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I negate. Ought is used to indicate a moral obligation. Prefer this interpretation for two reasons.

First, desirability conceptions of ought are circular. Derek Parfit writes: According to desire-based theories, such reasons would have to be provided by facts about what would fulfill our present desires. If, after informed deliberation, we want future happiness as an end, this fact could give us instrumental reasons to have certain other desires, since it would give us reasons to want whatever would make us happy. But the fact that we had this desire could not be truly claimed to give us a reason to have it. Desires cannot be self-supporting. Our wanting happiness as an end could not give us a reason to want happiness as an end.

Second, desirability frameworks presuppose a consequential calculus that could not function given the resolutions lack of context or provision of consequences of the resolutional action. This problem still exists with context since it is impossible to predict the future outcomes of any given action. Justifying a moral obligation instead requires that we examine the institutional obligations of the government, and so avoids this calculability problem. Thus, the affirmative has the burden to prove that submitting to the jurisdiction of an international court is morally obligatory. If the resolutional action is prohibited or merely permissible, you negate. So I contend that it is not obligatory for the state to submit to international law. First, it is impossible to have a positive duty towards others without accepting an infinite and unsustainable obligation. Jacques Derrida writes: As soon as I enter into a relation with the absolute other my absolute singularity enters into relation with his on the level of obligation and duty. I am responsible to the other as other, [and] I answer to him and I answer for what I do before him. But of course, what binds me thus in my singularity to the absolute singularity of the other, immediately propels me into the space or risk of absolute sacrifice. There are also others, an infinite number of them, the innumerable generality of others to whom I should be bound by the same responsibility, a general and universal responsibility. I cannot respond to the call, the request, [or] the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others. As a result, the concepts of responsibility, of decision, or of duty are condemned a priori to a paradox, scandal, and aporia.[[#_ftn2|[2]]]

This is especially true in the case of nations as states exist due to the reciprocal give and take relationship between the government and citizens. Once the state acquires an obligation towards outsiders the reciprocal relationship through which the state exists ceases to exist, destroying the state as a practical entity. Thus, the state does not have the obligation to promote global justice. Second, even if the United States has a positive obligation toward other nations, this obligation would not necessarily justify obliging

the United States to take the particular action advanced by the affirmative. This action would merely be permissible since the action itself is not obligatory as per the availability of alternative courses of action to fulfill this higher obligation. To say that no alternatives to affirming exist would entail a negative existential claim, the veracity of which it is impossible to demonstrate. Thus it is not obligatory to submit to an international court, and so I negate.