FILED

Court of Appeals
Division I
State of Washington
10/28/2022 4:47 PM
No. 83960-8-I

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION I

CHANDRA N. HAMPSON, as director of Seattle School

District No. 1,

Appellant,

v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, a municipal

corporation,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SEATTLE SCHOOL

DISTRICT NO. 1

PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP

Kymberly K. Evanson, WSBA #39973
Jacob A. Zuniga, WSBA #48458
1191 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, Washington 98101-3404
(206) 245-1700
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................... 2
A. District Policy Prohibited Harassment,
Intimidation, and Bullying. ........................................... 2

B. The Allegations Against Director Hampson and

Resulting Investigation. ................................................ 5

1. History of District Policy 0040...................................... 8

2. The August 28, 2020 Teleconference. ......................... 10

3. The September 16, 2020 Executive Committee

Meeting. ....................................................................... 11

4. The MFR Report Conclusions and the District’s

Outcome Letter. ........................................................... 12

C. The Board Votes to Take Action With Respect to

Director Hampson. ...................................................... 13

D. Director Hampson Files this Action and the

Superior Court Affirms the District. ........................... 13

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...................... 14

IV. ARGUMENT .............................................................. 15
A. The Applicable Standard of Review is Arbitrary
and Capricious. ........................................................... 15
B. The District’s Decision Adopting the MFR
Report Was Not Arbitrary and Capricious. ................ 23

C. The District’s Decision Adopting the MFR

Report Was Not Contrary to Law. .............................. 30

-i-
D. The Board’s Action Was Appropriate. ....................... 35

V. CONCLUSION ........................................................... 37

-ii-
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Washington State Cases

Bawden v. Seattle Pub. Sch.,
No. 82391-4-I, 2022 WL 277048 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. I, Jan.
31, 2022) ........................................................................ passim

Binkley v. Tacoma,
114 Wn.2d 373, 787 P.2d 1366 (1990) ................................. 30
Butler v. Lamont Sch. Dist. No. 246,
49 Wn. App. 709, 745 P.2d 1308 (1987) .............................. 36

Francisco v. Board of Directors of the Bellevue Public Schools,

85 Wn.2d 575, 537 P.2d 789 (1975) ..................................... 17

Haynes v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,

111 Wn.2d 250, 758 P.2d 7 (1988) .......................... 15, 16, 21
Hillis v. State of Wash.,
131 Wn.2d 373, 932 P.2d 139 (1997) ....................... 25, 27, 29
Household Fin. Corp. v. State,
40 Wn.2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952) ..................................... 17

Jones v. Pers. Res. Bd.,

134 Wn. App. 560, 140 P.3d 636 (2006) .................. 18, 19, 22

Overlake Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep't of Health,

170 Wn.2d 43, 239 P.3d 1095 (2010) ................. 30, 32, 34, 35

Pierce Cnty. Sheriff v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Pierce Cnty.,

98 Wn.2d 690, 658 P.2d 648 (1983) ......................... 21, 24, 29

-iii-
Plum Creek Timber Co., L.P. v. Wash. State Forest Pracs.
Appeal Bd.,
99 Wn. App. 579, 933 P.2d (2000) ...................................... 28
Porter v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
160 Wn. App. 872, 248 P.3d 1111 (2011) ..................... passim
State ex rel. Hood v. Pers. Bd.,
82 Wn.2d 396, 511 P.2d 52 (1973) ....................................... 21
Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings, Inc.,
193 Wn.2d 611, 444 P.3d 606 (2019) ................................... 31
Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State Pers. Bd.,
29 Wn. App. 818, 630 P.2d 951 (1981) .................... 20, 29, 31
Williams v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
97 Wn.2d 215, 643 P.2d 426 (1982) ..................................... 20
Yaw v. Walla Walla Sch. Dist. No. 140,
106 Wn.2d 408, 722 P.2d 803 (1986) ............................ passim

Washington State Statutes

RCW 28A.320.015 ......................................................... 2, 32, 36

RCW 28A.645.010 ................................................... 1, 13, 15, 16

RCW 34.05.570(3)(e) ............................................................... 28

Washington State Rules

RAP 18.17 ................................................................................ 37

-iv-
 I. INTRODUCTION
In this RCW 28A.645.010 appeal, School Board Director

Chandra Hampson seeks to overturn a finding that she violated

Seattle School District Policy No. 5207 prohibiting harassment,

intimidation, and bullying through certain interactions with two

District employees. The District’s finding that Director Hampson

violated Policy 5207 was supported by a thorough investigation

conducted by an independent workplace investigator, which

involved 20 witness interviews and review of thousands of pages

of documents. The District’s decision and the Board’s

subsequent vote requiring Director Hampson to read and abide

by Policy 5207 were well within the District’s authority. As the

Superior Court properly ruled, neither action was arbitrary and

capricious or contrary to law, and thus is not subject to reversal

by this Court.

Contrary to Director Hampson’s claims, her appeal does

not raise issues touching on the authority of Board directors to

make policy or to direct District staff. Nor does this case

1
implicate the rights of elected officials to adequately represent

their constituents. Rather, this case concerns a personnel matter

that was thoroughly investigated by the District and

appropriately handled by the Board. The Superior Court properly

declined to insert itself into the District’s internal affairs, and this

Court should do the same. The Superior Court should be

affirmed.

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. District Policy Prohibited Harassment,
Intimidation, and Bullying.
Seattle School District No. 1 (“the District”) is governed by a

Board of seven publicly elected directors serving four-year terms

(“the Board”). CP 21. The work of the Board includes hiring and

evaluating the District superintendent, setting District policies,

establishing District budgets, adopting instructional materials,

and serving as community representatives to the District and on

behalf of the District. See id.; see also RCW 28A.320.015(1)(a)-

(c). Board members carry out their work with assistance from

District personnel who report to the superintendent, either

2
directly or through others. See CP 21.

On November 1, 2017, the Board enacted Policy No. 5207,

which prohibited harassment, intimidation, and bullying (“HIB”)

directed towards District employees or volunteers. CP 142.

Under the Policy, HIB in the workplace referred to “repeated

and/or unreasonable actions of an individual (or group) directed

towards an employee or volunteer (or a group of employees or

volunteers) that is intended to intimidate, bully, degrade, or

humiliate.” Id. HIB could include “written messages or images

(including those that are electronically transmitted), verbal

comments, or physical acts.” Id.

As relevant here, to be considered HIB, the messages,

images, comments, or acts must:

• Have the effect of substantially

interfering with an employee’s or
volunteer’s work environment; or
• Be so severe, persistent, or pervasive that
it creates an intimidating or threatening
work environment; or
• Have the effect of substantially
disrupting the orderly operation of the
work place.

3
Id. Policy 5207 applied to employees, students, and Board

members. 1 HIB complaints alleging conduct based on protected

class status, such as race or gender, were investigated under the

provisions of Procedure 5010SP by the District’s Human

Resources department or its designee, which could include an

impartial external investigator.2

1
Policy 5207 has since been repealed, and has been replaced by
administrative guidelines governing workplace civility. Seattle
Pub. Schs. Minutes, July 6, 2022 Regular School Board Meeting,
at 7 available at https://seattleschools.sharepoint.com /sites
/SPSBoardOffice-O365/Shared%20Documents/Forms/All Items
.aspx?id=%2Fsites%2FSPSBoardOffice%2DO365%2FShared
%20Documents%2FSchool%20Board%2FBoard%20Meetings
%2F2022%2D23%2FFull%20Board%2F2022%2D08%2D31
%20RBM%2FC01%5F20220831%5FMinutes%5F20220706%
2Epdf&parent=%2Fsites%2FSPSBoardOffice%2DO365%2FS
hared%20Documents%2FSchool%20Board%2FBoard%20Mee
tings%2F2022%2D23%2FFull%20Board%2F2022%2D08%2
D31%20RBM&p=true&ga=1 (last visited Oct. 27, 2022).
However, Policy 5207 was in effect at all times material to this
dispute.
2
Seattle Pub. Schs., Superintendent Procedure 5010SP,
Employment Discrimination Complaint Process 1 (Feb. 4, 2021),
available at https://www.seattleschools.org/wp-content/ uploads
/2021/07/5010SP.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2022). See also CP
136.

4
 B. The Allegations Against Director Hampson and
Resulting Investigation.
On September 18, 2020, two District employees, Dr. Doe

and Ms. Roe, submitted to the Board a memorandum entitled

Bullying, Intimidation, and Anti-Black Racism, alleging anti-

Black and intersectional racism by Director Hampson and then-

Director Zachary DeWolf 3 in response to their ongoing work on

a new draft District antiracism policy, known as Policy No. 0040.

CP 18. Specifically, Dr. Doe and Ms. Roe alleged that over the

course of their work on Policy 0040, Directors Hampson and

DeWolf “orchestrated [a] campaign of bullying, escalating

intimidation, gaslighting, and retaliation.” Id. The memorandum

alleged “intersectional” discrimination on the basis of race and

sex, and HIB in violation of Policy 5207. See CP 18. Specifically,

the memorandum claimed that:

3
Former Director Zachary DeWolf left office on November 30,
2021. For ease of reference, he is referred to throughout this brief
as “Director DeWolf.”

5
 1. Director Hampson began bullying [Dr. Doe] and
attempted to discredited [sic] [Ms. Roe] in response
to what she perceived as a loss of control or
"ownership" over Policy 0040.

2. Director Hampson orchestrated with external

stakeholders the overt silencing of Director4 [Roe’s]
Board report, testimony and undermining [sic] the
credibility of her policy work.

3. Directors Hampson and DeWolf scheduled a

meeting with [Dr. Doe] and [Ms. Roe] under false
pretenses, so that they could continue to berate and
discredit Director [Roe].

4. Directors DeWolf and Hampson modeled overt

silencing and chastisement of Black women in
leadership, displaying the often public
consequences Black women face for addressing the
racism which Hampson and DeWolf regularly claim
a commitment to ending.

Id.

In addition to those specific examples, Dr. Doe and

Ms. Roe provided additional allegations regarding (i) Director

4
The reference in the memorandum and some administrative
record materials to “Director Roe” refers to the fact that Ms. Roe
is the Director of Racial Equity Advancement. She is not a
member of the Board.

6
Hampson’s perceived loss of control over Policy 0040; (ii) an

August 28, 2020 meeting at which the employees alleged

Directors Hampson and DeWolf engaged in discriminatory and

bullying conduct; and (iii) the “perceived silencing and

chastising” of Dr. Doe and Ms. Roe during a September 16, 2020

Board Executive Committee meeting. CP 42.

On November 2, 2020, at the insistence of Directors

Hampson and DeWolf, the District retained an external

workplace investigator, attorney Marcella Fleming Reed, to

investigate the allegations in the memorandum. See CP 20.

Ms. Reed interviewed 20 witnesses and reviewed more than

5,500 pages of documents including emails, policies, procedures,

agendas, meeting minutes, and transcripts. CP 15. She also

listened to various audio files. Id. Most interviews took place in

November and December of 2020 and January and February of

2021, with two additional interviews taking place in July of 2021.

CP 54. Ms. Reed’s comprehensive report (“MFR Report”) was

issued on August 5, 2021, and contained nearly 40 pages of

7
findings and conclusions, supported by 280 pages of notes,

emails and supporting exhibits. See CP 9-315.

The series of events detailed in the MFR Report is briefly

set forth in summary below.

1. History of District Policy 0040.

During August 2019, the Board took up certain policy

efforts to enhance diversity, equity, and inclusion to benefit

District students. See CP 24. Director Hampson was the primary

stakeholder on the Board. See CP 25. She was passionate about

the opportunity because she had policy drafting experience

gained through service to other organizations, including the

Seattle Council Parent Teacher Student Association

(“SCPTSA”). See CP 24-25. She sought to leverage that

experience while on the Board by proposing a policy she drafted

while heading SCPTSA. See id. Her proposal, Policy 0040, was

circulated to certain District personnel for review and comment.

CP 25-26.

8
 Dr. Doe and Ms. Roe were among the District personnel

to whom the policy was circulated. Id. Their views were sought

because each was respectively serving the District as Chief of

Equity and Director of Racial Equity Advancement. See id. The

two began their work on reviewing Policy 0040 by obtaining the

perspective of families they thought Policy 0040 would most

affect. See CP 26. The pace of their efforts to finalize Policy 0040

was slowed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting school

closures. See CP 26-27, 34, 39.

In June 2020, Director Hampson sought to expedite

passing Policy 0040 in response to current community

sentiments regarding racial inequality. CP 27-28. In response,

Dr. Doe and Ms. Roe expressed concerns that Policy 0040, in its

then-current state, would not adequately address community

feedback they previously obtained while working on the policy.

CP 27. Dr. Doe and Ms. Roe offered to revise the policy and

circulate a revised draft for subsequent community comment.

See id. Each offered to carry out that work under oversight by

9
Directors Hampson and DeWolf. See id.

2. The August 28, 2020 Teleconference.

On August 28, 2020, Directors DeWolf and Hampson

engaged in a teleconference with Dr. Doe and Ms. Roe regarding

their progress on Policy 0040. According to the MFR Report,

Director DeWolf was rude and unprofessional during the call,

and raised his voice at Dr. Doe and Ms. Roe and questioned their

veracity relating to work they had been doing on Policy 0040.

CP 48-49.

After Director DeWolf left the call to catch a plane,

Director Hampson continued the call for an additional 40

minutes. CP 51. Witnesses to the call characterized her behavior

as “abusive to staff throughout” by “yelling,” being

“disrespectful” and “challenging comments as untrue.” Id.; see

also CP 35-36, 50, 60-63, 101-02, 255. Further, the report found

that Director Hampson questioned Ms. Roe’s qualifications, and

chastised Dr. Doe in a raised voice. See CP 48-51; CP 34-36. The

report further found that the superintendent and her chief of staff

10
jointly called Dr. Doe to express concern after learning of the

events. CP 35, 102. Notes by an administrative assistant

memorializing the call characterize Director Hampson as

“abusive,” “yelling,” and “disrespectful,” among other things.

CP 51.

In her own interview with Ms. Reed, Director Hampson

agreed the call was “terrible.” CP 37, 48.

3. The September 16, 2020 Executive Committee

Meeting.
On September 16, 2020, Director DeWolf presided over

an Executive Committee Meeting at which he and Director

Hampson planned to present a Board Action Report (“BAR”) on

Policy 0040 in an effort to advance the policy without further

staff involvement. See CP 38, 49-51. Departing from standard

practice, the BAR was prepared by Director Hampson, not

District staff. See CP 38, 40, 49-51. Directors Hampson and

DeWolf did not tell staff that they should not plan to speak at the

meeting, though Dr. Doe and Ms. Roe expected they would do

so in accordance with their usual practice and in light of their

11
ongoing work on Policy 0040. See CP 49, 51. The MFR Report

found that Directors Hampson and DeWolf coordinated to limit

the amount of time available for Dr. Doe and Ms. Roe to speak

about Policy 0040, instead inviting others to speak who had not

planned to do so, in order to use up the time allotted for the

meeting. Id. When finally given an opportunity to speak at the

meeting, the MFR Report further found that Director Hampson

interrupted their presentation and used inappropriate tactics to

attempt to curtail their remarks. See CP 49, 51.

4. The MFR Report Conclusions and the District’s

Outcome Letter.
The MFR Report found that the allegations of

intersectional discrimination based on race and sex set forth in

the memorandum were inconclusive. CP 7, 42-46. With respect

to the HIB claims, the MFR Report concluded that Director

Hampson used her position and authority to the detriment of

Dr. Doe and Ms. Roe in violation of Policy 5207. CP 7, 50-51.

On August 19, 2021, the District issued an “outcome

letter” to convey the findings of the MFR Report to Director

12
Hampson. CP 6. The letter provided that though the MFR Report

had concluded that Director Hampson violated Policy 5207,

because she was not an employee of the District, it was up to the

Board to determine whether any corrective action should be

taken to address the violation. CP 6-7. The letter enclosed a copy

of the MFR Report, Policy 5207, and the District’s prohibition

against retaliation (Policy 5245 and Procedure 5245SP). Id.

C. The Board Votes to Take Action With Respect to

Director Hampson.
At the Board meeting on September 9, 2021, the Board

voted to provide Directors Hampson and DeWolf with a copy of

Policy 5207 and further instructed them that they are required to

comply with it. CP 323-24, 327-28, 336-37.

D. Director Hampson Files this Action and the

Superior Court Affirms the District.
Director Hampson filed this appeal pursuant to

RCW 28A.645.010, arguing that the Superior Court should

review the record de novo and find that Director Hampson had

not violated Policy 5207. See, e.g., CP 353-54. Rejecting those

13
claims, the Superior Court ruled that the District’s decision and

subsequent Board action requiring Director Hampson to review

and abide by Policy 5207 were not arbitrary and capricious.

CP 402-03. Director Hampson again appeals.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Where Director Hampson challenges the District’s

administrative decision applying an internal anti-

harassment policy and the School Board’s resulting

directive that Director Hampson must review and abide

by the policy, is the standard of review arbitrary and

capricious? Yes.

2. Where the District conducted a thorough investigation

and provided a detailed record of decision, should the

District’s finding that Director Hampson violated

14
 Policy 5207 and the Board’s resulting sanction be

upheld? Yes.

IV. ARGUMENT
Director Hampson assigns error to the District’s decision

to adopt the MFR Report and the Board’s subsequent action. As

detailed below, neither action is arbitrary and capricious or

contrary to law, and as such, neither is subject to reversal by this

Court.

The Applicable Standard of Review is Arbitrary

A. and Capricious.
Judicial review of administrative decisions under

RCW 28A.645.010 is limited to whether the challenged decision

was arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. Haynes v. Seattle

Sch. Dist. No. 1, 111 Wn.2d 250, 253-55, 758 P.2d 7 (1988) cert.

denied 489 U.S. 1015, 109 S.Ct. 1129, 103 L.Ed.2d 191 (1989)

(discussing the predecessor statute to RCW 28A.645.010);

Bawden v. Seattle Pub. Sch., No. 82391-4-I, 2022 WL 277048,

at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. I, Jan. 31, 2022) review denied 199

15
Wn.2d 1025, 512 P.3d 899 (Wash. Sup. Ct., Jul. 13, 2022). In an

appeal of a trial court decision under RCW 28A.645.010, this

Court stands in the same position as the superior court. Porter v.

Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 160 Wn. App. 872, 879, 248 P.3d 1111

(2011).

Here, the superior court appropriately applied the arbitrary

and capricious standard of review, and this Court should do the

same. Contrary to Director Hampson’s claims, de novo review

of the District’s decision does not apply. Rather, the Supreme

Court has made clear the de novo standard of review under RCW

28A.645.010 applies only to quasi-judicial determinations, not

administrative actions like the District’s investigation in

accordance with Procedure 5010SP and the Board’s subsequent

adoption of the MFR Report. Haynes, 111 Wn.2d at 254 (“[T]he

constitutional jurisdiction of the []court on appeal from agency

action is as follows: If the power exercised by an agency is

essentially administrative, the [] court, upon appeal provided by

statute, is limited to a consideration of whether the agency acted

16
arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law.”). This limitation

upon review of a nonjudicial decision by an administrative

agency is a function of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Porter, 160 Wn. App. at 874 (citing Household Fin. Corp. v.

State, 40 Wn.2d 451, 456-58, 463, 244 P.2d 260 (1952)).

In Francisco v. Board of Directors of the Bellevue Public

Schools, 85 Wn.2d 575, 579, 537 P.2d 789 (1975), the Supreme

Court identified four factors to determine whether an agency

action is administrative or quasi-judicial. Under Francisco,

courts consider: (1) whether this Court could have been charged

in the first instance with the responsibility of making the

challenged decision; (2) whether the function of the agency is

one courts have historically performed; (3) whether the agency

performs functions of inquiry, investigation, declaration and

enforcement of liabilities as they stand on present or past facts

under existing laws; and, (4) whether the agency’s action is

comparable to the ordinary business of courts. Id. Accord Yaw v.

Walla Walla Sch. Dist. No. 140, 106 Wn.2d 408, 414, 722 P.2d

17
803 (1986).

As she must, Director Hampson concedes that Francisco

factors one and two do not support de novo review. Op. Br. at 31

(arguing only the third and fourth factors). With respect to factor

one, Director Hampson does not even argue that Policy 5207

could have been applied in the first instance by this Court,

because it plainly could not have been. There is no contract or

statute within the meaning of Yaw that could have been

adjudicated by this Court. 106 Wn.2d at 416. Rather, as Director

Hampson concedes, her claim concerns the alleged

misapplication of Policy 5207. See e.g. Op. Br. at 36 (“District’s

application of Policy 5207 was contrary to law because it

prevents elected School Board Directors from using their

discretion to make policy.”). Thus, the “challenged decision” is

the result of an internal investigation pertaining to an internal

District policy. Where such internal matters are at issue, an

agency’s determination is administrative. See Jones v. Pers. Res.

Bd., 134 Wn. App. 560, 571, 140 P.3d 636 (2006) (administrative

18
action where investigation related to prohibitions codified within

“internal [] documents” and could not have been brought to court

in the first instance).

Director Hampson also concedes Francisco factor two

does not support application of de novo review. Rather, it is

undisputed that courts do not historically perform internal

reviews of personnel issues for compliance with internal policies.

Jones, 134 Wn. App. at 571. Director Hampson cites no authority

and makes no argument to the contrary.

Francisco factors three and four further demonstrate the

District’s action was administrative. In adopting the MFR Report

and admonishing Director Hampson to review the District’s

policies, neither the District nor the Board applied facts to law.

Id. at 572 (action to enforce employee handbook “does not allege

violation on which a court may pass judgment” as “no law is

being applied to facts.”); Bawden, 2022 WL 277048, at *2

(district’s decision that performance evaluation did not violate

Policy 5207 reviewed under arbitrary and capricious standard for

19
administrative actions). Neither is the District’s decision here

“comparable to the ordinary business of the courts.” Yaw, 106

Wn.2d at 414 (personnel issues not generally subject to judicial

review).

Director Hampson cites no authority where application of

an internal personnel policy was determined to be a quasi-

judicial function. This is because “as [courts] have said many

times, the courts of this state are ill-equipped to act as super

personnel agencies.” Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State Pers.

Bd., 29 Wn. App. 818, 820, 630 P.2d 951 (1981); Williams v.

Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 97 Wn.2d 215, 220-21, 643 P.2d 426

(1982) (“[T]he board’s determination of what is in the best

interests of the school district is not appropriately characterized

as an application of law to fact, and the broad discretionary

authority the statute confers upon the board does not resemble

the ordinary business of the courts.”). See also Yaw, 106 Wn. 2d

at 416 (“The Board’s application of facts to the rules which it

created, and which otherwise would simply not have existed, was

20
considered an administrative action.”); State ex rel. Hood v. Pers.

Bd., 82 Wn.2d 396, 401, 511 P.2d 52 (1973) (“Personnel

administration [is] left exclusively to the discretion of

management.”) disapproved of on other grounds by Pierce Cnty.

Sheriff v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Pierce Cnty., 98 Wn.2d 690,

693, 658 P.2d 648 (1983); Haynes, 111 Wn.2d at 253-54;

Bawden, 2022 WL 277048, at *2.

Acknowledging she can cite no authority on point,

Director Hampson attempts to distinguish the numerous

controlling cases by claiming they do not apply in a case

involving an elected school board representative. Op. Br. at 33-

34. Specifically, Director Hampson claims that application of

Policy 5207 to a Board Director is not a personnel matter because

she is not a District employee. Id. As such, her argument goes,

the District’s application of Policy 5207 to Director Hampson

was quasi-judicial, such that review is de novo.

This argument fails for numerous reasons. First, the

District’s action is not administrative merely because it involves

21
“personnel,” though adjudicating claims by two District

employees against a director certainly involves school personnel.

Rather, the action is administrative because it satisfies each of

the Francisco factors, none of which excise decisions involving

elected Board directors from the administrative framework. To

the contrary, the fact that Director Hampson is not operating

under a District employment contract only supports a finding that

the investigation and findings were administrative. By contrast,

District employees proceeding under a contract sometimes

present a quasi-judicial claim. This was the holding of Yaw: the

district there had acted in a quasi-judicial capacity because the

“case involved a determination of Yaw’s contract rights, and []

historically courts have made this kind of determination.” 106

Wn. 2d at 414.

While citing Yaw and Benson generally, Director

Hampson does not explain how their holdings support her case.

She admittedly has no employment contract with the District and

the issues at stake arise under an “internal policy.” Jones, 134

22
Wn. App. at 572 (interpreting internal policy “does not resemble

a court’s ordinary business.”). No case supports de novo review

here.

In sum, the District’s decision and the Board’s subsequent

action were administrative in nature. As such, as the superior

court properly ruled, the appropriate inquiry for this Court is

whether such actions were arbitrary and capricious or contrary to

law. 5 As detailed below, they were not.

B. The District’s Decision Adopting the MFR Report

Was Not Arbitrary and Capricious.
Arbitrary and capricious agency action is “willful and

unreasoning action ... without consideration and in disregard of

the facts and circumstances of the case.” Porter, 160 Wn. App.

at 880. By contrast, “[a]ction is not arbitrary or capricious when

exercised honestly and upon due consideration where there is

room for two opinions, however much it may be believed that an

5
Even were this Court to apply the de novo standard urged by
Director Hampson, which it should not do, the District’s and
Board’s actions were supported by the record and should be
upheld.

23
erroneous conclusion was reached.” Id. Decisions are arbitrary

or capricious only if they are made without reason or with

flagrant disregard for material facts. See Pierce Cnty. Sheriff, 98

Wn.2d at 695. The District’s adoption of the MFR Report was

not arbitrary and capricious.

Director Hampson’s brief does not articulate any failures

in the investigation process, identify the District’s disregard of

material facts, or allege any unreasonable action by the District.

Nor could she, as the report was the result of 20 interviews with

District staff and Board members, conducted over an eight-

month period, by an external independent and highly-

experienced workplace investigator. In addition to the

interviews, Ms. Reed reviewed and considered thousands of

pages of emails, policies, meeting minutes, and transcripts in

reaching the conclusion that Director Hampson violated Policy

5207. See CP 9-52 (report); CP 53-109 (interview memoranda),

110-315 (documents referenced). The District’s process was

consistent with its Policy 5010SP for investigation and

24
determination of complaints by District employees and Director

Hampson does not argue otherwise. Compare CP 9-52 (report)

with CP 136-141 (Policy 5010SP). The MFR Report clearly

demonstrates “due consideration.” Hillis v. State of Wash., 131

Wn.2d 373, 383, 932 P.2d 139 (1997). See also Porter, 160 Wn.

App. at 880 (school board’s consideration of multiple views on

suitability of math textbooks was not arbitrary and capricious).

Director Hampson cites no authority to the contrary.

Rather, throughout her brief, Director Hampson highlights facts

that Ms. Reed considered, but argues she should have reached

different conclusions based upon those facts. For example,

Director Hampson argues that her emails did not evidence intent

to harass Dr. Doe or Ms. Roe, because the emails were sent to

others. Op. Br. at 51. The MFR Report reasonably concluded that

the emails, along with Director Hampson’s conduct at the

September 16 Executive Committee Meeting, showed that

Director Hampson and Director DeWolf intentionally

coordinated to inappropriately curtail Dr. Doe and Ms. Roe’s

25
participation. See CP 49 (noting “contrived exclusion” from

meeting); CP 28-33, 38, 51, 58-59, 67, 103.

Director Hampson further argues that her conduct could

not violate the Policy because it was not “part of a pattern” and

was not unreasonable. Op. Br. at 22, 28, 60. To that end, Director

Hampson contends her conduct on the August 28, 2020

conference call and vocal criticisms of Dr. Doe and Ms. Roe

were merely “candid evaluations” regarding their “job

performance.” Op. Br. at 42. But here, again, Director Hampson

asks this Court to review certain portions of the record while

ignoring others (e.g., CP 34-36, 48, 49, 50-52, 61-63, 101-02,

255). Moreover, Policy 5207 does not require proving a pattern

of conduct, only that the conduct be “repeated and/or

unreasonable.” CP 142 (emphasis added). Relying on witness

interviews and notes from participants on the August 28 call, the

MFR Report reasonably concluded that Director Hampson’s

conduct during the call, including yelling, making “abusive” and

“disrespectful” comments, and questioning Dr. Doe and Ms.

26
Roe’s veracity, constituted the type of unreasonable conduct that

violates Policy 5207. CP 51.

Far from demonstrating arbitrary and capricious action by

the District, Director Hampson’s brief simply recites the same

series of events carefully investigated and considered by Ms.

Reed and declares them in her view to be “wholly appropriate”,

not indicative of ill-intent, “entirely reasonable” or insufficient

to interfere with the workplace. Op. Br. at 38-54, 57-58, 61. Mere

disagreement with the District’s decision, however, is an

insufficient basis for this Court to overturn it. Hillis, 131 Wn.2d

at 383 (“Where there is room for two opinions, an action taken

after due consideration is not arbitrary and capricious even

though a reviewing court may believe it to be erroneous.”).

Moreover, the record demonstrates a careful and extensive

investigation into the events leading up to the staff complaint and

draws reasonable conclusions about their detrimental impact.

Director Hampson’s disappointment with the outcome of the

investigation does not undermine the District’s process.

27
 Finally, Director Hampson argues that the MFR report was

arbitrary and capricious because it failed to include specific

findings on Director Hampson’s intent, supported by substantial

evidence. Op. Br. at 48, 57-58. As the trial court properly ruled,

however, no “magic words” regarding Director Hampson’s

intent are necessary. Rather, the report set out the requirements

of Policy 5207, made detailed findings about intentional conduct

by Director Hampson, and concluded such conduct violated the

Policy. See CP 48 (noting persuasive testimony and

contemporaneous notes of Witness 20 regarding both directors

“yelling” and “berating” staff); 50 (finding “unprofessional

conduct ... personally and professionally critical” of Dr. Doe and

Ms. Roe); 51 (finding Director Hampson engaged in “yelling”,

being “disrespectful” and “abusive to staff”, “challenging [staff]

comments as untrue”); see also CP 17-21, 46-51. The superior

court was correct to find the record more than satisfied the

applicable standard.

28
 Moreover, Director Hampson is incorrect that the MFR

report is reviewed under a “substantial evidence” standard. The

only case Director Hampson cites for this proposition applies the

standard for adjudicative proceedings under the Administrative

Procedure Act, which is inapplicable to this case. 6 Op. Br. at at

50 (citing Plum Creek Timber Co., L.P. v. Wash. State Forest

Pracs. Appeal Bd., 99 Wn. App. 579, 591, 933 P.2d 287 (2000)

(applying RCW 34.05.570(3)(e)). Rather, as detailed above, the

inquiry under the arbitrary and capricious standard is whether the

decision was made without reason or with flagrant disregard for

material facts. See Pierce Cnty. Sheriff, 98 Wn.2d at 695.

Director Hampson has not identified any material facts that were

disregarded, she just disagrees with the investigator’s conclusion

drawn from the facts she considered. This is insufficient to

overturn the District’s decision. See Hillis, 131 Wn.2d at 383;

6
Even if this standard applied, which it does not, Director
Hampson does not challenge any of the MFR report’s factual
determinations. She merely criticizes the report’s conclusion.

29
Porter, 160 Wn. App. at 880 (even if erroneous, school board’s

decision not arbitrary and capricious where honest consideration

was given to conflicting points of view).

In sum, Director Hampson identifies no authority under

which this Court could substitute a contrary judgment for the

District’s thorough investigation. The arbitrary and capricious

standard recognizes deference is owed to agencies which are

better positioned than courts to decide issues involving

personnel. See Wash. Fed’n of State Emps, 29 Wn. App. at 820;

Yaw, 106 Wn.2d at 413-15. The superior court properly ruled as

much and should be affirmed.

C. The District’s Decision Adopting the MFR Report

Was Not Contrary to Law.
When determining whether an agency action is contrary to

law, courts “‘accord substantial deference to the agency’s

interpretation of law in matters involving the agency’s special

knowledge and expertise.’” Bawden, 2022 WL 277048, at *2

(quoting Overlake Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep't of Health, 170 Wn.2d 43,

50, 239 P.3d 1095 (2010)). This is particularly true in personnel

30
matters, where the government “‘must have wide discretion and

control over the management of its personnel and internal

affairs.’” Id. (quoting Binkley v. Tacoma, 114 Wn.2d 373, 386-

87, 787 P.2d 1366 (1990).

Director Hampson does not allege that the District’s

decision violates any law, nor does she challenge the authority

under which the Board promulgated its former anti-harassment

policy. Rather, Director Hampson merely disagrees with its

application to her own conduct. As the superior court properly

recognized, her claims are insufficient to warrant judicial

intervention. Washington courts give great deference to an

agency’s interpretation of its own properly promulgated policy,

especially where, as in this case, the policy concerns personnel

operations. Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings, Inc., 193

Wn.2d 611, 627, 444 P.3d 606 (2019); Yaw, 106 Wn.2d at 416

(absent rights created by an employment statute or employment

contract, personnel administration is left exclusively to the

discretion of management); Wash. Fed’n of State Emps., 29 Wn.

31
App. at 820 (recognizing courts are ill-equipped to act as

personnel agencies); Bawden, 2022 WL 277048, at *2 (same).

In her brief, Director Hampson claims that the deference

discussed in Taylor does not apply because Policy 5207 does not

involve “the education of children.” Op. Br. at 48. Not only is

Director Hampson wrong as a factual matter, but she also fails to

cite any authority that would support limiting the deference owed

to the District when interpreting its own policies.

If accepted, Director Hampson’s argument would not only

conflict with numerous binding cases, but would serve to

circumvent the established standard of review for administrative

actions of a school district. Moreover, this Court has already

determined that the applicability of Policy 5207 is exactly the

type of policy for which this deference is owed. Bawden, 2022

WL 277048, at *2 (discussing Policy 5207 and calling for

“substantial deference” to the district’s “‘interpretation of law in

matters involving the agency’s special knowledge and

32
expertise.’”) (quoting Overlake Hosp. Assn., 170 Wn.2d at 50)).

The District’s decision was not contrary to law.

This Court should also reject Director Hampson’s general

allegation that Policy 5207 unduly impinges on her statutory role

as an elected Board Director. Op. Br. at 37-44. Citing school

boards’ discretionary powers under RCW 28A.320.015, Director

Hampson argues that if the District’s former anti-harassment

policy applied to her, she would be precluded from adequately

representing her constituents.7 But nothing in former Policy 5207

or the District’s application of it curtailed Director Hampson’s

statutory policy-making authority. Rather, the Policy required

7
See e.g., Op Br. at 26 (“The state’s elected school board
directors cannot carry out their duties if staff, not the voters’
chosen officials, control the development of districtwide policy
and are immune to candid criticism from the elected officials
charged with governing the District.”); Op. Br. at 41 (“The
district erroneously interpreted [the prohibition on harassment,
intimidation, and bullying] so broadly that an elected director
cannot even criticize staff performance.”); Op. Br. at 43-44
(“[A]n adjudicatory body…should not construe a policy on
harassment, intimidation, and bullying in a way that rebalances
responsibility in favor of bureaucrats and away from the voters’
chosen representatives…”).

33
only that she exercise her authority in a civil and equitable

manner. The MFR report concluded that Director Hampson

failed to do so (see CP 51), and the School Board directed her to

review the Policy and abide by it in the future. CP 327-28, 336-

37. Director Hampson has pointed to nothing in the record

demonstrating that either the finding or the “sanction” has

impeded her work.

To the contrary, as noted in her brief, the Board has since

repealed Policy 5207. Op. Br. at 46. The Board’s action directly

undermines Director Hampson’s claim that her policy-making

role as a Board member has been diminished by virtue of the

District’s Policy or its application to her. Moreover, there is no

claim that the Policy could somehow impinge on her policy-

making role in the future because it has been repealed.

Finally, while Director Hampson objects to the application

of Policy 5207 to her conduct as a director, she neglects to

acknowledge that it was Director Hampson who insisted upon an

investigation under the Policy in the first place. CP 20. Dr. Doe

34
and Ms. Roe were opposed to the internal investigation under

Procedure 5010SP, as they did not believe it would adequately

address the concerns articulated in their complaint. Id. However,

according to the report, Director Hampson “felt it was important

to move forward with an investigation so that it was clear they

were not being held to a different standard or process than other

SPS staff.” Id. Director Hampson cannot now claim that treating

an elected director in the same manner as a staff member, as she

insisted, was arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law.

Director Hampson’s appeal should be dismissed.

D. The Board’s Action Was Appropriate.

In response to the conclusions in the MFR Report, at the

September 9, 2021 Board meeting, the Board voted to take the

following action with respect to Directors Hampson and

DeWolf:

(1) provide a copy of Policy 5207 and Procedure

5207SP to Directors Hampson and DeWolf; (2)
instruct Directors Hampson and DeWolf that they
are required to comply with Policy 5207 and
Procedure 5207SP and request that they review the
Policy and Procedure and direct any questions

35
 regarding its provisions to District staff; and (3)
request that District staff provide training on Policy
5207 and Procedure 5207SP to all new School
Board Directors prior to or as soon as practicable
after commencement of Board service and provide
ongoing training regarding Policy 5207 to School
Board Directors as needed.

CP 323-24. Director Hampson claims this “sentence must be

vacated” because it is based on the District’s “flawed decision”

that Director Hampson violated Policy 5207. Op. Br. at 63. She

accordingly asks this Court to “vacate the Board’s motion.” Id.

Director Hampson provides no argument or authority in

support of that request, nor does she explain why directing a

board member to review and comply with District policy is

arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. The Board’s decision

to direct Director Hampson to review and in the future comply

with the policy she violated is a “policy decision” plainly within

the Board’s authority to manage its internal affairs and not

subject to this Court’s intervention. RCW 28A.320.015 (school

board has broad discretionary power to implement policies); see

also Butler v. Lamont Sch. Dist. No. 246, 49 Wn. App. 709, 712,

36
745 P.2d 1308 (1987) (“The choice of sanction is a policy

decision....which neither judge nor jury is entitled to usurp from

the board.”); Bawden, 2022 WL 277048, *2 (the district “must

have wide discretion and control over the management of its

personnel and internal affairs.”) (quotations omitted).

V. CONCLUSION
The superior court properly ruled that the District’s

decision and resulting Board action should be upheld. Director

Hampson has again failed to demonstrate that the District’s

decision was arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. This

Court should affirm and dismiss this appeal.

This document contains 5,978 words, excluding the parts

of the document exempted from the word count by RAP 18.17.

37
 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of

October, 2022.

PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP

s/ Kymberly K. Evanson
Kymberly K. Evanson, WSBA #39973
Jacob A. Zuniga, WSBA #48458
Attorneys for Respondent Seattle School
District No. 1

38
 PACIFICA LAW GROUP

October 28, 2022 - 4:47 PM

Transmittal Information

Filed with Court: Court of Appeals Division I

Appellate Court Case Number: 83960-8
Appellate Court Case Title: Chandra N. Hampson, Appellant v. Seattle School District No. 1, Respondent

The following documents have been uploaded:

• 839608_Briefs_20221028164646D1146540_8962.pdf
This File Contains:
Briefs - Respondents
The Original File Name was SSD Response Brief.pdf

A copy of the uploaded files will be sent to:

• gary@tal-fitzlaw.com
• jacob.zuniga@pacificalawgroup.com
• matt@tal-fitzlaw.com
• phil@tal-fitzlaw.com
Comments:

Sender Name: Sydney Henderson - Email: sydney.henderson@pacificalawgroup.com

Filing on Behalf of: Kymberly Kathryn Evanson - Email: kymberly.evanson@pacificalawgroup.com (Alternate
Email: sydney.henderson@pacificalawgroup.com)

Address:
1191 Second Avenue, Suite 2100
Seattle, WA, 98101
Phone: (206) 245-1700

Note: The Filing Id is 20221028164646D1146540