Evaluating U.

S Foreign Policy and Aid Effectiveness in the Horn of Africa
Nick Eberhart, University of Georgia Defense and Diplomacy Center, Spring 2011

Letter from the PoLicy feLLows
The role of foreign aid as a foreign policy tool has long been a contentious debate. ‘Development’ is distinct from the other two ‘big D’s’ of Defense and Diplomacy yet to what extent is it subject to the strategic objectives of these bigger policy and political imperatives? In his Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, President Obama laid out a vision for America’s development efforts to be one of three equal pillars of America’s foreign policy portfolio with the other two. However, the extent to which this can be realized in practice is still unclear. Promising steps, most noteworthy of which is the inclusion of the USAID Administrator at National Security Council, have been taken but appropriately placing development’s voice in the context of American foreign policy remains challenging. One thing that is clear, however, is that foreign aid and development efforts are extremely important. Nonetheless, foreign aid has come under frequent attack for being ineffective, misdirected, or even for creating perverse incentives and fuelling corruption and, ironically, underdevelopment. Therefore, a frank, open, and innovative debate on aid effectiveness is much needed. Such a debate within the development establishment is already ongoing and many initiatives have been launched to achieve and manage results for improved development outcomes. What this White Paper seeks to do is not to replicate this ongoing process but rather to provide fresh perspectives on several of the many current development challenges. This research is by no way meant to be comprehensive or to provide a single formula for improved aid effectiveness. Indeed, at the core, this White Paper desires to underscore the essential need for context-driven aid policies and activities. It is the sincere hope of the writers’ that this work becomes a contribution to the wider efforts to reframe aid and improve development effectiveness through improving the mechanisms of aid planning, delivery, and management. Matthew Eldridge and Ahmad Soliman Senior Policy Fellows Defense and Diplomacy Center | Roosevelt Institute Campus Network

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i. introduction

The Horn of Africa contains profound humanitarian crises on a massive intrastate level. Conflict has defined the Horn of Africa

since most of its countries became independent over a half-century ago. Civil wars or wars between competing factions in Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are sufficient to show that the countries within this region suffer from deep instability. Along with the internal instability of the countries, wars between countries in this region such as the Eritrea-Ethiopia War of 1998 to 2000, support of proxy groups such as Ethiopia’s support of the SPLA in Sudan and Eritrea’s support of Al Shabaab in Somalia, and other ethnic conflicts make this region extremely volatile. Aid to the region has not been lacking, but the region still suffers from more humanitarian and political difficulties than most. US foreign aid to the region has not been enough to lift this region’s population out of poverty, not necessarily because it has been delivered poorly, but because the United States and the international community at large have been unable to help create an environment that is conducive to development or efficient use of foreign aid. The region has too many difficulties and too rich a history of interconnectivity and conflict to warrant a quick fix by the US or any other actor. The region, though, is not helpless. The United States can choose to align its foreign policy with its foreign aid so that the two are not at odds. It would be unfair to say that the United States has not attempted to assist this region, but these attempts have been too inconsistent to achieve lasting stability in the region. An over-arching aid program that addresses every difficulty in the Horn of Africa is unrealistic, but by focusing on specific issues, such as border demarcation and security, the United States could help to stabilize this region and provide a sounder platform for development. The United States can only be successful in this region if it can increase the capacity of civil society, local government, and other key institutions by providing a safe environment for these institutions to grow. Security of individual countries depends on security of the whole region; security in the Horn of Africa is defined by interdependence and must be achieved through regional cohesion and cooperation. Lastly, United States policymakers must begin to link the short-term effects of foreign aid with the long-term goals of national security and foreign policy to ensure that short-term relief does not come at the expense of long-term stability.

ii. confLicts in the horn of AfricA
Conflict in the region has a myriad of causes. One of the most significant is the high prevalence of border disputes between countriesi, ethnic groups, semi-autonomous regions and other groups. Border disputes are not the only cause of conflict, but they are an important one and can be used as an example for the region as a whole.ii The Horn of Africa is marked by an interconnectivity that makes it difficult for conflict and humanitarian issues to be confined to just one or two countries. The border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a prime example of this as cited by Terrence Lyons in his book, Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa (2006).1 Lyons discusses the use of proxy militant groups in Somalia by Eritrea to hinder the Ethiopian military intervention force that was sent to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. Lyons describes this common strategy in the Horn of Africa as the belief that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” and can also be seen in examples such as the support of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA) by Ethiopia in decades past. This pattern of destabilization exacerbates poverty in already deeply impoverished countries. To understand the foreign aid issues in this region it is imperative to be aware of the history of conflict. Somalia has been without a powerful central government for over 20 years.2 As Peter Woodward points out in his book, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa (2006),3 after Siad Barre’s regime fell in 1991 the country fell into the control of warlords and other actors. There now exists in Somalia a Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is backed by the United States and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The TFG has had mixed success but has recently made an AMISOM-backed push to reclaim parts of Mogadishu, southern Somalia, and other former Al Shabaab-held areas.4 Despite these recent pushes, groups such as the International Crisis Group feel that the TFG is not the best option for Somalia due to its poor performance in power-sharing, decentralization, ability to maintain peace and also for its history of corruption.5

i. Border disputes in the Horn of Africa, as in much of Africa, are a legacy of the colonial system and have been particularly problematic in the Horn of Africa due to the history of French, Italian, and British colonialism that further separated groups in individual countries. ii. Border disputes are also incredibly difficult to manage in the region because of the high prevalence of pastoralists and nomads in the region. South Sudan especially is important because of its large pastoral population.

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Conflict has also been near constant in Sudan’s history. The regime in Khartoum and the rebels in South Sudan have been fighting for years, and their fighting has created many refugees and has led to a great human cost. The fighting officially ended, however, with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and South Sudan has this year voted for secession from the northern part of the country, set to take effect this summer. This transition will no doubt take much US and foreign aid because Southern Sudan as a country will be one of the poorest on earth.iii

iii. humAnitAriAn issues in the horn of AfricA
Statistics from the region are telling of the dire situation. The average Somali makes $600 per year, Ethiopia’s literacy rate is around 42%, and at least 40% of the population in the region lives below the poverty line(less than one US dollar per day).7 These issues warrant global attention, but one of the humanitarian factors in the region not only presents a huge task for the international community but also compounds the other problems in the region. According to the CIA World Fact Book, there are around 9.5 million refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s) in the Horn of Africa. Near-constant conflict in the Horn produced these refugees and these refugees in turn have strained the economy of the region. Around 80% of the labor force in the Horn of Africa is involved in agriculture, reaching as high as 85% in Ethiopia. As much of this agriculture is subsistence any disruption to agriculture in the region could be potentially catastrophic. This is especially evident in the prevalence of drought in the region. Drought is one of the primary humanitarian concerns in the Horn. In a region where about 80% of the labor force is involved in agricultures, especially pastoral activities, droughts can hit the population extremely hard. Drought in 1984 in Ethiopia was estimated to have killed around one million people.8 As can be seen with most droughts and famines in the region, the causes of the 1984 famine were two-fold. First, this region of the world is prone to drought because of arid conditions. The second, and increasingly common, cause of drought is human activity and conflict. As Milner notes, the 1984 famine and drought were caused by grain yields one million tons less than was needed to feed the population. The 1984 famine was made worse as both Ethiopia and its then territory Eritrea redirected food aid to feed their combatants in the border conflict. This pattern of conflict exacerbating and confounding aid efforts continues even up to this year with a drought in Somalia threatening to destabilize Somalia even more. In a region that is 60% arid that contains two countries, Djibouti and Somalia that are classified as 100% arid it should be understood that drought will inevitably strike.9 The goal of the United States and of the leaders in the Horn of Africa should be to ensure that a drought does not translate into extreme starvation in the region.

iV. united stAtes interests in the horn of AfricA
United States policy on the Horn of Africa must also tie in diplomatic, economic, and strategic concepts as well. The countries of the Horn of Africa are some of the largest and most important in East Africa. The Horn has coastline on the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Aden. This coastline and its proximity to the Middle East and the rest of Africa make it an important area strategically in the current War on Terror. In fact, the United States currently operates its only military base on the African continent in Djibouti,10 and the Department of Defense recently created Africa Command, which has been tasked with defeating Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups while stabilizing Africa. For over a decade now, the Horn of Africa has been seen as a breeding ground for terrorism. Sudan has supported Libyan terrorists, harbored terrorists such as Carlos the Jackal and Osama Bin Laden, and was officially designated as a State Sponsor of Terror in 1993.11 Somalia is also home to a number of terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab, which is an extremist Islamic group that uses violence to jockey for power in Somalia. What’s more, Al Shabaab has grown into a more powerful insurgency with the fall of the Islamic Courts Union after the US-backed invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia. More relevant to the US is the recent prevalence of Somali pirates in the region. In fact, Somalia pirates recently captured a tanker that was carrying $200 million worth of oil on February 9th, 2011.12 According to a Reuters report “Over 40 percent of the world’s seaborne oil passes through the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea,” suggesting that increased interference in this region by Somali pirates would lead to higher oil prices, adversely affecting the US economy. In addition to the humanitarian, political, strategic, and economic gains from stabilizing the Horn of Africa, the United States has accepted the role of the supporter and friend of democracy. Indeed the US State Department website notes that “The United States stands with all those who champion human dignity and liberty. The advancement of human rights and democracy is not just the policy of the United States; it is the epitome of who we are as a nation.”13 If one believes that the promotion of democracy is a central tenet of not only American belief, but also American foreign policy, then the United States should have an interest in the Horn of Africa.
iii. According to an ABC report South Sudan has a population that is 80% illiterate with over half of the population living under the poverty line.

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V. recent foreign Policy stance of the united states
United States interest in the Horn of Africa has waxed and waned over the years. During the Cold War the region was part of the tug-of-war that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Many countries in this region were first befriended by the United States or the Soviet Union and then switched back and forth according to the ideologies of the people in power. The huge influx of arms and the use of the region as pieces on the geopolitical chess board of the Cold War, rather than as new countries with legitimate development needs made for countries that would be much more prepared to settle disputes violently than diplomatically. The region drew attention in 1993 during the Battle of Mogadishu, an event which caused the American populace to develop an aversion to the region and American policy makers to shy away from the region for the remainder of the decade. In the past decade, however, the United States has been party to important negotiations in the region. The United States has been instrumental in several negotiations after conflicts in the region, and has also tried to prevent conflicts in the region from occurring as well. The 1998 US-Rwanda Peace Proposal was a cooperative attempt between the United States and Rwanda to bring a diplomatic end to the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict before it ever started. The peace proposal attempted to bring the two parties to the diplomatic table, to demarcate the boundary between the countries, and to demilitarize the boundary between them. In a 1998 release by the US State Department, the plan was drafted with “excellent relations with the Governments of both Eritrea and Ethiopia.” Eritrea rejected this agreement and the war continued until the Algiers Agreement in 2000 ended the war and created the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). The American partiality to certain countries in the region over others, especially Ethiopia, makes sense when viewed in a security context, but has led to increased tensions in the region overall. The United States has over the years, been partial to Ethiopia especially during its illegal annexation of Eritrea as described by Reid in Eritrea’s External Relations. Reid describes the support by saying “Despite the illegality of the annexation, the United States actively supported Ethiopia in its attempts to pacify Eritrea by providing it with military aid worth about $147 million, which was around half its total military aid to Africa between 1952 and 1976.” This pattern of supporting Ethiopia has continued and has seen Ethiopia receive over $20 million in military aid between 2002 and 2007.14 This continued support of Ethiopia has led to a distrustful Eritrea that feels wary of the global community in such situations as the Algiers Agreement, where Ethiopia defied the agreement and the US did not enforce the agreement. Peace in Sudan has also been one of the goals of the United States in the region. To effectively provide humanitarian aid, conflict in Sudan would have to end. It was not until 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that the Second Sudanese Civil War, which started in 1983iv finally ended. The process by which the CPA came to fruition represents one of the key arguments that will be presented later. The principle that the actors in the Horn of Africa, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), must be given a leadership role in negotiations is important in a region where every state in the region can either gain from the collective stability or lose from the continued regional instability. Another important aspect of policy in this region is that the United States can have significant influence when it chooses. Woodward states that the US brought considerable influence and that the peace process in Sudan “would probably not have happened at all without the weight that the US brought to the process.” An alternative to resolution of regional issues by the United States would be another credible third-party country handling the diplomatic dilemmas between states in the region. The border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti was mediated last year by Qatar with oversight by the UN Security Council,15 The government of Qatar was on good terms with the governments of both countries and was able to mediate their dispute over the shared border. Although this action was not performed by the United States it serves the United States’ interests. If such a third-party mediation of other disputes could lead to credible and lasting solution, then the United States as a member of the Security Council, should endorse it. Another current key element of foreign policy in the Horn is combatting Somalia’s Al Shabaab and supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Counterterrorism attempts have been successful in some areas, but have been unsuccessful and even harmful in others. As Ted Dagne pointed out last year in a U.S. House of Representatives’ hearing on the Horn of Africa, the United States created the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa to fight terrorism in the region.16 The establishment of a permanent base in the region shows an understanding of the importance of the region in the War on Terror. Such a presence in the Horn of Africa gives the United States a way to help contain terrorism on a small scale by eliminating certain key terrorists, but the danger lies in the US intervening too directly in the affairs of the Horn of Africa. Many analysts believe that Al Shabaab has grown due to the Ethiopian occupation and has now turned into a full-blown insurgency in much of the country. The US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia undoubtedly had good intentions, but, as will be addressed later, many in Somalia while not supporting Al Shabaab resent an Ethiopian invasion of their territory.
iv. The Second Sudanese Civil War came around a decade after the destructive First Sudanese Civil War of 1955 to 1972.

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Vi. united stAtes Aid in the horn of AfricA
Given the humanitarian, political, and economic issues discussed above in the Horn of Africa there exists a great need in the region for humanitarian aid. This humanitarian aid is supplied in great quantities by the United States, but humanitarian aid must be a means to an end and not merely the end itself. The United States and the global community can clearly benefit from a stable Horn of Africa. United States pours humanitarian and development aid into the region in attempt to stabilize it. The goal of humanitarian aid must not be only to stabilize regions, but it should put them in a position to effectively handle developmental aid and become self-sufficient. The only way to achieve such self-sufficiency is to clear away any boundaries to self-sufficiency created by conflict, geopolitical disputes, or inefficient governments. While clearing away these boundaries to growth, aid in the Horn of Africa must also build up local communities and civil society leaders. This aim to stabilize and improve the region is where the United States aid effectiveness over the years can be questioned. In the past few decades US has sent billions of dollars in aid to the Horn of Africa yet for years Sudan continued to fight a civil war, Somalia became a collapsed state, and the majority of the region remains in abject poverty. US aid to the region has had the best of intentions, but the best intentions do not always translate into the best results. In September 2010 President Obama signed a Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development which calls for “the elevation of development as a core pillar of American power and charts a course for development, diplomacy, and defense to mutually reinforce and complement one another in an integrated comprehensive approach to national security.”17 Such a statement would enforce the stance that the United States should use aid to advance the welfare of the Horn of Africa to thereby further enhance its interests in the region and the greater global community. To create a more self-sustaining Horn of Africa, the United States is currently funding a program called Feed the Future,18 which has as its primary aims both the increased nutrition of the population of the countries it supports as well as the growth of private sector agriculture that will translate into much more long-term sustainable growth in the supported nations. The initiative is global, but it will be especially beneficial to the Horn because the three countries receiving the most funding are Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya receiving around $29 million each.v This policy addresses one of the key recurring concerns in the Horn of Africa and illustrates one of the policy recommendations of this paper, which is the centrality of shielding the population from the effects of drought and famine by adequately developing the agricultural sector in the region. Another key component of the Feed the Future program is its investment in building more integrated regional cooperation. This will allow food to be traded and more effectively be allocated to the segments of the population that need it most. Although Feed the Future is one of the newest programs that the United States Government is introducing, it is certainly not the only source of aid going to the Horn of Africa. The United States aid community currently operates and partners with dozens of programs in the region such as programs to ensure peaceful border-crossing corridors between Kenya and Somalia and dialogues on how to mitigate violence by peacefully discussing clan differences. The US has poured millions of dollars into the region and is requesting an additional billion dollars for activities this year.19 This amount is a substantial number, but when one considers the extreme condition of the region and then compares this aid request to the request for Israel which is three billion dollars, it seems that the United States’ aid priorities are misaligned. This policy paper’s recommendation, however, does not push for pouring money into regions that cannot adequately handle excess funds. Another recent aspect of US foreign aid for the region is the deteriorating relationship with Eritrea. Eritrea has been extremely limiting in the access it will give to foreigners. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea was terminated in 2008 because the restrictions imposed on the mission were too severe to continue carrying on operations. USAID also no longer operates in the country, which has an extremely repressive government, and currently there is no money requested for the country in the United States foreign aid budget for Fiscal Year 2011. Eritrea, as mentioned earlier, has responded to diplomacy through the recent Qatari mediation of the border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti. Eritrea is no less impoverished than the rest of the region, yet is one of the more destabilizing entities in the region. A common concern with foreign aid is whether the aid will reach the people it is intended to help. This concern is especially prevalent in war-torn areas such as Somalia where aid can often end up as the possession of the same warlords and leaders who are causing the strife in the region. A stinging example of the danger of these warlords is the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu where US forces were sent in to apprehend the aides of a leading warlord, Mohamed Aidid,20 but were ambushed and forced into a brutal fight.vi Because food is such a highly valued commodity in these situations, whoever controls the food will also control the power in the region. The United States and other donors cannot effectively defend food and ensure that it is apportioned to those who need it.

v. Ethiopia and Kenya will both receive $29 million and Uganda will receive $29.5 million. iv. As a result of a well-planned ambush by insurgents and militia in Mogadishu, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and 18 US soldiers were killed.

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Vii. intergovernmental Authority on development (iGAd)
The Horn of Africa, as mentioned earlier, is an extremely interconnected region. The extreme diaspora of refugees from the conflicts in the region are testament to that fact. The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Developmentvii (IGADD) was formed in 1986 in response to the Ethiopian drought and famine of 1984.21 IGADD was then revitalized by its member countries in 1996 and with a broader mandate it was also given a new name, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD, now a branch of the African Union, as it exists today was formed in the mid 1990’s and has a much more broad set of objectives including macroeconomic growth and harmonization, regional peace, and common security through increased dialogue. IGAD, after its revitalization, was set on ending the violence in Sudan. The IGAD talks began in 1994 and for years were unsuccessful. However, these efforts included some key ideas that would eventually be incorporated into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which marked the end of the violence in Sudan on paper and set timelines for the independence referendum that recently passed in Southern Sudan. This idea - that a peace deal in Sudan could eventually lead to Southern Sudan secession - came from IGAD.

Viii. Policy recommendations
As illustrated, the Horn of Africa presents many humanitarian, political, and economic difficulties to the United States’ aid community. Given the dire situations in the individual countries in the Horn, the United States should be specific and decisive in its policies and actions. The main policy recommendation of this paper is to focus on solving regional issues. This recommendation has two main components. The first is to bring decisive ends to conflict between countries in the Horn.viii The second is to build regional responsibility, preferably through the existing model of IGAD. This paper certainly does not recommend the cessation of humanitarian aid to the region, but it does emphasize that through more involved foreign policy aid could be much more efficient. The end goal of these recommendations is to create an environment that is more conducive to international aid. Currently aid to the Horn can only be effective in sustaining the population or in developing at the regional level. The goal of the United States and the international community should be a Horn of Africa that can manage its own conflict so that foreign aid can truly take root and begin to develop the region. Humanitarian aid to the Horn will undoubtedly remain an essential part of US foreign aid. Just this year the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (Fewsnet) warned of food shortages in the region. The UN World Food Program is requesting food to feed 2.5 million Somalis who are currently in areas dangerous for aid workers.22 Providing emergency food and humanitarian aid will remain as part of the US commitment in the region, but providing development aid to stable regions should be stressed heavily as well. The Feed the Future Initiative will help to build the capacity of some states in the region to feed their own populations, which will allow the region to move to self-sufficiency. Such aid projects are essential in that they will empower the local population to work more efficiently, and enable the region to survive the frequent droughts without large outpouring from the international community. This self-sufficiency through developmental aid can only be efficient in the proper environment. The Eritrea-Ethiopia border dispute remains a great destabilizing force in the region. Therefore the first policy recommendation is that the US work to improve the region’s transnational issues. The United States has had trouble in the region before, but as Terrence Lyons stated “The case for trying is a good one, as the report [Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa] makes clear that failure to resolve the Ethiopian-Eritrean dispute could exacerbate governance, health, and humanitarian problems, and set back U.S. efforts to fight terrorists, who are increasingly drawn to the area.” The United States should make the resolution of the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea its first diplomatic objective in the region in order to create an environment more conducive to aid. If Eritrea and Ethiopia settled their border dispute border then Eritrea would have less incentive to destabilize Ethiopia by supporting Al Shabaab, and if not then the US can focus diplomatically on this situation.23 Settling not only this, but also the other border disputes in the region are important to creating environments for aid.ix Given the extreme interconnectedness of the region, it would best serve the United States to solve those problems that are both diplomatically feasible and causing the most transnational issues. The second recommendation is to allow other mediators to assist the region. Recently, the Qatari mediation of the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute was successfully enacted. The United States and European states can give generous foreign aid to the Horn, but many situations in the region may be more efficiently solved through mediation by other actors. Most importantly the building of regional
vii. IGADD was formed with the idea that the national governments in the region needed a supplement to their individual drought recovery efforts given the magnitude of the drought. viii. For example, The United States and IGAD had effective involvement in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 in Sudan. ix. The United States has brought considerable diplomatic clout to the region before in the 2005 Peace Agreement and the Algiers Agreement of 2000, which was intended to originally end the conflict.

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capacity through IGAD, which clearly has a vested interest in the region, would give sustainability to the interactions between the states in the region. Therefore, the last specific policy recommendation of this paper is to build the regional institutions, namely IGAD, in order to create an environment more conducive to aid. As the current IGAD Executive Secretary stated in a recent interview when asked about what the international community should do with regards to Somalia, he said “listen to IGAD [because] member states are neighbors of Somalia. It is in the interest of IGAD members that there is a permanent settlement in Somalia.”24 IGAD has not been entirely successful in orchestrating aid efforts, but the member states of IGAD do have the most to gain or lose through the betterment of their region as a whole. If IGAD were to be kept accountable and actively partnered with the United States then the orchestration of aid activities throughout the region would run more smoothly and possibly lead to regional self-sufficiency, even in conflict resolution attempts.

summary of conclusions
The Horn of Africa remains one of the most unstable regions of the world. Unfortunately, it will most likely stay that way for years to come given the complex way interactions and connectivity that exist between its countries. Foreign aid to the region is greatly constrained by the political and civil situations in the region that are currently mired in conflict. The goal of the United States should be to eliminate some of these political and civil situations that are constraining foreign aid. Despite these difficulties that are immediately presented, the United States clearly possesses incentives to assist this difficult region. The United States must recognize its unique ability to bring diplomatic clout and development to this desperate region and then act to bring stability to a region that since independence has never truly known peace.

references
1. Lyons, Terrence. 2006. Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 2. Patman, Robert. 2010. Strategic Shortfall. Santa Barbara: Praeger. 3. Woodward, Peter. 2006. US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa. Hampshire, England: Ashgate. 4. UPI Emerging Threats. “Somali Government Push Makes Headway.” International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center. (2011). EBSCOhost.com 5. International Crisis Group. “Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support.” 21 February 2011. Retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/ africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/170%20Somalia%20The%20Transitional%20Government%20on%20Life%20Support.ashx 6. Peter Cave. “South Sudan to Become One of the Newest and Poorest Countries.” ABC News. January 10 2011. Accessed March 6, 2011. http://www.abc.net.au/pm/ content/2011/s3109928.htm 7. Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook”. Last modified February 28, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/region/region_ afr.html 8. Milner, Kate. “Flashback 1984: Portrait of a Famine.” BBC Online. April 6 2000. Accessed February 2, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/703958.stm 9. Knips, Vivien. “Review of the Livestock Sector in the Horn of Africa (IGAD Countries).” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2004. FAO Online. 10. Reid, Richard. 2009. Eritrea’s External Relations. London: Chatham House. 11. Department of State. “US-Sudan Relations.” Last modified 2011, http://sudan.usembassy.gov/ussudan_relations.html 12. Saul, Jonathan. “How Will Somalia Piracy Affect Shipping.” Reuters. February 10 2011. Accessed February 13, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/10/piracytankers-idUSLDE7191BY20110210 13. Department of State. “Advancing Freedom and Democracy.” Last modified May 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/afdr/ 14.Slavin, Barbara. “U.S. Support Key to Ethiopia’s Invasion.” USA Today Online. January 1 2007. Accessed February 12, 2011. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/200701-07-ethiopia_x.htm 15. UN News Centre. “Security Council Welcomes Agreement Between Eritrea and Djibouti to End Border Dispute.” UN News Centre Online. June 11 2010. Accessed February 15, 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=35005&Cr=djibouti&Cr1= 16. Congressional Research Service. House of Representatives. Hearing on the Horn of Africa: Current Conditions and US Policy. 111th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2010. 17. The White House. “Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy.” Last modified September 22 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/factsheet-us-global-development-policy 18. United States Agency for International Development. “Feed the Future: East Africa FY 2010 Implementation Plan.” Last modified 2010, http://www.feedthefuture. gov/implementation.html 19. Department of State. “Foreign Assistance by Organizational Unit.” Last modified 2011, http://www.foreignassistance.gov/OULanding.aspx 20. Shay, Shaul. 2006. Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 21. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development. “About Us.” Last modified January 9 2010, http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93 &Itemid=124 22. Latham, Brian. “East Africa Should Begin Planning for Food Crisis, Fewsnet Says.” Bloomberg. February 24 2011. Accessed March 5, 2011. http://www.bloomberg. com/news/2011-02-24/east-africa-should-begin-planning-for-food-crisis-fewsnet-says.html 23. The Australian. “Eritrea Warned on Al-Shabaab Links.” The Australian. August 10 2009. Accessed March 2, 2011. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/ eritrea-warned-on-al-shabaab-links/story-e6frg6so-1225759586190 24. IRIN News. “Horn of Africa: IGAD Chief Interviewed on Humanitarian, Political Challenges.” IRIN News Online. February 1 2011. Accessed February 12, 2011, http:// www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=91800

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