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Bomber Command
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XXI

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1 JULY

1945

XXI BOMBER COMMAl.11D

M 0 NTH

LY

ACT

1V I T Y

REP

0R T

1 July. 1945

CONTENTS PART PART PART PART PART PART
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II III IV VI VII

~SULTS COST OF MISSIOJ)TS EFFECTIVENESS OF AIRCRAFT ON MISSIONS USE OF AIRCRAFT Al\1DCREWS OTHER USES OF AIRCRAFT .MID OBEi'lS STRENGTH OF THE COMMAlID

HIGHLIGHTS

FOR ~

111 HOURS FL01'rn PER ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT

93 HOURS

FL01'IN PER ASSIGNED

eRE1-T

*7.1 LONG RANGE SORTIES PER ASSIGNED AIRCBAFT
*0.,8% OF AIRBORl~ AIRCRAFT LOST

*90% OF AIRBORNE Alc BOMBED PRIMARY TARGET *94% OF AIRBORNE AI C BOMBED ANY TARGET *6.7 TONS CARRIED PER AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT

*32.360 TONS RELEASED ON ALL TARGETS
'"New Records

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Prepared By 33rd Statistical Oontrol Unit

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1;

Destruction Of Targets

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During .June the XXI Bomber Command bombed Japan in force ten times. This, pl~s mining and other combat missions, resulted in the largest monthly effort to date. Urban areas accounted for 64% of the sortie effort, individual strategic targets 26% and mine fields 7%. The results of this performance are given below. r------------, S'ffi1Iv!ARY OF 'l-IAJOR MISSIONS % Of Total Missions Sorties Tons Sorties Strategic Targets' (DaYlift) 24 1412 7861 25% Strategic Targets (Night 2 71 438 1% Urban Areas (Daylight) 4 12006 20~6 37% Urban Areas (Night) 11 1521 9974 27% Mining (Night) 12 2081 367 7% IMiscellaneous Sorties 22~ 5b2' ___ _ Total . 32350

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The XXI Bomber Command attacked precision targets on four days during the month of June. These attacks wer e scheduled to take place on three days',but weather conSiderations forced a delay of 24 hours for six missions scheduled for 9 June. A total of 24 targets were aSSigned to forces of varying sizes for these missions. ~ourteen of these afforded a sufficiently good radar bombing run to be assigned as both primary visual and primary radar targets. For the remaining ten targets, a specific primary rl'.dar target was aas Lgned ,

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Of the ten primary visual targets, seven were bombed visually, while in the other three cases weather conditions 'diverted the attacking force to the primary radar target. Of the fourteen primary radar targets, 5 were attacked visually, 6 by radar, and 3 by a combination. of the two. Of the total targets assigned, 15 or 62% were attacked visually by a part of the force. This percentage gives an indication of the variable nature of weather conditions over the Japanese Empire and the consequent difficulty in weather prediction.'
e ts ion targets:

The follOWing table summarizes the damage assessment results on these preTarget

% Destroyed

Or Damaged

Visual Bombing Ka\lanishi Aircraft Co., Himeji Plant 99% Mitsubishi Aircraft Co., Mishima Plant, Tamashima 87.5% Aichi Aircraft Works, Atsuta Plant 95.7% Aichi Aircraft \'lorks, }Tagoya Plant 53.6% Kawanishi Aircraft Co., Naruo Plant 73.4% 60.5% Kawasaki Aircraft Plant, Kagamigahara (Two Attacks) 20% (Preliminary) Mitsubishi Aircraft Plant, Kagamigahara (Two Attacks) 44% (Preliminary) Kawasaki Au'craft Co., Akashi Plant (Two Attacks; also one . radar attack) 40% (Preliminary) Nagoya Arsenal, Chigusa Factory 20.4% (Prelim.) Nagoya Arsenal, Atsuta Plant 40.5% (Prelim.) Nippon Vehicle Mfg. Co., Nagoya(Same attack as Nagoya Arsenal, Atsuta) 20% (Prelim.) Sumitomo Duralumin Mill, Nagoya No Assessment Kure Naval Arsenal No Assessment TachikB111.". Depot Air Radar Bombing Sumitonro Light Metals Industry, Osaka Aichi Aircraft Works, Eitoku Plant Kawasaki Aircraft Co., Akashi Plant (Also two visual visual attackS) Japan Aircraft Company, Tomioka Hitachi Aircraft Co., Chiba Osaka. Army Arsenal, Osaka (Note: Percent damaged includes removals). l~ No Damage No Damage No Damage No Damage (Prel im.)

4.3% (PreU.m.)

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Th: three attacking force, which .were forced to bombpr imary radar tL.et, were aole to bomb these targets visually and inflict substantial damage. The resul ts of these attacks ar e as f'o.Ll : ows Targets Kasurnigaura Seaplane Base (Attacked by t\'IO forces) Hitachi Engineering 1"orks, Kaigan Plant Strate~ic Targets (Ni~

% Destroyed

Or Damaged

39.5% 97.5% (Preliminary)

. The 315th iling made ~t~ ~ebut this month in two night mi~sions against oil lndustry tal·gets. By utlllzlng the APQ-7 equipment of tIlis specialized wing it is hoped that material damage can be inflicted at night on precision targ~ts. It ,rill be remembered that similar attacks launched in March by other wings of the command \ ere not successful. ... Information is not available to assess adequately the results of these two missions. Preliminary reports indicate that 30% of one target, the Utsube River Oil Refinery, Yokkaichi, has been destroyed or damaged, but this assessment includes damage inflicted on a previous daylight mission when a small force bombed this target as secondary objective. Urban Areas Over 25 square miles of urban and industrial areas wer e burned out during June to bring the total to date to approximately 120 sqUaJ.·emiles. The attacks against uroan areas for June fall into two categories: (1) four daylight large scale attacks against Osaka and Kooe in the early part of tl~ month; (2) three night attacks against eleven secondary cities during the latter part of the month. In these latter raids, each city was the target for a .,ing attack, except Fukucka against which two Vlings wer e airborne. The fo11O\'ling summary gives the damage inflicted by target: Osaka and Arnagasruci 8.02 sq. miles (Total to date-16.3) Kobe (Total to date-8.75) Harnamatsu Shizuoka 2.28' Kagoshima 2.11 Okayama (Preliminary) 2.13 Toyohashi 1.8 (Preliminary) Fuh.-uoka 1.37 Yokkaichi 1.23 (Prel imim1.ry) .... , Moj i, Ornuta, & IITobeoka aaebo Less than 1 s~. ni. oach (Prelim.)

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It Should be remembered that substantial da~age to important strategic targets often results from these incendiary raids against industrial and urban areas Mining Operations

Mining operations were carried on every other night during June beginning on the seventh. Targets were the Sllimonoseki Straits, Niigata, Fushiki, Nanao, Tsuruga, Maizuru, Fukuoka, Karatsu, Sakata, Obama, Sakai, Hagi, Senzruci, Yuya B~ and the Kobe-Osaka area. According to the A-2 Shipping Intelligence Section it is estimated that as a result of these operations: (a) passage of all but· smaller vessels through the Shimonoseki Straits was impossible for at le ast 75% of the period 8-30 June; (b) ports on the m., coasts of Honshu and Kyushu were blockaded for varying periods after each mining mission, the length of closure varying, in all probability. in inverse proportion to the importance of the port to the enemy. In other wor ds , the more important ports were probably opened within tvo or three days after a mining, .,hile smaller ports very likely rernainef. closed for a week or more. To/compensate for that probability the larger ports were mined at more frequent intervals; (c) based upon the number of mines laid during the month, it is est Imat ed that at least 100 enemy vessels of all ty~es and classes "Tere sunk or damaged by B-29 laid mines in June; (d) although the effect of minelaying on Japanese imports and exports cannot be evaluated on the basis of available information, it is estimated that the available merchant ship tonnage was able to operate during June at only about 50% of normal efficiency as the results of submarine, air and mining attacks~ This estimate is partially BUbstantiated by photographs showing large numbers of vessels immobilized for unusually long periods in harbors and anchorage areas in Japan.

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Bombing

Accuracy

The Operations Analysis Section has recently prepared a detailed study of the bombing accuracy of this Command. Although the final report for this study has not 'been completed, the following data summarizes some of the statistics it will contain: To dete;rmine the accuracy against precision'targets, a t o t al, of 39 d~light missions beginning with 27 March were analyzed. The very high altitude attacks prior to this date were omitted as unrepresentative of current operations. All available strike photography from these missions has been examined in detail, and where pOSSible, bomb plots for each formation were prepared. \'lhensmoke or overcast prevented identification of the actual bomb burst, accuracy was determined by calculation from bombs-in~air photographs. Insofar as information was available, formations dropping by radar were also included. The three most important elements in determin~ng bombing accuracy are: (1) Percentage of hits within a certain distance from the aiming point; (2) The radial or circular error or the distance between the actual NFl and the assigned ~~I; and (3) The size of the bomb pattern. Each of these elements has been conSidered in this study. ' The f'o l Lot..ing table summarizes the bombing accuracy of the Command in terms of -the bombs \'/ithin1000 feet of the aiming point: PERCENT OF :BOMBS RELEASED AT TARGET FALLING llITHIN 1000' Precisi<>n Targets Only 1'1IN G 58 73 31~ \ 31
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[VE[~:,

OF A.P.

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.APRIL* 34% 15% 40% 31% of March'27

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MAY

----,--JUNE T OTALI 35% 17% 2~% I 31% j with

LXXI :BC --

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... issions M April.

37% 45% 19% 16% 27% 27% 32% ' '-----'and 31 are included

38% 26%

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From the above table it c~~ be seen that approximately 30% of the Command's bombs fall within 1000 feet of the AP. Of the 1'lings, the 58th, operating in M~ & June, has compiled the best record, with the 73rd and 3l4th close behind. In analyzing this tabulation, it must be remembered that bombing accuracy figures tend to fluctuate subst-antially from month to month. For this reason, data is presented for the three month period as a Whole, and to be valid, any comparison by 1'Tingshould be confined to the three month basis. The follo~Ting table summarizes the accuracy in terms of the second element, the distance of the ,actual MFI from the assigned MFI. During this period, the average circular error of the Command has been calculated to be approximately 1100 feet. The average for~ mation pattern has been in an area slightly less the four million square feet. -

ANALYSIS OF CIRCULAR ERRORS BY FORMATION
March-June 1945 Sighting _ liJ'~fFo;;~tions 1'lithUEA 0 Target Not 1 0- 1100012000~~ 0:rer of Assess,1000' ,20001 0001 0001 ... able

WING
73 313

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10 0 2 33 21 8 18 1 13 4 5 7 10 6 3 6 4 - 314 18 16 I 9 I 12 1 7 4 130 I 70 I 54 __ 1_32 ! 40 _.2_~1 ~3l_ ! 1~'" , _ _ • Includes the following formations: , 73rd lling - Mission 6.3~ Shizuoka A/C Engine Plant 3l3th Wing - Mission 64 - Target 6195 313th l'ling- Mission 126 - Hamamatsu AjF 3l3th Wing - Mission 126 - Toyohashi 3l4th Wing - Mission 199 - City of Tokyo .* Breakdown of this figure by circular error is as follows: Circular Error No of Formations ~l mile 1~2 mile 4 Over 2 mile 4

58-r-'~-

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Sighting-' Not---' AssessAssessTOTAL able able 2 2 0 7
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Radar

3

100 41 70 255_

It is wor thwlu.Le to compar command during these tnree months with the accuracy achieved by the Eighth Air Force during its first year in the European tileatre. The three chief components for judging bombing accuracy for the two Air Forces are suiamar-Lzed in the following table: !--------------------------;::-;----:;----------------, Circular % Of Bombs Within Error Pattern Size 1000 Feet Of AP (Estimate) i---.:::.;un:.:,]::..;',t"----

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Eiglltl'lir Force A XXI BOlilber Command.

25%

30%

1100 Ft. noo Ft.

7,000,000 Sq. Ft. " Less Than 4,000,000 Sq. Ft. _!

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For a comparable period in/the history of the two units, the command been [.. b.Le to better the accuracy of the Eighth Air Force. Tnis increase is lJart1cularly marked in the per Gent of bombs falling wi thin 1000 feet of tIle 1\.1'. be even greater

It is believed that-the accuracy of the command would were it not for two factors in rlarticular:

(1) The variable size of the formations. This results, from the difficult weather conditions often prevailing enroute to the target, scattering the orJ.ginul aircraft of a formation and making reassembly difficult. (2) The mixed cha.. racter of t.he formations in which aircraft of two or mor-e groups are comb.ined in one formation. Experience in the Eighth Air Force va t.h cornposite groups has definitely proved that bombing is less accurate w116n aircraft from more than one group comprise a formation. This is usually caused by t.he difficulties of assembling during peor flight conditions.

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Enemy Fighter

Reaction

Japanese fighters again did not constitute 11 serious interference to the comma·nd' s combat effort during the month. However, on the Kobe mission of ') June, there Here 100 - 125 fighters which offered the stiffest opposition to the Superforts Since the Tokyo mission of 27 January. However, deS1Jite the fact that fighter oppcs.it i.on has yet to show a general marked increase, IT. must be pointed out toot with the fall of Okinawa, many of the Jup fighters und trainers have been converted into B-29 interceptors until such time as they may be needed to repel an invasion, and good base weather jJlus favorable f'Li.g conditions may result in renewed fignter activity. hf
Vifl1ile aggressiveness of Jap fighters remained relatively undiminished during June (40 - 45% of attacks breaking off at 250 yards or less), the effectiveness of their attacks appears to have diminished when viewed in terms of B-29 losses.

Effec'tiveness I

Of Enemy Fighter

Attacks May June

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Attuclcs Attacks Attacks \ Attacks

Per Per Per Per

B-29 Over Tho Target
B-29 L,ast,

B-29 D'~JllLI.god B-29 Los t and Damaged

0.8 105 16
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0.3

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14
12

0.3 158 16
14
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The per cent of enemy aircraft a.t tacki.ng wh.Lch were destroyed or prob<...b1yestroyo:::d'decrease slightly in June to 13.f:Jj, compo.red to the 16.7% d rt;;cordfor May. However, 4.3 enemy aircruft were destroyed per B-29 lost to enemy action or unknovm compar-ed to 2.2 in May. Fighter escort was given for three missions during the month. Missions on those days sustained 428 attacks, lOSing only one aircraft to action by enemy aircraft.

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Bomb and Fuel Data

AVERAGE BOMB REIGHT PER AIRCRAFT
14000,-, 12000 1000 80006000 4.000 2000 -

JUN'

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The Command averaged the largest bomb load on record during June, each plane carrying ~ average of 13.445 pounds including mining missions of the 313th Wing. or 13.506 pounds for bombing missions alone. The 73rd ''lingaveraged 13,935 pounds, the 313th l'ling' 13.547 including mining missions and 13.761 pounds excluding mining missions, the 58th "ling 13,379 pounds, and the 314thWing 12,949 pounds. It should be remembered that these figures include substantial loadings of the M-47 incendiary bombs. Aircraft carrying these bombs are limited to a load of 184 bombs, or 12,880 pounds. If aircraft carrying M-47 bombs are excluded from the above comparison. the total for each wing is increased by apprOXimately 35~450 pounds.

AU 1'Tings substantially exceeded their May figures. the 314th lting achieving the largest increase \-/itha 1500 pound raise over May. It must be pointed out that this .~ling is at a weight disadvantage because of the distance differential.
Average fuel returned remained at apprOXimately the May level, the Command averaging 742 gallons returned in June compared to 750 in May. The 73rd lTing averaged 710 gallons, the 3l4th lTing 733 gallons, the 3l3th l'ling748 gallons, and the 58th l'ling750 gallons. Potentialities of the B-29B stripped aircraft were partially indicated by the Eerformance of the 3l5th l1ing in its first t'o'Ocombat missions on the 26th and 29th of June. The average bomb load per aircraft was 14,631 pounds and 14,647 for these missions from Guam. This load can be expected to increase substantially inasmuch as the average fuel returned was 1320 gallons and 1181 gallons. Average gallons consumed ner hour on these first two missions was only 387.2 and 379.7 compared to 418 for the Command.

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~. PART II COST OF' MISSIONS

Aircraft and crew combat losses for the' month of June were extremely low. A total of 44 aircraft were lost on combat missions this month. This represents a loss rate of 0.8% on combat missions substantially be Low the 2.1% rate for May and lower than the rate, f ~r any previous month. The low loss rate can be attributed largely to the lightly defended targets that were attacked during the month. The Tokyo and Nagoya urban areas were not attacked at all while on hlo missions against Osaka, poor weather prevented more than a few enemy fighters from becoming airborne against the attacking force. It should be noted that approximately 50% of the combat losses occured on two missions early in the month against Osaka and Kobe. The three night attacks against eleven secondary cities were carried out at exceptionally low cost. As a result of weak defenses, particularly search-1ights, at these targets, only four aircraft were lost or 0.26% of the sorties. Only one aircraft was lost on mining miSSions, a loss rate

An analysis of the cause of loss indicates that enemy antiaircraft was again the chief factor cauSing the month's losses. The number ~Dd percent of combat operational losses declined to 0.22%, the Lowest monthly rate since the start of operations.

Fighter escort was provided for five missions during the month. Howcver , for only three missions wer e tho fighters able to complete rendezvous uith the bombers and successfully escort them to the target. A severe weather front forced tho fighters to return to 11110 on the remaining twa mis sions, on one of 1;lhich27 P~51 s "lore 10 st. One of the major changes in loss rates of the month is the large number of aircraft wh.i ch wez e r edes Ignat.cd to TB-29 or returned to the United States as war "leary. Since the return of "tar weary aircraft may reduce the aircraft strength and consequently the combat effort, the feasibility of returning war weary aircraft to the United States in the future must be appraised in light (1) of the sharply dec'reas Ing flm.,r of aircraft to the command, (a) the potential capacity of third and fourth echelon maintenance facilities to repair these aircraft, and (3) the increased utilization of the aircraft as shown by June performance. The f'o I Lowd.ng table summarizes the reasons for the 32 aircraft in this category.
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CAUSES FOR \TAR lTEARY-A-I-R-CRAFT-' ORllDESIGNATiC)N
No. 11 11

TO TB-291 ,35% 35%' 16%

• _... _,-,;-,==l-=~=_~=.~~!~;e ~~~~UlEP!.~~~
CAUSES FOICB-29 Enemy Action Combat Operationsl Unknown on Missions Reclass & Reorg Rotation Total CREW'LOSSES May

Requires Excessive Maintenance I Battle Damage 1 Flight Characteristics

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June%

No.
19 12 33 14

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% No. 22.6 16 15.4 Enemy Action 14.3 5 4.8 Combat Operational 39.3 7 6.7 Unknown on Mis'ns 16.7 13 12.5 ''far ''{eary 6 7.1 63 60.6 Mech & Accidents 1 84 100.0 104 100.0U: Total

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CAUSES FOR p;.29-A/C LOS'SES .-May June
No.

L_..i~
29 33 30

6

30.9 23 29.1 35.1 12 15.2 31.9 9 11.4 32 40.5 2 2.1 3 3.8 94 100.0 79 100.0

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No.

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