Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45 Author(s): David Thomas Source: Journal of Contemporary

History, Vol. 22, No. 2, Intelligence Services during the Second World War (Apr., 1987), pp. 261-301 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260933 Accessed: 16/09/2010 06:58
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DavidThomas

ForeignArmiesEastand GermanMilitary Intelligence in Russia1941-45
The intelligence war in Russia 1941-45 was waged on a scale unmatchedin any other theatreof the second world war. Nevertheless, for various reasons, the conflict between the German and Soviet intelligence services has not received the attention that it deserves. In this paper, an effort is made to discuss certain facets of German intelligence operations on the Russian Front, specifically, the work of FremdeHeere Ost (FHO), 'Foreign Armies East', the department of the Oberkommando Heeres (OKH) responsible for the evaluation des of all military intelligence about the Soviet Union, including the analysis of Soviet intentions and strategy;and Amt Ausland/Abwehr, the military intelligence service under the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), whose field headquarters in the East were responsible for clandestine collection, special operations, subversion, and counter-espionage and counter-intelligence. Abwehr operations against the Soviet Union did not fall within the strict scope of FHO activities. However, these operations are noted here, because Abwehr headquarters in Berlin furnished intelligence to FHO from the beginning, and the Abwehr field organization in the East responsible for espionage, sabotage, and counter-intelligence, Stab WALLI,was placed under the control of FHO in the spring of 1942 (departments I (espionage) and III (counter-intelligence)only). A forthcoming paper will examine Soviet intelligence operations on the Russian Front.2 For lack of space, there is no detailed treatment of the other German intelligence organizations that provided information to FHO, in particular, Fremde Luftwaffe Ost, German Air Force intelligence, and the Wehrmacht signals intelligence organization in Russia, Leitstelle fir NachrichtenaufkldrungOst. The operations of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA), including the sabotage and subversion organization in Russia,
Journal of ContemporaryHistory (SAGE, London, Beverly Hills, Newbury Park and New Delhi), Vol. 22 (1987), 261-301.

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Journal of Contemporary History

'Zeppelin', are omitted, for they were not an important source of intelligence for FHO.3 Fremde Heere Ost was the intelligence department in the military intelligence staff organization of the German Army High Command (OKH) responsible for military affairs in Eastern Europe, with special reference to the Soviet Union. FHO was established on 10 November 1938, as 12 Abteilung des Generalstabesdes Heeres, under IV(O. Qu. IV). From November 1938 to March Oberquartiermeister FHO was directed by Oberstleutnant Eberhard Kinzel. On 1 1942, April 1942, General Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, replaced Kinzel with Oberstleutnant (later Generalmajor) Reinhard Gehler, formerly the Chief of the eastern group of the Operationsabteilung of OKH. Gehlen directed FHO until 10 April 1945, when OberstleutnantGerhard Wessel assumed command of FHO, pending its dissolution on 21 April 1945, at which time the Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab (WFST) of the OKW assumed the functions of FHO.4 FHO was responsible initially for the collection of statistical data and technical information concerning the armies of Poland, the Scandinavian countries, some Balkan countries, China and Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The collection of data about the Red Army did not become the primary task of FHO until 31 July 1940, when Hitler informed the General Staff of his intention to attack the Soviet Union and ordered OKH to undertake preliminary planning. Before this date, the Soviet Union was merely one of the areas for which FHO was responsible and the organizational structure reflects this low priority assigned to Russian intelligence. Until the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, FHO concerned itself primarilywith the evaluation of statistical and technical intelligence about the Red Army, furnished by: (i) the Amt Ausland/Abwehr in OKW (agent reports and reports of German military attaches, primarily from Helsinki and Moscow); (ii) Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Abteilung Fremde Luftwaffe Ost (aerial reconnaissance photographs of Red Army troop concentrations, installations, and fortifications); (iii) the Wehrwirtschafts-und Riistungsamt (Soviet armament production and military-technical data); and (iv) the Leitstelle fur Nachrichtenaufklarung Ost (signal reconnaissance relating to the Red Army). Before the commencement of 'Operation Barbarossa', FHO did not essay to draw broad conclusions regarding the Red Army from the assembled information, leaving this function to the Operationsabteilung of the General Staff.

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

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Owing to the unsatisfactory performance of German military intelligence in general, and of FHO in particular,during the first year of the war against Soviet Russia, Halder replaced Kinzel with Gehlen, and elevated FHO from an essentially statistical organization to the de facto status of an operational department directly subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff and the Operationsabteilungof OKH. FHO under Gehlen was granted the authority to formulate its own judgments regarding large-scale operational issues, including planned German offensives, anticipated Soviet attacks, and probable Soviet military capabilities and intentions. In the spring of 1942, OKW agreed to place Stab WALLI, sections I (agent espionage) and III (counter-intelligence) under the operational direction of FHO. Thus, FHO assumed responsibility for collecting and evaluating data, and for providing an independent estimate of the enemy situation (Feindlagebeurteilung).Hereforth, the mission of FHO subsumed (i) the processing of data into statistical intelligence concerning the Red Army, based on facts drawn from all available sources of intelligence; and (ii) the evaluation of these facts, in order that a general estimate of the enemy situation, enemy capabilities, and intentions might be provided to OKH and the army commands on the eastern front. Gehlen reorganized FHO in May 1942, and the new organizational structure was retained with minor modifications until the end of the war. Briefly, the Russian section was accorded pride of place, given the best personnel, and divided into three groups. under Hauptmann Gerhard Wessel Gruppe I (Fuhrungsgruppe) became the most prestigious component of FHO. This group prepared the daily enemy situation report in close co-operation with the Operationsabteilung of OKH, as well as the daily enemy situation map, special maps (air reconnaissance results, troop concentrations etc.), and a daily statistical report (number of Soviet prisoners, captured equipment, and artillery concentrations). To ensure the effective utilization of all sources of intelligence available to FHO, in particular signals intelligence and aerial reconnaissance, Gruppe I periodically prepared and dispatched reconnaissance briefs for the East (AufklarungsfordcrungenOst). These daily reports and the (periodic) estimates of the overall enemy situation (Gesamt Beurteilungen der Feindlage) prepared by Gruppe II formed the basis of all planning by OKH. Gruppe I was sub-divided into five to six sections, including one for each German army group on the eastern front (North, Centre, South, A), another for the partisan war (Bandenlage),

without success. military schools. signal reconnaissance (Nachrichtenaufklarung)and aerial reconnaissance provided much of the hard information about the current deployment. Section IIa evaluated all intelligence relating to Soviet overall operational intentions. and war organization. conGruppe III (Dolmetschergruppeund Unterlagenbeschaffung) sisted of five sections (IIIa-IIIf) and was responsible for all translation work involving captured documents. enemy morale. From 22 June 1941. and agent reports provided by WALLI I and III. High Command structure. the economy.5 Regarding the sources of intelligence utilized by FHO before 'Barbarossa'. IIc maintained the main index of Soviet formations and (Truppenkartei) special indices on comparative force dispositions. IIb assessed statements of Soviet prisoners-of-war. troop organization. Gruppe II (Russland/MilitarischeGesamtlage)was responsible for all matters relating to the Soviet Union concerning the enemy situation. For this reason. (ii) prisoner-of-war interrogation. the strategy and operational intentions of the Soviet High Command. reports of the German intercept organizations. Soviet operational reserves. and Soviet combat propaganda material. reserve formations. (iv) signals intelligence. FHO began to base its computation of the Soviet order-of-battle and its evaluation of Red Army capabilities and intentions on intelligence reconnaissance data obtained from six main sources: (i) troop reconnaissance. articles in the Soviet press and captured Soviet documents and Feldpostbriefe. the evaluation section of FHO (Gruppe II) came to place especial reliance upon signals intelligence. (iii) aerial reconnaissance.6 For a decade preceding the invasion of Russia. and conditions in Soviet-controlled Russia. (v) agent reports (Abwehr I and III). order-of-battle. A special was interrogation centre (Vernehmungslager) subordinate to Gruppe III. only these sources are noted here. wherein special Soviet prisoners were subjected to detailed interrogation involving the writing of reports and the completion of questionnaires on specialized subjects of interest to FHO and OKH. and command structure of the Red Army. Soviet press articles and radio broadcasts. and Soviet personnel (from the rank of divisional commander upwards).264 Journal of ContemporaryHistory and a section for questions relating to aerial reconnaissance (Luftaufklarung). The material submitted by Amt Ausland/Abwehr before June 1941 . (vi) captured Soviet documents. Soviet military and military-industrial potential. As the campaign proceeded. the Abwehr exerted great efforts to gather intelligence on Russia . aerial reconnaissance.

under the command of Major Hermann Baun. reconnaissance. closer co-ordination between the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht in the field was necessary.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 265 contained in FHO files is of poor quality. the Abwehr began the formation of the I. Abwehr I assumed responsibility for long-range enemy reconnaissance and established a forward headquarters (Befehlstab WALLI I) outside Warsaw at Sujowek. NKVD buildings. das wir erhielten. subversion. because the Abwehr would be able to enter Soviet territory and establish agent networks.8The operational directive for Abwehr II stipulated the employment of motorized columns to a depth of 300 kilometres in the Soviet rearfor the conduct of sabotage. under which the Abwehr was given specific operational tasks in support of the army. The reconnaissance territory assigned Abwehr I (b) (partisan groups) included the entire rear of the Wehrmacht in occupied Russian territory. A German General Staff Soviet analyst described the contribution of the Abwehr thus: 'Die Masse des Nachrichtenmaterials. The first function of FAKs I and III was the deployment of agents (V-Leuten)in the frontline area. conduct sabotage. but also the seizure of documents.10 . Frontaufkldrungsleitstellen II.7The situation was expected to change after the start of Barbarossa. whose responsibilities embraced not only mass murder. The planning of 'Barbarossa' revealed that the Abwehr knew almost nothing about Soviet Russia. Stab WALLI I. The Abwehr I detachment assigned to each German army group and army was subordinated to Stab WALLI. and III. subordinate to Abwehr headquartersin Berlin. a formal arrangementfor co-operation was concluded on 9 June. To this purpose. Reconnaissance across the main battle line was restricted to a depth of 200 kilometres. In early 1941. and the Frontaufklrungskommandos (FAKs) Frontaufkldrungstrupps (FATs) subordinate to these command posts. was entrusted with the extended training of agents selected from prisoner-of-war camps for long-range missions in the Soviet rear. war Mist'. The command posts would serve as forward departments of the Abwehr. the special detachment of the AuswartigesAmtassigned to the task of seizing the records of all foreign diplomatic missions. and the Einsatzgruppen of the SS. and subversive missions in the Soviet rear. Therefore. and avail itself of captured and stolen Soviet secret documents. in co-operation with Gruppe Kuensberg. and reconnaissance missions.9 Abwehr III was charged with the collection of all forms of documents from Red Army headquarters. The FAKs and FATs were restrictedto operations in the front area of the army groups to which they were assigned for Barbarossa. and Communist Party offices in the enemy rear.

the FAKs and FATs under WALLI I succeeded in inserting a number of agents in the rear areas of the Red Army and in penetrating temporarily several Red Army field headquarters. Most of these soldiers were reported to be members of Red Army signals staffs.266 Journal of Contemporary History Abwehr I activities in Russia before June 1941 were unsuccessful. It is now clear that every one of these Abwehr agents either was a Soviet double-agent or functioned unwittingly as a conduit for Soviet disinformation. especially the High Command of the Red Army. The Max organization in Russia was said to consist of a net of wireless agents among Russian soldiers who were members of families which had been anti-Soviet.13Major Baun and Colonel Gehlen imagined that the Abwehr controlled a small number of well-placed agents in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia. and another Russian emigre. 'agent radio' (5). Turkey. dated 14 November 1944. under the auspices of Abwehr I Luft. who worked in Sofia with a former White Russian emigre.12Deducting the duplications. who provided a reliable picture of Soviet strategy until the end of the war. Ilya Lang. 159 names remain.14 The most important Abwehr network was controlled by the 'Max' Organization in Sofia. who claimed to have been a Cossack officer. containing a list of 184 espionage sources evaluated according to nine different ratings. 'limited' (15). the reports of some of the sources contained in the appendices to FHO estimates contain almost no information of value about the Soviet Union. 'very valuable to useful' (2).1 The type of agent used by WALLI I in Russia is shown by an FHO document entitled 'Abwehr I Ost Agenten'. General Anton Turkul. and the intelligence services. 'very limited' (3). 'usable' (21). An analysis of the 159 sources according to category of evaluation yields the following picture of WALLI I agents in Russia: 'very valuable' (18). Bulgaria. the Politbureau. as well as reports about Soviet military strategy at critical . 'limited to very limited' (4). 'usable to limited' (17). The leader of this organization was Richard Kauder. of which almost half are described as 'still doubtful'. After the invasion. 'still doubtful' (74). whence they were radioed to Sofia. The Max reports provided detailed and accurate tactical information about Red Army troop movements and the Soviet order-ofbattle. The list is evidence only that the network of Abwehr I Ost was far-flung at the end of 1944: in a few instances alone does it appear that the source actually operated in Soviet territory. Kauder told the Abwehr that the reports were collated in Russia at one or more centres and then transmitted via intermediaries to Istanbul and Samsun.

was probably a Soviet agent.16However. and there is probative evidence that Kauder. and Soviet operational intentions. except in the case of the Max reports. through a liaison officer from the Leitstelle. or 'signal reconnaissance situation'.was the most effective and important type of signal reconnaissance on the Eastern Front. FHO obtained useful intelligence from the agent sources controlled by WALLI I. the interrelationship and the functioning of the Soviet military chain of command. Gehlen and FHO considered the Max reports very good and incorporated their information into a number of major FHO estimates of the enemy situation.'5 Nonetheless. Reconnaissance through agents was found to be valuable in providing starting-points from which to trace the train of thought of the Red Army High Command. the decision about the evaluation of the intelligence collected by signal reconnaissance to be published in the pertinent FHO report or estimate was made by Gehlen. In cases of doubt. too. It was the German experience in Russia that a good percentage of success was achieved when twenty per cent of the agents' reports could be used. it is clear that FHO could not and did not rely upon WALLI I for timely intelligence about Soviet operational intentions.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 267 junctures. the grouping of Soviet forces. Oberstleutnant Ritter Bitterl von Tessenburg. at the tactical and operational level. Drahtaufkldrung(telephone reconnaissance). Signals intelligence obtained from radio reconnaissance was passed to FHO by the Leitstelle fur die NachrichtenaufklarungOst in OKH. After the war. Lang was in contact with Russian emigres and other sources in the Middle East and purveyed reports to the Abwehr under the codename 'Moritz'.'7 The Leitstelle fur Nachrichtenaufklarung Ost published the results of signal reconnaissance activity in a daily. even if the remaining eighty per cent had to be discarded. Radio reconnaissance. the Nachrichtenaufkclarungslage. and. Allied intelligence identified Turkul and Lang as Soviet agents. Signals reconnaissance (Nachrichtenaufklarung) was the most important source of intelligence available to FHO concerning the Red Army order-of-battle. The liaison officer participated in discussions in FHO concerning the determination of the enemy situation. including the tapping of Soviet telephone wires and field cables. The interception of Soviet diplomatic radio traffic (Diplomatenfunk) was totally unsuccessful. if . based on a conference with the liaison officer from the Leitstelle. or Funkaufkldrung. was restricted for the most part to the tactical level. consolidated report.

thereby preventing an accurate determination of the enemy situation and timely evaluation of Soviet operational intentions. the Red Army imposed radio silence before every Soviet offensive. collective farms.the Kommandeur. depriving German long-range radio reconnaissance units of intelligence about Soviet troop deployments. on a telephone conversation with the Ic officer of the front sector in question. and Breslau. Luftwaffe signal reconnaissance. including ciphers for transmitting meteorological data. short-range One company normally was attached to each army. as well as the ciphers used by the Soviet railroad organization. Warsaw. Horchtruppen Ost. too. and four-digit ciphers. as with the army. Each army group organized the regiment assigned to it in accordance with the needs of the immediate situation and the size of the front to be covered. German signal reconnaissance achieved its best results at the tactical and operational level. was responsible for signal reconnaissance.268 Journal of ContemporaryHistory necessary. Before Barbarossa. The Germans also broke certain NKVD ciphers. and by establishing the tactical order-of-battle and the command structures and groupments of Soviet forces by means of radio direction-finding (Funkpeilung). by four Horch companies. Soviet signals security improved from the summer of 1942. In July 1940. or diplomatic cipher. The impenetrability of all Soviet strategic cryptosystems therefore deprived FHO . which was conducted from three fixed stations. The Luftwaffe signal reconnaissance organization broke some high-level Soviet Air Force ciphers. German signal reconnaissance never broke any highlevel Soviet army. After the invasion. However. Army Group B was transferred to the east and given intercept units. Furthermore. groupings. and the platoons of this company were deployed one platoon for each corps sector.18 Notwithstanding these successes. and by aerial direction finding and analysis of pilot and air controller communications. the Leitstelle was organized. by unbuttoning Red Army two. The standard arrangementconsisted of two battalions to each regiment. traffic analysis (Verkehrauswertung). Moreover. inland shipping vessels. Konigsberg.and content evaluation (Inhaltsauswertung). and signal reconnaissance regiments were attached to every army group. each battalion with one long-range reconnaissance company (Fernaufkldrungskompanie) one or two and reconnaissance companies (Nahaufkldrungskompanien). obtained most of its intelligence about the strength and deployment of Red Air Force units through the interception of ground radio traffic. and command structures at the operational level. intelligence. and certain defence factories. three.

because of insufficient manpower reserves after the summer campaign season. at one moment in time. Stalingrad is the locus classicus. the Leitstelle fur Nachrichtenaufklarung reported a comprehensive regroupment of Soviet forces between the Don and Volga. and the enemy movements in front of Fourth Panzer Army as 'defensive enemy behaviour'. 'Gedanken zur Weiterentwicklung der Feindlage im Herbst und Winter'. and between the Moscow headquarters of the GRU. singleton agents and agent groups in the German rear. air reconnaissance was the most reliable source of strategic intelligence available to FHO regardingRed Army troop deployments and movements and rear facilities and fortifications. including the establishment of a new Soviet field headquarters.21 After signals intelligence. FHO evaluated the insertion of this headquarters. NKGB. Another signal reconnaissance report submitted to FHO in November confirmed the existence of a large grouping of Soviet forces behind the bridgehead of Serafimovich and provided clear evidence that the Red Army had recognized the weaknesses of.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 269 of any veracious intelligence about Soviet military strategy and intelligence operations based on high-level encoded traffic between the STAVKA and Red Army field headquarters at army and front level. and the boundary between. Gehlen analysed the experience of FHO in evaluating air reconnaissance data in a comprehensive study based on a large number of examples of past operations. Unfortunately. specifically.20 However. Erfahrungin der Auswertung derLuftaufklarungim Osten. the regrouping of Soviet units in the zone of the Soviet Sixty-ThirdArmy. NKVD. On 11 October. the fundamental assumption that the Red Army would be unable to mount more than one winter offensive. FHO refused in some instances to modify its existing evaluation to accommodate the results of signal reconnaissance.19 Nevertheless. when the results of signal reconnaissance consisted of tactical indicators that contradicted the strategic indicators of enemy intentions upon which FHO had already based its assumptions. this evaluation contradicted the forecast of Soviet intentions and fighting strength submitted by Gehlen in late August. and SMERSH and major field offices in Soviet territory. and legal and illegal Rezidenturain foreign countries. but that the advantage of air reconnaissance for .22 This document acknowledged that air reconnaissance could reveal only a section of the enemy's conduct. 'Don Front'. the Rumanian and Italian armies to the north of Stalingrad. signals intelligence was the basic source for most FHO estimates of the enemy situation.

attained by the air intelligence organizations of the British and the Americans. the Luftwaffe possessed neither the aircraft nor the intelligence personnel and organization necessary for continuous. especially after June 1941. weather conditions. military-industrial sites. and therefore. and evaluation of air reconnaissance data. the characteristics of the Russian terrain. comprehensive coverage of strategic military areas and the evaluation of the data obtained thereby. the number of trains and thus the number of troops and vehicles such as tanks that were being transported over a specific stretch of track or road. either troop movements or groupments: however. Having computed the capacity of Soviet railroad cars and motor trucks and . and the shortage of German reconnaissance aircraft all combined to restrict the effectiveness of air reconnaissance. In the judgment of Gehlen.23 and Railroad reconnaissance (Eisenbahnaufkldrung) the reconnaissance of principal roads (Strassenaufkldrung)constituted the most valuable forms of strategic air reconnaissance utilized by FHO in the evaluation of Soviet intentions. depriving FHO of photo reconnaissance data at critical moments. with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Indeed. and strategic level. air reconnaissance furnished a starting-point for the evaluation of intelligence data from other sources. the outstanding aptitude of the Red Army and the Red Air Force for camouflage and concealment at the tactical. and military bases in European Russia. operational. air reconnaissance could not provide an exact picture of any facet of enemy activity. the Luftwaffe practice was to fly photo reconnaissance missions of the strategically important stretches of road and of key railroad stations and trans-shipment installations three times per day. To insure accurate interpretations of air reconnaissance. However. Soviet air defences. By this method.270 Journal of Contemporary History purposes of evaluating enemy intentions consisted in its ability to furnish quickly a deep insight into the different activities of the enemy. it was an indispensable supplementary means of confirming perceptions of enemy intentions distilled from other intelligence sources. The Luftwaffe did conduct at one time or another photo reconnaissance and aerial mapping missions over all major cities. Luftwaffe intelligence was able to estimate. As the strength of the Luftwaffe in Russia diminished and the Red Air Force achieved air superiority. the number of strategic and tactical air reconnaissance missions rapidly dwindled. processing. Fremde Luftwaffe Ost never achieved the level of efficiency and sophistication in the collection.

not through signals intelligence and aerial reconnaissance. the intensity. and so on). based on the volume of railroad activity (number of lines in use. per section of the front. As noted by Gehlen in his study. number and size of trains per day. aerial road reconnaissance never provided data sufficient to estimate accurately the strength of the troops in movement. to networks and penetration agents with access to the German High Command and German intelligence .24 The Gehlen study confirms that within the scope of strategic and tactical aerial reconnaissance. emphasizing tank assembly areas. the degree of Red Army preparedness for launching an attack. Counter-intelligence assumed a position of special importance in German intelligence operations on the Eastern Front. and the scale of the war that they would be compelled to wage against the Soviet intelligence and security services. Owing to the excellent camouflage discipline of the Red Army.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 271 the daily number of trains needed to supply a Red Army rifle division or armoured division. experience tended to show that the evaluation of the volume of Soviet railroad movements could be certain only when it was restricted to specific sectors of the front and rear areas. the daily aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet battle area. When the Wehrmacht invaded Russia. Russia won the 'intelligence war' on the Eastern Front. nor FHO (nor the RSHA) possessed any realistic conception of the complexity. FHO could use air reconnaissance data to tabulate the probable number of Soviet formations behind a given sector of the front. as did Britain and America on the Western Front. but by means of espionage conducted by Soviet agents at every level of operations. artillery positions. OKH and the Abwehr grossly underestimated the Soviet intelligence threat to the Wehrmacht and never succeeded thereafter in confuting the activities of the Soviet services. and Soviet operational intentions regarding an entire section of the front. and when it was based on intelligence collected over a long period (ten to twelve days). from parachute agents in the tactical zone of the Wehrmacht in Russia. The results of this form of reconnaissance often provided FHO with valuable intelligence upon which to base evaluations of where the Soviet main effort would be made. The evaluation of aerial photographs was complemented and confirmed by agent reports. neither the Abwehr. and forward airfields was of especial importance in the estimation of enemy operational intentions.

and it failed to protect the Wehrmacht. and Soviet governmental offices as their targets.some 3. German counter-intelligence units combed out the border zone to a depth of 200-300 kilometres. Leitstelle III Ost fur Frontaufklarung. indeed. Following the armoured units closely.25 The counter-intelligence organization attached to Stab WALLI was constituted in the spring of 1941 from the Abwehr III units that had participated in the campaigns against Yugoslavia and Greece.272 Journal of Contemporary History organizations. South) and the Trupps were placed under the armies. including the complete files of the NKVD Rezidenturaat Brest Litovsk and of the Soviet Nineteenth Army. For administrative and disciplinary purposes.26 . WALLI III registered.000 documents. In 1941. and Odessa. The forward unit of Abwehr III-F assigned to Russia. This chain of command was as follows: Leitstelle III Ost was under Abwehr Abteilung III. the FATs concentrated on larger cities. and its control organization. against Soviet espionage and deception. However. The FAKs were concentrated to await the occupation of Leningrad. the FAKs and FATs captured so much Soviet documentary material that its evaluation could not be completed until shortly before the end of the war. headquarters. Kiev. During the initial advance into Russia. the Kommandos were assigned to the army groups (North. FHO assumed responsibility for the Leitstelle. under Oberst Schmalschlager. and the 'Trupps' came under the Kommandos. German counter-intelligence in Russia was overwhelmed. The mission of WALLI III was to direct and supervise the Kommandos and Trupps in their tactical assignments and their general intelligence activities. WALLI III. Four Frontaufklarungskommandos (FAKs) and twelve Frontaufklarungstrupps (FATs) were formed and assigned to Leitstelle III Ost. and. the 'Kommandos' were subordinate to the Leitstelle. However. When it was discovered that there were numerous NKVD intelligence units in the area between the border zones and the line Leningrad-Moscow-Kiev-Odessa. the most important success of WALLI III in 1941 was the acquisition of a relatively complete picture of the Soviet intelligence and security services based on captured documents and the interrogation of captured Soviet agents and intelligence officers. the FATs were removed from the FAKs and assigned to the armies. Moscow. performed creditably and achieved considerable success against Soviet intelligence. Centre. These units in turn were charged with the seizure and collection of all captured records and material of operational and intelligence value. in the end. FHO.

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 273 During the first weeks of the war. The Wehrmacht possessed no means of defending itself against this Soviet activity because there were no mobile military counter-intelligence units available for protection. (2) formulation of a complete picture of the Soviet intelligence situation. depriving the FAKs and FATs of their best source of operational intelligence. the Soviets began a comprehensive intelligence offensive marked by the mass deployment of agents and the expansion of sabotage and diversionary operations by the partisans. Spiele and G. The partisan movement had been organized. and numerous Soviet agents penetrated the German civil and military administrations in the guise of collaborators and anti-communists. The flow of captured Soviet records reduced to a trickle. The consequences of this insouciance for the German army are well-known. and specifically. in embryo. Funkspiele (radio play-backs). After the initial phase of the war. the NKVD infiltrated hundreds of agents into the rear of the German army. (3) strategic deception of the Soviet intelligence services by means of G.27 Although WALLI III soon tumbled to the importance of the partisans to Soviet intelligence and their value for the Red Army. Moreover. . OKW changed the missions of Leitstelle III Ost to include the following tasks: (1) collection of information about the employment of Soviet agents. by the Fourth Department of the GUGB in the NKVD SSSR before the war. Spiele (double-agent operations) and G. (6) tacticaldeception by means of G. V. When the German advance came to a standstill in late 1941. Funkspiele. The First Section of the Fourth Department had prepared the operations of partisan groups in the rearof any possible enemy. Therefore. (5) evaluation of all non-intelligence information and documents obtained during interrogations. Germany. V. the changed military situation created severe difficulties for WALLI III. (4) identification of Soviet operational intentions from Soviet intelligence activities. no Russian agent in Germanoccupied territory was identified by Abwehr III or the SD.V. OKH and several senior field commanders initially underestimated the threat posed by the partisans and therefore refused to divert sufficient troops to the rear to combat the partisans in co-operation with the FATs.V. possibly because the GRU and the NKVD were unable to carry out such assignments.

to be developing. In addition.000 trained Soviet agents dispatched behind German lines. and in generalunprepared to wage modern warfare. Of the estimated 130. in the sense that German counterintelligence understood the working methods. nor had assimilated the new military technologies that it was known. In the view of several leading German generals. GRU. Given German resourcesand the scope of Soviet intelligence and partisan activity.29 The planning and preparation of Barbarossa were influenced strongly by the traditional Russland-Bildof the Generalstab. German counter-intelligence successfully infiltrated and disrupted a number of partisan units. Per annum.000 members of Frontaufklarung III faced the combined strength and experience of the NKVD. which would break asunder under a swift.000 well-trained agents and perhaps twice as many poorly prepared mass agents.274 Journal of Contemporary History WALLI III was expanded along the lines of functional necessity to execute these newly assigned missions. strong blow from the outside. was a 'colossus of clay'. The swiftness and ease of the victory in 1940 over France (the strongest military power in Europe. NKGB. the Soviet Union. German counter-intelligence succeeded in preventing numerous sabotage actions. and SMERSH.000 and neutralized another 20. The poor performance of Soviet forces in Poland and Finland was adjudged prima facie evidence that the Red Army neither had recovered from the decimation of its officer corps in the purges. effective result against the Soviet Union. The . it is hard to see how Leitstelle III Ost could have accomplished any more than it did. the FAKs and FATs identified 50. operational patterns. German intelligence records testify that the FAKs and FATs were overwhelmed by numbers.000.28 Leitstelle III Ost was prepared for the Soviet intelligence offensive that began in early 1942.000 Soviet intelligence officers were identified by German counterintelligence. or suspected. from the summer of 1942. and primary targets of the Soviet services. and succeeded at times in deceiving the Red Army and Soviet intelligence. the Soviet services committed roughly 40. Almost 3. like Czarist Russia. habituated to mechanical militaryplanning and operational conduct. incapable of operational initiative at all command levels. according to the conventional wisdom) confirmed OKH in the belief that German military-technical superiority and leadership would ensure a swift. the Red Army in 1940-41 was clumsy. Approximately 1.According to this picture. Leitstelle III Ost forwarded valuable intelligence to FHO regarding Soviet operational intentions and the Soviet intelligence services. However. training.

(ii) reports of Abwehr agents and immigrants from the Baltic States. namely. FHO did not begin systematically to observe the Red Army until the Polish Campaign in the fall of 1939. Initially. (v) Soviet Army deserters.3' The information about the Soviet Union collected by FHO during 1940 was convolved into a memorandum entitled 'Die Kriegswehrmacht der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken. (iv) information from allied intelligence services. FHO was quite unclear regarding the most important questions. and the Generalstab viewed the problem of an attack on the Soviet Union as essentially a matter of the correct operational preparation. FHO was compelled to base its assessments of the strength of the Red Army in 1939 and 1940 on five main sources of intelligence. the organization and strength of the Red Army. However. (iii) German military attache reports. Through radio reconnaissance (primarily direction-finding) and aerial reconnaissance. two thousand copies of which were issued on 15 January 1941. each of which was inadequate: (i) long-range and short-range radio reconnaissance. It was assumed that the higher staffs . On the contrary.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 275 planning documents for Barbarossa and the official statements and diary entries of ranking German generals regarding the feasibility of the undertaking combine to suggest that OKH. and the operation of the Red Army conscription system. radio reconnaissance provided almost no hard intelligence about Soviet reserve formations in the interior. The description of the basic administrative structureof the Red Army in 'Die Kriegswehrmacht'shows that FHO had established the existence of sixteen military districts and two military commissariats under the Peoples' Commissariat for Defence. radio reconnaissance furnished the most reliable information about the strength and deployment of the Red Army and the Red Air Force.1 1941'. Soviet active-duty units not stationed in European Russia. After aerial reconnaissance. but only for the portion of the Soviet Union accessible to German radio reconnaissance. However. the FHO assessment of Soviet military capabilities re-affirmed the traditional German picture and served up additional justification for the optimism prevailing in OKH. FHO established that at least eleven Soviet armies had been constituted in European Russia. Stand 1. the WFST. the evaluation of the Red Army by FHO before 22 June 1941 furnished no corrective to the erroneous Russland-Bildthat informed German military thinking. The overall assessment of the Red Army by FHO between July 1940 and June 1941 must be described as incomplete and inaccurate.30 In general.

FHO handed up two influential assessments in 'Die Kriegswehrmacht': (i) that the bulk of Soviet forces would deploy either north or south of the Pripyat Marshes. although it was doubtful that the Red Army would be capable of such a flanking operation. in order to seal off a breakthrough by means of a counter-attack against the flanks of a German advance. and operational groups would be drawn from the high commands of the military districts and armies. or as copies or modified versions of foreign models. given the present level of military leadership and training. 0.6 million Internal troops 6. FHO calculated that eleven to twelve million men were available for mobilization for the field army. due to existing labour shortages and the lack of officers and materiel.6 million Rear Services 1.276 Journal of Contemporary History of the army groups (fronts).32 The total strength of the Red Army was established as follows: 20 armies (at minimum) 20 rifle corps 150 rifle divisions 9 cavalry corps 32/36 cavalry divisions 6 mechanized corps 36 motorized-mechanized brigades The number of rifle divisions in European Russia at the end of 1940 was estimated as at least 121. for which . and courage of the individual soldier. However. Moreover. notwithstanding the use of the T-34 in the Khalkin Gol campaign in 1939.33Taking as the basis of computation approximately 200 rifle divisions and other units. As of 15 January 1941. FHO possessed no definitive intelligence as of 15 January regarding the disposition of these forces in Russia. it doubted that this many men could be mobilized.2 million men34 Total As regards Soviet military strategy and operational intentions in the event of a German attack. hardness. FHO assumed the following strength figures: 4 million men Field Army ca. armies. The number of tank and motorized regiments and the number of special formations of artillery were not known. FHO evaluated the known Soviet tanks and armed vehicles as obsolete. and the organization and state of Soviet railroads and roads. (ii) that the strength of the Red Army derived from numbers of men and weapons and the stoicism. the existence of the T-34 main battle tank was unknown to FHO and the Wehrwirtschaftsamt.

especially with reference to the experiences of the Finnish War. 'Die Kriegswehrmacht' (and subsequent FHO evaluations of the Red Army) betray no comprehension of the political. not. the economy is run by engineers and managers. The weaknesses of the Red Army reside in the clumsiness of officers of all ranks.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 277 reason the Red Army would be particularly effective on the defence. the clinging to formulae. the substance of true Marxist teaching': 'the state is directed by a bureaucratic approach blindly devoted to Stalin. The Army is to be constituted on a new foundation. avoidance of decisions and responsibility has not changed . who are indebted to the new state for everything and are truly devoted to him. Whereas the Soviet soldier in the Finnish Campaign had fought without enthusiasm. the lack of a competent. by the idea of the defence of the proletarian Fatherland. the insufficient trainingaccording to modern standards.'35 Notwithstanding the defective intelligence about the fighting power and military potential of the Soviet Union provided by FHO. and psychological change that had occurred in the Soviet Union since the Revolution of 1917. 'the Soviet Union today preserves only the outward form. schematism.' FHO summed up the Red Army thus: 'The clumsiness. at the end of which process the Soviet armed forces would be capable of attacking Germany and Europe. Having weighed up the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet army. military leadership cadre capable of replacing the body of generals and senior officers executed by Stalin in the purges. According to 'Die Kriegswehrmacht'. social. The Feindbeurteilung the Red Army issued by FHO on 20 May on 1941 re-affirmed that the bulk of Soviet ground forces were deployed . the backwardness of the Red Army in troop-training and the insufficient stockpiling of sufficient quantities of modern war materiel for all Soviet formations.. OKH imagined that it possessed a satisfactory grasp of the most important elements of the Soviet armed forces. however. the effect of twenty-four years of Communist Party indoctrination and education upon the Russian population and the individual Red Army soldier and officer. highlevel. in the event of a German invasion of Russia he would be motivated to fight. Nevertheless. it still appeared to FHO and OKH that the same problems preponderated (with no near-term solution to hand): namely. within certain limits.. FHO concluded that the Red Army was evolving into a completely modern fighting force. the aversion to responsibility and the marked insufficiency of organization in all aspects. specifically.

36 Given the exiguous intelligence available to FHO in 1941 concerning Soviet war strategy and the capabilities of the Red Army.37 The invasion of Russia and the subsequent course of the German campaign from June to December 1941 exposed serious weaknesses in the FHO evaluation of the Red Army and Soviet military strategy. in response to German mobile warfare. would be impossible. after the example of 1812. the FHO evaluation of the most likely form of the Soviet military response to a German attack was neither unreasonable nor illogical. in the event of an attack from the West. This erroneous presumption figured in every FHO evaluation of the Red Army in 1940 and 1941.278 Journal of Contemporary History in European Russia as follows: 130 rifle divisions. a withdrawal of the bulk of Soviet forces into the interior of Russia. FHO predicted (i) that the defensive would be conducted to a depth of thirty kilometres. Summing up the presumed. FHO noted that it made no allowance for Red Army formations known or believed to be stationed in the Soviet Far East. A typical example is provided by an after-action report prepared by the operations section of XLI Panzer Corps: . every Wehrmacht army group headquartersdiscovered that the intelligence furnished by FHO about the deployment. FHO convinced itself that the Red Army High Command did not yet possess the ability rapidly to plan and execute large-scale. (The campaign also revealed the general inadequacy of Abwehr I clandestine collection operations against the Soviet target. 36 motorized-mechanized brigades. and strength of opposing Soviet forces was inaccurate and otherwise inadequate for operational planning in the field. using the field fortification system in the border region. (ii) that the fortified areas would serve as the base for offensive thrusts with limited objectives. This estimate stated that 'a substantial reinforcement from Asia is improbable on political grounds'. FHO concluded that. armoured attacks on the operational or strategic level. to the detriment of an objective understanding of the actual capability of the Soviet military leadership and Red Army strategy and tactics.) Within days. Consequently. 21 cavalry divisions. for the purpose of thwarting German attack-operations and the transfer of the fighting to enemy territory. overall intentions of the Soviets. resistance. German underestimation of Soviet military capabilities and ignorance of Soviet strategy proved costly to the Wehrmacht in Russia. 5 armour divisions.

for the rest of 1941. For instance. he went on record with a clear accounting. and organization of the enemy forces opposing the corps was attained. the furtherdiminution of the fighting morale of the Red Army is to be counted upon. Between July and December 1941. General Halder was not convinced by this estimate. FHO issued a number of inaccurateintelligence estimates. it was not deemed to be a serious problem at the time. in order to gain a breathing spell in which to refurbish and enlarge the armed forces using British and American material assistance. Posterity has ratified this assessment. although. and resulted in errors of German strategy and operational conduct at decisive moments in the campaign. in August. on the basis primarily of prisoner-of-war interrogation reports and wishful thinking. to the effect that the Russian colossus had been underratedand still could dispose of manpower reserves for new formations to redress all large losses. no lessons were drawn from the various failures of FHO in respect of analysis and estimates. in the hope of prolonging the campaign to the period of bad weather. Owing to the unbroken duration of the battles and the intercession of new.' Incidentally.39 . In the event. FHO concluded that: (i) 'The number of new formations had reached its maximum strength.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 279 The documents to hand provided indeed only a superficial picture of the enemy resistance to be expected. no clear picture about the strength. groupment. and German confidence in final victory. given the magnitude of the initial German successes. and virtually no additional new formations need be counted. paradoxically. in particular.' (ii) 'The available Soviet forces suffice only to retard the German advance against the bases essential for the survival of the army and the state. the repeated judgment in FHO intelligence estimates that the Red Army was near collapse and incapable of taking the offensive against German forces. which nourished the overconfidence of OKH and the Fiihrer. FHO described the will to fight and the battle worthiness of the Red Army as 'diminishing':'Die Gesamtkraft reicht nunmehr weder fur einen Angriff grosseren Stils noch zur Bilding einer durchgehendenAbwehrfront'. heavier casualties. Only the near catastrophe suffered by the Wehrmacht during the winter of 1941-42 compelled OKH to reconsider the effect on German strategy of the poor performance of FHO. Despite all endeavours including those of the Abwehr station in Konigsberg. On 11 August.38 The FHO underestimation of the Red Army in 1941 was acknowledged by OKH.

were not evaluated in timely fashion by FHO.40 When Gehlen assumed command of FHO in April 1942.Thus. FHO failed to predict the counter-attack against Army Group Centre in December. systematic collection and evaluation of intelligence about the Soviet order-of-battle. fixed operational objective. therefore. because the Soviet command in the operational sphere showed itself to be completely dependent on German initiatives. The alarming contents of the numerous items of intelligence pointing to a Soviet counter-offensive against Army Group Centre. the Red Army launched its first series of counterattacks with a wider. Sixteenth Army near Tichvin. equipment losses. The various intelligence reports concerning Soviet troop movements and new concentrations. including probable Soviet intentions. FHO informed OKH that the Soviet forces in front of Army Group Centre presently would be incapable of a large-scale offensive. When the Red Army regained the initiative on particular sections of the front in the winter of 1941-42.280 Journal of ContemporaryHistory In November. Indeed. Consequently. or could not procure in the immediate future. FHO continued to believe that the Red Army was incapable of training a significant number of new divisions. impaired OKH operational planning. and military-industrial production. were interpreted by FHO as relating to existing Red Army formations being transferred from peaceful sections of the front for the support of counter-attacks. against First Panzer Army at Rostov-on-Don. In actual fact. FHO responded by issuing assessments entitled 'Most Important Characteristics of the . unit strength. and it failed to discover the deployment of the fresh formations disposed behind the Moscow front for a full-scale counter-offensive designed to destroy Army Group Centre. apart from verbal briefing reports. he undertook to improve FHO analysis and estimates by instituting standardized procedures for the continuous. Moreover. Thus. Red Army organization. FHO also did not anticipate the formation of new Soviet reserves. the Soviets used the respite in early December to bring up precisely the reserves and the equipment that FHO reported the Red Army did not possess. FHO did not issue written estimates of the enemy situation. during late November and early December. lack of comprehensive estimates of the overall enemy situation. forwarded by Luftwaffe Intelligence East and the Ic section of Army Group Centre itself. troop movements and deployments. casualties. on 4 December. Under Kinzel. and against Fourth Army on the flank of Army Group Centre. FHO did not foresee these counter-offensives. or Lagebericht. FHO limited itself to the publication of a daily 'Situation Report'.

months in advance'). FHO made a number of serious mistakes in analysis and estimation. FHO distributed a daily 'Brief Estimate of the Enemy Situation' (Kurze Beurteilungder Feindlage) to the interested commands (Chief. Gehlen issued a major intelligence estimate. In the course of the wider development of the war in Russia. This assessment concluded that the 'indications of a large-scale operation with far-rangingobjectives still cannot be perceived'. Gehlen registered the modest judgment that the actual course of Soviet operations from July 1943 to December 1944 demonstrated that FHO succeeded in recognizing the enemy's intention in prescient fashion ('in some cases.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 281 Enemy Situation (Wichtigste Merkmale der Feindlage). On the assumption that the continuation of the war made it necessary to provide OKH and the army group commanders with prognosticative documentation about expected enemy behaviour. 12 May 1942. Ic Sections of the army groups. On 1 May 1942. FHO prepared on Gehlen's orders a collection of FHO 'Estimates of the Overall Enemy Situation before the German Front in the East' for the period April 1942 to December 1944. from 11 April 1942. Luftwaffe Fuhrungsstab).42 The first case relates to the Soviet offensive against Kharkov. 'through a systematic evaluation of all available sources of intelligence it was possible to furnish the leadership in a timely manner with an essentially correct picture of the enemy's intentions and troop strength. owing to the arrival of additional German forces. FHO now began to issue at intervals of four to eight weeks a 'Comprehensive Estimate of the Enemy Situation' (Zusammenfassende Beurteilungder Feindlage). In his introduction. Accordingly. the Red Army retained only the appearance of the initiative. and thereby provide a usable basis for German decision-making'. General Staff. According to FHO. which contributed directly to the defeat of the Wehrmacht in Russia. The documentary record of FHO prognostications does not corroborate Gehlen's statement. FHO predicted that the Red Army could not achieve in any given position such an outstanding success as to compel the removal of significant German forces from the deployment . and that.4' In 1945. 'Evaluation of the Total Enemy Situation and its Possibilities of Development'. in which an evaluation of enemy intentions appertaining to the enemy situation was set forth. Chief. it became necessary in the context of the daily situation briefings before the Chief of the General Staff to put in writing existing thoughts concerning the evaluation of the enemy (Feindbeurteilung). Operations Department.

Soviet military historians affirm that there was no thought of a precipitate withdrawal. In the summer of 1942.43 The next example of faulty estimation concerns Soviet strategy in the Ukraine in 1942. (2) assault against the deep flank of Sixth Army with the objective of Rostov.282 Journal of Contemporary History for the forthcoming offensive in the Ukraine.'OperationUranus'. not a fullyfledged offensive. To judge from a Gehlen briefing at the War Academy in September. to cut off the Caucasus. The estimate betrays no awareness either of the actual scale of Soviet deployments for the counter-offensive against Kharkov that opened on 12 May. or of the Soviet intention to execute this attack .which forced the Wehrmacht into a comprehensive regroupment and delayed the start of the summer offensive until 28 June. planned withdrawal movement to the Volga in the face of the advance of Army Group South. The FHO evaluation did register the direction of attack actually selected by the Red Army: however. Gehlen and FHO were quite ignorant of actual Soviet plans. the withdrawals that the Red Army was forced to carry out in the summer and autumn of 1942 were part of a deliberate Soviet strategy of mobile defence. FHO foresaw the possibility of a Soviet counter-offensive against Army Group B at Stalingrad. FHO relied on an agent report for the prediction that the Soviets would execute a massive. Prima facie. registered the following operational possibilities:45 (1) recapture of Stalingrad. in which he stated that the course of operations justified the expectation that the area around Stalingrad and the oil-producing region in the Caucasus would be firmly in German hands before the onset of winter.44 A third example of FHO mis-estimation relates to the Soviet attack against Stalingrad. FHO failed to interpret Soviet strategy in response to the German offensive in the Ukraine. as the front approached the Volga at Stalingrad. (3) attacks against the especially weak positions on the front of the allied armies. As earlyas August 1942. During the autumn of 1942. . which would have allowed the German forces to spend the winter on the Volga. specifically. the purpose of which was to prevent entrapments similar to those of 1941. With regardto possible developments. Gehlen in his assessment 'Thoughts regarding the Further Development of the Enemy Situation in the Autumn and Winter'. FHO expected a localized Soviet operation. FHO assessed the overall Soviet intention as defensive: 'Forces sufficient for a large-scale offensive are lacking'. the bridgeheads at Serafimovitch and Korotoyak. In reality.

FHO concluded that the available Soviet forces would be too weak for 'far-reaching operations'. and it was not certain that the main Soviet effort would . and Abwehr agents.47 However. careful operation on the Don Front. As late as 10 December. large Soviet troop concentrations behind the Don Front.46 In November. stated that Soviet troop deployments from the beginning of November permitted one to assume that the intention was a decisive operation in the middle section of the front in the direction of Smolensk (i. on 6 November. FHO acknowledged the possibility that a weaker offensive might be launched against Army Group B after the end of the mud season. The appendix to the 'Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage' of 10 December. with the aim of interdicting the railroad to Stalingrad in order to endanger German forces stationed further east and compel a withdrawal of the German divisions in and around Stalingrad. against Army Group Centre) and a modest.48 Gehlen's obduracy in the face of the evidence is astonishing. On 12 November.e. True. Gehlen avouched that it was evidentthat Soviet preparation for the attack in the south had not proceeded so far that it was necessary to expect that a large operation would be conducted in the near future simultaneously with the expected offensive against Army Group Centre. German short-range radio reconnaissance secured definite evidence of new. the Russian High Command still disposed of weighty reserves in the central sector. According to this estimate. which nourished in Gehlen's mind the id6efixe that the main Soviet winter offensive would be directed against Army Group Centre. FHO interpreted this intelligence as evidence of a possible attack in the near future against Third Rumanian Army. prisoners-of-war. in the autumn. According to this assessment. in the belief that it would be impossible to seek a decision simultaneously on two sections of the front. unequivocally. that the main Soviet winter offensive would not be directed against Army Group Centre. or had limited their objective in the south. radio reconnaissance. FHO secured information from captured documents. 'Possible Indications for a Beginning Russian Shift of Main Effort from the Middle Front Section of the Don Front'. However. Gehlen issued a major 'Estimate of the Enemy Situation in Front of Army Group Centre'. Nevertheless. it was still unclear whether the Russians intended to launch a larger offensive across the Don. wherein he concluded that the main effort of the coming Russian offensive would be in the area of Army Group Centre. he refused to acknowledge.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 283 However.

the Red Army attacked the Italian sector of the front and sealed the doom of Paulus' Sixth Army. Two days later. This attack surprised FHO.49 By the end of October. including the intelligence that pointed to a Soviet attack at Stalingrad. whether the Russians also would conduct offensive operations against the Italian and Hungarian armies. according to FHO. Operation Uranus opened on 19 November and achieved complete tactical and operational surprise. Soviet operational and strategic maskirovkaseriously disoriented OKH and FHO as regards Soviet capabilities and intentions for the winter offensive of 1942. Soviet forces encircled Sixth Army. However. Within four days. and admit the possibility that the Russians could have shifted the main effort of their forces from Army Group Centre more toward the southern section of the front. Not until 9 December did Gehlen modify his stated conviction that the main Soviet offensive would be directed at Army Group Centre. it still could not be discerned whether a large-scale offensive should be expected across the Don against the Italian Eighth Army and the Second Hungarian Army with the objective of Rostov. FHO must bear the final responsibility for the intelligence failure at Stalingrad in November 1942. echeloned after the operation against the Third Rumanian Army. Soviet radio silence and bad flying weather in October and November severely curtailed the effectiveness of German signals intelligence and aerial reconnaissance respectively. the successive victories of the Red Army prompted FHO to issue a number of pessimistic assessments. Furthermore. in the final analysis. FHO had to hand sufficient tactical and operational intelligence from which to distill a timely and correct assessment of Soviet intentions vis-a-vis the Don-Volga front. Thus. or. And thisjudgment is not based upon hindsight. FHO passed over this intelligence failure in silence.284 Journal of Contemporary History be made on the Don Front. True. because it was still under the spell of the notion that the Red Army was fully preoccupied defending against the German counter-attack to break the encirclement of Sixth Army. it was Gehlen's unshakeable belief that the main Soviet offensive would be directed against Army Group Centre which distorted FHO analysis of Soviet operational intentions.50 In January and February 1943. unfounded optimism of FHO estimates by underestimatingGerman capacity for effective resistance and exaggerating the ability of the Red Army to sustain its offensive . Army Group B intelligence assembled an accurate picture of Soviet strategy based on the same intelligence as was available to FHO. Moreover. which compounded the earlier.

on the basis of the high Russian losses during the winter. Specifically. Gehlen tendered these judgments: 'the Red Army had decided to revert to the defensive on the southern front in the face of German counter-attacks. Thus. During this period. German military intelligence was poorly informed about Soviet plans. Thus.53 When Gehlen briefed the commanders of the army groups and armies on 23 June.51 The brilliant success in February and March of General von Manstein's counter-offensive restored a certain degree of confidence to FHO. Simultaneously. the Red Army would attack the right flank of Army Group Centre to eliminate the German . dating to 23 March. having taken into consideration identified German offensive preparations for an attack designed to sever the Russian north-south connection.' FHO acknowledged that Soviet intentions after the mud season were still unclear. in another FHO 'Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im grossen'. which was reflected henceforth in FHO estimates issued between March and May. the estimation of Soviet intentions vis-a-vis Zitadelle and the Soviet summer offensive of 1943 represents the high point of FHO analysis. this estimate predicted a Soviet counter-attack against the right wing of Army Group Centre to eliminate the salient at Orel as a threat to Soviet operations against the north wing of Army Group South. Indeed.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 285 in the Ukraine. the FHO 'Comprehensive Estimate of Overall Enemy Intentions before the German East Front' of 21 May 1943 predicted correctly that the Red Army intended to conduct a large-scale summeroffensive. including the Soviet counter-attacks against the northern and southern flanks of the participating German forces. it must appear doubtful whether the enemy was in the position at all to conduct a "war-deciding summer offensive". This operation would be initiated through enveloping attacks against the Sixth Army and the right wing of First Panzer Army and against the projecting bulges in the German front in the area Kharkov-Belgorod.52 From May 1943. he reiterated this assessment: the point of main effort of the expected Soviet summer offensive was to be expected opposite Army Group South in the direction of the Dnepr. FHO provided OKH with timely and correct analysis of the difficulties that the Wehrmacht would face in executing 'Unternehmen Zitadelle' and of the consequences of this operation. A major FHO estimate dated 22 February 1943 could offer only the jejune conclusion that recent decisions of the Red Army leadership about the future course of operations had been influenced by the situation in the Ukraine.

involved four complete Russian field armies. and the inability to discard initial preconceptions and presumptions about Soviet intentions and capabilities in the light of countervailing intelligence and new events. equipment. the scope of these attacks and the Red Army formations involved were not foreseen by FHO.286 Journal of ContemporaryHistory threat on the flank from the bulge in the front at Orel. on the other. The ramifications of this tendency can be seen in the most important FHO estimates relating to Army Group Centre and the 1944 Soviet summer offensive. on the one hand. Operation Bagration achieved operational and strategic surprise and issued in the destruction of Army Group Centre. History has shown that the enemy was profoundly misled concerning our real intentions. and strategic maskirovka.' However. were involved.000 railroad carloads of troops. What FHO did not foresee was the full dimension of the Soviet summer offensive against Army Group South and Army Group Centre in August. one tank army. put it: 'This system of operational deceptive measures proved its worth. in the last resort. and supplies. FHO failed to anticipate Bagration because of the consistent tendency to underestimate the leadership ability of the Red Army High Command and Soviet operational art. Eight Sovietfronts. The Soviet troop concentration around Orel permitted the assumption that the Russians intended to attack the Orel salient on both sides and penetrate as far as Bryansk in order to tie down Second Panzer Army and seize the area around Orel. the Soviet offensive against Army Group Centre which began on 22 June 1944. The magnitude of this intelligence failure makes a mockery of Gehlen's assertion that FHO anticipated all major Soviet offensives. the inability of FHO to detect Soviet preparations for Bagration was a function of Soviet tactical. Nevertheless. As General Shtemenko.55 The Soviet deception plan for Bagration was the most sophisticated and thoroughly organized of the Great Patriotic War. The Red Army did not achieve tactical surprisein most sectors because German aerial reconnaissance successfully detected the preparations for the attack. In the first instance. operational. Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff. and an enormous logistical effort requiring 75.56 . and the Red Army maintained the initiative on attack until October 1943. 'Operation Bagration'.54 The most serious failure of FHO analysis attaches to the collapse of Army Group Centre in June 1944. FHO was completely deceived and disoriented regarding Soviet intentions for the summer offensive and failed to predict Bagration.

Gehlen handed up a comprehensive estimate of the enemy situation. the Soviet main effort probably would be directed at the Balkans. wherein he set down a number of assumptions about future Soviet intentions. issued on 13 June. According to Gehlen. designed to strike behind Army Group Centre north-west to Warsaw.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 287 On 30 March 1944. predicted that the summer offensive would be launched between 15 and 20 June. it was presumed. The presumed Soviet operational intentions with reference to army groups South Ukraine. This estimate asserted that (i) would require such a level of tactical proficiency that the STAVKA would not select this course: therefore. and as delineated in the comprehensive estimate issued on 3 May. it appeared questionable whether the Red Army possessed sufficient forces to conduct a wide-ranging offensive in the general direction of Minsk after the capture of the . Firstly. Soviet successes on the southern wing of the Ostfront threatened to open the way for the Red Army into the Balkans and the General Gouvernment by sundering the German front between the lower Dnestr and the Pripyat Marshes. therefore. there could be no doubt that the Red Army would attempt by every means to drive strong forces deep into the General Gouvernment between the CarpathianMountains and the Pripyatregion before the construction and fortification of a continuous German defensive front. (ii) an attack through the Carpathian Mountains into Rumania. The 'Comprehensive Estimate of the Enemy Situation' issued by FHO on 3 May had discerned two possible Soviet offensives: (1) one starting from the sector Kovel'-Lutskon the southwestern edge of the Pripyat Marshes. North Ukraine.57 The final FHO evaluation of Soviet plans before Bagration. thence to the Baltic coast. the 'Comprehensive Estimate of the Overall Enemy Situation before the German East Front and Presumed Enemy Intentions'. and North remained unchanged. a priori. that the summer offensive would be directedagainst army groups A and South: 'The available operational possibilities in the area between the Black Sea and the Pripyat region will influence the future enemy combat leadership'. In the judgment of FHO.58 of Subsequent FHO estimates placed the Schwerpunkt the expected Soviet summer offensive between Kovel' and the Carpathian Mountains. Since the Soviet leadership realized these operational possibilities. and stated that all available intelligence confirmed the previous FHO evaluation that the main blow would be delivered against Army Group North Ukraine. which informed all subsequent FHO evaluations relating to the expected Soviet summer offensive.

Nevertheless. the Soviet grouping of forces in the south. FHO systematically compiled and analysed an enormous quantity of intelligence concerning almost every aspect of the Red Army and Soviet military industrial organization. Ic Army Group Centre and the intelligence sections of its subordinate armiesdiscernedadditional Soviet preparation for an offensive. Army Group Centre began to receive intelligence that indicated. Under Gehlen. despite many accurate reconnaissance results and pieces of intelligence. FHO remained convinced that the main Soviet offensive would be launched against Army Group North Ukraine. An Aktennotiz of FHO. Until the end. not to mention the partisan movement. Not until the end of July did FHO acknowledge that the Soviet High Command viewed the offensive in progress as decisive for the outcome of the war. In sum. The attack preparations in front of Army Group Centre were acknowledged. registered the new information. Soviet troop deployments in preparation for an offensive against Army Group Centre. the poor performance of FHO in evaluating the capabilities and the strength of the Red Army in connection with the planning of Barbarossa is beyond dispute. for which reason it was not recognized in time that the first powerful wave of the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 would break over Army Group Centre. even after the first successes of Bagration. neither FHO nor OKH could locate the position of the Soviet strategic reserves.288 Journal of ContemporaryHistory area Mogilev-Orsha-Vitebsk. Nor can there be any doubt about the unsatisfactory record of FHO between June 1941 and April 1942 in assessing Soviet operational intentions and fighting power. but reaffirmed that the Schwerpunkt of the anticipated Soviet attack operations remained unchanged and directed at Army Group North Ukraine. which were registered in intelligence estimates. Soviet internal conditions. and related to the main offensive against Army Group North Ukraine. From 10 June. dated 17 June 1944. was the most important reason that FHO (and OKH) expected the main attack against Army Group North Ukraine. and the Soviet intelligence and security services.59 To conclude. but did not confirm. Indeed.60As a result. FHO steadily improved its evaluations of the Soviet order-of-battle and strategic . FHO clung to this erroneous estimate of Soviet intentions. especially the armour formations. However. Between 16 and 21 June. but were assessed as of secondary importance. FHO declined to change its basic assessment that the main Soviet attack would be launched against Army Group North Ukraine.

and SMERSH. On the contrary. organization. which produced valuable intelligence about Soviet intentions. GRU. who provided useful information about the methods. and SMERSH officers. allowance must be made for the inconsistent format and Delphic language of the estimates). Bearing in mind the fact that Gehlen's attempt to furnish long-range intelligence estimates of Soviet intentions was an innovation for German military intelligence (for which reason.61True. But WALLI III never succeeded in penetrating the headquarters and main field offices of the NKVD. FHO was never privy to the type of strategic intelligence collected by the British and American signals intelligence organizations. In the first instance.62However. Stab WALLI I did succeed in placing agents in Soviet military headquarters at the divisional and army level.Nevertheless. the inability of FHO accurately to estimate Soviet intentions was a function of insufficient intelligence and Soviet maskirovka. personnel and targets of their respective service.63 . NKGB. any component of Abwehr I. these reports seriously disoriented Gehlen. succeeded in penetrating any Red Army headquarters above army level. nor indeed. The information about Soviet strategy collected by agents of WALLI I on behalf of FHO became a positively dangerous source of intelligence. more knowledge about capabilities did not vouchsafe better understanding of intentions. WALLI III 'doubled' many Soviet agents and captured several NKVD. For this reason. OKH. the FHO evaluation group. FHO failed on a number of decisive occasions either to apprehend Soviet intentions or to predict major Red Army offensives at army and front level. while WALLI III successfully utilized a number of apprehended Soviet intelligence personnel in double-agent operations and Funkspiele. and the Wehrmacht field commands about Soviet intentions. neither WALLI I. and elsewhere in the rear area of the Red Army. it is nonetheless true that FHO did not provide the German High Command with an 'essentially correct picture of the enemy's intentions and troop strength'. Over time.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 289 manpower reserves. or any high-level department of the Soviet government. For it can be proved that nearly every report concerning high-level Soviet military and political plans transmitted by agents of Abwehr I contained Soviet disinformation. German signals intelligence never succeeded in unbuttoning the highest cryptosystems of the Red Army and the Soviet intelligence and security services. as Gehlen claimed. GRU.

66 However. Gehlen was possessed of an exaggerated self-confidence and an unfounded belief in his own infallibility. especially at the strategic level. Recent Soviet official accounts of maskirovka operations against the Wehrmacht and the German intelligence and security services document the role and the success of Soviet deception in connection with several major offensives and every phase of Abwehr activity in Russia. and simultaneously conduced to underestimation of Soviet military capabilities. and functioned as a conduit of strategic disinformation. Stex was a Soviet-controlled source. of Soviet deception. He formulated certain beliefs about the enemy situation of which he subsequently could not be disabused by . high-level intelligence about Soviet plans. and Ivar Lissner (Harbin). FHO was vulnerable to Soviet deception. and radio deception. imitation. ab initio. demonstration manoeuvres. the centralization of the FHO estimation process in the hands of Gehlen himself and a small group of evaluators. who transmitted disinformation. the same records affirm that neither FHO nor Gehlen comprehendedthe working principlesand the interlockingtechniques of maskirovka. but also owing to certain German militaryhabits of mind. troop movements. a preoccupation with Soviet military deficiencies that repeatedly induced FHO to underrate the degree of Soviet operational skill. and the basic purpose. simulation. a tendency toward what is called today 'mirror-imaging'.290 Journal of Contemporary History The Abwehr possessed three important agents upon whose reports about Soviet strategy and intentions Gehlen personally placed great reliance: Max (Sofia). With the clairvoyance of hindsight. not only because of the lack of hard. these were a sense of superiority that persistently ensnared FHO in optimistic predictions about German plans. Max was under Soviet control.64 Disinformation comprised only one element of the operational and strategic maskirovka employed against FHO by Soviet intelligence. leavened with a modicum of accurate tactical information about Red Army deployment. the presumption that the (German) estimate of Soviet intentions was in fact the one that offered the best chance of success in a given set of circumstances. 'Stex' (Stockholm).65 Various FHO documents and Gehlen's own statements at his interrogation testify that FHO was formally cognizant of the fact. The full Soviet armoury included camouflage and concealment.namely. Specifically. it can be seen that the dossier of Lissner reports consisted of a cunning admixture of strategic disinformation. as described in official Soviet accounts of actual deception operations against German intelligence. morale and promotions.

Gehlen is proof that the greatest deception senior intelligence officers suffer is from their own opinions. as is the magisterial trilogy of John Erickson: TheSoviet High Command. Glavnoye Upravleniye Main Administration for Kontrrazvedki Counter-intelligence [Soviet Military Counterintelligence] STAVKA Stavka VerkhovnogoGlavnokomandovaniyeGeneral Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. and frame or frames:e. RG 319. David Kahn. National Archives. entry 179. Other records from the National Archives are cited according to repository.g. Citations from captured documents in the National Archives.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 291 any countervailing evidence. The claim has merit:however. to acknowledge this . Suitland.The Road to Stalingrad (London 1975). Soviet military historians complain justly of the failure of'bourgeois' historians in the West to appreciate the decisive importance of the Eastern Front and the magnitude of the Soviet victory over the Wehrmacht.g. Maryland (WNRC) are according to repository. Abbreviations Soviet Military Intelligence Main Administration for State Security KGB Committee for State Security NKGB People's Commissariat for State Security NKVD People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs SMERSH Smert Shpionam. Special gratitude is due to Mr John Taylor and Mr Will Mahoney and Mr William Lewis. entry and box where appropriate: e. 1. record group number (RG).g. microfilm publication number (e. (NA) and the Washington National Records Centre. NA T-78/483/1-5. T-78). for their unflagging help in locating documents. Washington. Hitler's Spies.A Military-PoliticalHistory 1918-1941 (London 1962). GermanMilitary Intelligence in World WarII (New York 1978) is an outstanding exception. microfilm roll number. Documents obtained by the author under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) are recorded by agency of origin as FOIA. Modern Military Records Branch. GlavnoyeRazvedylvatel'noyeUpravleniye Glavnoye UpravleniyeGosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti Narodny Komissariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti Del Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh GRU GUGB Notes The author wishes to thank Dr John Dziak and Mr Raymond Rocca for their encouragement and assistance in preparing this article. Thus. and The Road to Berlin (Boulder 1985). DC.

Die DeutschenFunkpeil-und 1945 (AEG Telefunken 1982). Timokhovich. Volker Detlef Heydorn. 1964-1970. US Army. in Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion.C. 31. 3. German Experiences in Russia. 'SMERSH. 94. WNRC RG 165. 3.9 July 1945. US Air Force Historical Studies 175 (New York 1960). Horst Boog. D. 7707 European Command Intelligence Centre. VolumeII-covering 1971 and 1972. N.6 March 1948. ed. 69-159. B. NA RG 319. Intelligence Report(henceforth IR) no. see Generalleutnant Kurt Schubert.11. appendix B.C. 5-17. 66-157. Add now Raymond Rocca and John Dziak. 'SD in the East'. NA manuscript no. with bis Horch-Verfahren citation of documents. Consolidated Interrogation Report (CIR) no. Larionov. Foreign Military Studies. D-193. For the Luftwaffe intelligence evaluation of the Red Air Force before June 1941.forthcoming. 16. US Third Army. On the organization of FHO. 'Die Beurteilung der Sowjetischen Luftstreitkrafte 1939-1941'. entry 179. US Twelfth Army Group. Soviet Counter-intelligence in World War Two'. XE 003374. For the Luftwaffe radio intercept service. D. 1725. Military Intelligence Service Interrogation Centre. A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications with some Additional Titles from Other Sources (Washington. no date.39'. See V. For FHO organization in 1943. 'Amt VI RSHA: Central and Eastern Europe'. 13July 1945. 'Final Report on Dr Gerhard Willy Teich'. box 665. 61. 4. Pullach Intern. On ZEPPELIN. IR no. Hitler's Spies. 15. DerKriegim Dunkeln. A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications (Washington. 20 February 1946.6. Generalleutnant D. Colorado 1985). Aufzeichnungen(Wiesbaden and Munich 1979). Signals. General Gehlen und die Geschichte des Bundesnachrichtendienstes(Hamburg1971). For the important Soviet sources on the intelligence war. Ernst Klink. NA T-321/86/7 I1Ic.41'. 22. 1982). CSDIC no. T-78/458/6435904-909. 3 May 1945.4. box 69. WNRC RG 332. V. see 'Arbeitseinteilungder Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost ab 1. see Soviet Intelligence and Security Services. The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders. 'Arbeitsabteilung der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost ab 15.132 (Heidelberg 1952). Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) no. P. Williamson Murray. 2. Gehlen's reorganization is discussed in Hermann Zolling and Heinz H6hne. T-78/458/6435615-616. 20. box 69. Strategyfor Defeat. Yeronin. WNRC RG 332.4 (October 1987). D. IR no. 1972).57-74. US Army European Command. On the SD and the RSHA.Machtund . 189-202. See now for a detailed discussion of tactical radio reconnaissance. see Counter-intelligence Special Report (CI-SR) no. see Kahn. LuftwaffeFiihrungsstab 1942. Solovyov.C. Walter Schellenberg. 239-47. 1975). Fritz Trenkle. see now Horst Boog. Journalof Contemporary History. Amt C and other Departments of RSHA'. Nachrichtennahaufkldrung (Ost) und sowjetrussischesHeeresfunkwesenbis 1945 (Rombach 1985). NA RG 238. 1942-1945. US Third Army. 'Diensteinteilung der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost. file no. MS no. T78/458/6435890-894. Uberschar (Stuttgart 1983). Heinz Hohne. World War II Decisive Battles of the Soviet Army (Moscow 1984).1943'. 121-43. See also Robert Stephan. Signal Communications in the East. Walter Schwabedissen. Joachim Hoffmann. Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and Security Services (Boulder. 'Notes on Mil. Rolf-Dieter Miillerand Gerd R. Jiirgen F6rster. with General Albert Praun. 'Amt VI of RSHA'.Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Stand vom 20. 18July 1945.292 Journal of Contemporary History is not to endorse the fiction that the Soviet Union won the second world war more or less single-handed. On German signals intelligence in Russia. der Oberkommando Luftwaffe/740. Luftwaffe CommandEast. See in general 'The Organization of the Ic Service of the German Air Force'.3.Soviet Intelligenceand Security Services. 'The SD and the RSHA'. 'Unternehmen Zeppelin'. TheLuftwaffe 1933-1945 (Washington. NA RG 238.

4 (October 1983). Maxwell Brownjohn (New York 1979). 53. II. T-77/1443/884. 7. Buchheit. I was satisfied with the activity of our intelligence service. Abw. 22 July 1945. 18. Geheime Ostfront. See Counter-Intelligence Final Interrogation Report (CIFIR) no. NA RG 319. Tdie 78/482/6466565ff. for Abwehr I activities in the Baltic States in 1940. nr. 692-4. box 1218a. Der Krieg imDunkein. op. entry 179. Erinnerungen1942-1971 (Mainz and Wiesbaden 1971). 253-7. 'Chef. Der Dienst. in 1941. Interrogation Report. Die Deutschen im Osten (Munich 1965). and David Thomas. For Abwehr II. Ausl. CI-CIR no. Military Intelligence Service Centre. translated by J. 20-61. Hermann Baun..H.: "Organisation zur Behandlung von Zwischenfallen an der deutsch-sowjetischen Grenze" '. T-78/458/6435243ff. Note the limited nature of Abwehr operations against Soviet forces in Poland from 1939 in 'Amt Ausl. 31 January 1946. XE 013988. XE 003134. 140-266. 9. 'Abschnittsstab Ostpreussen. 13. NA RG 319. cit./Abw. Gehlen. the secondary accounts of Abwehr activity cannot be verified by documentary evidence:e.Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45 293 Einfluss der deutschen und russischen Geheimdienste(Munich 1985).1941'. WNRC RG 165. Einsatzbefehl fur die Abwehrkommandos und Abwehrtrupps'. Denkschrift btr. Canaris. NA RG 165. entry 179. Spy of the Century (New York 1971). 11 December 1945. US Forces European Theatre. II auf russ./Abw. NA RG 165. Ausl. E. Entry 79. Vortrag Leiters Abw. With the exception of the valuable account of Abwehr operational activity by Oscar Reile. 18 June 1940. Gruppenleiter FHO II. Die Brandenburger zbV 800. op. T-77/908/ 5662771-798. Geschichte der militarischenAbwehr(Munich 1966). Cookridge. 54-5. file no.. First Special Intelligence Interrogation Report. The best discussion of FHO activity and organization from 1941 is The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign (Ic-Dienst Ost). 8./Abw. See 'Amt. with documentary sources. Auskunfterteilung'. US Army Intelligence and Security Command. T-77/1027/ 651065ff.. 11 June 1941. Eine Deutsche Kommandotruppe (Munich 1978). Tatigkeit der Abw. For the establishment of Stab WALLI. 'Amt. in Poland./Abw. See Hohne. Journalof ContemporaryHistory. Documentary evidence about Abwehr I activity in Russia 1940-41 is generally lacking.. Amt. cit. T-78/458/6435434ff. cit. On Abwehr II operations in 1941 and thereafter. 10. Ausl.432-3. For Abwehr III. (signed by Canaris). II. Its finest result was the exact identification of the grouping of Russian forces in the early part of 1941 in western Belorussia and the Ukraine'. box 739. box 704. for an evaluation of Abwehr espionage in Russia before June 1941. 63-70. Ausl. Aktennotiz uiber Besprechung mit Reichsleiter Rosenberg am 30 Mai 1941'. 'The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-1982'. Paul Leverkuihn. 6. 'German Methods of . General Jodl in his interrogation by Soviet intelligence stated that: 'In general./Abw. op. 14 June 1941. Geheim Akten-Russland'. and Reinhard Gehlen. op.g. See Heinz Hohne. II. Military Intelligence Service Centre. 448141. see 'Amt. Helmut Spater. Gehlen. 446-56 passim. The author of the quotation was Major Heinz Hiemenz. Gehlen. 20. 45-61. Abw. But some German generals were happy with FHO reports.. Cited in Gert Buchheit. Ic/VO. and in Wien'. Interrogation Report. Zolling and Hohne. 255. For Abwehr reports on Russia. Der Deutsche Geheimdienst. see Oberst Heinrich Schmalschlager.. 5662799-809. US Army Intelligence and Security Command. Befehl btr. 129-40. Gebiet. Der geheime Nachrichtendienstder deutschen Wehrmachtim Kriege (Frankfurt am Main 1957). T-78/458/6435482. cit. 441. file no. 5.4. 'Asts in the Balkans.

paragraphs 116-129.T-78/587/486-494. for a collection of 'Wichtige Abwehrmeldungen'.9 August 1945. for an overview. paragraphs 11-13. Gehlen. US Third Army Interrogation Centre. See G. T-77/ 1445/216-295. 'The German Intelligence Service and the War'.294 Journal of ContemporaryHistory Combatting the Soviet Intelligence Services'. 1727./Abw. 'Zusammenstellung wichtiger militirischer Nachrichten'. see T-78/503/lff. appendix I. responsible for some of these reports was under the control of Soviet counter-intelligence in the summer of 1942. ibid. Lang and Turkul.1941-8.1941. in 1945. For Stex. 16. interrogation file. 5. with translation of Japanese intelligence interrogation report of Lissner. Der Krieg im Dunkeln. op. 72-89. provide a glimpse of Abwehr I activity. Abwehrkommando I'.Erzihlungen undBerichteaus der Arbeit der Tscheka (East Berlin 1973). See David Thomas. 13. with references to Soviet consulate contacts in Harbin 1942-1943. FOIA. FOIA: file includes 'Counter-intelligenceCorps Met. T-78/498/6485725-855. 372-73. Ausl.1944. XE 003702. 15.2. See also US Army Intelligence and Security Command. KTB nr. memorandum. XE 0111758. See 'Amt.3 January 1946. 'Die Verschworung der Verblendeten'. 'Abwehrgruppe Sld. For specimens containing prima facie disinformation. T-78/503/ no frame numbers. T-77/1443/1-323. See Zolling and Hohne.2. CIA. 12.9 September 1945. Turkul bent but never broke. CI-CIR no. Akselrod. Meldungen und Karten. reports of V-Mdnnerin Russia reporting on US and British lend lease and allied troop movements. Amt Ausland Abwehr and on the Activities of its Outlying Centres'. 1716. cit. in Schild und Flamme.5. 14. Austria. 1 (January 1986).1943. 'Max' and'Moritz': Germanand Soviet Intelligence in the . 1. 'Orion'. Unit no. 'Abwehrgruppe Sid. 16 September 1945. Ivar Lissner. with US Army Intelligence and Security Command. Turkul was interrogated first by the 430 CIC detachment. see CSDIC Special Interrogation Report (SIR) no. Contra Cookridge. interrogation file. box 665.Stand 3 Mai 1943'. "Decknamenverzeichnis der Agenten der Abwehr I" '.6. T77/1443/324-404. no date. including Abwehr agent reports. Fremde Heere Ost (IIa). 'Notes on Gruppe I Luft.10. 21. 'Frontaufklarungskommandos'. 11. no. 40. 'The Legend of Agent Max'. FOIA. I" '. Lang (real name Longin) almost certainly was a Soviet intelligence officer: the interrogation reports of Lang and Turkul reveal that Lang probably was Turkul's control and that Lang definitely provided Kauder with the intelligence that he transmitted to the Abwehr (using the 'Max' organization as the cut-out). Lissner. Entry 179. For Abwehr reports in the summer of 1941. The war diaries of Abwehr detachments in Russia 1941-43. For Max. no.1941. Ic/AO Dienststelle Baun. T-78/673/825ff. IR no.1942'. 64-7. 6-7. see David Thomas. CSDIC SIR no. see his report of 3 April 1943 at T-78/556/435ff. interrogation file. Ivar'. Military Intelligence Service Centre. 'Heeresgruppe Slid Ic. Richard Kauder. 81. see 'Wichtiger Abwehrmeldungen und Gefangenaussagen der Letzten Zeit uber sowjetrussische Operationsabsichten. 'Notes on Abwehr I Luft'. and then by British counterintelligence. Kriegstagebuch Abwehrgruppe Sid'. paragraph 15. See for example the dossier of WALLI I reports. T-311/298/1100.7. 22.11. 4. On the Max organization. See 'Abt. The Abwehr I network. For another informative collection.. for additional information on Turkul. NA RG 238. no number. Salzburg. both reports WNRC RG 165. see T-78/574/674-759. 5 February 1946. "Abwehrtrupp I. See 'FHO.11. FOIA. NA RG 238. Oberst Werner Ohletz. 434-48 passim. Anlagenband zur Zusammenstellung der in der Zeit vom April 1942-Dezember 1944 in der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost abgefassten Beurteilungen der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront im grossen'. and H6hne. 14.1942-31. ForeignIntelligence andLiterary Scene.

11. NA. ['VVS (Air Force) Zhurnal. 125-7. 89.42. 'Study of Intelligence . 1. see for example 'FHO.1943. Fernaufkldrer 1914-1945. Lw. GMDS. 'OKL. 550-2. Stabsmeldung nr. Fu.4. 1. 'Luftaufklarungsergebnisse'. 12 September 1944. kdos. Anlagenband 5.. See note 3 for sources. 20. 10. and Heydorn. T-313/266/8537134-192. 12. St. 24. Heinz Nowarra. and types of air reconnaissance data. a 55-page instruction manual.. file copy.Generalleutnant D. Nachrichtennahaufkliirung. Ic. in US Army. Ic. NA RG 165. forthcoming. Ic/AO. Uber Lage der Funkaufklarung vor deutscher Ostfront'. Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklarung. 'Erfahrungen in der Auswertung der Luftauklarungsergebnissefur die Beurteilung der Feindlage'. note 248. and in Kehrig. 21. See 'The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign (Ic-Dienst Ost)'.10. For examples of such reports.. Georg Pemler.42-3. cit. Heft: Der Osten. 18. See Heydorn. Kahn. 34-66. 1. 19. 7. See note 17 above. Entwicklung. 'Operativnaia maskirovka VVS v nastupatel' nykh operatsiiakh'. see 'AOK 17. Anlagenband I-II z. Frontaufklarung Kommandos 103 und 203.'. Hitler's Spies. T-77/727/8366281-3.1942'. see 'Abw. Aus den (Leoni am StarnburgerSee 1981). Ausl. 5 April 1945.43. Stalingrad. Aufkl.4. On the effect of Soviet radio silence. Kommandeur fur Nachrichten./Abw. for interpretation.. Voyenno-istoricheskii 12 (December 1977). 1941. T-321/96/221-244. 20. P-096. for examples of German successes. For examples. Colonel Ye. 'Der V-Mann: Ratschlage zu seiner Ausbildung im Rahmen eines Einsatzlagers. no. nr.42'. T-311/233/914ff. DC 1964). 19-26. 1011/42 geh. Office of the Chief of Military History. For examples of Luftwaffe aerial photographs. Department of the Army. 30. T-312/683/8318773ff. A Study of German Operational Intelligence'.4. 28-49 passim.4. 'Pz AOK 4. 41-4..43'.1941' (photographs of Soviet border fortifications) T312/683/8318725ff. 38-40. 11. 1-15. cited as 'Kdr. KTB nr. see 'AOK 17 Koluft 4. citing a 'Besondere Feindfunklage-Meldung vom 11. geheimen Kriegstagebucheines Aufkldrungsfliegers 187-92. Nachrichtennahaufkldrung (Ost) und sowjetrussischesHeeresfunkwesenbis 1945. T-78/483/6468318. 16. US Air Force Historical Studies 176 (Washington. 17. I. 'Meldungen Koluft' (air reconnaissance reports). op. 247. Stalingrad. Surprise and Deception during Offensive Operations']. The estimate is reproduced in Kehrig.. See 'German Operational Intelligence'. CIA. 'Aufbau von Flugplatzen'. Manfred Kehrig. use. Kahn on Codes (New York 1983). 25. 20. also 'German Operational Intelligence. 7-8. Lw. d. Klaus Ube. at T-77/1453/917-987. See in general 'German Counter-intelligence Activities in Occupied Russia (1941-1944)'. Vortragsnotiz. T-78/458/6435920ff. Modern Military Records Branch.Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45 295 Balkans and the Near East during World War Two. 'OKL. Pz AOK 3.553-8. 124-36. nr. Simakov. 168. 23. Foreign Military Studies. 2. T-313/349/8633040ff. See note 3 for sources.1943. Zusammenfassende Feindfunklagemeldung'. 8-27. 22. MS no. April 1946. Einsatz (Stuttgart 1982) is useful on aircraft and organization. Feindfunklage am 1. 'Schutz der Flugplatze der SU-Fliegertruppe'. Einzelschriften des Ic-Dienstes Ost der Luftwaffe'. 203-07. Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht (Stuttgart 1974). 'FHO. For Soviet airfield camouflage. Besondere Feindfunklagemeldung XI/1. Flug zum Don. RussianReactions to GermanAirpowerin WorldWarII. T-312/727/8366057-59. See also Amt.4. Fu.1944'. 94-5. P-122. St. 'AOK 17. MS no. For an eyewitness account of German air reconnaissance over Russia.T-321/240/no frame numbers. 1.1944. Nachr. Entstehung. ibid. Einzelschriften des Ic-Dienstes Ost der Luftwaffe'. December 1943.

27 January 1947.1941. 43-9. past experience. 42-60. See for example. 16. April 1947.. CI-SR no. 2460. Kps. Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. Geheime Ostfront.Ic Vortragnotiz Russland. Nr. Edgar Howell. CI-SR no. 'Das Russland-Bild der Fuhrenden Deutschen Militars vor Beginn des Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion'.. nr.1941. 51-52. 31. Frd Heere Ost (B/P). 32.1. Epstein zum 80. 'Die Ausbildung der Abwehr Funktionare des NKWD. and intuition. 'Werturteil uber die Rote Armee nach den Berichten iiber den Einmarsch in Polen. T-78/567/ 918ff. John A. 272-6 (assessment of Red Army before the invasion). Ia/Ic.. it was essentially impossible in Russia to collect any worthwhile information about the Red Army except at the annual October Day parade: one had to draw conclusions about developments in the Red Army on the basis of general impressions. 30-39. Teil I: Text'. 26. See also 'Die Landesbefestigungen der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken UdSSR Stand: 15. I. Angaben des NKWD-Funktionares Shigunow'. See in general for sources and documentation. 76-82. On Soviet intelligence and the partisan movement. Armee Feindnachrichtenbeschaffung Vorbereitungender Operationen Studie Barbarossa 21. 20-23. 7707 Military Intelligence Service Centre.4-21. for FHO acknowledgement of the lack of intelligence about Red Army strength and reserves. 3.1940-11. ed. see Seaton. The assessment of the Red Army expounded in 'Die Kriegswehrmacht' was influenced strongly by the reports of General Kostring. 32. German Strategy against Russia 1939-1941 (Oxford 1973). is based on the testimony of Schmalschlaiger and is an invaluable treatment of German counter-intelligence in Russia.1. 120ff (Reile served in Abwehr III-f and later in the Bundesnachrichtendienst). Finland. 57-67.6. 27. Thus. who was a most astute and experienced observer of Soviet Russia. and the Baltic states). 29. T-78/479/6462622ff. Stand: 1. Festschrift fur Frite T. im Baltikum und in Finnland'. I. See Heydorn. NA. Armstrong (Madison 1964). 'Die Kriegswehrmacht der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken. T-311/256/615-848 (Red Army capabilities based on observations during the Soviet occupation of Poland. Nachrichtennahaufkldrung. Barry Leach.41 '. There is important eyewitness information in Reile. the German military attache in Moscow. 'Nachrichtenuiber Bandenkrieg'. As Kostring acknowledged. T-314/981 /725ff.1943. see '41 Pz Ar. which is followed closely here. Soviet Partisans in World War II. 'Bewaffnung und Ausriistung der Roten Armee. The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944 (Washington. German and Russian Operations 1940 to 1945'.1940'. 112-15 (military-industrial resources). CI-CIR no. Andreas Hillgruber.11. notwithstanding Kostring's deep experience of Russia and the Soviet military leadership.5. author's personal files. Office of Naval Intelligence. Abt. 32.39-19. CI-SR no. 28. Key FHO evaluations between 1939 and June 1941 include 'Heeres Gruppe Suid. 12-20. 32. CI-SR no. T-120/240/175713ff.296 Journal of ContemporaryHistory and Counter-intelligence Activities on the Eastern Front and in Adjacent Areas during WW II'. 32. See also 'Espionage-Sabotage-Conspiracy. 296-310. 28. 91-5. T-78/550/729-802. 19 December 1939. NA RG 263. 26 November. DC 1956). 194-202 (Red Army strength). Teil II-III'. 32. CI-SR no. Geburtstag(Wiesbaden 1978). 'Erfahrungen aus dem Finnischen-Russischen Krieg'. T-78/488/ 647415 l1ff. there were . 3. T-311/26/535-852. T-78/501/6489522-645. 30. RG 165. 338-60. 3-4. The Russo-German War 1941-1945.3. T-311/256/826ff.40'. Abt. 'Operations and Experiencesof Frontaufklarung (FA) III Ost during the Eastern Campaign'. For the shortcomings in the FHO evaluation of the Red Army.

33. See 'Zusammenstellung. Der militarische Mittler zwischendem DeutschenReich undden Sowjetunion1921-1941 (Frankfurt am Main 1966). Vorbereitungen der Operation Studie Barbarossa'. thereare no comprehensive analyses of the Red Army for the period December 1939-June 1941. For Soviet troop deployments before the invasion. 202-4. See 'FHO. T-78/466/6445876-6446237. See Gehlen. 71-6. Die Wende vor Moskau (Stuttgart 1972). 39. Anlage' (report of visit to a Soviet tank brigade). 38. with an increasing uncertainty and equivocation in the wording of Kostring's assessment of Soviet military affairs. Soviet High Command.Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45 297 strict limits to his knowledge of unfolding developments in the Red Army. Ia/Ic. 1941 (Novato 1984). 26-33. Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. 14-59. Stand August 1940'. Kriegstagebuch(KTB). In the available dossier of reports. 3. on 22 June the Red Army possessed roughly 20. For actual Soviet strength totals in 1941. See 'OKH. Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front. and Brian Fugate. Ar. 1297/40. Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Heidelberg 1951). Kostring's reports therefore were not a solid foundation for the FHO analytical edifice erected upon them. Kps. Stand 20. See Klaus Reinhardt. Uberlaufer Bericht. Amt Ausl.. 40. Abt. 'Zersetzungserscheinungenin der Roten Armee'. KTB 3. Feindbeurteilung. See Boog. with Leach. For Halder's assessment.IV. et al. (in Russian) Voyenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal (henceforth VIZ). See Hillgruber.. Teil A'.). see Der Angriffaufdie Sowjetunion. FHO. 34. T-78/482/6466640ff. 159. 35. for analysis. See '41 Pz. Fremde Heere Ost (II) 14 January 1941. 21 September 1940. See for example the Abwehr assessments of Red Army morale at 'Amt Ausl.. nr. Alferov. Teil A'. T-78/498/6485726-855. et al. 79083 (1981)./Abw. See John Erickson.Qu. including the T-34. FHO grossly miscalculated the number and quality of Soviet tanks./Abw. 21 November 1941'. See 'FHO Lagebericht Ost. 42.000 tanks of preponderantly inferior quality. 600-1. no. 26 November 1941.000 tanks.41'. In the spring of 1941. 3. 30-9. 267. General Ernst K6string. in reality. nr. 'Russland-Bild'.5.565-87. 37. appendix 4. Operation Barbarossa. Hermann Teske (ed. including roughly 170 in the military districts in European Russia. Der Dienst. 189-202. T-77/1027/6500209-6500221. T-78/479/6465470ff. 199-200. Abt. Nachrichten aus den westukrainischen Gebieten der Sowejetunion. T-314/981/725. 'Anlagenband zur Zusammenstellung der in der Zeit vom April 1942-Dezember 1944 in der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost abgefassten Beurteilungen der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront im grossen'. 'Strategic Deployment of Soviet Troops in the Western Theatre of Military Operations in 1941'. See also for a selection of Kostring reports. 59-61. 172:Halder informed Hitler on 3 February 1941that the Red Army disposed of 10. with General Heinz Guderian. with Boog. 498-503 for sources. T-311/256/634ff. 170 (11 August 1941). for the quotations from 'Die Kriegswehrmacht'. translated in Joint Publications Research Service. 'Zusammenstellung der in der Zeit vom April 1942-Dezember 1944in der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost abgefassten Beurteilungen der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront im grossen. GenstdH. 6 (June 1981). A review of the attache reports submitted from Moscow 1939-41 reveals a steady constriction of hard factual data about almost every facet of the Red Army. 36. T-77/1027/6500222-225. for Gehlen's . see now Colonel S. O. 299-300. 41. the Red Army possessed some 300 divisions. GermanStrategy. Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. for references to FHO evaluations and reports. See General Halder.

See 'Anlagen Band zur Zusammenstellung'. See Kehrig.298 Journal of ContemporaryHistory introductory remarks. Teil A'. 48. 7-72. in Donald Daniel and Kathrine Herbig (eds). FHO 'Beurteilung der Feindlage vor Heeresgruppe Mitte'. See 'Anlagenband zur Zusammenstellung'. 18: 'The enemy is ostensibly engaged in the preparation of a large operation against Army Group Centre. Gehlen imbibed this notion from a Max report dated 20 February.11. 'the idea of causing the collapse of the entire German front through the shattering of both wings of the German Army now played an authoritative role in the enemy's decision-making process'. Qu. Stand 21. Auf Grund der neuesten Abwehrmeldungen'. 46. 'Zusammenstellung. the agent reports were part of the Soviet strategic deception plan for 'Operation Uranus'.10. Anlage 1 zu Fremde Heere Ost (I) vom 10. Der Dienst. in 'Zusammenstellung. 550-2. Gedanken zur Weiterentwicklung der Feindlage im Herbst und Winter'. See Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm. with Gehlen. Teil A'.1942'. Teil A'. 'Kraftebild und weitere russische Operationsmoglichkeiten im Siidbereich der Ostfront'. H. 388-90 and 423-5 for Soviet planning for 'Operation Uranus'. Stalingrad. for a critical assessment of the full dossier of FHO estimates. 'Stalingrad and Belorussia. 51. 22. 'Operativnaya maskirovka voisk v kontranastuplenii pod Stalingradom'. Teil A'. dated 4 November. 32. Prima facie. 7-13.1942'. On the intelligence. 43.8.5. against which he should be ready for operations about the beginning of November'. 'Zusammenstellung. 10-12 and 23-25. Teil A'. concluded that: under the influence of the failure of the attacks with large forces against Army Group Centre and the success of the offensive in the Ukraine. Teil A'. Fremde Heere Ost (I). 47. Earl Ziemke. 'Zusammenstellung. 29. Matsulenko. 50. 45. The FHO estimate of 22 February. in 'Zusammenstellung. with sources. Prima facie. Teil A'. 'Zusammenstellung.1942.1943. Stalingrad. 61347 (1975). FHO. 'Zusammenstellung der wichtigsten Abwehrmeldungen uber russ. TheRoad to Stalingrad.1. See Kehrig. no. 'Die Prognosen der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost 1942-1945' in ZweiLegendenaus demDrittenReich (Stuttgart 1974). 'Kurze Beurteilungen iiber die Feindlage'. 44. 20. 15 July 1942. on the intelligence estimate of Army Group B. 15. FHO 'Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage vom 12. 'Anlage zu Fremde Heere Ost (I) vom 6. 41. 'Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im grossen. 'Beurteilung der Gesamtfeindlage und ihrer Entwicklungsm6glichkeiten am 1. Teil A'. Soviet Deception in World War II'. 9 (Max report. See Erickson. 39. See FHO 'Kurze Beurteilungen der Feindlage vom 15. Stalingrad. For discussion of the maskirovka at Stalingrad. translated in Joint Publications Research Service. 86-119 for the picture of the enemy situation adopted by OKH in October and November 1942.10.2. Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage vom 28.42. Strategic Military Deception (New York 1982). 47-50. See V. see note 20. 'Zusammenstellung.43'. 16. See 'Fremde Heere Ost (I). 49.1942'.42'. ['Operational Maskirovka of Forces during Counter-offensive at Stalingrad'] VIZ.92-3. reproduced in Kehrig. 59-62.42'. 1 (January 1974). on a supposed 'war council' in Moscow at which the forthcoming offensives were decided).12. . referring to a high-level command conference in Moscow.'M6gliche Anzeichen fir eine beginnende russische Schwerpunktverlagerungvom mittleren Frontabschnitt an die Donfront'. T-78/466/64470-78. Operationsabsichten.11. 'Zusammenstellung. See Fremde Heere Ost (I) 19. 247-54.

Marshall G.3. 28-48. Second and Third Ukrainian fronts against the Balkans launched from the Soviet left flank south of Army Group North Ukraine. T-78/556/393-398. Shimanskiy. the plan adopted entailed an offensive by the Soviet First. Reminiscences'and Reflections. Fremde Heere Ost (Chef) 21. Stand 3. The Soviet General Staff at War (Moscow 1970). On the Soviet strategic maskirovkafor Operation Bagration.6. 74-9. 112/44 gkdos. 8 (1974). Juni 1943'. Rolf Hinze. Pz. Teil A'. 53. 56. Fremde Heere Ost (IIa). Gehlen does not discuss the collapse of Army Group Centre in Der Dienst. nr. 'Zusammenfassende Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im grossen'. Chernyayev. For Zitadelle and the Soviet counter-offensives that followed the battle. Fremde Heere Ost (I). 'Uberblick uber die Feindlage. see Niepold. 1226/43 gkdos. the most authoritative account incorporating the newest Soviet sources. 58. wherein it was reported that the basic plan for the Soviet summer offensive had been approved at a conference in Moscow: according to Max. nr. See Anlage 4 zu Fremde Heere Ost (I) nr. 'Zusammenstellung. nr.6.1944. Die Rote Armee. Abt.44'. The Road to Berlin. 1428/44 gkdos. T-78/466/6446158-167. nr. Shtemenko. 13. For discussion. A. For accounts of Operation Bagration. VIZ. 46237 (1968).1943. 222-56. For the documents. 60. dated 27 April 1944. 106-9. 264-96.. no. 'Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im grossen'.3. 1-14.3. 12-14. 'Operativnaya maskirovka voisk v Belorusskoi operatsii' ['Operational Maskirovkaof Forces in the Belorussian Operation']. ibid. encompassing a large-scale offensive in the direction north of Orsha. see Abt. 24-30. 1616/44 gkdos. Abt. see now Erickson. Gehlen in the 13 June estimate forecast that the main Soviet offensive would be concentrated between Kovell (opposite Army Group North Ukraine).6. Vortrag vor dem Chefs der Generalstabe der Heeresgruppen und Armeen am 23.Materialund Quellensammlung .Z. 87-135.'Beurteilung des Feindverhaltenbei Durchfuhrungdes Unternehmens "Zitadelle" '. 'Zusammenfassende Beurteilung der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront und vermutete Feindabsichten im grossen.Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45 299 52. Zhukov.5. VIZ. 30.. 574/43 gkdos. Erickson. see V.1944. 57. 54. Teil A'.16-23. 21 Mai 1943. For Zitadelle. Stand 13. Mittlere Ostfront Juni '44 (Herford and Bonn 1985).44'. 244-55. Fremde Heere Ost (IIa) nr. 'Zusammenstellung. General S. vom 3. 103-04. Abt. 191-229. 55. 'Zusammenfassende Beurteilung der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront und vermutete Feindabsichten im grossen. for the Max message of 27 April.1943.44. T-78/556/798-801. This estimate incorporated a Max message. Teil A'. 'O Dostizheniy strategicheskiy Vnezapnosti pri Podgotovke Letne-Osenney Kampaniy 1944 Goda' ['Concerning the Achievement of Strategic Surprise in the Preparationfor the Summer-Fall Campaign of 1944']. 'Wichtige Abwehrmeldungen und Gefangenenaussagen der letzten Zeit uiber sowjetrussische Operationsabsichten. 3. Suffice to state.5. 'Zusammenstellung. 'Stalingrad and Belorussia: Soviet Deception in World War II'. 1931/44 gkdos.7. Mittlere OstfrontJuni'44. 59.M. Fremde Heere Ost (I). Space precludesa comprehensivetreatment of FHO reporting. see now Gerd Niepold.1943. also T-78/466/6446124155. 17-28. contains the first account to integrate the full range of Soviet military sources.44'. Stand 30. Der Zusammenbruchder HeeresgruppeMitte im Osten 1944 (Stuttgart 1980). See Heeresgruppe Mitte Ic/AO Ausw. AOK 3 on 21 June reported that Soviet preparations were complete and that an attack was expected momentarily. 6 November 1944. 257-68. Fremde Heere Ost (I). 6 (June 1968). translated in Joint Publications Research Service. Ziemke. 23. 2 (Moscow 1985).

For examples of reports containing prima facie disinformation. A documented instance of Abwehr espionage involving penetration of Red Army field headquarters concerns the agent. Er hat daher seine Nachr. see for example 'Flugzeugbau in der UdSSR. T-78/492/6478926-2943. 35-39. Stand: Mitte 1944'. g. T-78/677/738-760. T-78/582/ 313ff. T-78/575/479-643. 8. H3/753.T-78/559/322. a folder of documents on the organizational history of German Funkspiele 1944-1945. author's personal files.7. 'Die Organisation der deutschen Nachr. Betr. Schriftverkehr'. Armee: Uber Wahrung der Geheimhaltung bei Gesprachen mit Hilfe technischer Nachrichtenmittel'. Recent accounts of Soviet counterintelligence in the second world war document the almost total deception and . 'Die Sowjetische Agentenabwehr und Gegenspionage im Operationsgebiet der Ostfront'. T312/1594/1081-83. report of V-Mannat US air base in Ukraine. On Soviet signals security. T-314/1161/151-156. as plotted by WALLI III on maps. Agenten Arbussow. 29. 'Auswartiges Amt POW Interrogations at Schloss Loetzen'. 5 Oktober 1942'. report of V-Mann 420.4.1942. Garde-Pz. 'Panzerfertigung in der SU'.. see FHO 'Anlage zur kiirzen Feindbeurteilungen.'. 'Aussage des russ. Qu./Abw. 'Befehl an die Truppen der 5.' 62. Rufzeichen und Wellenauswendung und Einfuhrung zahlreicherschwierigerer Schlusselverfahren gegen eine Weitere Aufklarung in weitgehenden Masse geschiitzt. T-78/590/291ff. See 'Sovetskiy Organy Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny' ['Soviet Organs of State Security in the Years of the Great Patriotic War']. Fiihrungsgruppe GenstH.: 'Funkspiel zur Feindtauschung'. Agentbericht'. and T-78/576/1-243. On Funkspiele. Piotr Ivanovich Tavrin. see for example AOK 16 Ic Abwehrtrupp 112 25. T-78/204/6149034ff. NA RG 242. Anderung seiner Decknamen. box 27. 63. T-78/497/6485615. 'Gesamtergebnis der Vernehmungen des Spions Semjon Nikolajewitsch Kaputsin' (NKVD). Aufklarungs-Ergebnissen durch erheblich verbesserte Disziplin. nr. T-78/481/6464956-6465469. Nachrichteniiber Bandenkrieg. Kdos. Agenten Einsatz im Operationsgebiet Ost'. Merkblatt Geheim 11/5. See 'Innere Verhaltnisse in SU'. see the captured Russian order.: 'Russischen Fuhrungsfunkverkehr Heer. T-78/562/1-52. for FHO reports on internal conditions. See also OKH 'Gen. see for example 'Truppenverbande und Truppenahnliche Organisationen des roten Volkskommissariats des Innern (NKWD)'.1944. see the FHO report series.2. 1944. On the partisan war.1944. Ausl. T-78/488/6473211-6473330. 'Zusatzbericht zur Vernehmung der Agentin Klavidia Simonenko'. Wichtige Abwehrmeldungen'. Abt. 1072/42. a published handbook of FHO intelligence studies.1942. stating that the Soviet summer offensive was due to begin in July!. FHO Ic Unterlagen Ost. T-78/488/6473331-6473467. Luftwaffe und NKWD'. 48 Pz. Alexander'. See FHO (I). see for example FHO (IIb) 'Chefsache Irrefiihrung Allgem. Aufklarung ist dem Feinde im wesentlichen bekannt. Kundschaftergruppen. Voprosy Istoriy. 61.. For interrogations. T-77/1424/563. OKH H. For Soviet military-industrial organization. T-78/578/536-712. Soviet operational intentions vis-a-vis specific sectors of the front sometimes were revealed by the concentration of Soviet agents in the German rear. I. Oper. NA RG 242. (Fest). 'Schwerpunkte des sowjetische Agenteneinsatzes im Sept. Kps. St d H/Chef. Denkschrift btr. Walli I. 'Die Uberwachungsorgane im sowjetischen Staat'.300 Journal of ContemporaryHistory fur den Ic Dienst.12. FHO 'Chefsache Funkspiele Bd. 24 June 1944. Geheime Feldpolizei 14. 1 December 1944. Ansatz sowj. Fremde Heere Ost (I) 1943. 5 (May 1965). 'Amt. Heeresnachrichten. 22 July 1943. On the Soviet services.

1 (January 1972). T-78/556/565ff.A. 4 Stand 20.11.January 1944. See Colonel David Glantz. 1-8.9. Naval Postgraduate School. Armeiskie Chekisty [Army Chekists] (Leningrad 1985). 01036/44 geh. His article is based on research for a forthcoming study. VIZ. nr. See for example Georgi Tsinev. no.Intelligence and Security'. NA RG 59 861. Bogdanov et al. AOK 3 Ic Abt. Three basic Soviet works on counter-intelligence operations against the Abwehr are: Sergei Zakharovich Ostryakov. Seventh Army Interrogation Centre.A. T-78/496/6483611ff. Center for Land Warfare United States Army War College (Carlisle. 1 (January 1975). General V. FHO 'Einzelschriften des Ic-Dienstes Ost nr. Fuhrungsgrundsatzeund Kampfweise'. Matsulenko. 23 (December 1984). . Pennsylvania 1985).Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 301 manipulation of Abwehr agent networks in Russia. 73037 (1979). 6. 24 (December 1974). 27-33.. 1771/44 geh. 'Anzeichen fur sowjetrussischen Durchbruchsangriffe'.Mitte nr. add 'Russian Emigre Organizations'. noting Soviet Tiuschung and Tarnung.. 24 June 1945. for sources.T-78/530/279-321. 11-20. On Turkul. Luftwaffenverbindungskommando beim Obkdo.Gr. 65. Leonov (eds). 10 May 1949. for an outstanding documented study of maskirovka operations on the Eastern Front. 3. See John Dziak. USSR KGB].42'. H.1944. SAIC/R/2. (in Russian) Agitator. Poyedinkes Abverom. DavidThomas is a Research Associate at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and Research Scholar in Residence at the National Intelligence Study Centre. A. Monterey. Pirozhkov [deputy chairman. For Gehlen's understanding. Lang. NA RG 165. United States Political Advisor for Germany. no. 66.1944. 64. 55246 (1972). 6-18. 'Operativnayamaskirovkasovetskikh voisk v pervom i vtorom periodakh voyny' ['Operational maskirovka of Soviet Forces in the first and second Periods of War']. Washington DC.A. Bogdanov and I. for a resume of cases.9. Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Joint Publications Research Service. 31-34.Dokumentalnyy ocherk o ChekistakhLeningradskogofronta 1941-1945 [Duelling with the Abwehr. Matsulenko. 'Tarnung Pz der Bewegungen der Roten Armee'. 'The Operational Tradition of Soviet Deception: 'A Historical Sampling'. V. Maskirovka. Soviet Military Deception.Y. no. VIZ. conference paper. Recent accounts include General V.20262/5-1049. translated in Joint Publications Research Service. A Documentary Essay about Chekists of the Leningrad Front 1941-1945] (Moscow 1968). 10-21. 26-31. UPS85-023 (1985). See notes 14 and 15 above. California (1985). 'Operativnayamaskirovka sovetskikh voisk v Vislo-Oderskoi operatsii' ['Operational maskirovka in the Vistula-Oder Operation']. 'Notes on the Red Army . 'The Red Mask: the Nature and Legacy of Soviet Military Deception in World War II'. See FHO 'Die Rote Armee und die Eigentumlichkeit ihrer Gliederung. 'Na strazhe interesov vooruzhennykh sil SSR' ['Guarding the Interests of the Armed Sil. T-313/311/8588525-6. VoyennyeChekisty [Military Chekists] (Moscow 1979). translated in Joint Publications Research Service. and Kauder. 'The Invisible Front'. translated in Forces'].