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TABLE OF CONTENTS AND SHORT RE\'IEW OUTLINE

Page
I. A FOTJNDATION
FOR ESTATEPLANNING: SOCIETY,S
CONTROL OF INHERITANCE I

A. PROLOGUE 1

B. INHERITANCE AND ITS LIMITATIONS I

l. T. Jefferson I
2. 2 W Blackstone,Commentaries I
3. SupremeCowt I
4. TakingPropertyWithout JustCompensation I
5. on Mafiase Permissible
PartialRestraints 3

C. TIIE PROBATEPROCESS
l. lntroductionahdTerminology

a. Execulor,administralor ... 4
b. Oth e te
r rmi n o l o g.........
y 4

2. ls Probale
Necessary?. . .. .. 6
3. A Summaryof ProbateProcedure

a. Openingprobare 6
b. Supervising therepresentative's
actions 6
c. C l o si n g
th ee sta te....... 6

4. of Wills
Contest

a. Gro u n dfo
s rco n te st.....

D . P R O T E S S ION ARLE S P ON S IBILITY.,.............

l. Will Beneficiaries
OwedDuty of Care ,7
2. Fiduciary
Duly 8

II. INTESTACY: AN ESTATE PLAN BY DEFAULT . . . . . . . . . . 10

A. INTESTATE SUCCESSORS!
SPOUSEAND DESCENDANTS .. . . . . .. . . . 10

l. Spouse l0

a. S i mu l ta n e oduesa th....... l0

Wills - v
l) Evidenceof survival 10
2. Descendants ll

a. Taking by representation:
per stirpesdist ibution 1l

1) UPC rule-per capitaat eachgeneration . . . . . . . t2
2) Minodty rule-strict per stirpes t2
b. Posthumous children I2
c. Adoptedchildrcn 12
1) I-oss of inheritancedghts from or throughnatuml parents t2
2) Equitableadoption l3

d. Childrenbomout of wedlock ').4
Cryogenically-preservedsperm
.. t4
t Transfersto minors l5
e. Advancements t)

B. INTESTATTSUCCFSSORS:
ANCESTORSAND COLLATERAT,S . . . . . . . t6
l. HalfBloods l6
2. Escheat 16
C. BARSTO SUCCESSION l6
1. Misconduct 16
a. Killing decedent l6
b. Adultery t1
c. Deseftion ).'l

2. Transferof Interestin Decedent'sEstate t7
a. Releaseofexpectancy 17
b. Tnnsfer of expectancy t't
c. Disclaimer t1
l) Disclaimerupheld 17
lr, CAPACITYAND WILL CONTESTS t9
A. MENTALCAPACITY 19
l. Why RequircMentalCapacity? l9
2. Testof MenralCapacity I9
3. InsaneDelusion l9

vi - Wills
a. delusions
-lnsane aboutmen .. 19
b. Insanedelusionresultinefrom irrationalbeliefin nonexistent
facts . . . . 20

B, TJNDUEIMLUENCE 2l

l. Subjeclive
Test ......... 2l
2. Requirement
ot erootsnowrng
suusti*,ion
oinpiurroi
T e sl a me n l a ryD i sp o si.....
tion 2l
3. UndueInfluenceArisingout of Attomey-Client
Relationship 22
4. UndueInfluencea Questionof FactwhereTestatorIs EasilySwayed. . . . . . 23
)_ No-contest Clauses

C. FRAUD 24

l. Definition u
a, Fruudin the execution A
b. Fraudin the inducement 24
Constuctive Trust ImDosedWhercTestatorPreventedFrcm
ExecutingWill 24

Iv. EXECUTION: FORMSAND FORMALITIES 26

A. EXECUTION 26

I. wills
Attested
a. of dueexecution
Requirements 26
b. thatbothwitnesses
Requirement be present

2. of Witnesses
Competency 27

a. Interested
witnesses 27
b. Requirement of disinterestedness 27

3. Re co mme n dMe e d th o do f Executing
a W ill ........ ......... 28
4. Se l f-ko vi n g A ffi d a vi......
t . ..... 28
5. Sa fe g u a rd ianWi g l l ....... ....... 29
6. Mistakein Execution of a Will ..-... 29
7. Co n d i ti o nWi
a l l l s ......... ........ 30
8. Sta tu to ryWi l l s ....... 30
9. Ho l o g ra p hWi
ic lls. . . . . . . .........30

a. Self-provedwills 30
b. Testamentaryprovisionsnot in handwritingof testator
c. Infomal will

Wills - vii
B. REVOCATIONOF WILLS 33
l. MethodsofRevocation 33
2. ProbateofLost or Destroyed
Wills 33
3. Revocationby Writingor PhysicalAct 34
a. Presumption will destroyed.. .. .. 34
b. Attemptedrevocationby writing on paperuponwhichwill is wdtten 35
c. Partialrevocationby physicalact 35
4. Dependent
RelativeRevocation
andRevival

a. Prcsumptionagainstintestacy ...... 36
b. Doctrineapplicable
wherelaterwill revokedundermistakenbelief
thatdoingsoreinstates
prior will
c. Revival 38
1) Commonlaw 38
2) Modemlaw 38
5. Revocation
by Operationof Law:Changein FamilyCircumstances 39
a. Marriage 39
l) Stateswithoutstatutes 39
2) Stateswith statutes 39
b. Divorce 39
c. COMPONENTSOFA WILL 39
l. Integrationof Wills 39
2. Republication by Codicil 39
3. Incorpontionby Reference 40
a. Notebookincorporatedby reference 40
b. Validationof inoperative
will by holographic
codicil 4l
4. ActsoflndependentSignificance 42
D, CONTRACTSRELATING TO wlLLS 42
I. Contractsto Make a Will 43
2. ConrractsNot to Revokea Will 43
3. JointWills 43
a. Electivesharein conflictwith will conracr 43

viii - Wills
V, WILL SUBSTITUTES 4S
A. CONTRACTSWITHPAYABLE.ON-DEATH
PROVISIONS 15
l. Life Insurance 45
2. NonleslamenlaryTransfersat Deatt
3. Successor
Beneficiarynot Pemittedin Life Insurance
Contact
4. Investment
ClubProceeds 46
5. ChangeofBeneficiaryof Life Insurance
Policyby Will

B. JOINT TENANCYAND MULTIPLE-PARTYBANK ACCOT'NTS 48

l. TypesofAccounts. . . . . . . . 48
2. JointBankAccount:LackofDonativelntent ... 48
3. StockCertificates
Heldin JointTenancy. . . . . . . 49

c. JOINT TENANCIES IN LAND 5t,

D. R EV O C A B L E T R U S T ............-
S . 50
1. Intoduction 50
2. Retentionof Controlby Settlor 50

a. Creationof validintervivostrustnotwithstanding control
retainedby settlorfuustee. . . 50
b. Intervivostrustrevoked.... 52
c. Creditorsmayrcachtrustassets overwhichthe settlorhadcontrol
at thetime of his death . . . . . 53

3. "Pour-Over"
Testamentary intoanInterVivosTrust .......... 54

a. UniformTestamentary Additions to TrustsAct . . . ...... 54
b. Effectof divorceon validityof dispositions to formerspouse
m a d eb y re vo ca bilnete rvi vostr ust ......... 54

4. UseofRevocable
Trustsin Estate
Planning ....... 56

a. Co n se q u e n d
ceu sri n gl i feof settlor ......... )o
b. Co n se q u e n a
cetdse a tho f settlor ........... 56

5. D w a b l eP o w eor f A tto me y.... ............... 57

a. A g e n t's
a cti o nu p h e l d. . . . ............... 5' l

6. H e a l th -C aDrei re cti ve ........
s ............... 58
'1. T e r mi n a ti o nf Me d i caTl re a tment ............. 58
8 . D i s po si ti oonf D e ce d e n Bt'so d y . .............. 58

Wills - ix
vr. WILLS: CONSTRUCTIONPROBLEMS
59
A. ADMISSION OF EXTRTNSTCEVIDENCE: AMBIGUTTI
MJSTAKE,
AN'DOMtssroN..
59
l. LatenlAmbigur!ies
2. PatentAmbiguities 59
3. No ExtrinsicEvidenceto Corect Drafter,sMistake 59
Failurero ComplywjrhSlalutory 59
RequiremenLs 60
5. E_xtrinsicEvidenceAdrnissibleto Ascertarn
Circumstances
U n d e rWh i ch WiWasMade
ll ........
6. Correcting MistaLes 60
62
a. Extrinsicevidenceofscrivener'serroraclmlssible
to ascertalntestator'strue intent

7. Liability for DraftingAmbiguousWill

B. DEATH OF BENEFICIARYBEFORE
DEATH OF
TESTATOR:LAPSE
64
1 . LIPCSection2-601
2. ttP CS e cti o2n-6 0 5.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 64
3 . An li- lAh ca s' "h ,,- . 64
64
a. Anti-lapsestatutedoesnot apply
64
4. RuleofConstructionthat..And,,BeReadas.,Or,,to
Effectuate
5 RuleofConsrucrionHeldInapplicable 65
66
7. cift ro ClassandNamedIndividualWhopreaeceases
thetestaior
C. CIIAiIGES IN PROPERTYAFTEREXECUTION
OF WILL:
SPECIFICVS. GENERALDE\'ISES
68
r. Aoempuon
68
a. Ademption
by extinction.. , .. ..
69
2. Abatement
69
a. IJP Cse cl i o 2
n -6 0 8 ............
69
3. Exoneration
ofLiens
69
a. IJPCsection2-609:nonexoneration
69

x - Wills
4. Satisfaction 70

a. IIPC section2-607:ademptionby satisfaction 10

5. StockSplits 10

VII. ON THE POWEROF DISPOSITION:
RESTRICTIONS
PROTECTIONOF TIIE T'AMILY 7l

A. RIGHTS OF THE SURVIVINGSPOUSE 7l

L. Introductionto MaritalPropertySystems '71

a. propertysystem
Separate 11.

l) Prctection
aeainst
disinheritance ...... 7l

b. Communitypropenysystem '11

2. Rightsof SunivingSpouse
to suppon 'tl

a. Socialsecurity '11
b. P ri va tep e n si opnl a n s ..... 7l
c. Homestead '11
d. Personal propenyset-aside. '72
e. F a mi l ya l l o w a n ce....... 12
f. Do w e ra n dcu rte sy...... '12

I) Propenysubjeclto dower . . . '12
2) T e sra me n ta
e ffe
ry ct....... 12
3) Presentstatusof dower andcurtesy 72
3. Rightsof SurvivingSpouseto a ShareofDecedent'sPropelty '12

a. Electiveshareandits rationale 72
b. Election requiredfor public assistance 73
c. No forced sharein homosexualrelationship . . . . . . 14
d. Survivingspouse's statutoryshareof assets
of intervivos
trustcreatedby deceased spouse .
UPCrighttoelective share.... .. 16
f. Sourceof elecliveshare '76
a. Otherstatures '76

l) Inter vivos transferincludedin computationof electiveshare . . . . . 17

h. Waiver. . . 18

l) Wa i ve ru p h e l d .......... 78

Wills - xi
4. Rightsof SuryivingSpousein Communityproperry . . . . . . . . . .tg
a. Introduction 79
b. Classification
of assets ascommunityor separate
property 79
c. Pullinglhe sur\ivor lo anelection 79
5. MigratingCouplesandMultistatepropertyHoldings . . . . . . . . . .7g
Migntion ftom separatepropety stateto cornmunitypropefiy state . . . .lg
b. Migration from communityprcpertystateto separatepropertystate . . . g0
c. Uniform Dispositionof Co.nmunitypropefy Rights at Oeathlct . . . . . S0

6. SpouseOmiuedfrom premariralWill
80
a. Stateswithoutstatutes
80
b. Statutorysolurions
80
c. Spouseomitted from premaritalwill
80
B. RIGHTS OF ISSUEOMITTED FROM THE WILL
81
l. ChildBom After Will but Befo.eCodicil
8l
2. No MalpracriceSuitWithourprioriry . .
82
3. GreatgrandchildrenNot p."r"r-itt"dt"j;; . .. . .. . . 82
VUI. TRUSTS:CREATION,TypES,AND CHARACTERISTTCS
u
A. INTRODUCTION
84
l. Background
84
2. The Settlor
84
3. The Trustee
84
TheBeneficiaries
84
5. Use of Trustsin Estateplanning . .
84
6. A TrustComparcdwith a LegalLife Estare
84
B. CREATIONOFA TRUST
84
1. Intentto Create
a Trust 84
a. Neednot expressly
directthatsubjectmatterbe heldin trust 84
b. CustodianshipUnderUniform Tmnsfelsto Minom Act
85
c. Precatorylanguageand equitablecharges
86
d. No intentJonto imposerrusreeduries L .
86
e. Constnrctive
delivery 87
2. Necessityof Tnistproperty
8'I
a. Promisero makegrftsin thefuture
87

xii - Wills
b. Resultingandconstructivetrusts 88

l) Resultingtust 88
2) Constructivefust ... ... 88

c, Trust distinguishedfrom debt 89

1) Trustbasedon intercstnot in existence 89
2) Gift madeof propertynot in existenceat time of gift 90

3. Necessityof Trust Beneficiaries 9L

a. Identificationofbeneficiaries 9l
b. Honorarytusts . . . . . 92

4. Oral Inter Vivos Trustsof Land 93

a. Oral promiseto rcconveyland held sufficient to imposea
constructivetrust 93

5. Oral Tmsts for Disposition at Death 94

a. Trustsnot sufficiently defined 94

c, D I SC R D T I ON A R Y T R U S T.,....,..
S 95

1 . T r u s t e €D'su ty ...... 95

D. S P E N D T H RIF T R U S T S.......,..... .......' ........ 97

l. lmmunityfromAlimonyandChildSupport. . . . . . ........ 97
2. Creditorc'Rights in SupportTrustsandDiscretionaryTrusts 99

a. Supporttusts 99
b. Discretionaryfusts . . . . . . . . . 99

..l .. .. ..
1 ) IR Su n su cce ssfu ........ " 99

3. M e d i c aiTdru sts ..... 100

a. trusts. . ... ....
Discretionary 100

1 ) E xce p ti o n s ' ..100

b. n sts . . . . . . . . . .
T h ird -p e n ofu ...... .. . .l0O
c. C a re fudl ra fti n g ........ 100

E. M O D I F I C AT IONA N D T E R MIN A TIONOF TRUSTS......."........."... 101

Wills - xiii
l. Modificationof Distributiveprovisions
101
a. Trustmodification
denied....... 101
2. Terminationof Trusts
101
a, Remainingmaterialpwpose.. ..
102
b. Trustsremaining
indestructible
beyondtheperpetuities
period........ 103

rx. POWERSOFAPPOINTMENT:BUILDING FLEXIBILITY INTO
THE ESTATEPLAN
r04
104
l. Typesof Powers
r04
a. Generalandspecialpowers
104
2. Doestie Appointjve propenyBelongto theDonororthe
Donee?. . . .. . .. . r04
r. ( reolrors Krghtlo propenySubject
to a powerofAppointrnenr. . . . . . . . . . 104
4. TaxReasons powers
for Creating
105
B. CREATIONOFAPOWER OFAPPOINTMENT .........
105
l. Intentto Createa power . . . . . . .
2. P o w e rsto co n su ."...............
t05
:...... :...... :.. :........... : 105
a. Inconsistent clausesin will . 105
b. T a xa ti oonf p o w " t,t;.";;;; .. .. .. . .. :. .. ... ... .. .. ... :.. .. : 106
c. RELEASE OFA POWER OFAPPOINTMENT . . . ..
. . . .. 106
l. Conftactto Exercisea powerof Appornrmenr. . . . .
106
D. EXERCISE OFA POWER OF APPOINTMENT . . .
.. . . . . . IM
l. Exerciseby Residuary
Clausein Donee,sWill ... to1
a. Partialreleaseof generalpowerof appointment. .
r08
2. Limitationson Exerciseof a Specialpower . . . . .
109
a. Creationof limited interest . . .
b. 109
E xcl u si ve
a n d n o n " *"lur i;"po;; . .. .. . :. .. ... .. . .. .. .. ....
.. . 109
3. Fra u d o na sp e ci a l p o w e...........
r
4. IneffectiveEierciseofthe power _ . ' 109
- 11 0

xiv - Wills
a. ........
A l l o ca ti oonf a sse ts ...,.,.. ...110
b. C a p tu re .... . 110

E. FAILURETO EXERCISEA POWEROFAPPOINTMENT .............. 110

l. Dispositionof PropertyWhen SpecialPowerofAppointment
Is Not Exercised . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . 110

x. FUTURE INTERESTS! DISPOSITM PROVISIONS OF
TIIE TRUST INSTRUMENT . . . . . . . . , . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . ll2

A. T N T R O DU C T ION,.........,.. ............... .. . ll2

B. CLASSITICATION OF FT]TTJREINTER.DSTS . . . . . . . II2

l. i n th eT ra n sfer or
F u t ueIn te re sts ............... ll2

a. R e ve rsi o n ,,.... 112
b. P o ssi b i l iotyf re ve rte ......
r .......,ll2
c. R i g h to fe n try ...............ll2

2. F u t ure i n T ra n sfe re es
In te re sts .............. .ll2

a. R e ma i n d e rs ................ ll2
b. E xe cu to ry .......
i n te rcsts ......,.,,... ll2

3. Remainders
of Contingent
Destructibility ....... ........... il3

C. CONSTRUCTIONAND DRAFTING PROBLEMS . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . . I13

1 cer V e steIn
Pr e fe re nfo d te re s ts ............... 113

a. T mn sfe ra b i lai ty
n dta xa tion... ............113
b. i nntop o sse ssion
A cce l e ra ti o ........... 113

l) R e n u n ci a tiva
o nl i d ....... .....' .....113

c. g rvi vato
R e q u i d nsu l ti meofpossession
....... ..,,,,., 114

1) t steidn te rest....
P re se nve .......... ll4
2) Heirsdetermined asof thedateof deathof thetestator.......... ll5
3) Cornmonlaw rule whercbequestis to be paid at certainage . . . . . . 116
4) Controve$ialchangein UPCsection2-101 . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 16

2. G i f tsto C l a sse s .....,117

a. Gi ftso fi n co me ............ ll' 7

Wills - xv
l) Constuingclassgift to testator'sgrandchildren_. 117

b. Gifts to childrenor issue. . . 118
1) Meaningof'thildren,' and..issue" 118
2) UPCSection 2-705... .. .. 118
a) Adoptedadult not consideredan ,.heir' 119

3) Giftsoveron deathwithoutissue 119
c. Giftsto heirs. .. .. .. . ll9
l) Determiningidentiry of heirs 119
2) The docrrineof worthier tirle r20
3) The rlulein SheUeybCase . , . 121
d. Theruleofconvenience 121
1) Classcloses
whenall existing
members
rcachstated
age ........ t2l
xr. DURATION OF TRUSTS: TIIE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITTES . . . . . . . . . . 123
-
A. T N T R OD U C T ION.,........... t2l

l. Development of theRule . . . . 123
2. PoliciesUnderlyingtheRule 123
3. WhentheLivesin BeingAre Ascertained. . . . . . . r23
4. T h eV a l i d a ri nLgi fe ....... 123
B. THE REQUREMENT OF NO POSSIBILITY OF REMOTE
VESTING: TIIE WHAT-MIGHT.HAPPEN RULE . . . . . . , . . 123
1. The "Fertile Octogenarian" 123
2. T h e " U n b o mWi d o w.....
" 124
a. Example 124
b. Barcpossibilityis sufficient t24
c. S p l i tco n ti n g e n ci es
...... 125
C. APPLICATION OF TIIE RULE TO CLASS GIFTS t26
1. The BasicRule:All or Norhing 126
a. Classgifts 126
b. Consequences
of violating
therule t27
2. Gifts to Subclasses t2"t

xvi - Wills
not invalidated. .
to othersubclasses
a. Remainders 127

3. SpecificSumto EachClassMember 129
4. DoesVest= Vest= Vest?.... r29

D. APPLICATION OF TIIE RULE TO POWERS OF APPOINTMENT . . . . . . 129

L Exercisable
GeneralPowersPresently "" 129

a. Validityofpower .... . . .. " 129
b. Validity of interestscreatedby exerciseof a general
power
presently exercisable """ "' 129

2. PowersandSpecialPowers
GeneralTestamentary """"" 129

a. o f p o w e r . ... .
V a l i d i ty ...."" " 129
b. va l i d i tyo f e xe rci se..... ......."" ' ' 129

taxtrap" . .
l) The"Delaware ."""" 129
docrine ....
2) Thesecond-look 130

c. powerofrcvocation
Ruleappliedto unconditional " 130

E . SA V T N GC L A U S E......'....... .,... ' ........... 131

1. AttomeyLiabilityfor violatingRule .... l3l

FI, PERPETTJITIESREFORM ..... I32

1. The "Wait-and-See
Doctrine" "" 132

a. Statutoryperiod apPliesto nonvestedinterestcrcatedpursuant
to power of apPointment. . . . . . . " 132

2. (1986,asamended
The UniformStatutoryRuleAgainstPerpetuities
in 1990).. . . 133
3. Reformation
Cy Prcsor Equitable ...... . . .134

G. TIIE RULE AGAINST SUSPENSIONOF THE POWER OF
: E W Y OR K L A W
AL I EN A T ION N ' ...."""""" 134

l. Rule .. .
ofthe Suspension
A Brief Explanation 134
2. Trusts . . . . . .
Ruleto StatutorySpendthrift
Applicationof theSuspension 134

xII . E R U S T S.........
C H AR T T A B L T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

A. I N T R O D U C T ION......,...... ,................. 135

Wills - xvii
l Creationof a ChadtableTrust 135

B. MODIFICATIONOF CHARITABLETRUSTS:CY PRES ...'.........' 136

l. GenemlCharitablePurpose . . 136
2. GreatIncreasein AvailableFunds t3'1

C. STJPER\'ISION OF CIIARITABLE TRUSTS . . ' . . . . . . . ' 138

l Donor HasNo Standing . . . . . . . . . 138

XIII. TRUSTADMINISTRATION: TIIE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION . .. .. . ... .. .. . l4l

A. GENERAL FIDUCIARY DIIIIES AND LIABILITIES t4l

l. Duty of Loyalty: Hereinof Self-Dealing . . . . . . . 141

a. Trustee'swife actsaspurchasel l4l
b. Conflictof interest...... 141
c. Co-tustees 143
d. Insidertrading 143

2. Fiduciary DutiesRelatingto Careof the Trust Property 143

a. Duty to collect andprotecttlust property 143
b. Duty to earmarktrust prop9rty . . . . r43
c, Duty not to mingle trust furds with trustee'sown . . . . . . t43
d. Duty not to delegate t43

l) Delegationof investmentPower t43

e. Liability for contractsandtorts t44

3. Duty of Impafiiality: Allocation to IncomeandPdncipal t44

a. Trustee'sduty of impartiality r44

4. Full DisclosureRequired . . . 146
5. Constuctive Fraud 147
6. Changing Trustees...... 148

B. POWERS OF TIIE TRUSTEE 148

1 GeneralManagerialPowers . . . 148
2. Powersof Investment.... 148

a, Duty to diveGify 148
b. Balancing gainsandlosses
..... 149

r\iii - Wills
C. ERISA 149

XIV. WEALTH TRANSFERTAXATION: TAX PLANNING 150

A . IN TR ODU C TIO N
............. 150
1 . A B r i e fH i sto ryo f th eF e d e raEstate
l Tax ....... .......... 150
2 . Es t ate a n dIn h e d ta n ce
T a xeD s i stinguished
...... .......... 150

a. E sta teta xco mp u ta ti o.....
n ............. 150
b. In h e ri ta n ta
cexco mp u ta tion ............. 150

3. T h eUn i fi e dF e d e raElsta te a n dGiftTax ....... ........... 150
4. L i a b il i tyfo r P a yme notfT a xe s ................ 150

a. P a yme notf g i ftta x ......... 150
b. P a yme notf e sta teta x ..... ............ 150

B. T I I E I ' E D E R A LGIF T T A X ....,.,... ...,........ 151

1 . N a t ure
o f a T a xa b lGi
e ft .... ............... 151

a. D i scre ti o n apry
o w eirn tru stee ...,....... l5l
b. I n co meta xb a si s ............ 152

2. T h eA n n u aEl xcl u si o n.... ...,.,, 152

a. Transferfor thebenefitof minor .. . .. ... .. 152
b, Giftsof a present
intercstin property ...... 152

3. GiftsBetween
Spouses
andfromOneSpouse
to a ThirdPerson.......... 153

C. T I M F E D E R A L E S T A T E
TAX ...........,.....,. 154

1. Introduction .. .. .. . 154
2. The GrossEstate:PropedyPassingby Will or Intestacy ..... 154

a. Section2033:Propertyownedat death 154
b. Section2034:Doweror curtesy 154

3. The GrossEstate:NonprobateProperty 154

a. Section2040:Jointtenancy 154

1) Joint tenancybetweenpersonsotherthan
h u sb a n d a n d w i fe ..... 154
2) Joint tenancyandtenancyby the entirety
between husband and wife 154

Wills - xix
b. Section2039:Employe€deathbenefits 155
c. Section2042:Life insurance 155
4. TheGrossEstate:LifetimeTransfe6with RishtsRetained 155
Section2036:Transfeftwith life estateor powerof contol retained 155
1) No bona fide sale 155
2) Requirement
of anascertainable
standard 156
b. Section2038:Revocabletransfers t5'7
c. Section2037:Transfe6with rcvercionary
interestretained 157
5. WithinThreeyearsofDeath
The GrcssEstate:Tmnsferu 157
6. TheGrossEstate:PowersofAppointmentGivenDecedentby Another 157
a. Cohfort limitedby ascertainable
standard 157
b. S€quentialtusts 158
7. TheMaritalDeduction
.... 159
Inlroduclion 159
b. Interests
thatqualifyfor thededuction 159
l) Failureto qualifyfor thededucrion 160
2) Refomationallowed 161

t62
8 . T h eC h a .i ta bD
l ee d u ction
....... 162
9. Executor'sElections:post-Death Taxplanning . . . 162
a. Valuationof estateassets 162
b. Sections2053and2054deductions 162
D. THE GENERATION.SKIPPING TAX 163
E. STATE WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES 163
TABLE OF CASES
165

xx - Wills
I. A FOLINDATIONI'OR ESTATEPLANMNG: SOCIETY'S
CONTROLOF INHERITANCE

A. PROLOGUE

Thematerialin thisoutlinecoverswills, ffusts,futureinterests,andestateand
tust administration.
Eachof thesetopicsrclates tothesocialprocessby which
privatewealthis aansmittedandallocated, andis criticalto a comprehensive
understandingof theestateplanningprocess.

B, INIIERITANCE AND ITS LIMITATIONS

l. T. Jefferson. "The earthbelongsin usuftuctto the living; the deadhave
neitherpowersnor rightsoverit."

, 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries. "The permanentdght of property,
vestedin the ancestorhimself, was b]ot a'l natuful, but merely a ciyi,
dght." "Wills . . . testaments, dghtsof inheritancel,]
andsuccessionsare
all . . . creatwesof the civil or municipallaws."

a Suprcme Court. In lrying Trust Co. u Day, 314 U.S. 556 (\942), the
SuFemeCowt heldthatsuccession dghtsto a deceased person'sprcp-
erty arecreatedby statute.The Constitutiondoesnot forbid statelegisla-
twes from limiting or abolishingtestamentarydispositionover property.

4. Thking Property Without Just Compensation-Hodel v. Irving,481 Hodel v
U.S.7M (1987). kving

a, Facts.Pursuant to an 1889actof Congess,tractsof landreserved
for theSiouxIndianNationwereallottedto individual Sioux,though
heldin trustby theUnitedStates,andwereallowedto passto the
allottees'heiN. Succeeding generations of Siouxdividedthei pre-
decesso$'tmctsinto increasinglytiny undividedfractionalinter-
ests,which oftenyieldedpenniesin annualrent.Congressresponded
by enactingsection207 of the IndianLand Consolidation Act of
1983,which providedthat any undividedftactional interestreprc-
sentinglessthan2% ofa fact's acrcage, andwhichhadeamedless
than $100 in the precedingyear,would escheatto the tribe rather
than descendby intestacyor devise.ThreeSioux who would have
inheritedsuchinterestsbut for the operationof section207 filed an
action for injunctive anddeclaratoryrelief in federalcourt, claim-
ing that section207violatedtheFifth Amendmentby taking private
propenywithoutjust compensation.

The Distdct Court foundthat the heirs (Ps)did not haveany vested
propertyinterestwhichwouldbeentitledto constitutional protec-

W ills- l
tlon,andaccordingly deniedreliel TheEighthCircuitrevened,holdingthat:
(i) Pshadstandingto assedthedecedents' right to contrclthedispositionof
theirpropefty,and(ii) therakingof thatright withoutcompensation violated
theFifth Amendment.

b. Issue.Doesa federalstatutebardnginheritance oflndianlandallotments and
providing for escheatto the tribe effect a taking of the decedents'property
withoutjustcompensation in violationofthe Fifti Amendment?

Held. Yes.Judgmentaffirmed.

I) The fact that section207 hasdeprivedthosetribal membersof fractional
intercststhattheywouldotherwisehaveinheritedis sufficientiniury in
fact to satrsfythecaseor conlrovers)requiremenl of Arlicle lll of rhe
UnitedStatesConstitution.

2) Theoriginalversionofsection207oftheIndianLandConsolidation Act
of 1983effectsa takingof picpertywirhoutjustcompensation in viola-
tion of theFifth Amendment. It entirclyabolishes
bothtle descentand
deviseof thesepropertyintercstsevenwhenthe passingof the prcperty
to an heir might result in the consolidationof property.

3) Thegovemment hasconsiderable latitude,undertheJustComDensation
Clauseo[ lhe FifthAmendment. in regularing
propenyrighrsrn ways
that may adve$ely affect the owne$.

4) Thereis no setformulafor determiningwhenjustice andfaimessrequire
thateconomicinjuriescausedby publicactionbe compensated by rhe
govemment,ratherthanremainingdispropofiionatelyconcentratedon a
few persons. Instead,thequestionwhethersuchactionrcsults in atakins
of propenyunderlheFifth Amendment is examinedby engagingrn esl
sentially ad hoc, factualinquiries in which sevemlfactors-such asthe
economicimpactof theregulation,its interference with reasonablein_
vestrnent-backed expectations, and the characterof the govemmental
action-havepanicularsignificance.

5) Although the stateandfederalgovemmentshavebroadauthorityto ad-
Justtherulesgovemingthedescentanddeviseof prcpertywithoutim-
plicatingthe guarantees of the JustCompensation Clauseof the Fifth
Amendment, thecompleteabolitionof boththedescentanddeviseof a
particularclassof propertymay constitutea takingwithin the meaning
of thatclause.Underthesefacts,bothdescentanddeviseareabolished
evenwherethegovemmental puposesoughtto beadvanced, consolida_
tion of ownershipof Indianlands,doesnot conflictwith thefurtherde_
scentof th€ property.

2 - Wills
5. Partial Restraintson Marriage Permissible-Shapirav, Union Na- Shapira
tional Bank, 39 ohio Misc.28,315N.E.2d825(1974). v. Union
NationalBank
Facts.Thewill of thedecedent, DavidShapira, M.D., bequeathed a
portionof theresidueofhis estateto his son,DanielJacobShapira
(P), plovided that he is mardedto a Jewishgirl, both of whosepar-
ents arc Jewish,at the time of the testator'sdeath.If after seven
yearsfrom the testatot'sdeath,P is unmardedor maried to a non-
Jewishgirl, thenhis sharcshouldgo to the Stateof Israel.P,who is
2l yea$ old andunmarried,brings a petition in the Court of Com-
mon Pleasfor a declaratoryjudgment, arguingthat the condition
uponhis inheritance contraryto publicpolicy,
is unconstitutional,
andunenforceable because of its unrcasonableness.

b. Issues,

1) Is a partialrestrainton marriagein a will a violationof the
right to marry protectedby the Fouteenth Amendment?

2) Is a partial restnint on marriagethat imposesonly reasonable
restrictions validandnot conharyto publicpolicy?

c. Held. l) No. 2) Yes.Petitiondenied.

l) P is cofiect that the right to malry is constitutionallyprotected
from Estrictive statelegislativeaction.Here,however,thecourt
is not askedto enforceany rcstdctionon P's constitutional
dght to marry;rather,thecout is askedto enforcethetestator's
restrictionon his son'sinheritance. Theright to receiveprop-
erly is a creaturcof the law and is not a constitutionally
guaranteed right. Hence,upholdingthepartialrcstraintimposed
by thetestatorwill not violatetheConstitution.

2) Nor doesa partialestraint on marriageviolatepublic policy.If
the condition werc that the b€neficiarynot marry anyone,the
restraintwouldbegeneralor total andwouldbeheldconmry to
public policy.A partial restnint on mardagethat imposesoflly
reasonable restrictionsis valid,andnot contraryto publicpolicy.
Th€ weightof authodtyin the UnitedStatesis that gifts condi-
tionedon thebeneficiary'smarying within apadicularreligious
classor faith are reasonable. It is the conclusionof this court
thattheconditions contained in thetestator'swill arereasonable
restnctionson mardaeeandarevalid.

C, TIIE PROBATE PROCESS

L. Intmduction and Tbrminology. The generalstepsin the prcbatepro-
cessare(i) openingtheestateby offeringthe will for probate,(ii) col-

Wills - 3
l e c li n g l h e d e ce d e n r'sa ssets.{ iii) payingan} fam ilyallowanceandsetti ngas i de
homes'tead andexempt personat propefly. andlaxblll('
tiv I pa)ingcreditors'clajms
a oe€ree
and(v) distributingthe assetsof theestateuponthe probatecourt enteflng
ofdistribution.

a. Executor'administrator.Theexecutorisa personalrepresentative namedin
a will. The administratoris a perconalrcprcsentativeappointedby the coul't'
Therearevarioustypesof administratorc.

1) Administrator.An administrator when
is a personoriginallyappointed
diesintestate.
thedecedent

2) Administrator with the will annexed(administratorc't'a')' An ad-
ministratorwith the will annexed(administratolc t a ) ls a personap-
pointedwhenthedecedent diestestatebut no executoris namedin the
will.

3) Administrator of goodsnot administered(administertdd'b'n')' An
administratorof goodsnot administered(administeredd b n ) is a person
appointedto succeedan original administrator'

4) An administatorc t a d-bn is a pelsonap-
Administratorc.t.a.d.b.n..
anexecutoror anadministatorc t a
pointedto succeed

5) Specialadministrator. A specialadministator is a personappointedto
pieservethe assetspendingqualification of the regularadministrator'

b. Oth€r terminology,The teminologyusedin decedents' estatesandtrusts
originatedprimarilyin England,wherecommonlaw courtshadjurisdiction
couts hadj urisdictionoverpersonalp'op-
ovJr realpropertyandecclesiastical
erty.Eachgroupdeveloped a distinctterminologythathascarriedoverto this
day.Somekeytermsaredefinedbelow'

l) Succession.Successionis theprocessof becomingbeneficiallyentitled
lo thepropenyof a decedent

2) Intestatesuccession. Intestatesuccessionoccu6 when the decedent
leavesno valid will, sothathis propertypassesto thoseof his relatives
namedin a statestatute(calledtheintestatelaw)'

3) Statuteof descent.A statuteof descentis an intestatelaw thatapplies
only to real property.Intestatereal propeftyis saidto Passby descent

4) Statuteof distribution.A statuteof distdbutionis anintestatelaw that
appliesonly to personalproperty.Intestatepersonalpropeftyis saidto
passby distribution.

5) Statute of descentand distribution. A statuteof descentanddistribu-
law thatappliesto bothrealandpersonalproperty'
tion is an intestate

4 - Wills
6) Heir.Apersonentitledby statuteto thelandofthe intestateis calledtheheir
or heirat law.

a) Expectantheir.An expectant
heiris onewhoexpectsto takeby inheri!-
ance,

b) Prospectiveheir.A prospective
heiris onewho mayinheritbut maybe
€xcluded.
This categoryincludesheirspresumptive
andheirsapparent.

(1) Heir prcsumptive.An heir presumptive is a personwho will ir.
herit if the potentialintestatediesimmediately,but who will be
excludedifrelativescloserin relationshiparebom.
(2) Heir apparenl An heir apparentis one who is certainto inhenr
unlessexcludedby a validwill.

7) Nextofkin (or distributee).Thenextof kin, or distributee,
is rharperson(or
persons)who is, or may be,entitledto the personalpropertyof an intestate.
This perconis saidto ir,rreritthepersonalproperty.

8) Ascendantor ancestor.An ascendant or ancestoris a penon relatedto an
intestate
or to a claimantto an intestate
sharein theascendinglinealline.

9) Descendant. A descendant is a personrelatedto an intestateor to a claimanr
to an intestatesharein thedescending linealline.

10) Collateral.A collateralis a relativewho tracesrelationshipto an intestate
tlrough a commonancestor but who is not in his linealline of ascentor de-
scenl,

a) Collateralsof the half blood.A collateralof the half bloodis a person
relatedto an intestate
throughonly onecommonancestor.

1r) Alnnity. Relationshipby marriageis calledaffinity.
12) Consanguinity,Relationship
by bloodis calledconsanguinity.

13) Escheat.Propefiyescheats
to thestateif no relativesofthe intestare
areen-
titledto inheritance.

14) Will. A wiJl is an expression, eitherwritteno. oral, of a person'sintention
concerning the dispositionof propefiyat death.A personwho diesleavinga
validwill is saidto diet€stare.

1s)Devise.Adeviseis a clausedirectingthedispositionofrealpropertyin a will,
andthepersonwho is namedto taketherealpropenyis calledthedevisee.

r6) Legacy.Alegacyis a clausein a will directingthedispositionof money.

Wills- 5
17) Bequest.A bequest is a clausein a will dircctingthedispositionof
personalpropertyotherthanmoney.

18) Attested, holographic, aDdnuncupativ€ wills. An attestedwill is
a will signedby a witness.A holographicwill is a will entirelyin
the handwritingof the testator.A nuncupativewill is an oral will.

19) Codicil. A codicil is a testamentaryinstrumentancillary to a will.

20) Probate, Probateis theprocedue by which a transactionallegedto
judicially as a valid testamentary
be a will is established disposi-
tion, andalso appliesto the act of approvingthe will after probate
I
hastakenplace.

2, Is Probate Necessary?Oneof theprimaryfunctionsof the probateprccessis
to provide evidenceof transf€r of title to the decedent'sheirs or devisees.
Howevet in view of the costsand delaysof probate,one may wish to avoid
probateby tansfedng title to propertyduring life. Three commonways of
avoidingFobat€ are(i) taking title in joint tenancy,(ii) creatinga trustdudng
life, and (iii) designatinga payable-on-death beneficiaryin a life insurance
contractor other contract.Statutesin all statespermit heirs to avoid probate
wherethe amountof propertyinvolved is small.

3. A Summary of Probat€ Pmcedur€.
a. Opening probate. Primary or domiciliary judsdiction is found in the
jurisdictionwhercthedecedent wasdomiciledat thetime of death.An-
cillary adminishationis requiredif the property is located in another
jurisdiction. Eachstatehasa detailedstatutoryprocedue for issuanceof
letters testarnentaryor letten of administration.The majodty of states
rcquirepdor noticeto inleresiedpaniesbeforethe appointmentof a per-
sonal rcprcsentativeor Fobate of a will. Under the Unifom Prcbate
Code("LIPC"), thercprcsentativealsohasa duty to publish a newspaper
noticefor creditoNonceeachweekfor thre€we€ks.

b. Supervisingthc representative'sactions.The probatecowt supervises
the representative'sactionsand approvesthe inventory and appraisal,
paymentof debts,family allowance,grantingof optionson real estate,
borowing of funds,personalrepresentative's commissions, attomeys'
fees,preliminary and final distributions,and discharyeof the personal
representatrve.

c. Closing the estat€.The representativeis under a fiduciary duty to the
estateuntil the cout grantsdischarge.

4, Contest of Wills,

a. Groundsforcont€st.A will contestposestheissueofwhetherthedocu-
mentofferedfor probateis a valid will. While mostwill contestsinvolve

6 - Wills
theissuesof testamentary capacityor undueinfluence,a will con-
testmay alsobe basedon defectiveexecution,revocationof thewill
by the testator,lack of testamentaryintent, ftaud, andmistake.

D, PROFFSSIONAL RFSPONSIBILITY

No lawyer shouldpreparea will unlesshe considershimself competentto do
so.

1. Will BeneficiariesOwed Duty of Care--Simpsonv. Calivas, 139 Simpson
N.H.l, 650A.2d318(1994). v.Calivas

a. Facts.RobertSimpson,Sr, (T), executed a will &aftedby Chdsto-
pherCalivas@). All realestatewasleftto RobertSimpson,Jr.,(P),
exceptfor a life estatein "our homestead locatedat PiscataquaRoad,"
which wasleft to P's stepmother. UponT's death,P andhis step-
motherfiled a petition to determinewhether"homestead"referred
to the houseand surounding (limited) acreageor if it referredto
the house,over 100 acres,buildings,andthe family businesson
Piscataqua Road.The cout admittedextrinsicevidenceshowing
the closerelationshipbetweenT and his wife, but did not admit
notestakenbyD duringconsultation withT, whichread,"Houseto
wife asa life estateremainderto soll . . . remainingland . . . to
son. . . ." The courtconstrued the will to providethe stepmother
with a life estatein all of thercal property.Two yearslater,P bought
out his stepmother's life estatefor $400,000.P broughtthis mal-
practiceactionin contract,basedon a third-partybeneficiarytheory
andnegligence. The trial courtdirecteda verdict,grantedD sum-
mary judgment, anddismissed.P appeals.

b. Issues.

l) Doesan attomeywho draftsa will owe a duty to the intended
beneficiary?

2) Did thetrial cout elr in rulingthatthefindingsof theprobate
cout on thetestator'sintentcollaterallyestoppedP from bring-
ing a malpracticeaction?

c. H€ld. 1) Yes.2) Yes.Judgmentrcvened andremanded.

1) A d$fting attomeyowesa duty of careto an intendedbenefi-
ciary,notwithstandinglack of privity, dueto the foreseeability
of injury to theintendedbeneficiaryAfter the testator'sdeath,
the failure of his testamentaryschemeworks only to deprive
his intendedbeneficiades of theintendedbequests.

2) If a testatorcontractswith an attomeyto draft a will andhas

Wills - 7
identified thoseto whom he wisheshis estateto pass,the identified
beneficiariesmay enforcethe contact asthird-partybeneficiaries'

3) Wherethe termsof the will are ambiguous'extrinsic evidenceof
the testator'sintent may be admittedto probateproceedingsto the
extentthatit doesnot contradictth€expresstermsof the will While
both the probatecourt andthe superiorcowt arecompetentto con-
sider the sameevidenceon the issueof T's intent, that is not dis-
positiveof an identity of issues.The probatecourt's role is to
;eterminethetestator's intentexpressed in thelanguage of thewill
Direct declarations of the testator'sintent are generallyinadmis-
siblein probateproceedings. A findingof actualintgntis notneces-
sary(orissential)to thatj udgment.Evenanexplicit finding of actual
intent by a probatecoufi cannotbe the basisof collateralestoppel'
Collateralestoppelis only applicableif the finding in the fi$t pro-
ceedingwas essentialto the judgment of that cout. [Restatement
(Second) Judgments, $271

Hotz v. , Fiduciary Duty-Hotz v. Minyard, 304S.C. 225' 4O3S.E.2d634(1991)
Minyard
a. Facts.JudyMinyard Hotz (P) andToomy Minyard (Dl ) arebrotherand
sister.D1 hasbee! in chargeof theftfather'sGreenvillecar dealeNhip
since197?;P workedat theirfather'sAnde$ondealership since1983,
andwasalso vice-prcsidentandminority shareholderIn 1985,their fa-
ther signeda contractwith GeneralMoto$ designatingP successorof
the Andersondealership.

In october of 1984,their father had Dobson (D2), a lawyer and
nonpracticingCPA,draft a will, which their father executedone mom-
ing in the presence of his wife, his secretary,andD1 Dl wasleft the
Greenvilledealership;otherfamily memberswerc left bequeststotaling
$250,000andtheremainderof the estatewasdivided betwe€nDl anda
trust for P after the wife's death.Later the sameaftemoon,their father
signeda secondwill with all of the sameprovisionsexceptit gavethe
real estateon which the Gretnville dealershipwas locatedto Dl out-
right. He told D2 not to disclosethe existenceof the secondwill and
specifically said P should not be told about it. Thrce months later, P
askedto seethewill andwith herfather'spermission, D2 showedherthe
first will anddiscussed it with her in detail P claimsD2 gaveher the
impressionshewouldreceivetheAndersondealershiPandsaidshewould
shareequally with D1 in their father's estate.D2 claims he explained
that their father intendedto provide for P ashe had for Dl when and if
shebecamecapableof handlinga dealership.D2 notedthis on the will
andP claimedshethoughtthesenoteswere part of the will.

About 16 monthslater, the father had a stroke and he is now mentally
incompetent.P andD1 agreedthatwhile their fatherwasill, P would

8 - Wills
carc for him andDl would temporarilyrun the Ande$on dealership.Under
D 1's direction,theAndersondeale$hipboughtanotherdealership,which was
operatingat a loss;Dl alsoformeda holding company,which assumedown-
ershipof thefather's real estateleasedto theAndersondealershipandgreatly
incrcased the rent.WhenP tried to retum.Dl refusedto relincuishcontrol
andeventuallyfiredher

After P consultedanotherattomey,the father executeda codicil rcmoving P
andher childrenasbeneficiariesunderhis will andadvisedP of this by letter
Later,at a meetingwith theirmother,Dl, andD2, P wastold shewouldbe
restoredunderthe will andcould work at the Greenvilledealershipif she
droppedher plansfor a lawsuit.P discharged her lawyersand movedto
Greenville.Eventually,D I terminat€dher.

P suedDl, D2, D2's lawfi.m, andanaccounting firm of whichD2 is a share-
holder and director but from which he receivesno remunemtionas an em-
ployee.The causesof actionagainstD I for totious interferencewith contact,
a sharcholderderivativesuit for wrongful diversionof corporateprofits, and
fraud survivedsummaryjudgmentandarenot at issuehere.P appealsvarious
causesof actionthat did not survivesummaryjudgment,but the only issue
addressedherc is the fial judge's order grantingsummaryjudgment on the
causeof action againstD2 for breachof fiduciary duty.

b. Issue.Do material issuesof fact, precludingsummaryjudgment,exist as to
whetherD2 oweda fiduciary duty towardB who consultedhim regardingthe
termsof herfather'swill?

Held. Yes.Judgmentrevelsedin part, affirmedin part.

l) D2's law film had preparedP's tax retumsfor approximately20 yea$
until 1985andhadprepared a will forherwhichshehadsignedonly one
weekbeforc sheinquircd aboutthe effect of her father's will. P testified
shehadconsulted D2 in 1984or 1985abouta suspected misappropda-
tion of funds at one of the dealershipsand as late as 1986 about her
problemswith D 1. A fiduciary relationshipexistswhenonehasa special
confidencein anothersothat the latter,in equity andgoodconscience,is
boundto act in goodfaith.

2) An attomey-client relationship is a fiduciaryone.D2 did not owe P a
duty to disclosethe existence of the secondwill, but he did owe her a
duty to dealwith her in goodfaith andnot activelymisrepresentthe first
will.

3) SinceD2wasactingasanattomeywhenhemetwith B thereis evidence
to prcsentajury issuewhetherD2's law firm shouldbeheldvicariously
liablefor D2's conduct.

Wills - 9
II. INTESTACY: AN ESTATE PLAN BY DEMULT

A. INTESTATESUCCESSORS:
SPOUSEAND DESCENDANTS
All stateshavestatutesofdescentanddistribution
thatgovemthedistribution
of thepropertyof a personwho diesintestate,
or who doesnot makea com-
pletedistributionof theestate.

l. Spous€,Undercommonla% a spousewasnot an heil andthe decedents
propeftypassedby intestacyto descendants. Today,the survivingspouse
takesan intestateshareof the decedent'sestatein all jurisdictions.If the
decedentis survivedby a spouseandby descendants (childrcn,gandchii,
dren, etc.), in most statesthe spousetakesone-thirdor one-halfof the
decedent's estate.If thedecedent is survivedby a spousebut not by de-
scendants or parcnts,in manystatesthe spouseinheritsthe entireestate.

a. Simultaneousdeath.A pe6on cannottakeasan heir or will benefi-
ciary unlesshe survivesthe decedentfor at leastan instantof time
Howevet it is often difficult to determinewhetherthe pe6on sur,
vived the decedent(e.g.,whenthe p€rsonandthe decedentarebotn
fatally injuredin anaccident).The Unifom SimultaneousDeathAcr
(or its Uniform ProbateCodeequivalent,the 120-hoursurvivalrule)
providesfor this situation.UndertheAct, wherethe title to properti
or the devoluion thereofdependsuponpriority of deathandthereis
no sufficientevidencethat the partieshave died otherwisethan si_
multaneously,the propety of eachpersonshallbe disposedof asif
hehadsurvived.Ifthere is sufficientevidencethatonepartysuffived
the other,evenfor a brief periodof time, theAct doesnot apply.
Janusv. l) Evidenceofsurvival.-Janusv. Tarasewicz,135lll. App.3d
Tarasewicz 936,482N.E.2d418(1985).

a) Facts.This declaratory judgmentactionaroseout of the
deathsof a husbandand wife who died afteringesting
Tylenolcapsules lacedwith cyanide.StanleyJanuswas
pronounceddeadshortlyafterhe wasadmittedto thehos_
pital.However,TheresaJanus wasplacedon life support
systemsfor almosttwo daysbeforebeing pronounced
dead.Claimingthattherewasno sufficientevidencethat
Theresa Jalussurvivedherhusband, Stanley,smother(p)
broughtthis actionfor theproceeds of Stanley,s
$ 100,000
life insuancepolicy,which namedTheresaas the pri-
marybeneficiaryandP asthecontingentbeneficiary.Mef
ropolitanLife Insurance Company(D) paidtheproceeds
to Tarasewicz (D), who is Theresa'sfatherand the ad-
ministratorof herestate.The t.ial courtfoundsufficient
evidence thatTheresa survivedStanley.p andtheadmin-

l0 - Wills
istratorof Stanley'sestateappealed, contendingthat thereis
not sufficientevidenceto DrovethatbothYictimsdid not suffer
brain deathprior to their affival at the hospital.

b) Issue.In a factuallydisputedcaseof whetheronespousesur-
vivedtheother,is theappellatecourt'sreviewlimited to whether
the trial court's finding wasagainstthe manifestweight of the
evidence?

c) Held. Yes.Judgmentaffirmed

(l) A civil caseis govemedby the law as it existswhena
judgmentis rendered,not whenthe factsunderlyingthe
caseoccur.

(2) EventhoughIn re lialmer, which setforth standardsfor
determiningwhenlegaldeathoccurs,wasdecidedafter
the deathsin issue,the trial court properly applied the
Fialmer standards.Fudhermore,applicationof thosestan-
dardswasnot unfairsincethetreatingphysicianshadmade
pertinentdiagnosesat the time of the deathsandthe par-
ties presentedevidencerelevantunderthe standards.

(3) Survivorshipis a fact thatmustbe provenby a prepon-
deranceofthe evidenceby thepartywhoseclaim depends
on survivorshiP.

(4) In caseswhere survivorshipis detemined by the testi-
mony of lay witnesses,the burdenof sufficient evidence
maybe metby evidenceof a positivesignof life in one
body andthe absenceof any suchsign in the other.

(5) In caseswherethedeathptocessis monitoredby medical
professionals,
theirtestimony asto theusualandcustom-
of medicalpracticearehighly rclevantwhen
ary standards
consideringwhatconstitutes a positivesign of life and
what constitutesa criterion for determiningdeath

(6) The appellatecourt'staskon rcview of a factuallydis-
putedcaseis to determinewhetherthetrial court'sfind-
ing wasagainstthemanifestweightof theevidence. The
findingherethatthe wife survivedher husbandwasnot
againstthemanifestweightofthe evidence.

) Descendants.

a. Taking by rtpresentation: per stirpes distribution' After the spouse's
shareis setaside,thechildrenandtheissueof deceased childrenof the

Wills - I I
the decedentwill takethe remainderof a decedent,spmperty.If the decedent
is survivedby childrenandgmndchildrcn,the grandchildrenwill takea share
of the estateonly if they are childrenof a deceased
child of the decedent.
Grandchildrentakeonly by reprcsentation.

l) LIPC rule-per capita at each generation. UpC section 2-106 pro-
videsthateachdescen dant thefirst generdtianalkvel u whichliere
ate living takers takesone^t share,andthe shareof eachdeceasedperson
atthalgenerattonal levelis dividedequallyamongthedescendanti at the
nextgenemtional level.

2) Minority rule---6trict per stirpes.A few statesapplya,,strictperstirpes"
rule. Under this rule, the stirpital sharcsarc always determinedai the
fi$t generational level,evenif thereareno living takersat thatlevel.

b. Posthumouschildren. Today,in many states,a child conceiveddurins the
faLher's
lifetimebuLbomafrerhrsdeathis consideredhischild for inheriince
pu4)oses.

Adopted children. In all statesthat haveenactedstatutesgovemingin}lerit_
ance.ights of adoptedchildren, an adoptedchild has the sameinheritance
rights asa naturalchild.

Hall r l) Loss of inheritance rights from or through natural parents_Hall v.
Vallandingham Vallandingham,75 Md. App. 187,540A.2d 1162(1988).

a) Facts. Earl Vallandinghamdied in 1956,survived bv his widow.
Elizaberh.andtheirfour chitdren.Two yearsIateqEiizaberhmar-
ried Jim Killgorc,who adoptedthe childrcn.Earl,sbrother,Will_
iam, died childless,unmaried,andintestate.His soleheils were
his surviving brothersand sistersand the children of the brothers
and sisteNwho predeceased him. Earl,s four natuml childrcn (ps)
allegedthat they, ereentilled tothedistributive shareofrheirnalu_
ral uncleWilliam'sestatethat thef naturalfatherwouldhavere_
ceivedhad he survived.The circuit cowt found that ps were not
entided to inherit from the decedentbecauseof their adoDtionbv
theirstepfatheraflerthedeathof lheir naturalfatherandrheremar_
riageof theirnatumlmother.ps appeal.

b) Issue.Do children adoptedafter the deathof a natural parentlose
all righlsofinheritancefrom or throughLhatnatulalparent?

c) Held.Yes.Judgment
affirmed.

(l) Everystatepossesses thepowerto regulatethemannerby which
propertywithin its dominionmay be transmittedby will or

12- Wills
inheritanceandto prescdbewho canreceivethatproperty.The state
maydenytheprivilegealtogether or mayimposewhateverrestic-
tions upon the grantit deemsappropriate.

(2) An adoptedchildis entitledto all therightsandprivilegesof a bio-
logicalchild insofarastheadoptiveparcntsareconcemed,but adop-
tion doesnotconferupontheadoptedchildmorerightsandprivileges
thanthosepossessed by a natumlchild.To allow dualinhedtance
would bestow upon an adoptedchild a superiorstatus.

(3) Adoptedchildrenmay not inherit from or throughtheir naturalpar-
ents.Oncea childis adopted, therightsof boththenaturalparents
andtheir relativesareterminated.

(4) Becausean adoptedchild hasno right to inheritfrom theestateof
a naturalparcntwho diesintestate,it followsthat the samechild
may not inheritthroughthe naturalparentby way of representa-
tion.

2) Equitableadoption.Thedoctrineof"equitableadoption,"basedon estoppel
pdnciples,allowsa child to inheritftom a stepparent or fosterparentjustas
thoughthechild hadbeen adopted. The basisof the estoppelis thestepparent's
or foster parent'sconductin failing to perfom the agreementto adopt.The
docrine only works againstthe stepparentor fosterparent.Thus,if thereis an
unperformedagreementto adoptandthechild diesintestate,the stepparentor
fosterparcntdoesnot inherit from the child.

a) No valid adoption-O'Neal v. Wilkes, 263 Ga. 850,439 S.E.2d490 O'Nealv
,1994't. Wilkes

(1) Facts.O'Neal(P)filed a petitionin equityseekinga declarationof
virtualadoption.P wasgivento the Cooksby her auntin 1961-P
lived with theCooksandaftertheyweredivorced,continuedto live
with Mr. Cookuntil 1975whenP wasmarried.P waseducated by
Mr. CookandheidentifiedP'schildrenashis grandchildren.
When
Mr. Cookdied,his administrator, Wilkes(D), refusedto rccognize
P's asserted interestin Mr. Cook'sestate.A jury foundP hadbeen
virtuallyadopted. Thecoult grantedajudgmentn.o.v.,findingthat
P's auntwaswithoutauthorityto confact for P's adoption.P ap-
peals.

(2) Issue,Doesanaunthaveauthorityto contractfor herniece'sadop-
tion if sheis not thelegalguardian?

(3) Held. No. Judgmentaffirmed.

P andhis con-
(a) AlthoughP's fatherhadneveracknowledged

Wills- 13
P's auntwasnot
sentto the adoptionwasnot necessary,
P s "legalguatdian."

(b) EventhoughP's aunthadphysicalpossession of P at the
timeof theadoption, P'sauntwasnotgivenlegalcustody
by courtorder;evenif shehadbeen"legal custodian,"
underGeorgialaw,a custodian doesnot havetherightto
consentto a child'sadoption.
(4) Dissent.Equityconsiders thatdonewhichoughtto havebeen
done.Thiscourthasheldthatanagreement to adopta child,so
as to make the child an heir on the adoptingperson'sdeath,
performedon the part of the child, is enforceableupon the
deathof the adoptingpersonasto propety undisposedof by
the will. P hasfully performedthe allegedcontractover a life-
time.

d. Children born out of wedlock. In all statestoday,a child bom out of wed-
lock(i.e.,a nonmarital
child)inheritsfromhisnaturalmotherandthemother's
kin, andtheycaninheritfrom andthroughthechild.While therulesrespect-
ing inheritancefrom the father vary, most stateshaveadoptedthe provisions
in UPC section2-109,whichpermitpatemityto be established by evidence
of the parents'subsequent marriage,by the father'sacknowledgment by an
adjudicationduringthe father'slifetime,or by clear andconvincingproof
after his death.

Hechtv. e. Cryogenically.preservedsperm-.Hechtv. Superior Court, l6 Cal.App.
SuperiorCourt 4th 836,20 Cal.Rptr.2d275(1993).

1) Facts. Kane left frozen spermspecimensfor his girlfriend Hecht (P),
with whom Kanehad lived for five yearsbeforehis death.He indicated
in a letterthathe hopedP wouldhavehis child.He bequeathed only a
pieceof landto his two adultchildren,whomhe considered financially
secure. Aftet Kane'ssuicide,his childrenfiled sepamte will contestsal-
leging lack of mental capacityand undueinfluence by P The children
rcquestedKane'sspecialadministratorto file a petition to orderKane's
spermdestroyed.The adminishatoralsofiled petitionsto havethe sperm
distributedandfor thecourtto determinewhetheranychildrcnconceived
from Kane's spermwould be entitled to disaibution under instructions
accompanying Kane'Ewill. P contended that the spelmwaseitheran
inter vivos gift or a gift causamortis.The coult ordercdthe spelmde-
stroyed.P petitionedand the trial court'sorderwas stayedp€ndinga
heanng.

2) Issues.

a) Did Kanehavesufficientright of possession or ownershipof the
spermso asto bdng it within thejurisdictionof theprobatecourt?

14- Wills
b) Doesthe public policy of Califomia prohibit the artificial insemi-
nationof P becausesheis anunmarriedwomanor becauseKaneis
deceased?

3) Held. a) Yes.b) No. Judgment
rcversed.

a) Other authoritieshave, in consideringthe legal statusof pre-em-
bryos,determinedthat spermis "gameticmaterial"thatcanbe used
for reproduction.At thetime of Kane'sdeath,hehadaninterestin
the natureof ownershipto the extentthat he had decisionmaking
authority asto the useof his spermfor reproduction.Suchinterest
is sufficientto constitutepropertywithin the meaningof the rel-
evantprobatestatute.

b) This court hasinterprctedstatecivil law to afford both manied and
unmarriedwomena vehiclefor obtainingsemenfor artificialin-
semination withoutfearthata donormay claimpatemity.The do-
nor wasdeterminedto havea statutoryvehiclefor donatingsemen
withoutfearof liability for child support.Thus,we arenot opemt-
ingin a legalvacuumandarefreeto establish policiesrelativeto an
unmaried woman'saccessto atificial insemination. Thercis no
supportfor theargument thatCalifomiapublicpolicyprohibitsP's
artificialinseminationbecause of herstatus.

c) Kane'schildrendo not establish, with theirargumentthatposthu-
mousconception wouldcreateorphaned child.enwith stateautho-
rization, a stateinterestsufficient to justify interferencewith P's
andKane'sdesireto conceivea child.Thereis no Califomiastatute
thatcontainsa publicpolicy statement thatrevealsan interestthat
couldjustify infringingon gamete-providen' decisionalauthority.

Transfersto minors.Minorsdo not havethelegalcapacityto manageprop-
erty.Therc arethreeoptionsavailableto parentsof minomfor propertyman-
agement:guardianship, custodianship,and trusteeship. Custodianships and
trusteeshipsmaybe createdonly duringthe lifetimeof the creatororby will.
A guardianor conservatorwill be appointedby the court if Foperty is left to
a minorchild andtheparcntdiesintestate.

g. Advancements. At commonlaw andin a numberof statestoday,anylifetime
gift to a childis Fesumedto beanadvancement ofthatchild'sintestateshare
to be takeninto accountin distributingthe intestate'spropertyat death.Many
stateshavestafutes govemingadvancements. Most of thesestatutes provide
that an advancement canbe madeto any heir andnot just a child or other
descendant. The mostimportanteffect of thesestatutesis to rcversethe com-
mon law presumption:in manystates,a lifetime gift to an heir canbe treated
asanadvancement onlyif (i) expressly
declaredassuchin a writingsignedby
thedonor,or (ii) acknowledged assuchin a writing signedby thedonee.

Wills- l5
B, INTESTATESUCCESSORS: AND COLLATERALS
ANCESTORS
If the intestateis suNivedby descendants, parentsandcollateralsdo not take
in anyjurisdiction. If thereareno descendants, theintestate's propeftyis usu-
ally distributedto theparentsafterdeductingthe spouse's share.In nearlyall
states, ifthe intestate is not survivedby a spouse, descendants, or parents,
the
estatepassesto thedescendants of theintestate'sparents,i.e.,to thedecedent's
brothersandsisters(andthedescendants of deceasedbrcthercandsiste6, per
surpes).

1. Half Bloods.In moststates,a relativeof the half blood (e.8.,a half-
brother)is treatedthe sameasa relativeof the whole blood.

2. Escheat,If thereare no heifs, the property of the decedentescheatsto
the statein all juri sdictions.

C. BARS TO SUCCESSION

1. Misconducl

In re Estate a. Killing decedent--Inrc Est^tEofMahoney,126Vt.3\,220 A.2d,
ofMahoney 4',75(1966\.

1) Facts.The decedent, HowardMahoney,died intestateafter
beingshotto deathby his wife, CharlotteMahoney(P),who
wasconvictedof manslaughter andsentenced to prison.The
decedentwassuflived only by P andhis parents.Thet ial cowt
enteredajudgmentdecreeing theresidueofthe decedent's es-
tateto his parentsin equalshares.
P appeals.

2) Issue.Cana widowconvictedof manslaughter
for thedeathof
herhusband inheritfrom his estate?

3) Held.Yes.Judgmentrcvened.

a) Thereareth.eeseparate linesof casesdealingwith this
issue:(i) somestateshold that legal title passesto the
slayerandmayberetainedinspiteof thecdme;(ii) some
statesholdthatlegaltitle doesnot passto the slayerbe-
causeof thepdnciplethatno oneshouldbe permittedto
profit by his own wrong;and (iii) somestateshold that
legaldtlepasses to theslayerbutequity holdshim to bea
constructive trusteefor theheirsor nextof kin of thede-
cedent.

b) We adoptthe third line of cases.However,in this case,
thetrial courtdid not decreetheestateto thewidowand
then makeher a constructivetrusteeof the estatefor the
benefitof the parents;rather,thecourt below decreedthe

16- Wills
estatedirectly to the parents.We reve$e. The trial court was
bound to follow the statutesof descentand distribution and
decreethe estateto the widow.

c) Further,juisdiction to imposea constructivetust restswith
the chancerycowt, not the probatecourt.Accordingly, we re-
mandthis caseso thatapplicationmay be madeto the chan
cery cowt for purposes of imposinga constructivetrustand
for determinationof whether the death of the husbandwas
voluntarymanslaughter or involuntarymanslaughter.
Ifno such
applicationis made,thentheprobatecout shallassignto the
widow theinterestin theestateof herdeceased husband.

b. Adult€ry. In a few states,a spouseis disqualifiedfrom dowel inhedtance,
or anelectiveshareif the spouseabandoned the decedentandcommitted
adultery

c. Desertion. Statesmay disqualify a parent as an heir if the parenthas
failed or refusedto supportthe child or hasabandonedthe child during
his minority.

2. T[ansfer of Interest in Decedent'sEstate. A personmay be barredfrom
succeedingto a decedent'sestateb€cause
he hasreleased,
transferred,
or dis-
claimedhis interest.

Relcas€ofexpectancy. A child'sreleaseto hisparcntdudngtheparent's
lifetimeis bindingif givenfor fair consideration.

b. Tfansfer of expectancy.An expectancyis merely the possibility of in-
heriting prcperty and, as such,it cannotbe transferred,though a pur-
portedtransferof anexpectancyfor considerationmay be enforceablein
equity.

Disclaimer.It hasalwaysbeenheldthata beneficiarycandisclaimany
testamentary gift. If a beneficiarymakesa valid disclaimer,thedisclaimed
interestpassesas though the disclaimantpredeceased the testator.If a
persondisclaims,andthe disclaimeris not "qualified,"ie., thepe$on
hasnot madeaniflevocableandunqualifiedrefusalof aninterestin prcp-
erty underIntemalRevenueCodesection2518procedures, gift tax li-
ability results.The disclaimermustbe madewithin nine monthsafter
the interestis createdor afterthe doneereachesase21. whicheveris
later.

l) Disclaimerupheld-Troyv. Hart, 116Md.App.468,697A.zd Troyv.
ll3, cert.denied,341Md.255,700A.2d 1215(1997). Hart

a) Facts.PaulLettich,a residentof StellaMarisHospice("Stella
Maris"),wasreceivingMedicareandMedicaidbenefitswhen

Wills - 17
his sisterdiedintestate.
Oneof l_ettich'stwo survivingsisters,Hart (D), was
appointed penonalrepresentative of herdeceasedsister'sestate.
andalthoush
D wasawareLeltichwasrepresenled byTroy(p). D visiledLeuichandhelD;d
hime\eculea disclaimer to hisSt 00.000shareof rhedeceased sister.sest;te.
D did not adviseLettichof theeffectof thedisclaimeron his Medicaidstatus
andshedividedthe $100,000with their orhersisrer.p was notifiedof the
renunciation thefollowingmonth.Counselfor I_ettichfiled a Detitionto re_
scindthedisclaimerandremoveD aspersonal representative oi thedeceased
sister'sestate.One day beforethe deadlineto.espondto the petition,D,s
attomeyvisitedLettichandaskedhim to executea motionto striketheDeti_
tion.A socialworkerintervened andsuggesred p beconsulted. t ertichdied
shortlythereafterThe courtdeniedp's petition.p appealed. D,s motionfor
Judgmentwith rcspectto p,s requestto haveher tEmovedwasglanted:p,s
pelitionro rescind wasdjsmissed. p appeals.

b) Issue.May a Medicaidrecipientdisclaimaninheritance?

c) Held.Yes.Judgment
affirmed.
( 1) Marylandlaw requiresthatonceanindividualis elisiblefor and
receiv_
ingMedicaidbenefits.
hemustnorifytheDepartmeit ofSocialServices
("DSS")within l0 workingdaysof changesaffectingeligibility.

(2) Lettichfailedto notify DSSof his inheritance andtherebyviolatedap_
plicableMedicaidlaw anddeprivedboththe stateandfederal
eovem_
menlsof anopponunity to ree\alualehiseligibility.
(3) A New Yorkcourthasfoundin similarcircumstances thatrcnunciation
of an intestateshareis irreconcilablewith theconceptthatpublicaidis
limited andshoutdbereservedfor thosewho havea legitimateneed,that
a renunciationis essentiallyequalto a transfer,andshouldbe penalized
in lhesamemanner. Weadoptthereasontng of theNew york coufl here.
(4) If a rcnunciation
wouldcausea benefitsrecipientto be disqualified.the
renuncjalionshouldbe lreatedasa translerandincur thesamepenalty
that.aftansferprior ro eligibilitywould incur The recipientshouldbe
liablefor anypaymentsincorrectlypaidby the statein consequence of
therenunciation.

(5) WhileLettich'sdisclaimeris valid,hissurvivingsistersshould
rakesub-
ject to any claimsthe statemay haveagainstl_ettich,sestate
for anv
paymenrs improperly madeasa resulrof Lenichs failurero notifyDSS
of his acquisition
of property.
(6) A consructiverust is applied wherecircumsrances
renderrl inequitable
for thepartyholdingrirleto rctainit, ashere

l8 - Wills
III. CAPACITYAND WILL CONTESTS

A. MENTALCAPACITY

l Why Require Mental Capacity? Mental capacityis required for the
protectionof societyandfor the protectionof the decedent'sfamily and
the decedentherself.

', Test of Mental Capacity. The decedentmust know: (i) the natue and
extentof her propedy;(ii) thepersonswho arethe naturalobjectsof her
bounty;(iii) thedispositionsheis making;and(iv) how theseelements
relatein planningfor the dispositionof her propefiy.

1 InsaneDelusiol. An insanedelusionis an exteme misconception of
reality to which the testatoradheresagainstall proof to the contrary.

a. Insanedelusionsaboutmen-L re Strittmater,140N.J.Eq. 94, In re
53 4.2d205 (1947). Strittmater

r) Facts. Strittmater(T) never married.Shelived with her par-
entsuntil their deathandwasdevotedto them andthey to her.
Four yearsafter their death,shewrote that her father was "a
conupt,vicious,andunintelligentsavage,"typicalof thema-
jority of his sex,andon a photograph of her mother,shein-
scribed,"moronicshe-devil."T's dealingswith her attomey,
over a period of years,were nomal. T becamea memberof
the NationalWomen'sParty andvolunteeredone day a week
for at leasttwo years.In her will, sheleft her estateto the
party, ashad beenher expressedintention.T died one month
after her will wasexecuted.The will wasadmittedto probate.
Two cousinschallenged the will, allegingit wasa productof
T's insanity.

2) Issue.May a will that was executedby a personwith insane
aboutmenbe admittedto prcbate?
delusions

J) Held. No. Decreeaffirmed.

a) T's femalephysicianopinedT sufferedfrom a splitper-
sonality.

b) T hadbeena memberofthe partyfor 11yearswhenshe
wrcte: "It remainsfor feministorganizations
like [the
party] to make exposureof women's'protectors'and
'lovers'for whattheir viciousandcontemptibleselves
arc."

Wills - 19
c) condition,especiallyher insanedelu-
I think it washer paranoiac
sionsaboutthe male,that led her to leaveher estateto the pady'
Probateshouldbe setaside.

Inrc b. Insanedelusionresulting from irrational belief in nonexistentfacts'-
Honigman h re Honigman, 8 N.Y2d 244, 168 N E.2d 676, 203 N.YS 2d 859
(1e60).

1) Facts. Prior to his death,the decedent,Frank Honigman,told friends
andstrangers alikethathe believedhis wife wasunfaithful.This suspi-
cionbecameanobsession, althoughhe wasnormalandrationalin other
respects.The decedent,a man of 70 who had undergonea numberof
operations, oncecommented that he was sick in the headand that he
knewsomething was wrong with him Thedecedent instructed bis attor-
neyto preparea will cuttingoff his wife from anyof his estate,leaving
her life useof her minimum statutoryshare,with dircctionsto pay the
principal upon her deathto his surviving brothersor sistersand to the
descendants of anypredeceased brotheror sister,per stirpes.At the trial,
theproponents of thewill adducedevidence which,theyargued,showed
a reasonable basisfor thedecedent's belief.This includedanannive$ary
card sentby a Mr. Krauseto the decedent'swife; a letter; evidencethat
wheneverthephonerangthedecedent's wife wouldanswerit; andevl-
dencethatMr. Krausecameoverto thedecedent's houseonenightwhile
the decedentwas out. When the will was offered for probate,the
decedenfswidow (P)filed objections. A trial wasconductedon theis-
sueof whetherthe deceased was of sound mind andmemoryat the time
hesignedthewill.Thejury answered in thenegative. Theappellate court
revers€d. Thisappealfollowed.

2) Issue. If a p€rsonbelievesfacts that arc againstall evidenceand prob-
abilityandconducts himself,howeverlogically,upontheassumption of
theirexistence in makinghiswill, doeshesufferfrom aninsanedelusion
soasto defeattestamentary capacity?

3) Held. Yes.Judgmentrevetsedand a new trial ordered.

a) The generalrule is thatif a personpersistently
believessupposed
factsthathavenorealexistenceexcept in hispervefiedimagination
andagainstallevidence andprobability,andconducts himself,how-
everlogically,uponthe assumption of theirexistence,he is, sofar
asthey areconcemed, undera morbid delusion Such a personis
mador insaneon thosesubjects
essentially

b) Here,theissueofthe decedent'ssanitywasan issuefor thejury to
resolve.Therewassufficientevidenceto justify placingthis issue
repeatedsuspicions
beforethejury: thedecedent's ofP's unfaith-

20 - Wills
fulness;his belief of P's misbehavingby hiding male
callersunderherbedandby haulingmenfrom thestreet
up to her bedroomby the useof sheets;andso forth.

c) Theproponentsarguethatevenifthe decedentwaslabor-
ing undera delusion,otherreasonssupportthe validity of
A will is invalidif its dispository
the will. We disagree.
provisions mighthavebeencausedor affectedby thede-
lusion.

d) Finally, we hold that the DeadMan's Statute-which
excludesthe testimonyof a witnessconceminga per-
sonalcommunication betweenthe witnessandthe de-
ceased-wasmisconstrued to permitthetestimonyofP
when an objection to her testimonyhad beenproperly
raised.

4) Dissent.Theevidenceadduced utterlyfailedto prcvethatthe
testatorwassufferingfrom an insanedelusionor lackedtesta-
mentarycapacity.Much of the evidencewas improperly ad-
mitted,asthecoufi itselfnotes,by reasonof theDeadMan's
Statute.

B. LNDUE INFLUENCE

A will or a gift in a will may be setasideif it wastheresultof undueinflu-
ence-mental coercionthat destroyedthe testator'sfree will and forcedhim
to embodysomeone else'sintentionin his will in placeof his own

l. Subjective Test. The test of whethera testatorhas been subjectedto
undueinfluenceis a subjective one,measurcd atthetimeofexecutionof
(i)
the will. The evidencemustestablish: that undueinfluencewasex-
ertedon thetestator;(ii) thattheeffect of theinfluencemusthavebeento
overpowerthe mind andwill of the testator;and (iii) that the influence
musthaveproduceda wili or a gift in the will thatexpresses the intent
not of thetestatorbut of the oneexerting the influence,
andthat would
not havebeenmadebul for the influence

Requir€ment of Proof Showing Substitution of a Plan of T€stamen- Lipper v
tary Disposition-Lipperv. Weslow,369S.W.2d698 (Tex.1963). weslow

a. Facts.M.s. SophieBlock (T) executeda will writtenby her son,
FrankLipper, a lawyer,22 daysbeforeshedied.Lipper bore malice
againsthisdeceased half-brother,whowasexcludedfrom thewill.
This resultedin Lipper receivinga larger shareunderthe will than
he otherwisewouldhavereceived. LiDperlivednextdoorto T and

Wills - 2l
hadakey to herhome.After signingthewill, T toldonewitnessthatshe
wasleavingher estateto her sonanddaughterandthather otherson,
JulianA.Weslow,andhischildrenwouldbeexcludedbecause theynever
showedanyattentionto her.Thewill provideda lengthyexplanation as
to why Julianwasexcludedfrom thewill largelydueto the"unfriendly
and distant attitude" T felt had been accordedto her. The children of
JulianWeslow(Ps)contestthe will, chargingFrankLipper andIrene
LipperDover(Ds) with undueinfluence.At tial, ajury foundthatT's
will wasprocuredby undueinfluence.Ds appeal,contending thatthere
is no evidenceto suppofithisfinding.

b. Issue.Must a personcontestinga will on the basisof undueinfluence
supplyproof of the substitution
of theplan of testamentary
disposition
as
by another the will of thetestaaix?

c. Held. Yes.Judgmentrevercedandrenderedfor Ds.

l) Thecontestants haveestablisheda confidential
relationship, theop-
portunity,andperhaps a motivefor undueinfluence.However,they
go
must forward and prove in somefashionthat the will aswdtten
resultedfrom D's substitutinghis mind andwill for that of T. Prcof
of vital factsof undueinfluencemustbe provided:thesubstitution
of a planof testamentary dispositionby anotherasthe will ofT.

2) Here,theevidenceshowsthatT wasof soundmind,of strongwill,
andin excellentphysicalcondition.Apersonof soundmindhasthe
legaldght to disposeof her propertyasshewishes,with the burden
onthoseattackingthedisposition to provethatit wastheprcductof
undueinfluence.T hada legalrightto do whatshedid whetherwe
think shewasjustifiedor not.Weconcludethatthercwasno evi
denceof probativeforce to supportthe verdict of thejury.

h rc Will Undue Influence Arising out ofAttorney.Client Relationship.-In rc Will
of Moses of Moses,227So.2d 829(Miss.1969).

a. Facts. FannieTaylor Moses (T), during her secondmarriage,became
friends with ClarenceHolland, an attomey.Prior to her death,shesuf-
fered from hearttrouble, had a breastremovedbecauseof cancet and
becamean alcoholic.Threeyealspdor to her death,shemadea will
devisingvirtuallyall of herpropertyto Holland.This will wasdraftedby
a lawyerwhohadnoconnection with ClarenceHolland,nordid Holland
knowaboutthewill. T's eldestsister(P)attackedthewill on theground
of undueinfluence.Thetrial courtfoundfor P Hollandappeals.

b. Issue.Doesa presumptionof undueinfluenceexistwherca sexualrcla-
tionshipbetweenattomeyandclientcoexists
with theattomey-client
re-
lationship?

22 - Wills
c. Held, Yes.Judgmentaffirmed.

1) It is arguedthatevenifHolland,T's attomey,occupieda fiduciary
relationship onthedateofexecutionof thewill, thepresumption
of
undueinfluenceis overcomesinceT had the independent advice
andcounselof an attomey.Wedisagee.The evidencehercshows
thatthe attomeywho draftedthe will waslittle morethana scriv-
ener,andthattherewasno meaningfulindependentadviceor coun-
sel touchingupon the areain question.

2) Herc,the intimatenatureof this relationshipis relevantto theques-
tion of undueinfluenceto theextentthatits existence warantedan
inferenceof undueinfluence,extendingandaugmentingthat which
flowed from theattomey-clientrelationship.This is particularlytue
whenit is consideredthatHollandwill Dersonallv benefitfrom the
will asdrafted.

d. Dissent.Thercis not one iota of evidencein the recordthat Holland
evenknew of the will, much lessthat he padicipatedin the preparation
is to thecontary T prepared
or executionof it. Theevidence herwill on
theadviceof independent counselwhose solepurpose was to adviseher
andpreparethewill exactlyasshewantedit.

4. Undue Inlluence a Question of Fact Where Testator Is Easily Swayed.
Underthefactsin 1nre Kaufrnann's Will,20 A.D.2d464,U7 N.YS.2d664
(1964),aff'd, l5 N.Y2d 825,257N.YS.2d941,205N.E.2d864(1965),the
decedent, RobertKaufmann,a millionaireby inheritance, lived with Walter
Weissfor someeight years,during which time Robeft, in successive wills,
increasedWalter'sshareof his estate.UponRobert'sdeath,his brotherJoel
suedto havethefinal will, draftedin 1958,setasideon the groundof undue
influence.In his deposition,Walterdeniedthat a homosexual relationship
existedbetwe€nthetwo men.After two jury tdals,bothfinding undue influ-
ence,the court of appealsaffirmed, statingthat "where, as here, the record
indicatesthat testatorwaspliableandeasilytakenadvantage of, that there
wasa long anddetailedhistoryof dominanceandsubservience betweenthem,
thattestatorreliedexclusivelyuponproponent's knowledge. . . andpropo-
nentis willed virtuallythe entireestate,we considerthat a questionof fact
waspresented concemingwhether[therehadbeenundueinfluence]."

5. No-ContestClauses.A no-contest clausein a will providesthatanype$on
who conteststhe will shallforfeit all interestshe otherwisewould havere-
ceivedunderthatwill. If a beneficiarycontesting the will is successful,
the
no-contestclausefails with the will. In most statesandunderthe UPC, a
beneficiarywhounsuccessfully contests thewill doesnot forfeitthelegacyif
the court finds that the beneficiarychallengedthe will tn goo.lfaith alld on
thebasrsof prcbablecaase.A minorityview givesfull effectto no-contest
clausesevenif the losingcontestant hadprobablecausefor challengingthe

Wills - 23
will. A challengebasedon an actionbroughtto construethe will, on
jurisdictional gounds, or on the appointmentof an executor,or to the
accounting madeby thatperson,is not considercd a contestto the will
that would result in a forfeifure undera no-contestclause.

c. FRATJD

1. Definition. Fraudconsistsof (i) falsestatements of materialfacts,(ii)
knownto be falseby the partymakingthe statements, (iii) madewith
the intentionof deceivingthetestator(iv) which actuallyde€eivethe tes-
tator,and(v) which causethe testatorto actin relianceon the falsestate-
ments.

a. Fraud in the ex€cution.This tlpe of fraud (alsoknown asfraud in
the factum)includescaseswherethe testatorwastricked into sign-
ing a documentnot knowingit to be a will, andcaseswhereone
for another.
will is substituted

b. Fraud in the irducement. This type of fraud includesthosecases
wherethe testatoris fraudulentlyinducedinto makingthe will (e.8.,
in rctum for a falsepromiseof care).

Latharn v. 2. Constructive Tfust Imposed Wherc Testator Prevent€d From Ete-
FatherDivine cutingWill..Latham v. FatherDivine,299N.Y 22,85N.E.2d168,ll
A.L.R.2d 802(l949).

a. Facts.Thecomplaintbroughtby Ps(first cousinsof thedecedent)
allegedthe following facts: The will of Mary SheldonLyon (T)
gavealmosther wholeestateto FatherDivine, leaderof a religious
cult (D), two corporatedefendants(Ds), andto PatienceBudd @),
one of FatherDivine'sactivefollowers.After makingthe will, T
expresseda desireto revokethe will and to execut€a new will by
which Pswouldreceivea substantialportionof theestate,T, shortly
beforeher death,had attomeysdmft a new will for her with Psre-
ceivinga substantial sum,butbeforcshecouldexecute thiswill, Ds
by undueinfluenceandphysicalforce,preventedT ftom executing
thewill. Thecomplaintbroughtby Ps allegedthatDs conspired to
kill, anddid kill, T by meansof a surgicaloperationperfomedby a
doctorengagedby Ds withoutthe consentor knowledgeof any
relativesofT. The will thatT did signwasprcbatedundera com-
promiseagreement in a proceedingin which Ps werenot parties.
The tdal cowt upheldthe complaintbut the appellatecourt dis-
missedit on groundsof insufficiency. Psappeal.

b. Issue.When an heir or deviseein a will preventsthe testatorfrom
providing for one for whom she would have provided but for the
interferenceof theheir or devisee.will thatheir or deviseebedeemed
a trusteeofthe propertyreceivedby him to the extentthatthede-

24 - Wills
beeninterfered
fraudedparty would have receivedhad not the deceased
with?

Held. Yes.Judgnent of the appellatecowt reversed

l) The generalrule is that wherc an heir or deviseein a will preventsthe
testatorfrom providing for onefor whom shewould haveprovidedbut
for the interferenceof the heir or devisee,that heir or deviseewill be
deemeda trustee,by operationof law, of the property,real or personal,
receivedby him from the lestator'sestate.to lhe amountor extentthat
the defraudedparty would have receivedhad not the intention of the
deceasedbeeninterferedwith.

2) This is not a prcceedingto probatethe will nor is it an attemptto accom-
Dlisha revocationof the earlierwill. The complaintallegesthat by force
ind fraud Ds keptT from makinga will in favor of Ps.We cannotsayas
a matterof law that no constuctive trust canarisetherefrom

3) A constructivetrust will be erectedwhenevernecessaryto satisfy the
endsofjustice.Here,theprobated will hasfull effectbut equity,in oder
to defeatthe fraud, raisesa trust in favor of thoseintendedto be benefit-
ted by the testatorandcompelsthe legateeto tum over the gift to them'

d. Comment. Tortious interferencewith an expectancyis anothertheory that
can be used to rectify fraud or undueinfluence. (Restatement(Second)of
Torts$?74B(1979))The plaintiffmustprcvetheinterfercnce involvedcon-
ducttortiousin andofitself, e.g.,fraud,duress,undueinfluence.

Wills- 25
IV. EXECUTION: FORMS AND FORMALITIF^S

A. EXECUTION

1. AttestedWills. The standard
form of a will is onethatis signedby the
testatorandwimessedby two witnessespursuantto a formal attestation
DrcCedure.

a. R€quirementsofdue execution.For a will to be valid andadmis-
sible to probate,the testatormust meetthe formal requircmentsof
dueexecutionimposedby statutesof the appropdate state.These
requircmentsvary from stateto state,andgenerallyinclude requir-
ing thetestatorto signat theendof thewill andin thepresence of
all attestingwitnesses.The testatormight also be requiredto pub-
lish thewill, ie., declareto thewitnesses
thattheinstumentis her
will.

In re b. Requirement that botb witnessesbe present-I2 re Groffman, I
Groffman w.L.R.733(l969).

1) Facts. CharlesGroffman (T), oneeveningwhile sitting in his
lounge,askedDavidBlock, thesolicitorwhoprcparcdhiswill,
andJuliusL€igh,a friend,to witnesshis will. Block ledT out
of the loungeinto the dining room whercT took out his will,
whichhadalreadybeensignedby him. T askedBlock to sign
thewill andBlockdidso.Mr.Irigh, however,wasleft behind
andwasnotprcsentwhenBlock signed.Block retumedto the
lounge,leavingT in the diningroom.Mr. IJigh wentto the
diningroomandsignedhisnamebeneath Block's.In themean-
time,Blockhadremained in thelounge.T's son@) andBlock
(P),bothexecutors underthewill, propoundthewill to bepro-
bated.T's widowcontests thewill, contending
thatit wasnot
validly acknowledged in thepresenceof two or morcwitnesses
presentat thesametime.

2) Issue.Fora willtobe valid,mustitbe signedby thetestatorin
theprcsenceof two or moaewitnessespresentat the sametime
with thewitnessessigningthewill in thepresenceof thetesta-
tor?

3) Held.Yes.Probatedenied.

a) TheWlls Act statesthatno will shallbe validunlessir is
in writing andexecutedin themannerhercaftermentioned:
It mustbe signedat the end by the testatoror someother
personin his presence andby his direction;andthesig-
naturcmustbemadeor acknowledged by thetestatorin

26 Wills
theprcsenceof two or morewimessesprcsentat the sametim€,
and thosewitnessesmust attestand subscribethe will in the
presenceof thetestator,but no form of attestationis necessary

b) Here, therewasno acknowledgmentor signatureby T in the
presenceof two or morewitnessesat the sametime The argu_
ments put forth-that there was suflicient acknowledgment
sincethe attestingwitnesseshadanoppofiunity to seethe will
if they hadwishedto andthat therewasno breakin the conti-
nuity of theftansaction-are without merit l amboundto prc-
nounceagainstthiswill.
7 Competency of Witnesses.Witnessesmust be competent This genenlly
meansthat at the time the will is executedthe witnessmustbe matureenough
and of sufficient mental capacityto understandand appreciatethe natureof
the acthe is witnessingandto be ableto testify in coud shouldthis be neces-
sary.
a. Interestedwitness€s. At commonlaw.if an altestingwitnesswasalsoa
beneficiaryof a will, the witness-beneficiary wasnot a competent wlt-
nessaldthe will wasdeniedprobate Today'however,mostjurisdictions
have interestedwitnessstatutes,which provide that if an attestingwit-
nessis alsoa beneficiary,the gift to the witnessis void but the witnessis
a competentwitnessandthe will may be probated

b, Requirement of disinter€stedness-Estrte ofParsons, 103Cal App Estateof
3d:84, 163cal. Rptr.?0 (1980). Parsons

1) Facts. Threepersonssignedthe will of the decedent'GenevePar-
sons(T):EvelynNielson,MarieGower@), andBobwarda,a no-
tary public. Two of them,Nielson and Gower, werc namedin the
wiil asbeneficiaries.After T's death,her will was admittedto pro-
bate.Nielsonthenfiled a disclaimerof herbequestin thewill There-
after,the assigneesof T's first cousinoncercmovedandotherfirst
cousinsoncercmoved(Ps)claimed an interestin the estateon the
groundthatthedeviseto Gowerwasinvalid. The rial courtrejected
that argument.Ps appeal.

2) Issues.

a) Is a subscdbingwitnessto a will whois namedin thewill asa
subscribing
beneficiarya disinterested witnessasrequiredby
statute?

b) Is a subsequentdisclaimereffectiveto tansfolm an interested
witnessinto a "disinterested"one?

3) Held. a) No. b) No. Judgmentreversed

Wills - 27
a) ProbateCodesection5l providesthata gift to a subscribing
witnessis void unlessthereare two otherdisinterested wit-
nesses to the will. Ps contendthata subsequent disclaimeris
ineffective to transforman intercstedwitnessinto a disinter-
estedone.Theyassertthatbecause therewasonly onedisin-
te.estedwitnessat the time of attestation,the deviseto D is
void by operatiorof law.D, however,pointsto language in
PrcbateCodesection190.6thatstates"in everycase,thedis-
claimershallrelatebackfor all purposesto thedateofcreation
ofthe intercst."

o) At commonlaw a partyto an action,or onewho hada dircct
interestin its outcome,wasnot competent to testifyin court
becauseit was thoughtthat an interestedwitnesswould be
temptedto perjurehimselfin favorofhis interest.If anyoneof
therequisitenumberof attestingwitnesses wasalsoa benefi-
ciary thentheentircwill wouldfail. Parliament, in 1752,en-
acteda statutethatsavedthewill by providingthattheinterest
of an attestingwitnesswasvoid; undersuchlegislation,the
competence of a witnessto testifyis restoredby invalidating
hisgift.Themajorityofjurisdictions havesimilarstatutes; sec-
tion 51 fallsinto thiscategory.

c) The essential
functionof a subscribing witnessis performed
whenthe will is executed.We believesection5l looksin its
operationsolelyto thattime.It opemtesto insue thatat least
two ofthe subscribingwitnesses aredisinterested.

d) Becausewe hold that section5l lookssolelyto the time of
executionandattestation of the will, it followsthat a subse-
quentdisclaimerwill be ineffectiveto transforman intercsted
witnessintoa disinterestedonewithinthemeaningof thatsec-
tion.D's rclianceon section190.6is misplaced-thatsection
servesto equalizethe tax consequences of disclaimersasbe-
tweenheirsat law andtestamentary beneficiaries.

1 Recommended Method of Executinga Will. A decedenr might not die in
j
the urisdictionwherethewill wasexecuted, thusgivingriseto potentialcon-
flict of lawsissues. The validityof rhewill in disposingpe$onalpropefiyis
deteminedaccordingto the laws of the decedent's domicileat death.The
validityof the will in disposingrealpropertyis determined accordingto the
laws of the statewherethat propertyis located.Hence,the will shouldbe
executed sothatit will be admittedto probatein all j urisdictions
involved.

Self-ProvingAffidavit. The greatmajority of stateshaveadopteda self-p.ov-
ingalfidavitprocedure in whichthereslarorandrheq irnesses,aftere^ecuring

28 - Wills
the will, executein ftont of a notarypublic an affidavit reciting that all of the
requisites for dueexecutron havebeencompliedwith.This allowsthewillto
be probatedif the witnessesare dead,cannotbe located,or have movedfa!
away.

Safeguardinga Will. An attomey'sretentionof a client's will may have
theappearance whichis an ulethicalpractice.Many
ofsoliciting business,
stateshave statutespermittingdepositof wills with the clerk of the pro-
batecourt.

6. Mistake in Execution of a Will--h re Pavlinko's Estate' 394 Pa 564' 148 In re
A,.2d 528(1959\. Pavlinko's
Estate
a. Facts.The decedent, VasilPavlinko(T), by mistakesigfledthewill of
his wife, Hellen,andHellenbymistakesignedthewill ofher husband'
T. The &afting attomeyandhis secretarysignedaswitnesses.A brother
ofHellen,who wastheresiduarylegateeof bothwills, offeredfor pro-
bateasT's will thewill thatpurportedto bethewill of HellenPavlinko'
but which was signedby her husband.The trial court refusedto pro-
batethewill. Thisappeal followec.

b. Issue.Will a courtrefom a will to allow prcbatewhenthereis a mistake
in executionof the will in that one pafy mistakenly signs the will of
another?

Held. No. Judgmentaffirmed.

1) The wills Act providesin clear languagethat every will shall be in
writing and shall be signedby the testatorat the end thereof.The
court below correctlyheld that the paperthat rccited that it wasthe
will of Hellen Pavlinkocould not b€ Fobated asthe will of T and
wasa nullity.

2) To decidein favor of the residuarylegatee,almost the entire will
would haveto be rewritten.Here,thepapersignedwasnot T's will
He hadexecutedno will andtherewasnothing to be reformed.He
thereforedied intestateand his property descendsas at law. Were
we to rewrite wills or makeexceptionsto theclearprovisionsof the
Wills Act, theAct wouldbecomemeaningless andwouldencour-
agefraudulentclaims.

d. Dissent. The majority doesnot make a seriouseffort to effectuatethe
intent of the testator.The fact that someof the prcvisions in the will
cannotbe executeddoesnot strike down the residuaryclause'which is
meaningfuland standsindependently.Someof the provisions are not
effective,but their ineffectualityin no way baIsthe legality andvalidity
of theresiduaryclause,whichis completein itsell

Wills - 29
7. Conditional Wills. A conditionalwill is onethatbecomesoDerativeif a stated
eventocculs.

8. Statutory Wills. Severalstateshaveauthorized"statutory wills," which are
shortwills, with the terminologyprovidedby statute.Spacesareprovidedfor
the namesof beneficiaries.Formalities for execution,such as signing and
attestation,must be followed.

9. Holographic Wills. A holographicwill is handwrittenand signedby the tes-
tator; attestingwitnessesarenot required.About half of the statesp€rmit ho-
lographicwills. Under the UPC, a holographicwill is valid if the signatue
and the materialprovisionsarc in the handwriting of the testatorevenif not
witnessed.

In rcWlll a. Self-provedwills--fr, re Will of Ranney,124N.J. 1,589A2d1339
ofRanney (l991).

r) Facts, RussellRanney(T) executeda four-pagewill before a no-
taryandtwo witnesses. T acknowledged thattheinstumentwashis
will andhe wantedthewitnesses to actaswitnesses. T sicnedthe
will on theunnumbered fourthpage,andrhewitnesses iimulra-
neouslysigneda self-provingaffidavit on the fifth page.All parties
believed they were complying with statutory attestationrcquirc-
ments.All signatureswerenotadzedandthe fifth pagewasstapled
to the foudh. The attestationclausercferc to the executionof the
will in thepasttenseandstatesthateachwitness"signedtheWill as
witnesses." UponT's death,the will wasadmittedto prcbate;T's
wife contested, claimingthatthewill failedto complylitelallywith
the statutoryformalities.The supedorcourt ruled that the will did
not containthesignatures of two witnesses.
The appellate division
reversedandfoundtheaffidavitto be a partof thewill, and,there-
fore,thewitnesses hadsigned. Thesupreme courtgmntedT's wife's
petitionfor certification.

2) Issue,Shouldan insffumentpurportingto be a last will andtesta-
mentthat includesthe signatureof two witnesses on an attached
self-provingaffidavit, but not on the will itself, be admittedto pro-
bate?

3) Held, Yes.Judgmentaffirmed.
a) Wedo not agreewith the appellatedivision thata will contain-
ing witnesses'signaturesonly on a self-provingaffidavit liter-
ally complieswith attestationrequirements.The court,s
rationalewasthatan affidavit andanattestationclausearcsuf-
ficiently similar to justify the conclusionthat signatrreson an
affidavit,like signatures on theattestationclause,satisfythe

30 - Wills
requircment that the signaturesbe on the will. This conclusionfails to con-
siderthe basicdifferencesbetweena subsequently-executed, self-provingaf-
fidavit andan attestationclause.

o) Attestationclauses(i) provide"prima facieevidence"thatthe will wassigned
by thetestatorin thepresence of witnesses;(ii) pemit probatewhena witness
forgetsthe circumstancesof executionor dies before the testator;and (iii)
express thepresentintentof the attestantto actaswitness.

Self-provingaffidavits arc swom statementsthat the will hasbeenexecuted
andhasalrcadybeenwimessed.The affidavit performsall thefunctionsof the
clauseandpermitsprobatewithoutrequiringeitherwitnessto ap-
attestation
pear.

o) Here,affiants,intendingto actaswitnesses,signedtheaffidavitimmediately
aflerwitnessing T s e\eculionof thewil,.

e) Nothingin statutorylanguage or historysuggeststhatthelegislaturc contem-
plateda subsequently-executed affidavitasa substitutefor theattestationclause
The legislaturedid indicateits intentionthat subsequently-executed, self-prov-
ing affidavitsbe usedsolelyin conjunctionwith duly executedwills. In the
instantcase,the affidavit doesnot comply with statutoryrequirements.

f) In limitedcircumstances, complies"with
however,a will that"substantially
statutoryrequirementsmay beadmittedto probate.Otherstates,scholars,and
teatiseshavedetermined that"substantial
compliance betterservesthegoals
of statutoryformalitiesby permittingprobateof formally-defective
wills that
nevertheless representtheintentof thetestator"

Formalitiesin executionof wills (i) arc meantto insurethat the instument
rcflects the testator'suncoercedintent; (ii) p€rformthe function of providing
uniformityin theorganization, language, andcontentof a will; and(iii) pro-
videa ritualthatundeNcores the sedousness ofthe occasion. Thesepuposes
are often ftustratedwhen rigid insistenceon literal complianceinvalidatesa
will that is the deliberateandvoluntaryact of the testator.

n, The variationof the UPC adoptedby the statelegislatwein 1977minimizes
theformalitiesofexecution:(i) witnessesarenot requiredto signin thepres-
enceof thetestatorandeachother;(ii) a beneficiarywho actsasa witnessis
no longerprevented fromtaking:and(iii) unwitnessed holographic wills may
be admittedto probate.Thus,we believethelegislature did not intendthata
will shouldbedenied probate
because thewitnesses signedin thewrongplace.

1) Becausean affidavit servesa uniquefunction, we arereluctantto permit the
signatureson an affidavit to both validate the signatureson the will and to
renderthewill self-proving. However,if thewitnesses, with theintentto at-
test,sign a self-prcvingaffidavit,but do not sign the will or an attestation

Wills- 31
clause,clearandconvincingevidenceof thef intentshouldbe ad-
ducedto establish
substantial
compliancewith thestatute.
14 /e Estate b. Testamentaryprovisionsnot in handwriting of testator-h /€ Estateof
of Johnson Johnson,129Ariz. 307,630P2d 1039(1981).

1) Facts.Thewill ofthe decedent, Amold H. Johnson(T), wason a printed
will form availablein variousofficesupplystores.It containedcertain
printedprovisionsfollowedby blankswhereT couldinsefianyprovi-
sionshe might desire.BartonI-ee Mcl-ain andMarie Ganssle(Ps),two
beneficiariesunderthe will, petitionedfor fo.mal probateof the instu-
ment.The personalrcpresentativeof the estateobjectedto the petition
andfiled a motion for summaryjudgmenton the groundsthat theinstru-
mentwasinvalidasa will, in thatit wasnot attestedby anywitnesses,
andthat it did not qualify asa hologaphic will sincethe marerialprcvi-
sionsthereofwerenot in T's handwriting.Ps filed a cross-motion for
summaryjudgment,urgingthatthedocument constituteda holographic
will. Thetrialcowt grantedthemotionof theperconalrepresentative. ps
appeal.

2) Issue.May aninsh]lmentbeprobated asa holographicwill ifit contains
wordsnot in the handwdtingof thetestatorif suchwordsarc essentialto
the testamentarydisposition?

3) Held. No. Judgmentaffirmed.

a) A will that doesnot comply with the statutoryrequirementsfor a
will may still be valid as a hologaphicwill, whetheror not wir-
nessed,if the signatureandthe materialprovisionsarein the hand-
writing of the testator An instrumentmay not be probatedas a
holographicwill if it containswordsnot in thehandwritingof the
testatorif suchwordsare essentialto the testamentarvdisDosition.
However.lhe merefacl lhat a teslatoruseda blanktlrm doesnoL
invalidatewhatwouldotherwisebea validwill ifthe printedwords
maybeentirelyrejectedassurplusage.

b) Herc,theonly wordsthatestablish T's requisitetestanentary intent
are found in the printed portion of the form. Though T used the
word "estate,"this word aloneis insufficient to indlcatean animus
testandi.

Kir[nel's Informaf will..Kimmel,sEstate,278Pa.435, 123A.4OS0924).
Estate
1) Facts.A lettermailedby the decedent,
Kimmel (T), to two of his chil-
dren,who werenarnedasbeneficiariesthercin.wasadmittedto Drobate.
T djedthealtemoonof thedayhe wrotetheletter.Oneof T s heirsob-
Jectedto theadmissionandnow appeals.

32 - Wills
2) Issues.

a) May an informal letter be testamentaryin character?

b) Is the signature"Father" sufficient to comply with the
Wills Act?

3) Held. a) Yes.b) Yes.Decreeaffirmedandappealdismissed.

a) Wherea testator'spurposewasto makea posthumous
gift, we havehelddeeds,letters,powe$ of attomey,and
an informal letter of requestsaswills.

b) T's contingencyhere,"if ennything hapens,"was still
existingwhenhe diedsuddenly, andthequestionof tes-
tamentaryintent is oneof law for the cowts.

c) T's words make it difficult to determinethat he meant
an)4hingotherthanatestamentary gift, andhis actof send-
ing the letter to the personsfor whom the gift was in-
tendedgivesfwther supportto that determination.

d) The signatue "Father"wasintendedasa completesigna-
tule.It wasthemethodemployedbyTin signingall such
lettersandwasmailedby T asa finisheddocument.

B. REVOCATION OF WILLS

1. Methods of Revocation.A will may be revokedby one of three metl-
ods:

By operationof law If a t€statorgetsmarriedor divorcedafter ex-
ecuting a will, this changein statusmay revoke,by operationof
law, all or part of the will.

language
By a laterwill or codicil.In theseinstances, thatexprcssly
revokestheprior will shouldbeincluded.Altematively,a laterwill
may revokea prior will if thereareinconsistent provisionsin the
laterwill thatimpliedlyrevoketheearlierwill.

c. By a physicalactof destruction.Generally,buming,tearing,or oblit-
eratinga mat€rialpart of the will revokesit. Anotherpersoncando
the teadngor buming if in the testator'spresenceand at his direc-
tion.

2. Probate of Irst or DestmyedWills. In theabsenceof a statute,the fact

Wills- 33
thata will is lost,or is destroyed
withouttheconsentof thetestator,doesnot
preventits prcbate,providedits contentsareproved.Moststatesrequireproof
of contents by testimonyof persons whohadknowledgeof thecontents of the
will, asby havingreadthe will or havingheardit read.Statesthathavestat-
utesrestrictingtheprobateof lostor destoyedwills havenarrowlyconstrued
themin orderto permit probate.

3, Revocationby Writing or PhysicalAct. Underthe UPC,a will or anypart
thereofisrevoked(i) by a subsequent will thatrevokestheprior will or partof
it expresslyorby inconsistency; or (ii) by beingbumed,tom,canceled, obli!-
erated,or destroyed,with the intent andfor the purposeof revoking it by the
testatoror by anotherpenonin his presence andby hjs direction.

Harrison a. Presumptionwill destroyed-Harrisonv. Bird, 621So.2d,972(Ala.
v. Bird 19931.

r) Facts. The decedent,Daisy Speer(T), executeda will naming
Harison (P) as the main beneficiaryT latercalledher attomey,
who hadtheoriginalwill, to rcvokethewill. The attomeyandhis
secretary toreupthewill andwrotea lettertoT confirmingthisand
enclosingthe tom pieces.He informedT shewaswithouta will.
UponT'sdeath,theletterwasfound,butnotthetom pieces.I-etters
of administration weregrantedto Bird (D). P filed thecopyof the
rcvokedwill for probate. Thecircuitcourtruled(i) thewill wasnot
revoked;(ii) therecouldbe no ratificationof thedesaucdonof the
will asithadnotbeendonepuNuantto saictstatutory requirements;
and(iii) basedon thelact thatthepieceswercnot found,therewas
a presumption thatT revokedthewill herself.The courtfoundthis
presumption hadnot beenrebuttedby P andthe duplicatewasnot
T's will. ThecourtheldthatT'sestateshouldbeadministered asan
intestate estate.P appeals.

Issue.Wastheevidencepresented sufficientto rebutthepresump-
tion thatT destroyed
herwill with theintentto revokeit?

J' Held.No, Judgment
affirmed.

a) Eventhougha duplicateexiststhatwasnot in T's possession,
if T hadpossessionofher will beforeherdeath,andthewill is
notfoundafterherdeath,a presumption arisesthatT revoked
herwill andall duplicates.

b) P arguedthatthefactsthatT's attomeydestroyed thewill out-
sideof T's presence,
T hadpossession ofthe pieces,andsuch
pieceswere not found, are not sufficient to invoke the pre-
sumptionof revocation.This argumentis withoutmerit.

34 - Wills
b, Attempted revocationby writing on paper upon which will is written" Thompson
Thompsonv. Royall 163V^. 492,175S.E.748(1934). { Royall
'
1) Facts.On September 4, 1932,the decedent, Mrs. Knoll (T), sigfleda
will consistingof five sheetsof legal paperOn September 19, 1932,at
T's request,her attomeyandher executortook thewill andcodicil to her
home,where shetold the attomey,in the presenceof her executorand
another,to deshoyboth.But insteadof destroyingthem' shedecidedto
retatnthem asmemoranda.On the back of the manuscriptcover,in the
handwritingof her attomey,signedby T, therewaswdtten:"This will
null andvoid andto be heldonly by (theexecutor)insteadofbeing de-
stroyedasa memorandumfor anotherwill if I desireto makesame." The
samenotationwasmadeon thebackof thecodicil,exceptthatthename
of the attomeywas substitutedfor that of the executor.The jury found
that the instrumentswerethe last will andtestamentof T. From an order
sustaining this verdictandprcbatingthewill, this appealwastaken.

2) Issue.Must wdtten words usedfor revocationby cancellationof a will
be soplacedastophysicallyaffectthewrittenportionofthe will andnot
merelytheblankpartsof thepaPeron whichthewill is written?

3) Held. Yes.Judgmentaffirmed.

a) A will mustbe revokedasprcscribed by statute,eitherby (i) some
writing declaringan intention to rcvoke and executedin the same
manneras a will or by (ii) cutting,teadng,buming,obliterating,
canceling,or destroyingthe will with the intent to revoke.

b) Here, the notationsmadeon the back of the will are not wholly in
T's handwriting, by subscdbing
nor areher signatuesattested wit-
nesses. Hence,underthestatutetheyareineffectualas"somewrit_
ing declaringanintentionto rcvoke."

c) Nor are the words sufficient to revokethe will by cancellationby
physical act. The statutecontemplatesmarks or lines acrossthe
written parts of the inshumentor a physicaldefacementor some
mutilation of the writing itself with the intent to rcvoke. If written
wordsareusedfor thepurpose, theymustbeplacedasto physically
affect the written pofion of the will, not merely the blank partsof
the will on whichthe will is written.The attempted revocationis
thereforeineffectual.

Partial rtvocation by physical act. Most statutesauthorizepartial aswell as
totalrevocationof a will by physicalact.Extrinsicevidenceis generallyad-
missibleto show whetherthe testatorintendedonly a partial rcvocation.In
the absenceof a statuteexpresslyallowing partial revocation,severalstates
lefuseto recognize partialrevocation by a physicalact.In thesejurisdictions,

Wills- 35
wherethetestatorattemptsto revokea portion of the will, theactis given
no effect. Thus, if the testatorcrossesout a bequestto Tom, Tom takes
the bequestdespitetheattempted cancellation. podon
If the destroyed
cannotbe recreated by extinsic evidence,only the destroyedportion
fails; the remainderof the will is given effect.

4. Dependent Relative Revocation and Revival. The doctdne of dependenr
rclative Gvocationis anequitabledoctrineunderwhich a court may disrcgard
a rcvocationif the coufi finds that the act of rcvocationwas premisedon a
mistakeof law or fact andwould not haveoccured but for the testator'smis-
takenbelief that anotherdispositionof propertywasvalid. The requirements
of thisdoctrineareasfollows:

(i) It mustbe shownthatthe testatorat the time of revocationintendedto
makea new testamentarydispositionthat for somereasonwas ineffec-
tive.

(ii) It mustbe shownthattherewasan otherwisevalidrcvocation.

(iii) It must be shownthat the testator'sintent was premisedon a mistaken
beliefasto the validityof thenewdisposition.

(iv) It mustbeshownthatinvalidationof thercvocationwouldbeconsistent
with thetestator's
probableintent.

Carterv. a. Presumptionagainstintestacy-Carter v. First United Methodist
FirstUnited Churchof Albany,246 Ga.352,27| S.E.2d493 (1980).
Methodist
Church 1) Facts.Thedecedent's, Mldred Tipton's(T's), 1963will wasfound
ofAlbany at T's deathamongher personalpape$ togetherwith a handwritten
instrumentdatedMay 22, 1978,captionedas a will but unsigned
andunwitnessed.Pencilmarkshadb€€nmadethroughthe Foperty
dispositionsof the 1963will. The supedorcout foundT hadindi-
catedto herattomeythatshewishedto changeherwill but thatshe
did notintendto rcvokethe 1963will by scratchings.
The 1963will
wasadmittedto probate.The caveator,Carter,appeals.

2) Issue.Wassufficientevidenceprcsentedto rebut the statutorypre-
sumptionof revocationandto give dse to a presumptionin favor of
theprcpounderunderthedoctrineof dependentrelativercvocation?

3) Held. Yes.Judgmentaffirmed.

a) We agreewith First Methodist's contentionthat the Ceolgia
statuteprovidingthatintentionto rcvokewill bepresumedfrom
theobliterationor cancelingof a materialportion of the will is
inappropdately appliedin thiscase.

36 - Wills
b) The doctrineof dependentrelativerevocation,oneof presumedin-
tention,hasasits purposeto effectthe testator'sintent.The mere
fact that a testatorintendedto makea new will, or madeonethat
failed,will not alone,in everycase,preventa cancellation or oblit-
erationof a will from operatingasa revocation. If it is clearthatthe
cancellationand the makingof the new will were partsof one
scheme,andthe revocationof the old will was so relatedto the
makingof thenewwill asto bedependent on it, thenif thenewwill
is not made,or is invalid,the old will, thoughcanceled, shouldbe
siveneffect.

c) Thestipulationthatthe1963willandthe1978document werefound
togethershifted the burdento Carter to prove that T would have
prefered intestacy.The presumptiol againstintestacystands
unrebutted.

b. Doctrine applicable wherc later will revoked und€r mistaken belief that Estateof
doing so reinstatesprior will.-EstateofAlburn, 18Wis.2d 340,ll8 N.W. Album
2d919 .L963)'.

1) Facts.The decedent, OttilieL. Album (T), executeda will in Milwau-
kee,Wisconsin, in 1955andleft it with her attomey,ceorgeR. Affeldt.
ThereaftetTmovedtoKankakee, Illinois,andin 1959executedanother
will whilercsidingtherc.Shethenmovedto FortAtkinson,Wisconsin,
wheresheinstucted her brother,Edwin Lehmann,to disposeof the
Kankakeewill, which shehadtom up. He did so.OlgaI-ehmann,the
wife of Edwin,testifiedthatT told her that shewantedthe Milwaukee
will to stand.T's sister,AdeleRuedisili,broughta petitionfor appoint-
mentof a specialadministrator,allegingthatthe deceaseddiedintestate.
Thereafter,T's grandniece,Viola Henkey,filed a petition for the prcbate
of theMilwaukeewill, andLulu Album andDorisAlbum filed a petition
for probateof the Kankakeewill. The county court heardall threepeti-
tions and held that T destroyedthe Kankakeewill under the mistaken
beliefthatby sodoingshewouldrevivetheMilwaukeewill. The coult
appliedthe doctrineof dependent relativercvocationandheldthatthe
Kankakeewill wasadmittedto probate.Ruedisiliappeals.

Issue.Whena testatorrevokesa later will underthe mistakenbelief that
by doing sosheis reinstatinga prior will, may the doctrineof dependent
relativercvocationbeinvokedto renderthercvocationineffective?

3) Held. Yes.Judgmentaffirmed.

a) We arccommittedto the doctrineof dependentrclative rcvocation.
The usualsituationfor applicationof this doctrineariseswhena
testatorexecutesonewill andthereafterattemDts to revokeit bv

Wills - 37
makinga latertestamentarydispositionthatfor somereasonptoves
ineffective.

b) However,the doctrinehasbeenappliedto the unusualsituationin
which a testatorrcvokesa later will underthe mistakenbelief that
by doingsosheis reinstating a priorwill ln this situalion,thedoc-
tline of dependent rclativerevocationis invokedto ender therevoca-
tion ineffective.The doctrineis baseduporl the testator'sinfered
intention.It is held that the destructionof the later documentis in-
tendedto beconditional whenit is accompanied by theexpress intent
of reinstatinga former will andthereis no explanatory evidence'

c) Here,we find thatthetdal courtwascorrectin findingthatT had
revokedthe Kankakeewill underthe mistakenbelief that shewas
therebyreinstating thepriorMilwaukeewill. T's statement to Olga
Lehmannthat shewishedher Milwaukee will to stand,the infer-
encethat shedid not wish to die intestate,andthe fact that shetook
no stepsfollowingthe destruction of the Kankakeewill to makea
new will are sufficient evidencethat shedestoyed the Kankakee
will underthe mistakenbelief that the Milwauke-ewill would con-
trol the dispositionof her estateApplyingthe doctrineof depen-
dent relative revocatlon,therefore,the trial court was corect ln
holding that the attemptedrevocationof the Kankakeewill wasin-
effective andadmittingthe will to probate.

4) Comment.Wisconsinlaw on revivalof wills precludedtheMilwaukee
will from beingrevived.

c. Revival.

1) Commonlaw.Thecommonlawrule,still adhered is
to in severalstates,
that no part of a will is effectiveuntil the deathof the Thereibre,
testator.
if Will #2 (whichexpressly revokesWill #l) is itselfrevokedbeforethe
testator'sdeath,Will#1aloneremainsin effectandisoperative uponthe
testator'sdeath.Destructionof Will #2 opentes to "revive" Will #l '

2) Modern law. In mostjudsdictions,a will, oncerevoked,is not revived
unlessrepublishedby (i) reexecutionor (ii) a latercodicil underthe doc-
trine of republication by codicil.Thus,rcvocationof a later will that
containedlanguagerevokinganearlierwill doesnot, by itself, revivethe
earlierwill or anyof its provisions.UndertheUPC andin a substantial
minority of states,destructionof Will #2 andits ldlguage of revocation
may operateto teviveWill #1, depending on thetestator'sintent.Such
intentis establishedby thetestator'sstatementsandby referenceto all of
thecircumstances of thecase.

38 - Wills
5. Revocationby Operationoflaw: Changein Family Circumstances.
mayrevokeawill by operation
Achangein familycircumstances oflaw
presumes
Thelawin theseinstances anintentto revokeon thepartof the
testator

a. Marriage,At conmonlaw,a mardagefollowingtheexecutionof a
will hadno effecton the will, but a marriagefollowedby a birth
washeldto revokethewill. Most statesno lonserfollow thecom-
mon law rule.

1) Stateswithout statut€s.About half of the stateshaveno stat-
utedealingwith theeffectof marriageon a previouslyexecuted
will.In mostofthesestatesmariage,by itself,doesnot affect
thewill. In a minorityof states,
however,thecourtsapplythe
commonlaw rule notedabove.

2) Stateswith statutes.In mostof the stateshavingstatutesdeal-
ing with the effectof marriageon a will, the will is only par-
tially revoked.Themarriagerevokesthe will only to theextent
ofprovidingthenewspouse with anintestate share.After dis-
tributionof the spouse'sintestateshare,the will operatesto
distribute the remainingassets.In a minority of states,mar-
riageafterthe executionof a will revokesthe will in its en-
tirety.Notethatin eithercase, thewill is notpafiiallyor totally
revokedif (i) the will makesprovision for the new spouse,(ii)
the will providesthatthe spouse's omissionwasintentional,
or (iii) it appeanthat the will wasmadein contemplationof
mamase.

b. Divorce.A majorityof stateshaveenactedstatutes thathold a di-
vorce partially revokesa will in that it automaticallyrevokesthe
provisionsof a will in favor of theformer spouse.The will is readas
thoughthe former spouseprcdeceased the testator.

C. COMPONENTS
OFA WILL

1. Integration of Wills. Integrationof a will concernsthe problemof
whatpagesshouldconstitutethewill. Thepape$thatarepresentwhen
the will is signedandareintendedto be includedin the will areinte-
grated.rypically, theproblemadseswherethepagesof a will havenot
beenfastenedtogether.

Republicationby Codicil.Republication by codicilmeansan implied
restatement or rewritingof thelanguage of a validwill asofthe time of
republication.Republication by codicilhassometimes beenusedto vali-
datea prior invalidwill.

Wills- 39
Incorporation by Refercnce.Pagesthat cannotbe integratedbecausethey
werc not presentat the will's executionneverthelessmay be given effect un-
der the doctrineof incorporationby reference.This doctdnerecognizesthat a
duly executedwill may by appropriatereferenceincorporateinto itself any
extrinsicdocumentor writing eventhoughthe otherdocumentwasnot prop-
erly executed. Thefollowingrcquirements mustbe met:

(i) The documentmusthavebeenin existence
at thetime thewill wasex-
ecuted:

referto thedocumentin thepresenttense;
(ii) The will mustexpressly

(iii) The will mustdescribethe documentto be incorporated so clearlythat
therc can be no mistakeas to the identitv of the documentreferredto;
and

(iv) The testatormusthaveintendedto incorporatethe extrinsicdocumentas
part of the overall testamentaryplan.

Clarkv. a. Notebookincorporated by r€ference- Clark v. Greenhalge,4l I Mass.
Greenhalge 4lo, 582N.E.2d949(1991).

1) Facts.Testatrix,HelenNesmith(T), executeda will in l9?7 nam-
ing Greenhalge (D) executorandpdncipalbeneficiaryof anyper-
sonalpropertyexceptthat designatedby a memorandumknown to
D or in accordwith T's wishesasexpressed duringT's life. D had
helpedTdraft a documententided"Memorandum"in 1972;T modi-
fied this list of specificbequests from time to time.T wishedher
friend Clark (P) to havea painting and so listed it in a notebookT
kept. T's nursesknew of her wish for P to have the painting and
knew of the notebookand had observedT write in it. T executed
two codicilsin 1980;T amendedsomebequestsandratifiedher
will in all otherrespects. UponT's death,D wasgivenT's note-
book.D distdbutedT's propertyin accordwith thewill asamended,
the 1972memorandum, andcefiainof the provisionsin thenote-
book,includingall of thepropertybequeathed to him in the not€-
book.Howevetherefusedto giveP thepainting.P commenced an
actionto compelDto deliverthepainting.Theprobatecowt found:
(i) T wishedP to havethepainting,(ii) thenotebookwasa memo-
randumwithin the meaningof T's will, (iii) the notebookwasin
existence at thetimeof thecodicils,whichntified thelanguage of
the will in its entirety,and(iv) the notebookwasincorporated by
rcferenceinto the tems of the will. D appeals.

2) Issue.WasT's notebookincorpomtedby referenceinto the terms
of T's will?

40 - Wills
3) Ileld. Yes.Judgmentaffirmed

a) A will may incorporateby referenceanydocumentnot soexecuted
andwitnessed ifit wasin existencewhenthewill wasexecuted and
is identified by clear andsatisfactoryproof asthe paperrefenedto
in thewill.

b) Thecardinalrule in theintelpretationof wills is thatthe intentionof
the testatorshallprcvail.T's languageandthe circumstances sur-
rcundingthe executionof T's will and codicils are used to deter-
mineT's intent.

c) T intendedto retain the right to alter and amendher bequestsof
tangiblepersonalpropertyin her will withouthavingto formally
amendthewill. The mechanism T chosewasa memorandum, and
the notebook,althoughnot titled "Memorandum," hasas its pul-
poseandis in the spidt of T's intent.T is not limited to only one
memomndum.

d) Havingbeenin existence at thetime T executedher codicils,that
rcpublishingof T's intent incorponted the notebookby reference.

b. Validationof inoperativewill by holographiccodicil--Johnsonv. John- Johnsonv.
son,279P2dc28(Okla.1954). Johnson

1) Facts.The will of the decedent, DexterG Johnson(T), consisted of a
singlesheetof paper with threetypewrittenparagraphs.The typewritten
portionwasnot dated,signed,or attested by two witnesses.At thebot-
tomofthe t)?ewritten portion,T wrotein his a
handwriting $10 bequest
to his brother James.The prcpofientsof the will introducedevidence
showirigthatT wasa practicingattomeywho hadpreparedmanywills;
that he had told his inswancecounselorthat he hada will but it wasout
of dat€;that he hadtold his rentalagentthat the typewdtteninsffument
was his will and that he wantedhis rental agentto witnessit; that his
rentalagentdid not do so but laterT told him thathe hadchangedhis
will by codicilanddid notneedhim to signit asa witness.Thetdalcourt
refusedto admit the instrumentto probate.The appellatecourt affirmed
The proponentsappeal.

2) Issue.May a validholographiccodicilrepublishandvalidatea will that
wastheretoforeinopentive becauseit wasnot signed,dated,or attested
accordingto law?

3) Held.Yes.Judgment reversed with directionsto
andthecaseremanded
enterthe will for probate.

a) Thereis noquestionthatthetypew tteninstrument wasnot signed,
dat€d,or A
aftested. will may be so defective,as here,that it is not

Wills - 4l
entitledto probate,but if testamentaryin characterit is a
will nonetheless.

b) By definitiona codicilis a supplement to anexistingwill
madeby the testatorto alter,enlarge,or restrict its provi-
sionsandit mustbe testamentary in chamcterA codicil
neednot be calleda codicil;rather,it is the intentionto
add a codicilthat is controllilg. Here,the handwritten
words arc testamentaryin characterand they make an
additionto theprovisions ofthe will alrcadyin existence'
Further,thecodicilmeetsall therequirements of a valid
hologaphiccodicil.It is wdtten,dated,and signed by T.
The fact that it waswritten on the samepieceof paperas
thetypewdttenwill doesnot invalidatethecodicil.

c) The generalrule is that a codicilvalidly executedoper-
atesasa republicationof the will no matterwhat detbcts
mayhaveexistedin theexecutionof theeadierdocument,
that the instrumentsare incorporatedas one, and that a
propetexecutionof the codicilextendsalsoto the will.
We thereforehold thatthe valid holographiccodicilin-
corporatedtheprior will by referenceandrepublishedand
validatedtheprior will asof thedateof thecodicil.

4) Concurrence. All rules of constuction are designedfor the
purposeof effectuatingthe intent of the testatorTo hold other-
wisewouldpermita contrarydispositionof thetestator'sprop-
eny againstthepurposefor which the statutoryprcvisionswere
aimed.

5) Dissenl Thetypewdttenpartis not a will andthehandwritten
partis not a codicil.T intendedthe typewrittenportionio be
partof his will, not thecompletedwill. I canneversubscribe
to the propositionthat a holographiccodicil will validateasa
will an instumentthat is typewritten,unfinished,undated,
unsigned,andunattested.Propertymay descendby will when
the will is executedin confomity with the statutes

4, Acts of Independent Signiffcance.Under the (JPc, a will may dispose
of propertyby referenceto actsandeventsthat have significanceapart
madein the will (e.9.,"I devise
from their effecton the dispositions
Blackacreto thepersonsnamedasbeneficiaries in my sister'swill.")

D. CONTRACTS RELATING TO WILLS

Conhactsto makea will, contractsnot to revokea will, andcontactsnot to
pertainingto wills. In theseinstances,
makea will arekindsof contracts the

42 - WiUs
law of contractsapplies.A will in violationof a validcontractmadeby thetesta-
tor,whileit maybe probated, will be subjectto contactualremedies(e.9.,impo-
trust).
sitionof constructive

l. Contracts to Make a Will. Many stateshaveenactedstatutesrcquiring that a
contractto makea gift by will be in writing lf the promisorfails to makethe
promisedtestamentary gift, the promiseehasa causeof actionagainstthe
promisor's estatefor damagesfor breachof contract The measureof dam-
agesis the valueof the propertypromisedto be devisedor bequeathed.How-
ever,if the caseinvolvesa promiseto makea deviseor bequestof specific
prope.ty,the usualrcmedyis to grant a consfuctive tlust for the promisee's
benefit.
,, typicallyarisewhena hus-
ContractsNot to Revokea Will. Thesecontracts
bandandwife haveexecuted joint or mutualwills A numberof stateshave
enactedstatutes rcquiringthatany agreement relatingto a will, includinga
contractnottorevokeawill, be in a writingexecutedwith certainformalities
The mereexecutionol reciprocalwills containingidenticalprcvisionsdoes
not constituteevidencethatthewills werecontractual.

Joint Wills. A joint will is the will of two or morc pefionsexecutedas a
singletestamentaiyinstrument.In contrastto j oint wills, reciprocalwills, some-
timescalledmirrorwills, areseparate wills of two or morcpersons containing
reciprocalprovisions.

a. Elective share in conflict with will contract-'Via v. Putnam' 626 So. \4a v.
2d 460Gla. 1995). Putnam

1) Facts.EdgarandJoannPutnamexecuted mutualwills contracting
thatthesurvivornotdo anythingto defeatthedistributionschedule
setforth therein.The wills devisedthespouse's entircestateto the
survivor andthe residuaryestateto thechildrenuponthe su ivor's
death.After Joanndied,Edgarrcmafiied anddid not executea sub-
sequent will providingfor his newwife,RachelPutnam(P).Upon
Edgar'sdeath,P filed a petitionto determine the shareof a preter-
mittedspouseandanelectionto takeherelectivesharc.The chil-
drenof thefirst marriage(Ds)filed claimsagainsttheestatealleging
thatby marryingagain,Edgarhadviolatedhis contractnot to de-
featthe distributionschedule setforth in his mutualwill. The rial
judgefoundthatthemutualwill constituted a bindingcontractand
Ds werethird-partybenehciaries to that contract.Summaryjudg-
mentwasentercdfor Ds,who werefoundto be class7 obligations
under Florida Law (third-party beneficiaries/crcditorstatus),and
thejudgeconclldedthatP's pretemittedor electiveshareis sub-
iectto theclass7 obligationsof theestate. Theseconddisrict cowt
of appealreversed, acknowledging thatits decisionconflictswith

Wills - 43
thethirddistrict'stuli ngin Johnsottu Girtman,542So2d 1033(Fla 3dDCA
1989).Ds appeal.

Issue.Shouldtheclaimsof the decedent's childrenasthird-partybeneficia-
riesunderthemutualwills of their parents
be givencreditorstatusunderFlodda
law whentheirinterestscontravene theintercstsof the survivingspouseun-
der the pretermittedspousestatute?

Held. No. Judgmentaffirmed.

a) We agreewith thedistrictcourt'srelianceon the reasoning in S,nnp u
Huff,315Md . 624,556A.2d252(1989),a caseidenticalto thisone.The
Si/imp court found the public policy underlyingthe mariage relation-
shipandtheelectivesharcstatuterequiredit to rule in favor of prctecting
thesurr'ivingspouse'sright to receiveanelectiveshare.The district cout
found that Florida's statutesalso suggestthe samestrongpublic policy.
The third districtin "/ortrsortook the view thatthe survivingspouse's
statutorysharecanbe subordinatedto claimsof third-partybeneficiaries
of previouslyexecutedmutualwills. ./o/irsonandothersimilarrulings
have advancedfour rationalesfor giving priority to contractbeneficia-
ries:(i) thesurvivingspouse's rightsattachonly to propertylegallyand
equitablyownedby the deceased spouse,andthe will contractplaces
equitabletitlein theconftactbeneficiary; (ii) whenthesurvivingtestator
acceptsbenefitsunderthecontractualwill, anequitableftust on dle Fop-
erty is createdin lavor of theconttactbeneficiaries: the testatoris en-
titled only to a life estateandthe beneficiariestakethe rcmainderupon
the testator'sdeath;(iii) whenthe suryivingtestatorbenefitsunderthe
contractualwill, the testatorbecomesestoppedfrom making a different
dispositionof the property,despitea latermaniage:and(iv) whenthe
survivingtestatorbreaches the will conftact,the beneficiades areen-
titled to judgment Under
creditor status. these theories,the duation of
the mariage makesno difference.

b) We, like the covl in Shrimp,recognizethe well-established principle
that contractsthat discourageor restrainthe right to marry are void as
againstpublicpolicy.

c) TheFloddalegislature setforththreespecificcircumstances whenapre-
termittedspousewould not be entidedto a share of the estate:
decedent's
(i) whenthe spousehasbeenprovidedfor or waivedprovisionby pre-
rluptial or postnuptialagre€ment;(ii) whenthe spouseis providedfor in
thewill; and(iii) whenthewill statesanintentionnot to providefor the
spouse. Thetrial courtfoundnoneof th€seexceptions appliedForusto
hold otherwisewould amendthe statutoryexceptionsand add a fourth.
Wehaveno authorityto do so.

44 - Wills
V. WIL ST]BSTITUTES

A. CONTRACTSWITHPAYABLE-ON-DEATHPROVISIONS

L. Life Insurance.Theissuein thesecasesincludeswhethera beneficiarr
of a life insurancepolicy canbe changedby will. A majorityof courts
hold thatif the policy requireswrittennoticeof changeof beneficiary
filed with theinsuancecompany,th€beneficiaryof a life insurancepolicy
maynot be changedby will.

t NontestamentaryTransfers at Death. Under the UPC, wdtten agree-
mentsto pay,after the deathof the decedent,moneyor otherbenefitsto
a persondesignated by thedecedent in eithertheinstrument
or a separate
writing aredeemedto be nontestamentary.

Successor BeneficiaryNot Permittedin Life Insurance Contract-- Wilhoit v.
Wilhoit v. PeoplesLife InsuranceCo.,218F.2d887(7thCir 1955). Peoples Life
Insurance Co.
a. Facts.RoleyWilhoit was the insuredof a $5,000life insurance
policyissuedbyCenturyLife andreinsuredby PeoplesLife (Dl).
After Roley'sdeathin 1930,SarahWilhoit,his widow andbenefi-
ciary,arrangedto leavetheamountdueheron depositwith Dl on
specifiedterms,includingthatuponherdeathanyremainingfunds
plusaccruedinterestwouldbe paidto herbrothet RobertOwens.
RobertOwensdied in 1932leavingall his propertyby will to
ThomasOwens(D2). Sarahwilhoit died in 1951.Her will pur-
portedto leavethe fundson depositwith Dl to RobertWilhoit
(P). Both P andD2 claimthe funds;D1 refusedto recognizeP's
claim.The district court grantedP's motion for summaryjudg-
ment,andD2 appeals.

b. Issue.Wherethe proceeds of a life insurancepolicy areto be dis-
posedofin accordance with its provisions,
maya beneficiary of the
policy designatea successorbeneficialy to take uponthe deathof
theprimarybeneficiary?

c. Held. No. Judgmentaffirmed.

l) Ds relyoncasesthathaveheldthattheproceeds ofa life insur-
ancepolicyareto bedisposed of in accordance with its provi-
sions,andthata beneficiary, if authorizedby thepolicy,may
designatea successorbeneficiaryto take on the deathof the
primary beneficiary.This contenilonis without merit if we do
not acceptthe premisethat the agreementbetweenSarah
Wilhoit andthecompanywasaninsurancecontractor anagrce'
mentthereto.Werejectthis premiseandhold that the arrange-

Wills- 45
mentbetweenthepartieswastheresultof a sepanteandindepen-
dentagrcement,
unrelated
to thetermsofthe policy.

2) SarahWilhoitdid nottakeadvantage ofthe investment provisionin
theinsurance policyby whichshecouldhave left theproceedswith
the companyon the termsandconditionsstatedtherein.Instead,
she acceptedthe proceedsand surenderedthe policy. Only later
did sheby lettermakeherownproposal, whichwasaccepted by the
companyon conditionsthatdifferedmateriallyfrom thosecontained
in thepolicy.We agreewith B the.eforc,thatthe provisionin the
agreement by which RobertOwenswasto take the fundsin the
eventofher deathwasaninvalidtestamentary disposition.

3) Finally,it is not immaterialto takeinto consideration the inten-
tions of the parties.Here,SarahWilhoit in her will specifically
devisedthefundsin controversy to P Itthus appea$plainthatshe
did not intendthefundsto go to the successors of RobertOwens
but thar,afterhis death,shethoughtshehada right to disposeof
the fundsasshesawfit. While we recognizethatthe intentionof
the partiesis not controlling,we think that it is entitledto some
considemtion.

Estateof 4. InvestmentClub Proceeds-Estate
of Hillowitz,22N.y2d 107.238N.E.2d
Hillowitz 723,291N.y.S.2d325( 1968\.

a. Facts,AbrahamHillowitz's (T's) executors(Ps)brcughta discoverypro-
ceedingin surrogate courtagainstT's widow (D) to havedetermined
whetherT'sinvestment clubcontractto havehis sharepaidto his widow
uponhisdeathwasaninvalidattemptto makea testamentary disposition
of property.The surrogatecout ruled for D; the appellatedivision for
Ps.D appeals.

b. Issue.Is a partnershipagreementproviding that, upon the deathof one
partnethisjntercstshallpassto thesurvivingpartneror partneff,resting
in contract,valid?

c. Held.Yes.Orderreversed.

1) Thereis no differencebetweena contractprovi.lingfor surviving
paftne(s)andoneprovidingfor a survivingwidow.

2) Thisis a third-partybeneficiary
contract,performableat death,and
it neednot confom to therequirements of thestatuteof wills.

3) Othersuchcontractsinclude(i) a contractto makea will. (ii) an
intervivosftustin whichthe settlorrcservesa life estate.and(iii)
aninsurance policy.

46 ' Wills
5. Changeof B€neffciary of Life Insurance Policy by Will--Cook v. Equita. Cookv.
ble Life AssuranceSociety,428N.E.2d110(Ind.App. 1981). EquitableLife
Assurance
a, Facts.The decedent, DouglasCook(T), hadpurchased a wholelife in-
surance policy in 1953 naminghis wife at thattime,Doris, asthebenefi
ciary In 1965,T andDorisweiedivorced.The divorcedecrcemadeno
prcvisionregarding theinsurancepolicy.AfterthedivorceT ceased pay-
ing the premiumson his life insurance policy,andthe inswancecom-
panynotifiedhim in 1965thathis wholelife policy wasautomatically
convenedto a paid-upterm policy.The policy containeda provision
allowingtheownerto changethebeneficiary by writtennoticeprovided
thatthe changeis endoNedon thepolicyby theinsurance company.ln
1965, T married Maryarct,anda son,Daniel, was bom to them.In 1976,
T madea holographicwill in whichhebequeathed his insurancepolicy
to his wife andson.

T's insurerbroughtaninterpleaderactionto determinewhetherT's former
wife, Doris,the namedbeneficiaryon the life insurancepolicy,or T's
widow andchild,MargarctandDaniel,to whomT hadbequeathed the
insurance policy in a holographicwill, wereentitledto the proceeds
of
T's policy.The circuitcourtentercdsummaryjudgmentin favorof T's
formerwife, andwidowandchildappeal.

b. Issue.Can a beneficiaryof a life insurancepolicy be changedby the
intentasexpressed
testator's in his will?

Held. No. Judgmentaffirmed.

1) An insured'sattemptto changethebeneficiaryof a life insurance
policyby will, withoutmore,is ineffectual.

2) It is in theinterestof inswancecompanies to requircandto follow
specifiedprocedures in thechangeof beneficiaries sothattheymay
paybenefitsto persons properlyentitledto themwithoutsubjecting
themselves to claimsby othe6 of whose.ightsthey hadno notice
or knowledge.Theseprocedules arealsoin theinterestof benefi-
ciadesthemselves, sinceinsumncecompanies will not feel obli-
gatedto withholdpayment until a will hasbeenprobated, in fearof
litigationthatmightresultfrom havingpaidthewrongpafy.

3) Substantialcompliancewith therequirementsof aninsurancepolicy
will be sufficientto changea beneficiaryaslong astheinsuredhas
doneeverythingin his powerto effectsucha change.Underthese
facts,thercis no indicationthatT took any actionin the 14 years
betweenhis divorcefrom Dorisandhis death,otherthanthe mak-
policy
of hislife insurance
ing of thewill, to changethebeneficiary

Wills - 47
from Doris to MargaretandDaniel.If T hadwantedto change
the beneficiary he hadampletime andoppofiunity to comply
with thepolicyrequirements.

4) Publicpolicy requiresthattheinsurer,insured,andbeneficiary
shouldbe ableto rely on the certaintythatpolicy provisions
pertainingto the namingand changingof beneficiaries will
control exceptin extremesituations.

B. JOINT TENANCY AND MULTIPLE-PARTY BANK ACCOUNTS
1. Tlpes ofAccounts.Multiple-paftybankaccounts
includejointandsur-
payable-on-death
vivor accounts, accounts,agencynccounts,andsav-
lngsaccounttrusts.

Franklin v. 2. Joint BankAccount:Lack ofDonativeIntent-Franklin v.Anna Na-
AnnaNational tionalBankofAnna, l40Ill. App.3d 533,488N.E.2dlllT (1986).
BankofAnna
a. Facts.Theexecutorofthedecedent's estatebroughtanactionagainst
the bank allegingthat fundsin a joint savingsaccountwerc the
propertyof the estate.The bank interpleadedthe decedent'ssister-
inlaw, Cora Goddard,who assertedher dght to the money as a
survivingjointowner.

The decedenthadhadeyesurgeryand,accordingto Goddard,was
losinghiseyesight. Coddardsubsequently movedin with thedece-
dentto helphim. Goddardclaimsthat sheandthe decedentwentto
thebankto havehismoneyputin boththeirnamessoshecouldget
moneywhentheyneededit.Sheallegesthat"hewantedmeto have
this moneyif I outlivedhim." Goddardtestifiedthat shedid not
depositanymoneyin thesavingsaccountto which sheandthede-
cedenthadsigneda signaturecard.Shemadeno withdrawals,though
sheonce took the decedentto the bank so he could make a with-
drawal.Later in the year Enola Fmnklin (P) beganto carefor the
decedent.The decedentsentP to the bank to deliver a handwdtten
letter signedby the decedentin which he attemptedto changethe
nameof thejoint ienantto P The bank,however,would not remove
a signaturefrom a signaturecard basedon a letter.Thus, the most
recentsignatuecardthebankhadfor thesavingsaccountwassigned
by the decedentandcoddard.

The trial coult found that Goddardwasthe soleownerof the funds
in the savingsaccountby dght of survivo$hipas survivingjoint
tenant,andthat no part of the funds becarnepart of the decedent,s
estate.P arguesthatthe decedentdid not intendto makea gift of the
savingsaccountto Goddard.After remandby the appellatecourt,
the circuit court enteredjudgmentfor Goddard.P appeals.

48 - Wills
b. Issue,Doesevidenceof lackofdonativeintentat thetime of creationol
severlhejoinl tenancy?
ajointlenancy

c. ofthe circuitcoul reversecl
Held.Yes.Judgment

1) Theinstumentcreatingajoint tenancyaccountpresumably speaks
the whole truth. In orderto go behindth€ tems of ajoint tenancy
agreement,oneclaiming adverselytheretohasthe burdenof estab'
liihing by clearandconvincing evidencethata gift wasnotintended

2) The form of ajoint tenancyagreement is not conclusiveregarding
the intentionof the depositofi betweenthemselves'

3) Evidenceof lack of donativeinteflt mustrelateback to the time of
crcationof thejoint tenancy.The decisionof the donor' madesub-
sequentto the creationof thejoint tenancy,that he did not want the
pr;ceedsto passto the survivorwould not, in itself, be sufficientto
severthejoint tenancy.

4) It is properto considerev€ntsoccurringaftercreationof thejoint
accountin determiningwhetherthedonoractuallyintendedto hans-
fer his interestin theaccountat hisdeathto thesurvivingjointten-
ant.

5) Evidencethat,ninemonthsafteraddinghis sister-in-law's nameto
his savingsaccount,thedecedenthadattemptedto rcmoveher name
and substituteanotherand that the decedenthad written lettersto
the bank indicatingthathe might losehis sightandbe unableto
transacthis own bankingbusiness, establishedthat the deceden!
hadmadehis sister-in-law a signatoryof thejoint accountfor his
ownconvenience, in casehecouldnot gethis money,andnot with
the intent to effect a presentgift lt doesnot appearthat Goddard
everexercisedanyauthorityor control over thejoint account Such
evidence thusestablished that,uponthedecedent's death,moneyin
thejoint accountwasthe propefiy of the decedent'sestate'

3. StockCertilicatesHeld in Joint Ten^ncy.lt\Blanchette v Blanchette,362
Mass.518,287N.E.2d459 (1972),Robert Blanchette worked for AI&T and
beganto buy shares ofstockin thecompany. Whenhe acquiredtheshares, he
toldhis wife,Marie,thatheputthemin both theirnames asjoint tenantsThe
certificateswereissuedat his request:"RobertL. Blanchette& Mrs Marie A
Blanchette, JointTenants."Heexecuted assignmentsto himselfandMarie"as
JointTenantswith rightsof survivorshipandnot asTenantsin Common-"
Robertnevertold Made that sheownedhalf the stock.The certificateswere
kept in the wardrobeof thei bedroomup to the time they separated:atlhat
timeMariedemanded oneofthe two bankbooks but did not askfor anyof the
stock.No evidenceexistedthatshemadeanyclaim to the stockbeforethe

Wills - 49
parties'divorce.Marie broughta petition in connectionwith the divorce
to detemine her interestin the stock.The petition wasrcfered to a mas-
ter,who heldthatRobertneverat anytime indicatedthathe intendedto
transferanyprcsentinterestin the stockto his wife. The masterfound
that the words"joint tenants"werc usedbecausethis wasthe only form
of issuanceauthorizedby thecompanythat would approximateRobert's
desireto makehis wife his beneficiaryif he died. On appeal,the court
deteminedthatcertificates ofstockheldinjoint tenancybetweena hus-
band and wife may be paid to the wife upon the deathof the husband
without the arrangementbeingdeclaredtestamentaryandvoid.

Thecourtfoundthattheintentionwasclearthatthehusband wasto have
solecontrol during his life andthat whatevershouldremainat his death,
ifthe wife survived,shouldripenintofull ownershipby her Thefinding
that no presentgift wasintendedwould havethe effect of frustratingthe
intentionof the ptutiesby renderingtheir arrangementtestamentaryand
void. The court avoidedthis result by finding a presentgift of a futule
interest,subjectto a reservedlife estatein the husbandandsubjectto his
powerto revokehis wife'sinterest.

c. JOINT TENANCIES IN LAND

Onecommonmethodof avoidingthe cost and delayof probateis to hold
propertyin joint tenancyor tenancyby the entirety.Whenonejoint tenantor
tenantby the entiretydies,the survivorownsthe propertyoutright.The share
of ajoint tenantcannotbe devisedby will. If ajoint tenantdoesnot wantthe
co-tenantto takehis shareat death,hemust severthejoint tenancyduring his
lifetime,thuscrcatinga tenancyin common.Credito$of ajoint tenantcan
Ieachthejoint tenant'sinterestonly dudnghis life.

D. REVOCABLE TRUSTS

1. Intmduction. In a revocabletrustthe settlorhasthe powerto revoke,
alter, or amendthe aust and has the right to trust income during her
lifetime.Revocabletnrstsarcvalidin all jurisdictions.

2. Retention of Control by Settlor. If the settlorretainsnumercuspowers
andlacksthetrueffust "intent," thetrustmay beruled illusory.However,
aslong asthe trust createssomeinterestsin somecategoryof beneficia-
ries, couts will rerognizea valid nontestamentary tust eventhoughthe
settlorrctainsextensive powers.

Farkasv. a. Creationof valid inter vivostrust notwithstandingcontrol re.
Williams tained by settlor/trustee-Farkas v. Willi ams,5 lll. 2d 4l'7 , 125
N.E.2d600(l955).

l) Facts.Albeit B. Farkas,whodiedintestate, on four
Durchased

50 - Wills
occasions duringhis life thestockoflnvestorsMutual,Inc.,insftuctingit, by
meansof a wdttenapplication, to issuethe stockin his name.,astnisteefor
RichardJ. Williams." Farkasalso signedseparatedeclarationsof trust, all of
which wereidenticalexceptasto dates.In eachof thesedeclarations,Farkas
reservedto himselfas settlorthe followingpowels:(i) the dght to receive
during his lifetime all cashdividends;(ii) the right at any time to changethe
beneficiaryor revokethe trust; and (iii) upon saleor redemptionof any por-
tion of the trustproperty,theright to retainthe proceedstherefromfor his own
use.The co-administratorsof the estate(Ps)bring this actionto havedeclared
theirlegalrightsin thefour stockcertificates. Thecircuitcourtfoundthatthc
declarationswerc testamentaryin characterand, not having beenexecuted
with the formalities of a will, were invalid, and directed that the stock be
awardedto Ps as assetsof the estaleof Albert Farkas.The aDDellatecoun
affirmed.WilliamsandlnvestorsMutualI Dsl appeal.

2) Issues.

a) Doesthe fact that the interestof a beneficiaryis contingentupon a cer-
tain stateof factsexistingat thetime of the settlor'sdeathindicatethat
no prcsentinterestis acquiredin the subjectmatterof a tust, andhence
rcndera tust insfument testamentaryin character?

b) Doesthe rctentionof power by a settlorto sell or redeemstockandkeep
theproceedsfor his own use,to changethebeneficiary,andto rcvokethe
trust indicatethat the settlor hasretainedsuchcontuolover the subiect
matterofa trustsoaslo rendera trustinsfumenlteslamenlarv in chara(_
ter?

3) Held. a) No. b) No. Judgmentreversedandremanded.

a) Williams acquircda presentinterestin the subjectmatterof the intended
tusts. Farkas,irDmediatelyafterexecutionof theseinstruments, could
not dealwith thestockthesameasifhe ownedthepropertyabsolutely.
As trustee,Farkasis heldto haveintendedto takeon thoseoblisations
that areexpresslysetout in the instrument, as well as thosefiJuciarv
obligationsimpliedby law.

(l) The fact that the trust instrumentprovidesthat .,thedeceaseof the
beneficiarybefore my deathshall operateas a revocationof thrs
trust" doesnot changethe result. The dispositionis not testamet-
tary and the intendedtrust is valid eventhoughthe interestof the
beneficiafyis contingentuponthe existenceof a certainstateof
facts at the time of the settlor,sdeath.
(2) Admittedly,absentthis prcvision,Williams,sinterestwouldhave
beengreater.But to saythathisinterestwouldhavebeengreateris
not to saythathe did not havea beneficialinterestdurinsthelife_
timeof Farkas.

W ills- :
b) Farkasdid not retain such contol over the subjectmattgr of the
trust as to rcnderthe trustinsfumentstestamentary in character.
The retentionby the s€ttlorof the powe. to revoke,evenwhen
coupledwith a rcservationof a life interestin the trust property,
doesnotrenderthetrustinoperative for wantofexecutionof a will.

(l) A moredifficult problemis posedby the fact rhatFarkasis
alsoftusteeandassuchis empowercd to vote,sell,andother-
wisedealin andwith thesubjectmatterof thetrusts.Here,the
controlreservedis not as greatas in thosecaseswherethe
powerisrcservedtotheownerassettlor,for astrusteehemust
conducthimselfin accordance with standards applicableto
trusteesgenerally.Williamswould havehad an enforceable
claimagainstFarkas'sestatewereFarkasto haveimproperly
dissipated
thestock.

(2) Anotherfactorin determining whetheranintervivostust ex-
istsis tle fomality of thetnnsaction.Here,the stockceitifi-
catesin questionwereissuedin Farkas,snameastrusteefor
Williams.He thus manifested his intentionin a solemnand
fonnal manner

In re Estate b. Inter vivos trust revoked-/r, /e Estate and Trust of pilafas. 172Ariz. 207.
andTrust 836P.2d420 (1992).
of Pilafas
1) Facts.Thedecedent, StevenPilafas(T),executeda trustappoinring him-
selftrustee.Theagreement directedthatuponT's death,a poitionofthe
ftustestatewouldbe distributedto eightnonprofitorganizations (ps).
Theremainingportionwasto be heldin vtuioustrusts.Two of T's chil_
drenwereexplicitlyomitted.Thetrustincludeda revocation/amendment
provisionthatT exercised twice.On theoccasionof thesecondamend_
mentin 1987,afterT's divorce,T simultaneously executeda will that
gavetheresidueofhis estateto thetrust.Subsequently, T,s relationships
wrlh his childrenfDst rmproved. Duringthe lastmonthof hls life,T
indicatedto his attomeyhis intentionto revisehis estateplanto include
all hischildren. T s arrome)hadgivenf theoriginals;fthelrust.the
amendments, andthe will immediatelyaftertheywereexecuted. Upon
T s dealh. T s sonunsuccesslully searched T s houselor rhedocumenrs.
Ds testifiedthatT fastidiouslysavedimportantdocumentsandthatT
wasa manofdirectactionwhohadbeenknownto tearor discardDaDers
thirroffended him.T s sonfrleda petitionfor appoinrmenr of a ipecial
administatoranda specialtrustee,a petitionfor adjudication of intes_
tacyanddetermination ofrevocationof fust, andaskedthecoultto au_
thorizehim to transferall trustassets ps objected,seeknga
to T's estate.
determination thatT hadrevokedneitherhis will nor thetrust.Thetdal
coufi grantedDs' motion for summaryjudgment.ps appeal.

52 - Wills
2) Issues.

a) Did D presentsufficientevidencethatT revokedhis will?

b) Did the trial court en in determiningthat T effectively revokedhis
inter vivos trust?

3) Held. a) Yes.Ruling affirmed.b) Yes Ruling reversed.

a) Ds' argumentrelieson the commonlaw principlethatif a will is
last seenin a testator'spossessionand cannotbe found after his
death,thereis a prcsumptionthat the testatordestroyedthe will'

b) Ds submittedaffidavitstendingto provethat(i) T took possession
kept importantpapers,and (iii) a
of his will, (ii) he meticulously
diligentsearchdid not uncoverthewill Ps offeredno evidenceto
rebut.

c) A ttust, unlike a will, involves the presenttransfer of a property
interestto beneficiaries.Theseinterestscanonly be takenfrom the
beneficiaries (i) in accordwith a trustprcvision'(ii) by their own
acts,or (lii) bYa courldecree

d) T's trust providedfor revocationonly by written insfument'

e) ln accordwith ihe Restatement (Second)of Torts,section330, ard
accompanying we holdthatT couldonly revokehis trust
coinrnentary'
in thernannerprovidedfor in thetrustinstrumentlf a settlorrese es
a powerto levokethe tlust by a transacdoninter vivos, for example'
bt a noticeto thetustee, he cannotrevokehis tust by his will'

Cr€ditors may rcach trust assetsover which the settlor had control at the StateStreet
time of his death--State Strtet Bank & Trust Co. v. Reiser' 7 Mass App Bank & Trust
ct. 633.389N.E.2d768(1979). Co. v. Reiser

1) Facts.The decedent, WilfredA. Dunnebier(T), createdan inter vivos
trust with the power to amendor rcvoke the trust, and conveyedto the
trustthe capital stockof five closelyheld corpomtions lrnmediatelyfol-
lowing the executionof the trust,T executeda will underwhich he left
his rcsiduaryestateto the tust he hadestablishedThereafter,T applied
to theStateStreetB ank& TrustCo.(P)for a loan,whichwaslatergranted'
Approximatelyfour monthsafterheborowed the money,T died andhis
esiite hadinsufficient assetsto pay theentireindebtedness duethebank'
P seeksto reachthe assetsof the inter vivos trust'

2) Issue.Whena settlorplacesPropertyin trust,may the settlor'screditors
reachthoseassetsownedby the trust over which the settlorhad control
at the time of his death?

Wills- 53
3) Held,Yes.Soordered.

a) We hold that wherca personplacespropertyin trustandrc-
servestheright to amendandrevoke,or to directdisposition
of principalandincome,the settlor'screditorsmay reach,in
satisfactionof thesettlor'sdebtsto them.thoseassets
owned
by thetrustoverwhichthesettlorhadsuchcontrolat thetime
ofhis deathaswouldhaveenabledthe settlorto usethetrust
asselsfor his own benefil.

b) Assetsthatpouroverinto sucha trustasa consequence ofthe
settlor'sdeathoverwhichthesenlordid not havecontroldur-
ing his life arenot subjectto thereachofcredito$.

4) Comment.If probateassetsare insufficient,UPC section6-215
allowscreditorsto reacha decedent's
Davable-on-death
accounts
andhisjoint bankaccounts.

3. Testamentaryr?our-Over" into an Inter Vivos Tiust. Pour-overwills are
usefulto establish
anintervivostrust,whichlatermergesinto theestateafter
the deathof the settlor.The settlorcreatesa revocableinter vivos trustby
narninga tustee andthentransferingprobateassets to thattrustee.Theseft-
lor thenexecutesa will devisingtheresidueofhis estateto thetrustee,to hold
askusteeunderthe termsof the trust.

a. Uniform TestamentaryAdditions to Tfusts Act. This Act validatesa
testamentary gift to a trustprovidedthetrustis sufficiendydescribedin the
testator'swill. The hustinshurnentmaybe executedafterthe will. This is
so whetherthe trust wascreatedby the testatoror by a third p€rsonand
whetherit wasmodifiableor in fact modified.The sizeandextentof the
tlust corpusduringthe testator'slifetime is likewiseirnmaterial.The Act
specificallyvalidatesgifts to eitherfundedor unfundedlife insurancetrusts,
evenif thetestatorhasreserved all rightsof ownershipin thepolicies.

Clymer b. Effect of divorceon yalidity ofdispositionsto former spousemade
v Mayo by revocableint€r vivostrust-.Clymerv. Mayo, 393Mass.754,473
N.E.2d1084(1985).

1) Facts.The decedent, ClaraMayo (T), diedin 1981.Shehadbeen
marriedto JamesMayo (D) from 1953to 1978.The couplehadno
children,andT's soleheirsat law areherparents(Pls).As a conse-
quenceof a $300,000gift to thecouplefrom T's parentsin 1971,
sheandDexecuted newwills andindentuesof trustin 1973wherein
eachspousewasmadetheother'sprincipalbeneficiary. Underthe
termsof T's will, D wasto rcceiveherpe$onalproperty.Thercsi-
dueof herestatewasto "pour over"into the inter vivos trustshe
createdthat samedav.

54 - Wills
T's tust insffumentnamedherselfandJohnHill asaustees.As thedonor,'l
retainedthe right to amendor revokethe tust at any time by written instru-
mentdelivercdto the tustees. In the eventthat D survivedT, the tust estate
wasto be divided into two parts.TrustA wasthe madtal deductiontrust' The
balanceof T's estate,or theentireestateif D did not surviveher,composed
Trust B. Trust B provided for five specific bequests.After those gifts were
satisfied,the remainingtmst assetswere to be held for the benefit of D for
life. UponD's death,theassets in TrustB wercto beheldfor thebenefitof T's
nephews andnieces living at thetimeof herdeath.Whenall of thesenephews
andniecesreach€dthe ageof 30, the trust wasto terminateandits remaining
assetswercto be dividedequallybetweenClarkUniversityandBostonUni-
versity.

TheMayosdivorcedon January3, 1978.The courtincorporated into the de-
creea stipulationof the parties' propetty settlementUnder the termsof that
settlement,D waivedanyright,tide, or interestin T's secudties, savingsac-
countsandcertificates,retirementfund, fumiture, andart.

Theadministrator ofT'sestate(P2)petitionedfor instuctionson theeffectof
T's divorceon theestate'sadministration. T's parentsbroughtactionsfor de-
claratory and equitablerelief to precludeD ftom participatingin the estate
andto removeP2.The probateandfamily courtdismissed P1s'action,and
appealwastaken.

2) Issues.

a) Did T createa valid trust despitethe fact that it wasnot fundeduntil her
death?

b) Doesa statutethat revokesany dispositionto a former spousemadeby
will apply to revoke dispositionsto the former spousemadeby a revo-
cableinter vivos trust that hasno funding or practical significanceuntil
thedecedent's death?

3) Ileld. a)Yes.b) Yes.Judgmentaffirmedin part,reversedin paft,andremanded'

a) In light of the Massachusetts statutegoveming'?our-over" deYises,T's
inter vivos trustexecutedcontemporaneously with her will was valid
despitethe fact that the trust did not receivefunding until her death.

b) Probatecourtsareempoweredto terminateor reform a tust in whole or
in part when its puposes have becomeimpossibleto achieveand the
settlor did not contemplatecontinuationof the fiust undernew circum-
stances.

c) D couldnot takeunderthetrustestablished by T' inasmuchassuchtransfer
was intendedby its terms to qualify for a marital deductionfor federal

Wills- 55
estatetax purposes,andsuchobjectivebecameimpossibleaf-
ter the parties'divorce.Thereforethe trust waseffectively ter-
minated.

d) Refercnceto an existingtrustin a will's pour-overclauseis
not of itself sufficient to incorporatethat trust by reference
withoutevidencethatthetestatorintendedthatresult.

The Massachusetts statutethatopemtedto rcvokeanydisposi-
tion to a former spouse"madeby the will" wasalsoapplicable
to revokedispositionsto a decedent'sdivorcedhusbandmade
in a revocableinter vivos tnrst executedcontemporaneously
with her will, inasmuchasthe trusthadno funding or practical
sisnificance until thedecedent's death.

0 InasmuchasT hadno siblings,andthushadno nephewsor
nieceswho wereblood relations,T's bequestin the indentue
of trustto "nephewsandniecesof thedonor"createda latent
ambiguity.The trial cowt thereforeproperly consideredex-
trinsic evidenceto determinethat T intendedthe bequeststo
go to thenephewsandniecesof D.

g) The statutethat operatedto revoke any testamentarydisposr-
tion to a former spousedid not apply to rcvokeT's bequestin
indentureof tust to D's niecesandnephews.

4. Useof RevocableTfusts in Estate Planning.

a. Consequencesduring life of settlor. Durisg the life of the settlor, a
rcvocabletrust may be usedto relievethe settlorof the burdensof finan-
cial management, to dealwith thecontingency ofthe settlor'sincompe-
tency,and to cladfy title andownershipof assets.Therc are no fedeml
taxadvantages in creatinga revocabletrust,sincetrustincomeis taxable
to thesettlorregardless of to whomit is paid.

b. Consequencesat death of settlor. Upon the deathof the settlor,a revo-
cabletrustcanbeusedto avoidprobate.Undera revocabletust continu-
ing afterthesettlor'sdeath,incomeandpincipal canbedisbursed to the
beneficiarieswithout significantdelay.In contrastto probale,thercis no
short-termstatuteof limitations applicableto revocabletruststo cut off
therightsof creditors.A rcvocablerust avoidspublicitysinceit is not
rccordedin a public place.To avoid ancillary probateover rcal propefiy
locatedoutsidethe domiciliary state,land in anotherstatecanbe trans-
fenedto a revocable intervivostrust.In somestates, thelaw mightper-
mit a fundedrevocabletrust to defeata spouse'selectivesharein certain
circumstances. An inter vivos tlust of penonalpropertymay be gov-
emedby thestatelaw ofthe settlor'schoice.In practice,it is mor€diffi-

56 - Wills
cult to setasidea revocabletrustthana will on groundsof lack of mental
capacityandundueinfluence.Finally,a revocabletrust that becomes
irrevocable uponthedeathoione spouse cantherebycontrolthesurviv-
ingspouse's of ptopen).
disposilion

5. Durable Power of Attorney. A duable power of attomey may be usedto
plan for incapacity.

Agent's action upheld--Franz€nv. Norwest Bank Colorado, 955P2d Franzenv.
1018(Colo.1998). NorwestBank
Colorado
r) Facts. Janes Franzencreateda tust for the benefit of himself and
his wife. FrancesFranzen.anddiedfour monthslater.Mrs. Franzen,
who wasliving in a nursinghome,wasadvisedbya NorwestBank
trust officer that pursuantto the trust instrument,threemonthsatter
herhusband's death,shecoulddirectthatthetrustcontinueor that
the residuary trust estatebe transfered to her. Mrs. Fmnzenindi-
catedshewishedthe trustto continuefor her lifetime.Concemed
because thetrustdid not includeMrs. Franzen'svacanthomeand
other assets,the bank contactedthe trust remaindermen, Mrs.
F@nzen's two nephews. They were reluctant
to intervene. James
O'Brien,Mrs.Franzen's brother,wasnot,howeverHe movedMrs.
Franzento Kentucky and providedthe bank with a power of attor-
neypurportingto authorizehimtoactin Mrs.Franzen's behalf,and
a letterattemptingto revoke the trust andrcmove the bankasfilstee.
Thebankfiled a petitionfor adviceandlatera petitionfor appoint-
ment of a conservator, askingthe probatecourl to protectMrs.
Franzen'sassets.The courtfoundthepowerof attomeyhadcrc-
ateda valid agency,but thatthe trustcontinuedin existence. The
bankwasappointedspecialfiduciarywith responsibilityfor both
tust and non-trustassetsand directedto usethe assetsto make
paymentsfor Mrs. Franzen'sbenefit.Mrs. Franzenappealed. The
courtof appeals reversed. Thebankappeals.

Issue. Under the commonlaw, must a power of attomeythat ap-
pearsto givetheagentsweepingpowersto dispose of theprincipal's
propertybe narrowlyconsfuedin light of the circumstances sur-
roundingtheexecutionof theagencyinstrument, andif so,maythe
principalconferon an agentauthorityto amendor revokefusts
withoutreferdngto thetrustsby namein thepowerof attomey?

1I affirmed.
Held.Yes.Judgment

a) The trustinstrumentprovidedthatafterher husband's death,
Mrs. Franzencouldremoveanytrusteewithoutcause.It fur-
therprovidedMr. Franzencould amendor revokethettustin
wholeor in partby a writingdeliveredto thetrusteeandafter

Wills - 57
death,Mrs. Franzencouldexercisethesepow-
Mr. Franzen's
erswith to theentirctrustestate.
respect

b) While underColorado'spowerof attomeystatuteanagentmay
notrevokeor amendaaustwithoutspecificauthorityandspe-
cific referenceto the trustin the powerof attomey,that statute
went into effect almosttwo yearsafter Mls. Fmnzenexecuted
a power of attomey. Pinciples of statutoryconsruction and
legislativehistoryleadusto concludethe statutewasnot rct-
roachve.

Thereis no commonlawrulethatrequiresa powerof attomey
to referto a trustby name.The casesrcquircthat a broadpower
be constuedin light of the surroundingcircumstances, and
wherethe broadly wordedpower authorizesactsthat may be
inconsistent with theprincipal'sintercsts,the actsshouldnot
be pemittedin theabsence of specificauthority.

o) TheinstantpowerauthodzesO'Brien to revoketrusts,andwhile
not specific,we concludethatlanguageauthorizesO'Bdento
revokethe Franzen fust.

4) Comment. This holdinggivesthe attomey-in-factthe powerto
changethewill oncethep.incipalbecomes incompetent.
An aftor-
neywho draftssuchabroadpowermay unleasha dangerousweapon
in thehandsof anunscrupulousindividual.

6. Health.Care Directives.ln Cruzanv. DirectotaMissouri Departmentof
Health,49']U.S.26l (1990),theSuprcme Courtheldthata pe6onmaymake
known her desiresregardingterminationof medical fteatment,or may ap-
point a surogateto makethosedecisions,providingstatelaw requirements
aremet.

7. Terminationof MedicalTreatmenl A living will providesthatthelife of a
terminally ill personshall not be prolongedby extraordinarymeasrres.A
durablepowerof attomeyfor healthcareis an altemativeto a living will. It
putsdecisions rcgardingtreatment in thehandsof a third person;theagentis
empowered to respondto changingcircumstances whenthepatient'swishes
arenot known.

8. DispositionofDecedent'sBody.All stateshaveenactedUniformAnatomi-
cal GiftActs,whichallowa pe$onto donatehis bodyto anyhospital,physi-
cian,or medicalschoolfor research
or hansplantation.

58 - Wills
VI. W[LS: CONSTRUCTIONPROBLEMS

A. ADMISSION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE: AMBIGLTITI MISTAKE'
AND OMISSION

to changetheplainmeaning
In general,exffinsicevidenceis not admissible
do notapplythisrulerigjdlybutinvokea pre-
of i will. Somejurisdictions
sumptionlhatcanbeovercomewith srong evidenceol a conttarymeanlng'
Parolevidencemaybe admissible in a will'
to resolveambiguities

1. Latent Ambiguities. A latentambiguityexistswhenthe languageof the
to morethanonemeanlng
will, thoughclearon its face,is susceptible
whenappiiedto theextrinsicfacts ln thesecases,parclevidenceis ao-
missibleto rcsolvethe ambiguity'

2. Patent Ambiguities. Apatent ambiguityexistswhentheuncertarntyap-
pearson thefaceof th€will. The traditionalview is that parolevidencels
;ot admissibleto clarify a patentambiguity The modemffend is to ad-
mit parolevidencein theseinstances aswell'

No Extrinsic Evidenceto Correct Drafter's Mistake-Mahoney v' Mahoneyv.
3.
Grainger
Grainger'283Mass.189,186N E 86 (1933)

a. Facts,Upon Sullivan's(T's) death,her only heir at law washer
aunt.However,shortlybeforeT's death,Texecutedawill,insfuct-
ing her attomeyto leavethe rcsidueof her estateto her 25 cousins
an-d"let them shareequally." The languageof the residueclause
read:"I give, deviseandbequeathto my hei6 at law living at the
time ofmy decease, to be dividedamongthemequally'
absolutely;
shareand sharealike." The prcbatecowt denieda petition for dis-
tributionto thefirst cousins.Certaincousinsappeal'

b. Issue. Are T's statementsregardingT's understandingof "heirs at
law" admissible?

c. Held. No. Decreeaffirmed.

l) A testator'sstatementsare admissibleonly to give evidence
wheretestamentary language is not clearin its applicationto
thefacts.Extrinsicevidencewill notbeallowedifthe property
bequeathed or theidentityofthe beneficiaryis clearlyandab-
solutelyidentified

2) Theteis no doubtasto themeaningof "hei$ at law " A draftert
mistakedoesnot authorizea court to reform or alter a duly
€xecutedandallowedwill

wills - 59
d. Comment.This holdingwasreaffirmedin 19'17in Gustafsonv.Svenson,
373Mass.273,366N.E.2d,'l6l(197'7).

Flemingv. 4, Failureto Complywith Statutory R€quirements--Fleming
v. Morrison,
Morrison 187Mass.120,72 N.E.499(1904).

a. Facts.FrancisButterfield(T) executeda shamwill leavingall of his
propertyto Flemingin an effort to get her to sleepwith him. The will
wasdraftedby Goodridge, T's attomey,who alsoattestedthe will asa
witness.Pdor to havingtwo otherwitnesses attestto T's signature,
T
informedGoodridgethat the will wasfake and wasmadefor a specific
purpose.Thewill wasadmittedto prcbate.Contestants appeal.

b, Issue. Has the proponentof the will proved the necessatyanimus
testantli?

c. Held.No. Decreereversed;
instrument
disallowed.

l) T indicatedto his attomeythatthe will wasa sham.

2) It is competent
to contradictby parolethe solemnstatements con-
tainedin aninstrumentthatis a will, thatit hasbeensignedassuch
by thepersonnamedastestator,andattestedandsubscribedby per-
sonssigningaswitnesses.

3) If theanimustesldndidoesnot existwhena will is signedor ac-
knowledged before,or attestedandsubscribedby,eachofthe nec-
essarythreewitnesses, the statutoryrequirements
havenot been
compliedwith.

4) Herc,if acknowledgmentof a.nimusteslandiof a signatulenot origi-
nallymadewith thatanimrr is enough,ifT hadacknowledged the
instrumentsubsequently
beforetlree witnesses, thewill wouldhave
beenduly executed.But T did not;two witnesses areinsufficient.
Estateof Extrinsic EvidenceAdmissible to Ascertain CircumstancesUnder Which
Russell Will Was Made-Estateof Russell,69 Cal. 2d.2OO, 4M P.2d353,7OCal.
Rptr 561(1968).

a. Facts.The decedent, ThelmaRussell,died leavinga validly executed
holographic will wdttenon a smallcardthatbequeathed everythingshe
ownedto ChesterQuinn,a closeftiend, andto Roxy Russell,her pet
dog,whichwasaliveon thedatethewill wasexecutedbut predeceased
thetestator.ThercveNesideof thecardbequeathed a $10goldpieceand
diamondsto GeorgiaNanRussellHembree(P),thenieceandonly heir
at law of the testato..P broughta petition for determinationof heirship,
allegingtharRo\y wasa dog.thallheProbale Codeenumerates thoie

60 - Wills
gift of halfof
entitledto takeby will andthatdogsarenot included,thatthe
,t" ,o Roiy is void, and that P, as the testator'ssoleheir at law' is
"*u,"to half oi the re$idue.At the headng,P infoduced without objec-
entitled
his
tion extrinsicevidencethatRoxy wasthetestator'sdog Quinn'through
a omey.inlroduced evidence of hrsrelalionshipw'lh thelestator'anddocu-
mentaryeuidenceconsistingof the testator'saddressbook and a cefiain
quiLclaim deed.all of whichwasadmilledoverobjectionThe lrial coun
q
tieldLharit wastheintentionof theleslalorlhal Quinn as to receiveher
entireestateexceptingthe goldcoin anddiamondsbequeathedto P andthat
testator'sdeathThe coult
Quinnwasto carefoithe dogin theeventof the
h-eldthatthe lang,rage in the will indicatedthatQuinnwasto usewhatever
portionofthe esiateasmightbe necessary to carefot andmaintainthe dog'
P appeals.

b. Issue.May extrinsicevidence underwhicha will is made
of thecircumstances
whatthetestatormeantby thewordsusedin a
in ascefiaining
be considered
will?

c. Held. Yes.Judgmentreversed

l) Whenlhe language of a will is ambiguous or uncerlain'resonmaybe
had to extrinsic evidencein orderto ascertainthe intention of the testa-
tor A latent ambiguityis onethat is not apparenton the face of the will
butis disclosed by somefactcollateralto it, whereasa patentamblgulty
is an uncertaintythat appearson the faceof the will We think it is self-
evidentthal in lhe Interpretation of a will' a courtcannotdetermlne
whetherthe termsof the will arecleat anddefinite in thefirst placeuntil
it considersthecircumstances underwhichthewill wasmadeExtnnsic
evidenceof thecircumstances underwhicha will is mademay becon-
sideredby thecoul'tin ascertainingwhatthe testatormeantby the words
usedin thewill

2) Here,extrinsic evidenceoffeied by P to ruiseandresolvethe latentam-
biguity as to Roxy and to establishthat Roxy was a dog was properly,
co;sideredin orderto ascertainwhat the testatormeantby the wordsof
thewill. However,viewingthe will in Iight of thesuroundingcircum-
stances,the trial coult ered in holding that thetestatorintendedto make
anabsolutegift of herentireestateto Quinn A dispositionin equalshares
to two beneiiciaries cannotbeequated with a dispositionof thewholeto
oneof them,who may usewhateverportionon behalfof the other'We
concludethat the tes;atorintendedto make a disposition of all of the
residueof the estateto Quinn and the dog in equal shares As a dog
cannotbethebeneficiary underawill, theattempted gift to Roxyis void
Hence,thatpofiionof theestatercmainsundisposed of by thewill and
oassesto the heirs at law We concludethat the residue of the estate
;houldbe distributedin equalsharesto QuinnandP

Wills - 61
6. CorrectingMistakes.Iftheallegedmistake involvesthereasons thatledthe
testatorto makethewill (or thereasons for makingornot makng a particular
gift), andthemistakewasnotftaudulentlyinduced,noreliefis granted. Some
courtshaverecognized anexceptionifthe mistakeappears on thefaceof the
will, andthedisposition thetestatorwouldhavemadebut for themistakecan
at leastbeinfelredftom theinsfument.Casesin whichsuchreliefis granted
arerarcbecause it is unlikelyfor themistakeandthe altematedispositionto
appearon the faceof the inshument.If a provisionwasmistakenlvomitted
from rheq ill. or a provision conrained in thewill is nor whatrherestator
intended, paroltestimonyis generallynotadmissible to showtheexistence of
the mistakeandwhatthetestatorintendedto providehadthe mistakenot been
made.Thus,mistakesof omissiongenerallycannotbe corected,nor cana
mistakein describing a beneficiary or item of property.

Ericksonv. a. Extrinsicevidenceofscrivener'serror admissibleto ascertaintesta-
Edckson tor's true intent-.Erickson% Erickson.246 Conn.359-716A.2d,92
(l998).

r) Facts.The decedent, RonaldErickson,executeda will two days
beforehe marriedDorothy Erickson(D). The will left everything
to D. If shepredeceased him, half of Ronald'sestatewasto go to
his childrenandhalf to D s children.D wasappoinred guardiinof
Ronald'schildren(whosemotherhaddied)andexecutorofhis es-
tate.Ronald'saftomeyinnocentlymisrepresented thatthewill would
be valid afterthe mariageto D, but the will did not containany
language providingfor thecontingency of thesubsequentmarriage.
(Connecticutlaw providesthat if a testatormaries subsequentto
the malingof a \^,illandrhewill makesno provisionfoisucha
contingency, themardageopemtesasarcvocationof thewill.) Eleven
yearslater,uponRonald'sdeath,the will wasadmittedfor Drobate.
Ronalds daughrer AliciaErickson {P).appealed.priorro rrial.p
filed a motionin limineto excludeextrinsicevidenceof Ronald,s
intent.D madea detailedoffer of proofto showRonald'scontrary
intent.Thetrial courtgrantedP'smotion,butdismissed p,sappeal,
andfoundthatthewill providedfor thecontingency of marriage.p
appeals. D crossappeals.

Issue. Shouldthe trial court have admittedextrinsic evidencere-
gardingthe decedent's intentthat his will would not be revoked
automaticallyby his subsequent mariage?

J) Held.Yes.Judgment
reversed
andremanded.

a) The natureof the will's provisionsandthe couple'sexfeme
closenessatthetimeof mariageprovideclearandconvincing
evidenceof theprovisionfor thecontingencyof marriageeven

62 - Wills
case
though the will itself did not do so and' under existlng
law' would havebeenrcvokedby a subsequent mamage

b) We havepreviously heldthatexlrinsice\idenceis not ad-
missible,;ut concludenow thatthe reasoningof the dissent
Conn'
ii Connicti,utJuniorRepublicv' SharonHosPital'188
i, q$ A'.21190(1982),is persuasive and we overrulethat
case.

enorhasmisledthelestator intoexecuting a
c) [f a scrivener's
the
will on the belief that it wiU be valid notwithstanding
marriage'exLrinsic evidenceof lhaterror
lestalor'ssubsequent
is admissiblelo eslablish theintentof the lhathrswlll
teslator
be validnotwithslanding thesubsequent marriage

and
d) Ifthe error andthetestator'sintent areestablishedbyclear
' that
convincing evidence,they will be sufncient to establish
the will hasprovidedfor suchcontingency

e)' b(trinsicevidenceis admissible to provefraud'duress'or un-
dueinfluence. Thereis littledifference belweenerroneous be-
those
liefs inducedby fraud, duress'or undueinfluence and
the in-
inducedby innocenterror,ashere ln both situations'
fluenceof a third party distortsthe prccess

f) Thereis no subversion of wills ex-
of thepolicyof the.stalute
evidence becauseoIlhensk ol subverslon or
cludingextrinsic
de-
the tesiator'sintent, wherethe testatorcannotpersoflally
would not exclude
fend his testamentarybequestThat statute
extrinsicevidencewhercfraud'duress'or undueinfluence^were
enlorce_
concemed Therefore,that statutedoesnot compel
mentof testamentary provisionsthatthetestatornevermtenoeo
to make

g) lf fraudwereinvolved'it is arguabletht th: l"ff]:y-Til
anda
thefraudulentconductwouldnot be allowedto benellt
constructivetust wouldbe imposedon theirinheritance Analo-
gously'here,extdnsicevidence shouldbe admissible to estab-
lish the testator'strue intent

preparinga will pursuantto
n Liability for Drafting Ambiguous Will' If in
that makesa gift to a
tf," i"rtutor'. in.t-"ti;ns, the attomeyomits a clause
i"r"n-li"ty, ,ft" is liable to the intendedbeneficiaryfor the amount
ii" l"t"itii-v
"n".ey havereceived
*".ra the will had the clausenot been
'.rnder
Caselaw, however,hasheld that an attomeyis rot liable
""grrg".iiy "til*a.
for draftiry at ambigt ous document'

Wills - 63
B , DEATH OF BENEFICIARY BEFORE DEATH OF TESTATOR: LAPSE

Whena beneficiarypredeceases the testator'the beneficiary'sbequestwill
lapse(andpassthroughtheresiduaryestateor throughintestacy)in the ab-
takers'
statute,whichspecifiessubstitute
senceof an anti-lapse

1. LrPCSection2-601.Underthissection'ifa deviseedoesnot survivethe
testatorby 120hours,thenheis treatedashavingpredeceasedthetesta-
dealingspecifically
tor, unlessthewill containssomeexplicitlanguage
with simultaneous deaths.

2. UPC Section2-605.Underthis section,if a deviseewho is a grandpar-
ent or a linealdescendant of a gtandparent(i) is deadat the time of ex-
ecutionofthe will, (ii) failsto suNivethetestator'or (iii) is treatedasif
he hadpredeceased the testator,thenhis issuewho survivethetestator
by 120-hours takein his place.If theissueareall of the samedegreeof
kinshipto thedeviseetheytakeequally,but if they areof unequaldegree
thenthoseof moreremotedegreetakeby representation'

3. Anti-LapseStatutes.The states'anti-lapsestatutesvary widely as to
theirscope.In manystates, theanti-lapse statuteappliesonly if thepre-
deceasing beneficiarywas a child or otherdescendant of the testator'
Underthe UPC andin sevemlnon-LrPCstates,the anti-lapsestatute
appliesif the predeceasing beneficiarywas a grandparent or a lineal
deicendant ofa grandparent nearly
ofthe testator.In all states,theanti-
lapsestatuteoperates only if thepredeceasing beneficiaryleft descen-
d;nts who survivedthe testator. Such descendants take the gift by
substitution. In moststates,the antilapsestatutedoesnot applyif the
gift is contingenton thebeneficiary's suNivingthetestator

Allen v a. Anti-lapsesiatutedoesnot apply-Allen * Talley,949S W2d 59
Talley (Tex.Ct. App. 1997).

1) Facts'At the time the decedent, Mary Shoults,executedher
will, shehadthreebrcthersandtwo sistersalive Thewill pro-
videdthat all of her propefiywasto be sharedby her living
brcthe6andsisters, whomshenamedAt thetimeof herdeath'
onlya brotheranda sisterwerealive,butthedeceased siblings
Irwis
all left children. Allen, Jr.,a survivingchild of oneof
thedeceased brothers,filed an applicationfor probate andis-
suanceof lettersof administation,asdid thesuNivingsister,
IJra Talley.The court admittedthe will but did not appointan
administrator.After filing petitions for declaratoryjudgment,
Lera arguedthat the languagein the will operatesaswordsof
survivorshipandprecludestheapplicationof theanti-lapsestat-
ute.Irwis arguedthata classgift wasnot createdandthatthe

64 - Wills
statuteapplies.Both partiesfiled motionsfor summaryjudgment;
thetrial courtgrantedI-era'smotion.Lewisappeals.

Issue.Doesthedecedent's will containwordsof survivorship,
which
precludeapplicationof theantilapsestatute?

Held. Yes.Judgment
affirmed.

a) Sincebothpartiesagreethatthe languageis not ambiguous,
we construethewill basedon theexprcsslanguageused.

b) Therewereno otherprovisionsin the will but thatthe dece-
dent'sliving brothersandsisterstakeher wholeestate,sharc
andsharealike. It is clearfrom the languagethat the decedent
intendedthather siblingswho wereliving at the time of her
deathtake her estate;otherwise,the phrase"share and share
alike"followedby no otherprovisionswouldaddnothingto
the meaningof the will. Therefore,"living brothersandsis-
ters" arewordsof survivorship.

4) Comments.

a) A careful will drafter will provide for the contingencyof the
intendeddeviseenot survivins the testator.

b) The anti-lapsestatutesdo not operateto savea decedent's
in-
terestin propertyheldinjoint tenancy.

4. Rule of Construction that 'rAnd" Be Read as "Or" to Effectuate Testa- Jacksonv.
tor's Intent-Jacksonv. Schultz,38 Del. Ch.332,l5l A.2d 284(1959). Schultz

a. Facts.Thechildrenof BessieBullock(Ps)contactedto sellto thede-
fendant(D) a houseformerlyownedby the testator,their stepfather,
Ironard Bullock (T), contendingthat title passedto themthroughT's
will. The will bequeathed all propertyto BessieBullock"andof what-
evernatweandkind, to her andher hein andassignsforever."Bessie
Bullock,however,predeceased T. D contends
thatsinceBessieBullock
prcdeceased T, Ps took nothingunderT's will, alguingthatthe words
"her heirs and assignsforever" were words of limitation defining the
quantityof the estatedevisedandthat, assuch,the heirstook nothingby
sincethedeviseepredeceased
wayof substitr.rtion, T. D furthercontends
that wherethe word "and" appearsbeforcthe words"heirs airdassigns,"
thesarneruleapplies,in conrastto wherctheword"ol' appears, which
hasbeendeemedto designate thosewho will takeby way of substitu-
tion.Psmovefor summaryjudgmentrequesting thecourtto gmnta de-
creeof sDecificDerformanceunderthe contract.

Wills - 65
b. Issue.will thewords"and" or "or" be substitutedfor eachotherin arriv-
ing at a properconstructionof a will for the purposeof carrying out an
obvioustestamentarypupose of a testator?

Held. Yes.Ps' motion for sunmaryjudgmentis granted.

1) D contendsthat whena deviseis madeto a nameddevisee"his
heirsandassigns forevet" theheirsnormallytakenothingby way
of substitutionif the primary deviseepredeceases the testator,such
expressionbeingdeemedoneof limitation defining the quantityof
theestatedevised, andthatthisrulehasbeenappliedincaseswhere
theword"and"appears beforetheclause"heirsandassigns-" How-
ever,whenthe word "or" is usedfollowing a primary devise, the
subsequentreferenceto "heirs" or the like hasbe€ndeemedto des-
ignatethosewho will takeby way of substitution in theeventthat
the pdmary deviseepredeceased the testatoranda lapseis thereby
avoided.

2) It hasalsobeenheld,howevetthatthewords"or" and"and"may
be substitutedfor eachotherin arriving at a properconstuuctionof
a will, "and" havingbeenreadas"or" for thepuposeof carlying
out an obvioustestamentarypurpose.

3) Here,the evidenceindicatesthatT's fatherwas survivedby his son
(T,IJonardBullock),a brother,andastepson, all ofwhom entered
into anagreement designedtoinsurethat, in the eventofT's death
duringthe settlement of his father'sestate,his sharewouldgo to
his wife, Bessie.This agreement clearlydemonstrates T's intent
thathis shareofhis father'sestateshouldgo to his wife.Addition-
ally,T's will shouldbe rcadnot only to cary out his intentionbut
construed, if possible,to avoidnot merclyintestacybut totales-
cneat.

4) A decreefor specificperformanceshouldnormally be grantedin a
landpurchase caseunlessto do sowouldrequirca buyerto accepta
defectivetitle subjectto attackby an adverseinterestnot beforethe
court.Here,thereis a solidbasisfor sustaining Ps' claim to a fee
simpletitle in thelandhereinvolved.I adopttherde of consffuc-
tion that pemits "and" to be read as"or" whento do so will carry
outthetestator's intent.Here,theevidence sustainsa rulingthatthe
will be constuedasmakinga substitutionary deviseoverto Ps.

Rule of ConstructionHeld Inapplicable.In Hofingv. Willis,3l 111.2d
365,
201N.E.2d852(1964),thecourtheldthatwhilethereis somesupportfor the
propositionthatthephrase"andto theirheirs"couldbe considered aswords
by readingtheword"and"as"ot" thepresence
of purchase of thewords"and
assigns"makessucha constmctionunacceptable. The courtstatedthatit is
hardlyreasonable thatthegrantorwouldcreatea substitutionary
to suppose

66 - Wills
gift andat the sametime designatethe assignsof the namedtakersto takeby
way of substitution.

6, No ClassGift-Dawsonv. Yucus,97Ill. App.2d 101,239N E 2d 305(1968) Dawson
v. rucus
a. Facts.NelleStewart's(T's)duly executed will devisedherone-fifth in-
tercstin cettain farm lands to two nephews, Wilson and Burtle' each
takingone-half.Butle diedpior to T's deathWilsonfiled suit to con-
struethewill, allegingthedevisewasaclassgift andthathe,assurvivor
Wilsonlatercon-
ofthe class,wasentitledto theentireone-fifthinterest.
veyedtheinteresthe allegedlyreceivedassurvivorto Burtle'stwo chil-
dren (Ps) and they were substituted as plaintiffs.The residuary
beneficiaries(Ds) contendthatthe gift to WilsonandBurtlewasnot a
classgift but insteada gift to two specificindividualsThe trial court
foundfor Ds. Ps appeal.

b. Issu€.Wasa classgift to thenephewscreatedin T's will?

c. Held.No. Decreeaffirmed.

l) sumto a bodyof pe$onsuncer-
Aclassgift is a gift of anaggregate
at a future
tain in numberat the time of the gift, to be ascertained
time,andwho arcall to takein equalor in someotherdefinitepro-
portions,the sharcof eachbeingdependentfor its amountuponthe
ultimatenumberof Pelsons.

2) Here,thereweretwo namedindividuals,makingcertainthe num-
andtheirshare.Thesharesdo not dependupon
berofbeneficiaries
the numberwho surviveT.

3) i.e.,"nephews"'"cousins,""descen-
T usedno classgift language,
dants,"etc.andthewill contained a survivorshipgift ofthe residue
gift
ofherestateino survivorship was createdin theclausedevising
the farmland.
the Testator-I' l'e
Gift to Classand Named Individual lYho Predecease's In rc'
Moss,[1899]2 Ch.314,aff'd, llg}ll A C.l87 (H L.) Moss

a. Facts. Walter Moss (T) bequeathedhi s interestin the Dail! Telegraph
newspaper in fust to paytheincometoElizabethMoss(hiswife) for life
and,uponherdeath,in fust for ElizabethJaneFowler(hisniece)andthe
chil&enof Emily Walter(hissister)who shallattaintheageof 21,to be
dividedequallyamongthemastenantsin common.T left theresidueof
hisestateto hiswife.ElizabethJaneFowlerdiedin 1891IT diedin 1893
ElizabethMoss(T'swidow)diedin 1897,leavingherr€siduary estateto
WilliamGeorgeKingsbury(P).Shewassurvived by thefive childrenof
Emily Walter(Ds),all olderthan21.P claimsthattheshareof T's estate
bequeathed to ElizabethJaneFowlerlapseduponherdeathduringT's

Wills 67
lifetimeandbecamepartof T's andElizabethMoss'sresiduaryes-
tates.Ds claimthatthebequest to ElizabethJaneFowlerandthem
wasa gift to a class,ofwhich theyarethesurvivingmembe$.The
trial courtheldfor P Ds appeal.

b. Issue.Wherea gift by will is to a classand a naned individuai
equally,sothat the testatorcontemplatesthe namedindividual tak-
ing thesamesharethateachmemberofthe classwill take,doesthe
testatorintendthatthewholeshallpassby his gift to the surviving
membersof the classif any memberof the classsurvives,even
thoughthenamedindividualdoesnot?

c. Held.Yes.Judsment
reversed.

l) (Lindley,M.R.) The questionwe haveto decideis: Who are
the personsentitled to T's sharein theDail) Telegraphnews-
paper?Oneview,adoptedby the trial court,is thatthe share
thatElizabethJaneFowlerwouldhavetakenif shewerealive-
one-sixth-has lapsedand fallen into the residuaryestate.I
declineto follow thisview.Whetheryoufollow thedefinition
thata gift to A andthechildrenof B mayin effectbe a gift to a
classifthe testatortreatsthelegatees asaclassor whetheryou
call thema numberof peNonswho .!Ie to be treatedasa class
is quiteimmaterial. Here,theintentionof thetestatorwasthat
the shareshouldgo to suchof the childrenasshallbe living.
Thealtemativeview takesthesharcawavwhercit wasnever
intendedto go.

2) (Romer,L.J.)Whena testatorgivespropertyto A anda class
of persons-say the childrenof B-in equalshares,heintends
that the whole propertyshall passby his gift if any oneof the
childrenof B survivehim eventhoughA doesnot.Generally,
when the testatorgives property to be sharcdat a pafiicular
periodequallybetweena classproperlysocalledandanindi-
vidual, thenwhatthe testatormustbe takento meanis thatyou
areto seewhich part of that aggregatedbody is to sharein that
propertyat the time it comesfor distdbution.Hence,a gift by
willto aclassanda namedindividualequally,sothatthetesta-
tor contemplates theindividual takingthe samesharethateach
memberof theclasswill take,is primafacieevidenceof a gift
to a class.Here,ElizabethJaneFowlerwasonly intendedto
shareasoneof a class,and,inasmuchasshedid not survive,
the rest of the classtakesthe whole of the property.

C. CHANGES IN PROPERTY AFTER EXECUTION OF WILL: SPE-
CIFIC VS. GENERAL DEVISES

1. Ademption.If specifically
devisedpropenyis notin thetestator's
estate

68 - wills
the gift is
at thetime of death(e.8.,it wassoldby the testatoror desffoyed)'
doctrile only ap-
adeerned.This is tnown as ademptionby extinction The
piies to specificdevisesandbequests;generallegaciesare not affected

v' Cohen'414Mass lT2' 606 Wasserman
a. Ademptionby extinction-'Wasserman
v. Cohen
N.E.2d90l (1993).

1) Facts, FriedaDrapkin crcatedan inter vivos trust fundedat execu-
tion, and retaifledthe dght to add propertyby inter vivoslransfer
tust'
andwill andamend,revoke,andwithdraw propertyfrcm the
a
A trustprovisionorderedDavid Cohen(D)' trustee'to convey
h'rl sold the
buildinj to Elaine Wasserman(P) However'Drapkin
buildini prior to her deathandhad neverconveyedher interest-in
jt]d.C-
the proierty to the mrst. P brought an action for dTlarato:y
ment.requesting thetrusleepayherlhe ptoceeds of thesale.ofth€
building.Theprobatejudge dismissed theactionP applreo lor cu-
rect appellatereview

2) lssue.Doesthe docttineof ademptionby extinctionaqpl) to tl:
inter\ ivoslrusll
conlainedin a revocable
specificgift of reatestal.e

3) Ileld. Yes Judgmentaffirmed'

a) Whena testatordisposesduringher lifetime of th€ subjectof a
specificlegacyin herwill' thatdeviseis heldto be adeemed'

b) A trust, particularly when executedas pa of an estateplan'
shouldbi consmredaccordingto the samerules traditionally
apPliedto wills.
glfls in cases
2. Abal€ment.Abatementis theprocessof reducinglestamentary
,h. eslate
u..atsarenoi sufficienrto payall claimsagainst-lhe
"hf.. "r,uta and devisesAl commonlaw all grlts ol personal
and satisfyall bequests
oro*nt utur" U"fot"disPositions of realpropenyToday'in mostslateslhe
stal
li,iin.tion b"r*""n t"al ind personalpropenyhasbeenabolishedand
utesprovide a gefleralorderin which the typesof gifts are abated'
iight
a. UPC section2'608.Underthis section,a specificdeviseehasthe
to a generalpecuniarydeviseequalto thenetsalepriceofdevisedprop-
ertysoldbYa conse atol

Exoneration of Liens, Most jurisdictionsfollow the doctrineof exoneration
lhatspecificdispositionsoflropenysubjecl to mort-
of liens.whichpresumes
gagesor otherencumbrances areto be paidout of the teslalor-sreslduary
Jsite, absentlanguage to thecontraryin thetestator'swill'
propertypasses
a. flPC section2'607i nonexoneration'Underthis section'
withouttherightof exoneration-aspecificdevisewill passsu'ject to a
of
secudtyinterestexistingon the dateof the testator'sdeath'regardless
anyprovisionsin thetestator'swill to paythe debt'
vlvos trans-
4, Satisfaction. Satisfactionapplieswherea testatotmakesaninter
making the
fer to a beneficiaryafter executinga will' with the int€ntion of
testator
testamentarygift inoperative At commonlaw a gift to a child of the
i. p."*rnp,*irvrn pi*al or totalsatisfaction of anygiftsmadeto thechildin
a previouslyexecuted will.
prop-
a. flPC section2-607:ademptionby satisfactiorl Uflderthis sectlon'
ertypasses withouttherightof exoneration-aspecificdevisewill pass
suijict to asecttity interestexisting on the dateof the testatot'sdeath'
reg"ardlessof anyprovisionsin thetestator'swill to paythedebt
ad-
5. Stock Splits. Underthe majodty rule' a specificbeneficiaryis entitledto
ditionalsharesof stockproducedby a stocksplit' but is not entitledto addi-
tionalsharesof stockproducedby a stockdividend UndertheUPC'thespecific
beneficiaryof corpoiatesecuritiesis entitledto additionalor other securities
of thesameentity-i.e., bothstocksplitsandstockdividends

70 - Wills
VII. RESTRICTIONS ON TIIE POWER OF DISPOSITION:
PROTECTION OF THE FAMILY

A. RIGIITS OF TIIE SURVIVING SPOUSE
man-
l. Introductionto Mariial PropertySystems'Thereatetwo basic
systemoi
tal propertysystemsin the United States:(i) the cornmonlaw
separatepioperty and(ii) the systemof communityproperty
is
a. Separate property system' Under this approach'each spouse
entitledto whateverpropefiy he eams-there is no sharingof earn-
ings.This excludesjoindy-ownedproperty

1) Prctection againstdisinheritance' Nearly all ofthe common
lawjurisdictions haveenacted electivesharestatutesdesigned
to givethesurvivingspouse some disin-heri-
proleclion.against
tanceThese give
statutes thespouse anelectionto takeastatu-
tory share(usuallyone-thirdor one-hal0of thedeceden t's estate
in lieu of takingunderthedecedent's will'

b. Communitypropertysystem'Underthisapproachanyeamings'
ln
andpropertyacquiredfrom eamlngs'aftermarriagels owneo
prop-
eqoA,onAiulaea.nat"sIn general'noneof the community
power
erty siateshasan electivesharcstatute Eachspousehasthe
one-half com-
of iestamentarydispositionover only that spouse's
munityinteresiThi survivingspouseautomatically ownsone-half
of the communityestateuponthe other spouse'sdeath'

2. Rights of Surviving Spouseto Suppo '

a. Socialsecurity.The survivingspouseis enlitledto thedecedent's
socialsecuritybenefits-thedecedent benefits
maynot transferthe
to
to anyoneelse.However'the surviving spousemay be requircd
sharethe benefitswith the decedent'sdependents'
paid under
b. PriYate pension plans' ERISA requiresthat pensions
survivor
coveredprivatepensionplansmustbe paidasajoint and
annuityto theworkerandtheworker'sspouse' unlessthe nonworker
spouseconsentsto someotherform of distributionof theretirement
benefit.
in
c. Hom€stead.Most stateshave statutesthat secwesomeintercst
children' free
the family homefor the surviving spouseand minor
prcbate
the claims of creditors Thesehomesteadsarc known as
homesteads.

Wills- 7l
d. Personalproperty set-aside.Somestatutesexemptcertainitemsof
tangiblepersonatpropertyftom executionor levy ifl satisfactionof
creditors'claims.

Family allowance.The survivingspouseor minor childrcn arc en-
titled io Detitionfor a family allowanceto providefor their mainte-
nance d;ring the period in which the decedent'sestate1s ln
administratlon.

Dower and curtesy.Dower was the provision the law madefor a
widow out of the husband'sproperty.Upon the husband'sdeath'the
widow was entitledto a life estatein an undividedone-thirdof the
husband'slands A husbandhad a comparableinterestin his wife's
landsknownascurtesy.Upon the wife's death,her husband'scurtesy
right gavehim a life estatein all (notjust an undividedon€{hird) of
th; Ia;ds of which the wife was seisedduring marriageHowever,a
husband ! curtes)estaleI unliLedower)aroseonly if issue\rerebom
to the marriage.

1) Property subiectto dower' Dowerattachesto anylandthehus-
ac-
bandownsat the time of the mardageand all subsequently
ouiredland.The husbandcannotdefeatthewife's dowerinterest
by attemptinga tnnsfer of land without herjoinder

2) Testamentaryeffect.Dowerandcurtesyrightscouldbe asserted
regardlessof the decedent'swill. Thus, a wife's dowerinterest
in her husband'sland wasnot affectedby the fact that the hus-
bandhaddevised lhelandto another'To thisextenteachspouse s
powerof testamentary dispositionoverpropertywaslimited by
the other'sdoweror curtesyilght

3) Present status of dower and curtesy.Most stateshave abol-
isheddowerandcurtesyin favor of electiveshalestatutes'

3. Rights ofsurviving Spouseto a ShareofDecedent's Property'

a. Electiveshareand its rationale.The majorityof statesgive the sur-
viving spousean electiveshareof thedeceased spouse'srealandper-
sonalasiets.The spousecanelect to eithertake underthe deceased
spouse'swill or renouncethe will and take a statutolyshareof the
estate(,.rsuallyone-thirdor one-half) Section2-202(a)of theUPC
Drovidesa scheduleto determinethe electivesharepercentage deter-
minedby the lengthof the malliage The survivingspouseis entitled
to 50% of the decedent'sestateafter 15 yearcof marriage ln addi-
tion, if the survivingspouse'sassetsarelessthan$50,000,sheis en-
titledto a supplementalelectivesharein the amountof $50'000'

72 - Wills
75 Ohio st' In re Estate
b. Election rtquired for public assistance-It /e Estateof Cross'
of Cross
3d 530.664N.E.2d905(1996).

1) Facts.CarrollCrossdiedtestate, leavinghisestateto his sonSay Crcss
-' spouse'Beulah Beulah'80'
Cpl,*fto *u. not thechild of his surviving
sifered from Alzheimer'sdisease andwasin a nuning home;her care
waspaidfor by Medicaid Pursuantto statute'theprobatecourtappointed
thecourt
a commissionirwho investigatedthe matterandconcludedthat
would
shouldelect on Beulah'sbehalf to takeagainstthe estate Beulah
thenrcceivea spousalallowanceof $25'000andhalf of apprcximately
is,mo. rh" ptoiur" aftera hearing,soelect€dP appealedBeulah
diedwhile the appeal"out,
waspendingThe appeals courtreversed'hnding
to
thatthe electionwasnot in Beulah'sbestinterestandnot necessary
providefor hersupportbecause hercalewaspaidbyMdicaid Beulahs
ud.ini.t uto, (D) uppealsa'Id is joined by the board of commissioners
that rcpresentedBeulahbeforethe probatecourt'

for
2) Issue.Did the probatecourtjudge abusehis discretionjnelecting
her support' to
Beulah, who dependedsolely on Medicaid benefitsfor
takeagainstherdeceased husband'swill?

3) reversed
Held.No Judgment reinstaled'
counjudgment
Probate

a
a) The prcbatecoult has statutoryauthority to elect on behalf of
disabledspouseafter ascertainingthe spouse'sadequatesupp9l
n""Jt una thevalueof thespouse's shareunderthewill
"o-p-lng The
with her rights under the statuteof descentand distribution
court must-first considerother rcsourcesand the age' life expect-
needs
ancy,physical and mentalcondition, and anticipatedfuture
necessary to provide
of tit" spous"unaa"termineif the electionis
for her adequatesupport.

b) The appealscourtignoredBeulah'sMedicaideligibility requirc-
ments.imong the rcsourcesthat areconsideredin determiningeli
gibility for M;dicaid is propertydevisedto a recipientfrom a parcnt
ir spouse,including"thosercsourcesin which anapplicant/recipient
"
has^alegal interesiandthe legal ability to useor dispoqeof
Medicai-drules statethat an applicantor recipientwho fails to use
availableincomeis ineligiblefor benefits'

Beulah's Medicaid eligibilityandto conlinue to
c)' Here.to maintain
haveherexpenses providedby Medicaid,thejudgewasreqliredto
elect for Biulah to take againstthe will and receiveher intestate
sharc.

Wills - 73
1r?re Estate c. No forced sharc in homosexualrelationship-I, /e Estate of Cooper,592
of Cooper N.YS.2d797,187A.D.2d128(1993).

1) Facts.UponWilliamCooper's(T's)death,thebulk ofhis estatewaslef!
to his formerlover,EmestChin(P).B who hada homosexual relation,
shipwithT, petitionedthe
courttoallowhimto electagainstthe
will. T's
executrix(E)opposed andappliedto dismissP'saction.Thecourtfound
for E. P aDDeals.

Issue.Is a homosexual relationshipa "spousalrelationship"suchthata
suryivoris entitledto a rightof electionagainstthedecedent's will pur-
suantto therelevantstatute?

t) Held. No. Decreeaffirmed.

a) The statutepermitsa suNivingspousetheright of election.

b) A "survivingspouse"is definedasa husbandor wife,but evenif it
werenot,thelanguage ofa statuteis generallyconstrued
according
to its naturalandmostobvioussensein accordwithits ordinaryand
accepted meaning.

c) Thetraditionaldefinitioncontemplates
thesurvivorof a unionbe-
lweenmembers of theoppositesex.andwe \eeno reason to reject
that.

d) Any equalprotectionanalysisin theinstantcaseis to be measured
by therationalbasisstandard, i.e.,thelegislationis validifthe clas-
sificationdrawnis rationallyrelatedto a legitimatestateinterest.

e) TheSupreme Courtof Minnesota rcjectedsamesexpetitioners'ar-
gumentthataprchibitionon samesexmariagesdeniedthemequal
protection,holdingt"the institutionof marriageasa unionof man
andwoman,uniquelyinvolvingtheprocreation andrearingofchil-
drenwithina family. . . [is] 'fundamentalto theveryexistenceand
survivalof the race.'This historicinstitutionmanifestlyis more
deeplyfoundedthanthe asseftedcontemporaryconceptof marriage
and societalintercstsfor which petitionerscontend."lBaker v.
Nelson,191N.W.2d185(I4inn. 1980)lThe SupremeCourt dis-
missedpetitioners'appealfor want of a substantial f€deralques-
tion."Suchadismissalisaholdingthattheconstitutional challenge
was consideredand rejected."Elicks v. Miranda,422 U.S.332
(1e60)l

4) Comment.On appeal,the New York Court ofAppealsdismissedon
the groundthat no substantialconstitutionalquestionwas directly
involved.[14rc Cooper,
82N.Y2d801,624N.E.2d696,604N.YS.2d
558 (1 993) t

74 - Wills
d. Surviving spouse'sstatutory shareof assetsof inter vivos trust created Sullivan
by deceasedspouse.-Sullivanv. Burkin, 390Mass.864,460 N.E.2d571 v Burkin
(1984).

1) Facts.Mary Sullivan(P),a widowwho exercised her statutoryright to
take a shareof her husband's (Emest's) estate,broughtanactionseekng
detemination that the assetsheld in inter vivos hust createdby Emest
duringmariage shouldbe consideredaspart of theestatein determining
that share.Emest had executeda deedof trust under which he trans-
fered rcal estateto himself as sole trustee.The net incomeof the trust
waspayableto him during his life andthe husteewasinstucted to pai
to him all or suchpart of the principal of the trust estateas he might
requestin writing periodically.He retainedtheright to revokethe trust at
any time. On his death,the successor tlusteewas directedto pay the
principal and any undistributedincomeequally to Georgeand Harold
Cronin(Ds)if theyshouldsurvivehim,whichtheydid.Emestdiedwhile
still tustee of the inter vivos tust. He left a will in which he statedthat
he intentionallyneglectedto makeanyprovisionfor his wife andgmnd-
son. He directedthat, after paymentof debts,expenses,and all estate
taxeslevied by rcasonof his death,the residueof his estateshouldbe
paid over to the trusteeof the inter vivos trust. The ProbateCourt re-
jectedP'sclaimandenteredjudgment dismissing thecomplaint.Appeal
wastaken.

2) Issue.Are the assetsof aninter vivos trust to be considercdin determin-
ing theportion of theestateof thedeceased
to which a widow may claim
her statutoryshare?

3) Held, No. Judgmentaffirmed.
a) Atust with rcmainderintercstsgivento otherson the settlor'sdeath
is not invalidasa testamentary
dispositionsimplybecause thesett-
lor retaineda broadpowerto modify or rcvokethefust, the dght to
rcceiveincome,andthe right to invadeprincipal during his life.

b) The fact that the settlorof a trust with rcmainderintercstsgiven to
otherson the settlor'sdeathis the soletrusteedoesnot makethe
t1!st testamentary.

c) Whetheror not thedecedentestablishedaninter vivos tmst in order
to defeatP's ight to takeher statutorysharcof the assetsplacedin
trust,andeventhoughthedecedenthada generalpower of appoint-
mentover the trust assets,P obtainedno dght to sharein the assets
of thattrustwhenshemadeherstatutoryelection.

d) In thefuture, asto anyinter vivos trustcreatedor amendedafterthe
dateof this opinion,theestateof thedecedent, for purposes
ofthe

Wills - 75
survlvtngspouse's statutorysharc,shallincludethevalueof assets
held in an inter vivos trustcreatedby the deceased spouseas to
wiich he aloneretainedpowerduringhis life to directdisposition
of thosetrustassets for his benefit,as,for example,by theexercise
ot a powerof appointment or by revocationofthe trust.

UPC right to etectiveshare.UnderrheUpC,thesurvivingspouse
hasa right
a p:rc:ntag::lthe decedcnfs"augmented estate"based on the length-of
::
the mariage.LIPCsection2_203combinesthe propertiesto
be inclu;d in
the augmented estate.Nonprobateassets_suchaJ life insumncepolicies,
pensionplans,bonds,andbankaccounts_frequently pas. to t"n"ii"lJ".
outsideof the will. As a result,instances
arisewheri the survivingspouse
mayrcceivetoo greata shareof thedecedent's estate,or too tittte.tinjer ifre
IIPC, thespouse's sharefrom tle augmentea in"tua", tt iolio*ing,
".tut" "
l) Theprobare esralelessfunerale\penses.claims.andvarious familyal_
lowancesi

2) The valueof propertytransfereddudngthemariagewithout
the con,
sentof thespouseby a.mngements
thatare,in effeci,will substitutes;

Propenyacquiredby lhe survivingspou.efmm the decedent
or olher_
wrsetranslerfed
lo thesurviringspouse.

4) The_\ alue.ofthesurvi\ingspouses.s
propenyandnonprobaretransfers
lo otherstharwoLrld
havebeenin heraugmeniedestat;uponherdeath;
arnd

5) Life insurance
proceeds
payableto anypersonotherthanthe surviving
spouse.

Sourceofelectiveshare.Statutes in somestatesprovidethatvaluesincluded
Lhalpassor havepassed lo the surviving,pour.
:i:1,. ligln".","d
appleo :tj"le
lrrstto salistytheeleclivesharecndlo reduce an) conrriluijons -.
from otherrecipients '----- due
---
of transfe$includedin tt e uug_"ni"a ertute.

Neq yort provichsgenerouslyfor a suniving spouse.
9,lTi "T1"i*:
erecr\eshareslalutes Irs
providelhatIhesurvivrng spouse is entitlediotheen_
lireesrale if ir is in rhe$t00.000range. ln additionto rhepr"b";;;., ;;
rorowrng\rr substilules aresubject to lheelectivesh616.;111g;ft5caus.rnar_
.rs:rI|l sa vtn gsaccol/nlr ustsl{ ijjr conlr ibuttonstojointbanliac c ounts
propenypayable ti \ I :
on dearhro a person olherrhanrhedecedent;
Urerrme tut .euocable
lransters. pension plans. andpropenyoverwhjchlhedecedenl
generar hada
powerot appointment. Theelecrive shareis reduced by thevalueo[
anyinterest(otherthana life estate)thatpassesf.om tle
aeceaenitottresuruiv_
rng spouse.lncontrast, Delawareincludesin theelectiveshareall DroD_

76 - Wills
erty includiblein the grossestatefor federalestatetax purposes,
regardless
of
whetherthe decedent files an estatetax retum.

1) Int€r vivos transfer included in computation of €lective share--fr,re In re
Reynolds,87 N.Y2d 633,664N.E.2d1209,642N.YS.2d l4'7 (1996). Reynolds

a) Facts,William(P)andDorothy(T) Reynoldsweremarriedfor25 years.
T hadfour childrenfiom a previousmariage.Shortlybeforeherdeath
in 1989,T createda trust for the purposeof qualifyingfor Medicaid
b€nefitsif nursinghomecarewasne€ded.Two of herchildrenwerenamed
trustees,the majority of her propertywastransferredto the trust,andher
chilfuen were namedremainderbeneficiaries.T relinquishedall rights
in the property tlansfelred,but retainedthe right to appointremainder
beneficiariesat any time prior to the terminationof the trust. Under the
termsof the retainedpower,shecould not appointto herself,her spouse
(P),her estateandits creditors,or her creditors.By its terms,the hust
terminatedone day prior to T's death.Upon T's death,her entire estate
havingbeenleft to her children,P filed a noticeof election,whichwas
given effect by the surogate's court. Later, P filed an objection to the
prcposedaccounting for theestatebecause it hadexcludedthetrustas-
setsfrom theestatefor thepurposesof computinghis electiveshare.The
surrogatecout sustainedthe objection.The appellatedivision disagreed.
P appeals.

b) Issue.Doesan inter vivos trustin whicha decedent
retaineda limited
powerof appointment constitutea testamentary in violationof
substitute
thesurvivingspouse'srightof election?

c) Held.Yes.Appellatedivision'sordermodified.

(l) Therclevantstatutedefinesa testamentary substituteasonein which
the decedent,at the dateof her death,retaineda power to rcvoke
suchdispositionorto consume, invade,or disposeofthe principal.

(2) l-egislativehistoryrevealsthat the statutewasenactedto protect
the right of electionof surviving spousesftom timely usesof vari-
ousintervivostlansfers. A specialshrdyinitiatedfor thepuposeof
proposingtheprotectivelegislationconcluded thatamongtheinter
vivostransferssubjectto theelectivedghtsof a survivingspouse
shouldbe thosewherea power of appointmenthasbeenretained.

(3) T retaineda limited power of appointrnentthat left her with mean-
ingful controloverthe trustduringher lifetime.Sheretainedthe
right to executewhat weretestamentarytransfersto any numberof
beneficiades. Thispowerisequalto thepowerto revoke,consume,
invade,or disposeascontemplatedby the statute.

Wills - 7?
(4) The fact that the power teminated one day prior to T's death
effectedno realisticlimitationon its exercise.

h. Waiver.A survivingspousemayvoluntarilywaivehis rightsto election,hom€-
steadallowance,exemptpropefiy,or family allowanceby a written and ex-
ecuteoagreement.

I rc Estate 1) Waiver upheld-h /e Estateof Garbadg 221A.D.2d8,14,633N.YS. 2d
of Garbade 878(1995).

a) Facts, In 1990,Respondent(R) mardedJ. Robertcarbade,the de-
cedent,a wealthyexecutive, aftersigningaprcnuptialagreement in
which R waivedher electiveshare,anong otherprcvisions.The
agre€ment alsorcquiredthedecedent to maintaina $ 100,000policy
on his life for R'sbenefit.Followingthedecedent'sunexpected death
in 1992,R received assets totalingapproximarely $340,000 andfiled
noticeofher electionto takehershareofthe decedent's estate.
The
decedent's sonsfrcm a previousmarriage,Petitioners (Ps),moved
for summaryjudgment,claimingR's right had beenwaived.R
claimedthe waiver hadbeenprocuredby fraud, misrepresentation,
andduress.Thecoul'tenteredjudgment for Ps.R appeals.

b) Issue.Wasthe prenuptialagrcementprocuredby fraud?

c) Held. No. Judgment
affirmed.
(l) Like anyothercontract,aduly executedprenuptialagreement
is given a presumptionof legality.The party attackingthe
agreement's validityhastheburdenofprovingfraud.
(2) R presented evidence to showthatit wasthedecedent whohad
filst raisedthe issueof an agreementand askedthat it be ex-
ecut€dbeforethe wedding.The decedent's lawyerhad pre-
paredthe agreementandit wassignedonly a few hoursbefore
the wedding.R did not obtainlegalcounsel,nor did sheread
the agreement beforesigningit. R wasnot told of theprovi-
sionwaivingher electivesharcandwasnot providedwith a
copyof theagreement.

(3) Howevel it wasuncontovertedthat R readilyagreedto the
agreement becauseshedid not want the decedent's moneyi
shejustwantedto behiswife. Priorto signing,R wastoldthe
full scopeofthedecedent's
wealth,wasadvisedto obtaincoun-
sel, andwasgiven the opportunityto readthe agrcement.
(4) Ther€is no evidenceof fraudhere.R hasesrablishedonly that
shewasderelict in not rcadingthe agreementand in not con-
sultinscounsel.

78 - Wills
4. Rights of Surviving Spousein Community Property.

Intrcduction. In all of the communitypropertystates,if an intestateis
not survivedby descendants, one-halfshareof the com-
the intestate's
munityestatepasses to the survivingspouse. Becausethe otherhalf of
the communityestatebelongsto the survivingspouse,the surviving
sDouse succeeds to theentircestate.In severalstates,thesurvivingspouse
t;kes the entire communityestateevenif the de{edentwas survivedby
d€scendants. In others,the decedent's one-halfcommunityshareis in-
heritedby his descendants.

b. Classilication of assetsascommunity or separateproperty. This clas-
sification is important for tax reasonssince under federal tax law the
entirc valueof a spouse'sseparatepropertybut only one-halfof thecom-
munitypropefiyis includedin thedeceased spouse's grossestate.

Putting the survivor to an election. Under the widow's election, an
estateplanningdevice,thedeceased spouse's will purportsto disposeof
theentirecommunitypropertyandnotjust anundividedone-halfshare,
givingthesurvivingspouse anelectton,suchthatifthe survivingspouse
lays claim to her communityinterest,shelosesthe testanentarygifts in
herfavor On theotherhand,if thetestatordisposes only of his separate
prcperty and his one-half shareof community property,the surviving
spousemay claim both her sharcof communitypropertyandher devise
underthe will.

5. Migrating Couplesand Multistate Property Holdings.

a. Migration from separateproperty stat€to community prcperty state.
Whena couplemovesfrom a separate propertystateto a community
propertystate,potentialproblemsarisein determiningwhat the surviv-
ing spouseis entitledto uponherhusband'sdeath,padiculadyif heeamed
or acquiredthe majority of thei Foperty while domiciledin the separate
propertystate.This occwsbecauseownenhip of propertyis determined
in accordance with the lawsof the statein whichthecouplewasdomi-
ciled whenit was acquiredor eamed.Two states,Califomia andldaho'
give thesurvivingspousea remedyin thesesituations throughthecon-
cept of quasicommunity property Quasi-community property is prop-
ertyacquiredby onespouse whiledomiciledin anotherstatethatwould
havebeenclassifiedascommunityprcpertyhadit beenacquiredwhile
the spousewas domiciled in the communityproperty state.Real prop-
erty locatedin anotherstatedoesnot constitutequasi-cornrnunityprop-
erty.Whenthe acquiringspousedies,one-halfof the quasi-community
propertygoesto the survivingspouseandthe otherhalf is disposedof
accordingto the decedent'swill. The non-acquiringspousehasno testa-
mentarypowe$ over the quasi-communityplopelty if shedies first-
the entirepropertybelongsto the acquiringspouse.

Wills - 79
"il*",**tilrg,*t*r
" ,*i:ii;#
i*il';'T*fi,*{,rqf#
#l{::
6. SpouseOmitted from premarital
Will.
a. Sates without statutes.The

run;":#*i.l "Jffi:T
#H;:"+ri"l$i
:'i'!i
st

sr::*:,l:
;:m;nffi .,;:n'#i;:
::,#"iiT
"*iji,:":t"i$*,,,x#fi
{f"n*qi:L,h
gg4,5p*n: .l$iiil.
;1p;5,*** ;.1'.t*im
ft ftTf $:,,:'l*i'l
il?r,liJiir,*ll,i''ri''lr,***tl#;"
Estateof
Shannon -'..1i:p*'ffi
" iil::: lill"r',i":T'iil:: Esrare
l"l,;;i; orShan
non.
2z-+
car
",1r$;;;1;qiff*j..
iffirr"l,*#l
2)
#il,jii:;]fi
t#iTtffiiHflilf:q*f
Issue.Wasp a pretermitted
spouse?
3) Hetd. yes. Orderreversed
andremanded.
,;T:jil?:il:H:i,."",":i::$iil,T"#:
l:fi,::?i::
80 - Wills
the executionof the testator'swill, the omittedspouse
shallreceivea share.

b) Noneof the exceptionsthat would precludeP from shar-
ing in T's estateapply T's failue to provide for P does
not appearfrom the will to be intentional.No evidence
showsT providedfor P outsidethe will. P did not execute
an agrcementto waive her sharc.

c) The exclusionaryclause,without more,is insufficient to
avoid the statutorypresumptionof revocationof the will
asto the omitted spousebasedon public policy

B. RIGHTS OF ISSUE OMITTED FROM TIIE WILL

Pretermittedchild statutesare designedto protect children who have been
accidentallyomiftedfrom the will In moststates,the statuteoperatesonly in
favorof childrenbomor adoptedafterthewill's execution. the
In otherstates,
pretermittedchild statuteappliesto childrenalive whenthe will wasexecuted
aswell asto afterbomand after-adoptedchildren.

1. Child Born After Will But Before Codicil-'Azcunce v, Estate of Azcuncev.
Azcunce,586So.2d1216(Fla.l99l). Estateof
Azcunce
a. Facts.Ren6Azcunce(T) exeauteda will that establisheda tlust for
the benefitof his spouseandhis then-bomchildren;therewasno
provisionfor after-bomchildren.T subsequendy executeda codicil
ihat republished the tems of the will. T's daughter, Patricia(P)'
wasbom after this first codicil but beforc a second'which, agair-,
republished thewill andfirst codicilandmadeno mentionof after-
bom childrcn. T died of a heart attackat age38 P petitionedfor a
statutory shareas a pretermittedchild The trial court denied the
Petition.P apPeals
b. Issue. May a child who is bom after the executionof her father's
will, but beforetheexecutionof a codicilto thewill, takea statu-
tory shareunderFlorida's prctermittedchild statutewhen the will
and codicil fail to provide for the child and all the other statutory
.equirementsfor pretemitted child statusareotherwisesatisfied?

c. Held. No. Order affirmed.

l) Under the statute,prior to the secondcodicil, P was a preter-
mittedchild,a childbornafterthemakingof thewill whohad
not rcceiveda portionof T's propertyby way of advancement'

2) Thesecond codicilexpressly origr-
itrepublishedthe
statedthat
nal will andfirst codicil.Thus,P'sFetermittedstatuswasde-
stroyed.
3) IfT hadwishedto providefor P,presumably, he wouldhavedone
soin thesecondcodicil.P was,in effect,disinherited.

4) Thereis no ambiguityin thewill andcodicilsthatwouldauthodze
thetakingof paJoleevidence.

Espinosav. ) No Malpractice Suit Without Priority-Espinosa v. Sparber,Shevirl Shapo,
Spalber,Shevin, Rosen& Heilbronner,612So.2d 1378(Fla. 1993).
Shapo,Rosen
& Heilbronner a. Facts.After Ren6Azcunce's(T's) daughter, Patricia(P), wasbom, T
contactedhis attomey(D) andindicatedhis desireto includep in his
will. D dmfteda will andrestructured thetrust.However,because of a
disagreement betweenT andD,T neversignedthesecondwill.Instead,
T executeda secondcodicil that did not provide for p p broughta mal-
pmcticesuit againstD. Thetdal cout dismissed for lackof privity and
enteredsummaryjudgmentfor D. The court of appealreversedthe dis-
missalwith regardto theestate,affirmedit with regardto B andcetified
thequestionof whetherP hasstandingto bring a legalmalpracticeaction.

b. Issue.May a malpracticelawsuitbe broughtagainstan attomeywho
drafted a codicil if the plaintiff is not in privity with the attomeyor an
intendedthird-panybeneficiary?

c. Held. No. Judgmenraffirmed.

1) To bringa legalmalpracticeaction,theplaintiff musrbe in privity
with the attomey,where one pafiy has a direct obligation to the
othet or mustbe an intendedthird-partybeneficiary.

2) Because Tis notaliveto tesdfyregardingintendedrhid-partyben,
eficiaries,the courtis obligatedto honorT's intentin confomity
with thewill's contents.

3) T's estatestandsin T's shoesandsatisfiesthepdvity requirement.

In re Estate Great-Grandchildren Not Pretermitted Heirs-I2 re Estatc ofl-aura, l4l
of Laura N.H.628,690A.2dl0l1 0997).

a. Facts. EdwardLaura(T) executed a will in 1984andsubsequentlydied
in 1990.The will provided rharT's estare wouldpassro his daughrer,
Shirley,andspecificallydisinheritedhis sonEdwardandhis two grand-
children,RichardandNeil, childrenof his deceased dauehter.JoAnn.
Afterlhewill wasexecuted. Neilhadtwochildren, CeciliaandNeil [l
(I's great-grandchildren).
kior to his deathin 1990,T attempted
to ex-
ecutea codicil to the 1984will that would havedividedhis estatein
propoftionatesharesbetweenShirley andher children,Edward andhis
childrcn,andRichard. However,thecodicilwasnot properlywitnessed,

82 - Wills
anduponT's death,the 1984will wasofferedandaccepted for probate.Rich-
ard alld T's great-grandchildren(Ps) challengethe will and claim they are
pretermittedheirs. The probatecoult adoptedthe master'sfindings that Ps
werenot pretemitted heirs.Ps appeal.

b. Issu€.Are Pspretermittedheirs underthe rclevantstatute?

Held, No. Judgmentaffirmed.

l) The relevantstatutestates: "Every child bom after the deceaseof the
testator,andeverychild or issueof a child of the deceasednot namedor
ref€rredto in his will, andwho is not a deviseeor legake,shallbe en-
titled to the sameportion of the estate,real andpersonal,ashe would be
if the deceasedwereintestate."

2) The statuteprotectsagainstthe omissionof a child unlessthat omission
is shownin thewill to beintentional.

3) WhileCeceliaandNeil III werenot narredin T's will, theirfatherwas
specificallydisinherited.Wherea testatorhasspecificallynamedanheir
to disinherithim, he hasrefenedto the heir's issuefor the purposeof the
statute.

4) If a testator'schild is mentionedin his will, that child's issueare not
pretermittedheirs.Here,T's will specificallynameshis prcdeceased
daughter,Jo Ann. Thus,her issue,Ps, arc not pretermittedheirs.

Wills - 83
VIII. TRUSTSTCREATION,TYPES'AND CHARACTERISTICS

A. INTRODUCTION

Background.The tflrsteeof a tlust ownsthe legalinterestof the fust
propertywhilethebeneficiaryownstheequitableinterest

The Settlor.The settloris thepersonwho createsthe trust.A tlustcre-
atedduringthesettlor'slifetimeis anintervivostrust.Atrust crcatedm
trust.
thesettlor'swill is a testamentary

The Trustee.Thetrusteemaybea thirdpartyor abeneficiary. Failureto
namea trusteewill not defeata trustla courtwill appointa rustee.
Theyhavea
hold equitableinterests.
4. The Beneficiaries,Beneficiaries
personalclaimagainst claims
thetrusteefor breachof trust,andequitable
on thetrustpropertyitself-

Useof Tfusts in EstatePlanning.Trustscanbe usedto avoidthepro-
Also, trustscanbe usedto securccertarntax advantages
bateprocess.
andfor propefiymanagement,includingtransferingpropeftyto minors
or incompetents.

6, A Trust Comparedwith a LegalLife Estate.In mostcases,creatlnga
to givingthedoneea
trustwith thedoneeaslifebeneficiaryis preferable
problemswith
legallifeestate,sinceresolutionof variousadminiskative
theestateis facilitatedby havinga trustee.

B. CREATION OF A TRUST

1. Intent to CreateaTrust. Whilethesettlormusthavetheintentto create
for thegrantor
atrust,no pafiicularwordsneedto be used.Itis sulTicient
to holdfor theuseand
to conveypropertyto a grantee benefitof another'

Jimenez a, Neednot expresslydirect that subiectmatter be held in trust-
v Lee Jimenezv. Lee,274Ot.457,541P.2d'126(1'916).

1) Facts.In1945,thepatemalgrandmother of BetsyLeeJimenez
(P) purchased a $1,000U.S. SavingsBond registered in the
nameof P and/orJasonLee (D), the fatherof B and/orDor-
othyLee,themotherof P,to beusedfor P'seducational needs.
In 1956,Mrs.AdolphDiercksgave$500to P andmadeiden-
tical gifts to D's othertwo children.Mrs. Diercksdeposited
the$1,500in a savingsaccountin thenamesofD andhisthree
children.Thereafter, D cashedthe savingsbondandinvested
the proceedsin commonstockof the CommercialBank of
Sdem,Oregon,withtheshares registered as"JasonLee, Custo-
dian. . . for BetsyLee [P]."At thesametime,D closedthe

84 - Wills
joint savingsaccountandinvest€d$1,000of theproceeds in Cornmer-
cial Bank stock,takng this stockascustodianfor his children P con-
tendsthatthegifts for hereducationalneedscreatedfusts in eachinstance
andthatthetrustssurvivedD's investment of thetrustassets in theCom-
mercial Bank stock. P brought an action for an accounting The trial
court held for D. P appeals

2) Issues.

a) To createa tust relationship, to exprcsslydirectthat
is it essential
the subjectmatterof a giit be held in trust?

b) Doesa trusteehavetheresponsibility to administera tust solelyin
the interestof the beneficiaryof the trust andto prove that any ex-
pendtturcsmadewere madefor trust purposes?

3) andfemanded.
Held. a) No. b) Yes.Casereversed

a) It is undisputedthat the gifts werc madefor the educationalneeds
of P.Whiletherespective donorsdid notexpressly directD to hold
thesubjectmatterofthe gift in tust, thisis not essential to createa
trustrelationship.It is enoughif the hansferof the property is made
with the intentto vestthebeneficialownershipin a third person'
This wascl€arlyshownin thepresentcase.

b) Havingdecidedthata ttustwascreatedfor the benefitof B it fol-
lowsthatD's purchase ofthe Commercial Bankstockascustodian
for P was ineffectual to expand D's powers over the trust property
from thatof tusteeto thatofcustodian. D's attemptto broadenhis
power violated his duty to the beneficiary to administerthe tust
solelyin the interestof thebeneficiary'Here'manyof theitemsthat
D lists astrustexpenditures areeitherquestionable or clearlyout-
side the purposeof an educationalffust The trial court theretbre
erredin findingthatP hasreceivedthe accounting that shesought
andis entitledto no furtheraccounting.

c) The casemustbercmandedfor anaccountingto be predicatedupon
atustee'sdutyto accountandthefustee'sburdento provethatthe
expendituresweremadefor trustpurposes.In determiningwhether
D hasmet this strict burdenof proof, the trial court must adhereto
therulethatall doubtsareresolvedagainsta trusteewhomaintains
aninadequate accountlng system

b. CustodianshipUnder Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. Under this Act, a
gift to a minor may be transfered to a personascustodianfor the benefit of
theminor Thecreationof thiscustodianship is simplerthanthecreationof a
trust.The custodianis a fiduciary.To th€ extentthat the custodialpropertyis

Wills - 85
not expended for theminor'sbenefit,thecustodian is requiredto transferthe
propertyto theminoron his attainingtheageof 21 or,ifthe minordiesbeforc
arlainingrheageof 2l , ro lheesrare
of theminor

Precatory language and equitable charges.Precatorylanguage-such as
"To A with the hopethatA will carefor B"----createsa monl obligationunen-
forceableat law.Uncertaintycanbe avoidedby specifyingthatonly a moral
obligationis desired;e.9.,"I wish,but do not legallyrequirc,thatA will carc
for B." Likewise,anequitablecharge(nota tust) occwswhena testatorde-
visespropertyto a personprovidedthat personpaysa certain sumof money
lo anomerperson,

The Hebrew d. No intention to imposetrusteeduties-The Hebrew UniversityAssocia-
University tion v, Nye (HebrewUniyersity
AssociationI ), 148Conn.223,169A.2d 641
Association ( 1 9 6 1 ).
v Nye
1) Facts.HebrewUnivelsity(P) obtainedajudgmentdeclaringit wasthe
ownerof a rarcbookcollectionpurchased by ProfessorYahudaandhis
wife Ethelduringtheprofessor's lifetime.Ethelhadpurchased a partof
thecollecdoninventoriedin theprofessor's estatewhenhe died,andat
herdeath,sheownedthecomplete collection. Professor
YahudaandEthel
hadindicatedto friendsbeforctheDrofessor's deaththatbothwishedto
createa scholarship research centerin Israel.Professor Yahudahadfor-
wardedsomeof thebooksto New Havenfor shipmentove$eas,butno
consignee wasnamedandthebooksremainedin New Havenandwere
purchasedby Ethel at theprofessor'sdeath.ThereafterEthel vi sitedPin
Israelandannounced hergift at a luncheon. Thenextday,Ethelsigneda
prcssrcleaseprep:uedby P,indicatingEthel had madea gift to P Ethel
alsoprovidedP with a memorandum listingmostof the library'scon-
tents,andits impoitantbooksanddocuments. [SeeHebrewUniversity
AssociationII, infral Late\ Ethel statedorally and in writing that she
"had given" the library to P, she refusedoffers of purchase,and told
othersthe librarydid not belongto her.Ethelcratedandcatalogued the
books,andup to thetimeofher death,coresponded with P aboutdeliv-
eringthelibrary,andsentsomeitemsto a warehouse for delivery.Upon
Ethel'sdeath,P soughta declaratory j udgmentdetermining whetherP or
Nye (D), Ethel'sestate'sreprcsentative, ownedthelibrary butP's com-
plaintcontained no theorybaseduponwhichownershipwasclaimed.D
appeals.

2) Issue.Is P theownerof thelibrary?

3) Held. No. Caseremanded
for a newtrial.

a) Thejudgmentbelowprovidedno basisfor the court'sconclusion
thata trustwascreatedat theluncheonwhenEthelmadepublicher
intentionto createthekust.

86 - Wills
b) The factsindicatethatEthel intended'andpossbil orqcc
rrmr
to give an executed,prcsent,legal inter vivos gift o P
deliverY'

c) Becausea gift fails for lack of delivery' the intent to glre catr-
not be canLd into effect throughthe presumptionthat the do-
nor intendedto havemadeheNelftrusteeto makethenecessaq
delivery
propeflyand
d1 One may constituteherselftrusteeof personal
cleatea tust erforceablein equity'eveflwithout consideration
to
or delivery.However,while theterm "ttustee"doesnot have
be used,the donormust showanintent to imposeupon herself
enforceabledutiesof a trustee'

e) No facs areprovidedin theopinionbelowindicatingthatEthel
ever imposedausteedutieson he$elf
v'Nye The Hebrew
e.
-' Constructivedelivery-The HebrewUniversityAssociation
39i University
fi"ir". u"ir"^ity AisociationII), 26 Conn' SDpp342' 223 A'2d
Association
(1966).
v Nye
l) Facts. SeeHebrew l|niversity Associatiotll' supra'
therigh'
2) Issue.IsP thelegalandequitableownerof thelibrarywith
to immediatepossessionof its contents
'
3) Ileld, Yes Judgmententeredfor P

a) P claimsconstructivedeliveryby meansof.Ethel'smemo-
randum.Consfuctivedelivery requiresdelivery as nearly
perfectandcompleteasthetypeof propertyandthe-circum-
deliveryhasbeenfoundin
stanceswill permit Constructive
deliveryofkeys,pointingout hidingplaces'andaninforrnal
memorandum.

b) Here,deliveryof the memorandum' alongwith Ethel'sacts
gift
andieclarationsthatclearlyshowherintentionto give a
and to divestherselfof ownership'was sufficientto com-
Pletethe gift
Any type of
2.
-' Necessityof Tlust Property. A trust must have trust property
leasehold
policies'
life insutance interests-
oroo"nu--ontngent remainders'
'*i li.uin.. fft" ituin concemis whetherlheparticularclaimwill bedeemed
propertyby a coun
S W 2d Unthankv.
a. Pmmiseto make gifts in the tuturc-Unthank v' Rippstein' 386
Rippstein
134(Tex.1964).

Wills - 87
payh€r
r) Facts.C.P Craftwrotea letterto Iva Rippstein(P),promisingto
that long ln the
$200 a monthfor the next five yearsprovidedhe lived
I
marginofthe letter,hewrote:"l havestdckenoutthewords'provided
iiulifruifong' u.a ft"t"by andherewithbindmy estateto makethe$200
monthlypay-ments." Ctaft diedthreedaysafterwriting theletter'Pbrcught
of his eslale(Ds) for declaralory judgment
suiragainsitheexeculors
aal,ral"car;ng rtreirtiauililyto paylulureInstallments astheymatureThe
tri'al court iranted th" motion for summaryjudgment The
"i""uiotr' the
court of apfeds reversedandrenderedjudgment for P' holding^that
*.iting inlu"ttion a voluntalytrustunder which Craftbound
"ttablished
his pr;pertyto theextentof thepromisedpaymentsDs appeal'
a
Issue.Is a writing promisingto makegifts in the futurebindingas
voluntarvtrust?

3) Held' No. Thejudgmentof the coufi of appealsis reversedandthatof
the trial court is affirmed.

a) While the transactionsunder review are in the form of voluntary
Lhe)aregovemed
lflJsls. in general by lherulesapplicable to gifts
Theprincrpat belween
difference sucha fusl anda g'll llesIn rne
fact ihat in the caseof a gift the thing givenpassesto the donee'
whileinthecaseoi a voluntaryhustonlytheequitableor beneficiaL
title Passes to thebeneficiary'

b) Here,thelanguage ol thenotationof Craft cannotbe expanded to
showanintentionon thepartof Craftto placehis property in fust
The mostCraft did wasto expl€ssan intentionto makemonthly
gifts to P accompanied by an ineffectualattemptto bind his estate
in futuro; the writing wasno morc than a promiseto mak€ similar
gifts in the futwe andassuchis unenforceable'

b. Resulting and constructive trusts.
(i).
1) Resultingtrust' Resultingrusts ariseby opelationof law when an
express priceforprcpertybut
trustfailsor (ii) apersonpaystheputchase
tiG resultsin the nameof anotherpenon who is not relatedto the pur-
chaser(putchase moneyresultingtrust)

2) Constructivehust. Constluctivetrustsare flexibleremediesimposed
to preventunjust en chment The trusteemust convey the property to
thewrongedpartyRequirements for a consfuctivetust are:

(i) al relationshiP;
A confidenti

prcmise,expressot implied;
(ii) A transferee's

88 - Wills
(iii) A transferof propertyin relianceon thepromise;and

of thelranslerce
(iv) Unjustenrichment

A consfuctivetrustmayalsobe imposedto avoidunjustenrichmentA
neednot exist'
promiseor confidentialrelationship
a
Tfust distinguished from debt. The crucial factorto differentiatebetween
the fundsis
t..r.t ,"lutionihip undun ordinarydebtis whetherthe recipientof
to o." th". ashis own andcomminglethemwith his own monies
"ntitl"d
Brainardv.
1) Tiust bas€don interestnot in existence"Brainardv' Commission-
Commissioner
er,9l F.2d880(7thcir 1937)

a) Facts. Brainard,a taxpayet contemplatedtradingin the stock-mar-
ket.He consulted a lawyerandwasadvisedthatit waspossiblefor
him to tradein trust for his childrenandothermembersof his fam-
ily. Brainard statedto his wife andmotherthat he declarcda trust'
u;on certaintermsandconditions,of his stocktrading for the ben-
eiit ofhis family.He agreedto assume personallyanylossesresult-
ing from the venture,and to distributethe profits' if any' in equal
sharesto his wife, mother,andtwo children after deductinga rea-
sonable compensation for hisservicesBrainardcarriedon histrad-
ing operationsandattheendof theyeardeteminedhis compensation
toie slightlylessthan$10,000,whichhe reportedin his income
tax for thatyear The profitsrcmainingwerethendividedamong
the memberi of the family in approximatelyequal shates'which
theyrcportedin theirresp€ctive incometa'{retums The Boardof
TaiAppealsheldthattheincomeincontroversy wasta'{ableaspaft
of grossincome.Brainardappeals'

b) lssue.Can a trustbe basedon an interestthat had not comeinto
existenceat the time the ttust is declaredandin which no onehad a
presentinterest?

c) Held. No Orderof the boardaffirmed'

{ l) An interest thathasnotcomeintoexistence or lhathasceased
to existcannotbe heldin trust A pe$oncanmakea contact
bindinghimselfto createatrustof aninterestif he shouldthere-
aftera;quireit' but suchanagreement is not bindingas a con-
fiact unl;sstherequirementsof contractlaw arecompliedwith
An expeclancy cannotbe thesubjectmatlerof a tnrsl andan
altempledcrealion.beingmerelya ptomiseto translerprop-
enyin lhefuture. is invalidunlesssupponed byconslderauon
Here,the taxpayerhadno propertyinterestin the profits in

Wills - 89
stocktradingbecause therewerenonein existenceat thetime.His
declantionamountedto nothingmorethana ptomiseto crcatea
trust. We thereforcmust determinewhetherit complied with the
law of contracts.

(2) It is elementary
thatan executorycontact,in orderto be enforce-
able,mustbebasedupon valuableconsidention.Here,thedeclan-
tion wasgmtuitous.Evenif we assumethat it wasbasedon love
andaffection,thiswouldnotbesufficientconsiderationfor a Drom-
ise.

(3) Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatthetaxpayerhadnorightto carry
outhis declarationafterthesubjectmatterhadcomeintoexistence.
Thequestionis, therefore,at whattimesdid therespective
eamings
thatconstitutethetrustfundcomeinto existence andat whattimes
did thetrustattachto them?

(4) Whena personputportsto declarehimselftrusteeof aninterestnot
in existence,
no tust adsesevenif theintercstlatercomesintoex-
istence,unlessthereis a manifestation
of intentat that latertime
Meresilenceordinarilywill notbe sucha manifestation.

(5) Herc,theprofitsin questionwercnot impressed with a trustwhen
theyfirst cameinto existence.The taxpayer'screditingtheprofits
to thebeneficia.ies
on hisbooksseemsto constitutehis firct subse-
quentexpression of intentto becomea trusteeof the fund.Before
that,thedeclarationcouldnot havebeenenforcedagainsthim, and
his meresilenceshouldnot be considered an expression of his in-
tenlionlo establish
a trusl.

Speeiman 2) Gift madeof property not in existenc€at time of gift-Speelman v. Pa.scal,
v. Pascal l0 N.Y2d313,178N.E.2d,723,222 N.y.S.2d 324 o96t\.

a) Facts.In1952,GabrielPascalEnterprises, Ltd. madeanagreement with
the estateof GeorgeBemard Shawthat grantedto the corporationthe
exclusive.ightsto prepareandprcducea musicalplaybasedon Shaw,s
Pygmaliottand a motionpictureversionof the musical.prior to this
agreement, Pascalhadproduced a nonmusicalmovievenionofthe play
underrightsobtainedby Pascalfrom ShawduringShaw'slife. Thenew
agreement providedthat the Shawestatewould rcceive3Eaof therc-
ceiptsof the musicalplay andmovie.It alsoprovidedthat the license
wasto terminate ifthe licensee
did notarrangeto havetheplayproduced
within certaintime periods.At a time whenthe licensestill had two
yearsto run,GabrielPascal,who diedshotly thereafter, wrote,signed,
anddelivercd to Speelman (P)a letterthatconfirmedthathe wouldgive
to P57oofthe profitsobtainedin Englandandthroughout theworldand
27oof theprofitsin theUnitedStates. P broughtsuitto enforcepascal,s

90 - Wills
trial cout heldfor
promiseto paytheshareof theprofits The
i. ut . put"ui(o)' puscal'swidow'appeals'
gifl bemadeofproperty thatis nol
b) lssue'Ma) a \alid present
in existenceat the time the gift is made?

c) Held' Yes Judgmentaffirmed'
letterconstl-
(1) Thequestlonnereis: Did thedeliveryof the
presenl gift to P by way of assign-
tutea \ alld'complete'
holdlhal rt did'
menlol a share;nfutureroyaltieriWe
assignments
Therearcmanymstancesof courtsenforcing
to b€come
of rights to sumsthat wereexpectedthereafter
ihat failed' thereJlad
dueto the asslgnor'In thoseiases
andine\ocable dellvery ol tm
nolbeensucha completed
subJect matterof thegift asto pul thegil'tbey:i:"tT;::-
lelt lor ras-
ladonby thedonorHeretherewasnothing
to P of palt of
cal to do to makean irevocable ffansfer
productions'
Pascal'snght to receiveroyaltiesfrom the
must havea beneficiary'However'
3. Necessityof Trust Benefrciaries'A trust
when-thetlust is created^Jf
the ben€ficiarymay be unbom or unascertained
aretoo ifldefinite to be.ascertaiied
thereis morethanonebeneficiaryandthey
trust may fail' in which casethere
itt" ,rrn" ,fl" *" u"comeseffective' the rn
or othersuccessors
"i
*iiil" t".ti,*g trrrstin favorofthe settlor'hisheirs'
"
lllrcrest.
r Campbell'82 N H 28l' 133 Clark v.
a. Identification of beneficiaries-Clark Campbell
A. 166(1926).
bequeathed to his trusteesanicles
1) Facts.The will of the decedent
of personalproperty"suchasbooks'photogtqht" 1b".T:'.!t^"]:l:t
asthe trusteesshall
statuary letc ]" to give to the decedent'sfriends
of whetherthe enu-
select.The lowercoufi reseryedthe question
restnctive or mercly
meration of the chattelswas intendedto be
propetty bequeathedOn-ap-
indicative of the variety of personal
the bequestfoi the benefitof-the testator's
f"ui, i, i, u'go"a thut
iriendsmustfail for uanlofcenaintyol benelrcrarles

2) Issues.
personalpropertyto a
a) Doesa bequestto a ttusteeto distribute
Lstator'sfiiendsconstitutea privatetiust?
a classof beneficia-
b) Must a privaterust havea beneficiaryor
i".l"ati"Ji",rt" *rll capableof cominginto courtandclaim-
ing thebenefitof thebequest?

Wills - 9l
3) Held. a) Yes.b) Yes.Casedischarged.

a) At commonlaw, therecannotbe a bequestto an indefinite person.
Theremustbe a beneficiary or a classof beneficiaries indicatedin
thewill capableof comingintocoufiandclaimingthebenefitof the
bequest.This principleappliesto privat€tusts but not to public
austsandchadties.Here,thelanguageof the will, ganting thetlust-
eespropertyof the describedclassto give to the testator'sfriendsas
they shallselect,clearlydiscloses an intentionto createa private
trust.

b) However,we hold that the will doesnot provide for definite and
ascertainable beneficiaries.Thus,it cannotbesustainedasa private
trust.Theword"ftiends,"unlike"relations,"hasno accepted statu-
tory or othercontrollinglimitationsandin facthasno precisesense
at all. No sufficientcritedonis fumishedto govemtheselection of
theindividualsfrom theclass.

c) Whena gift is impressed witb a tust ineffectivelydeclaredandin-
capableoftakingeffectbecause of theindefiniteness ofthe benefi-
ciary, the doneewill hold the property in trust for the next taker
underthewill, or for thenextofkin by way of a resultingtnist.The
trusteesthereforehold the propertyunderconsiderationto be dis-
posedof aspan of theresidue.

ln re b. Honorary trusts-.h /e Searight'sEstate,87OhioApp.417,95N.E.2d779
Searight's r1950).
Estate
1) Facts.The will of the decedent,
ceorgeSearight,bequeathed his dog,
Trixie,to FlorenceHand,anddirectedhis executorto deposit91,000to
be usedby him to pay Hand the sum of 75Cper day for the careof the
dogaslong asit shalllive.Handaccepted thebequestofTrixie andrhe
executorpaidher75Cperdayfor thekeepandcarcof thedog.Thetrial
courtheldtheprovisionin thewill valid.This appealfollowed.

2) Issues.

a) Is the creation of a trust for the benefit of a specific animal the
propersubjectof an honorarytrust?

b) Doesa bequestfor the benefitof a specificanimal"as long as it
shalllive" violatetheRuleAgainstPerpetuides?

3) Held. a) Yes.b) No. Judgment
affi.med.

a) A bequestfor the careof a specific animal is an "hononry trust,"
thatis, onebindingtheconscience of thetrustee,sincethereis no

92 - Wills
beneficiarycapableof enforcingthefust. The modemauthori-
tiesupholdthe validity of suchgifts wherctheperconto whorn
thepowerisgivenis willing to carryoutthetestator'swishes
Weholdthatthebequestfor thecarcof thedog'Trixie,is noL
in andof itselfunlawful.

b) Nor doesthebequestviolatetheRuleAgainstPerpetuitieslt
is to be noted that unlessa trust establishedfor specific ani-
mals limits the durationof the trust-that is, the time dunng
which thepoweris to be exercised-tohumanlives,we will
havehonorarytusts establishedfor animalsof g1€atlongevity
thatpossiblycouldcontinuelongerthanthemaximumperiod
allowedby theRuleAgainstPerpetuitiesHerc,however,the
rule is not violatedsincethe moneygivenfor the purposeof
caringfor the animalis limitedto $ 1,000at 75t per day This
sumof moneywill b€ fully exhausted in threeyearsand238 l/3
days.It is thus apparentthat the testatorprovided a time limit
fot the exerciseof the power given to the €xecutorand that
suchtime limit is lessthanthemaximumperiodallowedun
dertheRuleAgainstPerpetuities.

4. Oral Inter Vivos Ttusts of Land. An oral inter vivos trust of personalprop-
but ifthe subjectmatterof theoralaustis land,a wntten
ertyis enforceable,
insfumentis requiredto makethetrlrsteffective.However,somecourtswill
imposea conskuctivetrustuponpropertyif the transferee stoodin a confi-
dentialrelationshipto thetransferor'

a, Oral promis€ to reconveyland held sufficient to impose a construc- Hieble v'
tive trust-Hieble v' Hieble,164Conn.56' 316A.2d71'7(19'72)' Hieble

1) Facts.Mrs.Hieble(P)transfened title ofher realestateby deedto
her son(D) andto her daughter.The motivationfor the transferwas
that P feared a recurr€nceof cancer.She and the granteesorally
agreedthat thetansfer would be temporary;that shewould remain
in controlof thepropenya'ld payall expenses andtaxes;andthat
oncetheillnesshadpassed, thegrantees wouldreconveytheprop-
ertyto P uponrequest. Fiveyearsaftertheconveyance, P requested
that D reconveyhis title to her' D refused.P broughtsuit againstD
seekinga reconveyance of thepropeity.The bial court heldfor P D
appeals.

2) trustbe imposedon propertywhenthe
Issue.Will a constructive
doneeby deedhasreceivedrealty underanoral promiseto hold and
rcconveyto the grantorbut refusesto pedorm his promise?

3) H€ld. Yes.Judgmentaffirmed.

Wills - 93
a) D hasnot attackedthecowt'sfindingthattheagreement was
in factmade,nor doeshecontestthereceiptof parolevidence
ashavingviolatedthe Statuteof Frauds.Sincethe findingof
factsis not challenged. the conclusionof the court that rhe
partiesstoodin a confidential relationship
muststandunless it
is uffeasonably drawn.Wegrantthatthebondbetweenparent
andchild is not per sea fiduciaryone;it doesgenerate, how_
evel a natulalinclinationto reposegreatconfidenceandftust.

b) Thiscasecomes squarelywithinthegeneralruletlat whenthe
ownerofan intercstin landhansfersit intervivosto anotherin
trustfor the transferotbut no memorandum is signedasre-
quiredb) theSlaruteof Frauds,andthe transfereirefusesro
pedorm the trust, the ftansfereeholds the interest in a con_
structivetrust for the fansferor if the transfereeat the time of
thetransferwasin aconfidentialrclationshipto thetmnsferor.

5. Oral Trusts for Disposition at Death. If a testatordevisesproperty to his
executors in trustsnot definedin thewill buttheexistenceof whichthetesta_
tor hascommunicated to theexecutorsbeforcthewill's execution,
somecoufts
hold thatthosetrustsmaybe provedby oralevidence. Othercourtsrefuseto
follow this line of decisions,
holdingthatthe trusthasnot beensufficientl\
definedby the will to rakeeffect,andrheequirableinreresrgoesby way of
rcsultingtrustto theheirsaspropefiyofthe deceased.

Olliffe a. Tiustsnot sufficientlydefined-Olliffev. Welts,l30Mass.22l(1881).
v. Wells
l) Facts.The will ofthe decedent, EllenDonovan.left thercsidueof
her estateto Rev.Wells@) to distibute in suchmannerasin his
dlscretionshallappearbestcalculated to carryout the wishesthar
shehadexpressed to him or may expressto him. The heirsof th€
decedent(Ps)broughtsuitagainstD, claimingthattheresidueshould
bedistributedto them.In hisanswetD stat€dthatthedecedent hac
statedto him her wish that her estatebe usedfor charitablepur.
poses.D furtherstatedthat hedesiredandintendedto distributethe
rcsiduefor thesepurDoses

Issue.Ifa will showsthedeviseeto takelegaltitle only andnot the
beneficialintercst,andthetustis notsufficientlvdefinedbv will to
lakeeffect.will a counimpose a resulringrrusiontheheiisof rhe
decedentasto thepropertyof thedecedent not disposed ofby will?

J' Held.Yes.Judgment
for Ps.

a) It hasbeenheldthatifa testatordevisespropertyto hisexecu_
torsin trustsnot definedin the will, but which,ashe statesin

94 - Wills
thewill, he hascommunicated to thembeforethe will's
execution,thetrusts,if for lawful purposes,maybeproved
by theadmission of theexecutors or by oralevidenceand
enlorcedagainstthem.It hasalsobeenheldthattheffusts
maybeenforcedagainsttheheirsor nextof kin.

b) We rejectthis line of cases.The will on its face shows
thatthedeviseetakesthelegaltitle only andnot theben-
eficialinterest,andthetust is not sufficientlydefinedby
the will to takeeffect.Thus,the equitableinterestgoes,
by way of resultingtrust, to the heirs as property of the
deceased, not disposedof by will. They cannotbe de-
privedof thatequitableinterestunlesssignifiedin those
forms that the law makesessentialto everytestamentary
disposition. A tnist not sufficientlydeclaredon the face
of the wjll cannotthereforebe set up by exrinsic evi
denceto defeatthe ghtsof theheilsat law.

C. DISCRETIONARYTRUSTS

ln a mandatorytrust,the tnisteemustdistributeall the income.In a discre-
tionarytlust,the trusteehasdiscretionto distributeeithertheincomeor the
principalor both.

1. Tfustee'sDuty-Marsman v. Nasca,30Mass.App.Ct. 789,573N.E.2d Marsman
1025f1991). v.Nasca

Facts.Testator wassurvivedby hersecondhusband (ID, for whom
sheprovidedin a trust.Trustee(T) wasdirectedto pay quart€rly
incometo H and,aiterhavingconsideredH's sources ofincome,to
payprincipalfor H's comfortable supportandmaintenance. H ob-
tainedtitle by operationof law to the Wellesleyhomeownedas
tenantsby the entirety,but testatoralsoindicatedin her will her
intentto conveythepropertyto H. UponTestator's death,Farr,the
attorney,met with H. H was forcedto reducehis styieof living
dramatically andtoapplyfor a mortgage to paybills.Fafi wasaware
of H's statusbecause herepliedto aninquiryofthe mortgagebank
andH hadaskedFarrfor moneyon oneoccasion. Farr askedH to
suppofthis needin wdting andwrcte to H thatFarI thoughtthe
trusilanguage was"broadenoughto permita distributionofprinci-
pal."H neveraskedagainfrom thedateof Testator's deathin 1971
until H wasadmittedto a nursinghomein 1983.Farrhadgivenhim
only $300beyondtheincomeofthe trust.H remariedin 1972and
executeda simplewill draitedbyFarr,leavingmostofH's property
to his wife (P).By 1974,H couldnot meetexpenses andconveyed
his hometoTestator'sdaughterby a formermarriageandherhus-

Wills - 95
band.Thedaughtertookoverthemortgagepayments,taxes,insurance, and
majorrepairs.Hretaineda life estate.FarrhadneveradvisedHhecoulduse
thetrustprincipalfor theexpensesof thehome.The daughterdiedbeforeH.
Upon H's deaththe daughter'shusband askedP to vacate.P broughtthis
actionin probatecourt.The court foundT in breachof his duty to H and
orderedthehusbandto conveythehometo P andalsoorderedFan to reim-
burceTestator'sdaughter's husbandfrom theremainingportionof H's hust
for the expenseshe andTestator'sdaughterhadpaid for the upkeepof the
property.Ifthetrustwasinsufficient,thecourtfoundFarrpersonallyliable.
P appealsthe denialof attomeys'fees.Testator'sdaughter'shusbandand
FarI appealfrom thedenialoftheir motionsto amendthefindingsandfor a
new trial.

b. Issues.

l) Doesa trustee,holdinga discretionary powerto pay principalfor the
"comfortablesupportandmaint€nance" of a beneficiary,havea duty
ofthat beneficiarysoasto recog-
to inquireinto thefinancialresources
nizehis needs?

2) If so,wasthecourt'sremedyfor suchfailurecolrect?

Held. l) Yes.2) No. Judgmentvacatedandrcmanded.

l) The requircmentthat a trustee'spowermust be exercisedwith sound
judgmentfollowingfrom a dueappreciation of trustresponsibilityim-
posesupona trusteea duty of inquiryinto thebeneficiary'sneeds.

2) T alsofailedto meethis responsibilities
ofdistributionunderthetrust.

3) The conveyancewas supportedby sufficientconsideration,
and
Testator'sdaughterandher husbandhadno noticeof a breachof trust
andwercnot themselves guilty ofa breachoffiduciary duty;theycan-
not be chargedasconstructivetrusteesof the property.

4) The remedyfor T's failure to expendtrust principal in this circum-
stanceis to imprcssa conshuctivetrust on the amountsthat should
havebeendistdbutedbut werenot becauseof T's error On remand
theseamountswill be determinedandpaid to H's estate.

5) The exculpatoryclausein Testator'swill, draftedby Farr andholding
wasincorrectlyinvalidatedby the pfobatecourt since
Farr harrDless,
therewasno evidencethatthe insertionof the clausewasan abuseof
Farr'sfiduciaryrelationship
withTestatorat thetimethewill wasdrawn.

6) Far's actionswerenotbreaches of trustcommittedin badfaithorinten-
tionallyor with recklessindifference.Nor weretheywillful neglect.

96 - Wills
D. SPENDTHRIFTTRUSTS

In a spendthrift
trust,thebeneficiaries
cannotvolunta.ilyalienatetheirinter-
estsandtheirinterestsareprotected
ftom creditors.

1 lmmunity from Alimony and Child Support..Shelley
v. Shelley,223 Shelleyv.
Or. 328, 354 P.2d.282 (1960). Shelley

a, Facts.HughShelleyleft a husttheincomeof whichwasto bepaid
to his wife, GertrudeShelley,as long as shelived, and afterher
deathto his son,GrantShelley.The trustalsoprovidedthateach
beneficiarywaspreventedfrom alienatingthat beneficiary'sinter-
estintheestate, nor wouldtheinterestor estatebesubjectto claims
ofcreditors.GrantShelleywasfirst maniedto PatriciaShelley,and
two childrenwerebomof thismalriage.Thereafter,Patriciadivorced
Grant,withthedivorcedecree requiringpaymentfor suppof.Grant
latermaried BeftyShelley(P),andtwo childrenwerebornof this
marriage.P laterobtaineda divorcefrom Grant,with the divorce
decreerequiringbothsupportandaUmony. TheU.S.NationalBank
ofPortland,Oregon(D) investedthe trustassetsin securities,
which
arenow heidby it togetherwith the undisbursed incomefrom the
trust.P obtainedaninjunctionreshainingthedisbursement of any
of thetrustassets.PatriciaShelleybroughta gamishment proceed-
ing by which shesoughtto subjectthetrust to the claim for suppofi
moneyprovidedfor in her divorce decrce.D thenbroughta bill of
interpleader, tendedngto thecourtall ofthe fundsheldin trustmd
prayingfor an orderestablishing therightsof the paities.Thet al
couitentereda decrcesubjecting theaccruedincomeofthe trustto
the claimsof P andPatriciaShelJey;subjectingfutureincomeof
the trust to the pe odic obligationsbroughtby P and Patricia
Shelley;andholdingthatin theeventthetrustincomewasinsuf-
ficientto satisfysuchclaims,thecorpusofthe trustwassubjectto
invasion.

b. Issue.Is a spendthriftprovisionof a trusteffectiveagainsttheclaims
of the beneficiary'sformer spousefor alimony and for supportof
thebeneficiary's child?

Held. No. Decreeaffirmedin partandreversed
in part.

l) Althougha trustis a spendthdfttlust or trustfor suppoft,the
interestof thebeneficiary canbe reachedin satisfactionof an
enforceable claimby the spouseor child of a beneficiaryfor
support,or by thespouse for alimony.Theprivilegeofdispos-
ing of propeity is not absolute:jt is hedgedwith variousre-
strictionswheretherearepolicyconsiderations warrantingthe
limitation.

Wills- 97
2) Publicpolicyrequiresthattheinterestofthe beneficiaryofa trustshould
be subjectto claimsfor child suppon.It is clearthatparentshavethe
obligationto supporttheirchildren.Werewe to bar claimsfor support,
we wouldhavethe spectacle of a parentenjoyingthebenefitsol a trust
whilethecommunitypaysfor thesupportofthe children.With regardto
alimonyfor thespouse, thesameconsiderations apply;in manycases, if
thebeneficiary'sinterestcannotbereached, thestatemaybecalledupon
to supportthespouse.

Weholdthatthebeneficiary's intercstin theincomeof thetrustis sub-
ject to the claimsof P for alimonyandto the claimsfor supportof tle
childrenasprovidedunderbothdivorcedecrees.Weadoptthe view,how-
ever,thattheclaimantsmayreachonly thatmuchofthe incomethatthe
tdal courtdeemsreasonable.

4) The questionof the claimant'sright to rcachthe corpusof thetrustin-
volvesotherconsiderations. Thereis nothingin this trustthatwouldin-
dicatethe testator'sintentto makeP eitherdirectlyor indirectlythe
beneficiaryof the trust.At leastwith respectto the corpus,an Oregon
statutemakestle subjectmatterof the tlust free from attachment.It foi-
lowsthatthelowercourterredin makingthecorpusof thetrustsubject
to P'sclaimfor alimony.

Whetherthechildrencanreachthecorpusinvolvesstill a differentprob-
lem.Theftuststatesthatdisbursements to GrantShelley'schildrenwere
to be made"in caseof anyemergency wherebyunusualandextraordi-
naryexpenses arenecessary. . . ." D claimsthattheexpenses claimedin
this casearenot unusualor extraordinaryWe disagree.We conshre the
clauseto includethe circumstances involvedhere-where thechildren
aredesertedby their father andarein needof support.

6) The decrceof the lower court, permitting the corpusof the trust to be
invaded,wastoo broad.Firct,it improperlyincludedP's claimfor ali-
mony;andsecond,it permittedencrcachment uponthecor?uswithout
relerenceto whetherthe ffusteehasexercisedhis discretionor whether
therehasbeenanemergencyascontemplatedby the testator.The decree
thereforeshouldhavepermittedaninvasionof thecorpusonly ifit was
necessary first to reachthe incomeunderthe circumstances mentioned
andsuchincomewastheninsufficient.Further,thedecreeshouldhave
madesuchcorpusavailableonly in theeventofthe fiustee'sexerciseof
discretionundertheemergency circumstances providedfor in thetust.

d. Comment.Ohio recognizedspendthrifttrustsin 1991.lscott v. Bank One
TrustCo.,62 OhioSt.3d39,577N.E.2d1077(1991)lIn NewYorkby statute
all trusts are spendthrifttrusts unlessthe settlor expresslymakesthe
beneficiary'sinteresttmnsfemble.

98 - Wills
Cr€ditors' Rights in Support Thustsand Discrttionary Trusts'

a. Support trusts. A suPporttrust is onein which the trusteeis directedto
make distributionsas necessaryfor the educationand maintenanceof
the beneficiary,and to expendthe income and pdncipal only for that
purpose.In a supporttust, creditorsof the beneficiarycannotreachthe
beneficiary'sinterest.However,suppliersof necessaries may rccover
throughthebeneficiary's rightto support.

b, Discretionarytrusts.Adiscretionary trustis onein whichtheftusteeis
givendiscretionwhetherto applyor withholdpaymentsoi incomeor
pincipal to or from a particularbeneficiary, or (in somecases)to distdb-
utethesameto someotherbeneficjaryBeforethe fusteeexercises her
discretionto makepayments to thebeneficiarythebeneficiary's interest
cannotbereachedby his If, however'thetrusteedecidesto pay
creditors.
overorto applysomeamountof trustincomeor principalto thebenefi-
ciary,therighttheretovestsin thebeneficiary andhiscreditorsmaythen
reachit.

1) 517N w2d
Statesv. O'Shaughnessy'
IRS unsuccessful..United United Statesv.
574(Minn. 1994). O'Shaughnessy

a) Facts,O'shaughnessy of two separate
is a beneficiary identi-
caltusts establishedin 1951('1hel95l Trusts")by his grand-
parentsfor the benefitof their grandchildren.The trusteeshave
discretion to distribut€ or withhold trust assetsdu ng
O'Shaughnessy's lifetime. Howevet,the 1951trusts give
O'Shaughnessy a limited powerof appointment exercisable
only by his last will and testamentto a cefiainclass of indi-
viduals.If thepoweris notexercised, thetrustagleements pro-
vide for the distributionof the principaland undistributed
incomeat O'Shaughnessy's death.TheIRS (P)assessed a tax
deficiency ($412.q21.27) againsl O Shaughnessy and anempted
to levy the fust propertyor rightsto suchpropertyto satisfy
thedeficiency.No distributionftom thetrustswaspendingwhen
the levy wasserved.P filed suit seekingenforcement of the
levy.ThetusteesandFirstTrust Bank (Ds) moved to dismiss.
The disttictcourtdeteminedthatthe issueraisedby themo-
tion to dismissraiseda questionof statelaw appropriate for
certificationto thiscourt.

b) Issue."UnderMinnesota law,doesthebeneficiary ofa discre-
tionarytrustwith theprovisionsdescribed hereinhave 'prop-
hustprincipal
erty'or any'rightto property'innondistributed
or incomebeforethetrustees haveexercised their discretion-
arvDowersofdistdbutionunderthetrustagrcement?"

Wills- 99
c) in thenegative
Held.No. Cefiifiedquestionanswered

(1) Under an expressdiscrctionarytrust, there is a legal in-
terestvestedin thetrust€eandanequitableinterestvested
in thebeneficiary.The beneficiaryis entitledonly to what
thetrustee'in his uncontrolleddiscretion,seesfit to dis-
tribute.The ben€ficiarycannotcompelthe tustee to d1s-
tribule$ hal is a "mere expectancy'

(2) The beneficiary'scrcditors have no remedyagainstthe
trusteesuntil the trust propertyis distdbuted'

(3) The trust statesthat the trustees"may" pay all or sucl'
part of the trust assetsasthey seefiti aslong asthe trust-
eesacl in goodfaith. from propermotives and reason-
ably,thecourtwill not interferewith theirdecisions'

3. Medicaid Trusts.To qualify for Medicaid,anindividual's financialrcsources
mustnot exceeda few thousand dollars.Whethertusts thatprovidesuppon
to theindividualarecountedarnongtheindividual'sresources for Medicaid
purposesdependson the t)?e of trust.

a. Discretionary trusts. If an individual's assetsform all or part of the
tust andif the trustwasestablished by the individual,a spouse,or a
peNonactingon the individual'sbehalf,for purposesof Medicaid'a
irust is deemedto be crcatedby the individual.All of the assetsoi a
revocable rusl areconsideredavailable resources Any incomeorprinci-
pal that may bepaidto the individual underanycircumstancesunderthe
tems of aninevocabletust areconsidercdrcsources'

l) Exceptions. A dtscretionary truslcreatedby will by onespouse for
the benefitof the sutvivor is not deemedan available resourcelf a
tust is createdfor a disabledpersonto prcvide care for the indi-
vidualoverandabovewhatMedicaidmay provide,andthercis a
provisionfor thetrust to reimburseMedicaid uponthe individual's
death,thetrustis not considered an availableresource'

b. Third-person trusts. Income or pdncipal actually or legally available
to a beneficiaryof a mandatoryor supporttust establishedby a thid
personis considered a resowce.A discrctionarytrustgivingthe appli-
cant no legalright to theincomeis not considercda resourceavailableto
the individual unlessthepurposewasto provide for the applicant'ssup-
port.

c, Car€ful drafting. This areaof the law demandsgreatcaution Judicial
interprctationsof trustlanguagearenot consistent.Publicpolicy consider-
ationsareunsettled.What worksin onejurisdictionmay not work in an-
other.

100- Wills
E. MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION OF TRUSTS

l. Modification of Distributive Provisions.Somecourtswill permi! a
deviationof the termsof an expressgift in instanceswhercan unforc-
seenemergency threatenstheaccomplishment ofthe testator'spurpose.

Tfust modification denied..l, .e Trust of Stuchell, 104Or App. /r re Trust
332.801P2d 852(1990). of Stuchel

r) Facts.Petitioner's (P's)four childrenwereremainder benefi-
cia.iesof a trust.Oneof them,Harrell,wasmentallyretarded
andunableto live withoutassistance. Harrelllived in a state
facility andreceivedMedicaidandSocialSecuritybenefits,
bothof whichhaveincomeandrcsoucelimitationsfor par-
ticipants.P requested the courtto apprcvea modificationof
the trustso asto prcventHarell's remainderftom beingdis-
Fibutedto him if he suNivesthetrust'sincomebeneficiaries.
The proposed modificationwasdesigned to preventHarell's
disqualificationfor publicassistance.P appealsfrom thetrial
court'sdismissalof herpetition.

Issue.ShouldP'sproposedmodificationbe approved?

3) Held. No. Judgmentaffirmed.
a) P relieson commonlaw autlority for allowing a court to
approvetheproposed modification.
A tlustmaybetermi-
natedunderverylimitedcircumstances: (i) all beneficia-
riesagree,(ii) no beneficiaryis undera legaldisability,
and (iii) the trust'spurposes
would not be frustratedin
doingso.

b) To extendthe rule, P rclies on Restatement (Second)
Trusts,section167(l), whichprovidestbat a courtmay
pemit the trusteeto do actsnot authodzedby the tems
of thetust.

c) However,Commentbto section167(1)statesthata court
will not permit a deviationfrom the termsof a trust
"merelybecause suchdeviationwouldbemorcadvanta-
geousto the beneficiaries thana compliancewith such
direction."This limitationprecludes permittingthepro-
posedamendment, theonly purposeof whichis to make
thetrustmoreadvantageous to thebeneficiaries.

7 Termination of Tlusts. If the settlorandall beneficiariesconsent,a trust
may be terminated. The weightof authorityprovides,however,that a
trustcannotbe terminatedDriorto thetime fixed for termination,even

Wills - l0l
thoughall thebeneficiaries if teminationwouldbecontraryto a material
consent,
purposeof the settlor.

ln re E'state a. R€mainingmaterialpurpose--I/,te Estateof Brorvn,148Vt.94,528 A.2d
ofBrown '152.L981).

1) Facts.AndrewBrown diedin 1977,settlinghis entireestatein a trusl
The relevantportionof the trustinstrumentprovidedthatthe trust would
beusedfor theeducation of thechildrenofhis nephew,WoolsonBrown.
After this purposewasaccomplished, theincomefrom the rust andas
muchof thepdncipalaswasnecessary wouldbe usedby thetrusteeior
thecare,maintenance, andwelfareofWoolsonBrownandhiswife (Ps),
sothattheymightlive in thestyleandmannerto whichtheywereaccus-
tomeddudngthe remainderof their naturallives. Upon their demise,
anyremainderof the trust wasto be paid to their thenliving childrcn in
equalshares.

Thetrusteecompliedwith thetermsof thetust by usingtheproceeds to
payfor theeducationof thechildrenof Ps.After he determinedthattheir
educationwascomplete,thetruste€begandistributionof ffust incometo
Ps.
thelifetimebeneficiaries,

In 1983,Pspetitionedtheprobatecourtfor terminationoftrust,arguing
thatthesoleremainingpurposeof thetust wasto maintaintheirlifestyle
andthat distdbutionof the remainingassetswasnecessary to acconr-
plishthispurpose.
Therernaindermen (Ps'children)filedconsentsto the
proposedtermination.The probatecourtdeniedthe petitionto termi-
nate,andPs appealed to the WashingtonSuperiorCourt.The superior
courtreversed,concludingthatcontinuation of the trustwasno longer
necessary becausetheonly materialpurpose,theeducationof thechil-
dren,hadbeenaccomplished. An appealby thetusteefollowed.

2) I6sue.If any matedalpuryoseof the trust remainsto be accomplished,
may thetust beteminatedif all beneficiariesconsent?

3) Held.No. Judgment
reve$ed.

a) An activetrustmaynot b€teminated,evenwith theconsentof all
if a materialpurposeof the settlorrcmainsto be
thebeneficiades,
accomplished.

b) If eithera supporttrustor a spendthdfttrustwereinvolved,temi-
nationcouldnotbecompelled by thebeneficiaries a mate-
because
rial puposeofthe settlorwouldremainunsatisfied.

c) The tust at issuedoesnot qualify asa supporttrust.A supporttrust
is createdwhenthetrusteeis directedto usehustincomeorDdnci-

102- Wills
palfor thebenefitofan individual,but onlyto theextentnecessary
to supporttheindividual.Because thefusteemust,attheveryleast,
payall of thetrustincometo Ps,thetrustcannotbecharacterized
as
a suppofimlst.

d) Thetrustalsodoesnotqualifyasa spendthrift trust.Afust in which
by thetermsof thetrustor by statutea validrestrainton thevolun-
tary and involuntarytransferof the intercstof the beneficiaryis
imposedis a spendthrift trust.Thetems of thetust instrumentdo
not manifestAndrcw Brown's intentionto createa spendthrift trust.
The merefact that an interestin a trust is not tmnsfembledoesnot
makethe trust a spendthritltrust.

Termination cannotbe compelledherebecausea materialpurpose
of the settlorremainsunaccomplished.The settlor'sintentionto
assurea lifelongincometo Pswouldbe defeated if terminationof
thefust were allowed.

b. Tfusts remainingindestructiblebeyondthe perpetuitiesperiod.A trustis
not void merelybecauseit canextendbeyondthe perpetuities period.The
RuleAgainstPerpetuities appliesto interestsin a trustandrequiresthatthey
vestor fail within the periodprovided by the Rule,but it doesnot limit the
durationof thetrust.Nonetheless, a trustcannotremainindesfuctibleby the
beneficiariesbeyondthe perpetuitiesperiod.

wills - 103
IX. POWERSOF APPOINTMENT: BIILDING FLEXIBILITY INTO
TIIE ESTATE PLAN

A. INTRODUCTION

1. rypes of Powers,The creatorol a powerof appointment is calledthe
dorrl. Thepersongrantedthepower is calledthedore€.Thosepersons
to whomthedoneemay appointpropefiyaretheobjects.

a. Generaland specialpowers.All powersof appointment canbe
djvidedintogeneralpowersandspecialpowers.A generalpoweris
on€exercisable in favorof the donee.her estate.her crcdito$.or
thecreditorsof herestate.A specialpoweris onenotexercisable in
favorof thedonee,herestate,hercreditors,or the creditoNof her
estate.

2, Doesthe AppointiveProperty Belongto the Donor or the Donee?
Undertherelation-back doctrine.thedoneewasconsidered to haveau-
thorityto fill in blanksin thedonor'swill; propertysubjectto apowerof
appointment wasviewedasownedby thedonorandthepowerwascon-
ceivedasmerelyauthorityof thedoneeto do an actfor thedonor.Spe-
cial powersarestill treatedaccordingto this doctrine.

Irwin Union Creditor's Right to Property Subjectto a PowerofAppointment.-
Bank& Trust Irwin UnionBank & Tfust Co.v. Long, l60 Ind.App.509,312N.E.2d
Co. v. Long 908(1974).

a. Facts,In1957,VctoriaLong(D) obtained ajudgment in theamount
of $15,000againstPhilipLong aspartof a divorcedecree.In this
action,D seekssatisfaction of thatjudgmentby punuingfundsal-
legedlyowedto Philip asa rcsultof a trustsetup by Lau.al,ong,
his motherD allegedthatthe Irwjn Union Bank andTrustCom-
panywasindebtedto Philipastheresultofits positionastrusteeof
thetrustcreatedby Laura.Thetuialcoud orderedthatanyincome,
propefiy,or profitsthatwereowedto Philip andnot exemptfrom
executionshouldbe appliedto the divorcejudgment.Thereafter,
the trial coufi orderedthat 47oof the tlust corpusthat benefited
Philipwasnotexemptfrcm executionandcouldbe levieduponby
D. The primaryissuemisedon appealis whetherthe trial court
e.redin allowingexecutionon the4% ofthe trustcorpus.

b. Issue.Can a creditorreachpropertycoveredby an unexercised
powerof appointment?

c. Held.No. Judgment
of trial couitreversedandcasercmanded.

l) Wherea beneficiarywasgivena powerundera testamentary
tlustto dist.ibutepropertynothisownby electingto withdraw

104- Wills
not more than 4% of the fust corpus under certain circum_
stances, the powergivento the beneficiarywas a "powerol
appointment," andthe beneficiary's formerwife wasnot en-
titled as a creditor under a divorce decreeto reachproperty
coveredby a powerof appointment thatwasunexercised.

2) Thebeneficiaryof a trusthadno controloverthetrustcorpus
until heexercisedhispowerofappointment andgavenoticeto
thetrusteethathewishedtoreceivehis47oofthe trustcorpus.
Until suchexercise wasmade,thetrusteehadtheabsolutecon-
trol andbenefitof the kust corpuswithin the termsof thetrust
insfiument.

4. Thx Reasonsfor Creating Powers.The doneeof a generalpower of
appoinftnentover incomeor principal is regardedas the owner of that
property.The incomeis taxableto the donee.If the power of appoint-
mentis exercised duringthedonee'slifetime,thetransferredpropertyis
subjectto gift taxation.Ifthepowerof appointment is notexercised
dur-
ing the donee'slifetime,the propertyis a part of the donee'sfederal
grossestateandis subjectto taxation.Note that propertysubjectto a
specialpowerof appointment is nottreatedasownedby thedonee.

B. CREATION OF A POWER OF APPOINTMENT

1. Intent to Crcate a Porver.The creationof a power of appointmentmust
be accompanied by thedonor'sexpressor impliedmanifestationof intent.

2. Powersto Consume.Theissueof whethera powerto consumeprinci-
with powersof appointment.
pal hasbeencreatedarisesin connection

a. in will--Sternery, Nelson'210Neb.358,314
Inconsist€ntclau.$es Stemer
N.W2d263 (1982). v. Nelson

1) Facts.Thewill ofthe decedent,OscarWurtele(T), bequeathed
to his wife,Mary,all his property"absolutelywith full power
in her to makesuchdispositionof saidpropertyas shemay
desire."It alsoprovidedthatuponthedeathof his wife (or if
shepredeceasedT), theremainingpropertyshouldvestinT's
fosterdaughterandher children(Ps).After T's death,Mary
remarried.Mary died testate,leavingpropertyto variousindi-
viduals,includingherhusband, butnot to Psreferredto in T's
will. Thetrialcowt heldthatthelanguage inT's will createda
feesimpleabsolutein Mary.Psappeal.

2) Issue.If a will conveysabsolutetitle in fee simple,will an
inconsistentclausein theinstrumentattemptingmerelyto limit
thattitle or conveyto thesamepersona limitedtitle be disre-
sarded?

Wills- 105
3) Held. Yes.Judgment
affirmed.

a) The generalmle is thatwhenthereis a bequest to onein
genemltermsonly,expressing neitherfeenor life estate,
andthercis a subsequent limitationoverof whatremains
at thefirct taker'sdeath,if thereis alsogivento thefirst
takeranunlimitedandunrestricted powerof absolute dis-
posal,thebequestis constuedto passa fee.The attempted
limitationoveris void.[f a will conveysanabsolutetitle
in feesimple,aninconsistent clausein theinshumentat-
temptingto limit thattitle orconveyto thesamepersona
limitedtitle will be disrcgarded.

b) Here,the $ant to Mary Wurtelewasclearandunambigu-
ous.Shewasto havethe Foperty "absolutelywith full
powerin herto makesuchdispositionof saidpropertyas
shemaydesire."Wefind no reasonwhy thecornmonlaw
rule shouldnot be appliedto this bequest.
Accordingly,
we holdthatthebequestto Mary Wurtelewasa fe€ simple
absolute.

b. Taxation of powers to consume.A power to consumethat allows
the doneeto appointpropefiyto himselfduring his lifetimeis a
generalpowerof appointrnentandis taxable.However,if thepower
is limited by asceitainable
standards,it falls within an exception
andis not taxable.

C. RELEASE OF A POWER OF APPOINTMENT

Powersof appointment (exceptpowersin tust or imperativepowe6)maybe
released j puGuantto caselaw or statute.
in alI urisdictions,

Seidelv 1. Contractto Exercisea PowerofAppointment-Seidelv. Werner,81
Wemer Misc.2d 220,364N.Y5.2d963(19'75).

Facts.The decedent,StevenWemer,entercdinto a sepamionagrce-
mentwith his secondwife, Harriet,wherebyhe agreedto makea
willin whichhewouldexercise his testamentary powerofappoint-
mentover his shareof a trust, known astheAbrahamWemerTrust
No. 1, by establishinga tuustfor the berefit of their children,Anna
and Frank Wemer.l-€ss than four months after the divorcejudg-
ment,of which the separationagreementwasmadea pafi, thedece-
dentexecuteda will, which,insteadof executinghis testamentary
powerof appointment in favorofAnna andFrankWemer,left ev-
erythingto his third wife, Edith (D). The trusteesof the fust (Ps)
aresuingfor a declaratoryjudgmentto determinewho is entitledto
thedecedent's shareofthe trustfund.

106- Wilts
b. Issue.May the doneeof a power of appointmentthat is not prcs-
ently exercisablecontractto makean appointment?

c. Held. No. Summaryjudgment$antedfor D.

1) The doneeof a powerof appointrnent thatis not presentlyex-
ercisable,or of a postponedpower that hasnot becomeexer-
cisable,cannotcontractto make an appointment.Such a
contractcannotbe the basisof an action for specific pedor-
manceor damages, but thepromiseecanobtainrcstitutionof
the valuegiven by him for thepromiseunlessthe doneehas
exercisedthepowerpwsuantlo lhecontract.

2) Howevef Halaiet,Anna,andFrankWemerarguethat at a mini-
mum the agreementshould be construedas a releaseof his
powerof appointment, andthatAnnaandFrankshouldbeper-
mitted to take ason default of appointment.This argumentis
inapplicable to thiscasesinceit is clearthatthepartiesdid not
intend a releaseof the powerof appointmentNor is the effect
of thepromisedexerciseof thepowerthe sameaswouldfol-
low from rcleaseof the power, sincethe agrcementprovides
for appointmentof a greaterprincipal to Anna andFrank than
they would get in defaultof appointment.Also, underthetrust
insfument, on default of exerciseof the power, the property
goesto thefour childrenabsolutely,whereasunderthe separa-
tion agreement the decedentshall createa trust payableto
Harriet astrusteefor the supportof Anna and Frank. Finally,
under the separationagrcement,if Anna and Frank fail to
qualify,theprincipalwouldgo to thedecedent'sestate,whercas
under the trust instrument,in default of appointmentand an
inability ofAnna andFrankto take,thedecedent'ssharcwould
go to his otherchildren,ifliving, andif not,to his nextofkin.
Underthesecircumstances, it is too strainedto construethe
separationagrc€mentastheequivalentof areleaseof thepower
of appointment. Accordingly,D is entitledto the decedent's
sharein the pdncipal of theAbrahamWemertrust.

D. EXERCISE OF A POWER OF APPOINTMENT
1. Exercise by Residuary Clause in Donee'sWill. Courts are split over
whethera residuaryclauseshouldpresumptively exercis€a generalor
specialpowerof appointment. The Uniform Probate Code,section2-
610,providesthata generalresiduaryclausein a will, or a will making
generaldispositionof all of the testator'sproperty,doesnot exercisea
powerof appointment heldby the testatorunlessspecificreferenceis
madeto the poweror thercis someotherindicationof intentionto in-
cludethe propertysubjectto the power

Wills- 107
Bealsv. State Partia.lrcleaseof generalpow€r of appoinlment-Beals v. Stlte Str€etBank
Stre€tBank & Tfust Co.,367Mass.318,326N.E.2d896(1975).
& TrustCo.
1) Facts.The will of thedecedent, Arthur Hunnewell(T), placedtheresi-
dueof his propertyin a trust,theincomeof which wasto be paidto his
wife during her life. The will dircctedthar ar the deathof the wife the
trustwasto be dividedinto pofiions,onefor eachsurviving daughterand
for thethen-surviviflg issueof anydeceased daughterThe will directed
that the incomeof eachpofiion shouldbe,on a daughter'sdeath,paid
anddisposed ofas shemaydirectandappointby herlastwill. Following
the deathof her mother,one daughter,Isabella Hunnewell Dexter, re-
questedthe trusteesto makethe principal paymentsby transfer.ingvir-
tually all of her trust sharcto the Dexter family office in Boston.
Thereafter,Isabellaexecutedan instrumentpartially rcleasingher gen-
eral powerof appointment underher father'swill. Isabella,who died
withoutissue,did not expressly exerciseherpowerof appointment un-
derherfather'swill but did leavea will thatleft theresidueof heresrare
to theissueof hersisterMargaretBlake,who hadpredeceased Isabella.
In defaultof appointment, theBlakeissuewouldtakeone-halfof Isab€lla,s
trustshare.If Isabella'swill shouldbe teated aseffectivelyexercising
her power of appointment,the Blake issuewould take the entire trust
sharcandthe executorsof the will of Isabella'ssisterJanewouldnot
receivethat one-halfof thetrust sharethat would otherwiseeo to Janein
defaultof appointmenl. The lrusrees(Ps)of T's wjll filed a peririonfor
instrucdons,seekinga determinationof the distdbution to be made.The
trial court reserveddecisionand reportedthe caseto the appealscourt.
The casewasthentransfered to the suprcmecourt.

2) Issue.Doesthe partial releaseof a generalpower of appointmentobvi-
atethe applicationof therule of conskuctionthatpresumes thata gen-
eralresiduaryclauseexercises a genemlpowerof appointment?

3) Held. No. Judgmentordered.

a) We arc unawarcof any decidedcasethat, in this context,hasdealt
with a testamentarygeneralpower reducedto a sp€{ial power by
action of the donee.We concludethat the residuaryclauseof
Isabella'swill shouldbe prcsumed to haveexercisedthepowerof
appointrneflt.We believe that a presumptionof exerciseis morc
appropriatein this casethan a presumptionof nonexercise.

b) Whenthis courtfirst decidednot to extendto a sDecialDowerof
appointmenttheruleofconsuuctionthala generalresiduary clause
executesa genemltestamentarypower unlessa contrary intent is
shownby thewill, we notedsignificantdistinctions
betweena gen-
eralpoweranda specialpower.A generalpowerwassaidto be a

108- Wills
closeapproximationof a propertyinterestwhile a specialpower
lackedthis quality.

c) The rationalefor thecanonof construction applicableto gen-
eralpowersshouldbe appliedin this case.The powerwasa
generalpowerat its inception.Isabellahadtheuseandenjoy-
mentof the major portionsof the propertyandthis is a factor
properlyconsidered asweighingin favorof th€ exerciseof a
poweroi appointment by a will. Here,thepartialrcleaseof a
generalpowerdoesnot obviatetheapplicationof thatrule of
constructionthatpresumes thata genemlrcsiduaryclauseex-
ercisesa generalpower of appointment.

Limitations on Exerciseof a SpecialPower.Doneesof genemlpowe6 of
appoinhnent canusuallyappointoutrightor in fulher trust.They can also
createnewpoweNof appointment. Thedonee'sauthorityis morelimitedwith
a specialpowerof appointment. A specialpowermustbe exercised in accor-
dancewith theinstrument creatingthepower,andthedonormay imposere-
strictionson thewaythepowermaybeexercised.

a. Crcationoflimited interest,Unlessthedonorhasexpressed a contmry
intent,thedoneeof a specialpowermayappointlimitedintereststo ob-
jectsof thepowet or appointin futher trust.In somestatesthedoneeof
a specialpower maynot appointin furthertrustunlessit appears thatthe
donorintendedto allow suchan appointment.The rationalefor this mi-
nodty view is that the donorpresumptively intendedthat the trustbe
terminatedandthe assetsdistributedto personsselectedby the donee.
Thespecialpowergivesthedoneeonly therightto selecttherccipients.

b, Exclusiveand nonexclusivepowers.A specialpoweris eitherexclu-
siveor nonexclusive.If thedonorintendsthatthe doneebe ableto ex-
clude one or more of the class of objects,perhapsappointing all the
propedyto oneobject,thepoweris exclusive.If the donorintendsthat
all membe$ofthe classbenefit,but thattheamountofeachshareshall
be determined by the donee,the poweris nonexclusive.The presump-
tionis thatthedonorintendsthepowerto beexclusive. However,courts
oftenhavefoundthat the presumption is overcomeby particularlan-
guagein thecreatinginstrument.

Fraud on a SpecialPower.Thedoneeof a specialpowermaynot appointto
non-objects of thepower If thedoneeof a specialpowerappointsto a class
composed of objectsandnon-objects, the appointment to the non-objectsis
void.An appointrnent to an objectwith an expressconditionthatthe object
payoveran amountto a non objectis a fraudulentappointnent.The condi-
tionis void.If thedoneeof a specialpowerappointsto anobjectin consider-
ationof a benefitto a non-object,theappointment is void to theextentit was
motivatedby thepurposeofbenefitingnon-objects.

Wills - 109
4. Ineffective Exerciseof the Power.If an attemptedexerciseof a power
of appointmentis ineffective,the donee'sintent may still be effectuated
by allocationandcapture.

a. Allocation of assets.Under the doctrine of allocation, when the
doneeof a powerblendsher own propertywith the appointiveprop-
erty,andexercises the powerin an invalid way,the donee'sown
propertyandtheappointivepropertywill be allocated, if possible,
to give maximumeffectto the donee'sintent.Thus,thedone€'sown
propeftymaybeallocatedto theappointees, andtheappointiveplop-
erty may be allocatedto legateesof the done€'sown propefiy.

b. Capture. Ordinarily, if the doneeof a power makesan ineffective
exercise,the propertygoesin defaultof appointment.If thereis no
gift in default,the propefiy revefis to the donor or the donor's es-
tate.The exceptionto this is tbe captue doctrine.If the doneeof a
generalpowerof appointrnentineffectivelyexercisesthepower,but
manifestsanintent to assumecontrol of the appointivepropertyfor
all purposes,thepropertyis capturedin thedone€'sestate.Theques-
tion is whetherthe doneeintendedto captwethe propefiy; if so,the
propefiy doesnot passin defaultof appointment.The intent to cap-
ture the propertycanbe foundin a generalblendingclausein a will
thatexpresses thedonee'sintent to disposeof her own propertyand
anypropertyoverwhich shehaspowerof appointment.An intentto
capturecanalsobe foundin a residuaryclausethatdisposes of the
donee'spropertyandtheappointiveassets in thesamemanner

E, FAILIJRE TO EXERCISE A POWER OF APPOINTMENT

Appointivepropertypassesin defaultof appointrnentif the doneeof a general
power fails to exercis€it. The propertyrevertsto the donor,sestateif thereis
no gift in defaultof appointment.Appointive propertypassesto the objectsof
thepowerifthey arcan ascertainable, limitedclassif the doneeof a special
powerfails to exerciseit andthereis no gift in defaultof appointment.

Inring v. 1. Disposition ofProperty When SpecialPower ofAppointment Is Not
Marshall Exertised-Loringv. Ma$hall, 396Mass.166,484N.E.2d1315(1985).

a. Facts.MarianHovey (T) died in 1898,survivedby a brother,a
sister,andtwonephews. By herwill, T left theresidueof herestate
in fust, theincomepayablein equalsharesto her brotherandsister
du.ingtheirlives.Uponherbrother'sdeathin 1900,his shareof the
incomepassed to hersister,and,uponhersister'sdeathin 1922,the
incomewaspaidin equalsharesto hertwo nephews. Onenephew
diedin 1928,unmarried andwithoutissue.His shareofthe income
then passedto his brother who remainedthe sole income benefi-
ciaryuntil his deathin 1946.

110- Wills
T's will gaveCabotJackson Morse,thesu ivingnephew,a specialpowerlo
appointthetrust principalto his "wife andissue"with thelimitationthatorly
incomecouldbeappointed to a widowwhowasliving atT's death.Cabotwas
suryivedby his wife Anna, whowasliving atT's deatb,andby his only child,
CabotJr, whodiedin 1948,two yearsafterhisfatherCabotleft a will, which
providedthatthepowerof appointment hehadunderT'swill wasto beexer-
cisedby appointingto his wife the right to the incomeduringher lifetime.
Consequently, the trustincomefollowingCabot'sdeathwas paid to Anna
until herdeathin 1983,whentheprincipalbecamedistributable. Thetrustees
thereupon sought inskuctions as to who is entitledto the remainder of the
Marian Hovey Trust now that the trr.lstis distributable.Among the claimants
areseveralcharitieswho wereto rcceivethewholetrustfund ifneither nephew
left appointees.

b. Issu€.Ifthedoneeof a specialpowerfailsto exercise
it andthereis no gift in
defaultof appointment,
maytheappointive propertypassto theobjectsof the
power?

Held. Yes.Judgmentsoordercd.

l) Whena specialpowerof appointment is not exercisedandabsentspe-
indicatingan expressgift in defaultof appointment,
cific language the
propertynot appointedgoesin equalsharesto themembersof theclass
to whomthepropertycouldhavebeenappointed.

2) Applyingthis rule of law thereis no specificlanguage
in the will indi-
catinga gift in defaultof appointmentin theeventCabotshouldfail to
appointtheprincipal.

3) T's will disclosesanintentto keepherpropety in thefamily.The inter-
estsT gave to hersisterandbrotherwerelife interests, aswerctheinter-
estsgivento hernephews. Thesharcofany nephewwhodiedunmarried
andwithoutissue,asonedid,wasaddedto theshaleof theothernephew.
Eachnephewwaslimitedto exercising his powerof appointment
in fa-
vor of his issueandhis widow.The apparentintentto keepthe assets
within thefamily is sufficientlystong to overcomeany claimthatT's
will providesfor a gift to thecharitiesin defaultof appointment.

4) Wherea testamentary trustprovidedthatthelastsurvivingincomeben-
eficiary hada powerof appointmentof trustprincipal andthelast surviv-
ing incomebeneficiaryof a trustappointed only therust income,in the
absence ofany express gift in defaultof appointment thesurvivingissue
thedoneeof thepowerof appointment (i.?.,theestateof CabotJr.)was
entitledto distributionof thetust principal.

Wills- 111
X. FUTUR.EINTERESTS:DISPOSITIVEPROVISIONSOF TIIE TRUST
INSTRIJMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

A futureinterestis d nonpossessoryintercstcapableof becomingpossessory
in thefuture.The law of futureintercstsd€alswith situations
wheretheben-
eficial enjoymentof land by a successor occursat sometime in the futue.
Certaintyof beneficialenjoymentis not requiredihowevettheremustbe at
leastthepossibilityof futurebeneficialenjoyment.

B. CLASSIFICATION OF FT]TUREINTERESTS

l. Future Interests in the Tlansferor:,The threetypesof future intercsts
that can be retainedby the transferor are rcversion, possibility of re-
vertcl, andight ofen /Jr'.Theseinterestswill or maybecomepossessory
in thetransferoror her successors in interest.

a. Reversion,A reversionis a futureinterestleft in the grantorafter
sheconveysa vestedestateof a lesserquantumthanshehas(usu-
ally a life estate).

b. Possibility of reverter.A possibilityof rcverterariseswhena grantor
carvesout of herestatea deteminableestateofthe samequantum
(thedeterminable estatewill endif somefutureeventoccurs).

c. Right of entry. A right ol entryoccurswhena gnntor createsan
estatesubjectto a conditionsubsequentandretains
thepowertocut
shortor teminatetheestateuponthehappening of thatcondition.

2. Future Interestsin Transferees,The threetypesof futureinterestsin
bansfereesarc y?.rt?dremainders,contingent remaintlers, andexecu-
tory interests.

Remainders.A remainder is a futureintercstcreatedin a erantee
lhatis capable of becoming a presenl possessory esrateufon rhe
expirationof a pdor possessory estatecreatedin thesameconvey-
ancein whichtheremainder is c.eated.A wfted remainder is cre-
atedinanascertained personin beingandis notsubjectto acondition
precedent (i.e.,it is capableof becomingpossessory wheneverthe
precedingestateterminates).Acontinge t temainder,on the other
hand,is createdin anunasceftained penonor is subjectto a condi-
tion precedent (i.e.,it is contingent on something happening before
it canbecomepossessory).

b. Executoryinterests.Any interestin a transferee
thatcannotbe a
rcmaindermustbe anexecutoryintercst.An executoryinterestis a
tutureinterestthatmust,in orderto becomeDossessorv.divestor

112- Wills
cut shortsomeintercstin anothertransferce (a shiftingexecutory
interest)or divestthetransferorfollowinga certainperiodof time
duringwhich no tmnsferceis entitledto possession (a springing
executoryinterest).

3. D€structibilityof ContingentRemainders.This doctrineholdsthatif
a legal contingentremainderin land doesnot vestbeforeor at the telmi-
nationof the prccedingfreeholdestate,the remainderis destroyed. In
aboutthrce-fourths of the states,the desttuctibilityrule hasbeenabol-
ishedby stalule orjudicialdecision.

C. CONSTRUCTIONAND DRAFTING PROBLEMS

1. Prcferencefor VestedInterests.If an interestmight be classifiedas
vestedor contingent,thecommonlaw preferenceis to classifyit asvested.

a. Tfansferability and t&xation. Over 40 stateshave madecontin-
gentinterests transfembleby statute orjudicialdecision.
Reversions,
remainders, andexecutoryinterests arc descendibleand devisable
at deathin the samemanneras possessory interests.The federal
govemmentsubjects to gift or estatetaxationanygratuitoustans-
fer of a propertyinterest.

b. Accelerationinto possession.

1) Renunciationvalid--Itt /e Estateof Gilbert, 156Misc 2d 1n re Estate
592N.Y.S.2d224(1992).
3',79, ofGilbeft

a) Facts. I-esterCilbert (D) renouncedhis shareof two
wholly discretionary trustsunderhis father'swill. The
estatewasworth $40million dollars.D, age32, hadno
childrenand was a memberof a groupof peoplewho
shareda similarreligiousdoctrine.Theexecutor(P)peti-
tionsthiscoufito declarcD's renunciationnull andvoid.

b) Issues.

(l) Would permittingthe renunciationviolatethe
intentto providefor D?
testator's

(2) DoesD possess
a cunentpropefiyinterestthat he
I
cantenounce

c) Held. (1) No. (2)Yes.Judgment
for D.

intentionis not contolling.Thelaw
(l) Thedecedent's
doesnot compela manto acceptan estateagainst
hiswill.

Wills- 113
(2) The contolling statutesproviderhata beneficiaryof a dispo_
sitionmayrenounce all or panof his inrerestjn a rransfei
of
propertyby a personduing his lifetimeor by will. properryis
"anythingrhatmaybethesubjectofown€nhip.,,

(3) D's renunciation appliesto his remainderinterestin oneelec_
tlve sharetrust,contingentuponD suniving his mother,and
to his cufientinterestin a trustunderwhichhe may havethe
right to compelthefusteesto distributetrustpropertyto him
undercertaincircumstances.

(4) Thefiling of a rcnunciation hasthesameeffectwith resDectto
therenounced inrereslasif D hadpredeceased
hrsfather\ ith_
out issue.

Requiringsurvival to time ofpossession. Generally,a remaindermanneed
rlot live to thetime ofpossession.
If theremainderman predeceases
thelife
tenant,the rcmainderpassesto his estate.The testatormay.however.ex_
presslyrequiresur\,ival, andin somecasescounswill Infera requiremen
ofsurvival.
FirstNatioml l) Pr€sentvest€dinterest--FirstNational Bank of Bar Harbor v. An.
Bankof Bar thony,557A.2d957(Me. 1989).
Harborv
Anthony a) FactJ.JohnAnthony(T) createda revocableintervivostrustDro_
vidingfor income lo bepaidto himtor Iife.lhenhiswidow,should
shesurvivehim, and uponher deaththe corpusto be dividedin
equalshares to T's threechildren,John,peter,andDencie.T's wife
andJohnpredeceased T. UponT's death,his will wasadmiuedto
probateand left two-thirds of T's estateto peter and one{hird to
Dencie;theheirsof Johnwereexpresslyomitred.Thebank(p), as
trustee,filed a complaintin superiorcourtrequesting construction
of thetrust.John'schildren(Ds),T,s gandchil&en,filed a motion
for summaryjudgment,assefiingJohn,sinterestin the trustwas
vested,not contingent,at the time of its creation.The summarv
judgment morionwasgranted againslDs.Dsappeal.

b) Issue.WasJohn'sremainderinteresta prcsent,vestedintercstat
thetimeofthe creationof theintervivostuust?

c) Held.Yes.Judgment
vacated.
(l) Becausea will is not operativeuntil the testator'sdeath,an
lnrcrestln a testamentary
trustcannotvestprior to thedeath.
An intervivostrustis operativefrom thedateof creation.

(2) Thetermsof T's trustincludedT's right to changebeneficia_
des,an absenceofcontrol overhow the childrenmisht dis_

114- Wilis
Doseof thet sharcs'andno conditionof survivalof anychildren
ihis plan effectively eliminatedany futher idterestof T unlesshe
choseto inteffene.

(3) T's failureto changethetrusttermssuggests a dispositionto a pre-
deceased child'sestaterathelthana reveNion

f4) Otherstateshaveheldthatanintervivostrustrcseryingto thesett'
lor incomefor life plus power to rcvoke, with a remainderover at
the settlor'sdeath,crcatesa vestedinterestin the remaindermen
subjectto defeasance by exerciseof therevocationpower'Enjoy-
ment is postponeduntil terminationof the life estates,but upon
executionof the trust instrument,thereis a presentight to the re-
mainder.

2) Heirs determined as of the date of death of the testator-'Security Trust SecurityTmst
Co. v.Irvine.33 Del.Ch.375,93A.2d,528(1953). co v kvine

a) Facts.The will of the decedent,JamesWilson (T), devisedall real prop-
erty to the SecurityTrustCompany(P)in trustfor T's two sisters,Martha
andMary wilson, during their joint lives and duing the lifetime of the
survivoroi them,andfurtherprcvidedthatif his sisterMargarctIrvine
shouldbe left a widow,thensheshouldshareequallywith theothertwo
sisters.Upon the deathof Martha andMary, the estatewould be divided
equally amongT's brotheN and sistets'sharcand sharcalike, with the
isiueof anydeceased brotheror sistertotakehis or herparent'sshareT
wassurvivedby five brothe6 andsistersFrom these'Mary Wilson was
thelastsuwiving life tenant Pbroughtanactionto determine:(i) whether
the residuaryestateleft to T's brotheNandsistersvestedasof the dateof
the deathof the last life tenantor as of the date of his death; and (ii)
whetherMartha andMary take asmembersof the classof brothersand
sistersshould it be decidedthat the estatevestedas of the date of T's
death

b) Issues.

(1) In the absence as
of a contraryintent,will theheirsbe determined
of the dateof deathof the testator?
leavingno issue,arctheinter-
(2) In theeventof thedeathof devisees
divestedby theirdeath?
estsof thos€devisees

c) soordered'
Held. (1) Yes.(2) No. Judgment

(l) The law favorsearlyvestingof devisedestatesand will presume
that wordsof survivorshiprelateto the deathof the testator'In the
absenceof a clear intent to the contrary the heirs will be deter-
minedasof the dateof the deathof the testatorand not at some

Wills- ll5
futwe date.The fact that a life tenantis a memberof a classdoes
not preventthelife tenantfrom participatingin theremainderof th€
testator'sestateas part of the class.Here, the life tenantsshould
participatein the remainderdevisedby the testatorto his brothers
andsisters.

(2) The weight of authority in other sratesis to the effect that in the
eventof the deathof the devisees leavingno issue,the interestof
thosedeviseesi snot divestedby their death.The interestsof Martha
and Mary Wilson and MargaretIrvine were not divestedby their
deathswithoutissueandthattheirinterestsin T's estateshouldso
to their respectiveestates.

Clobberie's 3) Common law rule where bequestis to be paid at c€rtain age-Clobberie,s
Case C^se,2VenL342,86Eng.Rep.476(1677).

a) Facts. A sum of moneywas be4ueathedto a woman to be paid to her
with interest upon her reachingthe age of 21 or upon the day of her
marriage.Shedied beforeeithercondition was satisfied.

b) Issue.If a bequest is to bepaidon theexpress condirionthatthebenefi-
ciary rcach a cefiain age, and that condition does not occu, doesthe
bequestpassto theestateof thebeneficiary?

c) Held.Yes.

(l) Whena sumof moneyis to be paidto a womanuponherreaching
theageof 2l or uponherdayof marriage,andshediesbeforeeither
conditionis met,the bequestpassesto her executoraspartof her
estate.However,if the moneywerebequeathedto one ..at',the age
of 21,thentheb€questwouldlapse.

4) Controversial change in UPC section 2-707, A few states(Alaska. Colo-
rado,Hawaii,Mchigan,Montana,andNew Mexico)haveadopteda highly
controvercial1990changemadeby the revisersof the UpC to sectron2_70'1.
Under the new language,absentlanguageto the contrary,the following rules
apply:

(i) All future interestsin trust arc contingenton the beneficiary'ssurviving
to the dateof distribution.

(ii) If a remaindermandoesnot slrrviveto the distributiondate,I_lpCsection
2-707createsa substitute
gift in the remainderman,s descendents who
survivethedateofdistribution.

(iii) If a remainderman diesbeforedistributionandleavesno descendents,
the remainderfails,and,if thereis no altemativeremainderthattakes

116- Wills
effecr.lhelrustpropenypasses
lo rhesettlor'sresiduarydevi-
seesor thesettlor'sheirs.

This provision destroysthe flexibility of the commonlaw and the
tansmissibleremainderrule; the beneficiarymay no longerdevise
the rcmainderto whomeverhe pleases.Spousessuffermost,as
only issue are substitutedfor the deceasedrcmaindermen. The
changepresentsnumercusprcblemsfor estateplanners;to insulate
their trustsfrom theproblemsinherentin section2-707,plannersin
stateswherethesectionhasbeenadoptedcanincludein the tust
instruments a generaldisclaimerthattotallydisclaimstherulesof
construction embodiedin section2-707.

2 Gifts to Classes.

a. Gifts of income.

1) Construing classgift to testator's grandchildren-.Dewire v. Dewirev
Haveles,404Mass.274,534N.E.2d782(1989). Haveles

a) Fact-s.A petitionfor a declaration
ofrightswasbrcughtseek-
ing constructionof a will creatinga classgift on behalfof
ThomasDewire's(T's)gandchildren.T diedin January1941
survivedby his widow,his son(ThomasJr), andthreegrand-
children.His will placedsubstantiallyall ofhis estatein a re-
siduarytrust.The trust income was payable to his widow for
life and on her deathto ThomasJr. and ThomasJr.'s widow
andchildren.AfterT's death,ThomasJr.hadthrcemorcchil-
drenby a secondwife. ThomasJr. diedin 1978,a widower,
survivedbyall sixofhis children.ThomasIII, whohadserved
astustee since1978,diedin 1987leavinga widow andone
child,JenniferThequestionppsentedis whetherJennifertakes
herdeceased father'sshal€in thetrustincomeor whetherthe
remainingclassmembers(theotherfive grandchildren) take
thatincomeshareequallyby dght of survivorship.

In his will, T providedthathis grandchildrenshareequallyin
thenet incomeof his estate.Thereis no explicitprovisionin
the will concemingthedistributionof incomeon thedeathof
a grandchild,nor is thereany statementasto what the fustee
shoulddo with trustincomebetweenthedeathofthe lastgrand-
child andthe dateassignedfor terminationof thetrust 2I yeals
after that event.

b) Issue.Is the daughterof T's deceased grandchildentitledto
succeed by right of reprEsentationto thegran&hild'sincome
interestin a trust createdby a classgift?

Wills- 117
c) Held. Yes.Judgmentsoordered.

(1) Thegift ofnerincometoT's grandchildrcn, dividedequally or
to be sharedequally,is a classgift. The classincludesail six
grandchildren,three of whom were bom before and three of
whomwercbom afterT's death.

(2) In the absenceof a contraryintentexpressed
in the will or a
controllingstatutestatingotherwise,membersof a classare
Jointtenantswith rightsof survivorship.
(3) T's will violatedrheRuleAgainstperperuities because Tho-
masJr could(anddid) havechildrenafterT's death:therrust
wasthusscheduledto terminate21 yearsaftera lifenotneces_
sarilyyetin being.Nevertheless,
thelanguage ofthis voidpro_
visioncanbeusedtodetermine T's intentionasto dispositions
thatdo not violatetheRule.

(4) T provided that the trust should terminate2l yeals after the
deathof his lasrgrandchild. It is unlikelythatT inrendedthat
trustincomeshouldbeaccumulated for21 yeals.He musthave
expected thatsomeone wouldreceivetheincomedurinsthose
years.Theonly logicalrecipientswouldbe rheissue{by right
of representation)of deceased grandchildren, thesamegrcup
ofpeoplewhowouldtakethetn6t assets onteminationof the
trust(assuming no violationofthe RuleAgainstperpetuities).

(5) Sinceeveryotherprovisionin thewill conceming thedistribu_
tion of fust incomeandprincipal(afterthedeathof T andhis
wife) pointsto equaltreatment ofT's issueperstirpes,thereis
a sufficientcontraryintentshownto overcometheruleofcon_
structionthattheclassgift ofincometo glandchitdren is given
to themasjoint tenantswith the right of survivorship. Thus,
Jenniferin her lifetimeis entitledto one-sixthof the net in_
comeofthe trustdudngtheperiodofthe classgift ofincome.

b. Gifts to children or issue.

1) Meaningof'.children" and ,.issue."The word .'children,'doesnotin_
cludegrandchilfuen.
Theword"issue"includesgrandchildren andmore
remotedescendants.

2) UPC section2-705.Adoptedpe$onsandpersonsbom out of wedlock
areincludedinclassgift terminologyin accordance
with rulesfor deter_
miningrelationshipsfor pulposesof intestatesuccession.However,a
personbom outof wedlockis nottreatedasthechildofthe fatherunless
he is openlyandnotoriouslysotreatedby thefather.

118- Wills
a) Adopted adult not consideredan "heir"--Minary v. Citizens Minary v.
FidelityBank & Trust Co.,419S.W2d340(Ky. 1967). Citizens
FidelityBank
(1) Facts.The will ofthe decedent, Amelia S. Minary (T), de- & TrustCo.
visedherresiduaryestatein trustto paythe incometo her hus-
bandandthreesonsfor their respectivelives. The trust wasto
terminateupon the deathof the last surviving beneficiary at
whichtimethetrustwasto bedistributed to T's survivinghei$
andif no heirs,thento theFirstChristianChurch.Two of the
threesonsleftno survivingissues, buta thirdson,Alfred,mar-
ried andthereafteradoptedhis wife. Myra Minary (P),the wife
ofAlfred, broughtsuitagainsttheCitizensFidelityBank(D),
contendingthat the trust shouldbe awardedto her sinceshe,
havingbeenadoptedby her husband, becomesan "heir" for
purposes of thewill. The ftial courtheldfor P D appeals.

(2) Issue.Will adoptionof an adultfor the purposeof bringing
thatpersonundertheprovisionsof a preexisting
testarnentary
instrumentb€ permitted?
(3) Held, No. Judgmentreverced.

(a) Even thoughthe adoptionstatuteprovidesthat an adult
personmay be adoptedin the samemannerasa child, we
are constrainedto view this pnctice as an act of subter-
fuge that thwafis the testator'sintent. Here, were we to
give strict effect to the adoptionstatute,we would thwan
the efforts of the deceasedto disposeof her property as
shesawfit. Adoptionof anadult for thepurposeof bdng-
ing thatpersonundertheprovisionsof a preexisting tes-
tamentaryinstrumentwhensheclearly wasnot intended
to be socovercdshouldnot be pemitted,andwe do not
viewthisasdoinganygreatviolenceto orr adoptionlaws.

3) Gifts over on death without issue.In thesecases,the questionto be
determined is whetherthe exprcssion means(i) deathwithoutissueat
any time or (ii) deathwithoutissueduringthe testator'slifetime.The
first constructionis preferredby a majodty of couts if a possessoryfee
simplemay be divested.The secondconstruction is preferredif a re-
maindermaybe divested.

c. Gifts to heirs.

1) Determining identity of heirs..Estateof Woodworth, lSCal.App. Estateof
4th 936,22 Cal. Rptt. 2d 676 (1993). Woodworth

a) Facts.HaroldWoodworth's (T's) testamentary trustestablished by
T's will providedfor apofiionof T's estateto go to T's wife (W) as

Wills- I l9
life tenantand to terminateuponW's death.The rcmainingtust estate
wasto go to T's daughter@) if shesurvivedandifnot, thento D's heiN
at law.UponD's deathin 1980,shewassurvivedby herhusband(H), a
niece,anda nephew.H died testatein 1988,leavingtheresidueof his
estateto the Regentsof the University of Califomia (Rs) for the
unive$ity'sBerkeleycampus.W diedin 1991.The rrusreebank(P)pe-
titionedtheprobatecourtto detemineD's heirsat law Thecowt deter-
minedthenieceandnephewto beD's heiG.Rs appeal.

b) Issue.Absentevidence of T's intentto thecontrary,musttheidentityof
"heirs" entitled to trust assetsbe detemined at the dateof the deathof
thenamedancestor who predeceased thelife tenant,andnot at thedate
of thedeathof thelife tenant?

c) Held.Yes.Judgment
rcversed.

(1) Thereis a commonlawprcfercnce for vestedrutherthancontingent
remainders, unlessaninstumentdiscloses a differentintent.Thus.
a remainderto a classbecarnevestedin the classwhenoneor more
ofits members cameinto existence andcouldbe ascertained. even
thoughtheclassis subjectto open.

(2) Whena gift is madeto "hei$," the donoris sayihghe wantsthe
propefiy distributedasif thenamedpersondied intestate.Thus,the
deathof thenamedindividualis thenomal time for applyingthe
statut€of descentor distribution,absenta manifestedintentby T
that the statut€be appliedearlieror later.

(3) Noneof theexceptions to theearlyvestingrule reflectedin W?lh
FargoBankv. TitleInsurunce& TrustCo,22Cal. App.3d295,99
Cal.Rptr 4g (1971),applyhere.This is not a situationwherethe
"life tenantis thesoleheir,butthewill devisestheremainder to the
testator's
heils."

(4) WehavenothingbeforcusthatrcvealsT's intentandnothingfore-
closesthepossibilitythatT took into accountthatD might prede-
ceaseandH mightoutliveW.

(5) Thereis no language in thedecreethatcontainsanyexpression of
futurityin thedescription heirs,suchas.,mythen
of theancestor's
living heirsat law" The word"then"hercmerelyindicatestimeof
enjoyment.

2) The doctrineof worthier title. The docrrineof worthiertitle providesthat
if a settlor transfersproperty in trust but retains a life estatein himself or
another, andattempts to crcatea remainder in his heirs,a presumption adses
thatthesettlorintendedto retaina reversion in himselfinsteadof a remainder

120- Wills
in his heirs.The docrine is a rule of consfuction,not a rule of law It
raisesa presumptionthat no remainderin the settlor's heirs has been
created,but this presumptioncanbe rebuttedby evidenceof a contrary
intent of the gFntor. The doctrinemay still exist in somestates.

3) The rule in Sl€lley's Case,T\e rule rn Shelley'sCasestatesthat if one
instument createsa freeholdin land in A and puryorts to crcate a fe-
mainderin As heirs andtheestatesareboth legal or both equitable,then
the rcmainderbecomesa remainderin fee simplein A. It is a legal prin-
ciple that appliesnotwithstanding the transferor'sintent.The rule has
beenabolished in nearlyall states.

d, The rul€ of convenience. Undertheruleofconvenience, a classcloseswhen
any memberhasthe right to demanddistributionof her share,andnot when
the beneficiaryactually demandsdisaibution or whendistribution occurs.If
no membersof theclasshavebeenbom beforethetestator'sdeath,theclass
doesnotcloseuntilthedeathof thedesignated ancestor of theclass.If thereis
an immediatebequestof a separatefixed sum to eachmemberof a class,the
classclosesat thetestator'sdeath,evenif thereareno membetsof theclass
alive.Ifthegiftis postponedinpossession aftera life estate,theclasswill not
closeundertheruleofconvenience until thetimefor takingpossession.

1) Classcloseswhen all existing membersr€ach stated age--Lux v. Lux v. Lux
Lux, 109R.I. 592,288A.2d701 (19'72).

a) Facts.The will of thedecedent, PhilomenaLux (T), providedthat
in the eventthather husband, AnthonyLur, prcdeceased her,the
residueof her estateshouldgo to her grandchildren,shareandshare
alike. It fwther providedthat anyrcal estateincludedin the residue
shall be maintainedfor the benefit of the grandchildrenand shall
not be solduntil the youngestof thegrandchildren hasreached2l
yea$ of age.T wassurvivedby oneson(Anthony) andfrve grand-
children.The youngestgandchildwasbom aftertheexecutionof
the will but beforeT's death.The soninformed the trial court that
he andhis wife plan to havemorechildren.The trial court appointed
a guardianad litem to reprcsentthe interestsof thegandchildren. It
alsoappointed anattomeyto represent therightsofindividualswho
are unknown but who may have an intercstunderthe will.

b) Issue.Whenall existentmembersofaclasshaveattainedthestated
age,shouldtheclass be closed
andthedistributionbe made?

c) Held. Yes.Judgmentsoordercd.

(1) We hold that the distributionof the trust corpusshallbe made
at any time when the youngestof the then-living grandchil-
drcn hasattainedthe ageof 2 I . Whenall existentmembersof

Wills- 121
the classhaveattainedthe statedage,considerationsof conveniencerequire
thatdistributionshallthenbe madeandtharthe propenyshallnot beiepl
ftom furtherutilization to awaitthe uncertainconceptionof further members
of the group.

Shouldit becomene.gssarydueto a declinein rentalincomoto sell theDroD_
erty. the trusteehasthe discretionarypower to sell the real estate.The pro-
ceedsfrom the saleshall,becauseof the doctrineof the subsriruteres.reoiace
thereallyastheEustcorpus.lncomewouldbe payableto thebeneficiariisas
it accrues.Shouldadditionalchildren be bom, tho amountof eachshareof
incomercceivedby a gandchild would be rcducedas eachnew memberof
the classjoins his brothersand sistgrs.

122- Wills
XI. DURATION OF TRUSTS: THE RULE AGAINST PERPETIJ'ITIES

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Developmentofthe Rule. The RuleAgainstPerpetuitiesstates:"No
interestis goodunlessitmust vest,if at all, not laterthan21 yearsafter
somelife in beingat the creationof the interest."lJohnC. Gray'The
RuleAgainstPerpetuities, s20l (4th Ed. 1942)lAn early formulation
of theRulewasannollnced in theDukeof Nofolk's Casein !682' and
theRulewasfurtherrcfinedoverthenextfew centudesascourtssought
to preventlong-termrestrictionson the alienabilityof land.

PoliciesUnderlyingthe Rule.TheRuleis designedtofurthermarket-
ability of propefiyandpreventanundueconcentration of wealthin the
handsofthe few.TheRulealsoencourages thesociallydesirableresult
that wealthbe controlledby the living and not by the dead.It also
curtailstrusts,whichcanprotectwealthybeneficiades from bankupt-
ciesandcreditors.

When the Lives in BeingAre Ascertained.Thevalidity of aninterest
is determinedas of the time of the purportedcreationof the intercst.
"Lives in being"mustbe personsaliveat thattime.Generally'the per-
petuitiesperiod(livesin beingplus 2l yea6) beginsto run whenevel
thetransferormakes anirtevocabletransfer'Ifthe interestis createdby
will, the periodbeginsat the testator'sdeath.If the interestis created
by deed,or by an irrevocabledeedof trust,the pe.iod beginsat the
time thedeedis delivercdwith intentto passtitle.Ifa trustis revocable
by the settlor,the periodbeginsat the datethe rust becomesirevo-
cable.

4. The Validaaing to be valid.the necessary
Life.For an inlerest proof
must be madeftom amongpersonswho can affect vesting.Altema-
tively,theinterestmustvestat creation,or vestor fail within 21 years
aftercrcation.

B. THE REQTJIREMENTOF NO POSSIBILITY OF REMOTE VEST-
ING: THE WHAT-MIGHT-IIAPPEN RULE

Under the commonlaw rule, any possibilityof remotevestingvoids the
rule
interest.Abouthalf the stateshavercfomed this what-might-happen
Oneof the reformsis the wait-and-seedoctrine(coveredbelow).

1. The "Fertile Octogenarian."The law conclusivelypresumesthat a
personcan havechildrenaslong asthe personis alive A few stat€s
haveenactedlegislationto dealwith the conclusivepresumptionof

Wills - 123
fetility, prescribingthatanypersonwho hasattainedthe ageof 65 shallbe
deemed incapable
of havinga chrld.

2. The "Ijnborn Widow." The law presumes thata person'sswvivingspouse
mighttum out to be a personnotnow alive.

Example.O devises"to A for life, thento A's wife for life, thento As
childrenwho surviveA's widow."It is possiblethatA maymarrysome-
onenot in being(not yet bom) at O's death(whichis the time of the
fansfer).Shecouldlive beyondlivesin being(O'slife andA s life) plus
2l yean.Thereforc,thedeviseto thechildrenis void.This is thecaseof
the"unbomwidow."

Dickersonv b. Bare possibilityis suflicient-Dickersonv. Union NationalBank of
Union National Little Rock, 268Ark. 292,595S.W.2d677(1980).
Bankof
Little Rock 1) Facts.NinaDickerson(T) wassurvivedbyhertwo children.Cecil
(P),50, wassingle,andMartin,45, wasmaried. At thatrimethe
two sonshada total of sevenchildren,who wercT's grandchil-
dren.T namedthebank(D) asexecutoranddirectediharat rhe
closeof administration proceedings D transferto itself astrustee
all the assetsof the estate.The will requiredthe trustto continue
until thedeathofboth sonsandMartin'swidow,andtheyoungest
child ofeithersonhasreachedtheageof 25.At thattime,thehust
wasto distributeandpayovertheentirebalanceof the trustfund
to thebodily heils of borhof her sons.

T diedin 1967.The probatecourtentercda routineorderreciting
that the will had been properly executedand approving the
executor'sfiNt andfinal accountingandclosingthe administra-
tion of theestate.The ordermakesno rcferenceto the validity of
thetrustor themannerin whichtheassetsof theestatewereto be
distributed.

In 1977,P filed a complaintagainstD and its trust officer.The
complaintasserted thatthe trustwasvoid underthe RuleAsainst
-viola-
Perpetuities. Thecomplainlcharges lhe trusroffrcerwirh
tionsof his fiduciarydutiesin failing to deliverall the estateas-
setsto T's heirsandin failing to askthe probatecourtto construe
the will with respectto violationsof the Rule Againstperpetu-
ities.ThechancerycourtrejectedP's attackon two grounds.First,
P shouldhaveraisedthequestionofthe validityofthe trustin the
probatecoufi in connectionwith the probateof the will andthe
administration of the estate.His failue to do so makesthe issue
resjudicata.Second,on the medts,the trustdoesnot violatethe
RuleAgainstPerpetuities.

124- Wills
Issue.Is a tust createdby a will void undertheRuleAgainstPerpetu-
ities becauseit is possiblethatthe interestof the variousbeneficiaries
mightnot vest within theperiodallowedby thatrule?

3) Held.Yes.Chancerycourtjudgmentreversedandcaseremanded.

a) Failureof a will beneficiaryto challengethe validityof a tust as
violativeof the RuleAgainstPerpetuities in probateproceedings
doesnotpreclude himfromraisingthatissuein a lateraction,where
thevalidityofthe trustwasnot necessarily within theissuesbefore
the probatecourt andthe probatecourt made no pertinentdecisions
asto the validity of the trust.

b) Sincethe bankwasboth executorof the estateandfustee of the
trustestablishedin the will, thebankwasa fiduciaryandoweda
dutyofgood faith andloyaltyto all beneficiades ofthe estateand
of the trust.Therefore,thebankcouldnot ignorethe possiblein-
validityof thetrustbothin probatecourtandin ex partechancery
courtprcceedings andthentake advantage, to its own pecuniary
benefit,of the beneficiaries' similarcourseof conductby assert-
ing that the beneficiaries'failureto challengethe validity of the
trustin probateproceedings precludedP from raisingthatissuein
a lateraction.

A barepossibilitythata beneficiary's
interestwill not vestwithin
the pedod allowedby the RuleAgainst Perpetuities is enoughto
renderthatinterestvoid.

d) The termsof this trust presentan instanceof the "unbom widow."
This trust is not to terminateuntil the deathsof P, Martin, and
Martin's widow,but theidentityof Maltin's widow cannotbe known
untilhis death.Martinmightmarryan l8-year-oldwoman20 years
afterhis mother'sdeath,haveadditionalchildrenby her,andthen
die.P might alsodie.Matin's youngwidow,however,might live
for another40 or 50 years,afterwhichthe interestswouldfinally
vest.But sinceP andMartin wouldhavebeenthe last measuring
livesin beingat T's death,the trustpropertywouldnot vestuntil
manyyearspastthemaximumtime allowedby theRule.The hust
is thereforevoid because thereis a possibilitythat the estatewill
not vestwithin a periodmeasured by a life or lives in beingat T's
death,plus2l years.

Split contingencies.If the transferormakesa gift uponeitherof two contin-
gencies, oneofwhich mustoccurwithintheperpetuities period,andtheother
of whichmightnot,thecontingencies arejudgedseparately. The gift is valid
ifthe first contingencyoccurs;thesecondcontingency is void.

Wills - 125
C. APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO CLASS GIFTS

1. The BasicRule:All or Nothing.Pursuant to theRule,a classgift mus!
be validasto all membenof theclassor it is completelyvoid.It cannot
be valid asto somemembersandinvalidasto others.If the gift to one
memberof the classmight vesttoo rcmotelyto satisfythe Rule,the
entireclassgift is void.The nrre o:fconveniencemay operateto save
someclassgifts.

Wardv. a. Classgifts-Ward v. Van der Loeff, u9241A,.C.653.
Vander Loeff
1) Facts.Thewill of thedecedent, WilliamBumyeat(T),left his
estatein hustfor his wife with theremainderto his children.
In theeventthathe hadno children,he gavehis wife a power
to appointthe trust fund amongthe children of his brcthers
andsisters;in defaultofappointrnent, thetrustfundwasto go
in equalsharesto the childrenof his brothersand sisters.A
codicilto thewill provided:(i) thatthelife interestto hiswife
shall be terminableon her remaniageunlesssuchremaniage
shallbe with a natural-bom Britishsubject;(ii) thatthepower
of appointrnent berevoked;and(iii) that,afterthedeathof his
wife, the trusteeswould hold the ftust for any or all of the
childrenof his brothersandsisterswho shallbe living at th€
deathof his wife or bom at anytime afterwardbeforeanyone
of thechildrenattainsa vestedintercstandattainsthe ageof
21 (if a son)or attainsthat ageor maries (if a daughter), in
equalshares. T wassurvivedby his wife but no children,by
his father and mother,aged67, and by two brcthersandtwo
sisters,eachof whomhadchildrenliving at T's death.Phillip
Bumyeat,anothernephewofT, wasbom afterT's deathand
aftertheremariageof his widowto a Dutchsubject,

2) Issue.Will a gift to a classviolarethe RuleAgainstPerpetu-
ities if the bequestis to the childrenof b.othe6 and sisters
bom at anytime afterthedeathofa life in being?

3) Held.Yes.Judgment
affirmed.

a) (LordHaldane)In construingrhewordsof a will, theef-
fectof theRuleAgainstPerpetuities mustin thefirst in-
stancebe left out of sight,and thenhavingin this way
definedtheintentionexpressed, thecourtmustapplythe
Ruleto themeaningthusascertained. Here,thecodicilis
void sinceit speaksof T's brothersandsistersgenerally
andthereis no expression thatexcludesthe childrenof
other possiblebrothersandsistersof the wholeor half
bloodwho mightin contemplation of law be bom.

126- Wills
b) Howevetthecodicildoesnot operateto revokethegift to the
childrenof brothersandsisterscontainedin the will. The revo-
cationin thecodicilisconfinedtothepowerof appointment to
thewife. The prcvision in the will stands
undisturbed The time
whendistribr-rtionof the estateoccurs-herc, whenthe widow
remaried-is whentheclassofchildrenwho will takewill be
ascertained. Phillip Bumyeatis excludedsincehe wasbom
after the widow rcmarried

c) (Irrd Dunedin)Thereareonly two classes ofcaseswherethe
primarymeaningof a class gift can be departed ftom. First,
whereit is impossibleunderthecircumstances that anyperson
indicatedby the prima facie meaning can tale under the be-
quest.Here,this is not the casesincethe law presumes that
otherbrothersandsisters could still come into existence. Sec-
ond,wheresomething in thewill itselfexcludes theprimafa-
Herc,this also
cie interpretation. is not the case

b. Consequences ofviolating the rule. Violationofthe Rulewill resultin
the violatinginterestbeing stricken,with all other valid intercstsleft
standng.

Gifts to Subclasses. Oneexceptionto theall or nothingclassgift rule is the
doctrineof subclasses. Underthisdoctrine,a remainder heldto be invalidas
violative of the Rule Against Perpetuitiesdo€snot taint and invalidate all
otherremaindenwhetethe ultimatetake$ arcnot describedasa singleclass
but asa groupof subclasses.

a. R€maindersto oth€r subclassesnot invalidated-American S€curity Amencan
& Tfust Co, v. Cram€r' 175F' Supp.367(D.D.C.1959). Security&
Trust Co.
1) Facts.The will of the decedent, AbrahamHazen (T), bequeathed v. Cramer
the residueof his estatein trust to his wife for life; after her death
halfofthe corpuswasto be giventoT's sisterandbrothersandthe
otherhalf wasto remainin trust for T's adopteddaughter,Hannah
Duffey. Upon the deathof Hannah,the income was to go to the
childrenof Hannah.if alive,andif deadthento thek issue,and
uponthe deathof each,the shareof eachwasto go to thosewho are
heirs accordingto the law of descentand distribution.T's heirs
brought this action to have the will stricken as in violation of the
RuleAgainstPerpetuities. Thelowercout heldthattheinterestsof
Hannah'schildrenwerevalid. The courtof appealsaffirmed.At the
time of T's death,Hannahhad two children-Mary and Hugh
Duffey-and after T's death had two more-Depue and Homce
Duffey. After the deathof Hugh, the trusteebrought a bill for in-
structionsregardingthe validity of the remainderover to Hugh's
heirs;again,theremainderwasheldvalid.ThereaftelDepuedied

Wills - 127
andagaina suit washought. While this actionwaspending,Horace
diedanda supplemental bill for instuctionswasfiled.AlthoughMaryis
stillliving,thiscourtwill passon thevalidityof theremainderregarding
all partiesconcemed.

2) Issues.

a) If a classgift is to be valid, must the classclosewithin the period pro-
vided by the RuleAgainstPerpetuities?

b) Whenoneremainderis heldto beinvalidasviolativeof theRuleAgainst
Perpetuities,doesthis taint andinvalidateall otherremaindersif the ul-
timate takersare not describedas a single classbut as a group of sub-
classes?

3) Held. a) Yes.b) No. Counselwill submitan appropriateorder.

a) A gift will fail unlessthe membersof the class are finally determined
within a life or livesin beingplus2l yealsandactualperiodsof gesta-
tion; stateddiffercntly, the classmust closewithin the period provided
by theRule,if theclassis to be heldvalid.Here,the remainde$to the
heirs of Hugh and Mary Duffey are valid-both Hugh and Mary were
livesin beingat T's death,andtheremainders limitedto theirhei$ had
to vest,if at all, withintheperiodprovidedby theRule.Thercmainders
to the heirsof HoraceandDepueareinvalid-they both werebom after
T died. andhencethe remaindersto their heirs could vestlater thanthe
periodpfovidedby theRule.It doesnot helpto showthat the Rulemight
becompliedwith,or that,thewaythingstumedout,it actuallywascom-
pliedwith.

b) Theinvalidityoftheseremaindem doesnottaintthevalidremainders to
the heirs of Mary andHugh.If the ultimatetaken arenot describedasa
singleclass-i.e.,As childrenthatreachage25-but nther asa group
of subclasses-i.?., theheilsof eachof A s children-and if theshareto
whicheachseparate subclassis entitledwill finallybedeteminedwithin
the period of the Rule, the gifts to the differcnt subclasses
are separabie
for the purposeof the Rule. We read the languagehere as a deviseof
rcmainders to subclasses andnot asa singleclass:"uponthe deathof
'each'theshareof the 'one' sodyingshallgo [to] . . . heror his heirsat
law" Accordingly,the invalidity of onedoesnot invalidatethemall.

c) The Rule in ShelleykCa.redoesnot savethe two invalid remainders
sincethercmaindeNwerenot limitedto "hei6" but insteadwentto"her
orhis hei6 at law accordingto thelawsof descent now in force."When
a remainderin fee after a life estatefails, thereis a revercionin theheirs
of the testatorThe two one-sixthsharesheldinvalid shallthereforepass
to thesuccessors in interestof T's heirs.

128- Wills
3. Specilic Sum to Each ClassMember. Another exceptionto the all or
nothing class gift rule is wherethere is a gift of a statedsum to every
memberof the class.The policy underlyingthis exceptionis that the
amountintendedby the conveyorto be given to eachclassmembercan
be deduced withoutestimating how manypersonsarein theclass

4. DoesVest= Vest= Vest?Difficulties adseregardingthe meaningof the
word vest. sinceorthodoxdoctrinehasinsistedthat whetheran interest
is vestedor contingentdependsuponthe form of words setforth in the
limitation.

D. APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO POWERS OF APPOINTMENT

To apply the R'lle AgainstPerpetuitiesto powe$ of appointment,the powers
must be separatedinto (i) generalpowerspresentlyexercisable,which are
treatedasabsoluteowne$hip for pur?osesof theRule, and(ii) generaltesta-
mentarypowen andall specialpowers.

1. General PowersPr€sently Exercisable.

a. Validity of power.A generalintervivospoweris valid if thereis
certaintythatthepowerwill vestor fail within theperpetuihes pe-
riod. OncethePowerbecomesexercisable,the propertyis no longer
tied up.The factthat thedoneemayexercisethepowerafter lives in
beingplus2l Yealsis irrelevant.

b. Validity of interestscr€atedby exercis€or a generalpower pres-
ently exertisable.An interestcreatedby exerciseof a generalpower
is deemedvalid accordingto the sameprinciplesas if the donee
owned the propeny in fee. The perpetuitiesperiod runs ftom the
exerciseof the Power'

2. General T€stamentaryPowersand SpecialPowers.

a. Validity of power. A testamentaryor specialpower is valid if it
may not be exercisedbeyondthe perpetuitiesperiod that beginsat
thecreationofthe powerIf thepowermaybeexercisedbeyond the
per?etuitiespedod,it is void abinitio.

b. Validity of exercise.Generaland specialpowersate treatedalike
whendetermining The perpetuities
the validityof an appointment.
p€riodbeginsat thedalethepower$as created.

1) The "Delaware tax trap." Under Delawarelaw, every inter-
est createdby the exerciseof all powersmust vest within the
perpetuitiesperiod.Thisprovisiontheoteticallywouldpermit
to be createdin indefinitesuccession
life estates throughthe
exerciseof successive specialpowersof appointment,thus

Wills - 129
avoidingfederaltax liability (sincepropertysubjectto a specialpower
of appointment is not taxableat the donee'sdeath). Howevet section
2041(a)(3) of theIntemalRevenueCodetaxesthe assetsin thedonee's
estateif he exerciseshis specialpowerof appointment by establishing
another power thatcanbe exercised of thefi$t power'sdate
regardless
ofcrcation.

2) The secondJookdoctrine.Underthe second-look doctdne,the exer-
ciseof a powerofappointment is readbackinto theinstrumentthatcre-
atedthe power,andthe factsexistingon the dateof theexerciseof the
powera1€takeninto consideration. Thus,thecoul'twill detemineifthe
interestsvestor fail within the time prescribed
by the rule,takinginto
accountthefactsexistingon thedateof theappointment.

SecondNa- Rule applied to unconditional power of revocation--SecondNational Bank
tionalBankof ofNew Havenv.Ilarris Trust & SavingsBank, 29 Conn.Supp.275,283
New Haven A.2d226 (19',11\.
v. Haris Trust
& SavingsBank 1) Iacts. CarolineTrowbridge(T) createdan intervivostrustnamingthe
SecondNationalBankof New Haven(P) astrustee,with theincomeof
thetrustto bepaidto T's daughtetMargaretManh, who wasalsogiven
a generaltestamentary powerof appointment over half of the corpus.
The remaininghalf wouldbe distibutedto Margaret'ssurvivingchil-
dren,andif nonethento T's otherdaughter,Mary BrewsterMuray, or to
her survivingissueper stilpes.T reserved thepowerto revoke,modify,
or alterthetermsof thetrustrespecting paymentof theincome.Marga-
retMarshleft a will purportingto exercisethepowerby creatinganother
rust giving theincometo her daughter,Mary Washbume,for a periodof
30 years,afterwhich time the tr.rstwould be distributedto her or, if
Mary died prior to this, then to her survivingchildren.At issuewas
whetherthe exerciseof the testamentary power of appointmentby
Margaret'swill is invalidasviolativeof theRuleAgainstPerpetuities.

2) Issue.Ifa settlorreseflesanunconditional
powerof revocation,
for pur-
posesofthe RuleAgainstPerpetuities,
doestheperiodofthe Rulebegin
from whena powerof appointmentis first created?

Held.No. Judgment
enteredaccordingly.

a) Whena powerof appointment is in fact exercised,
the validityof
theappointment is determinedby preciselythe samerule asif the
onginaltestatorwho createdthepowerhadmadein her own will
the sameprovisionin favor of the s.!meappointee. The appoint,
mentis readbackinto theinstrument creatingthepower.As far as
perpetuities
areconcemed, theperiodofthe Ruleis reckonedfrom
thedateof creationof theDower,not from thedateof its exercise.

130- Wills
b) However,thercis anexceptionto thisgeneralrulewherc
anunconditional powerofrevocation is reserved.In those
instances,theperiodof perpetuitiesis calculatedfrom the
time the powerof revocationceased,usually at the death
of the grantor.

Here,the powerto rcvokereservedby T doesnot qualify
for the exceptionapplicableto a full andunconditional
power of revocation,sinceshereservedthe power to re-
vokeonly asto thepaymentofincome.Thus,theremote-
nessof the futue intercstscreatedcould not be affected
by anyexercise of thepower.

o) Herc, both the gift of the incometo Mary Washbumefor
30 yearsandthegift of thercmainderafterthe 30 yearsto
Mary'schildrenvestedin interestat thedeathof Marga-
retMarchwithintheperiodof theRule.Postponement of
enjoymentbeyondthe periodof theRule wouldnot in-
validatethem.Accordingly,Mary hasa valid incomein-
terestin the half of the trust subjectto the power of
appointment for 30 yearsandis thenentitledto theprin-
cipal.If shediesbeforethen,theprincipalwouldbe dis-
t.ibutedto her estatebecause herremainderhasbecome
indefeasibly vested.

e) If Marydiesbeforethe30-yearpedod expires,thepdnci-
pal goesto her estate;it doesnot passto her surviving
children underthe termsof Margaret'strust. That trust's
contingentrcmainderto Mary's childrenviolatestheRule
AgainstPeryetuities because it might vestmorethan21
years after Margaret'sdeath.The result in caseswherc
futureinterestsare voidedby the Ruleis that the p.ior
interests b€comewhattheywouldhavebeenhadthelimi-
tation of the future interestb€€nomitted from the instu-
ment.If a divestinginterestis void, theinterestthatwould
otherwisehavebeendivestedbecomes absolute.

E. SA\INGCLAUSE

A savingclauserectifiesany possibleviolationof the Rule.Sucha clause
shouldbe includedevenin thosejudsdictionsthathaveadopteda cy prcsor
"wait-and-see"doctdne.

1. AttorneyLiability for ViolatingRule.Courtsaredividedastowhether
an attomeywho dafts a will that violatesthe Rule is liablefor negli-
gence.

Wills- 131
F. PERPETTIITIESREFORM

Threekinds of reforrnhaveemergedto alleviatesomeof the harsheffectsof
the Rule: the wait-and-seedoctrine,the equitablereformationor cy presdoc-
trine, andremedyingthe most objectionable applicationsof the Rule with
specificremedies.

1. The "Wait-and-SeeDoctrine.r'Underthis doctrine,thevalidityof in-
terestsisjudgedby actualeventsastheyhappen,andnot by eventsthat
might happen.lsee In re Estateof Anderson,541 So. 2d 423 (Miss.
1989)l

ln re Trttsl a. Statutory period appliesto no[vested interest cr€at€dpursu-
of Wold ant to power of appointment-Ir, ,'e Trust of Wold, 310 N,J. Su-
per 382,708A.2d787(1998).

1) Facts,SewardJohnson(ofJohnson& Johnson) createdtrusts
in 1944to benefithischil&en;ElaineJohnsonWold(P)is the
beneficiaryof the trusts.Underthe tems of thetust, thehust-
eeswercdirectedto collectincome,payexpenses payableout
of income.andaccumulatethe net incomeuntil P reachedthe
ageof 21.At thattime,thetrustees hadabsolutediscretionto
pay to P asmuch of the incomeas the trusteesdeemedto b€
for herbestintercst.Thelust alsopemits thetmsteesto hansfer
and pay to "the life beneficiary" (P) "any or all of the trust
property."UponP's death,thetrusteesaredirectedto payover
the trust property to her spouseand issueas directedin her
will or, in theabsence of a will, to her issuein equalsharcs. P
wishesto createa testamentary trustappointingthe proceeds
of her fiust in fwther kust for the benefit of her spouseand
survivingissue.Thenewtust wouldpermitprcpertyheldby
oneof P's childrento continuein trustfor that child'sissue
uponthechild'sdeath.Thus, theissue's (P'sgrandchild's)inter-
estwouldbe considered nonvestedsincethe propertywould
passonly uponthehappening of a specificevent,thedeathof
P's child. P plansto rely on the New Jersey"wait andsee"
go-yearperpetuities pedodandhasrequested the trusteesto
petitionthis courtfor directionandinterlretationregarding
theapplicationofthe New Jerseystatuteto her proposedex-
erciseof her powerof appointmentunderthe termsof the
1944trust.

2) Issues.

a) Doesthe powergrantedto P to disposeof the fiust res
includethepowerto appointthetrustassets
by a succes-
sivetestamentary
trust?

132- Wills
-!
l
b) DoestheNew JerseyUniform RuleAgainstPerpetuities,* hrcf-
providesthatan actthatwouldhavebeeninvalid at common
validif it vestswithin 90 yearsof its cre-
law is nevertheless
ationandbecomes invalidonlyifit continues in existence and
doesnot vestwithin that time period,apply to a nonvested
intercstcreatedpursuantto theexercise ofa powerof appoint-
ment vestedin P by a 1944 tust and measwed from the cre-
ationof the 1944trust?

3) fot P
Held. a) Yes.b) Yes.Judgment

a) Thetrusteeshavebeengiventhe maximumflexibility anddis-
needs.
thebeneficiary's
cretionin addrcssing

b) Thelaw ofhustssuppofisP'sposition.TheRestatement (Sec-
ond)ofTrusts,section17, providesthatatmst may be created
by "a personhavinga powerof appointment to anotherpe6on
astrusteefot the doneeof the power or for a third person"

c) Thesettlor'sclearpuposein establishing thetrustwasto pro-
tect the trust ftom tax burdensto the fullest extentof the law.
Theproposed testamentarytrustwilleffectsignificanttaxsav-
ings.Sucha purpose, ratherthanbeingrestricted, is well within
thecontemplation andintentof thetust instrument.

d) WhiletheNewJeNeystatutegenerallymaynot applyretroac-
tively,wheretheapplicabilityof a new statutoryperiodis be-
ing determined, thelaw statesthatanintercstcrcatedpurcuant
to a power of appointrnent is deemedcreatedupontheexercise
of thatpower.Thus,if thepowercreatedby P wereexercised
after July 3, l99l (the effective dateof the statute),the Rule
would apply to an interestcreatedunderthat power,

4) Comment.The New JerseyUniform StatutoryRuleAgainstPerpe-
tuitieswasrepealedin 1999.It wasreplacedwith a statutethatal-
or i mplied
lows a perpetualttustif thetrusteehaseitheranexpressed
powerto sellor anunlimitedpowerto teminatethetrustin oneor
moreliving persons.

2. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against P€rpetuities (1986, as amended in
1990),The Uniform StatutoryRuleAgainstPerpetuities("USRAP") provides
for two rulesagainstperyetuities, thecommonlawRuleandthewait-and-see
rule of 90 years.The original &afters of USRAPfailed to noticethe effect of
thisprovisionwhenconjoinedwith thegeneration-skipping transfertax (a tax
payableon the transferto a pe$on who is at leasttwo genentionsremoved
from the transferor).Pursuantto treasuryregulationsin effect whenUSRAP
wasenacted, thegeneration-skipping transfertaxdoesnot applyto trustscrc-

Wills- 133
atedprior to 1986unlesstheexerciseof a specialpowerof appointment
delaysthe vestingof an interestbeyondthe commonlaw perpetuities
period. Under USRAP,a grandfatheredtrr.rstis not exemptif a special
powerof appointment in violationof thecornrnonlaw per-
is exercised
petuitiesperiod,thusgivingrisetothe90-yearwait-and-see rule.In1990,
sectionl(e) wasaddedto USRABprovidingthatif thevestingof a gift
is basedon two altemativecontingencies, oneof whichcomplieswith
the commonlaw period
perpetuities and the othercomplieswith the
USRAPperiod,effectis givenonly to thecommonlaw perpetuities pe-
riod.

3. Cy Pres or Equitable Reformation. Under this doctrine,an invalid in-
terestis reformedwithin thelimits of theRuleto approximatemostclosely
theintentionof thecreatorof theinterest.

G. TIIE RTJLEAGAINST SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIEN-
ATION: NEW YORK LAW

l. A BriefExplanationofthe Suspension Rule.Theruleprohibitingsus-
pensionof the powerof alienationproceeds upona policy assumpdon
thatthe power of alienation is suspended
only whentherearenot per-
sonsin beingwho canconveyan absolutefee.The rule appliesonly if
the takerof a contingentinterestis unbomor unasceitainable Subse-
quentmodifications of the statutehavemadeit similarin scopeto the
commonlaw RuleAgainstPerpetuities, with the exceptionthat trusts
that might last beyondthe statutoryperiodarc morc likely to be held
invalidunderthestatutethantheywouldbe undertheRule.

2. Application ofthe SuspensionRule to Statutory Spendthrift Trusts,
Thepowerof alienationis suspended whena transferis madein trustif
(i) the legal fee simple to the trust propertyis nontransferableor (ii) the
equitableowne$cannotconveypossessory intercstsin absolutefee.

134- Wills
XII. CIIARITABLE TRUSTS

A. INTRODUCTION

A charitabletrust is one for the benefit of a classof pe6ons, and not for the
benefitof the communityat large,andmustbe for relief of poverty or lbr the
advancement of education,rcligion, health,or othercharitablepurpose.It must
benefitthe generalpublic or someparticularclassof the public that is indefi-
nite in number.

1. Creationofa Charitlble Trust-ShenandoahValleyNational Bank Shenandoah
786(1951).
v. Thylor,192Va.i35, 63 S.E.2d ValleyNational
Bank v. Taylor
Facts. The will of the decedent,CharlesHenry provided that the
residueofhis estatewasto beheldin trustby the Shenandoah Val-
ley NationalBank of Winchester, to be paid by the trusteeon the
lastschooldaysof eachcalendaryearbeforechristmasandEaster
"in asmanyequalpartsastherearechildrenin the first, second,and
third $ades of the JohnKen Schoolof the City of Winchester,and
(thetrustee)shallpayoneofeachsuchequalpartsto eachchildin
suchgrades,tobeusedbysuchchildin thefwtheranceofhis orher
obtainmentof aneducation."Oneof the nextof kin of the decedent
(P) filed suit againsttheexecutorandtrustee(Ds) challengingthe
validityofthe will, whichundefiookto createa charitabletrust.P
aryuedthat the trust did rlot constitutea charitabletrust and was
invalid in that it violatedthe RuleAgainstPerpetuities. The trial
courtheldthatthetrustwasnot charitablebut wasa privatetrust,
andthusviolatedtheRuleAgainstPerpetuities andwasvoid.

b. Issue,Must a trustbe public in naturebeforeit will be considereda
charitabletrust?

Held. Yes.Decreesaffirmed.

l) A charitablehustis createdonly if the settlorproperlymani-
fests an intention to crcatea charitableffust. Charitablepur-
posesincludethe relief of povertyand the advancement of
education, religion,health,municipalpurposes, andotherpur-
posestheaccomplishment ofwhich arebeneficialto thecom-
munity. It is essentialthat the charity be for the benefit of an
indefinite numberof persons,for if all the beneficiariesare
pe$onally designated,the rust lacksthe essentialelementof
indefiniteness, whichis onecharacteristic of a legalcharity.

2) Herc,the time for paymentof thefundsto the childrenis when
their minds would be far removedfrom studiesand indicates
thatno educational Dumose mind.Execu-
wasin thetestator's

Wills- 135
tion of the mandateof the trustaccomplishes no educational
purpose. It merelyplacestheincomeforeverbeyondtherange
of the ftust. The wordsof the trust import an intent to havethe
ffusteepay eachchild an allotted share.The testator'sintent
wasto bestowuponeachchild gifts that wouldbring happi-
nesson the two holidays,which purposefalls far short of an
educationaltrust.

3) It is arguedthat evenif the will fails to createa charitable
trustfor educational purposes, it nonetheless producesa de-
sirablesocialeffect.Wedisagree. A trustfrom which thein-
is
come to be paid at statedintervals to eachmemberof a
designated segmentof thepublic,withoutregardto whether
therecipients arepooror in need,is notfor thereliefof pov-
erty,nor is it a socialbenefitto the community.Thercis no
languagein this will that permitsthe trusteeto limit the re-
cipientsto theschoolchildren who arein necessitous circum-
stances.Accordingly, it is mere benevolence-a private
fiust-and not a charitabletrust.

B. MODIFICATION OF CIIARITABLE TRUSTS: CY PRTS

Wherea generalcharitablebequestis impracticable,somecourtswill execute
a gift cy presthrougha schemeftamedby the court for the purposeof cany-
ing out thegeneralpuq)ose.

I re 1. Gen€ralCharitabl€Purpose-.Inie Neher,279N.Y 370, 18 N.E.2d
Neher 625 0.939\.

Facts.Ella Neher's(T's) will devisedcertainrealpropertyto the
village(P),with a directionthatP erecta hospitalnamedasa me-
morial to T's deceasedhusband.P acceptedthe propefiy in 193l In
1937,P petitionedtheswrogate'scourtto conshueandreformthe
relevantprovisionof T's will, directingthat P would receivethe
propertyand erectan administrationbuilding in T's husband's
memorysincea nea$y hospitaladequately servedP's needs.P's
petition wasdenied.The appellatedivision affirmed.P appeals.

b. Issue.WasT's devisea generalintention to devotethe propertyto
charitablepurposes insteadofaspecificintentionto limit theuseof
the prcpertyto the operationof a hospital?

Held.Yes.Orderre\elsedandremanded.

I) This wasa gift to theentirecommunity.That wasthefiIst stated
desienof beneficence.

136- Wills
par-
2) The direction that a hospitalbe erectedshowsan absenceof
tlculantyaslo type.managemenl' or control'exceptthatP s trust-
eeswereto be thegovemingboardThis absence of par(lct antyrs
a strongshowingagainstlhe \iew thattheinstructionwasthesub
stanceof the gift

3) We thinkT's intentionwasa generalcharitablegift with an added
graftasto T's desiresA graftmay beignoredwhencomplrance ls
iltogetherimpracticable'and the gift may be executedcy pres
throigh a schemedevisedby thecourtto carryout thegeneralchari-
tablePurPose.
L Rev' In re Estate
2. Great Incrcase in Available Funds-Itt re Estateof Buck' 21 U S'F
of Buck
691(Cal.sup.ct. 1986).

a. Facts.In 1975,BerylBuck(T) dieda residentofMarin County'Califor-
nia.MarinCountyis themostaffluentcountyin the SanFranciscoBay
Areaandis thenation'ssecond-wealthiest countyof morethan50'000
residents.T's will left theresidueof her estateto the SanFranciscoFourr-
dation,a communitytrust administeringcharitablefundsin five counties
in the Bay Area. Her will directedthat the residueof het estatebe used
purposes
for exclusively nonprofit charitable'rcligious' or edutational
in prouiaing foi ttte needyin Marin County,andfor other nonprofit
"ur"
ieligious,or educational purposes in thatcounty'
charitable,

At the time of T's death'the largestassetin her estateconsistedof a
blockof stockwofih about$9 million ln 1979,ShellOil won a bidding
wat andboughtthe stockin theBuckTrustfor $260million' whichin-
creasedto we-ilover$300million by 1984 In 1984'thefoundationbrcught
suit seekingjudicial authodzationto spendsomeportion of the Buck
Trustincolie in the otherfour countiesof theBay Arca The foundation's
petition for cy presresteduponthe following theory:The enormousln-
creasein the'valueof principalwasa changein circumstances raising
substantialdoubt whetherT, had sheanticipatedsuchan event' would
havelimitedherbeneficence to MarinCountyForty-sixindividualsand
charitableorganizationsin theotherfour counties(called"objector-bgn-
eficiaries") wereallowedto interveneto objectto theMarin-only limita-
tion.

b. Issue.Doesthe doctrineof cy presapplyif thereis a dramatlc'unex-
pectedincreasein tilst funds anda diffetent useof trustfunds would be
more advantageous to the community?

c. Heltl. No. Judgmentdeniedthe petition for modification'

I) Cy Dresappliesonly uherethe purposeof a rust hasberomeille-
impraclicable
gut.i.po.iilt". ot p.rmanently and
of performance'

Wills - 137
thetestatormanifested a generalcharitableintention.In prac-
tice,cy preshasmostoftenbeenappliedin Califomiain such
caseswherethecharitable trustpurposeis literallyimpossible
to fulfill or in caseswhercit hasbecomercasonably impos-
sibleof performance. Ineffectivephilanthropy,inefficiency,and
relativeinefficiency(i.e.,inefficiencyof trustexpenditures in
onelocationgivengreaterrelativeneedsor benefitselsewhere)
do not constitute impracticability.

2) If both the testator'sintent andthe charitablegift can,in fact,
beeffectuated, i.e.,thespecifiedtrustpurposehasnot become
impossible or impracticable of performance,thereis nojusti-
ficationfor cy pres.Cy prcsmaynot be invokeduponthebe-
lief thatthemodifiedschemewouldb€moredesirableor would
constitutea betteruseof the income.Courtshaveheld that
termsof a charitabletrust may not be modified on the grounds
that a differentusewouldbe morebeneficialto the commu-
nity or advantageous to thecharity.Cy presdoesnot authodze
the court to vary the termsof a trust merelybecausethe varia-
tionwill meetthedesireandsuittheconvenience of thetrustee.

3) The residentsof Marin Countyhavesubstantial unmetneeds
that arewithin the scopeof the purposesof the Buck Trust.
The entireincomeofthe BuckTrustis presentlyinsufficient,
andwill remaininsufficientin thefuture,to addressall of these
needsandopportunities.

c. SIJPERVISION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS

Most statesauthorizetheir attomey generalto enforce charitabletrusts on
behalfof a community.Otherswith a particularidentifiableinterestin the
trust may alsoenforcethe trust.

Carl J. Herzog 1, Donor HasNo Standing-CarlJ, HerzogFoundation,Inc.v. Univer-
Foundation, Inc. sity of Bridgeport,243 Corlf'],.I,699
A.2d995 (1997).
v. Udversity
of Bridgepofi a. Facts. In 1986,the Carl J. HerzogFoundation(P) madegrantsto
theUniversityof Bddgeport(D) forneed-based meritscholaNhips
for medicallyrelatededucationfor disadvantaged students.The
scholarships wereprcvidedto nursingstudents until 1991whenthe
nursingschoolclosed.P allegesthe fundshavebeencor[ningled
with D's generalfundsandarenot beingusedin accordance with
the trust instrument.P rcquesteda temporaryand permanentin-
junctionrequiringD to segregate $250,000,requestinga full ac-
countingof the fund, and requiringthe fund be reestablished in
accordance with theoriginalpurposes.D movedto dismiss,claim-
ing P did not havestanding.The trial courtdismissed,notingthe

138- Wills
attomeygeneralcouldbringanaction.Theappellatecourtreversed,
conclud-
ing the ConnecticutUniform Managementof Institutional Funds Act
("CUMIFA")providesdono6with standingeventhoughno such.ightispro-
vided for in the trust instrument.D appeals.

b. Issue. Does CUMIFA establishstatutory standingfor a donor to bdng an
actionto enforcethetermsof a completed
charitable
gift whenthegift instru-
mentcontainedno exprcssreseflationof controloverthegift?

Held.No. Judgment
reversed.

l) Onewith standingis eitherclassicallyaggdeved orprovidedwithstand-
ing by statute.Here,P's solebasisis CI-MIFA.

2) At commonlaw,unlessa donorwho madea completedcharitablecon-
tributionexpresslyreservedthe right to bring an actionto enforcethe
termsof thegift, shehadno standingto do so.Generally,suchgifts are
enforceable by theattomeygeneral.Theattomeygeneralhastheexclu-
sivepoweron behalfof a donorwhoattaches conditionsto seethatthose
conditionsarcmet,i.e.,to corect abuses in theadministration of a pub-
lic charity.

3) Subsection 45a-533of CL\4IFAprovidesthataninstitution'sgoveming
board may seekrelief from an onercusor obsoleterestriction without
resortto the couts by obtainingthe donor'sconsent,if living, or from
tbecourtifthe donoris dead.In thecaseof theabsence of a resriction.
the subsection permitsa govemingboardto usea gift only for "educa-
tional,religious,charitable
or othereleemosynary
purposes." Thestatute
is not meantto supplantbut to supplementthedoctrinesof cy presand
approxlmatlon.

4) In the absenceof exprcsslanguagein the statuteprovidinga donor's
access to thecourtsto complainof achangein a resirictionwithoutcon-
sent,we mustlook to thelegislativehistory.Thishistorydirectlyrefutes
P'sclaim.

Wehavestatedthat in the absenceof prior authorityto aid in interpreta-
tion of C['MIFA, we are guidedby the meaningof the draftersof the
UniformManagement of InstitutionalFundsAct ("UMIFA"). In enact-
ing CUMIFA, the draftersintendedto implementthe intention, mean-
ing, andobjectivesof UMIFA.UMIFA specificallystatesthedonorhas
no right to enforcerestdctions, no powerto changethe eleemos),nary
beneficiary,andno interestin thefund;shemayonly lessena restriction
in effect.

6) Thedonor'spowerherewasconsideredin thelight of adverse
taxconse-
quences for donorsif fIMIFA provideddonorswith controlof theirgift
after the gift wascompleted.In their commentaryto UMIFA, the &aft-

Wills 139
ers clearly statedthey wishedto protect the donor's federalcharitable
contribution deduction,andthey anticipatedno federaltax problemby
allowing the donorto releasea restriction.

7) The appellatecout dismissed this languageasapplyingonly to tax is-
suesandrcasonedit did not answerthequestionwhetherthe soleright to
speakto the donor's interestin the releaseof a restriction lies with the
attomeygeneral.Wedisagree.Thercis no languagein either statutethat
the draftersintendedthe donorto supplantthe attomeygeneral.

d. Dissent.This decisioncondonesa doneedoublecrossingthe donor andget-
ting awaywith it unlessan attomeygeneraldoessomethingaboutit.

140- Wills
XIII. TRUST ADMINISTRATION: THE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION

A. GENERAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND LIABILITIES

1. Duty of Loyalty: Herein of Self'Dealing. A fustee hasa duty to give
undividedloyalty to thebeneficiariesThe duty of loyalty requirestrust-
eesto avoidanyconflictsof interestbetweenpeNonalinterestsandthe
interestsof the trust or estate.Thus,dtJ transactionsbetweenthe indi-
vidualandthetrustor estateshouldbe avoided.A rusteewho engages
in self-dealing is liableevenif he actedin goodfaith and treatedthe
beneficiaries fairly.Thetustee'sonly defense is consent
to self-dealing
by thebeneficiaries (thetransaction
afterfull disclosure muststill befar
andrcasonable).

a. Tlustee's wife acts as purchaser"Hartman v. Hartle' 95 N J. Eq. Hartman
r23, 122A.615 (t923). v. Hartle

1) Facts.ThetestatorDorotheaGeick(T), namedhertwo sons-
inlaw executorsanddirectedthemto sellher rcal estateand
dividetheprcceeds equallyamongher five children.The ex-
e.uton soldpartofthe realestateto oneof T's sons,who bought
thepropefiyforhis sistetthewifeofoneofthe executorsShe
soldthepropeitytwo monthslaterfor a $1,600prcfit. Oneof
T's daughters(P) filed a bill charyingthe sal€ to have been
improperandfraudulent

2) Issue.Is thesaleof propertyby anexecutorto his wife, with-
out previousauthorityfrom thecoun,illegalandvoid?

3) Held.Yes.Decreewill be advised

a) The settledlaw tn this stateis a rusteecannotpurchase
fromhimselfathisownsale,andhiswife is subjectto the
samedisability.

b) Because thepropertyis nowownedby innocentpurchas-
ers,the executonandthe wife will be heldaccountable
for P's one-fiithshareofthe profitson rcsale

b. Conflict of interest-'In re Rothko' 43 N.Y2d 305,372 N.E.2d In re
291,401N.YS.2d,l49(1977). Rothko

1) Facts. The decedent,Mark Rothko (T)' an intemationally
knownpainter,diedtestate,leavingan estateconsistingprin-
cipallyof798paintingsBemardReis,Ttreodoros Stamos, and
Mortonl€vine were appointedco-executors(Ds).Within three
Ds agreedto sellto Marlborough
weeksoftheir appoifltment,
A.G.,a Liechtensteincorporation,100paintingsto be paid

Wills- 141
for in interest-freeinstallmentsover a 12-yearperiod after aninitial payment
of $200,000. Theyalsoconsigned to MarlboroughGallery,Inc., a domestic
corporation,some700 other paintings listed in a scheduleto be prepared.It
later came to light that Reis was a director,secrctary,and treasurerof
MarlboroughGalleryin additionto beingco-executorof theestate;thatStamos
wasa not-too-successful artistfinanciallyandthatit wasto his advantage to
curry favor with Marlborough Gallery; and that Levine failed to exerciseordi-
naryprudencebecausehewasawareof Reis'sconflict of interest.KateRothko,
T's daughterlaterjoined by her brother,ChristopherRothko,andthe attomey
generalof the state(Ps),bmughtsuitto removeDs, to enjointhe saleof the
paintings,to rescindtheagreements enteredinto,to haveretumedthepaint-
ingsstill in possession of the corporations, andfor damages. The tdal coun
held for Ps.The app€llate court affirmed. This appealfollowed, Ds contend-
ing thattheyactedin goodfaith andthattheplanwasfair

2) a trust,musthe refrainfrom placing
Issue.While a husteeis administering
interestmayconflictwith theinterest
himselfin a positionwherehispersonal
of thebeneficiaries?

3) Held.Yes.Orderaffirmed.

a) The duty of loyalty imposedon a fiduciary preventshim from accepting
employment from a thirdpartywho is enteringinto a business transac-
tion with the trust.While the fiduciaryas trustee is administerjng
the
trust,he mustrefrainfrom placinghimselfin a positionwherehis per-
sonalinterestor that of a third pefton doesor may conflict with the
interestof thebeneficiaries. Here,to assertthatthercwasno conflictof
intereston the part of Reisand Stamosis to indulgein sheerfantasy.
Reiswasnot only a dircctorandofficerof MarlboroughGallerybuthad
financialinducements to favor Marlboroughthroughsalesof his own
extensive ancollection.SotoodidStamosbenefitasanartistundercon-
tract with Marlborough.

b) Levinearguesthat,havingactedprudently andupontheadviceofcoun-
sel, a completedefenseis established. We disagree.
An executorwho
knowsthathis co-executor of tmst andwhonot
is committingbreaches
only fails to exerteffortsdircctedtowardpreventionbut accedes
to the
breaches is legallyaccountable eventhoughhewasactingon theadvice
of couNel.

c) Wenow tum to thepropermeasureof damages. In general,whena fustee
is authorizedto selltrustproperty,but in breachof hust sellsit for less
thanhe shouldreceive,he is liablefor the valueof the propertyat the
time of the salelessthe amountthathe received.Ii the breachof trust
consistsonly in sellingit for too little,thetrusteeis not chargeablewith
the amountof any subsequentincreasein value of the property.How-
evet if thebreachconsists ofsomemisfeasance otherthansolelyselling

142- Wills
tbr too low a price, appreciationdamagesmay be appropriate.
A trusteemay beheld liable for appreciationdamagesif it was
his duty to retain the property.The sane rule should apply
herewherethereis a seriousconflictof interest.

c. Co-trustees.A co-trustee doesnot havethe powerto hansferor deal
with the propeftywithoutconsultingthe otherco_trustees.
Nor mav a
trusteedelegatedecisionmaking powersto a co_truslee.
Thesepowers
canonly beexercised by theco-trustees
togelher.
d. Insidertrading.UnderSecurities Exchange Commission Rule l0b_5,a
personwitl insideinfomationabouta stockcannotbuy or sellthestock
unlesshe first discloses
this information.A fiduciarywlll be boundby
thisrulesincetheobligationsof a fiduciaiydo not includetheperforri
ingofan illegalacr.

2. Fiduciary Dutiei R€lating to Care ofthe Tfust propefty.

a, Duty to collect and protect trust prcperty. A trusteehas the dutv to
immediatelycollectthetust assetsandascenainthartheexecutorhas
tenderedthe appropriatepropefty.

b. Duty to earmark trust prcperty. A trusteehasa duty to earmarkprop-
erty andis liable for any lossthat resultsfrom the failure to do so.

c. Duty not to mingle trust funds with trustee'sown. A trusteehasa
duryto notcomminglethetrustfundswith hisown andwill beliablefor
lossesresultingfiom cortuningling.

d. Duty not to delegate.A fustee hasa duty not to delegateactsthat the
trusteecan reasonablybe requiredto perfom penonally. He may del-
egatecertainnondiscretionaryfunctions,but he hasa duty to supervise
thoseto whomhe delegates.

1) Delegationof investmentpower--ShrinersHospitalsfor Crip_ Shriners
pled Childrcn v. Gardiner,152Anz.527,733p2d lllO 0987). Hospitals
for Crippled
a) Facts.LaurabelGardinerestablisheda ffust to Drovideincome Childrcn
to herdaughter, MaryJane.hergrandchildren, Charles and v. Gardiner
Robert,andher daughter-inJaw, Jean.The remainder passes
to ShrinersHospitalsfor CrippledChildren (p) uponlh;dearh
of theincomebeneficraries. MaryJanewasappointed rrustee;
Charleswas namedfirst altematetrustee:andRobert second
altematetustee. Mary Jane,not anexperienced investor,placed
thetrustassetswith DeanWitter.Charles,aninvestmentcoun_
selorandstockbroketmadeall investment decisionsandem_
bezzledin excessof $300,000.p broughta petitionto surcharge

Wills - 143
Mary Janefor the full amount.The trial coufi deniedthe petr-
tion:a dividedcourtof appealsreversed. Mary Janeappeals.

b) Issues,

(l) Is MaryJane'sdelegation powerto Charles
of investment
a breachof fiduciary duty?

(2) Was Mary Jane'sdelegationof investmentpower to
Charlestheproximatecauseof theloss?

(3) Can Robertprcperly continueto act as successortrustee
andasguardianandconservator for theprcdecessortnrstee
Mary Jane?

c) Held. (1)Yes.Judgmentreversedandrcmanded.(2) Remanded
for findings of fact by tdal cowt. (3) If the trial couft finds
Mary Janeliable, Robertwould have to be removedsince,as
herguardianandconservator, his intercstwouldconflictwith
his fiduciary duty astustee to enforcethe surcharge.

(1) A trusteebreaches the"prudentman"standard whenshe
delegatesherresponsibilitiesto act prudendyandperson-
ally performher duties.

(2) Charleswasa surrogatetrustee,andMary Janeunreason-
ablydelegatedherinvestment autho.itytohim.It is ofno
importthatCharleswasnamedasan altematetustee.

(3) Mary Janewas under a duty to exercisecontrol over
Chades'sinvestments
andevaluateCharles'sadviceand
thenmakeherown decisions.

e. Liability for contractsand torts.Thetraditionalruleis thata trusteeis
personallyliableon any contractthe trusteemakes,in the absence of
express provisionin thecontractlimitingthetrustee'sliability.A trustee
is similarlyliablein tort.A tusteeis pe$onallyliableto thesameexten!
that a beneficialownerof the trust propefiy would be liable.

3. Duty of Impartiality: Allocation to Income and Principal. A trusteehasa
duty of impartiality betweenthe incomebeneficiaryand the remainderman,
i.e.,shemustactto producea reasonable incomewhile at thesametimepre-
servingthe trust propertyfor the remainderman.

Dennisv. a. Tfustee'sduty of impartiality-Dennis v. Rhod€Island Hospital Tfust
RhodeIsland Co.,744F.2d893(lst Cir 1984).
Hospital
TrustCo. 1) Facts.The great-grandchildren
ofAlice Sullivar (Ps)areremain-

144- Wills
dermenof a trustestablished and as such,aJe
by their great-grandmother,
entitledto incomeuntil 1991whenthe tlust ceases andPs receivetheprin-
cipal.Psclaimedin the districtcowt thatthebanktrustee(D) hadbreached
variousfiduciaryobligations.The courtfoundthatD hadfailed to actim-
partiallyasbetweenthe trust'sincomebeneficiadesandremaindermenD
;old the trust'sreal estateat the lowestpoint of value.Both sidesappeal
differentaspectsof thejudgment.

Issue,Did D act unfairly as betweenthe incomebeneficiariesand the re-
maindermen?

3) Held. Yes.Judgmentaffirmedasmodified.

a) ThedistrictcourtfoundthatD failedto keepup therealestate,to reno-
vate.modemize,orto takeotherreasonable stepsthatmighthavegiven
the remaindermen propertyroughlycapableof continuingto produce
reasonableincome.Therecordprovidesadequate supportfor thesecon-
clusions,andwe will not overtuma distdctcourt'sfactualdetermina-
tionunlessit is clearlyerroneous,particularlyin a diversitycasewhere
a reasonable constnrction of statelaw is involved.

D) D did not appraisethepropertyperiodically, did not keepproperrecords'
andmadeno accountingfor 55 years.An impa.rtialtrusteemustview
theoverallpicture,not closeits eyesto relevantfacts.

c) D couldhavesoldthepropertyin 1950andreinvestedtheproceedsso
as not to createa "partiality" problem.The Restatement (Second)of
Trustssaysa fustee is undera duty to the beneficiaryultimatelyen-
titled to principalnot to retainpropertycertainor likely to deprcciate'
eventhoughthe propertyyields a high income,unlessD makesad-
equateprovisionfor amortizingthe income.

d) Statecaselaw allows the couft considerablediscretionin fiduciary
breachcasesto fashiona remedybasedon hypotheticalsale.The
a
year 1950is not an unreasonable remedialchoicebecausethat date
marksa rcasonableouterbound the time the trusteecould plead
of
ignoranceof the seriousfaimessproblem.

e) The district court'ssurchargecalculationis approvedexceptfor the
additionalpercentage to reflect"appreciation" Thercis no leasonto
believeD wouldhaveoutperformed inflation.

0 D's removalis primarily a matterfor the disrict court.D can be fe-
movedevenifchargesofmisconductarenot madeout.Ill feelingmight
inlerfereherewithlhelrustadministration.

Wills' 145
Fletcherv. 4. Full DisclosureRequir€d-Fletcher%Fletch€r,253Va.30,480S.E.2d488
Fletcher ( t991).

Facts.Uponthedeathof her husband, ElinorFletcher(T) placedall of
her assetsin a revocableinter vivos trust for which shewas the grantor
andtfustge.Severalyearslater,sheamendedthe hust to coDtain,among
otherthings,a provisionestablishingseveraltusts uponher death.Three
of thesetrusts($50,000 each)werefor thebenefitof heradultson,James
(P),andhis two childrcn.AnotheradultsonandF & M Bank-Peooles
TrustandAsserManagement GroupfDs)wereappointed successor rust-
ees.The fust for P authorizedthe trusteesto expendsuch amountsof
incomeand principalnecessary to providehim andhis chil&en with
adequatemedicalcareand insurancefor P's life or until his tlust is de-
pleted.UponP's death,anyremainingtrustbalanceis to be paidto p's
children.Upon T's death,her trust becameirrevocableandDs assumed
their duties.P broughta proceedingagainstDs to compelDs to provide
full and completecopiesof the trust instruments,alleging that T had
transfered assetsdescribedon a "ScheduleA" attachedto the original
tust instrumentto a "new trust" with Ds as trusteesand that Ds had
failed to provideP wirh the detailsof this trust. P further allegedthat he
wasgivenonly certainpagesfrom theoriginaltrustandtheamendment,
andthat without a completelisting of the termsandassetsof thetrust,he
cannotdetermineif the trust is being properly administercd.p alleged
his brother'sclaimthatthek motherwantedthe tust keptconfidential
ftom thebeneficiariesis without documentedsupport.Ds assertthatupon
T's death,when separatehusts werc crcated,P was provided with all
documentsthatrelateto him andhis childrenandwasnot entitledto any
furtherinfomation. Ds filed thetrustagreementundersealwith thecout,
but failed to file "ScheduleA." The trial court, after hearing,ruled in
favor of P.Ds appeal.

b. Issue.Did the trial coufi err in finding that P had an absoluteright to the
completecopies of the trust agreementand ordering Ds to Fovide p
with same?

Held. No. Judgmentaffirmed.

1) Whilethisis acaseoffirst impressionin Virginia,we areguidedby
text writers andthe Restatement(Second)of Trusts.

2) The beneficiariesaretheequitableownersof the ftust property;the
fiusteesaremerelyreprcsentativeswho keepthe tust propertysafe
andadministerthe trust accordingto the prcvisionsof the tlust in-
srument.

3) Becausethe beneficiaryenjoysthe trustpropertyindirectly,that
doesnot imply thebeneficiaryis to havethenatureof thetrustprop-

146- Wills
keptftom him
ty andits administration

4) "(W)herea trustis createdfor several eachof themis
beneficiaries'
entitledto infomation asto the fust " [Scoft'The Law of Trusts
sl73 (4thed. 1987)l

5) Evenifthe trusttermsregulatetheamountofinformation thetrustee
muslgiveandlhefrequenc) withwhichit mustbegi\en theben-
eficiaryis alwaysentitledto asmuchjnformation asis reasonably
necessary to allowhim to enforcehis rightsor preventa breach

6) Thelrusrhereconlains no provrqionthatP should.notbegiven.in-
formationandtherewas no e\identiaryhearing below regardrng
Ds'assenionthatT gaveoraldirectionsto thatpurposeTherefore'
grantor
we do not opineon whateffectanydirectiveof secrecyby the
wouldhavehere.

7) Ds' claimthatthe grantor'screationof threeseparatetrustssome-
how makethe trustthreeseparateandindependenttrust docum€nts
"unltary
is without merit. Thereis onetrust agreementbasedon a
corpus"

8) TheinformationDs failedtodisclosetoPmayhavea materialbear-
of thetrustasfar asP is concemedWith'
ing on theadmini$tration
ou] ful disclosure'P cannotjudgeDs' investmentdecisionsand
rea-
cannotdeteminewhetherDsarecanyingouttheirdutyto use
sonablecareandskill to makethe propertyproductiveand areact-
ing imPartiallY
Tiust National
5. Constructive Fraud-National Academy of Sciencesv' Cambridge
Academyof
Co.,370Mass 3O3,346N.E 2d 879(1976)' v.
Sciences
l-eonardT' Troland(T)' left a[ of his Cdnbridge
a. Facts.The will of the decedent,
(D)' with TmstCo.
orooertvto be held ln trustby theCambridgeTrusLCompany
ii"'n.t'in.o-" to be paidto his wife for life as long as shercmained
major
unmarried.It furtherprovidedthat his wife shouldnot devoteany
ponionof herIncomelo thesupponor benelitof peopleother than h€,F
the
self.T furtherprovidedthat on his wife's death'D would transter
trusteeship to tiheNationalResearch Councilof Washington' ' an
D C
olthe NallonalAcademy of Sciences a ru^stfor
{ P' lo conslllute
aqency
,J."u.ln in pty.r'o-pt'y.icsThewidowsubsequently rcmaniedbutfailed
(P) a
io notiiy o oi tfti. ihe NationalAcademyof Sciences brought
by D
petition seekinga rcvocationof the accountsof D andrestoration
The
if ttre$lO6,Od *rat waspaid to the widow afterher remariage
probatecourtheldfor P' orderingrevocationof the accounts and charg-
ins D for theamountseffoneously distributedD appeals'

Wills - 147
b. Issue. Doesthe failure to make any reasonableeffort to ascertain
thetruesetof factsconstitutea sufficientbasison whichto hold a
trusteeresponsible
for a constructiveflaud on beneficiariesof atrust?

Held. Yes.Judementaffimed.

l) Ifapersonmakesa representadon of factin relationto subject
mattersusceptibleof knowledgeandsuchreprcsentationis not
true,andif anotherpartyto whom it is madereliesandacts
upon it, it is fraud and deceitfor which the party makingit is
responsible. Weholdthatthe"fraud"in theapplicablestatute
contemplates this standardof constructivefraud, at leastto the
exteflt that the fiduciary hasmadeno reasonableefforts to as-
certainthe tlue stateof facts that it hasmisrcpresentedin the
accounts.Herc, the probatecowt found that D madeno effofi
at all to ascertain if thewidowhadremaried.

6. Changing Tfustees.Unlessthe trusteehasbeenguilty of breachof trust
or hasshownunfitness, thebeneficiaries
cannotremovethetrusteeand
havea newoneappointed. Thesettlor'sspecialconfidencein thedesig-
natedtustee haspriority.

B. POWERS OF THE TRUSTEE

1. General Managerial Powers.The trusteeis obligatedto carry out the
setdor'sintentandin doingsois grantedadministrative powersasspeci-
fied in the trustinstrument.
In additionto the powerslistedin thetust
instrument, the fustee'spowerscanbe broadened by statestatutes,
or
theymaybe impliedto accomplish thepurposes of thetust.

2. Powersof Investnent. UndertheUniform PrudentInvestorAct, a fustee
mustobservethestandards in dealingwith thetrustassets thatwouldbe
observedby a prudentpersondealingwith the propertyof another.If the
tustee hasspecialskills or is namedtrusteeon the basisof representa-
tionsof specialskillsor expertise, he is undera duty to usethoseskills.
Thehusteemustconsiderthefollowing factorsbefoleinvesting:(i) safety
of pdncipal,(ii) liquidity,and(iii) rateof retum.

Estateof a. Duty to diyersify--Estateof Collins,T2 Cat. App.3d 663,139
Collins Cal.Rptr.644(1977).

1) Facts.The will of the decedent,RalphCollins, authorizedthe
trustees(Ds), the decedent'sbusinesspartner and lawyer, to
purchaseevery kind of property and make every kind of in-
vestment,andfufiher providedthat all discretionconfered
uponthetrustees shallbeabsolute. After thewill wasadmitted
to p'robateanddistributionof theestatemade,therewas$50,000

148- Wills
rcmaining for Ds to invest. They loanedthe money to two real estate
developers, DowningandWard,who assured Ds thatthey werenot in
default on any of their loans.Thereafter,Downing andWard Constuc-
tion Companywent bankrupt,resulting in a loss to the trust fund of
$60,000.Ds filed a petition for approvalandfor setrlingof the first and
final accountand for their discharge.The beneficiariesunder the trust
(Ps)objectedon thebasisthatDs hadimproperlyinvestedthe$50,000.
Thetrial courtheldforDs. Psappeal.

Issue.Is a trust€€undera duty to the beneficiariesto distributethe risk
oflossby a reasonable diversificationof investments?

3) Held. Yes.Judgmentrcvelsed.
a) Atrusteeis undera dutyto distributethedsk ofloss by reasonable
diversification.Here,Ds investedtwo-thirdsof thetrustDrinciDalin
a singleinvestment.

b) The generalrule is that secondor otherjunior mortgagesare not
propertrustinvestments.Here,Ds investedin realpropertysecured
only by a seconddeedof trust.

c) Also, in buying a motgage for trust investinents,the truste€should
give careful aftentionto the valuationof the property,in order to
makecertain that the margin of securityis adequate.Here, Ds in-
vestedwithoutadequate investigation of eithertheborowersor the
collateral.

b. Balancing gains and losses.Couns typically apply the prudentpersonstan-
dard to eachinvestmentdecisionof the trusteeratherthan to the trust portfo-
lio asa whole.Thus,thetrusteeis notpermittedto balancegainsandlossesif
thebreaches of trustareseparateanddistinct.

ERISA. TheEmploymentRetirementIncomeSecurityAct of 1974(..ERISA")
prcvidesrulesgoveminginvestment ofp€nsionfundsby thefusteesmanag-
ing the fundsandimposesa prudentinvestorrule.The trusteemust discharge
hisduliessolelyin rheinterest
of thebeneficiaries.

Wills - 149
XIV. WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION: TAx PLANNING

A. INTRODUCTION

1. A Brief History of the Federal Estate Tax. Under the Tax Refom Act
of 1976,Congress uritedthegift andestatetaxes.The sameratesched-
ulewasappliedtobothgiftsandestates, thusremovingthetaxincentive
to make gifts before death. A single "unified credit" wasenactedwhich,
in effect,operatescumulativelyto both lifetime and deathtransfers
Moreover,thenewunified tax computationrequirestheestatetax to take
into accountlifetimegmtuitoustransfers, sothatall gratuitoustransfers
arcnow taxedcumulatively. Federal wealth transfer taxation
consistsof
threetaxes:(i) gift tax,(ii) estatetax,and(iii) generation-skippingtrans-
fer tax.

2. Estate and Inheritance TaxesDistinguished.An estatetax is a ta-{upon
the value of all propertyownedby a decedentthat is transfered to the
decedent's heirsor beneficiaries uponthedecedent's death.On theother
hand,an inheritance tax is a tax uponthe valueof propertyreceivedby
an heiror beneficiaryon accountof a decedent's death.

a. Estate tax computation. A single set of deductions,exemptions,
andgraduated estate;with few
ratesareappliedto the decedent's
exceptions, it doesnotmatterhowmanyhein orbeneficiaries share
in the estate,or who they are.

b. Inheritance tax computation. Separateexemptionsandlates arc
appliedto thesharereceivedby eachbeneficiaryand,typically,the
Iatesof tax andallowableexemptions vary accordingto the rela-
tionEhipof thebeneficiaries
to thedecedent.

3. The Unified Federal Estate and Gift Tax. Under the unified system,
unified taxesareimposedon theestatesof decedentsdying afterDecem'
ber31, 1976,andfor giftsmadeafterthatdate.Theratesareprogrcssive
basedon cumulativelifetimeanddeathtransfels.

4. Liability for Payment ofTaxes.

a. Payment of gift tax. The donoris prjmarily liable for paymentof
the gift tax.However,if thedonorfails to paythetax,the govem-
menthasa lien on thedonatedpropertyto theextentof thetaxdue,
andalsohastherighttoholdthedoneeliablefor theunpaidgifttax,
to the extentof the value of the propertyreceivedby the donee.

b. Paymentof estatetax. The executoris p marily responsible for
paymentofthe estatetax.Theexecutoris personallyliablefor pay-
mentofthe taxuntil shehasbeendischarged from liability,but she
is senerallventitledto reimbunement
out ofthe decedent's estate.

150- Wills
B. THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX

1. Natureofa TaxableGift. Section2501(a)of theIntemalRevenue Code
of 1986levies a gift tax uponthe hansferof propertyby gift The courts
haveheld that a "gift" occurcwhenthe donorrelinquishescompletedo-
minion andcontrol.In a revocabletrust,a taxabletransferdoesnot occur
until thepowerofrevocationceases.

a. Discretionary power in trustee-Holtz's Bstate v. Commissioner' Holtz'sEstate
38"t.C.31(1962). v.Commissioner

1) Facts. A trust instrumentof the decedent,I-€on Holtz, pro-
vided that the ffusteeshoulddistributethe net incometo the
settlor as the ffusteethinks desirable,and upon the setdor's
death,if his wife survivedhim, the incomeof the trust should
be paid to her for life, and upon the deathof both the setdor
andhis wife, thetrustwould teminate andthercmainingprin-
cipal would be paid to the estateof the survivor. The settlor
transfenedpropertyhaving a valueof $384,000into the trust
andthereafterhetransfered anadditional$50,000to the trust
The Commissioner(D) determinedthat as a result of these
transfers,Holtz madetaxablegifts in the amountof $263,000'
which weresubjectto the gift tax.The settlor'sestate(P) peti-
tions the coult andcontendsthat the tansfers were not com-
pletedgifts andthat no part thereofwassubjectto the gift tax.

2) lssue.Doestheplacingof discretionarypowerin thetrusteeto
invadecorpusmake the gift of corpusincompleteand hence
not subjectto thegift tax?

3) Held. Yes.Decisionfor P.

a) The placing of discretionarypower in the ftusteeto in-
vadethe corpusmakesthe gift of the corpusincomplete
undercertaincircurnstances. The rule of thumb is gener-
ally that if the tustee is frce to exercisehis unfettercd
discretionandthereis nothingto compelhim to invade
thecotpus.thenlhesettlorretains a mereexpectancy that
doesnot makethe gift incomplete.However, if the exer-
ciseof thetrustee'sdiscretionis govemedby someexter-
nal standardthat a court may apply in compelling
compliancewith the conditionsof the tust agreement'
andthe tustee'spowerto invadeis unlimited,thenthe
gift of corpusis incomPlete

b) Here, the trusteehad unfetteredpower to use all of the
corpusfor thebenefitof the settlorif it thoughtthat it was

Wills- 151
desirablefor thewelfarc,comiort, andneedsof the settlor It is
reasonable to assume thatthetrusteewould.andcouldbe re-
quiredto, invadethecorpusif this wasdesirablefor thewel-
fare,comfort,andneeds of thesettlorIt wasthuspossiblethat
theentirecorpusmightbe distdbutedduringthesettlor'slife-
time.Hence,the settlorhadnot abandoned sufficientdomin-
ion andcontol over the propedytransfered to makethe gift
consummate.

b. Income tax basis,Under the federalincometan, a tax is imposedupon
capital gain from the saleof property.The amountof the tax variesac-
cordingto the amountofgain, whichis thedifferencebetweenthe"ba-
sis"andthe sellingprice.

The Annual Exclusion.Undersection2503(b)of theCode,a taxpayermay
excludefrom taxablegifts the first $10,000givento anypersonduringthe
year.InCongress's 1997Amendment to theCode,theexclusionwasindexed
for inflation.Theexclusionnow increases in $1.000increments
asthecostof
living rises.The Codealsoprovidesan unlimitedexclusionfor tuitionfees
andmedicalexpenses paidon behalfof another. The annualexclusionis not
applicable to gifts of futue intercsts.

a. Tfansfer for the benefitof minor, Section2503(c)of the Codepro-
videsa way to avoid havinga gift to a minor classifiedasa futurc inter-
est.An annualexclusionfor propertytransfenedto a tust for a minor is
authorizedif all thepropertyandthe incometherefrcmmaybe expended
for the benefitof the minor beforehe attainsage2 I , aslong astheprop-
ertyandanyaccumulated incomewill be distributedto theminorat age
21 or, if thechilddiesbeforeattainingage21,to his estateor appointee.

Estateof b, Gifts of a presentinterestin pmperty--Estrte of Cristofani v, Commis-
Cristofaniv sioner,97 T.C.74 (1991).
Commissioner
l) Facts. The decedent,Mada Cristofani (T), had two children (Cs)
andfive grandchildren(Gs).T executedanirevocabletrust;Cs werc
tustees.BothCsandGshadtheright underthetust terms,during
a 15-daypedodfollowinga contribution,to withdrawan amount
notto exceedthe,lmountspecifiedforthefederalgift taxexclusion
undersection2503(b).Cs couldapplyasmuchof theprincipalas
necessaryfor thef propersupport,health,maintenance,andeduca-
tion,takingintoaccountsevemlfactorsincludingT's desircto con-
siderCstheprimarybeneficiariesandGsthesecondarybeneficiaries.
T intendedto fund the trust with a one-third individual intercstin
certainrealprcpefiyfor 1984,1985,and 1986.T did this for two
years,tansfering an intercst valuedat $70,000eachyear.T died
prior to makingthe 1986transferT did not reportthetlansfelson
federalgift tax retums.T claimedsevenannualexclusionsunder

152- Wills
section2503(b)for 1984and 1985with respectto Cs andGs' Gs
did not exercisetheir rights to withdnw underthetrust duringthose
years.The IRS (D) allowedT's estate(P) to claim the exclusions
with rcspectto Csbut disallowedit for Gsfor 1984and1985,deter-
mining that Gs' claimed exclusionswere not transfersof present
interests.P apPeals.

2) Issue. Do transfeNof propertyto a tust' wherethe beneficiaries
possesstheright to withdrawanamountnot in excessof the section
1503(b)exclusionwithin 15daysof suchtransfers, constitutegifts
of a presentinterestin propertywithin the meaning of section
2503(b)?

3) Held. Yes.Decisionenteredfor P

a) Forpurposes oftheexclusion, is considered
a fiustbeneficiary
a doneeof a gift in tlust

b) The exclusionappliesto presentinterestsin property'an unre-
strictedright to the immediateuse'possession,or enjoyment
of propertyor incomefrom property.

c) ln Cnonmevv. Contnksioner 397F.2d82 (9th Cir 1968),the
courtfocusedon theminor beneficiaries'legalright to demand
paymentftom thetrustee,not on thelikelihood that theywould
actuallyrcceiveprcsentenjoymentof the property lf the ben-
eficiarieshad a legal right to makea demanduponthe trustee
that could not be resisted,the coult determinedthe beneficia-
ries re-ceiveda presentinterest.

d) Revenuerulings arc not authorityfor this court but this ruling
showstheIRS'Srecognitionof whatconstitutes a prcsentln-
terest.

e) Here,theexclusionswercallowedfor Cs,who possessed the
sameright of with&awalasGs. Gs'legal right to withdra\'
specifiedamountsconstitutesa gift of a presentinterest.

0 It is not requircdthat trust beneficiarieshavea vestedprcsent
interest or a vestedremainderintercst in the trust corpus or
incomein orderto qualify for the exclusion.

3. Gifts Between Spousesand from One Spouseto a Third Person' Under
the EconomicRecoveryTax Act of 1981,a husbandand wife may transfer
their propertyto eachother without the paymentof any transfertaxes How-
ever,whenthe assetspassto a third person,a transfertax is imposed'

Wills - 153
C, TIIE FEDERALESTATETAX
l. Introduction. The federalestateta,r taxesthe value of propertyowned
or passingat deathandthevalueof propertygivenawayduringlife.
,,
The Gross Estrte: Property Passingby Will or Intestacy.

a. Section2033:Property ownedat death.Underthis section,the
valueofthe grossestateincludesthevalueof propefiyto theextent
of thedecedent's interestat thetime oi death;it includesall prop-
erty ownedat deaththatpassesby will or intestacy.It doesnot reach
a decedent'slife estatecreatedby anotherperson.

b. Section2034: Dower or curt€sy.Section2034of the Codein-
cludesin a decedent'sgrossestate"the valueofall propertyto the
extentof anyinterestthereinof the survivingspouse,existingat
the time of the decedent'sdeathasdoweror cufiesy,or by virtue
of a statutecreatingan estatein lieu of dower or curtesy."This
doesnot apply to communityproperty.In communityproperty
states,on the deathof eitherspouseonly that spouse'shalf is in-
cludablein thegrossestate;theotherhalfbelongsto thesuryiving
spouseandis not includable.Notethat the importanceof section
2034is grcatlyoffsetby the maritaldeduction,which operates to
takeout ofthe taxableestatemostofthe propertyincludedtherein
undersection2034.

3. The Gross Estste: Nonprobate Property.

a. Section2040:Joint tenancy,

l) Joint tenancy betw€en persons other than husband and
wife, Undersection2040(a),the entirevalueof the propeny
heldin j oint tenancy,exceptthatpart attdbutableto theamount
of consideration fumishedby the otherioint tenantmustbe
included.

2) Joint tenancyand tenancyby the entirety betweenhu.sband
and wife. Undersection2040(b),half rhe valueof property
heldbythedecedent andthedecedent's spouseasjoint tenants
with right of survivorshipor as tenantsby the entiretyis in-
cludableinthedecedent's g.ossestate.Itdoesnotmatte.which
spousefumishedtheconsideration for theproperty'sacquisi-
tion. Sinceeachspouseis deemedto own half of the amount
of thejoint tenancywith right of survivonhipor tenancyby
theentirety,the decedent's spouse's half interestin theprop-
erty includedin the grossestatewill receivea stepped-upbasis
at death.

154- Wills
b. Section2039:Employeedeath benefits.Under section2039,the value
of amountsreceivableby a beneficiaryunder an agrcementwhefe the
decedent, duringlife, wasreceivingor hada rightto rcceivepayments ls
includedin the decedent'sestate.Deathbenefitsarenot includableirr the
decedent's estateif he is preventedfrom selectingthe beneficiarybe-
cause,for example,a statuterequircsthe benefitsto be payableto his
spouseor children.If benefitsarepayableto a beneficiaryat a scheduled
time or uponthe happeningof anevent,irresp€ctiveof whetherthe de{e-
dent is living or dead,they are not taxable under section 2039, even
thoughthe decedentmay be deadat the time scheduledfor payment'

c. Section 2042: Life insurance. Under section2042,a decedent'sgrcss
estateincludesthe value of any life inswanceproceedsif the decedent
possessed at deathany of the incidentsof ownelshipunderthe policies
or if thepolicyproceeds werepayableto theinsured'sexecutorol estate.

4. The GrossEstate: Lifetime Transfers with Rights Retein€d.

a. S€ction2036:Transfers with life estateor power of control retained'
section2036(a)(l)appliesto propertytransfenedduringthedecedent's
lifetime if the decedentretaineda life estatein the tansferred property
The transferis subjectto estatetaxationbecausethe decedentretained
the right to possessandenjoy the propertyor the right to incomeftom it
until his death.Section2036(a)(2)exposesto estatetax any property
transferredby the decedentwhereintherewasrctainedthe right, either
alone or in conjunction with anotherperson,to confol the beneficial
enjoymentof the propertyor incomethereftom The tax will attachde-
spitethe fact thatthe transferorcould not haveexercisedthe power soas
to secufea personaleconomicbenefit.

1) No bona fide sale--Estateof Maxwell v. Commissioner'3 F.3d Estateof
591(2d Cir 1993). Maxwellv.
Commissioner
a) Facts. The decedent,Lydia Maxwell (T), conveyedher home
to her son and his wife in 1984for $270,000.T leasedthe
premisesfor five yearsat $ 1,800permonth.T forgave$20,000
of the puchase pdce as part of the annualgift tax exclusion
and held a mortgagefor the remaining$250,000.The buyers
paid expenses. The rent essentiallycanceledout the mortgage
payments,andthe buyefi werenevercalleduponto pay mort-
gageprincipal.UponT's death,thebuyerssoldthe homefor
$550.000.On T's estatetax retum, the estate(P) reported
$210,000remainingon themortgagedebt.The Commissioner
(D) found that the 1984transactionconstituteda transferwith
a retainedlife estateandassessed a deficiencyto adjustfor the
differcnce between the fair market value and the reported
amount.P appealedto the tax court, which affirmed D. P ap-
peals.

Wills - 155
b) Issues.

(l) Did T retainpossession
or enjoymentofthe Fopertyfollowingthe
aansfer?

(2) If shedid, wasthe transfera bonafide salefor an adequateandfull
considerationin moneyor money,sworth?

c) Held. (l) Yes.(2) No. Judgment
affirmed.
(l) Section2036(a)rcquiresinclusionin thevalueofthe srossestateof
all propeflyransferredunderwhich the decedenlritained a life
estate,r'.e.,possession,
enjoyment,
or rightto incomefromtheprop_
erty.

(2) Possession or enjoymentis retainedwhenthereis an expressor
implied understandingto that effect amongthe partiesto the trans_
ICI.

(3) The mortgagenotghadno valueif therewas,asthe tax court deter-
mined from the conductof the parties,no intention that it would
everbe paid.

(4) The forgivenessof the initial $20,000stongly suggeststhe exist_
enceof an undentandingbetweenT and the buyersthat T would
forgive 920,000eachyearuntil her deathandthe balancewould be
foryivenby T's will.

OldColony Requir€mentof an ascertainablestandard-Old ColonyTfust Co. y. United
TrustCo.v States,423F.2d601(lst Cir l9t0).
UnitedStates
a) Facts. The decedenthadestablisheda trust for the benefitof his sonand
namedhimself as a ftustee.The fust pe.mitted the ftusteesto incrcase
the percentageof incomepayableto the sonbeyondthe prescribedgoqo
whenin theiropinionsuchincreasewasneededin caseof sickness or
wasdesirable in viewofchangedcircumstances. In addition,thetrustees
werc giventhe discrctionto ceasepayingincometo the son.Another
article gavebroad administrativeand managementpowe$ to the trust_
e€s.A deficiencywasassessed againsttheestate.The executor(p) paid
the tax andsuedfor its recoveryin district court.The court ruled foi the
govemment(D). Old ColonyTrustCompanyappeals.

b) Issue. If thereis no ascertainablestandardwith which a settlor_tustee
mustcomplyin his distributionof tlust income,will the settlor'sestate
be taxedaccordingto the valueof the principal that the settlor contrib_
uted?

c) Held. Yes.Judgmentaffirmed.

156- Wills
(l) If there is an ascertainablestandard,the trusteecan be
compelledtofollow it. If thercis not,eventhoughheis a
hduciary,it is not unreasonableto say that his retention
of an unmeaswablefrcedom of choice is equivalentto
retainingsomeof the incidentsof ownership.Hence,if
thereis an ascertainable standard,the settlor-tustee'ses-
tateis not taxed,but if thereis not,it is taxed

(2) Here, the settlor retainedthe unrestrictedpower to dis-
tribut€ the trust income Accordingly, the tax was prop-
edy assessed.

b. S€ction 2038: Revocabletransfers. Under section2038, the value of
the grossestateincludesthe valueof all property"of which the decedent
has at any time madea ransfer . . . by trust or otherwise,where the
enjoymentthereofwassubject. . . to anychangethroughthe [decedent's]
exerciseofa power. . . to alter,amend,revokeor terminate. . " Unless
the decedenthastheright to exercisethe power, a transfersubject
to such
poweris nottaxablein herestate. Thisis trueevenifthe powerisvested
in onewho lacksa substantialadverseinterestto the decedent,suchasa
kusteeor evena subordinateparty (e.9.,transferor'sspouse)

c. Section 2037: Iiansfers with reversionary interest retained' Under
section2037,the decedent'sgrcssestateincludesthe valueof Foperty
transfenedduring his life if (i) possessioncan only be obtainedby sur-
viving the decedent,(ii) the decedentreserveda reversionaryinterestin
theprop€rty,and(iii) that rcvercionaryinterestwasworth morethan57,
of the valueof the propertyirnmediatelybeforethe decedentdied.

5. The Gross Estater Tfansfers Within Thr€e Yearsof Death. Under section
2035,certainint€r vivos transfersmadewithin threeyearsprior to deathare
bfoughtwithin thedecedent's grossestate.

6. The Grcss Estate: Powers of Appointment Given Dec€dentby Anoth€r.
Undersection2041,the grossestateincludesthe valueof propertyoverwhich
the decedentheld a generalpower of appointmentat the time of her death.
The owner of a generalpower of appointmentis consideredthe owner of the
propertysubjectto the power Whenthe generalpower of appointmentis ex-
ercisedor released,the doneehasmadea taxablegift lf the decedentmerely
possessed a genelalpower of appointmentat the time of her death,the prop-
erty is taxablewhetheror not thepowerwasexercised.Propertysubjectsolely
to a specialpoweris not taxablein thedonee'sestateundersection2(Xl.

a. Comfort limited by ascertainablestandard"Estlte of Viss€ringv. Estateof
Commissioner, 990F.2d578(l0th Cir 1993). Visseringv.
Commissioner
1) Facts.Thedecedent's, NormanVissering's (T's),mothercreateda
tust controlledby Floridalaw.T anda bankservedasco-tustees.

W ills' 157
T receivedall the incomefrom the trust after his mother's deathandon
T's deaththe assetswereto be dividedin equalpartsfor T's two chil-
dren.T developed Alzheimer'sdiseaseandentereda nulsinshomein
1984butneverresigned asrustee.Ar T s death.hepossessed ; po\aerof
appointmentthat permittedhim to benefit himself, his estate.his credi-
tols or theestate'screditorcfor his 'tontinuedcomfort."The tax couft
heldthatT heldat his deatha generalpowerdefinedby I.R.C.section
2041,requiringthe trustassetsto be includedin T,s glossestate.T's
estateappeals.

2) Issue.Did T holdpowerspermittinghim to invadethe principalof the
trustfor hisown benefil.unrestrained
by anascenarnable
srandardrelat-
ing to health,education,
suppofi,or maintenance?

3) Held.No. Judgment
reversedandremanded.

a) Statelaw determineslegal intercstsandrights createdby the trust
instrument,
butfederallaw determines taxconsequences.

b) Floridalaw wouldholdthata trustdocument permittinginvasionof
principalfor "comfort,"withoutqualifyinglanguage,crcatesa gen_
eral powerof appointrnent.

c) However,thereis modifyinglanguagein the tust here_.,to the
extentrequiredfor continued
comfort,'-thatwe believewouldlead
Floridato holddoesnotpemit anunlimitedpowerofinvasion.

d) Examplesin theTreasuryRegulation,suchas,,supportin reason_
ablecomfort," "maintenancein healthandreasonable comfort," and
"supportin hisaccustomed mannerof living,,'deemedto belimited
by an ascertainablestandardarc no differcnt from the languagein
T's trustprovision.

e) IfT soughtto usethe tlustassetsto significantlyincreasehis stan_
dardofliving, hisco-trustee
wouldhavebeenobligatedto withhold
consentandtheremainderbeneficiaries couldhaveDetitioned the
counto disallowsuchexpendilures asinconsistent with theserrlor.s
intent.

Estateof b. Sequentialtrusts-Estateof Kurz v. Commissioner,
6g R3d lO27(7thCir
Kurz v. 1995).
Commissioner
1) Facts.Between1971(theyearofher husband's dearh)and 19g6.Erhel
KuIz was the incomebeneficiaryof two trusts.From the marital trust,
shewasentitledtoasmuchprincipalasshewantedby wdttenrequestto
theruslees.Fromthefamily trusl.shewasenlilledto 5aoof theprinci_
palin anyyearonlyifthe marilallrustwasexhausted.
UponKurz.ideaLh
in 1986.themaritaltrustwasworth$3.5mi ion andthefamilvrrusr

158- Wills
$3.4million. The estatetax rcturnincludedthe full valueof the
marital trust but noneof the valueof the family trust The IRS as-
sessed additionalestatetaxes.Theestate(P)challenged theassess-
ment. The tax court held that Kurz held a general power of
appointmentover570of thefamily trustandanother$170,000should
be includedin herestateunder26 U S.C.section2041(aX2). P ap-
peals.

2) Issue. Does a sequenceof withdrawal rights prcvent a power of
appointmentfrombeing exercisable?

3) Held. No. Judgmentaffirmed.

a) Section2041 is designedto include in the taxableestateall
assetspossessedor controlledby thedecedent.

b) If only a condition the decedentcould havecontrolledhad to
be satisfiedto receivethe moneyfrom the family trust, then
thedecedent's poweris exercisable.

c) P eroneouslyrelieson thercgulationsaccomPanying section
2041,andin particular,onestatement: "[A] powerwhichby
its terms is exercisableonly upon the occurence during the
decedent's lifetimeof aneventor a contingencywhichdid not
in fact takeplaceor occurdudngsuchtime is not a powerin
existence on thedateof thedecedent's death" P's claim that
thercquired"contingency"did not occurherefails. The ex-
amplesof contingenciesfollowing this sentence(if a decedent
reacheda certainage,if a decedentsurvivedanotherpeNon,or
if shedied without descendants) areoutsideof the decedent's
control.Expedientlyarrangingtrustsin a sequenceandalrang-
ing a sequenceof withdrawal doesnot createa contingency
and doesnot removethe beneficiary'sdominion and control
over all funds that canbe withdnwn at any given moment.
,|
The Marital Deduction.

a, Intmduction. Undersection maytransferbetweenthem-
2056,spouses
selvesunlimited amountsof propefiy (exceptterminableinterests)with-
out incurdng any gift or estatetaxes

b. Interests that qualify for th€ d€duction. For an interestto qualify asa
marital deduction,the following requirementsmust be met:

wasa citizenof theUnitedStates;
(i) The decedent

wassurvivedby his spouse;
(ii) Thedecedent

Wills 159
(iii) Thevalueof theinterestdeducted
is includablein thedecedent's
grossestate;

(iv) Theintercstpasses
to thesurvivingspouse;
and

(v) The intercstis a deductible
interest(i.e.,theinterestpassingto the surviving
spouseis subjectto taxationin her estateto theextentnot consumed or dis-
posedof duringherlifetime).

Estateof 1) Failure to qualify for the deduction--Estateof Rapp v. Commissioner,
Rappv. t40 F.3dt2tt (9thcir 1998).
Commissioner
a) Facts.Whenthe testatorBert Rapp(T), died,survivedby a wife and
two children,hewilledall ofhis household andpersonalpropertyto his
wife and one-halfof the communitypropertyto a tlust for his wife for
her life. T's children,asco-trustees,were givenabsolutediscretionto
disribute ftom the principal and income such amountsas they deter-
minednecessary for theirmother'shealth,education,andsupport. Upon
the wife's death,theremainingtrust assets,if any,were to be distributed
amongT'schildrenandtheirissue. UponT'sdeath,Mrs.Rappaskedthe
probat€courtto modify thewill sotheaboveprovisionwould qualify for
the maritaldeduction.Sheallegedit wasT,s intentionthat the income
from the trust wouldbe paidto l\fts. Rappat leastannually,or duringher
lifetime. Califomia law allows the court to modify or terminatea trust
uponthe consentof all partiesor dueto changedcircumstances,After a
hearingof which the IRS did not receivenotice and during which no
witnesses werc called,the courtgrantedMrs. Rapp'spetitionanden-
tered an order changingthe languageof the trust so as to authorizethe
executorto treat the fust as a qualified terminable interest property
("QTIP") trust.The orderbecamefinal andunappealable on April 30,
1989.After the order was entercd,but beforc it was final. the executor
(P)filed with theIRS @) an applicationfor anextensionof timeto file
the estatetax rctum.P indicatedon the applicationthathe intendedto
make a QTIP election and he submittedan estimatedDavmentof
$ 156.204. Theretumwasfiled in May.afterrheorderbecamefinal,and
P claimedthe QTIPdeductionfor $3,683,899, asmuchof rheestateas
wouldbring the taxesto the amounthe hadpreviouslypaid.D senta
deficiencynotice,claimingP failedto providefull subsranriation for the
deductionandit wouldbe allowedonly for the valueof the household
and personalgoodsthat had passeddirectly to Mrs. Rapp, i.e.,
$435,262.50. P appealed.ThetaxcourtclaimedthattheCalifomiacourt's
decisionhadnot beenaffirmedby theCalifomia SupremeCourt andwas
not binding, that the probatecoufi haderred,andthat the trust wasnot a
QTIPtrust.P appeals.

b) Issues.

160- Wills
(1) Doesthe trustcreatedby T's will constitutea QTIP trust,which
qualifiesfor themaritaltax deduction?

(2) Is the tax court boundby theCalifomia probatecourt'srefomation
of T's will?

c) Held. (l) No. (2) No. Judgment
affirmed.

(l) IntemalRe'renue v. EstateofBosch,387U.S.456(1967),is con-
trolling with regardto the effect of the statecout's determination.
In reviewingthe legislativehistoryof the marital deductionstatute,
the Bosct court determinedthat Congressintendedthat "proper re-
gard" be givena statecourt'sinterpretationaftera "bonafide adver-
saryproceeding," but notfinality.Congress did not intendthestate
coudsto detemine fedemllaw.

(2) While the probatecourt's orderwas final and cannotbe overuled
by the califomia SupremeCowt, this hasno effect on the fact that
the federalcourt is not boundby statecourt prcceedingsfor deter-
mining federalestatetaxes.The statecowt refomation is still in
effect for Mrs. Rapp,but shewill not receiveQTIP benefits.

R€formation allowed--Pondv. Pond.424 Mass.894.678 N, E.2d l32l Pondv.
(1997\. Pond

a) Facts,In 1991,The settlor,SidneyPond(T), executedhis will leaving
all of his personalproperty to his wife and the residueto a revocable
trust, naming himself and his wife truste€s,executedon the sameday.
All of their assetsexceptthe family homewere transfered to the trust.
The trust providedthat incomeand suchprincipal asnecessarybe paid
toT andhiswife duringtheirlives,butmadenoprovisionfor anyt)?e of
paymentto his wife ifshe survivedhim.Thetust Fovidedthatit would
terminateon the deathof both tustees andits assetswerc to be divided
equallybetween theirchildren. Thewill providedthatthewife hadabso-
lute discretior whetheror not to electto qualify undersection2056(b)(7)
all or a portionof thetrustfor the federalandanystatemarital deduction.
However,section2056(b)(7)requiresincometo be paidto the surviving
spousefor life in orderto qualify for the marital deduction.without this
deduction,the estatewould be liable for $70,000in taxes.Trustee(P),
allegesthat a scrivener'seror is apparcntwhenthe estateplan is viewed
asa wholeandthatT intendedto providefor his wife. P asksthe court to
insertinto the hust a provisiongrantingthewife fust incomeanddiscre-
tionary principal paymentsfor her lifetime. P futher requeststhat the
cout incorporateinto the tlust languagethat would corect the ambigu-
ity in the terminationprovisions.All beneficiaries(Ds) assentto the re-
ouestedrcformation.

Wills - 161
b) Issue.Shouldthe trustbercformedto give effect to T's intent?

c) Held.Yes.Soordered.
(1) Clearanddecisiveprcof of mistakeis requiredto refom
a aust instrument
to embodya settlor'sintent.
(2) Both the will and h.trstwere executedon the sameday;
the trust was clearly intendedto prcvide for the marital
deduction.It wasessentialto the estateplan.All of T's
assetswere fansl-erredto it. The income and orincioal
wereavailable lo T andhiswifeduringlheirliue".Clearly.
T intendedthe sameto continueafterhis death.Only a
scrivener'selrorcouldhavecausedthe requisiteclauseto
be omitted.Thereis no indicationthatT intendedto de-
pdvehis wife of theaust assetsduringher lifetime.

c. Tax planning. Eachspouseis entitledto oneexemptionfrom estateand
gift tax, in the fo.m of a unifiedcredir.By taking advantage of borh
spouses' exemptions, thecombinedcreditcanbe passedto thecouple,s
childrenwithoutincur.ingestatetaxes.Becauseofthe gnduatedtaxmtes,
the total estatetax payableon the deathof a husbandand wife will be
lowerif thetwo estates areequal.Equalization is notnecessarily
thebest
solutionin all cases.Fomula clausesremainusefulin producingpre-
ciselytheright amountto putin a creditsheltertust or a maritaldeduc-
tion tust. A credit sheltertrust is a tlust designedto hold an amount
equal to the exemptionof the first spouseto die (i.e., the amountnot
taxableon his death)in sucha mannerasnot to be taxableon the surviv-
ing spouse's death.

8. The Charitable Deduction, Under section2055 of the Code,unlimited de-
ductionsmay be taken for ftansfels for public, charitable,or religious pur-
poses.

9. Exe€utor's Elections: Post.DeathTax Planning.

a. Valuation of estateassets.For estatetax putposes,assetsar€ valuedat
their fair marketvalueasof the dateof death,or asof the altematevalu-
ation date,which is the date six months after death(exceDtfor assets
distributed.sold.exchanged. or othenaisedisposedof duringthe six.
monthperiod,for whichit is thedateof distributionor sale).

b. Sections2053and 2054 deductioDs.Section2053 allows a deduction
for funeralexpenses,administrationexpenses,claims againstthe estate,
andunpaidmortgages. Section2054allowsa deducdonfor lossesin-
curredduringthe settlement of estates
arisingfrom fires,storms,ship-
wrecks.or othercasualties. or from thefl,whensuchlossesare not
compensated for by inswanceor otherwise.

162- Wills
D. THE GENERATION.SKIPPING TAX
The Tax ReformAct of 1986prcventswealthyperuonsfrom creatinginter
vivos or testamentarytrustsfor the purposeof avoiding estateor gift taxes.
Theunderlyingprincipleof thegeneration-skipping transfeftax is thata transfer
taxshouldbeimposedoncea generation andcannotbeavoidedbygivingthe
next generation only a life estateor nothing at all. If a trust createsa genera-
tion-skippingtransfer,the tax is due when the transferoccus. The tansfers
arctaxedat a flat rate,whichis thehighestrateapplicable. Thetypeof trans-
fer determines theamounttaxed andwhois liableforpayment.Undersection
2631(a),an exemptionof up to $l million may be takenby eachindividual
makinggefleration-skippingtransfers.A marriedcouplemay give awayup to
$2 million in generation-skipping transfeNwithouthavingto paya tax.

E. STATE WEALTH TRANSFER TAXFS

All statesexceptNevadaimposedeathtaxes,butlessthan12imposea gift tax
on lifetimetransfers.

Wills- 161
TABLEOF CASES
(Page
numbers
of briefedcases
in bold)

Album,Estateof - 37 Ericksonv. Erickson- 62
AIIenv. TalJey- 64 Espinosa v Sparber,
Shevin,Shapo,Rosen&
AmericanSecudty& Trust Co. v. Clamer- Heilbronner- 82
127 Estate of _ (Je" name of party)
Anderson,ln/e Estateof - 132
Azcuncev. EstateofAzcunce- 81 Farkasv. Williams - 50
First NationalBank of Bar Harborv Anthony
Ba k e rv N e l s o n - 7 4 - lt4
Bealsv. StateStleetBank& TrustCo. - 108 Fleming v. Mordson - 60
Blanchette v. Blanchette - 49 Fletcherv. Fletcher- 146
Brainardv. Commissioner- 89 Franklinv.AnnaNationalBankofAnna - 48
Brown,1zre Estateof - 102 Fnnzenv. NorwestBankColorado- 57
Buck,1, re Estateof - 137
Gerbade,1n/e Estateof - 78
CarlJ. HerzogFoundation,Inc. v. Gilbert,h rc Estateof - 113
Universityof Bridgeport- 138 Cttoffman,In re - 26
Carterv FirstUnitedMethodistChurch Gustafson v. Svenson- 60
ofAlbany- 36
Clark v. Campbell- 91 Hall v. Vallandingham- 12
Clark v Greenhalge- 40 HarrisonvBird-34
Clobberie'sCase- 116 Hartmanv. Hartle - 141
Clymerv. Mayo - 54 Hayrner,In re - ll
Collins,Estateof - 148 The HebrcwUniversityAssociationv Nye
Connecticut JuniorRepublicv. SharonHos- (HebrewUniversityAssociationt1 - 86,87
pital - 63 The Hebrew Unive$ity Association v. Nye
Cook v. EquitableLife AssuranceSociety- (HebrewUniyersityAssociationII1- 86,87
47 Hechtv. SuperiorCourt- 14
Coope4In le -'74 Hicksv. Miranda- 74
Cooper,1r,re Estateof - 74 HieblevHieble-93
Crisofani,Estateof v Corrmissioner- 152 Hillowitz,Estateof - 46
Cross,1rl/e Estateof - 73 Hodelvlr ving- 1
Crummeyv Commissioner - 153 Hofingv. Willis - 66
Cruzanv. Director, Missouri Departinentof Holtz'sEstatev. Commissioner
- 151
Health- 58 Hontgm n, ln rc - 20
Hotz v. Minyard - 8
Dawsonv. Yucus- 67
Dennisv. RhodeIslandHospitalTrustCo. - IntemalRevenuev. EstateofBosch- 16l
144 IrvingTrustCo. v. Day - 1
DewirevHaveles-117 Irwin UnionBank& TrustCo. v. Long - 104
Dickersonv Union NationalBank of Little
Rock- 124 Jackson v. Schultz- 65
DukeofNorfolk'sCase- 123 Janusv. Tarasewicz - 10
Jimenezv. Lee- 84

Wills- 165
Johnson,lnre Estateof - 32 SecondNationalBankofNew Havenv Har-
Johnsonv. Gifiman - 44 ns Trust & SavingsBank - 130
Johnsonv. Johnson- 4l SecurityTrustCo. v Irvine - 115
Seidelv. Wemer- 106
Kaufmann'sWill, 1r /e - 23 Shannon,Estateof 80
Kimmel'sEstate- 32 Shapirav. UnionNationalBank- 3
Kurz,Estateof v. Commissioner
- 158 Shelleyv Shelley- 97, l2l, 128
Shenandoah ValleyNationalBankv.Taylor-
Lathamv. FatherDiYine- 24 135
Laura,1'' re Estateof - 82 Shrimp v Huff - 44
Lipp€rv. Weslow- 21 ShrinersHospitalsfor CrippledChildrcnv.
Ioring v. Marshall- 110 cardiner - 143
Lux v Lux - 121 Simpsonv. Calivas, T
Sp'eelmanv. Pascal- 90
Mahoney,/n re Estateof - 16 StateStreetBank & Trust Co. v Reiser, 53
Mahoneyv. Grainger- 59 Sremerv Nelson- 105
Marsmanv. Nasca- 95 Strittmater,h rc - 19
Maxwell,Estateof v. Commissioner - 155 Stuchell,lnre Trustof- 101
Minary v. CitizensFidelity Bank & Trust Co. Sullivan v. Burkin - 75
- 119
Moses,Ir /e Will of - 22 Thompsonv. Royall - 35
Moss,In re - CI Troy v. Hart - 17

NationalAcademyof Sciencesv Cambridge United Statesv. _ (seeopposingparty)
Trust Co. - 1.47 Unthankv. Rippstein- 87
Neher,1zze- 136
Via v. Putnam- 43
Old ColonyTrustCo.v. UnitedStates- 156 Vissering,Estateof v. Commissioner
- 157
Olliffe v. Wells - 94
O'Neal v, Wilkes - 13 Wardv Vander Loeff - 126
O'Shaughnessy, United Statesv. - 99 Wassermanv. Cohen- 69
WellsFaryoBank v Title lnsurance& Trust
Parsons,Estateof - 27 Co. - l2O
Pavlinko'sEstate,1nre - 29 Wilhoit v. PeoplesLife Insurance
Co.- 45
Pilafas,1, re EstateandTrust of - 52 Wold, 1are Trust of - 132
Pondv. Pond- 161 Woodworth.Estateof - 119

Ranney,In re Will of - 30
Rapp,Estateof v. Commissioner- 160
Reyn'olds,In re - 17
Rothko,1z re - 141
Russell,Estateof - 60

Scottv BankOneTrustCo. - 98
Searight'sEstate,1r,re - 92

166- Wills