MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, -versus- G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940 A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x DECISION LAUREL, J.: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. chanroblespublishingcompany It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Commrs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has

committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the necessity of the case. chanroblespublishingcompany Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows: SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. chanroblespublishingcompany The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said in Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know. The proper distinction the court said was this: The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation. (Field vs. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.) In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation, not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by

permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest. chanroblespublishingcompany The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. chanroblespublishingcompany Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation. chanroblespublishingcompany The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins vs. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good. And in People vs. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered. chanroblespublishingcompany The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. chanroblespublishingcompany Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and

paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. chanroblespublishingcompany IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Writ of Prohibition Prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT THIRD DIVISION MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- G.R. No. 75662 September 15, 1989 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NLRC SHERIFF and CESAR E. LADISLA, Respondents. x---------------------------------------------------x DECISION FERNAN, C.J.: Petitioner assails in this Petition for Review on Certiorari the Resolution dated July 24, 1986 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-19301-78-T denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of its decision dated April 30, 1986 which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana and ordered the reinstatement of private respondent Cesar E. Ladisla to his former position with full backwages. chanroblespublishingcompany Records show that private respondent Cesar E. Ladisla was employed by petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation as a Stock Analyst at its Claro M. Recto Branch. He had been with the company for two years and nine months when on August 15, 1977 he was apprehended by representatives of Mercury Drug while in the act of pilfering company property consisting of three (3) bottles of Persantin and one (1) bottle of Valoron at 100 tablets per bottle with a total value of P272.00. He admitted his guilt to the investigating representatives of petitioner company and executed a handwritten admission. Said admission was repeated verbally at the police station before the arresting officer as shown in the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report which was signed and authenticated by Ladisla.[1] Thus, on August 19, 1977, petitioner, while simultaneously placing private respondent on preventive suspension, filed before the Department of Labor an application for the termination of private respondents employment on grounds of dishonesty and breach of trust. chanroblespublishingcompany Private respondent opposed the aforesaid application for clearance to terminate his services alleging among others, that his suspension and proposed dismissal were unfounded and baseless being premised on the machinations and incriminatory acts of Ms. Leonora Suarez and Edgardo Imperial, Manager and Retail Supervisor, respectively, of petitioners Claro M. Recto Branch; and that he was not given the opportunity to be heard nor allowed to explain his side before he was summarily suspended. chanroblespublishingcompany The parties were then required by the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor to file their respective position papers. While the case was being heard by Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for attempted qualified theft against private respondent before the Fiscals Office of Manila but this was dismissed by the court before the arraignment of the accused. However, the case was refiled and docketed as Criminal Case No. 43096 before Judge Pedro A. Ramirez of the then Court of First Instance, subsequently the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXX. chanroblespublishingcompany In a decision dated November 8, 1979,[2] Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana sustained the validity of private respondents dismissal and granted petitioners application for clearance to terminate the services of the former. Private respondent appealed his aforesaid dismissal to the National Labor Relations Commission. Pending resolution of the appeal, herein petitioner filed a Manifestation with said Commission

notifying the latter of the ongoing trial in Criminal Case No. 43096 against private respondent. On September 15, 1983, judgment was rendered in Criminal Case No. 43096, finding private respondent-accused guilty of the crime of simple theft.[3] No appeal was taken from the decision in the subject criminal case, private respondent having availed himself of the benefits of the Probation Law. He was eventually discharged from probation on December 27, 1984, after complying with the terms and conditions thereof.[4] chanroblespublishingcompany On April 30, 1986, public respondent National Labor Relations Commission reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter because it found no substantial evidence establishing the charge against private respondent Ladisla stating thus: WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby set aside and a new one entered ordering respondent to immediately reinstate him in (sic) his former position with full back wages. SO ORDERED.[5]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision, which was denied by public respondent Commission in its resolution dated July 24, 1986.[6] Hence, this petition assailing the latters reversal of the labor arbiters decision and its order for the reinstatement with full back wages of private respondent. chanroblespublishingcompany Petitioner submits that it was serious legal error on the part of public respondent to order the reinstatement of private respondent who was convicted of the crime of simple theft by Judge Pedro Ramirez in Criminal Case No. 43096 filed by petitioner against said private respondent-employee involving the same facts obtaining in the present case for termination. On the other hand, private respondent maintains that he was a victim of revenge and incriminatory machinations as the charge of qualified theft of company property was a frame-up. chanroblespublishingcompany We hold that public respondent National Labor Relations Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding no substantial evidence to sustain the charge against private respondent. This conclusion is in complete and utter disregard of the Regional Trial Courts conviction of private respondent for the crime of simple theft which decision was rendered prior to its own assailed decision. It must be remembered that proceedings in criminal cases such as that held in the subject criminal case require proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish the guilt of the accused and findings of fact of the trial court on this matter are generally accorded great weight by appellate courts most especially where no appeal had been filed thereafter, thus rendering the said findings final. As mentioned earlier, private respondent did not appeal from the decision of the lower court but instead availed himself of the benefits of the probation law which was correspondingly granted by the Regional Trial Court. chanroblespublishingcompany Dismissal of a dishonest employee is to the best interest not only of management but also of labor. As a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest, a company has the right to dismiss its erring employees. An employer cannot be compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to its interest, justifying loss of confidence in him. The law does not impose unjust situations on either labor or management.[7] We therefore find justification in the termination of private respondent Cesar E. Ladislas employment by petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation. Under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employment for fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative. Loss of confidence is established as a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee. The law does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employees misconduct to invoke such a justification. It is sufficient that there is some basis for the loss of trust or that the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position.[8] chanroblespublishingcompany Private respondents admission of his guilt as earlier stated, his subsequent conviction in Criminal Case No. 43096 and his acceptance of the same as implied in the absence of an appeal therefrom and his subsequent application for probation established beyond reasonable doubt his guilt for the crime of simple theft. It was this same act which gave rise to his conviction by the trial court that was the basis for the termination of his employment by petitioner. chanroblespublishingcompany We have held that the eventual conviction of the employee who is prosecuted for his misconduct is not indispensable to warrant his dismissal by his employer.[9] More specifically, an employee who has been exonerated from a criminal charge of theft of gasoline on the basis of technicality may still be dismissed from employment if the employer has ample reason to mistrust him.[10] If acquittal from the criminal charge does not negate the existence of a ground for loss of trust and confidence, with more reason should conviction for such criminal charge fortify said mistrust. Anent private respondents claim of summary suspension without being given the opportunity to be heard, the Court takes note that, in addition to the fact that his suspension was merely preventive pending approval by the Department of Labor of its application for clearance to terminate the services of private respondent, the latter was given the chance to defend himself in several instances: at the Police Precinct No. III, Western Police District, Metro Manila where he was brought for investigation or questioning immediately after the occurrence of the alleged pilferage of medicines and where he was given the opportunity to state his defenses, and thereafter, before the arbitration branch of the Department of Labor where he was required and did submit his position paper. chanroblespublishingcompany The law in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.[11] While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights, which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the

established facts and applicable law and doctrine. WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is reversed and set aside and the Labor Arbiters decision of November 8, 1979 dismissing Cesar E. Ladisla as petitioners stock analyst is hereby reinstated. No costs. chanroblespublishingcompany SO ORDERED. chanroblespublishingcompany Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. chanroblespublishingcompany Feliciano, J., is on leave. Chanroblespublishingcom

SAME CASE

G.R. No. 75662 September 15, 1989 MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NLRC SHERIFF and CESAR E. LADISLA, respondents. Veronica G. de Vera for petitioner. David B. Agoncillo for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.: Petitioner assails in this petition for review on certiorari the Resolution dated July 24, 1986 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-19301-78-T denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its decision dated April 30, 1986 which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana and ordered the reinstatement of private respondent Cesar E. Ladisla to his former position with full backwages. Records show that private respondent Cesar E. Ladisla was employed by petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation as a Stock Analyst at its Claro M. Recto Branch. He had been with the company for two years and nine months when on August 15, 1977 he was apprehended by representatives of Mercury Drug while in the act of pilfering company property consisting of three (3) bottles of Persantin and one (1) bottle of Valoron at 100 tablets per bottle with a total value of P272.00. He admitted his guilt to the investigating representatives of petitioner company and executed a handwritten admission. Said admission was repeated verbally at the police station before the arresting officer as shown in the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report which was signed and authenticated by Ladisla. 1 Thus, on August 19, 1977, petitioner, while simultaneously placing private respondent on preventive suspension, filed before the Department of Labor an application for the termination of private respondent's employment on grounds of dishonesty and breach of trust. Private respondent opposed the aforesaid application for clearance to terminate his services alleging among others, that his suspension and proposed dismissal were unfounded and baseless being premised on the machinations and incriminatory acts of Ms. Leonora Suarez and Edgardo Imperial, Manager and Retail Supervisor, respectively, of petitioner's Claro M. Recto Branch; and that he was not given the opportunity to be heard nor allowed to explain his side before he was summarily suspended. The parties were then required by the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor to file their respective position papers. While the case was being heard by Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana petitioner filed a criminal complaint for attempted qualified theft against private respondent before the Fiscal's Office of Manila but this was dismissed by the court before the arraignment of the accused. However, the case was refiled and docketed as Criminal Case No. 43096 before Judge Pedro A. Ramirez of the then Court of First Instance, subsequently the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXX. In a decision dated November 8, 1979. 2 Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana sustained the validity of private respondent's dismissal and granted petitioner's application for clearance to terminate, the services of the former.

Private respondent appealed his aforesaid dismissal to the National Labor Relations Commission. Pending resolution of the appeal, herein petitioner filed a Manifestation with said Commission notifying the latter of the ongoing trial in Criminal Case No. 43096 against private respondent. On September 15, 1983, judgment was rendered in Criminal Case No. 43096, finding private respondent accused guilty of the crime of simple theft. 3 No appeal was taken from the decision in the subject criminal case, private respondent having availed himself of the benefits of the Probation Law. He was eventually discharged from probation on December 27, 1984, after complying with the terms and conditions thereof. 4 On April 30, 1986, public respondent National Labor Relations Commission reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter because it found no substantial evidence establishing the charge against private respondent Ladisla stating thus: WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby set aside and a new one entered ordering respondent to immediately reinstate him in (sic) his former position with full back wages. SO ORDERED. 5 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision, which was denied by public respondent Commission in its resolution dated July 24, 1986. 6 Hence, this petition assailing the latter's reversal of the labor arbiter's decision and its order for the reinstatement with full back wages of private respondent. Petitioner submits that it was serious legal error on the part of public respondent to order the reinstatement of private respondent who was convicted of the crime of simple theft by Judge Pedro Ramirez in Criminal Case No. 43096 filed by petitioner against said private respondent-employee involving the same facts obtaining in the present case for termination. On the other hand, private respondent maintains that he was a victim of revenge and incriminatory machinations as the charge of qualified theft of company property was a frame-up. We hold that public respondent National Labor Relations Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding no substantial evidence to sustain the charge against private respondent. This conclusion is in complete and utter disregard of the Regional Trial Court's conviction of private respondent for the crime of simple theft which decision was rendered prior to its own assailed decision. It must be remembered that proceedings in criminal cases such as that held in the subject criminal case require proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish the guilt of the accused and findings of fact of the trial court on this matter are generally accorded great weight by appellate courts most especially where no appeal had been filed thereafter, thus rendering the said findings final. As mentioned earlier, private respondent did not appeal from the decision of the lower court but instead availed himself of the benefits of the probation law which was correspondingly granted by the Regional Trial Court. Dismissal of a dishonest employee is to the best interest not only of management but also of labor. As a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest, a company has the right to dismiss its erring employees. An employer cannot be compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to its interest, justifying loss of confidence in him. The law does not impose unjust situations on either labor or management. 7 We therefore find justification in the termination of private respondent Cesar E. Ladisla's employment by petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation. Under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employment for "fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative." Loss of confidence is established as a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee. The law does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct to invoke such a justification. It is sufficient that there is some basis for the loss of trust or that the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position. 8 Private respondent's admission of his guilt as earlier stated, his subsequent conviction in Criminal Case No. 43096 and his acceptance of the same as implied in the absence of an appeal therefrom and his subsequent application for probation established beyond reasonable doubt his guilt for the crime of simple theft. It was this same act which gave rise to his conviction by the trial court that was the basis for the termination of his employment by petitioner. We have held that the eventual conviction of the employee who is prosecuted for his misconduct is not indispensable to warrant his dismissal by his employer. 9 More specifically, an employee who has been exonerated from a criminal charge of theft of gasoline on the basis of technicality may still be dismissed from employment if the employer has ample reason to mistrust him. 10 If acquittal from the criminal charge does not negate the existence

of a ground for loss of trust and confidence, with more reason should conviction for such criminal charge fortify said mistrust. Anent private respondent's claim of summary suspension without being given the opportunity to be heard, the Court takes note that, in addition to the fact that his suspension was merely preventive pending approval by the Department of Labor of its application for clearance to terminate the services of private respondent, the latter was given the chance to defend himself in several instances: at the Police Precinct No. III, Western Police District, Metro Manila where he was brought for investigation or questioning immediately after the occurrence of the alleged pilferage of medicines and where he was given the opportunity to state his defenses, and thereafter, before the arbitration branch of the Department of Labor where he was required and did submit his position paper. The law in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. 11 While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights, which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine . 12 WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is reversed and set aside and the Labor Arbiter's decision of November 8, 1979 dismissing Cesar E. Ladisla as petitioner's stock analyst is hereby reinstated. No costs. SO ORDERED. Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave.