G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999 ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner, VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EUFEMIO MULI, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales which declared a failure of elections. Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. The COMELEC, after revision and re-appreciation of contested ballots, declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes. Lonzanida was then ordered to vacate his post. In the May 11, 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. His opponent Eufemio Muli filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio on the ground that he has served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998 the first Division of COMELEC grant the petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida's assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the xpiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. COMELEC en banc affirmed the finding of the COMELEC First Division. Thus, this petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the resolutions issued by the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC en banc. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective government officials HELD: No, Petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. RATIO: Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent: (1) The petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation of and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as a mayor cannot be

deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. A proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections. (2) The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

G.R No. 147927, February 4, 2002 RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., respondents. FACTS: Private respondent, Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. He was reelected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998 he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the office of the Povincial Election Supervisor a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three consecutive term as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, (2) in the election of May 1995, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where; he served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election The COMELEC, through the First Division, found private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the position of city mayor on the ground that he had already served three consecutive terms, and his Certificate of Candidacy was ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled. The COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. On May 19, 2001, after canvassing, private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City. Thus, this petition for certiorari, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to nullify and set aside the resolution of public respondent Commission on Elections. ISSUE: Whether or not public private respondent was disqualified to run for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections

HELD: No, private respondent's victory in the recall election was not considered a term of office and is not included in the three-term disqualification rule. RATIO: COMELEC's ruling that private respondent was not elected for three consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. Private respondent's victory in the recall election cannot be deemed as a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interuption in the continuity of service.

G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner, VS. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents. ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor. FACTS: On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines (Ramos) issued AO 372 (Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998). This requires LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized appropriations for non-personal services items and to stop all training (except those funded and conducted by the national government), hiring of personnel, and foreign travel (except those funded by grants). The AO also suspended tax expenditure subsidies to all LGUs. Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUs cost reduction program in violation of the LGU's fiscal autonomy (Section 1) 2. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withholding of 10% of the LGU's IRA (Section 4) HELD: 1. No, Section 1 of AO 372 is consistent with the president's power of supervision over local governments (Sec.4, Art. X of the Constitution). 2. Yes, Section 4 of AO 372 encroaches in the fiscal autonomy of local governments.

RATIO: (1) Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control1.The directive to identify and implement measures that will reduce total expenditures by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern. Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. No legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their offcials who do not follow such advice. (2) Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five days after every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. Such wothholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means something held back or withheld, often temporarily. Hence, the temporary nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.

G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002 VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner, VS. THE COMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR., respondents. FACTS: On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officals of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA). The PRA was convened to initiate the recall of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001.On the same date, the PRA passed Recall Resolution which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution. The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election. On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall
1 Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to perform them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

election. Several petitions seeking to disqualify Hagedorn were filed. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. The COMELEC's First Division dismissed for lack of merit the petitions. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. Hence, the instant consolidated petitions for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. ISSUE: Whether or not Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002 HELD: Yes, Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa. RATIO: The three term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 82, Article X of the Constitution, which is reiterated in Section 43 (b)3 of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts: (1) an elective official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms, (2) voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next reglar election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons: (1) a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms, (2) the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City because: 1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001; 2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntary interrupted from June 30,
2 The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. 3 No local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interrupon in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen; 3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and 4. Term limit should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders.