variable renaming in QxBo. 3 ) . ( 2 ) . let z be the list of all other variables occurring in A. Q E {V. and Bo[x ++ y] is clean by 2. Now so so A A QxBo. (1)follows from 2.= Bo). then also x e FV(Bo).3.12. (3). then [xz ++ yz] is a bound variable renaming in A. Thus x # B V ( B o ) . and B. it follows that (Bl * G I )is clean. Congruence is the smallest equivalence relation N-modal predicate formulas with the following properties: (1) QxA - between (2) A - - &Y(A[x Y ] ) for a: @ B V ( A ) . Now consider an arbitrary equivalence relation satisfying (1)-(3)and show that congruent formulas are --related. However. 3).3.

for some B1 Al. It is worth noting that there exists an equivalent description of congruence (or a-equivalence) via variable swaps. 31. it follows that B = QyD for some D l y. and thus y $ V(QxC1) by the choice of C1. We skip a similar simple case when A = OiA1.14. we have C C1 by the induction hypothesis. and thus A B by (3). by a bound variable renaming (Lemmas 2. suppose A = QxC A B.y $ BV(C1). [Gabbay and Pitts. so the claim is trivial. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC by induction on IAl.8. - - N where the latter readily follows from C A C1. Since ICI < IAl.3. On the other hand. Ai Bi. Q E {V. Next. B1 A A2 we have B = (B1 * B2). So B := QYD by (2). then as we saw in the proof of 2. 20021: Lemma 2.C1[x++yl. C is congruent to a clean formula Co. Finally.94 CHAPTER 2.3. cf. where y $ FV(C). If A is atomic.3. 2.12) we transform Co into a congruent clean formula C1 such that s.3.17. Therefore A - B. by ( I ) . We also have QyD A QxC QxC1. cf. The characterization given in Proposition 2.. D . Then by induction hypothesis. and hence A = QxC QxCl by (2).3. . Since A=&. ! - (2)-(4) from 2. .17 resembles the definition of a-equivalence in A-calculi.. - e y c l [ ++ yl ~ and we already know that A - QxC1.3. Hence which implies y]. we obtain that y @ FV(QxCl). D AC~[XH By induction hypothesis. then obviously A A B implies A = B. Since congruent formulas have the same occurrences of parameters. If A = (A1 * A2).3. By Proposition 2.16.18 Congruence is the smallest equivalence relation modal predicate formulas with the following properties: (1') A N N between N - B i f l B i s obtained from A by replacing some of its subformula QxC with D = Qy(C[xy yx]).

3. Thus every equivalence relation satisfying (l'). If yi has a free occurrence in B and yi # r(x). this occurrence remains free in B [ x ++ y]. If x j has a free occurrence in B and j # i.3. (2) if yi E F V ( B ) then yi E r(x). since A[xy ++ yx] = A[x ++ y] for y # V(A).3.17. .yi . transformations described in the statement of the lemma. . any occurrence of xi free in a subformula B of QxiB occurring in A becomes an occurrence of yi in B[x H y]. Qyi . .17. Proof [Sketch]If A A C .. However this description will not be used in further studies. In fact. since otherwise r f c # r f ~ Thus ( 1 ) holds. The other way round.17. . let us also give a description of a congruence class of a clean formula in terms of transformations. so r fc # r fA. the following holds: (1) if x j E F V ( B ) and j # i then yj # yi. and thus referent to the first occurrence of Q in Qyi(B[x H y]). Thus (2) holds. preserve the scheme of A. in C they are replaced with the same bound variable yi.. B[x++yl .2. VARTA BLE SUBSTITUTIONS Proof Congruence satisfies (l'). To complete the whole picture. . this occurrence of xi corresponds to an occurrence of yj in the formula Qyi(B[x H y]) occurring in C. . Then every formula congruent to A can be obtained by a transformation [x H y] such that for any subformula of A of the form QxiB. . . where Q is a quantifier. Lemma 2. .19 Let A be a clean formula. (1') obviously implies (1) from 2. then all parameters of these formulas are at the same positions. Qfyi.3. Since A is clean.3. W (2)-(4) contains by 2. Now suppose QxiB occurs in A. . So yj # yi. It also satisfies (2)-(4) as noted in 2.3.12. all occurrences of every bound variable xi in A are coreferent and since r f A = r f C . since otherwise it is referent t o another occurrence of a quantifier Q' over yi in C: C = . where z is a list of all other variables from V(C). since for y # FV(C). This occurrence of yi is also free. So C = A[x H y] for a list x of bound variables and some y. On the other hand. and thus by 2.

. . . This again contradicts (1). . .21 Let A be a formula. [ x y] = H But &Z B [ x H y] = Q z ( B [ x Yl) = A[x YI. W Now we can define how variable substitutions act on formulas.xi . .and yi = yj. Also every occurrence of yi free in a subformula E [ x H y] of QyiE[xH y] occurring in C comes from a free occurrence of xi in E from a subformula QxiE of A. Then Proof Easy by induction on [At. since [ x H y] fixes yi.96 CHAPTER 2. & z B . Hence the claim follows. Now by induction hypothesis thus . f Thus A [ x H Y]= (A-[xHY ] . (since A is clean. otherwise yi E F V ( E ) . while yi = yj.3... Therefore A A[x H y ] . and j clean. Then A = .3. we define S [ x H y] as the result of replacing every occurrence o xi in S by yi. T ~ A ) . Definition 2. In fact. .20 For a variable transformation [ xH y] and a scheme S . Lemma 2.so yi E r ( x ) by (2). Q'xj . This contradicts the condition (1). BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC But this Q1yi comes from some occurrence of &'xj in A. . . since A is Now xi is free in a subformula D of Q1xjDoccurring in B . Qxi . + + + + .We consider only the case A = QzB. again since z does not occur in x.. [ x H y] a variable transformation such that r ( x y )n B V ( A ) = 0 . xi @ B F ( E ) ) . . Then yi = xj for j # i (since yi E F V ( E ) ) .. since a does not occur in x. - # i .

23 Every predicate formula A has a clean version A" such that ~ ( x Y )n BV(AO) 0. if 11 = n. [yl/x'].25 Forany predicate formula A. substitutions [y/x]. x lemma Therefore congruent formulas have the same substitution instances under every variable substitution.3.where [y/x] = [yfl/x"].3. a E Y. From the definition we readily obtain Lemma 2. in precise terms.2. take an arbitrary clean version and make an appropriate bound variable renaming.[y'l/x"]. then [ x . [z/u] and quantijier Q (4) [y"/x"][yl/xl]A [y/x]A. Then we define [y/x]A as an arbitrary formula B such that A [ x H y] = Let us show soundness of this definition. Proof To obtain A". Lemma 2.a H y .3.3. a. Then by Lemma 2. .3. [x/u]. Lemma 2.21. VARIABLE SUBSTITUTIONS 97 Definition 2..a] = [X H y].22 Let A be a predicate formula. The next lemma contains some simple properties of variable substitutions.[yl/x'] composition A (the of functions on V a r ). = Then [y/x]A A" [x +-+ y].24 A A + [y/x]AA [y/x]A1 ' Note that [y/x] and [x H y] do not depend on the ordering of x.3. [y/x] a variable substitution.

(#2). so suppose y # F V ( A ) .3.3. so every variable substitution in a formula can be presented as a composition of substitutions of the form [ y l x ] (simple substitutions). F V ( A V [ xH y ] ) . (4) Let A" be a clean version of A such that B V ( A O )n r(xx'x"yy'y") = 0..3.Alx t-i y ] ) = (or. . . it follows that F V ( [ y / x ] A ) V(. [] .z 6 F V ( A ) U r ( x y ) .17 or just by the definition of a scheme). this gives us exactly ( 2 ) Trivial. for distinct variables z l . A (13) Q y [ y / x [ A Q x A if y is distinct. (#I) QY [YIXIA Qy(AO t-i Y ] ) .( 0 ) ) . to be more precise. by 2. So we should take the set V ( & = F V ( A ) and replace every xi occurring in this set with the corresponding yi. r ( y ) n F V ( A ) = r ( ~n)r ( x ) = 0 .17.98 CHAPTER 2. A A A0 implies (by 2. A tt-i . Let A" be a clean version of A such that B V ( A O ) r ( x y ) = 0. -. A [X Since y # F V ( A ) .13.3. we know n As hence by 2. . So from ( # I ) . Proof ( 1 ) Since [ y / x ] A= A [ x I+ y ] . [ ~ l / z l ] [ z n / ~.17 we also have Now obviously. So [y"/x"][ y l / x ] A [y'l/x'l](AO[x'i y']) 2 ( A 0[x' H y'])[x'l Y"]. . Then [ y l / x ' ] A AO[x'H y']. ( 3 ) The case y = x is trivial. .n z l / x l ] A 9 . and obviously its bound variables are the same as in A'. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC (11) [ y / x ] A [ynlzn].(#3) we obtain Q y [ y / x ] A QxA. A By Lemma 2. the latter formula is clean.

VARIABLE SUBSTITUTIONS 99 Since [yl/xl]= [ylt/xlt]. the first substitution sends every ui to z and next t o [y/x]zi and every xj @ r(u) to yj. x := u. Then we have > = [y'/xl] 0 [yI1/x"] we may assume that and it remains to show that In fact. So if r(x) n FV(A) E r(u).l. Then [y/x]z = y. it suffices to check that [y/x] . for [y/x] r(x) F V ( A ) . .2.wl. u := x. so r(v) = FV(AO ++ v]). [z/u] and [[y/x]z/u]coincide on i parameters of A. Note that FV(A) n {u} C r(x) iff {u} G -FV(A) u r(x).Hence by Lemma 2. z := u.+VJ. (6) This is a particular case of (5) when x = z. On the other hand. In fact. Then r(u) = FV(AO). and thus v = w .3. [u Similarly we have where [W H Z] := [XI' HY"]~O [U+. thus the claim holds. > We can also write A0[xl H yl] = A0[u H V] . SOr(w) = r(v). suppose xj = ui E FV(A).3. (7) Apply (5) to the case y := v. Then by the choice of [u H v]. all parameters of A beyond r(u) remain fixed. (5) By (4). The second substitution sends ui directly to [y/x]zi and also fixes other parameters.a for some surjective a E CI. since x1 does not contain bound variables of A.we can always add variables to both x1 and y'. [W ++ z].l. where [U H V] := [XI H yIA.2. so we may assume that r(xl) FV(A)(= FV(AO)).

since r ( x ) n r(z) = 0 and z is distinct. B0 be clean versions of A and B such that BV(AO)n FV(A) = BV(BO)n F V ( B ) = 0. (9) Let A'. [y1/x'] = [y"y'/x"xl] and apply (4) (11) Since zi @ FV(A). So (8.2) Qz(AO[xH y]) &z[y/x]A by 2. QzA G &zAO and &zAOis clean by 2.3. . (###) and 2. On the other hand.21 we have: [y/x](A * B ) A (A0 * BO)[xH y] = (AO[x y] * B O [ xH y]) H ([ylxIA * [ylxIB).1) and (8.100 CHAPTER 2. Now (11) follows from (#). [zl/xl]A. . In the same way from (10) we obtain since r(z) n r ( y ) = 0 and z is distinct.2). Now (8) follows from (8. (10) Note that in this case [y"/x"] .16.3. AO[x hence YI 4% [YIxIA.(##).11. (8.1) [y/x]QzA H ++ (&zAO)[x Y] = &z(AO[x Y]). BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Then (8) Consider a clean version A" of A such that r(xyz) n BV(AO)= 0. .24.3. Then (A0 * B O )is a clean version of (A * B ) and by 2.3. from (6) we obtain (#) [ylzl[zlxlA [ylx[A By induction from (10) we also have (tin) [zlxlA A [znlxnl .

26 Describe the composition of substitutions (or of corresponding transformations) explicitly. BY (1217 Q Y ~ [ Y ~ / X ~ I [ A ~Y ~ I X ~ I Q Y ~ [ Y ~ I X ~ I A .3.2. Then by 2.3. x = xlx' and Qyl[y'/x']A A QxlA.3. by (lo).17(2). The base follows from (3). and (*I).17(2). (13) Apply induction on 11 = lyl.17(2) and (3) Now (13) follows from (*2). hence by 2.3. [y/x] QzA A Qzl [YIxIQz'A. suppose y = yly'. . by (8) QZ[Y/X]A. On the other hand. Y[ I ~IA hence by 2. suppose z = zlzl and then by 2. 101 For the step. VARIABLE SUBSTITUTIONS (12) Follows from (8) by induction on 121. (*3).3.3. Qzl [y/x]QzlA On the other hand.17(2). hence (12) follows. Exercise 2. x For the step.

we assume that D n Var = 0 . briefly. a = ( a l l . >}. . i. MS~=)(D) and IS(=)(D) denote the sets of D-sentences of corresponding types. [a/x]A is defined by induction on [A[: [a/x]P(y) := P([a/xIy). 140r . The D-instance [a/x]A of a D-formula A under [x H a] is obtained by simultaneous replacement of all free occurrences of X I . .. Obviously. So let D be a non-empty set....a.1 Let x = (XI.ax). So we can also denote [a/x]A by A[x H a] if r(x) n BV(A) = 0. A formula A is called a generator of every D-sentence [a/x]A. (x. . . . Then the D-transformation [x H a] is a finite function {(XI. a. [a/x]P:= P i f P EPLO. where [a/x]y is a tuple z such that lzl = [yl and for any j. . .. . Formulas of the language LN(D) (respectively. we will need auxiliary languages with constants. A.x. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC 2.) a list of constants (indiwiduals) from D (not necessarily distinct). n.)} sending every xi to ai. by M F ( = ) ( D ) . Co(D)) are called N-modal (respectively. . similarly for bi. the set of all these formulas is denoted by M F ~ = ) ( D ) ~ ~ (respectively. A D-sentence is a D-formula without parameters. . . .x.. a.102 CHAPTER 2. intuitionistic) D-formulas.. . Normally we use the notation [a/x]A in the case when both A is a usual formula and [a/x]A is a D-sentence (which is equivalent t o FV(A) 2 r(x)). . [a/x](B * C) := ([a/x[B c [a/x]C) if * E {V. without extra constants) is a D-formula. Let L N ( D ) be the language CN expanded by individual constants from the set D . 15Recall that jci is obtained by eliminating xi from x.e.4. in A respectively with a l . . For D-formulas we define schemes. . Strictly speaking.) be a list of distinct variables. Definition 2. . every predicate formula (in the ordinary sense. . .4 Formulas with constants Although our basic languages do not contain individual constants. IF(')(D)). i = 1. . clean versions and congruence in the natural way.

= n . (. So we can prove the claim for a clean version A" of A. .each of these maps sends xi to a. for any a E T . (4) Similar to (2). So = .4. a ) 1x1A A [(a . and let I. This holds.2 (1) A A B + [a/x]A A [a/x]B for any D-transformation [x H a] and D-formulas A. but it leads to some confusion: it may happen that a D-sentence B can be presented as [ a l ..a l x .x) = [a. Such an ambiguity may be undesirable (cf./xl.. (3) For any predicate formula A.implies [a/x]A = [a/x]B. y). B (2) Note that [x ++ a . a ) = [a/x]P(x. a ) n BV(A) = 0 .)/XI A. Section 5. In this case it is equivalent t o ~ ~ (A0[x H y] ) [y ++ a] = A" [x H a]. (3) As noted above. Then [a/. P ( a . But again. constant substitutions respect congruence. Let A be a formula such that r ( z . Proof (1)It is clear that [alx] = d x H a] A (a strict proof is by induction).2. B.]A for different formulas A. For example.-I (j) t o a j .4. . Now the claim follows from 2. with BV(AO) r ( x z ) = n 0 . (2) I x is a distinct list of variables 11 = n. 1x1 a :I . where BV(AO)n r(xy) = 0 . . . [(a .)/XI A = [ a / ( x . in this case [a/x]A is abbreviated to A(a). x. .1. . and %.1). a] = [x .(i). lzl = m 5 n. The abbreviation A(a) is convenient and rather common.4. - [a/yl [y/xI A A la/xl A. . y]P(x. since obviously [X H y] 0 [y H a] = [X H a]. . z be distinct lists of variables. Consider a clean version A0 of A. then for any predicate f x formula A.] [(z . FORMULAS WITH CONSTANTS L e m m a 2. a strict proof is by induction. so we will mainly use 'maximal' representations described as follows. for any distinct list x y (4) Let x . a.(. c . a-I)] A. a E Dn. a-l H a] . Then the claim reduces t o which follows from We also use a somewhat ambiguous notation A(x) to indicate that FV(A) r(x).

4 Every D-formula has a maximal generator.5 (1) If B = [a/x]A for a formula A and a bijection [x H a]. then A2 [y/x]Al for some variable renaming [x H y] (and of course. then A = B[a H XI. Similarly.A2 are maximal generators of B. B = [a/y]A2 for a bijection (y H a]. Proof (1) We check that by induction on \ A ( .[y H a].2).3 A formula A is called a maximal generator of a D-formula B i f B = [a/x]A for some bijective D-transformation [xH a].3. All induction steps are routine. More precisely. (2) If A1 is a maximal generator of B. when [a/x]A = A[x H a] (cf. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Definition 2. L e m m a 2. x = x1 .since xi @ BV(B). . a list of different new variables for B. This is clear for atomic A = P ( y ) . Since [a/x]A does not depend on the variables xi that are not parameters of A.4. Since B is a usual formula and [x [ailxi] thus B. and thus a is the list of all constants occurring in B . if B = [a/x]A1 = [a/y]A2 for bijections [x H a]. then B = [a/x]A1 for some bijection [x H a]. in the above definition we may further assume that r(x) FV(A).104 CHAPTER 2. H a] is a bijection. . and thus [a/x]A = A[x H a] = (B[a H x])[x H a] = B. .x. be a list of all constants occurring in a D-sentence B.a. A1 is obtained from A2 i n the same way). . By definition. Lemma 2. let us consider only the case A = QxiB for a quantifier Q. The formula A := B[a H x] (obtained by replacing every occurrence of ai with xi) is a maximal generator of B. ai does not occur in by the induction hypothesis. P r o o f Let a = a1 .4. (2) If A1. a L e m m a 2. . (3) A maximal generator of a D-formula B is a substitution instance of any generator of B under some variable substitution. then A2 A [y/x]Al. Therefore (1) holds for A. Now let A be a clean : version of A1 such that BV(A7) n r(xy) = 0 .4.

.4. there exists a clean A.2(4) [a. P ( x ) ) is usually denoted by [C/P(x)]. Definition 2.2 For a substitution [C/P(x)]. The substitution ( C . FORMULA SUBSTITUTIONS By 2. 2 A2 such that Therefore and the latter formula is [y/x]A1 by 2. the set of bound variables. if F V ( C ) r(x).T some surjective for map r : I +I. More exactly. [x H a]. for a bijection [x H a].r / z ] C = [a/x]A.5.T/z]CA [a/x][x. (3) Let C be a generator of B. where C is a predicate formula. .'-.5 Formula substitutions Definition 2. A substitution [C/P(x)]iscalled strict i f F V [ C / P ( x ) ]= i. A1 g A. P ( x ) is an atomic equality-free formula. A [x . with B = [a/x]A. We may assume that r(x) FV(A).2. is called the set of parameters. r/z]C. Hence by (2). Since a is distinct. r ( z ) F V ( C ) and r(b) = r ( a ) is the set of all constants occurring in B.3. (MF. P ( x ) ) . r/z]C. every hi equals to some a j .4.. .e. Similarly. [C/P(x)] is called an MFN-. thus B = [b/z]C for some [z H b].1 A (simple) formula substitution is a pair (C. IF=-) substitution zf the formula C is of the corresponding type.2(1). Thus B = [ a .22. c and we have by 2. and let A be a maximal generator of B.5. 2. [a/x]Ai = A. I F .5. implies B = [a/x]Al Hence B [ a H X] (Ay[x H a])[a H X] = A. so b = a .. 0.

3. Let A = QzB. Hence (1) [ v / u ] S A [v/u] A QzSB A Q z [ v / u ] S B by 2. A formula S A is called a substitution instance of A.(IF(=)-) substitution instance i f S is an MF. SOiA A Q S A . Lemma 2.106 CHAPTER 2. or more exactly. Let B be a result of replacing all subformulas of A of the form P ( y ) with [ y / x ] C . 3). and u . B A S E PREDICATE LOGIC Definition 2.5.25 (8).$=)-(IF(=)-) substitution. an MF$). Then for any variables u .3 Let A be a clean predicate formula.25 (7).3. but may introduce new occurrences if C contains equality.11 with the same bound variables as A. in S A the parameters of S do not collide with the existing bound variables from A.! F V ( S ) . u $! F V ( S ) = F V ( C ) . S Q z A QzSA for Q E {V. Note that applying S to A does not affect occurrences of equality in A.! V ( A ) . A S [ y / x ] Cand .v $. If A = P ( y ) . since u E F V ( A ) .3. By assumption.so we obtain S ( A [ uH v ] ) [v/u]SA by applying 2.then A[u ++ v] = P ( [ v / u ] y ) . note that z # u . Now we argue by induction on IAl. More precisely.r ( x ) . Every formula congruent to B is denoted by S A and is called a substitution instance of A under S .5. S = [ C / P ( x ) ] formula a substitution such that B V ( A ) n F V ( S ) = 0 . S(A[uH v ] ) [[v/u]y/x]C.5. and Definition 2. v such that v $! V ( A ) . S A is defined by induction: S P ( Y ) [YIxIC. Proof Since v $. 21.3 is applicable to this formula.{ u ) . S = [ C / P ( x ) ] formula substitution a such that F V ( S )n B V ( A ) = 0 . Due to the assumption B V ( A )n F V ( S ) = 0 .u E F V ( A ) . S A g A if A is atomic and does not contain P. S ( A * B ) ( S A* S B ) for * E {v. A. then S A A QzSB.we can prolong [u H v] to a variable renaming in A by fixing all variables from V ( A ).4 Let A be a clean formula. So A[u H v] is clean by 2.

The details are left to the reader. It remains to note that Qz(B[u H v]) = A[u H v]. Then SA S B . Therefore the claim holds for A.5.5. The case A = OiB is trivial. then by Lemma 2.3. B be congruent clean formulas.3. If A is atomic. If A = (Al * A2). the main statement trivially holds for B (or C). (2). Note that if u does not occur in B (or in C). since z # u. then A = B . Proof By induction on IAl = IBI.17. and there is nothing to prove. If A = ( B * C). Now by 2. we can use 2. We skip the easy case when A = OiAl S B by .9(1). S a formula substitution such that BV(A) n F V ( S ) = BV(B) n F V ( S ) = 0 . Eventually SA 2. [v/u]SB A S(B[u H v]).3 (3) &zS(B[u I+ v]) A S&z(B[u H v]).3.3. B = (B1 * B2) for A1 Az B2. FORMULA SUBSTITUTIONS By the induction hypothesis. and SAi A SBi by the induction hypothesis. and the argument does not change.2.6. Hence Bl.25 (9) and the distribution of S and [u H v] over *.5 Let A. (3) we have [v/u]SA n SQz(B[u H v]). hence (2) by 2. Lemma 2. &z[v/u]SB A &zS(B[u I+ v]) so from (I).5.

SA denotes an arbitrary formula congruent t o A. Note that according t o the definition. . Definition 2. Proof We denote [Ci/P(x)] by Si. that the congruence class of SAOdoes not depend on the choice of A". [C2/P(x)] be formula substitutions such that C1 A C2. Lemma 2.5.3. so by Lemma 2. Then for any predicate formula A. for some y @ FV(A1). [Cl/P(x)]A A [C2/P(x)]A.3.3.5 shows soundness of this definition.9(2). the claim is trivial. Hence by 2. Since A is clean. y @ F V ( S ) by the assumption of the lemma). since y $ V(A1) and x. i.e.2. Now SiA SiAO. To simplify notation.5. Obviously we can construct such A" by an appropriate bound variable renaming from an arbitrary clean version.24. so S I B A S 2 B follows from 2.4 (which is applicable. A strict substitution instance is a substitution instance under a strict substitution. Lemma 2. If B is atomic and does not contain P.5.) Thus and SB1 A S(A1[x H y]) A [y/x]SA1 by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 2. then Al so A2 can be used instead of Al.5. then S i B = [y/x]Ci. B1 We may also assume that y $ BV(A1).7 Let [C1/P(x)]. If B = P ( y ) . for a trivial formula substitution S = [P(x)/P(x)] and a formula A. (Otherwise consider A2 such that y $ BV(A2). x @ BV(A1). Let A0 be a clean version of A such that FV(Si) n BV(AO) = 0 for i = 1.so we show SIAOA S2A0 by induction on IAOI.108 CHAPTER 2.24(3) SB = Q y S B 1 2 Qy[y/x]SAl QxSA1 = SA. put B := A". BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Suppose A = QxAl for a quantifier Q. Now we can define substitution instances of arbitrary formulas.6 A substitution instance S A of a predicate formula A under a simple substitution S is an arbitrary formula congruent to SAO.where A" is a clean version of A such that F V ( S ) n BV(AO) = 0.

Definition 2.5. Definition 2. The set of its parameters and bound variables are respectively and B V [ c l . suppose B = QyB1.Ck. I . ..5. and therefore SIB S2B. Pk(xk)] and a clean formula A such that FV(S) n BV(A) = 0 . . . E.g. . Now we have an analogue of Definition 2. . Pk. .9 For a substitution S = (C1. .. .Ck/pl(xi).5. . . . .Pk(xk)] := ~ ( x . . . . . .P k and distinct lists x l . S A A if A is atomic and does not contain P I . so by 2. A. (Y) A [y/xi]Ci.3.3.Pk(xk)). . .5. a substitution instance SA is defined up to congruence by induction: SP. . . .5. . S(A * B ) (SA * S B ) for * E {v. hence QY SiBi I S2B1 QY by 2. SOiA A QSA. ) SQzA A QzSA for Q E {V. . 1 A substitution without parameters is called strict. Pi(xl). . 3 ) . . .xk).. . . Now let us consider complex substitutions. We also have an analogue of Lemma 2. By induction hypothesis. All the remaining cases are left to the reader.xk) and formulas C1. .Pk(xk) (with different predicate letters PI. .5. . FORMULA SUBSTITUTIONS 109 The induction step easily follows from the distribution of Si over all connectives and quantifiers.Ck/l(xl). . .Ck we define the complex formula substitution as the tuple (Cl. .17. .8 For atomic equality-free formulas Pl(xl). . then y @ FV(Si). . . . .2. .3.17. .

12 For any predicate formulas A. B are clean formulas.SAASB.5. A A B . Then for any formulas A. B and a formula substitution S . Hence we readily obtain Lemma 2. = BV(B) nFV(S) = 0 . Definition 2. so 0.5.110 CHAPTER 2.10 If A. B ( I ) SOiA A OiSA. (3) Let A" be a clean version of A such that F V ( S ) n BV(AO) = 0 .5 (including an analogue of 2. 31.9 now extends to arbitrary formulas: Lemma 2. .5.5. (3) S&zA A QzSA for & E {V. z @ BV(AO). So the following definition is sound.5. The inductive definition 2.5.11 For an arbitrary formula A and a formula substitution S . Then By definition.13 Let S be a formula substitution. SAOA SA. (2) An exercise for the reader. SAOA SA. SQzA A S&zAOA QzSAO. we define S A as SAO.for a clean version A" o f A such that F V ( S ) n BV(AO)= 0 .A. AGB=. hence &zSAOA QzSA. z Proof (1) Let A" be a clean version of A such that F V ( S ) n BV(AO) = OiAO is a clean version of OiA. @ F V ( S ) . Then &zAO is a clean version of QzA and By definition. hence therefore (1) holds.4).>).5. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Lemma 2. S is a complex formula substitution and BV(A) n F V ( S ) then S A G S B . (2) S ( A * B ) A ( S A * S B ) for * E {V. H Proof The same as in 2.

3. it suffices to consider only the case when A is atomic. hence S1A A S2A by Suppose S I B 2.3. Put If A = QuB.5. then SiA A QuSiB by 2. we leave them to the reader. Then Now the claim follows by 2.14 shows that in some cases variable substitutions commute with formula substitutions.3 and 2. Other cases are also based on 2.3. FORMULA SUBSTITUTIONS This implies (3).17.5.5. The nontrivial option is A = P(z).25).25(6). ! S2B. the claim is trivial.17.14 Let [C/P(x)] be a formula substitution.3. [y/x] respects congruence by 2. rn Lemma 2. Lemma 2.5.5. Proof Since S respects congruence by Lemma 2.5. 111 The next lemma shows that the result of applying a substitution does not really depend on the names of its bound variables.2.3.3. . Then for any predicate formula A. Proof If A = P(z). The next lemma considers situations where formula substitutions 'absorb' variable substitutions. We prove this only for simple substitutions.12. Then for any formula A.3. S[y/x]A A [y/x]SA. [x H y] a variable renaming such that r(y) n FV(C) = 0 . we have while [z/xlC A [zlyl [y/xIC by 2.5. Lemma 2. Lemma 2.3. If A is atomic and does not contain P . [y/x] a variable substitution such that FV(C) n r(x) = 0 . where u' $ FV(S1).15 Let S = [C/P(u)] be a simple formula substitution. leaving the general case to the reader.5.25(5).24 and both S and [y/x] distribute over all connectives and quantifiers in an appropriate clean version of A (Definition 2. Now we can argue by induction on IAl. we may assume that u @ FV(Sl)(= FV(S2)) -otherwise consider A' A A of the form Qu'Br.

5. Since [ y u / z x ] [ u y / x z ]this implies (*). Proof Again everything reduces to the case of atomic A. . .3. [ y / z ] C k / P l ( x l . Then where So = [[y/z]C1. r ( z )n r ( u ) = 0 ) . A a predicate b formula.5. by 2.24.5. does thanks to Lemma 2.5.. The previous lemma easily transfers to complex sibstitutions: Lemma 2. Lemma 2. r ( x )n F V ( A ) = 0 . a distinct list of variables x .3.16. Proof The same idea as in 2.. In fact.14 shows that it is sufficient to consider only the case when A = P ( u ) is atomic (and by the assumption. a list of predicate formulas B . = . so we can apply 2.16 Let [ C / P ( x ) ]e a simple formula substitution. . BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Lemma 2.5. .112 CHAPTER 2.17 Let be a formula substitution.. but the congruence class of [ [ y / z ] C / P ( x ) ] A not depend on the choice of a congruent version of [ y / z ] C . from r ( z ) n r ( u x ) = 0 . [ y / z ]a variable substitution such that r ( z ) n F V ( A ) = r ( z )n r ( x ) = r ( y )n r ( x ) = 0 . Then Note that [ y / z ] Cis defined up to congruence. a list of constants c . .7.25(10) we have and similarly from r ( x )n r ( y z ) = 0 . In this case the claim becomes The latter congruence follows from 2. But in this case S W acts as a simple substitution. [ y / x ]a variable substitution such that r ( z )n F V ( A ) = 0 and r ( y z )n r ( x l . A a predicate formula.x k ) = 0 .18 [ [ c / xB / q ]A A [ c / x ] [ B / q ] for a propositional formula A. . a ] A list of proposition letters q. by 2. .24. . .3. ). Pk(xk)]. Note that r(z)nFV(So)= 0.5.

. So we may assume that r(xi) n FV(C0) = 0 . in which the parameters of S are not bound. In this case it suffices to check the claim for an atomic A.5. Lemma 2. i n C1. If PI.Ck for i = 1 .2.19 Every complex substitution acts on formulas as a composition of simple substitutions. . So let A = Pi(y).5.Pkdo not occur in A. More precisely. .5.Pk(xk)]. . The composition of substitutions reduces to a single (complex) substitution as the following lemma shows. there is nothing to prove. ..14 shows that a formula substitution acts in the same way after renaming bound variables. . Ci while So the claim holds. . . . . In this case we have Lemma 2. there exists a formula substitution S such that for any formula A SoSlA A SA.. Proof Similarly to the previous lemma. .15 This completes the proof. Lemma 2. FORMULA SUBSTITUTIONS 113 Proof The same argument as above reduces everything to the case when A is atomic. we may prove the claim for a congruent version of A. Then the claim is trivial. . . . .! is of the same arity of Pi and P! does not occur . . . .21 For any formula substitutions So. .5. .20 Let So = [Co/Pi(xo)]. Then by definition SA A [ylxi] . S o C k / P ~ ( x l ) . .k .. S1.5.Pk(xk)] is a complex substitution. . a proposition letter.13). it suffices t o check this only for A = Pi(y).. then for any formula A Proof Since substitutions respect congruence and distribute over all connectives and quantifiers over non-parametric variables (by Lemma 2.Sl = [C1. . .5. . . if S = [Cl.e. i. . .Ck/Pl(xl). Pk(xk)] be formula substitutions. . Lemma 2. Then for any formula A where S2 = [SoCl. P. .5.Ck/Pl(xl). . . . Then by Lemma 2.

Now let us prove the above observation on parameters of SA in more detail. A). rng[x H y ] = FVe(S. (1) A = P(y).16.3.5. y and xj E FV(C).5.25(1).22(2). S = [C/P(x)] a simple formula substitution.23 Let A be a formula. Definition 2. 2.22(1). .114 CHAPTER 2. Intuitively it is clear that free variable occurrences in a substitution instance [C/P(x)]A may be of three kinds: (1) those derived from original free occurrences in A if they occur in atoms not containing P (and thus not affected by the substitution).5. Then FV(SA) = FV(S) U FVe(S. Then SA A [y/x]C and by Lemma 2. . . of P ( y ) . We may assume that A is clean. Then we can use induction W on n and Lemma 2. ..15 Proof for some simple formula substitutions S2. we argue by induction. For atomic A there are two cases. (2) there exists a free occurrence of z i n A as some y j within an occurrence . Parameters of the first two types are called essential. A) otherwise.5. BV(A)n F V ( S ) = 0 . where y = yl . . Proof The second claim obviously follows from 2. FV(SA) = F V ( S ) U rng[x H yIc.A) in ~ this case. To prove the first. The set of all essential parameters of A for S is denoted by FVe(S.22 A parameter z E FV(A) is called essential for a formula substitution [C/P(x)] i f one of the following conditions holds: (1) there exists a free occurrence of z i n A within an atomic subformula that does not contain P. (3) those produced by parameters of the substitution wherever P ( y ) is replaced with [y/x]C.5. (2) members of y in subformulas of the form [y/x]C replacing occurrences of P ( y ) in A. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC By Lemma 2. By definition..5. Lemma 2. Here is a precise definition for an arbitrary substitution. We begin with a simple remark that a strict substitution instance of a formula A may be not a sentence if A is not a sentence. Now let us consider parameters of substitution instances. A) i f P occurs i n A FV(SA) = FVe(S.S. . cf.

B ) G F V ( S ) U F V e ( S . note that F V e ( S .24 Let A be a formula. ( 2 ) z has a free occurrence in QuB within P ( y ) as described in 2. B * D ) = F V e ( S . (2) F V ( S A ) = F V ( A ) if S is strict. the proof is similar to the previous case. Then F V ( A ) = F V e ( S .A ) U ( F V e ( S . B ) .B ) . (3) for any subformula B of A. In fact. ( 2 ) Follows from ( 1 ) . where * is a binary connective. the claim follow readily.A ) 2 F V ( A ) . since P occurs in B. Since P occurs in A iff it occurs in B and F V e ( S .5.B ) .{ u ) . So it remains to show that F V e ( S . For A = OiB we have S A = O i S B and thus F V ( S A ) = F V ( S B ) . S stitution such that P occurs in A. FORMULA SUBSTITUTIONS 115 ( 2 ) A does not contain P. D). Then = [ C / P ( x ) ] simple formula suba (1) F V ( S ) C F V ( S A ) C F V ( S ) U F V ( A ) .5.B ) U F V e ( S . For A = QuB we have F V ( S A ) = F V ( S B ) . .B ) .A). (1) z has a free occurrence in QuB within an atom that does not contain P iff z # u and z has the same kind of occurrence in B . For A = B * D .5. By induction hypothesis. A)).F V e ( S .{ u ) . A ) = F V e ( S . A ) = FVe(S.A ) ) = F V ( S A ) U ( F V e ( S . From the previous lemma we obtain Proposition 2.2. F V ( S B ) = F V ( S ) U F V e ( S .22 (2) iff z # u and z has the same kind of occurrence in B .F V e ( S . F V ( S B ) 5 F V ( S A ) U B V ( A ) . F V ( S B ) = F V ( S )U F V e ( S . Proof ( 1 ) Note that F V e ( S .B ) .

Then VzSA A Vy[y/z]SA by 2.5 .5.21.27 (1) Sub(Sub(r)) = Sub(r) (2) Sub(Sub(r)) A =(I?) for a set of sentences r (where A means that these sets are the same up to congruence). S is an MF$).5. The universal substitution closure of sures16 of formulas from Sub@').5.12 16Cf.25 The reader can try to prove this proposition directly without using Lemma 2. This does not seem easier. IF(=)). so this set is contained in BV(A). Lemma 2. Definition 2. Now let y be a distinct list of new variables such that lyl = lzl and r ( y ) n FV(S1) = 0.Vs1~ is congruent to a formula from Sub(l?). Then for any formula substitution S1. Definition 2.26 For a set of formulas I? MF$) (respectively.FVe(S. there is some ambiguity in this definition.2.116 CHAPTER We have B = VzSA for some A E r.5.5. Since A is a sentence. A) contians only variables that are free in B . S l S A E Sub(r) by Lemma 2.22. and so by 2. r is the set Sub(r) of all universal clo- Since every N-modal formula is also N1-modal for N1 > N . (2) Let us show that for any B E Sub(!?) and for any substitution S1.(IF(=)-) formula substitution). what kind of formulas we consider. -- Proof (1) Every B E Sub(r) has the form S A for some A E r and formula substitution S. B ) . substitution S and r(z) = FV(SA). ¤ Remark 2.23. Hence (3) follows. its substitution closure is the set of all their substitution instances of the corresponding kind: Sub(r) := {SA I A E I?. we have FV(SA) = F V ( S ) by 2.23. the set FVe(S. But usually it is clear from the context. We may also assume that F V ( S ) n BV(A) = 0 (otherwise we replace A with a congruent formula). BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Now note that according t o Definition 2.5. but not free in A.5.

Obviously FV(Am) = FV(A) U r(z) if A is not purely equational.21.5.2. by 2. zm a distinct list of new variables for A. Let 4 . Cy is disjoint with X. z = 21.3. where + > We also put A0 := A.5.e. Then we call P.Pk be all predicate letters (besides equality) occurring in a formula A.! be different (m ni)-ary predicate letters (i = 1 . . (**).5. . Now let us define 'minimal' non-strict substitution instances of predicate formulas. Hence by 2. by (*). .5. Pi E PLni. . .17(2) and 2.5. (* * *) we obtain and the latter formula is in Sub(I'). let m 0.13(3) it follows that Eventually. it contains some predicate letters other than '='.28 Let S = [C/P(x)] be a formula substitution. .12 Since r(y) n FV(S1) = 0. . Lemma 2.' the m-shift of Pi. an m-shift of the formula A is Am A [C/P]A. Then for any formula A and m 2 0 where we assume that the list of extra parameters z of Am. . since r(z) = FV(S)). Next.5. . k). . for purely equational A. from 2. FORMULA SUBSTITUTIONS Now by 2. Am = A. Note that Am is a substitution instance of any An. i. .16 [y/z]SA A S2A for some formula substitution Sz (note that the condition r(z) n BV(S) = 0 holds. and put i where every x is a distinct list of variables of length ni. this substitution instance is strict iff m 5 n. and let P.

Proof Let us first show this for a simple substitution S = [C(x. and let Pi. for a certain substitution S1.20 hence by the same lemma and the latter formula is (congruent to) [C(x.28 from 2. As we know. we have to check the claim only for atomic A (without equality).Pk be a list of all other predicate letters A .g. .20. L e m m a 2. If A = Pi(y).5. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC By definition.9(2) this proves our claim. So it is sufficient to show that applying a .5.5. Exercise 2. .z) / P(x)]A is a strict substitution instance of Am. where m = ly 1 Next.y)/P(x)] and a formula A containing P. . .5.P be their m-shifts.z) / P(x)]A. let z be distinct list of new variables. then (for some z) By our assumption. . Proof and FV(S1) = r(z). Since by 2. by Lemma 2. occurring in A.5.30 Every substitution instance S A of a formula A is obtained by a variable renaming from a st&t substitution instance of Am for some m 2 0. e.15.5. .5. .118 CHAPTER 2. for m = IFV(S)I. FV(Sl) = r(z) is disjoint with x. So. Let P I . In fact. .29 Deduce 2. as before. So [C(x. every complex substitution is a composition of simple substitutions. Now we can apply induction. So the claim follows by W Lemma 2. Then where every Pi(xi) is an atomic formula with distinct xi.

y): (Ax12) (Ax13) (Ax14) (Ax15) VxP(x) > P(y). By 2. or MP). 2. can also be presented in this form. .5. B . FIRST-ORDER LOGICS 119 simple substitution S t o a formula [y/z]SoAm. q and arbitrary x. Vx(P(x) > q) > (3xP(x) > q).otherwise change the list of extra parameters of Am.1.) is a set L such that (mO) L contains classical propositional tautologies. strict substitution S and variable renaming [t ++ u]. Thus and S1S2 is strict as required. (A 3 B) (Modus Ponens. let Sub(r) be the set of all their substitution instances. So by 2. .2. P(y) 3 3xP(x). Let A" be a universal closure of Am (for m 1 0).p. Both the these sets are closed under congruence if I' is a set of sentences. VzmAm " for a sentence A. (m3) L is closed under the rules A. for B SoAm for some k . thus A = Vzl . Vx(q > P(x)) > (q > VxP(x)).where S o is strict. 1 where S2 is a strict substitution.6.5.6 First-order logics MFN Definition 2.1 An (N-)modal predicate logic (m. Sub(r) set of all universal closures of formulas from Sub(r). (ml) L contains the propositional axioms (m2) L contains the predicate axioms (for some fixed P.28.6. For a set of formulas I?. Note that we may assume that r(z) n FV(S) = 0 .15 we have As we have already proved.

Definition 2.=) is a set L MFG satisfying (m0)-(m3) from 2.5 A logic L (modal or superintuitionistic) is called consistent ifI$L.3 and (s4') L is closed under IF'-substitutions. MN (respectively MG.CHAPTER 2. N-m.1.(Generalisation. s. by a 'first-order logic' we mean an arbitrary logic. y and fixed P): Definition 2.l. . (s5') = (m5') L contains the axioms of equality.. containing an m. .l.p. Definition 2. s.6.(Necessitation. s. The smallest N-m. (m5') L contains the axioms of equality (for arbitrary x.1. s.6. and we often write L I. V-introduction.=.p.2 An (N-)modal predicate logic with equality (m. which is a sequence of formulas that are either substitution instances of axioms or are obtained from earlier formulas by applying inference rules cited in (s3). (respectively.6.p.4 A superintuitionistic predicate logic with equality (s. by Q K E .6. L and a set r C M F . or V-introduction) A (m4) L is closed under MFN -substitutions.l.l. Section 1.p.A instead of A E L.l. see (m3). modal or superintuitionistic. c Further.l.=) is a set L IF' satisfying (s1)-(s3) from 2.l.=). The same is true for Q K ~ )but with the rules from (m3).p.2). with or without equality.l. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC . s.1 and also (m4') L is closed under MFG -substitutions.p. (respectively.=).l. (s2) = (m2) L contains the predicate axioms.l.p.p. Q H .p.p. or 0-introduction). Definition 2. S.6.) is a set L IF such that ( s l ) L contains the axioms of Heyting's propositional calculus H (cf.3 A superintuitionistic predicate logic (s.p. The notion of . s.. QH').=. It is well-known that every theorem of QH(') can be obtained by a formal proof.6. OiA A VxA (for any x E Var).1. (s3) L is closed under the rules (MP). N-m.l.. (s4) L is closed under IF-substitutions.p.p. S = ) denotes the set of all N-m.=) is denoted by Q K N (respectively.1. L +I? denotes the smallest m.1.=.p.1.p. Elements of a logic are called theorems.p. This notation is obviously extended to other cases (m.

9 If A Proof B then (A = B ) E L (for any m. = (Lo).(=) L ) ..8 below.l. thus (A = A) E L by (mO). Q K ~ )I. then L. Definition 2. or an s. The following is obvious. Hence (A B) E L. (2) If L is a predicate logic with equality. Hence we easily obtain QKE) Lemma 2. (m4) (or ( s o ) .8 (1) If L is an N-m. A A B implies (A = B ) (A = A).p.2.6. L.with the ' only difference that formulas from I' can also be used as axioms.6.. see Section 2.1). By applying deduction theorems. B be formulas in the language of a predicate logic L.l. := L n LN (for an N-modal L). and (A = A) = [ A / p ] ( p p).Qx(B > A) >. then L. Note that QCL(') is included in (and thus.10 Let A.1.p. . L contains all its MFN-substitution instances (and similarly for ( s 4 ) ) . An s.l. we can reduce the provability in L +I? to provability in L in a more explicit way.p. because it is a substitution instance under the dummy substitution.6. The rule (m4) means that together with a formula A.6 The quantified version of a modal (respectively.1. (s4)).6.p.(=) L is called intermediate iff L QCL(=). L contains every formula congruent to A.7 The propositional part of a predicate logic L is the set of its propositional formulas: L.l. Definition 2.(=) or s. is the classical predicate logic where EM = p V l p (see Section 1. in any m. superintuitionistic) propositional logic A is + QA := QKN +A (respectively. := L n Lo (for a superintuitionistic L). B > QxA. Then for a variable x @ FV(B): (1) L t. .6.p. Lemma 2. is a propositional logic of the corresponding kind. A well-known example of an s.- Lemma 2. In particular.(=)).6. QA := QH + A ) . FIRST-ORDER LOGICS 121 a formal proof extends to logics of the form QH(') +I?.p.l.p.

6.6.C > B . . up to congruence. then A is an L-inference (from 0 ) . Definition 2. = B and every Ai is either a theorem of L. which is L-derivable by a standard argument.6. If such an inference exists.5. then A > B follows by M P from B and B > (A > B). and so the latter formula is in L. If L k A.10. or Ai E or Ai is obtained from earlier formulas by applying MP. see any textbook in mathematical logic. Recall the simplest first-order analogue of the propositional deduction theorem: Lemma 2. k L A > C by induction hypothesis and x is not a parameter in r U {A).A. note that from a tautology (or an intuitionistic axiom (Ax2)). (i) If B E L U I?. then (A > B ) = (A > A). Congruence also distributes over > and Vx. L t. A 3. r Hence we obtain an equivalent characterisation of L-derivability. which is a substitution instance of (Axl).122 CHAPTER 2. B 2 VxA. .6. hence I? k L A > B by MP. then r k L Vx(A > C). (iii) Suppose B = VxC. or Ai is obtained from an earlier formula by V-introduction over a variable that is not a parameter of any formula from I?. we say that B is L-derivable from r . . by 2.13 If U {A) k L B .12 k L A iff L F A. The proof of (2) is similar. notation: r FL B . . then r F L A >B Proof Standard.13.11 Let be a set of formulas i n the language of a predicate logic L. therefore F L A > B by MP. note that x FV(S). q ] . S distributes over > and Vx (since x $ FV(S)). BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Proof (1) Consider the substitution S = [A. . Thus S(Axl4) Vx(B e > A) 3. i n which A.Vx(A > C) > (A > B ) . 'Only if'. (iv) If B = A.17. By induction on the length of an L-inference of A from 0 . by induction on the length of an inference of B from F U {A). Note that we distinguish inferences from proofs. From definitions we easily obtain Lemma 2. (ii) If B is obtained by MP from C and C > B and by the induction hypothesis r FL A > C. Proof 'If'. By Lemma 2.3. By Lemma 2.B/P(x). A n L-inference of a formula B from r a sequence A1. the latter may also use substitution and 0-introduction. r..

6. L F B implies Lt-T>B. The other way round.B by 2.T. Proof Since every inference from I' contains a finite number of formulas from I?. with T as the empty conjunction. it is clear that I? F L B iff there exists a finite X I? such that X FL B . L an N-modal (or superintuitionistic) predicate logic (with or without equality). . Then it also holds for X U { A ) .13 and our assumption 11 x.T > B implies L t. In fact. L I. Suppose (1) holds for X (and any B). The latter is equivalent to due t o (2) follows in a standard way by the deduction theorem from and The next lemmas collects some useful theorems and admissible rules for different types of logics. then But L t.6. we also include the case X = 0 .2. So we have to show that The proof is by induction on B iff L t. r FL B zff there exists a finite X C I? such that As usual.14 Let r be a set of N-modal (or intuitionistic) predicate formulas.B >. by 2. since L I. Then for any N-modal (or intuitionistic) fomula B. Of course the notation A X makes sense.6.B .12.6. Therefore LkBiffLt-T>B. FIRST-ORDER LOGICS 123 Lemma 2. so by MP. due to the commutativity and the associativity of conjunction in intuitionistic logic. T > B (this is an instance of (Axl)). If X = 0.

i f x @ FV(C). . A i f x $ FV(A). BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Lemma 2.15 The following theorems (admissible rules) are i n every firstorder logic L: (9 Bernays rules: B>A B~ V X A ' if x @ FV(B). i f x $ FV(A). (iv) Vx(A A [ylxlA ' > B ) 3 (QxA > QxB).124 CHAPTER 2. A>B QxA 3 Q x B ' (v) monotonicity rules for quantifiers (vi) replacement rules for quantifiers (vii) Vx(A A B ) (viii) 3x(A V B ) (ix) VxA (x) 3xA - -- A=B QxA = Q x B ' VxA A VxB. A 3 B 3xA 1B (iii) variable substitution rule: -. ( C 13xA) if x $ FV(C). ! EA (xi) Vx ( C > A) (xii) Vx (A > C) (xiii) Vx TA - -3 ( C > VxA) if x @ FV(C). (xvii) 3x(A V C) = 3xA V C i f x @ FV(C).6. 3xA V 3xB. (xiv) 3 s ( C > A) (xu) 35 (A > C ) > (VxA > C ) (xvi) 3x 1 A > 1VxA. 73xA. (3xA > C ) if x @ FV(C).

a distinct list x and a permutation a of In. the replacement rule (xxviii) can be written as follows: B ( .5. 3 ) . (xxiii) Q x A r Q ( x . . (xxv) V x A > [ y / x ] A a variable substitution [ y / x ] . (ii) By Lemma 2. . So (xxviii) shows that up to equivalence. (xxi) V x A V C (xxii) Q x Q y A - > V x ( AV C ) i f x $ F V ( C ) . Q E {V. F V [ A / P ( x ) ] ) So since L contains (Ax12). i f P ( x ) is not within the scope of modal operators in B ) . FIRST-ORDER LOGICS (xviii) Q x ( A A C ) = Q x A A C.13 we obtain [ A / P ( x ) ] ( V x P ( x3 P ( y ) ) A V x A > [ y / x ] A ) (note that x (ii). . a ) A for a quantifier Q. A 1 .10. . . for (xxvi) V x ( A = B ) > ( Q x A = Q x B ) .. Qy Q x A for Q E {V. ) ) 5 - with the same restriction as i n (xxvii).6.2. Hence V x A > A easily follows by induction on 11 and the trnasitivity of 3. (xxiv) 3xVyA > Vy3xA. .1).) Proof (i) Readily follows from 2.6. A . where n = 1x1. (xxvii) a ( A A') if B is non-modal (moreover. x The dual claims for 3 are proved in a similar way. if x $ F V ( C ) .3). (xix) 3 x ( A A B ) > 3 x A A 3 x B . (xx) V x A V V x B 3 V x ( AV B ) . Similarly t o the propositional case (Section 1. the universal closure V A does not depend on the order of quantifiers. ..) = B ( .it also contains . (xxviii) A [ A / P ( x )B ] A' [A1/P(x)]B (replacement rule) - > ~ ( [ A / P ( xB ] [ A 1 / P ( x B]) . The particular case of this is V x A > A.

> (v) If L I. 4. B by (ii) 2. we obtain L F QxA > QxB by MP. since every variable substitution is a composition of simple substitutions. Vx(A > B ) by assumption 3. Since L t. 4. CAD (vii) Since L F A A B > A by (Ax3) and substitution. Hence L t. and thus L t.VxA. Since L t. and thus Vx(A A B ) t .A r B. (i). B > A by (Ax3).126 CHAPTER 2. transitivity 6. we obtain L t [ylx]A by MP. . A > 3xB by 3. .A > B. VxA 3 B by 3. Therefore L is closed under variable substitution. then L t. ~ Similarly from (Ax4) we obtain - hence Vx(A A B) I-L VxA VxB.which is admissible in L. Here we apply the transitivity rule and the Bernays rule to L-derivability from l?. (iv) By the deduction theorem. then L t. (Ax4)17 and MP. VxA > VxB by 5. . For the case Q = 3 the argument slightly changes in items 4-6.A > B . it follows that L IVx(A A B ) > VxA. VxA > A by (ii) 5. 3xA > 3xB by 5.VxA > [y/x] A by (ii). Vx(A 3 B) 3 A . We have the following 'abridged' Linference from Vx(A > B): 1. MP 4.2. B > 3xB by (ii) 5. by (v). (Ax4) as classical tautologies.QxA QxB by C. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC (iii) If L t. (i).Vx(A 3 B) by generalisation.QxA > QxB.Vx(A B ) > QxA > QxB by (iv). then L t. it is sufficient to show Vx(A B ) FL QxA QxB. First consider the case Q = V. A 3 B by 1. D A-introduction . (vi) If L t.VxA.A. transitivity 6. QxB > QxA by (v). 4. the reader can easily see that they are really admissible in this situation. 171n the modal case we may use AX^).

by A-introduction and therefore VxAAVxB F L E Vx(A A B). VxA A VxB by assumption 2. VxA by 1. (Ax7). we have the following abridged inference from VxA A VxB: 1. In fact.4. substitution 3. 3xB 2 3x(A v B). To show the converse we may also use the deduction theorem. VxA A VxB 1VxA by AX^).6. MP. and therefore L I. Hence VXAAVXB L AAB.2. due to (Ax5).3x(A V B ) 3zA V 3xB. VxA > A by (ii) 5. > AVB. A by 3. > .2. by the deduction theorem. But these follow by (v) from A > AVB. (viii) I t is sufficient to show and L I. So it remains to show L k 3xA 13x(A v B). For the latter we can also use V-introduction after we show But A > 3xA V 3xB follows by transitivity from A > 3xA (ii) and 3xA 3xA v 3xB (Ax6). which are substitution The converse L t 3x(A V B) 2 3xA V 3xB follows by the Bernays rule from Lt.Vx(A A B) 1VxA AVxB. M P 4. The argument for B > 3xA V 3xB is similar. A similar argument shows VxA A VxB E L B .A v B > 3xAv3xB. we can use the V-introduction rule: which is admissible in L. FIRST-ORDER LOGICS by A-introduction. B instances of AX^). For the first.

and thus C > VxA. VxA. the latter reduces to A > C. > VxA follows by the Bernays rule from (xi) We have Vx(C > A) FL C > VxA by Bernays' rule. since x @ FV(C).VXAt-L C. . C tL3xA. . which we leave as an easy exercise for the reader. first note that by the abridged inference C. (xiii) Readily follows from (xii). For the converse. C hence C>VXAFLC>A by Deduction theorem. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC (ix) L I. and thus L t. with C = 1 (xiv) By Deduction theorem. By Deduction theorem. L t.A LtA>A. (x) The proof is similar to (ix). A. (xii) Along the same lines as in (xi). > VxA t-L Vx(C > A). using the second Bernays' rule and the theorem A > 3xA.128 CHAPTER 2. VxA > A.Vx(C > A) > C > VxA by Deduction theorem.VxA > A by (ii). (xvi) = (xiv) for C = 1 . The latter (xv) By the Bernays rule and deduction theorem from A > C I-L VxA > C. . >Vx(C 3 A). this reduces to 3xC follows by the abridged inference > A. Therefore L t C 3VxA. We leave the details to the reader.

The latter formula is equivalent to 3xA A C In fact. this rule is still admissible in L-inferences from C . 3 x A A C tL 3x(AAC). B2 = C. to show Lt3xAAC> ~ ~ ( A A C ) we argue as follows. Finally. and we may use C >. the argument is similar to (xvi). and the replacement rule for A1 = 3x(A A C). Then L k ~ ~ ( A A> 3 x A A C C ) follows from (xvii).3xA 3x(A A C) and M P t o obtain 3x(A A C). First we obtain by the deduction theorem and A-introduction. . so the admissible replacement rule B1 = B2 yields Since also L k 3x(A v C) L F 3xAV3xC = 3xAVC. L k 3xC = C. tL C >. Therefore 3 3x(A A C). and we obtain (xvi) by transitivity for r. = 3xA V 3xC by (viii). (xviii) If & = 'v'. B1 = 3xC. since b'xintroduction is admissible. using (ix).6. C since 3xA A C tL and 3xA A C EL 3xA. (vii). > t-L 3xA A C > 3x(A A C). and the replacement rule B1 = B2 AAB1-AAB2 Let & = 3. 3xA > 3x(A A C).2. So by the deduction theorem. Hence by (v). FIRST-ORDER LOGICS (xvii) By (x). (x). A2 = 3xA.

From AX^). BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC (xix) The proof is similar to (vii). hence L t.VyA > A.VxVyA > VxA by monotonicity and L t. The case of 3 is similar. Apply the Bernays rule to VxA V C (xxii) By (ii).130 CHAPTER 2.3xVyA > 3xA by monotonicity. ex. First we note that Lt-VxA>AvB by transitivity from VxA Similarly Lt-VxB>AvB. a)A. hence by (vi). a = yxi+lxiz. .e. we obtain QxA - Q(x . (xxiv) Since L t. Hence by V-introduction.VxVyA by the Bernays rule. (xxi) Almost the same as (xx). Hence L t 3x(A A B ) theorem. > A. 3x(A A B) > 3xB. (Ax4) by monotonicity we obtain L t. (xxiii) Since a is a composition of elementary transpositions. > 3xA A 3xB by A-introduction and the deduction (xx) The proof is similar to (viii).3x(A A B) > 3xA. A > A V B. hence L t. The converse is obtained in the same way. it is sufficient to consider a = So let x = yxixi+lz. L F VyA > A V C. we obtain L t.3xVyA > Vy3xA by the Bernays rule. > A. then x . OZ~+~. i. and (xviii) follows by the Bernays rule. by (xxii). We have (in L) tQZA = Q X ~ + ~ QZA > VyVxA.

L EVxA 3 [~llxl][y'/x']A. The base n = 1 was proved in (ii). (xxvii) To simplify the notation. which implies (xxvi) by the deduction theorem. So we show V(A = A') FL ~ ( B ( A = B(A1)) ) by induction on the length of B and then apply the deduction theorem. Vx(A (iv) 2. L t Vx'A > Vxl [y'/xl]A. Hence by propositional logic QxA Vx(A = B) t L - QxB. and we know that L t. Since x1 @ y'. we write B(A) instead of [A/P(x)]B.6.Vx'A 3 [y'/x']A. Vx(A > B ) 1. A = B. L k VxA > [z/x]A. L hence Vxi [y1lx'1A > [yllxl][y1lx']A. . QxA 3 QxB Hence Vx(A r B ) tL QxA > QxB. from the above. = B ) 3. 3. Now in the general case. y = ylyl. this completes the argument. We argue by induction on n = 1 1 x. let z be a distinct list of new variables. transitivity.2. the conclusion is [y/x]A as we need. by transitivity. QxA > QxB 4. A > B (Ax3) 2. so by transitivity Since [y/z][z/x]A [y/x]A. We also have = n. By (v) again. if x = xlxl. and thus L t VxA > Vz[z/x]A by the Bernays rule. monotonicity (v) 3. 3. Vx(A = B ) >. In the same way (using Ax4) we obtain Vx(A = B ) FL QxB > QxA. (xxvi) We have the following theorems in L: 1. FIRST-ORDER LOGICS 131 (xxv) First consider the case when x n y = 0 . lzl Then as we have proved. Vx(A 3 B) >. Next. then by (v).

. .A A'.Since V ( A also applicable. Now we can apply the admissible propositional rule - *.xn) .6.).y. hence we deduce (by (xxv)) B1( A ) = B1 (A').we change it to a congruent formula so that y @ F V [ A / P ( x ) ] .V ( A E A'). - Lemma 2..1)can be used. . V-introduction is I f B = QyB1.B(A1)= QyB1(A1). the details are left to the reader.132 CHAPTER 2. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC If B = B1 * B2 for a propositional connective hypothesis we have ( I V r V ( A= A') E L ~ ( B A ) B1(A1)). by the induction hypothIf esis B(A r A') B1(A) B1(A1). . and by the induction and obtain B ( A ) E B(A1). Hence by (xxvii) and MP. A xn = yn 3 P ( x l . then Hence we deduce QyBl(A)= QyB1(A1) by (xxvi) and M P and then apply generalisation. ( B ~ ( A ) B2(A1)). Now we can eliminate ti b y (xxv) and ) MP. . - V ( Az A') EL Vy(Bl(A) B I ( A ' ) ) . . then by generalisation L t.. - A') is closed. Then B ( A ) = QyBl(A). (xxviii) If L t. = P ( y l . . In the case when B = OiBl the propositional replacement rule (1. L k ~ ( B ( A= B ( A i ) ) . . B2(A) E B2 (A1). .1.16 Theorems in logics with equality: (4) xi Proof = y1 A .

x = y k L P(y) P(x) = P(y). FIRST-ORDER LOGICS (1) From (Ax17)by substitution [x= z/P(x)]we obtain (2.15(iii)) Hence by substitution [x/z] This implies x = y k L y = x (due to (Ax16)).and thus > P(x).z to y and does not change other .25(4).6. since this substitution sends x to variables. Now we apply the substitution where B := [xxl/xz]A and X I 51 V(A). So by 2. Then Note that [ylxl. so by A-introduction x = y k-L by the deduction theorem. and y =x FL P(y) 3 P(x).2.6. [xx1/zxI= [xlylxzl.3. P(Y) P(z) 3 by substitution [x= y/P(y)]we have This is equivalent t o (2)by H. whence L t x = y > y = x by the deduction theorem. X I . Hence by (I). (2) From (Ax17) y = z 3.

(4) By the deduction theorem. The assumption (#4) implies xm+l = yrn+l. .) holds. I since x1 does not occur in A. the claim is zm+l]Bm.CHAPTER 2. . .e. by 2. .6.15 (ii) and M P [~m+l/~m+lIAm [~rn+l/~m+lIBm. z n ) .3.). by transitivity we obtain [xm+l/zm+l]Am = [ym+l/ %+I.+1). to check (#3. (#6).25(4): It remains t o note that [xx/zxl]A % [x/z]A. so by (iii) we have From (#5).6. i t suffices to show For this we show by induction that for a list of new variables z = (21. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC and thus (#I) implies Hence L t. The case m = 0 is trivial. Hence by 2.15(iii). [ Y X / ~ X ~ [ x ~ Y I x ~ I A[ Y I ~ I A . i. assume Then by (b'zm+l)-introduction (since zm+l is new) V ~ m +(Am l where = Bm) .[X/XI](X y 3 [xlx/xz]A = [xly/xz]A) = . Am+1 proved. -- (#5) . Now since (#2) is (#3. Suppose (#3. The latter formula is congruent to Now we can again apply 2.

4). 5).15(xiii)) > C) = A A -47 (by a propositional tautology) 3. 3. Vx(A A 4') = VxA A 7 C (2. C - (iv) We have in QCL: (a) A V C (c) =. 4.6. Vxy(A > C) = Vx(A A -C) (2. 3.15(xvii)) (d) 1 C V 3xA > 3xA (from a propositional tautology) (e) 3x(C > A) = C > 3xA (by transitivity from 2. due to the admissible rule (ii) Take C = Iin (1) (iii) We have in QCL: (a) ( C > A) = (4 A) V (from a propositional tautology) (b) 3x(C 3 A) r 3 x ( l C V A) (1. 4 > A (from a propositional tautology) ' (b) Vx(A V C) (d) -C = V x ( 4 ' > A) (1. > C) Hence we obtain (a) d x ( A - ~ ( V X A C ) (by transitivity from 1.6.17 Theorems in QCL (and thus. 73x(A 2. replacement) ' (c) 3 x ( 4 V A) = 4 V 3xA (2.6.2.): (1) 3 x ( A 2 C) - (VxA 1 C ) if x @ FV(C).p. replacement) 5. 4 > VxA (2.15(xi)) ' > VxA.6. replacement) tlx(7C > A) =.6.15(xix)) ' > VxA A 4 = ~ ( V X A C) (by a propositional tautology). in any m. > This implies (I).6.1. 4. FIRST-ORDER LOGICS Lemma 2. -(A > C) = tlxi(A > C ) (Lemma 2. - VxA V C (from a propositional tautology) . We have in QCL: 1. Proof 1.

Lemma 1. . which is also admissible in the predicate case. := VxVy ( l l x = y > x = y) (the stable equality principle). For arbitrary a apply induction and monotonicity rules.. 2. x is a list of > V 0A. by the Bernays rule.1).. Is CD..:= Vx(1P(x) v q) > Vx1P(x) v q. (3) Let us first prove x = y > Oi(x = y).(x a E IF. using A > 3xA. O i ( z = x ) > O i ( z = y) 3. x = y . BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC (e) Vx(A V C) r VxA V C (by transitivity from 2. (3) x = y > O. Ax12. MP. M a . 6. (2) Similar to (I).6. 3.M a f .136 CHAPTER 2. Ui(x = X) > Oi(x = y) > Oi(z = y)) 2. MP. 3. cf.17Vx (P(x) v 1 P ( x ) ) . .1 1 3 x P ( x ) > 3 x l l P ( x ) (strong Markov principle). MP. Oi). we prove o i ( x = y). Oi(x = y) 4. x = y >.1. Hence L F x = y > Oi(x = y). Oi(z = x) > Oi(z = y) Ax17. hence L I. := V~n(Qn(xn) (Qn(xn) 2 AP. . Therefore L t.18 Theorems in modal logics (where variables): (1) OVxA (2) 3 x O A 0 E {mi. w We use special notation for some formulas.13xP(x) v 3x11P(x).6. := 3xP(x) 3 VxP(x). = y) for N-modal logics with equality. U P := ( l p > 3xQ(x)) > 3 x ( l p > Q(x)). := VxVy (x = y V 7 x = y) (the decidable equality principle).f_l)) v (n > 1). Vz-introduction (if z is new). 5.OVxA > V x O A .K F . Vz(Oi(z = x) 4. Proof (1)L k VxA > A (2. 4). := Vxl(Ql(x1) V lQl(x1)).OVxA > OA by monotonicity (1. [Oi(z = x)/P(x)]. 1. Lemma 2.15 (ii)).1. x 03xA. substitution 1. So assuming x = y. Intuitionistic formulas: C D := Vx(P(x) V q) > VxP(x) V q (the constant domain principle).1.

. All the above intuitionistic formulas except AU. QH + AU.' > AU.6. therefore QH' + AU. and AUF are classical theorems. = QKG + AU. . .. = QH= + AU. Grzegorczyk. This also holds in intuitionistic logic: Lemma 2. 18First introduced by A.2. t AU. So QH is trivial.6. (and so QK. so they are logically equivalent. i<j V xi = x j . t AU.). + AUl I- AU. FIRST-ORDER LOGICS Modal formulas: Bai := VxOiP(x) > OiVxP(x) (Barcan formula for Oi).AU. AUF VxVy(x = y). In particular. AU.20 (1) For any modal formula A and a list of variables x QS4F O V x O A ~ O V x A 0 3 x O A = O 3 x A ..)..6. (2) QH' (3) + AU.) and the substitution Then S(AUl) = i<n xi = xi > V xi = x j i<j implies (3) [TIPl (x)]AUl is equivalent t o AU.19 (1) QH' I. (and QKG 3 AU. Classically both formulas AU. Proof (1) Since Pi(xi) A (xi = xj) implies Pi(xj). and AUE state that the individual domain contains a t most n elements... = QH + AUl. Lemma 2. The converse ¤ Note that the argument is not valid for S(AU.). (2) Consider the formula (the 'quantifier-free matrix' of AU. CEi := VxVy(x # y > Oi(x # y)) (the closed equality principle for mi). because S renames bound variables xi in AU. AUl VxVy(P(x) 137 > P(y)). + AU.

7-Vx(P(x) V ~ P ( x ) ) (K F ) .7 .V x . this reduces to and next t o V x l l P ( x ) .l P ( x ) > l l V x P ( x ) let us show that L t.( P ( x ) V . note that --p(x). On the other hand.( p V -p) by the Glivenko theorem. and thus QH k V x 7 i ( P ( x )v i P ( x ) ) . By the deduction theorem. . using A > 3xA. we obtain OVxA > VxOA by 2. . = The other way round.A moreover.P ( x ) ) .P ( x ) ) kQH P(x). So by MP it follows that L I. V X v PP ( x)) ) k Q H --P(X). V V X ~ ~ P ( X ) . ~ X) I t suffices t o show that VX--P(x). ~ Proof ( 1 ) OVxOA > VxOA follows from Op > p. The other way round.V X ( P ( X ) . . H t. For the second formula the proof is similar.P ( x ) ) is inconsistent.hence U2VxA> UVxUA by monotonicity.16(1).6. + VX. V X P ( FQHK I . P ( x ) v ~ P ( x ) ( .138 CHAPTER 2. + by substitution.l P ( x ) > 7 . and thus OVxA > OVxOA (since S 4 k Up > C12p).K F .y ~ ( ~ 1 . In fact.(X To show (I).P ( x ) tQHV X ( P ( X )P ( x ) ) .P ( x ) and {--P(x). hence QH k 1 .VX7 . QH + K F = QH > 1-VX A. (2) For L := QH V x . (111) since P ( x ) t. let us show that QHK := QH + K F t. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC (2) For any superintuitionistic formula A QH + K F I. ~ V~ which follows from (1) (11) and VX--P(x).l P ( x ) > 1-VxP(x). p ( x ) v +(x) I-QH P ( x ) .

. GI := Gi .3.2 tL A i f f A has a generator in L (for A containing constants). . so Bi = [ci/xi] Gi for an injective [ci/xi].5. .7. (=) (respectively. . c := c1 .7.6 If L is a predicate logic (of any kind). y. . B' are maximal generators of A and B E L. i. . H L-provability also respects substitution into propositional formulas: Lemma 2.3 If B . so kL A implies A1 E L. GL. q := q l . and thus (Lemma 2.7.1 Let L be an N-m. For A without constants. A n N modal (respectively. Definition 2. it follows that kL SA. an intuitionistic) formula with extra constants A is called L-provable.2(3). L-provability does not depend on the presentation of a formula: Lemma 2.4. .7.1. Then OiAl E L and DiA = [c/x]OiA1. So B' E L.. Bi A [ci/yi] G:. Since [G1/q]A E L. with B E L. a distinct list of constants c. for distinct c. we also assume that A iff A E L.7.y.4. .p.4. an s. Hence B1 E L. then t-L OiA. if A has a generator B E L. (=)). . q. x. . Proof Let Gi be a maximal generator of Bi.e.7. Proof Suppose (A > B ) = [c/x](Al > B l ) .B. Lemma 2. . Take distinct lists y l .7 First-order theories In this section we again consider formulas with extra individual constants.. .15 (iii). . then kL B . x . by Lemma 2.7. then B' E L.7. or an L-theorem (notation: tL A) if it has a maximal generator in L.18).cn. . by Lemma 2. and a distinct list of variables x (cf. Proof By Lemma 2. y := y l . . A E L. FIRST-ORDER THEORIES 139 2.5 If tL A. then kL SA.15./ql. by MP. S = [B1.. q n . B' A [z/y] B for some variable substitution [zjy].2..4 If kL A and k L A > B..1. of variables non-occurring in any Gi and put G: := [yi/xi]Gi.4).1. Then A1 is a maximal generator of A.p. Lemma 2.4.] is a substitution of formulas with constants for propositional letters. .7. L-provability respects MP: Lemma 2. Proof Suppose A = [c/x]Al for distinct c. L-provability respects 0-introduction: Lemma 2.5). then its maximal generator A1 can be presented as [y/x]B (Lemma 2. and A1 E L. . if it can be presented i n a form A = [c/x] B.. A is a propositional formula..5. . Proof 'Only if' follows from 2.6. Then by Lemma 2. so Al E L by 2. and (A1 > B1) E L. The other way round..6.

The argument is essentially the same as for 2.3. Dr denotes the set of individual constants occurring i n a theory I?. with or without equality) i s a set of N-modal (respectively. and thus L t. FI. Definition 2. Lemma 2. we say that B is L-derivable from I (or an L-theorem of I) notation: I k L B.6 from ( 2 ) in the proof of 2.6. MsE)(D~) The next definition is an analogue of 2. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Definition 2.7.8 A n L-inference of a formula with constants B from a the' ory I is a sequence A1.. .9. or Ai E I.7 A n N-modal theory (respectively. For the induction step we need the equivalence which follows by Lemma 2. (1) If I? k L A.. W . = B and every Ai is either Lprovable. Hence Oil? E L OiA. > B .The set of all Dr-sentences (of the corresponding kind) L(=) := MS$) ( ~ r (or IS(=) ~ r )is) called the (I') ) ( language of I?.7.14. we check that for a finite theory X and a formula with constants B . an intuitionistic simple theory. L a predicate logic of the corresponding kind.7.. which follows in the same way as in 2. i n which A. with extra constants) I' k L B ifl there exists a finite X Proof I' such that t-I. ' If there exists an L-inference of B from I. then OiI? t-~.6.7./\ O i X > OiA.11. then by 2. (*) means 11 x.7./\X > A for a finite X L t Eli(/\ X ) > O i A .13. ( 2 ) By (I).14. Proof ( 1 ) W e apply 2.A. Then we can apply the U (2) If I? F L A axiom A K i and MP.5. ' ' . .6.9 Let I' be an N-modal or intuitionistic first-order theory (with or without equality). ' Then we easily obtain an analogue of 2. /\ X > B. If L t. r is a set of N-modal or intuitionistic Df-sentences: F C or I? I S ( ' ) ( D ~ ) .r F L A > B implies Oil? t L i ( A > B). So according to the terminology from Section 2. by induction on If X = 0 .14: Lemma 2.140 C H A P T E R 2. B @ t L T 3 B.OiA.7. or Ai is obtained from earlier formulas by applying MP or ' V-introduction. Oil? := { O i A ( A E I?). intuition- istic) sentences with individual constants.10 Let J? be an N-modal theory.6. r. Then for any N-modal or intuitionistic formula B (perhaps. then OiI? k L O i A O i B .7.6.

so we have Hence A ( x ) = A(c)[c x] = [ d / ~ I A o ( x ) . so > ' Then I? F L VxA(x)implies I k L A(c) by MP. x a variable not bound in A(x). ( 2 ) 3 (3).thus by the Bernays rule.7.Let Ao(x)be a maximal generator of A(x). 141 Lemma 2.. H and thus B A(x) = [dlyl(Bo Ao(x)). modal or intuitionistic).then by 2.2.Then the following conditions are equivalent: Proof (1) 3 ( 2 ) . ] (3)3 (1). where B = /\I?l.7. intuitionistic) theory.9. for some finite Fl I? we have A FL B > A ( x ) .6. t-L FI > A(c) for some finite rl I?. In the intuitionistic case it is convenient to use theories of another kind. (Bo > VxAo(x)) E L. x @ F V ( B o ) . Therefore r EL QxA(x). A(x) a formula with constants (resp.11 Let L be an N-modal or superintuitionistic logic. and also VxA(x)> A(c) = [dc/yx](VxAo(x) Ao(x)). it does not occur in B . We also have and so the latter formula is L-provable. therefore r t L B A(%). > But (VxAo(x) A o ( x ) )E L by 2.7.9. and assume that a constant c does not occur in I? U { A ( x ) ) . Since B is closed. Then by 2. So t L > A(x). Then for some injective [yx +-+ dc].13 (ii). I? a modal (respectively. Assume r t L ( x ) . ( x ) . Since by assumption c does not occur in I?.7.. Assume I? t-L A(c). Let B := I?. FIRST-ORDER THEORIES Another useful fact is the following lemma on new constants. B > A ( x ) = [dlyl(Bo3 Ao(x)) and (Bo 3 Ao(5))E L.then A(x)=[ d / y A. . So for some injective [ y H dl.

Proof First note that ' k L A V V Al implies I F L AV V A2 for any A2 2 A. as we assume V 0 := 1. A) F L C B .14 If (1'. the language of ( 'A) is L ( r .13. then r t L v V A l and C for some finite A1 C A.1 For a predicate logic L. I ' since FQH A V V A1 > A V V A2. A). So. The latter follows from the intuitionistic tautology P v q >pV(qVr). This provability respects M P as well: Lemma 2.A) k L B.A)(= I U A.7.p.( p V r ) A ( ( p > q ) V r )> q V r (the latter follows from p V r . Then .7. A) if I' E L A V V Al for some finite A1 E A. A n intuI.7. A) t-L B .6. ' I. D(r. and thus ( r .l.142 CHAPTER 2.A) F L C and (I'. which we leave t o the reader).7.6 since H t . a first-order theory I and formulas with ' constants A. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Definition 2.8.A) t-LC 2 B. ¤ Hence I' t-L B V V A l ... itionistic formula A (with constants) is L-provable i n (I?. Lemma 2.7. 2. using Lemma 2. ( 'A) an intuitionistic theory. I ' I. F L A implies ( 'A) F L A. So if (I'. But by 2.6.2 Let A be a predicate (intuitionistic) formula and let S be an IF(')-substitution such that FV(A) n F V ( S ) = 0 .13 Let L be an s. A are intuitionistic sentences (respectively.6.13. Definition 2. The details are left to the reader. with or DruA) denotes the set of constants occurring in without equality). then (I?. B of the corresponding kind Proof By an easy modification of the proof of 2.A) := I F ( ' ) ( D ( ~ . ( p > q ) V r FH q V r .8 Deduction theorems We begin with an analogue of Lemma 2. i n which I?.12 A intuitionistic double theory (with or without equality) is a pair (I?. rn Lemma 2. A) k L C and (I?. ~ ) ) .8.



A P r o o f Let FV(A) = r(x), so V = VxA. Let A" be a clean version of A, such that BV(AO)n F V ( S ) = 0 . Then SA S SAO,and thus

since r(x) n FV(S) = 0. But by Lemma 2.6.15 (xx),

where FV(SAO)= r(xy). By 2.6.15 (ii),

Hence QH(=) I-



and thus by ( I ) , (2) we obtain QH(') I- VSA

> s(~A).

Here is an example showing that the requirement

is necessary. Let A = P ( x ) , S = [Q(x,y)lP(y)l, so we have FV(A) n FV(S) = {x). Then


QH k+ VxQ(x,x) 3 VYQ(X,Y).
T h e o r e m 2.8.3 (Deduction t h e o r e m for superintuitionistic logics) Let L be an s.p.l.(=), I? an intuitionistic theory. Then for any A E IF(=) L + r I - A iff ; f S ( r ) k L ~ . P r o o f (If.) Sub(I') G L I, hence =(I?) ' L I?. So Szlb(r)t L implies A L I? kL A, and thus L I? I- A, since L I? is closed under L-provability. (Only if.) It is sufficient to show that the set {A I Szlb(I?) k L A) is a superintuitionistic logic. The conditions (s1)-(s3) from Definition 2.6.3 are obconsists vious (e.g. for generalisation we apply the Bernays rule, since =(I?) of sentences). To check (s4), assume that vAl,. . . ,FAk t LA for A1,. . . , Ak E Sub(r). Consider a substitution S = [C(xy)/P(x)], and let z be a distinct list such that


+ +


c +

r(z) n (r(y) U I FV(Ai) U FV(A)) = 0 . Let us show that Sub(I?)tLSA. J i=l We may also assume that BV(C) n r(xyz) = 0. Consider another substitution S' = [C1/P(x)],where C' := [z/y]C.




Since V A ~.,. . ,FA, F L A, we have

A VAi > A



L, and thus


and so (1) L I-

V S ' ( ~ A ~3 SIA. ) i= 1 On the other hand, since F V ( S f ) n FV(Ai) = 0, Lemma 2.8.2, we have by



and thus


Sub(!?)t LA



S1(vAi), and by (1) we obtain S u b ( r ) k L S'A,

which implies Sub(r) k L v z s f ~ , by V-introduction. But by 2.5.27(ii), [y/z]SIA A SA, and thus by 2.6.15(ii),

Therefore Sub(r) F L SA, as stated.

' Note that the previous proof can be simplified if I is a set of sentences: then we choose substitution instances A, in such a way that F V ( A , ) n F V [ C / P ] = 0, and we can readily apply Lemma 2.8.2. For an N-modal theory A put

Theorem 2.8.4 (Deduction theorem for modal logics) Let L be N-m.p.l.(=), r an N-modal theory. Then for any N-modal formula A


+ r I- A


OmSub(I') F L A.



Proof OmSub(I') kL A clearly implies L +r k A. For the converse, note that the set {A I CImSub(r) kL A) is substitution closed; this is proved as in the previous theorem. It is also closed under 0-introduction. In fact,
OalB1,..., O,,Bn FL Aiff t-LO,,BlA

...AIJa,Bn > A.

By monotonicity and the distribution of U iover A in K N , this implies

tL OiOal B1 A .. . A OiO,, B,
Hence O""Sub(r) EL OiA.


Definition 2.8.5 An m.p.1. (=) is called conically expressive if its propositional part is conically expressive.
Lemma 2.8.6 For any conically expressive N-m.p.l.(=) L, theory A and formula A, O*A FL A iff A U = ' kL A,


lJ*A := {O*B I B E A).

Proof 'If' readily follows from L k O*p > 0,p. For the general proof of the converse we need the strong completeness of Q K N , see below. But in particular cases (like Q S 4 or QK4), O*B is equivalent to a finite conjunction of formulas 1 from Um{B), SO 0 * A EL A obviously implies OmA kL A.
Hence we obtain a simplified version of the deduction theorem for conically expressive modal logics:

Theorem 2.8.7 Let L be a conically expressive N-m.p.E.(=), theory. Then for any N-modal formula A
L f I ' F A iff n * S u b ( r ) E L ~ ,


an N-modal


Follows from 2.8.4 and 2.8.6.

Here is a simple application of the deduction theorem.
Lemma 2.8.8 QH

+ W* I- KF, where

w* = Vx((P(x) 3 VyP(y)) 3 VyP(y)) 3 VxP(x), K = VxiiP(x) > iiVxP(x).
It is sufficient to show that

or, equivalently, W*,V X ~ ~ P ( ~'v'xP(x) FQH VxP(x). X), But this is obvious, since the premise Vx((P(x) > VyP(y)) > VyP(y)) of W* ) i.e. , is equivalent to Vx((P(x) > I > I), to V x l ~ P ( x ) in the presence of 1VxP(x). 1





Let A1.. .Am be a list of formulas (not necessarily distinct); we define their disjoint conjunction

where Si is a formula substitution transforming Ai in such a way that predicate letters in all conjuncts become disjoint. E.g. we can put
:= S~PL(X) P g k + i ( ~ ) ;

then Py occurs in SiAi only if 1 E i (mod m). The formula

is equivalent to V(A!

A ... A ~


in all our logics, see below. Similarly we define a disjoint disjunction:

For a theory O put OV := {A"\ E O, k 2 0 ) , A

0" = {A1

. . . A A I m > 0, A l l . . . ,Am E O). ,

Thus 8" contains conjunctions of variants of formulas from O in disjoint predicate symbols, and OAV {(Al =

A .. . A Ak)k ( k > 0,

All .. . ,Ak E O).

= Obviously, H + O = H + O v = H + o A H + Q A v . For theories e l , . . . ,Om we also define the disjoint disjunction

(the set of disjunctions of variants of formulas from e l , . . . ,Om) and the extended disjoint disjunction: (el

C... O m ) * ={(A1 $

I k>O,

A1 E 01, ... ,Am E Om).

In this section we consider only superintuitionistic logics

Definition 2.9.1 Let L be an s.p.l.(=), of L. W e say that

sets of formulas in the language



el L-implies 0 2 el and
0 2 <L

'dB E

0 <r, 0 2 ) 1


0 2

3A E 0 1 L t- A

> B.

0 2

are L-equivalent (notation: 0 1
0 2



0 <L 1

Q2 and


0 sub-L-implies 1



I y b0 2 )

if Sub(Ol) IL Sub(02);

el is sub-L-equivalent to 0 2
Sub(&) -r, Sub(&).

(notation: 0 -? 0 2 ) if 1

Here are some simple properties of these relations.
Lemma 2.9.2
0 <L 0 2 1

=+Q1 <?




<? 0 <? 1
0 1

0 2

iff Sub(01) I L 0 2 .
$ 0 C_ 2

02==~ +

~ + 0 1 .

(5) @ ~ - S , " ~ @ ~ * L + Q ~ = L + Q ~ .

(1) Note that L I- A

> B implies L t S A > S B for any substitution S.

(2) Follows from (1).

(3) By ( I ) , Sub(&) IL 2 0 converse is trivial.
0 1

==+ Sub(0l) = Sub(Sub(Ol)) I L Sub(&).



0 2

clearly implies e2 L C

+ 01.

(5) Follows from (4).

2.9.2(2), (5) allow us sometimes to identify L-(sub)-equivalent sets of formu-

Definition 2.9.3 A set of sentences 0 is called V-perfect i n a logic L i f the following holds

(If-p) for any A E Sub(@) there exists B E Sub(@) such that L I- B

> VA,

i.e. Sub(@) sL Sub(@).
Lemma 2.9.4 ('d-p) follows from its weaker version

148 @-p-) for any A E 0 , k


2 0 there exists B

E Sub(@) such that L k B

> A".

Proof In fact, assume (V-p-). If A' E Sub(@), then VA' = s A ~ some for substitution S and A E 0 , k 2 0. By (V-p-), L k B > Ak for some B E Sub(@);

L t S ( B > A") = (SB > VA').
Since SB E Sub(@), (V-p) holds for A'.


Definition 2.9.5 A set of sentences @ is called A-perfect in a logic L if
(A-p) for any A1,. . . ,Am E Sub(@) there exists B E Sub(@) such that L t- B Al A...AA,.


Note that the condition (A-p) for m = 2 implies (A-p) for arbitrary m , by induction.
Lemma 2.9.6 @ is A-perfect in L iff sub(@) SL Or\

Proof Note that if every Ai is a substitution instance of A: E @, then A1 A . . . A A, is a substitution instance of A A . . . A6. : Definition 2.9.7 A set 8 is called AV-perfect (in L) if it is both V-perfect and A-perfect.
Obviously, a perfect set (of any kind) in L is also perfect in all every L' 2 L. The next proposition suggests equivalents to 2.9.7.

Proposition 2.9.8 Let @ be a set of sentences. Then the following conditions are equivalent:

(3) for any Al, . . . , Am E Sub(@) there exists B E Sub(@) such that

L t B > VA1 A . . .VA,

(or equivalently, L t B

> V ( A ~ . . . A A,)); A

Informally speaking, (4) means that a AV-perfect set of axioms allows for the simplest natural form of the deduction theorem.

Proof ( 1 ) + ( 2 ) . I f L k B i > A " f o r i = l ,..., m a n d L k B > B I A . . .AB,, then L k B 3 F A ... A=. (2) (3). If VA: E S U ~ ( A ? ) for i = 1,.. .,r ,then for k 2 max(m, kl, , n


a substitution instance of (Al A . . . A Ak)k implies VA; A .. . AVA; QH (where e.g. Ai = A for m < i 5 k). , (3) (4). If L @ t- A, then by the deduction theorem 2.8.3, + L I- VA1 A . . . A VA, > A for some A1,. . . ,A, E Sub(@). The converse implications (and (4) + (1))are obvious.

. . . , k,),





Similarly in the case of V- or A-perfection we can somewhat simplify the deduction theorem: Lemma 2.9.9 Sub(@).
Proof (1) By 2.8.3, L @ F A iff Sub(@)FL A, so Sub(@) FL A implies L+@t-A. The other way round, if Sub(@) F L A, then

(1) I @ is V-perfect in L, then L f

+ 0 t- A iff Sub(@) FL A.
for some B E

(2) If 0 is A-perfect in L, then L

+ 0 t- A iff



for some A1,. ..,A, E Sub(@). By (V-p) there exist Bi E Sub(@) such that L t- Bi > BAi; thus Sub(@) EL A. (2) 'If' is again obvious. The other way round, suppose Sub(@) A, i.e. FL



.. . ABA, kL A

for A1,. . . ,A,

E Sub(@). Since

by the deduction theorem we obtain L ~ B ( A ...A A , ) I J A . ~ A By (A-p) then LFB>AIA for some B E 0 ; hence by monotonicity L t BB and eventually

... AA,

> V(Al A .. . A A,)

Lemma 2.9.10 (1) For any theory 0 , the theories GV,0",OAVare respectively V-perfect, A-perfect, and AV-perfect.

(2) For any theories 0 1 , . . .,,@ ,
Proof (1) Straightforward. (2) By 2.6.15(xx)

the theory ( 0 1 \j . . . i/ Om)* is V-perfect

hence Thus (V-p-) holds.


QH F (Al \j . . . \j

> ((A1 i/ . . . i/



So every recursively axiomatisable s.p.1. has a recursive AV-perfect (in Q H ) axiomatisation. lg Sometimes one can construct simpler perfect axiomatisations for Q H Q (or for L O, with a superintuitionistic L). E.g. if a set Oo is V-perfect, then Q t (or (Oo U 8')" for any 0 ) is AV-perfect, etc. To construct the sets Ov, QA,QvA from O we usually need infinitely many additional universal quantifiers or conjuncts, so these sets are infinite for any TI)." But sometimes finite perfect extensions also finite set Q (unless 8 {I, exist.



Lemma 2.9.11 If 01, .. . , O m are AV-perfect, then

Proof V-perfection follows from Lemma 2.9.10. To show A-perfection, consider Cl ,... , C k E (01 i/ ... i/ Om)*, with

Aij E Qj. As noted above, we may assume that different Ci have no common predicate letters. Then every Ci can be presented as

where Aij E Sub(Qj). By VA-perfection (2.9.8(3)), there exist B j E Sub(Qj) such that

L F B, > V / \ A : ~ .
i=l Then

Remark 2.9.12 Another kind of perfection was introduced in [Yokota, 19891, cf. also [Skvortsov, 20041. A theory 8 is called arity-perfect in a logic L if for any A E Sub(@)there exists a closed substitution instance B' of some B E 8 such that L t B' > A (and thus L t B1>VA).
''Of course every s.p.1. itself is At/-perfect, but such a trivial axiomatisation is not recursive. 20Formally speaking, Qv and 0'' are infinite even for Q = {I}, repetitions and dummy but ~ quantifiers can be eliminated, so we can say that { I ) = ={} I.



Our notion of V-perfection is weaker, because B in 2.9.3(V-p) is not necessarily closed21. Note that the sets OA, 0"' are arity-perfect.

Lemma 2.9.13 L-sub-equivalence preserves all forms of perfection.



Proposition 2.10.1 Let L be a superintuitionistic predicate logic, and let I',rl be sets of sentences such that formulas from I? and r1 have no common predicate letters. Then:

(2) (cf. [Ono, 1973, Theorem 5.51) If L I- C D then

(3) If L

+ r I- C D and L + I?' I- C D , then
( L + ~ ) n ( L + r l ) = L + C D + { A V B I A ~ rE I " ) . B ,


(1) Let (L +I?) n ( L

+ r l ) k A. Then by Theorem 2.8.3,

i= 1



for some A l l . . .Ak E Sub(r), B1,. . .B E Sub(rl). Thus 1

Assuming that IFV(Ai)l = m, IFV(Bj)I = n, we obtain that VAi V V B ~ - is a substitution instance of Am V Bn. So we obtain the first equality in (1)Now note that by substitution and omitting dummy quantifiers,

if m < m l , n s n l . Hence

where s = max(m, n), and the second equality follows.
'lRecent counterexamples by D. Skvortsov show that V-perfection is strictly weaker than arity-perfection.



(2) We use (1). Assume that A E I?, B E r'. Obviously, L A0 v B0 t- AV B , thus A V B E (L +I?) n (L r'). So it remains to show that for any m E w



- -

~ e Am = Vul t

. . .Vum Am, B = Vvl . . .Vv, Bm, and "

Then L

+ A V B F C and L F C > A" V B", by CD. Hence (*) follows.
+ C D as L.

(3) follows from (2): take L

Remark 2.10.2 The assumption L F C D in Proposition 2.10.1(2) is necessary. [Ono, 19721731gives an example of predicate logics for which (**) does not hold
Similarly one can describe intersections of modal predicate logics. Proposition 2.10.3 Assume that L is a N-modal predicate logic, and have no common predicate letters. Then


(1) (L + r ) n (L + r l ) = L + { o ~ A ~ v D ~ B ~ I A E I 'r,' ; m , n E w ; a , P E I P ) . BE For particular classes of 1-modal logics this presentation can be simplified, cf. Section 1.1: (a) For logics above Q T :

(b) For logics above Q K 4 :

(c) For logics above Q S 4 :
( n + r ) n ( n + r l ) = L + { O A r n v ~ B n lA E ~ B E r r ; m , n ~ w ) . , (2) If L t- Ba, then:

( L + I ' ) ~ ( L + I " ) = L + { U , A V O ~ B I A E I 'B E ~ ' ; ~ , P € I E ) . ,
Similarly, to (i), there exist simpler versions for the cases L B a , Q K 4 Ba or Q S 4 Ba.



> QK4 +

Therefore we have



P r o p o s i t i o n 2.10.4 The complete lattices of predicate logics (superintuitionistic or modal) are well-distributive, i.e. they are Heyting algebras. Moreover, the intersection of two recursively axiomatisable logics is recursively axiomatisable. The intersection of finitely axiomatisable logics is finitely axiomatisable for superintuitionistic logics QH C D and for 1-modal logics > QK4 B a .




Later in this book we will show that the intersection of finitely axiomatisable superintuitionistic predicate logics may be not finitely axiomatisable, if one of them does not contain C D .


Godel-Tarski translation

D e f i n i t i o n 2.11.1 Godel-Tarski translation for predicate formulas is the map (-)T : I F = M F = defined by the following clauses: AT = CIA for A atomic; ( A A B )= A ~ A B ~ ; ~ ( A V B )= A ~ v B ~ ; ~ ( A 3 B)T = O(AT 3 B T ) ; ( ~ x A= 3~ A T ; ) x ( v x A )= CiVxAT. ~ For a set r I F = put rT := { A T I A E r ) . Godel-Tarski translation is obviously extended to formulas with constants.
Since QS4= t- ( x = y)



O ( x = y ) , we may also define ( x = y)T just as x = y.

L e m m a 2.11.2 QS~(') t- OAT Proof

= AT

for any A E I F ( = ) .

By induction on the length of A.

L e m m a 2.11.3 (1) Let [ x H y] be a (simple) variable transformation. Then for any A E IF', ( A [ xH Y ] )= A ~ [ X H y]. ~
(2) For any formula with constants A E I F E ( D ) , for any D-transformation [XH a7 ( [ ~ I x I A ) [alxl( A T ) . 1 = ~

Proof If z

( 1 ) Easy, by induction on ! A [ .We consider only the case A = V z B .

# x , we have
( A [ xH y])T = ( V z ( B [ xH Y ] ) ) T = O V z ( B [ xH Y ] ) ~ = O Y ~ ( B ~H X] ) (by the induction hypothesis) [y = ( O Y ~ B *[) X Y ] = AT [ X Y].

If z = x, we have


= 0 V Y ( B T [ x y ] ) (by H = ( O V X B [ X ) y] = ~

~ 1 = )( Q y~ ( B [ x ~ 1 ) = O V y ( B [ x ~ 1 ) ~ ) ~
the induction hypothesis) [X Y].

(2) An exercise.



Lemma 2.11.4 If A A B for A , B E IF=, then AT A BT.

Proof We use Proposition 2.3.17. Consider the equivalence relation

on IF'. It is sufficient t o show that 2.3.17. We check only (1) for & = V:

satisfies the conditions (1)-(3) from

( V X A ) A (Vy(A[x H ~ 1 ) ) ~ ~ The remaining (routine) part is left t o the reader. In fact, by 2.11.1 and 2.11.3 ~ (Vy(A[x Y I H T = UVY(A[X Y I ) = U Q Y ( A ~ [ X YI), which is congruent t o ( V X A ) = OVxAT by 2.3.17. ~

Lemma 2.11.5 Let S = [B(x,y)/P(x)] be an IF(=)-substitution, and consider the MF(=)-substitution

Then for any A E IF(')

By induction on A.

Q S ~ ( ' )t ( s A ) ~






If A = P(z), then (SA)T = BT(z, y), and


~ = sT(np(z)) = O B ~ ( Z , A ~ y),

which is equivalent to B ~ ( zy ) by Lemma 2.11.2 ,


If A is atomic, A # P(z), the claim is trivial. If A = VzC is clean and also BV(A) n F V ( S ) = then


Q S ~ ( ' )F ( s c ) ~

by the induction hypothesis, and hence



- by replacement. So

(*) holds.

220therwise we can consider a congruent formula with this property.


INow again we have Q S ~ ( = ) (SA)T and replacement.


STAT by the induction hypothesis

If A = C V D , then

(SA)T = ( S C V S D ) ~ (SC)T V ( s D ) ~ , = STAT = ST(CT V DT) = STCT v sTDT.
By the induction hypothesis Q S 4 Iwe can apply a replacement.
r STCT, ( S D ) ~ S =

~ , SO D


The case A = C A D is almost the same, and we skip it.

If A = C II D , then
(sAlT = ( S C I) SD)T = O((SC)T II STAT = S T ( o ( C T I D ~ ) = n ( s T c T 2 s ~ D ~ ) . ) )
In this case we can also use QS4-theorems

and replacement.

= STcT,

( s D ) ~= s T D T

Lemma 2.11.6

g QS~(') + Sub(rT) for any r E IF(=)

Proof By Lemma 2.11.5 we have ( s A ) ~ E QS~(') + STAT for any simple substitution S . Now recall that every substitution is reducible to simple ones.
Lemma 2.11.7 For a list of variables x and a n IF(')-formula


Proof By induction on the length of x . The base: QS4 t- AT OAT (2.11.2). For the induction step, assume O\dxAT = ( V X A ) ~Then in QS4 we obtain: . 0'dy\dxAT = ~ l ' d ~ 0 ' d x(Lemma 2.6.202)- O V ~ ( V X A (by assumption and A~ )~ H replacement) = ( b ' y ~ x A ) ~ . Proposition 2.11.8 For any m.p.1. (=) L containing QS4 the set
T~ := {A E







Proof We check that TL satisfies the conditions (s1)-(s5). By Proposition 1.5.2, AT E QS4 for every propositional intuitionistic axiom A. The same holds for predicate axioms and for the axioms of equality, as one can easily see. It is also clear that TL satisfies (s3) from Section 1.2. Corollary 2.11.6 shows that TL is closed under IF(=)- substitutions. Definition 2.11.9 T h e above defined s.p.l.(=) TL is called the superintuitionistic fragment of the m.p.1 (=)L; a n m.p.l.(=) L i s called a modal counterpart of the s.p.l.(=) TL, cf. Definition 1.5.4.
Lemma 2.11.10 For a n y A E IF(=),

Proof By induction on the length of the proof of A. An alternative proof ¤ makes use of completeness, see below.
Lemma 2.11.11 Let L = QH(')

+r be a n s.p.1. (=).

T h e n for a n y A E IF(=),

A, Proof Suppose L t- A. Then by Theorem 2.8.3, Sub(r) tQH(=)i.e. there exists formulas Ax,. . . , An E r and substitutions S1,. .. ,Sn such that
QH(=) ta 1 =

A V S ~ A ~ A. >


Then by Lemma 2.11.10,



QS~(') t I\(~s,A,)~. i=l

3 AT.

o~sTAT. Therefore By definition and Lemma 2.11.5, QS~(') t ( ~ s ~ A ~ ) ~ ~ S u b ( rkQS4c=, i.e. Q S ~ ( = ) rTk AT by Theorem 2.8.4. ) AT,



As we shall see (cf. Proposition 2.16.17), in many cases the converse of 2.11.11 also holds, i.e. + ) QH(=) +- r = T ( ~ ~ 4 ( =r T ) ,


+r(=) k A

iff QS~(')

+ r F AT.

In particular, it is well known that

[Schiitte, 19681, [Rasiowa and Sikorski, 19631. Let us make another simple observation.



Lemma 2.11.12 If an s.p.1. (=) L = QH(') I has modal counterparts, then ' Q S ~ ( =+ rTis the smallest modal counterpart of L. ) Proof Suppose L = TA. Then obviously, QS~(') rTC A. By Lemma 2.11.11, L k A only if QS~(') rTk A. On the other hand, if LYA, then A VAT, and thus QS~(') rT VAT. Therefore Q S ~ ( =+ rTis a modal coun) terpart of L.





Remark 2.11.13 The paper [Pankratyev, 19891 states that every s.p.1. has modal counterparts. However the proof in this paper requires some verification, which we postpone until Volume 2.
We do not know if there exist the greatest modal counterparts in the predicate case, and Theorem 1.5.6 has no direct analogue:

Theorem 2.11.14 QH.

(1) [Pankratyev, 19891 QGrz is a modal counterpart of

(2) [Naumov, 1991] There exists a proper extension of QGrz which is also a modal counterpart of QH. These matters will also be discussed in Volume 2.


The Glivenko theorem

Proposition 2.12.1 (Predicate version of the Glivenko theorem) any intuitionistic predicate formula A


Let QCL k 1 A . Then by the deduction theorem 2.8.3

for some formulas A,. Then by Lemma 1.1.2, we have (1) QH k
By Lemma 2.6.20(11),

A 71V(~,

v TA,)



By Corollary 1.1.9, QH F %l(A, V l A , ) , so by applying (2), we obtain:

Hence by ( I ) , QH

+ K F tS

7 7 B ( ~ , v YA,)

+ K F t- 1 A .

Corollary 2.12.2 For any

A V-formula A,

QCLtA iffQH+KFtA. Proof By induction on A (exercise).

We say that an intermediate predicate logic L satisfies the Glivenko property if for any formula A, LtiA QCLI-iA and that L has the classical

A V- fragment if for any


A V-formula A,

T h e o r e m 2.12.3 The following conditions are equivalent (for a superintuitionistic predicate logic L):
(1) L satisfies the Glivenko property;

(2) L has the classical


A V-fragment;

(3) Q H f K F G L C Q C L .

In other words, Q H the property (i) or (ii). Proof

+ K F is the smallest intermediate predicate logic with

By Lemma 2.6.20(11),

Thus (i), (ii) imply Q H K F C L. (i) also implies L G QCL. In fact, suppose A E (L - QCL). Since Q H I- A > 7-A and Q C L t- A TTA, we then have 7 l A E (L - QCL), which contradicts the Glivenko property. Finally, (ii) implies L Q C L as well. In fact, assume (ii) and suppose A E (L - QCL) and Q C L t- A B, where B is a A V-formula; then Q C L t TT(A = B), whence Q H f K F t- 1 7 ( A r B), by Proposition 2.12.1. As we have proved, L I- K F . So we obtain L t= B), whence L t-A = ~ T Bby , Lemma 1.1.2. Since A E L, we also have -7A E L, and thus 7 7 B E (L-QCL), which contradicts (ii). H





The same result holds for the logic with equality QH'




Definition 2.13.1 For a predicate formula A put bA := p V ( p > A), where p is a proposition letter that does not occur in A. For a superintuitionistic predicate logic L put AL := Q H (6A I A E L) and also AOL := L, An+'L := AAnL by induction.


(2) Trivial. rn z. The other way round.p. So AL can be axiomatised as follows. (4) follows from (3) by Proposition 2. (1) AL L e m m a 2. W Quite similar to 1.13.6. (2) First note that by AX^). AL = Q H + (6A I A E z. + + + w . then VA E so @ E EL. As in the propositional case. L. Then apply the deduction theorem. (3) We have Q H I.13.VA > A by 2. both definitions are equivalent: L e m m a 2. and W L e m m a 2. since Q C L t 6A for every A.1. hence A FQH 6A.5 (2) LI L. so 6A E h L .2. since Q C L = Q H EM and E M = p V ~p is just 6 1 = p V ( p > I). p > A F Q ~ p > B . (3) A(QH + I ) = QCL. A-OPERATION L e m m a 2.2 The following formulas are theorems of QH: (1) A 2 6A Proof (1) A FQH p > A and p 3 A FQH bA. every consistent s. > 6A by (I). (3) A(QH I ) C QCL. P > (A3B). C L2 ===+ AL1 5 AL2. Hence by V-introduction Now (2) follows by the deduction theorem. then clearly K L 5 AL. where 6'A := > p) > p.2 using the deduction theorem.12. By Lemma 2. Hence Q H t. if A E L.13. ) + Proof Let EL:= Q H + {GA I A E 2). QCL C A(QH I ) .R A > eventually Q H -I ~ V A V6A by the Bernays rule. Therefore AL 2 h ~ . ((p > A) In [Komori. (4) AL c QCL for Proof (1) Since Q H t A > 6A for any A. &?A implies ? A V6A. Q H Proof + 6A = Q H + 6'A for any formula A.2. The other way round. 19831 AL was defined as Q H {6'A I A E L).

7 for the propositional case. .A for dzfferent . Hence Lemma 2. .P. P.k. 6 k O = n U 620.16.13. First we generalise 6-operation as follows [Yokota. 24The latter notation is somewhat ambiguous as it means P I . .1 and 1.. 6 etc. Definitions 1. 19831 (where they were denoted by A k ( w ) . .. For a set O of formulas and y = bk.2.pA23 Also put ( i n particular... for W := Q H I). W e also introduce b&O := b:O:=6 k .t{l) was denoted by P. 2 5 ~ n ~ o k o t a 19891 the set 6.k. If P does not occur in A.4 in [ ~ o k o t a 19891.7 (1) Q H + 6A k dkA. Also note that 60A = 6A and Pn = 6z1.. Let us now turn to a finite axiomatisation of Q H P ~ presented in [Yokota. we use the notation 6kA rather than 6k. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC In Chapter 6 we will prove the converse to (2). 19891..2. SEA = A). 19891. [ . . .. kELd U k l . ~ ~ Obviously. similarly to 1. . 6k.160 CHAPTER 2. . i s a distinct list of variables.6 Let y where P E P L ~ .EW 6kl.13. + Definition 2. szo E 6:O. The logics QHP: := An(QH I)= An-'(QCL) + were first introduced in [Komori. put . . r(y) n FV(A) = 0 . 23Cf. . that do not occur in A.@ for n E w .

. . (2) and (MP) we obtain Similarly Q H ~ O ( A A B ) ~ O B .8 The following are theorems of Q H : (1) A 3 O A . Q H F VA > A implies Q H I.2.OVA > O A by (I).2 (3). The next lemma shows that 6-type operators behave as 0-modalities..2 (I). where 0= 6 k .13. (2).13.P this follows from 2. (2) and the transitivity of 3 . The latter formula is equivalent to O A A OB 3 O ( A A B ) .OVA > 0 A by the Bernays rule. Since Q H t. by ( l ) . (2) by substitution [P(y)/p] and generalisation. (2) O ( A 2 B ) 3 O A 3 O B . a . k . For 0= d k l . ~ 6 k >. For the converse note that by AX^). hence Q H ~ O A > O ( B ~ A A B ) by ( I ) . so we can apply substitution and generalisation.k . . apply induction.13. Lemma 2. So let us show QHt-O(AAB)=OAAOB. (4) We may suppose n = 2 and use induction for the general case. (2) and next QH~-OA~OOB>O(AAB) again by ( l ) . A-OPERATION 161 Proof (1) Sk. hence QH t.pA = Qy [P(y)/p] 6A. .A A B > A. For 0 = bk.13. (2) Follows from (1). (2). and thus QHt-O(AAB)>OAAOB. or Proof (I). (3) Similar to 2. (3) Follows from (2) by induction..

since 6 r Lemma2.11 QH I>A. Proof Readily follows from 2.f and Q H + 6E0 C Q H + P. ¤ (1) Q H k P . I k. = (a) L (b) L 0 1 02.B1 A . A B.8(1). ) .13. W + 6k. . since Q H I( 2 ) Follows from ( 1 ) . . 0 2 Lemma 2.A whenever ll 5 k l . 0 (a) L + (b) L + 6. + 6 r (07)G L + 6.12 6 & 0 Proof <?A 6:0 rn 01. The same argument actually proves a stronger claim."A. f > 6 Y A .1.02 I.13.@2 provided 8 2 is V-perfect in L.l(=) L and sets of formulas (1) If L + 0 1 CL + 02. . thus k L F (/"\ 6.13.9 Q H I.. Since S k ~ E Sub(6kOz).13. for some B 1 . + >A c L + 0 2 . (2) If L + =L + then = L + 6.6 r A > 6 p A for n 5 m.@2 provided el. . (07) L + 6. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Proposition 2. .). (0. .6l Proof By substitution and elimination of dummy quantifiers. . for any theory 0 .. Since elimination of dummy quantifiers is legal in Q H .8 ( 2 ) .13. then by 2. .. .Bm E S u b ( 0 2 ) ..10 = 6F-"b.162 C H A P T E R 2. .13. knA I. Pn > 6 z A forany formulaA. . + + 6. Proof (1) By 2. ( 0 ."Bi) i=l &. Lemma 2.8 S u b ( 0 2 ) -l A. i. it follows that L i Therefore S k 0 1 C L 6:02..6EA.e. Proof ( 1 ) (a) If A E 0 1 C L L I-.13. Then by the monotonicity of 6.p.. then + 6 2 0 1 C L + 6. (2) Q H + b y 0 c Q H + P. we obtain: Proposition 2. 1.13.13 For an s. 2 are V-perfect in L .

p. z) V (P(x.. therefore (V-p-) holds for 6kA.14. Proposition 2.2. ~ Alternatively. P does not occur x in Am(z). [Yokota. for all n 0. This formula is clearly QH-equivalent to 6k+. > Proof For 6 : Q = sub-equivalence: b& O N G 620.13. and thus L k B 3 Am(z).4. lzl = m. for 6 & 0 one can apply a direct argument generalising the proof of Lemma 2.Am(z). . sL. z) = 3 Am(z)))).3 (V-p-). Proof 26 I a set Q is V-perfect in an s. Proposition 1.13.O is also f For an arbitrary 6kA E 6 k 0 .13. A-OPERATION 163 (b) Readily follows from (a). We may also assume that r(xz) n F V ( B ) = 0 . there exists B E Sub(@) such that L t B 3 VzAm(z).15 If O is V-perfect in L. since Ov is V-perfect in Q H and Q H + O = QH 0'. + (2) Follows from (1).14 V-perfect in L. then S&. with A E O. n are V-perfect O proceed by induction on n.. In fact.13. let us check the property 2.61. where xz is a distinct list of new variables. Since 8 is V-perfect. Lemma 2. (=) L. then 6 & 0 and 6:0 in L. We have ( b k A ) m ( ~ ) 'dzb'x(P(x. 11 = k. And for 6&@ use 26Cf.1. 1989.6. Hence by the monotonicity of 6k+m and as we can choose P that does not occur in Am(z) and in B.9.

Lemma 2.16 and 2.B.13.13. If n = 0.13. with the same set of (k + m)-ary predicate letters in both formulas.. with Q H t.7 b k Q Proposition 2.15. Z) > Vx(Pn-l (x. + + O and Q is V-perfect in Q H . Z) V (Pn-l(x.6. 4 Since by 2. so the statement is trivial.". 620 = O. since Q H + L = L = Q H + 8 and both Q and L are V-perfect in Q H .13. for G = {I) have we + O = Q H + Qv and Ov is ..17 (1) I L = Q H f AnL = Q H SF@. then Proof (1) By induction on n.A)m = VzVx(Pn(x. = (SEA)".A)~ as (6. for any n 2 0. . BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC L k B 3 Am(z) and next L I. Thus C AL.Am(z). then f Proof By 2.)))). In particular. then (2) I L = Q H f + 8 .164 implies CHAPTER 2.6 L m B > S.Am(z) again we can present b.16 I L = Q H + Q and O is V-perfect in QH. then AL = L. Z) > .13. For the induction step suppose Then by 2.+.+. (2) Follows from (I) and the observation that Q H V-perfect in Q H . Z) V Pn(x.13(2a) A L = Q H + S L = QH+S@. it follows that AL = Q H + 6&0. (C~.13.

4. In fact. B := Vz(Q(y.13. 1989. 19891.13.71.18 27 QHP: =Q H + 6:{1).2.20 Q H + bY6. [Yokota. Now let us show that every bgA for k > 1 (and hence every bkl.. bkB FQH A.. B 3 A.13. Proof Put L := QH + bYbj.19 Q H + 6.13. B 3 A k Q6 ~~ > &$A. by the deduction theorem From (I).tA k (bkA 3 A) > A for any k.QA = VYB. (2) we obtain28 Hence (again by the deduction theorem) Note that bkA is bk. On the other hand. (1) bkA 3 A. ) Hence by substitution [B/P(y)] (1) L t by'dy(B V (B 3 A)).8(2).pA for some P that does not occur in A.jA t 6YSj+lA for j > 0. but (3) still holds if P occurs in B .pA.k. is deducible from byA. n 2 0. z) 3 A)). Lemma 2.3(4) from [Yokota. 27Cf. Theorem 1. where lyl = j. Lemma 1. A-OPERATION 165 Corollary 2. and for the induction step we can apply (3).. Then &. .PA = V Y ( ~ ( YV (P(Y) 3 A)). bj+l.. m > 0.13. for n = 0 this is a substitution instance of an axiom. Q do not occur in A. 28Cf.. r ( y z ) n FV(A) = 0 and P. z) V (Q(y. Lemma 2. : Proof hence By 2. z @ r(y). Now by induction it follows that for any n.2.).

11.m let us show heor or em 1.B V ( B > A ) and therefore > B.13.13.8(2) we obtain as required. Our proof is similar to that paper. The case k = 1 is trivial.""~ By 2.13. and thus Hence by substitution [Q(y. Eventually from (I). Proof (1) implies (2).6. By induction on n . and the case k = 1 is trivial.6YSkA for k 1 1.A I.Vy (B v ( B 3 A)) 3 VyB.21 QH + 6. thus which implies (6) L I . Proposition 2. Proof By induction on k . n = m + 1) we have t (61. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC By Lemma 2. L F &?+'A.13.13.3. Lemma 2.13.A for k. 1989) is the particular case of this proposition for A = 1.11.13. by the monotonicity of Vy. n 2 0. . m 2 0. we also obtain QH F A 2 B .19 (for k = 1.166 CHAPTER 2.""~ + I. The case k = 0 in (1) also follows from 2.5 from [Yokota.13.11. So it remains to prove (1) for k > 1. If the statement holds for k we obtain it for k 1: by Lemma 2. (7) L t. by 2.22" For any A E I F ( = ) (1) QH + 6T. z)/S(z)] Since z @ FV(A). (7) and 2.sA > A) > A. (2) QH + 6.20 and the induction hypothesis.

.24 (1) I L = QH f + O and O is V-perfect in QH. This proof is not so straightforward. recall that Pn = 621.f for n > 1 (cf.13.18.13. By applying 2. For the step.g. Finally note that ( 1 ) is ( 3 ) for m = 0.22 for this proof. In fact QH + ~ o = QH A + P v ( p 3 A) I. [Ono.f for n > 0.13.V y ( P ( y )V ( P ( y ) 3 A ) ) = blA.13.17: + + + Proposition 2.13. suppose ( 3 ) for m. W by substitution [ P ( y ) / p ]and generalisation.13. E. but does not use the infinite axiomatisation described in 2.23 QH Proof + SIA = QH + dOA. Y P. (2) If L = QH + O.22. ( 3 ) holds for m . A-OPERATION 167 for 0 5 m 5 n.13. this is trivial.13.e.13.13.13. QH P.13.22 it follows that for any k > 1. then A n L = QH + 6. However it may happen that QH &.f = SYI.25. By 2. 19831).13.25 QHP: = QH + P. then Proof Follows from 2.17 and 2.24 to O = {I) obtain we Theorem 2."Ac QH 6rA for some A and n > 1. If m = n.21 we have So by the induction hypothesis we obtain i.1. From 2. Now let us show perfection for finite axiomatisations of QHP: and obtain an alternative proof of Theorem 2. We also have Lemma 2. Now we can strengthen 2. P. However we still need 2.O.2.

C 3 4. B . (2) If O is 'd-perfect i n L and L 2 dTO for some n > 0 . (3) If O is AV-perfect i n L and L _> bTQ for some n > 0 .13. Together with the induction hypothesis (2) implies C 3 9. k 0.168 CHAPTER 2. which obviously follows from i= 1 nfl for I < i < n + 1. . then bk0 is A-perfect i n L. then bkO is V-perfect i n L.n 2 0. The case n = 0 is trivial.13. i=l n Proof By induction on n. Hence (1) follows by the deduction theorem again. O a set of formulas.q. By the deduction theorem it + suffices to prove C ~ ~ F H C . Lemma 2.27 Let L be a predicate superintuitionistic logic.C and thus - B A (pi V (pi > q)). for C = r\ (pi V (pi> q)). Consider the inductive step from n to n 1.26 H t. Then > (1) If @ is A-perfect i n L. then 6kO is A'd- perfect i n L. Pi F. Pi FH Hence by the deduction theorem. where C = A (pi V (pi > q)).(C> q) > C . Put Then Ht. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Lemma 2.

i for lyl = k .2.26.B > V z A m ( z ) . . lyl = k. where P does not occur in A.r ( y z ) n F V ( A ) = 0 .where Q does not occur in Am. . A Di.. hence and so by standard properties of quantifiers (Lemma 2. B i ( x ) E Sub(@). may we assume that F V ( B ) n r ( y z ) = 0 and Q does not occur in B. where y and x are disjoint lists of variables. Put By Lemma 2. By V-perfection there is B E Sub(@)such that L I. for lzl = m.6. Q E PLk+m. r ( y )n r ( z ) = 0 .m. Since we obtain the required property for (2) Suppose A E Sub(@). Put . A-OPERATION Proof ( 1 ) Consider arbitrary formulas for i = 1.F V ( B i ( x ) )C x .13.13.15).x ) ) C X Y By A-perfection there exists B E Sub(@)such that we may assume that r ( y ) n F V ( B ) = 0. . F V ( A i ( Y . QH F ( C > B ) > C .

) and { : are AV-perfect in Q H + P. by (3) and (4).O1 well).13.f for all n.8. 19891.27(1) one can show Proposition 2.31 Q H P ~ Q H = + P.25 without applying 2.13. cf. Thus by Lemma 2.13."Q) L.CHAPTER 2. Since by the assumption (2) of the lemma 6.) and { : P ) are A-perfect in Q H for n > 0.16. this completes the proof. L t. hence and so (5) L t C V ( C > B ) > ( G k A ) m . these sets are arity-perfect in the sense of [Yokota. the proof of 2. then 6LO is A-perfect in L (and thus 6&Q1 6 : O are also A-perfect i n L ) . r > 0 (note P ) that the case n 2 r is trivial).13. where C' := Vy(C V (C > B)) E [C/Q(x)] SkPQBl E P L ~ Q (note that here V y is a dummy quantifier).13.B. it follows that (3) L F C > ( G ~ A ) ~ . Also L k B > C by 2. Remark 2. Since C1 E Sub(6kQ).( C > B) 3 B. Similarly to 2.13.29 (1) The sets {P. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Since L F B > Am (z). then 6LQ is AV-perfect i n L (and 6. (2) The sets {P.13. Proposition (2) If O is AV-perfect i n L.27(2) allows us to prove 2.f + Pn for r > n > 0.13. we obtain is Lemma 2.28 (1) If O is A-perfect in L. eventually.13.13.30 Moreover. ."B E Sub(b.19. Proposition 2. Since {I) AV-perfect in Q H . 6 : Q as Lemma 2.22 implies L k SZ+.

13. We have QHP:+~ = A(QHPR) = QH by Lemma 2. Next. without any restriction on Lo (recall that S.? + Pn+l.9.8 (1)).29 (ii). and so 6Ef '0 = 6k(6.9. Also recall that b[O Q H P ~for any O by 2. Note that 6. n 0.Lo Lo by 2. The case n = 0 is trivial. then one can reduce the : case k = 1 to k = 0 in an axiomatisation of AnL above Lo. n + + O and 40 & Lo for > 0.13. by Lemma 2. 8 2 := {Pn).O and 6 c 0 is tl-perfect in Lo for all k.13. + 6.13 (la) applied to L = QH + ~(QHP:) c Q H + P.13. : + c Lo for + > + P r o o f By induction on n.13. Therefore we obtain an alternative proof of Theorem 2.13. then Lo AnL = Lo 6. then Lo + Actually we need only the case k = 0 of this statement. 0 = QHP:. So AnL = Lo 6.2.(Ov) for all k .13.0 L.13 (la) Lo + An+'L = Lo + 6(AnL) = Lo + b(Lo + hnO) C Lo+6( + P.25 is clearly a particular case of this statement for n = r. Proof By induction on n.13.13. First note that by 2.A.?.6yA JI 676.13. c some r > 0.0 in particular.O G AnL for any L and O L and n 0.13.24. A-OPERATION 171 So Pn and P.O) is V-perfect in Lo by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.18.f = Q H + P + Pn for n < r. by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 2. 1 note that L 0 = QHP: = L O2 by the induction hypothesis. Hence 6[6.13.+lO. .f are deductively equivalent in Q H P f for a sufficiently large r.13. whenever Lo AnL.13. O is V-perfect in Lo and ST@ f some r > 0. So we have Corollary 2.25 that does not use 2.33 shows that if Lo contains 6O for some (sufficiently large) r > 0.10. + QH t. because the case k = 1 (and thus. and O2 is 1 tl-perfect in L by Lemma 2.0) k - = Lo+b. And 2.33 I L = Lo 0 . the case k > 0) readily follows from 2. rn Theorem 2. AnL = Lo SEO. The converse inclusion Lo is trivial.34 I L = Lo AnL = Lo 6. + + + P.32 Q H Similarly we obtain Proposition 2. c L~ + A ~ + ' L - + c c + > f Corollary 2. Consider the induction step.27. Consider the induction step from n to n 1.

2 If A A Sub(EN). For a formula A.l.. Lemma 2.. Consider the following sets of formulas (for N 2 0) EN :={VxVy(x = y > y = x ) . a E IF}.1. let M F N .l.x.. xi n <is >x = z).then we obtain a reduction for the corresponding decision problems. x = ( x l .= (s. for an m. There exists an obvious translation from formulas with equality to formulas without equality just replacing equality with an ordinary predicate letter.p. be the set of all N-modal formulas built from ~ predicate letters occurring in A: u{v(A ~ i = y i > ~ G (. . we define AQ as the formula obtained from A by replacing all occurrences of '=' with Q. . L n IF). nWr:= {&B I B E r. + that does not occur For any modal formula with equality A and Q E P L ~ in A. then OWEN vA.. B - . .1 For an N-m. In some cases specific equality axioms can be reduced to finitely many formulas . The other way round. Proof The only nontrivial case is when for P E PLn. x . i=l where all xj . yn). . L= is called the equality-expansion of L.14 Adding equality In this section we study correlation between a logic without equality L and its minimal extension with equality L=. ( y l . V A =v ( xG y 3. and for an s.p. ~2. i=l Then [ylxB). y = ( y l . let L= := QKZ + L. L.p. . MFA. o " & ~ . &A. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC 2. .14. Vx z = x ) We shall omit N if it is clear from the context and use the notation Ow&. Definition 2. . we define the equality-free fragment as Lo := L n M F N (respectively.p.172 CHAPTER 2.). ] We prove n m E N k Q K N VA by induction on the complexity of B. L.=) L. yj are different. .k21.P~#Q). . .. Put n X F y := /\xi = yi. let L= := QH= L. ) = P . VxVyVz(x = y A y = z N) U { V ~ V y ( x = y 3 > i ( x = y )11 ) yn))In.. For a set of N-modal formulas I? put rQ:= {AQ I A E r ) .14.1.

whenever it occurs in z. B A@B=A'@B" is admissible in the QKN-theory {x = y ) (with x . OiC = O~[Y/X]C. Then obviously.6. If B = OiC - = B' and we obtain by Lemma 2.I . . Z j = yj 3 Cli(xj = yj). ADDING EQUALITY 173 If B is atomic and does not contain P . it follows that U W E ~ Q K . the claim is trivial. then [y/x]B = P ( t ) .10 Since K N Oi(p = q) 3.O ~ ( X y) >.2. ~ = (4) Now EN FQK. By Lemma 2. y considered as constants) and apply the deduction theorem. and thus the claim holds for B.7.e. then the claim follows by an argument in classical propositional logic .note that the rule A A1.1 4. i.10 (xxvii) we also have Now (1) and (2) imply and it remains to apply generalisation. implies OWENkQKN x E y 3 Oi(x From (4) and (5) we have y). where t = [y/x]z. If B = P(z) for some list z (maybe not distinct). n i p = Oiq (Lemma 1. every xi is replaced with yi. If B = B1 @ Bz for a propositional connective 8 and by the induction hypothesis.I).

(8) which follows from 2. Vz(C G [Y/x]C) 3 v z c = Vz[y/x]C. If B = I z C . by Lemma 2.10(xxvii).6. then Eo kqH A.10(xi). follows from (6) and (7) by transitivity and v-introduction.6. we also have (6) by the induction hypothesis. The reader can check that in all cases the argument is based only on intuitionistic logic.3 If A E Sub(Eo).2. Again we prove by induction.6. Finally x = y 3 Vz(C = [y/x]C) .174 CHAPTER 2.4 Let L be a n N-m. we may assume z @ x y (otherwise. Lemma 2.p.14. after renaming z .10(xxviii). instead of (7) we use Vz(C = [y/x]C) 3. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC If B = VzC. Proof Very similar to 2. T h e n for any N-modal formula A with equality that does not contain Q If L i s conically expressive.14. Then by V-introduction we deduce (in the same theory) and hence by Lemma 2. . 3 z C = 3z[y/x]C. w P r o p o s i t i o n 2.14. then . B and [y/x]Bchange t o equivalent congruent formulas).14. Then.1.2 has an intuitionistic version: Lemma 2.

generalisation and O-introduction.14.8.£ 2 . By 2. where B E Sub(EN). so (10) holds for any B E I$ . ADDING EQUALITY 175 Proof First note that EN is a set of axioms for L= above L (they are all L=theorems and the usual axioms follow from EN). . suppose L= t A. T r T ) (10) is obviously L-provable. In fact.3 and generalisation. So by the deduction theorem 2. AQ is again proved by replacing redundant predicate letters with T.p.2. L' t A @ Oo0EN t L Replacing '=' with Q does not affect the L-inference (more precisely. Eventually which completes the proof.4.2. The implication &. The observation about conical expressiveness follows from Lemma 2.4.14. Let S be a The other way round. AQ.14. since S distributes over propositional connectives and quantifiers. Then we can argue by induction. the equivalence r F L A iff I'QtL AQ is checked by induction).y) 3. Then Om&$ t L formula substitution replacing every atomic formula P ( x ) with T for any P # Q that does not occur in A.14. Hence by Lemma 2. All formulas from O m S u b ( & ~ ) of the form o .& E L AQ =+ £ 2 t ~ . AQ Proof Follows the same lines as 2.5 Let L be an s. W Proposition 2. S(Q(x. ~ B . Thus A.7. ) L= k A e O m S u b ( E ~k L A.A @ &$ t L e £2 tL AQ.3.8.1. so and thus am&?F L AQ =+ L= k A. Then for any A E IF= without occurrences of Q L= t. P ( x ) = P(y)) = (x = y 3. are so they are QKN-provable in Om&Nby 2.8. We claim that Om&$ E L B =+ 0 " E j E L SB.14. which is equivalent to &$ t L AQ.

. so by 2. . We show by induction that .14.z. . z. For a predicate formula A.y) := &1np(x. . B. To show this. .. By the induction hypothesis... . for P E PLn and variables x. all zjs are different and x.]P(z).indiscernibility..10(ii) we obtain We also have In fact. . . . . BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC In many cases the equality-expansion is conservative.).z. Bm := [yl. .176 CHAPTER 2.zn). For the induction step we again consider A := [ X I . = P(y1.6. From ( I ) .+l. y we put where of course. Lemma 2. for logics without equality we define a weak analogue of equality . and (2) is a conjunct in the latter formula. .6. . y) 1 P occurs in A). . . b'zm+l-introduction and 2. y # zj. (2) by transitivity it follows that . ..6.y. 1 zm]P(z). 1yrn/z17. .. . Namely. . .6 For P E PLn Proof Almost the same as for 2.10(xxv). i=l for a list of new variables z = (zl.16(iv). .. put InA(x.xm/zl.

then for any A E I F Proof We have to prove the corresponding substitution instances of the 'axioms' from (o*)E? L..by A-. t ) Y again by standard arguments with A and 'd. . y) x) y) x) ing V z B > B. which implies I n p ( x . Thus V x I n A ( x . in the modal case we may apply Lemma 2. then for any N-modal predicate formula A that does not contain Q (2) If L is an s.I n ~ ( x .and V-introduction. X t ) Thus L t.p.2. Y .7. E L I n ~ ( y . Then L t.v ( U * ~ n A (y). we have [x/zj]P(z) [t/zj]P(z). 0 " . In the modal case this implies L I. by apply.and V-introduction. - - (3) Transitivity of Q. A.Y ) .p. I ~ P ( t ) ..l. y.14. Since G is transitive in H . and hence Since x . ) t-L O * I ~ A ( tX . by the deduction theorem. t are fixed in this proof. > I n ~ ( y .CI*In'4(y. So it remains to generalise over y) x.O*InA( x .10 for 0*: O * I ~ A (y). in ( I ) Reflexivity of Q. ADDING EQUALITY 177 Lemma 2. V x O * l n ~ ( x ) x .14. x y ) by the deduction theorem and v-introduction.F L I n p ( x .and Vz) introduction.7 ( I ) If L is a conically expressive N-m. hence I n p ( x .x ) and next I n ~ ( x . by the monotonicity of O*. x ) by A. (2) Symmetry of Q.y) > O*InA(x. A u * I n ~ ( t ).1. ) in the intuitionistic case. t-L hence I n p ( %y) I-L I n p ( y . in the modal case . By H we have - [ ~ l z j l P ( z ) [ ~ l z j l P ( z ) [ ~ l z j l P ( z ) [xlzjlP(z).. 3 ~ * I ~ At ( )x . We have [ x / z j ] P ( z ) [ x / z j ] P ( z by H .

. O*InA(xn.10 T.. x. Problem 2. Shimura and N.-Y. (cf.y. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC ( 4 ) VXVY(Q(X.14.p.y ) := 'v'z(P(x. L..A E > A by the deduction ~ theorem. By applying the substitution [O*InA(x.8 L= is a conservative extension of L.. L= t A implies O * E t L ~ A assume that Q does not occur in A.) / Q ( x . y)/Q( 3 A. Then in the modal case (by 2.A by Lemma 2.Y)I&? . (5) i v ( i=l( u * ) I n ~ ( xyi). and y [ I n A ( xy ) / Q ( x .x .4) and F L A in the intuitionistic case (by 2. L? Remark 2.e.z ) ) .1.). Fix a binary predicate letter P . ~ * I ~ A ( x I. 0*&2 12 or respectively.14.. . Then for any L E S. and for any r 5 IF= consisting of pure equality formulas with only positive occurrences of '='. Proof Let A be a formula without equality of the corresponding kind and = A. (L=)" = L for any superintuitionistic predicate logic L and for any conically expressive m. Hence L F A > A and respectively L t..y)F L P ( x ) yl). 3.3.X~=. Y) Y By 1.).. Therefore L I. y = ( y .5).. 3 'JiQ(x.178 CHAPTER 2. . ) ) . .14. L A[I~A(x. > O i O * I n ~ ( x . and let E>(x.y)] in the intuitionistic case. Now we can apply the deduction theorem and v-introduction..D*p > OiO*p. we obtain . 1993.14. - P(Y) (XI. i.1.14. ~ hence P(Y) by the reflexivity of O*.hence L tVx'v'y(O*In~(x. Suzuki obtained the following stronger result for the superintuitionistic case.14.14. Theorem 2. .y)] in the modal case.46 L I.9 Does Theorem 2.8 hold for an arbitrary m. Theorem 31).. [Shimura and Suzuki. y) y)) by substitution and V-introduction. P ( x ) " for P E P L n n M F ~ .7. ) z G P ( y .p.

L 5 . Let us now consider some specific axioms of equality. ADDING EQUALITY 179 Now recall a well-known definition from recursion theory [Rogers. since for a formula A without Q. 2. Definition 2. or C E . .A i f f L I .14. However. similarly for S E .4).5. Theorem 2.14. . L'~ is is not always conservative over L. AQ I I by 2. As we do not substitute formulas for '=' in predicate logics with equality. see Section 2. then L = .14.13 A logic (with equality) L is said to have stable (respec- tively. Lemma 2. Y we say that X is m-reducible to Y (notation X 5 . the corresponding function f sends every formula without equality to itself (and all other words to I.14.14.1. .2.X.12 If L is an s. the following lemma is an easy consequence of the deduction theorem.14.Y andY5. closed) equality i f it contains the corresponding formula ( S E . L=. L= 5 . L . decidable.Y)ifX<.X is m-equivalent to Y (notation: " Xr.1.8). Obviously.14. for an N-m.p.D E > A for a superintuitionistic logic with equality L and a formula A. 19871.14 (1) L + D E I . D E .p. Y ) i f there exists a recursive function f : Am -+ A such that X = f . we define where CEi denotes C E for Oi.14. since L= is conservative over L (2. the corresponding example will be given later on. let Similarly. L= C L=S L=d. If a formula A contains Q.4.11 For sets of words (in a finite alphabet A ) X. Proof L= t A iff L I. L=. So the reducing function sends every formula A without Q to A ( o * ) £ ~ 3 AQ and every nonformula to I.l [ Y ] .E.p. For a superintuitionistic predicate logic L (without equality)./ \ ( o " ) E ~ .. Soon we will show that Q H = ~ conservative over QH. L. Definition 2.say). or a conically expressive m. first replace Q with another binary predicate letter that does not occur in A.

15(I)(iv)). 19721731for the case of intermediate logics. For a set of formulas r let Obviously r(A) is equivalent (in Q H or in Q K N ) to a substitution instance of A (cf. then T(A) = r ( B ) .15 Propositional parts Let us explicitly describe the construction of the propositional part L. a propositional formula A is a substitution instance of r(A). r ( A ) E H). Proposition 2. cf.2 + + Proof By induction over a proof of A in QKN (or in Q H ) we show that r ( A ) E K N (resp.15. where L is a n > Q T this can be simplified: similarly. QS4. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC A i= l N CEi F A iff^ k. r(A) = (B > B) for predicate axioms). ( ~ ( r ) )for any r C I F (or I? C M F N ) . = H r ( L ) for a predicate logic L without equality (respectively.3 n(Sub(r)) = S u b . On the other hand. we can consider a bijection Then for any formula A. Lemma 2. denotes closure under propositional substitutions (of the corresponding type). = K N r ( L ) or L. It is easily checked that r ( A ) E K N if A is a substitution instance of a Q K N . let r ( A ) be the result of replacing each atomic subformula of the form P(x) with r o ( P ) and erasing all occurrences of quantifiers.CISk N N-modal logic with equality.1 L. . N-modal or superintuitionistic). Section 1. for a predicate logic L without equality. [Ono. If A is obtained by (MP) or (necessitation).6. cf. Thus we obtain Proposition 2.1. 2. If A = VxB. Lemma 2.axiom (for example.15. for L > QK4.180 (2) L + CHAPTER 2. then r(A) is also obtained by the same rule. where Sub.15. For a I-modal logic L i=1 CEi > A for some k E w . Since all the sets PLn are countable.

rr = H ~ ( r ) . for some formulas A.p. containing A also contains QA. Thus n(A) E (L.] Let A E (L + r).1. It is easily proved that (by induction on B). = L. Proposition 2. Then while r ( A . QTA k A implies Q S 4 Q ~ AT ( ~ ~ ) .11. PROPOSITIONAL PARTS 181 Proof Since every substitution is a composition of simple substitutions. since every s. Q(A +I?) is the smallest s. The converse inclusion is obvious by Proposition 2.(n(r)) (by Lemma 2. E Sub(r).1. + + (2) By 2. (QKN I = K N ~ ( r ) (.Q H r). (2) For a propositional S4-logic A.1. These two logics coincide.15. we can consider only simple substitutions.5 The quantified version of a modal (respectively. while Q A l? is the smallest s. superintuitionistic) propositional logic A is: QA := Q K N L e m m a 2.11.3).AT.p. QA := Q H + A). + + + + + + P r o o f [Modal case. Thus T . On the other hand.15. I n particular. +n(r)). ) E Sub. every propositional formula can be presented as n(C) for some predicate formula C.15.15.4 (L I?).15. ? ) . hence QA t.By the deduction theorem. containing A r . n ( r ) for a modal (or superintuitionistic) logic L + r . H Definition 2. (1) Consider the intuitionistic case.p.1. containing QA U r .6 (1) For any propositional logic A and a set of propositional formulas I?. T(QA) Proof > QTA.2. G + ( T ~ ) k AT. +A (respectively.15.

6.15. = A iff Q A c L c Q A + A U 1 .4 since n(A) C A. because they are dummy in n(A). recall that for any predicate logic L and for any predicate logic L with equality.15.182 CHAPTER 2. we can restore all occurrences of quantifiers from A.15. . Proof (QA + AUi).15.e. Then A E QKN AUi n(A) (in the modal case) or A E Q H AUl n(A) (in the intuitionistic case). Proof Follows readily from Proposition 2. = A).11 Let L be a predicate logic without equality. we use the formula AUl = Vx'dy(P(x) > P ( y ) ) from Section 2. given n(A).10. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Remark 2.9 For any modal or superintuitionistic propositional logic A.10 Let A be a predicate formula without e6uality. let AT be the result of replacing each occurrence of (x = y ) in A with T. To describe the greatest predicate extensions of propositional logics. Next. P r o p o s i t i o n 2. Q A is a predicate extension of A.8 30 A predicate logic L is called a predicate extension of a propositional logic A if L is called a conservative extension of A (i. and let A be a propositional logic of the corresponding kind. In fact. rn + + 30Cf. Q A is the weakest predicate extension of A. = A then L C Q A AUl.4 since On the other hand. rn Obviously. modal or superintuitionistic. can be replaced with VP(X). For example. QH= AUl). = A by Proposition 2.15. which is equivalent t o P ( x ) in Q K N AUl. if L.15. Definition 2. Then L . every occurrence of no(P) in n(A) coming from some P ( x ) in A.15. Then (A = AT) € ( Q K E AUl) (respectively.2Grz.15. A E L implies n(A) E L. + + + + P r o o f First. + + Lemma 2.7 We do not know if the equality T ( Q ~ = QTA holds for any ) propositional S4-logic. 19731. = A and A E Q A AUl by Lemma 2. For a formula A with equality. this is unknown for A = S4. if L. [Ono. + P r o p o s i t i o n 2.

Proof ( I ) ( a ) =+-(b). (2) Every modal propositional logic which does not contain S 5 . + (b) QH(=) + AUl L or QKE) AUl L (for the superintuitionistic or the modal case. Proof By Proposition 2.10. has uncountably many predicate extensions. QH + q V ~q and Let us also mention the following result on the number of predicate extensions. (b) + ( a ) . + + + + + + 31 [Suzuki. (c) L = QA(') AUl for a propositional logic A (superintuitionistic or modal. PROPOSITIONAL PARTS Therefore Q A logic A. T h e o r e m 2.2. On the other hand. A E Q H AUl n(A) or A E Q K N AU1 n(A). Now let us give another description of the greatest predicate extensions.15. these conditions imply + (d) for any predicate formula A (in the language of L ) there exists a propositional formula A' such that L + A = L + A'. (11) If L is a logic without equality.12 The greatest intermediate predicate extension of an intermediate propositional logic A is (QA + AUl) n QCL = QA + AUl v q v ~ = q . L AUl = L since n(AU1) = (no(P) > no(P)) E H (or KN).15. respectively).13~' (1) Every nonclassical superintuitionistic propositional logic has uncountably many predicate extensions. Moreover.15.15.1. P r o p o s i t i o n 2. n(A) E L A by Proposition 2. 19951.15. Then the following conditions are equivalent: (a) L + A = L + n(A) for any predicate formula A without equality. respectively). 183 + AUl is the greatest predicate extension of a propositional C o r o l l a r y 2. by Lemma 2. . all conditions (a)-(d) are equivalent.15.10. recall that Q C L CD E Q H + A U 1 v q v l q .1 (2).14 (I) Let L be a predicate logic (of any kind).

8 for all superintuitionistic logics and for 1-modal logics above QK4. we take A' = AT).15 Let L and L' be predicate logics containing AUl such that L is without equality and L' is with equality. the following formula is a theorem of L: Proof 32 for some k 2 0 and formulas A1. (3) + (1). L = QH' 3 x 3 (x # y AVz(z = x V z = y)).. .15.. (11) (d) + (a). By Proposition 2. . + + We say that L is a predicate logic with degenerate predicates if L satisfies the condition (I)(d) from Proposition 2. Since r((Vx(x = x ) ~ = T and ) = we 7r(([x/z]A. ~ + + It is clear how to describe the propositional fragments for these logics with equality. Thus. (b) + (a).184 CHAPTER 2. Let L + A = L + A' for a propositional formula A'. If (L')' = (L')' = L then L= C L'. x(A) E (L + A).14.Ak E MFG. On the other hand. L e m m a 2. (b) 3 (c).g.. Q H AUl and Q K N AUl are the weakest logics with degenerate predicates. (2) + (3). (1) 3 (2).)~) 7r(([y/z]A.e. Here we give a slightly simpler proof that fits for any modal predicate language. We can replace any A from L with A' because (b) implies (d).because (A = AT) E L' for any formula with equality A (recall that AT is a formula without equality). BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC (a) =+ (d). Then the following conditions are equivalent: (1) L:. + 7r(A) C L + 7r(A). If L is a logic with equality.)~). H h he implication (3) =+ (2) is proved in Proposition 2. A E L. obtain r ( A ) E L. Let A be a propositional formula.15.. A E L=.14. = L. On the other hand. . i. Then its substitution instance BT belongs to L and ~ ( B T €) L. and L= = L' . Then A' E (L + A). there AUl and satisfying (I)(d). = L.14. exist logics with equality incomparable with QH' e.15. . Then by the deduction theorem.

14 and Lemma 2.) Let L.15.= (L=S).16 Semantics from an abstract viewpoint Consider a language with the set of well-formed formulas a . and a set of its subsets A 2 closed under arbitrary intersections. Then and we can apply Corollary 2. The logic &A= AU1 is a maximal predicate extension (with equality) of a propositional logic A.A. SEMANTICS FROM AN ABSTRACT VIEWPOINT 185 Corollary 2. A a propositional logic.15. in which U is a class (whose elements are called 24-frames). L C QA + AUl.15. Nevertheless. Elements of A are called ' A-logics. C (&A= + AUI). (&A= 5L QA= + AU1 + AUl). The modal case is analogous. later on we will show that L. Proof = (L'").15.2. = A. Indeed. = A. and similarly for the modal case. k). (Intuitionistic case. Proof &A= implies (&A=). Corollary 2. = L. We define a semantics for the set A as a quadruple 9 = (a.. and (&A + AUl).16. Then (1) (L'). = (QA by Lemma Let L be a predicate logic with equality.17 Let L be a predicate logic without equality. for modal L. for any propositional logic A the greatest predicate extension with equality does not exist. by Proposition 2.U. Proposition 2. = A for the logic + + which is obviously incompatible with QA= + AUl. = + AUI).15 show that there exists a natural bijection between intermediate propositional logics and extensions of'the logics QH(') AUl (with or without equality). (2) (L').16. and I=is a binary relation between U and (called the validity relation) such that the set . If QA= c L QA= AUl c + then L. for a superintuitionistic L. Next. G L.. 2.15. = ( L = ~ ) .15. = A. = L. (QA + AUl).

BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC is a A-logic for any F E U. Lemma 2. and logics of the form Ls(F) are called simply 9-complete. Conversely. 19791.1 CS(r) is the smallest 9-complete logic containing I?. Then for any logic L.1). c If L is S1-complete then L = Csl (L) (by Lemma 2. Ls(F) is called the A-logic of the frame F (in 8 ) . 1973.16. [Chapter 5. Lsl ( F ) is 92-complete.21. . (L) is 92-complete. C s ( r ) is called the 9-completion of I?. This correspondence is derived from the relation != in the standard way.1. (2) S1 5 9 2 iff for any 91-frame F. it is called the A-logic of C .1.16. Here is a simple criterion of completeness: Lemma 2. One can recognise a particular case of Galois correspondence here. we obtain that for any class C C U. If F is a r-frame such that F !+A. complete logics. So is a closure operation on 2'. and hence L = Cs.16.1). As stated in [Ono. We can compare different semantics for the same set of logics. L is complete iff Cs(L) = L. 1 c c ~ 2 (L) cc~l (L). Theorem 2. we say that F separates A from a set I?.3 (1) 91 5 S2 ifl every S1-complete logic is S2-complete. (L) Csl (L) for any L E A. Thus r ks A means that A is valid in every I?-frame. the set Ls(C) = n{La(F) I F E C) is also a A-logic. Since A is intersection closed. Hence we have and the closed sets of formulas are just the S- Lemma 2. and thus Cs. Sometimes we write F E 9 instead of F E U. Theorem 191[Birkhoff.16. A semantics 9 gives rise to the logical consequence relation (between r C @ and A E a): I? ks A iff Q F E U (I? C Ls(F) + A E Ls(F)). by 2. cf. Then Cs.16. We say that F is a r-frame (in 9) if I? Ls(F). Proof In fact.(L) Csl(L) by Lemma 2. Logics of this kind are called Scomplete. assume that 91-completeness implies Sz-completeness.L) is separated from L by a frame in 9.2 A logic L is complete in a semantics S'iff every formula A E (@. Proof (1) Suppose 9 5 S2. A semantics S1 is reducible to S2 (notation: S1 5 82) iff Cs.16.16. completeness does not always imply simple completeness. (L) which implies 92-completeness of A (again by Lemma 2.186 CHAPTER 2.

16. some counterexamples will be given later on.5 S1 z: S2 iff S1-completeness is equivalent to S2-completeness. i.1 6.7 S1 C S2 implies S1 5 92. We do not usually distinguish between simply equivalent semantics.7.16.A.16.e. reducibility is equivalent to simple reducibility.e. so their equivalence implies simple equivalence.16. Obvious. we say that S1 is weaker than S2 (notation: S1 4 S 2 ) if Sl 5 S2 but not S2 3 S1. we have that Lsl(F) = L$. in which U = A (i. .16. Definition 2.(*F) for some class QF. i. 'frames' are just logics) and L b A iff A E L. from this viewpoint a semantics 9 = (a. To prove 'if' consider an arbitrary S1-complete logic If each Lsl (F) is 92-complete. L e m m a 2. Then showing that A is 92-complete.6 A semantics S1 is simply reducible to S2 (notation: S1 S2) if simple S1-completeness implies simple Sa-completeness. By Lemma 2. C Semantics 91 and 9 2 are called simply equivalent (notation: S1 E S 2 ) if S1 G S2 and S2 C S1.4). LT(L) = L). Lemma 2.9 We say that a semantics 6 has the collection property (CP) if every S-complete consistent logic is simply 9-complete.2. Definition 2.8 For any set of logics A there exists a 'trivial semantics' T.16.e. SEMANTICS FROM AN ABSTRACT VIEWPOINT (2) 'Only if' is an immediate consequence of (i) and Lemma 2.1. since complete logics are intersections of simply complete H E x a m p l e 2. I=) can be identified with the corresponding set of simply complete logics {Ls(F) I F E 2. for semantics with the (CP). Definition 2.3 readily implies: L e m m a Semantics S1 and S2 are called equivalent (S1 = 92) if S1 5 S2 and S2 3 S1.16.U. Proof ones. But in general equivalent semantics may be not simply equivalent.

Algebraic semantics is simply equivalent to trivial.17.13 I S admits equality and an N-m. BASIC PREDICATE LOGIC Example 2. f then L' is conservative over L.p. Definition 2. then for any A E M F N . Then Put C1 := {Fl I F E C). Similarly in the intuitionistic case we use the notations IL'(F). with the same frames and validity. c Proposition 2. Proof Almost obvious.m.modal or intuitionistic. I F != A} we use the notation M L = ( F ) rather than Ls(F). Remark 2. L is S-complete.16. with or without equality. For superintuitionistic propositional logics we have the following diagram: finite 4 Kripke 4 topological 5 algebraic S trivial.p. We will encounter such a situation in Chapter 5.1.e. we call So-complete logics 'Scomplete'. with the usual definition of validity. with the same frames as 9 (and So).l. since every logic is algebraically complete.16. M L ( F ) refers to semantics without equality. for {A E MF.11 However it may happen that there exists a semantics for logics without equality Sf. We say that S admits equality if there exists a semantics S1 for N-m.12 Let S be a semantics for N-m.10 In modal propositional logic we have semantics with the (CP): finite 4 Kripke 4 topological 4 algebraic S trivial. whether topological semantics is trivial.16. So LSo ( F ) = Lg(F)O. So we alter the notation Ls(F) respectively.p.1. but with a slightly different notion of validity. The question.p.188 CHAPTER 2. L = ML(C) for a class of Sframes C and M L ( F ) = MLF(Fl)O for any F E C. by the Lindenbaum theorem. In these cases we define M L ( F ) (or IL(F)) as Ls(F) and then prove that Sf = So. Suppose L is N-modal. is Kuznetsov's problem mentioned in Section 1. i. Loosely speaking. IL(F). 'Finite semantics' consists of all finite Kripke frames. For example.16. Every semantics 9 for logics with equality generates a semantics So for the same kind of logics without equality. Recall that in this book we consider four types of predicate logics . .= such that 9 9. So in this semantics simple completeness means tabularity and completeness means the f. if F is a frame in a semantics S for N-modal predicate logics with equality.

But completeness always transfers in the other direction: Proposition 2.l. Corollary 2.p. ML'(C1) is conservative over L = ML(C). then L is also %-complete. P r o o f Consider the modal case only. T(QS4 r T ) YA. L = (L=)O = ML'(C)O.e.16.(=) extending QS4(=). then L is also 9-complete.14. or an s.16. By assumption QH r is %I-complete. but A Lw(F).16 Let M be a semantics for m. Proposition 2.hence rT LM(F).l. i. (=). Q S 4 rT W + e + + + As we shall see in Volume 2.16.11..16.11. Consequently VAT. Suppose L= = ML'(C) for a class of Sframes C.2.16.p.16.17 Every %I-complete s.l. we have LM(F) _> QS4 r T .p. Since M is a semantics for modal logics above QS4. so there exists an Mframe F such that I? E L%(F). 9 a semantics for the corresponding logics with equality. SEMANTICS FROM A N ABSTRACT VIEWPOINT 189 Thus ML=(C1)O = L.p. Since ML'(C1) is a logic with equality containing L. Then by conservativity. Proof By 2.8. If L= is conservative over L and 9-complete. Proposition 2. the smallest modal counterpart of an %complete logic may be M-incomplete. Definition 2.1 6.14 Let L be an m. Then we define its intuitionistic version. ML'(C)O = ML(C). rn Finally let us show the existence of modal counterparts using completeness.15 If L is an s.p.16.1. AT !$ LM(F).1. the semantics % for s.e.14 and 2.p. i.16. Thus L is Scomplete. L w ( F ) = TLM(F).p. then TL is %I-complete. and obviously.1.(=) has a modal counterpart: P r o o f The inclusion 2 is proved in Lemma 2.1. with the same frames as M such that for any M-I-frame F. For the converse suppose Q H + I' YA. or a conically expressive m. Suppose L = LM(C)for a class of M-frames C. and L= is complete in a semantics 9. Then . it follows that L= C ML'(C1) and thus L= is also conservative over L. H Now let us prove a simple result on correlation between completeness of L and L= .18 If L Proof > QS~(') is M-complete. By Definition 2.

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Part I1 Semantics .

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A theory is an extension of some basic calculus by additional axioms (and perhaps inference rules) postulating specific properties of objects being studied. However in the nonclassical area it is essential to distinguish between logics and theories. . and thus alternative types of semantics (such as sheaves. and this book is aimed at organising some part of it. without any obvious preference between them. forcing.l To describe more plausible semantics we need to define notions of a model and of the truth in a model that could tell us 'how the logic works'. (GCT2) Every consistent classical theory has a model. GCT has no direct analogues. For example. Such translations can be viewed a s semantics and can be very illuminating. but of course such a semantics does not explain anything. a typical example is Heyting arithmetic. which formalises the intuitionistic viewpoint on natural numbers. and incompleteness phenomena enable us t o consider various semantics. this approach allows for a degenerate semantics. GGdel7scompleteness theorem: discussion First let us explain why GCT is not always transferred to nonclassical logics. Nonclassical model theory is still rather miscellaneous. Actually there exist two forms of Godel's theorem: (GCTl) A formula A is a theorem of classical predicate calculus iff A is valid in any domain. polyadic algebras) are of less importance in the classical case. In this case the completeness theorem is a triviality. See [Gabbay. Chapter 11. A logic is a theory whose theorems may be considered as 'logical laws' common for a certain class of theories and not depending on specific 'application domains'. These two statements are more or less equivalent: (GCTl) is equivalent to (GCT2) for finitely axiomatisable theories. The situation in nonclassical first-order logic is quite different. So we begin this part with a brief survey of important results in the area and some references for further reading. Due to Godel's completeness theorem (GCT). where 'frames' are just logics and L I= A iff L k A. 1996. which is very formal and does not help understand the meaning of language expressions.INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS SEMANTICS Introduction: What is semantics? In Chapter 2 we proposed a general approach to semantics. We can treat logical laws as 'Of course in general we may have a new logic and several syntactical translations into well-known logics. The book does not cover all the semantics in equal proportion. This is not a serious problem for classical first-order logic: in this case model theory can be developed within the standard semantics based on the well-known Tarski truth definition. the standard semantics works properly.

[Dragalin. Equivalently. These are completeness theorems of the following form: (GCTlt) a formula A is a theorem of a logic L iff A is L-valid. w) k A for any A E S. such that formulas from L are valid in F. In fact. Some results similar t o (GCT2) can be proved for nonclassical theories. 19761. Moreover. analogues of domains are frames (or model structures). Analogous claims are true for superintuitionistic theories considered as pairs of sets of formulas. because we require logics to be substitution-closed. whereas A is not.e. in the standard classical semantics 'frames' are just sets. and define a logic just as a substitutionclosed theory. 3 ~ h i set depends also on the language. In classical logic this is validity in a domain. 19881. So for a nonclassical logic L. and (GCTl) is a property of classical logic. a formula is valid in a frame iff it is true in every model over this frame. we also need 'substitutioninvariant' notions of validity. 2 0 f course this definition is rather conventional. and the notion of validity is well known. and thus the set L(F) of all formulas valid in a frame F is also a theory. s . We say that a class of frames C generates a semantics S(C) = {L(F) I F E C). for which (GCTl') may be true. where formulas are constructed. there may be many kinds of 'frames' and 'validity'.3 The difference between models and frames is the following substitution property implying that L(F) is a logic: (SP) The set of all formulas valid in a frame F is substitution closed. However finding nonclassical analogues of (GCTl) is more problematic. For example. So (GCT1) means that the classical predicate logic is complete in this semantics. it is well known that every consistent first-order normal modal theory S is satisfied in some Kripke model. Generally speaking. It is usually required that the set of all formulas true in a model is a theory. i. there exists a Kripke model M and a possible world w E M such that (M. from which we can obtain models of theories based on A if we specify interpretations of basic predicates. A logic L is called complete in S(C) iff for every formula A @ L there exists a frame IF E C. The main problem is in finding 'reasonable' notions of validity. In a general case. cf. M can be chosen uniformly for all consistent theories [Gabbay. a logic is complete iff it can be presented as an intersection of logics of the form L(F) for some frames F. and there exist examples of 'logics' which are not substitution-closed.2 So we can say that (GCT2) is a property of classical theories.194 INTRODUCTION: W H A T IS SEMANTICS schemata for producing theorems.

consider any formula A valid in all finite domains. This argument seems to be just a trick with definitions. but nonprovable respectively in QH' and in QS4'. This is due to the formulas x D E = QxQy (x = y V ~ ( = y)) and (decidable equality principle) (closed equality principle) C E = QxQy ( O ( x = y) > x = y) which are valid in all Kripke frames. 19501. In fact. Note that in the classical case these two approaches are equivalent: every 'non-normal' model. But their minimal equality extensions (QS4'. i. v (uRv J Du Dv). in which QS4=. 19731 and then in [ ~ r a ~ a l i19881. R. such a frame is a triple IF = (W. QH') are incomplete if the symbol '=' is interpreted in every domain just as the identity. Then we come to the semantics KE of Kripke frames with equality (KFEs). as an equivalence relation in D. and incompleteness is very frequent. in which equality is an arbitrary equivalence relation can be 'normalised' by identifying equal elements. Recall that X: is generated by predicate Kripke frames. R) is a propositional Kripke frame. The logics Q S 4 and Q H are known to be K-complete. so that its elementary theory does not change. a family of non-empty sets indexed by possible worlds (Dw)wEW. Incompleteness already appears for logics extending the classical predicate logic QCL. because the set of all finitely valid formulas is not recursively axiomatisable [Trachtenbrot. n. D is a system of 'expanding individual domains'. For a Kripke frame with equality a similar construction is possible: one can factorise every individual domain through the corresponding equivalence . so KE is stronger than K. by the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem).INTRODUCTION: W H A T IS SEMANTICS Examples of incompleteness in first-order logic 195 In Chapter 1 we gave a picture of semantics in nonclassical propositional logic and pointed out some rather strong completeness results. QH= become complete.e.. But in nonclassical logic there exist more natural examples of incompleteness. D ) . such that Qu. in which (W. But we can also interpret equality in a world w in another natural way. But in first-order logic the situation becomes worse: there are very few completeness theorems known. who proved that the intermediate logic of the strong Markov principle QHE =Q H +~ ~ x P ( > 3)x l l P ( x ) x is incomplete in the standard Kripke semantics (K). The logic QCL+A is incomplete. but refutable in some infinite domain (and thus refutable in any infinite domain. The latter observation and the definition of KE for the intuitionistic case first appeared in [Dragalin. The first example of this kind was discovered by H. 19731.Ono [Ono.

it happens to be stronger than K also for logics without equality. or counterpart) relation between individuals. Generalisations can be done at least in two directions. R) together with a system of individual domains (Dw)wEW and transition maps puv : Du ---+ D. The first direction leads to the algebraic semantics A&. In the intuitionistic case a frame in A& is a Heyting-valued set [Fourman and Scott. Shehtman & D. and the proof is easily transferred to KE. and further to the semantics of Kripke bundles (KB). On the other hand. v. it can be defined as a propositional Kripke frame (W. The neighbourhood (or topological) semantics I& is a particular case of A&. Skvortsov) is presented by the intermediate logic of 'the weak excluded middle' with constant domains: QHJD =Q H + ~p V lip + b'x(P(x) V q) 3 (b'xP(x) V q). This is a set of 'individuals'. involving only algebras of topological spaces (or algebras of propositional neighbourhood frames for the modal case). are replaced with transition relations puv 2 D. This can be seen again by analysing Ono's counterexample Q H E . for every R-related pair u. I& are not much investigated and seem to be rather strong. So every KFE corresponds t o a Kripke sheaf with the same modal logic. satisfying the natural transitivity condition: and such that puu is the identity map for every R-reflexive u.196 INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS SEMANTICS relation. and in a formal . A Kripke bundle can be defined - . We do not know if there exist A&-incomplete logics. Note that predicate Kripke frames correspond to those Kripke sheaves in which all transition maps are inclusions. . in which every individual has a 'measure of existence' (an element of some Heyting algebra) and every pair of individuals has a 'measure of equality'. Algebraic and Kripke-type semantics The semantics K& also is inadequate in many cases. Both semantics A&. but KE-incomplete. 19791. Ghilardi and V. Another direction leads from K& to the semantics of Kripke quasi-sheaves (KQ). collected in the unified accessibility (or inheritance. 19731. D. In Kripke bundles transition maps p : D. The idea of counterparts first appeared in [ ~ e w i s 19681. in particular for quantified versions of all intermediate propositional logics of finite depths. Although the semantics K& was introduced for dealing with equality. setting . Every individual has an inheritor (not necessarily unique) in any accessible world. Thus we obtain a Kripke sheaf. For the modal case Heyting algebras are replaced by modal algebras. Another counterexample (found independently by S. K-incompleteness of these logics was proved by H. Ono in [Ono. x D.in [Shehtman and Skvortsov. 19901. we do not know simple and natural examples of logics that are A&-complete. So one can try to generalise K& in a 'reasonable way' .

Kripke quasi-sheaves are a subclass of Kripke bundles. in which this is not allowed. In hyperdoctrine semantics every logic is complete.. As we know. Then Kripke sheaves correspond exactly to etale maps. which 'frames' are set-valued functors (or presheaves over categories). 19581. One may argue that after such a modification the notion of frame becomes almost useless and can be replaced by the notion of model. None the less. let us recall the two kinds of substitutions considered in Chapter 2: a strict substitution does not add new parameters to atomic formulas. There are several other options. 19881. onto a frame of possible worlds (W. a shift adds a certain fixed list of new parameters to every atomic formula. Recall that a simple substitution instance Ak of a formula A is obtained by replacing every atom PC(x1. . the 'straightforward' notion of validity has to be changed. a very simple counterexample shows that the (intuitionistic) validity of p V l p does not necessarily imply the validity of P(x) V -IP(x) (cf. Then we get a first-order version of general propositional frames mentioned above..e. So we introduce strong validity in a frame: a formula is said to be strongly valid iff all its substitution instances are valid (in the original sense).. by adding the existence predicate [Fine. every substitution is a composition of some strict and some . and thus every modal or superintuitionistic first-order logic is complete.g. and thus not suitable for large-scale applications.~ . Chapter 5). Also we will discuss the approaches where the basic language is modified. similarly to the well-known fact in sheaf theory [Godement. For. R). Further generalisations of K B are the functor semantics (FS). 19781or nonstandard substitutions [Ghilardi and Meloni. To avoid this. L(M) contains a formula A iff all substitution instances of A are true in M . 19781. . Makkai and Reyes.INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS SEMANTICS 197 p) as a pmorphism from a (propositional) frame of individuals (D+. various kinds of quantifiers [Garson.yk). .y1. In fact. i. . which will be considered later in this book (Volume 3). but this semantics is very abstract. Substitution property: discussion General Kripke-type semantics have some peculiarities: it turns out that in Kripke bundles (and even in Kripke quasi-sheaves) the above mentioned substitution property fails. . such as Kripke-Joyal-Reyes semantics [Goldblatt. . in the metaframe semantics.x. there is some advantage in dealing with Kripke bundles (or metaframes) rather than Kripke models.X. . For.) . In Kripke bundles an individual may have several inheritors even in its own possible world. where yl. This may help the reader to find his way through the landscape of first-order logic. xn by P ~ + ~ ( . In this semantics (GCT2) follows from (GCTl).yk are variables not occurring in A. Then the set L(F) of all formulas strongly valid in a frame IF is a logic (called the logic of I) F. and finally the hyperdoctrine semantics generalising both metaframe and algebraic semantics. 1988). .. 1984. in the same manner we can define a 'logic' L ( M ) of an arbitrary Kripke model M as the set of all the formulas 'strongly verifiable' in M . . e. 19951 or 'abstract realisability' [Dragalin.

So in general there is no way to describe the logic of M other than checking the truth of all possible substitution instances of formulas. One can prove that the set L-(P) of all formulas valid in a Kripke bundle P is closed under strict substitutions and variable renaming. Unlike that. the set of formulas true in a Kripke model M is usually not closed under strict substitutions. strong validity is nothing but validity with arbitrarily many extra parameters. but only the Ak are sufficient. In other words. in algebraic terms. this means describing equations in a subalgebra of the modal algebra of a Kripke frame with a given set of generators. I So to check strong validity of a formula A there is no need to verify all its substitution instances.198 INTRODUCTION: W H A T IS SEMANTICS simple substitution and a variable renaming. Therefore the logic of F can be derived from L-(IF) as follows: L(F) = {A V k 2 0 E L-(IF)). This may be very difficult even in the propositional case. Anyway the algebraic semantics A£ is the strongest semantics with (SP). but here again only simple substitutions are essential for strong validity. So the semantics of Kripke bundles is in some sense 'more constructive' than the semantics of Kripke models (not frames!). . that we know of. The Kripke-type semantics stronger than the Kripke bundle semantics Kt3 (such as the functor semantics 3s or the metaframe semantics M F ) do not have the (SP) either.

As pointed out in Chapter 1.1 Preliminary discussion There is no remembrance in former things.Chapter 3 Kripke semantics 3. is the domain of Mu. uEW . more exactly. R) as a collection of classical models parametrised by possible worlds: where every Mu is a classical L-structure. This is not yet enough for a formal definition. then M has the set of individuals Df = U D.1). at the world u the basic predicates are interpreted as in Mu. 1. natural logics turn out to be Kripke-complete.e. In the first-order case one can try to generalise the propositional Kripke semantics in a straightforward way.) In propositional modal logic Kripke semantics is widely used and is very helpful.3.. R) be a 1-modal propositional Kripke frame (Definition 1. Consider the first-order language C1with a single modal operator (Section 2. Let (W. because we have to answer the following two questions: What are the individuals in M? How are the quantifiers interpreted? The simplest way is to assume that every individual is an element of some Mu. neither shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come with those that shall come after. many of them have finite model property. We can define a 'first-order Kripke model' over (W. if D. and moreover.1).11. (Ecclesiastes. i. This makes Kripke semantics an efficient model-theoretic instrument in the propositional case.

if P(x) is interpreted as x i s a child. so that u k PC(a1.a.). D.a. but unfortunately.. Once the forcing relation is defined. Thus some individuals may exist in one world.x. . . . we have to consider only those v in R(u)..) VXCP I= 21 k~ X P u k o ~ iff iff iff iff Mu P.] cp for any a l l . we can define the forcing relation u cp between a world u and a D. For./xl. consider the formula which is a theorem of K (propositional) and is obviously true in all models defined above. it is natural to quantify only over existing individuals. . consider the model with two possible worlds u. u k [a/x]cp 3a E D.x. If FV(cp) = { X I .a.-sentence (cf. .2) cp by induction on the complexity of cp.200 CHAPTER 3. u k [a/x]cp V (uRv & cp is a D. R is the earlier-later relation. . and thus to check u 1OP(a). Robert Smith) u k OP(a) means: at the moment u it is true that always i n t h e f u t u r e Robert Smith w i l l use t h e l i f t only while he i s a child. . 2. thus Vxcp(x) must be true at the world u iff cp(a) is true for every a E D. In our example. we can say that a formula cp is true in M if u k v p for any u E W. To see what happens. Eventually. it may not be a modal predicate logic in the sense of Chapter 2. . consists of the individuals existing in the world u..-sentence + v v k cp) and with the standard clauses for the classical propositional connectives. Returning again to our example. This is an essential point: we cannot state u k P ( a ) for ax individual a that is not present in D.) (classically) Qa E D. . From this viewpoint. KRIPKE SEMANTICS We can say that D. but may not exist in another world. . . which have a in their domain. . . . . for a certain individual a (say. .. However take the substitution instance of a: This formula is not always true. . is the set of people inside the lift at the moment u.a. v and two individuals a.. Here W is the set of moments of time.. . . such that . b."(al. E D. then u k QxP(x) means that at the moment u (it is true that) only children a r e i n t h e l i f t . the latter is equivalent c to u k [al. Now what formulas are true in every Kripke model? This set can be axiomatised. . A more realistic example is given by a moving lift.

Figure 3. We can accept other definitions of semantics. u). C. since P ( a ) A P(b) is not a D. b). we can change (actually. Now there are several options t o choose: A.1. Then we have u O(P(a) A P(b)).3.1. In this Volume we accept OPTION A and keep the same notion of logic. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION R = {(u. v)). but u OP(a). P(a). Here is a more natural analogue of this example: if John and Mary always t a l k when they a r e i n t h e l i f t t o g e t h e r . we can try to amend the above definition. If we need semantics for the logics described in the previous chapter. B. Alternatively. see Fig. D.1. using different kinds of individuals and different interpretations of quantifiers. There is not so much to change in the original definition: it is enough to assume that . 3. v = {a. = {a). extend) the notion of a logic and try to axiomatise the 'logic' which is complete with respect to the above interpretation. (u. it may be not the case that John always t a l k s i n t h e l i f t . D.-sentence. u P(a) A P(b).

4 for atomic D. because obviously. as follows: u I 3xy iff 'dv E R(u) 3a E D. Wait for a later volume on this. we cannot guarantee the truth-preservation for all D.4.-sentences: The inductive definition of forcing from Section 1.' But it saves the logic. and we would like to keep the intuitionistic truthpreservation principle (TP) from Lemma 1. individuals are labelled and may be deemed t o have internal structure. For. In this case the truth-preservation holds for P(a) (because a exists only in u).sentences. this semantics is sound and complete for a few well-known logics. ~ ) ) Du = {a). . etc. KRIPKE SEMANTICS 'individuals are immortal'. t Figure 3.2. we can change the definition.Dana Scott writes in [Scott. and there were many philosophical debates on that subject. v Iy P(b). t 'Commonsense understanding of individuals is not easy to formalise. In this case (W. take a model based on a two-element chain: w = { ~ 7 ' ) 1 R = {(u. 19701.( u . Furthermore. and as we will see later on. e. ~ )( . To restore the truth-preservation. QS4. 'What is an individual? . Now. Of course this requirement contradicts the viewpoint expressed in the epigraph to this section. . but it fails for 3xP(x). R) is an S4-frame.u)..202 CHAPTER 3.3 can be extended t o the first-order case so that t u I 3xcp iff 3a E D. u I P(a).This is a good question!' .v . which in precise terms. (ED) is essential in semantics of intuitionistic logic.g. means the expanding domain condition: (ED) u R v + D u g D. u Ik [a/x]y. u IF [alxly. such as QK. Note that in labelled deductive systems. Dw= {b). without (ED).

since uRv. but is not a theorem of QK. + 2 ~ natural language a non-existing individual can still have a name in the world u. and some intuitionistic theorems may be false. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION 203 cf. The truth condition for V becomes u + Vxcp iff Va E D+ u [alzlcp. 3Quantification in natural language is a complicated subject.1. It turns out that the minimal logic QK is sound. we have t o add the unary existence predicate E to our language. not t o be discussed here. We can n say: S i r Isaac Newton discovered the laws of motion. As individuals may not exist in some worlds. This is so-called possibilist quantification. This is due to the formula found by Ruth Barcan and named after her. It normalises the situation. and thus u '& OVxP(x) since uRv. the semantics is not sound.3). 3. As before. as the following countermodel (of the type A ) shows (Fig. OPTION B is close to Kripke's treatment in [Kripke. and so u v VxP(x). Here we have u OP(a). Now instead of D.3. a Kripke model is a collection of classical structures. and v I P(b). t y y b being the only individual in v. 19631. and the logic QH becomes sound and complete in an appropriate semantics. Although axiomatising the minimal complete logic for the C1-semantics is simple. For example. using the name of a person given after the event had happened. F t which means that only 'immortal' individuals are considered as existing. but u I 3xP(x). the clause for the implication in the intuitionistic case. Note that anyway. a s in A l l students . We remark only that in most cases quantification refers to the actual world. this approach is controversial. it will be also considered later on (in Volume 2).. [alxlcp may also hold if a # D. at least in natural language. because quantification over all individuals is rather ambiguous.2 Note that u Option B can be realised within this approach as well.e.-sentences we evaluate D+-sentences (where arbitrary individuals are used as extra constants). over the whole set D+. we mention some of them. OPTION Cl (modal case). if we interpret Vxcp(x) as Vx(E(x) > (p(x)). VxOP(x). consider the formula P(x) > 3xP(x). On the other hand. y We will return to this subject in Volume 2 of our book. In the above model we have u I P(a). It is easily checked that the Barcan formula is true in every model.3 Still option C1 is possible and useful by formal reasons. the principle (ED) is quite natural for intuitionistic logic. Vv E R(u) u I [a/x]cp. but incomplete in this semantics. but quantifiers now range over all possible individuals i. Thus u I P(a) > 3xP(x). OPTION C includes many different approaches. But nevertheless without (ED). Another alternative is: u I 3 x 9 iff 3a E D.

In fact. . 1998]). In the latter case it is not quite clear whether the quantifier ranges over the whole D+ or not. together with transition maps (or relations) between them. . . but there also exists possibilist quantification. . nobody would identify a newly born baby and an old man or woman. a combination of B and Cl. 4 ~ o t that in the case C1 this is not required. . FURTHER OPTIONS. . . while Vy(VxP(x) > P(y)) is always true. cases A.. Now u (P is defined when p is a Df-sentence. OPTION C2. . a n ) for anyu. . B. . For example. [ ~ r o n ~ a u19981 studying these matters in Russian. This suggests we consider disjoint individual domains. Mike likes Socrates may be evaluated as true in the actual world. there is a difference in the definition of the truth in a model: + + ( ~ ( x l . z. . However. as in Any student has a supervisor. .^ The inductive definition of forcing is the same as in the. .3. KRIPKE SEMANTICS Figure 3. have supervisors. and basic predicates may be true for none existing individuals. .x. One may argue that one and the same individual cannot exist in different worlds. . that are partial functions from W to the set D+ (of 'individual images'). a n ) is put to be false when some of a l . for any a l . as mentioned in the Introduction to Part 11.) iff u cp(a1. . . M + This approach again breaks the logic: the formula VxP(x) > P(y) may be false.. This happens in natural languages as well. but u PF(al. This is actualzst quantification (see [Fitting and Mendelsohn. Another idea is to treat individuals as changing entities and consider indzvidual concepts. a n do not exist in the world u: only actual individuals are allowed to have atomic proper tie^.CHAPTER 3. a n . Cf. in D+ (not only in Du).

. . D). . by the induction hypothesis and 3. and u VX(P(X) Va (a(u) exists iff +u cp(a)). A n expanding system of domains over F is a system of domains D over W such that Vi E IN Vu. For an individual a E Df the set is called the measure of existence (or the extent). (sometimes denoted by D(u)) is called the individual domain of the world u.(u) for some (I: E I F .R N ) and an arbitrary predicate Kripke frame by F = (F.3 Let F Du C Du. Lemma 3. .. v E FTu..19. . we denote an arbitrary propositional Kripke frame by F = (W.an) is defined if al(u). the frame F (also denoted by F. then uRpwRiv for some w..2. .2.2 Let F = (W. the set D+ := Du u uEW is the total domain of F.. A predicate Kripke frame over F is a pair F = (F. Then we can apply induction on la1 In fact. .2. . C D. The set D. W By default. Then Proof By Lemma 1. R1. R1.an(u) exist.2.3. so D. PREDICATE KRIPKE FRAMES Now u P ( a l . i n which D is an expanding system of domains over F . Definition 3. In this case the logic grows much larger than QK and even becomes not recursively axiomatisable. . . We shall return to this topic in Volume 2.D) be a predicate Kripke frame. Since the system of domain D is expanding. is a family of non- Definition 3. .3. v E R. 3. if cr = pi and uR. = D.) is called the propositional base of F. E D.. D.v.2. E(a) is a stable subset of F . for cr = h we have v = u.1 A system of domains over a set W empty sets D = (DU)uEW. The following observation is an easy consequence of the definition. .R N ) be a propositional Kripke frame. . D). = (F.2.2 Predicate Kripke frames # 0 Now let us turn to precise definitions and statements.v E W (uRiv +-D. so D.).

(1) For any valuation 6 i n F there exists a global valuation 6+ such that for any P E PLm.4 A (modal) valuation J in a predicate Kripke frame F is a function associating with every predicate letter a member of the set 2Dr.e.7 Let F = ( F .2. Definition 3. so tu(P.). For u E M. Let us also define another kind of valuation in predicate Kripke frames.e. a local valuation i n F at u .6 A global valuation i n a predicate Kripke frame F is a function y sending every n-ary predicate letter P ( n > 0) to an 'n-ary 2W-valued predicate on D+'. The set is also stable in F.e. a global valuation in F . .2. y(P)(a) C E(a). a family of m-ary relations on individual domains: where J u ( P p ) C D r . m > 0. Definition 3.Ju) is called the stalk (or the fibre) of M at u. for A). KRIPKE SEMANTICS For a tuple a E (D*)n we also introduce the measure of existence E(a) := n n i=l . since E ( A ) = W. for any a E (D+)m and for q E P L O Of((?)= {u I QZL(P)= (~11. J) is called a (predicate) Kripke model over F . this is nothing but a classical valuation in D. We can also regard it as an O-ary predicate. TO include the case m = 0. P r n uEW i. So we can say that J is a family of local valuations (Ju)uEw. we may call a function sending every n-ary predicate letter to an n-ary relation on D+.2.. where (D+)O = {A). In this case the condition y(q)(a) c E(a) trivially holds for any a E (D+)' (i.5 Let M = (F.e. as a function (D+)O --+ 2W. We may call the function Ju sending every n-ary predicate letter to an nary relation on D. In particular.(ai) = {u E W ( r ( a ) C D.2..D) be a predicate Kripke frame. So y 1 P L O is a propositional valuation in the propositional frame F.. i. Definition 3. to a function y(P) : (D+)n + 2W such that for any a E ( D f ) n . and every q E P L O to a subset of W . the classical model structure Mu := (D.) is either {u) or 0 .206 CHAPTER 3. L e m m a 3. we assume that DE = {u).J) be a Kripke model. On the other hand. The pair M = ( F . for an empty a we define E ( A ) as W (since r(A) = 0). i.

)+-v E € v ( P j ) . I n this case a modal valuation t i n F (and the corresponding Kripke model) is called intuitionistic i f it has the truth preservation (or monotonicity) property:5 (TP) u R v = . a E (D+)n. m > 0 u E y ( P ) ( a )iff a c & ( P ) iff u E t f ( p ) ( a ) .R1.D ) . F = (W. a E (D+)m. is an S4-frame. or briefly: u k A) between worlds u E W 6 and D. The definition is inductive: 5Recall that we omit the subscript '1' in the 1-modal case. or intuitionistic i f its propositional base F.u k A. . ) Definition 3. F = ( F . := {a I u E y ( P r ) ( a ) ) ) for m > 0 and e. u I= A (in another notation: <.4.3.2. and similarly for m = 0. u E W and for q E PLO E ~ ( 9@ u E €u(Q). J u ( p ~ ) t v ( p r )( i f m > O ) .O) := {u> if U E y(P.8 A 1-modal predicate Kripke frame F is called %-based.(p. To define forcing. C uRv & u E JU(P. Then for P E PLm. .-sentences A. Proof (1) From the definition it is clear that for any P E PLn. The uniqueness of [ is also clear. C U ( P .O).2.2. y = <+ means that for P E PLm ( m > O ) . n (2) Put > 0.9 For a Kripke model M = ( F .J ) . Definition 3.R N ) we define the (modal) forcing relation M. 'Sometimes we write u E F or u E M instead of u E W.. . 0 otherwise. PREDICATE KRIPKE FRAMES (2) Every global valuation y equals <+ for a unique valuation €. we use the notion of a D-sentence introduced in Section 2. .

3.A or just by u I A ) by t induction: M .(u)v k B .since D is expanding. u k A for A atomic. u k a = b iff a equals b. Definition 3.J ) be an intuitionistic Kriplce model. e 8 ~ e r & is an abbreviation of 'and'."(a) i f f a a JJ(P. in Chapter 5.uII-c.B iff 3v E R.uI~-B&M. . M . u k C ) . It is more natural to use truth values l and 0 rather than { u ) and 0 .2. and further on in this definition Vv E R(u) abbreviates e 'for any v in R(u)'. M . u I A between a world u E F and an t intuitionistic Du-sentence A (also denoted by J .B iffVv E R. u b Pf iff u E J U ( P f ) . KMPKE SEMANTICS M .ulk B o r M . u l k C ) . Similarly to the propositional case. u Il.A iff M .etc. But our definition will be convenient later on. u ! # B o r M .") ( f o r m > 0).2. u k P. We define the intuitionistic forcing relation M . Now we readily obtain an analogue of Lemma 1. u l t B v C iff (M. u Il. u k O.(u) v != B . Remark 3. 7 ~ o t that B is a Dm-sentence.208 CHAPTER 3.12 Let M = ( F .2. u k 0.3: L e m m a 3. u k B > C iff ( M . U I ~ B A~~~M. M .11 For any Kriplce model: u!=OiB iff 3v E Ri(u) v k B . u k 7 B iffu!#B.10 The above truth definition for propositional letters seems peculiar. M .~ C M . we give the following inductive definition of intuitionistic forcing.

2. A = VxB follow from the transitivity of R. Definition 3. D.[alx]B (by Definition 3. v be worlds in an intuitionistic Kripke model M . u It. M.9 iff v M. by induction on the length of A. b ~ are not equal. M.[a/x]B.12) v )~ iff Vv E R(u) Va E D. v Il. u I k l B iffVv 'v R(u) M. u Il. by Let F be an S4-based Kripke frame.2. .[a/x]B by the induction hypothesis. L e m m a 3.14 (and is trivial for A of the form a = b). every Kripke model M over F has a unique pattern. W L e m m a 3. Mo. by Definition 3. which yields M.3.AT(= O V X B ~ ) V E R(u) Va E D. and hence M . v Il. The case when A = P ( a ) is atomic follows from the monotonicity property (TP)..2. For A = 3xB note that M . t Other cases are trivial. u It.[a/x]B. On the other hand. u I t . u k [ a / x ] ( ~ ~ ) . Mo is an intuitionistic Kripke model and Mo = M if M is itself intuitionistic.16 Let u. u It. u It.[a/x]B for some a E D. and it remains to note that ( [ ~ / x ] B= ~ ) [a/x](BT). u It. M.vIy B. then for any u E M .2.a f b i f f a . The pattern of M is the Kripke model Mo over F such that for any u E F and any atomic Du-sentence without equality A Obviously.3xB iff 3a E D.VxB iff Vv E R(u) Va E D.2. The atomic case follows from Definition 3.13 The intuitionistic forcing has the following properties M . Hence we easily obtain L e m m a 3.2.11. M . PREDICATE KlUPKE FRAMES M . Mo. M. Let us check only the case A = VxB.u Il.15 If Mo is a pattern of M . M. u I A implies t M . other cases are left to the reader. for any intuitionistic Du-sentence A Proof Easy. Then for any intuitionistic Du-sentence A Proof This easily follows by induction. M a Kripke model over F. u b ( [ ~ / x ] B (by the induction hypothesis). v I B. The cases A = B > C.VxB iff V E R(u) Va E D.2.

18 Let M be an intuitionistic Kripke model with the accessibility relation R .. The base is trivial and the step is almost trivial: u k VyVxA(y. c ) (by the induction hypothesis) i f fVw E R ( u )Va E D. similar t o the previous lemma. . 1x1 = n .. ..17. u t= A(a).19 A modal (respectively. C D.2. A(x1. u k V x A ( x ) iff Va E DZ M . u k VxA(b. Vw E R ( v )Vc E D: w IF A(b.2.xn) i f f V U EMVa17. For the induction step we have: = 0) u It. Proof By induction on n. c ) (by the induction hypothesis) i f fV a E D c f l u k A ( a ) . 'if' is trivial.x ) i f fVb E D. u E M . . 11 = n . A ( x ) an N modal formula with all its parameters in the list x .R M . M k (I!-)A(xl.. In the intuitionistic case we have the following L e m m a 3. take v = w and b = a l .2. v I A ( a ) t i f fVvVa E D: M . Then Proof By induction. v I A(a). .x ) i f fVb E Du VC E Dc u k A(b. t In the latter equivalence. KRIPKE SEMANTICS L e m m a 3. Then . take u = v..17 Let M be an N-modal predicate Kripke model.) a predicate formula of the corresponding type. u k ( l k ) A ( a ~ an).13) i f fVv E R ( u )Vb E D..V y V x A ( y .. x ) (by 3. intuitionistic Kripke model) M i f its universal closure V A is true at every world of M . . E..2.20 Let M be an N-modal or intuitionistic predicate Kripke model with a system of domains D .+l w IF A ( a ) .. Proof Follows easily from Lemma 3.. intuitionistic) predicate formula A is said to be true in a Kripke model (respectively. In the latter equivalence.x ) i f fVv 'v R ( u )Vb E D. v IF V x A ( b . for w € R ( v ) . the intuitionistic) theory of M (with or without equality).2. I T ( ' ) ( M ) ) and called the modal (respectively.V x A ( x )i f fVuVv € R ( u )Va E D. intuitionistic) sentences that are true i n M is denoted by M T ( = ) ( M ) (respectively. Definition 3. c = (an. t o show 'only i f ' . L e m m a 3. A ( x ) an intuitionistic Du-formula with all its parameters in the list x.g.x. t This is denoted by M t= A i n the modal case and by M I A in the intuitionistic case. 'if' follows from the transitivity o f R and the infor clusion D. w .an).an E Du M .. The set of all modal (respectively. Then for any x U E M M . a. 3.2.210 CHAPTER 3. given u .2. in the intuitionistic case we have M It.2.16. t o prove 'only i f 7 .. . The base (with n follows from Lemma 3. W .18..

C 5 I L ( = ) ( F ) ) . F t= C (or F Il.25 Let F be an S4-based Kripke frame. k A (respectively.A). intuitionistic) Kripke frame.e.A ( a ) iff M . 11 = n. Mo I t A iff M b AT. i.21 A modal (respectively. Then for any A E IF=. intuitionistic Kripke models) over F . we say that F is a C-frame (or C E M L ( = ) ( F ) . u It. F I t A iff F .2.2. By Lemma 3. a valuation J in F corresponds to J' in F . P r o o f Easy from definitions. = L(F.13.2. more precisely. The class of all C-frames is denoted by V ( C ) and called modally (respectively. Valuations in F . Then x P r o o f Let A = A ( x ) . intuitionistic) propositional formula. 6' are extended to propositional formulas in the same way.[). a E Dl. H L e m m a 3. PREDICATE K R W K E F R A M E S 21 1 D e f i n i t i o n 3. intuitionistic) sentences. we have to show M . intuitionistically) definable (by C). B y Lemma 3. Then F k A iff F .). u b A and similarly for the iptuitionistic case.20. Mo its pattern.22 Let C be a set of modal (respectively. J'). u k A T ( a ) (= A ( a ) T ) for any u E F . A an N-modal (respectively.3. 3. and thus A E I T ( M 0 ) iff Proof From 3.2. are in principle the same as valuations of proposition letters in F .2.18.2. where L is ML(=) or IL(=).C ) denotes that C is valid in F . E MT(M). Validity is denoted by F intuitionistic case.2. .2.15 we have: Mo. I= A in the modal case and by F Il. (Only if.A. W e say that C is valid i n a Kripke frame F (of the corresponding type) i f every formula from C is valid in F . So ( F .24 Let M be an S4-based predicate Kripke model. Let M be a Kripke model over F .2. L ( F ) . and both [. Finally note that every propositional valuation in F .A in the D e f i n i t i o n 3. or equivalently.) Assume F Il. is [' for some valuation E in F . II. ¤ P r o p o s i t i o n 3.23 Let F be an N-modal (respectively. such that for any q E P L O . intuitionistic) predicate formula A is said to be valid in a Kripke frame (respectively.. S4-based Kripke frame) F if it i s true i n all Kripke models (respectively.2. u t= ~ ( a ) ~ . A an intuitionistic formula with equality. u 1 A iff (F. L e m m a 3.

26 Let A(x). intuitionistic) Kripke model.2. We consider only the case & = 3.2. (If. By Proposition 2. u k [a/x]A.2. a E D' Our aim is t o show that A A B implies A B. u k AT(a)) by Lemma 3. [a/x]3yA = 3y[a/x]A.20.e. Then for any intuitionistic model M and u E F . u k (IF) A(a) iff M . u t= (IF) B(a). # V(A).u It.212 CHAPTER 3. and let M be an N-modal (respectively. Then for any u E M . a E DZ we have M . Hence F I A. u k 3y[a/x]A H M. Suppose FV(3yA) = r ( x ) for a distinct x. 11 = n . so 3z(A[y H z]) = 3zA. In this case A[y I-+ z] = A . By 3.9 we have M .17 this implication follows from the properties (1)-(4).) Assume F k AT. Similarly. Hence Similarly M . u != [a/x]3z(A[y++ z]) @ 3d E D.A(a).20. Consider the following equivalence relation between N-modal formulas: A B := FV(A) = F V ( B ) and for any distinct list of variables x such that : FV(A) = r(x).3. u IF A(a) by F Definition 3. Proof We begin with the modal case. M .20. [a/x]3z(A[yH z]) = 3z[a/x[(A[y H z]). a E DZ M. . B ( x ) be congruent N-modal (respectively.12. so (1) holds.2. Then again (since y # r(x)) [a/x]3yA = 3y [a/x[A. K R P K E SEMANTICS By Lemma 3.2. by Lemma 3. L e m m a 3. i. [a/x]3zA = 3z[a/x]A. since y does not occur in [a/x]A. u t= [a/x][d/z](A[yH 21). M . - (i) y # FV(A) (and thus y # V(A)). So let us check these properties for ! (1) QyA Qz(A[y H z]) for Y $ BV(A). intuitionx istic) formulas. Then there are two subcases. (ii) y E FV(A). and thus we obtain F k A ~ . F IF A implies Mo.2. for any u E M .

xy.3. o]A. PREDICATE KRIPKE FRAMES 213 But since y $! BV(A). T ) for some injection T. we have [ ~ / Y ] A = A [ ~ d = (A[Y++z])[z~ Y ] Thus (1) holds in this case too. FV(A) = F V ( B ) implies FV(VyA) = FV(VyB). u I=[alx] A B ) % M. let r ( x ) = FV(VyA). this implies (A A B ) (A' A B'). u k [ a . Then and similarly Now if y E FV(A)= F V ( B ) . B . a. B'. u t= [a/x](A1A B') Since A - % M.T]B. a ) for some injection a and F V ( B ) = r ( x . [a/x]B = [a. Obviously FV(A A B ) = FV(A) U N (A' * B'). x .2. a/x . hence M . Let us FV(B) = FV(A1) U FV(B1) = FV(A1A B'). ad. r / x . . Obviously [a/x]A = [a . u k [ a . we prove that (A * B) consider the case * = A. T]B. z $! V(A).T/X . B B'. Let r(x) = FV(AAB). so we can use (#) for A. ] - B. B B'. then FV(A) = F V ( B ) = r(x). If y @ FV(A). u k [a-T/x. Similarly M .a/x . Obviously. u I=[alx] e (A B M . Then its subset FV(A) is r ( x . then we use the hypothesis (#)for A. r]B1. and similarly for A'. u t= [ a . B . N A'. a / x . u k [a/x]A & M. (2) Supposing A d= [d/z](A[y H z]). a ] A & M . a]Ar & M . let us show that for ~ Y AQ ~ B & = N the case Q = 3 is quite similar. Anyway (3) Supposing A A'.

P r o o f By induction.2. Then every formula congruent to A is valid in F . ~ t L e m m a 3.20(1). Then by 3. In the intuitionistic case note that A B implies AT A B ~ by 2.15 we obtain: M . IL(') (F) = T ~ ~ ( (F). Proof By Lemmas 3. by Lemma 3. Since A B. for any u E M. T h e o r e m 3. and similarly for B. a E DZ x .26. A > B . . The axioms of K.2. Next. FV(OiA) = FV(A) = FV(B) = FV(UiB).28 For any classical Du-formula A M . So by applying the modal case and Lemma 3. u k A iff Mu k A (in the classical sense). let us show OiA OiB. The classical and modal truth definitions coincide in this case.23. intuitionistic) formula valid i n a Kripke frame (respectively. ' ) Proof (I) Let F be a predicate Kripke frame. since they are valid in every propositional Kripke frame and we can apply 3. an S4-based Kripke frame) F . In other words. Obviously. 3. they are true in so M. ( S o u n d n e s s t h e o r e m ) (I) The set ML(=)(F) of all modal predicate formulas (with equality) valid i n a predicate Kripke frame F is a modal predicate logic (with equality). (11) The set IL(')(F) of all intuitionistic predicate formulas (with equality) valid i n an %-based Kripke frame F is a superintuitionistic predicate logic (with equality). u IF A(a) iff M . these two conditions are equivalent.2.2. Let M be a Kripke model over F. u I B(a). and let x be a list of parameters of (A > B ) . KRIPKE SEMANTICS B. are obviously valid. suppose M t= A. 11 = n.11. .17.214 (4) Supposing A CHAPTER 3. L e m m a 3.2. In fact. the sets ML(')(F).2. It is also easy to check that modus ponens preserves the truth in a Kripke model.27 Let A be a modal (respectively. Moreover.3. u t= ~ ~ (iffaM ) u I= ~ (iffaM). IL(')(F) are closed under congruence.2. The classical first-order axioms and the axioms of equality are true in every Mu.

X I .27. but we leave this t o is the reader.3. Now for an arbitrary Kripke model M = (F. . a n E D.e. Due t o our assumption. Next. r(y) = F V ( S ) c FV(SA) c FV(A) U F V ( S ) .) again by Lemma 3. a n E D.zk.I&). . g ~ h case when P does not occur in A is trivial. . . v != [a/x]A. hence M I= b'yA(y. . . .2.5. . so we may assume that A is clean and BV(A)nr(y) = 0 .e..2. . . So suppose F !=A. . consider the V-introduction rule. To verify this (for certain fixed u and c). then by Lemma 3. then c'=Cl .20. y are disjoint lists of different variables such that r(y) C FV(C) C ~ ( x Y ) . Let us fx a distinct list z such that r(z) = FV(A) U F V ( S ) (for example.2.. As we know from 2. c'). let us show that M 1 SA. P E P L n . i put z = y t .. r(z) n BV(A) = 0. where r ( t ) = FV(A)). so BV(A) n FV(SA) = 0.24.and consider a simple formula substitution S=[C(x. To verify 0-introduction. .). Thus V-introduction preserves the truth in M. v k P ( a ) iff M . Vu Vb.. M .2. If M i= A(y. . .x. a l . . where m = 121. note that M . Thus M k B by 3. u I= [a/x]B. Recall that S A is obtained by appropriate replacements from a clean version A0 By of A such that BV(AO)n r ( y ) = 0. consider another model M1 = ( F . .20. where c' is the part of c corresponding to y (i. XI.20. so r ( y ) & FV(SA) E r(z). . y)/P(x)]. for any u E F and c E D r c). i. a l .. v k C(a. . and the right hand side of the equivalence follows from M k A by 3. . A and A" are equivalent with respect t o validity. and thus Vub'al.). . M . . n > 0'' and x . q) such that for any v E FTu.20(1).2.2. a E D t MI. Lemma 3. .. where P occursg in A. The only nontrivial part of the proof is to show that the substitution rule preserves validity. u k b'yA(y. e 1 ° ~ h e r e a little difference in t h e case when n = 0 (then x is empty). .a.2. if y = zl . PREDICATE KRIPKE FRAMES hence M . u k [a/x]OA iff Vv E R(u) M. u k A(b.an).al.

t. where tl. it has the form P(t1. (SB)(c. . It is essential that B (as a subformula of A) is clean. v k (SB)(c. If B is atomic and contains P. . ''Of course. a ) = [ca/zq]P((zq). . a) iff M. k = Izql. v t= B(c. KRIPKE SEMANTICS for any other atomic D. c')). r(q) = F V ( B ) n BV(A)). otherwise the argument is inapplicable. Then by 2. -. because S B can be constructed by induction only for clean formulas. .a). . a ) H M. For any v E F T u and tuple a in D. a ) = P((ca) . a ) = [ca/zq]SP((zq).tn are variables from the list zq. .24 So we can also present S B as (SB)(z. a ) iff (M1. v k Q. v I= (SB)(c. q consists of parameters of B that are not in z (i.v =i Q iff M . we can present B as B(z.a ) for some a : In Ik. this only means that F V ( B ) 2 r(zq). = (2) This is proved by induction. c'). Since FV(B) 5. a)) iff M .e.a ) by the definition of M1.a) iff M . a . then S B = B and MI. r(q) = BV(A). . .v k Bl(c. a ) or M. v k C(a. Now let us prove the following a Claim. FV(A) U BV(A).v I= B(c. Recall that y transforms to c' when z transforms to c. Now consider a subformula B of A. a.a). Certainly we can use the same presentation in the trivial case when P does not occur in B (and S B = B). Thus % ( P ) = {a E Dt 1 M. v k (SB2)(c.a)) iff (M. a) by the definition of MI.v k Bz(c. Then B(c. So we have B = P((zq) . such that l 1 = Iql M1.v k (SBl)(c.q). . a ) . v i (SB)(c. y) = C((ca) . q) 11.216 CHAPTER 3. So in this case MI. v k B(c.-sentence Q M1.v t= B ( c .a) V M1.). then M1. - . If B = B1 VB2.. . v I= B(c.5. The case when B is atomic and does not contain P is trivial. where q is distinct. a ) = [ca/zq]C((zq).

its superintuitionistic logic is IL(')(F). (1) is equivalent to for any a E DE since r(q) n FV(SA) = 0 . This is exactly the same as A E IL(')(F) iff AT E ML(=)(F). C) and similarly for superintuitionistic logics. C A D.2. by Proposition 2. then M1.2.p. In fact. (SBl)(C.ui=B(c.3. By (2).11. The remaining cases: B = C > D. then Ml. ( ~ W thus IL(=)(F) is an s. u k [d/t][cBi/zGi]Bl. . Vx C(x. v k (3t SBl)(c. then bi = d and bj = a j for j # i. with or without equality). (by the induction hypothesis) iff M. a)). and the latter Dv-sentence is Bl(c.25. a'). F It A iff F I= AT. (11) By Proposition 3. i. a) iff 3d E Dv M.a) (by the w w induction hypothesis) iff M.a ) 217 Here a' denotes the tuple obtained from a by putting d in the position corresponding to t .t. a)(= (SB)(c. for an intuitionistic F . the set ML(')(F) is called the modal logic of F (respectively. a ' ) i f f 3 d ~ M .a) iff V E Ri(u) M . Similarly.v I= B(c. v i = B l ( c . PREDICATE KRIPKE FRAMES If B = 3tB1. a)(= (SB)(c. if t = qi (in q). we have where Gi is obtained by eliminating qi = t from q and respectively Bi is obtained by eliminating ai from a . Let us explain the first equivalence in more detail. In accordance with Section 2.16.a) iff 3 d D. u I= B(c. a') ). In fact. If B = OiB1. So we obtain: IL(=)(F) = T ~ ~ ( = ) and ) .e.a) iff V E Ri(v) M1. w I= (SBl)(c. z) are quite similar.r. (=).8. So by definition. Now (1) easily follows from (2). M l . M .w I= Bl(c. the third equivalence is checked in the same way. v k ~ D. since t is bound in B.1. this is equivalent to which holds since F i= A. v k Oi(SB1) (c. For a class of N-modal frames C we define the modal logic determined by C (or complete w.

Similarly intuitionistic Kripke (frame) semantics is generated by the class of all intuitionistic predicate Kripke frames. W e also define the superintuitionistic logic determined over a propositional S4-frame F as IL(=)(KF) and similarly for a class of S4-frames C . Proposition 3.) is the intuitionistic version of K V ( S 4 ) . ML(')(IC(F)) is called the modal logic (with equality) determined over F. intuitionistic) theory without constants. for logics with equality) is generated by the class of all N-modal predicate Kripke frames.34 Let F be a predicate Kripke frame over a propositional Kripke frame F . ' P r o o f By induction on the length of an L-inference of A from I ' . xi.1. L an m. the proof of 3. P r o o f Rather trivial. K(F) (or K F ) denotes the class of all predicate Kripke frames based on F.2.18. IL(=)(c) = T ~ ~ ( = for( any class of S4-based predicate frames C .(=)). H . for a propositional modal logic A. Then ML(F). then also M k (It-) VA.218 CHAPTER 3.l. intuitionistic) Kripke model. If A E L . Similarly we define K(C) (or KC) for a class of N-modal propositional frames C and the modal logic determined over C. s. so the claim is also trivial. since QH t= H VA = VB and we can apply soundness.16. (=) (respectively. ) ~ ) Thus Proof According to Definition 2. The definition of validity for propositional formulas in F is the same as in F.=) Here is another version of soundness. In particular.p.25. = M L ( F ) .2.2.31 Let M be a modal (respectively. Then for any A E IF(=). r. r a modal (respectively. if A = VsB and M i (Ik) VB. such that M !=(Ik) U l?.'.32 If F is a propositional Kripke frame. KRIPKE SEMANTICS Definition 3. The second one is checked in the proof of 2. the first assertion is equivalent to 3.2. We may regard KC as a semantics for a certain class of logics. If A E r the claim is trivial. Definition 3.2.16.p. L e m m a 3. H L e m m a 3. Finally.16. the class K V ( A ) generates the semantics of all Kripke-complete logics containing A.33 K!.30 (N-modal) Kripke (frame) semantics KN (or KG.2. Kg)-complete or K!. cf.29. I FL A +-M k(Ik) VA.2.)-complete logics are called Kripke (frame) complete (or K-complete i f there is no confusion). then VA E It is clear that the truth in M respects MP.

D') be predicate Kripke frames based on F = (W. .2 Let f = ( f o . (f1u)ucw. (4) ~ R i * f l u v = fiv I' Du. .Rh) respectively.3.F E KC) ( M L ( = ) ( K C ) ) . = IL(C) in the intuitionistic case. and an =-morphism. f is called a pmorphism i f fo is surjective (i. a generated subframe and a pmorphism to the predicate case.3 Morphisms of Kripke frames In this section we extend the notions of a frame morphism. fo is called the world component.3. MORPHISMS O F KRTPKE F R A M E S Proposition 3. f is called a p'-morphism i f it is a p-morphism. .3. f l ) be a morphism from F to F'..1 Let F = ( F . I) ~ { M L ( =( )F ) I F E C } = ML(') (c). .R N ) . D>O(u) s a surjective map.R1.f l ) Definition 3.34. .f l ) such that ( I ) fo : F (2) fl = + F' is a morphism of propositional frames. and fo is an isomorphism of propositional frames. F' = ( F ' .2. Proof We begin with the modal case.35 For a class of propositional Kripke frames C.e. =-morphism) if every flu is a bijection.F' = (W'.D ) . i (3) every flu : D.. fo is a p-morphism of propositional frames).. f is called an isomorphism zf it is an =-morphism. we obtain = ~ { M L ( = ) ( F ) . f is called an equality-morphism (briefly. and (IL(=)(KC)). By Lemma 3. I = w 3. . f l the individual component of ( f o .= ( ~ { M L ( = ) ( F F E K C ) ) .3.Ri. A morphism from F to F' is a pair f = ( f o . Definition 3.2.

PKFE) In a similar way we can define the categories PKF~. R N )be a propositional Kripke frame. W T h u s we obtain t h e categories o f N-modal predicate Kripke frames and (=)-morphisms. . models. 2 for isomorphisms.5 Isomorphisms in P K F ~ are exactly isomorphisms i n the sense ) of Definition 3. m 0. where flu := id^^ for any u .4 - (1) For a predicate Kripke frame F = ( F . fiu(bm)).7 A p-morphism of Kripke models is a morphism of Kripke models.e.D ) . consider the composition ( f 0 . pmorphisms o f predicate Kripke frames (models) are denoted b y +. . fo(u) != P ( f i u ( b l ) . use Lemma 1.f l ) O - ---+ F' and (go. p=-morphisms and isomorphisms. + .3. (4) The statements (1)-(3) also hold for Kripke models.3. Lemma 3. bl. which is a p-morphism of their frames. A predicate Kripke frame morphism over F is a morphism of the form ( i d w .=) o f intuitionistic Kripke frames.3. the details are left t o the reader.3.3.. O S I U ) U G F ) . with obvious changes.32..') o f intuitionistic Kripke o f N-modal Kripke models. u E F .3 A morphism o f predicate Kripke models M = ( F .Dl). K R I P K E SEMANTICS Definition 3. This i s a morphism F (3) The composition of =-morphisms is an =-morphism. with the composition o and the identity morphism i d F ..gl) : (90. Proof An easy exercise. .f l ) . such that for any P E P L m . > M .gl) := (g0. and similarly for frames. -+= for p=-morphisms.6 Let F = (W.f i ) is a morphism from M t o M ' . the identity morphism idF := ( i d w ..D) ( F .. i.f l ) : ( F . ( f l u .bm E D . PKME) Definition 3. .f l ) of their frames F and F' preserving the truth values of atomic formulas. ( f 0 .2.u ( 1 - 7 m i f f M ' . W e also use the notation --= for =-morphisms. T h e notation ( f o . PKM!. . (2) For morphisms of predicate Kripke frames ( f o .<') is a morphism ( f o .. E ) and M' = (F1.R1.220 C H A P T E R 3.gl) +F". is an isomorphism. Similarly for =-.f l ) := ( f 0 90.f l ) : F F' F". One can easily check the following Lemma 3. As in t h e propositional case.3.f l ) : M M' means that ( f o . similarly for p(=)morphisms and isomorphisms.

9 Under the conditions of Definition 3. there exists a 'canonical' =-morphism ( h . the same holds for the intuitionistic forcing and B E IS(=)(D.1. MORPHTSMS OF KRIPKE FRAMES 221 T h e following is obvious Lemma 3.). and let F = ( F . But the case with equality is not so interesting. 9 )= ( f o .11 If ( f o . -+ Then ( h .h l ) 0 ( f 0 . fo(u) f l u . because all =-morphisms over F are isomorphisms. Definition 3..D ) be a predicate Kripke frame.3.) M .F -= F . If the models are intuitionistic. then for any u E M . B E MS~)(D. where flu . u I= B i f f M'. This frame F' is denoted by h.F. f l ) i f f idw.3. Lemma 3. f l ) = (idwt.7 The composition of (=)-morphisms over F is an (=)-morphism over F . Then we say that a Kripke frame F' = (F'. f l ) : F' F can be presented as a composition of an (=)-morphism over the propositional base F' of F' and the canonical morphism: F' - . Thus we can also consider the categories o f frames over F and (=)-morphisms. i f h is a p-morphism.f l ) is a unique morphism ( i d w ~ . Proof Put gu := idDl : DL + Dh(%). = Dh(u) for all u E F . Proposition 3. g ) is a p=-morphism. B is obtained from B by replacing occurrences of every a E Du with flu(a>.8 Let F . h : F' + F .h l ) 0 ( f o . P r o o f In fact. f l ) : M ---+(=) M'.3. g ) : h. (idwl. i f f f l = h l .10 Every (=)-morphism of predicate Kripke frames ( f o . g ) .3.3.l ) over F' such that ( f o . 9) F h Moreover. D') ( F . . i.3.3.(idw. o fo = fo (which is true) and for any u flu = hlu 0 gu = hlu 0 ido: = hlu. D') is obtained from F by changing the base along h i f DD:.D ) b y Definition 3.8. F' be propositional Kripke frames.e. (idw1. then ( h . Now let us show that every morphism is represented as a specific composition: Proposition 3. B .3.3. f l ) (fo)*F (fo. g ) : (F'.

)(P. u k B iff Vv' E R(. +=. . (2) B = 3xC(x. f l u .(.vl b flu .)(Pr) (for m > 0). fo(u) I= Oj(flu . Then M . u != B iff 3b E D.B). y) is a generator of B. M . Then by the induction hypothesis. . hence f l u . b E E.. and Ju(p') := { {v) 0 if J>ocu) = {fo(v)).o(w)(Pr)) for any v E F. u != C(b.1. a).f i ) : M -+ M'. a is a tuple from D. where 3xC(x.3.3. . C = flu . . . f l ) : F -+ F'. C for any Du-sentence C. Proof In fact. KRIPKE SEMANTICS Proof By induction on the complexity of B we prove the claim for any U.") G J>.o(u)) iff M'. Now suppose J' is intutionistic. Since fa is a morphism.a) iff 3b E Du M'. we obtain Thus J is intutionistic. Then there exists a unique model M over F such that (fo. we have R(i(fo(u))= fo[Rj(u)].(fo(u)) M'. v E R j (u). a)..bm) := (flv(bl).J) is unjquely determined by the equalities Jw(Pr) := {b E D r I flu. f lu(a) = flv (a) for any a E D. and let M' be a Kriplce model over F'. then M is also intuitionistic. . Proposition 3. f l u . a) (since fiu[Du] = D. C) (= f l u . So M . . and similarly for +.222 CHAPTER 3. if M' = (F'. . The intuitionistic case now follows easily by Godel-Tarski translation. fo(u) b C(c. Then VRUimplies fo(v)R1fo(u)and next J. -=. fo(u) ! C(flu(b). then M = (F.flu(bm)). Let us check only two cases (1) B = OjC. m > 0.C iff M'.. whence by definition In the same way. f l u . a) (by induction hypothesis) iff = 3c E Die(. fo(u) 3zC(x.12 Let (fa.(. where flu. If M' is intuitionistic. (PkO) otherwise.J1). By Definition 3.) M'.

. IL(=)( F ) C IL(=)(F')for intuitionistic Kripke frames. . . .3.M.15 Let F = ( W . . and assume that F' !+ A ( x l . [Ono. If V is stable. u Therefore. .2.4.). . Hence Definition 3. v. Now since fo and flu are surjective. . a l l .9 and Proposition 3. where (t t V)(P!r) := ( ~ u ( P k m ) ) u € v . there exists a model M over F such that ( f o . u' !+ A ( a i . such that and thus by Lemma 3.a. Proposition 3.3. !+ A(a1. . a l .12 to the canonical morphism ( h . So by Lemma 3. g ) : h. .).D ) a predicate Kripke frame.3. MORPHISMS OF KRIPKE FRAMES 223 Now let M be a Kripke model over F and consider changing the base of F. E DL. ML(=)(F').1312 If there e ~ i s t s a ~ ( = ) . . .3.fi) : M M'. V C W . we obtain M .r n o r p h i s r n ~ + ( = ) ~ ' M L ( ' ) ( F ) ~ then .3.. + By Proposition 3. . 1972/73]. unique Kripke model M' over h. Proof Consider the modal case. For any F E KF we have by Lemma 3.an.3.F .3.M .12. .R1.. Let ( f o . .e 12Cf.F . x n ) . By applying 3. we define the submodel M i v := ( F t t V).F such that ( h . .a. .a. for some model M' over F' we have M'. .13.20. Theorem 3. for some u' E F'. We also say that M' is obtained from M by changing the base along h and denote M' by h. If M = ( F . there exist u . Proposition 3.R N ) be a propositional Kripke frame.14 If there exists a p-morphism F' -+ F . F = ( F . Proof Consider the modal case only. . F' A implies F !+ A. . Let h : F' ++ F . . . then ML(=)(KF')c ML(=)( K F ) (and IL(=)(KF')E I L ( = ) ( K F )in the intuitionistic case). . and similarly. the subframe F 1 V and the submodel M 1 V are called generated. . J ) is a Kripke model.g) : M' . A subframe of F obtained by restriction to V is defined as where D 1 V := ( D u ) u E V . we obtain a .fl) : F + F'.

Definition 3.16 A submodel Ml c M is called reliable i f for any u E M I . similarly.3.i ) : F 1 V ---t F (and M 1 V ---t M ) . c ML(')(F 1 V). (3) ML(')(F) Proof (1) Obvious. V a stable set of worlds i n F . (3) Every valuation J' in F 1 V equals J 1 V for a valuation J in F such that Ju = [h whenever u E V.18 (Generation l e m m a ) Let F be a predicate Kriplce frame.3. Lemma 3.3.i) is a morphism from 3. for the intuitionistic case. of frames or models).ukA.18(1). put Eu(P) := { tL(P) 0 if u E V. otherwise.3.ukA i#M. in which j : V ---+ W is the inclusion map and every i .g. we define cones.3. since V is stable.3. Definition 3. then [ is also intuitionistic. Definition 3. rooted frames and rooted models: L e m m a 3.17 Similarly to the propositional case (Definition 1. If [' is intuitionistic. . is called the restriction of f to V. is the identity map on the corresponding domain.i ) o f . where ( j .224 The notation M I CHAPTER 3. KRIPKE SEMANTICS cM means that M I is a submodel of M . Now the claim follows from (2). Restrictions of Kriplce model morphisms are defined in the same way.-sentence A M1. Then (1) there is a morphism ( j . In this case obviously. e. ( 2 ) Apply Lemma 3. for any D.14).19 I f f : F ---+ F' is a morphism of Kripke frames and V is stable in F . M T ( M ) 2 M T ( M 1 ) .3.11 and (1).4 readily implies L e m m a 3. M a Kripke model over F.20 A restriction of an (=)-morphism (of Kriplce frames or models) to a generated subframe (or submodel) is an (=)-morphism (respectively. then f t V := ( j . Such a f obviously exists.3.3. (2) M 1 V is a reliable submodel of M .

a nonoriented path in ( F . Now we have a predicate version of 1.3. a component in ( F . with - G there is a joined g := iEI U gi.20.3. (2) for any family of morphisms fi = (gi. MORPHISMS O F KRIPKE F R A M E S If G = F 1 V . hu . iEI h := ( h u ) U E ~:= (hi)u for u E Fi.22 The notions 'path'. 'component'.26 (an exercise). (2) Every Kripke complete modal or superintuitionistic logic is determined by a class of rooted predicated Kripke frames: where L is M L or I L .3. 'connectedness'.3. every f IFi is a morphism.D) is its restriction to a component i n F . 'nonoriented path' are obviously extended to the predicate case. Proof ( 1 ) Similar to Lemma 1. + (3) every morphism f : F G is presented as U( f 1Fi).3. hi) : Fi morphism U fi : F -+ G defined as ( g . Viz.21 (1) ML(')(F) = n ML(=)(FTU) uEF and analogously in the intuitionistic case. D e f i n i t i o n 3. u E F ) . h ) . we also denote f IV by f IG.3. iEI Proof ( 1 ) Follows from Lemma 3.3. Then (1) for any morphism f : F --+ G .23 Let ( F i ( i E I ) be a family of all different components of a predicate Kripke frame F .D) i s the same as in F .38.. C f : = { F f u I F E C. ( 2 ) Follows from ( 1 ) .3. . L e m m a 3. a predicate Kripke frame is called connected i f its propositional base is connected. P r o p o s i t i o n 3.

if u E Fi. h. (3) Trivial.3.e. D.3. u E F1 such that F1l u -+(=) F 2 f v.21.25 Let C1. Definition 3.3. Therefore L(')(c~) any F2 E C2.3. r .3. Hence by 3. i. K(FTu) = { F t u I F E KF). We shall denote the latter class by (KF) T u. if F' = ( F u.3. = h. Cl red(') C2 denotes that C1 is (=)-reducible to C2.13 ( E and thus L(=)F ~ ) L(')(F~) by 3. by Propositon 1. We say 2 that C1 is (=)-reducible to C if for any F2 E C for any v E F2 there exists 2 2 F1 E C1 that is (=)-reducible to F2 T v. is surjective. Then for any Fa E C2. KRIPKE SEMANTICS (2) g is a morphism of propositional bases. f 2 g then L(')(c~) L(=)(C2) (where L denotes ML in the modal case and IL in the intuitionistic case). =- Proposition 3. u E F .3. which implies L(=)(C1) L(=)(c~). In the similar way reducibility is defined for classes of propositional Kripke frames..18 and 3. where D.24 A predicate Kripke frame F1 is called (=)-reducible to a rooted predicate Kripke frame F2 if there exists u E F1 such that F1T U --H(=) F2. uRjv. since it coincides with some (hi). DL & DL for any v E w F T u. by definition.2. Every h. Similarly to the propositional case. thus for any a E D. It is clear that reducibility implies reducibility. then v E Fi.3. since by 3. DL otherwise. Thus F1E (KF) u..3. Finally. C of predicate Kripke frames. Proof Suppose Cl red(') C2.27 Let F be a propositional Kripke frame. w We write F1 ++ F2 to denote that there is a pmorphism from F1 onto F2.226 CHAPTER 3.26 I Cl red(') C for classes C1. we give Definition 3. L(')(F~) for L e m m a 3. then F' = F T u for the frame F = ( F .D).38. := Dh if v E F l u . Then Proof The inclusion (KF) f u C_ K ( F I' u) is trivial. Dl). hu(a) = (hi)u(a) = (hi)v(a) = hv(a). v E F 2 there is F1 E C1. The other way round. C be classes of predicate Kripke frames. The system of domains D is expanding.

27. F2 E KF2 for some F2 E C2.21(2). we obtain ( K F l )red= (KF2). Then ( I ) K ( C t ) = (KC)T (= { F l u I u E F . Therefore (KC1)redZ (KC2).3.3. (KFl)red' K(F2 T v ) .3.3. (3) follow from (1) and 3.F2 E K(F1 T u ) = (ICFl) T u (by 3.29. w Proposition 3.28 Let C be a class of N-modal propositional Kripke frames.3. the restriction of h is a pmorphism and it follows that (h32)Tw + F2 t v by the restriction of y. there is w E FIT u such that h ( w ) = v . Since (h. Proof Let F2 E KC2.30 If C1 red Cz for classes C1.3. and h. So by 3. ¤ Corollary 3.32.3. F E KC)) (3) IL(')(KC) = I L ( = ) ( K ( c T ) )i f C is a class of S4-frames.9. there exists h : Fl for any F2 E KF2 there is a canonical tu -tt Fz for some u.3.3. L e m m a 3. thus Flred'(F2 t v ) for some F 1 E KFl C KC1.3. Since h is surjective.F2) T w E ( K F l ) w . Proof ( 1 ) In fact. there exists Fl E C1 such that Fl red (F2 T v ) . Since C1red C2. Proof By assumption. MORPHISMS OF KRIPKE FRAMES 227 Proposition 3.3. (2). and we can apply 3. F2 be propositional Kripke frames such that Fl red F2. C of propositional Kripke g frames. . By Lemma 3. i.3. Then by 1.31 If C1 red C2 for classes C1. ) ) for then M L ( = ) ( K C ~ E M L ( = ) ( K C ~(and I L ( = ) ( K C ~E I L ( = ) ( K C ~ ) S4) frames).e. for any v E F2.C2 of propositional Kripke frames. Then ( K F l )red' ( K F 2 ) . then F2 T v E (ICF2)t v = K(F2 v ) .27). then (KC1)red' (KC2).29 Let Fl.

Mi = ( F i .D ) n V . 1 D. there exists a p-morphism over F id^.32 We say that a Kripke frame ( F . Obviously. := ( a .33 ( F . In this case we denote ( F . .3.3.) such that fo(u) := ( u . g.3. otherwise for P E PLO. g ) : ( F . . M k ) onto a generated subframe in U Fi (respectively. If for each i E I . f l ) iEI iEI flu(.Di). .Dl) = ( F . an) := .2 ) ) 1 (al. for P E PLn. u E Fi. KRIPKE SEMANTICS By 3.Dl) by (F.D ) + ( F .34 Let ( F i ) i € ~ a family of predicate Kripke frames..i)(P) {((a192 1 . The disjoint sum (or disjoint union) of the family (Fi)iCIis the frame where D(u.i)(p) (Qi)u(P)) {{ ( ) ) if (Qi)u(P)= { u } .30 and 3.+ (an.D ) if for some V C D+. Proposition 3.3.3. Proof I f F has a root v. W Proof Definition 3. we can define g.D ) n V .D') is obtained by domain restriction from ( F . there exists an isomorphism from Fk (respectively. . .k ) . n > 0 and := @(u. the disjoint sum (union) of ( M i ) i Eis the Kripke model ~ where Q(u. In fact. rn Definition 3. Then obviously. = g whenever u&v.k ) . Fi = be (Fi.D ) red ( F .D ) n V. DL = D. U Mi). # 0 for any u E F. as an identity map on DL sending every a $ V t o some fixed element of V . given by the pair ( f o .26.. n V .Qi) is a Kripke model over Fi.i) := (Di)u x (2) for i E I . Obviously this definition is sound i f f V n D.228 CHAPTER 3. .

37 together with the family id^. a simple exercise for the reader.9). for p(')-morphic images by Definition 2.3.)^^^ (as usual.16. .37..3.i) yields Now we have an analogue of 1.28 using Lemma 3. ICE). have the Collection Prop@.13 Proof Validity is preserved for generated subframes by 3.3. iEI Proof A required isomorphism is the map f from the proof of 1.v!=A. n I T ( = ) ( M { )for the Proof Similar to Lemma 1. Corollary 3.D ) ) .p. G uI M~ > = I.44.3. for any Du-sentence A M .3.l.3.3. for disjoint sums by 3.3.36 for the modal case. we assume that F = (F.13. L e m m a 3.(=). IT(=) intuitionistic case.3.39 Let L be a conically expressive N-m.36. 1 Proposition 3. the definition of O(. R where R* is the same as in Lemma 1.21.38 Every modally or intuitionistically definable class of predicate Kripke frames is closed under generated subframes. Then F 2 U Fi.if the class is definable by a set of formulas with equality.3. Then for any N modal Kripke model M such that M != L for any u E M .37 Kripke frame semantics erty (cf.35 Let ( F i I i E I ) be a family consisting of all different components of a predicate Kripke frame F . disjoint sums and p(=)morphic images. IL(=)(F~). MORPHISMS OF KRIPKE FRAMES 229 In particular.3. Proposition 13p'-morphic images . 1 Finally let us prove a predicate analogue of Lemma 1.18.=) Proposition 3. u k C l * A ~ b ' v E *(u)M.

u (If. Let Mo be a propositional model over the same propositional frame as M . M. Let a0 E ( D . KRIPKE SEMANTICS Proof Similar to 1.v I= X ( p ) @ M .. c D. v E Ri(u)...C D . Consider = U so the first option. a E D. u k 3s O i P ( x ) . Consider a model M = ( F .3.3.44 and the soundness of the substitution rule in 3. Hence O i P ( a ) and thus M .29..= Oi3xP(x).. then D..~ R ~ . u . or D.)..230 CHAPTER 3. c D. Proof (1) (Only if.. 0 otherwise. = D.. M. . for all u E F. G .D ) . . M Then by induction we obtain for any propositional formula X ( p ) for any v E M.. Then there exists a path u o R i . is denoted by F 8 V. U ~ . for some U .) Let uo be a root of F. Proposition 3. . A CD-frame (F.[) such that (for a certain P E P L 1 ) c JW(P) := {ao) if a0 E D. Then M I v P ( a ) for some v E R i ( u ) .3.ukO*A* Moru/=p..vI=p++ . u ~. = D. Hence for any u E M and C from 1. D.4. . v I= X ( A ) .. # D. 3.2 (1) A rooted N-modal predicate Kripke frame F has a constant domain zff Vi E IN F t= Bai.42. # D. But by Lemma 1. ~ D. Mo. in which V = D. It follows that for some k D. v we have D.2. for any u . Thus for some i . v k A .4.42 and so by 1. If F does not have a constant domain.D..) Suppose M is a Kripke model over F and M I u t. and thus D. G D. V E F ..4 Constant domains Definition 3.1 A predicate Kripke frame F has a constant domain (or F is a CD-frame ) iff D. # D.. v E F. . such that for any v E M Mo.u ..19 and the choice of Mo Hence the claim follows. .3. (2) A rooted intuitionistic Kripke frame F has a constant domain iff F It .

Under this valuation we have u Iy q. then M . since a0 6D. u Oi3xP(x). Definition 3. ¤ from Definition 3. { w ) otherwise. Consider the valuation [ in F such that for any w 0 i f wRu. u Iy q and M . but M .. = D. for an intuitionistic F.. I f w R u .4 A predicate Kripke frame F = ((W.). Lemma 3. c D. v 3 x P ( x ) .5 (1) For an N-modal frame F. and suppose D. W .3.and thus u Iy V x P ( x )V q. we have D...R N ) .):= IX T h e class o f CD-frames is not closed under disjoint sums (the reader can easily construct a counterexample). ex:. is a class of intuitionistic CD-frames). . on the other hand.1 it is clear that the class o f CD-frames is closed under generated subframes. ) Let u be root o f F . but there is an equivalent semantics generated by a class with this property. u IF V x ( P ( x )V q) and U R U . (Only if. Definition 3.3 Modal and intuitionistic Kripke semantics with constant domains are generated by CD-frames: CK$) := {ML(')(x) {IL(')(x) / X is a class of N-modal CD-frames). . but u IF V x ( P ( x )V q). so there exists a0 E ( D . u ly V x P ( x ) .). In fact. and thus w Ik P ( a ) for any a E D. ( 2 ) Let R be the relation in F. then obviously D.=. Since u R v . which contradicts M .D ) is called a local CD-frame if it satisfies (*) ViVuVv (uRiv =+ D.4. a E D. for some v E W = R ( u ) .4. F is a local CD-frame i# F IF C D iff all cones in F have constant domains. q E PLO and t w ( Q )= 0 for all other predicate letters Q. w @u implies w It.2. u It. u Iy P ( a ) V q. v Iy P ( a o ) . v Iy P ( a ) for some v E R ( u ) . .. Proof Easily follows from 3. F 1 A Bai iff every cone FTu ~EIN has a constant domain iff F is a local CD-frame.4. suppose uRw. and thus M .4. ( I f .4.4.. (2) Similarly.) I f M is an intuitionistic Kripke model over F and M .D. Therefore u Iy C D . for a certain P E P L 1 . CONSTANT DOMAINS 231 Then we have M . but M . u 3 x O P ( x ) . q. # D. R1. . I t is clear that [ is intuitionistic. Hence M . V X ( P ( X ) V q). = D. = D.

w Proposition 3 4 9 . = D. assume that ( F .3.D ) ++ ( F ' . B y 3.38 this class is modally (or intuitionistically) definable.6 C H A P T E R 3. I t suffices t o consider the case when uRiv. on the other hand.4.232 Proposition 3. i f u. Dl) for a connected CD-frame ( F . Proof In a local CD-frame.f l ) : ( F . due t o the surjectivity. so we can apply 3. then b y Lemma 3.D ) . Dl) is local C D . and all the FTu are CD-frames..3. W Exercise 3 4 7 Show that the class o f CD-frames is not closed under p-morphic .D ) . W e know from Lemma 1.39 that F' is connected. (2) Conversely. SO flu = flu as functions.8 Every connected local CD-frame is a CD-frame. generated sub- frames and p-morphic images.4.. i f X is a class o f (N-modal) local CD-frames. Dl) are connected CD-frames. + : Proof ( 1 ) Again we show flu = flu by induction on the length o f a non-oriented path from u t o v . Let us now describe morphisms o f local CD-frames.. (1) If ( f o . ( F ' . so it is C D by 3.3.6. Then ( f .D ) (F'. v are in the same component.8. then all the maps flu (and certainly their targets D(fo(u)) u E F coincide and for ( F ' .4. = D.38. This easily follows b y induction on the length o f a non-oriented path from u t o v. f F -+F' and g : D. ( F ' .. then D.4. T h e n flu = f l u 1 D. KRIPKE SEMANTICS (1) The class of local CD-frames is closed under disjoint sums. Proof ( 1 ) B y 3. D') for f i = ( S ) ~ E F . Lemma 3. T h e targets coincide.. (2) CD-frames and local CD-frames generate equivalent semantics. (2) Note that every CD-frame is a local CD-frame.21.4. images. f i ) ( F . since D.3. ---+ DL is a surjective map. .5 and 3. but closed under p'-morphic images. D') is a connected CD-frame.

8 and apply Proposition 3.3.4. g. For every u E F consider V.I 2 IVI for any u E F. -+ F'.26. = gut 1 D.23. (Fi I i E I ) a family of all its G are exactly the maps of diflerent components. Corollary 3.3.4. Then F is reducible to F' and thus14 ML(F) 5 ML(F1) (and IL(F) E IL(F') for the intuitionistic case).4. 3. CONSTANT DOMAINS (2) Trivial by definition. w Every Kripke frame over a propositional frame F is reducible to some Kripke frame F a V. - %'(a) := gv(a) if a E Dv. where every fi : Fi -w G (as a p-morphism onto its image) has iEI the form described in 3.9.4..3. : D. the following proposition holds (its intuitionstic version was proved in [Ono. a0 otherwise. Proof Assuming h : F f v -tt F' T u. Then the p-morphisms F the form U fi. let us show To simplify notation. g ) : F thus ML(F) 5 ML(F1) by Proposition 3. --+ V a surjective map.9 is briefly denoted by f @ g.4. we assume that F = F f v and F' = F'Tu.4. In fact. Proposition 3. with a singleton V.11 is not transferred to the case with equality.11 Let F = (F. More precisely. L! a0 be a e fixed element of V. the following surjective function g. : D. 19891: 1 4 ~ Proposition y 3.13. The pmorphism described in 3. 19721731).3. In fact. for example. . Proof Note that every F i is a CD-frame by 3.4.4. D) and F' = F' @ V be predicate Kripke frames such that F is reducible to F' and ID.10 Let F be a local CD-frame. so we obtain ( h .11 implies that IL(F @ V) c I L ( F @ V') if IVI > IV'I But a similar assertion does not hold for logics with equality (even for infinite V'). and Remark 3. consider the following formula [Skvortsov.4. It is clear that uRiul implies g.12 Proposition 3.

if a p. b E V.for real numbers or functions. Then1' M. But does this properly correspond to our intuitive understanding of equality? In fact. v II. Then Ea = h(a).. whenever a # b.P ( a ) ) for a E V. Lemma 3. .a # b iff a .9): u k a = b iff a equals b.IL'(F @ V')). we can replace 2 with < if we accept Axiom of Choice.otherwise the map a H Za embeds V is H A ( F f u). The standard way is to interpret equality as coincidence of individuals ('normal 150f course. there are more formal reasons for modifying the notion of predicate Kripke frame.2. Consider Ea := {v E F f u I M. then Ea = zb for some a # b (from V) .) If IHA(FTu)l IVI for every u E F . y Iy P ( a ) - P(b) Therefore. Let h : V .13 CHAPTER 3.15 Proof Let M be an intuitionistic model over F @ V and let u E F .4.5 (see below) shows that the principle of decidable equality DE is valid in any intuitionistic Kripke frame.H A ( F f u ) be an injection. b are different. u whenever a . In classical model theory there exist two ways of dealing with equality. 3. u I Ao.5.A0 the sets zfi Vu E F IHA(Ffu)l 2 IV1.10.1 Kripke frames with equality Introduction Let us first make some informal comments about interpreting equality. but different in another world. we should evaluate a = b with respect to a certain world. . and consider a model M over F such that for any w 2 M. and thus Za # Eb. Hence M. a # b. u II.0. 16Recall that M. (Only if. and thus M. we have A E ( I L Z ( F@ V) .a # b A (P(a) = P(b)). For example. this happens in intuitionistic analysis . It is clear that Z a E HA(FTu). In Kripke frame semantics this interpretation is the simplest (Definition 3.5 3. So we should choose the interpretations of equality appropriately.Ao. equality may be undecidable. but IVI > 2IFl.234 L e m m a 3. so it might happen that a and b are the same in a world u. In particular. KRIPKE SEMANTICS F @ V II. set F contains an infinite cone F t u and V' is countable. and thus M Iu II. But from the intuitionistic point of view.) Suppose IVI 5 IHA(Ffu)l for some u E F. w IF P(a) iff w E h(a). Examples of this kind are quite popular in literature. u It. But as mentioned in the Introduction to Part 11. (If.

(2) Given a propositional Kripke frame F . and a function E satisfying (E1)-(Ed). we can uniquely restore the corresponding K F E as (F.5.3. .). In more detail. Moreover.b) = { u I a xu b).a ) . then x = (=c. but the second approach also makes sense. a non-empty set D+. Kripke sheaves are obtained from KFEs by taking quotients of individual domains through the corresponding equivalence relation.. KRIPKE FRAMES W I T H EQUALITY 235 models'). It is well-known that in classical logic these two approaches are equivalent. as we shall see. This semantics is stronger than the semantics of Kripke frames K for formulas with equality the crucial formula D E can be refuted in a KFE. such that for any a. . D . b ) ) 2 E(a. x ) .RN).). Kripke semantics for intuitionistic and modal logics corresponds to classical 'normal models'..5. The second way is to interpret equality as an equivalence relation preserving values of basic predicates. We will also describe an equivalent semantics of 'Kripke sheaves'. . x ) be a KFE.1 A predicate Kripke frame with equality (KFE) is a triple (F. KE is stronger than K for logics without equality.R1. b) for i E I N . . D . 3. - Then the following holds: ( E l ) E ( a .R1.5.~w is a family of equivalence relations ( x u C D. in which (F. Lemma 3. F = (W. b E D + the function E : D + x D+ E(a.5. because we can always take the quotient domain modulo the equivalence relation corresponding to equality.2 (1) Let (F. . Thus we obtain the notion of a predicate Kripke frame with equality ( K F E ) and the corresponding semantics KE. which is &-stable for every i E IN: The following lemma gives an alternative definition of KFEs presenting them as a kind of 0-sets (see Chapter 4).2 Kripke frames with equality Definition 3. x ) . . i f F = (W.. with . So we can interpret equality in a predicate Kripke frame as an equivalence relation on every individual domain D. (E4) Ri(E(a. x D. and obtain a logically equivalent 'normal' interpretation.D ) is a predicate Kripke frame and x is a valuation for the binary predicate symbol '= ' satisfying the standard equality axioms.Consider 2 W .RN). b) = E(b. D.

( E 2 ) follow respectively from the symmetry and the transitivity of xu. bl. . .a.9. . and ( E 2 ) implies the transitivity.J ) is intuitionistic. . Lemma 3. b) is called the measure of identity of a and b.236 Proof C H A P T E R 3.(P).2. In this case we define forcing M . Definition 3. b) C E(b. . F I A t t for the intuitionistic case. where J is a valuation i n ( F . b) n E(b. Again we use the notation M 1 A. . a n ) E & ( P ) & a1 xu bl & . The reflexivity of xu implies ( E 3 ) . .5. xu bn * (bl.bn E D+ ( a l . a ) n E(b. x. (2) Note that E ( a .) E [. intuitionistic KFE-models) over F .b). .2.it follows that u E E ( a .D . . obvious.12 with the only difference: A modal predicate formula A is called true i n M i f FA is true at every world of M .. x) is a pair M = ( F .2. intuitionistic) predicate formula A is called valid i n a KFE (respectively. . a ) by ( E l ) . b) implies u E E ( a . & a. ( E 4 ) follows from the Ri-stability of x.5. similarly for the intuitionistic case. (E2) and similarly. a ) C E ( a . Then we define forcing M . such that for every P E P L n . b)..e. . The reflexivity of xu is E ( a .13 has the following analogue. # 0 . E ( a . with the following difference: A KFE-model M is called intuitionistic if the corresponding model without equality ( F . x D. . Thus u E E ( a . Definition 3.0 .2.4 A modal (respectively. . b) = E ( a .-sentence A ) by the same conditions as i n Definition 3.3 A KFE-model over a Kripke frame with equality F = ( F . and is also denoted by E ( a ) . u =i A (for u E F and a D. a ) for a E D. u IF A according to Definition 3. .b. a ) is called the measure of existence (or the extent) of a . . The Ri-stability of x follows from (E4). n 2 1 and a l . KRIPKE SEMANTICS ( 1 ) ( E l ) . i.. .e. E ( a . and such an a exists since D. M I A . i.. ( E l ) implies the symmetry of xu. Lemma 3. ( E 3 ) implies the non-emptiness of every D.. .G D.11 obviously transfers to KFE-models. F 1A for the modal case. S4-based KF'E) F iff it is true i n all KFEmodels (respectively. .D ) respecting the relations xu.

3. A ( x ) an N-modal formula withFV(A)= r ( x ) .1 for any v E R ( u ) .17.uIFA&uRv + M. we have to show that for any P E PLn. .3.18. M. bi. u b OA. (ii) M It. u t= V x A ( x ) iff V a E D n M . 11 = n .6 For an intuitionistic model M and D.2. 11 = n.. u Ik A iff M . The pattern of M is the intuitionistic KFE-model Mo over F such that for any u E F and any atomic D. 3. F be an S4-based KFE.8 Let M o . u I= O P ( b ) .3.r F . a.5. u Il. v b P ( a ) iff Vv E R ( u ) M .5. v I= P ( a ) iff M . L e m m a 3.-sentence A without equality Definition it is intuitionistic by definition.5.V x A ( x ) i f f Vv E R ( u ) V a E Dz M . v. u I= A ( a ) . v IF A ( a ) . M . u It. hence M . M . such that Vi ai xu bi.A ( x ) iff V u E M V a E DZ M . Then (i) for any u E M M . M a KFE-model ove. v t= P ( b ) .9 The pattern exists for every S4-based KFE-model. b . a .5. by 3. Then x (i) for any u E M M . which implies (*). We also have an analogue of 3. A ( x ) x an intuitionistic formula with F V ( A ) = r ( x ) . u IF 7 B i f f Vv E R ( u ) M . 3.20 by the same arguments. u I= O P ( a ) iff M . In fact. Thus Mo always exists. Let us check soundness of this definition: L e m m a 3. (2) Let M be an intuitionistic KFE-model with the accessibility relation R . KRIPKE FRAMES WITH EQUALITY Lemma 355 .A ( a ) . v I= P ( b ) by 3.5. M .16: L e m m a 3. v ly B. Proof According to 3. b E D.vIkA Next we obtain analogues of 3.5. u k A ( a ) .uIta#biff V v ~ R ( u ) a $ . u (iz) M t= A ( x ) iff V u E M V a E D. Then (*) Vv E R ( u ) M .5.2.7 (1) Let M be an N-modal KFE-model.-sentence A M.

x) implies its refutability in (F.10 Let Mo be the pattern of M. predicate Kripke frames can be regarded as a particular kind of KFEs.15. so refutability of a formula in (F.D. ML(F. the proof of soundness is postponed until Section 3. x) # ML(F.5. Every valuation in (F.2. D) C ML(F.18. D l x ) is a valuation in (F.7 and 3. D l x).15. Proposition 3.5. D.D.2. Then obviously (F.2. On the other hand. L e m m a 3. Then W Proof The same as for 3. which is equivalent to a xu b by Definition 3. This notation is not quite legal before we show soundness. A trivial counterexample is (F.5. D). so it may happen that ML(F. Then we have Mo. P r o o f For formulas without equality the definitions of forcing in (F. Corollary 3.5.238 Now there is an analogue of 3. x) and (F. D is two-element and x is universal.5.b. x ) where F is a reflexive singleton. Dl x) k 3xP(x) > + VxP(x). KRTPKE SEMANTICS L e m m a 3.-sentence A and for any intuitionistic sentence A Mo I A iff M k t Proof The same as for 3.14 Not all valuations in (F.5. x ) . b.11 Let F be an S4-based KFE.uIFa=b~ax. CHAPTER 3.5. with a difference in the case when A is atomic of the form a = b. D. H The set of formulas valid in a KFE F is denoted by ML(')(F) (or IL(=)(F)).D) are the same.12 For a class C of S4-based KFEs Proof Followsfrom3.10. D). . u M. D).16. x ) . D. D) are admissible in (F. D.6.5.11 asintheproofof2.13 For any KFE (F. R e m a r k 3.5. D) ! 3xP(x) > QxP(x). while (F.25 based on 3. u != AT(= O(a = b)) @ V E R(u) a x. then for any u E M and for any intuitionistic D.1. A E I F = .

for any F E KC.7. in a simple KFE.b E D+(a # b + E(a. The other way round. if E ( a .1) such that for any u E F. a .5. x ) with F E C. (2) A K F E (F.) in the intutionistic case. x ) is simple iff V a .3.17 Strong morphisms of KFE-models are defined as morphisms of their frames satisfying the reliability condition from Definition 3. 3. D . x ) .15. D . Proof (1) Valuations and the corresponding forcing relations in F and F= are just the same.2).5.2. i n which xu= idD. In particular.f l ) : (F.17 Let F = (F. b) implies a = b. where E i s the measure of identity (3. x ) . we have A E M L ( F . Then ML(KEC) = ML(KC). A strong (p-)morphism from F to F' is a (p-)morphism of frames without equality f = ( f o . (2) In fact.5. Definition 3. and IL(=)(F) = IL(')(F. suppose A E ML(KC). D . If A E ML(KEC). Hence A E ML(KEC). then A is valid in every KFE over C. Proof Consider the modal case. Dl) (Definition 3. b) = 0 whenever a # b. similarly for strong p-morphisms and strong isomorphisms.5. for a class C of intuitionistic propositional frames. D . F' = (F'.5. A E n { M L ( F ) I F E KC) = ML(KC). Then ML(=)(F) = ML(=)(F=). D'. x ) by Lemma 3. D ) is associated with a simple K F E F = = (F. KlUPKE FRAMES WITH EQUALITY 239 L e m m a 3. D ) C M L ( F . D) (F'. for any u E F .. then a xu b holds only for a = b. u E E ( a .15 ( I ) Every Kripke frame F = (F. b E D+ - A strong isomorphism is a strong morphism which is an isomorphism of frames without equality.as morphisms of Kripke frames preserving equality. .3. Similarly. I L (ICEC) = IL (KC). So by Lemma 3. Proposition 3.3 Strong morphisms In this section we consider strong morphisms defined in an obvious way .13.5. The other way round. A is valid in the associated simple frame F.5. Then for any (F.3. b ) = 0 ) .5. A larger class of morphisms will be considered in Section 3. D. x') be Kripke frames with equality.16 Let C be a class of N-modal propositional frames.

a ) & a xu b * MI. This yields the categories o f N-modal KFEs and strong morphisms. o f KFE-models.3.4 easily transfers t o KFEs: L e m m a 3.u ! B = M'.21 Let ( f o . (2) The composition of strong morphisms (in the sense of 3. and let M' be a KFE-model over F'.[) is a KFE-model.e. we put for any u E F .3.D ) t o (F'. MI. KRIPKE SEMANTICS Obviously.18 (1) For a KFE F = ( F . then for any u E F and for any Du-sentence B M. with fl. f l ) : M --+= M'. x). If the models are intuitionistic. and similarly for ++=.5.5. Then M = ( F .(P). the same holds for any intuitionistic D.sentence (and the intuitionistic forcing). x ) are simple. fo(u) b P ( f l . . x ) the identity morphism idF := is a strong isomorphism. H Now we have an analogue o f Proposition 3.20 If ( f o . Proof An exercise.D . Proof As in the proof o f 3. similarly for p-morphisms and isomorphisms. i f the KFEs F = ( F .5. (1) . L e m m a 3. Lemma 3. p-morphisms by -H=.3. f l ) : F -= F' be a KFE-morphism. for KFE-models M .D . intuitionistic KFEs and strong morphisms. then a strong KFE-morphism from F t o F' is nothing but an =-morphism from (F. we have t o check that a E tU(P) Q i ~xu bi & i b E (. F' = (F'. fo(u) P ( f l u . strong isomorphisms by E. where flu . L e m m a 3. b ) .5. M'. Then there exists a unique model M over F such that ( f o .240 CHAPTER 3. * i. and similarly.12. P 6 PLm.(c). B is obtained from B by replacing occurrences of every c E D.B . fo(u) flu . In fact.3.4) is a strong morphism. Dl). strong Strong morphisms o f KFEframes and models are denoted by -=. Dl.11 L e m m a 3.19 Strong isomorphisms are exactly isomorphisms in the category of N-modal KFEs and strong morphisms.f l ) : M += M ' .

F generated. V are called It is obvious that M V is a KFE-model. x r V := ( x u ) u c v . KRIPKE FRAMES W I T H EQUALITY where a x u b : = ' d i a i xu bi. rooted frames (models) and cones are trivially extended to frames and models with equality.4 Main constructions Now let us extend the definition of subframes and submodels 3. for the intuitionistic case. If M = ( F . Proof Along the same lines as 3. r L e m m a 3.5. F = ( F . (2) M L ( = ) ( F ) & ML(=)(F .J ) is a KFE-model. since by the definition of a strong KFE-morphism. then M L ' ( F ) E M L = ( F 1 ) .f i ) : M uniqueness of M' follow easily. and similarly. and by the definition of a KFE-model. A subframe of F obtained by restriction to V is where D V is the same as in 3.5. But (1) holds. D e f i n i t i o n 3.3. IL'(F) C I L = ( F 1 ) in the intuitionistic case. F'. we define the submodel where J 1 V is the same as i n 3.5. The definitions of reliability. . since J 1 V coincides with J on V . 1V..15 to the case with equality.3. M a KFE-model over F . now using 3. Then (1) M r V is a reliable submodel of M . 3. .R1.13: - M' and the P r o p o s i t i o n 3.24 ( G e n e r a t i o n l e m m a ) Let F be a KFE. . If V is stable. 3. V W .23 Let F = (W. V a stable set of worlds in F . The claim ( f o . Hence we have an analogue of 3. 3.5.5. V ) .D l x ) a KFE.R N ) be a propositional Kriplce frame.7.5. similarly.22 If F += F' for KFEs F .

27 Let F be a propositional Kriplce.28 Let C be a class of N-modal or intuitionistic propositional Kripke frames. and for u @ V there is nothing to prove. Proof Similar to 3.18. D . where L is M L or IL. It suffices to extend the domain function D to the whole F .3.5.we have to show that G is F T u for some K F E F over F. where (KEF) f u := {F u I F E KEF).5. viz. Definition 3.5. x).26 ( I ) ML(=)(F) = u€F n ML(=)(F~u) and similarly for the intuitionistic case.we need a valuation J in F such that Ju = Jh for u E V.20. We use the same map (j. We do this by putting Then D' is obviously expanding.3. since F t u is a generated subframe and D. JU(P) := otherwise. To prove ( 2 ) . then KE(F T u ) = (KEF) 1u .25 Then we obtain an analogue of 3. Then .27.5. W This implies an analogue of 3. L e m m a 3. J respects xu for u E V. u E F . We define cones exactly as in 3. since it coincides with the valuation 6'. x is extended in the trivial way (as identity at every world). CT is the class of all cones of frames from C .21: L e m m a 3.3. KRIPKE SEMANTICS Proof Almost the same as for 3.242 CHAPTER 3. ) and apply i Lemma 3. (2) For a class C of N-modal or intuitionistic KFEs. Given a KFE G = ( F t u . This is really a valuation.28: Proposition 3. 5 DL for any w E F .

3. t . I are functions: 1:x-Y. 1 = i€I n ML(')(F~). Proof Similar to 3. and t ( f ) the target of f .- .3. Let us also define disjoint sums: Definition 3. To define them.5. Di. There are also the following conditions ('axioms'): o is a partial function . we obtain an analogue and similarly L e m m a 3.28. For a morphism f . the object o (f ) is called the origin of f .6 Kripke sheaves Now let us consider semantical equivalents of KFEs called 'Kripke sheaves'. In precise terms. i) := Di(u) x {i). let us begin with the SCcase. (a. X is called the class of objects of C and is also denoted by ObC. it can be defined as a tuple. I(a) is called the identity morphism of a and is also denoted by 1. Y is called the class of morphisms of C and is also denoted by MorC. i) f o r i E I. b E D. b) denotes the class of all morphisms in C between a and b. where L is M L or IL respectively. Y x Y --+ Y .29 Let Fi = (Fi.27 and 3.. apply 3. In this case a Kripke sheaf is a set-valued functor defined on a certain category. this is read as 'f is a morphism from a to b' (or between a and b).30 ML(') IL(=) U Fi G I (U Fi) iEI = zEI n lL(=)(Fi)for the intuitionistic case. The notation f : a b or a f b means that o ( f ) = a and t ( f ) = b. a . Since Fi is isomorphic to a generated subframe of (b. x i ) be predicate Kripke frames with equality. Recall that a category consists of objects ('points') and morphisms ('arrows') between some of these points.. 3.5.6. C(a.5. Then iEI where D(u. where X. u E Fi. o. i) := a xi b U F i .26(2). Y are non-empty classes. KRSPKE SHEAVES (2) L(=)(KEc) = L(=)(KE(cT)).5.

: D. is called the (propositional) base o f cP = ( F .D ...) i n the world v .D . then ( a o 0)o y = a o (0o y ) . = p. T h e frame F . -+ P P then x aoP z. D. . p = (pi. MorC := R. W e call puv(a) the inheritor of the individual a (from D. 5y ---+ z . U RN. p) Note that in R*.3 Let F = (W.. p = (p. The domains D.D . v ) := { ( u . Lemma 3. Definition 3. A standard example o f a category is S E T . p) such that cP* := ( F * .. : D. o pv. in which objects are arbitrary sets. p) is an S4-based Kripke sheaf over F*.R1.6. . = a. morphisms are maps.where R* is the reflexive transitive closure o f R1 U . KRIPKE SEMANTICS a. Viz. . (transition maps) satisfying the following functoriality conditions: (1) for every u E F..w).w ) := (u. 1 5 i I N ) a family of functions pi.R) [Goldblatt.. . o a = a o 1. T o extend this definition t o arbitrary frames. p ) where ( F .2 A Kripke sheaf over a propositional Kripke frame F is a triple = ( F . 0 are consecutive). p) and denoted is called N-modal i f F is N-modal. I u R v ) is a family of functions p. Definition 3. R N ) is associated with an S4-frame F* := (W. y. satisfying the conditions 3.6.1 A n (S4-based. := ( u .6.6. ( F . then 1. i f f arrows a. 19841. C ( u . u ) .D .R1. i. are also called the fibres or the stalks of a.e.. ( 2 ) for R*.R*). T h e composition is defined according t o the 'triangle rule': ( u . = idD.R N )be a propositional Kripke frame. or intuitionistic) Kripke sheaf over an S 4 frame F is a SET-valued co-functor defined on C a t F . .D .e. There is a well-known canonical way o f associating a category C = CatF with an S4-frame F = (W. b y @ ( F . So arrows o f C just represent t h e relation R. p = (p. satisfying the following 'coherence' conditions: - .D ) is a system of domains... is defined i f f o ( 0 ) = t(a)(i. the category o f sets. . ~ ) )1.244 (1) la: a (2) a o (3) i f x -+ CHAPTER 3.v) 0 ( v . (the identity function on D.D ) a predicate Kripke frame. Definition 3.1 ( I ) . recall that an arbitrary propositional Kripke frame F = (W.. . (4) if x (5) if x a y z u . (2) u R v R w ( i n F ) implies p.7. -+ D. I u R i v .. p..).20 p is a system o f functions parameterised b y 1 u R * v ) . This means that a Kripke sheaf is a triple = ( F . .. we put ObC := W.

(a) for a E D.3.u. := p ~ o u .6. .D .(a) and alu := (allv.u. . KRJPKE SHEAVES (1) if u & ~ u ~ R ~ .).D . Then it follows that p* determines a Kripke sheaf over F*. H Of course for S4-based Kripke sheaves the above conditions ( I ) ..ZO L i~k ~Uk t~L= ~id^. a E D. ( 2 ) follow from Definition 3.uk.. . l .3 (I).3. with the only difference: < Definition 3.. k V path ~ k any ( u .Rj. . < ( P g ) (for n > 0 ) .u k R i k u for some k 2 0. pi. whenever Then there exists a unique Kripke sheaf ( F . ~ U ~ .1. p*) is just a. ( 2 ) show that pz. p) put pi. n D. .a. ku v .. .a. we sometimes use the notation alv := p. . R ~ then Piouul OPilzlluz O ' ' ' OPikukv = P i o u v l O P j l v l v z O ~ ' Opjmw.. ~ then P ~ ~ U U ~ O P ~ ~ .) E u It.<) is called a Kripke sheaf model over D. If (F. Z ~ ~ .. : D. . .) iff (a1.. a.P$ iff u E <.). ~ E R* we can define a function pt.18 Proof For any pair ( u .... := p.6. P O (2) if u R ~ ~ u ~ R ~u~ R izk . Then the conditions 3.. .. if uRiu.. and pz.2. . But this notation should be used carefully. p*) such that pi.D ) .10): u IF PP(a1.(P.D .) E DZ. whenever uRiv..-sentence. A is defined by the same clauses as in predicate Kripke frames (Definition 3. . for = ( F .D.a. So every Kripke sheaf can be presented in the form described in 3.pi.5 A valuation i n an S4-based Kripke sheaf (and the corresponding Kripke sheaf model) is called intuitionistic if it satisfies the following conditions: < Then the'intuitionistic forcing in M is defined by the following clauses (cf. ' = PC. u k A between a world u in an N-modal Kripke sheaf model and an N-modal D. such that p:.~ ~ pfor . .u. . = pjuv if uRiv and uRjv. p) is just a ualuation i n the frame ( F . u1. -4 ) D.4 A valuation i n a Kripke sheaf @ = ( F .. is well defined.. ( 2 ) hold and the corresponding Kripke sheaf ( F . . lsSo in particular.and U R ~ ~ V ~..D. l ~ p ~ . If is a valuation.9). . So 3.. uR*u. . M = (a.(a) # p.v ) . Forcing relation M . i k .. .. Definition 3.lu) for a = ( a l .6.3 yields an alternative definition of a Kripke sheaf.6. i l .6.iO.6.. . . uRiv. Viz. . The conditions ( I ) . p) is a Kripke sheaf. = i d D . := idD.. Definition 3.6.. because it is ambiguous if the fibres are not disjoint (then it may happen that p.2.

. L e m m a 3. a ) .6.6. . u I A(a) & uRv t Proof Similar to 3. Then M . The definitions for the intuitionistic case are similar. a).. . .an) iff u l t 3 x A ( x ) iff 3a E D. . 1x1 = n .-sentence A ( a ) M . L e m m a 3.A(puv . . KRIPKE SEMANTICS u IF ( B 3 C ) ( a l . p. u I I.. . u IF V x A ( x ) i f fQv E R ( u )Qa E Dz M . v It.. 1x1 = n .. u E M . v It.-B(a) iff Vv E R ( u ) M . .pu.a ) . u II.a # b iff Vv E R ( u ) p. A is called valid in a Kriplce sheaf @ if it is true under any valuation in @. Then for any intuitionistic D.7 The intuitionistic forcing relation has the following properties: M .16. A ( x ) an N-modal formula with F V ( A ( x ) )= r ( x ) . + M . t L e m m a 3. Proof Similar to 3. .10 Let M be an intuitionistic Kriplce sheaf model with the accessibility relation R . A ( x ) an intuitionistic D. M . . v be worlds in an intuitionistic Kriplce sheaf model M .17.246 CHAPTER 3.9 Let M be an N-modal Kriplce sheaf model.2.6.(an)). u != A(a). v ItB(c.6. ..6.A(p. u t= V x A ( x ) iff Va E DE M . # puw(b).8 An N-modal predicate formula A is called true in an N-modal Kripke sheaf model M if V A is true at every world of M . L e m m a 3.A(a). u I V x B ( x . . Then for any u E M M .a l .2. u II.-formula with F V ( A ( x ) )= r ( x ) . Definition 3.(al). .(a) Proof Obvious from 3.6. v IpL B(p.5.6 Let u .2. .18. The notation for the truth and validity is the same as in the case of Kripke frames.an) iff Vv 'v R ( u )Vc E D. Proof Similar to 3.

¤ Now we have an analogue of 3.11 Let @ be an S4-based Kripke sheaf.6.2. intuitionistic) propo. u k (It) A(a) iff M.11.6. Then Proof Along the same lines as 3. intuitionistic) Kripke sheaf model. ¤ Definition 3. then (1) for any u E M . B(x) be congruent modal (or intuitionistic) formux las.16 Let A(x).3. @ k C (or @ Ik C ) denotes that C is valid in @. KRTPKE SHEAVES 247 Definition 3.6. sitional formula.6.-sentence without equality A As in the case of Kripke frames. for any intuitionistic D. a E Dz M . now using 3. A an N-modal (respectively.26: L e m m a 3.-sentence A (2) for any A E IF' MoIkA i f f ~ k ~ ~ .6. M a model over F . intuitionistic) Kripke sheaf over a propositional frame F .13 For a set C of modal (or intuitionistic) sentences. Proof Similarly to the case of Kripke frames (Lemma 3. u I= (IF) B(a).2. Proof Similar to 3.32). validity for propositional formulas in @ is the same as in F .2. .14 Let @ be an N-modal (respectively.6. intuitionistically) definable (by C). the pattern is an intuitionistic model and it always exists.15 Let Q. L e m m a 3. P r o p o s i t i o n 3. The class of all C-sheaves is denoted by VKs(C) and called modally (respectively.15 and 3. be an S4-based Kripke sheaf. and let M be a modal (respectively.24.6. 11 = n.12 If Mo is a pattern of a Kripke sheaf model M . L e m m a 3. Then @ k (It)A iff @ k (Ik)A. a C-sheaf is a Kripke sheaf (of the corresponding type) validating every formula from C .f3. Thus the set of formulas valid i n a Kripke sheaf is closed under congruence. Then for any u E M .3. The pattern of M is the model Mo over F such that for any u E F and any atomic D. A E I F = .25.2.

29: for any v E @Tu. v t= C(a. a E DL~' We have t o check the properties 2.16 we can replace A with a congruent formula. P r o o f Along the same lines as 3. so we assume that A is clean.17 (Soundness t h e o r e m ) (I) The set of all modal predicate formulas (with equality) valid in a Kripke sheaf is a modal predicate logic (with equality).248 CHAPTER 3.2. c'lv). where P E P L n occurs in A. So A B implies OiA - . c E D r Let c' be the part of c corresponding t o y.2. v I=P ( a ) iff M. u k [a/x]OiA w Vv E Ri(u) M. v I= [p. then Let m = lz 1. v t = Q iff M .26.-sentence Q M l . T h e o r e m 3. and r ( y ) C_ F V ( C ) C r(xy). and similarly for B..17(1)-(4) for this relation. By Lemma 3.2. Again we choose a distinct list z such that FV(A) U r ( y ) = r(z). and show that cP k SA for S = [C(x. the list x y is distinct. a/x]A ¤ OiB. For (4) there is a slight difference: now M . So we assume that cP k A for a formula A and a Kripke sheaf Q. ( 1 The set of all intuitionistic predicate formulas (with equality) valid in an 1) S4-based Kripke sheaf is a superintuitionistic predicate logic (with equality). for any u E M . v k Q .26.2.29.J). Again we consider the equivalence relation on modal formulas A - B iff FV(A) = F V ( B ) and for any distinct x with FV(A) = r(x). For (1)-(3) the proof is the same as in 3. we show that for any u E @.3.y)/P(x)]. The main thing is t o check that formula substitutions preserve validity. BV(A) n r(y) = 0.6. q ) similarly t o 3. for any other atomic D. Given a model M = (a. KRIPKE SEMANTICS P r o o f Along the same lines as 3. We define MI = ( a .6. . a E Dz M I .

. a valuation in F corresponds to the valuation O([) in O(F) such that c for P E P L n . a) iff V E Ri(v) MI.(a) = a for any a E .) and the transition maps p. alw) w iff V E Ri(v) M.. a n ) E t. . p. every KFE F = (W..). Every predicate Kripke frame corresponds t o a Kripke sheaf. which follows from Definition 3..24 we present S B as (SB)(z. . because a. R1. v) corresponds to a Kripke sheaf O(F) constructed as follows. Let a.3. . C x u .). modulo x u . = b. n > 0. . and x. H R e m a r k 3. and O(e). But then the set of validities is not necessarily substitution-closed.v k B(clv. Du .RN. Exercise 5. q). Then obviously 77 = O ( 0 The argument for the intuitionistic case is left to the reader.a. alw) (by the induction hypothesis) w iff M. := ((al). we define E by <.3.1.3 and since uRiv implies D. KRTPKE SHEAVES 249 Then every subformula of A has the form B(z. Then we prove the claim: Vv E @I. .a)).6. note that validity in Kripke bundles is not substitution closed either. . coincide on PLO. every valuation in O(F) has the form O(E) for some valuation ( in F . where a. r(q) = BV(A). and p is the inclusion map. Here we use the equality (a1v)lw = alw. . Now if 77 is a valuation in O(F). We define O(F) as the Kripke sheaf with the fibres DL := {a. recall that ( a l . .18 One can similarly define forcing and validity for the case when p does not satisfy the coherence conditions (I). v I= B(clv. These 'frames' are a special kind of Kripke bundle considered in Chapter 5. a) % M . .6. More generally.a.13.19 Valuations (both modal and intuitionistic) in a KFE F and in the Kripke sheaf O(F) are associated. The following is almost obvious: L e m m a 3.6.uV a E ~ $ 1(M1. This definition is sound. due to .. n > 0. . (a. Namely. D.6. for u R ~ v O(F) is well defined. I a E D. . w I= Bl(clw. i. E D. where q is distinct.6.(P) depends only on classes of a l . a)(= (SB)(clv.a)) by induction. The other way round.) := a. . . q).e. w l= (SBl)(clw. Proof The above definition of O(E) is sound. Lemma 3. v I= Oi(SBl)(clv.(a. The only difference with 3..6. cf. modulo xu.5.2.2. . be the class of a E D. . . E is intuitionistic ifl O(J) is intuitionistic. so by 2. iff Vi ai xu bi. C D. .. .29 is in the case B = OiB1: M I . v t= (SB)(clv. (2) from 3.) for a = ( a l . in which uRiv always implies D.

10. = f .20 (1) For any N-modal formula A ( x l .9. every Kripke sheaf is equivalent to one of the form O ( F ) .D'.(an). .. p. a valuation E i n F . . (in @ ( F ) ) .u O i B ( % ) . we obtain B ( a . . u k B ( a ) iff V Jv R $ ( u ) O(E). A is an intuitionistic formula. D e f i n i t i o n 3. The claims ( 2 ) ..a.u k A ( ( a l ) u l .6. a l l . (2) If F is an N-modal KFE. These logics are denoted by M L ( = ) ( F ) . .A.20. since a. For example.19. . .. a n ) (in F ) iff Q(E).6. . .21 ( S o u n d n e s s t h e o r e m ) (I) The set of all modal predicate formulas (with equality) valid in a KFE is a modal predicate logic (with equality). a. then F O ( F )k A.17 and Lemma 3. for any u E F .6. A is an N-modal formula. Due to Theorem 3. . ( F . E D.IL(=)(F) as usual. KRIPKE SEMANTICS L e m m a 3.v [.x.6.6. (11) The set of all intuitionistic predicate formulas (with equality) valid i n an S4-based KFE is a superintuitionistic predicate logic (with equality).16.6. is The other way round. According to the general definitions from Section 2. . then F Il. . pd. (3) now follow from 3. let us introduce a convenient subclass of Kripke sheaves. To show this. 3. whenever u R * v . P r o o f (1) By induction on the complexity of A.: 6. - .).6.. v O i B ( a ) iffVv 'v R i ( u ) c . Q ( 6 ) . + A iff (3) If F is an intuitionistic KFE.250 C H A P T E R 3. ..D.u The remaining cases are left to the reader. u I= A(a1.23 A n isomorphism between Kripke sheaves ( F . : D. p) and DL such that f. . . D e f i n i t i o n 3. p') is a family of bijections f . 3.6. the modal predicate logic of a class of Kripke sheaves 3 is The superintuitionistic logic I L ( = ) ( ~ ) defined analogously.) and similarly for the intuitionistic case. ) iff H T h e o r e m 3. = p.A iff Q ( F ) Il.22 A Kripke sheaf is said to be disjoint i f all its fibres are disjoint. .6.

note that (alu) = a for a E D. We leave this as an exercise for the reader... DL := U{D. such : that Q. Speaking informally.' X~).) Finally. D". So This there is a natural bijection between D. Proof In fact.and the )) transition map pewsends every equivalence class a / XL to a / x (for a E DL).5. L e m m a 3. makes every individual from D. For a disjoint Kripke sheaf (F. ~ It follows easily that DL Dh and x. x.. h Now. namely.. we can replace each D. u E F f w ) . with DL = {(a.D 1 . uRiv implies .(a). b) E (D.25 The Kripke sheaves @ and O(G(@)) are isomorphic..pl'). thus G(@) is really a KFE. for a precise proof.24 Every Kripke sheaf is isomorphic to a disjoint Kripke sheaf over the same propositional frame.a) for any D. So there exists a well-defined bijection 8.. u uEF f o r a D. KRIPKE SHEAVES 251 A more general notion of morphism will be discussed in the next section. xh := {(a. . Consider the KFE G(@):= (F. u t= B(a) iff M'. one should check the equivalence M. where D" = (DL. x:. u . p) and a E D.-sentence B(a) if it holds for any atomic D. p) be a disjoint Kripke sheaf. viz. every class a" = (b/ xL) E D t contains a single element a from D.D.3. u) := (p. (For the surjectivity. put pL. Now let @ = (F. DL absorbs D.6. equivalent to all its predecessors.-sentence... where I w E F. It is almost obvious that isomorphic Kripke sheaves have the same modal (or superintuitionistic) logics.=F. : D -+ D. and DL/ XI..)~ (alu) = (blu)).6.6. D. and the domains of all R*-predecessors of u. v). D'. v E F . u k B(f. observation is used in the proof of the following c L e m m a 3.(a. appropriately. XI). b~ D.(b/ -6) = blu. a = (blu). uRiv. whenever uRiv.2: D'+ .) and change the functions p. I Here is an equivalent presentation of G(@) in the form described in Lemma 3..u) I a E D. we sometimes write aRiv and say that a is Ri-related t o v. Proof We have @ ( G ( @ = (F.

u IF ( r .27 Kripke sheaf semantics has the collection property.252 and CHAPTER 3. so . which means that the family of functions (8.u . satisfiability in cP and G(@)is the same.20.29 A theory (modal or intuitionistic) i s satisfiable i n a n L-KFE iff it is satisfiable i n a Kripke sheaf validating L. u I A for any = A E r.(b/ x:) = blv.25. the same is true for the intuitionistic semantics.6. M. Definition 3.(pE. pz. u I= r . = 8. On the other hand. A).A) i s called satisfiable in a n intuitionistic Kripke frame (or K F E ) F if there exists a n intuitionistic model (or KFE-model) M over F and a world u E M such that M. KRIPKE SEMANTICS 8.e.6. As we pointed out at the end of Subsection 3. KFEmodel) M over F and a world u E M such that M . or just KE-complete. by Lemma 3. u Iy B for any B E A. by Lemma 3. i. M. Iu E F) rn So we can introduce semantics generated by predicate Kripke frames with equality. Logics complete i n these semantics are called Kripke sheaf complete. Proof In fact.3. Due to Lemmas 3.6. a sentence A is satisfiable at F .25. u IF A for any A E r a n d M .28 A n N-modal theory I? is called satisfiable i n an N-modal Kripke frame (respectively. W For Kripke and Kripke sheaf semantics there also exists a stronger version of completeness.6. Proof Obvious. Thus K E E ) .6.(b/ x:)) = 8. Similarly to Corollary 3. . is an isomorphism between the Kripke sheaves Q(G(@))and a . u iff it is satisfiable at O(F).. as we shall see later on. A n intuitionistic theory (I?.4. Similarly the intuitionistic Kripke sheaf semantics KE~. is isomorphic to H O(G(@)). K F E ) F if there exists a model (respectively.20 and 3. F and Q(F) have the same logic (of the corresponding kind).6. Thus p -6.6. the same semantics are generated by Kripke sheaves.6.2. . i. every Kripke sheaf Q. Lemma 3.30.e.37 we obtain ICE) KE) Proposition 3. by Lemma 3.) is generated by the class of all intuitionistic KFEs (or Kripke sheaves).5.26 The N-modal Kripke sheaf semantics ICE$=) is generated by the class of all N-modal predicate Kripke frames with equality (or Kripke sheaves). Definition 3. every predicate Kripke 5 ICE$) and actually 4 frame is equivalent a simple KFE.

3. then {TA) is L-consistent. . and thus F separates A from L. if A @ L. with or without equality) i s satisfiable i n some Kripke L-frame (respectively.1 and also (5) the following diagram commutes whenever uRiu: Du =flu D>o(u) The latter condition can be briefly written as (for a E Du. Thanks to Lemma 3.{A)) is L-consistent. if A @ L.7. Proof In fact. . R i .R h ) .l. Therefore L is complete by Lemma 2. the remaining argument is the same as in the modal case. then 1 A is satisfiable in an L-frame F .1: Definition 3.p. then ( 0 . D.30 A n N-modal predicate logic L (with or without equality) i s called strongly Kripke complete (respectively. 3.7 Morphisms of Kripke sheaves Kripke sheaf morphisms are a natural generalisation of predicate Kripke frame morphisms defined in 3.31 Every strongly complete m. (=) is complete ( i n the corresponding semantics of Kripke frames or Kripke sheaves). R1. L-KFE). MORPHISMS OF KRIPKE SHEAVES 253 Definition 3. A morphism from cP t o @ is a pair f = (fo. this makes sense only for disjoint ). in the modal case.7. . In the intuitionistic case.6.2. Similarly. f l ) satisfying the conditions (1)-(3) from Definition 3.RN). F' = (W'.6. So if L is strongly complete.3.1. cP' = (F'. strongly Kripke sheaf complete) if every L-consistent N-modal theory (respectively.16. p). a n intuitionistic predicate logic L (with/without equality) i s called strongly Kripke (Kripke sheaf) complete i f every L-consistent intuitionistic theory (with/ without equality) i s satisfiable i n some Kripke L-frame (L-KFE). U R ~ V but strictly speaking.3.29.p.(=) or s. . D'. sheaves.6. .1 Let cP = ( F . Lemma 3. . the notions of strong completeness are the same for Kripke sheaves and KFEs. .pl) be Kripke sheaves over the frames F = (W.. .

Every morphism ( h .5 A Kripke sheaf morphism over a propositional Kripke frame F is a morphism of Kripke sheaves over F .1 the diagram ( 5 ) commutes whenever uR*v. id^^)^^^) is an isomorphism of Kripke sheaves.() and M' = (@'.7. where @ = F'. g ) : h. f l ) : @ @' such that for any P E PLm.7.11: - Proposition 3.(a). R e m a r k 3.@ : --+ @ of a morphism over F' and the canonical morphism.We use the notatzon h. - Proposition 3.u +A iif M Mfo(u) '.254 CHAPTER 3.7.7. then for any u E M . (2) The composition of morphisms ( f o .. Now we easily obtain an analogue to Lemma 3. Definition 3. . f l ) : M --+= M' for N-modal Kripke sheaf models M . u !F P ( a ) i f fM'.@ --+= @. ) M. a).3 A morphism of Kripke sheaf models M = (a.4: - L e m m a 3. for a 'more traditional category of sheaves'.4 (1) The identity morphism id+ := ( i d w .3. The next claim is analogous to 3. 'isomorphism' are transferred to Kripke sheaves in an obvious way.6 Let @ = ( F .gl): @' ---+ @I' defined as ( f o 0 go.8-3.7.v) E Ri. m 2 p ) . U E @ .10: - Definition 3. where flu . ~ E D T M .7.2 Show that under the conditions of 3. This yields us different categories of Kripke sheaves as in the case of Kripke frames. A is obtained by replacing every a E D. The notions '=-morphism'. Next.7. 3.A. f l ) : @ --+ @' and (go. D'.7 This definition is sound in the case when h is only monotonic. We say that a' is obtained by changing the base along h i f DL = Dh(?) for any u E F and ph. = for any pair ( u .3.6. fo(u) P ( f l u . MI.3.7. f l u 0 glu)uEw)is a morphism @ @ I .f l ) : @" @. Definition 3. A E M S ~ ) ( D . in which the world component is the identity map. 'p(')-morphism'. h : F' F a morphism of propositional frames. we have analogues to 3.pl) be Kripke sheaves. The same holds in the intuitionistic case.<') is a morphism ( f o .D . i. KRIPKE SEMANTICS Exercise 3. there exists a 'canonical' =-morphism ( h . with fl.@ for @'.9 If ( f o .7.e. flu .6. can be uniquely presented as a composition @I' h. similarly for all other kinds of morphism. @' = (F'.8 Under the conditions of the Definition 3.

u I= iff M'. fo(v) b B(fl. u I=A iff Vv E R i ( u ) M .1 (5).7.7.7. = .9.7. M' a Kripke sheaf model over a'. M'.6. due to the monotonicity and the unique lift property. MORPHlSMS OF KRIPKE SHEAVES 255 Proof We check only the 0-case. If M' is that f : M intuitionistic.13. Proof Similar to 3. Definition 3. 3.3. Ri be the accessibility relations in M .10 and 3. due to the lift property.we have fo[Ri(u)] R:(fo(u)). a ) A as required.(f which is the same as Since f satisfies the conditions 3. Use Lemmas 3. Let R i . fo(v) I B(p>o(u)fo(V)l u . a ) ) . then M is also intuitionistic.then M .. the latter is equivalent to vv E Ri(u) M'.-(p.13 . Its converse is also monotonic.10 Let f : @ -+ @' be a morphism of Kripke sheaves. W In the case of disjoint Kripke sheaves there exists en equivalent definition of a morphism. ) by the induction hypothesis. rn Proposition 3. an exercise for the reader.3. = Eventually M .7. In fact. v t B(pu. Proposition 3. By 3. The same holds for all kinds of morphism. Then there exists a unique model M over such M'. - Proof Similar to 3.a)) .3. then ML'(Q1) C ML'(Q2) (or IL=(B1) C I L Z ( Q 2 )in the intuitionistic case). this is a bijection. W L e m m a 3.3.a) iff VV E R ~ ( uM'.12 A morphism of propositional Kripke frames is called etale i j it has the unique lift property In this case every restriction f I (F T u ) is an isomorphism to F' T f ( u ) . Let us first present disjoint Kripke sheaves in an equivalent form.11 Let and be Kripke sheaves.6. If A = U i B ( a ) (for a formula B ( x ) ) .10.7.12. fO(u)!= O i B ( f l u. If there exists a p(=)morphism from onto ( P z .1 (1)-(3).7.

256 CHAPTER 3.(a) = b always unique.2.1). Also let ( f o .f : D+ ---+ Dl+ of total domains such that flf(a) = flu(a) for a E D.e.Dl P ) . a' = (F'.1.. Proposition 3. Proof (1) The monotonicity and the lift property of T hold. . . for uR*v we can define the function p.6. p) be a disjoint Kripke sheaf over a frame F= (W. p') be disjoint Kripke sheaves over N modal frames. for any etale p-morphism of propositional frames T : F' -h F there exists a disjoint Kripke sheaf = ( F .R N ). - D.7. f l ) : @ a' be a morphism (in the sense of 3.D.R 1 . Since T is etale. Let T : D+ ~ ( a= u ) - W be the map sending every individual to its world (i. f: = U f l u ) .D . KRlPKE SEMANTICS (1) Let @ = ( F . p). 3.e. since p. R* . according to 3.. D'. whenever uRiv..Dl p). : D. and let T : F+ ++ F . Then T : F+ ++ F is etale. Then flf : Ft ++ F'+ - uEF and the following diagram commutes: .v ) E ( 2 ) In fact.1 (I). to D. .7. T' : F'+ + F' be the corresponding etale morphisms. since (p+)*induces a function p. = r-l ( u ). by the ~ ( b= v & a(pl)*b. ( 2 ) for ( F * . . ..6. from D. . The unique lift property is a function holds.). a E D.. : D. (2) Conversely. i n which F' is the frame of individuals and D. (i.p$). Consider the map f.14 ( I ) Let @ = ( F . Consider the frame of individuals F f := (D+. for any pair ( u . ---+ D. where pt. this b is ) condition p. ..6. The unique lift property also implies the properties 3.

3.3. T h e commutativity o f the diagram is almost obvious: for a E D. is a surjective map onto Dj0(. . Then for any a E D. . with f l u = g 1 D. g = f:.(a) = g ( a ) p : f g ( a l v )i..1.. O n the other hand.7. we define f l := ( f l u ) u E F .1.f (b). we obtain b y 3. Suppose aprb. it is a p-morphism whenever fo is a pmorphism. fT(b) = fl. since every f l u is surjective.7. fif(a) = fl.. Then b y definition.R N ) .o(u).7.1 ( 5 ) . (2) Given g. p ) be a Kriplce sheaf over a propositional frame F = (W.(a). But fo(u) = fo(rl(a)). f . Definition 3.. from Section 3. Now we can check the lift property for fif . . f i ) satisfies 3. g(alv) = g(a)lfo(v)..15 Let = ( F . (2) Conversely. b E D. . D. f ( a ) = flU(a)p:+b1. i. Therefore f: is a morphism. for which every g 1 D.). I t is surjective. ' - Since fo has the lift property.e. b = alv. By 3. Thus ( f o .and let V & W . b y 3.. Then by definition.3.13.D .. Since ap:(ajv). In fact. Then we define the corresponding subsheaf as follows: where F 1 V is the same as in Definition 1. since f l u : D. f l ) : - a'. u&v. we obtain v E R i ( u ) such that fo(v) = v'. equals fif for some morphism ( f o .e. it follows that fl. MORPHISMS OF KRIPKE SHEAVES 257 f: is surjective on all fibres. r For u E F . and thus f f (a)p:+f .. .R 1 .7. - P r o o f (1) Let us show that fif is monotonic. T h e definitions o f a subframe. where fi.Then b = flU(a)lv1for some d E R:(ul). uRiv flv(alv) = g(alv) E Dfo(v). and so it is a morphism.(b). a E D. suppose a E D..3 can also be transferred t o Kripke sheaves.(a) E D. every morphism g : F+ F'+. .7. etc. ap+(alv). the subsheaf generated by u or the cone cPfu is defined as (WTu).1.

6 sheaves. - - . Iu and similarly for the intuitionistic case.anlv). Thus for any model over @. where F" is the skeleton of F (Definition 1. IDL1 = 2 and E. one can easily see that for u MR v in an S4-based Kripke sheaf is a bijection between D.258 Exercise 3 7 1 . D) we have D.7.a.3. E'). KRIPKE SEMANTICS (1) Prove an analogue to Generation lemma 3. we can define a morphism F of associated Kripke sheaves O(F) 8(F1). . It remains to note that every intuitionistic valuation in Q.. . E) and F' = (F.21. CHAPTER 3. there exists an intuitionistic valuation 6" in @" such that t for any P. I = 1. = D. Therefore.. but there is no strong isomorphism from F to F'. similarly.". D. Then the map u H u is a p-morphism ((a. Proof Cf. if u. D. with the converse p..18 For an intuitionistic Kriplce frame F . the function p. then in every predicate Kripke frame F = (F. Finally note that Kripke sheaf morphisms are appropriate also for KFEs.40) and for a cluster u"..18 for Kripke (2) Define disjoint sums of Kripke sheaves and prove an analogue t o Proposition 3. where F is a reflexive singleton u.4. @ = (F. in the semantics ICEint is generated by Kripke sheaves over posets (and similarly.tW). For an intuitionistic valuation in Q.3.3. for the semantics ICint). So we can define the skeleton of F : F" := (F".7.14: L e m m a 3. . P r o o f Consider the case of Kripke sheaves. ID. F' of KFEs just as an arbitrary morphism Viz. for intuitionistic Kriplce sheaves. . So we can properly define the skeleton Q. consider KFEs F = ( F . Then we obtain an analogue to 1. and D.g." has the form t".D. Lemma 3.3. u k A(a1. u.e. but not the other way round. Analogously. E. := D.D").() " (@".. Then obviously @(F) 2 O(Ff). p). E' are universal. Every strong morphism of KFEs corresponds to a morphism in this sense. .36. L e m m a 3.. . Note that if u X R v (i." of an S4-based Kripke sheaf @..) iff v k A(alIv. IL(F) = IL(F"). v are in the same cluster) in a Kripke S4-frame F .. Dl.17 For a Kripke sheaf @ over a frame F ML(=)(@) = ~){ML(=)(@Tu) E F ) .

1.p.2 A pure equality sentence is a predicate sentence with equality that does not contain predicate letters other than '=I..3. u k A(a1. u Iy C > A for some u. By completeness.).18 ( I ) . and thus MTv It. it suffices to show that for any = KFE-model. . v Iy A for some v accessible from u.C (by 3.29.1 If an m. . it follows that FTv k C ..3.. M.l. .. .7.7.a.l. Then M f v .3.(=) L is conically expressive. which will be proved in Chapter 6 (cf. there exists an intuitionistic Kripke frame F I L and a Kripke model M over F such that M . .3.27). v Iy A. .2.39.is O*A admissible in L. and thus MTu b C. By completeness. by Lemma 3. Hence.l. . The proof is very similar. u b O*CAlA by Lemma 3. O*A(al. Its proof is based on the existence of exact KFEmodels for logics with equality. If M k A(xl.3. and therefore A is refuted in an (L C)frame. for any A. .1.5. .p.45. Definition 3. v IF C and M. by Lemmas 3. so its truth value a t every world does not depend on the valuation.O*C. We begin with a lemma analogous to 1. v I C and t M f v . L C t. .16). then the rule . But obviously.5. . since by Lemma 3. by 3.3.18 (I). If L f C Y A. KFE) model M over F such that M. We can argue similarly to 3. + + + + . (11) Intuitionistic case. In particular. Hence MTu. Since C is a pure equality sentence. .an).. FTv k L by Lemma 3. then L Y O*C > A.8. . Thus F f u b C.2.. Proposition 6.x. every closed propositional formula is a pure equality sentence. . We also have FTu 1 L by Lemma 3.3. T h e o r e m 3 8 3 I a conically expressive m. A L e m m a 3. .8. a n ) = (O*A)(al.. Thus M k O*A(xl. Hence M.3.= L is Kripke .8 Transfer of completeness In this section we show that in some simple cases Kripke and Kripke sheaf completeness transfer t o extensions. a n ) by 3.18 (2). . then for any u E M for any a l . . . then L C is also Kripke frame (respectively.8. E D..8.p. . by 3.a.). there exists a Kripke frame (or a KFE) F k L and a Kripke (respectively.19.). u k O*A(al.. if we consider the Kripke model with the accessibility relation R*. then t L y C > A. Kripke sheaf) complete and C is a pure equality sentence in the language of L.3. But C is a simple equality sentence. M k A implies M I O*A. u k O*C A -A for some u. Kripke sheaf) complete. P r o o f Since L has a characteristic model. + P r o o f (I) Modal case. f frame (respectively. If L C Y A.18 W (2). M.. TRANSFER OF COMPLETENESS 259 3. x..39 and 1. so A is refuted in an (L C)-frame.= or an s.

260 CHAPTER 3. with the following changes: 6' = J . u k (IF) B.2. By strong completeness.Omr. a E I F . we obtain that ( A .l. B& 8 The same statements are true under the assumption M k (It) EQ. where for any u E F. v I= I for any v E R * ( u ) . since obviously L+r t.5 Let M = (Q. P E PL J u ( P ) zf P occurs i n A or P = Q . If a theory A is (L+r)-consistent. an S4-)KFE CJ = ( F .l. So the theory OmI'UA is L-consistent. . u k (It) 2 M ' .B for any B E I?.8.4 Let L be an s. it is satisfiable in an L-frame U Q.D+ . SO by 3.. otherwise. (3) for any u E M . u k Ooor U A for some world u in a Kripke model M over F .3. Let CJ' := ( F .b) := { u I M .J ' ) . intuitionistic) KFE-model. at some world u.(=). + + Now let us consider equality expansions and prove some results generalising [Shimura and Suzuki.11 it follows that M . intuitionistic) Du-sentence B in the same predicate letters as A M . Then (1) a' is an N-modal (respectively. If L is strongly Kripke (respectively. E ) such that M b (It-) E: and Q does not occur in A. Then ' M . there exists a Kripke frame (or a K F E ) F k L such that M .9) L+r-consistent. ) be an L-modal (respectively intuitionistic) Kripke 6 model over N-modal (respectively. then the theory is (I? A . (3) holds for any D.8.8. then it is (L+Umr)consistent. El).b)). By strong completeness. (2) MI is a modal (respectively.Z) is satisfiable in the ( L I')-frame CJTu. Then as in the proof o f 3. Kriplce sheaf) complete.-sentence B without occurrences of Q. then L r is also strongly Kripke (Kripke sheaf) complete.(=) or an m. for any modal (respectively. where E1(a.E) is L-consistent. u k Q(a.p. I a set of pure equality ' sentences in the language of L.D+.p. Lemma 3. S4-) K F E . Then similarly t o the modal case. KRIPKE SEMANTICS An analogue o f this theorem holds for strong completeness: Theorem 3. MI := (a'. it follows that FTu is an ( L r)-frame satisfying A at u. u k O. 19931. + Proof ( I ) Modal case. (11) Intuitionistic case. I f a theory ( A .

). D).3 Q(Y. according to 3. By induction we obtain that it holds for any B E MFT(D. hence obviously Ef(a.).2. b E D+.ukBiffM.5. we have to check If P t occurs in A. (*) holds trivially. Similarly the other members of E are responsible for the properties (2)-(4) from Lemma 3. By definition of MI. this means : I which follows from M I=. hence uE Q(a. @' are based on the same (F. TRANSFER OF COMPLETENESS Proof implies Ef(a. u I= VxQ(x.ut=B for any u E M . let us show that M' is a KFE-model. sentences constructed from MF~=).) be the set of all D. x) means that M. P t # Q. If Pp does not occur in A.b) E Ef(b.2 and 3. M != ~ x ~ Y ( Q ( x . since @.a). a€D+ (2) Next. u I =B holds for any atomic B E MFT(D.3.5.8. For example. u k B& iff M f . for any atomic B E MFA(D. M.a).5. a ) (1) In fact..a ) for any a .3. Mf.). u for any a E D. (3) Let MF~=)(D. and thus the equivalence M . In fact.b) = Ef(b. .x)) Y) U Ef(a. (*) is equivalent to : I which also follows from. If P t = Q.

b. Consider a model M over @ with the trivial equality such that for any v E M .262 CHAPTER 3. Since ( M T u)' is a KFE-model over F f u. and N = M'. Then by Lemma 3. whence A @ ML'(KEC) by Proposition 3. b ) i f f a x .39. A . So let us show that if a modal sentence A does not contain Q. v i = Q ( a . ML(K&C) is also conically expressive. then IL=(KEC) = f IL(K&C)=. 3 M . u ! 7AQ implies = ( M T u)'.5.6 (1) Let C be a class of N-modal propositional Kripke frames such that ML(C) is conically expressive. u I# AQ. The equivalence (#) together with Proposition 2.y)] A'. then (+) Suppose o*( Then ~ £ 2 ) AQ @ ML(KEC). Then M I= E as one can easily check. A @ ML'(K&F). and M. we have A @ ML=(ICE(C T u)). y)] A. Now if A contains Q.5. KRIPKE SEMANTICS Theorem 3. Thus N . and therefore El*(/\E:) > AQ $ ML(KEF) C ML(KEC). Then MLE(KEC) = ML(KEC)'.J) such that N.v!=B .8.-sentence B without Q and equality. u k 7A. M T u k E:. the logics are really equal.8.4 show that sentences without Q are the same in MLZ(KEC) and ML(KEF)'. Proof (1) Since ML(C) is conically expressive. c 0* ~ (A&:) A 7~~ for a KFE-model M over F E C and for some u E M. u !+ A implies M .vl=BiffN. (+) Suppose for some F E C.8. : for any D.y)/Q(x. so we can apply Lemma 3.28. x) and a model N = (@. By the generation lemma Hence by a KFE-analogue of Lemma 3. then A = [Q(x. ~ M . Then there exists a KFE @ = (F. it can be replaced with another letter Q' that does not occur in A. M T u . Since for any formula A and a logic L.5. b D. a . Therefore all sentences in these logics are the same. (2) I C is a class of propositional Kripke S4-frames.y)/Q1(x. u !# A at some world u. A E L iff A' E L.14. so for any logic L.D.3. If A' := [Qf(x. A E L iff V E L.

Hence L= F 7(Al A .uo b O.uo b rQ OOO&$ u and @ f u o!= L.BQ for any B E EN. in fact. ( M T u)'.14. Then L= is also strongly ICE-complete. &z Iy A&. otherwise M and @ can be replaced with M f u o . and so A @ ILZ(ICEC) by Proposition 3.4. u ly A.p. and so by 3. there exists a KFE cP = (F. .11.19). . the same construction as in the modal case yields an intuitionistic M such that N = Mr.. In fact. otherwise by 2. ¤ Theorem 3. (+) Suppose > AQ # IL(KEC). We may assume that Q does not occur in . which implies A # IL'(KE(Cf)).8. U I ~ A ~ . Then for some intuitionistic KFE-model M over F E C and for some u E M M Iu I 82 and MI u k so by the generation lemma MfulkE: Then by Lemma 3. Proof (I) Consider the modal case first. Let L be a strongly ICE-complete m. Ak E r . u and M ~ U . IY A. uo b rQ om&$.to avoid Q.14. which means that I? is L'-inconsistent.p.18. u We may also assume that uo is the root of M.5. ~f uo. . since every u E M is covered by some R. it is sufficient to show that for a sentence A and an extra predicate letter Q The proof is quite similar to the modal case. we can appropriately rename all letters in I?.Dl x) and an intuitionistic N = (@. Since L is strongly KE-complete. .5. Then the theory Cim&$U I'Qis L-consistent. and @ t u g . 19We use an equivalent definition of a KFE from Lemma 3. A Ak) by 2.modal theory. TRANSFER O F COMPLETENESS 263 (2) Similarly.respectively. We leave the details to the reader. Let r be an L'-consistent N.[) and some world uo we have M.1.1 for some A1. E)19 such that cP k L and for some model M = (a.[) such that N.28. (uo) (Lemma 1. (+) Given @ = (F. .8.5. in the intuitionistic case due to Proposition 2. or s.2.3. = Thus M.8.3. M I &$.3.D+. since by Lemma 3..5.

note that it is equivalent to (4) M .bn) E o. Then @' is a KFE and M'. Then M I is also a KFE-model. .5.D+. .. it follows that M2 = Mi as in Lemma 3. .8. If (I?. It is again sufficient to check that @I k A for any A E I.J1) as in Lemma 3.7.b). 12. A = AQ. because Now put M1 := (a.264 CHAPTER 3. u k Q(a.b) holds for any a . it remains to show that @' k L. .13. the latter means (1) ( ~ 1 . n (2) ( a .. So we may further assume that for any u. and M. El). and the observation that (3) E(a. E 0.0).b) provided a.5. bi) * (bl. u k Q(a. In fact.b. So for an arbitrary KFE-model M2 = (Qr. To check (3). . KRIPKE SEMANTICS = (F. Since all equality axioms are valid in a'. since as soon as M is a KFE-model.) & u E i= 1 Since Mi is a KFEmodel. A) is an L'-consistent intuitionistic theory.8. b E D+. By definition. .u != Q(a.5. . .. since otherwise Q can be renamed.. a) as we already know. Now consider @' where E1(a. M1.(P[). ' and M1 = (@'.) i= 1 Now (1) follows from (2).. b) E1(a. M2 remains a KFE-model under this assumption. b))..8. hence M2 k A by Lemma 3.b) := {u I M . In fact. Since Q does not occur in A the truth values of A do not depend on 0+(Q). . (11) The intuitionistic case is considered in a very similar way.5.uo k I by Lemma 3. since A is without equality. b) e u E Er(a. But this holds. .bi) 3 (bl.O). . let us show that M2 k A.8.. we have n 0 E(ai. an) E Qu(p. Now cP l= L implies Ml k A. without Q. b E D. otherwise by 2. then (I?&U AQ) is also L-consistent. u k a = b > Q(a.(p[). a n ) E Ou(pt) & u E n E1(ai.

[) and some world uo.5.e. M' is a KFE-model such that M .D+.Q ( a .b) := {u I M.b) := {u1 M.u k B for any u E M .b)} and M' = ( @ I . Then by 3. for any u E M and D.-sentence A. (I) Let us begin with the modal case.5. u Il. Hence M'.8. i.8.8.5.Arl > V A l by 2. which implies by 2.3.8 Let L be a KE-complete s. .1. and M' = (Q'. W Theorem 3. TRANSFER O F COMPLETENESS 265 U E ~ I-& V A? for some finite rl r for some finite A1 A. @' Il.U k B& iff M1. As in the modal case. so (I'. t') as in 3. Then by 2.5 we obtain M. we may assume that u is the root of M. and so M'.A) is L'-inconsistent. By 3. The proof of @' k L is exactly the same as in 3. o and thus M IlSo we can define a KFE @' := (F.L is proved as in the modal case . and thus the latter formula is refuted in an intuitionistic . o (11) In the intuitionistic case suppose L= Y A. Then by 2.1.7. u ll. J') according to Lemma 3. u I t (r. Then L= is also KI-complete.J) we have M.every intuitionistic model over @' corresponds to an intuitionistic model over Q (for the basic language Lo). Then M' is a KFE-model. for any D. u ! O * E U o o= ~ {-AQ).8. £ 2 YL AQ.8.14.p. uo IF ( r Q ~ £ 2AQ). but now we should take care of Proof finiteness.14.4 O'E? YL A&.8. u IF iff MI.D+. or a conically expressive m. b)). there exists a KFE @ = (F. Consider an arbitrary formula A in the language of L such that L= Ijf A.5.5.p. E1(a. Essentially the same as for 3.1.8. L y A&: > A&. we may assume that u is the root of M and define o where E1(a. Hence L= I.D f 7E ) such that @ I L and for some intuitionistic model M = (a.A o A).-sentence B using predicate letters only from A. there exists a KFE @ = (F. u k Q(a. u F A . = By strong completeness.M. As in 3. and thus by completeness. El) such that £o&.7. E ) such that k L and for some world u in some KFE-model M = (a.8.

) = ( ' d x B ) ~ Vx(U(x) > Bu). Now we define @ I .8.8. u IF B for any u.p. then L is KE-complete iff L= is KE-complete. a' separates A from L=.16.from 3. Again we may assume that M is rooted and M. I L= is conservative over L and strongly S-complete.e.8 does not hold for K-completeness. and let U be a new unary predicate letter.-sentence in predicate letters from A. f Corollary 3. due to the conservativity.14 for strong completeness.8. but the equalityexpansions QH'.15.9 Simulation of varying domains Consider a formula A in a language with or without equality. (3xB)u = ~ x ( U ( XA Bu).6 below. In fact.1.8.9 The analogue of 3.l. 'only if' - from 3. ¤ 3. Proof 'If7 follows from 2. as we shall see in Chapter 7. w R e m a r k 3. Q H and QS4 are IC-complete.10.16.11 Let L be an m.V. Let Au be the formula obtained from A by relativising all quantifiers under U. ( B * C ) u = BU * Cu for * E Next. Then M' is intuitionistic and M . H Now let us prove an analogue of 2. i. or a conically expressive m. uo {AQ>) (£2. W Corollary 3. So I is satisfiable in an L'-frame ' ' (in the corresponding semantics). then L is f strongly KE-complete iff L= is strongly ICE-complete.p.266 CHAPTER 3.10 I L is an s.8. whenever B is a D. Proposition 3. Proof 'If' follows from 2. formally: Au := A for A atomic.p..8.8.8 and 3.8. or a conically expressive m.l.12 I L is an s.5.<) over a KFE @ validating L. uo Iy A. S a semantics of Kripke f frames or Kripke sheaves for the corresponding logics with equality.l.1. A). which is obviously an L-frame. by 3. A t := 3xU(x) > ALI .1..p. M' as in 3.p. 'only if' . Suppose I is an L-consistent theory.11.14.8. KRIPKE SEMANTICS KFE-model M = (@. put ( 3 . then L is also strongly S-complete. QS4' are K-incomplete. Eventually we obtain @' IF L and MI. or an s.8.p. P r o o f Consider the modal case.. U IF B~ iff M r . for the root uo of M . Then ' I is L'-consistent.7.

DK for any atomic D. ) F~ is well defined. T h e model M U is intuitionistic.9. P E PLn a E (D.O1)over a poset F with root vo there exists a Kripke model M = ( F @ V . D ) with root vo. V M. for any D.-sentence B . Then obviously M .vo IF 3xU(x). W e can obviously extend the relativisation t o formulas with constants.)n i f fM . a = ( a l l . IF B.3. Bu) such that for P # U.8) be a Kripke model over a rooted frame F = (W. . . Therefore MI = M~ .3xU(x).2 For every Kripke model M' = ( F . Then the following holds: L e m m a 3 9 1 For any world v in M . vo Il. Consider the frame FU := (W. v IF P ( a ) .R .-sentence B that does not . In fact.. ( e U ) + ( u ( a ):= {V 1 a E D. D u ) with and a Kripke model M~ := ( F U .R . such that M .8 ) over F with a constant domain such that M. # 0 since M.D1. put for P E P L n . since M is intuitionistic. by truth preservation D: C_ D: whenever wRv..an). By definition. L e m m a 3.).vo I t 3 x U ( x ) and MU= MI. uo 1 3 x U ( x ) and l - and for any v E M . contain U M ~ . v I t P ( a ) iff MI.9. Proof In fact. SIMULATION OF VARYING DOMAINS 267 Let M = ( F .V ~ k B~ Proof Easy by in induction.

First.b E D. b E D+ for any u . the Kripke semantics generated by a class C of Kripke sheaves (or KFEs) is S(C) = { M L ( @ )) @ E C). v E F (**) Vi Qu.9. v E F V a . Definition 3.268 Theorem 3.9. Let us consider three examples of Kripke semantics. (a xu b H a x.9. . b ~ a x b).1. if A E IF=.10.Dl) with a model M' such that MI. n D . or equivalently. or a DE-KFE. . vo I A. ) ( a x . KRIPKE SEMANTICS (1) Let F be a rooted poset. Thus A @ I L ( K ( F f v o ) ) and so A @ I L ( K F ) . the premise uRiv can be replaced with uR*v. A a sentence without equality and urithout occur- rences of U . there exist a model Mo over F @ V and a world vo E F such that Mo.vo I 3xU(x) and t Mo.4 3. vg Iy Au by 3. Consider a y model M according to Lemma 3. b)). .e.10 Examples of Kripke semantics According to the general definition from Chapter 2. then Proof We prove only (1). An intuitionistic KFE with closed equality is also called a KFE with decidable equality. Then by the generation lemma and Lemma 3.D . SO M . there exists a frame F' = ( F . suppose A @ I L ( K F ) . vo Iy Av Put M := Mo T vo. Corollary 3. Then MI = M u . F is a KFE with closed equality (or CE-KFE) i f for any i for any a. v o Iy A. Hence A u E I L (C K F ) . the proof of (2) is similar.1 A Kripke frame with equality F = ( F . now vo is root of F. The other way round. x) is called monic if (*) V u .9.v E F (u&v + Va. M U .9.2. b E ( D .1. Then (2) Similarly. i.3 CHAPTER 3.

let us consider the KFE F = ( F . a E D..wl E (R*)-'(u) n ( R * ) .D .2..b E D.b~ D+.). Assume wR*y.v ) ... ) Let u . E DL. a x: b. @ ( F )= ( F .. . = {au).3. . b since F is rnonic.t.).) Now. . (2) F is a CE-KFE iff O ( F ) is a CE-sheaf. in which u and v are incomparable. E ) as in Lemma 3.Dh = {a. DL = (Du/ x u ) .Dl.e. D 1p). xv= idD. v E F Va.2 A disjoint Kripke sheaf Q. p. a KFE F is rnonic iff the Kripke sheaf O ( F ) is monic.3. T h e necessary modification for the non-disjoint case is quite obvious.. Definition 3.D. = D. a. since a xu b. Recall that O ( G ( @ ) is is ) Consider the rnonic case (the CE-case is quite obvious). x ) based on the poset F = { u . On the other hand.puu = i d ~ .Then p.(a. let Q. In fact.) CE.b E D+ ( E ( a lb) = 0 V E ( a .1 0. and a xu b. a X . . = { a . O ( F ) = ( F . wll?v. Proof Q. xl). for some w.. . b.(a) = p.10..(b) since Q.D l x) be a rnonic KFE.10.e. Then a x. v E F. wlR*u. but not a x. u .(b. E Du n D. The other is way round. then the above conditions are rewritten as follows: (*'I (**I) Qa. is CE iff the KFE G(Q.D'. Thus a Kripke sheaf isomorphic t o Q. D.10. = p. then F is not necessarily rnonic (even in the intuitionistic case). b. i. Then F is not rnonic.D+. a. = ( F . ' E ( ~ b) c E ( a . p) is called rnonic if for anya. Example 3. xu= ( D u ) 2 . p .b). i f v E Ful a E Du C D. These three types o f KFEs and Kripke sheaves fully correspond t o each other and generate equal semantics: Lemma 3.. i. is rnonic iff the KFE G(Q. b. G ( @ = ( F .e. Let F = ( F .. v E F Q.b E Dh n D l . b) = E ( a ) n E ( b ) ) .' ( v ) and pwu(a)= pWtu(b)..) monic.bE Du Qi (uRiv & (alv) = (blv) * a = b).(au) = a.b E D+ QiE ( a ) n E(b) n R . i. p). = ( F . = ido. b.pu.. Qa.D .D l p ) be a rnonic disjoint Kripke sheaf.4 (Warning) In general i f O ( F ) is rnonic. is a CE-sheaf (or a DE-sheaf i n intuitionistic case) if (2) V u . wR*v. is monic. EXAMPLES OF KRTPKE SEMANTICS 269 I f F is presented in the form ( F .3 (1) A disjoint Kripke sheaf Q.b).

If a # b. Speaking informally. the semantics generated by CE-KFEs (or Kripke sheaves) . In fact.6 The logics QK'. b). Moreover. as we will see later on.5 shows that every simple KFE (or a simple Kripke sheaf . KRIPKE SEMANTICS aR*w & aR*wl + w = w' in O(F). let A be a modal propositional logic such that K A S 4 or S 4 C A c S5. b E D. and t h u s v # bfor any (2) We have to show that u IF a = b V a # b for any a .) is also rnonic. by definition. Lemma 3. k a # b.. which yields incompleteness. c c Proof In this case a two-element reflexive chain 2 2 validates A. QH' k K D E . + DE. F Proof (1) I f u i= a # bfor a . the individual a. = b in 8 ( F ) does not know that it corresponds to a. then v Iy a = b for any v E R(u).10.270 This Kripke sheaf is rnonic. by definition. All these inclusions are actually strict. w The semantics generated by rnonic KFEs (or Kripke sheaves) is denoted by M I C ~ )MIC~. .20 # (2) For any intuitionistic Kripke frame F. in which D = {a. 'O~ecall that this formula is denoted by CEi (Section 2. i 5N F VXVY(X y # > U ~ ( X y)). So we have: and similarly for superintuitionistic logics. p).. # b. @ v C E and @ Iy D E . QK' k K C E . since CHAPTER 3. Obviously.. then u IF a = b. Lemma 3. One can construct a similar example based on a rooted %frame. and is denoted by KCEL=).5 (1) For any N-modal predicate Kripke frame F. w Proposition 3. t h e n a v E Ri(u). if a = b.KC£&). thus u IF a # b. Obviously every rnonic KFE is CE (and similarly for Kripke sheaves). But by Lemma 3.5.=).10. Dl = {c}. Q H = are K-incomplete. Thus A (and &A=) is valid in the Kripke sheaf @ = ( 2 2 .10. D . ..6). or an intermediate propositional logic # CL. all = bll = c.with inclusions p. hence u k Oi(a # b). Therefore we obtain QA= y C E in the modal case and QA= Y D E in the intuitionistic case.10. b E D. Then QA= is K-incomplete.

if a b.One can easily show that @ is isomorphic t o O(F). In some special cases the three semantics introduced are equivalent. p) be the original Kripke sheaf (which we suppose disD joint) and let F = (W. Proof Let @ = (F. We may assume that u R v . Let a . y E W R(x) n R(y) # 0. It follows that whenever u R v . Consider the following relation between individuals: Since F is a tree. b) & 3 v (uRv & a x. In fact./ -.10. y E W (R(x) n R(y) is directed (if it is non-empty) as the frame with the relation R or R-' restricted to it). In fact.4 shows that monic KFEs do not have an adequate logical characterisation. then both u.10. d E D. .8 Every CE-Kripke sheaf over an S4-tree F is isomorphic to a simple Kripke sheaf over F.. is an equivalence relation. Clearly u I# ( a = b) V (a # b) iff -(a xu Example 3. dpb. .10. hence we obtain a PKF (F. and thus dpc.10.. KFEs F and G(Q(F))have the same modal logic. .5). R) is called directed iff Vx. Let us give two examples. A similar example can be constructed for monic Kripke sheaves. Hence dpd'. so by (CE) it follows that d' = e. epb. > (2) A n intuitionistic K F E (or a Kripke sheaf) is D E iff it validates D E : VX'J'Y = Y)v (0 # Y)). v see the world of b. which implies a c. rn - a - b := 3d (dpa & dpb). and thus they are comparable.- - - Definition 3. := D. Then we factorise the domains: D. R). b).. ((x Proof (1) immediate (2) (for KFEs). EXAMPLES OF KRJPKE SEMANTICS Lemma 3. b E D. Recall that simple Kripke sheaves correspond to Kripke frames with trivial equality. epc.. weakly directed iff Vx.9 A propositional Kripke frame (W. b c and dpa. e E D. So dpd' for some d' E D. but only one of them is monic.3. and also d'pb.7 271 (1) A K F E (or a Kripke sheaf) is C E iff it validates CE : VxVy (O(x = y) (x = Y)). Lemma 3.10.

10 Every CE-sheaf over a weakly directed frame i s monic.4. Proof Since (W. where b iff a .10.such that the diagram - D$ (the injectivity follows from commutes.272 CHAPTER 3. Thus. for all u E F).13 A K F E is called a KFE with a constant domain i f all its individual domains are equal. we can construct the direct limit Namely. (I)). Proof Assume that individuals a. x) for KFEs with a constant domain (where V = D.(D. = i. ML(@)= ML(F) by Lemma 3.3) are isomorphic.11 Let @ = (W. = KCEdi. we take D = D + / : a N -. : D. Corollary 3. Similarly we obtain (alv) = (blv) in the case. Do) with (Do). Also assume that (alu) = (blu).Then and thus (alv) = (blv) by (2). VRW.10. W when a . Consider the PKF F = (W. Then ML(@) = M L ( F ) for some PKF F over (W.10. URW. KRIPKE SEMANTICS Lemma 3. There exist natural embeddings i. .10. b in a given CE-sheaf @ are both related to worlds u.). R. Lemma 3.3. R. b have a common inheritor. R) is directed and the inheritance relation p is transitive. = M K d i . D l p) be a monic Kripke sheaf over a directed frame.12 to directed frames. R). K d i .. We use the notation F = (F @ V. It can be easily proved that @ and O(F) (see Section 3. where dir means the restriction Definition 3. b are related to some world in R-'(u) n R-'(v). v.

e. Definition 3. : Do -+ D. a xu b. o puV.15 A Kripke sheaf = ( F . 3a E D. p) is called meek i f all the maps p. i.D . ( a ) = po. ( 2 ) Let F = ( F @ Do. So.. p ) there exists a flabby KFE F such that Q ( F ) is isomorphic to a. x) is a flabby KFE. meek KFEs. x ) is called meek i f 'di'du'dv E Ri(u)'db E D.D . then Q ( F ) is a flabby Kripke sheaf. (for u R * v ) are surjective. A syntactic proof is an exercise for the reader. Lemma 3. whenever u R * v i n F .D . for u E F such that PO. = PO.19 C D T E ( Q S 4 + Ba).17 A Kripke sheaf ( F . see Chapter 7. since it has a constant domain. Proof Note that every meek Kripke sheaf over a rooted frame is flabby. Proof (1) Let Do be the domain of any world in F and po(a) = a.10. x).18 Meek Kripke sheaves.(= a/ xu) for u E F. Every flabby KFE is meek. H Lemma 3. i f any individual i n any accessible world is locally equal to some individual from the present world. Lemma 3.14 A K F E with a set of possible worlds W is called flabby i f the measure of existence of every its individual is W .10. Obviously.10. Definition 3. flabby Kripke sheaves. Now let us describe flabby Kripke sheaves corresponding to flabby KFEs. a KFE is flabby iff it has a constant domain. every flabby Kripke sheaf (or KFE) is meek . is surjective. EXAMPLES OF KRTPKE SEMANTICS 273 Definition 3. o puv is surjective. then p. where a xu b iff po.(b).10.16 (1) If F = ( F .10. p) is called flabby i f there exists a domain Do and a family of surjections po. . and flabby KFEs generate the same semantics.if PO.D . Proof This follows from Kripke completeness of Q S 4 + B a . A KFE ( F .10.D . (2) For a flabby Kripke sheaf @ = ( F ..3.10.

I=B(c. Take (Only if. t (iii) For an S4-based P K F F .. Proof (1) Let us consider only the 1-modal case. .. .al .al .. This is a contradiction. N A Bai if F is meek. Then u # OP(a) I and u l#VxOP(x)..) iffVc 'c ED. vRw and suppose there is bo E D. It follows that w I# VxP(x) and v rj OVxP(x). KRIPKE SEMANTICS R e m a r k 3.. Since is meek. + {Bal. such that b = p. . Then: C D E IL(@) iff B a E ML(@) iff @ is meek.) Suppose that 6.. (If.).p.(a)) for any u such that vRu and for any a E D..w E F.(D..20 In Chapter 7 we will show that IL(S4-PKFs with constant domains) = Q H ML(N-modal PKFs with constant domains) = QS4 +CD. (2m) For an N-modal KFE F Fk (3m) For an N -modal P K F F .10. . .21 In a meek Kripke sheaf the following holds: u bVxB(x. (ii) For an S4-based KFE F .. (lm) For a N-modal Kripke sheaf @.) u L e m m a 3.. @k A Bai iff i=l N N is meek. the intuitionistic case is similar. u l j OVP(x) for some valuation J in @ and u E F. Then v b VxOP(x).274 CHAPTER 3. since u b P(p. F I C D iff F is meek. w rj P(bo). u i= VxOP(x) and E. we can take a E D.) Let v .10.. i= 1 Fb i= 1 Bai iff every F r u has a constant domain.C D iff every its cone FTu has a constant domain. the valuation [ in @ such that E. u k P ( a ) iff vRu and a E p. B U N ) .(a).)...22 (i) Let @ be an S4-based Kripke sheaf. F Il. . On the other hand. a.10. v v P ( b ) for some v such that uRv and some u E D. Then J..(D. R e m a r k 3. a.

= {b).1 0. a rooted meek Kripke sheaf is flabby. Therefore.24 CK c BK. (If.vRw. Let BiC be the semantics generated by all bijective Kripke sheaves.u It. flabby Kripke sheaves generate the semantics equivalent to meek Kripke sheaves.u IF Q iff vRu&u # v. <. = {c. EXAMPLES OF K R P K E SEMANTICS 275 (2) (Only if. v K'. Proof CK: BK since every PKF with a constant domain F corresponds to the bijective Kripke sheaf Q(F). Since F is meek. such that Vb E D. R.Vx(Q V P(x)). w). Let c := 'dxVy(P(x) 3 P(y)). where W = { u . b E D. and u IF Q for any u E R(v) with u # V. K' := q 3 Oq. Definition 3. w E F. < w As we noticed.. Then v ly P(b) for some v E R(u). such that b x. 3. u Iy VxP(x) for some valuation in F and u E F.) Suppose that <. v Iy Q and v Iy VxP(x) since w IY P(bo). Qo k C' but Qo I$ C'. Moreover. [.Vx(Q V P(x)). b. and suppose there is bo E D. ~ .3. c. . v)). [. Proposition 3. To prove that the converse inclusion is not true. Then obviously. p = idg U {(a. since v It. R = idw U {(u. D. On the other hand. D = {a.) Let v. see Fig. d). Let CK: be the semantics generated by all PKFs with constant domains.u 1 P ( a ) iff vRu & 3a' 1 E D. Then v It.10.4. this semantics equals the semantics of flabby KFEs.P(a) for any a E D. This is a contradiction. consider the bijective Kripke sheaf Qo := (W. On the other hand. D. b $ bo Take the valuation [ in F such that: . d). (3) This directly follows from (2) and from the obvious fact that a PKF F has a constant domain iff its corresponding KFE with trivial equality is meek.10. Du = {a). b)). Then u Iy P ( a ) and u Iy QVP(a). a xu a'. a.23 A Kripke sheaf is called bijective if all its transition maps are bijections. we can take a E D. D. p). every flabby Kripke sheaf is meek.u Iy Q .

CK and BK are equivalent. as we shall see below. v ) and { w ) . Nevertheless. . ML(@) = ML(F) by Lemma 3. (r means the restriction t o rooted frames). Then ML(@)E CK... The above example also shows: L e m m a 3. the Kripke sheaves O(F) and @ are isomorphic. ¤ F k C' V K' only if (F k C' or F != K'). Since p gives rise to a family of bijections between Do and each D.ML(@2)E CK.4. w Corollary 3. So. on the ML(@l).3.CHAPTER 3.27 CK. = (F.4. Do = D. the restrictions of iPo respectively to { u .26 Let frame F.10. where cP1 are other hand. KRTPKE SEMANTICS Figure 3. Proof Let uo be the root of F . Thus M L ( a o ) 6 CK. = BIC.10. ML(@o)= ML(@l)n ML(Q2).25 Proof In fact. Q2 CK lacks the collection property (CP) from Section 2.16.10. and consider the PKF F = Fa DO. p) be a bijective Kripke sheaf over a rooted L e m m a 3. we have and II > 1&FVKi V SO + FVC'vK'. However. D . for every PKF F = F @ V..

3 Let @ be an S4-based Kriplce sheaf. Lemma 3.26 and 2.11.10. + Proof We shall use 'naive reasoning' in QS4=' Bal. we obtain Corollary and Corollary 2. extensions with closed or decidable equality may be nonconservative.1 QS4" + B a = QS4=' + Bal. Lemmas 3. We will see that these inclusions are actually strict (Lemma 3. Then @ I= Bal zff @ satisfies: .4).29 CK 2.28 Every logic from BK is CK-complete.11. Thus ML(@)is CIC-complete by Lemmas 3.1 Modal case Consider the following modal formula: ~ a := 0 3 x P ( x ) > 3xO3y(P(y) A O(x = y)).17.10. Then (from Bal) 3xOdy(P(y) A O(x = y)). 3.10. ' Note that QS4' +~ a lQS4' + Ba.11.7. Here is the sequence of all Kripke semantics considered above: 3.2 QS4' + Bal krc Ba.12. 3.24. Then by Lemma 3. Assume that 03xP(x).4 yield Corollary 3.11 On logics with closed or decidable equality In this section we show that unlike equality-expansions. ON LOGICS WTTH CLOSED OR DECIDABLE EQUALITY Lemma 3.10. BK. Using O(x = y) > x = y.3. 277 Proof Let @ be a bijective Kripke sheaf over F. Nevertheless: L e m m a 3.

(a) = b) and thus J . v k O(p. Since [. v b O(puw(a) b)... which leads to a contradiction. L e m m a 3. On the other hand. v != P(b). ) Suppose there is a valuation [ in cP and u E F such that J . we have w = v and c = b.(a) = c). such that [ . It follows that J .(a) # p. and w E F such that vRw and p. w k P ( c ) O(p. Vw (uRw p.(b). but it is not meek since bl does not have a predecessor in uo. Since cP satisfies (I).w E F and c E D. v E F. Take the valuation J in cP such that Then clearly J .. We have a contradiction.5. such A that u R v and J .5. Then there are v E F and b E D. @ Ba. v k 3 y ( P ( y )A O(pu.. W Figure 3. thus cP != B a l .. there are a E D.278 CHAPTER 3. KRIPKE SEMANTICS Proof (Only if. We have J .(a) = p.) Let u .4 QS4= + Bal vKEBa. Proof Consider the Kripke sheaf cP depicted at Figure 3. u != 0 3 x P ( x ) and [. uRv and suppose there is b E D. u k 0 3 x P ( x ) .. u Ij 3 x O ( 3 y ( P ( y ) O ( x = y)). Then there are a E D. u k 3xO3y(P(y)A 0 ( x = y)).(b)).(a) = y ) ) .11.. such that Va E D.11. suppose J . Corollary 3. = ( I f .w k P ( a ) . It is easily seen that cP satisfies (2).5 .

2 Intuitionistic case We shall use the following intuitionistic formulas: The corresponding logics were considered in [Umezawa. We also have: Lemma 3. in particular: One can easily see that QH= + Uo C QH' + 1 i U c QH' + U = QH= + VxVy(x = y). ON LOGICS WITH CLOSED O R DECIDABLE EQUALITY 279 Remark 3. where many inclusions and equalities between them were proved.11.6 One can repeat the argument for logics without equality: Bal should be replaced with 3.11. + Uo V A = QH'" U V A for every sentence A without occurrences of P.11.11. 19561. x = x and (2) Similar. x = y > x = y (in QH") . 1 1 > Vy-7 x = y. Proof (1) From R(x) > Vyi-R(y) by substitution we obtain and x =x Now.7 ( I ) QH=' (2) QH'S + U = QH=' + Uo. yield VxVy(x = y).3.

6.280 L e m m a 3.11.9 QH P r o o f The Kripke sheaf cP depicted at Figure 3. . there exists xo such that l l R ( x 0 ) .11.11 (1) QH + E is K-incomplete. Let It is easily seen that 113xR(x). KRIPKE SEMANTICS +E). L e m m a 3.6. El and E2 provide XI.so suppose X I # 2 2 . ¤ Since (so x l ) V (xo# x l ) . Corollary 3. we obtain J .11.. Due to 3. = + E !=K: U V J . does not validate UV J. as it is easily seen. If u k . ('Naive argument'). u != l l P ( a i ) .11. Corollary 3.G l x P ( x ) some model on cP then vl P(b). 52 such that and Vy(+(x2) 3 +(Y)) If x1 = 2 2 we have Uo.so due to E.10 QH + E vKeU V J .7 it is sufficient to show that (uoV J ) E (QH" + E). + Figure 3.V2k P ( q ) in for some i and so.11.8 (U V J) E (QH=' Proof CHAPTER 3.

. The variables of the first sort (ranging over individuals) are taken from the same set V a r as in our basic language L N . K-incompleteness) of Q H E was first observed by H.7 3.7 shows a Kripke sheaf needed for the proof. + vcT Figure 3.12. [van Benthem.t.r. The second sort has a countable set of variables (ranging over worlds) W u a r := {w. cf.12 Translations into classical logic In Section 1. we used the standard translation of propositional modal formulas into classical first-order formulas.e.11. countable frames.3.t. I n E w}. TRANSLATIONS INTO CLASSICAL LOGIC (2) K 4 K& (intuitionistic case). and Figure 3. 19831. + + Remark 3. Namely. Let us consider the two-sorted classical predicate language LZN.Ono [1973].r.12 Kripke-incompleteness (i.8 we showed that in many cases Kripke-complete modal or superintuitionistic propositional logics are recursively axiomatisable and complete w. he proved that QH E kK C D but Q H + E C D (the semantics C'T will be defined in Chapter 4). QH +E. there are two kinds of equality . L2N also contains equality2' 21Strictly speaking. Actually Q H E yKE CD also holds. In this section we extend this translation to modal first-order formulas. (3) QH" + E is not conservative w.for worlds and for individuals. To prove these results.

A Vvo3woU(wo. c) gives rise to an associated ~2. x) asserts that wo k P. thus A? means that an atomic formula can be true at world wo only for individuals from D. let D+ be the domain of the first sort. Proof In fact. Every classical model of ro is associated with some predicate Kriplce model.-structure M* satisfying Po and expanding F* such that for any u. = Next..a) iff a E D. a Kripke model M = (F. . and the domains are expanding with respect to Ri.1 Every classical model of Exd is associated with some predicate Kripke frame. u. for a E D:. D) based on a propositional frame F = (W. The accessibility relations pi in A are taken from p. D. ~ 2 . In the same way . every individual belongs to some domain. thus atomic formulas are of the form Ri (wm.*(U.7VO)).p ~ )we can construct the following (associated) L~N-structure . U. V2 U(w2. Given a Kripke frame F = (F.l"(x). a)). in which the universes of sorts 1 and 2 are the sets W and D+ respectively. = W. F* i U(u. .282 CHAPTER 3. wI W O) i= 1 The intended interpretation of the formula U(w0. Consider the following classical ~2.(w ~~). Then we have L e m m a 3. u2. u2) iff ulpiu2. From the above remarks it follows that p a model of Exd can be presented as F* for some F . the expansion of L2N is with (n 1)-ary predicate symbols of type (worlds x individualsn) corresponding t o n-ary predicate symbols PT(x) of our basic language CN. F* expanding F* and satisfying Exd. = M*. W the domain of the second sort.. So the conj u n c t ~of Exd respectively mean that every individual domain is non-empty. Ri are of type (worlds x worlds) and U is of type (worlds x individuals). . vo)A A ~ w I ~ w ~ \ J ? I o ( R ~ (A U. a F* != Ri(ul.x) is x E D. and for any u l . vo) Exd := Vwo3voU(wo. a M* k ~j"*(u.-theory: + PT* ro:= {Exd) U {A7 I n.12. u i = Pjn(a). 4 and i < + ( P t ( a ) ) := {U E W I p = P.. The formula pj"*(wo. pl. ..RN. Then put for every u E W. To define M . let p be a model of To.vn) or W. ...a) iff a € D z & M . j where N 2 O).. KRIPKE SEMANTICS and binary predicate letters R1. or vm = v. ..wn) or U(wm.

TRANSLATIONS INTO CLASSICAL LOGIC 283 Now by induction let us construct an ~ 2 5 . A H V ~ V U F ( F . R elementary). A (QB)*(wo. N-modal formula A.J)* k Vwo(AT)*(wo) for an intuitionistic sentence A and an S4-based frame F. a )for any intuitionistic Kripke model M .[)* E +VW~A*(W~).8.12. u k A ( a ) ~ V u El ek(u) M .15) i f fM* k (AT)*(u.5 A modal or superintuitionistic predicate logic L is called A-elementary (respectively. U ~ .3.A iff for any intuitionistic J .2).2 for any N-modal Kripke model M . Proof ( 1 ) B y induction. Let us consider the case A ( x ) = O k B ( x ) . R-elementary). ( 2 ) Easily follows from ( 1 ) . Definition 3.a ) (by Lemma 3. . x ) .a ) (classically) L e m m a 3. > (2)F ~ = A @ V [ V U E F ( F . Definition 3.12. u E M . ( B 3 C)* := B* 3 C*.12. We say that C is A-elementary (respectively. the standard a translation o f a first-order modal formula A ( x ) : P?(X)* := PY*(wO. (3yB)" := 3y(U(wo7y) B*). [ ) .3 (1) M . W L e m m a 3. u E M . . a ) (by the induction hypothesis) H M* t. u AT ( a ) (by Lemma 3. a E D&. u k A ( a ) (modally) iff M* != A* ( u . ~ w ( R k ( u . (1) M .[)* k VwoA*(wo) for an CN-sentence A and an N modal frame F. (2) F k A iff V[ (F. A*(u) (by ( 1 ) )H ~6 (F.12. u l k B(a) H Vul E e k ( u ) M* k B*(ul.wl)3 B * ( w ~ x ) ) .J)* t. I* := I. ( F . an intuitionistic formula A. ( x l = x2)* := ( 2 1 = x2). + T h e next two definitions are predicate analogues o f Definition 1. R-elementary) if the class of associC* ated t 2 ~ .4 Let C be a class of N-modal predicate Kripke frames.12. a E DZ.f o r m u l A*(wo. w ) B*(w. R-elementary) if the class V ( L ) of all L-frames is A-elementary (respectively.a)) w M* != ( ~ k ~ ) * ( a ) .2.12.s t r u c t u r e s := {F* I F E C ) is A-elementary (respectively. x ) := Vwl(R(w0. u IF A ( a ) ifS M* b ( A T ) * ( u . Proof t ( 1 ) M . M .2. (2) F It. x ) . u I A ( a ) i f fM .

Obviously.E)*. and the c. KRIPKE SEMANTICS Definition 3.12. For the intuitionistic case. L = ML(')(c) logic.p. the ~2:-models of C U roare exactly the structures of the form (F. A E ML(C) H C U rob \JwoA*(wo) (in the classical sense) Hence the set of all sentences in ML(C) is RE. in C. thus IL(=)(c) is reducible to ML(') (c). it suffices to note that IL(')(c) = T ~ ~ ( ' ) ( ~ ) . W e say that L has its modal the countable frame property (c.12. F is countable )). Proof Similar to 1.b. Since for any formula A.8 (1) If a class of Kripke frames C i s R-elementary.5. where F k C.8. F has a countable base)). C1 the class of all countable models of C. Proposition 3. .4 and Godel's completeness theorem we obtain for any sentence A: * roU C k Vwo A* (wo) (in classical predicate logic). and thus (1) follows. W e say that F has a countable base if the set of worlds i s countable and that F has a countable domain if D + i s countable. then its modal predicate logic ML(')(C) i s recursively axiomatisable (i.) in C if L = ML(=)({FI F E C. the intermediate logic IL(')(c) i s recursively axiomatisable for a n y R-elementary class C of intuitionistic Kripke frames.p. Definition 3.7 Let C be a class of Kripke frames.e. then ML(') (C) has the c.) in C if L = ML(=)({F I F E C. implies the c. and similarly for the intuitionistic case.b. the countable base property (c.p.1.f. the whole logic is reducible to this set.f.d. the c.p.12.29. and similarly for the intuitionistic case.f. F has a countable d o m a i n ) ) .8.p. by 3.p. the countable domain property (c.2. RE).D) i s called countable if the set of its worlds and the set of its individuals ( D f ) are both countable. Now by Lemma 1.284 CHAPTER 3.12.p. Then by Lemma 3.d.) in C: L = ML(=)({F I F E C.6 A predicate Kripke frame F = ( F . Let C be the class of models of an L2N-theory C. A E ML(C) iff VA E ML(C). (2) If C i s a A-elementary class of Kripke frames. Similarly.

1 it follows that p = M? for some Kripke model MI. i.12. Then there exists a countable reliable submodel of M containing S . 1 (AloA2) = AloA2 for o = A. ( p ! C U ro + p I= = VwoA* ( ~ 0 ) ) .x) is constructed as follows: Pj (x) = P. Proof Let V(L)* be the class of models of an t2jptheory C. Then M* I= C. M. Namely. we obtain that k C. u I= A(a). a) iff Hence by Lemma 3.3. the ~2:-formula A(zo. M* has a countable elementary substructure p containing S . (z0.-structure p.12. which means that M1 is reliable.12. TRANSLATIONS INTO CLASSICAL LOGIC 285 Similarly to the above. whose frame also validates L .e.3 M? I= A(u.12.9 Let L be a A-elementary modal or superintuitionistic predicate logic.10 In the intuitionistic case we can define a slightly different translation.12. Then p k roU C. ( X I = 22) = ( ~ = 52).12. and thus (as we have shown) to A E ML(C). A(a) E L(u): F? M* I= A(u.1 and the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem. u I=A(a) iff MI. Therefore ML(C) = ML(Cl). we have for any u E M . : Since M 4 M*. S a countable set of worlds i n M . Proposition 3. . M a Kripke model over F . By Lemma 3. 1 Remark 3. which proves (2). the latter is equivalent to C U roi=VwoA*(wo). V. so by Lemma 3. By the Lowenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem. F an L-frame. we can include the axioms of quasi-ordering (or partial ordering) for R in Exd and add the following truth-preservation clause to A?: For an intuitionistic predicate formula A(x). a). In the intuitionistic case note that The following refinement of (2) is also useful. F1 E V(L). we obtain that for any sentence A: A E ML(C1) iff for any countable ~2. If F1 is the frame of M I .x ) .

x). and Analogous properties hold for the intuitionistic case. W. (1) If 2 i s R-elementary.the class of all posets of height < n.12.. i n K(Z). So the superintuitionistic predicate logics of the following classes of posets are recursively axiomatisable (and satisfy the countable frame property): . By CK(Z) we denote the class of all frames with constant domains from K(Z).f. Put and apply the previous proposition. if one prefers. The resulting submodel Mo is reliable. are recursively axiomatisable. Corollary 3.p. Bn.286 CHAPTER 3. so M T ( M ) 2 MT(Mo). T h e n there exists a countable reliable submodel Mo M over a n L-frame containing uo such that M T ( M ) = MT(Mo). uo E M .f.p. M a Kripke model over a n L-frame F. K(Z) denotes the class of all Kripke frames based on frames from 2. KRIPKE SEMANTICS Recall (Section 3.12 Let 2 be a class of propositional Kripke frames. P r o o f For any sentence A @ M T ( M ) (in the language of L) there exists a world UA E M such that M IUA I+ A.2) that for a class of propositional Kripke frames 2. Corollary 3. SO MO. (2) If 2 i s A-elementary. I+ On the other hand.11 Let L be a A-elementary predicate logic.12. Equivalently. has the c. then the logics determined over Z ML(=)(K(Z)) and ML(=)(CK(Z)). vzvx U(z. the class of all posets of width 5 n.UA I+ A. then ML(')(K(z)) ML(')(cK(z)) has the c. Proof For the case of constant domains we have to add the axiom or. Therefore MT(Mo) C M T ( M ) .the class of all posets of branching 5 n. if A @ M T ( M ) .UA A by reliability of Mo. then M.. we can drop the conjuncts containing U in the definition of A. Examples Consider the following R-elementary classes: W. in CK(Z).

The constructions are rather straightforward. The same holds for the logics IL(K(Wm n U Pn)). R). then up to isomorphism.d. recall that the corresponding propositional logic is H B. Proof (cf. (Chapter 1). In this connection note that the logic of frames of finite heights and of finite branching bounded by m in all finite heights is not RE if m > 2. Remark 3.12. explicit axiom systems for these intermediate logics are unknown. if F = ( { a l .).)) = QH(=) for m > 2. see Chapter 11. IL(=)(K(B. n<w n<w Also note that explicit finite axiomatisations of the classes of frames with constant domains in the cases (a). (in K(F)).12. and we do not discuss them in detail.p. So the class {F) is Relementary for a finite propositional Kripke frame F . I L ( 2 ) is RE iff 2 is finite. In particular. we have: IL(=)(K(B. + Corollary 3.)). It is well known that every finite classical structure is finitely axiomatisable. and satisfies the c.12. see Chapter 8. F is defined by the following C1-sentence: However in many cases the predicate logics of R-elementary classes of frames are not recursively axiomatisable. . . TRANSLATIONS INTO CLASSICAL LOGIC (b) IL(=)(K(P~n W.3. . IL(K(Pm n U Wn)). (b) are known. [Skvortsov. Recursive axiomatisability and countable frame (or countable domain) property also can be established for logics complete in these semantics. Similar translations can be defined for Kripke sheaves and for other Kripke-style semantics considered in further chapters. IL(=)(K(P~ am)). On the other hand. For example. etc.)).13 Every predicate logic detemined over a finite propositional Kripke frame F is recursively axiomatisable. . see Chapter 11.)). see Chapter 7. explicit recursive axiomatisations are known for the logics n IL(=)(K(P. etc. [Skvortsov. 287 If m 2 2. .14 We have defined a translation from a modal logic language into a classical language based on Kripke frame semantics. 19951. for a class 2 of rooted posets. 19911). a.

~ . and thus Vu I DL1 5 K . and similarly for of any intuitionistic propositional Kripke frame F of Corollary 3. (i) We add a set of individual constants of sort 1 of cardinality K t o C2f: and fix a bijection v:T-tF. ) . D) has a constant domain. Therefore. Then (1) ML(')(K(F)) = the logic IL(')(F) cardinality K.Dl) has a constant domain. KRIPKE SEMANTICS We have established the countable domain property for any finite propositional Kripke frame.d. D).u 1 A(x) iff M$ 1 A(u.12. it has an elementary Obviously. Proposition 3. H.p. its universe substructure of cardinality K . of sort 1 must coincide with F . if A(x) @ ML(')(K(F)). can be extended t o any countable propositional Kripke frame as well.15 Let F be a propositional Kripke frame of infinite cardinality K. We denote the resulting language by ~ 2 . Here we give a model-theoretic proof for the modal case which is based again on the translation into a classical language. Then and similarly for CIC(2). Given a Kripke model ((F. u kt A(x). X) iff (F.\ 5 K ) .15 for the modal case. : ' . then M b VzVxU(z. X) iff M$' k A(u. D). It turns out that the c. kt) based on F . : Due to the downward Lowenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem. D) I Vu E F ID. x) and (F. it is refuted in a frame (F. we can construct a model M : by taking an ~2$-modelM+ and putting of C2$. ML(=){(F. Ono proved this result for the intuitionistic case by a straightforward argument (see Theorem 1. D'). (ii) Note that if (F. For the intuitionistic case one can repeat the proof or just apply Godel-Tarski translation.1 in [Ono. M b u = c. we have ID1+I 5 rc. Since Dl+ is the universe of sort 2 in M . x) and : thus M k VzVzU(z. Proof We prove Proposition 3. which we denote by M:'. iff u = ~ ( c . k).288 CHAPTER 3.12.Dl) such that lDhl 5 K for any U E F .16 Let 2 be a class of countable propositional frames.12. D). 19721731). For any modal predicate : ' formula A(x) we have (F. and so its ~2f:-reductcorresponds to some Kripke model ((F.

etc. In fact. Let us consider the following formula: Then . Let be the coatomic tree obtained by adding maximal points w.15 say for F = N2.3. / { a< K I Da $Z U Dp)l < NI. take an arbitrary valuation J in (F. < K such that Va (Pa Then < K * Pa I QO).12. a 0 IF Vx(P(x) v -P(x)). TRANSLATIONS INTO CLASSICAL LOGIC 289 On the other hand. Also note that In fact. let F be a propositional frame which is well-ordered of the type K.in which Fu is nonlinear (e. D ) if ID+I < K. Also we have K F E IL(F. a IF P ( a ) iff Pa 5 a . Consider the formula K F = -lVx(P(x) V -P(x)). the tree w* of all finite sequences of natural numbers. 19891.0 lk 1 K F . Then K F @ IL(')(IC(F)). Also take a. [Skvortsov. above every branch (maximal chain) T of F. = {ap I < K ID. let (app < K) be a sequence of distinct elements in V. K being an infinite cardinal.-./ < K . Therefore..12. Let us consider another similar example. D).l)* of all finite (0. 6. for every a E D+ take an ordinal Pa I such that K < . see Section 2. < K ID.g. P 5 a).3. In fact.I 2 No. cf. D) if D. since K F @ I L ( F @ V) if IVI 2 n. ID+[ 5 N1 if V a < K ID.l)-sequences.D) I V a IL(F. we cannot replace IDuI 5 K with IDuI 5 No in Proposition 3. Let us also note that for F = K KF and 'da thus K F @IL{(F.). or the binary tree {O. and consider the valuation such that for every a < K < Then (.[ < No) for F = N1. Let F be a denumerable tree (with the root OF).

Moreover. OF k --3xP(x). i f IVI 2 2N0).12. . provided IVI 2 IV'I. and there exists a chain uORulRu2R.). Proposition 3. E valuation in F @ V: u Then OF (F . k 13xP(x) for a branch T containing all u. denumerable atomic trees). F' is coatomic)) for a denumerable V. Vu :n > 0). . I)*). D) : Vu ID. 19811 that the predicate logic Q H K F is Kripke-complete (w. Vu E F Va E Do u since for a = a.18 This example is also related to the formula K F .t. It is known [Gabbay. ) 1P(a). i. V = {a.12.12. v ! Thus OF k V X ( ( . R e m a r k 3. from V for w. The corresponding predicate logic with constant domains is also Kripke-complete: + + QH + K F + C D = IL({F' @ V I (0.17 CHAPTER 3. KRIPKE SEMANTICS (i) C* E IL(F @ V) for a denumerable V. Proof (i) Suppose that uo p q.12. Q H K F = IL(w*) = IL({(w*...9.19 For the case of constant domains (without equality).). there exists v E Fu such that v $ T. uo k Vx[(iP(x) > q) > q].ug k 773xP(x). l R e m a r k 3. This follows from 3. Then q 'dn.r.e. such that V n > 0 [u. and = a. > 0 3v (uRv&v lP(a. This is a contradiction. (ii) Take different elements a.u. Then w.~ ( X3 9) 3 9).15 also shows that for any countable F and any constant infinite domain V. I)* c F' c w*. U We also have 7P(a) > q q.11: M L ( F @ V) C M L ( F @ V').4.290 L e m m a 3. (ii) C* # IL(F @ V) i f IVI 2 I -F F I (e. q]. &a /= q iff ~ T ( = w. . /= 7 P ( a n ) & .F ) . the following + P ( a ) iff 37 (U u = W. the above mentioned example shows that QH+K+CDcIL(w*@V) for a denumerable V. On the other hand.I 5 NO])) (and similarly for the binary tree (0.) &v p q).

V'.12.13. TRANSLATIONS INTO CLASSICAL LOGIC 291 The translation into classical logic and the well-known generalised form of the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem shows that M L = ( F @ V) = M L = ( F @ V') for any finite F and infinite V. V' liff all the cones i n F are finite.12. Thus we obtain the following claim (cf. Corollary 3. IVI 2 2IFI. cf. The intuitionistic case is quite similar.12. for IV'I = No. Theorem 1 in [Skvortsov. cf. 19951): Theorem 3. .3. if a poset F contains an infinite cone then C* E (IL'(F @ V) .12. Corollary 3. On the other hand.I L = ( F @ V')).20 IL'(F @ V) = I L z ( F @ V') for any infinite constant domains V.13.

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s) over a. c). E) is called an 52-valued structure or a Heyting valued structure (H. D . This suggests for the following generalization of KFEs: replace MA(F) by an arbitrary modal algebra (or a Heyting algebra for the intuitionistic case) and E with a function taking values in this algebra. b their measure of equality E ( a . E should satisfy the properties cited in Lemma 3. 19881. The elements of 52 are called truth values. Definition 4 1 1 Let 52 be a complete Heyting algebra (a locale'). every propositional Kripke frame F corresponds to a modal algebra M A ( F ) . (E2) E ( a .so Kripke semantics can be treated as a particular case of algebraic semantics. b) = E(b. b. E(a. in the predicate case Kripke frames with equality admit a straightforward algebraic generalisation. a). where D is a set. An 52. b) is a set of possible worlds. [Borceaux. To make the corresponding semantics sound. E : D x D R is a map such that for any a .. Likewise. D. ICf. and thus an element of the corresponding modal algebra M A ( F ) . the elements of D are called individuals.5.Chapter 4 Algebraic semantics 4. b) is defined. . Thus we come to the following two definitions. E).' valued set is a triple (52.1 Modal and Heyting valued structures As we know from Chapter 1. Fourman and Scott. c E D - ( E l ) E ( a .v. b) A E(b. 1994. Recall that by Lemma 3.2.2. every KFE can be represented as a propositional Kripke frame F with individuals such that for every two individuals a. Dragalin.5. 1979. D is called its individual domain. the triple (52. c) I also f I E ( a .

s) over Cl is a triple ( 2 D l E ) . 1 . and we put E A A := 1. where D is a set. where a0is the pattern of 52.1.2 is obviously equivalent to (E4) in 3.v. Since every Boolean algebra is a Heyting algebra (where V is U. Definitions and results for H. Eab abbreviates both E ( a .v. a n y a .v.N ) D.5.5. 4. where fib is the Boolean part of a . D .s. E : D x D ---+ R is a map such that for $. Therefore we have he reader will notice that our notation is ambiguous. A 0-tuple is just sequence). b) = 0.v.1.294 CHAPTER 4. we call E(a. Ea := E ( a ) := Eaa. b = (bl. . b.. . 0.. . be algebra.. In that case D corresponds to the set of all individuals D+.2 are exactly the same as in Lemma 3.bn) E Dn: and the following abbreviationx2 Eab := E(a. .D ..). .s ( a b .1. Definition 4. We also introduce the measure of equality for tuples a = ( a l .the conditions (El)-(E3) in Definition 4.2(1).2 generalise the situation in Kripke frames with equality.b). ( 0 . b) the measure of equality of individuals a . c ~ i E (1.1.1. The truth value E ( a . n. an m.ON) a complete modal . ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Obviously. then an m. The other way round. The condition (E3) again implies the non-emptiness of D. are often quite similar. they are 'fully equal7if E(a. (the void As we said above. b .D l E ) . ( a 0 .s. b E D. D l E ) .s. An a-valued structure or a modal valued structure (m. Nevertheless we use it.. (E3) implies that D is non-empty. . In these cases we talk about 'structures' and denote all operations in a Heyting-algebraic style. when there is no confusion. and the condition (E4) in 4. E ) over a modal algebra S1 corresponds to the H. U.a. a ) (which in general may be not equal to 1)is called the measure of existence of a.2 Let R = (0. and m. . b) = 1and 'fully different' if E ( a ..2 (I). A is n and a -+ b = a 3 b = -aUb).s. 01.b) and E(ab) = Ea A Eb. E). . . For example. .v. We can also include the degenerate case n = 0.v. for a .v. -.s ( a .1. As in Chapter 3. if is an S4-algebra. corresponds to the H. Definitions 4.

3 (1) Let F = ( F . I a xu b). (E3) means that every individual domain D. In the modal case we also have . the triple H V ( F ) := ( H A ( F ) D f . hence Eab = i=l Eab A Ebc = aEDn A n Eaibi 5 Eaiai = Eaa. . a)..b) A E(b. .D .R p ) . This easily follows from Definition 4. . . .an E D) 2 aEDi=l V I"\ n Eaa = 1. i f F is an S4-frame. In particular.1. i=1 i=1 A n V E ( a ) = V { E a l a l A .2 follow readily from 3. they are intended t o make the corresponding first-order formulas true (see below). Then M V ( F ) := .4.2(1).a ) < E ( a . it is necessary for verifying the substitution instances o f the equality axiom (Ax17). A Eanan I a l l .1. b. b E D and tuples a .s.2 correspond t o the symmetry and the transitivity o f equality.1. E ) is an m.1. is non-empty.1. (2) E a b (5) Proof V aEDn E ( a ) = 1.1. L e m m a 4. 4. E ) . (4) E ( a ) < O i E ( a ) (in the modal case). . (E2) in the above Definitions 4. . F = (W. E ( a . In fact. D.v. X ) be a KFE. (2) Similarly. . T h e conditions ( E l ) .1.a ) . b E D+ put E ( a .b) = { u ( M A ( F ) D+. (El)-(E4) in 4.2. more exactly. and for every two individuals a. individuals a.5.4 For any structure (0. Proof In fact. T o prove the reflexivity.v.c E Dn: (1) E(a1 b) l m a . E ) is an H.1. the condition (E3) is necessary.6.18(3): X = Y 3 Cli(~=y). < Eaa.s. .R1.b) = E ( a . MODAL AND HEYTING VALUED STRUCTURES 295 L e m m a 4. i=l n n A (Eaibi A Ebici) < Eaici = Eac. The condition (E4) corresponds t o a theorem in 2. (3) E a b A E b c < Eac.

P r o o f W e prove ( 1 ) by induction on n. i f a = b..a ) for any a E Dn. ifa=b..b) := and t o a CD-structure { E ( a 7 a ) otherwise.b) := t o a keen structure Fk. Such a structure is denoted simply by (52. E ) has a constant domain (or briefly. E ) is called flabby if E ( a . or a CD-H.s.v. b) otherwise. E f l ) . b E Dn+'. b E Dn < A(b). where E f l ( a .8 For any congruential predicate A : Dn (1) E a b A A ( a ) --+ 52. tt (2) E a b < A(a) A(b). b E Dn. the condition a = I b holds trivially. i. D . . b = blbl. and congruential if for any a . for any a.e.D .1. Such a predicate is called R. so the claim is obvious. If n = 1. Fcd := (52.D . for any a . D ) . Then (*) A ( a ) Eab = A(a) Ealbl A Ea'b' 5 A(b1a') A Ea'b' . Definition 4 1 6 A structure (52. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Definition 4 1 5 A structure F = (52. E ) . F is a CD-m. Ek. Eke ( a .296 CHAPTER 4.v. strict (or Scott) if A ( a ) < E ( a . D . Let a = alal. where := (52.. E ) gives rise t o a flabby structure ( o f the same type) Ffl := (52. b E Dn we will use the notation L e m m a 4.). a ) = 1 for every .D . Every structure F = (52. Suppose ( 1 ) holds for n for any congruential A and consider a . or a CD-structure) if the equality is trivial. D ) . a E D and keen if E ( a . Definition 4 1 7 For a structure F = (52. E ( a . for any i E In For a. E ( a .b) = 0 whenever a # b. . an n-ary F-predicate (or an 52-valued predicate on D ) is a map A : Dn ---. So a CD-structure is both flabby and keen. b) = 0 iff a # b. D .b E D 1 iff a = b.s.

since E ( A .1. for c. we obtain (1): A(a) A Eab 5 A(b). This predicate is always congruential and strict.) If a # b. L e m m a 4. therefore by (*). # 0 for some a0 # bo and consider the unary F-predicate A sending a0 to (I. The n-ary predicate B : c H A(b1c) is also congruential. Then the predicate A sending every a to 1is not strict. thus since A is congruential.10 For n-ary F-predicates we introduce the ordering . By the induction hypothesis. (2) (Only if. Definition 4. (If). a).1. In fact. and every a # a0 to 0. (2) A structure F is keen iff all F-predicates are congruential. ai) = 1 implies A(a) 5 E(a. Then thus A is not congruential.4. since A(ao) $ Eao.9 (1) A structure F is flabby i f fall F-predicates are strict. < A(b). which eventually implies (2) a. Suppose Eao # 1 for some a0 E D.1.) E(ai. A ) = 1. bo) = ct. d E Dn the condition c =i d implies blc =i+l bid. A(blal) A Ea'b' = B(a') A Ea'b' 5 B(bl) = A@). Suppose E(a0. Now (1) implies Eab 5 A(a) -t A(b) hence by symmetry Eba 5 A(b) A(a). A 0-ary predicate A : {A) - f can be treated just as an element A(A) of l Proof (1) (Only if. MODAL AND HEYTlNG VALUED STRUCTURES 297 since A is congruential. (If). then Eab A A(a) 5 A(a) = A(b). then E a b = 0. and obviously Eaibi A A(a) If a = b.

. (3) are obvious. hence (##) E a A Eaibi L Eb.12 For an n-ary F-predicate A put Then (2) Ac is congruential.1. Then (1) As 5 A. Then since A is congruential. by (#). (##). (2) AS is strict.4(4).1. Lemma 4.b E Dn and a =i b. we call it the strict version of A.11 For an n-ary F-predicate A put As(a):= A(a) A Ea. Note that trivially AS= A for 0-ary A. Thus ASis the greatest strict predicate "below" A. ( 4 ) Suppose a. (2).298 CHAPTER 4. Proof (I). and thus AS(a) Eaibi A 5 A(b) A Eb = AS(b). then As is congruential.11. Also Eaibi 5 Ebi by 4.1. Let us now prove a dual to Lemma 4.1.Therefore ASis congruential. (3) for any n-ary strict F-predicate B (4) i f A is congruential. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Lemma 4.

we call it the congruential version of A.2). (3) are obvious. Hence (4) Since A 5 AC. Proof ( I ) .4.1. Then for any i and d A ( d ) A Eaidi a. follows that AC(a) Ea implies A(a) it 5 < Ea. If i # k . By assumption A(a) 5 Ea.1. so all the disjuncts in AC(a) bounded by Ea. i = k. so Thus Also note that A ( a ) A Eakbk = A(a) A Ebidi for d = a. assume that A is strict.1(1). then ai = bi. j#i since Eaidi 5 Eai by 4. (2). then by 4. are . Now if i = k . < Ed A Eaidi = A Eai A Eaidi < Ea. MODAL AND HEYTING VALUED STRUCTURES (3) for any n-ary congmential F-predicate B (4) A is strict ifl Ac is strict. So Ac is the least congruential predicate 'above' A. and thus Ac(a) 5 Ea. =i The other way round.4(1).1. (2) Suppose a =k b. Then by well-distributivity (Section 1.

5 but in general A and (AS)' are 5-incomparable.1. VV i d={a since A ( a ) = A ( a ) A Eaiai.On the other hand. Remark 4.13 The latter equality holds since Eai A Eaidi = Edi A Eaidi (which easily follows from 4. And if A(d) A Ebd -$ A(b) for some b. The first disjunct is redundant as it equals A ( a ) A Ea A Eaiai. E. Exercise 4. AS is strict. for a strict A we have Ac(a)= ( A ( d )A Eaidi).14 For an arbitrary predicate A. Note that AS 5 (As)c AC. Remark 4.d. Then A(a) -$ ( A S ) c ( a ) .15 Show that (AS)'= A iff A is strict and congruential.300 CHAPTER 4. .13 Note that the disjuncts A(a) Eaiai corresponding to d = a are obviously redundant in the definition of AC.1.16 As we are interested in algebraic models satisfying the axioms of equality. ( A C ) " ( a ) A C ( a ) Ea = A ( a ) A Ea V = A V V ( A ( d )A Ea A Eaidi) i d=ia by well-distributivity. so by Remark 4. atomic D+-sentences should be evaluated by congruential predicates.1.4 (I)). ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Remark 4. i d={a In fact. This requirement also makes sense for logics without equality. since ( A S ) " ( a ) 5 Eaa. hence (*) follows.1.1. since A ( d ) A Ebd 5 (AS)"(b). we can construct a strict congruential version (*) ( A S ) " ( a= ) ( a )= V V ( A ( d )A Eaidi). consider a unary A such that A(a) $ Eaa for some a. A similar situation is in Kripke semantics . then (AS)"(b) A(b).and thus for d =i a On the other hand.as we know from Chapter 3. including equality in semantics is crucial for completeness.g.1.

this does not matter for semantics. This happens because strict predicates are not closed under all Boolean operations (for example. a = i b. Thus (cpS)p= ( ( ~ p )and so the definition is sound.4. E ) we define its (unique) 'large' extension to all modal (respectively. D .2. under negation.v.2. F'rom the definitions it follows that all the predicates c p are congruential.11. (2) p ( a = b) := E ( a . The pair ( F .e. inD tuitionistic) D-sentences i n the natural way: (1) p ( l ) := 0.s. sending every D-sentence to f such that l whenever P E PLn. b E Dn.1 A valuation is an m.4.3 For an arbitrary valuation p we define its strict version cpS such that pS(P(a)) := p(P(a)) A Ea.1.2. see Definition 4. a E Dn. But as we shall see.v. .4 For a valuation cp i n an m.2 A valuation cp is called strict i f every predicate associated to p is strict. However evaluating formulas with arbitrary predicates simplifies the inductive truth definition. . a .2 Algebraic models Definition 4.s.) F = ( a . by Lemma 4.) F = (a. p Definition 4.the underlying idea is that a D+-sentence may be true only within the "life-zone" of all occurring individuals. Definition 4. since (cpp)Sis congruential ~. H. since A(a) 5 Ea does not imply -A(a) 5 Ea if Ea # 1). Definition 4. b). foranya€Dn. (3) cp(A V B ) := cp(A) V cp(B).2. P € p L n . Certainly cpS = p if p is strict. E ) is a map cp : AFD ---.s.2. 4.cp) is called an algebraic model over F . i.v. ALGEBRAIC MODELS 301 Remark 4.1. i f cp(P(a))I Ea for any P E PLn.v.s. Then the n-ary F-predicate pp : a H cp(P(a)) is called associated to cp and P . (H.2. (respectively. because replacing every A with AS does not change the notion of validity.17 The strictness property is quite natural for evaluation of formulas .

c E Dn. In particular. ---+ I . let x . I n precise terms: let P E PLn. and let B = [ c / x ] y / x. is congruential. x ( ~:= ) ~ ( [ ~ / ~ l ~ ) for any a E Dn. . L e m m a 4. b E D cp([alxlA)A Eab i cp([blxlA).). ~ . B [ y H a] = P ( x ) [ x a H a ] [ xI-+ c ] .5 ( 1 ) cpp remains congruential after fixing some parameters. we sometimes write c p rather than c p ~ . Proof (1) First note that where a. T h e n 913.CHAPTER 4. since (i) if i G r ( a ) . for any a.s congruential.cp) with the individual domain D. We begin with a simple observation.2.a ] P ( x ) . =(PP. Similarly we have c p ( [ b l ~ l B ) cp(P(bl)). ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Then for any D-formula A and a distinct list of variables x 2 F V ( A ) of length n. [ i (2) Let A be a n atomic D-formula without equality with F V ( A ) { x ) . let a : I. otherwise. T h e n for any algebraic model (F.. be a n injection. . we may define the associated F-predicate such that ( P A . ~ Let us check that every predicate c p ~ . To simplify notation..-I This is clear. y be disjoint distinct list of variables of length n and m respectively. = .

ALGEBRAIC MODELS where b' is constructed from b in the same way as a'. Now a a' =. (3) If A is x = x.2. B(am) = A(a) and B(bm) = A(b).2(4) and the induction hypothesis cp(A(a))nEab 5 Oicp(B(a))nOiEab = Oi(cp(B(a))nEab) I Oicp(B(b)) = cp(A(b)). hence by Lemma 4.1. (PC are congruential. E(am. . (2) If A is a D-sentence. L e m m a 4.2. then cp(A(a)) A Eab = E a a A Eab I E b b = cp(A(b)). (4) If A is atomic without equality. then by Definition 4. if A is OiB.6 The predicate c p ~ . the claim follows from Lemma 4. Proof By induction on the complexity of A we prove cp([a/xlA) A Eab 5 cp([blxlA). for some B as in (I). p + Therefore + - . Otherwise we have A = [xrnly1B. Now since E(am. since cpp is congruential.1. c p ~ . if A contains P and x occurs m times in A. bm) = Eab. =i 303 b implies cp([a/y]B) A E a b = cp(P(a')) A E a b I cp(P(b')) = cp([b/y]B). the claim is trivial. (5) In the modal case.(i) b'.there is nothing to prove. is congruential. (2) If A is x = c or c = x.1.4.1 we have: cp(A(a)) A Eab = Eac A Eab I Ebc = cp(A(b)).5. we obtain (2). (1) If A is I. and thus. as required. (6) If A is B > C and (PB.bm) A cp(B(am)) I cp(B(bm)). thus cp(A(a)) A Eab A = (cp(B(a)) cp(C(a))) A cp(B(b)) A Eab I (cp(B(a)) -+ cp(C(a))) A cp(B(a)) A Eab (since c p is congruential) ~ 5 cp(C(a)) A Eab (by properties of Heyting algebras) I cp(C(b)) (since c c is congruential). is congrmential for any D-formula A with FV(A) C {x). By (I). then by 4.2. .8. then cp(A(a)) A Eab = (cp(B(a)) cp(C(a))) A Eab.

a a b Lemma 4. and the induction hypothesis applied to B(d... ) ) . is congruential for any D-formula A and r ( x )> F V ( A ) .an). Then cp(A(a)) Eab I cp(A(b)) A is equivalent to Eab A /\ (Ec cED + cp(B(c.6.6 ) ) ) . C. . ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS (7) If A ( x ) is 3y B(y.a ) ) )I Ec -* cp(B(c. dED So by well-distributivity. and assume that y E F V ( B ) . and thus # x (otherwise A is a cp(A(a)) = V cp(B(d1a ) ) ) . b of the same length as x.2.. ) )A Eab) i a (8) If A = B V C . Fix all the parameters of A but xi. Then by Lemma 4. Eab A (Ec + cp(B(c. . Proof Assume a =i b for a.x ) . (10) Let A = VyB(y. and the claim is proved for B ...cp(B(c.x). ) ) . we have (9) The simple case A = B A C is left to the reader. .7 The predicate cp~. ) ) )A Ec 5 Eab A cp(B(c. It suffices to show that for any c E D. ) ) )I a /\ c E D (Ec + cp(B(c.2. Eab A (Ec . we obtain cp(A(a)) Eab = A V d€D (cp(B(d. b i. .e. then we may assume that y sentence). xi. The latter follows by properties of Heyting algebras and the induction hypothesis: Eab A (Ec -+ cp(B(c. ) ) 5 cp(B(c. so put B(xi) := A(al.304 CHAPTER 4.x ) . ) ) )A Ec I cp(B(c. ai+l.ai-1.and that the claim holds for B. . a b)). .

.17. Then Proof By induction. (1) cpb(l) := 0. (4) $(A (6) $(A V B) := E ( A V B) A ($(A) V cpb(~)).4. Let F = Then we put E(A) := / \ { ~ a I a E Dl a occurs in A). (2) @ ( a = b) := E ( a . even for a strict cp. In particular. (7) cpb(OiA) := E(OiA) n O. > B ) := E(A > B ) A (cpb(A)-+ c p b ( ~ ) ) .2.cpb(A) (in the modal case). Definition 4. ALGEBRAIC MODELS 305 However. W e also define another associated predicate such that for any a E Dn Again we often abbreviate to cp. E ) we define an a-valued function cpb on corresponding D-sentences as follows. with the domain D.2. D . (3) @(A) := cp(A) A E(A) for all other atomic A. cp(A) = Eab < E a A E b = E(A). then by 4.9 Let ( F . (2) If A is a = b. as we mentioned in Remark 4. b).8 For a valuation cp in a structure F = ( 0 . (1) If A is I.1. (a. E ) be a structure.4 (1) and symmetry. (5) $(A A B ) := @(A) A cpb(~).. A a corresponding D-sentence.1. (9) cpb(VxA) := E(VxA) A A dED (Ed 4 cpb([d/x]A)). Lemma 4. So we introduce another extension of cp to D-sentences. the predicate c p is not necessarily ~ strict. A a D-sentence of the corresponding type. E(A) = 1 if A is a usual sentence (without constants from D). D.the claim is trivial.cp) be an algebraic model.2.

A E(A) 5 A E(B). E ( C ) . the claim holds by definition. Since E(A) 5 E ( B ) . then p(A) = E a a = E(A). C .1. = ) Next. then by the induction hypothesis. (5) If A is a modal formula OiB. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS (3) If A is a = a. then by the induction hypothesis Let us show that this equals In fact. we obtain (7) If A is B A C and the claim holds for B . and thus (6) If A is B V C . c p n ( ~ ) Q c p f l ( ~n E(A) = Q ( B ) n OiE(B) n E(A). OiE(B) n E(A) = OiE(A) n E(A) = E(A) by 4.306 CHAPTER 4. we have (8) If A is B > C . The other way round .4 (4). then by the induction hypothesis. (4) If A is atomic without equality.

A E ( A ) A (Ed . thus @ ( A )5 E ( A ) A The other way round. hence (*) E ( A ) A (Ed + cp(B(d))) Ed I which implies + E ( A ) A Ed A cp(B(d)). because now B(d)= B ( x ) and E ( B ( d ) )= E ( A ) .cp(C))I . thus E ( A ) A (cp(B). E ( B ( d ) )= E ( A ) .cp(C)A E(C). then B ( x ) d E D. So = B(d) for any (10) Finally let A = V x B ( x )and first assume that x E F V ( B ( x ) ) .2. (9) If A = 3xB(x) and x is a parameter of B ( x ) . then by the induction hypothesis and Definition 4. E(A) I If B ( x ) is closed. ALGEBRAIC MODELS 307 hence.2. . .cp(B(d))) Ed I E ( A ) A Ed A cp(B(d)). /\ dED (Ed + w(B(d))) E ( A ) A cp(A).Then E ( A )A A dED (Ed -+ E ( A ) A Ed A cp(B(d))) by the induction hypothesis. cp(B)A E ( B ) . A . the argument is slightly different.4.4 we have If A = 3xB(x) and B ( x ) is a D-sentence. = E ( A )A (Ed -t cp(B(d))) Ed 5 E ( A ) Ed A cp(B(d)). By the induction hypothesis we have cw p.

cpu([a/x]A) A Eaibi = cp([a/x]A) A E([a/x]A) A Eaibi < . If xi E FV(A). i.2. since To prove the congruentiality. Since a =i b and Eaibi 5 Ebi. we have thus cpu([alx]A)A Eaibi I ~ ( [ b / x ] ~ ) ~ b y 4.2. Proof Strictness readily follows from the previous lemma. (*) implies L e m m a 4. cp) be an algebraic model with a domain D. a E Dn. assume that 11 = n and consider a =i b in Dn. . ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS The other way round. Then for any D-formula A with FV(A) c r(x) the predicate cp\. Then (cpYh(A) = cpb (A) for any D-sentence A.2.10 Let (F.7.11) cp.308 CHAPTER 4.11 Let (F. L e m m a 4. (Lemma 4.1.2. =(cp~)~. x If xi @ FV(A).x is congruential.cp) be an algebraic model with a domain D .e. cpS the corresponding strict valuation such that for any P E P L n . it is also strict i f FV(A) = r(x). so the inequality is trivial. then [a/x]A = [b/x]A. then by the previous lemma and Lemma 4.7.cp([b/x]A) A E([a/x]A) A Eaibi.

2. 11 = n. Proof (1) By induction on n.3. Then (2) cp(VxA(x)) = 1 iff Y E Dn E a 5 cp(A(a)). lyl = n. they also coincide on all D-sentences. E) be a st7*ucture. so we may use the notation cp('?A). .2.2. ALGEBRAIC MODELS Proof By the choice of cps. + as required. The base is trivial. z).12 Let (F. .9 we also have Lemma 4. (2) Readily follows from (1). for any A E AFD Since the maps (cpS)b. a Thus cp(VxA(x)) does not depend on the ordering of x.13 Let F = (a. then VxA(x) = VyVzA(y. v h ( 4= ( P ~ ) ~ ( A ) . Then Proof By 4. D A(x) a D-formula of the corresponding type with r(x) = FV(A(x)).4. cph coincide on AFD and they are uniquely prolonged according to 4.11. (F. Since E(A) = 1. Lemma 4.cp) an algebraic model. x x distinct. If x = yz.2.2.8. Consider the step from n to n 1.2. by Lemma 4. so by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 1.2.cp) be an algebraic model. A a sentence of the corresponding type.

then some QKZ.15 A predicate A : Dn ---. F I= A iff A(A) = 1.12 and 4. E ) (notation: F t= A or F Il.A ) i f Ea 5 A(a) for any a E D n .2. For instance.14).Ct is called true i n a structure F = (a. L e m m a 4. (3) F t= ( P A . . then the formula A := VxVy(x = y A P(x) > P(y)) is not true in ( 0 . I in the intuitionistic case. E).(P) Il. (6) F b (cps)\. i n every strict model over F). (2) (F7(PS)b A. i. the corresponding D-structure (Ct.2.(P) k A or (F.14 A closed formula A is called true i n an algebraic model (F. .16 The following conditions are equivalent (where b stands for Iti n the intuitionistic case) (1) (F7 cp) b A. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Definition 4.2. i.2.2.(or QH=-) theorems become nonvalid. i. A Definition 4.310 CHAPTER 4.2. cp) (with the same notation) if V is true. Proof By 4. cpS(A(a))= E a . i.e. for a 0-ary A. V a E Dn Ea 5 cp(A(a)). for which cpp is not congruential (they are just valuations in D.2. V a E Dn (5) F k P (. cp) (in the sense of Definition 4.2.18 If in the definition of validity we also allow for 'valuations7 cp in F = (0. for a strict A.17 A formula A is valid i n a structure F (of the corresponding kind) i f A is true i n every model over F (or equivalently. V a E Dn Ea 5 cph(A(a)). D)). (P) (notation: (F.A i n the intuitionistic case) i f p(A) = 1. if P E PL1 and cpp is not congruential. V a E Dn (cpS)h(A(a))= E a . Validity is denoted again by k in the modal case.e. rn Definition 4.e. Thus FbAiffVa€Dn Ea=A(a). (4) F b cpi. D. t R e m a r k 4.e. and FbAiffFkAs. an arbitrary formula A is called true i n (F.13.

s.23.2. Proof The equality ( 1 ) is checked easily. W 4.1 Let F be a modal or Heyting-valued structure with a set of individuals D .(Eab A cp(P(a)). suppose 31 1 Eab A cp(P(a))$ cp(P(b)) for some a. Lemma 4. so let us check (2).cp(P(b))) . by our assumption.v. B without constants. Then for any a E Dn. Lemma 4.19 For any valuation cp i n an m. by ( I ) . F k (It-)A Proof F k (It)B.2..4. In fact. for any a E ~ 1 ~ 1 It is sufficient to show that has the properties 2. cp(A) I E a A E b . we have: Oi since E ( A ) I E ( A ) . .22.3.3 Soundness We begin with an analogue of Lemma 3. We only consider the case & = b'. for any valuation q5 i n F .2. x (11) for A . (I) Along the same lines as 3.13 (the proof of which does not use congruentiality). Consider the equivalence relation on modal (or intuitionistic) formulas: A B iff F V ( A ) = F V ( B ) and for any distinct list x such that r ( x ) = F V ( A ) .cp(P(b)) . B ( x ) be congruent formulas of the corresponding type. If FV(b'yA) = r ( x ) for a distinct x. Then by Lemma 4. = Eab A cp(P(a))--. and let A ( x ) . cp(P(b))# 1 . we have two options: .17(1)-(4). = E a A E b A Eab A cp(P(a)). b E D.2. 11 = n.3.3. SOUNDNESS In fact.

4. since y does not occur in [a/x]A. then and so cp( [ a l x l ~A) = y cp([alxIQz(A[y ED A (Ed = + cp([dlyl [alxlA)). let us show that (2) Supposing A We have F V ( A ) = F V ( B ) . + - 2)) d€D A (Ed cp([dlzl[alxl(A[~ zl))). + + It remains to note that [dlyl [alxlA = [dl21[alxI(A[y since y zl). cp([adlxylB)). let r(x) = FV(VyA).4 and 4. # BV(A). The argument for 3 is quite similar. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS 9 V(A). By Definition 4. A[y H z] = A. By the same reason so (1)holds in this case. Hence by Lemma 1. cp(v~[alxlA) = /\ dED (Ed cp([alxlA)).2. + B implies and the claim follows. FV(VyA) = FV(VyB). (ii) If y E FV(A).312 (i) If y gZ FV(A). then y CHAPTER 4. z $2 V(A).1. Then cp([alxlV~A) = cp([alxlv~B) = Now A N dED dED A (Ed A (Ed + cp([adlxylA)).1(E3).2. . B .

3.3. the set Proof First let us show that the set of valid formulas is substitution closed.e.a ] A> [ a . (Lemma 4. see Definition 2. where x .16).3. r ] B ) a = cp([a a / x . SOUNDNESS 313 Consider the case * = 3.s.T / X . a ] A )-+ cp([a. We may also assume that P occurs in A (otherwise S A = A ) and y n F V ( A ) = 0 . due to Lemma 4.cp) let us show that ( F .1). c E Dj (where m = lyl. Since S A is defined up to congruence and validity respects congruence (Lemma 4. Let S = [ C ( x y ) / P ( x ) ]be a .23 we also have F V ( S A ) = y U F V e ( S .22. a. r ] B 1 ) -+ T = cp([a/x] > B')). then F V ( A ) = x . y ) . i.16) for any b E Dm. r ] B )= - The proof of (4) is trivial.9 it follows that cp$(A(a)) cp'(B(a)). but the detail is slightly different. Let (a. the proof of Lemma 3.5. F V ( B ) = x .2.2. T . c F V ( A ) = r ( z ) .22.2. F .2 (cf.by Lemma 4.2. z = z'z". By Lemma 2. T for injections a.4. / x / . (11) is an obvious consequence of (I). the set (2) For an H. a ] A r ) cp([a. If r ( x ) = F V ( A > B ) . we may further assume that A is clean and B V ( A ) n y = 0 . / X . where F V e ( S . T h e o r e m 4. then S A is obtained by replacing every subformula of the form P ( x l ) with C ( x l . A ) . / x . j = Iz'I) . F .16. Now A A' & B B' implies F V ( A 3 B ) = F V ( A 1 > B') and - - cp([a/x](A B ) ) = cp([a.We argue similarly t o 3. simple formula substitution. = Since E ( A ( a ) ) = E ( B ( a ) ) .cp) i= (IF) S A .2.s. y are distinct lists such that r ( y ) C F V ( C ( x .5.y ) ) C r ( x y ) . (A' .3. Assume that F = D . The argument resembles the proof of Lemma 3.v.v. For an algebraic model ( F .2 (Soundness theorem) (1) For an N-m.A ) = r ( z l ) . F V e ( S .T / X 3 a = cp([a. E ) k A.A ) F V ( A ) is the set of essential parameters.

d)) = cp(SB(b. b) is a D-sentence. Then we have: B(d) = [d/u][u. Assume that B is atomic. x' = u . b ) = C(a. The case when B is atomic and does not contain P.23. y]SB = [dlb l u . with a distinct u such that and for any d E D' (where 1 = lul) or in a simpler notation.d)). b). . . so S B = VxSB1. a. On the other hand.2. Let us check that 7 is a valuation. and so [dlb / u .5.314 CHAPTER 4. y) = C ( d . where a : In . ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Given tuples b . by Lemma 2. y ] C ( u .2. r](Bl(a. and thus by Definition 4. a. S B = SB1 * SB2. Thus by definition of 7. y ) . In fact.4 and the induction hypothesis >. where a = d . A or 4. B = P(x'). where * is V. v(B) := cp(B) for any other B E AFD. Then by Definition where * is the corresponding operation in a. c . a. Note that SB(d.. a. 4 ) ) = /\ aED (Ea cp(SBi(blaid))) cp(VxSBl(b.2. a. Let B = B1 * B2. S B = C ( u . then by our assumption x @ uy. a/x]P(x) = P ( a ) .4 and the induction hypothesis r](B(d)) = = r\ aED ( E a --. is trivial. let a =i d . since FV(SB) uy. If B = 'dxB1. we construct a valuation 77 in F such that for any a E Dn (where n = 1x1) v(P(a)) := cp(C(a1b)). then by Lemma 4.7 Then we claim that for any formula B(u).a/x]P(x) = [d .Il. The claim (1) is proved by induction.

Y ) . ( s l ) . (F. (m5)=. Then by ( 1 ) we have: But (3) Id. they are also valid in F. (s3) from Definitions 2. Suppose F i= A ( x .2.3. Let us also show the validity of (Ax14): V x ( P ( x )> q) > ( 3 x P ( x )> q). Let 1. and the lists x y . We check only some of them. [ d / z ] A [c/zl]A.3 are verified in a standard way. In fact.cp) . y ) .z ) ) = ~ ( Y Z ) ( x )f. 2.y ) > B ( Y . Note that the value cp(A) of a propositional formula A in a structure F = (52. And finally let us consider modus ponens.6). cp(Vx(P(x)> q) > ( 3 x P ( x )> q)) = 1 iff cp(Vx(P(x)3 9 ) ) 5 cp(3xP(x)2 q) = cp(3xP(x)) -+ iff cp((Vx(P(x) 9 ) )A cp(3xP(x)) 4 9 ) 3 I Transforming the left part of the latter inequality by well-distributivity. (#) holds.b l z f .16. We have hence i. 2. The remaining properties (m0)-(m3).( 3 ) . where F V ( A ( x . SOUNDNESS 315 The case B = 3xB1 is similar and is left to the reader. A ( x . = since F V ( A ) = r ( z ) . Take an arbitrary e E Dk-j and the corresponding d = ce E Dk. By our assumption.y]SA. since all propositional axioms are valid in Cl (Lemma 1. F V ( B ( Y . yz are distinct (and some of them may be empty). E ) is exactly the same as in the algebra 52.4.1.cp) i= V x P ( x )> P ( y ) .y ] S A )= v ( [ d / z ] A= v ( [ c / z f ] A ) Ec 2 E b A Ec. consider an algebraic model (F. D. Now let us verify (#)./ z f .2.and Lemma 4.r ( z ) = 0 r.6. we obtain A (cp(P(d)) ~ ( 9 ) ) V cp(P(a)) A + dED aED as required.e. In fact. YISA = [c. So. F V ( S A ) = r ( y z f ) .6. b / z .16. m. b ) 2 i.Y ) ) = r ( x . we obtain cp([c. n be .by Lemma 4. and so by (2).z ) . F I= A. Let us check the validity of (Ax12): V x P ( x ) > P ( y ) .e.6.2.2.

Let us now consider a particular kind of H. over a basic locale is also called basic.v.those arising from S4m.2.v.v. For basic H. the intuitionistic truth definition matches with the modal definition. By 4. Let us consider the induction step for A = 'dxB(x).316 CHAPTER 4. c)) As this happens for any a E DL.v. this means the following.4(5).z). where B(x) is a D-formula. c E Dn and valuation cp Hence E ( a b c ) = E ( a b ) A E(abc) I cp(A(a. c)).3.2. the lengths of x. More generally: Definition 4. . F = (fk.4.2. Then according to Definitions 4. of this form is called 'basic'. y .s.v.v.11.5 Let cp be a valuation in an S4-m.s F = ( a .4 A locale is said to be basic if zt is isomorphic to the pattern of a complete S4-algebra. which implies F I=B(y. Lemma 4.s. FO ( 0 ° . ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS . But by 4. E). Thus E(bc) 5 cp(B(b.16. Definition 4.16. and put $(A) := Ocp(A) for every A E AFD.1.v.1 and Proposition 1. The required equality is easily proved by induction. Then $ is a valuation i n FO and $(A) = cp(AT) for every A E IF5 Proof By Lemma 4.7. E ) . A n H. = An H. $ is congruential. D .E) is the H. In precise terms.s.3. for any a E D ~ b E Dm.s. we have: .3.7.2.b ) ) A cp(A(a.2.s. z respectively.3 The pattern of an S4-m. b) 3 B(b. by 4.D.v.s.we obtain I cp(B(b. c)). D . 2.s. FV(B(x)) {x).

6 Let F = (a.. Proof We may assume that x = F V ( A ) . and thus +"(OVxAT(x)) = 1.11.s. (+) Suppose F0 k A.Let $" be the same valuation in F . D.(BT(d))) 5 O ( E d .3. cp(AT)5 which implies n .4.7 For any S4-m. then + " ( v x A T ( x ) ) = 1. IL(')(FO) = s ( M L ( ' ) ( F ) ) .2 and since FO k A. 1 L e m m a 4. 4. For an arbitrary valuation cp in F .3.(Ed d€D 3 v(BT(d)))..5 to the case when p = $".11. Q S 4 t. it follows that FO k A.7. ) Proof + Apply Lemma 4. SOUNDNESS On the other hand. x + hence by Lemmas 4. .3.3. hence AT) = and thus dED .s.3.3. v ( ~ ~ ( d ) ) ) . let us show that p(VxAT ( x ) ) 1. (+) Suppose F k AT and consider a valuation in FO.i. ( E d .5.3. we obtain $ J + and therefore cp(VxAT( x ) )= 1. . Then = by Lemmas 2. By Lemma 2.v.e. The case A = 3xB(x) is left t o the reader. 4. E ) be an S4-m.6 Since is arbitrary. Then $ ( A ) = $ " ( A ~ for every A E IF. F O k A ( x ) ifl F F AT ( x ) . F and intuitionistic formula A ( x ) .v.O V X A(~ ) = ( v x A ( x ) ) ~ . a valuation i n F O .2.7.$" the same valuation i n F .3. 1 Proposition 4. Let be a valuation in FO described in Lemma 4. and eventually 4 A T )= $(A).

3..s. Neighbourhood frames generate a special kind of modal algebras.12 ICErn(=)5 I&. The question. is denoted by MV(@). so we can define the associated algebraic semantics. D . S. is called basic general algebraic. we have: Lemma 4.=) and A&. Definition 4.s.11 W e define general neighbourhood/topological semantics as follows: IE.).(.s.10 A neighbourhood frame with equality is a triple @ = ( F . If F is a topological space.318 CHAPTER 4. I&.(=) 5 A&.) are equivalent.=) := {IL(=)(F) I F is a basic H. Let us also introduce some particular cases of algebraic semantics.s (or H. E ) such that F is a neighbourhood frame and (MA(F). ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Definition 4 3 8 W e introduce general algebraic semantics for our four types . and so we do not know if A&.9 For superintuitionistic logics the semantics A&.s.S=): A n algebraic semantics is a semantics generated by a class of m. The latter m. M = .v. whether every locale is basic.v. Definition 4. . From the definitions and since Kripke frames correspond to a special kind of neighbourhood frames.) := {IL(=)(@)I @ is a topological frame with equality ).v. we call @ a topological frame with equality and define The corresponding logics are defined in an obvious way: Definition 4.(=) := {ML(=)(@) @ I is a neighbourhood frame with equality). E ) is an m.v.v.).D .(. seems open. of logics ( M .3.3.3.(=).

. ) a ( a . a' E D l . MORPHISMS OF ALGEBRAIC STRUCTURES 319 4.4. V aEDl If instead of ( E l ) .equivalence i= 1 For a = ( a l . a ) . I t is obvious that (11) implies ( E l ) .b1).4 Morphisms of algebraic structures In this section we consider maps between algebraic structures preserving validity. i. - (Q1) E l ( a ) 5 (QZ) E2 (b) 5 V bEDz a ( a . (EZ).2 A p(=)-morphism a is called up(')-equivalence i f both a. b) ('totality ' . . This is because t h e conditions ( E l ) . (E2). b2) L El ( a l . b E ' D2 : (E) E2(b1. R (an '0-valued graph') morphism y : Fl -4 F2 is a map a : Dl x D2 b satisfying the following conditions for any a E Dl.b.b) A El ( a ) L E2(b). .4.embedding R fr 'p . i t is called a p'-morphism. Let us begin with the intuitionistic case. Definition 4. Definition 4. E D2: ( E l ) a ( a . where a-'(a. a-' are p(')-embeddings.b) ('surjectivity '). . a satisfies ( E ) and - T h e diagram below shows the correlation between different kinds o f morphisms: p= . .an) E D y .bi). .so every p=-morphism F2 is a p-morphism. A p(')-morphism a is called a p(')-embedding i f for any a. (12) are 'symmetrical'.b) := A a ( a i . E l ) and F2 = (0. let a ( a .and (12) implies ( E 2 ) .bz) A Ez(b1.az) ('injectivit~').b l ) A cr(a2. .embedding R p= .. I t is also clear that every p(')-morphism a : Fl 4 gives rise t o the converse p(')-morphism a-' : F2 .s.b)Aa(a. ( Q l ) . A pDl D2. b. E 2 ) be H. they are analogues o f pmorphisms used i n propositional logic. ( Q 2 ) .equivalence IT p .morphism p . b) = a(b. . b = (bl.b)Ia(a.) E DF. a satisfies the conditions ( I ) a(a1.v.morphism a p .e.4. . ( I l ) .F l .4.1 Let Fl = (0.

320 CHAPTER 4. Then a ( a . b E DT.b) A E I (44) J32(A(b)).. . ."A(b). b € D ? . bi) A a ( ~ bi) A El (ci) I E I (ai.x ) A ( x ) E 2 . . b) 2 2 whenever valuations cpl in Fl and ( ~ in F are matching. then for any a. x.b) A E I ( c )I &(a. whence the statement follows easily.s. i.uA(a) (P. ..5 Let a : Fl -+ F2 be a p-morphism of H. Then 4% F (P.4. IF('))..3 If a : Fl ---t F2 is a p-morphism of H. b) Proof In fact.4. Definition 4.6 Let a : Fl --t F2 be a p(=)-morphism. I Proof Easy by (El).4. x = ( X I . . the condition (El) yields: a(ci bi) A El (ci) F E2 (bi). . b E D?.). b E DF. . ~ ( a . a E D?. On the other hand.v.s. L e m m a 4. F V ( A ) C_ x . ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS L e m m a 4.x = ( X I . F V ( A ) C x .4 Let a : Fl -+ F be a p(=)-morphism. from (12) we have: These two inequalities imply a(ai.4. A ( x ) E IF(=). a E D . + + . A a ( c .v. The above condition is equivalent to ++ (P2P(b). We will use the following abbreviations: W (PA := (P(A). c E D?. c ) . $"A := $"(A). Valuations cpl in Fl and cp2 in F are said to be matching if 2 4% 5 (P1P(a) b) for any P E p L n . .ci). a E Dy. and can be replaced with the following two: L e m m a 4.

2. Then ( X I = x2).4.x).4. Let A(x) = 3yB(y. A cpyC(a) by the property of Heyting algebras b) 5 cpYC(b) by the inductive hypothesis for C.4."A(b)i cpTA(a).(a. we have: Now. since by (Ql). b) The atomic case is obvious.b) A (cpYB(a)--. 4% A (cpi-B(a)--. so we obtain: Thus Similarly one can check (**). by the inductive hypothesis and Lemma 4. cpTC(a))A cpTB(a) by the induction hypothesis for B 5 ~ ( a . MORPHISMS OF ALGEBRAIC STRUCTURES Proof By induction on A we check the following two properties: (*) 4% A cpTA(a) < cpTA(b). apply (**) a(a. Then we have: by Lemma 4. Let A = B V C.4. Then by Definition 4. The case A = B A C is trivial. the conditions (Il).4. Let A = B > C. y E FV(B).4.b) A cp. cpTC(a))A cpTB(b) b) 5 ct.1. EI(c)I V dE D2 a(c. similarly we obtain (**). Next. if A is (12).d ) .

d) A cpTB(c. note: 4 % b ) A cpYA(b) = a ( a ."B(d. d) A (E1(c) cpTB(c. a)) A E2(d) cp."B(d. To check (**). b) A a(c. For any d E D2 we have: a(a.db) A cprB(c. a))) cpTB(c1a))) CEDI (by distributivity) I V ( 4 % b ) A a(c.a)) (since in Heyting algebras x A (x + y) 5 y) V (a(ca. b) A = dEDz dEDz V cp.b ) A Ei(A(a)) A CEDI (Ei(c) -+ cpTB(c. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS and by the inductive hypothesis.d) by (Q2).a)) 5 cp.b) A CEDI A (E1(c) + cpTB(c.a)) A E2(d) A + = a(a. b)) L V cpTB(c. Hence we obtain (*): a ( a . for any c E Dl we have: . we obtain: So A satisfies (*).322 CHAPTER 4. d) A E l ( 4 A (El( 4 biE$2) + 5 = CEDI V ((. Let A(x) = VyB(y.(a. b) A cpTA(a) = a(a.b) CEDI (by IH).b) A 5 V CEDI A (El(c) + CEDI V a(cld) (by (Q2)) ( 4 % b ) A E2(d) A a(c.a ) = cp:A(a)."B(d. by the inductive hypothesis and since E2(d) I Let A(x) = 3yB(x).'B(c. a)) 5 Similarly. b ) A Ez(d) A cp. x). y @ FV(B). then V cE Dl a(c. b) CEDl V (a(a.

We may assume ! ~) that A is a sentence.4.6 (for Corollary 4. a ) )= cp. Let cpl be a valuation in Fl such that PYA # 1. b )A E2(A(b)) A + I E l ( A ( a ) ) A ( E l ( c ) cp. By Lemma 4. is a valuation in F2. V (a(c...a ( c .8 If a IL(=)(F~)."A# 1.c ) A c p l P ( ~ ) ) cplP(4.4. 5 < CED.1. - F2 is a p(')-embedding. cp.b) A Ei(c) I E2(b) for any c E D.F2 is a p(=)-eguivalence.4.. cpl.4.'B(c. then (1) every valuation cpl in Fl matches with some valuation 92 in Fl.'A(a). Also cpzP(b) I E2(b). Indeed. V (cu(a."A= 1.. we define cpzP(b) := cED.and thus cp.A~cp.3 and Definition 4. : Fl .b) A cplP(c)) b) V b) A a ( c ."B(d.4. cE D.b ) A &Dl = a ( a .b ) )5 i Lemma 4 4 7 If a : Fl . Then a(a. by ( E ) .b ) A El(c) A c p l P ( ~ ) ) (since cplP(c) I El(c) for the valuation c p l ) V (El (a.b) A cp2P(b)= = cED.2.cp. Proof (1) Given pl. A cplP(~)) b) for every b E DF.since by ( E l ) . (2) Let us show that A $ I L ( = ) ( Fimplies A $ 1L(')(F2). and let 972 be a valuation in F2 matching with n=O). then I L ( ' ) ( F ~ )= . A a ( c . MORPHISMS OF ALGEBRAIC STRUCTURES and thus we obtain (**): 323 a(a. This cp2 by Lemma 4. A dED2 A (Ez(d).

The condition (91) E l ( a ) 5 a ( a . First note that a satisfies ( E l ) a ( a . D 2 . p'-embedding. In fact.s.v. D2. g is a strong p=-morphism z f f a is a p'-morphism p-equivalence. E 2 )and a map g : Dl -+ D2.10 For H.E2) be two H.g(a)) El ( a ) 5 E2(b)7 which obviously holds. I t is also obvious that every isomorphism is a strong p'-morphism and that every strong p'-morphism is a strong pmorphism. So a surjective g is a strong p=-morphism i f f (iii) holds.E1).4.4.b E D2. Let us show that ( E 2 ) for a and ( i ) for g are equivalent. E l ) and F2 = (52. Then g is a strong p-morphism iff a is a p-morphism. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Definition 4. D l .324 CHAPTER 4. An isomorphism is a bijection g : Dl (iii).1. A D2 is called a strong pmorphism if for any a E D l . Lemma4. this follows from ( i ) and implies E2(g(a))5 El ( a ) i f we take b = g(a). consider a : Dl x D2 f12 such that - for a E Dl.D1. Fl = (52. p'-equivalence).s. The condition is equivalent t o E2(b7 g(a)) 5 E l ( a ) .9 Let Fl = (52. b E D2 map g : Dl - A strong p'-morphism is a map g satisfying (ii) and for any a l . Proof (or a p-embedding. a2 E D l . this means Ez(b.4(1). -+ D2 satisfying Note that (ii) obviously holds i f g is surjective and that (iii) implies (i). by Lemma 4.b) V bE D2 .v.b) A E l ( a ) 5 E2(b).F2 = ( n .

a) A E2(b7g(a)) Ez(b) I E2(b. this condition implies El (a) E2(g(a)) for any b E D2. In fact. b2) I El(a1.4. the condition I V EZ(~. the condition 1 ) (I1) ~ ( ~ bl) 7A a(a27 b2) A El(al. ~ 2 5 E2(b1. since E2(b. E2(bl. b2) I These two conditions follow from (iii) and taken together. since E2(g(a)) = E2(g(a). Next. a2). g(a')) and thus follows from (iii) This proves the second part of the Lemma. g(a)) the other ha.g(a)) means A El(al.g(aa)) A E ~ ( a l . Next. b2) A Ez(b1. A ) and (12) means El(a1. imply (iii) if we put b~ = b2 = g(a2). g(a)) I is equivalent to aEDl which is the same as the condition (ii). a2) means ~ ~ ( b ' A E2(b7g(a))A &(a) b) . Therefore g is a strong p-morphism iff a is a p-morphism. let us show that g satisfies (iii) if a satisfies (11) and (12). b2) means E2(b17g(al)) E2(bz. MORPHISMS O F ALGEBRAIC STRUCTURES is equivalent to &(a) I V bE Dz g(a)).4. and holds by Definition 4. The condition a(a1. .g(al)) A E2(b27g(a2)) A Ez(b1. On bE D2 I E2(g(a)).1. bl) A a(a2. this follows from (i).2.nd. The condition I E2(b1.~(~)). a a l E2(bi9b2).

.s.s.12 Does the existence of a p(')-morphism (p(=)-embedding i n our form) imply the existence of a p(=)-embedding satisfying (E')? Now let us consider the modal case. . In this case the conjunct E l ( a ) in ( E ) . p(=)-equivalence) D2. I: (cpiP(a) cpaP(b)).).b) n & ( a ) F and so on. Fl = (a.b) I: 'Jio(a1b) for all i E I. p(')-embedding p(=)-equivalence) a : Fl --. b E D2): ( E l ) a ( a . L e m m a 4. F V ( A ) C x = ( 2 1 .4. a E D y . E2) is a p(=)-morphism (respectively.v. . So we can give Definition 4. l E ) is an D D m.s. then its Boolean part F b = (ab. p(=)embedding.".v. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS R e m a r k 4.s.v.4. F2 are m. F..13 A p(=)-morphism(respectively.v. Note that a strong p(=)-morphism g gives rise t o the p(')-morphism a in this stronger sense.4.s. T h e following is rather trivial. etc.s..5: Definition 4.v..16 Let a : Fl ---. a E Dy.15 Let a: : Fl ---+ F2 be a p-morphism of m. S1 satisfying (EO) and the - T h e definition o f matching valuations in the modal case is the same as Definition 4. l . A ( x ) E MF(=).v. are the corresponding H.F2 from a p-m.s.4. b E D z . .14 If Fl.4." F i of the corresponding H. p(=)-embedding. should be omitted.4. p(')-equivalence) F. but slightly more restrictive definition of p(')-morphism.. Viz. Thus a p-morphism is a map a : Dl x D2 conditions (for any a E D l .11 One can consider a more natural. the conditions ( E l ) .l E ) is an H. then the same map a is a p(=)-morphism (respectively.v.v. for any P E P L n . x.s.4. P r o b l e m 4.. . over the same S4-algebra.b) I: E2(b) A El ( a ) . b E Dz. F2 be a p(')-morphism. p(=)-embedding. p(=)-equivalence). a: : Fl . Valuations cpl i n Fl and cpz i n Fz are matching i j b. --. L e m m a 4. F. E l ) to an m.326 CHAPTER 4. Then whenever valuations cpl i n Fl and cp2 in Fz are matching. I t is clear that i f F = (0. F$ satisfying the condition of the Boolean parts F! - (EO) &(a.F2 is a p(')-morphism (respectively. Fz = D (a. ( E 2 ) can be replaced with a stronger one: (E') a ( a ..

9 is a Remark 4. i m.4. Let us also define some auxiliary kinds of morphism. be two H. b) - - 5 E2(y(a). (2) E l ( % a) = E2(y(a). Borceaux. 1984. which we call weak morphisms [Goldblatt. Ei). in the sense of Definition 4. b). a') 5 a(al. by (EO).b') < a ( a . Definition 4. b). (1) a ( a .s) over the same algebra 52. b E Dl (1) El (a.4. 0-rnvs) denotes the category of H.17 Let F = ( 0 .v.4. b ) n OiqlB(a) l n i ~ 2 B ( b ) . m. i = 1.v.6. V. (respectively.s.v. In particular. 0-Hvs (respectively.4. b) A E l ( a . there also exists another kind of morphisms. V were considered in the proof of Lemma 4.s. we have: and thus Hence. By Lemma 4. A weak morphism is defined as a mapping a : D l x D2 -+ C? with the following properties: E2(b.18 For H. >. Di.2.v. .s.) over 52 and regular morphisms. ~ ( b ) ) .b') a ( a . MORPHISMS OF ALGEBRAIC STRUCTURES 327 Proof By induction on A. 3. 19941. a ( a .4. Consider the case A = OiB. A regular morphism y : Fl F2is a mapping y : Dl D2 such that for any a. The atomic case and the cases of A.y(a)).4.s (respectively. every strong p'-morphism regular morphism.4 (which obviously holds in the modal case).4.v. By induction hypothesis.

Higgs's theorem [Higgs. 19841. 4. 19791. [Borceaux. b'). For every locale 0 let Cat(0) := Cat(R.5 Presheaves and 0-sets In this section we consider an equivalent representation of algebraic semantics using presheaves. and the following conditions hold: (1) F ( u . states the equivalence between the category of sheaves and sheaf morphisms and some full subcategory of 0-sets (so called 'complete' 0-sets). this construction can be used to define logics of presheaves. also cf. Definition 4. Fourman and Scott. in which (u. Unfortunately. weak morphisms are not logically faithful (see the discussion below). such that b) = E(b. 1977. 19941. First.) (the identity function). On the other hand.?(a))- 4% Moreover. This means that we have a family of sets (.SET. this result does not help for our purpose. equivalent to the whole category of 0 sets [Goldblatt. Goldblatt. b) A a ( a . and the semantics of complete H.R) corresponds to a category Cat(F.F(u) : u E S1) and a family of functions (restriction maps) where u. R). u 2 v. It also turns out that the latter subcategory is 'representative'. i. 2). 1984. F . u)= idF(.328 a ( a .v. However.s. because the 0-set isomorphisms used in this theorem are not logically faithful.s. v E R. So in this section we describe another construction showing that the logic of any m. Every presheaf corresponds to an 0-set in a standard way [Fourman and Scott. Makkai and Reyes. 1994.v. v) is the unique morphism from u to v whenever uRv. The connection between presheaves and 0-sets is well known in topos theory. : Cat(0) . It is clear that every regular morphism y corresponds to a weak morphism a . .e. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS 5 Ez(b. 19791. and in the latter subcategory all weak morphisms correspond to regular morphisms [Borceaux.s. let us recall (Chapter 3) that every poset ( F . Thus the above equivalence is not sufficient for showing the equivalence between the semantics of H. the category of 0-sets and weak morphisms is equivalent to its full subcategory of complete 0-sets. 19841. for the case of sheaves there exist a connection in the opposite direction.1 A presheaf (of sets) over a locale 0 is defined as a functor . b') CHAPTER 4.5. can be presented as the logic of some presheaf.v.

Definition 4. The set of all the individuals is called the total domain of 3.5. w)0 3 ( u .3 A presheaf 3 over S2 is disjoint if Lemma 4. provided u > v 2 w.w ) .5.2 A morphism f : 3 1 F2 of presheaves over fl is a functor morphism (natural transformation) i. A n isomorphism is an invertible morphism. a family of mappings - such that the following diagram commutes (provided u 1 v ) . Presheaves over fl and morphisms constitute a category Psh(S2). as usual.v ) = 3 ( u .4 Every presheaf is isomorphic to some disjoint presheaf. A presheaf F is called inhabited i f V { u I F(u)# 0 ) = 1.5.e.4. . this is equivalent to bijectivity of every f.. its elements are called individuals (or sections) over u .5. Definition 4. PRESHEAVES A N D S2-SETS (2) F ( v . The set 3 ( u ) is called the (domain) of F at u .

v). Then (2) (alv)jw = alw. The other way round. (2) g(alv) = g(a) I v.6 Let F be a disjoint presheaf. Definition 4. we can define a 3 morphism f : F1---.5. given a map g satisfying (I).v)(a).V ) 0 fu : a and also H (a. we can assume that all presheaves are disjoint.v) fv 0 3 ( u . Then F' is a disjoint presheaf. (2). w 5 v 5 la[. v) (a.let F 1 ( u ) := F ( u ) x {u) . since F1(u. v) . and there exists an isomorphism f : 3 4 3 ' such that fu(a) = (a.5. Con1 sider a map g : F : 3 such that .5. v) (a). Given a presheaf 3. 2 by putting . u).330 Proof CHAPTER 4. u) := ( F ( u . In a disjoint presheaf 3 every individual belongs t o a unique 3 ( u ) .1 for disjoint presheaves can be reformulated as follows. The following simple lemma yields an equivalent definition of a morphism of disjoint presheaves as a map of domains preserving extents and commuting with restrictions: Lemma 4. a E . f is obviously bijective. and the corresponding diagram commutes. the restriction of a t o v is f Definition 4.5 I v 5 lal. u) H ( F ( U .5.7 Let f : F ---+ 3 2 be a morphism of disjoint presheaves. In fact. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Almost obvious. 3 ' ( u . v) : a H ( F ( u . - Then g has the following properties. (1) lg(a)l = 14. Thanks to the above lemma. v)(a). the corresponding u is called the extent of a and denoted by lal. a (1) a I (la11 = a. Lemma 4.

Hence it follows that E ( a . b) = E(b. a ) = la1 and 3 is inhabited.5. If g : 3.E ( a .4. b E F* let E ( a . b) A E ( b . c ) C X ( a . that is So for any u E X ( a . c ) } 5 V X ( ~=. b) n X ( b .5. a). b) = Then the triple V X (b).5. b) = X ( b . c ) we have (U A V) E X ( a . W - .5.v. (and basic 52). V { E ( a . ~ E H V ( 3 ) = (s2. then one can easily check that X l ( a .which means that g is an isomorphism of H.8 Let 3 be an inhabited disjoint presheaf over a locale 52. c ) = V { u A v I u E X ( a . 3.a ) I a E F*} = 1holds. Thus E l ( a .5.s. then Lemma 4.9 If F 1 . H V ( 3 1 ) . is a bijective map satisfying Lemma 4. . because E ( a . v E X ( b . C) Obviously.g(b)).7. . similarly for m. 3 2 described in Proposition 4. isomorphic to EO.v E X ( b .s.8. F2 are isomorphic disjoint presheaves over 52.for some S4-algebra E. ) Proof The equality E ( a . b). Proof Let X 1 .v. and for a . since X ( a . a ) is trivial. Since by Lemma 4.8.s. b). (ii).c). c). X 2 be the functions corresponding to F 1 .v. H V ( F 2 ) are isomorphic. b) = X2(g(a). PRESHEAVES A N D %SETS Proof 331 H Straightforward. if the locale f is basic. l and E is the same as in Proposition 4. X ( a . b ) = E 2 ( g ( a ) g(b)). b) is >-stable. then the corresponding H.5.5.7 (i).F. Proposition 4.

leaving (2) for the reader.b]. a] = [v. be the following equivalence relation in Go(u): (u. 3 2 gives rise to an isomorphism of the associated H.a]):= [v. (m.s. since G*.s. an isomorphism of disjoint presheaves T I .v. It is clear that (*).e.8. a) zU(u. [v.a] = [u. I i-2 is basic. v) is well-defined. For every u E i-2 let Go(u) = {(u. (2) For any m.s. since [u.s.v.4. Now let us show that IL=(G) = IL'(G).).s. by Lemma 4. and let z.v. uES2 . Recall that IL=(G) = IL'(HV(G)). Proposition 4. In fact.v. Proof We prove only (I). and thus the corresponding logics are equal.a]. we define its superintuitionistic logic (with or without equality) via the corresponding H. a)/ z. where HV(G) = (a. which implies v 5 Eab.5. E*) is the H. (**).5.v)([u. G over a Heyting algebra i-2 there exists a disjoint presheaf G over i-2 such that IL'(G) = IL'(G). b) ($ u < Eab We denote the equivalence class (u. i. and we may assume that G is disjoint. G is inhabited.a] (provided v < u).9.332 CHAPTER 4.v. by [u. in which G* = U G(u) = {[u.v.5.. Now we define the presheaf G as follows: (**) G(u.: where 3. u 5 Eaa). b] means that u < Eab. is a disjoint presheaf isomorphic to 3.11 (1) For any H. really define a presheaf. G over an S4-algebra f l there exists a disjoint presheaf G over f1° such that ML'(G) = MLZ(G). a] I a E D. we also define the modal logic f These logics are well-defined. The map G (u.10 If 3 is an inhabited presheaf over a locale fl.s. u I Eaa). ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Definition 4. by Corollary 4. a ) 1 a E D.

( (E') E*([u'. 4.al.b). F2 be two inhabited disjoint presheaves over a locale a. .2). if u 5 Eaa'. ] .a ] . Proof Let H V ( F i ) = (0. Let us show that is a p'-equivalence (Definitions 4. since E * ( [ u a ] )= u = u A E a a = a([u. W C o r o l l a r y 4.5.al)~a([u.a ] )= u A E ( a ) = u. Consider the map a : G* x D - R such that a ( [ u a ] .6.a] = [ u . we have: E * ( [ u . since E ( b ) = a ( [ E ( b )b]. . MORPHISMS O F PRESHEAVES In particular.[u. i. (Ql) E(b)5 c€B* V a ( c .8.b) := u A Eab.b').a'].1. g : Fl -+ F 2 a morphism (in the sense of Lemma 4.12 Every algebraic semantics can be obtained from a class of presheaves.17).b). I n particular.4.6.a'l.b)= u' A u A Ea'a A u A Eab 5 u' A Ea'b = a ( [ u l .1 Let 3 1 . V bED a([u.*.by Corollary 4.a]. . EblbAa([u. ] .4.7).e. a ) .a).4. the general algebraic semantics A& is generated by the class of all presheaves. 4.4. Therefore IL'(G) = I L G ( H V ( G ) ) . E i ) .b ) . since if [ u .5. . This map is well-defined. then u A Eab = u A Ea'b. a ' ]6).4. ( Q 2 ) E E * ( [ u a ] )5 . a .6 Morphisms of presheaves L e m m a 4. Then F.b)= Eb'b A u A Eab 5 u A Eab' = a ( [ u . Then g is a strong morphism frbm H V ( F 1 ) to H V ( & ) (in the sense of Definition 4.

since Ez(a. be the map such that for x = v or w. alu). and for a strong morphism f .17).6.1. a) = lal. b) C Xz(g(a).2 is in general false. So we obtain Proposition 4. E2(g(a).g(a)) holds. a-Hvs for any locale a. (Definition 4. On the other hand. Since g is a morphism.2 There exist functors HV: Psh(i2) --. a) = {u l u and thus -&(a.g(a)) = Ig(a)l. .4.334 CHAPTER 4.s. hence l lal). M V ( 3 ) are defined as above.5. g is a strong morphism of the corresponding H. Example 4. Hence Xl(a. b) implies and thus u E Xz(g(a). similarly. b) = u = El (a. Let g : F -+ F. and so On the other hand.6. HV(f) = MV(f) = f . ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS (see Proposition 4. T 4. Xl(a. g(b)). El (a. g(b)). MV: Psh(i-2) 4 a-mvs for any basic locale a . a) = E2(g(a).3 Let F1and F2 be inhabited disjoint presheaves shown a t Fig.8).6.v. such that H V ( 3 ) . and the proof is completed. Then g is not a morphism of presheaves. we have: So u E Xl(a. The converse to Proposition 4.

b = f(x1v)..-morphism H V ( F 1 ) ---t H V ( F 2 ) is a morphism of presheaves F 1 32. i. It is sufficient to consider the case y f z = X ~ V . b) = v .s. In fact.6. MORPHISMS OF PRESHEAVES Figure 4.b) 2 E l ( x .4 Let F1 and F2 be two inhabited disjoint presheaves over a locale Every strong morphism f : H V ( 3 1 ) H V ( F 2 ) (Definition 4. every strong H.b) = v and alv = b.v. Proposition 4. is a morphism of presheaves if satisfies the following condition: - Moreover.17) a.1. v < u. Consider the m'ap f : 3.v.v. z ) E z ( f ( y ) .b) = v E - - * alv= b).v.-morphismg : H V ( 3 1 ) H V ( F 2 ) the following holds: (*) Qu > v Qa ~ g ( F l ( u ) ) Q b3 2 ( v ) (Ez(a. 5 E F 1 ( u ) . Let us show that f ( x l v ) = f ( x ) l v for x E F l ( u ) . f is a strong morphism of H.s. by the condition (*) applied to f . we By our assumption. and thus g(xlv) = alv.) Let f be a morphism of H.s. since f ( x l v ) = b. alv # bfor a = f ( x ) E 3 2 ( u ) . g is a morphism of presheaves.e. Proof (If. x l v ) = v .4. otherwise.v. for some u > v . defined as follows - ( Y ) := { gb ( y ) < if y = xlv. On the other hand. -+ 3.Then .6. let us show that E l ( y . b E F ~ ( v ) have Ez(a.4. and thus E 2 ( a .f ( 2 ) ) for y.s.) Assume that every strong H.v. Then Ez(a.s. Take a = f ( x ) .s. (Only if.-morphism f : H V ( F 1 ) + H V ( F 2 ) is a morphism of presheaves 3 1 3 2 iff for any strong H. Then f is not a morphism of presheaves. but f ( x ) l v = alv f b.morphism g : H V ( F 1 ) ---+ H V ( F 2 ) that does not satisfy (*). z E F. Suppose there exists an H.

6.e. L e m m a 4. v = V{w 5 v I g(a)lw = g(alv)lw}. - - (Cf. More precisely. g : HV(31) (2) I there exists a p-embedding g : . g(alu) = g(a>lu implies (5). (3) holds for every surjective pre-morphism.+ 3 is a p(')-morphism of presheaves zff g is a strong . A pre-morphism g is called a pmorphism if it satisfies (3) for a n y u E R .s. (Definition 4. HV(32).6. A p-embedding is a p-morphism satisfying Note that (2) (4). E l ( a ) = Ez(g(a)) @ lal = lg(a)l @ G IL(=)(F~).5 Let 3 1 . i. (4) holds for every injective morphism.4. such that (1) Ig(a)l = lal for any a .9).9. b E F 2 ( u ) A p'-morphism is a p-morphism satisfying (5) i f a ~ F l ( u ) v I u .4. p'-morphism) of disjoint presheaves.v. .Fl f F2 (respectively. then I L ( F I ) C IL(F2) (respectively. the following holds. but it exactly corresponds to the definition of a p-morphism of H. Lemma 4.7 stating the converse inclusion: IL(')(F~) Proof (i) Let us check items (i)-(iii) from Definition 4.v. F2be (inhabited) disjoint presheaves over a locale a.s. .336 since CHAPTER 4. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Definition 4. A pre-morphism from Fl to F2is a map g : F --+ 3 preserving extents.) (1). then .6 (1) A map g : 3. The definition of a p(')-morphism of presheaves is rather complicated. p(')-morphism of corresponding H.4. IL=(F1) C IL= (F2)). .

Take the sets for i = 1.4. Indeed. In fact. On the other hand. let a E Fl(u). a l ( u = azlu. Take a1 = a . Then by (5). (4) follows from (2) and the bijectivity.a2 E . (1) and (2) implies (5).g(a)) This condition (#) implies (5). Every isomorphism (i. a2 = alv). g(a)lv = g(a1v) = g(a1v)lv. rn . On the other hand.e. MORPHISMS OF PRESHEAVES (ii) E2(b) 5 V Ez(b. And if v = wl A w2.F2(u2). by (1)). in fact. wi E Xi. u 5 u1 A u2. (recall that then is a complete Heyting algebra). assume that a1 E 31(ul). in fact.2. Also note that every surjective pre-morphism is a p-morphism: the condition (3) holds if b = g(a) for some a E F:. a bijective morphism) is a p'-morphism. then allv = a2lv Thus (recall that Ig(a)l = u 2 v = lg(alv)1. v 5 u.6. Note that a p(')-morphism is not necessarily a morphism (because the condition (2) does not always hold). (5) implies (#).

) 3 ( x ) := (FO(x)/ r ) of all the germs at x is called the stalk (or the fibre) of 3 . The set .b E F ( u ) and (alui) = (blui) for all i E I . 3a E F ( u ) Vi E I (alui) = a i . is a morphism of presheaves. the family of mappings a. 19581) that a sheaf (over a locale 0) a presheaf 3 satisfying two conditions: (Fl) if u = V ui. F ( u ) := {f E and for u C U . gives rise t o the Every disjoint presheaf 3 over a topological space (W. b ) . the restriction of the map f from u to v. j E I. 0) canonical sheaf defined as follows.(a) r - F ( u ) such that =f H Vx E u f (x) = a.338 CHAPTER 4. The following fact is well-known [Godement. := (a/ = is called the germ of a at x.. is Recall (cf. We define F ( u ) as the set of maps from u to . : F ( u ) . . (a = b) := x E E(a. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS 4 7 Sheaves . at x. then a = b. F ( u . [Godement. a is isomorphic iff 3 is a sheaf. is a sheaf. let 3 ( x ) ( Vx E u 3v XEU C u 3a E F ( v ) (z E v & Vy E v f (y) = a. In this and the next section we look more closely at topological semantics.)). sending every x E u to F some germ at x. The equivalence class a. iEI a. (F2): if u = then iEI V ui.v ) ( f ) := (f v). For x E W consider the set with the equivalence relation . First let us show that in this case presheaves can be replaced with sheaves. 19581: Proposition 4 7 1 .. ai E 3 ( u i ) and (ailui A uj) = (ajlui Auj) for all i. More precisely.

F* - P r o o f By Lemma 4. b) = ~ ( 6b).7. D) is a family (vu)uEW.7. by Lemma 4.2 and because g is surjective (see remarks after Definition w 4. we can use 'fibrewise models'.5 7& generated by the class of all sheaves over topological is spaces. b E F E(a. x E E ( a . 6 := aIaI L e m m a 4. p .3 Consider the same F.2 Let 3 be a presheaf over a topological space. where D is a family of non-empty sets D = (Du)uEW. & & L e m m a 4. . Instead of Kripke models. Let g : P" be the map such that g(a) = TL for a E F*.7.6 Is the semantics A& generated by the class of all sheaves over locales (or complete modal algebras)? 4. Let H V ( 3 ) = ( f l . HV(F) = ( 5 2 .2. F as in the previous lemma.10 and Corollary 4.4. or points) is a pair (W.2. Then for any a .7. Corollary 4. whenever P E P L n (VOis treated as a certain singleton). similarly to Kripke semantics.7. M L = ( 3 ) = ML=(F) Proof Follows from the previous lemma.4.4. = b.3. Then by Definition 4. E). FIBREWISE MODELS For a E 3* us denote let (a).7. which are collections of classical models on fibres of 3 . As in Definition 3. b) 3u E f l (x E u & u 5 la/ n lbl & alu = blu) 3u E 52 (x E u & u 5 la1 n 11 & Vz E u-a. Then g is a strong p'-morphism H V ( 3 ) ---+ HV(F). ~E). A (modal) valuation in a system of domains (W. Proposition 4. recall that in the modal S4-case p(')-morphisms are just the same as in the intuitionistic case.4 IL'(3) = IL=(?).) 6 3u E f (x E u & u 5 la1 n lbl & 6lu = blu) l u 2€ ~(6~6).8. a system of domains over a non-empty set W (whose elements are called possible worlds. F its canonical P r o o f Let f l be the Heyting algebra of the given topological space.8 Fibrewise models In this section we show that validity in a presheaf 3over a topological space can be defined via a forcing relation between points and formulas. Question 4. where . A classical valuation in a non-empty set V is a map [ from P L to relations on V such that J ( P ) Vn.4. sheaf.4. D ) .8. .9).

D ) with D. M . M . Let us consider two cases.D . . P r o o f 6 is a valuation since (here a.0).. M . u k [ a / x ] A . This has t o be done only for the last item. v ) we define the (modal) forcing relation M . for u E E ( a . D. . U G l a l l n .). u k P p ( a ) i f l a € % ( P p ) (form>O).). n\a. M . A ( a ) = [a/x]A. u k A (or briefly: u != A ) between u E W and a Du-sentence A: M .. M .8. u k 3 x A iff 3a E D.q) a fibrewise model..where 7 is a valuation in ( W ..We associate with 3 the system of domains 3+:= (W. such that vu(p) E { u ) for every proposition letter p. = F ( u ) (the fibre at u). Let us check that forcing is well-defined.D ) is a triple ( W . Then f j is a valuation on 3 and (*) is true for every A(a) E MFF*.1 Let 3 be a presheaf over a topological space (W. More precisely.. (a. u != [ a / x ] A . u k P j iff u E % ( P i ) .). Definition 4. . v).. we have t o show that i f L e m m a 4.340 CHAPTER 4. Consider the algebra be R as follows: 52 = M A ( W .2 For a fibrewise model M = (W. M .D . u k UA((al). A (modal) model over (W. T h e second claim is proved by induction on the length o f A.D ) . 0) and define the map fj : AFF* where F V ( A ) x.. = b. (a.3 Let M = (3.8. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS 7 7 2 ~ is a classical valuation in D. by the definition o f germs).) iff there exist an open U such that u E U .b).8.. v k A ( ( a l ) U . A fibrewise model over F is a model over F f . . Definition 4. M . u b a = b iff a equals b. u k V x A iff Va E D. .l a n d V v ~ M .

A constant presheaf over 52 with the domain D is denoted by C(52. Conversely. . non-empty) and all its restriction maps are identity functions. the domain o f HV(C(52.9. assume (**).v ) is bijective (for u 2 v ) .s. I t is clear that every constant presheaf is a sheaf.). Using these observations. we obtain: P r o p o s i t i o n 4. I t is also clear that every CD-presheaf 3 over C2 is isomorphic t o the constant sheaf C(52. implies x E E ( a . define 77 b y Q is well-defined. = b.1.1 A presheaf F over a locale 52 is called constant i f all its domains are the same (usually. 4. Since (a.s. (or H.11 is isomorphic t o C(52.9.4.D ) the corresponding presheaf constructed i n Proposition 4. P r o p o s i t i o n 4. @ w a = b. (3) the class of CD-m.9 Examples of algebraic semantics D e f i n i t i o n 4.).v. (2) the class of CD-presheaues. b ) @ 3 U 3 w ( a l U = b l U ) w a w = b .s. but also the restrictions alu such that E(a1u) = E ( a . (52.). and therefore u E cp(P(a)) i f f u E cp(P(b)). (ii) w E . P r o o f I t is sufficient t o show that every valuation cp i n 3 equals f j for some fibrewise valuation Q.5.D ) ) # (Cl. = b. A presheaf F has a constant domain (or briefly.8.9. In fact. 3U 3 w 3 b E 3 ( ~ ) ~ (= bw & V v E U ( v k A ( b ) ) ) k (*I (**> I t is clear that (*)+(**). D). b). EXAMPLES OF ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS 341 (i) w Efj(a= b ) @ w E E ( a .3 Note that HV(C(52. and so v A(b. R e m a r k 4.9.rj(UA(a))i f f 3U 3 w (U G fj(A(a))) i f f 3 U 3 w V v ~ Uv k A ( a ) ) ( w b U A ( a )i f f a . a J u ) .D ) .v. = b.v.3 ( 1 ) ) .2 The following classes correspond to equal semantics: (1) the class of constant presheaves.).4 A modal formula is valid i n 3 iff it is true i n every fibrewise model over 3.thus (Vv E V a .D ) . there exists an open V U containing w such that (Vi ( a i l V ) = (bilV)). is a CD-presheaf) i f every 3 ( u . b y (**). In fact.2. One can easily see that for a CD-m.D ) contains not only the individuals a E D with E ( a ) = 1. since a.b y Definition 4.

Iowa Historically.10.v. 19871.24. b) # 0. Then the m. F is rnonic. then the associated presheaf 3 (Propof sition 4.v. it was introduced earlier than the general semantics d& [Ra.7 Let 3 be an inhabited disjoint monic presheaf.b] (i.9.9. it is easily seen that F != (C' V K t ) implies F I= C' or F k K' for every CD-m. F = (0.6 and 4. whenever E ( a ) n E(b).v. and thus u E(a. 1963.8 The classes of rnonic m. injective.9.1) < < < L e m m a 4.s. [Takano.5 A presheaf 3 is called rnonic if all 3 ( u . similarly for H. ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS Thus we obtain the algebraic semantics with constant domains denoted by A. b E D. b) E (0.9.25 we have: L e m m a 4. b E F*. and alu = blu (since 3 is monic). b) # 0. v ) (for u 2 v) are D. An m. in fact.7 we obtain: Proposition 4. v 5 E(a. From the proof of Lemma 3. Note that the semantics M K introduced in Section 3.a] = [u. Recall that C E denotes the formula (x # y) > U(x # y). Let us state some simple logical properties of rnonic m.6 I an m.v. . b)) only if E ( a . P r o o f It is sufficient to show that [v.E(a.s.s.' and Sikorski.s. Thus E ( a ) n E(b) = u = U{v 5 u 1 (a/v)= (blv)) = E(a. This semantics is denoted by MA. DE denotes the formula (x = y) V (x # y).25 we know that ML(Q0) is an intersection of CK-complete logics. v u and so. which will be used later on. P r o o f Consider the Kripke sheaf Oo from the proof of Proposition 3.s.v. M V ( 3 ) is rnonic.9.4 The semantics 7 and A do not satisfy (CP). So it suffices to show that ML(Oo) @ A.s and rnonic presheaves generate the same semantics.9. E(a. Definition 4. From Lemmas 4. X.s. Ch XI].v.11) is rnonic.342 CHAPTER 4.5.v.e. E ) is called rnonic if E(a. F .4 is generated by rnonic presheaves over Kripke spaces. b) = E ( a ) n E(b). L e m m a 4. b] implies [u.9. similarly t o Proposition 3. b) by our assumption. Then alv = blv for some v 5 u.10. But [v. (4.10. Ch.10. $15.a] = [v. Similarly to Lemma 3.b]. . P r o o f Assume that a. (E(a) n E(b))) for all a.a] = [v. u = la1 n Ibl.24. b).

p.v.9.s. that is Q A M L ( F r ) .9.v. Corollary 4.l. with the same property.e. .s.1. Consider F' = (Q.14 I := A n I & (neighbourhood semantics with constant domains). let us find a monic m. MK: := M A n ICE (mono-Kripke semantics). and cp is also a valuation in F. P r o o f Assume that an m. Section 2.s. C o r o l l a r y 4.9.2).12 Let A be a propositional logic. F = (a.9.2. Corollary 4. b) = 0 5 cp(P(a)).9. EXAMPLES OF ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS L e m m a 4.9 CE is valid in every monic m.p. Note that M I corresponds t o monic presheaves over neighbourhood frames. i. P r o p o s i t i o n 4. Proof For a valuation cp we have: cp(a # b) = ( E ( a ) n E(b)) .4). Q A = (QAEc)" (cf.v. so cp(a f: b) is open. E ) separates some sentence B E M F from Q A . We can also define corresponding restrictions of neighbourhood and Kripke semantics.v. being either E ( a ) n E(b) or 0.4 and Lemma The converse is not true: an H.9.4. b).. Section 2. There exists a valuation cp in F such that cp(B) # 1.9). H (see 1. 2. and cp(P(a)) 5 E(a) = E'(a). then QA=' is a conservative extension of QA. Then CMA(QA) = Cd(QA). ) ASd C CMA(A) if A is an s. where It is clear that F and F' validate the same propositional formulas. Dl E'). Definition 4. D. M I := M A n I E (mono-neighbourhood semantics).13 I the quantified version Q A of a modal propositional logic f A is A-complete.E(a. validating D E may be not rnonic.11 A=' C C M ~ ( A if A is an m.10 D E is valid in every monic H.s.9.s.v. since a # b implies cp(P(b)) n E'(a. Q A its quantified version (see.

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parametrised by pairs (u. Our starting point is Kripke sheaf semantics. I u E F ) .1. D. 19901.. Recall (Section 3. are replaced with 'inheritance' (or 'counterpart') relations p. But can we give more freedom to individuals allowing them to have several inheritors in the same accessible world (perhaps.. In Kripke sheaves inheritors of different individuals can collapse in some accessible world. in the world v. The first idea is t o extend the definition of forcing from Kripke sheaves to Kripke bundles as follows.(a) is an 'inheritor' of an individual a E D. ap. In all these semantics we keep to the main idea that the truth value of a formula depends on a possible world and a formula O A is true at some world iff A is true at every accessible world.1 Preliminary discussion In this chapter we study some further variations of Kripke semantics. we can equivalently use the global inheritance relation p C D f x Df on the set of all individuals D+ and define p.5) that a Kripke sheaf over a propositional S4-frame F is a . If the domains D... v. as p n (D. together with transition maps p : D. where transition maps p. Models in Kripke bundles are defined in the same way as in Kripke sheaves..Chapter 5 Metaframe semantics 5. but with a special care about the 0-case. in their own)? Following this idea we come to Kripke bundles [Shehtman and Skvortsov. x D.b is read as 'b is an inheritor (or a counterpart) of a in v' (or a v-inheritor of a). u k CIA iff for any v E R(u) every v-version of A is true at M. For a Du-sentence A put (V) M .). x D. are disjoint. Forcing is defined by induction. . Kripke bundles Let us first consider S4-frames. - Here we assume that the relation p is reflexive and transitive .. system of domains D = (D.which is analogous to the properties of transition maps from Definition 3.6. p. D.v) E R.

because then we can refute some theorems of QK= (and QK). R = {(u.v)). But this definition gives too much freedom. so we can define a v-version of A as a result of replacing every occurrence of every individual with some of its vinheritor. An example of a Kripke bundle: p is the smallest partial ordering containing the indicated arrows.1. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Figure 5. In Kripke sheaves v-versions of Du-sentences are obtained by replacing every occurrence of every a E Du with aJv. consider the formula B := VxO(x = x) and the following Kripke bundle.CHAPTER 5. . the unique inheritor of a in v.2. To see this. In Kripke bundles inheritors may be not unique. Figure 5.

So we adopt the following definition: (vv) a v-version of a D. Now consider the same Kripke bundle model M as above. For example. . By applying (V') we obtain M . as we know (Section 2.). cf. u !# B. This 'Recall that a maximal generator is obtained by replacing all occurrences of a constant with the same variable. There is the simplest 'way out' . Section 2.a l x .. These maps are 'local analogues' of the maps p. . . .] A) for different formulas A(x1.. x. in Kripke sheaves. v +i P(bz). y] (x = y). . if we use only maximal generators.-sentence can be presented as A(a1. v I= In fact. Yl 0 ( x = Y). then P ( a ) > P ( a ) has a false v-version P(bl) > P(b2)./xl. The same argument applies t o the formula without equality P(bl) and M.) (= [al.-sentences are obtained by replacing different occurrences of the same individual a with its different inheritors b l . . . But such a 'definition' is ambiguous. the latter are defined on the whole D. where Const(A) is the set of all constants from A.)) in a form similar to Definition 3.-sentence A s a D. .a. .1. so M . u for any model M such that M.-sentence.1 O(a = a ) is regarded as [a/x]O(x = x). .to forbid such a splitting of individuals within the same D.. but M..-sentence. For example. In other words. u i+ [a. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION Then (for any model M ) because a = a has a false v-version bl = bz.6. in A with some its v-inheritor a'. u l= (a = a) from this viewpoint. .5. . Hence M. such that apf (a) for any a E Const(A).4. v-versions of A are of the form f . It seems natural to write the condition (V) (which is analogue of (. u b [alx]U(x = x).a. . In these examples undesirable v-versions of D. .4. A for maps f : Const(A) ---+ D. . However the ambiguity of (V') disappears after fixing one of the presentations of a D. (a = a) = [alx] (x = x) = [a.a. . b2. It is refuted at M. . In fact. .4) the same D.a l x .-sentence obtained by replacing all occurrences of every a E D.

consider the same Kripke bundle on Fig. u k OA(x) [x H a] iff V E R(u) Vbl .instead of evaluating Du-sentences. O(P(x) > P(x)) become true .Y A similar example exists in modal logics without equality.10. b2] M . . u k P ( x .b+ v M. Now the formulas 0 ( x = x). . bl.. Then according to (V"). u since lf' O(x = Y) [x. v lf' 0 ( x = Y) [x. This formula is refuted in the same Kripke bundle in the model M such that M .. the QK'-theorem A : = (x = y > U ( x = y)) is refuted. M.4).in fact.2. b. 5.9. a]. y) [x. But soundness still remains a problem. e. later on we shall see that this is sufficient for (and closely related to) soundness.6. v k P ( x . The truth value of a formula A(x) with a list of parameters x a t a world u is defined under a 'finite assignment' (or a Du-transformation) [x H a]. where a is a tuple in D. Although the use of maximal generators and the condition (VV) seem ad hoc. In full detail and in a more general context it will be considered in Section 5. This approach is well-known in classical logic.Y H a .vkx=x [XH b]). Viz. is equivalent to V E R(u) Vb(ap. Consider the following QK-theorem: which is a substitution instance of axiom (Ax13) from 2. bj] iff i = j. we can evaluate formulas under variable assignments.348 CHAPTER 5. y H bi.. 2. (Vi aip. x ) [x H a].bi v =+ M. Here we only sketch the main idea. (cf.g. In fact (for any model 111) but M. METAFRAME SEMANTICS restricted version of (V') exactly corresponds to the combination of (V) and (VV). Then (V') changes to v'' M.. There is another natural way to avoid ambiguity in definition (V') . v i A(x) [x H b]).

cf. it can be regarded as a system of domains (F. are pad for all a E C(u. its frame representation F is a reflexive singleton. .) iff Vv E R(u) Vcr E C(u. . v) of morphisms from u t o v is non-empty. D. u since F DP(x. justify the truth definition stated in (V). Y) 1 7 Y x b l . x) [x H a]. where uRv iff there exists a morphism from u to v. so that M. . in C-sets we may not worry about different presentation of a D. Given a model M in a C-set (F.2. because p. v If P ( x .padn). iff the set C(u.1. F is called the frame representation of C. because a quasi-ordered set is replaced with an arbitrary category C. More precisely. v). let C be a category with the set of objects W. These counterexamples.v) M . A C-set is defined as a functor from C to SET.. where we allow for many transition maps between the same possible worlds. consider the category C with a single object2 21. a].e.1.a under the same transition map pa. Validity Validity in a Kripke bundle or in a C-set is defined again as the truth in all models. Similarly to Kripke sheaves.Y + + a . .5.. d. we define forcing. u UB(dl. . .dl. R).). (VV) or its equivalent (V') using maximal generators. . the v-inheritors of an individual d E D. i. x ) [x H b i ] . . This happens. But there is another problem: the set of valid formulas may be not substitution closed! To show this.-sentence as B(d1. u I= OP(x. . = M . Consider the frame F = (W. u k P(x. since M. together with the soundness theorem (Proposition 5.6. Kripke sheaves over F are nothing but CatF-sets.e. p).d. But M. x) [x H a]. are functions. b21. Y) 15. cr E C(u. Functor semantics C-sets are another generalisation of Kripke sheaves. Definition 3. . . M .12). v t= B(p. v ! P ( x . A vinheritor of a D. Obviously. v). M. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION In fact. In a C-set.-sentence is obtained by replacing all individuals a E Du with their images p.D) together with a family of functions respecting composition and identity.

x D. = { a . . C D.@) = b. their natural combination (the 'C-bundle semantics') is strongly equivalent to C-sets. In fact. C-bundles are defined analogously to C-sets. Exercise 5.(a) = P. u OA(a1. but P(x) 3 P(b).U) Vbl. .u A(b1.3. the clause (V') is modified as follows: - ('+) M. p. a). then Exercise 5. see Fig. two new semantics seem independent. So it turns out that the set of all formulas (modal or intuitionistic) that are valid in a given Kripke bundle or a C-set. consider a model in which u P(a).b). b ) such that p.) iff VU E R(u) Vy E C(U. METAFRAME SEMANTICS u and two arrows: id and y such that y o y = y (and certainly.3 with Du = {a.a. But actually the semantics of C-sets is stronger. b).. .b. .1. Figure 5. At first glance.)) ..1. Then the formula p > Up is valid in F (since F k p 3 Up) OP(x) is not. = {(a. b)).. . C is just a two-element monoid). To obtain a sound semantics.. 5..u u UP(a). parametrised by morphisms a E C(u. Let F be a C-set in Fig. . . v).a). Show that the formula ) P ( x ) 3 UP(x) is not valid and P ( x ) V ~ P ( x is not intuitionistically valid in G. . b. D.4.2 Consider the Kripke bundle (6 with the single domain D. : D. (b. we replace validity with the notion of strong valzdzty .1 Let us call a formula A intuitionistically valid in a C-set (or in a Kripke bundle) if AT is valid.350 CHAPTER 5.we replace functions p.bi i M. . (a. (Vi aip. Furthermore. id o y = y 0 id = y. with the following difference . with relations p. . 5. whereas P(x) V l P ( x ) is not intuitionistically valid. Show that the formula p V ~ is intuitionistically p valid in the same C-set as above.a formula is said to be strongly valid if all its substitution instances are valid. is not necessarily a predicate logic. because u P(p.

2.. is reflexive.2..RI.. in which D = (D. The frame F is called the base of F.e..1 A n (N-modal) Kripke bundle over an N-modal propositional frame F = (W. Definition 5.4. KRJPKE BUNDLES Figure 5. v i. dom(pi. 1 5 i 5 N ) is a family of relations pi.2. .2 A n intuitionistic Kripke bundle is a 1-modal Kripke bundle (F. cf.5. .R) satisfying the following two conditions: (#2) every p. This is not very surprising. . p). .2 Kripke bundles Now let us turn to precise definitions for the polymodal case. . p) over an S4-frame F = (W.and the domain D. A for 'local functions' f . Definition 5. the fibre at u. rather than pl. this means that every individual has inheritors in all accessible worlds.. therefore every Kripke bundle also corresponds to some C-set.. with the same requirement about A. (VV). x D...) = D. 5. It turns out that for any C-bundle there exists a C-set with the same valid formulas. D. C_ D.R N )is a triple IF = (F. I u E F) is a system of domains over F and p = (pi. such that for any i . because 'functionality' of C-bundles is hidden in the fact that v-versions of A are of the form f . u . D . I uRiv. For the 1-modal case we use the notation p.

. R1.) for u R i v ..2. . the corresponding Kripke bundle is intuitionistic iff both Fl. are functions satisfying 'coherence conditions'.. Thus we come to the following equivalent definition of Kripke bundles: 3As in the case of Kripke sheaves. ) gives rise to a system of disjoint domains D. is the identity function o n D. ply. Sometimes it is convenient to denote the base F = (W. . Kripke sheaves are exactly Kripke bundles of this kind.rr is a ) p-morphism Fl + F .3 A n intuitionistic Kripke bundle (F. x D. RN) of a Kripke bundle IF by F o = (DO. p) is called a Kripke quasi-sheaf i f every p. a p-morphism of modal frames T - : Fl = ( W rpi. = pi n (D. The other way round. . For the case N = 1..) and the frame of individuals F by l (Dl.R N ) . = . METAFRAME SEMANTICS Definition 5. are disjoint.F are S4-frames. b E D.. Then we obtain the propositional frame of individuals (also called the total frame of IF): F = (Dl. Section 3. gives rise to a Kripke sheaf. in which pi.352 CHAPTER 5.5.3 Consider the total domain with relations Pi := U{pauv I U&V) for 1 5 i 5 N .4 (1) Let IF = (F.. R:. Ri. i. Moreover.R. cf. Lemma 3.b a = b). . D.rr-l(u) for u E W and a family of relations pi. In a sense. . . which forms a modal Kripke bundle.. iff Fl is an S4-frame. for N = 1. are functions.e.p ~ -H F = (W. Lemma 5. . (ap. .. Rh). . . l Let . PN). 1 5 i 5 N . i f V a . . (2) Conversely.. R1. .. Then . . As mentioned in the previous section.rr : D1 W be the map such that ~ ( a= u for a E D.2. . IF is an intuitionistic Kripke bundle..p) be a Kripke bundle. in which all p. .6. Obviously.D. . . every Kripke sheaf is a l-modal Kripke bundle.. It is also clear that in the intuitionistic (and in the S4-) case every Kripke sheaf is a Kripke quasi-sheaf. a Kripke bundle can be presented in another equivalent form. .3 shows that every Kripke bundle. in which the domains D.

u k C ) . The choice between two equivalent definitions o f Kripke bundles is a matter of convenience.").1) in the clause for we should explicitly indicate all the individuals occurring in A and use the presentation of D. * . M . modal or intuitionistic).x. F = (W. . .. .2. .p) is just a (modal) valuation i n its system of domains D = ( D . i. u k C). . . M .[) a Kripke bundle model.) and a l . p) be a Kripke bundle. b.5 A Kripke bundle (modal or intuitionistic) is a p-morphism between two propositional frames (resp.x. M . M .D. u k B or M . The pair M = (IF. Z L Cii [ a l . . the only differenceis in the 0-clause: Definition 5. . . . u k Pf iff u E Eu(P. KRIPKE BUNDLES 353 Definition 5...c) is called a Kripke bundle model. are distinct./xl. . u != a =b iff a equals b. M . ./xl. E D. M .7 A valuation E i n a (modal) Kripke bundle F = ( F . cf.5.4. Forcing in Kripke bundle models is quire similar t o Kripke frames or Kripke sheaves.2.e. u f B o r M . u k B > C iff ( M .. u != 3 x A iff 3a E D.2. . x.b.6 Show that Kripke sheaves correspond t o coverings. v k [bl.2.R 1 . .]Bo) where F V ( B o )= { X I . ( V j a j piuubaj M ... u t= P p ( a ) i f fa E J u ( P p ) (for m > 0).. Definition 5. .-sentences described in Lemma 2.. uk [ a / x ] A . The inductive definition o f forcing is more delicate than for Kripke frames or Kripke sheaves. because (as explained in Section 5. .2. I t is clear that quasi-sheaves correspond t o pmorphisms o f S4-frames n : Fl Fo such that Fl 1 n-'(u) is a discrete frame. .R N ) . a quasi-sheaf is a Kripke bundle with discrete fibres.. - Exercise 5.D . I u E W ) . .a. . i. We define the forcing relation M . M = (IF.a. E D.2. .. Definition 3.e. u k A between worlds u E F and Du-sentences (with equality) by induction: M . u k B V C iff ( M ..4. t o Kripke bundles with the unique lift property: n ( a ) R v + 3!b(apb & n(b) = v).8 Let IF = ( F . .] Bo i f f k VV E Ri ( u )Vbl.4. M .

. Lemma 3. IF k+= A). . a.10 For a Kripke bundle model M and a modal formula A ( x 1 . x. . . so we introduce the following notion. i. METAFRAME SEMANTICS So in the latter case we present a D. E D . .2. a.. ] A ( X I . .4. . + Recall that A(a1.) denotes [a1. v k B .X . The following is trivial (cf.. exactly as in standard Kripke semantics. . MFG) -substitution instances are valid i n IF. But it may be not substitution closed (cf. ..)./xl.12 (2) The strong validity of a formula A follows from the validity of all its mshifts Am. Gen and 0-introduction.. Consider the set of valid formulas This set is closed under MP.2. .9 A (modal) predicate formula is called true i n a Kripke bundle model if its universal closure V A is true at every world of this model.354 C H A P T E R 5. In particular.1. A formula is called valid i n a Kripke bundle IF if it is true i n every model over IF. u k O i B iff V V E R i ( u ) M ..2.2. cf. strongly valid with equality) i n F if all its MFN (respectively... cf. This clause can be equivalently presented in the form discussed in 5. .a. .e. . Exercise 5.2.-sentence O i B as Oi[a/x]Bo a formula for Bo and an injective [ x H a ] . 2. .) M A ( x l .20(1)): Lemma 5. for a sentence B we have: M ..a. . .2.x ) ifl V u E M V a l . Let Then we have Proposition 5.2).1: (V) M .... 3.xn). u k A ( a l . recall that Bo is called a maximal generator of B and it is unique up to renaming of x. Definition 5. As above. u b O A iff for any v E R ( u ) every v-version of A is true at M . . ... Definition 5. M .11 A formula A E M F ~ = ) is called strongly valid i n a Kripke bundle F (respectively. .. .27. v. notation: IF k+ A (resp. . the sign k denotes the truth in a model and the validity in a Kripke bundle.

12(1).2. cf. but the set of valid formulas is not substitution-closed. For example.12(2) means that A is strongly valid iff it is valid with arbitrarily many extra parameters. The proof is postponed until Section 5.12(2) shows that this is impossible. which in its turn. the substitution interior of ML(=)(F)).2. ML:=)(IF) is closed under strict substitutions. For propositional axioms it is easier to use proposition 5. Thanks to 5. 0-introduction follows from the same property of MLI=)(P) (again.17) in the particular case of strict substitutions.due to (2)). KBN-complete logics are called Kripke bundle complete. but not for any MFG-substitution. At the first stage we prove (2). In the proof of (I). Section 5.2. Also note that ML(')(P) is the largest modal logic contained in ML(=)(F) (so to say. Exercise 5. Proposition 5. We also remark that the notion of strong validity a priori depends on the language. So it is sufficient t o check the following Claim. But 5. we may call ML(")(P) the modal logic of F. The substitution closedness of ML(')(F) is obvious. because the set of valid formulas is already substitution closed.13 Give an example of a 1-modal Kripke bundle. In fact.15 Kripke bundle semantics K B N is generated by the class of all N-modal Kripke bundles. so ML'(F) is conservative over ML(F). Gen. in which p.5. Exercise 5.2 shows that this is not always the case in Kripke bundles. due to (2).1. The closedness under M. the strong validity of axioms. (A > B)n E ML!=)(F). follows from the validity of their shifts. However.3. this is a particular case of a general soundness theorem for metaframe semantics. it might happen that IF l= SA for any MFN-substitution S . The proof is very similar to the substitution closedness of Kripke sheaves (Proposition 3. follows from (2). are functions.12. KRIPKE BUNDLES 355 Speaking informally. for MP note that (A > B)n = An > Bn. The latter is proved in a straightforward way.6. Definition 5.14 For a class C of Kripke bundles we define Definition 5.7 (see below). let us sketch a general plan of the proof. Let us point out again that for Kripke sheaves the notions of validity and strong validity are equivalent. Recall that substitution instances of a formula A are the strict substitution instances of its m-shifts Am.. so Bn E ML?)(F) whenever An. More exactly.2. .

we first recall the notation from Lemma 5. To define accessibility relations on the sets Dn.4. KB(F) denotes the class of all Kripke bundles based on F . For n = 0 we put RP := R . . 53 . so that A our new definition of D1 corresponds to that in Lemma 5. a propositional modal frame F = (W. E+(PC) := uEW u In particular.R1.16 (Cf.. Recall that for any function 8 such that 8(P.2.2.. So i n particular. Definition 3. For n 2 0 we define the nth level of D as the set Dn := U{DE I u E W). The logic NIL(') KB(F)) is called the Kripke bundle modal logic (with equality) determined over F.. .. Rf = pi. see Definition 3..) is called the nth level of IF .) n D.D. there exists a valuation [ such that 8 = [+: tU(p.RN). R. . p) be a modal Kripke bundle over F = (W.32) If F is a propositional Kripke frame. and it will lead us to a more general notion of a metaframe. they are not equal). . R1. i The frame Fn := (Dn. v Recall the subordination relation between n-tuples (see Introduction): c a sub b := V j . . More on forcing in Kripke bundles Now let us present an arbitrary Kripke bundle as a collection of propositional Kripke frames. since D = { u ) . I u E W) be a system of disjoint domains over .4.3.RN). METAFRAME SEMANTICS Definition 5.2 Let IF = (F.2. Similarly we define KB(C) for a class of propositional frames C and the Kripke bundle modal logic determined over C.2. we define the relation on Dn: aRFb iff V j ajpibj & a sub b. (strictly speaking. We also identify D and D. . Definition 5.2.R. Ic ( a j = ak * bj = bk). . we have <+(pi) W. This presentation is more convenient from the technical viewpoint. Definition 5 3 1 Let D = (D.) := e(p. Also note that Do = W. . 1 5 i 5 N . . For n > 0 .356 CHAPTER 5.4: Pi := U { ~ i u I uRiv).) C_ Dn.. : Note that every valuation E = ([u)uEW in a system of disjoint domains is associated with the following function [+ sending n-ary predicate letters to subsets of Dn: CU(P2).

and consider a presentation of B(a) as [c/x]Bo with a distinct c.3. To check (*). every occurrence of ak in B(a) either replaces an occurrence of xk in B or replaces an occurrence of x j in B for j # k . let B be an N-modal x formula with FV(B) r(x).2.3. we can drop u from the notation of forcing and just write M k A(a) (or M k [a/x]A. and u-versions are obtained according to (VV). let us show that for a R l b . Then Bo is a maximal generator of B(a) = [a/y]B(y). In the first case an occurrence of ak in B(a) corresponds to an occurrence of bk in B(b). B(b) is a v-version of B(a).8. some of ai's may coincide. u k OiB(a). u k Oi[c/x]Bo.) Suppose (*).(~)= c. Bo is obtained by a variable substitution from B . x To show that M . where 11 = n. . a / y ] B by (*).e. Then = Also (c . L e m m a 5. u k= B(b)) where as usual. Similarly. M . Now (*) becomes almost the same as in the propositional case: M t= OiB(a) iff V b (aR7b +-M i= B(b)). 1 1 = n.4.2. u k= OiB(a) iff (*) Vv E Ri(u) V b E D.if a j = ak. v (for any v E &(u)). Now the inductive clause for UiB from the definition of forcing can be rewritten in the following form. .8.3 Show that if pi is transitive. Eventually M . a n ) in the same world. In fact. this means that every v-version of B(a) is true a t M.5. Since by definition of R7.(j) (remember that c is distinct). i. B(a) denotes [a/x]B . . consider v E Ri(u) and d E D: such that Vk ckpidk. lyl = m. a is subordinate to b. v != [d/x]Bo by (**). since c.5(2). MORE ON FORCING IN KRIPKE BUNDLES Exercise 5. Bo = [x .2. the truth value of UiB(a) is well-defined for any tuple of individuals a = (al. 357 Again in the 1-modal case we write Rn rather than RT. a ) sub ( d .3.a / y ] B for some a E Cmn. then R7 is also transitive. g )R y ( d . in the second case an occurrence of a j = ak in B(a) corresponds to an occurrence of bj in B ( b ) . so by 2. and bj = bk. i. u != Oi[c/x]Bo by Definition 5.(j) implies a(i) = a ( j ) and thus d. hence M. W Since the world u is fully determined by a tuple a E Dn. to be more precise). v I= [ d .. ('If'.e.) Suppose M.4 Under the conditions of Definition 5.8."(aR7b + M. a). a ) . Therefore (c . . since aRqb. Then for any u E F and a E DZ M. variables Proof ('Only if7. As explained after Definition 5.

and let Mn = (F.e.10.2. M ) .7 For an N-modal Kripke bundle IF and an N-modal propositional formula A.) := E+(Pt).. En) be the n-level of M .6 Let IF be an N-modal Kripke bundle.5 implies that for any model M over IF. In fact. W L e m m a 5.3.358 CHAPTER 5. METAFRAME SEMANTICS So IF corresponds to the sequence of propositional frames Fn. A Kripke bundle model M = (IF.5. Proof Easy. En) k A. Then for any N-modal propositional formula A and for any a E Dn M n . in which Fo is the basic propositional frame.3. In (: fact. i. tn(P.4. Proof Follows from Lemma 5. This presentation of Kripke bundles allows us to describe the propositional fragment ML~=)(F)of the predicate logic ML(')(F). Hence IF k An iff b'E (IF.5 Let M = (IF. note that by 5.6 and Proposition 5. Finally note that every valuation 8 in Fn is En for some valuation 6 in IF. where Mn = (Fn. En) k A Proposition 5. iff Mn M A by 5. Then for any n 2 0 Proof Lemma 5.3.3. J) b An iff (Fn. The case A = UiBreadily follows from Lemma 5. a l= A iff M M An(a).En) and for any k. Mn) is called the n-level of IF (respectively. A a propositional N-modal formula.3. . on other predicate letters. by induction on the length of A.[) is then associated with the family of propositional Kripke models (Mn)nEw. one can put tf (PF) := OP) for any k and define arbitrary values of t+ Fn b A. Fn (respectively.2.3. IF l=+ A ifl b'n Fn l= A. Hence V( (Fn.12. L e m m a 5. E) be an N-modal Kripke bundle model.3.

every flu := fl 1 D. G1 is a morphism of propositional frames. f l the individual component of ( f o .Dl p).e. l . Exercise 5.4. then fl is also an isomorphism. Thus ( f . fo is called the world component. From the definition one can easily see that the following diagram commutes (where . A pair f = ( f o . -- .a is a morphism Fn FA.4 Morphisms of Kripke bundles D e f i n i t i o n 5. a ) sub ( f . (3) f l is a fibrewise bijection. i.1 Let IF = (F. a)sub(f .f l ) is called an equality-morphism (briefly.since R L f respects subordination.4. an isomorphism i f fo. MORPHISMS OF KRIPKE BUNDLES 359 5.f l ) is called a p=-morphism if fo is surjective (and thus. suppose a sub b.3 Show that i f ( f o . ( f . then f l ( a i ) = f l ( a j ) implies ai = aj (since f is a fibrewise bijection). L e m m a 5. which implies ( f . 6).4. =-morphism) from F to G (notation: f : F -= 6) if (1) fo : F (2) f l : Fl - G is a morphism of propositional frames. p') be Kripke bundles.4. b ) .5. f l ( b i ) = f l ( b j ) . the reader can show this i n a similar way.4 I f f : F -+= F' is an =-morphism of Kripke bundles.4.2 Show that in Definition 5.f i ) . In fact. . G = (G.1 for Kripke frames is a particular case o f 5.1 the condition ( i ) follows from (ii) and (iii). a )Rin ( f .).f l ) is an =-morphism and fo is an isomorphism.1.rr' are the pmorphisms corresponding respectively t o F. fl Exercise 5. the statement holds for n = 0 . In fact. then for every i . b). a p-morphism). is a bi3ection between DtL and D.4. T h e other way round. fl are isomorphisms.rr. Let us show that fn respects subordination. Now the monotonicity o f fn ( n > 1 ) follows easily. ai R k bil and thus f 1 ( a % ) f 1 ( b i ) . and hence bi = bj (due t o a s u b b). then the map fn sending a to f .4. b) implies a s u b b. Proof B y definition. A n =-morphism ( f o .D'.3.o (. i f aREb. I t is clear that Definition 3.

D.u i P(a) MI. Definition 5. A. f l ) : M -+= M 1 then for any u E M and for any D. Put b := (bl. We also assume that n > 0. there exists bi such that aiRkbi and ci = fi(bi). .a) E < I f ( p ) . a)Rknc. u I= P for any P E PLO Then we obtain an analogue of Lemma 3. and f o ( ~ ) R i fo(v).e. for any P E PLn. i. Let us consider only the 0-case. fo(u) !#Di B ( f 1.4. we also have Thus ai = aj implies bi = bj. So suppose M . n > 0.A is obtained from A by replacing every c E D. So we obtain aRFb and fn(b) = c. METAFRAME SEMANTICS To show the lift property for fn ( n > l). b E D. a ) subc. . with f l (c). we obtain M'. We also have ( f l . . Then for every i. then asubb. (*) where f l . f l ) : F -= (6. or in another n ~ t a t i o n : ~ a E <+(P)iff ( f i.fo(u) != f i . ( f l . b). f o ( v )y B ( f l .a).5 Let f = ( f o .where a E DZ. 4Cf. since f is a fibrewise bijection.. A = O i B ( a ) . fo(u) t= P ( f 1 .360 CHAPTER 5. u !#OiB(a).4. and thus by the lift property of f i . a E DZ.Proof By induction. 21 + A iff M r . fl(ai)Rici. In fact. assume ( f .4. Since ( f . .[') we say that f is an =-morphism from M to M' (notation: f : M -= MI) if = M.). For Kripke bundle models M = ( I F . v !#B ( b ) and a R l b . a ) R .6 If ( f o . since fo is a morphism.R such that M . we have ai and = aj iff f l ( a i ) = f i ( a j ) bi = bj i f f c i= c j .11 ++ M'. By the induction hypothesis. the easy case n = 0 is left for the reader. Hence MI. fo(u) k P L e m m a 5.3.4. a E D:.b. and also M . b) by Lemma 5. MI = (IF'. a). [ ) . Section 5.3. and let us show that We have v E Ri(u).-sentence A M .

a. Therefore.6. such that = fo(u). Then for some u' E F'. and let M' be a Kripke bundle model over 6. suppose M'. = fl. fo(u)Raw..(al). Df.4. . f : G morphism of propositional frames. a n ) .b for some b E R l ( a ) . . and put - Fa . c *= IF'. . D. a..4.). and (say. uf If A(atl. Proof If M' = ((6. L e m m a 5. M'.13. . D. Hence we obtain an analogue of Proposition 3. By the previous lemma. L e m m a 5.7 Let (fo.3. and assume that IFf A(x1. p) be an N-modal Kripke bundle. Hence M. then M L I ( P ) Proof Let (fo. . Then there exists a model M over F such that (fo. . a n E DL. . and thus M. u CjOiB(a). we obtain M. U' and thus by Lemma 5. fo(u) l+OiB(fl a). where v is the world of b. . a l .4. a l . p) -w= P' = (F'.9 Let IF = (F. for sofne model M' over IF' we have MI. n > 0.. .4. Then there exist w and c E DE such that (fi .5.4. . v Cj B(b) by the induction hypothesis. u Cj A(al. w Cj B(c). f l ) : IF = (F. . for P E PLn. . NIL' (F) ML=(F1).a ) R l c . . $I)one can take .. . there exists a model M over IF such that Since fo and all flu are surjective. MORPHISMS OF KRTPKE BUNDLES 361 For the converse..p'). there exist u. from alRibl) it easily follows that uRiv. and for P E PLO. c = fi . .(an). Proposition 5. IF' Cj A implies P t+ A. . = fi.xn). . . .4. .8 If there exists a p=-morphism f : F MLT(IFf) and thus. f l ) : F -= G.4.a. a'. f l ) : M ---+= MI. . By Lemma 5. A particular case of an =-morphism is an inverse image morphism obtained by the pullback construction as follows.

4. Then (1) n1 : ( X .. a ) E X iff ( u l .a ) . a E D f ( u ~ ) ~ ( a= f (u') (u'.v ) E Ri n ( V x V ) . Explicitly it is defined as follows. Then we define IF 1 V := (F'. b) It is clear that cp is a fibrewise bijection.pi.4. b) E X .D . where F' = F 1 V .. the restriction of IF to V ) .9 we shall use the notation f. (u'.p k ) + F'.TI. In all the cases the monotonicity is obvious. a)p:(vr. . . p' is an appropriate restriction of p.a ) := u'. iff ) iff Checking the lift property for cp is left t o the reader. To check the lift property for . IF. A particular case of this construction is a generated subbundle. '. in fact. i. p) a Kripke bundle over F . . .a. D' = D 1 V .362 CHAPTER 5. cp(ul.IF and say that it is obtained by change of the base along f . D'. piuv = piuv for ( u . tonicity. W For the Kripke bundle G constructed in Lemma 5. and thus there exists b such that apib and n(b) = f (v'). suppose u l R ~ v ' Then f (ul)&f (v') by rnono.10 Let F 1 V be a generated subframe of a propositional frame F. where (6 (2) ( f . as required. b) where pi and Ri are the relations respectively in F 1 and G. Hence (v'.a)p:(v1. cp) : G -= Proof corresponds to n'. a )E DL. Fo corresponds to IF. Consider the relations on X defined as (u'. ~ ' ( v b) = b. METAFRAME SEMANTICS -w where n : Fl follows. Definition 5. IF = ( F . i f f u'Riv' & apib. IF 1 V is called a generated subbundle of IF (more precisely.e. Let also n1(u'..

4. cp : D" the inclusion map.4. T : Fl + F the associated p-morphism. MORPHISMS OF K R P K E BUNDLES Lemma 5. if F f V is a cone F T u . then IF 1 V is also called the cone of IF and denoted by IF t u .4.4. Then (j.4.12 Show that IF f V is isomorphic to j. $ ) : W += P be an arbitrary =-morphism from a Kripke bundle W over G to IF. an exercise for the reader (cf.14 Let IF be a Kripke bundle. Lemma 5.15 Let f : G -+ F be a morphism of propositional frames.5. Proof An easy exercise.13 Proof Follows readily from Lemmas 5.3. Then Proof Follows for the previous lemma and the observation that every cone in IF 1 V is a cone in IF. Then (1) there exists a unique map g : G1 -+ Fl such that the following diagram (where T is associated with W commutes. IF f V its generated subbundle. ) .P. P = f.4.4. IF a Kripke bundle over F. Also let ( f . Finally let us show that G = f. cp) : (6 += F the =-morphism described i n 5.11 Let j : F 1 V F be the inclusion morphism. - 363 + D1 Exercise 5.4.P and (f. In particular. p) : IF [ V --t= IF.4. Lemma 5.IF gives rise to the pullback (or 'coamalgam') diagram: In precise terms.26). this means the following Lemma 5. the proof of Lemma 1.7.6 and 5.9.

Proof (i) The diagram commutes iff for any x E H. i.$(x)) E G1 since . . we only need to find a unique y E GI such that xl(y) = T(X)& p(y) = $(x). METAFRAME SEMANTICS (2) g is a n isomorphism between H1 and G I . SO g is well-defined. T . for which the : following diagram (where T' : Hf -+ G is associated with H') commutes. (ii) We can consider the category P of Kripke bundle morphisms of the form (f. note that (T(x). p) : (6 + IF from P. xl(g(x)) = ~ ( x and ) p(g(x)) = $(x). whenever f (u) = ~ ( a ) But this holds since p is a fibrewise bijection between x'-' [u] and .rr . $) : W -+ IF. $ = f .$(x)). iff g(x) = (T(x). So it suffices to show that . But actually the above argument applies to any (f. $) : W -+F to (f.p ) is a terminal object of P. In fact.e. where IHI is an arbitrary Kripke bundle over G. A morphism (in P ) from (f.364 CHAPTER 5.x-' [f (u)]. The assertion (i) shows that our specific (f.$I) W' -+ P is defined as a map h.

uIt-A:= M .-sentence. +-r1(g(y))R:r'(g(z)). (aRnb & M.5.uIk B o r M . Proof An exercise. A an intuitionistic D. (3) M . v IF B ( b ) + M. Then for any y. u b B (for B atomic). The model (F.1 If F is an intuitionistic Kripke bundle.2. F = (W. i. First note the following: L e m m a 5. it remains to show the monotonicity of g. the monotonicity g-l follows by the same argument. Intuitionistic forcing in intuitionistic Kripke bundle models is defined via modal forcing similarly to the case of Kripke frames (Definition 3.D . u I t B V C iff (M. u ~ A ~ .(G) I u E W} is stable i n F. (4) M .. R).4 Under the conditions of Definition 5.4. are S4kames.2 A valuation 5 i n an intuitionistic Kripke bundle F is called intuitionistic i f every set J + ( P r ) = lJ{J.3 Let M be an intuitionistic model over an intuitionistic Kripke bundle F = ( F .e. z E H I and similarly ysiz Thus ysiz =+ ~ ( Y ) P : ~ ( z ) by definition (see Lemma 5. p ) . u IF B iff M.5. u F . v I C(b)). Now we obtain an analogue of Lemma 3. u E M .5 Intuitionistic Kripke bundles Now let us consider the intuitionistic case. To complete the proof of (ii).3 (1) M.12): Definition 5. 5. H Definition 5. INTUITIONISTIC KRIPKE BUNDLES 365 Thus all objects in IJ are terminal.5.5. So the map g from (i) is bijective.B(a) > C(a) ifl V 'v R(u) Vb E D. J ) is also called intuitionistic i n this case. u It. So let Si be the relations in H I .5. and all morphisms are invertible. u I F C ) . Then we put M.5.5. i f Rn([+(P2)) J+(PF).2.9).13: L e m m a 5. then all the F.

u I t a # b i 8 a does not equal b. (8) M . (6) M It.5.4. Here we assume that in all cases we evaluate D.5.3 and Lemma 5. we have for any u for any D. CHAPTER 5.5.1 ~)~ iff Vv E R ( u )V b E D t (aRnb + v ! ~ ( b C ( b ) T )by Lemma 5. The pattern of M is the Kripke bundle model Mo over F such that for any u E IF and any atomic D. B (6) M .3. b ) ) . As in the modal case. Now we obtain some facts similar to those proved in Section 3. In the fixed model M we have u I t B ( a ) > C ( a )iff u I= ( B ( a )> C ( a ) ) T= o ( B ( > C ( a ) T )by Definitions 5. u I t V x B ( x . u It.7 Under the conditions of Definition 5.-sentences at u. L e m m a 5. M a Kripke bundle model over F.4. Definition 5.2.6 Let F be an intuitionistic Kripke bundle.C ( b ) )by Definitions 5. ( a R n b & v I B ( b ) t v It.a ) iff Vv E R ( u ) Vd E D. .the others are an exercise for the reader. 5. METAFRAME SEMANTICS (5) M . so e.5. M .b)).11. sentence A ( a ) M IF A(a) & a R n b + M I t A ( b ) .5.[alx] . (6) are written as follows: (4) M I t ( B 3 C ) ( a )iff V b ( a R n b & M I B ( b ) t M It. v I t B(d. E IF.C ( b ) ) .5 Let M be the same as in Lemma 5. u k A ~ . V b E Dz (aRnb =+ M .g.A iff M . In (4). u It. we can drop u from the notation.6. B . (6) and (7) we also assume that a E D t is a list of individuals.5.5. u I t 3 x B 283a E D. which replaces a list of variables containing the parameters respectively of B > C or V x B .3. Proof Let us consider only the case (4). 2.-sentence A It is clear that the model Mo is intuitionistic. Proof Then for any D1- By Definition 5.V x B ( x .-sentence A Mo.3. (4). a ) iff VdVb ( ( d b )E Dn+' & aRnb + M It. L e m m a 5.B ( d .5.4 = >) ~ iff Vv E R ( u )V b E D.

u k O(B(a)T > C(a)T) (by Lemma 5. INTUITIONISTIC KRIPKE BUNDLES 367 P r o o f By induction.4 and Definition 5.8 Let M be an intuitionistic Kripke bundle model with the accessibility relation R. v I= B(b)T =+ M." ( a R n b & Mo.2. u IF VxA(x. c) iff Vv E R(u)V a E D t Vd E D r (cRmd +-M.8).12) iff ~ ~ iff Vv E R(u)V a E Dc v b A(a)T (by Definition 5." v It. v Il.5. Let us consider only the case A = B(a) > C(a). u IF A(a.12. c E D r x M. lyl = m.5.C(b)) (by Lemma5.5. y ) an intuitionistic formula with FV(A) xy. valid i n an intuitionistic Kripke bundle F (notation: P IF A) i f it is true in all intuitionistic Kripke models over P.5.1.11. v t= C(b)T) (by the induction hypothesis) iff M.3). similar to Lemma 3.5. v Il.B(b) =+ Mo. 11 = n.8 and Lemma 5.2. but the proof is different.2.3. L e m m a 5.10) iff Vv E R(u)Va E D.5. A(x) an intuitionistic formula with all its parameters i n the x list x. F (notation: IF IF+ A) i f .5. Definition 5.9 Let M be an intuitionistic Kripke bundle model with the accessibility relation R.11. u E M . now it is based on soundness (Proposition 5. 11 = n.2.uIl-Aiff Vv E R(u) Vb E D. Then for any u E M Proof The claim is similar to Lemma 3.VxA(x) iff u k ( v x A ( x ) ) ~ and By Lemma 2.A(a) (by Definition 5.4) iff Vv E R(u) Vb E D.2. strongly valid in an intuitionistic Kripke bundle all its substitution instances are valid i n IF. We have Mo.12)." (aRnb & M . d ) ) .2. The latter formula is AT by Definition 2.2. in the given model M we have: u It.10 A n intuitionistic predicate formula A is called true i n an intuitionistic Kripke bundle model M (notation: M IF A) i f VA is true at every world of M .15.18. Then for any u E M . thus u k ( V ~ ( X ) ) u b O V X A ( X )(by Proposition 5. in QS4 the latter formula is equivalent to OVXA(X)~.2. By Definition 3.7. A(x. Exercise 5.

(c)+(a). = ) rn . . IF k (SA)T. (b)+(c). Proposition 5.u I t L e m m a 5.) Assume IF It. A E I F = . and thus it is valid in IF. we havetoshow M . by Proposition 5.11. moreover.11. . A(al.A(a) iff M .11. METAFRAME SEMANTICS M. a E DZ. a E D. (2) (a)+(b) is obvious.-.5.7 we have: M o . and thus we obtain F k AT. u t= ~ ( a ) ~ . we obtain F k+ AT by Proposition 5.e. Then for any intuitionistic model M .5. Proof Similar t o Proposition 3.29.5.A(a). . Then (2) the following three assertions are equivalent: (a) IF I t + A. By assumption. IF I t A implies M o . 11 = n. By Proposition 5. By Lemma5. x (Only if.11. (If. u It. i. By Lemma 2. u k A(a)T(= AT(a)) by Lemma 5. . By Lemma 5.e. Thus IL(')(IF) = s ( ~ ~ ((F)).20.an). . . Assume IF kf AT. IF k (Am)T.e.5. M . (b) tlm F IF Am. by Lemma 5. u k AT(a)(= A(a)T) for a n y u E F. Proof (1) Let A = A(x). By Lemma 5.11. u Il. any u E M.5.2.5.-. Proof Similar t o Lemma 3. Assume F I t Am.A.5. a n E D.5. u I t A(a).11 M IF A(x1.12. which means A E IL(=)(IF) iff AT E ML(=)(P).2.2. Let M be a Kripke bundle model over F. Therefore IF It A+. i.13 For an intuitionistic Kripke bundle F the set of strongly valid formulas IL(=)(F) := {A E IF(=) I F IF+ A) is a superintuitionistic predicate logic (with or without equality).12.5. i. x n ) ifl Vu E M V a l .12 Let IF be an S4-based Kripke bundle.368 CHAPTER 5. (SA)T = sT(AT) is a QS4'-theorem.5.2. thus we obtain IF I= ( s A ) ~ . and for an arbitrary IF'-substitution S let us show F I t SA.. F I= ST(AT). (c) F k+ AT. rn Proposition 5. Hence IF I t A.) Assume F k AT. Since (Am)T = (AT)m.12. . F I t + A iff IF k+ AT." we have M .

Then for any u E M and for any intuitionistic D. P r o o f Follows readily from Lemma 5.14.5. B . IL'(F) C IL'(G). INTUITIONISTIC KRIPKE BUNDLES 369 Definition 5. Definition 5. and the equality L e m m a 5. Then I L ( = ) ( F G IL(=)(FI. v). .14 The set IL(')(F) is called the superintuitionistic logic of F (respectively. note that IF += 6 implies ML'(P) C_ ML'((6) by Proposition 5.f l . with or without equality).5.2. Chapter 1.W T . Definition 5. u ll. f ~ ( u Il. P r o o f From Lemma 5.13. I u E W ) and a family of relations p = (p.16 If F and (6 are intuitionistic Kriplce bundles and IF + 6 . Now we easily obtain intuitionistic analogues of some assertions from the previous section.18 Let P be an intuitionistic Kripke bundle. For the intuitionistic case the notion of a Kripke bundle can be slightly extended. hence s ( M L Z ( F ) ) s(ML'(G)). . f l ) : M -= M' for intuitionistic Kripke bundle models M .~ - A Kripke quasi-bundle can be presented equivalently as a triple F = (Fo.2 and 5Recall that quasi-p-morphisms are intuitionistic analogues of p-morphisms.D . M L e m m a 5. I u R v ) satisfying ( # 2 ) .B i f f M'.13.17 For an intuitionistic Kripke bundle IF IL(=)(F) ~ { I L ( = ) ( F ) 1 = 1-U F).4. p ) with a system of domains D = ( D . cf. M'.5.5. F 1 V its generated subbundle.5. cf.4. (83) from Definition 5.6. . ) Proof Similar to Lemma 5.5. L e m m a 5.18.e.15 Let ( f o .4.4.8. Definition 1.5. by Proposition 5. i.5. ' then I L I ( F ) ILT ((6) and IL' (P) IL'(6).5. Proposition 5. Proposition 5.13.19 An intuitionistic Kripke quasi-bundle is a quasi-p-morphism T : Fl Fo between S4-frames.-sentence B ) M ..5. For the second.4.3 and the observation that f l B~ = (fl . Proof The first statement is an exercise for the reader.5.

u1 IF 3xP(x). Exercise 5. p is universal on {al.20 Try to give an inductive definition of intuitionistic forcing in a Kripke quasi-bundle (intuitionistic valuations are defined similarly to Kripke bundles). So since u1Rug. it is not a surprise that the semantics of quasi-bundles i not sound for modal logics. but bl is its own inheritor in ul = R ug. ag). as the following counterexample shows. R is universal.14.5. but M. see Section 5. ug IpL 3xP(x). Lemma 5. A familiar truth definition for a formula 3xA is irrelevant in this case.21 Consider a quasi-bundle F pictured at Fig.370 CHAPTER 5. Since an intuitionistic quasi-bundle is not necessarily a modal bundle. does not have inheritors in ug. there is no truth-preservation for 3xP(x). METAFRAME SEMANTICS However one should be careful about using quasi-bundles. truth-preservation (or 'monotonicity') is necessary for soundness. Putting we obtain M. . we have to reduce the class of quasi-bundles.. Figure 5. Example 5. SOIF is still a quasi-bundle.5.5. Consider an intuitionistic model M = (IF.15). Note that the definition of forcing is not so straightforward. But as we shall soon see (cf. But it is not s sound for intuitionistic logic either! To obtain soundness.5. 5) such that [+(P) = {b). bl E D.17 for details. 5.

7).5. as we shall see later on.12) iff Fn k AT (by Lemma 5. n 1 0 such that tn(pk) = <+(PC) any k 2 0. u . 3 b E D:(bRna & M . Let us also make some remarks on Kripke quasi-sheaves. L e m m a 5.3. v It B(d. v are i n the same cluster.18) of quasi-bundles. Assume that u MR v i n F . is a bijection between D.12).4..3 x B ( x . v I t B ( d . A a propositional intuitionistic formula.2.22 Let M = ( F . P r o o f V n F. (*) Due to the quasi-lift property (1.7) iff P IFf A (by Proposition 5.4(6).5) iff M IF An(a) (by Definition 5. with the converse p. according to Definition 5..5.3). and for any intuitionistic propositional formula A and for any a E Mn Proof Mn is intuitionistic. 3 b E D. INTUITIONISTIC KRIPKE BUNDLES So here is an alternative definition: 371 M .5.3. and D.5.24 For an intuitionistic Kripke bundle F. I A iff V n Fn It. Proposition 5.5.3. and let tn be a propositional valuation i n its n t h level Fn.5. u It.5. a I t A iff Mn. Let Mn = (Fn.a ) iff 3vRu 3d E D. b)).An iff Fn It. Then for any n > 0 P It.4. Proof F I t An iff IF k ( A n ) T ( =( A T ) n )(by Proposition 5.e. [ ) be an intuitionistic Kripke bundle model.23 Let IF be an intuitionistic Kripke bundle. L e m m a 5.b ) ) .1) iff M k ( A T ) n ( a )(= ( A n ( a ) ) T ) (by Lemma 5.4. i.5.3 x B ( x .. (*) can be rewritten as M . a k AT (by Definition 1.A.AT (by Lemma 1. Then p. Then every Mn is intuitionistic."(b xna & M .7) iff IF k+ AT (by Proposit tion 5.4.6) iff Fn It.A (by Lemma 1. (**) Note that this definition for the 3-case is dual t o the clause for the V-case in Lemma 5. u It.En) be the corresponding propositional for Kripke model.5. L e m m a 5.5.a ) iff 3v x u 3d E D. Mn.25 Let P be a quasi-sheaf over an (intuitionistic) frame F .5. . The modified definition provides the desired truth-preservation property.

fl) is a fibrewise bijection. where fo(u) := u". there exists a' such that bpVua1..2. Next. and thus p.27 P" is called the skeleton of F. and thus a = a'. by Definition 5.3. there exists b such that aR1b and n(a) = v.5). aopuVa2.26 Let F = (F. R"). To show the injectivity. which implies a1 = a2. a Z R I b only if n(a) Z R n(b)..e.b. (F1)" = ((Dl)".Then by transitivity. Let us find a E D. i.1. note that an arbitrary element of (7r")-l(u") is of the form b". there exists a' such that bR1a' and n(a1) = n(a). (R1)") be their skeletons (Definition 1.. . = It remains to show that both p. then u W R v. we can factorise a quasi-sheaf F and obtain a quasi-sheaf over the partially ordered frame F": Lemma 5. by Lemma 1.25. Hence bR1a..39).3. To check the lift property for n". (3) There exists a p=-morphism F F". whose converse is p.2..3.. In fact... By the lift property. i. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Proof First. suppose n(a) = n(b) = u.a.a implies ap. H n(a)" is a p-morphism (and thus defines a Kripke (2) F" is a Kripke quasi-sheaf. is a bijection. suppose x" R-v".40.D. such that a" = b"..39). (iii) Let us show that (fo. Since T is a p-morphism.e.ao. Then (1) The map n" : a" bundle F"). W So. So assume aop. similarly to the case of Kripke sheaves (Section 3. and again we can check this only for p. Then a" # b". note that ap.. due to the monotonicity of T. In fact. it follows that a Z R I b. and D. Now take a := p... alpv. a"(~')"b" iff aR1b (by Definition 1. iff n(a)"RWr(b)" (by Definition 1. Let F" = (D". For the surjectivity. the same argument shows that bp.5. but a # b. with F = (W. T(a)Rv.e.. is a bijection between D. R1).. so it remains to show that (fo.. and by Lemma p.39). f l(a) := a". i. and thus a"(R1)"b". it follows that a' = a. apUua1.. p. But then aR1a' by transitivity. v" = n(b)" = ~"(b"). by Definition 1. since F is a quasi-sheaf.3. only if n(a)Rn(b) (since n is p-morphism). with u" = n"(bm) = ~ ( b ) " . i. we have t o show that bR1a.39. since in Kripke quasi-sheaves different individuals in the same fibre are not related..372 CHAPTER 5..e. fl) : P -= F".. R) and consider the corresponding frame of individuals F1 = ( D l . that f l restricted to D.then alp.3. Obviously.5. are functions. and thus by transitivity. To obtain a" = b". ~ ( a Z)R I n(b) and also (a")(R1)"(b"). by Definition 5. -r. aR1b. p) be the same as in Lemma 5. Proof (i) n is well-defined.3.al.5. let n : F1 --++ F be the associated p-morphism.b implies bp.a2. Let v := n(b). (ii) Suppose n"(a") = ~"(b"). and a E D. In fact. these maps are propositional pmorphisms. and since IF is a Kripke quasi-sheaf. W Definition 5.

16 shows that we can use only cones. because the domains of equivalent worlds may be of different cardinality. u I Aiff (F". suppose M = (IF. for any predicate letter P. because a quasi-ordered cone may still have several equivalent roots with non-equivalent domains. . and thus a E cp+(P).18: L e m m a 5.26 and Proposition 5. and it remains to show the converse. a E $+(P). Thus in the intuitionistic case it is sufficient to consider Kripke quasi-sheaves only over posets. suppose a c= f-a Figure 5. we conclude that IF" IF A.5.6). t t Since M Iy A by our assumption. In fact.5.5. + is an intuitionistic valuation. Proof The inclusion IL(=)(P) C IL(=)(P") follows from Lemma 5.5. there exists b E Rn(a) such that d = f .6. and let us show IF" Iy A. and By Lemma 5. Let f : IF + IFN (Lemma 5.5.6.a 1 a E cp+(P)). and we also have f : (F.28 IL(')(P) = IL(=)(P") for a Kripke quasi-sheaf F . In fact.4.5. So we have to consider Kripke bundles over arbitrary quasi-ordered sets.7. c ( R " ) ~ ~ . To prove the converse. Suppose f . INTUITIONISTIC KRIPKE BUNDLES So we obtain an analogue of Lemma 3. Then a == b (by the definition of f ) . cp) += (IF". let us show that d E $+(P).cp) is an intuitionistic model.6 we obtain (for a given sentence A and for any world u): M . $).+). Then c = f .26). Then from a R n b we obtain b E cpf (P).5. Thus by definition. So $ is intuitionistic.e. A is an intuitionistic sentence and M Iy A. since cp is intuitionistic. b (Fig. by definition. and let us define a valuation $ in F" such that $+(P) = { f .4.uW I A. a E cp+(P) only if f . By Lemma 5. On the other hand. Lemma 5. but this does not simplify anything. a E ++(P). a = f . b for some b E cp+(P). for Kripke bundles analogous reductions are not always possible. d E $+(P). 5. a E $+( P ) .4. i. f .

. A n i-morphism is a morphism of colour i . morphisms in C* are paths (sequences of consecutive morphisms) in C: aI a 2 UrJ --+ U1 --+ U2 ---' .4. This is actually a coloured multigraph. .ocp:=cpol. or a labelled transition system. which is mainly due to Ghilardi. The composition of morphisms in C' is defined as the join of sequences: and of course we define l. Similarly to a category (cf. Y are sets. and Y is the class of morphisms (notation: Mor C). . and we also add all identity morphisms 1. . It is also clear that a category is a 1-precategory expanded by identity morphisms and composition of consecutive morphisms (cf. . (where uo. Y are non-empty classes. Let us begin with a notion of a precategory. If a (small) category C has a single object. X is called the class of objects (notation: ObC).V) { f I ~ ( f = U. may be not all different). t ( f ) = v ) (the class of all morphisms from u to v).v) (the class of all i-morphisms from u to v).R1. Y . METAFRAME SEMANTICS 5.374 CHAPTER 5. . t ( f ). . . . where X. Every morphism is coloured. In this section we define this semantics in a more general polymodal setting. := ) Ci(u. o. . I n this case the Kripke frame (W. where X.6 Functor semantics In Chapter 4 we defined validity in a presheaf over a locale and showed that the presheaf semantics is equivalent t o algebraic semantics.-1 a. cr(f) are called respectively the origin. 3.v) := Mori(C) nC(u.RN) is called the frame representation of C (notation: FR(C)) if W = ObC and Ri = {(u.:=cp for any cp E C*(u. and the colour o f f . u. cr). . its frame representation is an S 4 frame. it consists of objects (or points) and morphisms (arrows). o (f ). the target. Every 1-precategory C can be extended to a category C*. o.v) 1 Ci(u. Makkai and Reyes.6). . this construction is similar to reflexive transitive closure of a binary relation. (as new).v). C(U. t .1 A n N-precategory is a tuple C = ( X . Note that a 1-precategory is nothing but a multigraph.v) # 0 ) . t : Y ---+ Y and c r : Y ( 1 . and without special identity morphisms. . . - W e shall usually consider small precategories. W e also use the following notation: Mori(C) := c r P 1 ( i )(the class of all i-morphisms). Namely.u.3). . Section 3. but a priori without composition. ---+ u.N ) are functions. then MorC* is the free monoid generated by the set MOTC.6. Functor semantics is based on an alternative definition of validity in a presheaf (over an arbitrary category). Definition 5.

6.. P r o p o s i t i o n 5. C be the corresponding : C 1 ( F ) C V ~ C such that E ( a ) = u etale prefinctor. 1 ) . can have different a-inheritors i n the same world v for different morphisms a.(a).e. b. a E MoriC). F ( a ) = pa. origins and targets: i f f E Ci(u. a preset F = (C.. Conversely. then F ( f ) E Ci(F(u).6. C1(F)i(al := { ( a . A Co-preset IF is called a C-set (more precisely.v ) . every prefunctor F : C --+ S E T such that every F ( u ) is non-empty. D e f i n i t i o n 5.o .3 Let C be a category based on a precategory Co. and E ( a .(d) is called the a-inheritor of the individual d i n the world v . for cu E C ( u .D . can be considered as a preset.5. i n which D = ( D . I u E W ) is a system of domains on W and p = (pa I a E M o r C ) is a family of functions indexed by morphisms of C . a E C ( u . and let E : C 1 ( F )--.@ M o r C .D . then F ( f ) E C f ( F ( u )F ( v ) ) .F ( v ) ) .6. W e also extend this definition to the case when C is an N-precategory and C' is a I-precategory: i f f E Ci(u. a ) = a. C' from an N-precategory C to an N precategory C' is a map sending objects of C to objects of C' and morphisms of C to morphisms of Cf%nd preserving colours. + D. b) W e also obtain an etale prefunctor E whenever a E D. a ) I b = p. The objects of C are called possible worlds of IF.D . A C-preset is a triple IF = (C.6. an intuitionistic C-set) if it preserves composition and identity morphisms: (iv) Pa00 = pa 0 pp. otherwise.v ) .5 (1) Let F : C --t S E T be a C-preset. the image p. FUNCTOR SEMANTICS 375 D e f i n i t i o n 5.v ) . Then E has the following properties 'We may assume that ObC i l M o r e = 0. p) is nothing but a prefunctor F : C C V ~S E T such that F ( u ) = D. If d E D. E for any a. p) is also associated with the precategory of individuals C 1 ( F ) such that ObC1(F):= D1 := U uEObC D.4 A prefunctor F : C --. O n the other hand. i. . C can b e replaced with an isomorphic category having this property.. such that pa : D. v ) .6. and the elements of D. Let also give an alternative definition o f C-presets.b .2 Let C be a (small) N-precategory with the set of objects W . . Note that an individual d E D. u E ObC. C = (Co. So we see that a C-preset (C. D e f i n i t i o n 5. p).. are called individuals at u .

a) o E(b.b. If C is category. E((a.b.a) 0 (b. c. The precategories C' and C1(F) are isomorphic.6 If F is a C-set. b.. For a morphism a E C(u. (2) For an object u put D. 1 := (a. v).. Lemma 5. a ) o (b.a) to the the unique lift of a beginning at a . Etale prefunctor. a ) . then E : C1(F) -A F is a functor. = Proof In fact. (a. and . E(a.c. b. b) and Cf(a.V)and a E D. (2) Let G : C' ^. put F ( a ) := p.e.t C be a prefunctor which is surjective on objects and has the unique lift property.l. P r o o f (1) (i) F is surjective on objects since every set F(u) is non-empty. Then C' is isomorphic to C1(F) for some C-preset F . c.b) sending (a. F : C -A SET is a C-set. then we can also make C1(F) a category by putting . b.) for a E D. := F(u) := G-' [u]. and there is a bijection between C1(F)(a. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Figure 5. (i) tlu E 0 b C 3a E ObC1(F) E(a) = u (surjectivity on objects). P).7. b) I3f ( o ( f ) = a & t ( f ) = b & G ( f ) = a ) } . o ( f ) = a. := {(a. they have the same objects. P)) = a o E(L) = l~(a). (ii) Suppose a E C(U. Then E ( f ) = a & o ( f ) = a holds iff f = ( a . i. a o p ) . In fact.6. (ii) tla E ObC1(F) tla E M a r c (E(a) = o ( a ) + 3!f (F(f) = a & o(f) = a ) ) (the unique lift property).p) := ( a . to f such that G ( f ) = a .CHAPTER 5. c .a. where b = pa (a).

v) := otherwise.3.. The forcing relation M .R N ) we define the associated N-precategory C = CatoF as follows: ObC := W. From definitions it is clear that every Kripke sheaf based on a frame F is a CatoF-preset.3).8 Note that if F is not an S4-frame. 6)) where [ is a valuation in F . Ci(u. Definition 5. FUNCTOR SEMANTICS 377 Definition 5. because it may not satisfy the coherence conditions (I)*. (2)* from Lemma 3. u k Pi iff u E [.7.6. M. M + VxA iff V a E D.2. M. 5. M. .9 (cf. M. .6.10 A (modal) predicate formula A is called . Definition 5. u k [a/x]A. we obtain a CatF-preset (where C a t F is the category defined in Section 3. it may happen that a CatoFpreset is not a Kripke sheaf. u Here as usual i n the 0-case B(a) means [a/x] B.(Pr) (for m > 0). u k P r ( a ) i f fa E [. M .(u) VO E C ~ ( U .8).7 For a propositional N-frame F = (W. u k a = b iff a equals b.6. a ) . The following definition is similar to the case of Kripke bundles. V ) . u k 3xA iff 3a E D .5.(Pi). v 1 B(pa . and we assume that FV(B) = X.6.6. u 1 [alx]A. if F is an S4-frame. u t= A between a world u E W and a D. M . A (modal) valuation in a Cpreset F i s a valuation in the system of domains D = (F(u) I u E ObC).5. R 1 . M .-sentence (with equality) A is defined by induction: M . Note that the truth condition for Oi[a/x] B obviously extends to the case when FV(B) x.u + OiB(a) iffVv E R. Remark 5.6. A model over F is a pair (F. Definitions 5.2..

Definition 5. u k A(a). l=+ for strong validity. : The nth level of F is the frame Fn := (Dn. Similarly to Kripke bundles. valid in a C-preset F if A i s true in every model over F .D. Definition 5.13 (Proposition 5.6. W e again abbreviate R? t o Rn i n the 1-modal case..6. . u k OiB(a) iff Vu E Ri(u) V b E Dz (aRab + M.[) a model over a C-preset F = (C. . l 5 i 5 N : a R a b iff 37 E MoriC p.12 For a C-preset F: (1) ML(')(F) is a modal predicate logic.. Fn := (Dn. . M = ( F . .6.11 For a C-preset model M and a modal formula A(x) M I A(x) i f f Vu E M Q a E DZ M . a = b. We use the same signs as above: != for truth and validity.14 Let F = (C. = For a C-preset F let The proof of the following soundness result is postponed until Section 5. R k ) .p). . Also let R := Ri. The following is a trivial consequence of the definitions: L e m m a 5. D.6.6. 11 = n. METAFRAME SEMANTICS true in a C-preset model M if its universal closure VA i s true at every world of M . Then x for any u E F and a E DZ M .13. . From the definition of forcing 5.9 we readily obtain L e m m a 5.).Ry. .p) be a C-preset over a n N-precategory C. R. .15 Let C be a n N-precategory. we introduce levels for C-presets. . Proposition 5. Let B be a n N-modal formula with FV(B) x. Let u s define relations Rr o n Dn for n > 0 .13 For N-modal predicate logics we introduce the functor semantics FSN generated by presets over N-precategories.6.R.378 CHAPTER 5. strongly valid i n a C-preset F if all substitution instances of A are valid in F.u l= B(b)).2).

19. u It.6.6.u)Vc E D.18 Let M be an intuitionistic model over a C-set F = ( C . a ) + M .u IF A iff M. a ) i f f Vu E R ( u )V p E C(u.4. u != B(c.A ( b ) .6.e.6. D.19 Under the conditions of Definition 5.5.6. W Definition 5. .5. and similarly to Lemma 5.-sentence A M0.5. M a model over F . with obvious changes. u E M .3 x B iff 3a E D. (6) M . u It.)) C_ <+(Pp). FUNCTOR SEMANTICS 379 L e m m a 5.<) is also called intuitionistic.. a ) . M .V x B ( x . u k B (for B atomic). p).u)M . u I C ( p . Proof Similar to 5.(P.21 Let F be a C-set. u It.16 If C is a category and F is a C-set. . L e m m a 5. we obtain L e m m a 5.20 Let M be the same as i n Lemma 5.6. a ) . t t (5) M .-sentence A The model Mo is intuitionistic. u I t B V C i f f (M.-sentence.6.u ) ( M . l B ( a ) iff Vu 6 R ( u ) V p E C(u. u I a t # b iff a does not equal b. . P r o o f An exercise.6. The model (IF.18 (1) M .u I B(p.22 For any u E F.6.B iff M . A an intuitionistic D. (4) M .7.. p. u I t C ) .17 A valuation in a C-set F is called intuitionistic i f every set <+(PC)= U{<.uIF B o r M .U k . t B (7) M . u I [alx] . Then for any D1sentence A ( a ) t M I A ( a ) & aRnb + M It. i f Rn(J+(P. u W B(p. i. (3) M . Definition 5. then every Fn is an intuitionistic propositional frame. for any D. M . Then we put < L e m m a 5. u I B ( a ) > C ( a ) i f f t Vv E R ( u )V p E C(u. u It. The pattern of M is the model Mo over F such that for any u E F and any atomic D. a). (8) M .6. Definition 5.) I u E W ) is stable in F.

METAFRAME SEMANTICS L e m m a 5. u IF A ( a ) .6. L e m m a 5.A ) i f it is true i n all intuitionistic models over F .380 CHAPTER 5.26 Let F be a C-set. Proof Similar to Lemma 5. 11 = n. Proposition 5. u It. Definition 5.A ) i f V A is true at every world of M .25 For an intuitionistic C-set model M and an intuitionistic formula A M It. Proposition 5.28 The set I L ( = ) ( F )is called the superintuitionistic logic of F .6. (b) V m F IF Am.27 For a C-set F the set I L ( = ) ( F ):= { A E IF(=) I P ~t-+ A ) is a superintuitionistic predicate logic (with or without equality). .6. and IL(=)( F ) =T NIL(=)( F ) . Then for any u E M x M .12. (c) F k+ A T .24 A formula A E IF(=) is called true i n an intuitionistic C-set model M (notation: M It.6.A ( x ) iff V u E M V a E DE M . Proof Cf.6. A E I F T .V x A ( x ) i 8 V v E R ( u )V a E Dc M . Then (1) F I F A i f f F k A T (2) The following three assertions are equivalent: (a) F It-+ A . Proposition 5.12).6. strongly valid in a C-set F (notation: F It+A ) i f all its IF(=)-substitution instances are valid in F .5. valid i n a C-set F (notation: F It. A(x) an intuitionistic formula.23 Let M be an intuitionistic model over a C-set with the accessibility relation R.5. u IF A ( a ) .6. Definition 5.8 using soundness (5.

C' is a prefunctor with the lift property. @. Proposition 5. A pair y = ( Q 7 9 ) is called an =-morphism from F to F' (notation: y : F += F') i f (1) @ : C 2.7.v ) the following diagram commutes: Q v y is called a p=-morphism i f it also has the property (4) @ is surjective on objects.7..e.3 For y = yn : Fn -+ FA as follows: (a7@) : F -+= F'. .7. Definition 5. (2) @ = (9.6. for any p E C ( u . Definition 5 7 1 (Cf.5. F' a C'-preset. The above conditions (2).4 yn : Fn -= FA. E has the lift .7. (3) mean that 9 is a functor morphism ('natural transformation7) from F to F' . we define the map n whenever a E F ( u ) ~ . L e m m a 5. The reader can see that this is a generalisation of the lift property for propositional frame morphisms. MORPHISMS O F PRESETS 5. I u E ObC) i s a family of bijections (3) @ respects morphisms. i. property if V U E ObVVp E MorE(@(a)= o ( p ) + 3 f E MorV @ ( f )= p ) .) A prefinctor @ : D --.2 Let F be a C-preset. n 2 0 .7 Morphisms of presets Now let us define truth-preserving morphisms of presets. Definition 5. > 0 .5.

Since cP has the lift property. v') b' = F1(X) . METAFRAME SEMANTICS Figure 5. ( b ) . ~ . To check the lift property. Then 3X E C'(ul. suppose aRnb. and assume N = 1 to simplify notation. there exist v E ObC and p E C(u. Then put . b1 E F'(v1). 3p E C(u. . aRnb. a ) . suppose a E Fn. i. To prove the monotonicity. and so by definition.7. . and we also claim that b' = yn(b) = Q. . a' E By definition. F'(ul). . a'Rrnb'.2(3).v) such that X = cP(p).8).382 CHAPTER 5. b (Fig. b = F1(@(p)) (Qu . Thus Q.v)Vi bi = F(p)(ai). Proof We consider only the case n > 0. ( a ) ( R ' ) ~ y . Then by 5. 5. a. a' = 9.8.e. a'.

7 If the models are intuitionistic.5. let b" = 9. then for any intuitionistic F(u)-sentence A M . for any P E P L n .4. 5.6. u It.1. l P r o o f By an obvious modification of the proofs of 5. J ' ) (notation: M ' ) if f : M -= .5. Definition 5.7.7. Proof Cf. an exercise for the reader.' Let y : F -= G . y o ( u )It. A. u b A iff M I .15 based on Lemma 5. B y 5.5? Let y : F -= G be an =-morphism of presets. A. = ( F . and also for any P E P L O M' for preset models M L e m m a 5. 7Cf. M' = (F'. W D e f i n i t i o n 5.4. for the intuitionistic case: I L I ( F ) c I L S ( F ' ) and IL'(F) G IL'(F1). *Cf. y is called an =-morphism from a model M = ( F . ~ ( uk ) 1 . 5. a' = b'. b.7.4. .5.7.8.A i f f M 1 . ML' ( F ) M L = ( F 1 ) .7. Then there exists a model M over F such that y : M -= Mr. W L e m m a 5. MORPHISMS O F P R E S E T S In fact. Propositions 5. the following diagram commutes: Q v a i Thus b" = F1(X).7. w P r o p o s i t i o n 5.5. a E F ( u ) ~ n > 0.y . J ) to M' = ( F 1 .4.J1). Proof The same as for Lemma 5.16.J ) .6 If y : M -= then for any u E M and for any F(u)-sentence A M . 5. .7. Similarly.7. and let M' be a model over G . then MLf ( F ) C M L T ( F ' ) and thus.8 If there exists a p=-morphism F += F'.

11 Let C.4. Consider a precategory 2)' with the class of objects { ( u . G : V -+ C an arbitrary prefunctor with the lift property. a E ObC'. -+ I P E D ( u . + (2) There exists a prefunctor with the lift property.F += F and a prefunctor isomorphism (over the same precategory) E : F' + @. G' : D' C' such that G 1 ( u .7.211. E : C' --. F is a C-set and G is a functor. Q ) : F' -= F i s the composition of the inverse image morphism O : Q?.384 CHAPTER 5. .la).7. (3) The following diagram commutes: (4) If F' is a D-preset corresponding to E'. Q ) : F' --+= F such that Q u ( u .9' Let F be a C-preset. f E C1(a.7. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Let us now construct inverse image morphisms. G ( u ) = E ( a ) ) and with D1((. G 1 ( p f ) . D be N-precategories. = f.10 Every =-morphism of presets ( @ . then D' becomes a category with the composition and F' becomes a D-set. a ) = u .9. a ) 1 u E ObD. V such that E ' ( u . Definition 5. Lemma 5.a ) = a.F. D are categories. C the corresponding etale prefunctor. G ( P ) = E ( f )). then there exists (G. a )= a . V is called a full subprecategory of C (notation: D Lo C ) if 9Cf. Proposition 5. Lemma 5. b). (a1b ) ) := {(Pl f Then (1) There exists an etale prefunctor E' : 2)' E1(P1f ) = P. (5) If C.

15 Let F be a C-preset. v ) . from 5. Let J : V C be the inclusion prefunctor (sending every object and every morphism of V to itself). g i n V f o g (in V )= f 0 g (in C). J has t h e lift property and 9 respects morphisms.7.17. (1) If F is a C-preset.16.16 (2) For a C-set F Proof Along the same lines as Lemmas 5. v E ObVVi 5 N Ci(u.7. then obviously.14 Let F be a C-preset. V Go C. v ) . then D is called a full subcategory of C (notation: V c C ) i f (3) for any consecutive morphisms f .7.5. c IL(=)(F 1 D).17 c ML(=)(F I. (2) V u . V Proof 5 C. ) # 0 ) . The restriction of F to V (notation: F 1 V ) is the V-preset taking the same values as F on objects and morphisms of V . D e f i n i t i o n 5.12 A full sub(pre)category D of a (pre)category C is called a conic sub(pre)category (notation: 2) E(0) C) i f Here is a typical example. For u E ObC we define the cone o f F generated by u : F t u := F (CTu). Also let = (idF(u)1 u E ObV). If C. Then * ( J . D e f i n i t i o n 5.13 For a (pre)category C and u E ObC the cone generated b y u (notation: C f u ) is defined as the full sub(pre)category with the class of objects { v I C*(U. r Note that i f F is a C-set and V C C. MORPHISMS OF PRESETS (1) ObV c ObC. (2) If F is a C-set.13.7. F 1 D is a V-set.7. (1) For a C-preset F L e m m a 5.7. L e m m a 5.7. Q ) : F rV +=F. . 5. then ML(=)(F) L e m m a 5.7. V LoC. v T h u s every object o f C f u is accessible from u via a path o f morphisms. Proof Obviously. D are categories and D Go C.5. V soC.4.v) = V i ( u . D e f i n i t i o n 5. then IL(=)( F ) Easy.

Hence it follows that the semantics of Kripke bundles ICB is included in the functor semantics FS.2.3. where [ is a valuation i n P.16) to the semantics of C-sets. dom p. is reflexive (on D. But actually.2. the corresponding conditions for intuitionistic Kripke bundles i n Definition 5.6. p) is a valuation in the system of domains D. for a A n intuitionistic C-bundle over a category C is a modal C-bundle satisfying two extra conditions: (1) pl. Pa I a E MorC) x D. the corresponding relation i n FR(C). C D. as we show below.8 Bundles over precategories Let us now combine two generalisations of Kripke sheaves: Kripke bundles and presets. p = (p. FS is stronger than KB. t). D. i n which D = (D.1 A modal C-bundle over an N-precategory C is a triple F = (C.8.D..7). Definition 5. p). Definition 5.) for u E W. Also put Ry := Ri. C-sets are just C-bundles with functions p.8. But it turns out that the semantics of C-bundles is strongly equivalent (in the terminology of Section 2. I u E W) is a system of domains.386 CHAPTER 5. p) put a R a b iff a s u b b & 3f EMariC V j a a j p f b j for a .D. The notion of a C-bundle generalises both Kripke bundles and C-sets.. n > 0. To define forcing in C-bundles. b E Dn.8. and Kripke bundles based on a frame F are exactly CatoF-bundles (where CatoF is the precategory from Definition 5.v).2 For a C-bundle F = (C. is a family of relations parametrised by morphisms E C(u. as we shall see later on (Section 5. Now let us give a preliminary definition of forcing. of c. cf. A model over F is a pair (F. = D. . METAFRAME SEMANTICS 5.2 to this case: Definition 5. In fact. we first extend Definition 5.3 A (modal) valuation i n a C-bundle F = (C.10).

- D. . u b 3 x A iff 3a E Du M . to D.). Again in the U-case B ( a ) means [a/x]B . u I= Eli B ( a ) iff Vv E Ri(u) Vb E DE ( a R l b + M . M . M . Ry = Rin for all n E w .5. the presentation of the same formula in a form B ( a ) is not unique..2.") (for m > 0).5 Let IF = ( C . 5.4 (cf. So we replace every relation p. . u I= P: i f f u E & ( P i ) .uIfl. Proposition 5. 5. := f in IF'. with the set of all functions from D. So we should prove that forcing does not really depend on this presentation. Proof Put Cf(u. The forcing relation M . But this definition should be justified. Definitions 5. and let p. 1 5 i 5 N (where Ry and Rin are the nth level accessibility relations in IF and F' respectively). In fact. M . we find a precategory corresponding to the same 'metaframe' relations Rr.8. and we assume that F V ( B ) = x. then C' is also a category and Ff is a C'-set. if IF is an intuitionistic C-bundle over a category C (in particular a Kriplce bundle over an S4-frame. u b a = b iff a equals b.2. v b B ( b ) ) (for lal = n).8. " M .6. D. C D. M.9). x D. Moreover. as we know.8. Then there exists an N-precategory C' and a Cf-preset F' such that FR(C) = FR(C1). u k P ( a ) iff a E EU (P.8. Dl p) be a C-bundle over an N-precategory C. = F f ( u )for any u E ObC. To show this. u t= A between a world u E W and a Du-sentence (urith equality) A is defined by induction: M .v ) := { f is a function D. included in this relation. u b [ a / x ] A . I 37 E Ci(u.v) f C p. BUNDLES OVER PRECATEGORIES 387 Definition 5.7.

. by Definition 5.e. or to the conjunct asub b in the definition of R r . suppose aRinb. thus ajp. - R e m a r k 5..8. Then the set g = {(al. for all j . is not guaranteed in this case. v) such that b = pP. 6 ) corresponds to the model M' = (F'. Now let us consider arbitrary metaframes.388 CHAPTER 5. which implies aRYb. u != A as MI.bj.6 The crucial point of this construction is 'local functionality' in the definition of forcing for a Kripke bundle. . for a Kripke bundle IF with the base F there exists a CatoFpreset F' such that ML(') (IF) = ML(=) (F') . a . METAFRAME SEMANTICS Let us show that Rin = R> In fact. in the inductive clause for 0. is reflexive by 5. Hence we obtain the semantics of C-bundles. So far the . u 1A.. since domp. iff C p. then C also becomes a category after we define 0 as the ' composition of functions and lDU the identity function id^". and the following Corollary 5. relations R r were derived from other relations or functions.. 5.v).8.1).and we can define M. . This g can be prolonged to a total function f : D. . for some y E Ci(u. and g C p. suppose a R l b . without special requirements for accessibility relations. This corresponds to the choice of distinct individuals a l . . there exists y E Ci(u. which implies aRinb. = D. Proof In fact. idDUC plU.9 Metaframes The definition of forcing in Kripke bundles and C-sets via forcing in propositional frames F motivates a further generalisation of Kripke semantics.8 KBN 5 F S N . i. . D.7 Note that the argument fails for intuitionistic Kripke quasibundles.8. .@ (by Definition 5. such that f p. a. as and g pp. Therefore a model M = (P. In fact. which is obviously strongly equivalent to the functor semantics. t). If C is category. then f o g pa o pp C pa. then asub b.a = pP. a . The other way round.a = f . lCBint 5 FSint. and we can further define validity in I and the logic F in the modal case and IL(=)(F) := IL(=)(F') in the intuitionistic case.1.since pl.8. bj = f ( a j ) Since f E C:(u. Hence b = f . . Then we obtain the properties described in Definition 5.v) such that f p. b. (a. and there exists f E C:(u. because the totality of p. R e m a r k 5. . .8.)) is a function (since a sub b). . v). bl)..8.8.4. they are defined as sequences of propositional frames of tuples.1.

or by applying a D..RN) be a propositional Kripke frame. So we begin with Definition 5.Rg). coni. A (modal) metaframe model over F is a pair M = (IF. If D) the list x is empty. DO := W1 ROz := Ri. a ) (arranging a transformation in a certain order).5. a).). . where is a (modal) valuation i n IF. [). For a E DZ we denote the domain D. In the classical case (and in all our earlier Kripke-type semantics) the two versions of the truth definition (with D-sentences or variable assignments) are equivalent. Definition 2.-individuals in a formula A(x). As usual. Note that the worlds of Fn are n-tuples of individuals.€. . Remember that every D. a is just the world u .. Our goal is now to define forcing in metaframe models. Moreover. i(=I) is not indicated in the notation if N = 1. a E Dz. sider it as a graded propositional frame.1.9. n-ary predicate letters are evaluated in IF as propositional letters in Fn. W is called the set of possible worlds and D1 the set of individuals of F . where x is a distinct list of variables.-sentence is obtained by replacing parameters with D. . R1.As usual.1. Let Fn = (Dn.1 Let Fo = (W. The reason is that in arbitrary metaframes it is impossible to define forcing for D. is a pair (x. . D ) is called an N-metaframe uEW based on Fo. cf. be propositional Kripke frames such that Dn = U Dc. This definition is not a straightforward generalisation of the corresponding definitions in functor and Kripke bundle semantics.this will be shown later on. This transformation itself (not only its result A(a) 'forgetting' the original A(x) and [x H a]) is essential in our definition. R.-sentences in the natural way .3 A n ordered assignment (at a world u ) i n a metaframe IF = ((Fn)nEw.4.9.m e t a h m e IF is a valuation i n its system of domains. Then the pair IF = ((F. . . Thus we may define D := { u ) . The original Tarski's definition is given in terms of assignments. we define forcing for a formula A(x) with respect to an 'ordered assignment' (x. then by definition..9.-transformation [x H a] to A(x). by D(a). We shall often identify a metaframe F with the sequence (Fn)nEw..9. and the original worlds from W are '0-tuples'. Definition 5. . METAFRAMES 389 Definition 5.9. Fn is called the n-level of F . n > 0. By default we assume that an arbitrary metaframe and all its components are denoted as in 5. < So a valuation in IF is a graded propositional valuation. D a system of disjoint (nonempty) domains over W . : We say that an n-tuple b is an i-inheritor (counterpart) of an n-tuple a if aRYb.e.2 A (modal) valuation i n an N ..

a. . a k B 3 C [ x ]iff ( M . = a . (5) M . ' O ~ h enotation A[x] should not be mixed up with A(x) denoting a formula with parameters in x . u F A. a I= [ x ] ) .9.a ) I= A between ordered assignments and formulas.4. .xu(. ( ~ ). we denote . It can also be regarded as a relation between tuples a E Dn and pairs ( A .ai-l.. . . a I= U i B [x]iff 'db (aRab + M . a I= ( x i = x j ) [ x ]iff ai = a j . (ac) I= B [ x y ] .a a = a . M . Remember that according to the Introduction. a is a possible world u . or just M . Let us make some remarks about notation.4 For a metaframe model M and a modal formula (with equality) A we define forcing M .. . A The same notation applies to lists of variables. thus in Definition 5.. a i= 3yB [x]iff 3c E D. a : Im In..... or 'a formal expression A[x]'.a != B [ x ]or M . Definition 5. .)) and x .. a != A [x]. has the form P p ( x r ( l ) . M .)).).. a . xu(. 0 . SF for a list of variables x = ( x l . this is written as M . M . . However the case m = 0 is special. ( x . (for (4) M . a means ( x .x ) ' . "If x is empty. (3) M . for a tuple a = ( a l . b I=B [ x ] ) .) and a : I --+I.. .a C B [ x ]& M . then M ..On as the empty list. .x ) . (ac) k B [ x y ] . (8) M . a ) E [+(Pjm)(for m > 0). is the empty map.e. and we define x .a.. This is read as ' a forces a pair ( A . then a = 0. a i= P~O [x]iff u E eJ+(PjO) a E D c ) ..a ) (such that F V ( A ) C r ( x ) ) l l by induction: (2) M . . S y = ( a l . for some F E C a . (7) M . a b B V C [ x ]i f f ( M . a b P j " ( x . = u a E Dt). u F A [ I . a Y B [ x ]or M.xi means x . - Note that every atomic formula P p ( y ) with r ( y ) C r ( x ) .1° It is convenient to give such a definition for the case when F V ( A ) C r ( x ) . a b 'dyB [x]iff 'dc E D. a ) [ x ]iff ( a . (6) M . a . 0 . so we use the alternative notation M . a I= B /\ C [ x ]iff ( M . x . (9) if y @' x . as the world of a (i. or P ~ ( . a I= A [x]under an ordered assignment ( x .ai+l . and a . . METAFRAME SEMANTICS We define forcing in a model M as a relation M .x ) . . a E DZ. 1x1 = n ..390 CHAPTER 5. . a b C [ x ] ) .a!= C [ x ] ) . xn).9.

a n ) = ( a l . a is injective iff T.9. are called jections.4) corresponds to the old one (5. Remembering that a$ = Dl E Col. .. and it is clear that T.9. then every map a E C . r. n?(a) = a .1: - - if a E T n ..ai I= 3xiB [X .ai for a E Dn. a E Em... we also have n$(al) = u for a1 E D. . Proof Follows from Lemma 0. Do = W For the empty map 0.. They have the properties mentioned in Lemma 0.9. Weshalluse thesame notationr. : Dn -+ Dm is surjective. .5 Let IF = ((Fn)nc.12 Proof Then Follows from Lemma 0. a . (a(i) u(j)=$. a.9. .. is a permutation of Dn and T. For example. is the empty list. in which not all domains are one-element.) for n > 0. Then for a E Em. sometimes we use a simpler notation and write TB rather than n ~ . : Dn Dm sending a to a . Our new definition (5.3. Definition 5. a b l B [ x ] iff M .6 Let IF be a metaframe.. for listsof variables. usuba denotes the property Vi.) . : Dn sending every tuple to its world.(a) = a . j = i .2. So by Definition 5. inparticular. In a metaframe the maps T.. M. D) be an N-metaframe. I2Here similarly to 5. METAFRAMES (10) M. then T.-I = (T.r~(x1 x. n 2 0. .4 is essentially the same as in earlier Kripke-type semantics.a = a j ) .8) as follows. H We also use notation from the Introduction: recall that .9. a v B [ x ] . (lo).a-ait=VxiB[x-xi]. n > 0.0. .2. rn L e m m a 5. m .9.an+l for a E Dn+'. a . maps every D z to D F exactly as in the Introduction. $!(al.)-l. E Con we can define the map TD.[Dn] = {a E Dm I asuba). n > 0. TTT.0.4.. Note that in all the clauses except (a).al=VxiB[x] iffM.2 applied to every D.. we obtain: M .0.5. L e m m a 5. a b 3xiB [XI iff M. Also note that if D is a system of domains over W. .xi]. consider Kripke bundles. gives rise to the map T . a.3.

ac) is not a correct assignment .4(2) M . if y 6 x. We have t o be careful about the quantifier clauses. u k [a/x]A (in the old sense). For a (distinct) list of variables x and y E Var we put x-y:= and xlly := ( x . . So before adding y to x. which is clear.2. where u is the world of a.Y)Y. because (xy. a I= A[x] (in the new sense) is equivalent to M. we should eliminate it from x and its value from a. a k P r ( x . then either y 6 r(x)13 or y E r(x). in clause ( 5 ) . This leads us to clause (10). see the Introduction.y is repeated twice. These lists can be obtained by corresponding transformations. viz. For evaluating a formula A we use assignments (x.8.14 then The associated jections are denoted as follows: 1 3 ~ h i is always the case if ~ ( x= FV(3yB). s ) 14+ means the simple extension. provided 1x1 = n. if r(x) > FV(3yB). FV(C). .a ) [x]. To do this. In fact.392 CHAPTER 5 . e. put x-xi ify=xi. So 5.c € [ + ( P r ) becomes exactly as in 5. METAFRAME SEMANTICS M. In the first case we obtain the clause (9). Sometimes it is convenient to join (9) and (10) in a single clause.9. . let us introduce some more notation.a .g. a ) with r(x) 1 FV(A). because it may be that F V ( B > C) # FV(B). The requirement r(x) = FV(A) is insufficient. But if y E ~ ( x ) the clause (9) is inapplicable.

3. A similar version for functor semantics was considered in 5. Let us also recall another reading of the 0-clause in Kripke-type semantics considered so far: (8.e.9. x).-sentences [b/x]B for b E Rn(a) n D. t o (*) in 5.4. Different presentations may lead to different sets of inheritors for the same Du-sentence. In metaframes we can also call Rn the 'inheritance relation' between n-tuples and read (8) as (8') M . a I= B [x] e Vb(aRnb + M. This happens.(ac) = a c and xlly = xy. u k C7C iff for any v E R(u). in the case of Kripke bundles (8) O M.a. Example 5. In Kripke bundles we define the relation Rn in a special way.2) M . because a D. .4. for p E C(u.5.4. y). b k B [x] But now we cannot always define inheritance relations between D. In fact. (10) from Definition 5. v k C'. if y y = xi.3. Then where B1 := P ( x . M. for any v-version C' of C in v. METAFRAMES So we can combine (9). where C is a Du-sentence.7 Consider a Du-sentence C := P ( a .(ac) i= B [xlly].. In functor semantics inheritors also result from map actions: b = p. And if The clause (8) generalises a version of the truth definition for OB(a) in Kripke bundles given in 5.1). M.9.1) transforms to (8. B2 := P ( x . The following example shows that this is crucial. b k B [x]) corresponds to i. as mentioned in 2. a k O B [x] iff for any inheritor b of a .e. 7rxll.9. a). . In fact.15. a I= 3yB [x] iff 3c E Du M. a.-sentence can be presented as [a/x]A in different ways.4 in a single clause: M. then 393 (9 + 10) 6 x. (8." (i.2) or (8. In a Kripke sheaf a E Dc has a unique v-inheritor pu. then 7rxll.2) if we define v-versions of a Du-sentence [a/x]B as D. and similarly for V.6.-sentences and transform (8) to (8. for b that are v-inheritors of a ) . v).

u i= A for D.14). a k A [x] any ordered assignment (x. e) M. in a metaframe model M = (F. Then its associated metaframe is Mf (F) := ((F. That is why we define metaframe forcing in the form M. M . ML=(IF) := { A E M F ' I F b f = A ) . aa b O P ( x lY ) [ X Y ] e X I C J + ( P ) . MFG-) substitution instances are valid i n P (notation: IF k f A or respectively. In fact. in which -just put So we see that in arbitrary metaframes there is no reasonable way to define the relation M.-sentences A. In this case ( 8 ) cannot be rewritten as (8. we may call the members of I31 'inheritors of [ a a / x y ] B l ' . I 5 ~ h reader can easily construct such an example.1).8 A modal formula A is called true i n a metaframe model M = ( F . strongly valid with equality) i n a metaframe P if all its M F N .t') (notation: M k A ) i f M. B1 := { [ b l x y I B i 1 b E X i ) = { P ( b ) I b E X i ) . Definition 5. Definition 5.). D . But it may happen that X I # X2. B2 := { [ d / x ] B 1 a R 1 d ) = { P ( b ) 1 b E X 2 ) . I Put Since X 1 consists of all inheritors of aa.394 CHAPTER 5. Let M L ( F ) := { A G MFN I F b+ A ) . p ) be a preset over an N-precategory C. X2 := { ( d d ) E D2 1 aR1d). Now let us define the truth in a metaframe model.11 Let F = (C. the members of BZ are 'inheritors of [a/x]Bz'. D ) . So there exists a model.9.10 A formula A E MF&=) is called strongly valid (respectively. ) i n P for a such that F V ( A ) r ( x ) .(respectively.6. a b A [ x ] . and thus we cannot properly define inheritors of C .9. Definition 5.x) [XI H X 2 J f ( P ) .9. Definition 5. e . a k CIP(x.9. IF b+= A).15 SO B1 # Bz.9 A modal formula A is called valid i n a metaframe F (notation: IF k A ) if A is true i n all models over P. (Definition 5. I n the same way we define Mf ( F ) for a Kripke bundle F . where F is the n-level of F .Similarly. METAFRAME SEMANTICS X l := R2(aa) = { b E D2 1 ( a a ) R 2 b ) . Let MLI=)(P) := { A E MF$) IF + A).

4.9.9. Consider a metaframe IF over F such that D.15 A metaframe IF is called modally sound (respectively modally sound with equality).9. (2) follows from (I).<).16 Let F = (W.) for any ordered assignment (x.5.9. RI := {(ci.10. 5. but without the pair (clc2. E x a m p l e 5. cj) i I 5 j).9.14 One can also define a metaframe Mf (@) for any Kripke quasibundle @ (cf.9.10-5. if ML(')(F) is an m. Then for any formula A E MF~.19(a) shows that the set ML(Mf (@))is not always a modal predicate logic. Our goal in the next sections (5. 5. a ) I a E 02)U ( ( ~ 1 ~C ~ C Z ) .p.9. in brief. METAFRAMES 395 So a Kripke bundle or a C-preset model M = (F.6.9.12 Let F be a preset over an N-precategory (or a Kripke bundle). R~ := {(a. according to 5.19) such that for any modal formula A.12.9. because M.13 For a C-preset or a Kripke bundle F: Proof Follows readily from 5.9. 5. m=-soundness is equivalent to m-soundness (Theorem 5.9.~ 2 ) ) . as we shall see.12. Definition 5. m(')-sound. P r o o f (1) By straightforward induction on the length of A. The counterexample 5.<) corresponds to a metaframe model Mf (M) := (Mf (F). 5.5.12) will be to describe the class of msound metaframes. and the two definitions of forcing 5. Proposition 5. But first. a != A [x]may depend on the ordering i of x and a and also on the variables x that do not occur in A. a I= A [x] (2) M k A iff Mf (M) i= A.4.9 are obviously the same: L e m m a 5.F.2. 2 ~ 1 . This notion is still too broad. R e m a r k 5. = {cl.13).9. 2. a ) in Mf (F) with FV(A) C r(x) (1) M t= [a/x]A iff Mf (M). 5. (~ ~2 So R2 is the same as the corresponding relation in the Kripke bundle in Fig. .6.5. let us point out some peculiarities of forcing in arbitrary metaframes.czc2). R) be a reflexive singleton {u).1.6. cz). 5. (=). M a model over.

a k * V x i B [ x ] V b E Dn (b . + M . a k A [ x ]may depend on the values of xi that do not occur in A. clcl k B [ x y ](since ( C I C I ) R2(c2c1)). Consider a metaframe model M = (IF.then in M we have but (since ( ~ 1 ~ 4e2(c2c2)). 61 & M . b k* B [ x ] ) iff 3c E D ( a ) M . Now put B := O Q ( x ) .4.17 The above counterexample may cause doubts about the clause (10) in Definition 5. 2 ) So M . a . J ) such that J + ( P ):= {c2c2}. [c/ai]a B [x].then (in M ) ~ 1 k ~A [XIXI] 2 cl k B [x](since alR1cz). I=* In arbitrary metaframes the relations k and k* may not be equivalent: 16So b . x 2 ) .9. 67 iff b = [ c / a i ] afor some c E D(a). .9.6: = a . Instead we can define an alternative forcing relation k* by the same clauses (1)-(9) and the following modification of (10). Rn can be universal on DE.6? = a . METAFRAME SEMANTICS Figure 5. b I=* B [x]) iff b'c E D(a) M . Q E PL'. In fact.ai I= 3xiB [x. (lo*) M .396 CHAPTER 5. but clc2 2) B [ x y ](since R2(c1c2)= ( ~ 1 ~ and clca b' Q ( x ) [ x Y ] ) . Let A : = O P ( x l .: iff 6 =a . We do not specify the frames Fn for n > 2. a k A [x] depends on the ordering of x and a. So M .16 and similarly is M . as M . a k B [ x ]depends on the variables in x that do not occur in B . it seems improper t o make M . 6.xi]. [c/ai]a B [ x ] . a k * 3xiB [ x ]iff 3 b E Dn (b .9. R e m a r k 5. for example. I=* where [c/ai]a obtained by replacing ai with c at position i. a k 3xiB [x] equivalent to M .J f ( Q ) := {cz} for certain P 6 P L 2 .

1 An N-metaframe IF is called permutable if s.10.) s.9.ir. whenever a is a simple transposition a.(a) Rrs. we obtain the following equivalent condition: L e m m a 5.9. Show that If* 3xlC [x~xz]. clcz If A [x~xz]. € T.a = a .10 Permutability and weak functoriality Now let us describe a class of metaframes without pecularities mentioned a t the end of Section 5.. Since for any permutation a . is a p-morphism Fn * Fm. is monotonic for every permutation a: V a E T n Vi E IN b'a.. First we give the following Definition 5.16 and formula C = 7Q(xl) A A. c ~k~ c 3xlC [xlxz] and M. b (aR2b + s.0. is a (p-)morphism. (.4 A metafiame IF is called weakly functorial (w-functorial) if for any injection a Tmn (where m 5 n). it suffices to check that n. (b)). it is sufficient to check monotonicity of jections corresponding to (simple) transpositions a.6 we already know that s. where not all domains are one-element.10. is a bijection for any a E T n by Lemma 0. since in these cases Tfl = {idn}.3 Show that in a 1-modal permutable metaframe. 5.12) that t= and t=* are equivalent in logically sound metaframes.1. s.-I = (s. later on we will show (see the end of Section 5. Proof (Only if. x2). or a simple embedding a..10. = Exercise 5.)-l.17 : Remembering that n.18 Consider a metaframe model M from Example 5..10.2 A metaframe IF is permutable iff for any permutation a E T n .9. l this condition holds trivially. the relation R2 cannot be a linear ordering.10.. where A = OP(xl.10.clcz On the other hand.. From 5.+l. Note that for n = 0 . € C.a.+l for n # 0. clcl t= A [xzxl] and M. This class will be used in the further description of m-sound metaframes. .1 by applying so-I (so)-'. M . To show w-functoriality. s. n. is surjective for a E T. which are generators of the symmetric group.5. Hint: recall that M. we obtain: "See Introduction.9. Definition 5.a)Rn (rub)+ a R n b follows from 5. is an automorphism of the n-level F. because every injection is a composition of functions of this kind. and sa is the world of a (for a E D l ) . Also note that to show permutability. where 2 5 k 5 n. PERMUTABILITY AND W E A K FUNCTORIALITY 397 Exercise 5.

a ) .b E Dn (aRYb + (a-an)R:-l(b- b.5 A metaframe F = ((Fn)nG. The model M is fixed. for any injection a E T. k 2 0. B V C . b E Dn Vc E D1 ( a R l b & (ac) E Dn (the lift property for T.Qb E D. Hence by definition. ) F L e m m a 5. (4) VU. u ) . then r ( y ) C r ( x ) . ( I ) 'Only if' is proved by induction on A . ) is an ordered assignment. are trivial. (2) V n > Ova. (*) follows. So we assume that F is respectively permutable or transformable and check the equivalence (*). Let A be atomic. for any ordered assignment ( x . .).6 Let I be a metaframe. CT) E <+(P:) A ( a . . a ~ t b (the lift property for T:). B > C ... where 11 = n 2 m 2 0. (7 a b A [ x ]i f f i f fa O n the other hand. (aR!b + uRiv) (the monotonicity for n:). for any ordered assignment ( x . x are empty and A is a sentence) is trivial.a . The cases when A = I . METAFRAME SEMANTICS L e m m a 5. a. and since ( a . + 3d (ac)~~+l(bd)) (3) Qa E D. r E <+(P. x and for any formula A with F V ( A ) C r ( x .. a ) is also an ordered assignment. (2) F is w-functorial i f f (*) holds for any model M over IF. so ( x . a ) . for any formula A with F V ( A ) C x and for any permutation a E T n . a .398 CHAPTER 5. a ) I= [y]i f f ( a . Let y := x .10. (1) F is permutable iff for any model M over F . where n = 1x1. B A C . so we drop it from the notation. then the list a x . i E I N .)) (the monotonicity for 7ry-l). it follows that for some j. the following conditions hold: (1) V n > 1 Va. ( r . 7 E Ckm (not necessarily injective). D ) is w-functorial ifl IF is permutable and for any n > 0 .a ) . Proof The case n = 0 (when a.u (uRju + Va E D J b E D. a ) .10. r = a . a ) . Note that i f a is injective and (x. then since F V ( A ) C r ( y ) .). and the proofs o f ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) can be made in parallel. a is distinct.

= p+.:= E ~ . ( 7 ) . ( ( x.y. Then a b A [x] iff ( 3 ) V b E R y ( a ) b b B [x] which by induction hypothesis. is equivalent to (4) V b E R r ( a ) 7rU(b)k B [rU ) ] .(a+ .0. p. u In view of ( 6 ) .(a) k A [n. For the proof note that X . T = X .y is a distinct list of variables from x . T + b B [ ( x y ).~ . a ! = 3 y B [ x .9). for any appropriate assignment ( x .(x)] iff (5) Vb' E R:(T. Then ~ ~ = Tl + . T.a ] i f f 3 c E D ( ( a . u)y) . . p = x . p+ = ( x . (T+ .rr. . o)lly. ~ ( ~~ . .~p . ( x . So (4) is equivalent to Put T := E ~ . and thus IsRemember that ( x y ) .(x)]. (T+ . ~ ) c ) . ~ + k B [ ( ( x . (ac) . T + ] . So by Lemma 0. X for some injection A. (x On the other hand. a ) y ) . ( a ) )= T .y. since (5). . Note that x .5. But Ra ( T . T + = xlly.y) .10. l ~ l ~ ) l So according t o our definitions and notation (see condition (9+10) in Section 5. it suffices t o find an ' injective A such that (10) ( x y ) . A') = ( x y ). a . P+). Let A = 3yB. to apply the induction hypothesis. C l a i m T . x .y = ( x .a ) we obtain1' i ( 6 ) a k 3 y B [x] f f3c E D. is a pmorphism. PERMUTABILITY AND W E A K FUNCTORIALITY Let A = OiB. a .a ).a . X = a . ( a ) )b' I= B [T. (a+ .p+).y . ~ + ] . [Rr( a ) ] . and (7) a . (11) (ac) .8. X I ) = (ac) .

A = O i P for P E PLO. we assume x. But then r. Consider the same formula A = OiP(7r.a l ) . By the choice of J. .(x)). (b).2).5.(b). Therefore xu (a)R y r . thus x. b' = r. which means by Definition 5.(a)Ry .7.. Such an assignment (at a world u) is nothing but a D. M. according to 5. Then and thus M. (1) and (2). . Then by Definition 5.400 CHAPTER 5. Hence by (*). .(x)).(b). for a E . the claim now follows by Lemma 0. so (lo). p+.-substitution (Section 2.0. T or a E T) .(x.(b) = b'. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Since x is distinct. where x = (xl.6(1) shows that in permutable metaframes forcing M..(b)). (11) hold for A' := A+. Consider the model M = (F. a function [a/x] sending every xi to ai.4. by the choice of J.4. Hence by Lemma 0. .Ef ( P ) = {7rB(b)). .. na(a) l= A [ra(x)l. ra(a) b A [ru(x)l..J) such that ( + ( P ) = {r. We assume (*) and check the p-morphism properties of T. and the model M = (IF. Hence by (*). a. E) such that J + ( P ) = {b'). and show that n. (b) E c + ( P ) . (11) Now let us prove the 'if' part in both assertions. M. x.x ) is distinct. To check the lift property. (respectively.9. Let A = OiP(x. a b A[x] is invariant under simultaneous permutations of x and a. . then we have a = 0. Lemma 5.(a) R r b ' and find b E Rr(a) such that r. A+ = a+ . i. we also assume a R l b .0.9.a + A [XI. Note that the same argument is valid in the particular case m = 0. for some b E RT(a).4 and so M . a ) corresponds to the unordered assignment [a/x] = {(XI. An ordered assignment (x. a k A[x].e.9. 7ru(a)RYbffor some b' E E+(P).10. permutable metaframe we can define . .)). where n = 1 1 So in a model M over a x.(b) = W b'. To check the monotonicity. So we can also define forcing under unordered assignments. T+ .

9 Let M be model over an arbitrary metaframe. in fact. A a modal forr(x). L e m m a 5. b I= A [y]. a i = A [x] i f f M . a for some a E T. a c i = A [xz]. where the tuple [c/ai]a is obtained from a by replacing ai with c. and A' = A[y H y']. a ) an assignment in M such that FV(A) V(A). . a k A [y] reduces to M.10. where k* To show that forcing in w-functorial metaframes is congruence independent.8 Show that in a permutable metaframe for any model M M . suppose r(y) FV(A) = r(x). we begin with an auxiliary lemma. i. So by Lemma 5. So by induction on IAl. x' = [y'ly] x. b) is obtained from (x.9. =x .10. 5. a k A [x]iff M . a for some injection a. a I= A [x] iff M.. cf. a I= 3xiB [x]iff 3c E D(a) M. [a/x]= [b/y] iff (y. [c/ai]a I=B [x]. Furthermore. a . So by Lemma . Exercise 5. In particular: L e m m a 5. b = a . one can easily show that for a model M over a permutable metaframe for any A E MF'.9.5.10. Remark 5. Then M. > M .a . denotes the modified forcing from Remark 5.e. in w-functorial metaframes the truth value of a formula A depends only on individuals assigned to parameters of A (or only on a possible world if A is a sentence). because clearly y @ FV(A) = r(x). Also let y' @ mula.7 If r(x) = FV(A).4 we need only the clause (9) for A = VyB or 3yB. z is a distinct list of other variables and c is a tuple of individuals (from the world of a) of the same length. a and ( a .1 0. PERMUTABILITY AND WEAK FUNCTORIALITY 401 This definition is sound.17.ai)c = ([claila) .6(2).10. (x. then M . a for a E T. a k A [y] iff M . in Definition 5. Hint: (x . Then x = y . b k A [x] for an appropriate b. a i = A[x]. Thus forcing M. M . a I=A' [x']. y @ BV(A).X C ) X ~ .10. iffy = x . Viz.9. a k A [x]for r(x) = FV(A). Since in w-functorial metaframes we may use only the forcing relation M.17. a) by some permutation.6(1).

Let us consider three cases. =T . METAFRAME SEMANTICS This statement is quite obvious . nl. [aclxy]! = A 3c E D(a) M . Then z # Y . F V ( Q z ( A [ yH z ] ) )= FV(QyA). .g.17. Q E {V. [ a l x ]F 3 z ( A [ yH z ] ) .17. . [ a / x ]F Qz(A[yH z ] ) provided y V ( A ) . Then y. 1.9.9 ) e M . Then for any assignment [ a l x ] with F V ( A ) c .so we have M .aI=A[x] V ~ E H Ra(a) M . By Definition 5. A' = M .then A' = P ( x l . [ a l x ]k A It suffices to check that := for any assignment [ a l x ]such that H M .) Consider e. (xllz)' = x'llz. Proof We apply Proposition 2.3>and F V ( Q y A ) C r ( x ) . All other cases are rather trivial. [ a l x ]k 3yA e 3c E D ( a ) M . [aclxz]k A[y ++ Z ] (by Lemma 5. a). A' be congruent modal formulas.3. ( 3 ) Let A = OiB. ~ 'by the assumption of our lemma. so 3zB1. F V ( A ) .it means that the truth value of a formula does not depend on the name of a certain free variable. a l=A' ) [x'].402 Proof CHAPTER 5. b k B [x] # Vb E Rl ( a ) M . z @ r ( x ) . a).3.7rXtl~. # BV(A). since the metaframe is w-functorial.10 Let M be model over a w-functorial metaframe. the case Q = 3. a I= Eli (= A') [x'] B' . a I= 3zB1(=A') [x']. ( 2 ) Let A = 3 z B .10. and let A. I Then by the modified clause (9+10) of Definition 5. So M . M. ] a / x ]I= B. z !$ (Obviously. (1) If A = P ( x . We may assume r ( x ) = F V ( Q y A ) . a != A [ x ]& 3c E D(a) M. a E Dn.(XI and thus MFA-M!=A~.10. ( 1 ) M .. b I= B' [x']e M .4 and the induction hypothesis.F V ( B ) r(x). satisfies the conditions (1)-(4) from 2. nXt (ac) I= B' [x'llz] @ M . a k A [x]iff x. Formally we argue by induction on the complexity of A.(ac) B [xllz] I= @ 3c E D ( a ) M . Consider the equivalence relation between formulas: A N B M . [ a / x ]k Q y A @ M .9. L e m m a 5.4 and the induction hypothesis.a E e + ( ~ iff M .

PERMUTABILITY AND WEAK FUNCTORIALITY 403 (2) Assuming A B let us prove QyA QyB (for Q = 3). y' are distinct variables that do not occur in B . If a metaframe is permutable. cf.10. Example 5. a c I= B[z H y] [xy] @ (*I) while M. B) (3) This property holds trivially.10 M. so y r(x). Then for any congruent modal formulas A.16. then (*I) means and (*2) means 3c 3d 3e 3e' ((abc)~"+l (de'e) & de E ['(P)).10. For example. Now. by the definition of forcing.12 Wecannot extend Lemma5. these conditions may be not equivalent. z ) . but not w-functorial. e.10 toarbitrary(notw-functorial) metaframes. [b/x] k A R l ( a ) M. [b/x]k B H M. z $ BV(B) and y. abc I= B[z H y'] [xyy'] @ (*2) 3c E D(a) M.10.9. [a/x] t= OiA H V b E Rl(a) M. [ac/xy] t= A H (since A 3c E D(a) M. and thus we obtain - - M.11 Let F be a w-functorial metaframe. we do not know if w-functoriality is necessary for Lemma 5.10. as in the proof of Lemma 5. [a/x]I= 3yB.ab k 3y(B[z H y]) [xy] H 3c E D(a) M . [aclxy] I= B H M.9.5.10. if B = OP(x. Then the formulas 3y(B[z I-+ y]) and 3yt(B[z H y']) are congruent. However by 5. Hence we readily obtain L e m m a 5. suppose r(xz) = FV(B). . 3c E D(a) M. ac I= B [xz]. R e m a r k 5.4 and 5. We again assume r(x) = FV(A). abc t= B [xyz]. [a/x]t= 3yA H 3c E D(a) M.6.10. (4) Assuming A B let us show OiA UiB: H 'v'b E - - M. On the other hand. One can try to construct counterexamples explicitly. A' IF~AHFFA~. [a/x]I= OiB.10.g. a b k 3y1(B[zH y']) [xy] @ 3c E D(a) M.10.

bl. ATk (see the Introduction). a R l b implies 3c (aa. .3 If an N-metaframe satisfies ( m m ) . ak) = a . So for a w-functorial metaframe aRpb implies (aj. bz) + bl = b2). and the latter yields asub b. and we can apply (mmz) to (aj.) is equivalent to Ry-stability of all sets n. Thus by the lift property. Proof If n. An equivalent form of (mm2) is Ri(A) A.(a)Rrb. (mm.e. ak)R?(bj. i E IN and a E Em. [Dn] is Rr-stable. L e m m a 5. b E n. k ( a j =ak n?a = aa.[Dn] for c E C.[Dn]. components.rr.11. n > 0. i.) follows from (mm2).4 Show that for a certain i. note that n. then n. and by (mmn+l). since (aj. rn Exercise 5. For an N-modal metaframe for any n > 0. Proof In fact.c for some tuple c with different n = Icl. bk). .5.) R. (mm. METAFRAME SEMANTICS 5.+ '(bc).2 (m%) ( m) m: + bj = bk).11. For the next lemma recall that a s u b b @ V j . where A := {(a.. VaQb (aRp b + (n? a )R" (nl4b)) .. b2 ((a.404 C H A P T E R 5.11. for a E Dn. L e m m a 5.9. ak) and (bj. in the intuitionistic case (section 5.14).11. bk). where a E C. a) a E 1 D').a)R. i E IN we have VaQb (aRpb + asub b). Hint: a E Dm can be presented as n.(a) sub b. : Fn+l+ Fn in a w-functorial metaframe. Hence The next lemma will be mainly used later on. (bl. by 5... then .1 An (N)-modal metaframe is a w-functorial metaframe satisfying (mmz) Qi E IN Qa. To check (mm:). it follows that c = b.11 Modal metaframes Definition 5.

) We assume that F is functorial and check (mma).a). In fact.11. we have: Let A = (yj = yk).~) = P.11. [a/x]I= [x .(~..6 - A metaframe is modal iff it is functorial.10.(~.11. T E Ek. a / y ] A @ M. y = ( ~ 1 .. L e m m a 5. by 5. bl = bz = b. a / y ] k A.7 Let M = (F. But this does not matter in functorial metaframes. . Recall that [ x .a/y]A~A0[y~x.a].10.((x. then we have [x. (If. x. To check the lift property. Let A = P. To simplify notation.5 A metaframe F is called functorial if every its jection ..rrl (b) for some b. So we may replace A with its clean version A0 both sides) with any B n such that BV(AO) r(xy) = 0 (and FV(AO)= FV(A) r(y)). P r o o f (Only if. Thus bc = bb. b2) = .)~y+l(bc). Then.9. (bl. and for any a E Dn: M. is a composition of simple injections and simple projections.11. since F is w-functorial. a / y ] A is defined up to congruence. .10. and hence b. : Dn + Dm is a morphism F . L e m m a 5. a) = . the claim (#) does not change if we replace A (in A.10. Recall that every function a E Em. MODAL METAFRAMES 405 Definition 5. Then (aa. suppose (a. = c.(x. o l y ] A = (xu(j) = So we have lgSee Introduction. rn The next lemma shows that forcing in functorial metaframes 'respects variable substitutions'.5.T). assume T?! (a) = (aa. for any distinct lists of variables x = (xl. b2). [ a . we now assume A0 = A and proceed by induction on A. We also have aRPb by Lemma 5.10.).rr! ( a )R:(bl.. Since 7rk is a pmorphism. .rrn(b). 5) be a model over a functorial metaframe.a/y]A = P.5(1).ym) such that FV(A) r(y). Fm. .4.e. for any modal formula A (#)for any a E Em..lg Since F is w-functorial. . Then [x. ..rr. Proof By Lemma 5. = . So by Definition 5.T)). Its monotonicity is already stated by (mm. i.) Assume that a metaframe IF is modal. it is sufficient to show that every jection 7rT (= xu?) is a p-morphism.) sub (bc) by (mmn+l).). then [x.

since n. Hence M. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Let A = 3zB.10. [(ac) . 5. the latter is equivalent to M.7. [x. which follows from IF k A.9 and Lemma 5. [a/xl b [nu(x)/yI A @ V b E R l ( a ) M7 [b/xl@ ( 4 1 ~B [nu 1 w V b E R l ( a ) M. we have Ry(n. then r(y) = FV([y/x]A).11. a/x] I=A. is a p-morphism. Then for any variable substitution [y/x].(a)) (1) @ (2). By Definitions 5.11. we may assume that r(x) = FV(A). [a/x] t= [x.(b)/y] b B (by the induction hypothesis) On the other hand.9. for any assignment [a/z] in IF M.8.8 Let IF be a functorial metaframe. U)C/YZ] B e M. then z $ r(xy) by the choice of A.9 Let IF be a metaframe such that for any model M over IF. u/y]A w 3c M. then y = z . [y/x]A is valid in IF.ir.a / y ] b A. [(a .11. All other cases are obvious. [Rl(a)]. [a.7.(a)/y] I= A is equivalent to Vb' E Rr(. By 5. IF I= [y/x]A. a+/yz] B. IF I= [y/x]A iff for any model M over F. I= Let A = OiB.11. Proof Since [y/x]A does not depend on the variables beyond FV(A). A a modal formula such that IF t= A.406 CHAPTER 5. Definition 5.7 in a stronger form. L e m m a 5. M. u/y] B = 3. [blly]b B .9. for any quantifier-free formula A .u/y] A = 3z [x . [ac/xz] I= [(xz) . Therefore. [n.9. [a/zl [ylxlA. and so ! [X . u+/yz] B @ 3c M. C T + / ~ Z ]b B (by the induction hypothesis) @ 3c M. Thus Hence it follows that variable substitutions preserve validity.a for some transformation u. Now. Let z be a distinct list such that r(z) = r(y). L e m m a 5. The next lemma can be considered as a converse to 5. [a .4 By M. (2) = T.2 [(xz) . (a)) M.

rub= b' Obviously. . () such that ( + ( P )= { r u b ) . b I= P(r.i.e.a) Ry(r. a = O n .1 1. a . assume aRab. ra b A [ y ] and thus . and so M.b). EC . rua I= A [Y].x) [ X I .a)Rybf.x/y] A = O. x l ~ l 1x1.. Then and so M . b' = rub. i. such that F V ( A ) T h e n F i s functorial. Consider the same formula A = O i P ( y ) and the model M = (F. then we can use the formula A p E PLO)both in ( 1 ) and (2). P E PLm and the model M = (IF. if m = 0. Thus by assumption (#). 8) such that 8+(P)= {b').by the choice ' of (.11. Then [r.. f Assume (r. (2) ( r U a ) R y b + 3 b E Ra(a) rub= b'. Proof Given an arbitrary a for .a [ r . for some b' E Ry(r.b).P(r.a). a I= ( [ x. = Oip (with Remark 5.x). a R l b for some b such that Hence rub E 8+(P).for any a E Fn M .e. for any distinct lists x of length n and y of length m r ( y ) . a I= A [ y ] . A Hence by assumption (#)we have M . a / y ] A ) [x]H M . MODAL METAFRAMES 407 a) for any a E C.e. M . let us check the p-morphism properties In fact.rr.a)Ry(r.i.5.10 Note that in the above proof we use the condition (#) only for formulas of the form O i P ( y ) or Oip. Consider the formula A := O i P ( y ) . so we obtain (r. . Hence b E ( + ( P ) . ( 1 ) aRab + (r.

11.7(#). Since both these assertions are similar. B = [y .4. and B is obtained from A' by identifying those variables x j in x'.11. the proof of Lemma 2. (2) 5. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Proposition 5.2) a Du-sentence [a/x]A can be presented in the form [b/y]B. if x' = x .11. where b is a list of distinct individuals (from D. Let x' be a sublist of x such that FV(A) = r(xt). a.-sentences: [a/x] A = [a*/x*] Then Proof Recall that (Lemma 2.) and r(y) = FV(B).9 0 holds for ) any formula A.([x. A* be modal formulas.12 Let M be a model over a functorial metaframe. [bly] I= B and (I*) M. [a'lx'] I= A by Lemma 5. [ajx] I=A iff M. and let A. a' the corresponding sublist of a (i. then for some function a E . Actually (#) in (2) should be formulated as the equivalence M. So let us show that (1) M. while in non-functorial metaframes forcing may be sensitive to congruence.2). Thus if m = lx'l = la'l and n = lyl = Ibl is the number of distinct individuals in a'. a / y ] A is unique. Here b is a list of distinct individuals from a'. Since b . Now by 5. Thus (2) M.11. since F is w-functorial. [a/x]. C we have a' = b .4. u E M . then a' = a . .9 (#) holds for any quantijier-free A. [a* lx*] != A iff M. [a*/x*] assignments giving rise to equal A*. D. this presentation is unique up to the choice of a distinct list y.a = a'.6. But for a quantifier-free A. Note that variable substitutions are defined up to congruence. which correspond t o equal individuals aj in a' (cf. T).e. [alx]I= A iff M. a IF A [y] for any congruent version of [x .11. (3) 5.11 For a metaframe P the following properties are equiva- lent: (1) P is functorial. a/y]A. a It. (1) follows from (2) and (3). a/xt]A. the formula [x . Proposition 5.408 Hence we obtain CHAPTER 5. T for an injection T. it is sufficient to check (1).10. a . [bly] != B. u/y]A) [XI H M. so there is no ambiguity in (3).

M t= A if M. (2) M. [a*/x*] in F such that [a/x]A = [a*/x*]A*. A* and assignments [a/x].5.) F.~~ Therefore modal (i.10.9. a ) i n IF such that FV(A) = r(x). again we have x = n. The other way round.12.2(4). for an arbitrary A it should be replaced by congruence.(y) for an injection a . due to the surjectivity of nu (see ¤ Lemma 5. 5.11.4.e. a for some injection a .9). (3) there exists a list of distinct variables y containing FV(A) such that M. and a = r. Corollary 5. L e m m a 5.(b) for some b. P r o o f Obviously.10. Proof Note that (##) implies 5.0.12 Modal soundness In this section we show that modal metaframes are exactly m(')-sound metaframes Recall that by Definition 5. "This equality holds for a quantifier-free A. let us show (I). assuming (2).9. we have x = y .6. for a metaframe model M = (F. let us check (2).6).11. Finally. i.e. (1) implies (2).1 Let M = (F( be a model over a w-functorial N-metaframe I.11.13 Let IF be a metaframe such that for any model M over F. A an N-modal formula. [bly] k A for any assignment [b/y] with r(y) FV(A).-sentences. So we can apply Lemma 5. a* t= A* [x*]. a k A [x]for any ordered assignment (x. cf. thus 5. By 0.9. and (2) implies (3). assuming (3). a / x ] k A. hence by Lemma 5. b k A [y] for any ordered assignment (y. In fact. a) in F with FV(A) C r(x).6 can be applied. a k A [x]for any ordered assignment (x.12. [b. Section 5. M.9 (8) for a quantifier-free A. which holds by our assumption. (##) M . M.7.9. [b/y] k A is equivalent to M . c). b ) i n F. > Recall that MLI=)(F) denotes the set of all formulas valid in F (Definition 5. For a w-functorial metaframe we can fix the list x as the following simple lemma shows. . Then F is functorial. a/y]A by 2. a A [x]e M.9. for any u E M .8. since [a/x]([xa/y]A) = [ a . Then the following conditions are equivalent. functorial) metaframes are exactly those in which forcing can be defined for D. quantifier-free formulas A. MODAL SOUNDNESS 409 Again we have the converse to the above proposition in the following stronger form.

M. (8) and ( 9 f 1 0 ) in Section 5. Hence M k C by Lemma 5. A = A"). i. Recall that a substitution instance [ C / P ( y ) ] A defined up to congruence is ' and can be obtained from a clean version A of A by replacing every subformula of the form P ( y f )with [ y f / y ] C(y' may be not distinct).2 For any metaframe F: (1) ML(=)(F)is closed under necessitation and generalisation. a b O i B [ x ]e V b E Rl(a) M . (2) If M.1.10. . (+) follows readily from (1). . y = ( y l . a k V y B [ x ]e V c E D. [ a / x ]b B . Consider a strict substitution S = [ C / P ( y ) ]where P is .7rXll.a ) with a fixed x containing F V ( B > C ) F V ( C ) .9) M . [ a / x ]b B > C and M . a k V y B [x]. it suffices to check the first equivalence. (+) Suppose F b V y B and consider a model M over F. (4) Suppose F k A. [ a / x ]!= C . . for (4.12. then MLI=)(F)is closed under modus ponens. (2) If F is zu-functorial.) is a distinct list containing F V ( C ) . then we have M . [ a / x ]!= [ C / P ( y ) ] A any assignment [ a / x ] . and let us show that F k S A .12. Note that by definition (cf.(ac)I= B [xlly].ac). (if a E DE).y. then MLI=)(F)is closed under strict substitutions. . So we may assume that A is clean (i. Let r ( x ) = FV(VyB).a ) we have M .10.12. ac != B [xy] for any assignment ( x y . Proof ( 1 ) Rather trivial. Hence M b B by Lemma > 5.Since y @ x .1.. (3) Obviously. an m-ary predicate letter.410 CHAPTER 5. for any assignment ( x .e. (3) If P is w-functorial. METAFRAME SEMANTICS L e m m a 5. then for any B E MFG (4) If P is functorial. this means that M . b I= B [ x ] . For a model M = (IF. that ). for any model M over F we have and thus FbAiffFbAO. then for any assignment ( x . and M .e. By Lemma 5.<)and a list of distinct variables x such that r ( x ) = F V ( A ) 2 F V ( [ C / P ( y ) ] A we have to show that M F S A .1) M .

B = Q ( z . [ a / z ]l= B iff 3c (ac E Dn+l & N . [ a / z ]b SB1 A SB2 (= S B ) .3) holds for B . Also r ( z v )n B V ( B 1 ) = 0 . [ a / z ]i= Oi(SB1)(= S B ) .3) holds for B 1 . [ a / z ]! B2 iff = M . 7 ) such that 7 + ( P )= { b I M . [ b / z ]i= B I = iff V b E Rr ( a ) M .2). N . [aclzv]t= B1) iff 3c(ac E D ~ + '& M . [aclzv]i= SB1) iff M . a ) (Q # P ) are trivial.3) holds for B . [ a / z ]k B1 & N . then for an n-tuple a we have: N . since B is clean. MODAL SOUNDNESS Since A is clean. a / y ] C(= S B ) .-+(P) M . If B = 3vB1. let us prove (4. [ a . i. B 2 . a) E T.5. [ a / x ]b A.a / y ] I= C. So by Definition 5. [ a / z ]b [z .4 and the induction hypothesis we have N . The proof is by induction on the complexity of B . [ b / z ]k SB1 iff M . If B = OiB1. If B = P ( z . a ) for some map a . we obtain it for B : N . v @ r ( z ) .3) N . [ a .e. [ a / z ]i B iff V b E R r ( a ) N .3).3) holds for B1. Consider the model N = ( F . We claim that By our assumption. [ a / z ]i= SB2 iff M .u / y ] l= C iff M . thus N .1). [ a / z ]t= Biff M .4 and the choice of N. and (4. ~ ' So (4.2) implies (4. F i= A. and thus B satisfies (4. To show (4. [ a / z ]i= S B for any subformula B of A and for any assignment [a/z]with r ( z ) 2 F V ( B ) . T ( Z ) nB V ( B )= 0. then by our assumption. then by Definition 5. (4. 21Notethat in our case S3vB1 = 3vSBl . [ a / z ]i= S B 1 & M . B = B1 V B2 are similar to the above. The case B = VvB1 is left to the reader. $ ( Q ) = E+(Q) for any other predicate letter Q. and so (4. [ a / z ]I= B iff N .9. [b/yI i= C ) . B V ( A ) n r ( x ) = 0.11. The cases B = B1 > B 2 .9. [a/z]i= B iff ( a .12.7 in a functorial metaframe we have M . and the cases B = I. iff By Lemma 5. If B = B1 A B2 and (4. [ a / z ]b 3v(SB1)(= S B ) .

where S1 is a strict substitution.3.12. a ) > L e m m a 5. Proof Recall that 3 = V A ~so the second equality follows from 5. By 5. 0. R e m a r k 5.11. if all MF:-instances are valid in IF.2(4) and 5.12.7 Let F be a w-functorial N-metaframe. n that En(pk) = [+(PC)for any k 2. .12. Corollary 5. for any a E Fn and for any assignment (x.412 CHAPTER Proposition 5. In fact. we can only state that of a formula A E MFN ML'(IF)" C ML(F).12. Thus SA is valid.5 and 5. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Lemma 5. So we cannot claim that ML(F) C ML=(IF). By Lemma 2.3. A an N-modal propositional formula. Since An is a substitution instance of A. which is used in the proof of 5.6. then all its MFN-instances are also valid.11.() a model over 0 such IF.12.12. so we leave their proofs to the reader. Then P k A n zffFnkA.8 The w-functoriality of IF is essential in Lemma 5. we have The other way round. By 5. The next two lemmas are full analogues of 5. the latter formula is valid in IF.5.12.2(3).12.3 Let IF be a functorial N-metaframe.6 Let IF be an arbitraq N-metaframe.12. R e m a r k 5.10.12. Let Mn = (Fn. L e m m a 5. Then for any N-modal propositional formula A. suppose V n IF k An.12. Then ML(=)(F) = = {A E MF$) {A E MFA=) I IF l= An for I P l= A for " any n E w ) any n E w ) . then MLZ(IF) is conservative over ML(IF). by 5.5 For an arbitrary N-metaframe IF. but not the other way round.4 If IF is a functorial metaframe. and let (" be a propositional valuation i n its n-th level Fn.12.7 we obtain: Proposition 5.en) be the corresponding propositional Kripke model.9 For a modal metaframe IF . every substitution instance SA of A is congruent to a formula of the form [y/x]SIAn.2 (3). M = (IF. (4) yields the following convenient description of the set of strongly valued formulas ML(=)(F) for a functorial metaframe IF.3 and 5.7.

13.9 (and Corollary 5. H Exercise 5. P r o o f For a functorial IF. L e m m a 5. (3) ML=(F) is a predicate N-modal logic with equality. and do not indicate it in the notation of forcing.12.12.11 Show that Proposition 5.12. Then (2) ML(F) is a predicate N-modal logic without equality. then the set ML(')(F) is closed under necessitation. only modal (i. and arbitrary substitutions. ML(=)(P) is substitution closed. Then An E ML(=)(P) for any n. the validity of their n-shifts (for n 2 0). We fix a model M = (IF. c) .12.2 and Proposition 5. because as we will show in Theorem 5. Hint: for a substitution instance A' of a propositional formula A and for an assignment (s.12.) By Lemma 5.12. MODAL SOUNDNESS 413 Corollary 5. by Lemma 2. i. (Note that ML(=)(F) is the largest substitution closed subset.10) holds for any N-metaframe F (not necessarily functorial).27.12.e. P r o o f (1) + (3).3.a) (where FV(Af) r ( x ) and a E D n ) the truth of M.12. of view.e. since they are valid in all propositional frames Fn.12 If a metaframe IF is functorial. let us check the strong validity of the predicate axioms and the axioms of equality. the 'substitution interior7of ML(=) (IF).12. Hence VzA E ML(')(P) by 5.10 A11 theorems of K N are strongly valid i n every N-modal metaframe P.13 (Soundness t h e o r e m ) Let the following properties are equivalent: (1) F is modal. H T h e o r e m 5.12. (1) + (2).3. For a modal metaframe F. Suppose A E ML(')(IF). and hence (VxA)" = VxAn 6 ML(=)(F) by 5. functorial) N-metaframes validate Q K ~ ) Therefore only modal metaframes are interesting from the logical point . generalisation.12. For example. modus ponens..12.5. However the claim of the above exercise is not so important. a k A' [x]can be checked in the propositional frame F.5. it follows that ML(=)(F) is closed under necessitation and generalisation (for a functorial F) as well as under modus ponens (for an arbitrary metaframe IF). Proof Obvious. F be an N-metaframe. consider generalisation.2.

[alx]!= x = x holds trivially.Y ) for some b E D.and thus [ablxz]!= P ( x . [abclxzy]!= P ( x . y )3 Q ( x ) )3 ( ~ Y P ( ~3 Y ) x ) ) ./XI != QY ( P ( x . i. ac 'c E+(P). z 4 r ( x ) .4. Suppose [ablxz]!= V y P ( x . If [abclxyz]I= y = z .y). e x . y. then by Definition 5.z).. since a = a.y). since otherwise M != A6 is trivial. and thus we obtain Therefore M != A3 A4 := V y ( P ( x .y) > P ( x .Y ) ) 3 ( Q ( x )3 VyP(x.y).z ) > 3yP(x.y) > P ( x . METAFRAME SEMANTICS A1 := V y P ( x .e. So [ablxz]!= A2. We may assume that y.e. a E c+(Q).which implies [abclxyz] P ( x .9. (viz.9. and thus [ablxz]!= 3 y P ( x . = .. A6 := ( y = z > ( P ( x . Hence ab E ( + ( P ) .y).4./XI != V Y ( Q ( X3 P ( x . A2 := P ( x . ) Assume [. Therefore M k A4. Similarly to the previous case. [ablxy]!= Q ( x ) .y).Y ) ) .then for any b E Du. a E E+(Q). which is equivalent to Vc 'c D. where Y # r ( x ) . for y.. then by 5. we have If also [ a / x ]k Q ( x ) . ) a E D. b = c and ab E J + ( P ) .e. z are distinct.i.z ) ..which implies [ a / x ]!= Q ( x ) .y # z.z ) ) .. A5 := ( x = x).z ) .Y ) 3 Q ( x ) ) and [alxl != ~ Y P ( Y ). X Then [ablxyl P ( x .i. Then for any b E D.z ) by the same definition. assume [ablxz]I= P ( x . ab E D. Hence [ablxy]I= P ( x . and [abclxyz]k P ( x . Therefore M I A6. for c = b ) . for any c E D.. A3 := V Y ( Q ( X2 P ( x . and also Thus [ablxy]!= Q ( x ) .y # z.414 CHAPTER 5. where y. Then for some c E D. z 6r ( x ) . ab E J + ( P ) . z # r ( x ) . Therefore [ablxz]!= Al.y).+l. Q( Y Assume [. Y ) ) .y) for any b. [abclxzy]!= P ( x .

6.e. MODAL SOUNDNESS 415 The implications (2) + (4). In fact. and so (by Definition 5. Consider the QKN-theorem where p E PLO. since aRf b.[)such that <+(P)= { b ) . ( b ) . cf whenever a E D. which implies uRiv. Since M. ( 5 ) + (4) follows by Remark 5. Thus M . (11) IF is w-functorial. Hence M . (IIa) aRf b U R ~ V . u b B 1 .(b) for any a E T. we have M . c = . Thus c E ( P ) . u b 3y Oip. Then (since T D ( b ) = v ) . i.(a) and cRyd for some d E E+(Q). u I=Oip. J ) such that J + ( P )= { ~ . i. (a) Ryn.9.e.e.5. assume aRfb. n > 0. Suppose a R l b . c b ( P ( x )A O i Q ( x ) ) [XI for some c E D:.5. for d = ~ . ( x )A o i Q ( ~ . aRrb + T. bd k P ( x ) [xy]. ( b )Therefore 7 r . and a model M = ( I F .. . M . We assume Q K N C ML(IF) and show that IF is functorial. )). u 3 x ( P ( ~ . < ) such that J+(p)= { v ) . ( a ) ) J+(Q)= { ~ ~ ( b Then M .rr. (3) =+ (5) are obvious. b E D.10. We apply Lemma 5. ! Then M . .4) M. and a model M = (IF. . ) + Since M . Consider the QKN-theorem . (IIb) ( a c ) ~ : + l ( b d+ a R l b for n > 0.and a model M = ( I F . a I= (P(na( x ) ) )A OiQ(na(x)) [XI. ) Suppose ( a c ) ~ T + l ( b dConsider the QKN-theorem ). b Q(nu( x ) )[XI and M .e.12. b b p [y]. where 1x1 = n. ( I ) F is permutable.12. ( x ) ) ) . a E DE. y $ r ( x ) . u k B2. ( a ) R ~ ~ .. ( 4 ) + (1).i. we have i.

ae != OiP(x) [xy]for any e E D..<)such that < + ( p ) = {v). By definition.) = b . Then M . 7ra(b) = v. . ac != OiP(x) [xy]. assume ac E D.e. y @ x. we have and so M. [XI. b2 E D. . bl. a k B4 [x]. This property (mm2)easily follows from the validity of the QKZ-theorem x = y > Oi(x = y). In particular. b != p [y] for some b E ~ : ( a ) .CHAPTER 5. (IId) uRiv + Va E D... Thus aa k x = . 3b E D.and so Since M. i. and a model M = (P. a a 1 x = y [xy]. (111) (a.g. g Now from M .and thus aRTb by (IIc) ac E Dnfl & aRTb + 3d ( a c ) ~ y + ' ( b d ) n for > 0. a R l b . u t= Oip. b k P ( x ) [XI. i. . obviously.we also have i. u != V Oip. a != 3yOiPn(x) [XI.and so we can take d = gn+l. Thus y which yields M. aRjb.+l. it follows that M. or b E D. .. and M.e. In fact.+~). M. In fact. . (ac)~:+'(b~. Then we obviously have M.e. and consider the QKN-theorem x where 11 = n. a k B the choice of M. v k p.a )RS(b1. So there exists g = (gl. . . . a k OiP(x) [x].gn+1) E Dn+' such that Hence (gl. b2) =+ bl = bar for a E D. Consider the QKN-theorem for p E P L O and a model M = (IF. the latter means that 7ra(b) E <+(p).J) such that J + ( P ) = {b}. we obtain M. Since M. u != B5. METAFRAME SEMANTICS :' Since (ac)R+ (bd). M.

which implies a1 = a2 = a. i.12. x) [x] for any b. x)). . since (a. Therefore we obtain a precise criterion of logical soundness in metaframes. which is equivalent t o (111). for which every F. such metaframes are not necessarily modal. so every L-metaframe is modal (Theorem 5. u I= 3x(P(x)AQQ(x. In the next section this criterion will be applied to Kripke bundles and C-sets. u b B 6 we obtain: for some a l . This allows us to introduce the metaframe semantics M E and M N for modal predicate logics (with or without equality) generated by the class of N-modal (or functorial) metaframes. To check (111) for the case without equality (i. bib2 Q(xi. should be called an 'L-metaframe'. a E D.. a2 E D.13 means that modal metaframes are exactly m-sound (and also m'-sound) metaframes.e. Now let us make some remarks on terminology. We also have M. a)R:(bl. b I= Q(x. Therefore IF is modal. If L is a propositional logic. a metaframe validating a modal logic L (predicate or propositional).5) such that Then M. Thus from M . a k OiQ(x.5. W Theorem 5.12. since [+(P)= {a). Let (a. But if L is a predicate logic. According t o general definitions.. Thus (bl. Now we have and so M. a)Rq(bl. bl = b2. This is the largest sound modal Kripke-type semantics generated by metaframes. then IF is an L-metaframe iff L C ML(=)(IF). a I= P ( x ) 1x1. ba). So we have proved (5) + (1). MODAL SOUNDNESS 417 y > Oi(x = y) [xy] implies a a I= Oi(x = y) [xy]. for the proof of (4)+(1)) we need a longer argument. 'L-metaframes7 are those.13).12. alas k P(x1) A P(x2) [xlx2]. hence M.since M . Consider the QKN-theorem Take a model M = (F.e. is a propositional L-frame (Proposition 5. bz) E tS(Q).12.9). x2) [xixz]. Then M. x) [XI. ba).

17 does not really change the notion of logical soundness.12. The argument does not use the clause (lo). Proposition 5.9. On the other hand.a ) i n M and formula A with FV(A) C r(x).9. F is an S4-metaframe iff every F is reflexive and transitive. In fact. because it does not involve forcing M. Moreover.1. we say that F is modally sound for k1 (respectively. METAFRAME SEMANTICS In particular. (2) If b1 is equivalent to k i n modal metaframes. (iii) IF is modal. modally sound) IF + Thus a 'reasonable' modification of 5. So e.14 Consider a modified forcing relation +I satisfying 5.9.4(1)(9). (ii) P is modally sound. then IF is a modal metaframe.12.17. ~ ~ (2) Obvious.9. a QS4-metaframe. (1) If Q K N ML1(F).4 we have T(X) "One can easily rewrite the proof using only clean formulas and forcing M. QA-metaframes are just modal A.e.418 CHAPTER 5. because it is equivalent to b in modal metaframes. . If this set is an m. ML'(=)(F) = ML(')(F) Proof (1) We can repeat the part (4) =+ (1) from the proof of 5. To see this we consider an arbitrary modification !=I of forcing satisfying the clauses (1)-(9) from Definition 5.4(10) does not affect logical soundness.g. for any assignment (x. Let ML'(')(F) be the corresponding set of strongly valid formulas in a metaframe IF.e.13. validity and strong validity for k1 in the natural way. a -JyB[x] with y E r ( ~ ) .4. a k1 A [x] H M. An S4-metaframe is also called propositionally intuitionistic. M. is a 1-modal S4-metaframe. by 5. without or with equality).p. then for any metaframe P the following conditions are equivalent: (i) F is modally sound for b1 (with or without equality). metaframes. a I A [x] = for any model M over a modal metaframe.9. Finally let us explain why the modified forcing i=* described in 5. This applies to the forcing k* from 5.9. for modal (i. a k A [x] with = FV(A). (=). for a propositional logic A. This notion is described as follows. Then we define the notions of truth. 2.

.nu : Fn 4 F. To show the and show that ..6.2) that the relations in Mf (F) are a R l b iff V j aajpibj & a sub b. By Proposition 5. a I=B [x].a = (al..9. consider a E T.3.3. Thus k satisfies the inductive clause (lo*) from 5. By 5.9.5...an). hence ML(')(F) = ML(')(F'). 5. a = X. . f then Mf (F) is an N-modal metaframe. .2) as well as with a preset F' (over some precategory).ai and M. ML(')(F) = ML(=)(M~ (F)).D.14. then Mf (F) is a QS4-metaframe. a ! 3xiB [x] w 3c E D(a) M. p) is associated with a metaframe Mf ( F ) = (Fn)nEw(cf. ((a.bi = a . Proof (1) By the above remark.13.e. We also know that every Kripke bundle F = ( F . b k B [x]. ML(')(M~ (F)) = ML(')(F).8.17 for 3 (and similarly for V). it is sufficient to consider only presets.8. so the existence of c is equivalent to the existence of b E Dn such that b . c.6 we can further write M . D.1 (1) I F is a preset over an N-precategory C (or an N-modal Kripke bundle). (2) If F is a C-set over a category C (or an intuitionistic Kripke bundle).13.13.ai)c) . 5.13 Representation theorem for modal metaframes Recall that a preset F = (C.xi)xi) .. Lemma 5. a b* A [x] easily follows by induction on \A].5 these constructions are coherent.ai)c) . . a != A [x]and M.9. Mf (F) = Mf (F'). p) over an N-precategory C gives rise to the metaframe Mf (F) = (Fn)nEw with the relations cf. cf. and let a E T n be a permutation then ((x . i. ai+l. Definition 5. Definition 5. Hence the equivalence of M.. REPR.5.10. . . By 5. To check the w-functoriality. Recall (Definition 5.ESENTATION THEOREM FOR MODAL METAFRAMES 419 x Now let 1 1 = n. . ai-1. = But ( ( a .13. By 5.

a = b'. . METAFRAME SEMANTICS monotonicity.12. Let us now show that all countable modal metaframes can be represented by C-sets. . a) . Proposition 5. a ) = b' for some y E Ci(u.6. a ) = (p.420 CHAPTER 5. (PY.1 (mmz). a ) .16.(a) = b2. f f ) ) j = P r ( ( a ' f f ) j ) = Pr(au(j)) = (Py .p. a. a) = (p. Definition 5.e. u = ng. v = nO(bl).a = b for some . If ( a .13. v = ~ g .1 or by the observation that if IF is an intuitionistic Kripke bundle. i. then ML(=)(F) > QS~('). So by (3) we have: p.13. : u E W) is a system of countable domains if every D. Theorem 5. a ) . Then for some y E Ci(u.9. In fact.12. then p.5). a)Ra(bl. a = b . By (1) it follows that (py ' a ) . .(=). a. To check the property 5.5. + F.1.3. suppose (a..13. Thus (a .(a).11. (2) If F is a C-set.a )R l ( b . and Corollary 5.8. ( b ) . Therefore by Proposition 5. is an S4-frame by 5. (a . then the corresponding C-preset F' is a C-set (Proposition 5. then every F. v) i. Then p. . u = na(a).12.23 In this case we also say that a metaframe with a system of domains D has countable domains. a . a E D. bl = p.e. a ) . where b = p. The same holds for intuitionistic Kripke bundles by 5. Thus (mm2) holds. ( a . ( a . ( a ..2 Let F be a preset over an N-precategory C (or an N modal Kripke bundle). l .13. Next. is countable. 2 3 ~ e c a lthat according t o our terminology. Then (1) ML(') (F) = ML(') (Mf (F)) is an N-m. (4) if F is C-set or an intuitionistic Kripke bundle. and Mf (F) = Mf (F'). b' = n u b . let us check the lift property for nu. bz E Dv. . 7 E Ci(u1v)Now note that (3) p. .3 We say that D = (D. bl . a ) j .. suppose aR:b.a)u(j) = ((Py . a countable set may be finite. v). bz). (3) ML'(F) is conservative over ML(F).4 we obtain Proposition 5. a)RYb1. Therefore nu : F. and thus aR/b.

2) implies F ( = FR(C)) = Fo: - In fact. by monotonicity of T. Finally note that (1. . Recall that Rn are reflexive and transitive in and this case. ! bfor some b E D. (2) Consider a QS4-metaframe = ((Fn)nEw. Moreover. v) and F = FR(C). The other way round.10.bk) for all k > n.6.b by (1. . . thus f o g E C(u. v). starting a t our a = (al. u) for u E W.13. R) is a 2-element chain: W = {UO. Consider the N-precategory C with ObC = W and D). thus by and (1.D ) . .UO)). REPRESENTATION THEOREM FOR MODAL METAFRAMES 421 T h e o r e m 5. suppose uRiv.. Then F = Mf (F') for some preset F' over an N-precategory C.2).v) # 0.4 (Representation theorem) (1) Let F be an N-modal metaframe with countable domains. .1). V ) so Ci(u. a E D. . and all but one domains are countable. g E C(v. then C is a concrete category.10. . . D . Let a l . .b.2) holds.. the composition of morphisms is the composition of functions and identity morphisms are identity functions. . . v). . . bn+l .14. E C(u. f ( a ) = b for some f E C ~ ( U .5 (2). .for which (1) does not hold. .. i. a n + l . Let us ensure that P = Mf (F') according to Definition 5. (recall that p j = f).an). ui).b.e. and this is also true for k < n.a k ) ~ f ( b l . URVRW. .. then a ~ ..v). In fact. a = b . Then the function f sending each .10. .5(3). . p).5(4). Proof (1) Let F = ((Fn)nEw. Note that if F is a QS4-metaframe ( N = I).) and (al..((211. . By 5.e. W) whenever f E C(u. in D.5. then C is a category and F' is a C-set. .13. if f E Ci(u. by induction we construct a sequence b l . . in which pf = f for f E Ci(u. . also idD. a ~ . ( a l .v). The other way round.. then aR. .. f E Ci(u. . if IF is a QS4-metaframe. R = W x W . Using Lemma 5. where (T : I k Inis the inclusion map. a n . . . ak t o bk belongs to Ci(u. Thus (1. such that b = (bl. i f f . Consider the C-set F' = (F.ak)Rf(bl.bk) for k 2 n. In fact. . by our construction. be an enumeration of D.f! (a) and f (a) E D. . . Hence uRiv by 5. suppose aRyb. w). . (2) There exists a modal (QS4-) metaframe F. b E D t . i. such that Fo = (W. for a E DZ. .. .

14 5. For the intuitionistic case (discussed below) this question is also open. Let u. n 2 0 i.422 CHAPTER 5. so there exist a l .... But this semantics is probably not maximal in the intuitionistic case.10.1 Intuitionistic forcing and monotonicity Intuiutionistic forcing Now let us consider the intuitionistic case. b E * To check that IF is a modal metaframe. One can easily construct similar examples for any N > 1. First. since the relation sub is reflexive and transitive.. Then for any c E D. j 5 k .5(4) is trivial. respectively. D.1 A valuation J in an S4-metafr-ame F is called intuitionistic if it is intuitionistic in every Fn7 for any predicate letter Pjn. p). I > ID. 5. ul). Henceforth until Section 5.2.(i) = iff a R n b iff Vi. Then (al. the property (mmz) also holds: (a. w.e. we apply 5. a)R2(bl.. The case n = 1 described in 5. b. * bi = bj) for a E D&. n is an automorphism of Fn.(j) (a.. such an individual d always exists). 5. Definition 5.14.(al) = p. otherwise take d # bi for any i (since D.19. such that a1 # a2 and p. H Therefore modal metaframes with countable domains are nothing but C-sets. i. The pair (F. v be the worlds of a. . j (a. All the F are S4-frames.(a2) = b.b) in Mf (F'). we shall consider mainly S4-metaframes. . By definition. is a function from Duo to D. In fact. then p.a).14. b E D. a z E Duo. there is d E D. We shall begin with a simple observation that QS4-metaframes generate a sound semantics for superintuitionistic logics via Godel-Tarski translation (Proposition 5. suppose aRn-lb. METAFRAME SEMANTICS a R n b @ a s u b b & b s u b a ++ Vid(ai = a j D. A similar argument shows that 7r0 is monotonic for any a E T..".14.e.5. Let us first give a definition of intuitionistic forcing in S4-metaframes. a2)R2(b.E ) is called an intuitionistic metaframe model. In fact. 1. take d = bi. Now suppose F corresponds to a C-set F' = (F. is infinite. j (ai = a j ++ bi = bj) iff Vi. asub b and b sub a. But ID. but not in IF. Second. has the lift property. However we do not know if the semantics of modal metaframes is stronger than functor semantics (either in the case of C-presets or C-sets).10. .a)Rn(b. . b. so our goal will be to identify a larger class of 'intuitionistic sound metaframes'. such that (ac)Rn(bd): if c = a* for some i.7).(i) = a.b2) + bl = b2.10. for a permutation a E T n . Let p E C(uO.

12. Similarly to the modal case. Definition 5. strongly valid with equality) in F if all its IF(respectively.2 An intuitionistic model M = (F. a It. valid in F (notation: IF I A) if it is true in all intuitionistic models over t IF. A [x] (where a E Dn. This situation was already discussed for quasi-bundles in section 5. a It. we use the notation Note that ILE(IF) is the largest substitution closed subset of IL~=)(F). a)[x] iff (a. E. c t This definition of forcing is motivated by Godel-Tarski translation. ~ .14.(xj= xk) [x] iff 11 aaj= a k . 11 = n .c) gives rise to the forcing relation M . t t t (V) M . It.14.3yB [x] iff 3b E (Rn)-'(a) 3c E D(b) M. IF')-substitution instances are valid in F. it may be the case that F I SA t for any IF-substitution S. As we have pointed out for Kripke bundles. the intuitionistic forcing for VyB resembles the modal forcing for UVyB. .5 for the modal case. a I B [x] or M.+ (respectively. 1) t ( 1 ) M . t t It(VII) M . ~ ~ . unlike Kripke frame or Kripke sheaf semantics.g. but not for any IF=-substitution. a It.VyB [x] iff V b E Rn(a) Vc E D(b) M . In more detail the connection between modal and intuitionistic forcing will be discussed later on. a I C [x]. a I (B v C) [x]iff M . INTUITIONISTIC FORCING AND MONOTONICITY 423 Definition 5. ~ ~ .a) E J+(P2). a) with r(x) 2 FV(A). F t t (VI) M.(x. a It. (B 2 C) [x] iff V b E Rn(a) (M. a I C [x]. so ILZ(F) may be not conservative over IL(F). a It. M.3 Let F be an S4-metaframe.+=). Strong validity is denoted by It. ( bI )B [xlly]. An intuitionistic formula A is called true in an intuitionistic model M overF (notation: M It. cf. Remark 5.5.14. a I P. (IV) M . a I A[x] t for any assignment (x. a I (B A C) [x] iff M . ~ .5. FV(A) C r(x)) x defined by induction: ( 1 M . However note that for the ]-case the intuitionistic and the modal definition differ. b I B [x]+ M. a I B [x] and M .A) if M. b I C [x]). ( b c ) B [xlIy]. strongly valid (respectively. A E IF'. Similarly to the modal case we have IL=(F) n IF E I L (F).

30). M. Lemmas 3. Then - The argument for the 3-case is slightly longer as the intuitionistic and the modal definitions differ in this case. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Definition 5.1. : F . n 2 0. As we shall see in Section 5.(%(a)) C E+(P).a) with FV(A) C x Then for any Proof By induction.5. b I= OAT [x].rr.11. Mo. a k AT . The other way round. It is clear that Mo is an intuitionistic model and Mo = M if M itself is intuitionistic.14. b b AT 1x1.15.424 CHAPTER 5.14. J) a metaframe model. For the induction step let us only check the quantifier cases.12. QS~(') t. (see the remark after Definition 1. and thus M.16. for short) if IL(')(F) is an s.to) such that for any j.p. a I t OA [x]u Qb E Rn(a) n. 5.3.(b) E Jf ( P ) e w. 11 = n.just take b = a. The pattern of M is the model Mo = (IF.a) = w. A E IF' and any assignment (x. Suppose A = 3yB and the statement holds for B. F. i'-soundness implies i-soundness. - - . which implies M. suppose M.14. then x . so M b AT OAT by soundness (5.4 A metaframe IF is called intuitionistic(') sound (i(=)-sound. so the statement is true in this case.6 Let M be the same as in Definition 5. Suppose A = QyB and the statement holds for B. We have The latter holds if M . cf. As we know. L e m m a 5. a k AT.x).5. But &(.a) C J + ( P ) . Now let us show that all QSCmetaframes are i=-sound.14. a IF A [x]u ra E J$(P) H Rm(w. (=).13).M = (IF.AT OAT (Lemma 2.5 Let F be a QS4-metaframe.. This happens because intuitionistic forcing for QSCmetaframes corresponds to modal forcing via Godel-Tarski translation.2). Definition 5.(Rn(a)) for a morphism w.7 If A = P(n.2. o E C.

7 Let IF be an QS4-metaframe.11.7. then IL(=) (F) is an s. a != AT[x]. a It A [x]for any appropriate assignment (x.14. for any a E T.e. a It A [x]. Proposition 5.6.6. IL(') (F) =T ML(=)(F) .12.12). Proposition 5.. Corollary 5. which follows from our assumption.l. the latter is equivalent to Mo. whether i-sound metaframes generate a stronger semantics. i. i. Use By Lemma 5. 5. (If. a It A [x] iff M . a). 1 (=).p.14.14. the class of i-sound metaframes is larger.6(2). (c) IF b+ AT. by Lemma 5.8 If F is a C-set (or an intuitionistic Kripke bundle). Then (1) IF It. The same happens to i'-soundness.12. M .a). and let us show M It.6. Let M be an intuitionistic metaframe model over IF. As we shall see later on. Let IF be a QS4-metaframe.Am.9 Using 5. where 11 = n 1 m and for any formula A E IF' with FV(A) 2 r ( x . (3) IL(')(F) =T ~ ~ ( ' ) ( F ) therefore IL(=)(F) is an s. Since Mo = M .) Assume IF It A.7 shows that QS4-metaframes are i(')-sound.11. . M. INTUITIONISTIC FORCING AND MONOTONICITY The case A = 3xiB is reduced to the above: 425 All other cases are left to the reader. moreover. (b) Vm IF It. (2) The proof is completely analogous to 5. A E I F = . check the following properties of intuitionistic forcing in QS4-metaframes analogous to the properties of modal forcing (cf. Proposition 5.12. H (3) follows readily from the equivalence (a)w(c) in (2).A iffIF != A ~ .14. (2) The following three assertions are equivalent: (a) IF It-+ A. Lemma 5. M an intuitionistic model over IF. Then x (1) for any ordered assignment (x.) Assume IF k AT.13) for (c)+(a).3 for (b)'+(c) and soundness (5. Lemma a t= AT [x] for any appropriate assignment (x. For a metaframe model M over P let us show M b AT.14. a ) .. Lemma 5. is open. and P r o o f Similar to 5. a). but the question.p. and the latter follows from IF k AT.(=). (1) (Only if. M . Exercise 5.

a It. a It.2) for I 5 i 5 n M . ^ai It. y = ( y l . .V x i B [x] M . iff t M . a .2) corresponds to the clause 5. for any distinct lists of variables x = ( X I . t Now in QS4-metaframes T: is a morphism. A* are intuitionistic formulas.). [ a / x ] .W x i B [x. . d c I B [ ( x.9 extend to arbitrary i'-sound metaframes.A [ y ] .ai It.xi)xi]. to equal D.a i It-VxiB [x-xi] * M .-sentences: [ a / x ] = [a*/x*] then M . because it may happen that nY(Rn(a))# Rn(r:(a)).2) may not be true.V x i B [x] M . 5. Let us first note that the quantifier clauses in Definition 5.B [ x y ] .9.4.3xiB [5ii]. Let us show that in QS4-frames (VII. t (VII.24 The reader can construct a counterexample as an exercise.A [ x ]u M.xi iff Vd E Rn-'(a-ai) Vc E D ( d )M.W x i B [x] M .B [ ( x .18.ym). G It. n / y ]A ) [ x ] M . cf.dc It. by (VII.xi] a . all the claims in 5. for any intuitionistic formula A with F V ( A ) E r ( y ) . a I 3xiB [x] 3 b E (Rn)-'(a) 3c E D ( b ) M .l) corresponds to the clause ( 9 ) from Definition 5. M . then M . .V x i B [x] Vb E Rn(a) Vc E D(b) M .[a*/x*]assignments giving rise A A*.9.VxiB[5ii]. B and any ordered assignment ( x .( [ x.2). a It. As we shall see later on.B [ ( x .A [x*]. Section 5.a* It. a I 3 x i B [ x ]iff M . so the latter is equivalent to (VII. a .ai I V x i B [ x. t M . a It. (b-bi)c It. But in arbitrary SCmetaframes (VII. Now let us consider arbitrary SCmetaframes. t In fact.x i ) x i ] iff iff Vd E T: ( R n( a ) )Vc E D ( d ) M .dc It.9. .a ) with F V ( A ) G r ( x ) (3) for any a E C.16.l) M . Now if we consider two options in the intuitionistic case.e.4(10). a It. a I I y B [ x ]iff 3 b E ( R n ) . bc I B [ x y ] .426 CHAPTER 5.. METAFRAME SEMANTICS ( 2 ) for any congruent intuitionistic formulas A. b c It. ( 4 ) if A. dc I B [ ( x xi)xi]. 240r note t h a t may not imply M .14. i. t iff Note that (VII. for any a E Dn M .xi)xi]. a .l) if y $ x. . a . a It.14.x.2 are analogues of the combined clause (9+10) for modal forcing from Section 5.x i ) z i ] t iff Vd E Rn(7r:a) Vc E D ( d ) M . iff M . .V y B [x] V b E Rn(a)Vc E D ( b ) M . 5.9. a I t . a It.l ( a )3c E D ( b ) M . cf. we obtain (VII.B [ ( x.9..9..

INTUITIONISTIC FORCING AND MONOTONICITY 427 Later on we shall see that (VII.14. M . (3) the following conditions are equivalent: (a) IL(')(F) (c) QH(=) is an s.9. c ILI_=)(P). let us check that M IF C. i.VyB [x] for any assignment ( x .2 (I).12. B E IF(=). B > C . Now let us show that . By our assumption. ab IF ( B 3 C)[xy].1) M . Assuming M I B. ~ ~ ~ ~ . (=).1 4.11 Let IF be an S4-metaframe. a ) with r(x) 2 FV(VyB).rXlly(bc) B [xlly].2) and its analogue for the ]-case hold in all i(=)-sound metaframes. Proof (1) (I) Let us first consider generalisation. B . let us prove M I VyB.1.p. a I VyB [x]iff Vb E Rn(a)Vc E D(b) M. since M It. (2) and Corollary 5.12.e. we readily obtain (for any assignment (XY a b ) ) F (3. c Since every relation Rn is reflexive. a It. Proposition 5.B . Remark 5. Suppose 11 = n. Then (1) ILI=)(F) is closed under generalisation and modus ponens. t I t But M .17: All these definitions are equivalent in i(')-sound metaframes.14. x If y @ x. ab It. t Let M be an intuitionistic model M over P.10 These comments motivate an alternative definition of forcing (It-") for the quantifier case instead of (VII): This can be rewritten as follows: There also exists an altrnative version (IF*) resembling 5. t M . Now we obtain an analogue to Lemma 5.B [xy]. Assuming M It. I b c[xlly] holds. (2) IL(=) (IF) is closed under formula substitutions.12. Let x FV(C). for any assignment 7 (XY a b ) 7 M. then M . (b) QH(=) g IL(=)(F). Let M be an intuitionistic model over IF. ( tB ) (11) Now let us consider modus ponens.x.5. y = FV(B) . ab I C [xy].

13).5. (3) The implications (a) + (b). By Lemma 2. (A 2 B) E IL(')(IF). First note that IL!. so .13(3). In fact. Since IL~=)(P)is congruence closed and MP-closed (by (I)). cf. (2) Note that the composition of substitutions is a substitution. So by the assumption (c). then by 2. Finally.12. MP and substitution). So for a substitution S . (c) + (b) is also obvious. By (c). because a substitution instance of VxA is not always of the form VxA' for a substutition instance A' of A (cf. and hence (A > B ) E QH(') (by AX^). So it is sufficient to show that IF Ik S[y/x]A.3.CHAPTER 5. S(A > B) E IL(=)(F) for any formula substitution. By Lemma 2.5. let us consider generalisation. A 3 B E IL(')(P). As we already know. Now (3. Let y be a new variable.1) implies as one can easily check. it remains to consider modus ponens and generalisation.25(13) Hence by 2.12. Due to (2). let us check (a).==)(IF) closed under MP.13. SA. " Then S. this implies S B E IL(=)(P).2) follows from (3.14 (for complex substitutions) we can rename the bound variables of S. Since by (1) IL!. suppose A E IL4(IF) and A B. In fact.==)(F)is closed under congruence. (3. This does not follow directly from (I). the validity in IF is closed under congruence and generalisation.6. IL(')(P) is substitution closed. Lemma 2. Eventually B E IL'(IF).12 and 2. We suppose A E IL(')(IF) and show that VxA E IL(')(P). METAFRAME SEMANTICS In fact. y @ V(VxA) U FV(S).3). (b) + (c) are obvious. So assuming (c). (3.4).5. SdxA A Sdy[y/x]A A VyS[y/x]A.5.5. and the reflexivity of Rn. is Now the closedness of IL(=)(F) under modus ponens follows easily. we also have since VyC 3 C is an intuitionistic theorem. let us prove that IF It.SdxA. S(A > B ) A (SA > SB). suppose A. it follows that B E IL!=)(IF).9. Then (A B ) E QH(=) by 2. the argument in the modal case in 5. and so we need a little detour.

there exists a formula substitution Sosuch that x @ FV(So) and But then by 2.2 Monotonic metaframes Now let us consider an important property of intuitionistic sound metaframes.3. b E Dn.15 we obtain Eventually from (#I)-(d4) and 2. By (I).6. before we know that [y/x]A E IL(')(F). Corollary 5. thus IF I [y/x]B.14 An S4-metaframe IF is called monotonic(') the condition if it satisfies (im) M .5. which rn 5. t t if IF I B.14. In fact. . ILL') Remark 5.14. for any intuitionistic model M = (IF. we had to replace x with x' and Sowith S1. Definition 5. then IF I VxB by (1). we can apply modus ponens.11(3). a l t A[x] & aRnb + M .14.5 when quasi-bundles were discussed. Now we introduce yet another new variable obviously have XI.14. so it is valid in IF by our assumption (c).15(xxv). since A E IL(')(P). C (IL=(F))" C IL(P). thus IF I S[y1x1A by (#5). VxB > [ylx]B is an intutionistic theorem.17.14. 429 Then we By 2. Since Sodoes not always commute with [ylx] for x E FV(So). Proof QH' C ILE(IF) implies Q H = (QH')" implies i-soundness by 5. we obtain F I [x/xl][y/z]SoA.since (IF) is closed under congruence. b I A[x] t for any A E IF(').13 2 ' -soundness implies i-soundness. INTUITIONISTIC FORCING AND MONOTONICITY ! with x $ BV(S1). We already mentioned this property in Section 5.12 The above proof cannot be simplified by concluding IF I/So[y/x]A directly from A E IL(')(IF).24 it follows that It remains t o notice that validity in IF respects variable substitutions. The next lemma proves that monotonicity is really necessary. J). a distinct list x of length n containing FV(A) and any a.14.5. t t t Therefore.5. By 2.

v E W V a E DZ V b E D: Vc E D. b It T ( = I> I [x]. So it suffices to check the monotonicity of r.10. ) The idea of the previous proof is quite clear. .e. Obviously.e.2) V n > 0 V u . B' expresses the property (im) for A . s=-functorial) if it satisfies the condition (cf. Definition A n S4-metaframe F is called semi-functorial (or s.10. is monotonic. . if every T . i. by the definition of forcing for implication. D e f i n i t i o n 5. (ac) D e f i n i t i o n 5. a It T > A [x] since M . ( n 2 0 ) . ((ac)Rn+l( b d ) + aRnb). i. c IL(=)(F). Lemma 5. m.14. and thus A will always be true in the future. ru= = a. Assume a R n b and M. n > 0 functorial. respectively). a I I. P r o o f Let us check (im) for an arbitrary formula A. Now recall that a: = W 41.25 (12. simple embeddings and simple projections.)) (Also note that (12.14. a? ( n > 0 ) and for all permutations. then IF is monotonic('). Consider the following substitution instance B' := A > (T > A ) of B.14. 5.T D . for a = ( I . Let us now describe monotonic metaframes in terms of accessibility relations. ( a ) = u for a E D z .1) can be replaced by its particular case with n = 1.1 0.14. (Oo) holds for all (simple) permutations a. Vd E D. METAFRAME SEMANTICS L e m m a 5. (11) F is permutable (see Definition 5.19 A semi-functorial metaframe is called semi-functorial with equality (briefly. L e m m a 5.1).it states that if A is true now. and thus M.16 Let F be an S4-metaframe such that H Then F is monotonic(=). TO: ( a ) = aa. C is a composition of permutations.14.B' [x] and Rn is reflexive.Then M.1) 25Cf.b E Dn ( a R n b + (aa. a It A [x].) P r o o f Every a E . b It A [x]. then T > A is also true.18 A n S4-metaframe F is semi-functorial iff the following holds..) Rn+' (bb.430 C H A P T E R 5. Hence we obtain P r o p o s i t i o n 5.15 If the formula B := p > (T 3 p) is strongly valid i n an S 4 metaframe IF (in the language with or without equality.1. M.b E Dn ( a R nb + ( r u a )Rm(rub)). for short) i f for any a E C (00) V a . (I3) V n > 0 V a .

a)Rm(7r.x).14.11. The steps of the proof are almost trivial. r u b = blb. Proof (mm2) implies (mm. The induction step for A.a)R2(bl.) Qa. Suppose y @ x . and thus bl = b2. a I A [x].).-'. since a I P (7r.xi = x j [x] iff ai = a j .).a E <+(Pjm). is Now let us give more details.14. c IF B [x]. since a R n b implies (ai.b2) = b . INTUITIONISTIC FORCING AND MONOTONICITY (mm2) Qa. and thus M.e. aj)R2(bi. we see that monotonicity exactly corresponds to (00). suppose (mm. bj) by (Il).14.a) Rn ( r u b ) .14. M I cd I B [xy] for some c E Rn (b) and some d E D(c). b I A [x]. and since M is intuitionistic. b (aRnb + a sub b) are equivalent for n > 2.b). M. By (I4). a)R2(bl.z such that Then r. aRnc and thus M. b). y .b E <+(Pjm). Recalling that and <+(P) Rn-stable. i. y y Let A = VyB. a sub b. By s-functoriality (r. W An inductive argument shows that s'-functoriality implies monotonicity.). a R n b and M. we have all.) By induction on the complexity of A. bl.Then by Definition y y 5. The other way round.a = an. so the only problem is the atomic case. Lemma 5. t If A = (xi = xj).) holds in every s'-functorial metaframe. V is obvious.14.2. Let a = (a. So (mm. i.2. L e m m a 5. blt xi = x j [x] iff bi = bj. a R n b implies (7r. hence by (mm.20 In an s-functorial metaframe all properties (mm. By monotonicity of P. then (im) holds.bz) + bl = b2). Suppose aRnb and M I b I A[x]. b I A [x].a)sub(r.e. cf. y Let A = B > C . and consider the projection a E C.x) [x] iff r. (12. t m j If A = Pjm(r. By transitivity.2).21 A metaframe is s(')-functorial iff it is monotonic('). (7r. aRnc. so ai = a j implies bi = bj. aRnb.2. By transitivity. b2 ((a. a I A [x].5. we obtain r. M I c I C [XI for some c E Rn(b). L e m m a 5. due to the definition of forcing 5. Proof (Only if.

432 CHAPTER 5. and we need two extra conditions related to interpretation of quantifiers.x) [x].1 A n S4-metaframe F is called quasi-functorial (i-functorial. we certainly need s-functoriality corresponding to monotonicity. M. as we have already proved. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Now suppose A = VxiB. So we have L e m m a 5.14.a) Rm(rr. . Then by Definition 5.15. The case A = 3xiB is similar t o A = VxiB and is left to the reader. a I t Pm(rr. all rr. and suppose a R n b and M. Si Ijc A [Zi]. b Ijc A [x]. Ijc A [Zi]. and hence we obtain M. Recall that Si = =. an intuitionistic analogue of the lift property for jections rr. b IF A [XI.e. So since n. let us show that P is monotonic('). is monotonic.15. and so (n. a ljc A [x]. and thus M. In SCmetaframes we use the notation znfor the corresponding equivalence relation z ~ on Dn. this is yet insufficient. Then M. 5. b ) .23 Monotonicity is an intrinsic property of intuitionistic forcing. we have cRnb. A Now we obtain Proposition 5. y 6 x. a IF A [x].14. (If.. R e m a r k 5.22 Every i(')-sound S4-metaframe is s(=)-bnctional.[) (n.2. Its description is more complicated than in the modal case.14. is i-functorial iff it is s-functorial D) (i. We also need the 'quasi-lift property'. are quasi-morphisms. Let A = 3yB. are monotonic) and all rr.) Assuming (im).a)Rmb' + 3 b E Dn(aRnb & s u b zmb')). But unlike the modal case.x) [x] in the intuitionistic model M = (IF. then M. n u b E such that [+(Pm)= Rm(s.e.15 Intuitionistic soundness In this section we prove intuitionistic soundness for a certain class of S4metaframes.a).2.a for a =. for short) i f all its jections s. aRnb.2 A metaframe IF = ((Fn)nEw.8 explains why we confine ourselves to s-functorial metaframes in our further considerations. i. : 6 a R n b implies Si~"6i. it is called n-equivalence. If aRnb.by Definition 5. bi. By transitivity. have the following quasi-lift property: (la) V a E Dn Vb' E Dm((n. Note that ( m m ) ~ readily follows from (im) for A = (xl = x2). Thus by (im).14.14. As explained in the previous section. thus Lemma 5. cd IF B [xy] for some c E (Rn)-l(a) and some d E D(c). a IF Pm ¤ [+ ( P m) . M. Therefore M. M. n Definition 5.

The intuitionistic analogue of functoriality is quasi-functoriality. (perhaps. then.4 One can see that in the above proof monotonicity and quasi? ~ lift property are used explicitly only for injections a and ~ ~ 1 1But . section 5. and thus by monotonicity 5.21. The next lemma shows that in functorial metaframes the intuitionistic truth definition for the 3-case is quite analogous to the modal one. So in our semantics.3 Let M be an intuitionistic model over an i-bnctorial wimetaframe P. cf. The modified definition of forcing in the 3-case resembles the familiar definition for intuitionistic Kripke models. we also use the monotonicity of forcing relying on the monotonicity of n for arbitrary . a 'witness' for 3yB does not always exist in the present world. if there exists bc E Dn+' such that b R n a and M . n-tuples of individuals up to e n . cf. INTUITIONISTIC SOUNDNESS Recall that in the modal case we defined functorial metaframes.15. t t Proof In fact. are morphisms for injective a . This reflects the basic idea that intuitionistic models26 'distinguish' worlds up to z O . but as we shall see now.rr. where T.. (b'c') = b').14. 5.5. by the quasi-lift property (la:). there is no need in the intuitionistic analogue of weak functoriality. Now by ( o b i ) . non-injective) a. Therefore in further definitions we suppose monotonicity of all nu. but should exist in an equivalent world (cf.14. but with xn replacing '='. Then we can replace Rn with enin the truth definition for 3: M . r x l l y ( b c I )t B [xlly]. This simplifies the proof of Lemma 5. Lemma 5.lly(bc)I B [xliy]. ' . where all r. (recall that n.15.14 (im). Lemma 5. e . b' zna .14.5).15. and also weakly functorial metaframes. Remark 5. are morphisms.6.individuals up to z l . 2 6 ~ u to t h e monotonicity of forcing. a I 3yB [x] iff 3 b zna 3c E D(b) M. there exists b'c' E Dnf l such that (be)R ~ +(b'c').14.14.

15.13)..n+l are simple embeddings and a+ E Cm+l. aic It.+l is the simple extension of a E C. . Recall that al.2).15. Then we readily have t M . see the Introduction. (2a). So a metaframe is intuitionistic iff it satisfies (Oo).m+l. Definition 5.11.+ c))). an s'-functorial wi-metaframe). Intutionistic metaframes As we already know. But i-functoriality does not yet imply intuitionistic soundness as we shall see in section 5. Now let us consider two other soundness conditions specific for the intuitionistic case. ( l a ) . functoriality is equivalent to modal soundness (Lemma 5. b' = a .16. is a morphism. The same equivalence for V was already proved in 5. a I 3xiB [x] * M. Note that in this case (Oa) holds for arbitrary o. Definition 5.6 and Theorem 5.. (2a).. for short) is an i-functorial metaframe satisfying (20) (forward 2-lift property) V a E Dn Vb E Dm+' ( ( r u a )Rm( r ~ b+ 3c E Dn+l (aRn(r. y 6 x Proof The same as in 5. E Tn.15.15. (3a). H R e m a r k 5. Definition 5.8 A weak intuitionistic (wi-) metaframe is an s-functorial metaframe satisfying ( l a ) .B [xixi]. t holds in functorial metafkames. Then for any B E IF'.3. a. (3a) (backward 2-lift property) V a E Dn V b E D m + ' ( ( ~ ~ b ) R m ( ~ u 3c) E Dn+' ( ( ~ 3 c ) R " a +a & bRm+' (r.7 A n intuitionistic metaframe 0-metaframe. a I 3xiB [x]H 3c E D(a) M. for short) and respectively. the condition (VII. cf. a weak intuitionistic metaframe with equality (a wi'-metaframe) is an s'-functorial i-metaframe (respectively.c) & ) (ru+c)Rm+' b)) .15. but now T.12.14. so we can take . because in a functorial metaframe every ruis monotonic.434 CHAPTER 5.9 A n intuitionistic metaframe with equality (an i=-metaframe.5 Let M be a n intuitionistic model over a functorial metaframe..ai I t 3xiB [xi].15. E Tm. METAFRAME SEMANTICS L e m m a 5.6 In a similar way one can show that the equivalence M. Note that forcing is monotonic. (30) for any a . for all injections a.

Forward 2-lift property Figure 5.10. INTUITIONISTIC SOUNDNESS Figure 5. Backward 2-lift property. .11.15.5.

(n. b.(.e. wi-metaframes) satisfying (mmz) from 5. put c = ab. in fact. Then consider E C(u.a). Figure 5. This shows (20). . D.(l) .+l.(l). v) such that n+mb = pp .12 below. . ( 3 ~ for the case when Rk are the equality relations. c is their 'join'. The starting point is the following simple observation on tuples (called the 'lift property' in [Skvortsov and Shehtman. ) n.) = n F b . In fact.a..(~)). . Let then there exists c E Dn+' such that a = n.+c = b. p) over a category C.a is a 'common part' of b and a. Our next goal is to show that i'-metaframes are exactly i=-sound metaframes (Theorem 5.))Rm(bl.16.e. i. then there exists a morphism p V i bi = p. + ~ E D.n+l.. We can also check these properties for a metaframe Mf (IF) associated with a C-set F = (C.16. if for a E DE and b E D.c and i.(~. See Fig.10(3)). . 5. b = a.11. ..+l. .436 CHAPTER 5. a. It follows that and thus obviously (nu+c ) ~ ~ + l b ."+' we have nus = (a.(. METAFRAME SEMANTICS L e m m a 5. n.12.13) and at the same time .10 z=-metaframes (respectively wi'-metaframes) are exactly imetaframes (respectively. . and extend it to C := ~ ' b .)b. .11 Let us give a motivation for 2-lift properties.1.15.wi=-metaframes (Theorem 5. R e m a r k 5.15. 19931).

aRnn.12 In i-functorial metaframes (20) is equivalent to V a E DnVb E ~ ~ + ' ( . Proof (20) + (2-0).). for a E Dn+l. sends a to p.7r. we can find a' E Rn(a) with n. r r . Hence by transitivity aRnnn+c. Rm+l t o z m . Then by applying (2-a) to a' and b . Given a . 5.5.+c. L e m m a 5.a) Rm(n? b). Figure 5. 5. by the quasi-lift property ( l a ) . so we skip it. it exists.15. b E Dm+' such that (7r. Namely.15. Here p.13. (2"a) + (20). . Again c is the 'join' of c' and b. (3a) is checked in a dual way. n.c') by monotonicity (On. see Fig.c. Then using the quasi-lift property ( l a f ) we find c'.al xmn y b . we obtain c such that a' xn n. We see that in the first example the condition(2a) expresses the'co-amalgamation property' of tuples (Fig. b such that (n.+cRmf l b is obvious.14.4c' & nU+c1 First we apply (20) to a .15. 5. these conditions are obtained from (20) and (30) by changing Rm.rr.13.a.rr. The proof of (3a) @ (3-0) is dual. b and find c shown in Fig. z m + l . b xm+l . 5. We assume (20) and prove a stronger claim than (2-0). The second example corresponds to Fig.+c xmf' b1)xm & c) (2-a) Similarly (3a) is equivalent to As we can see. . a n F b =+ 3c E ~ ~ + ' ( a ~ ~ ( n . because they have a 'common part' n y b . INTUITIONISTIC SOUNDNESS 437 So (2a) holds. Finally we note that aRn (rTc)Rn(. similarly for p:. Assume (2-a).12).a)Rm(nyb) we find c' E Dn+l such that xmb .

METAFRAME SEMANTICS Figure 5. Figure 5.C H A P T E R 5. .15.14.

a . The property ( l a ) together with s-functoriality means that T. a I t A[x] e M . In fact.10. for any injection a E Tmn such that F V ( A ) c x .e. for some b' E Rm(a . Then P is weakly functorial iff for any A E IF('). a ) by s-functoriality.11 and 5. for any intuitionistic model M = (P.a]. a I A [x .5. in intuitionistic models. The atomic cases are obvious.B [x]. is a p morphism. are also easy. In modal logic we have a stronger requirement that T. a . y Hence M. M . The next assertion is an intuitionistic analogue of Lemma 5. due to monotonicity (im).12 (an exercise).15. Let A = B > C. M . y y t The other way round. M. Proof Similar t o Lemma 5. a I A[x] does not depend on the choice of a list Proof (+) is proved by induction on the complexity of A (cf. Now by monotonicity. a]. o]. .e. i.13 In i-functorial metaframes (20) is equivalent to 439 and dually for (3a). is a quasip-morphism. a zmb' y for some b E Rn (a). suppose M. M. E ) M . for any assignment (x. and we leave them to the reader. b' I C[x .15. a ] . thus M.a) of length n.6). i. a I A[x . b I C [ x ] y for some b E Rn(a). t So (*i) means that M . a ly A [x]. Now we are going to prove intuitionistic analogues of the results from Sections 5. Lemma 5. t (*i) x > FV(A) and possible renumbering of variables. a )Rm(b . a]. b It. a I A[x]. z n equivalent worlds are indistinguishable.15. b .a I A [ x . and thus by the induction hypothesis. b' I B [ x . Then ( a . a . Then by ( l a ) . Lemma 5.1 5. Suppose M. INTUITIONISTIC SOUNDNESS Lemma 5.6.a .14 Let IF be an s(=)-functorial metaframe. and so by the induction hypothesis. The cases when the main connective of A is LJ or A. Thus equality transforms into zn in the intuitionistic case. a).12.10.

2. a ly A [x .a)Rn(b . where T is the same as above."(x.r .(be) = b & ( b . and let us prove M. a>llvl. a)lly = (xlly) . a). a]. d E D(c) such y that Ml .14. Hence by s-functoriality. By definition. we obtain b E Dn.u)lly(cd) IY B [ ( x .6. we have c E Rm(a .a ) . a ) 11y. by Definition 5. a I A [x]. we obtain But (a. a)e = xu+(be)~"+'(cd). i.a)Rmc = r?(cd). as we saw in the proof of 5. by the induction hypothesis. Then for some b E Rn(a). Supposing M. Hence by the induction hypothesis. .10.440 C H A P T E R 5. Hence by a standard argument we have the same for arbitrary tuples: Then by monotonicity we obtain and since ( x .e. where 1 is the length of (x . Now note that for some 7. suppose a Iy A [x]. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Now let us consider the case A = VyB. by s-functoriality. The other way round. Since (r. e E D(b). e E D1 such that aRnr. thus eventually. thus a I VyB [x]. required. a . by applying (2a). it follows that y as But aRnb.

(2a).. Then b' E Ef (P)-J+(Q).a). b I Q(n. Then nxlly(be) IF B[xllyl for some b E (Rn)-'(a). b' zm nub. it follows that nxllv(be) I B [xllyl.5. Then by monotonicity and since ( x .u)lly((b. we obtain b E Dn. where 1 is the length of (x a)ll y. The proof for this case is obtained by inverting the accessibility relations Rn.( b Hence by s-functoriality. (3a) for an injection a E T. by (3a). n. e E D(b). Thus r u b E t y ((+(P) .15. it follows that (+) Assuming the equivalence (*i) for suitable formulas A. M. thus M. Consider the formula and the intuitionistic model M = (IF. there exists b E Rm(a) y such that M.J) such that (recall that IF is an S4-frame).J+(Q)) = zm (b'). a I A [x]. In more detail. (la) Let a E Dn. suppose a IF A [x].a) Rmb'.x) [x]. d E D(c) such that From cRm(n. . Therefore by (*i). and assume (n. i. e E D1 such that a)e. INTUITIONISTIC SOUNDNESS 441 The case A = 3yB is dual to A = VyB.a I y A [nux]. we obtain a Iy VyB [x]. a IF A [x . a)ll y = (XI1 y) .e. Hence by the induction hypothesis. a . By definition. i. a)llyl. a). b' E Dm.a ) . F Since aRnb. b I P(x. there exists c E (Rm)-'(a. This is the same as "(x. To show the converse. n.e. ale) IF B [(x.T by the induction hypothesis. changing I to It. ( b a)Rn(a .x) [x] and M. Since by s-functoriality. (be) = bRna & (cd)~ ~ + ' . suppose M .. let us prove the properties (la).a]. and applying (3a) y instead of (20).

and so M. Lemma 5. Then X ! M . since (n. y]. Since c E <+(P). Thus by (*i).x. .a)Rm(. (3u) The proof is quite similar to the previous case. as required.14 allows us to arbitrarily change a list x 2 F V ( A ) in M . and the intituionistic model M = (IF.rr.iryc).10.2c).A [ x ] . c = (. where x = ( X I .x.rr.15.).rr.a) .g. Lemma 5.15 Let M = (IF. So in the truth conditions for quantifiers we may always assume y $! x .x.rryc) (. c Il. y) with x = ( X I . thus nu+ $! ( + ( P ) .rr.P(.so by definition of M .b)d E Dnf' such that (. we can take x = F V ( A ) . L e m m a 5. . METAFRAME SEMANTICS Let a E Dn.15.e.<) be an intuitionistic model over an S4metaframe.rr. F V ( A ) C r ( x ) . i. y 6x. .A [ x ] i. bRna may be replaced with b zn a in the clause for 3.x.V y B [ x ]iff V b E Rn(a) Vc E D ( b ) b c It.rr. a It.442 (20) CHAPTER 5 .<) such that <+(P)= R ~ + ' ( c ) . y @ x . (or equivalently. (. nu+ E <+(P). . y' $! V ( A ) .a)Rm(n1..3).+ (b) Rm+'c.+ b ) .x. Also let y 6 B V ( A ) .. = Since c 6<+(P).we have and so M . cf. As in the modal case. M .15.A [x]iff M . e. (b) But (n.rr3b)Rnaand M . r.rr. a It. and thus we have a It.a Iy A[n.x].B [ x y ] .e.2c)d E D ~ + ' and assume that (.x) y = nu+( x y ) . y) [n. Now let a E Dn. y' $ r ( x ) . . r. <) such that <+(P) {c' E D ~ + '1 T ( c ' R ~ + ' c ) ) .x. Thus by (*i) M . and A' := A[y H y']. there ex.). a It.e. Now let us prove an intuitionistic analogue of Lemma 5. a It. there exists b = (n7b)d E Dn+' such that i.x].a Itwe A [. Rm = Consider the formula A := 3yP(n.a). Y ) [xY].9. a Il. which is equivalent to b and hence cRm+'(n.3yB [x]iff 3bRna 3c E D ( b ) bc It. b Ik P(K. .x. .B [xy]. ists b = (. a Iy A [ x ] . X' := [y'/y] . c (n1.A1[x']. since ( n y c ) R m(. y). . A E IF('). have M .2c)dE Dm+'. . Consider the formula A := VyP(n.rr1. and the intuitionistic model M = (F.

L e m m a 5.A [x] iff Vb E Rn(a)Vc E D(b) b c It. x = FV(A). then A1 = Vy'B'. x It is sufficient t o consider the case when A' is obtained from A by replacing its subformula QyB with Qy'B'.15 ) e a I Vy'B' t [XI. due to the previous remarks. a It. a ) E <+(P) iff alt A1[x']. y' 9 V(A).15. (1) If A = VyB. Let A = VzB and suppose the assertion holds for B. Thus a It. A* and any appropriate assignment (x. other cases can be easily checked by the reader. INTUITIONISTIC SOUNDNESS 443 Proof Since F is a wi(')-metaframe. we prove the equivalence only for x = FV(A).15. the argument is similar: a It.A[x] iff ( a . s o y @ x.A[x] e M . (2) If A = 3yB.15. 11 = n. a It. so z $ x'. t a It.5. By our assumption. We argue by induction and consider only the atomic and the quantifier cases. and thus a k 3yB [x] 3 b xn a l d E D(b) ad It. and again the right parts of these equivalences are equivalent.A [x'] iff Vb E Rn(a)Vc E D(b) bc It. y' by the assumption of the lemma. a I t A1[x] for any congruent formulas A. We have A' = 3y1B'. so - alt. Lemma 5. the right parts of these equivalences. Then z # y. and z @ x. and thus a k VyB [x] @ Vb E Rn (a) V E D(b) ad It.15.10.) We assume x = FV(A).A [x] iff 3 b zna 3 c E D(b) bc I B [xz].A' [x'] iff 3 b xn a 3c E D(b) b c It. So the assertion holds for A. a). Suppose y'.15 ) e a I 3y1B' [x]. where Q is a quantifier. t . the proof is almost the same.B' [x'z] . If A = 3zB.B' [xy'] (by Lemma 5. a)') = P(xl . M an intuitionistic model over IF Then: (c) M .10. Let A = P ( x a). Then A' = P ( ( x . ' Since (xz)' = x'z. Proof (Cf.B [xy] H 3 b xn a 3 d E D(b) ad Ik B' [xy'] (by Lemma 5.B' [x'z]. by our additional assumption.B [xy] H d Vb E Rn(a)Vd E D(b) ad It.B [xz].a ) . y 9x. are also equivalent by the induction hypothesis.10.16 Let F be a wi(')-metaframe. Now the proof is by induction. y @ BV(B).10. Let us prove an intuitionistic analogue of 5. B' = B[y y'].

(2) Suppose A = B 3 C.15. y = (PI. Now we argue similarly to 5. y Since a R n b implies ( a . . . we y The other way round. a)/y]A is defined up to congruence and can be obtained from a clean version AO of A such that BV(AO)n r(xy) = 0 (and FV(AO)= FV(A) y ) by replacing [y c-. Proof ('Only if'. t Similarly to 5.a ) / y ] A [x]w M . a) by (Oa). x ... METAFRAME SEMANTICS (I). We have x = FV(A). so we only consider the case A = VzC. (2) prove the base of the induction.11.x.16 we may assume that A" = A. the proof is the same as in .B [y] and b . By Lemma 5. 5. A1 = VzC1. (1) If A is yi = yj or P ! ( ~ T).. b lpL [(x.7 by induction. Then P is an i-rnetaframe iff (#) for any a E C. .) Recall that [(x . and thus a I A [x]e 'v'b E Rn(a)Vd E D(b) ad It.7.7. a )R m ( b . a II.15. for any model M over P. Let us prove the intuitionistic analogue of 5. ) I Y I C then by the induction hypothesis b .)..11. a]. for some b E Rn(a) y x.ym). a I A[y].11. this equivalence is stated for all congruent versions of [X .444 CHAPTER 5. distinct lists of variables x = (XI.~IYIA. have a . if then for some c E Rm(a . a ) c I B [y] and c IY C [y].VzB1 (= A1) [x].7.C [xz] % t 'v'b E Rn(a)Vd E D(b) ad I B1 [xz] (by induction hypothesis ) t e a II. a I t [ ( x .a E Dn: M . z @ x. a . The step is rather routine.e. and ~ 1x1. and formula A E IF(') with FV(A) C r(y). T E Ctm or A is. a I C [y]. a)/y]A 1 1 i. The remaining cases are left to the reader. . W Lemma 5. If a I [(x .a I (B > C) [y]. .11. F .17 Let F be an s(=)-functorialrnetaframe.

Then for some c' E Rm(a-a). [XI.Hence by (2a)there exists b E Dn+' such that aRn(nn+b) and (nu+ ) ~ ~ + ' c .5. E D(cl) c'd I#B [ y z ] . ) / y ] C[XI. a z m c . b IF [(x. (3) Let A = VzB.there exists b E Rn(a) such that b .B [ y ]and b a Iy C [ y ] . INTUITIONISTIC SOUNDNESS 445 Now by ( l a ) . then z $ r ( x y ) by the choice of A so If a IPL [ ( x ~ ) I Y I A . suppose a. a)d = ( b d ) . nu+ b Then by the induction hypothesis. then there exists b E Rn(a). a+ Iy B [ y z ] . . Then by monotonicity b-a It. a Since aRnb. [XI.d E D ( b ) such that bd Iy [ ( x z ).a ) . SOfor c := c'd we have (nua)Rmc'= TTC. b Put b := n y b . So by the induction hypothesis (b. this implies a 1 [ ( x~ ) / Y I A Y . it follows that d The other way round. Iy B [ y z ] .a ) / y ] B[x]and b ly [ ( x . a )Rm(b.a+lyz]B [xz]. Since ( a . then ' Since (no+ )R ~ " C b by monotonicity we have Iy B [ y z ] .15.0 Iy A[y]. So by the induction hypothesis.

rr.x. (F+(Q) Rm(b'). so by definition of M . Checking the details is left to the reader. Consider A := P ( y ) > Q ( y ) . M . and the intituionistic model M = ( P . z ) [ x ] i. t ) such that { + ( P )= Rm+'(c).14.em(b').and the intuitionistic model M = (IF. Thus by (#). b Iy P(. V are almost trivial.+(xz). We assume a E Dn. (.446 CHAPTER 5.x) [ x ]and M . The proof makes use of (3a). there exists b E Rm(a) such that M .we have and so M . lyl = m and the intuitionistic model M = (IF. i.) (Cf.e. But ( r u x ) z = .a)Rm(rI. i. as required. c) such that E f ( P ) = Rm(b').[) such that [ + ( P ) = {c' E D ~ + '1 ~ ( c ' R ~ + ' c ) ) . Since c $ <+ ( P ) .x)).+(b)$Z E+(P).rr.14.. r u a IY A [ y ] . where lyl = m.cf. .~~ Iy aRn (.b)d E Dn+l such that .r(n. ( (3a) The proof is similar to (2a). METAFRAME SEMANTICS But b = b'bn+l. ( 5 ) The cases of A.rrTc)Rm(. z @ r ( y x ) . b zmrub.Lc)d E Dm+'.z ) with lyl = m . b IF P(r.z ) . let us check the properties ( l a ) . = Then b E [+ ( P ) . Consider the formula A := V z P ( y .e.Therefore by (#).15.e. b) & M .c). while aRnb'.a Iy A [ y ] .15. ' thus M .rr. a ) / y ] A with a is new variable z (not xi E r(x) . and assume that (r.rrua)Rmb'. 3 ~ ) . b Iy Q ( r U x ) Thus rub E ((F+(P) (F+(Q)) em [XI. the proof of 5. a congruent version of [(x.) For a E Em. c = (nl. z ) . ('If'.since ( r u a ) R m ( r T c ) . (.a)and consider the formula A := 3 z P ( y . Hence by the definition of forcing as required.x. ' (20) Let a E Dn. ru+b ) R m fl c . z ) [xz] . c = ( r T c ) d E Dm+'. = (b'). 2 7 ~ tessential that here we use VzP(n.rr. n. there exists b = (rl. z $ r ( y x ) . (4) The case A = 3zB is dual t o the previous one. the 3-case in the proof of 5.x.<+(Q). ( 2 ~ 1(. a QzP(. thus r. b' E Dm. (la) Let a E Dn.rr.

12. The following lemma is an analogue of 5. But imetaframes still enjoy the property (##).14 instead of .11). but now we apply 5. Exercise 5. (3) there exists a list of distinct variables r(y) FV(A) such that M. Then the following conditions are equivalent.17 instead of 5.5.c. a Il. Proposition 5. b) i n P.A [x] * M.<) be a model over an w(=)-metaframe IF. Then (##) M. INTUITIONISTICSOUNDNESS 447 Note that unlike the modal case (Lemma 5. Hint: choose a such that a s u b a & a suba and apply ( l a ) t o c such that a = r.20). Proposition 5.6.12. because (20)~ (3a) are related to quantifiers. Proof 5. a* It.A . &) > Thus r(l) does not depend on the choice of y. Show that (mm.-sentences: [ a / x ]A = [a*/x*] A*.10.12.12. u E M . Lemma 5. (2) M.11.20 Let M = (IF.11. 5.7.11. but not always in i-metaframes (cf. cf.) VaVb (aRnb + a sub b). In the modal case this definition is successful.18 Let M be a model over a wi(')-metaframe. a It.1 1. Along the same lines as 5.A [x*] Proof Similar t o 5. This property also holds in i'-metaframes (5.14.") VaVb (aRnb + 3b' zn a sub b') b holds in i-functorial metaframes. A.16). b IF A[y] for any ordered assignment (y.18 allows us to define forcing for D.15. Proposition 5. perhaps thanks to the following weaker version of (mm. Now we can prove intuitionistic analogues of results from Section 5.-sentences [ a / x ] Ain i-metaframes in the same manner as we did in Kripke sheaves.15. but now we apply 5. A* E IF('). L e m m a 5. Now we obtain an intuitionistic analogue of 5.15. we cannot consider only quantifier free formulas A in the proof of 'if7 in the above lemma. Example 2* in 5. Kripke bundles and modal metaframes. (1) M It. due to the property (mm.).12: Proposition 5.15.a ) i n P such that FV(A) = for r(x). [a*/x*]be assignments i n M giving rise to equal D.1. 5. and let [ a / x ] .14. and let A E IF(').15.A [x] any ordered assignment ( x .

15.16. This model is intuitionistic.17 we have ) C z C N . 7 ) such that 7 v + ( P ) = {b 1 M . (3) Follows from (2). the choice of N.15. a I t S B [ z ] for any subformula B of A and for any assignment (z. but now we use Lemma 5.12.14 and the reflexivity of Rn.a ) with r ( x ) = FV(A) FV(SA). a ) E r l + ( ~iff ~ .2(2). a I t B [ z ] iff M .12. By Definition 5. Note that (1) for B E IF holds in every uri-metaframe IF. o / ~ ] [z]. Now it suffices t o prove by induction that (#) N . i. a I t .12. and thus (fl) holds.2(4). M .a) with r(z) F V ( B ) . r(z) n B V ( B ) = 0.448 CHAPTER 5.12. the proof of Lemma 5. Consider the model N = (P. then SB = [z . a l[ t .15. a I F B [ z ] iff ( a . L e m m a 5. we may assume that A is clean. (2) Cf.A.SA.14 (and the reflexivity of Rn 5.[ y ] iff ~ .15. METAFRAME SEMANTICS The next lemma is an analogue of 5.2. a . v+(Q) = (+ (Q) for any other predicate letter Q. (4) The argument is essentially the same as in the proof of 5.15. . a I S A [x]for any intuitionistic model M and F any assignment (x. we show that P It. again we use 5. > If B = P ( z .2(3). by monotonicity of P.e. > By Lemma 5. Assuming that S = [C/P(y)] is a strict substitution ( F V ( C ) y ) and P It. Then (2) for any B E IF(') (3) IL~=)(P)is closed under generalisation. (1) ILI=)(F) is closed under modus ponens.2.14.20). b C [Y]). Proof (1) Similar to the proof of 5. a / y ] C .15. BV(A) n r ( x ) = 0. a ) for a map a . and Lemma 5. (4) IL(=)(P) is closed under strict substitutions.21 Let IF be an i(')-metaframe.

so we have N. a IF Vv(SB1) (= S B ) [z]. IL(=)(F) = = Then {A E IF(=) {A E IF(=) I F It.9.21 and Proposition 5.An for any n E w ) .23 For an i(=)-metaframe IF Corollary 5. b IF B1[z] 3 N.26 (Soundness theorem) For any i(')-metaframe is an s. Therefore IL=(F) is conservative over IL(IF) We also obtain the following analogues of 5. (=). Now similarly to 5. but Proposition 5. a I t B [z] iff Vb E Rn(a) (N. bc It SB1 [zv] iff M. 449 ! Suppose B = VvB1 and (#) holds for B1.12.15.3 we obtain the following Proposition 5.15. I IF IF An for any n E w ) .5.15.15. b I t SB1 [z] + M. The cases B = B1 A Bz. b I t SB2 [z]) iff M. IL(=) (F) .15.25 Note that we cannot extend Lemma 5.15.23 still holds (cf.15. 3vB1 are left to the reader. However in the next section we will show that only i(=)metaframes can validate predicate all QH-axioms (and theorems).22 Let IF be an i(')-metaframe. Exercise 5.11 for the modal case). a I t SBI 3 SB2 (= S B ) [z] (where n = la/). B1 V Bz.12. we obtain it for B: N. Bz.12.1. INTUITIONISTIC SOUNDNESS If B = B1 > B2 and (g) holds for B1. F. Proof H C IL(Fn) if Fn is an SCframe. Proposition 5.B1 [zv] iff V b E Rn (a) Vc E D(b) M. v $ r(z).10. a I t B [z] iff V b E Rn(a) Vc E D ( b ) N. bc It. 5. and the case B = Iis trivial.24 All theorems of H are strongly valid in every 2-metaframe.22 to wi-metaframes.12.p.15. 4 R e m a r k 5.15. Thus (#) holds for B . T h e o r e m 5. b I t Bz [z]) iff V b E Rn(a) (M. By our assumption.

15. y ) [ x y ] .15.450 CHAPTER 5. ab E [+ ( P ) . [).for i'-metaframes).4) blt Q ( x ) [ x ]=+b l t V y P ( x . A2 := P ( x .e.14. So consider an intuitionistic model M = (IF. (3. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Proof Soundness of the inference rules is proved by the same argument as in 5.y ) [ x z ] . z ) [ x z ] . y # z . So we assume and prove that which means (3. Therefore t ab It. we prove the strong validity of the predicate axioms (and the axioms of equality . t hence ab I 3 y P ( x . y ) [ x z ]+ ab IF P ( x .which t is equivalent to a c E [ + ( P ) . z ) [ x z ] . y ) [ x z ] .7) b'd E Rn(b) b'c E D ( d ) d c l t P ( x . where y .P ( x . x It is sufficient t o show that ab It. z $ x. y ) [x].P ( x .12.3) b'b E R n ( a ) V C ED ( b ) b e l t ( Q ( x ) > P ( x . 11 = n.12. which is equivalent to ab I t P ( x . t Hence (by the reflexivity of Rn) for any c E D ( a ) . y ) [ x y ] . z ) [ x z ] . where Y $ x. 11 = n. z $ x. z ) > 3 y P ( x . all these formulas can be supposed clean.y ) [ x z ]by 5. ac I P ( x . y ) .then by 5. A1 := b'yP(x.14 a IF b'yP(x. t A3 := V y ( Q ( x )3 P ( x . So assume ab I V y P ( x . y ) [ x ] .y ) [x].1) means (3.12. Now similarly to 5. y ) [ x y ] . and we have to show for any b E R n ( a ) (3. y ) ) [ x y ] . 3 Y x Assuming let us show In fact. x Assume ab It. Since a zn a. y # z . y ) 1P ( x . 11 = n.13.i. for y. and thus to ac I P ( x . y ) ) 3 ( Q ( x ) V y P ( x 7 ) ) . .b'yP(x. by the definition of forcing it follows that a I 3 y P ( x . z ) .

so d E Rn(a).6) we obtain (4.8) d Q(x) [XI. (3. Therefore (3. y) [xy]. Eventually from (3.9) VCE D(d) d c l t Q(x) [xy].Q(x) [xyl.10) we obtain 'dc E D ( d ) d c I P ( x . then d E E+(Q). since b' znb. Y) 3 Q(x)) [XI [XI.5). for Y 2 ) Assuming (4. Rn is transitive.6). t which yields (3. y) [xy].5.7) b'c 11. so by (4.3) implies (3. t Now aRnb'. let us show (4.5) implies (3. A4 := V Y ( P ( ~ .6) b'c -!I ( P ( x .5) b'c I P ( x . by monotonicity.2) a ( 3 y P ( x . Y ) Q(x)) 3 ( ~ Y P ( x . From (4.4) bit-Q(x)[x]. t We have to show that (4.4) by monotonicity. x vy(P(x. INTUITIONISTIC SOUNDNESS Let b R n d . (4.3) b I 3yP(x. ~ 2 Q(x)) ) Consider an arbitrary b E Rn(a) such that (4. By (4. c E D(b1).8) b' I Q(x) 1x1. y) [x].1) a # x. (4. t and the latter implies (4. .3) we have for some b' znb.1 5 . 1 1 = n.9) and (3.y))[xy]. and thus (3. which implies (4.4) holds.1) (4.10) VcE D ( d ) d c l t (Q(x) 3 P(x. On the other hand. Y) 3 Q(x)) [XY]. Y3 Q(x)). and (3.

15. we present Definitions 5.452 CHAPTER 5.7. dn+2) P ( x . . So we can conclude that IL(=)(F) is a superintuitionistic predicate logic for any QSCmetaframe IF.18. y. y) [xyz].2) implies (abc) sub d by 5. z are distinct. b E Dn (aRnb =+ ( ~ . Thus soundness theorem 5.z) [xyz]. But first let us recall basic properties of i-metaframes and introduce some their versions. which (again by 5.16 Maximality theorem In this section we prove necessary conditions for intuitionistic soundness.14.7. and (6. . 2) [xz].9 in a more convenient form.15.dn.1) we readily obtain b = c. By 5. z $ x. this implies Since dn+l = dn+2. Thus (6. z)). y) > P ( x . 11 = n.26 implies Proposition 5. 5. ) . The proof is trivial. (6. 5. 5. z) [xyz]. y. Now we have to check that (6. (Oa) Va.15.18) implies d IF P ( x .4) is the same as (6.3) d lk P ( x . P(x.1) abc I t y = z [xyz] and From (6.8. ..20 (14). A6 := (y = z > .15.14. x In fact. METAFRAME SEMANTICS A5 := (x = x).3) d I t P ( x .15. y) [xyz] + d IF P ( x .15. assume (6.3) holds. Recall that QSCmetaframe is i'-functorial. a Rm(rub)). Hence dn+l = dn+2.5) (dl. So suppose (6. To this end.

4) Vn.e. We also need the following conditions: (12. ((ac)Rn+l(bd) =+ : Vd Vn > 0 Va. v E W V a E DZ V b aRnb). The correlation between different kinds of metaframes is shown in the diagram below. (w)i'metaframes also satisfy (mmz). (3a) for all a.1) Vn > 0 Vu.(a)Rnb =+ 3c E Dnfl (aRnf 'c & (7r. (2a). E D. (12.16.a) bRmfl (xu+c))). (14. (forward 2-lift property) (30) (backward 2-lift property) V a E Dn V b E Dm+' ((7rl.1) for any a . (mm2) Va. b E (12. bl. M A X I M A L I T Y THEOREM (la) (20) 453 V a E Dn Vb' E Dm((7rua)Rmb'+ 3 b E Dn(aRnb & r u b zmb')). + 3c E Dn+l((. b (x.2) Vn > 0 Vu. ( l a ) .rr.b)Rm(n. s-functorality) is equivalent to the conjunction of the following properties: (11) (Oa) holds for all permutations a. b E D1 . i-functorial metaframes i-metaframes wi-metaframes ---+ s-functorial metaframes i'-metaframes - wi'-metaframes +s=-functorial metaframes By Lemma 5. 62 ((a.v E W V a E DZ V E D. (13) D Vc E ED. b E Dn (aRnb + (aan)Rn+'(bbn)).14 the condition V a (00) (i.c) xn b)). wi-metaframes satisfy the same conditions for all injective a .b2) =+ bl = bz). a.14.5." ( a R n b + uRv). a)R2(b1.c) Rna & Recall that i-metaframes are the S4-metaframes satisfying (Oa).

1") for any a . a .2) & (15. So by 5.16. b E Dn+l (x.1 I n i-functorial metaframes (&. so (14. n > 0 3c E Dn b zn+l cc.1") 0 1 is ( 2 . L e m m a 5.3).12. By the same reason. so ( 2 0 1 ) is 0 1 = a: (and r0. e E D ( c ) (aRn+' ( c d ) & ( c e )Rn+'b). b. .a)Rn (ryb)+ 3c E Dn 3d. . 2 8 ~ e c a lthat l ri 6is obtained by eliminating cl from c. ( * and also the following:28 (15') for any a E D l . (14.a)R2(bn.9) that each of (I5).1").2) are respectively equivalent to (14. ( a .. a .2) for any n > 0. ( a ) = ?r:(a) is the 'da.I). (14.). r ) for any n > 0 .1) % (14. # bn+l Later on we will show (Lemma 5. b E Dn+l Proof Note that (14. METAFRAME SEMANTICS (14. (15. (14.) Rn+'b & bn # bn+l 3 c E R n ( a ) ( ( c % ) zn+'b).1) (aa.2") is (2"0.0 1 ) from 5.16. In fact world of a E D l ) . ( c ) = c l . (15. + & Now if c = ~ 1 ~then 2 . (14. b E Dn+l. b E D ~ + n > 0 ~ .1) is ( 2 0 1 ) . b E D1 ( I 4 . Analogously. (15') is equivalent t o (15.454 CHAPTER 5. b E Dn+2.2) for any a E Dn.+~) & b.2").1) @ (14.1) & (15. (r3" b) Rn+' (aa.3) for any a E Dn.2) is (20.) and (14.12.15.b E D' (nO(a)RO?rO(b) 3c E ~ ~ ( a R l n : c ?rO:(c)R1b)). n > 0 (15. n + ( c ) = c2.15.) & bn # bn+ 1 3 c E Dn 3d E D ( c ) ( c R n a & bRn+2 c ~ d ) ) .

4).[Dn].rr. [Dn]).4 Let IF be an s-functorial metaframe (1) If IF satisfies (la?) for any simple embedding a. Therefore c E (Rm(.rr. Recall that . (2) H satisfies ( l a ) for any a iff it satisfies (I2. b l # b2.10. Definition 5. [Dn]) . 2gFor the notation a m . L e m m a 5. let c := br1b2by-i.) If IF is s'-functorial.. Now letz9 a := am.11.) f a. satisfies (mm2)) iff .[Dn]. a E . j E Im. .2). Then by Lemma 5.rr. Proof s-functoriality implies permutability (cf. [Dn] is Rm-stable. and thus aRmc by s-functoriality.3 Every s-functorial metaframe satisfies ( l a ) for any permutation a .3. for any a E T n .rr. so ~ ( a s u b c )and thus c 9 n.(aa).9. a ( i ) = p(j).and thus a (p)morphism. then (a) F satisfies (15.11..3). n. Note that for an s-functorial metaframe IF. ~ ( j = 1 for j # i. (If. Then ci # c j . L e m m a 5. ( l a ) means that . i # j.11. .rr.2 Let IF be an s-functorial metaframe. Proof (Only if. and let a E (Em.2.[Dn] is Rm-stable. (2) I IF satisfies (la. then it satisfies ( l a ) for any Proof Follows from 5.16. but F does not satisfy (mm2). Next.Rm).Br it satisfies (12. n.rr. then a = an . Then (1) IF satisfies ( l o ) for any injection a i. by Lemma 5.3 and 5.5 Let F be an s-functorial metaframe. then it satisfies ( l a ) for any injection a .1).1).1 6.4).5.(blb2).which contradicts our assumption. is surjective iff a is injective. c = 7r.rr. consider T E Cn2 such that ~ ( i = 2.Rn) onto (Dm. f (b) ( l a ) holds for any a iff it holds for any in3ection a (iff IF satisfies (12. Then a = .6. is an automorphism of Fn.Tmn). L e m m a 5. (3) I IF is 3'-functorial. M A X I M A L I T Y THEOREM 455 The next lemma is similar to 5.5. by (1)). is a quasi-pmorphism from (Dn. (12. see the Introduction. L e m m a 5.4). .3) and (I2.16. and (15. so by 5.11.3 and the observation that the composition of quasimorphisms is a quasi-morphism.) (Lemma 5. Suppose (aa)Rz(blba).10.1).16. m 2 2.) Assume that n. and i.3) and (12.[Dn] is Rm-stable. ) ) On the other hand. Let us now reformulate the condition (la). and (la?) for every n.16. Then IF is s'-functorial (i.e.16. it satisfies (mm.

4(2).+l obviously implies the conclusion of (15. = b. (aa.16. T E Ckn Let a E Dn.3) is the quasi-lift property (10.CHAPTER 5.14.) and (12. c = c ' c ~ + ~ E Dk+l.+lRm+ld.1) is false. METAFRAME SEMANTICS (12. and assume that Then by (27). the second one is an easy exercise for the reader. then u . there exists d = dfdm+l E Dm+' such that ( n .4(1)..+l E D n f l such that aRn(n. Now let us turn t o properties ( 2 a ) . w .+l in the premise.18. L e m m a 5. ( d .16. Now by ( 2 u ) . 7 E Ckm. a ) .)+ b ) R k + l c . # b. Now (15.+l). Since 0 1 is a:. T+)R~" d . thus (15. = b. So by the transitivity of R ~ + 'it follows that (n(. . so the premise of (15.. ( 2 ) Similarly. ) + b = b .b) = b' and (nu+ = (b' . . we can apply 5.1) is (2a:). Lemma 5. 7 ) ) . we can apply Lemma 5. a)b.3) the worlds of a and b are zO-equivalent. Let a E Em.3) can also be replaced with its particular case corresponding to n = 1. T + ) R ~ + ' c . a ) R m ( n y d ) = d'. (3) (a) By (mm.16. up to the conjunct b.1) -just put c = b. Then and ( 3 a ) & (37) + ( 3 ( a . (3a). r)bn+1 = ((nu+ .+l)Rn+lb implies b. So assume ( 2 0 ) & (27).. there exists b = bfb.+l. so it can be analysed in a similar way. But b. ) for n > 0. Proof We prove only the first implication.4) is the quasi-lift property ( l a . Note that in (12. It is clear that ( 3 0 ) is dual to ( 2 a ) . (b) Obviously follows from ( 2 ) and (3)(a).1) @ (la:).6 Let IF be an s-functorial S4-metaframe. Thus b) ~ ( . Proof ( 1 ) (12.( a -7)' = ((b'. but not necessarily equal. . cf. T + ) b) ( by s-functoriality.

). Proof Let us check (30).2).b = (c' . d E D(c). (2) (20) & (3a) holds for any a i f f (14.7.1). and ( 2 ~ . similarly with (15.' ) ~ ~ ( ( a .16.2) & (15. + ~ and thus cRn+l(nU+ by the reflexivity of Rn+' b) So to prove (20).a-l) . so we can respectively change (15.16.16. c E Dn.7 Let IF be an s-functorial S4-metaframe. Then (2a). (30) is obtained from (2a) by replacing every Rk with its converse and permuting a with c. (30) for all injective a (respectively.3). then . (respectively for all a.8 Let F be an s-functorial S4-metaframe. (3a) hold for any permutation a E T. IF Note that a R n b iff (aan)Rn+'(bb..2) & (15.This is the same as with ( l a ) in Lemma 5.1). Let Put b = (c' ~ .1.2) & (15. We also have: ng+b = ((c' . (b) (20) & (3a) holds for any a iff it holds for any injection a (2. a"_). (201) is equivalent to (I4.2) & (I4. then (a) F satisfies (15. L e m m a 5. a .16. a-l) = a. (3) If F is s'-functorial. Then (1) (20) & (30) holds for any a iff (14.2). (2) ( 2 a 9 is If g = cd.2).e. so (30. MAXIMALITY THEOREM 457 L e m m a 5. = c ' ~ = c.3).1) & (14. But this replacement does not change (I4. Proof (1) As we noticed in the proof of 5. by (2)). it suffices to check them only for simple embeddings a.5.1) & (14.) . for all a).16.) by s-functoriality. ) is equivalent to (14.) is equivalent to (2a. a nZ. iff satisfies (14. (14.2).3). Then by s-functoriality.l ) % + ~ .2). .

3). put then (aan)Rn+l(. Thus (aan)Rn+l (. bl # b2. e e 2 .+l.rrY+lb). METAFRAME SEMANTICS Note that this implication holds if b.ds) & d2 # d3 + 3 e E D 2 d x3 ee2). bn+2) by s-functoriality. hence b. which is an equivalent of (15.a = eze2.3). a ( 2 ) = 3.1) & (15. for bl = b 2 .4). Suppose + + Then (a.+z.2) holds trivand ially.bz) x2 (c. then each of these conditions implies (15.2) is equivalent to each of (I5).b2). Suppose (I5).bn+2). hence by (I5').a )R~(d2. so by s-functoriality it follows that blb2 z2e2e2.(15) for n. . Proof Let us first show that (15) is equivalent to (15').a )R2(bn+l. an)Rn+l (b. and c ~ =dcb.+l). Let us find c E D1 such that (bl.20 s-functorial metaframes satisfy (mm. If a E T 2 3 is such that a ( 1 ) = 2. So (15. By (15') for n. assume (15') for n 1.l find c E D.1) & (15.16. Rn+2 with their converses. Thus an equivalent of ( 3 0 2 ) is obtained from (15.rr.5'). = b. (*) Assume (15) for n = 1: b'a E D1 b'd E D3 ( ( a .9 Let IF be an s-functorial metaframe satisfying. (3)(b) By 5.2) & (15. In fact. suppose ( a .2) by replacing Rn+'.+'b). Then we apply (15) to a := c'. (15') hold for n. b and obtain c E Dn+l such that b zn+2 ccn+1. To check (I5'). (2) If IF also satisfies (I2.+l. 3c E Dn+l b xn+2 C&+l. bn+2 c there exists c' E D n f l such that bl x n f l c'ck. Put d := blb2bl. (15) for n = 1 + (15') for n = 1.. Similarly we obtain (15. and . b+ # b. then blb2bl . A + (15') for n 1 =+. ( a .+'b) implies a R n c by s-functoriality. SOwe assume b E Dn+2.+ld = bRnf' b by reflexivity.458 so (20:) is equivalent t o CHAPTER 5.14. implies (aa.+l. L e m m a 5. a = blb2.a ) R 2 ( b l . . and we can put c = e2. In fact. By (*) there exists e E D2 such that d x3 ee2 = elezez.) sub (. (15'). and let us prove (15') for n 1.2). a E D l . = b.3) and thus (15) @ (15') @ (15. .c). Then (1) (15.rrl.+' such that b xn+2 k + l . Therefore ( 2 a 9 is equivalent to (15.

(15') implies (15. an)R2(cn.+~. Suppose + (aan)Rn+l6l. (aa. (an. . Hence by s-functoriality (deen)Rn+2b.+l. and . . Then by s-functoriality.16. . and (T... such that cl . . there exists c E Dn such that b =. and so aRn(cl . Therefore (15.1) holds.. which proves the conclusion of (15.2). d E D(e) such that (ee. (15. assume (15'). since b. In fact. b. c. .&+I) by s-functoriality. G . . NOWby (15') applied to d := bn+2b1 there exists e = cocl . .+' b) Rn+' (aa. . By s-functoriality we also have so (d2. Now we can apply (15. Hence by (I5'). Therefore for c := e l .d)~"+~(&bl). b E D.3).. cl . Suppose a E Dn.+l ="+' dd.+I c ~ Hence ( a a n ) R n + ' ( c ~ ) transitivity.3) (where d2 . Then by (12. k ) .~ + (15') + (15. Then by s-functoriality. by eventually aRnc.5. assume (I5. c + ~ zn+l . Let a E Dn. an)R2(bn.. M A X I M A L I T Y THEOREM (15. Suppose a E Dn.%+I.2). .1). . G + ~ we obtain d E Dn+l .1) & (15. %+I) by s-functoriality. . by s-functoriality. then aRn (bl .dn+l)Rna.4) there exists c E Dn+2 such that cl b ~ ~ and aa. . we have aRnc and ( c ~ QRn+2bas required.). b E Dnf 2. In fact. # b. .. bn+'bn+2bl (this is possible. . (aan)Rn+'b. Now (a. . . Thus ) again by s-functorality.b.+l). so by (15') (applied to a. . stands for c. assume (15'). .and thus by (15.+.2) (15).+l.bn+l E Dn+2. an)R2(bn. . dl stands for d).1) there exists c E Dn+' such that b x ~ c k + l . . In fact.bn+l) = xyf 'b. d.cn E Dn+' such that . .+l # bn+2). (15') + (15. (a. So there exist e E Dn. bn). . Assume (15').1).4). ) Finally let us show that together with (I2.2) t o a and 6lbl = b2.) R"+' (bl .

5. (3) F is a wz=-metaframe iff IF is an z5-metaframe iff F is a wi-metaframe satisfying (mmz).take c = b. (I5.16. the same happens to the 2-lift properties.11 Let F be an S4-metaframe such that Q H Then P is an i(=)-metaframe. (15')). then by 5.4) & (15.15.2). Proof By Proposition 5.15. F is monotonic(=). Consider the QH-theorem for p E PLOand its substitution instance. then by 5.10 it is sufficient to check the properties ( Let IF be an S4-metaframe. the latter implies (15).3) & (I2.16. The proofs in both cases are quite similar.3). Proposition 5.7. for monotonic= metaframes the quasi-lift property for all injections implies it for all maps.2).8. Then (1) P is a wi-metaframe iff F is an s-functorial metaframe satisfying (12. the 2-lift properties for injections are (together) equivalent to (14.1) & (14.9. and by 5.2). IL(')(F). in s-functorial metaframes the quasi-lift property for all maps is equivalent to (12. if P is weakly functorial and satisfies (I5). (15') become obvious if bn # bn+l is replaced with b. So if P is quasi-functorial. n > 0 d E D(a) (or uRv.1). (2) By 5.c) znb). which yields the quasi-lift and the 2-lift properties.3) & (12.1) & (I4.1) & (15.16. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Note that again (I5). Therefore we obtain the following equivalent form of Definitions 5. The other way round. (I4.460 CHAPTER 5.4).16. Also by (I).16.4). 5.). the quasi-lift property for injections is equivalent to (12. (2) F is an i-metaframe iff F is a wi-metaframe satisfying (15) (or equivalently.1). (3) By 5.3). By & (15. = bn+l . it satisfies (I5.15.1) & (14. it satisfies (12. By 5.1). d E D.16.2).2).5. the 2-lift properties for all maps are equivalent to (14.3) & (12.9.4) a R n b =. Proof (1) If a metaframe is s-functorial.16.16.3). (15.16. . (I4. V d E D(a) 3c E Dn+l ((ad)Rn+lc & (T. So by Proposition 5. Proposition 5. Suppose aRnb.8.8.2).8.2) & (15. By 5.3) & (12. it is weakly functorial and satisfies (15.4) & (14.16. (12.4) & (14. (15): (12.1) & (14.

Recall that by Proposition 5.16. y. by the definition of J. a assumption M IF A we obtain Iy P ( x ) > Q ( x )[ x ] .5. .rrl.z ) > V z P ( x .4).The latter is equivalent to be $ c + ( P ) . .10. is true in M . so we check only (14. by definition of forcing it follows that T .z ) [ x ] . bde Iy P ( x . this property is essential only for the case without equality. to ( b e ) R n f' c . in particular b E c+(P). ( .R-'(u).so from the and thus M . '$+(Q)= W . M A X I M A L I T Y THEOREM where 1x1 = n . Since x = ( x y ) . be an intuitionistic model such that '$) 461 Thus '$+( P ).z ) [ x y z ] . c Iy P ( x .1 6.a)Rn(r. a Iy . where 1x1 = n .a) Rn(r.z ) [xy].So there exists bde E Dn+2 such that aRn+' ( b d ) and M . J ) such that '$+(P) 0"'' . y @ x . which proves (12. The changes for (12. Suppose (rl.z ) . Let M := (IF.a Iy 3yVzP(x. For these properties the proofs are also similar.c). y # z .'$+(Q).'$+ ( Q ) = xn (b).2).hence M .c) and consider the intuitionistic model M := ( I F . V z P ( x .e.a Iy V z P ( x z )[ x ] Now M IF B implies M . z $ x . '! But M .i. Thus (14. By the assumption.z ) [ x z ] . + l c& c IF P ( x ) [xy]& c Iy Q ( x )[ x y ] .and so since (r.(Rn+l)-'(c). ad So there exists c such that IPL ( P ( x )3 [xyl- ( a d ) ~ . hence M . the QH-theorem (the sub= stitution instance of the same A l ) B := 3yVzP(x. r.2) holds. we have M .3) are now obvious: n = 0 and '$+ ( P ) = R ( u ) .

hence ( d e ) ~ ~ + 'by .1) M . Then there exists de E Dnf l such that ( 1 ) dRna and d e It.B [xz].<) that such Then obviously Now we claim that (0. z @ x. suppose the contrary. is equivalent to By ( 1 ) we also have E By our initial assumption. (3) we obtain which according t o the choice of M. In fact. Hence By the choice of M. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Suppose (aan)Rn+'Cl. Now by ( 6 ) we obtain . a Iy 3 z B [x].)Rn+'El. A is a QH-theorem (a substitution instance of the axiom A2 := P ( x n ) > 3 z P ( z ) ) . (aa.(5). y and consider the following formulas: #z Obviously.462 CHAPTER 5. y. Consider the intuitionistic model M := (F. dRna implies d # [+(Q2) and thus Now from (2). Take a distinct list x of length n.

* (I) by Theorem 5. d ly Q1 (x. Then b := en+le fits for the conclusion of (15).15. by (0) and 21~1L IP P2(y.26. if (in M) d Iy Q ~ ( x [XI.T p) (cf. z) [xzy]. x.16. (2) + (3) by Proposition 5.e. therefore t However note that ) In fact. Eventually from (8) and (9) it follows that So there exists e E Dn+' such that which is equivalent to by (0). T h e o r e m 5. A2 from the proof above.12 So we see that IF is an i(=)-metaframe if IL(')(F) contains > A0 := (p > . H R e m a r k 5. (3) (1) + (2) is trivial. This contradicts (7) and the reflexivity of Rn+2.12) and Al. M A X I M A L I T Y THEOREM On the other hand. then by definition.) $ E+(Q1).11.5. .13 (Maximality theorem) Let P be an S4-metafiame.) [XI. Then the following conditions are equivalent: (2) QH c IL(=) (IF). But the latter means (dd. the proof of 5.16. P r o o f In fact. So we have proved that a ly 3zB [x].14.But M I A.16. dRna. i. which implies (ddn)Rn(aan) by s-functoriality. x.16.

RO)is a two-element chain. dl.16. For example. (I2. . .13 shows that (using the terminology from Section 2. cn+l) if u = UO. .ul).bn. and (bl. see the following figure: Again..(mm2) fails. Rn) is a tree of height 2 with the root d : . .. .e) := (al.do)Rl2(dl.. RIn = Rn U (Rn)-l. (cl. . . (do. Note that the classes of weak i-metaframes.14 Let IF1 = ((Fn)nEw.=) generated by i(')-metaframes. for (16.1).. .. In the next section we will apply this criterion to describe intuitionistic soundness in Kripke-quasi-bundles.10.&... then we can put (bl.2) hold obviously. a n . . Theorem 5.16. (16. In fact. On the other hand. Example 5.&+l) if ( a l . P1is a wi-metaframe: the s-functoriality. ..d O ) ~ ~ ( d ~but there does not exist b' = (bo.an.an) Rn(cl. .( a i . Let us consider two simple examples. .b.an+l.15 Let IF2 be the metaframe with the same D as F1 and with the universal R'O.d2). . . and even an i-metaframe: (15) holds since (do.cn). d2).do..4). bl. . . .e. IF2 is not an 2'-metaframe . . d. but dl # d2.16.. . because it is generated by all S4-metaframes strongly validating QH(')-theorems.3). METAFRAME SEMANTICS Therefore we can introduce the intuitionistic semantics of metaframes MF~.d.cn). . . by Proposition 5. . i-metaframes and i=-metaframes are actually different. &+I) E (Dv)n+l. (12. IF2 is a wi-metaframe. i. (Dn. (Do. an+l) E (D. .12) this is the greatest sound semantics of S4-metaframes for superintuitionistic logics. yields a precise criterion of intuitionistic soundness for metaframes. . . (al. Example 5. . (I6. .2): if n > 0. d2). since (do. . bl) z3(dl. e) := (do. n-tuples from D.. . do. a n ) = ( ~ 1 . the tuple @ sees all On one hand. etc.)n+l. since (15) fails for n = 1. DO = {uo. . Therefore the list of properties of i(')-metaframes. d2). . .do.do) x3 (dl.464 CHAPTER 5. IF1 is not an i-metaframe. On the other hand. .16. (which are incomparable). be an SCmetaframe such that D). d2.

a Kripke quasi-bundle is a quasi-pmorphism between S4-frames.dl-i)) . . uo aRnb iff a = (bl. F is an i=-metaframe.rr : Fl Fo.13). a monotonic surjective map with the quasi-lift property. b.. al) E DE. On the other hand. + + Note that we can consider M 3 . . in fact. Let us also show that the class of i'-metaframes is larger than the class of QS4-metaframes (which are sound for the modal case).b.22). and 73b E Duo (ala2)R2(ao. ao) E 'D (al. sound metaframes are same (see Theorem 5. Dul = {dl.19.16 Consider an Shmetaframe F such that W = {UO. . . Recall also that IL(IF) = ILZ(F) n IF is the fragment without equality for any i=-metaframe F (by Proposition 5. because the (n 1)-tuple (ao. We still do not know if all these semantics are equal to M3g. the class of i-metaframes (which are sound for the intuitionistic logic without equality) is larger than the class of i=-metaframes. It also corresponds to a metaframe constructed - . IF is not a modal metaframe. .. . Rn = x n .3) holds: one can take (bi. := Rl n (D. di) & b = (dl-i.17 Kripke quasi-bundles Recall that according to Definition 5.) V 3i 5 l ( a = (di. bb) = (al. . .12. a n ) since R" = zn. On the one hand. . also as a semantics for superintuitionistic logics without equality. and we can stick together ( n 1)-tuples in Dul .3) fails.5. Every Kripke quasi-bundle .).16. .1 7. . . the condition (12.ao. Duo = {do). x D. . .a l . . Ri). . .b). because (12. Example 5.5.. Recall that in the modal case there is no difference between logics with or without equality in this respect. E. .C P OY holds.e. a2) E D?. (al. KRIPKE QUASI-BUNDLES Therefore. = u1. is associated with a system of domains Du := {T-'(u) I u E Fo)and a family of inheritance relations pu.UI). . . . 5. d2). . as a semantics for superintuitionistic logics (with or without equality) and MFG..g. And (16) also :: has an ="+I.fl. Obviously. . where Fi = (Wi.15. . a1R1ao. . i.

an)Rn(cl.) & b subc & csub b. b E Dn (bi are not necessarily distinct).3). .3. and a sub b implies (n. Rn). The cases when a. then there exists c E Dn+' such that dR1&+l & Vs I(b.2"). . (be)Rn+lc. (I2. (16.. Proof First.%) and d R 1 ~ + lThe requirement in (2) that d.R1c.4) is the quasi-lift property.(i) R1ba(~). with a R n b iff V j ajRlbj & a sub b. Proposition 5.1) is the same as (1). Then a s u b c and csuba. . . since the relations R1. ..)..2) or its equivalent version 5. the logic IL(=)(F) of a Kripke quasi-bundle IF is superintuitionistic iff the conditions ( I ) . . which follows from the definition of a Kripke quasi-bundle. . = ct). We call such quasi-bundles intuitionistic (or. . b = (bl. all ai and d are distinct.) & Vs. c E Dn+l.%) iff V s 5 n (b. .a) sub (nab). l .. . So Ri = Ri for i = 0 .+' E { a l . are distinct. (12. . (12. .8 (16. Now (3) yields us a tuple (bde) E Dn+2 such that aRn+l(bd). (3) are necessary: they definitely hold if IF is an i-metaframe. c E Dn+'. .2).17. %+l E {cl . all ci are distinct and Vs a.2. are distinct (but perhaps e = d or e = bi) such that (3) These conditions allow us to 'move' individuals from one world to another. . In fact. . a. (2). n n if n > 0. In fact. we also have (ad)Rn+'c. and (ad) E Dn+'. = (Dn. z1 c. since (al. . So let a. n y a zn nTc. .. In fact. and Vs asR1bs. It remains to check (16. Thus we may assume that all a j and all bj are distinct. RO. METAFRAME SEMANTICS as in the case of Kripke bundles.)) be a metaframe corresponding to an intuitionistic Kripke quasi-bundle. . . . The monotonicity is almost obvious..) zn c = (cl.16.1). all ai are distinct. (16.1 Let IF = ( F . Then IF is an i-metaframe iff IF is an i=metaframe zff the following conditions hold: (2) if n > 0. bl. they respectively follow from (I6. the n-levels are F. .10.. . z1c. Therefore. Definition 5. cf.(D. Also note that the conditions (I).b. = bt @ c. Now let us check the properties of i'-metaframes stated in Proposition 5.c.b. P is an S4-metaframe: all Rn are reflexive and transitive. a l . . .3) follows from (2).sub are reflexive and transitive.466 CHAPTER 5. . . (2).a.a. Vi aiR1bi implies Vi a. is overcome due to the 'local functionality'.. then there exists (bde) E Dn+2 such that d. . t I (b. (3) hold.16.) are obvious.

18. which is not modal. = { d l . ~ u ~ = ( ( 4 . Then iff t (1) M . .e. L e m m a 5. i-quasi-bundles). i n IF are monotonic (in particular. i= 1 N D e f i n i t i o n 5. i f F is a modal or a wi-metaframe). i L e m m a 5. fails for Kripke quasi-bundles. let M = ( I F ... corresponds t o the Kripke quasi-bundle (W. R N ) and let V C W .18. 5. For instance.u0 x 211. they generate a sound semantics for superintuitionistic logics. Then the submetaframe I I is the restriction of F FV to V . respectively). respectively).D .16.d 2 ) ~ u ~ = ~ .. a I ( k ) A[x] for any appropriate assignment ( a .~ T h i s explains why the construction o f the C-set corresponding t o a Kripke bundle described in the proof o f Proposition 7.18. Duo = {do).ul).5.)) be an N-metaframe based on F = (W. ~ u ~ .18. i n particular.. . the i'-metaframe F from Example 5.tIV) (the restriction o f M t o V ) such that (tIV)+(Pjn)= t+(Pjn) n (DIV)". wi-) metaframe. A submetaframe FIV is called generated i f V C W is Ri-stable for every i = 1. i. ROIV= R0 [ V . Every intuitionistic Kripke bundle is clearly an i-quasi-bundle. z=-. J ) over IF (N-modal or intuitionistic) gives rise to the model MIV := (IFIV. then each of its n-level ( F I V ) .x) (modal or intuitionistic.4 A metaframe model M = ( F .18.1 Let IF = ( F . Note that a metaframe associated with a Kripke quasi-bundle is not necessarily modal.8.16. a IF ( k ) A[x] MIV. I u E V ) with relations RYIV := Rr 1 (DIV). or a w metaframe. (D. P ) . ..I). i=-.R1.dl-i)). IFlV a generated submetaframe.(resp. and let M l V be the corresponding submodel of M .. W = { u o . iddui ( 2 = 0. is a generated subframe of F.11. it has a system of domains is DIV := ( D ..18.3 A cone F l u of a metaframe IF (for u E F O )is its restriction to the subset (cone) R*(u)i n the base F O . N .(resp.18 Some constructions on metaframes D e f i n i t i o n 5. Recall that R* is the reflexive transitive closure o f U Ri. I ) . . (2) Every submetaframe of an N-modal metaframe is an N-modal metaframe (3) Every generated submetaframe of an i. SOME CONSTRUCTIONS O N METAFRAMES 467 briefly. D e f i n i t i o n 5. t ) be a model (N-modal or intuitionistic. . wi-) metaframe is also an i.2 (1) If FIV is a generated submetaframe of F and all the maps TD.5 Let F be an N-modal metaframe satisfying (12.. .

IFj = ( ( F j n )D j ) . METAFRAME SEMANTICS Proof By induction on the length of A.(&-. for u F W F . a I+ A [x]for some ( a .(wi-. .). Hence we obtain Proposition 5. a A [XI. D ) such that j€J Fn = ( D n . 2-') Proposition 5.18.18. and for a .R. and thus MTu. Their disjoint sum (union) U Pj is defined as the metaframe F = ((F. .8 Let be a family of metaframes of the same type ( N . . . modal or intuitionistic). = (Djn. . P r o o f If M = ( I F . (2) F is an N-modal metaframe. . j€J Then j€J u Fjn. Note that every valuation (N-modal or intuitionistic) in FlV is also a valuation in F and it coincides with its restriction to FIV. or respectively an i.18.( i .6 (1) ML')(F) M L ~ =( ) I V ) and ML(')(F) C ML(')(FIV) for a generated P submetaframe of an N-modal metaframe P.R.11. . for u = rD(a). 6)I+ A then M ..x ) .468 CHAPTER 5. Thus we cannot state (1) for an arbitrary rn metaframe.. . see Section 5. where Dn = (J D z . b E Djn w€Fo L e m m a 5. (2) IL?)(P) & IL!=)(FIV)and I L ( = ) ( F ) IL(')(FIV)for a generated submetaframe IF. Note that in the intuitionistic case it is essential that in a wi-metaframe an inductive clause for 3 can be rewritten with = instead of R .i=-) metaframe iff all Fj are. rn Definition 5. Fj.RjnN). w . metaframe of an i.R.9 Let F = ( I ) Fn 2 U IFj.7 (1) ML?)(F) = M L ~ = ) ( F ~ u ) ML(=)(IF) = and ML(')(FTU)for an ucw uEW N-modal metaframe F ..). = uEW n n (2) IL:=)(F) n I L ~ ) ( F T U )and I L ( = ) ( F )n I L ( = ) ( F T U ) an i.18.) metaframe IF.

) j = nMLL=)(IFj) for N-modal metaframes.l. 5. Definition 5. every cone in j j corresponding IFj.=.=) satisfy the collection property (CP) (see Section 2. > Proposition 5.1.4..18. j ) . . 5.1 For every i(')-sound 1-metaframe IF there exists an S4metaframe IF' such that IL(=)(IF') = IL(=)(F). The notations ILL=).p.19. MF~. cf.13.19. n 0. . To conclude our description of intuitionistic sound metaframes.1. . . Finally a metaframe IF is called i(=)-sound if IL(=)(F) is an s.5. i=)-metaframes.. a valuation [ in a 1metaframe is called intuitionistic if Rn(tf ( P y ) ) J+(Pjn)for any predicate letter Py.) of arbitrary i(=)metaframes actually equals the semantics of all i(')-sound metaframes.10 (1) ML?)(uIF. Hence IF' is also i(=)-sound. j ) ) .( a n .16. ON SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC SOUND METAFRAMES 469 Proof (1) The map U Fjn jEJ - F sending ( a .2.cf. validity.14. we now prove the following statement. and strong validity are rewritten in a straightforward way (cf. j (2) IL?) (U~ j j= ) n IL(=) (Fj) for i.14.14.19. Definitions 5. to is an isomorphism.3). so it is an i(') -metaframe.. j (3) Similarly for IL. by 5. Now the definitions of forcing. IL(=) are also used in this case.. we need two auxiliary notions.14. Therefore the semantics M F ~ ) . each IFj is isomorphic to a generated submetaframe of is isomorphic to a cone in the UIFj. 5.16). j ) (for a E Dj") ( ( a l . On the other hand. (2) An exercise.(wi-. M L Proof On one hand. Therefore we can conclude that the semantics MF:.19 On semantics of intuitionistic sound metaframes Note that all definitions related to i(')-soundness can be readily extended to arbitrary (not necessarily S4-) 1-metaframes. L e m m a 5. Namely. To prove Proposition 5.

a I t P n ( x ) . . (1) If B1 E IL(F). = of B2. every reflexive propositional frame (and 1-metaframe) is w-reflexive and co-serial. and an intuitionistic model M = (F. R) is called weakly reflexive (or w-reflexive. Then M. B := p B E IL(') (F). z $ x. x 2 F V ( A ) and a. In fact.14. then IF is co-serial.19. . cf. Bz E IL(P). then IF is monotonic(=).5 A 1-metaframe F is monotonic(') i f it satisfies (im) M . b E Dn. so there exists b E (Rn)-'(a) satisfying the condition: 3c E D(b) M . 19931). if c E Rn(a) and M . > (T > p). Consider the formulas B1 := 3zT and B2 := (T > p) > p. A 1-metaframe IF is called w-reflexive if all its levels Fn are w-reflexive. Thus a E <(Pn) so a((Rn)* o Rn)a. (2) If IF is co-serial and B2 E IL(F).[) such that [+(Pn) ((Rn)*o Rn)(a). since M. then F is w-reflexive.3 A propositional frame F = (W.6 Let F be a co-serial-metaframe. Then M .19. a IF (T > Pn(x))[x]. Consider the substitution instance (Rn)-' (a). Let x = (xl. R) is called co-serial if Vu3v vRu.[).14.19.4 Let F be a 1-metaframe. Proof (1) Suppose B1 E IL(F). choose b E by co-seriality. b I t Bi [x] and bRna. then c E [+(Pn).19. . a Il. [Dogen. for short) i f the transitive closure of R is reflexive (cf. a I t A [x] & a R n b + M. Thus M. [x]. and so M . . This implies co-seriality. c IF Pn(x) [x].2 A propositional frame F = (W. A 1-metaframe IF is co-serial i f all F are co-serial.19.Bl[x]. b I A [x] t for all for A E IF('). L e m m a 5. METAFRAME SEMANTICS Definition 5. Proposition 5. a E Dn. Obviously. Given a E Dn. bc IF T[xz]. Hence the w-reflexivity of IF follows. 5. Definition 5. If .xn). (2) Suppose IF is co-serial. c It T . Consider an arbitrary intuitionistic model M = (IF.470 CHAPTER 5.. Definition 5.

19. co-serial. a I A [XI. where L e m m a 5. t M. a I A [x] u M*.4.Rn*). let M*. So it is sufficient to show that for every model M = (F.. So M .7 I for a I-metaframe IF.€.it follows that M. t t t t Since M. QH G IL(=)(IF) and even."ir.B [x] and M*. let M*. Then M.a IF A [XI. We proceed by induction and consider only three non-trivial cases. ON SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC SOUND METAFRAMES 471 Proof 30 Let us check (im) for a formula A E IF(=). (T 3 p) 3 p E IL(=)(F). Then M*. 5. 31N~te that R* o R = R o R* is the transitive closure of R. b I B [x] and M. 30Cf. a It. 7rxlly(bc) B [xlly] t and M*. Then there exist b. and monotonic('). b I t A [XI. D) we deD). b Iy C [x]. H Corollary 5. 7rXlly(bc) B [ X I [ y]. P r o o f Note that (p = (T> p ) ) E IL(')(P) iff p 3 ( T 3 p).19. and obviously b E Rn*(a). Due t o co-seriality. d E Dn and c E D(b) such that3' bRndRn*a and M*. the S4-metaframe IF* = ((Dn. a I A [XI. Take d E Dn such that aRn*dRnb. d I A [x].B [x] and M.8 For a w-reflexive metaframe IF = ((Dn.14. fine its transitive closure. then there exist b E (Rn)-'(a) and I F c E D(b) such that M . d I A [x] y y and by monotonicity M. w Definition 5. If M . Assume a R n b and M . 3 t T ) C IL(')(F). since <+(Pn) is Rn-stable iff it is Rn*-stable.€.19. c I B' [x]. a I A [x] by monotonicity.5.. Consider a substitution instance B' := A > ( T > A) of B. (1) A = B 2 C.lly(bc)It. The other way round. Then apply 5. y The other way round. . So M*. a It. Lemma 5. If M . a I ( T > A) [XI.19. there exists cRna.9 Let IF be a w-reflexive monotonic(=)-metaframe. the following holds: > e).15.J) and the correfor every ordered assignment (x. if {p = f ( T > p). So M*. Hence Itt t t M. Rn* = Rn+ is the transitive closure of Rn. a I A [x] as well. Now M.B [xlly]. a I A [x]. b I T [x] implies M. b I C [x]. Then P r o o f It is clear that J is an intuitionistic valuation in IF iff J is an intuitionistic valuation in IF*. Then there exists b E Rn*(a) y y t such that M*. so M . a) such that sponding model M* = (IF*. a I A [x].6. b It.since aRn*b.19. b It.A [XI. and thus M . b I C [x] y t y by the induction hypothesis. a I A [x]. then IF is w-reflexive.A [x]. (2) A = 3yB [x]. .Rn). b I B [x] and M*.ir.then there exists b E Rn(a) such that y M. x FV(A).lly(bc)I B [xlly].19. b I C [x].

By the way.9 IL(')(F) = IL(')(F*).19. the proof of Proposition 5. L e m m a 5.15.11 . By Corollary 5.1 l(3) to arbitrary 1-metaframes: Proposition 5. Then the following conditions are equivalent: (3) F is w-reflexive and monotonic(=). 3zT.19.9 and Theorem 5. cf.10 Let F be a 1-metaframe.19.16. Assume (4). By Lemma 5. and F* is an i(')-metaframe. we can give an explicit description of the class of all i(')-sound metaframes. or cf. Note that all formulas in (4) are QH-theorems. Al := 3yp 3 p. basing on Proposition 5. The previous consideration in this sectionallows us toextendLemma5. namely we put F' = F*. these conditions are equivalent to (4) the following formz~lasare in IL(=)(P): p (T 3 p).15 and 5.7.16. and therefore IF* is an i(')-metaframe.26 (soundness). So formulas from (4) are in IL(=)(F*).19. so by and Corollary 5. (2)+(3).19.11. Viz.16. METAFRAME SEMANTICS (3) The case A = QyB [x] similar. Section 5.9.11. P r o o f (3)+(1). Then F is w-reflexive and monotonic(=) by 5. and 5.10 (1) % (3).7obviously imply Proposition5. to check that IF* is an i(=)-metaframe. the condition (00) becomes or equivalently a R n b + (rUa)Rm*(nub). Lemma 5.472 CHAPTER 5. Remark 5.19.19. which we state without a proof.19.1.16) with Rn* replacing Rn. is Lemma 5. Here is a description of monotonicity(') for arbitrary metaframes. (4)+(3).14. In particular.19. Moreover. so (2) readily implies (4).11 and rn Lemma A2 := P(x) 3 3zP(z) Here A1 and A2 are the formulas used in the proof of Proposition 5. we can rewrite all conditions from the definition of an i(=)metaframe (cf..19.

and unlike the case of metaframes. cf.11.5. Now let us consider more general kind of frames. (d) express the monotonicity for the implication and the quantifiers Q. Recall that in the usual Kripke semantics for predicate logics we have a system of nested domains D = (D. (2) IF is monotonic' iff it is monotonic and satisfies (mm2). (iv) cRnbRna =+ Ve E D(c) 3d3g E D(d) (dRna & ( c e ) ~ * ( " + ' ) ( d ~ ) ) . but the semantics is the same. in metaframes. accessibility relations Rn (or R r . Y).u. 3 respectively. (iii) aRnbRnc + Ve E D(c) 3d3g E D(c) (aRnd & (dg)IP("+')(ce))... in the polymodal case) between n-tuples of individuals for different n 2 1 may be arbitrary. I u E F). w E W ( u R v R w + 3t ( u R t & wR*t & t R ' w ) ) . The interested reader can try to restore the missing details. . (ii) aRnbRnc 3c'(aRnc' & cRn*c & c'Rn*c). i.19.20 Simplicia1 frames Introduction In the last section of this chapter we briefly describe the next step in generalising Kripke-type semantics. . R ) is called weakly transitive if Vu. they describe inheritors of individuals in accessible worlds. 3yP(x. is considered as its own inheritor in the domains D. At the next step. the proof of 5. in which n-tuples are 'abstract'. of all worlds v accessible from u.e. for formulas P ( x ) > Q(x). 5. QY~(x. and every individual from D. (c). Accessibility relations between n-tuples of individuals (for n > 1) can be derived from these accessibility relations on individuals. . so the sets Dn for n 2 1 are a priori independent. SIMPLICIAL FRAMES (I) A I-metaframe F is monotonic iff it satisfies (i) a R n b + (nua)Rm*(nub)for any a E Em. and only the requirement of soundness puts some constraints on these relations.14. We point out that the description of i(')-soundness in 5. .20.11 is more complicated than the notion of an i(')-metaframe. The condition (ii) means that all levels Fn are weakly t r a n ~ i t i v e . Here the condition (i) corresponds to (00) in F* and expresses the monotonicity for atomic formulas P(nux). In Kripke sheaves. But n-tuples a = (al. ~ ~ Actually the conditions (b). So all n-tuples are taken from the set Dn = U{DZ I u E F). Kripke bundles and functor semantics accessibility relations (or functions) between individuals are introduced.) are obtained from individuals existing in the same world. a.Y). Dn is not constructed from the set of 'actual' individuals D 1= 32A propositional frame F = (W.

Obviously {Dg I u E W) is a partition of Dn. where D = + (Dn I n E w) is a sequence of (non-empty) sets. . .) is a family of mappings ('abstract jections ') nu : Dn ---t Dm for a E C . := {a E D1 I w ~ . so we have propositional N-modal frames: F. this correspondence is useful. But in general. ( a )= u). forcing. And finally. m. := T G ~ ( U ) n > 0 . I a E U Em.n So Dn (for n 2 1) are sets of 'abstract' n-tuples (in particular... RA.474 CHAPTER 5.different tuples may have the same 'components'. But then for any a E C = (I. R = (RT I n E w... Then Dn = U{DZ I u E F ) is a partition.. w.rr. But this correspondence in general is not bijective . are chosen arbitrarily. - Forcing in simplicial frames Now let us turn to precise definitions. wxR(a)).)). We begin with the case without equality. wA. which are briefly discussed later on. an 'abstract' n-tuple a and its 'components' wni. 33Up t o some details about the equality. . Next. .. Definition 5. But in the 'abstract' case w. Xr(1) = i . we can identify Do with the 'underlying propositional frame' F = (W. More generally.(a) may have different (and even disjoint!) sets of 'components'.RN). . u E W.where A? E El. METAFRAME SEMANTICS U{D. are mappings ('jections') transforming 'abstract' tuples. w = (w. As in metaframes. is the empty function from for Con. . for .R) :. put DE := n s t ( u ) for n 2 1.a. Put D.(l). a permutation a E T. ..)'".(a) can be regarded as the ith 'component' of a. .) = (a. R r are accessibility relations between n-tuples. The definitions of valuations.(. And we can introduce the individual domains of a world u E W as D. transforming 'actual' tuples: . D l R . R1. . validity. . T ) . and strong validity can be given quite similarly to metaframe semantics. Their metaframe analogues are 'jections' T. where 0. moreover. as we did in Chapter 5 for metaframes. (a). . D1 is the set of 'individuals'). . . R1. . ..it may be called the n-tuple domain of the world u. . E Con is the empty function. we assume that Fo := (W. As usual. := (Dn. this helps associate logically sound simplicial frames with metaframes. we can find constraints corresponding to logical soundness or to other natural properties of forcing. we should introduce a map . and T. . I u E F). : Dn Dm transforming 'abstract' tuples. Nevertheless. . In particular. see the Introduction. 'n-tuples' a and w. as we shall see in Volume 2.20. (al. R1. . An 'abstract' n-tuple a E Dn corresponds to the 'real' n-tuple (wx..a. rather than D and call this set the individual domain A of the world u. for n = 1 we sometimes write D. where 0. . .RN) is the original frame F. . 1 5 i 5 N ) is a family of relations R? C_ Dn x Dn.RN) is a tuple F = (F.33 And again the predicate logic ML(')(F) or IL(=)(F) for such a frame F is the set of formulas strongly valid in IF.1 A (formal) simplicial N-frame based on a propositional 4 ---f + Kripke frame F = (W. (a) for 1 5 i 5 n may be in domains of different worlds from F.

a ) [XI ifl ~ . A valuation J i n a simplicial 1-frame (or more briefly.with Dn. a) is an assignment i n IF. modifying 5. a). without the subscript i = 1.9. A simplicial model is a pair M = (IF.) a and similarly for the other Boolean connectives.20. i. and x ~ ( u = u for u E W.(a) = x ~ .e.e. for the monomodal (and the intuitionistic) case we denote accessibility relations on n-tuples by Rn. i.2 A valuation i n a simplicial N-frame IF is a function J sendDn. such frames are called T-identical. n > 0 is [a]i := xri.an 'individual' may be non-equal to its own 'component'. and x is a distinct list of variables of length n.) W (cf.. ) : As usual. every N-metaframe gives rise to a simplicial N-frame. ( a l . ing every n-ary predicate letter Py to a subset J+(Py) J+(P. where sin E Tin.3 A n assignment of length n i n a simplicial frame I is a pair F (x.20. SIMPLICIAL FRAMES 475 The i t h component of an abstract n-tuple a E Dn.4. ( [ a ] i ) . The definition is by induction.) . a 1 Pjm(x . M. where a E Dn. J) gives rise to the forcing relation M. a) is of length n. they can even 'live' in different worlds.e. Definition 5. . cf. Definition 5. ain(l) = i (i. a A [x].R r .9. i n particular. J). . where A E MFN.9.20. . Definition 5. (a) E D l .4 i n a natural way. E Jf (Pjm) (for a E C. But as we shall see later on. D = x. Chapter 1. (x.a.1. cf. in which rid.2). . xu described in Section 5.5. W e assume that (x. .20. Definition 5. The notations Rn+ (respectively.14. Definition 5. Rn* ) for the transitive (respectively.4 A simplicial N-model M = (IF. Obviously. a simplicial frame) is is intuitionistic i f every J+(Pj") an Rn-stable subset of Dn: =. We do not even assume that [all = a for a E D l . In these frames we also have [all = a for a E D l . reflexive transitive) closure of U R r are usual. sin = ai). We also consider i the corresponding equivalence relations :=% ~ * n on Dn. In general. in natural semantics (for modal or superintuitionistic logics) we may consider only frames. Now we can define forcing for modal formulas without equality. we do not assume that a and its components 'live' in the same world.l(u) = {u). F V ( A ) 5 r(x).9. a Y 1 [XI. + (Atl) (At2) M. (a) = a for any n. cf. that ns. Definition 5.

and similarly for Vxi B.rr. " . c = a iff c = ad for some d E D(a). a ) with r(x) FV(A) defined by the following inductive clauses (cf.4.a & M . a k * 3xiB [x] iff 3c E Dn(r6. (Q2) Hence we obtain the truth conditions for 7 and Oi similar to those in Section 5. In fact.6 An (intuitionistic) simplicial model M = (IF. wherex-xi = x . M . a It. t M .9. and if y @ x.rr. M . (9). But this definition actually leads to the same natural semantics of modal simplicial frames as Definition 5. (Ql). a I ( B A C) [x] ifl M.yl). (8). (Q2) become equivalent to (2). METAFRAME SEMANTICS M.a = a for any a E Dn) both cases of the inductive clause for the quantifier can be presented in the following uniform way (cf. for (Ql) note that in a metaframe T. b .20.rrb.xi)xi. since . One can see that in a simplicial frame corresponding to a metaframe the clauses (At2). c t= B [ ~ ( l y ] ) a ~ ~ EX-. (U). a I F ( B v C ) [x]i f l M ." and xll y = (x . c k B[x]). . .xi]. Definition 5.2): > M .c= r6. thus both versions are equivalent.20. a IF C [x].rrid.20. a != 3yB [x]iff3c E Dnfl(.. (9+10) in Section 5.14. a I= 3yB [x]iff 3c E D ~ + ~ ( T =~ C .5 Again we can propose a reasonable alternative definition of forcing I=* differing in the clause (Q2): M . M.xi]. a != VxiB[x] iff M.rr.rru. c ! B[xy]) = (for Y 94. However we do not know if these definitions give equal (or equivalent) maximal logically sound semantics. TJ: a != 3xiB [x. k M .rr. a I= 3xiB [x]iff M.x-ua = . (10) from Definition 5. Let us also note that in 'T-identical' simplicial frames (where Tid. since = 6. Similarly we can define forcing for the intuitionistic case. a I Pjm(. a I F C [x]..c = a & M.476 (Ql) CHAPTER 5.c = a + M .4. <) gives rise to forcing for intuitionistic formulas A and assignments (x.a b 3xiB[x . In fact. ~ ~& M. a != VyB[x] iffVc E Dn+'(.x) [x] iff .a = a and xll y = xy. B [x] and M. c I= B [xy]).9): M . a I F B o r M . this clause is equivalent to (Q2). then it is equivalent to (Ql).a E [+(Pjm). if y = xi. R e m a r k 5. x (where m = I .9. Definition 5.

(n m).. I( F) and for .rra. b I l .. M .x] I= ( t r fm) holds for any injection a E T.11. But unlike the case of metaframes. & M . These classes generate 'almost maximal' semantics (and maybe even maximal.10. Definition 5. 5. a I 3 y B [x] i83c E Dn+l(r. a IF VyB [x] iff Vc E ~ ~ + l ( a ~ (c) r .C [x]).. SIMPLICIAL FRAMES 477 M .x). 34Cf. > (. we call such a frame m-sound or i-sound respectively. t M .6(*). A simplicial frame F is logically sound if ML(F) or IL(F) is a modal or a superintuitionistic logic respectively. where forcing satisfies natural properties of 'logical invariance' similar to those we had for metaframes in Sections 5. a I k ( B > C ) [x]i f f V b ~ D ~ ( a R ~ b & M.15.8 A n N-modal formula A is valid i n a simplicia1 frame F (notation F k A) i f it is true i n all models over IF.20..10. ~ +. Section 5. The set of all formulas strongly valid i n F is denoted by ML(F) i n the modal case and by IL(F) i n the intuitionistic case. t M .5.al= QxiB [x. c I B [xy]).19 for intuitionistic sound metaframes).20. we do not know an explicit description of these semantics. The definition for the intuitionistic case is similar. Definition 5.9 A formula is strongly valid i n P if all its substitution instances (without equality) are valid.bII-B [ x ] + M . Logically sound simplicial frames generate 'maximal semantics'. The definition for the intuitionistic case is similar. Sound and natural simplicial frames Definition 5. 5. a) such that FV(A) C r(x). a) such that FV(A) r(r. ML-(F) denotes the set of all N-modal formulas (without equality) valid in F. Definition 5.20.(c)Rna t for a quantifier Q.20. and we may conjecture that they are rather complicated (cf. c I B [xy]) (for y @ x). for any model M = any assignment (x.16. the notation IL.5. ~ A [r.( I F ) is similar. Therefore in Volume 2 we shall describe more convenient classes of simplicial frames. a I= A [x]H M .20. a k A [x]for any assignment (x.10 A simplicial frame F is called modally transformable (or m-transformable) if the following condition3* M . M .xi] Again we have uniform presentations of quantifier clauses in T-identical simplicial frames. T . but this is yet unknown). a I t QxiB [x] iff M.7 A n N-modal formula A is true i n a simplicial model (notation: M l= A) i f M . 5.

METAFRAME SEMANTICS The definition of i(')-transformable frames for the intuitionistic case is similar . a = id. a is an injection. Recall that variable substitutions are defined up to congruence. for any model M over F.). So in ms-transformable simplicial frames forcing is congruence invariant: [/I M. Loosely speaking. Recall that the case n = 0 (when A is a sentence and a = ido = Ao) is trivial. . the choice of x' is inessential. M. we define is-transformable simplicial frames with the following condition: M . where x' = r.11 Let P be an m-transformable simplicial frame. M = (P. Lemma 5. On the other hand. A' (apply (trfsm) with y = x.they satisfy the condition35 M. a k A [x] with r(x) > FV(A) can be reduced to M.20. cf.3).7 for metaframes). a != (It-)A[x] does not depend on the choice of a list of variables x containing FV(A). for any modal formula A such that FV(A) 5 r(y). E ) a simplicial model.A [x]H M.20.12 A simplicial frame P is called modally s-transformable (or for any distinct lists x of length n. since for any enumerations x. in transformable frames forcing M.6. This observation allows us to use only the first case in the inductive clause for quantifiers.. a II. a k A[x] with r(xl) = FV(A). a II.X. there exists a permutation a such that x' = T. Section 2. T U [I. a such that FV(A) = FV(A1) C r(x): M .A [Y]. and the congruent versions of A are all the results of applying the identity substitution to A (cf. a b A [x]e M . and similarly for the intuitionistic case. respectively. we can show that forcing is congruence invariant in every transformable simplicial frame as well (cf. x' of FV(A). a != A [x]. A' and for any x.478 CHAPTER 5.x]. a I= A [x]H M . Then for any congruent formulas A. Definition 5. More precisely. r.and for any a E Dn : (*) Similarly for the intuitionistic case.11.A' [x] (*) for any congruent formulas A.([r. L e m m a 5. Section 5.x/y] A) 1x1 * M. ~ (trf is) This condition expresses the invariance of forcing under variable substitutions (cf. and similarly in the intuitionistic case. Moreover. m ms-transformable) if for any a E C.a I=A [r. a II.x. ( t r f 2) for intuitionistic models M and formulas A.



Lemmas 5.10.11 and 5.15.16 for metaframes in the modal and the intuitionistic cases respectively). Anyway, if the condition (*) holds, then the choice of any congruent version of [.rr,x/y]A in (trf sm) does not matter.

Definition 5.20.13 A simplicial frame F is called m-natural (respectively, inatural) if it is logically sound and transformable (respectively, s-transformable). The classes of all m-natural and i-natural simplicial frames generate the 'natural' semantics of simplicial frames SFmand SFint.
In Volume 2 we will also describe other classes of simplicial frames (called 'modal' and 'intuitionistic') generating the same semantics SFm and SFint; this description generalises the work done in Sections 5.11 and 5.15 above. Theorems 5.12.13, 5.16.13, along with 5.10.6, 5.11.7, 5.15.14, 5.15.17, show that for every logically sound metaframe the corresponding simplicial frame is natural; thus MFm 5 S F m and MFint 5 SFint. On the other hand, we do not know if every logically sound simplicial frame is natural and even if the semantics of natural simplicial frames equals the 'maximal' semantics of all logically sound simplicial frames. It is also unknown if the semantics of simplicial frames (natural or 'maximal;') are stronger than the semantics of metaframes.

Equality in simplicial frames
To conclude this preliminary exposition, we briefly discuss problems with interpretation of equality in simplicial frames. Recall that in metaframes the clause for equality has the following form:36

a k x j = xk [x]iff a j

= ak,


where a E Dz,11 = n. This definition admits several reasonable generalisations x for simplicial frames; in metaframes all these versions are equivalent. First, for the formula X I = 2 2 , x = (XI,xz), and a E D2, we can put

where ci2(l) = j (so (al, a2) . a j 2 Second, we can define


in metaframes).

a b xl = x2 [x] iff a = n,l (b) for some b E D',

where a' E C21 is the 'diagonal' map; a l ( j ) = 1 for j E I2(so T,I (b) = (b, b) in metaframes). These two definitions are clearly equivalent for 'real' tuples, but they differ for 'abstract' tuples. For example, in general we cannot assert that (a)) = a if x , (a) = ~ , , , ( a ) . ,, T,~,(T,I (b)) = b for b E D1 or that T,I (.r,
36We do not mention a model M as equality does not depend on the valuation.


There exist other more 'exotic' versions of forcing, e.g.

a I= X I = 2 2 [x] rUl2(a) r,,,(a) iff =

& a = r,l(r,,,(a)).

All these interpretations are equivalent to (=) (with n = 2, i = 1, j = 2) in metaframes, although they are non-equivalent in simplicial frames. To express these definitions (i.e. generalisations of (=) to simplicial frames) for arbitrary n and i, j E I n we use projections rain 'extracting' components of an n-tuple (ruin . . ,a,) = ai) and 'pairing jections' r x ? where X; E (al,. 3k ' Czn, Xyk(l) = j, Xjnk(2) = k, i.e. r ~(al, . . . ,a,) = ajak. ? 3k Thus we obtain the following interpretations of equality in simplicial frames

a !=+ x j

= xk

[x] rUj, = rukn iff (a) (a),


the 'componentwise' or the upper interpretation,
a !=- x j = xk


iff 3 b E D' r ~ ? & ( a ) n,l(b) =


the 'diagonal' or the lower interpretation, and also the 'combined' interpretation


xi = x j [x] rujn = rokn & r x (a) = r , ~ (a)). iff (a) (a) ~ ~ (ruin


We suppose that the upper interpretation is the most straightforward generalisation of the condition (=) in metaframes. However, some logical properties of the lower interpretation k- seem better. In Volume 2 we will consider a general approach to interpretation of equality in simplicial frames covering all these versions - various interpretations of equality a b xi = x j [x] depend on triples of the form (ruin(a), n,, (a), rx,;, (a)). But such a general approach seems too complicated, so we simplify it by using 'pairs' r ~ % ( aE D2. Thus, for example, the upper interpretation has a ) simplified version: a I=+' j = xk [x] TA? E I + , x iff

where I+= {b E D2 1 r,,, (b) = r,,, (b)). Although this condition is not equivalent to (=+) in arbitrary simplicial frames, for 'natural' simplicial frames this reduction works quite well.

Part 111


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Chapter 6

Kripke completeness for varying domains
Completeness proofs in this chapter are based on various canonical model constructions. They originate from canonical models in modal propositional logic and Henkin's completeness proof in classical predicate logic. The main idea is that worlds in canonical models are consistent (or even syntactically complete) theories, and individuals are identified with individual constants of these theories.


Canonical models for modal logics

Recall (Definition 2.7.7) that for a first-order modal theory I?, Dr denotes the set of individual constants occurring in I?, c(=)(F)is the set of all Dr-sentences in the language of I?.
Definition 6.1.1 A (first-order) modal theory I? i s called L-consistent zf

Y L r\


Ai for any A1,. . .,Ak E E, o r equivalently, if I?


A modal theory

i= 1

i s called L-complete if it i s maximal (by inclusion) among L-consistent theories in the same language.
Lemma 6.1.2 Let E be a modal theory.
(1) If I? is L-consistent and I? k L l A , then I'


(2) If I i s L-complete, A E L(')(I'), then '

in particular,

E (where

denotes the set of all sentences i n L ) .


(3) I I? is L-complete, then for any A E C(=)(r) f


Every L-consistent I' satisfying the equivalence (3), is L-complete.

Proof (1) If l7 kL 1 A and r t - A, then I? kL I , by MP. ~ (2) 'If' is obvious. To show 'only if', suppose A 6f I?. Then I? c I? U {A), hence r U {A) kL I,and thus I? kL A > I(= by 2.8.1. Hence rYLA by -A) (1). (3) 'Only if' readily follows from (1) and (2). To show 'if', suppose the contrary - that both A, 7 A are not in r. Then as in the proof of (2), we obtain I? kL -A and similarly, l kL l l A , which implies the L-inconsistency of ?
(4) Suppose the equivalence in (3) holds for any A E ,C(=)(r), but r is Lincomplete. Then r C r" for some I?' in the same language, so there exists A E ( r ' - I?). By (3), we have 1 A E I G r', thus r' is L-inconsistent. ' ¤


Similarly t o the propositional case, we have the following

Lemma 6.1.3 Let


be an L-complete theory. Then for any A, B E C(=)(r):

(A r\ B ) E

r iff

(A E I and B E I ' ' ) ;

(ii) (A v B ) E I? iff (A E r or B E r); (iii) (A > B) E l7 iff (A 6f r or B E I ' ) .

Proof (i) (If.) A A B > A is an instance of a tautology, so if (A A B ) E I?, we have r kL A by MP. Hence A E I' by 6.1.2 (2). Similarly B E r. (Only if.) If A, B E r, we apply the instance of a tautology A > ( B > AAB), MP and 6.1.2 (2). (ii) (If.) Similarly to (i), use A > A V B or B > A V B. (Only if.) Suppose A, B # r. Then -A, -B E I? by 6.1.2(3). Since 1 A > ( 1 B > -(A V B)) is an instance of a tautology, we obtain -A, 1 B EL l ( A V B ) , hence 7 ( A V B) E I?, and thus (A V B ) 6f I' by 6.1.2 (3). (iii) (Only if.) Supposing (A > B ) , A E r, we obtain B E I' by M P and 6.1.2 (2). (If.) If A 6f I?, then 7 A E r by 6.1.2 (3). Since -IA > (A > B ) is an instance df a tautology, by MP and 6.1.2 (2), it follows that (A > B ) E r. ¤ If B E I?, we use B > (A > B ) in the same way.
Recall that denotes the set of all sentences in a logic L, 0*r:= {O,A I A E I,a E I F ) (if N is fixed). '

Lemma 6 1 4 Let L, L1 be N-m.p.l.(=), ..


an L-complete theory. Then

(1) I is L1-complete iff '


zCr .
Then r an L1-complete ifl

(2) Suppose L1 = L o*Sub(@)G r.

+ @ for a set of sentences O.

Proof (1) 'Only if' follows from Lemma 6.1.2 (2). To show 'if', assume r. By Lemma 6.1.2 (3), (4), it suffices to check that r is LI-consistent. Suppose the contrary; then for a finite X r, t-L, A = 7 ( r \ X ) . Put A := l ( A X ) . Then by Definition 2.7.1, A has a generator r. But then I' k L FAl, whence E L A1, and Al E L1. Hence vA1 E therefore I? k L A implying the L-inconsistency of I?. (2) By ( I ) , l? is L1-complete iff I?. Since n*Sub(O) C z , the 'only if' part of (2) follows readily. For the converse, we assume 0*Sub(O) r and show that I In ' . L 8 is L-provable in fact, by the deduction theorem 2.8.4, every A E ~*S.ub(@), r k L A, therefore A E I?, by 6.1.2. hence






Lemma 6.1.5 (Lindenbaum lemma) Every L-consistent theory can be extended to an L-complete theory in the same language. Proof Similar to the propositional case. If L(=)(F) is countable, we consider its enumeration Ao, A1,. . . and construct a sequence of L-consistent theories I' = Fo rl,. . . such that rn+l rnU {A,) or r,+l = I?, U {lAn}. This is = possible, since one of r, U {A,}, r, U {lA,} is L-consistent (otherwise I?, t-L 7An, l l A n by Lemma 2.8.1, and thus Fn is L-inconsistent). Eventually the union r, := Urnis L-consistent and L-complete by 6.1.2(4).

If the language is uncountable, we apply transfinite induction, but actually we do not need this case in the sequel. Definition 6.1.6 An L-complete theory r is called L-Henkin if for any Drsentence 3xA(x) there exists a constant c E Dr such that

We say that

r is (L, S)-Henkin if r is L-Henkin with Dr


Due to Lemma 6.1.3 (iii), every L-Henkin theory I' has the following existence property: (EP) if 3xA(x) E

r, then

for some c E Dr, A(c) E I. '

Moreover, we have Lemma 6.1.7 Every L-Henkin theory r satisfies the condition (EP') 3xA(x) E

r ifl

for some c E Dr , A(c) E



Proof Since L F A(y) > 3xA(x) for a new variable y (Lemma 2.6.15(ii)), we have F L A(c) > 3xA(x), and so (A(c) > 3xA(x)) E I?. Thus Lemma 6.1.3 implies the converse of (EP), therefore (EP') holds.
Exercise 6.1.8 Show that every L-complete theory with the existence property is L-Henkin.

Lemma 6.1.9 Let I' be an L-consistent theory, D r Then there exists an (L, S)-Henkin theory I?' r .



S, I 1 S


I - Drl = No. S

Proof The set of all S-sentences is countable, so let us enumerate all Ssentences of the form 3xA(x) : 3xlAl(xl), ~ x ~ A ~ ( x .z. )Choose distinct con. , stants ck from (S- D r ) such that ck does not occur in 3xiAi(xi) for i k, and Put r, := r u {dXkAk(xk) > Ak(ck) I k E w).


Let us show that


is L-consistent. Suppose the contrary. Then for some k

Take the minimal k with this property. Let


ri B , 3yAk(y) 3 Ak(c) F L 1
(where y = xk, c = ck). Hence by Lemma 2.8.1,

Then from the propositional tautology ~ ( > q) p (1)

> p A l q we obtain

r,B F L ~ Y A ~ ( Y ) ; r,B E L l A k ( ~ ) .
U {B), by Lemma 2.7.11, it follows that

Since c does not occur in

r,B t - ~V Y ~ A ~ ( Y ) ,

and thus by 2.6.15(xiii),

R o m (1) and (4) it follows that r k - l~B , contrary t o the choice of k. Therefore r, is L-consistent, and by Lemma 6.1.5, we can extend it to I".



Lemma 6.1.10 Let A be a modal sentence, I 1 = No. S Then L F A iff (A E I? for any (L, S)-Henkin theory r ) . Proof 'Only if' follows from Lemma 6.1.3. To prove 'if', suppose L Y A. Then { l A ) is an L-consistent subset of MFL=)(B), and so by Lemma 6.1.9, there exists an (L, S)-Henkin theory r {-A). W


r' to the domain S). Obviously, r'lS is consistent (complete) if I?' is consistent
(respectively, complete), but for a Henkin (L, S')-theory I?', r'lS may be not a Henkin (L, S)-theory. Henceforth we fix a denumerable set S*,the 'universal set of constants'. We call a set S C S* small if (S*- S ) is infinite.

For S C_ S' and I?' C MF~=)(s'), let r'lS := ~ ~ M F L = ' ( s ) (the restriction of

Definition 6.1.11 An L-place is a Henkin L-theory with a small set of constants.
The set of all L-places is denoted by VPL.

Lemma 6.1.12 Let u be a world in a Kripke model M over an N-modal predicate Kripke frame F = (F,D ) and assume that M k L. Then the set of D,-sentences that are true at u


This is an easy consequence from the definitions. Let us only give an

argument for L-consistency. If

t L A Ail then B



i= 1


Ai can be presented

i= 1

as [c/x] for Bo E L, c E D,M, and then VxBo E L. Hence by assumption Bo M, u ZL VxBO, which implies M, u b [c/x] = 7 Bo one of the Ai must be false at M, u. i=l



Ai by Lemma 3.2.18. Thus


Definition 6.1.13 Let M be a Kripke model for a modal logic L, in which every ' individual domain is a small subset of S . The map from (the worlds of) M to VPL sending u to r, is called canonical and denoted by U M , L (or by V M , or by v if there is no confusion).
Lemma 6.1.12 extends to Kripke sheaves, Kripke bundles, or other kinds of models for L. Moreover, VPL is the set of all 'places' r, of all possible Kripke models (and of metaframe models) for L with small domains. To show this, we shall now construct a certain predicate Kripke frame (the canonical frame), whose worlds are L-places and in which every 'world' r has the individual domain D r , while I' is the set of all Dr-sentences true at this world. Since all the domains are small, there are infinitely many spare constants at every world.

For an N-modal theory I' and i = 1,. . .,N, put

Definition 6.1.14 For L-places tions: r RLi rt := o;r G rl. Lemma 6.1.15

r,rl we

define canonical accessibility rela-

r RLi I?' i f f Dr G Dr.

& Oil?' n C ( r ) G r

Proof (Only if.) Assume I'RLir'. For any c E Dr we have k L O ( P ( c )3 P ( c ) ) ,so O ( P ( c )3 P ( c ) ) E I? by 6.1.2(2), and thus ( P ( c )3 P ( c ) )E 0;I' g I". Therefore c E D r ) , which shows Dr c Dr.. (If.) Assume Dr C D p , Oil?' n C ( r ) C I?. Next, assume O i B E r. Then B E I?', since otherwise T B E I", O i l B E Oir' n L ( r ) 2 I, and thus r is ' inconsistent. Therefore Oil? r'.


The crucial property of canonical relations is the following

Lemma 6.1.16 For any L-place I? and for any Dr-sentence A such that O i A E I?, there exzsts an L-place I" such that rRLiI" and A E I". Proof Let us show that the theory ro := O ~ I ' U { Ais L-consistent if O i A E I?. } Suppose t L B j 3 1 A for some formulas B j E Oil?. Then t~Oi(l\ B j ) 3 l\ O i l A , hence L t A O i B j


> 1 0 i A , I F L T O ~ Aand thus by Lemma 6.1.2 ( 2 ) , ' ,


1 0 i A E r. This is a contradiction. Now by Lemma 6.1.9, we can construct an L-place I" such that ro r' (remember that Dr is small, so there exists a small S such that IS- DrI = No). By Definition 6.1.14, ~ R L ~ I " . Lemma 6.1.17 For any I E V P L and A E L ( r ) we have '
(1) O i A E

r z f f ( A E I" for (2) O i A E I i f f ( A E r' for '


r' E R L i ( r ) ) ; each r' E R L i ( r ) ) .

Proof ( 1 ) 'Only if' follows from 6.1.16. The other way round, if O i A = 7 O i l A $ I?, then O i l A E I?, hence 1 A E I" (i.e. A q I?') for any I" E RLi(r). ! ( 2 ) 'Only if' follows from Definition 6.1.14. To show 'if', assume O i A $ I?, then 1 O i A E I ,and since k L 7 0 i A > O i l A , this implies O i l A E r . Hence by ' W ( I ) , 1 A E r1for some I" E RLi(I'). Definition 6.1.18 The canonical Kripke frame with varying domains of an N-modal logic L without equality is V F L := ( V P L ,R L ~ . . , R L N ,D L ) , where ., ( D L ):= Dr. ~



Definition 6.1.19 For an N-modal logic L with equality we define the canonical Kripke frame with equality as

where c ( X L ) r d : = ( c = d) for C,d E D r . Due to the standard properties of equality 2.6.16(i), (ii), ( x L ) ~ an equivis alence relation on Dr (sometimes we denote it just by ~ r ) We also have .

since L -l (x = y) > Oi(x = y); thus from Definition 3.5.1.


satisfies the RLi-stability condition

Definition 6.1.20 The canonical model of an m.p.1. (=) L is

where (J~)r(Pkm) {CE (Dr), :=

I P ~ ( C r)) . E

Note that V M ~ = ) well-defined, since P r ( c 1 , . . . ,cm),(CI = dl), . .. , (c, is dm) E r implies P r ( d l , . . . , d m ) E I?, thanks to 2.6.16(v). The main property of canonical models is the following Theorem 6.1.21 (Canonical model theorem) V M L = ) , ~ A iffA E I' I = for any L-place

r E VPL and A E ~ ( = ) ( r ) .

Proof By induction on the length of A. The base readily follows from the definitions. The inductive step for classical connectives and quantifiers follows from 6.1.3 (i)-(iii) and 6.1.7 (EP'), properties (i)-(iv), (vi) of Henkin theories. The case A = OiB follows from Lemma 6.1.17 (1). Corollary 6.1.22 For any modal formula A, V M ~ = I= A iff L k A. ) Proof If A,is a modal sentence, then by Corollary 6.1.lo, A E L implies A E for any L-place r; hence V M ~ = ) , I= A by Theorem 6.1.21. The other way round, if A @ L, then by 6.1.10, A @ for some Henkin (L, S)-theory F, where S is infinite and small. So r is an L-place, and thus V M ~ = )r !+A by Theorem 6.1.21. , The claim for an arbitrary formula A is reduced to the claim for VA, since W V M ~ = 'k A iff V M ~ = k VA, and A E L iff BA E L. )

490 CHAPTER 6. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Definition 6.1.23 A n m.p.l.(=) L i s called V-canonical if V F ~ = ) L. b This property is sufficient for completeness: Corollary 6.1.24 Every V-canonical m.p.1. i s strongly Kripke complete. Every V-canonical m.p.l.= i s strongly K F E (or Kripke sheaf) complete. P r o o f In fact, let L be a V-canonical m.p.1. (=), roan L-consistent theory; by Lemma 6.1.9, there exists an L-place r ro.By 6.1.21, V M ~ = ) , T r, so k rois satisfied the L-frame V F ~ = ) .


Now let us consider canonical models for two N-modal logics L1 C L2. Every Lz-consistent theory is clearly L1-consistent, thus VPL, 2 VPL,. Moreover, we obtain L e m m a 6.1.25 Let L1 L2 be N-m.p.l.(=).


(2) VML, i s a generated submodel of VML,.
(3) I f L1 i s canonical, then VFL2k L1.

Proof (1) Let r be an L1-place. Then VML1,I' k iff 1 C I? (by the ; ; ' canonical model theorem) iff I is L2-complete (by 6.1.4(1)). This is equivalent to I' E VPL2,since r E VPL, already enjoys the Henkin property and has a small set of constants. (2) In fact, r k implies k OiA for any A E thus A I= for any A E RLli(r). SO due to (I), VPL, is stable in VFLl. VML2 is a submodel of VMLl, since V M L l , r I= P ( a ) iff P(a) E I' iff V M L 2 , rk P(a). (3) Follows from (2) and the generation lemma 3.3.18.





Proposition 6.1.26 If L i s a V-canonical N-m.p.1. (=), r is a set of N-modal pure equality formulas, then L1 = L + r i s also V-canonical. Proof By Lemma 6.1.25, VFL, is a generated subframe of VFL, so L C_ ML(=)(VFL) ML(=)(vFL,). On the other hand, VMLl I= I? by the canonical ' model theorem, thus since all formulas in I are constant, VFLl k I?. Therefore VFL, k L1. Corollary 6.1.22 shows that V M ~ = )is an exact model for L. The next proposition is a further refinement of this fact. Proposition 6.1.27
(1) Every m.p.1. (=) L has a countable exact Kripke model (respectively, K F E -

model). (2) Moreover, if L 2 Lo for a A-elementary canonical m.p.l.(=) Lo, such a model exists over a n Lo-frame.

If (i) holds for P.1.28.A I A E r). Since I-L OkB > OpB. then RLp 5 RLk.11 to L = Lo. P r o o f We can apply Corollary 3. CANONICAL MODELS FOR MODAL LOGICS 491 (3) Moreover. Then P r o o f (1) By induction on the length of a. Q A = are V-canonical. I'RL. M = V M ~ = ) .1. Suppose A E A. H Then Mo.0 and rRL. 0.28 Let a E I F .2. So by 3. since it is true in the canonical model.. Proof Every constant axiom is valid in the canonical frame. By Proposition 1. this implies TA E A. By (I). . Then the logics Q A .A. it follows that B E A.12.14 and the induction hypothesis we obtain (2) Ad absurdum. Proposition 1. every L-consistent theory is satisfiable i n some model described i n (2).29 Let A be a propositional one-way PTC-logic.1. T h e o r e m 6. Let us also show V-canonicity for some other simple modal predicate logics.11. If a = A .5. are V-canonical.6.i k := R ~ i 0 .yA E r . != Note that F != Lo by 6.1. and thus H O. L e m m a 6. a E IF let oar := {O. Then -0. Obviously. we obtain VFL != A. cf.12. the logics Q K N and Q K . a = k. For an N-modal theory I?. which makes A inconsistent.33.5 and Lemma 3. we have U p B E I?. rlRLaA. If A = Okp > O p p E L = &A'='. In fact. .11 there exists a countable reliable Mo 5 M over an Lo-hame such that MT(Mo) = M T ( M ) = L and uo E Mo.. By Definition 6.UO I? (for a given L-consistent I?). Also let RLil .A E (-r).A E I?..11.1. everything is obvious. then there exists I" such that I'RL~I?'. suppose I ' R L ~ A . uo b I' by reliability. By Lemma 6.1. = VF~=) F and uo such that M.34.C]kB E I?.A. . 0 R L ~ ~ l and let RLA be the equality relation Idvp.

31 A relation Ri So we obtain an analogue of Lemma 6. since vl b AUl and v2 AU1. so there are transition functions p. v C= AUl. D. In fact. because they may be ICE-incomplete. but 'only if' in (1) now follows from 6. In fact.1. It is clear that F is Euclidean. Every level Fn = (Dn..R = W x ( W .17. p. Consider the logic K5 := K OOp > Op.3. F OAUl > OAUl.! = 1. for some v E R(u) M . for which an analogue of Lemma 6. the relation Rn is equivalent to d sub c & c sub d (which is an equivalence relation) and anRnd for any d # an. Then ID.{a)). KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Example 6.1.32 For any selective Ri. consider a Kripke sheaf model M over a Euclidian frame. On the other hand.492 CHAPTER 6. v 2 ) .. C RLi on VPL is called (i-)selective if for any L-place I? and for any A E C ( r ) such that OiA E I. its Kripke frames are characterized by the 'Euclidian' condition + (€1 VuVvVw (uRv A URW> vRw). To see this.. u C= OAUl. Therefore F k QK5= by 5. The same as in 6. there exists an L-place ' I" such that r R i r l and A E I". and suppose M. Definition 6. Therefore QK5' ft OAUl > OAUl by soundness.1. To see this.17: Lemma 6. W . or D. This leads us to the following definition. ~ i . So ID. consider a Kripke bundle F over the base F = (W..29 does not extend to arbitrary PTC-logics. which means that IDv/ = 1. p = D+ x (D+ .1. because on n-tuples from D. cz).Rn) is also Euclidean. However QK5' If OAUl > OAUl. D.1.. for any r E VPL and A E C ( r ) we have (1) OiA E I iff (A E I for some I" E Ri(I')). by ( E ) we have vRw & wRv.30 The following counterexample shows that Theorem 6. and by the properties of Kripke sheaves it follows that they are bijections.{u)).1.21 still holds. One of the options may be to take an appropriate submodel of VML..31.. = {el. = { b ) . where W = { u . Du = {a).7 and soundness of Kripke bundle semantics.. So they are either Kripke-incomplete. v Actually many simple and natural predicate logics are not V-canonical. or the completeness proof requires more work. ' " (2) OiA E I ifl (A E ' Proof r' for each I" E R i ( r ) ) . R).e.1. first note that QK5' k K o OAUl 3 OAUl. i.1. Then QK5' is ICE-incomplete.] = 1 for any w E R(u).

I .7.-F)) is an L-complete ' intuitionistic theory. c . for any finite I'l C I?.{P(c) > P(c))) is inconsistent. So it follows that D-r Dr.. It is obvious that I n A = 0 whenever ' Definition 6.which is abbreviated as (-I').1.1.i. A) ' So in this case A = L ( r .p. we can introduce quasi-canonical Kripke frames (VPL. 6. YL /\r1 3 Val ( 'A) is L-consistent.-q.16 means that the relation RLi is i-selective. Then we obtain the following analogues of Lemma 6. A similar argument using P(c) A -P(c) shows that Dr g D-r.(=) L. Now similarly to the canonical frame. -I?) we have (P(c) > P(c)) E I.R N . since otherwise (P(c) > ' P(c)) E (-I').12.22: Lemma 6.2.l. Various modifications will be considered in this chapter later on.22).1. Al G A.. Ri and the corresponding quasi-canonical models (with the valuation &).1. a theory (I?.2 An L-consistent theory (I'. and thus it is the greatest i-selective relation on VPL.e.2.33 Let M be a quasi-canonical Kripke model for an m.21 and Corollary 6. Another option is t o use subsets of VPL still satisfying Corollary 6. is called L-complete if r U A = A) L(I'. A) is called L-consistent if ( r .1. Also note that for any c E L ( r .1 If L is a superintuitionistic logic (with or without equality). Then (1) for any L-place and A E L ( r ) (2) for any formula A MkAiffLl-A. For this purpose we need double theories introduced in 2.R1. Definition 6.2 Canonical models for superintuitionist ic logics Now let us turn t o the intuitionistic case. Moreover. CANONICAL MODELS FOR SUPERINTUITIONISTIC LOGICS 493 Lemma 6.10 (and thus. XL])with arbitrary i-selective relations .DL [.2. We would again like to represent possible worlds in Kripke (or other) models by sets of formulas. But now we should take false formulas into account as well.. Corollary 6. we shall often say that I (rather than (I?. I. while the theory ( 0 .6. So we can write Dr rather than D(r.1. because in intuitionistic logic the falsity of A is not equivalent to the truth of TA. A) . A) yl.

If at a world F of the canonical model VxA(x) is false. this property holds if C exactly defines the set of all strictly accessible worlds (and the canonical model theorem holds). 3V-complete theories seem to be a better intuitionistic analogue of Henkin theories than 3-complete theories. S)-complete) theory I? is called L3V-complete (respectively. but A(d) E F for all d E Dr. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Definition 6. For example. so (Av) holds. So property (Av) is responsible for the classical part of intuitionistic universal quantification.2. and thus (Ac) is just the dual of (E). On the other hand.1. In fact. S)-complete if Dr = S . then Vx(A(x) V C) E F for some formula C E (--I?). For a logic L containing the formula C D the condition (Av) may be simplified: (Ac) if VxA(x) E (--I?) . an L3-complete F is called (L3.5 Every L-complete theory r has properties 6. Note that (Ac) is an analogue to the property (V) of forcing in Kripke models with constant domains.494 CHAPTER 6. But the latter can be used for completeness proofs in the simplest cases (for example. More specifically. Lemma 6. an (L3. This explains. but A(d) is true for every individual d. then obviously VxA(x) must be false at some strictly accessible world.1. and thus the intuitionistic definition for the V-case consists of the 'classical' part dealing with individuals from a certain world and of the 'modal' part dealing with accessibility relations between worlds. 6. Since C D E F. 5)-complete) if it satisfies the following coexistence property: -' (Av) if VxA(x) E ( I ) and A(d) E F for all d E Dr. In the case of constant domains ( V X B ) is equivalent ~ to VxBT. Definition 6. an (L3V.3 An L-complete intuitionistic theorg F is called L3-complete if it satisfies the existence property: (EP) if 3xA(x) E I?. (Av) allows us to find a formula C such that I IF Vx(A(x) V C). let C D E L. If (Av) holds and VxA(x) E (-F) . the definition of intuitionistic forcing for the 3-case is the same as classical. the intuitionistic V translates as modal 0V. The intended meaning of this property (after we prove the canonical model theorem) is the following. we obtain (VxA(x) V C) E F. if (Ac) holds then the premise of (Av) is false.3(i). Since the Gijdel-Tarski translation for 3 is just 3. so C should be true at all strongly accessible worlds. Conversely. then A(d) E (-F) for some d E Dr. why the existence property is defined in the same way.2(2): . which leads to a contradiction. for QH(')). Thus (Ac) holds. then Vx(A(x) V C) E F for some C E (-F). then A(c) E I' for some c E Dr.2.2. where ' A(d) is refuted for some individual d. (iii).4 An L3-complete (respectively.

6.2. CANONICAL MODELS FOR SUPERINTUITIONISTIC LOGICS 495 ( A v B ) E i f f ( A ~o r B ~ r ) ; ~ r

r E L A iff A E r
3xA(x) E

(for A E L(=)(r)).

Every L3-complete I' also satisfies 6.1.7(EP). iff (A(c) E r for some c E Dr).

An exercise.

Now let us prove the crucial property of L3-complete theories analogous to Lemma 6.1.9 for Henkin theories. For intuitionistic theories (I?,A), (I", A') put ( r , A) 3 (r', A') := r E For a complete theory O also let

I" & A r A'.

which means (I', 5 ( 0 , - 0 ) . A)
Lemma 6.2.6 Let (I',A) be an L-consistent theory, D[r,&) = S C S', IS' = I IS' - S = No. Then there exists an (L3, St)-complete (and even an (L3V, S f ) I A) complete) theory 0 such that (I', 5 0. Proof The idea of the proof is quite standard. Namely, we can successively extend the pair (I', A) by adding S1-sentences either to I' or to A. Moreover, together with adding 3xA(x) to r, we always add A(c) for some new constant c from (S' - S). And together with adding VxA(x) to A, we add A(c) for a new c - but only if this is consistent. This construction provides the existence and the coexistence properties. If we need only an L3-complete theory 0 (I?,A), we can use the same procedure, but without mentioning V-formulas. Let IF(=)(s') = {Bk I k E w ) . Choose distinct constants ck from (S' S ) such that ck does not occur in B o y . . ,Bk. Next, define a sequence of Lconsistent theories

as follows. If Bk = 3xA(x), then k {Bk,A(ck)),A,) if { (( rr k lAk u {Bk}) otherwise( r k
U U {Bk}, Ak) is L-consistent,



If Bk is not of the form 3xA(x), then (rk+l, Ak+l) := ( r k u {Bk), Ak) if ( r k u {Bk}, Ak) is L-consistent, (rk, Ak U {Bk)) otherwise.

Let us show that (rk+l, is L-consistent if (rk, Ak) is. U Ak First, if (rk {Bk), A,) and (rk, U {Bk)) are both inconsistent, then ( r k ,Ak) is also inconsistent. In fact, in this case

for some finite A', A"

5 Ak, and thus

where A = A' U A". Now since p > q, p V q kH q, we obtain r k k L V A, i.e. ( r k ,Ak) is inconsistent. Second, if Bk = 3xA(x) and ( r kU {3xA(2),A(ck)),Ak) is inconsistent, then

for some finite A

C Ak; therefore by 2.7.11

since ck does not occur in

rkU Ak, which implies

U by 2.6.10 and MP, and thus (rk {Bk),Ak) is inconsistent. Next, put 0 := U r k . By construction, the theory ( 0 , - 0 ) is L-consistent

and has the existence property. To obtain an ~3b'-'-com~lete theory, we should slightly refine the above construction. Viz., if Bk = VxA(x), we put (rk U {Bk), A,) ( r k ,Ak U {Bk, A(ck)))


Ak+l) :=

Ak U {Bk))

if this theory is L-consistent, if this theory is L-consistent and (rk {Bk),Ak) is L-inconsistent, u otherwise.

In other words, we add Bk either to rkor to Ak keeping consistency, and also add A(ck) to Ak whenever this is possible. The consistency of ( r k ,Ak) again implies the consistency of ( r k + l , &+I), Ak since either ( r k u {Bk),Ak) or (rk, U {Bk)) is consistent, as we have seen above. Finally, let us check (Av) for 0 . Suppose Bk = b'xA(x) @ 0 and A(c) E 0 for all c E Do. Then Bk E &+I, and A(ck) @ Ak+l, SO by construction, (Fk,Ak U {Bk,A(ck)) is L-inconsistent, and thus,

for some finite A

C Ak.

Hence by 2.7.11

Since 0 is L3-complete, it satisfies 6.1.3(v), so it follows that Vx(CVA(x)) E 8, where C = V A E (-0). Lemma 6.2.7 Let A be an intuitionistic sentence, IS1 = No. Then: L F A iff (A E r for any (L, S)-place l) ? iff (A E I? for any (LV, S)-place I?). Proof Cf. Lemma 6.1.10 for the modal case.

Let I'lS := I? n IF^=) for S C S t and r G IF$=). We also f x a denumerable i universal set of constants S* and consider small subsets of S* as in Section 7.1. Definition 6.2.8 A n L-place (respectively, an LV-place) is an L3-complete (respectively, an L3V-complete) theory with a small set of constants. V P L and UPL denote the sets of all L-places and LV-places respectively. Obviously, UPL C V P L . We also have an analogue of Lemma 6.1.12: Lemma 6.2.9 Let u be a world in an intuitionistic Kripke model M over a frame F = ( F ,D ) and assume that M k L. Then

is an L3-complete theory.
Proof Almost obvious. As for L-consistency, note that if Ai E I?, for i =

1 , . . ., k and L k

A Ai > V
i= 1

Bj, then the latter implication is true in M, and is L-consistent.


so M , u IF B j for some j. Thus (I?,, -?) I,

Note that I?, is not necessarily L3V-complete. Similarly to the modal case we define canonical maps: Definition 6.2.10 Let M be a Kripke model for a superintuitionistic logic L, in which every individual domain is a small subset of S * . The map from (the ? , worlds o f ) M to V P L sending u t o I is called canonical and denoted by V M , L (or by v ~ or by v). , Lemma 6.2.9 also extends to Kripke sheaves, bundles and to metaframe models in modal metaframes.' The intuitionistic canonical model theorem (see ? below) shows that V P L is the set of all L-places I, in Kripke models for L with small domains. Now let us define some accessibility relations on V P L and UPL.
lFor intuitionistic metaframes the situation may be different.


Definition 6.2.11 For r , r' E VPL, we say that

r' is conservative over I? (notation: I? 5 I") i f r = r'l Dr; I?' is proper over I' (notation: l? < I?') if r c r l l D r .
Let 5 be the reflexive closure of <, i.e.

The inclusion relation denoted by RL.

G on VPL (i.e. the set { ( r , I")


I r C I?'))

is also

It is clear that

r C I?' iff r < r' V r 5 I" r' and A2 @ l?' r' E R ( r ) n W;

Definition 6.2.12 Let W C VPL. A partial ordering R RL is called selective o n W i f for any I? E VPL the following two conditions hold:
(3) i f (Al 3 A2) E (-I?), then A1 E

for some

(V) if VxA(x) E (-I?), then A(c') # I" for some I' E R ( r ) n W and some ? C' E Dr..
These conditions can be rewritten in an equivalent form:


r iff for any I" E R ( r ) n W (A1 E I" + A2 E I?'); VxA(x) E r iff A(cl) E r1for any r' E R ( r ) n W, c' E Dr, .
(A1 3 A2) E

Lemma 6.2.13
(1) The relation RL is selective on VPL and UPL.

(2) The relation 5 is selective on UPL.

Proof (1) ( 3 ) If (A1 > A2) @ I?, then r YL (A1 > A2) (Lemma 6.2.5), i.e. the theory (I? U {Al), {A2)) is L-consistent. So by Lemma 6.2.6, there exists an LV-place I" t (I? u {Al), {A2)). Thus r I?', Al E I', A2 # rl. (Q) Suppose VxA(x) @ I , then I? YL VxA(x). Take c E (S* - Dr); then ' the theory (r,{A(c))) is L-consistent (otherwise r kL A(c), which implies I' kL QxA(x)). Hence by Lemma 6.2.6, there exists r' E UPL such that r' k (I?,{ A ( c ) ) ) ,i.e. I" 2 r and A(c) @ r ' . (2) ( 3 )Suppose (A1 3 A2) E (-I?) and consider two cases. ! (a) If A1 $ r , then by (1) we obtain I" r such that A1 E F1, A2 @ I". So Al E ((rllDr) - r ) , and thus I? < r'. (b) If A1 E I?, then to show (IV), we can take r' = r , since A2 I-L (A1 > A2), and thus (A1 > Az) @ F implies A2 @ l7. (V) Suppose QxA(x) E (-r) and consider two cases. (a) If A(c) @ I' some c E Dr, there is nothing to prove: one can take I?' = I?. (b) If A(c) E I? for all c E Dr, we can apply 6.2.4 (Av). So there exists a formula C E (--I?) such that Vx(A(x) V C ) E r. Now as in the proof of (I), we



6.2. CANONICAL MODELS FOR SUPERINTUITIONISTIC LOGICS 499 obtain r' I? and e E ( D p - D r ) such that A(e) 6 I?'. Since Vx(A(x) V C) E C I?' and 'dx(A(x) V C) FL A(e) V C, we also have (A(e) V C) E r', and thus C E I?' by Lemma 6.2.5 (iii). Hence C E (rflDr) - r , and eventually I' < I".



Note that the previous argument fails for VPL. Definition 6.2.14 The canonical frame of a superintuitionistic predicate logic L is defined as VFL := (VPL,RL, DL), where r R L r l := I?

I' (DL)r := Dr ?,

similarly to the modal case (cf. Definition 6.1.18). The canonical frame with equality of an s.p.l.(=) L is

where, as i n Definition 7.1.10,

The stability condition for


holds trivially, due to the definition of RL.

Definition 6.2.15 The canonical model of an s.p.l.(=) (vF~=), &), where

L is V M ~ = ) :=

This valuation is obviously intuitionistic. Definition 6.2.16 W e also introduce two kinds of quasi-canonical frames and models: UF~=):= V F ~ = ) I U P U ,M ~ = ) V M L = ) I U P ~ , ~ := US (respectively, UI Mi=)) is the same as UF~=) (respectively, U M ~ = ) ) , but with the relation 5 instead of RL. T h e o r e m 6.2.17 (Canonical model theorem) Let L be an s.p.1. (=). Then for any L-place r and A E L ( r ) , VM~=),I? A iff A E IF



similarly for both quasi-canonical models UML, U 5 ML and for all their selective submodels.

P r o o f By induction on the length of A (cf. Lemma 6.1.21). The inductive step for A, V, 3 uses Lemma 6.2.5. In the cases of > and 'd use 6.2.12 ( )(b'). I,

500 CHAPTER 6. KRTPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Corollary 6.2.18 If M = V M ~ = ) ,U M ~ = ) u < M ~ = ) ,then or

for any A E IF(').
Now we obtain an analogue of 6.1.25: L e m m a 6.2.19 Let L1 C LZ be s.p.l.(=).


(1) VPL, = {rE VPL, I V M L , , IF L2),
(2) V M L , is a generated submodel of V M L , . P r o o f Almost the same as in the modal case. The proof of (1) uses a slightly different argument about consistency. Viz., let us show the L2-consistency for an L1-place O L2. Suppose the contrary: Lz k / \ A > V V for finite A C O, V -0; then E kQH / \ A > V V for a finite E L2 & 0, and hence QH t- /\(A U E) > V V , thus ( 0 , -0) is L1-inconsistent, which contradicts the assumption that O is an L1-place. For the proof of (2) note that I IF L2 implies A It- Lz for any A 2 I? since ' W the model is intuitionistic.



Definition 6.2.20 A n s.p.1. (=) L i s called V-canonical if L U-canonicity and Us-canonicity are defined analogously. Similarly t o 6.1.24, we obtain


Corollary 6.2.21 Every (quasi-) canonical superintuitionistic logic is strongly Kripke complete (Kripke sheaf complete i n the case of a logic with equality). By definition we readily have Proposition 6.2.22 The logics QH, QH= are V-canonical. We also have an analogue of Proposition 6.1.26:

' Proposition 6.2.23 If L is a V-canonical s.p.l.=, I i s a set of pure equality intuitionistic sentences, then L I' i s also V-canonical.



The same as in the modal case, but using Lemma 6.2.19.


Corollary 6.2.24 The logics with decidable and with stable equality Q H = = ~ QHT DE and QH=' = QH= SE are V-canonical.



Therefore, we obtain the following completeness result. T h e o r e m 6.2.25

(1) Intuitionistic predicate logic QH i s strongly Kripke frame complete.

(2) The logics with equality QH', QH'~, QH" complete.


are strongly Kripke sheaf

Note that (ii) can also be deduced from (i) by applying Theorems 3.8.8, 3.8.4.

Remark 6.2.26 In Section 6.4 we shall show that Q H = ~is actually Kripkecomplete. However V-canonicity is rare. In general one may expect that superintuitionistic predicate logics with simple axioms are not V-canonical. For example, classical logic Q C L is obviously not V-canonical; in fact, every QCL-place (as well as every L-place for any L) is not maximal in the corresponding canonical frame, since it may be extended after adding new constants to the language. Another trivial observation is that Q C L I- CD, but C D is not valid in VFQcL, since as we have just noted, every QCL-place sees another place with a larger domain. Moreover, the same argument shows that VFL is of infinite depth (for any logic L). Thus every superintuitionistic logic containing a propositional finite depth formula Pk , k 1 (see Section 1.1.2) is not V-canonical. Nevertheless for logics with additional axioms listed in Chapter 2 we can sometimes prove Us-canonicity. Let us now consider such examples.



Intermediate logics of finite depth

Let us begin with some simple, but useful remarks.

Lemma 6.3.1 Let L, L' be superintuitionistic logics, (I?, A) an intuitionistic theory.
(1) If ( r , A) is QH-consistent, ZC I, then '

(' A) is L-consistent. I,

(2) If (I?,A) is L3-complete, then it is L13-complete iff


(3) If ( r , A) is L3'd-complete, then it is L13'd-complete iff L'

Proof (i) Suppose ( r , A) is L-inconsistent, E r, and let us show that (I?,A) is QH-inconsistent. We have Fr, /\ rl > V Al for some finite rl G r , Al G A. So a generator A of this formula is in L; hence W E A I?. Thus I? tQH and A, so I? t Q ~ > V A l , which implies kQH V Al, i.e. the QH-inconsistency AI'l of ( r , A). (ii) (If.) Assume that p C r and (I?, A) is L3-complete. Then it is QHconsistent, and thus L'-consistent, by (i). Now L'-completeness and the existence property readily follow from L3-completeness. (Only if.) Suppose r, and take A E T - I'. Since Q H -I T > p, it T follows that tL > A, and thus (I?, A) is L1-inconsistent. (iii) The proof is similar to (ii).



502 CHAPTER 6. KMPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS R e m a r k 6.3.2 Every QCL-place F has all the properties from Lemma 6.1.3 (with L = QCL), so it obviously satisfies the conditions 6.2.12 (>), (V). In both cases we can take r' = r. In fact, (A1 > A2) @ r; implies -(Al > A2) E I?, and thus A1 E r , A2 6r. Next, if VxA(x) 6I?, then lVxA(x) E r , and thus 3 x ~ A ( x E I', by classical logic (cf. 2.6.17(ii)). Hence by the existence property, ) for some c E S we have lA(c) E r, i.e. A(c) @ I?. Now let us consider Kuroda's axiom. Recall that K F is valid in Kripke frames F = (W, R, D) with the McKinsey property: Vu E W3v E W(uRv & v is maximal), and similarly for Kripke sheaves. As noted a t the end of the previous section, there are no maximal worlds in the canonical frame VFL, so VFL does not have the McKinsey property (for any logic L). However let us show that the McKinsey property holds in u < F ~ = )whenever L contains K F . L e m m a 6.3.3 Let L be an s.p.1. (=) containing K F , ( r , 0 ) an L-consistent theory. Then ( r , 0 ) is QCL-consistent. Proof In fact, suppose tqcL -(A r l ) . Then ( A r l ) has a generator A such that -A E QCL. By the Glivenko Theorem 2.12.1, then 1 A E Q H K F L, and thus kL l ( A r l ) . SO the QCL-inconsistency of ( r , 0 ) implies its Linconsistency.



L e m m a 6.3.4 Let L be an s.p.1. (=).

r is a QCL-place iff I'

is maximal in U I F L .

(2) If K F E L, then for any L-place r there exists an QCL-place I" 2 r Proof (1) Every QCL-complete theory is maximal among consistent theories in the same language, so every extension of I? is conservative. By 6.3.2, r is a QCLV-place, i.e. r E UPL. (2) If already Q C L C I?, then according to 6.3.2, r is a QCLV-place, so we we can take I" = r , The other way round, if an LV-place r is not maximal in U5FL, then r < A for some A E UPL, so there exists A E ((AlDr) - r ) . Then A = B(a) for some B(x) E IF(') and a tuple a from Dr. By 6.2.17 it follows that U S ML((=), Iy A V -A, and thus F

! Hence Vx(B(x) V l B ( x ) ) $

Otherwise there exists B E (QCL - F). Obviously, the theory ( r , 0 ) is L-consistent, and thus QCL-consistent by 6.3.3. By Lemma 6.2.6, there exists a QCLV-place r' I?. We also have r < r' since B E (I?' - r ) n I F .

r, and thus QCL c I? (again by 6.2.17). -


The argument for logics with equality is similar. So we readily obtain completeness:


T h e o r e m 6.3.5 The logic Q H K F (respectively, Q H = K F ) is strongly determined by Kripke frames (respectively, Kripke sheaves) satisfying the McKinsey property. Now let us prove completeness for intermediate logics QHP; introduced where the logic AL is in Section 2.4. Recall that QHP; = A"'(QcL), axiomatised by formulas bA = p V (p > A) for A E L, p not occurring in A; QHPZ-frames are the intuitionistic frames of depth 5 k. L e m m a 6.3.6 If I?, I?' are L-places,



r < I?'

and AL

G I?, then L E r'

P r o o f Let B E L ( r ) n ( r ' - l?) and suppose L g I", A E L - I?'. Then B V ( B > A) is a substitution instance of 6A, so B V ( B > A) E AL. On the other hand, (B > A) 6 I?; in fact, otherwise (B > A) E I' G I", which together with B E I?', implies A E I" contradicting the choice of A. Now since also B 6r , we obtain B V ( B > A) 6 by Lemma 6.2.5. H Hence it follows that AL I?, in a contradiction to the assumption.


L e m m a 6.3.7 I QHP; f

L, then the frame U I F L is of depth 5 k.

P r o o f Suppose rl < . . .rr, is a chain in U I F L . We have L C QHP; = rl, which yields Q C L = Q H P ~ r k , by applying Lemma Ak-'(QcL) 6.3.6 (k - 1) times. Thus rkis maximal in u ~ Fby Lemma 6.3.4(i). ~, T h e o r e m 6.3.8 The logic QHP;(=) for k (respectively, Kripke sheaves) of depth k.

2 1 is determined by Kripke frames

P r o o f We already know that L = L P is sound for frames of depth k, so it ~ suffices to show that U ~ F L of depth k. By Lemma 6.3.7, U<FL is of depth is 5 k. On the other hand, L P ~ Pk-', hence U I F L Iy APk-' by Corollary Y 6.2.18. Therefore by Proposition 1.4.17 and Lemma 3.2.23 U I F L is of depth 2 k. R e m a r k 6.3.9 For some logics without equality canonical models allow us to prove KE-completeness rather than K-completeness. Indeed, let L be a noncanonical predicate logic without equality, L= = QH' L its minimal extension with equality, and suppose the canonical model for L= validates L (unlike the canonical model for L). Then L= is KE-complete (recall that axioms of QH' are valid in all Kripke sheaves), as well as L. In fact, if a formula A without equality is not L-provable, then by conservativity (Proposition 2.9.2), A is not L'-provable and thus is refuted in the canonical model of L=. Although we do not know how to apply this idea for a direct construction of a Kripke incomplete logic L, later on we will show an indirect construction of this kind.


Definition 6.3.10 Let L be a superintuitionistic logic, I? an L-place. W e say that E is a characteristic formula for I? if E E (-r) and A V ( A > E ) E I? for any A E L(=)(I?). Or equivalently, this means that ( A 2 E ) E I? for any A E (-I?), i.e. E is the weakest Dr-sentence outside r. If a characteristic formula exists, it is clearly unique up to equivalence in I? (the relation ( A r B) E I?). The next lemma uses the operation A introduced in Section 2.13 L e m m a 6.3.11 If I? is a AL-place, which is not an L-place, then there exists a sentence E E IF(') (without extra constants), which is characteristic for I?. Proof Let E E (L - I?). Then p V ( p > E ) E A L for p not occurring in E l and thus A V ( A > E ) E I? for any A E C(I?). W Corollary 6.3.12 If QHP; L for some n exists a characteristic sentence.

> 0, then for any L-place there

Proof Recall that Q H P ~= A ( Q H P ~ - ~for k > 0 and LP: = Q H I ) is inconsistent. For an L-place I?, take the least k (> 0) such that I? is an w ~ H ~ t - t h e oThen apply Lemma 6.3.11. r~.



Natural models for modal and superintuit ionistic logics

As we can see, canonical models work well only for some particular predicate logics. In subtler cases it is convenient to use so-called 'natural models' obtained from canonical models by a sort of 'selective filtration', together with canonical maps (cf. Definition 6.1.13). Let us begin with some simple remarks on canonical maps. The following is a trivial reformulation of the canonical model theorem. L e m m a 6.4.1 Let M be a Kriplce model for a modal logic L, i n which every individual domain is a small subset of S* (cf. Definition 6.1.13). Then for any world u E M , for any A E L ( u )

i.e. canonical maps are reliable. The same holds i n the intuitionistic case, with obvious changes.
L e m m a 6.4.2 Let M be the same as i n the previous lemma, relations i n M . Then for any u , v E M

Rithe accessibility

i.e. canonical maps are monotonic.



P r o o f Almost obvious: if O i A E v M ( u ) ,i.e. M , u k U i A , and u a v , then M , u k A , i.e. A E v M ( v ) . In the intuitionistic case, if u R v , then v ~ ( uE v ~ ( v ) , truth-preservation. ) by

However note that in general v~ is not a morphism of Kripke frames. The lift property does not always hold, because it may happen that r u R L i r v for incomparable u , v E F , but there does not exist w E R i ( u ) such that I?, = I?,. Definition 6 4 3 Let L be a predicate logic (N-modal or superintuitionistic, .. without or with equality), F = (W,R 1 , . . . ,R N ) a propositional frame of the corresponding kind. An L-map based on F is a monotonic map from F to (the propositional base of) V F ~ = )i.e. a map h such that for any u , v E F ,

In the intuitionistic case we say that h is an LQ-map i f all h ( u ) are LV-places, i.e. h is actually a map to UFL.
Definition 6.4.4 Let h be an L-map based on a propositional frame F . The predicate Kripke frame associated with h is F ( h ) := ( F ,D ) , where D, = (DL)h(U)for u E F . If L is a logic with equality, the Kripke frame with equality associated with h is F' ( h ) := ( F ,D , x), where

c x u d iff ( c = d ) E h ( u ) for u E F and c,d E D,. The L-model associated with h is ~ ( ' ) ( h ) ( ~ ( = ) ( h )(, h ) ) , := ~ where < ( h ) , ( p r ) := { c E D p I p F ( c ) E h ( u ) } foru E F.
All these frames and models are well-defined, since uRiv implies h ( u ) R ~ i h ( v ) (which means h ( u ) C h ( v ) in the intuitionistic case).

V F L and the associated L-model M ( h ) Definition 6.4.5 An L-map h : F are called natural i f h = U M ( ~ ) , L , ( h , i d ) : M ( h ) i.e. V M L is reliable: for any u E F , A E C ( u )



This definition is an analogue t o the canonical model theorem for M ( h ) . In this case we readily obtain M ( h ) ! L. = R e m a r k 6 4 6 Lemma 6.4.1 shows that every predicate Kripke model M with .. small domains can be presented as a natural Kripke model M ( h ) in a unique way; namely, put

and similarly in the intuitionistic case.


VFL based on F = (W, R1,. .. ,RN) Definition 6.4.7 A modal L-map h : F is called selective if it satisfies the condition
(0) if u E F and OiA E h(u), then there exists v E Ri(u) such that A E h(v).


L e m m a 6.4.8 An L-map h : F


VFL is natural i P it is selective. g

Proof The 'only if' direction is trivial, since in a natural model M(h) we have M(h), u b A iff A E h(u) (or VML,h(u) I= A, by the canonical model theorem) for any A E C(u). To prove 'if', we check the above equivalence by induction on the length A (for any u). Let us consider the case A = OiB; other cases easily follow from Lemma 6.1.3. If OiB @ h(u), then h(u)ljOiB, and thus h(u) k O p B . By ( 0 ) , there exists v E Ri(u) such that 1 B E h(v), which is equivalent to B @ h(v). Hence M(h), v !+B by the induction hypothesis. Since v E Ri(u), we obtain M(h),u!#OiB. The other way round, if h(u) b OiB and uRjv, then h(u)RLih(v),by monotonicity. So h(v) k B, and thus v b B , by the induction hypothesis. Since v is arbitrary, this implies u k OiB. Note that the condition ( 0 ) is a generalisation of selectivity from Definition 6.1.31 (where F is a subframe of VFL). Moreover, by (0)and monotonicity it follows that the image of h is a selective subframe of VFL. The intuitionistic analogue of 6.4.7 is the following VFL based on F = (W, R) Definition 6.4.9 An intuitionistic L-map h : F is called selective if it satisfies the following two conditions (cf. 6.2.12 (>), (d)).
(3) if (A1 3 A2) E (-h(u)), then A1 E h(v), A2 @ h(v) for some v E R(u);


(d) if 'v'xA(x) E (-h(u)), then A(c)

# h(v) for some v E R(u) and c E D,.
VFL is natural iff it is

L e m m a 6.4.10 An intuitionistic L-map h : F selective.


Proof Similar to Lemma 6.4.8. The 'only if' part is trivial. To prove 'if', we show by induction on the length of A E L(u) (for any u) that M ( h ) , u Il- A iff A E h(u) (or VML, h(u) Il- A). Let us consider only three cases. Let A = B > C . If A # h(u), then by (>), there exists v E R(u) such that B E h(v), C @ h(v). By the induction hypothesis, we obtain v Il- B, v Iy C. Hence u ly B > C. The other way round, if u Iy B > C , then there exists v E R(u) such that v I B , v Iy C. Thus h(v) Il- B , h(v) Iy C by the induction hypothesis. Since t h(u)RLh(v), it follows that h(u) Iy B > C.

M(h) is called a natural LV-model. Then u II. so A E h(v). and therefore H h(u) Iy A.0. Hence u Iy A. thanks to reflexivity. to check ( 0 ) . Sometimes we specify the terminology and say. MI selective submodel. Then by the lift property for h. such that B(c) @ h(v). Let A = VxB. suppose OiA E h(u). H we leave to the reader. then by (V). such that v Iy B(c). I-natural and proper. Informally speaking. If A @ h(u). set is called proper if in particular.8. In the modal case. which I. In the intuitionistic case an L-map h over a p. If an L-map h is injective and also U R ~ V h(u) R ~ i h ( v ) . if h is L. there exists I? E M1 such that h(u)RiLr and A E r. In the intuitionistic case ( ) (V) are checked by a similar argument. then Obviously this condition does not imply the injectivity for h. since h(u)RLh(v). c E D. e. Fl the propositional frame of MI. Proof By Lemmas 6. Thus h(v) Iy B(c) by the induction hypothesis. then there exist v E R(u). c E D.g. in the modal case for extensions of QT proper natural models on reflexive frames can be used. Similarly in the intuitionistic case one can consider proper natural models on a quasi-ordered F. iff then M(h) is clearly a selective submodel of the canonical model. there exists v E Ri(u) such that h(v) = I?. Let L be a modal or superintuitionistic logic.4. v Iy B(c). The monotonicity of h follows from the definitions. if u Iy VxB. In the intuitionistic case we also use the term LV-map if h is a map t o UFL. that h is an (L. .4. A. in these cases in natural models we do not have to 'repeat' the same L-place in strictly accessible worlds. Then h is a natural L-map.B(c) iff 3c E Du h(u) IF B(c) by the induction hypothesis. By the induction hypothesis. it is sufficient to show that h is selective. NATURAL MODELS Let A = 3xB. R1)-map if R1 is a selective relation on VPL such that uRv implies h(u)R1h(v). By selectivity of MI. The other way round. there exist v E R(u). VML a Lemma 6.A iff 3c E Du u It. Since h ( u ) R ~ h ( v )the latter is equivalent to h(u) lt. 6. h : F -H Fl.6. Also note that the naturalness condition ( 0 )is a weak analogue of lift p r o p erty.

(3) If L is 1-modal and L 2 QS4.1. . instead of applying 3.1.11. be the set of all greedy standard subtrees of FNTw Then . Let GT(A) be the set of all greedy standard A-trees. L = ML(KVo(A)).p. it has the c. where Vl(A) is the class of all countable rooted A-frames.4.4. then the claim holds for F = IT. Then Proof (i) By Theorem 6.21.29. where Vo(A) is the class of all countable A-frames. Next. Proof By Proposition 3. then one can take F = FNTw. We may assume that is the root of M1 (otherwise.508 CHAPTER 6. i.4.14. Fl sending A to r.13 Let FNT. So by Proposition 3.9..18. By Proposition 1. In the case (3) we use Proposition 1. By Lemma 6.5.14. Hence by Lemma 3.4. every frame from V l (A) is a p-morphic image of a frame from GT(A).3. by Proposition 1. = (2) If L contains OiT for 1 5 i 5 N .11. Now let us modify this proposition for the logics described in Theorem 6.10. thus we can take F = FNT. there exists a pmorphism h from some greedy standard tree F onto Fl sending h to I?. replace M1 with M1 T I?). by Proposition 1.12.e. L = ML(KVl(A)). By Proposition 1. Therefore ML(KGT(A)) C L. r E VPL..4.12.11 to construct a pmorphism h : IT. Then there exists a Kripke model M based on a standard greedy tree F such that YM(A) r and M != L. The converse inclusion is a trivial consequence of the definitions.12 (1) Let L be an N-modal logic..3. Proposition 6.3.11. Thus VI~. Of course.f. we could apply Lemma 6. h is a natural L-map. = ) so we can take M = M(h). by Corollary 3.29. In the case (ii) the argument is the same. the logic L = QA is Kripke complete.12.I(A)h ( ~ = r . This means that Fl is serial. In the case (2) all the formulas OiT are true in VML.10. it is also A-elementary. - Hence we obtain Proposition 6.11.8. there exists a countable reliable M1 VML verifying r.14 Let A be a propositional one-way PTC-logic. hence they are true in its selective submodel MI. based on the corresponding facts H about frames with eaualitv. Let Fl be the propositional frame of M I .18.11. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Lemma 6.

4. We shall often denote v ~ ( uby r. Q. Then by Lemma 3. R' a selective relation on . be the Kripke sheaf of M.5 (2) Let A be a propositional one-way PTC-logic. So in the intuitionistic case we have the following analogue of 6. from maximal points u of F at all points from IT.1.12. is isomorphic to a simple Kripke sheaf a' (in fact. Kripke sheaf completeness follows from Theorem 6.7 Now let us prove a somewhat stronger form of completeness (cf.: in fact. to apply this lemma.10) that the intuitionistic universal tree is IT.26. Lemma 6 4 1 Let L be a superintuitionistic logic. a < P iff 3y ( 0 = a y ) . where . if there is no confusion. then one can directly construct a proper natural model on IT. non-equal to F. So F is satisfied in a Kripke frame from QGT(A).Tu.. But if for example. R' = RL..8. Then for any L-place r there exzsts a proper natural (L. ) It is clear that for v E P(u) one can choose an L-place F. since CE corresponds t o a first-order property of KFEs.4.. we obtain that every L-consistent theory r is satisfied a t the root of a Kripke sheaf model M = M(h) based on a standard greedy A-tree. This natural model is in general improper. The logics are A-elementary..29 and Proposition 6. Let Q. due to the reflexivity. one can copy ? L-places I.. Recall (Definition 1. . := (Tw 4). recall that every L-place I? in the canonical model can be properly extended by extending its 'domain' Dr.10.12. Hence we obtain completeness: Theorem 6 4 1 . one should take the corresponding Horn closure). Therefore there exists a natural (L. As in the proof of Lemma 6.4. R1)-model on a = standard (complete) subtree F of IT.6. Then QA= + C E = ML'(ICGT(A)). R1)-model on IT. Proof (ii) We modify the argument from the previous proof. NATURAL MODELS For logics with closed equality there is a similar result: Proposition 6 4 1 .10. Dragalin 119881).6 VPL. Since M b C E . it follows that Q 'F CE. such that VM(A) I?.1.

23 Let M be an intuitionistic (L.11. ML(KF) C ML(KFTu) G QS4. < CL and u is a proper (LV. it is just the logic of all posets of depth k and branching n (obviously.18 Let F be an effuse countable tree. (not necessarily ~ r o ~ e rsuch that FA = F. In Section 6. Rf)-model on a poset F of finite depth. If a relation R' is selective on U P L (for an intermediate logic L).4.4. we obtain < L e m m a 6.22 > 0.12. for any n 2 2. Hence by Proposition 3.3. this construction t o the selective relation on UPL.21. (2) IL=(K&F) = QH=.4.= = IL= (KE(IT. In particular. In particular.4. k Proposition 6.4. one can apply ). then similarly to 6. <)-model u on a standard (greedy) subtree F of I : and an (LV. However unlike the case of VFL.19 QH(=)(~) determined by the universal n-branching tree is IT.. = IL(K(IT:)).510 CHAPTER 6. and a natural (LV. ( I ) QHP.20 If QHP. (3) ILz(KF) = QH=d. Thus we obtain the following completeness result for Q H P ~ . Thus by the generation lemma. KRJPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS T h e o r e m 6. (2) (QHP. < < L e m m a 6.14. The intuitionistic conditions of naturalness for this case can be slightly modified.4. The remaining statements are left to the reader. We have F r u -B IT2 + ITwfor some u. <)-model T on ITkw such that U ( A ) = r. Then (1) IL(KF) = QH. all these posets are finite). R1)-model on IT. Corollary 6.10 we will axiomatise the superintuitonistic predicate logic of the frames IT: of finite depth k and finite branching n.4.R1)model on a standard greedy subtree F of IT. is a frame of depth k . then F L e m m a 6. <)-model on the whole IT.21 If QHPE L then for any I? E U P L there exist a proper (LV. But first we shall give some simple remarks on natural models based on posets of finite heights. ML=(KF) = QS4'. we cannot state the existence of a proper (LV. for any I? E U P L one can construct a proper natural (LV. ML(KF1u) G QS4. <)-model on F.)). ML(KF) = QS4. ML(KF) = QS4'". Then (1) M is natural iff the following conditions hold (for any u E F): . Proof (1)In the modal case the argument is similar to Proposition 1.

. (V') + (V) The proof is similar. (3') & (V) * (V) If VxA(x) @ r.. and A(c) E r. . (C > VxA(x)) @ rvfor some v E Re(u).) v E Re (u).Ri(u)) is infinite. (otherwise VxA(x) E r. I n the transitive (or intuitionistic) case we should take PF(u) instead of Ri(u) i n the above condition. . then the condition (3')implies (Av'). for some (V) (2) if VxA(x) E (-r. Proof + ( 2 ) If A1 E I?. .... Rf)-model.R1. Thus every world of a small subtree F has infinitely many successors in FNT. for a + 1) (2') maximal v E R(u) such that (A1 > A2) @ I?.24 A subtree F = (W. then (A1 > A2) @ I?. RN) FNT. NATURAL MODELS (3') 511 If (A1 > A2) E (-I?. for all c E S. if (A1 > A2) @ r. and A2 @ I?. then A1 E I?.4. is isomorphic to a small subtree of FNT.) and A(c) E for some v E Re(u). and A1 @ r. Definition 6. I' Then (C > VxA(x)) @ r. Let us now prove two general lemmas on natural models. A2 @ rvfor some v E Re(u) then (A1 > A2) @ r..) and by ( ) . for an L3V-complete r. (or IT. we have Vx(A(x) V C) E r. r. then VxA(x) $ ! rv If M is an (LV.. then by (Av). is said to be small if Vu E F V i E IN ( c i (u) . for some C @ r. in intuitionistic case).4. Note that every denumerable tree... hence VxA(x) @ I?. (3) ( 'Obviously. for all c E Dru.6. unused in F .. in which every point is of finite height.

.VF~=)such that F' := UFn is small.1. (2) In the intuitionistic and in the modal transitive case the definition is slightly modified..p. : F' ---t VF~.is the list of all N-modal S*-sentences. then we extend h. can be extended to a natural L-map based on a (small) subtree F' 5 FNT. then 3v E Ri.16. In fact. i. natural. then 3v E P(u) 3c E Dh. Lemma 6. L and a small subtree F of IT. In the intuitionistic case the condition (*) is replaced with two (where IF denotes forcing in the canonical model): + + (**) if hn(u) Iy A 3 B. the corresponding v is u(2mN i .F consists only of the v constructed by (*).8. if OiAm E hn(u).) and hn+l 'cures the defects' of h. In the transitive case one should take P(u) instead of ci (u). OiA.(u)).Fn-l and . For any N-modal S*-sentence OiA choose the corresponding 'Skolem function' such that rRLiFOiA(r) any r E $(OiA).4.e.. (* * *) if hn(u) Iy VxA(x).+l(v) hn+l (v) Iy A(c).. Now if hn is constructed and (*) holds for Fn-1. So it follows that (*) holds for Fn . with odd k.4. Thus the joined map h' := Uh. More explicitly this is done as follows.1) of u E F . cf.2.=) is n selective. . hn(u) E dorn(fo. .1. of L-maps hn : Fn ---. such that F' > F .+l(v). u E F .512 CHAPTER 6. infinitely many ~i-successors follows that they are of the form u(kN i . if OiA E h. KRIPKE COMPLETENESSFOR VARYING DOMAINS Lemma 6. This function exists by the axiom for of choice. n Fn+1 Fn - c U i= 1 N ~i (F. Proof (1) By induction we construct an increasing sequence of small trees and a sequence h = ho c hl 2 .p.1). then 3v E P(u) (hn+l(v) IF A & hn+l(v) IY B ) . (2) The same holds for an s. It also is small (if Fn is small). by Lemma 6. .~. Actually we may assume that Fntl . E h.+l(u) A E h.) (i.25 (1) Let L be an N-m. Then every L-map based on a small subtree F of FNT.in fact.Fn-1 do not appear in .(u)..e. . : (*) for any u E F. to hn+1 by putting whenever .

A small tree F' from 6. Usually this lemma is applied to the case F' - cF ..12. with h ( ~ = I. correspond to steps in calculating Skolem functions used in a well-known proof of the downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem. ~VXA(X). V F ~ = ) of h. and r R LfA3B(I').26 The domain of an L-map h (and of the corresponding L:= U Dh(u).4.4. F' of FNTw (IT. or even LV<-map h' if the original map h is of the corresponding kind.4. We say that h' is conservative over h if for every u E F n F': - - (2) h(u) 5 hf(u) (cf. by adding only sentences with extra constants. Although we will further apply this construction to the linear case. The condition (1) means that additional constants in h'-domains are 'new' for h. which is its particular case for ) ' a singleton frame on {A).12. In fact.6. f ~ > ~ (E r[:(A) . fvxA(x) is defined on . then h' can be prolonged to a conservative extension h" : F U F' ---. NATURAL MODELS 513 Similarly t o the modal case.4. f A 3 ~ is defined on the complement of [ .4. the intermediate L-maps h. L e m m a 6. The construction in 6. Lemma 6.4. ( A 3 B). see Lemma 6.4. in the intuitionistic case) and h' is conservative over h.27 Let h : F VF~=)and h' : F' VF~=)be two L-maps.25 directly implies Lemma 6. we use corresponding Skolem functions fA3*.25 extends L-maps by adding new points above the existing ones.30 below. Definition 6. in the intuitionistic case).25 is a more explicit version of the proof of 6.25 is clearly isomorphic to a greedy one (or to the whole FNT. Actually the proof of 6.11). The main idea is to extend theories in a conservative way. We say that h' is a conservative extension of h if it is conservative and F F'.4.28 I h : F f VFL=) and h' : F' -+ VF~=) are two L-maps on subtrees F.4.4. Now we shall describe a construction allowing us to add new points (theories) below the existing theories. 6 Note that in the intuitionistic case we can construct an LV-map or LVL-map. model) is DL uEF Definition 6.2. we formulate it for arbitrary trees. or to IT. 6. For LV< we should not repeat ruin future worlds and similarly for any selective relation (in the intuitionistic or in the reflexive modal case).4.t t ( B ) ) W Analogously.: (VxA(x)).

= r. Let us begin with the intuitionistic case. suppose : I-L where r (c) A1(c..D. which is a contradiction.. Assume that I: satisfying (i) and (ii) is already constructed (with I?: = I'. Now. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Proof Consider the case when F' c F.. Then r:RLir: and [I D.. k i (by (i) for r:).). . C D...514 CHAPTER 6. . where x is a distinct ?.2. r.F'). Suppose I-L 1(A1(c. Now let us consider the modal case. A E r. A = A A ~ . E r.28. d ) > B(c. A ' = A A ~ . .4. r: for h(u).4.. by Lemma 6. so A $ r:. We construct hl'(v) for v E F .. i. d ) . P u t A1'(c) := 3xA1(c. similarly D.. d ) . C r: and ?:D ?. list corresponding t o c". let F U F' be a small subtree of FNT. A ) t o an L3-complete I?: k (I'. A. RLir. so A' E I: A E I?. Similarly to that case.6. Then k L 1(A1'A A) and UiA" E I?. Put (I?.c") A A(c. which is a contradiction. j T (d) C D.. Let us check the L-consistency of I?.4. and It follows that r. in : ? constants D such that D t n : fact.A). We put ~ h + again Dr = Dt U D. we extend ( r .*) = D U D.9 we extend I' to an L-Henkin theory C D. hl(u).1. we choose D such that D n : : c D.I k j A. A ) := (r:ur. then D t n ~ h + D. Therefore by repeating this construction for all v E ( F . I =I?.29 Under the conditions of Lemma 6. Let us show that ( r . A E -rV implies 1 A E rV r:. i. is L-inconsistent. Since put A1'(c) := 3xA1(c. -I?. r(cl') C D t .e. rv5 r:... Proof Apply Lemma 6. C Dv n D t = D.25 t o h" constructed in Lemma 6. A~ E r. ? for u E F n F') and consider v E &(u) (or v E P(u) in the intuitionistic case). d. CliAi E . Then k L A"(c) A A(c. A = A A j .?J is L-inconsistent. rl.. A) is L-consistent. c" are just the same as in the intuitionistic case).. abbreviates Dh(. = I?.x)..). d ) > B(c. (or IT.e. we obtain a conservative extension of F. so CliA1 E r:. hl'(u) respectively. we obtain A" E I?. Then D(r.c") A A(c. In fact. To simplify notation. B E -r.x).D.. since D t n Dh+ = D.. (c..). B? E -r. Then h' can be prolonged to a natural conservative extension ha of h over a (small) Subtree Fa 2 F U F'.F' by induction on its length l(v). U D t . with a set of Now by Lemma 6. d)). C c ~ h + Lemma 6. Obviously. E r:. OJ?. etc.B = VB. (in h). moreover. Hence .. we write I?.4.28. : ? where A' = AAL. D.

R) is called tree-like if it is rooted and Definition 6. 6. set IT. For constructing hl'(v) for v E R ~ ( A(i. We cannot just prolong h t o F by putting = r l ( D r n D t ) . to the tree-like p. := IG IT..e maximal chains) i n the universal tree IT.5 Refined completeness theorem for QH +K F Definition 6. Definition 6. in the modal case: 0: ( r l ( D r n D:)) C ru for all u E R i ( ~ ) . set F R-' is non-branching.4. is the set of maximal points and u IT!.E I N . z E IT. Let us extend IT.4. 2.0. 1 ( I T .5.31 Strictly speaking. (or IT.4. Then there exists a conservative extension hl' of h to F such that h " ( ~ = r . we use (ii) in the intuitionistic case and (i) ) in the modal case.5. i or for all u E P ( A ) resp. ) P r o o f Repeat the proof of Lemma 6. with the set of maximal elements G .2 A p.4. R e m a r k 6.30 Let F be a subtree of FNT. since the latter does not always have the existence property.:= F (1) Dr - { A ) .0.5. every world sees a maximal world. Lemma 6.e.6.5. REFINED COMPLETENESS THEOREM F O R QH + K F L e m m a 6. for all u E F (or equivalently.R) is called coatomic i f it satisfies the McKinsey property: V u 3v ( u R v & R ( v ) = { v ) ) . for all u E R i ( ~ ) . But this formal obstacle is not really essential.28 word for word.).3 Let IT! be the set of all w-paths (i.e. i n which IT. set F = (W. Recall that formula K F is valid in all frames over coatomic p.28 cannot be applied directly here. sets. A set G E IT! gives rise to the subframe -T . for u = A)..) (2) in the intuitionistic case: r l ( D r n D?) C I?.0. .1 A p. U G ) of IT. = IT. for all u E P(A) n F (hence for all u E F ) . for u E IT.. = (W.0. Let I' be an L-place such that n D t 2 D. 515 Let h be an L-map over F .

with UM(A) r . We consider the following formulas: M L := VxOOP(x) > OOVxP(x). is also coatomic .3. DL.5 Q H 4 poset IT. whenever u E z (and I 5 r.1).e. there exists a QCLV-place . Obviously. So by Lemma 6. choose a G' path z. i. F := 0 3 x P ( x ) > 03xOP(x).where I' := UI?.. R)-natural model. = -G G Proof First.in fact..for QH' 6. It is also clear that I C r. Now for every path z consider the L-consistent theory I k E w) E G we put DL := D.for QH=d + K F .).16 we find an L-natural model M over IT.) for any coatomic One can easily obtain the corresponding completeness results for logics with K F . --G (a) V u E IT. ' . is L-natural.516 CHAPTER 6.6. W > - Note that this construction can be applied to an arbitrary selective relation R on VPL (or UPL). K R P K E COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Obviously. in the proof of (2)). IT. (V) for a QCL-place I. we may assume that the set UD. ML* := OVxOUP(x) > OOVxP(x).. 19891.G I L e m m a 6. is small. E G containing u and put GI = { z . and k (I?. there exists an LSV-natural model M on IT. equality. IT. I u E IT. It is also clear that if IT.. holds for u E z E I ! in the resulting model. then there exists a denumerable G such that IT.4 Let L be a superintuitionistic logic containing K F . 2 I with Dr. hold trivially. ---G . . . by Lemma 6.5. ' .6 Directed frames In this section we prove completeness results from [Corsi and Ghilardi. = {uk k u this theory is QCL-consistent. i.) + G = IL(KIT.e. and in K . VFL sending v to r. in the semantics ICE . for each u E IT.. it is a subset of S* (cf. Section 7. is coatomic and tree-like. . Proposition 6. By Lemma 6.3. such that vM(h) = I?. Then for T any G I ! and for any L-place I? (1) there exists an L-natural model M on IT. since ? the conditions (>).RI?. ' I ' G The resulting map h : IT. is coatomic iff the paths from G cover IT. 32 E G u E Z . one should only check T that r.5.. 0 ) .. is coatomic. (2) similarly.2. to obtain an (L. + K F = IL(Km.4.

Definition 6. (IT. IT.1. I T . ( 2 ) .3 Let L be a l-m.3 ( I ) . . with the following properties - (1) the set ~ h := U Dh(u) is small. with the added greatest countable cluster C.n)R(P.6.. V F L such that g ( h ) = I?. DIRECTED FRAMES 517 Definition 6. denoted by coo. V F L such that h ( h ) = I?.6. . where F is one of the subordination frames from natural L-map h : F Definition 6. we can construct a natural L-map h : IT.1 A propositional Kripke frame F = (W.1.. Proof By 6. + 1 (IT. then h is a subordination map on each copy of IT.6.2 IT.m) n < m V ( n = m & a iff 40). the ordinal product IT. for cE we say that h introduces c at stage a if a is minimal in the set { p E > - - ~ h + . Then there exists a subordination L-map g : IT.4. recall that this is the set w x w ordered by the relation " (a. the elements of C are . we use renaming of constants.6.6. I n this case M ( h ) is called a subordination L-model. . .. D ) is called directed if its base (W.R) is directed.R) is called directed if the relation R is reflexive. ml.R. In this section we use specific propositional frames: Definition 6.6.p. w is called the multiple subordination frame. with the added top element oo) is called the subordination frame with the greatest element.4 Let L QS4 and let I? be an L-place. w . Viz. . For this purpose we should first trace all constants appearing in D:.12. so now we are going to transform it into a subordination L-map 9To satisfy the conditions 6. + uEF (3) i f F = I T . is called the subordination frame.2.p. or s.6.6. + C .) is called the subordination frame with the greatest cluster. transitive and such that A predicate Kripke frame F = (W. A subordination L-map is a V F L . Lemma 6.

by renaming constants. A E U-h(P). I c E D h ( ~ ) )The same constants can be introduced a t different stages. they are all incomparable. Now g satisfies the condition 6. a E w ~ ) .) consists exactly of the constants introduced at stage P.e.h ( a ) is L-inconsistent. Thus Y L1 (Ai). obviously n Note that a /< 0 implies 0 .a&. This operation respects provability. i. For (2).6. > 0. h(a) C ~ E U ~ Then for some n. +kL A for any Dh(.)-formula A. hence UUA E h(a) by S4. ~. Hence it follows that U 0 .p. . lal=n Now since every 0 .(x) > A. such that {Ai I 1 5 i 5 m) is L-inconsistent.)) E g(a).p such that 0 a and h introduces en a t stage p.is L-inconsistent. there is n such that (3xA(x) > A(en)) E h(a). Now let S* = {en I n E w) be an enumeration of our universal set of constants.they cannot appear in g(y). I h is a subordination map such that h ( h ) f then U Cl-h(a) is L-consistent. we obtain different sequences a ~ l c.e. First note that A can be also obtained from A.h ( a ) implies OA E h(a). Of course we have to ensure that g(a) is really an L-place.) Every Ai can be presented as [ci/xi]Bi. aEwm k k > > L. E W . We choose its small subset S and present it as a two-dimensional array: S = { ~ n .h ( a ) C 0-h(P). is obtained from A by replacing all occurrences of each constant en with cn.518 CHAPTER 6. if 3xA. so OA E O-h(a) C h(P)..Dh(. where r(ci) Dh(ai). this is uniquely determined by n and a. lalSn U U.. note that if a 10 . by joining conjunctions. since the new set of constants S is small. Now A E 0 . The Henkin property is almost obvious. In fact.) are of the ) W form cn. by monotonicity of h. so all constants in D g ( ~. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS IT. then Dh(p). formally. but .6.(%.xi is a c .(..(x) = (3xA(x)). 1 72. implies YL 1 A Ai. i= 1 i= 1 i.2. we define g : IT. Lemma 6.h ( a ) is /\-closed. - VFL as follows. Next.h(a) is L-inconsistent.D. the L-consistency of h(a) implies the L-consistency of g(a). Proof Suppose U 0. where A. Take the smallest such n. then 3xA(x) E C(h(a)). Thus if P y. one should ar- < gue by induction on the inference of A. (Note that ai are not necessarily distinct.3 (I). so FL A. By the Henkin property for h(a). E L(g(a)). In fact.5 Let L QS4. Therefore (3xA. of length n and formulas Ai E O-h(aiki) .

By 2. Then for every L-place I? there is an wsubordination model M with UM ( A ) = r . so h(aiki) k 3xiOBi.6.+l.1.6.1.+~ 2 U Dh(n. (A) = r. + Then put . Since h is a subordination map.G .15(xxvii). and (Up > OOp) E S4). By Lemma 6. This shows that 0 0 3 x i B i E 0-h(ai).6.1. the sets r(ci) are disjoint.6. a).3.5 and 6.6. so we may assume that all xi are disjoint..18 and soundness. which implies h(aiki) b 03xiBi by 2.3x A Bi7 and thus kL 1 A 3xiBi i by 2. By Lemma 2. thus and so h(ai) != 0 0 0 3 x i B i 7 by 1. Hence k ~ 001 is admissible.9.+~ ( a ) for all a E wm.1.+~(A) r. UM. DIRECTED FRAMES 519 distinct list of variables and Bi is a Dh(ai)-~enten~e.4. there is a subordination model Mo with Put h(0.15(xvi). ( a ) for all a E wm.1and soundness. = h(n 1. for every n there is an L-place rn+1 that such U UPh(n. so eventually (*) implies the L-inconsistency of U 0 . DF. since xi are disjoint. . a ) := UM. lal=n-1 Lemma 6.4. By Lemmas 6.6.2. a) := UM. Proof Let us define h as follows: By Lemma 6.6. -A i i i where x = xl . But h(aiki) k OAi.1.a) and rn+l aEwm > aEwm there is a subordination model Mn+1 with UM. Bi .h ( a ) contrary to the choice of n.10 tAi implies k Vx-. which implies Ai3xiBi (0-introduction and thus by Lemmas 1.6.6 Let L 2 QS4.7.6. we obtain kL -. 1.

8 An L-consistent theory I? MFs is called a nearly ( L .S)-Henkin theory then 0-I' is a ' nearly ( L .7 The logic QS4.. suppose is is not obtained by ( 2 ) . Then there exists an L-consistent theory I" C MFs# such that I? C r' and the following conditions hold: (1) O O l B E r' or O B E r' for any B E M F s t . .B . IS'I = IS' . rois L-consistent by assumption. A 0 0 1 ' ~ 'B ( x ) > 7 O O l B ( c ) .6. c + Lemma 6. ' . is not o f the form Qx B ( x ) . Let also S 5 S f .) is L-consistent and A. (2) if Q x B ( x ) E MFsl and O O i Q x B ( x ) E r'.SI = No. U {A. A B . Proof Standard. that some r. is clearly L-0-closed. W e only need to show by induction that r.6 and 6.S)-Henlcin theory and A is an S-sentence such that r U { A ) is L-consistent. " (1) where c does not occur in r. . Lemma 6. . it follows that r. For the induction step. S ) ' Henkin theory if I E L Qx A ( x ) . 6. W e define the following sequence o f theories: I . E r.6. ? . In fact.6.S)-Henkin theory. Then there are sentences B1. is L-consistent. := r. .6. such that L t B1 A . A E r only if r E L OA).6. is L-consistent. Each r. S a small set of constants.e. u { O O ~ A . U {no-A. If I is a nearly ( L .p. then I' U { A ) can be extended to an ( L ..l. If r is a nearly ( L . but rn+1 not. (2) rn U {UO-A. = V x B ( x ) . Definition 6.1.10 Let L > QS4 + ML* and let I C MFs be L-consistent and ' L-0-closed (i.) i f I U {OO-IA.) i f r.) otherwise. (2) Let L > QK Ba.O O ~ B ( C ) ) .. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Erom Lemmas 6.S)-Henkin theory.2 is determined by the w-subordination fmme. Proof Let { A i I i E w ) be an enumeration o f MFsl. (3) I U {OA.9 (1) Let L be an I-m.4.6. . whenever r F L A(c) for all c E S .9 we obtain Theorem 6. or in B ( x ) . ~ Since c does not occur in I?. . then OO7B(c) E I" for some C E S'.520 CHAPTER 6. Then Suppose rn+1is obtained by ( 1 ) .) is L-consistent and A.

By 6. It follows that I? tLOVx A(x). OA @ I" and so A @ 0-l?'.6.( 0 . so OTA E 0-r and O l A E r ' . and so OQx A(x) @ I?.11 Let L > QS4.6.OBI A Since r. Since r' is L-consistent. By 6. and by 6. Lemma 6.6. Therefore r' := U l . is L-0-closed. OA(c) E for all c.6. rnk L CIOTA. (2) If I" 2 0-I? is L-consistent then 0-I?' (3) If I' t L implies A E r .. we have .6. By Necessitation. Then Qx A(x) @ Owl?.6. and so I?. k L --tOOIAn. is L-consistent.2 + ML*.6. and so 0-I' bLL 0-A. .1 O(2). If rn+l obtained by is (3). S)-Henkin theory.10(1).10(1). is L-consistent and L-0-closed by a standard argu? nEw ment.12 Let L 2 QS4.10(2). From (2) it follows that 0 . C 0-l?. OOlA(c) E r for ' some c. then I?. U {OOlA. > OOQx B(x). Now suppose I? k~ 0 0 i Q x A(x).10(1) and A 6. I? bLL OOlA(c). and so I?. Proof (1) Suppose 0-I? FL Qx A(x).10(1) it follows that OOTA E I?.6. then the following holds: (1) 0-r is a nearly (L.6.6.6. then (1) and (2) above imply 6. Thus each I?.6. then 00-Qx A(x) E r . and so 0-I? bLL A(c). A OB. then rnk L C I A n .If r.+I is L-inconsistent. (3) We first check 6.r . and by 6. contrary t o hypothesis.10. DIRECTED FRAMES Since L 2 QS4 + ML*. S)-Henkin theory.. The conditions (1) and (2) hold by construction. but for all c E S . If O O l A @ I?.10(1).r ~ {CIA)) C 0-I? and so A E 0-r and OA E I?.) is L-inconsistent. This contradicts the L-consistency of I?. so I?' is an (L. Hence 0-I'U{OA) is consistent. then OTA @ 0-I?. . rn Lemma 6. Then A(c) E 0-I' and 0-r t-L Qx A(x). (2) Suppose A $2 0 . If r C M F s is an L-consistent theory satisfying conditions (1) and (2) of Lemma 6. hence L I. we obtain This contradicts the L-consistency of rnU { 0 0 7 A n ) . Then for every L-place r there is a subordination model M with the greatest cluster such that vM(h)= r . Then OO7A(c) $2 I?. Since I' is L-consistent. I F L OA(c). is L-inconsistent.

U {A) is L-consistent and A = A for some m. For any n we define r..14 Let L QS4.h ( a ) is L-consistent. a by Lemma 6.522 CHAPTER 6. By Lemma 6. 6. C In fact. St')-Henkin theory. Then OA @ I?" and O l A @ I?". .16.. By applying Lemmas 6. Let us show that 0 I is an (L.6. I?.6.1+ ML*. 6.12.6. Proof Same as Lemma 6.2. 6.14.2. Since we also have 0-r.6.9 we obtain Theorem We need to check the existence property instead of the Henkin property. for .4.10(2). r" be the same as in the proof of 6.13 The logic QS4.6.6.. Let OA E 0-I"'. By Lemma 6. + ML* is determined by the subordination Lemma 6.12.Rhr* and A E I?*. For any a E ww we have 0-I?. 2 0-r" C r m n . St')-Henkin theory.11(2).10(1) and 6. By ~ e m k 6. using Lemma 6. heref fore. Suppose that both A @ .16 instead of Lemma 6.P E IT.4. Then there exists a V F L such that g ( h ) = r.15 The logic QS4.2 frame with the greatest cluster. By Lemma 6.S'I = No.6. Let A1. By Lemma 6. Let h = VM. S1')-Henkin theory as well.. Now let us consider the intuitionistic case. . 0-I'" is a nearly (L. One can easily t o see that I is L-0-closed.1. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Proof We construct the corresponding h as follows. = O-O-I?. For n. O O l A E I?" and 0 0 l ~ E I' in contradiction with the L-consistency of I?".5.? " 0-I"' and 1 A @ 0-I?".6.1. We have 0 . but this is trivial.4. 57")-theory extending 0-I?'' U {A.12. A ". . then O-J?" U {OA) is L-consistent. I?". on wm.16 Let L subordination map g : F > QH and --+ let r be an L-place.6.. Such a model exists .1.6. Let Mo be a subordination model such that v ~( A ) = r . If A q! 0-r". = O-O-ra 0-r" and Dra S".6. by Lemma 6.6.6.. 0-I?.6.4.11(1). . IS'' .6.. . as a Henkin (L.6.. 0-I?" rm. ) Proof Let h Iww. there is an L-place I?* such that I?. a E ww and n E w we have 0-I?.10 there is an L-consistent set - aEwm I' > I" of St'-sentences with properties 6. s If OA E I?.4. be " an enumeration of all St'-sentences B such that 0-I?" U {B) is L-consistent. then 1 A E 0-r" and so 0-A E I?" and O l A E 0-r" contradicting the L-consistency of 0-I?".9 we obtain Theorem 6.).m E w we have. Then for every L-place I? there is a subordination model M with the greatest element such that with ~ M ( A= I?. 6. Analogously to Lemma 6. crRP implies aEwm + 0-ra c rD. I" := (J 0 . > c c By applying Lemmas 6.10(1). . and so it is an (L. Let S" > S' = ? ' U Dh(a).6.4 we have Lemma 6.F a C r p whenever crRP for all cr.1+ML* is determined by the subordination frame with the greatest element.

we choose maximal generators Bi of Ai.6 we obtain Theorem 6. a /I h ( a ) C h(/I). j 5 m ) is consistent. + w From Lemmas 6.6.6. which implies F L 1 A 3xiBi by 6.20 The logic QH+J i s determined by the w-subordination frame.2. (**) imply the L-inconsistency Corollary 6. DIRECTED FRAMES 523 We also obtain an analogue t o Lemma 6.6.10 (xvi.6. So the L-inconsistency of U h(a) < + implies the L-inconsistency of U lalsn aEITW h ( a ) for some n. Then U h ( a ) is L-consistent. Lemma 6. replacing modal lemmas with their analogues.6.6. Then there exists an subordination map with the greatest element h : I T .6.19 and 6.19 Let L > QH J and let r be an L-place. SO for distinct ci and xi Ai = [ c i / x i ] B i .6. h ( a i k i ) k 3 x i B i . aEITW > + Proof The argument is basically the same as in the proof of 6. Let L QH K F J and let be an L-place. Next. Now (*).6. Hence F L V x i l Bi. By monotonicity.6.17 Let L QH J and let h be a subordination map such that L 2 h ( h ) . Lemma 6. aET + Proof Obvious. we obtain Ai E h ( a i k i ) with different aiki of length n such that { A i j I 1 5 i . Proof Same as Lemma 6. xxvii). lal=n-1 Bi by A J .18 Let L > QH J and let h be a subordination map such that L > h ( ~ ) Then U h ( a ) is L-consistent for any standard subtree T of I T W . Then there exists an w-subordination model M such that U M ( A ) = r. As in 6.6: Lemma 6. thus h ( a i ) 1 3 x i B i . + V F L such that h ( h )= r. the other hand. . and next i i On since QH F p > l ~ p .6. > + + . Consider the least such n.6. which implies since h ( a i ) k -3xi Bi V-3xi of U h ( a ) .6.

3.6. then Q -+ F . Lemma 6. and it was rather laborious and complicated. Since I' is <-maximal and 5 is selective on UPL. Theorem 6. Another proof using linear natural models was given in [Skvortsov.4 there exists a QCL3-complete LV-place I' U g(a). Kripke's method of semantic tableaux for the linear case.7 Logics of linear frames In this section we prove strong Kripke-completeness for the logic Q L C w. which is a modification of the original S. By Lemmas ? 6. KRTPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Proof Let g be the subordination map given by Lemma 6. Therefore h is natural.t. 6. we observe that A E I?' ? and B 6I whenever ( A > B) 6I?' and VxA(x) E I' whenever A ( c ) E I for all ? ' ? ? ' c E Dp.524 CHAPTER 6. Now we present a new. or moreover.17.7.h ( m ) = I?'.6 and 6. Hence we obtain Theorem 6. CKn the class of all denumerable sets from Clin. > aEITW Let h ( a ) = g ( a ) for all a E I T W . Kripke frames over the set of nonnegative rationals Q+. Let Clin be the class of all linearly ordered sets.1 Moreover.2. Recall that every set from Crn is embeddable in Q.6.r.16.6. 19921 used the 'method of finite diagrams'.7.4. essentially simplified version of the latter proof basing on Lemma 6. strong completeness holds i n all these cases. denumerable linear Kripke frames.7. w.r.t. .3 If F is a countable linearly ordered set.2 Theorem 6.28. 20051. +J is determined by the subordination 6.22 The logic Q H + K F frame with the greatest element. The first proof of this result found by Corsi [Corsi.

{B)) to r' by Lemma 6.e..1. etc. . L e m m a 6. . satisfying the we ?tl standard falsity condition for (A > B) or VyA(y). L-chains will be finite fragments of this model at different stages of the construction.3. extend the members of the former we subchain r j + l .7.r. .4. .) the constants that are already present in r j + ] .l?j. we should extend rj+lto a new theory in a conservative way.then we have t o insert a new point above j . (2) A(c) @ ri+lfor some c E Dr.I'. etc.14.5 Let M for a certain j < k = (ro. if say. (by applying Lemma 6.{ j 1)) is a conservative and respectively: extension of h + + (1') AI E A2 @ i n case (I).+l. .7. 0 < 1 < . . Along with putting ri+lbefore rj+1.2. Let L Q L C be a superintuitionistic predicate logic. As usual. C o m m e n t We shall construct a natural L-model step-by-step.B #I?'.2. .ea new theory r' extending rj such that A E ~ ' . rj+2.. a sequence of L-places M = ( r o . .Dr. . . i. ... . because it may happen that ( A > B ) E rj+1..28).k).and after extending the theory (rjU{A). .7.1 and Proposition 3.. which together with the 'old' ( r i I i 5 j ) and the 'new' r' makes a (k+2)-element L-chain extending the original (k+l)-element L-chain. . Recall that D& := UDr. .28 (its condition is satisfied due to the linearity axiom). . > Definition 6. r l . for it is impossible to put after and it is not necessary to put it before r j . .+l . r5+2. . we may not preserve the conservativlty. But in general we cannot put this I?' above the whole n-chain. . rl. Thus we should add only new constants. Then apply Theorem 6.34. we apply Lemma 6. i n case (2). in . if we use (say. . . etc.r k ) be a finite L-chain and assume that Then there exists a finite L-chain M' = ( r o . . + 2 .c+l) such that Dr.k 1) .. To make this.+l n D L = D r j . LOGICS O F LINEAR FRAMES 525 Proof From the previous lemma it follows that Q+ + F for any rooted F E CFn..Then we have to insert a new point between j and ( j + l ) . i.6.4.4 A finite L-chain is an L-map over a finite linearly ordered set W = {0. = i Dr. Let us prove strong completeness. MIJ({O. (A 3 B ) @ r j . C o m m e n t Between rj and rj+1 insert a new theory r'.7. < k.rj or in r j + l . and thus obtain a conservative extension (I?:+] I i > j) of (riI i > j). .. Of course. r k ) such that ri E for z < n.r k to r . This positlon is exact. Soundness Q L C 5 IL(IC(Can)) follows from 3. . .6.

+l. . we add only new constants). This completes the construction. Thus (Bo > B ) E rj C rj+1. . . . u = ui. let B E rl+. So A1 E h(v). By LC.r. . .. In fact. Let us show that l?. since BOE rj+l.6 Let r be an L-place. DL Proposition 6.. Proof Rather straightforward. u k ) . and A1 E hn+l(v).4. Also ( B > Bo) 9 rj. est j {uO. U j .. KRlPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Proof Consider the following L-consistent theory (I?.2. . So consider the case j < k. .u.+llDrj C r j + l . according to Lemma 6. then Bo E ( r j + l lDrj) .. of ( r j + l . Then there exists a natural L-model M over a subframe (not necessarily generated) F Q+ with the root 0 such that v M (0) = r . B 2 . . .u j .. The inductive step is as follows. . where u j < v < uj+l. A ) := (rj.uk) for some j 2 i.+2. so that Bn E (-rui) for some i 5 k.. Then DF. We construct an exhausting sequence of finite subsets of Q+: (0) = Wo C Wl C .{A(c))).. A) 5 and the n = D r j (i. since otherwise B E implies Bo E I'.e. Now Lemma 6. with c # D L and By Lemma 6. there exists an L-place l?.uk). . and Bn has the form (A1 2 A2) or VxA(x). . and so B E rj+1. . Then we choose the greatk such that B @ rujand construct an L-chain Mn+l over Wn+1 = . the set I F ( S * ) of S*-sentences (where S* is the universal set of constants as usual). . . A2 @ hn+l(v). obviously M'I W is a conservative extension of M .. with h(u) = hn(u) whenever u E Wn.526 CHAPTER 6. - < U n n Thus h(0) = F and every MIWn is a conservative extension of Mn. .+. In fact.28 yields a conservative extension (I?.7. Assume that Mn is already constructed. . v . . .7.A) in the case (1) or (2) respectively: (2) ( r . . . so Mn+11 Wn is a conservative extension of Mn. of B1. Consider an enumeration BO.v.+~ 5 condition (1') or (2') (respectively) holds. . . uj+l. . A2 @ h(v) (by conservativity) and v > u j 2 ui = u in W.+l such that ( r . The case VxA(x) E -h(u) is quite similar.. ( B 3 Bo) V (Bo 3 B) E r j . and a sequence of finite L-chains hn : Mn V F L over Wn (for n E w ) such that hn(0) = r (for all n) and every restriction Mn+1I Wn is a conservative extensions of Mn. then (A1 3 Az) E -hn(u) for some n such that u E Wn and Bn = (A1 > A2) (recall that (Al > A2) occurs infinitely many times in our enumeration). .6. in which every sentence occurs infinitely many times. Let Wn = {uo. . Put Bo := (A1 > A2) or Bo := VxA(x) in case (1) or (2) respectively. J Now put W := Wn.. hn(ui) = r u i . Then Wn+l = {UO. the construction terminates.). with Wn = {uO.. if (A1 > A2) E -h(u) for some u E W. ..lDr. By the construction it is clear that the L-map h is natural.r k ) such that G r. If j = k. M := I Mn. ~ j + l .5.+. rn .

8 The completeness proof given in [Skvortsov. Note that here ID..{j+ 1)) is a conservative (*) . ) over W = {ul.. in which D. .7. ..4. VU < U D. . 527 Remark 6.5 is replaced with the following L e m m a 6.e. .In fact. Q L C = ~# IL=(F&). DQ).R L r k (with perhaps rj+1RLrj for some j). r U .6) one has to take care of properness of all inclusions between L-places. .I where ( r . and M'I W is a conservative extension of M. . Let us prove the result on strong Kripke completeness of QS4.9 Let FQ := (Q+.10 Let M = (ro..7.+l. the proof of Proposition 6. A) is an L-consistent prechain has the form ((I?... .< k corresponds t o r O R L r l R L .e. .7. . It should satisfy a special condition.r. Dl) be a Kripke frame with denumerable domains. . 0 < 1 < .7.& DL such that fulw x {v) = f: for any v 5 u. Such a . 20051 follows the same scheme. rul. there does not exist a single KFE F over Q+ such that IL=(F) = QLC=. Lemma 6.. we put fo := idQ . Then there exists a finite L-chain such that D r . .4.1. DQ) be a Kripke frame over Q+.7. which are obviously not in Q L C = ~ . and for any u E Q+ fix a surjective map f : w x {u) : DL. 1 u E Q+).I = No for every u E Q+.A).. . Obviously. So for are constructing a natural LC-model (cf. . since Q+ IF J).. I'll..r j + l .4. is a p-morphism. (i.28 allows us t o avoid these complications in the above proof.7.7.k extension of and A E r.. i. LOGICS O F LINEAR FRAMES Corollary 6. - - From Chapter 3 it follows that QLC= is characterised by all KFEs over FQ = (Q+.28. < I?. 19891. n D& = Drj.7. in the same KFE over Q+ (e. where f l = (f. Corollary 6. it uses the notion of a 'prechain' under a finite L-chain M = (r.)? theory. . Proof Let F' = (Q+. ..) such that (I?.. . . Finite L-chains are defined as in 6. MII({O. one cannot refute both formulas lVxy(x = y) and l l V x y ( z = y). Moreover. or a Kripke frame F over Q+ such that IL'(F) = Q L C = ~ . Then IL(FQ)= QLC. On the other hand.. < . r l . + . . Our proof follows the same lines as 6. Namely.A) 5 I?. fl) : FQ + F'. h f + 1) . But this notion makes sense only for L-chains M .g. proper).7 QLC is strongly Kripke complete. f l ) . all extensions rui< rui+. Now let us consider the modal case. Then we can construct a pmorphism f = (fo. (fo.uk). But Lemma 6. Then we define fu : D. . when it can be extended it to a finite L-chain M' = (I?. but instead of Lemma 6. ..6.3 from [Corsi.7. where r. . .&:= w x {v E Q+ I v 5 u).r k ) be a finite L-chain such that for a certain j 5 k OA E rj .

7. . since r j R L r j + l .+. and Dr.8 Properties of A-operation In this section we use completeness to prove syntactic properties of the Aoperation introduced in Section 2. In fact. Note that i L: j & OA E rj + OA E r i .7.28 for extending ..+. First let us introduce some notation. Note that D(OB 3 TA) V O(O-A since QS4.11 QS4.be its restriction to the set of all nonminimal elements (of course. since otherwise (DB 1 B ) E rUj -A) E r5+1 (remember that r j R ~ r $ + .= F . Now follows from OTA E r j + l .3 i s strongly Kripke complete.528 CHAPTER 6.4. .13 6.rk)to as required. since rj k OA. ) Then by induction we define: . Now we can apply Lemma 6. let F. and A E I?$+. would imply TA E r. B E rj+l W Proposition 6.7..+.+l n D& = Drj. Also O(OB > 1A) $2 rj.3 C r j . Hence O(O7A 3 B) E rj. such that 0-rj u {A) E I?. Note that in this case -(rj+lRLI'j). KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS YOA. it is sufficient to check that (**I n-(r. So we choose the largest j such that OA E rj and then apply 6.. ) and so O B E r$+. B E L(Dr.7 with the inductive step for Bn = OA. .+l IDrj) r j + ~ .r i + l ) in a conservative way so that r. Corollary 6. For a poset F .12 Again strong completeness holds in all these cases.+. it may happen that F. Proof Repeat the proof of 6. let O B E r$+. while rj+1 Proof There exists an L-place I?. DL c recall that Dr. .7.+l n = D r j (we add only new constants).10. so rjRLI'.). . Now we obtain full analogues of the intuitionistic completeness results: Theorem 6.7.13.so (0-A > B ) E r j + l .+lRLI'$+2.

F-.2 Let F be a rooted predicate Kripke frame (or a KFE. Then w # v. P ( a ) > A(b). Corollary 6. v and therefore M'. . rn So the validity of 6A at some world means that 'A will be true tomorrow'.be the restriction M F-.w It. w I B iff M. and tuples a . y. Q # P and a tuple of individuals b of the corresponding length r M'. we have y y M-. M'. a world w. where uo is the root of F . i.4.18.) Suppose F. b in D. Suppose F I ~ ~ . uo I P(c). MI. Proposition 6. let F. Then consider a y model M' over F differing from M only on P .be the restriction F IF-.8. uo I 76kA implying F y Iy 6kA.. w I P ( a ) . Thus Iy A(a). v E F-. w It.3. Hence M'.P(c) iff w # uo for any c E D.e. since it is a generated submodel.B k for any world w and D.I A. such that for any w.22. this also follows from their deductive equivalence: QH SkA = QH 6A. Then by 3.) Let us consider Kripke frames or KFEs.. such that M. Now by induction it easily follows that M'. Then there exist a Kripke model M over F. All dkA are KE-indistinguishable from 6. v I P ( a ) and M.. t y Let M.and a tuple a in D.1 For any intuitionistic formula A and k 20 P r o o f We write A as A(x) for r(x) = FV(A). so v is not minimal. y So there is v E R(w) (where R is the accessibility relation in F ) such that M . w Ik Q(b) iff M.8.13. w IE Q(b). v I A(a) for some v E F. Proposition 2. := F 1 F-. Hence F.8. v lk P(c). and also such that M'. P A ( =) y x VY(P(Y)V (P(Y) 3 A(x))) for disjoint x.I A(x). or a Kripke sheaf). (If. + + cf.e.v I A(b) by 3.-sentence B that does not contain P .18 there is a model M over F y such that M. i.3. the case of sheaves is similar. PROPERTIES OF A-OPERATION 529 If F is an intuitionistic Kripke frame or a KFE (or a Kripke sheaf) over F. v I A(b). (Only if. y and on the other hand.6.

and p does not occur in B ) .1 shows that M'. (3) An L C IL(=)(F) i f fL C IL(=)(F-. let M be an intuitionistic Kripke model over F .(Only if. Lemma 6.F-Tv Il. uo IF =(BE).{ao) below M . v ly B' contradicting M It- L. y y Since M is a generated submodel. Suppose L Y A(x).A.f v = Ffv. Since M and M' coincide on F. By that lemma we have z M'. since F-(n+l) (F-. v (2) AL c IL(')(F) iff L IL(=)(F-). such that M Il.SkA i f fV E F. uo I C.1. L y A x (x). Then by the canonical model theorem and the generation lemma 3.)-. an inductive argument as in the proof of 6. and let a0 E D. i n which the intersection of all individual domains is non-empty.8.A.p.) Again we write A as A(x). = Lemma 6.v Ilp iff v = uo.8.12. or equivalently.8.) Obvious. the definition of AL and soundness. Next. otherwise M'.A iff Vv E F.wIt B .p.3.530 CHAPTER 6.1.uo I C V (C > B'). such that M' F = M and M'.. and then M'.8. (3) Follows from (2) by induction on n. L Proof Although this lemma is syntactic.FTv Il.3.21 F. vo I A(a) for a tuple a in Duo. for Proof (1) By 3.D) be an intuitionistic Kripke frame. vo Il.). .1. the there exists a Kripke model M over F with a root vo such that M. n E W.3 Let F = ( F . KlUPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS (1) F Il. (If.8. t Mf. it follows that M. Consider the model M' = SM y defined in Lemma 6.Il.4 For any intuitionistic formula A and an s.wItB* M. It remains to note that F .1. C > B'. Consider an intuitionistic Kripke model M' = 6M obtained by adding a new root uo with the domain . we know only a model-theoretic proof. Proof If A = p V ( p > B ) E SZ (where B E Z. In fact. by the definition of AL.and M. v I B' for some v E M . Then M' IF Sub(SL).3. then every strict substitution instance of A has the form C V ( C > B') for a sentence C and B' E SZLb(z) SOlet us show uEF n z. (2) Readily follows from 6. L an s.

8. ' ' hence by Lemma 3. u2 such that M1.4.3. Therefore A(L1 n L2) Y 6A1 V bA2 by Lemma 3. uo ly p. By truth-preservation M ' . uo Iy p > Ai.ul I t ( T 2 ~ { p{)A l ) )and M2.10. M2 with roots u1. Obviously we may assume that there is a common individual a0 in the domains of the worlds u l . Proof (i) 'Only if' is trivial.1.1. A is monotonic.9. it follows that Next.p. vo Iy.11. Proposition 6.S u b ( b ( m ) ) by Lemma 6.s L1 and L2 and sentences A1. . then (6A1 V bA2) E (AL1 n ALz . (2) A ( L 1 n L2) = AL1 n AL2 iff L1 and Lg are comparable by inclusion.16. L2 (1) L1 C L2 iff A L 1 AL2. Similarly L1 y p > A2.u2 IF ( Z l u { p ) . YQH S A ( x ) by the deduction theorem.31.6. if Al E ( L 1 .bA(a). the proof of Lemma 2.8.2. vo I t I' implies MI It.4). (ii) Follows from (i).L a ) and A2 E (L2 . rn Let us mention the following analogue of Proposition 1. { A 2 ) ) . hence MI.8.8. Proof Since AL1 F bA1 and AL2 t 6A2. MI. AL i. 212. PROPERTIES OF A-OPERATION 531 for any w E M and a D.31 applied t o I? and L = QH.e.6 For s. { A 2 ) ) are QHconsistent.5 For any s.3.AL2 rn So as in the propositional case. A2. uo It. ui Iy p > Ai. we obtain - Sub(bz) YQH b A ( x ) . (2) L1 = L2 i f f A L 1 = AL2. we obtain MI. L e m m a 6. Since Mi IF it follows that M1 U M2 ItHence z.2. Proposition 6. Hence M'. Then consider the model M' := b(M1UM2) described in Lemma 6. uo Iy bAl V 6A2. and thus MI. .8.-sentence B that does not contain p. Since also MI.8. and by strong completeness there exist Kripke models M I . For 'if' note that A E L1 by 6.6. uo Iy A ( a ) .A ( L 1 n L 2 ) ) . We also have Mi. L2 y A1 implies L2 y p > A1 (cf.7 Let L1 and L2 be superintuitionistic predicate logics. Let us now prove an analogue to Lemma 1.p.8. L1.L l ) .I. - L2 implies b A E A L 1 . m. Now put I := Sub(bL). So the theories ( 1 2 U { p ) . { A l ) ) and (TIU { p ) .

X).. Section 1.1.. is a poset obtained by putting disjoint isomorphic + + wEmaxF copies of G. m a x F the set of its ---t maximal points G := (G. W . above the corresponding points w E rnax F . KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS 6.:= W .). are disjoint R-stable subsets in F+ G .R) be a non-empty poset.U wEmax F U V.m a x F (cf. = + e.1 Let F = (W..532 CHAPTER 6. and (F+ G ) 1 Vh r G. u {(v. Obviously v := vwx {w) . W' := W- + -+ for w E max F. Speaking precisely. i f Figure 6. then . I w E maxF) a family of rooted posets.. w)I w E max F) .). F G.9.. R. (V. If v is the root of G. then F + Z = (W. where - W := W ...9 A-operation preserves completeness Definition 6. Then F ?? := F U G.

). = (G.9. F+Z Definition 6.9... is . Similarly we define a class Co C of KFEs or Kripke sheaves for classes Co and C of rooted KFEs or Kripke sheaves respectively.3 Similarly for Kripke sheaves F = (F. D ) and G . p L . (x$). x ) and G . Definition 6. + + for u E F . where w E rnax F . in which B). Proof - Obvious. I w E maxF) is a family of frames from C. Then F-k e + U G . DL. = DL(v. DL) be Kripke frames over rooted posets G . -+ Lemma 6..) such that D. v E G. Recall that IT: (for k > 0.9. with roots v. + + +Z.) and = .. = (G. = DL(v.andD(v. D ) . for w E max F. if F is a predicate frame over F and G . Definition 6. It is also clear that and W' n Vd = {(v. p. (with roots v.). Obviously all these trees are uniform.x.9.. D(u)) the domain a t u in F (respectively..p. D ) be a predicate Kripke frame over a poset F and for w E max F let G . DL). in all other cases p is inherited from F or G . 3 ~ denotes the domain function in G. D(u) (respectively. by h Dh(u).9. so we denote the domain at a world u in G . and D..9. Similarly. are predicate frames over G..w ) = DL(v) for v E G. w E m a x F such that D(w) = DL(v. for w E maxF..6. Then we define a Kripke frame +:= (F+ G ..4 We can also define a KFE F' = F 2 for KFEs F = ( F .5 Let Co and C be classes of rooted predicate Kripke frames. The details are left to the reader. Definition 6.6 A tree of finite height is called uniform if all its maximal points are of the same height. = F G . where Then Co C denotes the class of all Kripke frames of the form F -+ F E Co and G = ( G . A-OPERATION PRESERVES COMPLETENESS is an 533 z. in the natural way. w ) ) for w E rnax F.D .. The levels I < k in F and F are the same. ( F + 2)W ' -stable 1 1 -+ Z F . n 5 w ) is the tree of n-sequences of length < k. w E R ( u ) n max F. + Definition 6.9. we define a -+ Kripke sheaf F G := (F z. = (G.subset of F + G .2 Let F = (F. then (F 2)-t + + = UG. in F ) .7 Let F be a uniform tree of height k .). in which D ( w ) = D ( w ) for w E W . and the level k in W F consists of the roots of posets G .

9. and let F o be a uniform tree of height k . C a class of rooted predicate Kripke frames. Note that if k = 0. let us show that L E IL(F) for any F E C. Then (Fo 2 ) .8. for a frame Fo over Fo so L C IL(C) implies L IL((Fo + -+ which is equivalent to G)-k).k g F1 + U vEmax Fo By our assumption hence by 6. Given F with a domain V at the root.534 CHAPTER 6. then F is a singleton and Co + C is equivalent to C. L C IL((F0 + G)-k) -+ = IL(F). Co = IC(Fo).24 I L ( 2~) = I L ( G ~ ) IL(C). + by 6. I w E maxFo) be a family of frames from C.9. For example. Then by 3.2. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Proposition 6. .2. Then a kC IL(')(c~ + C) iff L C IL(')(c).7. this implies (Only if. the frame with the constant domain V.) Let G = (G. 2 n wEmax F By Lemma 6. -+ Proof (If. we can put Fo = Foa V.8 (1) Let L be an s. consider the constant family Then there exists a frame Fo over Fo such that copies of F can be stuck to its maximal points. with Co = ICE(Fo).l.) Assuming 5 IL(Co + C)..5.8.p. ~ (2) Similarly for KFEs or Kripke sheaves. Since G is arbitrary.

Clearly.10 Let L be a superintuitionistic predicate logic. ~ + ~ ) . Proposition 6. Now for a Ak(L)V-place ro. u E IT:+' There exists one special case. for all v E (IT. After we reach a point w of level k in I : l . In this case the naturalness conditions hold with I?. And again for points w of level k we can apply the strong completeness of L.8. so A E IL(')(c) and hence obviously 1 1 A E IL(=)(CO C).8 < Now we can use the strong completeness of L and obtain a natural model with ? our I.7. Co C. and h > 0.9. beginning with FA = r o . with the uniform finite branching n > 0 instead of T . Then ah^ # IL(')(c~ C) for any class C C KE and any c02 I C & ( I T . for a logic with equality. A-OPERATION PRESERVES COMPLETENESS 535 Proposition 6.t. for in the language with equality and hence we obtain a natural KFE. On the other hand. Then L IL(')(c). by Proposition 6. + Hence AhL is Kripke-complete or Kripke sheaf complete w.: for the tree ~ . Proof Soundness follows from 6.+' u).QCL(') and suppose ah^ = IL(=)(c~ C). .I i.9.8. we construct places r. TTA 6AhL since AhL AL QCL(=). by Corollary 6. = r. u E IT:"). Then (or KE(IT.3. this construction gives us a natural model over a frame from Gf. is QCLV-place. So we obtain a natural model over a frame from Co C. I. is maximal in U FAk(L). us construct a proper (Ah~. Note that we cannot state Kripke completeness of ah^ for a (strongly) Kripke complete logic L with equality. where Co = K(IT:+') respectively). < r. at the root of a frame from C. is an LV-place since L QCL. W + + < c Note that the condition L Namely: C QCL(') is necessary in proposition 6.8.. then 3v E P(u) nFj+l(hj+l(u) It- A & hj+'(u) I? B).t.r.r. + Proof Consider a sentence A E L .9. Co C.9. then by Lemma 7. L QCL('). w + c + Now let us reformulate the previous completeness result (Proposition 6.7) k .6. = r.2(i) ? ? r. if for some point u E I : there do not T exist places > . so ah^ C r A implies L C I?. we obtain a (k 1)-element T + sequence rA .9.6.8. Namely. because in this case Co is still KE(IT:+').r. a class C of Kripke frames or K F E s .t.+') is strongly complete w. and we can put I?. + I (**) if hj(u) IY A > B.9 Let L be an intermediate predicate logic (with or without equality) strongly complete w. = I?.VS)-map let (? I. .e. because I?.Naturally.

21. model over F (F. ' .4. = r.8 to obtain L'V-places C . for all v E max(IT.8. Let k 5 let L = A ~ L @ for a set @ of sentences V-perfect in ah^. a class C of Kripke frames. + + s A similar statement holds for KFE.p. Br. IL(IC(Fin)) determined by all finite posets is not recursively axiomatisable. then L' is strongly complete w. Now. that A'+'L ' . Then for any v E max(IT. IE IT:+') in such a way that FA = I?o and L F. if n' = 0 (in applying of Lemma 7.+') are the particular cases + of these statements for L = QLC.8. I v E max IT:+').9. = IL(ITtf ')) and for LP. 6. the s.8. these models give us a natural where F E Co.+.10 Trees of bounded branching and depth As we shall see in Volume 2. Again we construct a LfV<-mapover ITi+'(I?. Finally. Still we can explicitly describe 'approximations' of this logic of bounded height and width or branching.k := A ( q 3 pi i=O .t. Note that the completeness for L P ~ + ~ + Br. here I? and AzL I?. Proof Soundness follows from Lemma 7. then we apply Lemma 7.k+') we apply the strong completeness for L and find a natural ? . Similarly. ' I T u).t. = IL(IT. > I for n points v E P(u). And if A k L + @ I?. + + + Recall that ah^ E L. and again we put . 3 q) A A ( q > p i V P ~> q ) i<j . C Co.536 CHAPTER 6. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Proposition 6. Note that a characteristic formula E for I exists by ' 2 C and L r. Recall (from Chapter 1) that the propositional axiom F n := i=O i j (Pi 3 v j#i ~j characterises posets of width 5 n.r. the axiom or its equivalent version: n B1. E C with I in its root.r.10.k+'). n > 0. If L = AkL @ I?. L-model on a frame F. for all v E (IT$+' T u).1. let I' be a L'V place. then we put C .k+') and T the naturalness condition (2') for all u E I : with v E P(u) holds. In fact. so there exists 1 < k such Lemma 7.. = C . cf. Let I for u E IT: be already con? . Let L' = AkL Bn[O]).11 Let L be an intermediate predicate logic strongly complete w. structed.++. for all (v E (IT:+' here we use that L C QCL. then I is a QCL-place. the concluding argument in the proof of 7. Let Co = IC(IT. Let us describe the inductive step.

10. Br..~ Also note that every finite poset belongs to w. Therefore by 3. We also know that H Br. thus pinT = U w T = U Bt It follows that . First we need some lemmas. Hence by the Deduction theorem. T R E E S OF BOUNDED BRANCHING AND DEPTH 537 identifies posets of branching 5 n among posets of finite depth. the logic of finite predicate Kripke frames IL(IC(Fin)) is in 1 . A.i Aj. i f j.1 Let r be an L-place.kT. 3 E ) E r. Then (I'U {E).n. .k>O 1.. I-L E A (E > Ci) > Ci and (I?U {E).) is L-consistent. : So consider classes B := Bn n P+ of posets of depth j h and branching jn (for n. Now it is not sufficient for axiomatising Kripke frames over finite n-ary trees. j ) with i # j .Ai) are Lconsistent for i = O 1.20. for some finite Atj G Ai.3. the logics IL(K(B:)) and ~ ( K ( w .k>O n. But . we have # j. k )are uniformly recursively axiomatisable. Note ) that W. k :. see 6. Since ( ( E 3 Ci) V ( E > Ci. it follows that ( E 3 Ci.2.Ai U Aj) is L-consistent for some .i.. E L. Up to isomorphism. T : . as we shall see in Volume 2. Actually the predicate logics are determined by rooted posets.10. > E ) ) E I (by the property of characteristic ' formula.kT C_ B 2 w ~ L .10). n. k > 0) and also classes W := Wn fl Pz of posets of depth k and ! width n. can deal only with the corresponding classesT:B each of these classes contains finitely many finite posets. k (hence to Bk) for some n. so (E 3 Ci) 6I?.6. and assume that there exists a characteristic sentence E for I' such that the theories (I'U {E). . In this section we study the propositional axiom Brn in predicate logics. so we and w.e. is the propositional logic of finite n-ary trees and Q H Brl = Q H WI. Proof Suppose (I' U {E). Ai U Aj) is L-inconsistent for any i Then for any pair (i. k. j#i On the other hand. for posets of bounded height. + + + < < L e m m a 6. But still it works properly above Q H P ~ . c where A ! := U ( A & u ci := V A.A. Now we shall find finite axiomatisations for the logics IL(K(B:)) and thus obtain a simpler and more natural resentati at ion for IL(K(Fin)).

. (11) If for any i 5 nk..)kE.10. then ( B > C) @ ri for some i. There are two cases. To begin the construction.3.A. ISf. B > C) $ r . In fact. KRTPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS ' since Br. So there exist LV-places ri + (I'U {E). which contradicts Definition 6. . put Ah := 0 for all i > 0 (i. W . ( E 3. the same with (2) in case (I). := A.10. we obtain E E I . whenever B @ r . and let E be a characteristic formula for I?. B > C) E r.2 (Main l e m m a o n n-branching) Let I' be an L-place. Assume that Dr = S c S'. . for all j # i (thus nk+l = nk). B > C) E I? implies ( B >. A. . . {B > C)) is ' L-consistent. A.+l := A. (b) if ( B @ r . A. j 5 nk.+..Ai). (b) holds by our construction. U { B > C)) is L-consistent for some i 5 nk. So (E 3. Thus condition (a) holds. Therefore ( E 3.538 CHAPTER 6.1.) is L-consistent for 1 5 i 5 nk.m > C ) E (--I?) and B (so ~ R L F ~ ) . is increasing. Then there exist L-places r l . for all i i nk (thus nk+l = nk 1).. u {B 3 C).) is L-inconsistent for any different i.S = I 1 = No.e. To check (2) in case (11).I?.{ B > C) and A. B @ r and B V ( B > E ) E r . (I? U {E). no = 0). B 3 C ) # I. we have to show that ( r U {E). Consider Ak = B > C. A. so C E Ai. . (I) If ( r u {E).+. i. Next. k+l + The properties (1). Proof Let {(B 3 C) E (-I?) I B @ r) = {Ak I k E w ) .e. A: U A.(3) hold trivially by definition. E L. Brn E L. is constructed as follows. m 5 n such that I S (a) r u {E) C ri for i = 1 . We define a family of theories A. L e m m a 6. (2) implies the Lconsistency of every (I? U {E). Since the sequence (A. thus ( B > E) E I?. then take the minimal i with this property and put A:+. put m := max{nk I k E w ) (thus m 5 n) and for 1 i i i m. . := A. since E is a characteristic formula. (3) (rU {E). then put ank+l . i > 0 such that c and for any k there exists nk < n with the following properties (2) (I'u {E). which contradicts ( B > C) @ I?. since B C = Ak for some k. U {B > C)) is L-inconsistent.10. L ( r ) for k E w . Ai). Hence by Lemma 6. Since I? is an L-place. nk 5 n.

9.2 always exist by 6. I. the logics Q H P ~ Wn for k 2 3. n 2 2 are Kripke incomplete [Skvortsov. Our conjecture (based on some results from Volume 2) is that all the corresponding logics IL(K(w. but the proof of this fact provides only an implicit axiomatisation. are + 6. which gives us the condition of ' . Finally we repeat the theories from the rn maximal points of the resulting subtree at all leaves of I : T. determined by an arbitrary 'uniform' tree of finite depth.4 IL(K(B~)) IL(K(IT:)) = 0. 20061. Proposition 6. due to Kripke completeness). H W t. P r o o f We construct I using Lemma 6. . Recall that characteristic formulas used in Lemma 6. n.7. for some m (e.k + + Br.5 Q H P ~ L C is determined by an k-element chain. T Proof Readily follows from 6.6 IL(K(1Fin)) = ~ ( Q H P : n. Corollary 6. generalised versions of formulas B r . <) -model on I : (not necessarily proper). LOGICS O F UNIFORM TREES 539 ' L e m m a 6.1 1. On the other hand.~)) not finitely axiomatisable.) =~(QHP: + W.4.k P r o o f In fact. The construction terminates at some height 5 h . = Q H P +Brn for any n.W.10.12. here we describe an explicit axiomatisation of an s. for n = 1 we have: Corollary 6.B r n and H .10. we repeat some theories.3.3 Assume that Q H P ~ Brn C L.10.10. due to Lemma 6. naturalness from 6. In this section we make a step towards the logic of all finite trees clarifying main ideas of the whole construction. T T standard subtree of I : such that FA = r and a natural (LV.10. Then for any L-place I there exists a proper natural (LV. I)-model N = (' I u E F ) based on a greedy I.1. Thus + + APk A B r .g. allow us to axiomatise the intermediate predicate logic of all finite trees explicitly. the proof will be given in Volume 2.p. Recall that the logic determined by an arbitrary finite poset is recursively axiomatisable (Chapter 3).3. k ~ + > rn In particular. if m = 0 then the construction terminates at this point. where I : is the n-ary tree of height k .). If 0 < m < n.10.11 Logics of uniform trees As we shall see in Volume 2.

): Lemma 6. Br.3 QH + BT! = QH + BrkA (for n > 0). . countable) iff every ti is finite (respectively.pl. The other way round. . n > 0.n ) of length h 2 0 corresponds to a uniform tree Tt = IT:+' considered if n = w . countable).f3(u)l for all points u E F of height i < h (obviously..11. the branching at a maximal point is 0). in Section 6. The corresponding h-sequences are called hf. every h-sequence t of cardinals corresponds to a unique tree Tt of depth (h 1) and of branching ti at points of height i.1 A tree F is called (levelwise) uniform if all its cones F T u with roots u of the same height are isomorphic. BrLA.: + Tt = { a E w* 1 la1 5 h.Br. Every denumerable uniform tree can be represented as a subtree of IT. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS Definition 6. be different proposition letters non-occurring in A.10 or to Definition 6. We put and define the formulas ( i=opito Br.p. q) > Brk respectively. Every h-sequence t of cardinals gives rise to the truncated hsw-sequence t t . [A] for B r t .andand (A > 1> Brk.(respectively. ti is the branching i. Note that for h = 0 there is the empty sequence corresponding t o a one-element tree Tk of depth 1.po. B T and BrkA are equivalent to ~ We will also use the notation Brn[A]. . A >V n Now let us show that both axioms are actually deductively equivalent (cf.. in which every infinite ti is replaced with w . . . A levelwise uniform tree F of depth h + 1 gives rise to an h-sequence t = (ti I i < h) of non-null cardinals ti. Lemma 2 for Brn and Br. Vi ai < ti}. .11.540 CHAPTER 6.2 Let A be a predicate formula and let q. this tree is clearly levelwise uniform. We shall construct explicit axiomatisations for all denumerable levelwise uniform trees and show that for any uncountable Tt.11. Obviously Tt is finite (respectively. ht-)sequences . . A constant sequence t = (n. Thus B r i and BrkL are equivalent Obviously.

.j). For the proof of (2) first note that FQHVC~VCi>q.. . so there is at most one pi missing from that conjunction..6. AB which implies ( 1 ) . we argue in H. in which every conjunction contains either pi or pj from each distinct pair (i. j#i the premise of [C/p] BT.1 1. where C i := /\ pj j#i show that ~ Let B be the premise of B T ~CzT. [C/p]Br:= i=O and thus [ C l p l ~ r . Then i<j l\ (pi V p j ) . H To show this.pn.:= V Cj. It suffices to check that hence we can obtain n n B . C := C1. Assume q and i<j A ( q > pi V p j ) . which is equivalent to V C i by distributivity . LOGICS OF UNIFORM TREES Proof 541 and let us ( 2 ) Let p := pl . Cn. i=O i=O ~ Q 9.. Hence .. Thus We also have since pi is present in every Cj for j # i.in fact. this should be a i=O disjunction of conjunctions.

Eventually (2) follows from (ll). (7). where i=O In fact. Next. (G) Similarly.(12). (12) by (3) and since A > q is also a conjunct in B. since (q > pi) 3 q is a conjunct in B.(pi > p i ) . hence ci FH q > P j . KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARMNG DOMAINS by (B). FH D = pi V p i . Thus Next. Thus by (13). by (9). and consequently since B kQH (q > pj) > q. hence D := V pi. .542 CHAPTER 6. i for j # i. and (14). we obviously have c FH pj. n FH ( D 3 p i ) -.

/ q . p l .p l . the claim follows.4 The following formulas are QH-theorems: (1) A > ~ r f . . .P. where B does not depend on A and q.11.] BrAA and B r f coincide.A1 3 D.2(5). . (17) the premise of B r f : implies the premise of [ D . . . Since I-H p i > D . For B r f replace q with V p i . . . (2) Note that A > A 2 . . So by ( 1 6 ) .>piI-~D>pi.1. Since BrAA is equivalent to B > ( A 3 q. . A z 1 (3) B y Lemma 1. since I> A. ~ . LOGICS O F UNlFORM TREES and thus pi>pi. the Lemma 6. . .p~ / q .pn]BrLA : Since the conclusions of [ D . .p r claim ( 1 5 ) follows. . . A Proof ( I ) A trivial exercise. . (4) Follows from (2).11. > q). . i W .>pi. p i .p.6. this implies It also obvious that for i < j . > D I. . > B T .

Then u Iy q > pi. L e m m a 6.p. states that 'the branching is < n until A becomes true'. V v > u v IF q.3 and 6.) Suppose BrkA .. := Brk := T . [el] L + B r .11. BT. n (1) If L + 0 1 > 0. 0 n < w .5 Let Q 1 . . (Only if. C L +0 2 . := B r ' := 0 .l. We also put B~L@ QH+@ B r . u It. [02] = provided el. [el] L + B r .q > pi v pj. [e2] C provided 0 2 is V-perfect i n L . Lemma 2.v . then (a) L (b) L + B r .) Suppose F u Iy A and there exist different vo. (If. . So BT. A). so due to the finiteness of height. Consider an intuitionistic model over F such that u Iy A and . Then < ~ r E IL(F) ifS Vu E F(IP(u)l > n + F t u It. Since u lpL q. and obviously vi E P ( u ) Since u It. =L+e2.11.11.6 Let F be an intuitionistic Kripke frame of finite depth.q. = ' Proof Cf. i. So all vi differ. u I q > p i V p j for i F # j. 0 2 be sets of sentences and let L be an s. + B r n [@:I C L + B r . Proof Let 5 be the accessibility relation in F . [@:I for any 0 1 . u IF (A 3 q). UlF (9 3 pi) 3 q. . vi Iy pi.8. so there exist a minimal vi > u such that vi It. . it follows that u Iy A. KRIPKE COMPLETENESSFOR VARYING DOMAINS For a set of formulas 0 we define the sets Then Q H + B =QH+ ~ ~ by 6. [Q:]. there exists a Kripke model over F and u E F of maximal height refuting BrkA.A > q. 0 (b) L + B r . [0:] L + B r . 2 are V-perfect i n L .4 (1).7 (on &operation). and thus IP(u)l > n.A I L ( F ) . E P(u).e. .11. (2) If L + then (a) L + B r . u Iy q. therefore F t u Iy A. 0 2 . Recall that 0 is V-perfect in QH for any 0. L e m m a 6.544 CHAPTER 6. it follows that vi I t pj for all j # i.

. Let E be a characteristic formula for I?. which contradicts the property of characteristic formula E.11. . thus u Iy q > pa and u I t (q > pi) > q..l. + Proof Since L O I .. Now we proceed as in the proof of Lemma 6. Then (I'U {E). However the equality of logics does not directly follow from this semantical argument. I' E V P L and L O I.p. for Br?. O be a set of sentences that are V-perfect in L. .10.11.) Then u y since u I A.. .Ai U Aj) is L-consistent for some i # j.l. since B~L@ . . Hence Ai E (-J?) for some i. Lemma 6.2. once we have not yet proved the completeness of QH BrFM. Finally note that v F IgL BrAA Iy q > pi. Finally. Then there exist rl. W Lemma 6. The latter is equivalent to t. q which readily implies Br.7 Note that QH + BrkEM = QH + Br.10. I E V P L (where m 5 n) such that ? . .O L.AAk > B . + Now let us prove a natural analogue of the main lemma on n-branching. and assume that (I' U {E). 6...( E M > q) > Br. I? E V P L . .. Also u IF q > p i Vpj for i # j . In fact. + + So by L-consistency.9 Let L be an s. n.1 and find Ci (for 0 II i n) ' such that ((E> Ci) > E) E I and ( E > Ci V Cj) E I' whenever i < j .. and so (recall that E M = p V i p ) . there exist A1.10. since Dr is denumerable and the parameters of Ai can be replaced with constants from Dr. if B E L O .6.7.11 we may assume that Al. .1. Ai) are L-consistent theories in the language L(I') for i = 0.. .11..there exists A E Sub(O) such that A E (-I?). since pi..Ak E Sub(@) such ' that k L A1 A. Assume that Br: ' L.. whence we deduce (q V yq > q) > Br.p. Also assume that $ I? and Br: L for a finite n. this formula is in I?. From the semantical point of view. .1. Ak E C(I'). LOGICS O F UNIFORM TREES (Such a model exists. O a set of sentences that are V-perfect in L. . the statement we have proved means that if the branching is 5 n in all nonmaximal points then it is 5 n everywhere..11.( ~ > q) > Br.8 Let L be an s. ' In fact.then by V-perfection. Hence (A > E) $ I?.I . . since H k ((q > pi) > q) > (-9 > q). q do not occur in A.. We begin with an analogue of 6. BrLEMt. by Lemma 2. Also let E be a characteristic formula for I?.. since 545 Iy q and u I t A > q. Hence ¤ Remark 6.

although i+ may be non-equal t o min{j > i I j E C + ( t ) ) (the next element of C + ( t ) ) .10.11. Oi+ := { I ) f fi+ = k i + 1.~ i-i * L i * ) Brti [Oi+] ( + + is strongly complete w. Also note that Q H P $ + ~ -5 Li. c Li*. + + The levels from C f ( t )and C ( t ) are respectively called +-critical and critical fort."+)respec.k+' is an 'empty tree' and its logic is inconsistent.-.~ (LPl+l-i*) G ~ ~ Ai*-' ~ i-i * L i * )c Li. 0 i < h. h 1 ) U { i < h ( i # 0 .r. I t is also clear that for any u E Tt o f level i < h..11.th-l). > i 1 t j > t i ) otherwise. i < i* 5 i+ and i+ E C + ( t ) . . Definition 6.. So ~. Assume that the logics < are strongly complete w.8 instead o f 6. and Tt t u r T i := Ttti.+. put i* := min{j i+ := >i Ij E C(t)). since LP.i . using Lemma 6. Proof Along the same lines as 6. Obviously. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS (2) r u { E ) g rifor i = 1.t. For i E C ( t ) . F < r i ) . K ( T i ) . : = Q H + I i f f i * = k + 1 and similarly. .546 CHAPTER 6.1.2. ti-1 < t i ) . i < h .11 Let t = (ti I i < h ) be an ht-sequence..r. C ( t ) := ( 0 .t. and let i E C ( t ) . tively. the tree Tt t u is of depth hi := h + 1 .11. SO Q H P ~ + = . where t i := (ti. Let Oi+ be a set of sentences that are V-perfect i n Q H P $ + ~ and assume ~ that Q H P ~ + Qi+ = Li+ .10 Let t = (ti I i < h ) be an ht-sequence. ( . (3) if (A1 > Aa) E (-I?) and A1 $2 F. . h > 0. . ti-1 # t i ) . then ( A 1 > A2) $2ri for some i . .m (and thus..*) and K(T. the classes of frames K(T. :. { i f V j > i tt 5 ti. Li.ti+1. Put C + ( t ) := { h 1 ) U { i < h I i # 0. Then the logic L z.10. and therefore Li W e may also put = IL(K(Ti)). L e m m a 6.

. Then if ti < w.e. if (A1 > A2) E (-r.6.3. Now if (A1 > A2) E (I. for all v E R(uo) of levels < i+.12. So we and obtain infinitely many LQ-places I for v E P(u0) . apply the . I is an Li+-place.~ ( ~ i .. note that t j = ti for all levels j such that i 5 j < i*. so we can repeat the place . (i. . we consider levels in the tree Tt not in T. for all v and the naturalness condition (3)' for r. holds. Note that the naturalness condition ( 1 ) ' holds for all points v of levels j < i+." = Tt T uo.. since Li+ = QHPZfl Oi+ Li Oi+ r. First let us show that Tt is an Li-frame.11. And for any w of level i+ we obtain a natural : * I 5 I?. so T. and Lemma 6.. By Lemma 6."'.1 1. by the strong completeness of Li+. r.. . and repeat this LV-place r. then we obtain a sequence of LiV-places I ? < . ... so it does not produce any LV-place I > r.). for all points w of level i* and use the strong completeness of Li.) . we apply Lemma 6. till level i*.~ Tv) for any v of level j > if and the branching of Tt is 5 ti at any point of level i j < i+ (to minimise calculations.as in the previous case.. < r. A2 @ r. (thus (A1 > A2) @ rw r.11 yields a V-perfect axiomatisation of IL(K(T2)) . since A E IL(T~)=IL(T.? ' ..2. Now consider the 'nontrivial' case Li Oi+ r. Let us begin with the 'trivial' case: Li Oi+ C r.. since LP:+l C Li). for points u E T. We apply this construction to all points from . LOGICS OF UNIFORM TREES 547 Proof Fix a point uo E Tt of height i.23 and the property of Vs-models: r. ? .6. fact..~ ( L C * ) ~ IL(Tt).. the proof of Lemma 6. the proof of 6. There also exists a degenerate case. if uRv in T.10. Li Oi+ r. 1 trivially holds for I?...3.. then we proceed as in the 'trivial' case. In fact. cf. many. < I . we construct an LV-place I?. then we can repeat one of them at all other points v E P(uo).9 is inapplicable.i in Tt. is an Lie-place). when at point uo (or at some intermediate point) Lemma 6. since I ? is a ~ ~ * . at levels > i* in Tt. 5 I?. Consider an LiV-place r . such that I?. of levels from i till i+ or i*. in fact.11. Now we prove the strong completeness.3 (recall that a characteristic formula E exists by Proposition 6. Then we repeat the same construction for points v E P(uo) and so on. till level i*.9 (for n = ti.1 we can conclude that L. cf.. Then we put r. Let R be the accessibility relation in Tt. Eventually we obtain LpV-places I?. < + + + + + It is clear that Lemma 6.B(uo) and further on.11. < r. since Lie is valid at all points of height > i* . := I?. A ~ * .. If for a certain v. for v E P(uo) such that I?. := r for root uo of Tt and construct (inductively) LiV-places I'.if there are only finitely ? . We put r. for any w E R(v) of level i f . Also B r t E IL(Tl) for any A E Oi+ by Lemma 6. and Finally let us mention the case ti = w. But in this case the naturalness condition ( ) ' . . U {A1) C_ r. If we successfully arrive at a point w of level i*.4. in model over Tt f w = T with .) A1 @ I?.~ l a c we. then (A1 > A2) @ I?.. Now e strong completeness of Lie and obtain a natural model over Tt f w = T. During our construction we take care of the naturalness property (1)' from Lemma 6.) .e.13(2).9 should be applied to m = 0..11.. i. r.? I at every v E Tt uo and thus obtain a required natural model.11.). at all points above v till level i+. O = Oi+) and find LiV-places r. -?.

n ) of length k > 0 (where 0 < n L: w) we have C ( t ) = (0. .so~~~+l~i~ =LP~+~-~ LP.[@a])v for i < h. Note that by Lemmas 2. 6. .9. . is strongly Kripke-complete w. as this formula follows from A.11.k 11.+l and by Proposition 2.12 Let t = (ti I i < h ) b an ht-sequence. so we obtain a standard axiomatisation L P ~ + IT:+ l .)'I preserve deductive equivalence.. Also note that for h = 0 and the empty h-sequence t we have C ( t ) = ( 0 .I ) . of ~ In some cases the axiomatisation described in Proposition 6. so we obtain the axiomatisation L P ~ + Br.31. Ok+1 = { I ) .t.5. l l at the induction step i.in particular. Recall that L P ~ + IL(K(Tt)) IL(K(Tt) and also ~ that every set of the form OV is V-perfect in QH and V-perfection is U-additive. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS for any ht-sequence t and i E C ( t ) . In particular.12 can be simplified.11 . and A E Oi for some i < h. Then all Oi are V-perfect in L P ~ + . and these logics are strongly Kripke-complete w. If n = w.g.12 can be strengthened as follows. .(Of).11. recall that B r z = 0 .+. then we can eliminate 6$-iA from b$-. and Br.11. Consider the e sequence Qi for i E C ( t ) constructed by induction on h 1 .). Oi for all i E C ( t ) . if A E Oi. so every Oi can be replaced with its simpler deductive equivalent.r.2 and 6. ei + + + .t.-i(Oi*) U (Brt.Br. = Proposition 6. and this axiom generates classical logic QCL = IL(K(Tk)). then Oo = {APk+l). K(Tt).-. ~ . for IL(K(Tt)) IL(K(Tt)).i: + @i := S. since I E Oh+l and S$-i 0 (6h+l-i* 1 = 6h+l-il. then Oo = { 6 i + l l )U { B r k ) = {APk+l. . So we can apply Lemma 6. Proposition 6. E.I E for any i.~by~roposition2.10. Proof Every Qi is Q-perfect in LP.13.r. 0 1 = { I ) . K(Ti).[(. 0 c c Note that APhfl-i = b~+.P. for the ~ uniform tree T k f l described in Section 6.33.13. If n is finite.11. For a constant sequence t = ( n . ) Recall that L P ~ ~ + ~ + A P ~ + ~ . Oo = ( 6 1 ) = { A P l ) .548 CHAPTER 6.

1.irc.0 j k. in particular.e. such that LP.+~ C Lo C IL(IC(Tt)).11. and APh+l-iji1 E I L ( K ( T j ) ) for i i j + 1 . For each i E C [ t ]let @i be a set of sentences.11. + P r o o f Again we proceed by induction on h 1 . since the branching is t i at all points of levels < i j + l .. Note that if tk = w . . i+ = Z* = min { j ' > i I t j > t i ) = ij+l for i = i j . SO all these levels are +-critical with the critical levels 0 = io Obviously.13(2). consider an increasing ht-sequence t = (ti I i < h ) . P r o o f We apply Proposition 6. cf.11.6.11. Assume that LO+Oh+1 = Q H + I . The sets Oi are Q-perfect in Lo by 2. while Proposition 6. .13 Let t = (ti I i < h ) be an ht-sequence. since any set of the form ( B r E ) v is infinite.11.13 allows us t o find a finite axiom system for the case of increasing t. the axiom Brt. T h e o r e m 6.ik+l) (where io = 0 . H So Proposition 6.12.p.11. Lo an s. < th-1. Then we define the finitely axiomatisable logics < < L ( t ) := LPh++l + Brt. .12 yields an infinite axiomatisation for any nonconstant t . + { B r t . LOGICS OF UNIFORM TREES 549 P r o p o s i t i o n 6. which i s V-perfect in Lo whenever i E C + ( t ) . < i k < h and put except for 0. .8. j < k we have > + < .i .6.11. Obviously L ( t ) G I L ( K ( T t ) ) by Lemma 6. . . . which is actually a particular case of this construction for Lo = LPh++l. [APh+l-ij+l]I j < k).11. := h + 1. so ik+l ..11.14 IL(IC(Tt)) = L ( t ) for any increasing ht-sequence t . and the argument at the induction step fully repeats the proof of Proposition 6. = T is redundant. ik+1 = h 1).11. the proof of Lemma 6. and for any i < h in C ( t ) Then Lo + @i = I L ( K ( T l ) )for all i E C ( t ) . Let t' be the corresponding subsequence: t i := tij for 0 < j 5 k + 1.13 to Lo = L ( t ) and O i= {APh+l-i) for each i E C ( t ) = {io. to < tl < < il < . i. For i = i j E C ( t ) . Viz.

we can show (by induction on h 1. Let us also present a simplified infinite axiomatisation for IL(K(Tt)) for a decreasing t . > + Therefore we really have an explicit recursive axiomatisation for an arbitrary levelwise uniform tree of any cardinality.15 Let t = (ti tl 2 .I. and thus to Oj for j 5 i. More precisely.11. where the sets bifor i E C[t] are constructed just as + in Proposition 6.13.11. .550 CHAPTER 6. cf.17 L e t t = (ti I i < h) be an ht-sequence. so by Proposition 3.16 Lett be an h-sequence with some ti able). Finally we obtain axiomatisations for uncountable levelwise uniform trees.11. Thus Finally by 6. ..14. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS FOR VARYING DOMAINS and Brti [Oi+]= Brt.12).11. is H-equivalent to Brt. . a proof will be given in Volume 2. then + I i < h) be a decreasing ht-sequence: to 2 P r o o f Readily follows from Proposition 6.e. On the other hand. > w (i.11. are also valid in Tt. IL(K(Tt)) = LO Oo = Lo +APh+1 = L(t).13. recall that BT? = 0 . but with a difference at the beginning + + + . for any i E ~ ( t t ) The argument is almost obvious. For an h-sequence of cardinals t = (ti I i < h) let us also consider a poset Tt 1 obtained by adding the top element. . . IL(K(Tt)) 2 IL(K (Ttt)).11.11. since APh+1 E L(t)On the other hand.+)). Proposition 6.12. IL(K(Tt)) IL(K(Ttsw)). Then IL(K(Tt)) = IL(K(T. T h e o r e m 6. Note that here C + ( t ) = { h + l ) . Tt is uncount- P r o o f Obviously Tt + TtSw. so the levels i with ti = w do not bring anything new to the axiomatisation Oi. Then IL(K(Tt 1))= Q H P ~ ~ J ~60. soundness proof for Lemma 6. for all non-increasing ht-sequences t the corresponding logics IL(K(Tt)) are not finitely axiomatisable [.'.since all the axioms used in the axiomatisation Oo for TtSw (Proposition 6. In fact.11. Then the following holds.11.i) that Oi C IL(K(Tt+f u))for points u of level i. i+ = h + l for any i < h. > th-l. + Proposition 6.3. (AP/t+l-ij+l) E LO. Brti[Oh+l]= {Brt) and Br.

Theorem 6.t. these classes of Kripke frames or sheaves.16).r. K(Tt + 1)).11.11. Then and similarly for Tt 1.t. . This logic is strongly complete (w. We also have for an uncountable t (cf.11. LOGICS OF UNIFORM TREES All of them are V-perfect i n QHP:+~. One can also consider logics with equality and obtain the following consequence from the results of Section 3.11. Proposition 6.6.9: Proposition 6.15). Theorem 6. + 4So t o say.r. + 1)) for an increasing We can also obtain a finite axiomatisation of IL(K(Tt t (cf.18 Let t be an h-sequence ( h 2 0 ) .14) and a simplified infinite axiomatisation for a decreasing t (cf. the depths increase by 1. The corresponding logics are strongly complete w.11.

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p.Chapter 7 Kripke completeness for constant domains In this chapter we prove completeness results in Kripke semantics with constant domains for modal logics containing Barcan axioms and superintuitionistic logics containing CD. Let CPL be the set of all L-places (from VPL) with the set of constants So. it is clear that every m. Since the Barcan formula is not valid in frames with varying domains.1. Unfortunately. Definition 7. Now we have to show that the restricted relations RLi are selective on CPL. 7. Here is a precise definition. containing B a is not V-canonical.1 Let L be an N-modal logic containing Bai for 1 5 i 5 N . e 553 . So)-Henkin theory I? without adding new constants. CML := VMLICPL. Thus we can consider CPb as consisting of (L.) to an (L.9 does not hold for the case of constant domains. DL is constant: DL(I') = So. Thus canonical models should be restricted to L-places having a fixed denumerable domain So.1 Modal canonical models with constant domains Let us first describe canonical models with constant domains for modal logics. For the sake of simplicity.' But the following lemma suggests the way out. So in particular. because one cannot extend an L-consistent theory r C MF~. The canonical frame and the canonical model with a constant domain for L are defined as CFL := VFLICPL. a direct analogue of Lemma 6. the notation of relations and the domain function in CFL is the same as in VFL. l ~ h corresponding counterexample for the intuitionistic case was constructed by Ghilardi.1.1. It is clear that mentioning the superset S* is not necessary. So)-Henkin theories rather than L-places.

In fact. In fact. {3xAk(x) I k > 0). 7. .2 Let L be an N-modal predicate logic. is L-consistent. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS Lemma 7. Oi(/\rk-1) E r .r. We also have (say. A E MF~=)(SO)and OiA E for some i.e. for the first one in an enumeration of So). Remark 7.1. := A ( 3 d k ( x ) 3 ~ ~ ( c ) E ) for some c E So.1. since in this case Oi(A r o ) E l? (otherwise 7 0 i ( A r o ) E r. for a new variable y).1. kEw Then 0-r U r.2 is applicable. c This lemma means that the relations RLi on CPL are selective. we cannot state the existence of a single constant c for all these rb. if Oi(A rb) E r for any finite subset r of roand 3yA(y) has Henkin property (w. Definition 6. 1 0 i ( l \ r k ) E r . L F Bai for every i 5 N . -(A I'o) E Oil?). Thus Now by the Barcan axiom. Then there exists r' E CPL such that Oil? I?' and A E I?'.5. cf. Oil? U I?. then b but there exist constants c' E So satisfying Arb A A(cl) for all finite I'b G ro.554 CHAPTER 7. So)-complete theory r'. So)-Henkin theory. This contradicts ( 0 ) . This argument fails if rois infinite. suppose n i r FL ark) for Some k. Then we construct a sequence of finite subsets (rklk E w ) of such that for any k E w MFL~) We put ro:= {A) and rk:= u {3xAk(x) > Ak(c)) for some c E So (say.1. In fact. i.e. Let r E CPL. So)-Henkin theory.1 Let I?. Let us show the existence of this c.14). can be extended to an (L. and 0. ) r U rk. In fact. Then r kL O i 1 ( A r k ) .r U {A) I?'. which implies Oil(l\ r o ) E r .31 (recall that r R L i r l ++ Oil? C r' ++ Oil?' C_ r .3 The above lemma implies that every L-consistent theory of the form 0-r U r o with finite To. can be extended to an (L.t. i. Definition 6. Clearly I" is an (L. Proof Let us enumerate the set of modal So-sentences of the form 3xA(x). r ) for any rb. viz. and thus by property (vi) of Henkin theories oi (A r k . such that ( 0 ) holds. by the inductive hypothesis. and thus for the whole infinite set r o . Finally by Lemma 6.1.1. cf.

Corollary 7 1 7 Every C-canonical m. Then OsOkB E I? (note that I U B E L(A1) = L(I'). since rRL. € MF~=)(SO). since the domain is constant).r lf A. Then the logics QAC. canonical m. 'Only if' follows from 6.22).10.l.1.21): Theorem 7 1 4 For any I? E CPL and A .B E L C r it follows that U. Every C. If A = OpOkp > 0. hence CML.1.l. ' R L ~ A ~ . .4. C RLk. N Theorem 7 1 8 Let A be a propositional PTC-logic. then R o RL. For an N-m.4..l. . To check 'if'.1.29..1. 6. So)-Henkin theory I?. suppose r R ~ p A i .k B E r . which will be proved in Section 7.2 Intuitionistic canonical models with constant domains Let us now consider intuitionistic models.(=) A put AC := A + /\ Bai.24. Let L be a superintuitionistic predicate logic (with or without equality) containing the formula CD.p. the proof is very similar.A2. by W Theorem 7. then by ! 6. . 6. Definition 7 1 6 A m. Therefore B E A2. 7. QAC= are C-canonical.1. Proof The argument for closed axioms is trivial. This theorem is actually a particular case of a more general completeness result by Tanaka-Ono.. We can consider only the case when A is a sentence. So W we obtain AlRkA2. suppose A $ L. for any formula A. Then L is definitely not V-canonical.7..4. we readily obtain the main ~ property of the canonical model with a constant domain (cf. is strongly CK-complete. and we have to extract a subframe of VFL with a fixed denumerable domain So.29 for constant domains. Proof Similar to Corollary 6.. In fact. Proof (Cf.1.1.3 and Theorem 7.p. . INTUITIONISTIC CANONICAL MODELS 555 Now since the relations R L are selective on CPL.1. . cf. and eventually CFL b A. and thus from OpOkB 3 O.1.p.B E r . Lemma 6. we have A $ I? for some (L.p E L = $A(=) + Ba. ¤ i=1 The next result is an analogue of 6.2. Corollary 7 1 5 For a logic L with Barcan axioms.p.= is strongly CKE-complete.(=) is called C-canonical if CFL k L.1.

Lemma 7. Proof Similar t o Lemma 6. we define (rk+17Ak+1):= { ( r k U {Bk). Ak) is L-consistent. so it remains t o check 6. r E CPL.Ak) implies the consistency of ( r U r k + l . so (DL(I?) = So) and r R L r r iff r C rr. and let ( r U r o .Ao) i . . Definition 7. This reflects the property of forcing in intuitionistic Kripke models with constant domains: u IF VxA(x) iff for all c E D(u) u IF A(c). and Again we use the same notation of relations and domains as in VFL. r U ro C rr. ( r k . Ao) be an L-consistent theory with finite ro. n I? = 0).e. The property 6. We enumerate IF(")(so) as {Bk ( k E w) and construct an increasing sequence of finite theories ( r o . L3V-completeness is equivalent t o the property (Ac) VxA(x) E iff for all c E SoA(c) E r.3 Let L be a superintuitionistic predicate logic containing C D . KRIPKE COMPLETENESS Definition 7.6. we omit So from our notation. &+I). . A k ) if (I? u rkU {Bk).2) for L containing C D .2. since every proper extension of contains additional SO-formulas (see Definition 6.556 CHAPTER 7. such that (I' U rk. .2. Then the consistency of ( F u r k . Now let us show that the relation RL is selective on CPL. Then there exists an L3V-complete theory rr t ( r U r o .2.6. As in the modal case. Note that R L coincides with 5 on CPL.. 5 (rk. (2) If Bk = 3xA(x) and (rU rkU {Bk).11).2. A. Ak) 3 . Recall that (Section 7. Ao) (i. this is proved as in Lemma 6.12(>).2.2. ( I ) If Bk is not of the form 3xA(x) or VxA(x). A.1 Let CPL be the set of all (L3V.2. is consistent for any 5 E w..12(V) follows readily from (Ac). then and thus V X ( / \r k A A(x) 3 V Ak) @ I? .2 The canonical frame and the canonical model with a constant domain for a superintuitionistic logic L containing C D are (respectively) CFL := V F L ~ C P L CML := VMLICFL. The construction is as Ah) follows.So)-complete intuitionistic theories. they are called CDL-places.A k u {Bk}) otherwise. Ak) is L-consistent.2.

2. > V Ak) g' r for some c E So. we put then as in (I). then (I? U r k + l .Ak+l) := (rk U VxA(x). Ak) is L-inconsistent. Take this c and define then (I? U rkfl. if r k~ r k > we define V Ak V VXA(X). Thus ~ k . the theory (' U rk+l. Eventually. where I is L-consistent. Ak+l). ( A rkA A(c) and so r ~ A r k A ~ (3 c V ) by Lemma 6.2.Ak+l) is again L-consistent.5(v). Ak+l) is L-consistent. and the existential property is not used. if (rU r k U {Bk). Otherwise. Otherwise. i. (3) If Bk = VxA(x) and then by axiom CD. Hence ( A r k > V ~ k ~ ~ ( ~ ) ) @ r for some c E So. INTUITIONISTIC CANONICAL MODELS Hence by (Ac). Ak). U rkitself) k€w (rk+l. . ¤ is essential in the above Note that only property (Ac) of the original theory proof. we obtain that ( r U r k + l . the theory l := r U U rk (or ? ' and (I? U rot 5 r' as required. Ak+1) is consistent.7.e. Ao) kEw is L3V-complete.

2. + + T h e o r e m 7.12 (3)and is selective.4. Proof Similar to Proposition 7.2. .2 Classical logic Q C L is C-canonical.2.6.p. QHC'~.1 (=) L is called C-canonical if CFL k L. Sometimes we also use the notation QAC. Q H C K := Q H C K F .2. Let Q H C := Q H CD.1.7 we obtain Proposition 7.2. one cannot always find an L3V-complete extension for an L-consistent theory (r U r o .4 and the conditions 6. this was shown by Ghilardi).3 the sets Fo. ¤ Proposition 7.5 Note that in Lemma 7. A1 E F'.2. and thus it is actually equivalent to Corollary 7. for an L-unprovable So-sentence A there exists an L3V-complete theory F E CPL such that A @ F.3 Some examples of C-canonical logics Unlike the case of varying domains. If roU A.1. Thus CML. rn Now we can repeat Definition 7. Ono.2.2.3.r Iy A. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS L e m m a 7.2.p.2.9 Every C-canonical s. Q H C . for any formula A Proof By Lemma 6.12(>). Definition 7.8 A n s. there are quite a few natural examples of C-canonicity. 7. {A2)) is L-consistent.3.6 for the intuitionistic case.2. QACK for an arbitrary intermediate propositional logic A. E CPL.2.2.3. Ao) (as we have mentioned. some of them were first found by H. From Corollary 7.7 For a logic L containing CD. (A1 > A2) @ r . I Proof If (A1 > A2) @ I?. I'RLrl). ¤ and so we can apply Lemma 7. Then there exists I?' E CPL such that I g I?' (i. by Theorem The logics Q H C = . are finite.15.6 For any I' E CPL and A E IF(')(&) Corollary 7.558 CHAPTER 7. containing C D is Kripke-complete.e. A. (V) we obtain the main property of the canonical model: T h e o r e m 7. the ' relation RL on CPL satisfies 6.2. QHC=' are C-canonical. Remark 7.2. A2 @ I?'.CD.4 Suppose L t. In other words. From Corollary 7. is infinite. then the theory ( 'U {Al).

i. then CFL is of depth k. r k . . Proof Suppose A1 E (I"-I?") and A2 E (I?" -I"). . Since Ai+i E r i . By induction we obtain a chain r k . Then by induction on i it follows that < < (for 1 i k). Suppose Bi @ r i . Proof (1) Suppose rkc rk-1 . C .7.4 Note that the argument used in the above proof of (1) fails for the case of varying domains.cf. In the second case we have (Ai+l 3 Bi) E ri+l ri.2. Then I? Iy A1 3 A2.7. E CPL. This observation somewhat explains why propositional axioms cannot describe the finite depth in this case and we need predicate axioms taking new individuals into account. r = rl. c rl c roin CFL. I". . and thus I? Iy (A1 > A z ) V (A2 > A1). I? I?' and r C rl' imply that r' and I?" are C-comparable. The first option contradicts the choice of Ai+1.2. (1) If C D A APk E L. This contradicts Corollary 7. and so there exists rk-z rk-1 such that r k .C rl C l?o such that ri Iy APi.by consistency. r k . Therefore Bk @ r k .e.7 there exists I?k-1 E CPL such that rk-1 A P k .. we obtain Bi E r i .I Iy qk-1 > APk-I.5 Let L be a superintuitionistic logic containing 2 .r i ) for c 1 i k. This contradicts CML IF L. for any r . ri-1 I qi for F i > 0.3. Lemma 7.~Then Iy . Then Bo @ ro. SOME EXAMPLES O F C-CANONICAL LOGICS 559 Proof The frame C F Q c ~ discrete. which contradicts the inductive hypothesis.3. In fact. and let L be a superintuitionistic logic.thus we may not find an appropriate substitution instance of APk refuted in r k . i.2 Iy APk-2. Then Ai+l E ri+l or (Ai+l > Bi) E ri+1. r R Q c L r l iff is Lemma 6. 3 (92 V (q2 3 q1 V 141))) (since APk-1 is refuted in a Ic-element chain with a constant domain).2 Ik qk-1. (2) Recall that L t+ APk-1 = qk-I V (qt-1 3 . r k . ri Iy qi. then CFL is of depth (2) If L = QHC + APk.e. because the formula Ai can contain additional constants not occurring in ri.3 Let k > 0 ... Bi+1 = Ai+1 V (Ai+1 > Bi) for 0 I i k-1 (where Bo = I).4(i) (recall that RL = in CFL). but Bi+l E ri+i..1 Iy qk-I. and let Ai E (ri-1 . < < < > Remark 7. . the proof of W C-canonicity also holds for many logics of finite depth. Then every rl' cone in CFL is linearly ordered. Lemma 7. A2 3 A1. while Bk is a substitution instance of APk. By Corollary 7. 5 Ic.I C r k .

4(i)).1. as we showed in Section 6. (1) was proved in Ono [Ono. 19831. QS~CK' := Q S 4 C + MK'. (3) Q H + C D A AZ A APk for k > 0.. for any CDL-place I E CPL there exists a CDQCL-place I" > ' Then C F L is coatomic.3. 19691. 19841. Now consider the logics Q H C K := Q H C where + + KF. (3) k-element chains. r. containing QS~CK'. These logics are also determined by countable frames of the corresponding kind.p. . Note that it is also equivalent to the logic IF introduced in [Takeuti and Titani. Note that Q S 4 C K + contains S4. 19831. Lemma 6. Lemma 7 3 9 (1) Let L be a superintuitionistic logic containing Kuroda for. (2) Kripke frames of depth k . MK+ := OVXU(P(X)3 UP(X)). Moreover.1. [Minari. Thus the logic Q L C and all its extensions are not V-. domains (for any logic) obviously do not validate A Z . U-.7. They are respectively determined by the following classes of Kripke frames with constant domains: (1) linear Kripke frames.. Remark 7 3 7 The logic Q L C CD was also characterised algebraically in . KRIPKE COMPLETENESS Proposition 7 3 6 The following superintuitionistic predicate logics are C .560 CHAPTER 7. or Us-canonical. Note that QCL-complete theories are maximal in C F L (cf. Still QLC is Kripke complete. canonical: (1) QLC + C D = Q H + C D A AZ. [Horn.. Remark 7 3 8 Note that canonical and quasi-canonical frames with varying . Then its C-canonical frame C F L is coatomic. (2) Let L be an m. mula K F .. two extensions of an L-place with incomparable sets of new constants are always RLincomparable. In fact.

.A. . so there exists E RL(I'. hence there exist formulas Ao. . . If A. So r' is an L-place.. we put r. r' is a QCL-place. is critical for r. is a Henkin theory. -I?') is Lconsistent. . For a CDL-place 0 a formula A is said t o be critical if CML.7. and it is maximal in CFL. v TA. . . in CFL. But this is impossible. which follows from kQcL V ( A V ~ A ) y by the Glivenko theorem.3..A).+l := r. Suppose I?. U ~ k C - rk+l.).(c). and moreover. kL V A for some n and finite A 5 -I" 5 -r. is not critical for r.. Hence 0 I -a(A V -A) for any 0 and A. . Hence A. . so does r ' .assuming ARLA'.(c) € O-Fn+l G A. is I t not critical for I?. (2) Similar to (1).(c) > UA. In fact. Since every I?. and thus n=l 0-r. Suppose A = A. is constructed and A.). consider an arbitrary formula A. k O ~ O ( A .(y)). such that rn+1 V(A. we construct a sequence r = roC rl C . be an enumeration of MFl. = It remains to note that A is maximal . therefore r' kQH B.+l != A. Now assume that I?. 8 I B(A V -A).V(A. by the deduction theorem. By our construction and reflexivity. so I'. .+l := r. and let Ao. . Al . and therefore an LV-place (by 6.) for an So-sentence A' = A (or A > c . I y lV(A.but then (r. we construct a sequence = r o R L r l . y Since L t KF. there exists > I?.3.e. -I?.). Since L Q S ~ C K + . such that V(Aov-Ao).(c). in CPL as follows Let Ao. . This procedure makes all formulas noncritical . O IyvO(A> CIA). has the (EP). B E QCL implies Sub(p V i p ) kqH B. We also have r. Again starting from r E CPL. is critical for I?. . Now by the Lindenbaum lemma. V TA. Q C L C r'. In fact.V-A. whence B E I" By 6. b Then we claim that the theory n > is L-consistent. . A != A. let us show that A').). .+l ! OA. we have r. where FV(B(x)) {x) as usual. be an enumeration of I F . In fact.3. Since ) there exists c E So such that k A. It is clear that (r'. > CIA... we have kL llV(Av-. otherwise r.) J-QH B.(c). otherwise n=l U 0-r. there exists an L-complete A I". Eventually we obtain a theory r' := U r n .A. is always noncritical for l'n+l.2). since r n R L r k + i for n 5 k + 1. Since r.) such that rn+l VO(A. .3. Therefore A E CPL. > oA.) is L-inconsistent. Now we call a formula A critical for 0 E CPL if C M L . . E A (i. A1 . Let M F l be the set of all So-formulas with a t most one parameter. It follows that A is a Henkin theory. we put r. If A.(y) of the form 3xB(x) > B(y).. is constructed and A. . != V y ( A n ( ~> OA. SOME EXAMPLES O F C-CANONICAL LOGICS 561 Proof (1) For r E CPL. k is L-inconsistent for some finite k.

Then for any I? E CPL the set {A E CPL I I? 2 A) has the greatest element. Thus r Iy 1 A V --A. since I? is infinite.3.3.c o m ~ l eNor. Al Iy A. Recall that Q H C D A APk t. R e m a r k 7.9. hence Al Il.3.). and our 'extension lemma' 8. To = QCL(') (or T'o = {v(A V 1 A ) I A E IF('))).3.1 A by maximality of Al. and the latter.3.K F for any k. > > Proposition 7. i. E A'. as we shall see now. Ghilardi. = 0 . since A is maximal.12 Note that the logic of the weak excluded middle with constant domains QH+CDAAJ is not C-canonical. V V ~ ~ ' V ~ ~ W& V~ R w ) This property fails for the ( v ~ R W. But there is no difficulties with the logic Q H C D A A J A K F .e.. Suppose A is not the greatest in C F L ~ I ?then there exists another . and thus A k OA. since a poset of a finite depth is clearly coatomic. which contradicts kL TA V 1-A. I?. + + + L e m m a 7. Then there L e m m a 7. ---+ CFL such that g ( ~= r . when we construct a QCLIV-complete extension I?' of r . by the same kind of frames of depth k.3 to the logic QCL(') and empty r o .562 CHAPTER 7. Proposition 7. > CIA. canonical frame. because the basic theory r is not in general ~ ~ ~ ( ' ) 3 . The former is determined by Kripke frames with constant domains and top elements. ) + + > + .15 A subordination L-map with constant domains is a natural L-map from a subordination frame to CFL. there exists a CDQCL-place A r . KRIPKE COMPLETENESS A. which is the same as W A k A. Recall that a Kripke frame validates A J iff it is directed.13 Let L be a superintuitionistic logic containing C D A A J A K F . So there CDQCL-place A1 exists A E I F ( & ) such that A IF A. 19891. which implies A. te we can apply Lemma 7.10 Note that the proof in case (1) almost repeats the proof of Lemma 7.2.3 does not allow us to extend ? the L-consistent theory I?' U rr' (where I? c I' and I? c I?") to an L3V-complete theory with the same set of constants So. But in our case we cannot directly apply Lemma 7. and the latter by chains with the greatest element and constant domains and also by countable chains with the greatest element and constant domains. and thus A A l .11 The logics Q H C K and Q L C C K are C-canonical. > OA.. 1990. Q H C D and let I? be an LV-place. The former is determined by Kripke frames with constant domains and the McKinsey property.2.14 The logics Q H C A J A K F and Q H C C D A A J A A P ~ for k > 0 are C-canonical. Proof By 7.3. R e m a r k 7.RLA. see also Volume 2. The logic Q H C D A A J is actually Kripke-incomplete [Shehtman and Skvortsov..2. By construction r.16 Let L exists a subordination L-map with constant domains g : IT.3 to an L3-complete I? and A. A o . so A k V(A. Definition 7.

The canonical general frame of L is where W L is { e L ( A ) I A E M F . By existence property.2.4. ? ' Therefore h extending g by h ( m ) := I" is natural.l l ( l V x A ( x )> 3 x ~ A ( x )hence ( l V x A ( x )2 3x-. therefore r 1-A and A E I?'.4. r bLL l A . we obtain T h e o r e m 7. E L 1 1 A V T T T A .18 The logic QH C D K F AJ is determined by the subordination frame with the greatest element and constant domains. 1 CFL such that h ( h )= r.1 Let L be a modal or superintuitionistic predicate logic with constant domains. L e m m a 7.16. I? contains either T T A or A -. suppose VxA(x)@ I?'. Then by AJ we deduce that 1 A ( c ) E F for all c and so V x l A ( x ) E r r'.7. + + + 7. it is clearly L-consistent and closed under deduction in L. From Lemmas 7. Tanaka.2. I" is a QCLV-place. g rl. 563 L e m m a 7.3.3. Then e there exists a subordination L-map with constant domains h : IT. so J? contains either A or 1 A . Since for every Dpsentence A.we have 13xA(x) E r' and so 3xA(x) # . I?' and 3 x l A ( x ) E r'. Ono.2 C@Lis well-defined. suppose A(c) @ I" for all c.Then kL 1 A V 7 1 A by A J . T. A J ( S ~ ) ) the modal case or { o ~ ( AI )A E in I F ( & ) ) in the intuitionistic case. we see that A E I" and B @ I whenever ( A > B ) # I".16. Definition 7.4 Predicate versions of subframe and tabular logics The results on canonicity of some families of predicate logics presented in this and the next section are due to H. thanks to canonical models and some results on propositional logics.3. But the original proofs are essentially simplified. Since FQH V x l A ( x )3 13xA(x). Shimura and Y. Moreover. In fact. But Q H + K F t. Then l V x A ( x ) E I?'.4 and an analogue to Lemma 6. Let I" = r).3 and 7. -A(c) E I" for some c and so { A I T-A E Let g be the subordination map given by Lemma 7.4. . c A(C) Since I?' is maximal.17.17 Let L QH CD K F J and let I? b an LV-place. To check the existence property.? 'I To show the coexistence property. PREDICATE VERSIONS Proof From Lemma 7. > + + + + - Proof Suppose A E g(a) for some a E ITW.4.3.A(x)) E ).

3 CQL i s refined. so$(A) =QL(SA) = C P L by 1. so Q A C is C-canonical by Proposition 7. Then S A E L. [ k and a valuation $ in CQL.4.1.6 in the intuitionistic case). Proof Let L = QAC.5 For any m. By 7.p.12. Tightness in the modal case follows from the definition of RL.2. By A @ BL(A) for some A. 19991: Theorem 7.6. this frame is refined.4.5.. and thus by Theorem 7.. f then the predicate logic Q A C i s C-canonical. Note that WL is a subalgebra of MA((CFL).8.6. KRIF'KE COMPLETENESS Proof Similar to 1.4 (or 7.1. [and so.4. strongly Kriplce complete] Proof By Theorem 1. Proposition 7.4.). Ghilardi noticed.p.. Lemma 7. . since by definition OL (7A) = -eL(A). Since CFL has constant domains. Proof It is again similar to the propositional logic.Bk/pl. .( and 7. the logic Q A C is C-canonical.7 (TanakaOno) For any universal propositional modal logic A. In the intuitionistic case this is written as VA(I'kA+A!=A)+rLA and follows from 7. 19931: . In almost the same way we prove the result from [Shimura.6. so by r-persistence. We can argue as in the proof of 1.4 CQL is not descriptive. L.7. 6~( A A B ) = 0~(A) n ~ L ( B )0~(OiA) = O ~ ~ L ( A ) . consider a formula A E L. I? E eL(A)..1. . W Proposition 7. and thus the whole L. W Hence we obtain the main result from [Tanaka and Ono.4.1. This allows us to construct many examples of canonical predicate logics. Viz. since r # A implies r 9 A (or vice versa). Choose Bi .9andthecanonicalmodeltheorem7. .6 I a propositional modal or intermediate logic A i s r-persistent. it also W validates the Barcan formula. .4.2. CQL != A. A is r-persistent. Remark 7.564 CHAPTER 7. . CQL validates L.2. such that $(pi) = 0 ~ ( B i )and let S := [BI. we obtain CFL k A. or s.4. as S. CQL is differentiated. Proof Again we consider only the modal case.pk].

. Now we use an auxiliary 'pre-canonical' model dual to the Lindenbaum algebra of So-sentences.RN). .7. So we can apply Proposition The next result for the intuitionistic case was proved in [Ono.6. 20011. A is r-persistent. W e define the following propositional frames and models: the pre-canonical frame of L is C f FL is defined as i n the canonical model: rRiA := (C'PL.4. I where IAI := {I' E C+PL I A E l?).12. PREDICATE VERSIONS O F COFINAL SUBFRAME LOGICS 565 Theorem 7 4 8 (Shimura) If A is a subframe intermediate logic. R1.1. This follows from the equalities: The first two are just reformulations of 6. Proof 7. where B:). Lemma 7 5 2 C+@L is well-defined. Proof We have to show that the sets IAl constitute a subalgebraof MA(Cf FL). O Z ( ~:= {l? E C+PL I pi E l?).p. of all L-complete theories with the set of constants So. A is r-persistent.5.. So we can apply 7. ~) the pre-canonical general frame of L is C+@L := (C'FL.27. with constant domains. .1. Definition 7 5 1 Let L be an N-m. For the third. By Theorem 1. the pre-canonical model of L is C + M L := ( C f F ~ .6.. note that the inclusion 10iAl OilAl readily follows from the definition of Ri.14. then Q A C . Proof By Proposition 1.. 19831. . the modal version is probably new.. Theorem 7 4 9 If a propositional modal or intermediate logic A is tabular.7.3(i).1.5 Predicate versions of cofinal subframe logics In this section we prove completeness results from [Shimura.. W 7. where Ri V E MFN(So)(OiA E A r + A E A). {IAl A E MFN(SO))).4. is C-canonical. C f PL the set . .2(iii) and 6. then Q A C is C-canonical..

13: Theorem 7.. this explains the name 'precanonical'.. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS The converse lOiAl OilAl is proved a s in propositional logic and similarly to 6.9 and (2)..3. .5.1. by induction on the length of A..p. . (3) ( AI ( 6)then by (2). (1) For any N-modal propositional formula A.. which contradicts OiA I?. using properties of complete theories 6. So A E IlAl = -IAl.p. hence I? FL OiA by Lemma 2.16. [ k and a valuation in Cf @ L . consider a formula A E L. suppose OiA r. .. So we can argue as in the proof of 1. Thus I? @ OilAl. .3 Let L be an N-m. . Then the theory > e is L-consistent. z.1.7.5. Proposition . consider a substitution and S := [&. For otherwise we have O i r EL A.4 Let L be an m. e As complete theories may be not Henkin. + We also have an analogue of Theorem 1.16 for complete theories. Then SA E L. In fact. so $(A) = 82(sA) = Cf PL by 1. for any L-complete r (2) For any N-modal propositional formula A.5 C+QL is descriptive. Then Lemma 7. since L-complete theories contain For 'only if' use the Lindenbaum lemma 6. its proof uses 6.1. the canonical model theorem for this model holds only for propositional formulas.1.. If L.5 there exists an L-complete A 2 Ao. Choose Bi such that $(pi) = IBiJ = B ~ ( B ~ ) . We also need an analogue of 6. and thus C + a L YA. Consider the modal algebra Lind(L(S0)) of all So-sentences up to the equivalence t-L A = B.5. (2) 'If' follows from (I). and also rRiA.pk]. Viz. ( 2 ) The claim (1) can be written as 82(A) = IAl.Bk/pl.1. Now by the Lindenbaum lemma 6. = Proof (1) Standard.7.2.5. .1. with constant domains. (3) ML(C+@L) L. C+ML YA.1.566 CHAPTER 7. with constant domains.

the second and the third follow from Lemma 6. Definition 7.7.3 there exists an L-complete A 5 (I'U {A). Quite similar constructions and proofs can be made in the intuitionistic case. PREDICATE VERSIONS OF COFINAL SUBFRAME LOGICS Proof It is again similar t o the propositional case. Cf QL is differentiated. It is sufficient to check the equalities: The first one is trivial. then the theory ro:= {A I IAl E V) is L-consistent.a contradiction.5. let C+PL the set of all L-complete intuitionistic theories with the set of constants So.~ 7 .5.IBI). suppose (A > B) @ r .6 For an s.2. {B)) is L-consistent.14. Then we define the pre-canonical model. By the Lindenbaum lemma. and therefore r 6(IAl -+ IBI).5. . c .5. Proof Let us show that {IAl I A E I F ( S o ) ) is a subalgebra of H A ( C f F L ) . there exists an L-complete n /Ail = I i= l Ail = 0 A i=l k k Alternatively. lAkl E V. For compactness. i= l A k Ai for some IAll. Thus by Lemma 7. hence r A E (\A1. The latter follows from In fact. and next (A > B ) E r by 6. since I' # A implies r A. one can apply Theorem 7. B I IAI -+ IB1. Tightness VA ( r E CIilAI + A E IAI) + I'KA 567 E IAl. the pre-canonical frame and the pre-canonical general frame of L: where Lemma 7.7 I n the intuitionistic case Cf QL is well-defined. Then the theory (I' U {A).p. which implies I' k L A > B .2. if rotL1. by the Deduction theorem. and thus IAl for some A.4 and Proposition 1.7.A FL B.so n v 3 r .1.. since IA > BI n IAl IBI. . {B)). t then . L with constant domains.2. A 6 follows from the definition of Ri and the equality lOiAl G OilAl we have already proved. ]A > B the implications c To show the converse.5. The equality IA > BI = IAl -+ I I is checked as in the propositional case.5. SO r cro. note that if V is a set of interior sets with non-empty finite intersections. For otherwise we have r. In fact. .

13 instead of 1.5.1 .3. (2) for any intuitionistic propositional formula A. Proof ( 1 ) Follows the lines of the proof of 7. W Lemma 7.A iff A E L .5.13 Let A be an intermediate propositional logic axiomatisable by cofinal subframe formulas of weakly directed finite rooted posets.I' It. with minor changes. (2) Since L 2 S4.5. Then (1) for any intuitionistic propositional formula A .p. Then Q A C K is C-canonical.2. A finite transitive frame is called weakly directed if it contains a terminal world.12 A world t i n a transitive frame is called terminal i f it is accessible from every nonmaximal cluster and its cluster t" is maximal and either trivial or degenerate. for any L-complete I ' C+ML.1.5.p.A i f f A E I'. = Proof Repeats the proof of 7. with constant domains.568 C H A P T E R 7. containing Q S ~ C K ' .5.9. C f Q L is descriptive.1. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS The next proposition is an analogue of 7. Lemma 7.10 For any s. we can apply the same argument as in the propositional W case for S4. . We leave the details to the reader.p. containing Q H C K .5.9. 1.1.11 I n each of the following cases the pre-canonical frame C+@L is coatomic: (1) L is an s. Proof Similar to 7.5. We begin with a theorem from [Shimura.p. Theorem 7..5. (2) L is an m. 19931. L with constant domains. where Lind(L(S0)) is the Lindenbaum algebra of So-sentences i n L . for example.p. L with constant domains. W Hence we obtain Theorem 7 5 9 For any s. (3) IL(C+@L) L. use 1.3.its canonical frame is coatomic. Now we can prove the main completeness results of this section. Proposition 7. C+QL Lind(L(So))+.8 Let L be an s. ..3. Definition C + M L It.2.

5. Since K F E L.G. This means that CFL is not cofinally subreducible to Vn.p. since y is classical.5.13.5. l which is equivalent to n CML. Suppose the contrary.while by the McKinsey property. i=l ( 1 i=l V n Ai > $Z u. hence f '(u) = f (u)RF f F ~ RF denote the accessibility relations in G.) . By distinguishability.5. Then Q A C K is C-canonical.11. hence C+FL IF A by d-persistence (Theorem 1. Then C+ML f u has the same mmzmal worlds.y.5. The next lemma and theorem are also taken from [Shimura. 19931. and assume that a cone CML f u has finitely many maxzmal worlds. By Theorems 1. vRLxi i=l n for some i. Hence l A 1 A .. containing Q H K . so it suffices to extend f only to maximal points of C f F L .10). + Lemma 7.22. The monotonicity of f ' follows from the definition: if U R ~ ~ u E G.1) maximal + . and thus Cf FLIy A.5. (Here by the choice of f . . A l A n E y.8 and Cf @L is descriptive (7. while fl(y) is terminal. then CFL is cofinally subreducible to some F E 3.12. Then let us prolong f to f ' : G' -w F for a cofinal G' C C'FL T UO. xn be all maximal worlds in CML T u. the subframe G' := G U (maximal points ' of C+FL) is cofinal in C+FL. Then xi IF Ai contradicts xi IF 1 V Ai. so CfFL Iy C S I ( F ) . so CFL ItCSI(Vn) (where L := QACK). On the other hand. Let y E Cf PL CPL be a 'new' maximal point (so y is a classical non-Henkin theory). Therefore.12. L = QACK. y E G' . A by 7. let us show that CFL It. where t is a (fixed) terminal world of F.14 Let L be an s..12. the lift property is preserved. Proof Let X I . and thus every cone CFL u contains at most (n . so f (u) is nonmaximal and . We can do this as follows.) @ u. Since f sends maximal points t o maximal points. F respectively.5. . Thanks to the McKinsey property. and to CML.C S I ( F ) for F E 3. then l A i E y.1. 1. where Vn = IT. Proof By Theorem 7. C+FL is coatomic by Lemma 7. lA. there exist Ai E xi . But then Theorem 7. whenever x is maximal in F .. . Q H C K CSI(Vn) is C-canonical.15 Let A be a cofinal subframe intermediate propositional logic containing a formula CSI(Vn) for some finite n. We put ff(y) := t. and suppose that y is another maximal world in C'ML f u.28). .u Iy 1 i=l V n Ai. This is a contradiction. and thus ~ ( 1 A A . C f F L is subreducible to F.v I'r 7 V Ai for some v E RL(u). there exists f : G ++ F for a cofinal G c CFL f uo (for some uo) such that f-'(x) consists only of maximal points. then u is nonmaximal. PREDICATE VERSIONS O F COFINAL SUBFRAME LOGICS 569 Proof If A = H {CSI(F) I F E 3)for a set 3 of weakly directed posets..30..7. Cf @L It.

By Theorems 1.12. Since by 7. 20011 with slight additions.16 QACK is C-canonical for A =H + AJ .570 CHAPTER 7. Then L = QACK is C-canonical. In fact. Now we can show that CFL IF C S I ( F ) whenever C S I ( F ) E A. (2) The same holds for a A-elementary cofinal subframe A SM(FS3) and L = Q A C K + .3. which leads to a contradiction. In fact. as G is cofinal in CFL T u.5.9.17 Let A be a modal propositional logic miomatisable above S4 by cofinal subframe formulas of weakly directed posets. we extend f to maximal points of C+FL by sending every y E C+PL . 1. by Lemma 7.a cofinal subreduction to Vz does not exist iff a frame is confluent. due to the McKinsey property 7. On the other hand.12.13 t o show that C+ FLIF A.12. Then we prolong f to f' : G' ++ F for a cofinal G' G C'FL T uo.5). Proof In fact.13. Hence we obtain another proof of 7.11 C+FL is coatomic. C+FL T u has the same maximal points as CFL 1 u.1 1.30. Then G is cofinal in C+FL T u. and they are all in G. otherwise CFL is cofinally subreducible to F and by 1. Hence Cf FLWCSM(F).22. otherwise.27. provided CSM(F) E A and F is a weakly directed poset. then CFL is cofinally subreducible to F . there exists f : G -+ F for a cofinal G CFL T u such that for every maximal x E F. hence Cf FL i= C S M ( F ) by d-persistence (1. By 7.5. W Corollary 7. Let us now prove the main result from [Shimura.12.12.3 and C+@Lis descriptive (7.18 ( 1 ) Let A be a cofinal subframe intermediate logic containing the formula + SI(FS3).22).5.30(4). Therefore f is a cofinal subreduction from C+FL to F . A = H CSI(V2) . which leads to a contradiction.5. f-'(x) contains only maximal points of CFL.5. Now we can use the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 7.5. there exists f : G -++ F for a cofinal G CFL T uo such that for any maximal x E F . It is sufficient to show that CFL != C S M ( F ) .CPL to a certain terminal world of F .5. f-'(x) consists only of maximal points. Corollary 7. Proof Similar to the proof of 7.14. Suppose the contrary. 1.5.1 containing .3. there exists a cofinal subreduction to Vn. > S4.5. the set of maximal points is cofinal in C+FL. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS points.14. C+@Lk C S M ( F ) by 7. Then QACK' is C canonical. T h e o r e m 7.5.

then F contains a subframe (where 0 is the root): So F. f(a1) = 1. so they are inner in G.7. 2 are. so there must be the least of them. a2 are incomparable.1-frame is not cofinally subreducible to FSl iff the set of its inner points is a quasi-chain. a l . and thus CFL.1-frame is not cofinally subreducible to FS2 ifl every maximal point is accessible from every inner point.ti.5. a2 see points in f -'(3). then we may assume that F is a blossom frame (by 1. b are 2c incomparable and ml E ii . .19 (1) A rooted S4.1 2 A). ) .5.30). f(a2) = 2. But then CFL Iy SI(FS3). then both a l . (2) A rooted S4. say 6.7b2 E b .&. PREDICATE VERSIONS O F COFINAL SUBFRAME LOGICS 571 Proof (1) As we know from 7. then the partial map f : G -+ FS1 sending ai to i and every maximal point to 3 is a cofinal subreduction.12.) If G is coatomic. Proof (1) (If. has a root a0 and two incomparable inner points a l . This is a contradiction. if ii. which contradicts the canonicity of QHCK SI(FS3) L. az. if C S I ( F ) E L and F is a weakly directed finite rooted poset. But then every non-maximal a sees every m E iio which means that F is weakly directed. and hence a poset (since S4.max(F)) is a chain in (2max(F). and F t is not weakly directed we can show that C S I ( F ) @ A.5. By assumption. R) and for any a E W put ii := R(a) n max(F). (Only if. So assuming that CFL Iy C S I ( F ) . since 1. Thus inner points are not in a quasi-chain.13. is subreducible to FS3. We claim that {ti I a E W . In fact. + Lemma 7. Now we can repeat the argument from the proof of (1) replacing C S I with CSM. (2) If C S M ( F ) E A. Therefore the sets ii constitute a chain. then CFL I C S I ( F ) . Let F = (W. CFL is cofinally subreducible t o F.) If f is a subreduction of G to FS1.

2.5.) Suppose G is coatomic with root a0 and has an inner point a l . the logics QHCK C S I ( F S l ) . Proposition 7. f(a1) = 1 and a1 sees a maximal point a2. which does not see a certain maximal point as. i. Since incompatible sets are always strongly incompatible in the canonical models of the intermediate propositional logics.5. For.) If f is a cofinal subreduction of G to FS2.15. In fact. CFL is cofinally subreducible t o F . (2) The same holds for a A-elementary cofinal subframe A C S M ( F S 1 ) or C S M ( F S 2 ) and L = QACK+. FS3.1 containing Proof (1) By Theorem 7. with constant domains.1.5. To prove ( 2 ) . KRIPKE COMPLETENESS ( 2 ) (If. the validity of C S I ( F S i ) is preserved by cofinal subreductions.use the same argument applying 7. FS2. Figure 7.Therefore F is weakly directed by Lemma 7. Then the map defined on ao.572 CHAPTER 7. QHCK C S I ( F S 2 ) are C-canonical.5.1.3. then f (a2) = 2. t t Now assuming C S I ( F ) E A let us show CFL It. Is every incompatible subset of CPL strongly incompatible? .e. Then L = QACK is C-canonical.C S I ( F ) . Similarly there exists a maximal a3 E f (3). we can prove that all cofinal subframe propositional logics are canonical. Figure 7.5. Question 7. so CFL I C S I ( F S 1 )or CFL I C S I ( F S 2 ) .p. if CFL ly C S I ( F ) . + + Figure 7. FS1. (Only if. then F is weakly directed.5.C S I ( F ) by Theorem 7. > S4. So a1 is an inner point and a1 does not see as. thus F I t C S I ( F S 1 )or F I C S I ( F 2 ) . (1) Let A be an intermediate propositional cofinal subframe logic containing C S I ( F S 1 ) or C S I ( F S 2 ) . t Hence CFL It. a1 and all maximal points of G is a cofinal subreduction if it sends ai to i and all other maximal points to 2.21 Let L be an s.

6. v E M Definition A CDL-map h : F C F L and the associated CDL-model M ( h ) are called natural if h = V M ( ~ ) .32 + + 7. where c xu d iff ( c = d ) E h ( u ) . h ) ) . A CDL-map based on F is a monotonic map from F to (the propositional base of) C F ~ = ) . The same holds i n the intuitionistic case. Definition 7. Lemma 7.6. .4. := ~ where The CDL-model associated with h is ~ ( = ) ( h ) ( ~ ( = ) ( h )(. 19931 - CFL is natural iff . R.(=) containing Barcan axioms or an s. The predicate Kripke frame associated with h is F ( h ) := F @ So. Lemma 7.l. . g J t h ) u t P r ) := { C E Sm I p r ( c ) E h ( u ) ) for u E F .6.6 For a modal logic L . with obvious changes.3 Let L be an m.e.1 Let M be a Kripke model for a modal logic L with the constant domain So. the accessibility relations in M .R 1 . a CDL-map h : F it is selective (in the sense of Definition 6. (=) containing C D . A E C ( u ) . for any u E F .7). 7.4 to constant domains.6.5.p. the Kripke frame with equality associated with h is F'(h) := ( F . x).p. Definition 7.6 Natural models with constant domains In this section we transfer the method described in section 6.2 Let M be the same as in the previous lemma.R N ) a propositional frame of the corresponding kind. Li.6. .1.V M ( U ) k A.D .6. F = (W. - M ( h ) k ( I t ) Aiff C M L .4 Let h be a CDL-map based on a propositional frame F . Then for any u .h ( ~b)( I t ) A (e E h ( ~ ) ) . If L is a logic with equality. . A Lemma 7. u k A iff C M L . [Shimura. Then for any world u E M . NATURAL MODELS W I T H CONSTANT DOMAINS 573 Question 7.22 Is QA C D K F strongly complete for every cofinal subframe logic A ? What happens i n the case A = H + C S I ( F S 3 ) where FS3 is the frame in Fig. for any So-sentence A M .

By induction hypothesis. it obviously holds for v = u . Lemma 7..CFL .9.9 Let L be a modal (resp.12.4. C D ) ..11. Hence u Iy A. cf.10 (1) Let L be an N-modal logic containing Barcan formulas for all mi. Lemma 7. is natural iff it is selective.4. Fl the propositional frame of M I . (3) If L is 1-modal and L Proof Cf. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS H . since h ( u ) satisfies (Ac). such that u Iy B(c).then by (Ac).4. then the claim holds for w Proposition 7. 6.13. The other way round. s CHAPTER 7.10. there exists c E D.11 Proof Follows from the previous lemma. h : F + Fl. if u Iy V x B .574 Proof The same a for 6. (2) If L contains OiT for 1 < i < N .8. Note that now we do not postulate the analogue of condition (V) from Definition 6. Thus h ( u ) Iy B ( c ) .6.7 An intuitionistic CDL-map h : F (W. Then h is a natural CDL-map.6. u Iy B(c).which implies h ( u ) Iy A. Proof Cf.I' E CPL.R ) is called selective if it satisfies the condition (3)if (A1 3 Az) E ( . Lemma 7. Then (1) QAC = ML(CKGT(A)).6. then A1 E h ( v ) . then since the domain is constant.12 Let A be an N-modal propositional PTC-logic. Then there exists a CD-Kripke model M based on a standard greedy tree F such that V M ( A )= I' and M k L. MI C M L a selective submodel.. F = IT.4.h ( u ) ) . > QS4. then one can take F = FNT.4. Proof Similar to 6. W Proposition 7. Lemma 6. The only difference is the case A = V x B in the 'if' part: If A # h ( u ) . A2 CFL based on F E = # h ( v ) for some v R(u).6.t Definition 7. such that B ( c ) # h(u).8 An intuitionistic CDL-map h : F . .6.6. superintuitionistic) logic containing Barcan formulas (resp. Lemma 6.4...there exists c E D.

21.7.3. by 3. R.I'. 6..11..8. 6. as in the proof of 6.4.e. and hence L = ML(CKVl(A)).) Now by 1. Then by 1. are ( L . i.4. etc.) All main properties of natural models and crucial lemmas from Section 6.8 we obtain L = ML(CKVo(A)). Definition 7 6 1 Let L be a predicate logic.since theories in CPL are Ltl-complete.So)-places such that I.4. . Recall that in the intuitionistic case the condition (tl) from Definition 6.15 .6.) respectively). (now one has to use r or .11.4 (together with their proofs) can be directly transferred to the case of constant ' I domains: namely 6..14 it V1 follows that ML(CKG'T(A)) L. (2) The proof is similar.e they satisfy Ac from Definition 7. 6. A n L-model N is called natural if the conditions from Definitions 6. . RL)-model is called a natural L-model. Natural models with constant domains are a particular case of natural models described in section 6. (We use the same notation Vo.6.4.15 Proposition 7 6 1 . (Recall that = R L in the intuitionistic case with constant domains.1. Therefore the logics with Bai or with C D (in the N-modal or in the intuitionistic case respectively) satisfy the main completeness results about the universal tree T. instead of L-places ( S .11 and 3. Q A C is CK-complete.10. In the same way we obtain an analogue of Proposition 6..4 and let Ri ( 1 I i I ) or R' i n the intuitionistic case be relations on CPL. . F a propositional Kripke frame.9 holds obviously already with v = u. Then Q A C Z + C E = ML'(CKGl(A)).11. RE Proposition 7.4.. NATURAL MODELS W I T H CONSTANT DOMAINS Proof Similar to Proposition 6. Let us formulate these completeness theorems for the intuitionistic case.14.12.Rh)-model on F is a mapping from F to CPL.14. N A n (L.3. N = (' 1 u E F ) where r.2.7. (or its subtrees).9 (for the modal or the intuitionistic case respectively) holds (with So replacing SU). only the notation is slightly simplified in this case.5 and 3.3 (2) Let A be a propositional PTC-logic.4. As in Section 6. r ) or (S.4. a natural (L.4. i.1.4. (1) By 7.4. .4.8.

i ? Call a path generic if it intersects every X B .. we cannot always extend an Lto consistent theory I? = U rUi an LV-place I?. E CPL. I B E I) for QCL-theorems B E IF(=) (without constants from So).16 Q H C D A APh = IL(CK(IT. if kL ATl > V Al for finite Fl F2. there always exists a denuG merable subset G G r such that IT. the class of (denumerable) coatomic 4 trees of the form IT. .) holds. (for G C I : T ) (cf. with constants from So)..576 CHAPTER 7. but anyway natural models with denumerable domains are insufficient. then 3xA(x) E rvand A(c) E I. Note that in the case of constant domains a natural analogue of 7. Here the situation is subtler than for varying domains. is coatomic.. W Recall that although G r may be uncountable. We do not know if this logic is complete w. thus I?.t.r.11B (by the Glivenko theorem). I i E w).6. (in a natural model on IT.3. Also by genericity. ? . iEw + m.Al -F2. and for each i .e. That is why we cannot prove completeness of Q H + C D A K F w. Obviously. the tree IT. These sets are dense since L I. Now for any generic path w E G. u l . cf. with a constant domain.r. Instead we can show completeness w. Moreover Q H C D A K F is not determined by @ w.1). z c c UEW c c . Now let us prove completeness results (w. Vu E ITw3w E G(u E w ) . Remark 7.h)) for h > 0 and similarly for the corresponding logics wtth equality. Then I.. + L e m m a 7. I u E G IT. I u E IT. is called dense if Vu R(u) n X # 0 . @ V with uncountable V.17. some v E w. then I?l I?. .4. Lemma 3.) on IT. i. coatomic trees) for the logic Q H + C D A K F . For example. is (QCL. IT. I. actually it is sufficient to consider only theorems of the form B = v(AV l A ) . also.12.. if 3xA(x) E I?. P(q) E r u t . T is coatomic and for any G' G there exists an L-natural model N = (I?.) in IT. for for some v E w. Namely. is coatomic. c E So. Recall that a subset X of IT. Proof First we construct an L-natural model (I?. [Gabbay. in the same language (i. ) (with the constant domain So) such that ' = I?. Then for any (L. thus 1 B $ for any u. ? . We put X B := {u E IT. we take the set r. then I satisfying (Ac) does not exist.12 holds for any logic L containing APh. So)-place r there exists a subset G 2 I ! such that IT.t. Q C L I?. cf.6. 19721). while -+xP(x) E I. if So = {c. Therefore we obtain the following completeness result. ? .r. for G' C G. for an arbitrary path w = ( u o .e. := (J F. So)-place 4 ' and condition (Ac) for I?. KlUF'KE COMPLETENESS Proposition 7. Al -Fv ? I?.17 Let L be a superintuitionistic predicate logic containing C D A 4 K F ..t the coatomic tree IT. In ? fact. let Gr be the set of generic G paths.t.r.

7.7 Remarks on Kripke bundles with constant domains Now let us make some observations on completeness in more general semantics than IC or ICE. However we do not know if Q H C K is determined by a single coatomic tree of the form T . ? model N (with constant domain) on I : P r o o f We simply extend an L-place . for Kripke bundles the situation changes drastically: + Proposition 7. e.6.r.6.t.t.g. . tree. T Obviously the tree I: is coatomic iff X is a dense subset of IT. the class of all coatomic trees moreover one can take only denumerable coatomic trees. REMARKS ON K R I P K E BUNDLES 577 Proposition 7. Proposition 7. of all coatomic trees refuting nontheorems of the logic.7.19 A subset X IT.: I But still it is determined by a single denumerable coatomic 4 . + z. CICE or w. 7. as explained below. K) is quite obvious.21 Q H C K = IL(CIC(IT:)) particular.place I ? .r. = I?.UX* where X * = {u* I u E X ) is the set of maximal elements u* := (u.18 The logic Q H C K := Q H CD A K F is complete (in semantics CK) w.20 Let L be a superintuitionistic predicate logic containing C D A K .t. Then for any I? E CPL and for any X & IT.6..1 IL(CKB(IT1)) = Q H + CD. by Smorynski's sum HIT. is not itself denumerable. there exists an L-natural T such that I. for any dense X C_ IT.6.16 clearly shows that Q H CD A APh is determined by the tree I : in the semantics of Kripke sheaves or even quasi-sheaves (recall that T APh is strongly valid in any Kripke quasi-sheaf based on a frame of depth 5 h). by Proposition 7. T Definition 7. Q C L = IL(CIC(IT1)) = IL(CIC&(IT1))= IL(K&(IT1)).6.7. Another alternative is to add maximal elements not above paths. (in A similar completeness result for logics with equality (w. gives rise to a denumerable tree I : := IT.r. ? I Lemma 8. Note that the sum over all denumerable atomic trees of the form 4 IT. -1) such that u* is an immediate successor of u. where IT1 2 Z1 is a one-element poset. On the other hand. (for u E X ) to an L. for X = IT.).6. L e m m a 7.3. . In particular. but above points of IT.

Obviously. Corollary 7 7 2 IL(CKB(F)) = Q H ... F has a constant domain -every ci is incomparable with all elements of Duo.. KRTPKE COMPLETENESS Proof Let M be a Kripke model based on IT. Branching of + .) U {bi.e. ci I i E w) is quasi-ordered by the following relation R1: a. Remark 7 7 5 Let us also mention the semantics of Kripke quasi-sheaves. for U..) iff M . M. One . . .v E IT. Take a Kripke bundle F based on {u0) in which Duo = {a.. . can be simulated in a Kripke quasi-sheaf over ITl similarly to Proposition 7.578 CHAPTER 7. Remark 7 7 3 Note that the above corollary does not transfer to logics with . but it is still unclear how to simulate arbitrary Kripke frames with varying domains within a single domain in a single world. )= 0 for any i E w. for all i E w.. has infinitely many predecessors bi (i E w)..7. and biRlbj for all i. + C D for any propositional base F . u E IT. in fact. ) ) and consider the model M' over F for the formula A' (with an additional parameter z ) such that: where the predicate letter P' is substituted for P in A1 One can easily check that M1. u k B(x(dl). . with constant domain w refuting a nontheorem A. every a. . d l . the formula Vxy(x = y) > p V l p is strongly valid in every Kripke bundle over a one-element base.Rla. and so A 6 IL(F). every Kripke model based on IT. Therefore in the semantics of Kripke bundles the propositional base is not so important as the structure of individual domains.. ) ) t for any formula B(x1. so that individuals replacing additional parameters of formula A' correspond to worlds of the original Kripke frame. h Iy A.1. I u E IT.xn) and u E IT. W In the same way we can simulate every Kripke model with a constant domain by a Kripke bundle model based on one-element poset.v E IT. . biRla.d. . iff u Q v E IT. can easily show that IL(CKQ(ITl)) = QH CD and IL(KQ(IT1)) = QH for the w-chain ITl. Remark 7 7 4 One can also try to describe the logic IL(KB(IT1))determined .uo I ~ l ( a ... ~ ( d .e.. i. (by induction on B).g. by a one-element base with varying domains.. We may conjecture that this logic is QH. MI. Consider the following map x from Duo onto w: ~ ( c i = i and ~ ( b i= ~ ( a . j E w. . equality . Thus. vo Iy A1(A). .

7. For the case of varying domains. These results were first proved in [Takano. the logic of frames over the rational and the real line. L e m m a 7. but the second is a 'happy chance7 making a contrast with classical logic. Vx((Q(x) > r ) V 3x(r > Q(x))). (VxP(x) > 3xQ(x)) > 3x(P(x) > r ) V 3x(r > Q(x)). we may assume that individual domains of all worlds at the same level coincide. The first result is not a big surprise. KRIPKE FRAMES OVER THE REALS AND THE RATIONALS 579 individuals in a quasi-sheaf replaces the branching of worlds. It suffices to show that QLCC Tat t Ta. for an h-element chain).8. Similarly we have (2) Vx(r > P(x)) v 3x(P(x) 3 r). Similarly. hence (Q(x) > r) V 3x(r > Q(x)). 19871 who also observed that strong completeness theorem holds in both cases. Both logics happen to be finitely axiomatisable.8. So we argue in Q L C C Tat. We have ( Q b ) 3 r) V (r 1Q(x)) + + by A Z . On the other ~ hand. note that for constructing a natural model over IT. Proof (C).8 Kripke frames over the reals and the rationals In this section we consider specific extensions of the intermediate logic of linear ordered sets with constant domains QLCC. can be used here. note that IL(CKQ(F)) = Q H CD A APh and IL(ICQ(F)) = L P for any poset F of finite height h > 0 (in particular. atomic trees IT. From (1) and (2) we obtain either the conclusion of Ta: . + + + 7. We use the following two axioms: Ta. or IT. IL(CICQ(F)) = Q H C K and IL(KQ(F)) = Q H K F for an 4-X (w 1)-chain F. and thus by CD. viz.1 Q H C + Ta = Q L C C +Tat.

and thus (31.r 2 ~ Y Q ( Y ) .3 x ( P ( x )3 r ) .r 3 Q ( x ) .( 4 ) t. ( 4 ) 1.( 6 ) t.347. hence ( 3 ) . ( 4 ) 1.580 CHAPTER 7.(5) 1. Y Q ( Y 3 Q ( x )t. Now assume Since by 2.~ Y Q ( Y 3 Q(x)*2 r 2 Q ( x ) . ~ ) and thus (3). Therefore by monotonicity and eventually (317 ( 4 ) . ) . .15 V x ( r 3 P ( x ) ) t.15 we also have and thus (31.r 3 3xQ(x).r 3 Q ( x ) .6. Y Q ( Y 3 Q ( x ) 1. we have (3)k r 3 V x P ( x ) .3 Q ( x ) ) . Now obviously r hence 3 ~ Y Q ( Y )~. KWPKE COMPLETENESS Now assume the premise of T a (congruent to the premise of T a t ) : Hence by Tat we have Consider the first option and assume By 2.r 2 V x P ( x ) .6.(4. ) (31.

(2) By the Shimura theorem.t.t.vIt-A) Note that (*r) readily implies @(A) = O+(A) n Fo. c M. Q+ + F for any rooted countable chain F. in particular. the class of countable chains with domain w.i. V . Mo A right extension is obviously unique (if it exists). note that 581 + + Ta'. KRIPKE FRAMES OVER THE REALS AND THE RATIONALS So we have proved the conclusion of T a . Then we can apply Propositions 7.r. R the accessibility relation i n F .6. W In this section we consider subsets of 8 .6. R the accessibility relation in F .. w. (2).3.r. The proof of 2 is quite similar to 6. Q+ O w follows by 5. Q L C C is strongly Kripke complete. Let M = ( F . To is clearly equivalent to (p > r ) V ( r > p). O).r.AZ.1.4 Let Fo F be linear Kripke frames with a constant domain V . for any u E M u E @(A) iff R(u) n Fo c O$(A). M is called a right extension of Mo if for any V-sentence A O+ (A) = R(O$(A)). Let M = (F.Ta'. Theorem 7.e.2. +co).7. M is called a left extension of Mo i f for any V-sentence A.14.00) be intuitionistic Kripke models. CKQ and Q Proof (1) The inclusion C follows readily from Proposition 7. By Lemma 6.2 we know that Q+ -+ F for any countable chain F. Mo = (Fo. (2) Q L C C is strongly complete w. By 6.uI=Aiff3v~Fo(vRu&M~. . since obviously [3xQ(x)/r]T a show Q H T a t. Q. Definition 7 8 3 Let Fo c F be linear Kripke frames with a constant domain . Definition 7. 3. R+ = [O.3.2 (1) Q L C C = IL(CKQ) = IL(Q w). Hence Q+ @ w + F O w by 5. (*r) So we have M. Q+ = R+ n Q as propositional Kripke frames with the accessibility relation 5. We have Q H T a t. hence it is also strongly complete w. be intuition00) istic Kripke models.t.8.3.1 and eventually strong completeness w. O). Mo = (Fo.

3 for all atomic V-sentences A. there exists q E R-'(u) n Wo. ('If'). Since u @ R(B$(A)). (I) Consider the case A = B > C. R). K R P K E COMPLETENESS The latter condition can also be written as follows 0+(A) = oRO$ (A). 0 is obviously intuitionistic.vl). but vz W: C. and so v E R(O$(C)). Then we check (*r) for any V-sentence A by induction. then wlRv.5 Let F @ V be a linear Kripke frame over F = (W. Then for some vz E R(vl).8. Wo and let Mo = (FIWo. . where (*1) is also equivalent to (*1) ORU := {U I R ( U ) ~ F O u). Thus wl Ik C.~(B)). By the induction hypothesis.80) be a Kripke model such that cW (2r) for any V-sentence VxB(x) Then there exists a right extension of Ma over F Note that the converse to (2r) obviously holds. vl Ik B implies wl I t B. Assuming u E ~ ( 0 : (A)).vz It. we l have u Iy A. since R is transitive. URVand v E R(B. Let wl = max(ul.B > C .B. it suffices to show that for any u ) v u E R ( ~ $ ( A ) iff V E R(u) (VE R(@(B)) + v E R(~$(c)) let ('Only if'). us check v E R(B$ (C)). c Lemma 7.582 CHAPTER 7.8. We suppose u @ R(B$(A)) and show By assumption (lr). Now ul I t B > C implies wl It. so (2r) is equivalent t o Proof We define the valuation 0 by the equality from 7. By assumption there exists ulRu such that u1 I t B > C and vlRv such that vl I t B (where I t refers to Mo).

The inclusion 'G' obvious.then obviously v E @ ( B A C ) . be a Kripke model such that 60) = (W. If ZJ = max(vl.(C)). ( C ) for some vl. but necessary for the existence of a right extension. remains to check that v # R(Q$(C)). by the induction hypothesis it suffices to show ~ ( 6 (.5.e. ( B ) & w # 0. Suppose A = B V C. and thus u E R ( ~ $ ( A C ) ) .B ) )n R(O$ = (c)). (11)I f A = B A C.8. (*l)for A is equivalent to oR6$( B )U 0 ~ 6 (. Then vl E ) Q$(B). By the induction hypothesis. Since R is linear. vRw or wRv. ( r l ) from (*r)for A = T. Now we define @+(A) := OR^$ ( A ) . w E R(u)(v # 0. note that for the case A = VxB(x) one can use the assumption (2r). and thus v E t R ( ~ $ ( B ) It. This is because C > ( B 3 C ) is an intuitionistic tautology. for atomic V-sentences A and prove (*1) by induction for arbitrary A.B implies v I B . then u # R(6$(B > C ) ) implies u # R(o. so let us check '2'. ) If v = va. . KRTPKE FRAMES OVER THE REALS AND THE RATIONALS 583 Now put v = max(u.(r2)are not only sufficient.v2).so anyway u # OR6$( B V C ) . W2 cW (21) for any V-sentence 3xA(x) Then there exists a left extension of M over F o Proof Similar to Lemma 7.8. 6: ( C ) E 6$ ( B 3 C ) . up).R ) . 2 If v = u. suppose u E R ( ~ $ ( B n)R(B$(C)). ( B ) and 6. so Mo It.C > ( B > C ) .6 ( r l ) . Lemma 7. then v # R(e$(C))follows from v W C. W Remark 7. Then respectively. Then v2 It. Suppose u is CIR6$(C). v # 6$(B V C ) or w # 6$(B V C ) . ( B A C ) C O$(C). i. The other way round. vz E R-l(u).This proves '2' in (#).v2 E 6.B A c)) ~ ( 6 (.8.7 Let F O V be a linear Kripke frame over F and let Mo = (FIWo.8.C )= ORB$ ( B v C ) .7.Then # OR6$(B)U 3v. (#) The inclusion 'C' follows from 6$(B A C ) C 6. B The remaining cases are left t o the reader. (r2) follows from (*r) for A = VxB(x). ( C ) ) .

8 ( C ) for some v E R(w) C R(u). v # 6of(b'xB(x))for some then v E R(u)r l Fo. if u # O R ~ .5. B$(B) C CIR6.f(B). The other way round. (+) Suppose u R v .8. We would like to define a model Mo with a valuation 8 over S as a right 0 extension of 8: OO(A) 5 ( @ ( A ) ) . v E ( u R ~ $ ( B )U~8of(C)). ( B( a ) ) . . 6 ) be an intuitionistic Kripke model.8. i n which every instance of Ta' i s true. ( A ) for some w E R(u). So v @ Oof(B(a)) some a E V.8 Let M = (Q+ OV. But 6$(A) 8. By the induction hypothesis we can rewrite (*I)as (+-) Suppose u # nR8$ (A). Then w $2 8. If A = QxB(x) we have u # O f ( A )H 3a E v u # 8+ ( B ( a ) ) = (~(a)). it suffices to prove that for the relation 5 on S. Then there exists an extension 8* of 8 such that (R+ V.and thus v E 8 ( B ).so u # 8+( A ) implies u @ ORB$( A ) . Obviously. To prove this. and thus u # 8+(A)by (**). for every V-sentence VxA(x). we assume that for a certain a E S . (**) since the domain is constant and by the induction hypothesis. Proof The proof consists of two parts. ) Hence The case A = B A C is obvious. ~ ( A ) .584 Suppose A = B CHAPTER 7. Then w # 8$(C) for some w E R(v) R(u) and v E O R ~ $ ( Bimplies w E 8 o f ( ~ ) . since its converse holds trivially. for c Lemma 7. v @ O R ~ $ ( C Since Mo is intuitionistic. ). The case A = 3xB(x) follows from ( 2 9 . := By Lemma 7. : . B*) is an intuitionistic model. (I) First we define a model over the set where C T B ( ~ ) inf := R f3(3yB(y)). KRlPKE COMPLETENESS > C. This proves (+).

and this a is what we need. K H P K E FRAMES O V E R THE REALS AND T H E RATIONALS 585 and show that for some q E Q+ Case 1. q W 3yB(y).3zB(z) > B(a). Thus q satisfies (7.VxA(x).aIkA#Va~S(cu5a+M~. (11) Next.8. and we have a ) .1).e.O W VxA(x) > 3yB(y). Case 2. Case 1. Hence M. aEV V Now we argue in Mo. Then ag(y)ItIy 3yB(y). Case 2.A(a) for some q.. ! By definition. a It. 0 It. Then by the assumption of Case 2. so there is q E Q+ such