‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

:
The Future of Genocide Prevention in the Anglo-American Sphere
By Julia Pettengill

First published in 2009 by The Henry Jackson Society The Henry Jackson Society 38 Craven Street London WC2N 5NG Tel: 020 7340 4520 www.henryjacksonsociety.org © Julia Pettengill & the Henry Jackson Society, 2009 All rights reserved The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and are not necessarily indicative of those of the Henry Jackson Society or its Trustees Designed by Genium Design, www.geniumdesign.com Printed by Intype Libra Limited, www.intypelibra.co.uk

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About the Henry Jackson Society
The Henry Jackson Society: Project for Democratic Geopolitics is a crosspartisan, British think-tank. Our founders and supporters are united by a common interest in fostering a strong British, European and American commitment towards freedom, liberty, constitutional democracy, human rights, governmental and institutional reform and a robust foreign, security and defence policy and transatlantic alliance. The Henry Jackson Society is a registered charity (no. 1113948). For more information about Henry Jackson Society activities, our research programme and public events please see www.henryjacksonsociety.org.

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About the Author
Julia Pettengill is an Associate Fellow of the Henry Jackson Society and a graduate of the University of St Andrews. She has extensive experience in the field of genocide studies, including a thesis on the testimony of Holocaust survivors. She has also served as an Editorial Assistant for the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, which will release a further publication on the issue of humanitarian intervention in September 2009.

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’:
The Future of Genocide Prevention in the Anglo-American Sphere
By Julia Pettengill

www.henryjacksonsociety.org

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Foreword by Eric Joyce MP
The prevention of genocide is a challenge which must engage the attention of all political parties and all citizens in Britain. This momentous task is perhaps impossible to tackle without the cooperation of key allies; yet with the active engagement of voters, civil society groups and Members of Parliament, Britain may find that she has a great deal to contribute to this vital and necessary cause. In my own work as Chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Genocide Prevention & the Great Lakes Region of Africa, I have witnessed the tremendous potential within Parliament itself and the electorate to advance this cause at the highest levels of government. Our APPG – in cooperation with civil society groups and active citizens – is currently campaigning to close the gaps in UK legislation relating to the prosecution of suspected perpetrators of genocide. This need for mobilization and concrete goals forms the central focus of this new report written by Julia Pettengill for the Henry Jackson Society, entitled ‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’: The Future of Genocide Prevention in the AngloAmerican Sphere. In this report, Ms. Pettengill highlights the opportunity to promote this issue in the United Kingdom and the United States by examining the policy options available to politicians on both sides of the Atlantic, and the constructive role which should be played by civil society groups. She draws attention to the need for a practical reassessment of this issue, arguing that the persistent threat of genocide constitutes both a moral failure to uphold the terms of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, and a significant peril to regional stability and international security. By bringing together the perspectives of eminent politicians, policy experts and civil society representatives from the US and UK, this report adds to the existing body of perspectives on this subject, and will, I hope, contribute to a reinvigorated discussion of the issue within and between these two countries.

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ContEntS
Foreword List of Main Acronyms used in this Publication Executive Summary Introduction Chapter One: Competing Legal, Academic and Political Understandings of Genocide Chapter Two: Civil Society, Political Will and Genocide Prevention Conclusion Interview Subjects Written Sources & Further Reading Useful Websites 6 8 9 11 14

50 62 66 71 75

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LiSt MAin oF ACronyMS uSEd in tHiS PuBLiCAtion
Au dfid Eu FCo iCC iCtr iCty idP Mod nAto nGo oSAPG P-5 r2P un African Union Department for International Development European Union Foreign and Commonwealth Office International Criminal Court International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia Internally Displaced Persons Ministry of Defence North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Governmental Organisation Office for the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Permanent Five (members of the UN Security Council) Responsibility to Protect United Nations

unAMid African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur unGC UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide

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Executive Summary

ExECutivE SuMMAry:
• The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide – passed in tandem with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – was intended to be a foundational document of the post-war era. However, the international community – and particularly the UN Security Council – has consistently failed to prioritize the prevention of genocide, and have remained bystanders to at least five subsequent genocides. As two of the world’s leading democracies, the United Kingdom and the United States have a responsibility to put the issue of effective genocide prevention at the forefront of their foreign policy agendas. This report advocates the promotion of this issue at the highest levels of government – with particular emphasis on the leadership of the Executive. This can be approached under the rubric of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, a cogent expression of the moral and practical intolerability of genocide. If this concept is to have any meaning, it cannot remain wedded to seeking Security Council approval for coercive action in the event of genocide or mass atrocities, as the Security Council’s record on this issue is one of abject failure. The US and UK – and indeed all responsible member states – must begin to formulate an alternative approach, and can begin by making a commitment to protect the civilians of Darfur from the ongoing campaign of atrocities orchestrated by the Sudanese government. A new approach to genocide prevention cannot rely on the International Criminal Court as a deterrent for future genocidaires. The value of the ICC can only be measured after

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

a genocide is halted and, if possible, its perpetrators brought to justice; in the immediate situation, the US and UK must focus on concrete measures to protect targeted civilians and take steps for the eventual removal of the regime in question. • Long term policy shifts and inter-agency cooperation within both the US and UK governments are absolutely essential to the development of a responsive early warning capacity, and contingency plans for humanitarian intervention. This should form the springboard of a treaty committed to ending genocide, which could be initiated through NATO, a new global body of democracies or ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing.’ This should be undertaken as a demonstration of the validity and necessity of the ‘responsibility to Protect’. Non-governmental pressure groups are vital to assembling the political will necessary for governmental action, and genocidefocused civil society groups must place the goal of engaging the electorate at the centre of their strategies. In the UK – where the anti-genocide movement is less visible than the US – civil society groups should push for the creation of a policy group similar to the US Genocide Prevention Task Force, which could propose UKspecific policies for genocide prevention.

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Introduction

introduCtion

‘This guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems...We are simply not equipped to deal, on a human, political level, with a guilt that is beyond crime and an innocence that is beyond good and virtue.”1 When Hannah Arendt wrote of a ‘guilt that is beyond crime,’ she referred to the incomprehensible scale of the murder conducted by Nazi war criminals. This unprecedented atrocity is honoured annually through events such as Holocaust Memorial Day, where politicians routinely make the now-clichéd promise of ‘Never Again.’ Yet the moral clarity with which we recall the liberation of the concentration camps, the discovery of the killing fields of Cambodia and the mass graves in Iraq and Bosnia has a curious habit of fading from the general political view, only to recur after the next genocide has been successfully concluded. In this sense, the bystander nations of the international community – but particularly the powerful permanent members of the Security Council – have become party to this ‘guilt beyond crime.’ The modern phenomena of organised and targeted mass murder has occurred in the context of a globalized world, yet many politicians have tended to cordon this issue off from the calculations of international relations, maintaining that nothing can be done about it and, in any case, it is not relevant to our strategic interests. Former President Bill Clinton once observed that ‘All over the world were people like me, sitting in offices... who did not fully appreciate the depth or the speed with which [the

1. Arendt, Hannah, & Jaspers, Karl, Correspondence 1926-1969, eds. Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner; trans. Robert & Rita Kimber (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992) p. 54

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

Rwandan Tutsis] were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror.’2 Then again, none of those people occupied the most powerful office in the world. The task of assembling sufficient political will remains the central obstacle to constructing a clear, consistent and morally acceptable strategy for the prevention of genocide in any of its stages. Although the intervention in Kosovo demonstrated the US and UK governments’ willingness to intervene in anticipation of a repeat of the Bosnian genocide, a consistent and muscular Anglo-American policy on genocide prevention did not emerge from this experience – as demonstrated by the absence of a robust response to the occurrence of genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. The public discourse on genocide in both the United States and the United Kingdom is plagued by two opposing and incorrect assumptions. First, that the Western world – and America in particular – can halt all of the world’s evils simply by virtue of its economic and military strength. This approach ignores the realities of the democratic system, characterized by competing interests, priorities and a penchant for short-sighted decisions. The second supposition holds that the West can do nothing, and perhaps should do nothing, to stop genocide – that we would just make things worse, and that it is none of our business anyway. This report seeks to dispel these corrosive assumptions by investigating pragmatic strategies to both build political will and fashion implementable anti-genocide policies. The scope of this report has been limited to the Anglo-American sphere, and is framed around the insights of forty academics, legal and human rights experts, NGO representatives and politicians from both sides of the Atlantic regarding the viability of various long and short-term strategies for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. This survey of opinion – unique to this Henry Jackson Society report – provides a collection of perspectives on the crucial need to close the gap between rhetoric and action on this issue. The first chapter of this report provides an overview of the legal and political issues which have inhibited the development of a consistent strategy for genocide prevention, and some suggestions as to how these obstacles can be overcome. This report argues for the integration of
2. Power, Samantha, ‘Bystanders to Genocide,’ The Atlantic Monthly, September, 2001, http://www. theatlantic.com/doc/200109/power-genocide

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Introduction

concrete measures for the prevention of genocide in the foreign policy of the US and UK. The past sixty years of history – and most recently the feckless handling of the UNAMID (African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur) mission – have demonstrated the uselessness of relying on the UN Security Council to take steps to end genocide. Moreover, while the recent decision to issue a warrant for President Omar Bashir’s arrest may create the illusion of international action on behalf of Darfur, it is essentially unenforceable and influenced President Bashir’s subsequent expulsion of vital humanitarian organisations from Sudan. It is time for the Anglo-American alliance to abandon rhetoric and obfuscation in favour of a permanent and realistic strategy – a strategy which includes an early warning mechanism at the governmental level and a standing contingency plan for immediate intervention in the case of genocide. Although politicians may embrace the idea of a firm antigenocide agenda, competing political priorities and a lack of sustained public pressure have prevented this from emerging, particularly in the UK. Consequently, Chapter Two of this report underscores the indispensability of a vocal non-governmental anti-genocide campaign in mobilizing electorates on this issue. The report advocates the expansion of these civil society initiatives particularly in the UK, where genocide-focused projects are comparatively rare in contrast with the US.

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CHAPtEr onE
COmPETING LEGAL, ACADEmIC AND POLITICAL undErStAndinGS oF GEnoCidE

What is ‘genocide,’ and why does it exact a duty from the international community beyond other cases of mass death? The term brings to mind vivid images and associations, but does this basic understanding necessarily reflect either the scope or limitations of this word? Genocide might immediately be associated with the skeletal prisoners at the gates of Auschwitz or Belsen, but would the mass graves of Burundi, Bangladesh or East Timor be recalled similarly? If Saddam Hussein ‘only’ murdered an estimated 200,000 Kurds, does the Anfal Campaign ‘count’ as genocide? This report defines genocide as the targeted murder of defined ethnic, religious and/or social, political and cultural groups deemed to possess endemic qualities which render them essentially inhuman and thus suitable for destruction. As stated by the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide – to be discussed in the following section – this destruction can be undertaken in whole or in part, and includes attempts to destroy the possibility of the continuation of that group via the destruction of collective practices, knowledge and artefacts, policies of forced abortion or sterilisation and the indirect murder of groups through intentional policies of deprivation, which Helen Fein describes as ‘genocide by attrition.’3 Dr Greg Stanton is one of the leading scholars of comparative genocide, a former diplomat at the US State Department and the
3. Fein, Helen, ‘Genocide by Attrition 1939-1993,’ Health and Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1997), pp. 10-45

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Competing Legal, Academic and Political Understandings of Genocide

founder of the first dedicated anti-genocide organisation, Genocide Watch. Stanton’s pioneering study ‘The Eight Stages of Genocide’ offers clear guidelines for the process by which genocide occurs, and posits that genocide is not so much an ‘explosion’ of violence, as occurs with massacres committed at a time of war, but rather the breakdown of the bonds which prevent a neighbour from murdering his neighbour. ‘The process unfolds in different ways depending on the cultural context,’ explains Stanton. ‘Whereas the ‘Final Solution’ took years to come together, and was exemplary by virtue of its incredible bureaucratization, the Rwandan genocide killed 800,000 people in 100 days in a really lowtech operation.’ Stanton argues that the essential steps towards murder are shared in each case, and consist of ‘Classification, Symbolization, Dehumanization, Organisation, Polarization, Preparation, Extermination, and Denial.’4 Dr Brian Brivati, Director of the John Smith Memorial Trust and former Professor of Comparative Genocide at Kingston University, expressed a similarly process-oriented approach to the phenomenon. ‘When a governing party starts to describe its opponents in an overtly ethnic or derogatory way, and when this starts a mushroom effect of isolation, exclusion and differentiation, you see the psychological shift take place which is necessary for genocide,’ Brivati argues. In this way, destabilized societies become ideal host states for racist, nationalist and other extremist pathologies. Brivati observes that one of the underpinnings of his understanding is Raul Hilberg’s seminal observation that the Holocaust occurred as the result of a sinister triangle between ‘victims, perpetrators and bystanders.’5 The final ‘point’ on that triangle signifies the passive complicity of those who, either out of terror or silent approval, ‘stand by’ as genocide proceeds. Scholars such as Robert Gellately, Ben Kiernan and Robert Melson have argued that genocides tend to emerge in times of war – particularly civil war – or extreme political crisis, ‘when the normal rules of human interaction are suspended and the practice of violence is honoured and rewarded.’6 This link has been borne out by statistical studies

4. Stanton, Gregory, ‘The Eight Stages of Genocide,’ Yale Genocide Studies Series, (February, 1998) 5. Hilberg, Raul, The Destruction of the European Jews, (New York: Holmes & Meir, 1985) 6. Gellately, Robert & Kiernan, Ben, The Spectre of Genocide, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 2003), p. 56

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by Barbara Harff and Rudy Rummel, whose comparative genocide models reveal almost every case to have resulted from these conditions.7

The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
The aforesaid models of the processes of genocide are rooted first and foremost in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (UNGC), conceived and written by Dr Raphael Lemkin. ‘The Genocide Convention was a turning point for humanity, the founding moral document of the post-war era’ remarks Philip Spencer, Associate Dean and Professor of Comparative Genocide at Kingston University. ‘To borrow an analogy, the convention was like the discovery of how the heart pumps blood around the body. It doesn’t stop you from having a heart attack, but it does tell you what a heart attack is – it is our task to translate that understanding into prevention.’ The UNGC was passed after the devastating and unprecedented murder of an estimated six million European Jews, in addition to thousands of Sinti and Roma and the mentally and physically disabled. However, the legal foundations of Lemkin’s argument can be traced back to his proposal for the introduction of international laws against ‘barbarity’ (the murder of groups) and ‘vandalism’ (the destruction of cultures) in 1933, which was itself a reaction against the mass murder of Armenians by the Turkish state during the First World War.8 In the aftermath of the Holocaust, there was little excuse not to endorse a document which would recognize a crime of this scale and which pledged to prevent and punish its perpetrators.9 Concurrent with the newly-minted proscription of ‘crimes against humanity,’ the UNGC recognized genocide as a unique variant in its scope and in: ‘...the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group...’ by ‘Killing members of the group;
7. Harff, Barbara, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955,’ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, p. 57-73; Rummel, Rudy, ‘Power, Genocide and Mass Murder,’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Feb., 1994), pp. 1-10 8. Lemkin Raphael, ‘Genocide as a Crime under International Law,’ The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan., 1947), pp. 145-151 9. Although despite American support for the measure at the UN, the United States Congress did not ratify the treaty until 1988.

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Competing Legal, Academic and Political Understandings of Genocide

causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’10 The only legal obligations imposed upon signatories are Article 5, which requires that state-parties enact laws to outlaw genocide, and Article 7, which compels signed states to extradite persons indicted on the charge of genocide. However, signing on to a convention implies that the signatories have committed to articulating the principles therein as a matter of policy. To this extent, the obligation to prevent is clearly undertaken in Articles 1 and 8: ‘The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.’ ‘Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any other acts enumerated in Article III.’ [emphasis mine].11 This document does contain some problematic elements. Namely, the failure to include the murder of political and social groups in the definition; the ambiguous ‘mental harm’ provision; the legal difficulties of proving the ‘intent to destroy in whole or in part;’ the lack of recommendations for prevention and the lack of a specific quantitative definition of genocide.12 In fact, political and social groups were included in Lemkin’s original draft of the Convention but were excised from the final version at the insistence of the Soviet Union.13 The omission of social and political groups from the text of the convention, in addition to the
10. ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,’ 9 December 1948, http://www.unhchr. ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm 11. Ibid. 12. Harff, Barbara, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955,’ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, p. 58 13. Power, Samantha, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, (New York: Harper Perennial, 2003), p. 386

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

inclusion of the rather vague phrase ‘the attempt to destroy in whole or in part,’ have been enduring bones of contention in the interpretation and application of the UNGC. One sad consequence of this debate is that it has been invoked as an excuse for inaction. Some experts feel that infrequent application of the word ‘genocide’ is the only prudent way to protect the convention from dilution and abuse. In keeping with this attitude, Human Rights Watch has declined to label the atrocities in Darfur as genocide, and has chosen to maintain this position despite the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictments of senior Sudanese officials on the charge of genocide. Senior Legal Adviser for Human Rights Watch James Ross explains the legal rationale for this decision as a ‘strict interpretation’ of the convention. According to Ross, ‘while Cambodia was certainly a case of state-organised mass murder, legally one can only refer to the targeting of the Cham and Vietnamese as genocide because they were killed because of their national and religious identities. The Khmer Rouge’s politically motivated mass murder is a crime against humanity, but does not fall under the same description as genocide.’ Charles Garraway, one of the British jurists consulted during the drafting of the Rome Statute, concurs: ‘When one speaks of destruction in whole or in part...one must beware of broadening the definition so much that genocide becomes indistinguishable from other crimes under international law,’ Garraway reasons. ‘There really has to be some notion of size,’ adds Joost Hiltermann, Deputy Programme Director of the Middle East and North Africa Section of the International Crisis Group and author of A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq and the Gassing of Halabja. ‘And one mustn’t confuse crimes against humanity with genocide – genocide must remain the most severe crime and thus have accompanying strict evidentiary standards.’ James Ross argues that while many situations fall under the rubric of crimes against humanity, to prove genocide ‘one must provide sufficient documentary, testimonial and circumstantial evidence of intent to destroy a certain population’ and that it is the ‘intent’ aspect of the convention which ultimately limits its application. In the case of Darfur, Ross argues that the research conducted by Human Rights Watch attests to a campaign of severe crimes against humanity, but that their research had not uncovered a ‘smoking gun of genocidal intent, based on documentary, testimonial and circumstantial evidence.’ Interestingly, the Human Rights Watch report ‘Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and

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Militia Forces in Western Sudan’ did find evidence of the intentional targeting of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups for annihilation, but determined that this did not fulfil the criteria of ‘in whole or in part.’ As for the legal onus imposed by these findings, Mr Ross argues that ‘since the convention does not impose a requirement for intervention, our perspective is that whether a situation meets the legal requirement for genocide or not, the international community has an obligation to take steps to bring genocide or crimes against humanity to an end.’ This minimalist interpretation of the term genocide rightly contends that the term ‘genocide’ must have a specific and narrow application if it is to retain its meaning and moral potency. To be sure, the word must be defended against politicized misapplication, which undermines the purpose of the UNGC. The recent Israeli-Hamas conflict, the Russian invasion of Georgia and, indeed, the Georgian governance of South Ossetia have all been labelled genocidal at various points, in a manner which constitutes a dangerous abuse of the term. Yet should this interpretation be so narrow as to exclude cases which certainly appear genocidal from being covered under the UNGC? Greg Stanton advocates a broader interpretation of the convention. ‘The fact is, genocide ‘in part’ as defined by the UNGC is far more common than many people think,’ he contends. According to Stanton, arguments in favour of a ‘narrow understanding’ of the convention tend to misconstrue both the obligations imposed by the convention and the body of legal precedent which has arisen from subsequent cases of genocide, such as the Nuremberg Trials and the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). To that end, the conviction of Jean-Paul Akeyesu on the charge of genocide at the ICTR set an important precedent for the application of broad evidentiary standards to prove intent and complicity.14 In Stanton’s view, lawyers who have argued that there is a legal obligation to intervene, and that hence it is necessary to invoke the term genocide sparingly, fundamentally misunderstand or misrepresent the legal obligations imposed by the convention. In fact, the convention is notoriously reticent on the subject of intervention, and through Article 8 leaves the decision to the discretion of the contracting state parties, which ‘may call upon competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter as they consider appropriate for the
14. Greenawalt, Alexander, ‘Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation,’ Columbia Law Review, Vol. 99, No. 8 (Dec., 1999), pp. 2259-2294

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prevention and suppression of genocide.’ For Greg Stanton, the inclusion of politicide in the accepted legal definition of genocide would be the natural extension of Lemkin’s original intent. Indeed, had it not been for the Soviet Union’s presence on the Security Council, the Convention would have included the targeting of socio-political groups in the definition of genocide. Moreover, scholars such as Beth van Schaack have argued that this ‘blind spot of the convention’ has been superseded by the jus cogens norms of international treaty law, whereby the body of precedent now supports the inclusion of political groups in the definition.15 Jane Gordon, Senior Lecturer in Human Rights at Kingston University, comments in a similar vein: ‘The Genocide Convention was originally written as a generic policy statement. And over the years more bones have been added to it, with the evolution of case law and the Rome Statute in particular.’ Dr James Smith, Executive Director of the anti-genocide charity Aegis Trust, is a firm opponent of the ‘minimalist’ interpretations of the UNGC, which he feels have tended to reduce the convention to something of a dead letter. ‘Unfortunately,’ Dr Smith argues, ‘it is often lawyers who have undermined the spirit of the genocide convention because they have claimed that you need to prove intent in the form of some sort of blueprint for annihilation. In fact, there is never a clear documentary blueprint, so it’s a matter of assembling evidence to prove the crime via evidence on the ground, and analyzing that evidence to see if genocidal processes are underway.’ The US State Department began to take a more proactive stance towards the application of the convention in the aftermath of the Department’s endorsement of inaction during the Rwandan genocide. Between 1996 and 1998, US attorney Pierre-Richard Prosper prosecuted Jean-Paul Akeysu at the ICTR and won the first successful conviction under the terms of the Genocide Convention. In 1997 President Clinton approved the creation of the position Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, and in 2004, Prosper, the-then-occupant of this position, launched an unprecedented investigative project to determine whether the Sudanese government’s actions in Darfur constituted genocide, entitled the Atrocities Documentation Project. This investigation and statistical analysis was conducted by the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, which after interviewing a sample of over 1,000 Sudanese
15. Van Schaack, Beth, ‘The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot,’ The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106, No. 7 (May, 1997), pp. 2259-2291

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refugees concluded in 2004 that the atrocities constituted genocide.16 While this led US Secretary of State Colin Powell to publically acknowledge the situation as genocide, no other permanent members of the Security Council have done so, and the International Commission of Inquiry into Darfur has declined to label the atrocities genocide. To date, the UK Foreign Office continues to classify the events in Darfur as a ‘humanitarian disaster,’ as if the Darfuri people were victims of earthquakes rather than AK-47s. ‘What more evidence do you need?’ asks Greg Stanton. ‘The actions of the government and militias – the demonstration of a pattern of targeted mass murder of whole groups, of rape and intentional displacement and starvation all fit the evidentiary standards built through precedent.’ Brian Brivati observes that withholding an official acknowledgement of genocide ‘gives legal cover to inaction, and successive genocidaires have learned and grown from that precedent – they’ve learned to destroy evidence, and they look to the rest of the world to see what they can get away with.’

Genocide Prevention and the International Criminal Court
The ICC has indicted Sudan’s Ahmed Harun and Ali Kushayb for genocide and crimes against humanity and has issued a warrant for President Omar Bashir’s arrest for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Does the ICC hold any promise as an instrument of justice for sitting ministers of state and, moreover, as a deterrent for potentially genocidal governments? The Rome Statute, which came into effect in 2002, gives the ICC jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. Article 6 defines the crime of genocide as: ‘Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
16. Stanton, Gregory, ‘Proving Genocide in Darfur: The Atrocities Documentation Project and Resistance to its Findings,’ in Totten, Samuel & Markusen, Eric (eds.), Genocide in Darfur, (New York: Routledge, 2006)

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(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’17 As one of the UK delegation of jurists charged with drafting the Rome Statute, Charles Garraway is sanguine about its potential to protect or stop genocide. ‘It’s more of a political problem than a legal problem, because it comes down to choices that states make,’ offers Garraway. ‘The ICC is a step forward, but international criminal law can only go so far – particularly when you’re looking at cases like Rwanda where you had a lot of voluntary participation on the part of the Hutu population.’ The perpetrator-oriented processes of the ICC are necessarily arduous and slow, and are of limited help to societies devastated by genocide. Moreover, the ICC cannot arrest an ongoing genocide because it lacks enforcement power and is entirely reliant on states to support it. To this extent, Garraway points out that the ICC has essentially been given the task of ‘taking the fall for the Security Council’s unwillingness to make a political decision to stop genocide.’ The United States has refused to ratify the Rome Statute due to objections over the scope of the Court’s powers and its lack of checks and balances. By the end of President Bush’s administration however, the United States had begun to enter into a new modus vivendi with the ICC – a development which looks likely to continue under President Obama, who has indicated his willingness to re-sign the Rome Treaty. Clint Williamson, the current US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, comments, ‘I think that over the past three years the US has had a much more cooperative relationship with the ICC. For instance, we did not block the UN Security Council’s referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC, and we abstained on the Security Council resolution on the AU/UN Mission in Darfur mandate because the language undermined the ability of the ICC to pursue these prosecutions.’ However, Ambassador Williamson noted that ‘The US government’s position, as well as the ICC’s own approach, is based on complementarity, so we’re committed whenever possible to having these actors tried in their own courts domestically, or if necessary in a hybrid domestic-international arrangement and if all else fails by a purely international process.’
17. Article 6, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,’ 10 November 1998, http://untreaty. un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm

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Certainly, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s decision to issue warrants for the arrest of Sudanese officials was an important symbolic gesture, and exile groups such as the Darfur Union of the UK have shown their support at recent protests calling for the arrest and trial of Omar Bashir. ‘It makes me so happy that the world will hold them accountable for their crimes,’ says Dr Halima Bashir, a Darfuri refugee and author of the recently-published memoir Tears of the Desert. Kishan Manocha, barrister and Fellow of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, is also encouraged: ‘There are problems and it is slow, but the ICC indictments are valuable in themselves because they send a message.’ Yet the likelihood of these indictments acting as a deterrent without powers of coercion is slim, and may actually work against the interest of the victims of these perpetrators – as evidenced by President Bashir’s recent expulsion of humanitarian groups in response to the warrant for his arrest. ‘On the one hand issuing these indictments is absolutely the right thing to do,’ reasons Brian Brivati. ‘But on the other hand, it doesn’t give the perpetrators any incentive to stop what they’re doing. You could write an eloquent editorial in The Guardian about how wonderful this indictment is, but at the end of the day nothing happens. And from a purely realist perspective, genocidaires don’t understand indictments – they understand airstrikes.’ In addition, a careful balance must be struck between recognizing genocide as a universal crime which imposes a duty of action upon the international community, and the right of a people to try their own criminals. Of course, this is not possible until those genocidaires are stopped and apprehended. ‘When we talk about nation-building, I think one of the factors that is put low on the list, which should actually be at the top, is building the rule of law,’ notes Ann McKechin, Labour MP for Glasgow North and former Vice Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Genocide Prevention. For example the ICTY has stymied the development of a robust Bosnian judicial system by marginalizing Bosnian judges and prosecutors within it.18 Mary Kayitesi-Blewitt, founder and former Director of the Survivors Fund, noted that many of the survivors of the Rwandan genocide whom she assists have been unable to testify in front of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda because there is no funding for their travel expenses. ‘They feel totally uninvolved in
18. Snyder, Jack & Vinjamuri, Leslie, ‘Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice,’ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter, 2003 - Spring, 2004) p.23

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this process which is supposed to bring us justice,’ Blewitt remarks. More recently, the long-awaited trial of former Khmer Rouge leader Kaing Guek Eav has been received approvingly by the international community and the people of Cambodia. However, the evidence suggests that although justice may finally be done, such trials will do little to deter future genocidaires. Is it time for a renewed attention to the text of the genocide convention, and possibly for an amendment to that text? The majority of the individuals interviewed for this report stressed that the UNGC must be re-emphasized, but that it was most likely a waste of resources to attempt to revisit or amend the language of the treaty. ‘An optional protocol to set up a treaty monitoring body may be a good step forward, to remove the gap in enforcement and reporting,’ Greg Stanton reasons. ‘But on the whole I think an amendment might be a waste of time, as the ICC has already codified the law of crimes against humanity to include political extermination.’ James Ross concurs: ‘I would be afraid that any attempt to amend it might actually weaken the text, so I would rather we focus on complying with the existing body of law.’ Ultimately, legal strategies to confront genocide will arise in the political sphere, and will require sufficient political will to become a reality. The following chapter addresses ways in which politicians in the US and UK can put genocide prevention on the policy-making agenda, and why they should do so.

Current Policy Initiatives – Progress, Challenges and Suggestions
‘I think the victims of Darfur who lost their lives are, in a way, luckier than those of us who survived and are still waiting for support and help after six years.’ Like so many survivors of genocides before her, Dr Halima Bashir carries the guilt and the pain of not being able to fight the forces who murdered her family, friends and neighbours. Bashir’s recentlypublished memoir Tears of the Desert testifies to the marginalization and racist discrimination meted out by the Arab-dominated regime in Khartoum towards the African Animists, Christians and Muslims of Darfur. Years of discrimination and civil war culminated in the state-ordered attacks by the Janjaweed militias upon the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit tribes, which reached the point of genocide by 2004. A medical doctor, Bashir was brutalized and raped by the Janjaweed militia for speaking out against the mass rape of primary school

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Competing Legal, Academic and Political Understandings of Genocide

girls by the militia and government officials. Her village was later attacked, her father killed and Bashir was forced to flee the country without her family. Bashir now lives in Britain, but is under surveillance by the Sudanese government and must cover her face in public to avoid identification.19 I was provided Bashir’s details through a mutual contact, and became aware that she was noticeably wary about even speaking on the phone, given her need for constant vigilance. Despite the threat to her safety, Dr Bashir is determined that her story should inform politicians and the public of the consequences of inaction in Darfur. ‘The Sudanese government has created a misconception that this is a problem of warring groups, when in fact the Darfuri people had been increasingly discriminated against right up to when the killing began,’ Bashir explains. ‘Now the government is attacking the survivors in the camps, and we are looking for more support from everyone – from the UN, from the UK, from the whole international community.’ The situation in Sudan has been a top-tier issue at the UN Security Council, the US Department of State and to a lesser extent the UK Foreign Office, and yet little effective action has been taken to adequately protect civilians from attack. Where are the helicopters so desperately needed by the UNAMID forces? Where are the additional 16,000+ troops needed to patrol the area of Sudan targeted by the Janjaweed – a region roughly the size of France with only 9,000 UNAMID troops to patrol, protect and rebuild the lives of the fragmented Darfuri population? Where, indeed, are the forces needed to protect the Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDP) camps where the Janjaweed continue to raid, rape and murder their inhabitants with impunity? It seems incredible that this should be the result of thousands of hours spent passing bills and resolutions, constructing treaties and forming committees on this issue. Even before the recent expulsions of humanitarian workers from Darfur, the Sudanese regime actively obstructed these groups and – worse still – deployed governmentbacked militias to attack and intimidate aid workers. The key components of the 2004 communiqué between the UN and the Sudanese government – the promise to disarm the Janjaweed, protect IDPs and protect civilians from human rights abuse – remain almost farcically unfulfilled. The human costs and threat to regional security increase by the day, as at least 300,000 Darfuris have been killed and an estimated
19. Bashir, Halima & Lewis, Damien, Tears of the Desert: A Memoir of Survival in Darfur (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2008)

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

3 million IDPs have fled to Chad and the Central African Republic. If left unresolved and the perpetrators unpunished, such wounds are likely to fester for years – as has happened in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis have flared up consistently since the conclusion of the Rwandan genocide. ‘When you look at these quite monumental failures,’ remarks Brian Brivati, ‘you have to ask: is this a failure of will, understanding, policy or just of indifference?’ At this pivotal moment in the future of the Anglo-American alliance, the prioritization of genocide prevention could provide a springboard from which to broach the intersection of human rights, the implementation of international law and responsible statehood, conflict prevention and the deterrence of aggression. Genocide prevention is intimately tied to shifting concepts of sovereignty and responsible statehood, and is a challenge which is at once singular in its political and moral dimensions and also very much connected with the top-tier concerns of the State Department and FCO. As a consequence of the Iraq War, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have distanced themselves from the topics of the limits of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the distrust bred by this conflict has permanently damaged the Anglo-American ability to garner the support necessary to undertake a full-scale humanitarian intervention. Yet a similar general aversion characterized much of the Anglo-American foreign policy agenda for many years prior to the second Iraq War. Indeed, the mismanaged and aborted 1993 intervention in Somalia was one of the primary reasons that the Clinton administration was unwilling to become involved in Bosnia and Rwanda. But at a time of mounting belligerence from Russia and Iran, an emboldened authoritarian regime in Beijing, and the persistent threat of rogue states, there has never been a more important moment for the US and UK to forge a resolute and clear consensus on the privileges and limitations of sovereignty in the 21st century. This inevitably requires a full and frank assessment of the UN’s record on genocide prevention, and the organisation’s current efforts to redress these failings.

The United Nations and Genocide Prevention: An unpromising record
‘The sovereign territorial state claims, as an integral part of its sovereignty, the right to commit genocide, or engage in genocidal massacres, against people under its rule, and the United Nations, for all

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Competing Legal, Academic and Political Understandings of Genocide

practical purposes, defends this right.’20 As one of the twentieth century’s foremost scholars of genocide, Leo Kuper arrived at this bleak conclusion just four years after the end of the Cambodian genocide. Twenty-five years and at least four genocides later, has anything improved? To respond with a resounding ‘no’ would seem obvious to the point of cliché – the Kurdish, Rwandan and Bosnian genocides unfolded virtually without interruption, with the Security Council’s stance ranging from ‘bystander’ to outright complicity. The Rwandan genocide is the most dramatic example of the institutional failure of the United Nations, and the failure of individual member states, to arrest the progress of genocide. Incredibly, as the Hutu massacres of the Rwandan Tutsi intensified in the Spring of 1994, the US and the UK lobbied the Security Council for a drawdown of the already-paltry UNAMIR Peacekeeping Force there. ‘Rwanda should have stopped us in our tracks,’ observes Linda Melvern, investigative journalist and a foremost expert on the Rwandan genocide. ‘I’ve studied this for fourteen years now, and I still have trouble believing that this could have been allowed to happen, and that no one has been held to account. It is the human rights catastrophe of recent years – and that should have made us re-think absolutely everything.’ Less than one year after 800,000 Rwandans were murdered, the UN peacekeeper Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Karremans famously shared a drink with Bosnian-Serb General Ratko Mladic as the latter’s army prepared to massacre over 7,000 Bosnian civilians.21 Under the terms of the UNGC, the Security Council is meant to be the central instrument – although, crucially, not the only instrument – for the application of the convention at the earliest or latest stages of genocide. Some critics believe that the failure of the UN to apply the genocide convention at any point has discredited the institution so indelibly as to nullify its original purpose. Others contend that, through reforms and the elaboration of concepts such as the ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ the UN can gradually evolve into the positive role envisioned at its founding. What, at this point, is the most practical approach to take towards the UN’s role in genocide prevention, both in the long and short-term?

20. Kuper, Leo, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) p. 161 21. Woodhead, Leslie (Director), ‘Srebrenica: A Cry from the Grave,’ 1999, BBC4 Productions

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

Almost all of the politicians, academics and NGO representatives with whom I spoke cited the power and composition of the Security Council as one of the key impediments to the prevention of genocide. ‘As an institution it just has not delivered,’ remarks US Congresswoman Louise Slaughter, Chairwoman of the House Rules Committee and member of the Helsinki Commission. The existence of the Russo-Chinese voting bloc within the permanent five (P-5) members of the Security Council was cited by nearly all interview subjects as the primary obstacle to achieving any action on genocide through the Security Council mechanism. Indeed, although Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to undertake military action in the event of ‘any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression,’ this device has not met the immediate challenge of halting incidents of genocide. The lack of accountability in the UN decision-making process emerges as the shared theme of any discussion of genocide prevention, and particularly on the failure of the Security Council to forge effective responses to potential or ongoing genocides. Linda Melvern uncovered one of the most disturbing examples of this opaque decision-making process. In June 1994, Colin Keating of New Zealand, acting President of the Security Council, informed Melvern that he was being ‘kept in the dark’ regarding the ongoing Rwandan genocide by the Secretary-General and P-5.22 Melvern has uncovered substantial evidence not only of collusion by P-5 members – particularly France – to reduce the potential for intervention, but of an intentional ‘cover-up’ of this information by senior UN officials. In contrast to the Rwandan genocide, the Security Council has dedicated many sessions to the fate of Darfur, and yet has taken years to deploy the undermanned, poorly equipped and inadequately trained joint UN-AU UNAMID peacekeeping force. Hiding behind the judgement of the International Commission of Inquiry into Darfur, P-5 members China and Russia have been decisive in forcing the issue over to the ICC. The watereddown sanctions passed against the Sudanese regime are best described as farcical given the fact that the Chinese government continues to sell arms to Khartoum. Moreover, the protection of civilians in Darfur has been circumscribed by the deficient mandate of the UNAMID force, whose presence remains contingent on the consent of the Sudanese government.

22. Interview, Linda Melvern; See also A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2000)

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Competing Legal, Academic and Political Understandings of Genocide

The ongoing misery in Darfur cannot be laid entirely at the feet of Russia and China or at some more general failure by the UN as a whole. As P-5 members, the US and UK have the power to both bring situations to the attention of the Security Council and conclude alternative arrangements outside the Security Council if no appropriate action is taken. However, it would appear that fallout from the Iraq War has left the State Department and Foreign Office eager to pursue the issue via the Security Council, even at the price of inertia and inaction. The failure of this approach, and some pragmatic steps forward for US and UK policy, will be discussed later in this report; the following section assesses the opportunities for useful collaboration with the UN on the issue of genocide prevention.

Positive Steps Forward
Although the politicized nature of UN decision-making has hindered genocide prevention efforts, it must be stressed that individual agencies such as UNICEF have saved and improved lives in some of the most deprived areas of the world. While the sprawling bureaucracy of the UN and the difficulties of oversight can yield diminishing returns if not outright corruption, that bureaucracy also has an extremely valuable capacity for the collection and analysis of information across the globe. However, politicians would do well to quietly abandon the belief that the Security Council will ever make responsible decisions to this end. If the US and the UK are committed to an effective strategy for the prevention and arrest of genocide, the best strategy would be to phase out the practice of turning to the Security Council on these matters, and draw upon the areas in which the UN has demonstrated success. Some critics may dismiss the UN as an overfunded talking shop, yet this weakness may also be one of the organisation’s most important strengths. Possessed of a formidable capacity for the collection and analysis of information, the UN may well serve the cause of genocide prevention through the collection of on-theground information as part of an early warning mechanism. Two recentlyfounded initiatives within the UN are attempting to do just this – the Office for the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the Office of the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect.

The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide
The abject failure of the UN to prevent or intervene in any

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

of the genocides of the latter half of the twentieth century became a cause for institutional concern in the aftermath of the Rwandan and Bosnian debacles – for existential, if not moral, reasons. Although a full and frank investigation of allegations that senior UN officials withheld evidence of the Rwandan genocide from the non-permanent members of the Security Council has not been undertaken, in 2000 the Security Council acknowledged its failure to act. In 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan created a new post designated with coordinating an institutional strategy for genocide prevention, the Office for the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG). Greg Stanton initially proposed this office in 2002, and is an admirer and associate of the current Special Adviser, Dr Francis Deng – one of the original theorists of the doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect.’ Over the past four years, the office has been assembling the funding and capacity to carry out its mandate, namely to collect and analyze information from within and outside of the UN system of ‘massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.’ The office intends to harness this information in the service of an early warning mechanism for the Secretary-General, to make recommendations to the Security Council – through the Secretary-General – based on issues of concern, and to liaise between relevant agencies in order to enhance the capacity and effectiveness of UN performance in cases of potential or ongoing genocide. Simona Cruciani directs the Information Management component of the OSAPG, and explained some of the challenges facing this new office. ‘Our staff has worked for the past four years to develop a careful methodology so that the OSAPG can carry out its mandate effectively – but it is difficult to engage and process information from various agencies,’ Ms Cruciani notes. ‘We have made progress in terms of establishing our information-sharing with agencies like UNICEF and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, but sensitivity to the use of the term ‘genocide’ tends to complicate our ability to communicate effectively about specific events and countries we might be concerned about.’ To that extent, the OSAPG has attempted to both ‘keep discussions behind closed doors’ while interacting with the public sphere through its collaboration and links with civil society groups. The implicit assumption seems to be that civil society groups should voice the judgements that the OSAPG cannot articulate in the interest of working effectively within the UN system.

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Competing Legal, Academic and Political Understandings of Genocide

Is this ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach helpful, or does it symbolize the UN preference for ornamental but impotent committees, commissions and titles? While James Smith of the Aegis Trust supports the OSAPG’s objectives, he fears the position may be ‘fundamentally weak.’ Realistically, the OSAPG will not change the fundamental interests, calculations or veto decisions of the P-5 members of the Security Council. The present situation in Darfur and past precedent sufficiently shows that ‘naming and shaming’ may somewhat influence the democratic P-5 states, but that China and Russia remain relatively impervious to this form of pressure. However, the OSAPG can provide a focal point within the UN system to digest and analyze information, in concert with independent non-governmental organisations, and provide genocide-specific warnings of potential or unfolding genocides. Dr Matthew Krain, Professor of Political Science at the College of Wooster and an expert on genocide, notes that the most important task for such efforts is to ‘put politicians to the test, and remove the opportunity for excuse-making.’ In the best case scenario, the OSAPG would limit the ability of politicians to claim ignorance of genocide; in the worst case, the office will be ignored. The OSAPG has established a beachhead of informational capacity, and the Special Adviser should bring attention to the issues being addressed by enhancing his public role. While Francis Deng must necessarily lobby quietly within the UN system, the office should show its commitment to engaging in a public discourse by increasing Dr Deng’s public role, perhaps best accomplished by organising joint speeches or publications with survivors such as Halima Bashir. However, given the fact that the UN does not institutionally recognize Darfur as genocide, it remains to be seen whether the Special Adviser can take even these limited steps.

The Office of the Special Adviser on the responsibility to Protect
The concept of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ or ‘R2P’ is perhaps the most encouraging step forward in genocide prevention from the UN since the genocide convention itself. As agreed upon at the 2005 World Summit, the R2P entails the ‘...clear and unambiguous acceptance by all governments of the collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

humanity...[and] the willingness to take timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it.’23 The concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ was initially formulated by Francis Deng and fellow scholars at the Brookings Institute in the 1996 publication Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa. Deng and his colleagues concluded that sovereignty is fundamentally linked to behaviour, and that the failure to protect one’s population from massive violence, crimes against humanity or genocide constitutes, in effect, the abdication of the privileges of sovereignty.24 This recognition was first translated into policy in the African Union’s Constitutive Act of 2000, which asserts “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.”25 The evolution of this concept led various scholars and dignitaries to convene the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000, chaired by former Australian diplomat and current President of the International Crisis Group Gareth Evans.26 The findings of the ICISS report formed the basis of Kofi Annan’s recommendations in the 2005 report ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All,’ and the passage of the 2005 World Summit Outcomes Document.27 The R2P is a common-sense proposition which carries immense and complex implications for international relations. It falls to Dr Edward Luck, the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, to communicate
23. ‘2005 World Outcome’ Resolution by the United Nations General Assembly, 24 October 2005, http:// www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/united_nations/ 24. Deng, Francis, Sadikiel, Kimaro, Lyons, Terrence, Rothchild, Donald, & Zartman, William, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996) 25. ‘Statement by Edward C. Luck, Special Adviser to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon Senior Vice President and Director of Studies of the International Peace Institute (IPI),’ 1 December 2008, http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/409/LArria.pdf 26. ‘The Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,’ February 2007, http://www.iciss.ca/media-en.asp; see also Evans, Gareth, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008) 27. ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All,’ Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 2005, http://www.un.org/ largerfreedom/

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the UN’s vision of the concept’s application. ‘If the Responsibility to Protect is to become an implementable policy, we must keep the scope narrow,’ Luck argues. ‘It is crucial that we orient the ‘R2P’ around three bedrock pillars – first, reinforcing the concept of the state’s responsibility to protect its population from mass violence or genocide; second, to assist and support states which have difficulties meeting that responsibility and to build structures to make this less likely; and finally, to respond appropriately when a state fails to uphold its responsibility.’ He notes that one of the most important points of departure from previous UN policy is the stipulation that the international must intervene ‘...when a state is manifestly failing’ – that is, when the state begins to fail rather than when it has already failed. ‘This has important implications for genocide prevention, because it means that as soon as that process is underway the international community has a responsibility to interrupt it.’ How does Dr Luck propose to translate this concept into an international norm? ‘Our first task is to get the General Assembly on board – we’ve already agreed upon the R2P as a goal at the 2005 Summit, and now we have to be prepared for the next debate in the General,’ explains Dr Luck. ‘The challenge is getting countries who are nervous about sovereignty on board, and that needs to be done by articulating sovereignty as a responsibility which also has benefits. If countries commit to that responsibility, they also commit to protection for themselves, and to international assistance if need be.’ Moreover, Luck argues that the third pillar of the R2P concept – the possibility of intervention – is only a last resort, far outweighed by the emphasis on ‘preventing state failure through assistance via development and an emphasis on good governance.’ The World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy has partnered itself with Dr Luck’s office through its dedicated Responsibility to Protect -Engaging Civil Society (R2PCS) Project.28 ‘We’re focused on engaging civil society around the globe in a discussion about what the R2P means,’ explains Sapna Chhatpar, Project Manager for the Responsibility to Protect. ‘We concentrate most of our efforts on working with other NGOs, particularly in the Global South, to dispel the impression that this is some sort of Western, imperialist agenda.’ By working in close coordination with Dr Luck’s office, the Responsibility to Protect Project seeks to build a global
28. On January 28, 2009, the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy and 7 other NGOs launched the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP). WFM-IGP will dedicate and integrate its five year old R2PCS project into the Coalition initiative.

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

network of civil society support, and held seven consultative roundtables with NGOs from around the world in 2008. ‘We see translating this into an international norm as a long-term process,’ Ms Chhatpar notes, ‘but if we are to tackle issues like genocide, we have to stay focused on the R2P.’ To this end, the ICRtoP has experienced an encouraging level of interest and engagement from a diverse array of NGO partners around the world, including partners in Tanzania, Argentina and Uganda.29

The US, UK and the R2P
The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is consistent with the idea that irresponsible behaviour by states should not be excused by an immovable understanding of sovereignty. However, this seemingly common-sense assumption has come under considerable attack by UN member states who fear that this may license external intervention in their internal affairs. The US and UK have an interest in monitoring the progress, findings, and funding for the Special Advisers for the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect. However, these initiatives are not solutions in themselves, and at best may only contribute to early warning capacity or contribute to raising awareness on the international stage. As P-5 members and leaders of the free world, it is imperative that the US and the UK take up the gauntlet thrown down by the introduction of this concept in the international arena. ‘Right now, the Responsibility to Protect is a bumper sticker, not a policy,” notes Andrew Mitchell MP, Conservative Shadow Secretary of State for International Development. ‘You can’t have one attitude towards murderers in your own country but then decide that mass murderers in other countries are not accountable because of some rigid notion of sovereignty which lets them off the hook.’ As for establishing the R2P as an international norm, Mr Mitchell remarks that ‘the British government is moving limpingly in that direction – a Conservative government would see to it that the FCO, MOD and DFID forge a unified response.’ Under Foreign Secretary David Miliband, the Foreign Office has established a dedicated R2P desk as part of a cross-Whitehall effort to support Ed Luck’s office at the UN, and made the development of the R2P
29. For more information, see the ICRtoP report ‘Global Consultative Roundtables and the Responsibility to Protect,’ available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/civil_society_ statements/?theme=alt3

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Competing Legal, Academic and Political Understandings of Genocide

norm a priority of the last Foreign Office Strategy Report. In an interview in Prospect, Mr Miliband reaffirmed his commitment to the principles of sovereignty-as-responsibility, arguing that: ‘...[there is a] responsibility of states to their own people according to certain universal values, but also [a] responsibility they have to the international system.... in extreme cases you do intervene.’30 The US State Department does not have a dedicated R2P desk, and seems to be taking a ‘wait-and-see’ approach to the initiative. The individuals with whom I spoke with at the State Department and legislative advisors who deal specifically with the issue of genocide commented that the underlying principle of the Responsibility to Protect was, as far as they were concerned, already the operating assumption of US foreign policy. Needless to say, much could be done to concretize that assumption. The R2P is a concept of universal significance, and as such the US and the UK have a duty to initiate a robust discourse on its potential application. It is a welcome sign that this was initiated by the United Nations, but it would be irresponsible for elected officials to leave the development of the concept under the exclusive remit of the UN, particularly in light of some of the more problematic aspects of the current R2P proposal. To begin with, the UN scheme’s provision that humanitarian intervention should be the prerogative of the Security Council would inevitably make the application of the principle a non-starter. After sixty years of ignoring the UNGC, there is scant reason to believe that the Security Council will embrace the principles of the R2P with any conviction, and the US and UK governments have an obligation to point this out. It is crucial that the R2P is subjected to critique in forums outside of the UN, where policy makers can openly explore the practical application of this principle, and discuss strategies to persuade burgeoning democracies to embrace this principle. While the R2P may be very much on the radar at the FCO and State Department, there are no current initiatives within either the US Congress or the UK Houses of Parliament to bring this issue to the forefront of the legislative agenda. If the R2P is to evolve into an international norm, parliamentary scrutiny would provide a crucial opportunity to address its problematic aspects. The introduction of a debate or bill on this concept in the US Congress could provide a step towards achieving some sort of bipartisan consensus on America’s future
30. Falkner, Kishwer, Goodhart, David, Miliband, David, Lawson, Dominic, & Reeves, Richard, ‘Miliband’s Message,’ Prospect Magazine, No. 151, October 2008

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

role in international relations after years of fractious and polarized politics. In Britain, the introduction of a debate on the subject in either the House of Commons or, more likely, the House of Lords, would be an important first step, and could be implemented as part of a strategy to restore public confidence in the decision-making process at Whitehall. The House of Lords may be the best place to begin this debate, as its appointed status may give members more freedom to broach this topic at a time when the Commons is primarily occupied with domestic concerns.

Genocide Prevention and Prospects for UN Reform
Can the UN take any meaningful action to prevent or arrest genocide without substantive institutional reform? While a flawed central point for diplomacy is certainly better than none at all, it seems counterintuitive that an organisation which routinely ignores the principles of its own charter should be empowered to lead the fight against genocide. ‘The only way we can hope to move towards consistent application of the UNGC is by moving to either majority voting on the Security Council or by forging an alternative in the form of a council or league of democracies,’ comments Brian Brivati. Brivati links the creation of a cooperative body of democracies – ‘preferably growing out of the husk of the United Nations’ – to the goal of creating an international system of responsible statehood via a ‘club for which human rights and democratic governance are a requirement of membership, and which confers security and economic benefits to its members.’ Roger Helmer, a UK MEP noted for his vocal opposition to the Lisbon Treaty, carries his suspicion of supranational institutions to his view of the United Nations. ‘A caucus or league of democracies sounds lovely, but I’ve been in politics too long to be optimistic,’ Helmer remarks. ‘I have no opposition to trying to achieve this, but I think it will just prompt accusations of some sort of colonialist plot.’ Other interview subjects expressed concerns about where such an initiative might lead, and whether or not it could provide a more effective response to occurrences of genocide to begin with. ‘I don’t see what it will achieve when the fact is that you have to engage with countries you don’t necessarily like,’ reasons Iain Levine of Human Rights Watch. ‘There are 25-to-30 governments who aren’t that bad but in the General Assembly they tend to side with the bad guys. And the question should be, how do we move away from a purely western agenda to engage these countries?’

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Competing Legal, Academic and Political Understandings of Genocide

Certainly, sprees of UN-bashing can deflect attention from the fundamental responsibilities of the US and UK to uphold the principles which the Charter – as occurred in the British parliament in the aftermath of Rwanda. ‘If we are to avoid another Rwanda, there must be some way to hold politicians accountable for their decisions,’ Linda Melvern maintains. ‘This is never going to happen at the UN, but must happen in Parliament and in Congress as part of the democratic process.’ Genocide prevention – and the establishment of the R2P as an international norm – should be central to a renewed effort to fulfil the mandate of the UN Charter through the creation of a caucus of democracies within the United Nations. Alternatively, this could be the goal of new treaty organisation of global democracies designed to incentivize responsible behaviour on the part of states, and, if necessary, to provide an alliance of nations willing to assemble a coalition of the willing to arrest the progress of genocide.

Policy Options: Forging a United and Consistent Strategy
The failure of a comprehensive strategy for genocide prevention to take root in either the State Department or the Foreign Office can be largely attributed to the imperatives of multiple competing goals. ‘Career diplomats and analysts have a lot on their plate, and are already hardpressed to fulfil the priorities set by their superiors,’ explains Victoria Holt, Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Centre and expert lead of the ‘Military Options’ component of the Genocide Prevention Task Force’s 2008 report ‘Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for US Policymakers.’ ‘The challenge is integrating various concerns into a common strategy. For instance, the decision-makers at the Pentagon are worried about stability, and are thinking about problems from a different vantage point than the Office for War Crimes. Everyone’s got one-too-many things on their plate to begin with; where will this new priority fit into their tasks at hand? So we need to incorporate the issue into an overall organisational strategy, and the impetus for doing so really has to come from senior leaders initially, such as the Secretary of State and the President.’ Ms Holt added that it is vital that the issue of genocide not be subsumed solely into the field of conflict prevention, but that it instead receive dedicated attention on the basis of its extremity. ‘Genocide has a unique place in American thinking for its moral component and the incalculable loss incurred by the fact not just of mass murder, but of the loss of generations, a loss of a people.’ Accordingly, the Genocide

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

Prevention Task Force report recommends that the Department of Defense develop clear guidance for planning and policy, and interagency cooperation on this issue, with a particular emphasis on improving the coordination between intelligence-gathering agencies and the Department of Defence.31 The research achieved by the Genocide Prevention Task Force group signals a positive step forward in putting genocide prevention on America’s foreign policy agenda. The key recommendations made by the Commission express perhaps too much faith in the goodwill and effectiveness of international institutions, yet the core content is likely to appeal to a bipartisan contingent of the US government. Such a policy initiative offers the Republican minority in Congress the opportunity to join the Democratic majority to achieve a genuine step forward for the United States’ foreign policy agenda, and may help to dispel the popular disgust expressed towards both parties for the past eight years of partisan rancor. However, Congressional support is not likely to affect any significant policy change without the leadership of President Obama. President Obama has been sphinx-like on the question of whether his foreign policy will further US attempts to promote and protect international human rights, and even less clear on his intentions regarding genocide prevention. Although he has appointed the formidable genocide expert Samantha Power to his National Security Council, Power’s success as an advocate for effective prevention strategies may be hampered by her enduring conviction that the United Nations should be the locus for such an endeavour. Encouragingly, Obama consistently supported legislation to address Darfur during his time as a Senator, and raised the issue of genocide specifically in his second debate with John McCain: “...When genocide is happening, when ethnic cleansing is happening somewhere around the world and we stand idly by, that diminishes us. And so I do believe that we have to consider it as part of our interests, our national interests, in intervening where possible.” He has also mentioned the possibility of imposing a no-fly zone in Darfur, but has taken no specific

31. ‘Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers,’ Madeleine Albright & William Cohen, Co-Chairs, Genocide Prevention Task Force, December 2008, http://www.usip.org/events/2008/1211_ preventing_genocide.html

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steps on this point since entering office.32 President Obama has reportedly designated top policy analysts to review the current US policy on Darfur and make a decision about future steps. However, this policy review seems unlikely to yield any substantive change if it does not acknowledge the need to place pressure on China – the chief arms supplier and diplomatic defender of Khartoum. This seems unlikely at present. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has promised that the Obama administration will place the issue of China’s human rights record on the backburner in exchange for Beijing’s cooperation during the financial crisis, while at the same time expressing ‘concern’ over the situation in Darfur. Advocates within the US Senate and House should bring this incompatibility to the attention of Congress, and cooperate with human rights campaigners to expose the likely consequences of this approach. What sort of preparatory work should the State Department and Foreign Office take to better anticipate the possibility of genocide, and to prepare an appropriate response? ‘Genocide should be seen as the most severe point of a breakdown which is quite common around the world,’ argues Charles Garraway. ‘It is characteristic of the post-Westphalian stage we may well have reached, in which the end of the Cold War has loosed the artificial boundaries of states, and the ethnic and human divisions those boundaries cut across are coming into conflict.’ Certainly, the divisions so often defined by ethnicity or religion – particularly in countries lacking the habits of democratic governance, coping with the legacy of colonial divideand-rule policies, or suffering from problems of scarce resources – have the potential for targeted violence on a mass scale. A long-term prevention strategy would be the most politically appealing approach to this issue. The US State Department already contains a number of departments which handle the issues of US policy relating to genocide and mass atrocities. However, there may be a case for assembling a new initiative focused on sovereignty and mass atrocities, which could draw together interagency efforts at early warning and articulate US policy in relation to sovereignty and the issues of prevention and intervention. According to the Genocide Prevention Task Force, the Office of War Crimes Issues – which should be the go-to point within the State Department for risk assessment and strategy relating to potentially genocidal situations – is currently only able to devote an estimated 10%
32. Marshall, Will, ‘Obama Needs a Strong Foreign Policy,’ The Wall Street Journal, 7 November 2008

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

of its time and resources to these tasks.33 Instead, most of the office’s resources are focused on the criminal tribunals which contribute little to the task of preventing or stopping genocide to begin with. The FCO has tended to focus on tribunals and models of conflict prevention which rely on the assumption of reasonable conduct by perpetrators, and which overlook the extremist views which so often inform genocidal policies. To that end, the incorporation of a genocide prevention model in the Foreign Office’s analytical framework may be a step towards a more proactive approach in the Anglosphere and, potentially, for Europe as a whole. In the short term, diplomatic efforts at negotiation with groups likely to enter into the conditions necessary for genocide – namely, a civil war or a takeover of power by a group defined in totalist or exclusivist terms – is a necessary but often insufficient pursuit. ‘If the US were to replace the State Department with the AFL-CIO and Britain replaced the Foreign Office with the trade unions, we would be much better off,’ jokes Michael Horowitz, Director of the Hudson Institute’s Project for International Religious Liberty. ‘These diplomats have no skill in bargaining with nasty governments, and they fall into this trap where they think that the guy on the other side of the table is representative of his people. ‘Scoop’ Jackson understood that when you’re bargaining with bad regimes, they tend to be much more fragile than they seem, and if you tighten the screws a bit, you may just get them to make some concessions.’34 James Smith, Director of the Aegis Trust, commented on what he perceives as reluctance by diplomats to depart from preconceived understandings of a situation as a conventional conflict, when that altercation may have shifted to full-scale genocide. ‘Genocide nearly always occurs during a time of war, but this seems always to confuse diplomats,’ he reasons. ‘They can’t see the forest of genocide, if you will, for the trees of conflict.’ The United Kingdom has shown little interest in Darfur outside its assistance in forging the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. Incredibly, these negotiations did not take the ongoing genocide into consideration as a hindrance to an implementable peace agreement. ‘The
33. ‘Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers,’ Madeleine Albright & William Cohen, Co-Chairs, Genocide Prevention Task Force, December 2008, http://www.usip.org/events/2008/1211_ preventing_genocide.html 34. Henry M. ‘Scoop’ Jackson (D-Washington) was a Congressman and Senator from 1941-1983 known for his robust attitude to international security issues and the Soviet Union but also for his human rights focus in foreign policy as a way of demonstrating that there can be no moral equivalence between democracies and non-democracies. The Henry Jackson Society is named after him.

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UK government could have done so much more,’ laments Louise RolandGosselin, Director of the anti-genocide NGO Waging Peace. ‘DfID and the FCO just changed the subject and would not address the Sudanese regime’s predominant role in the deaths of civilians in the West. By constantly affirming that all sides of the conflict were at fault, they reassured the Sudanese government that the UK was not ready to use its power or influence to stop the killing.’ As an advocate of the Darfuri cause in the House of Lords, Lord Avebury concurs, ‘I think we could have taken a much firmer line of Darfur, but it took quite a long time to get it on the agenda.’ It is crucial for US and British diplomats to take a bold and creative approach towards instances of genocide or mass atrocity; an approach which appreciates the dangers of institutional groupthink, recognizes the limits of negotiation and remains in close consultation with actors external to the diplomatic process such as displaced peoples. Sanctions, travel bans and the imposition of no-fly zones may help to deter perpetrators, but these forms of non-military coercion are rarely implemented in full force, and must be backed by the promise of punitive action by the international community. Targeted sanctions and measures such as divestment are designed not to affect the population at large, although their overall effectiveness in deterring genocide or atrocities remains questionable. Oversight of the use and abuse of trade partnerships and international aid is a related area of concern in genocide prevention, and deserves sustained attention.35 The US and the UK are at a turning point in defining their essential approach to foreign policy. At this time of financial, political and diplomatic turmoil, neither country can afford to be indecisive. In the UK, there is a distressing gap between David Miliband’s erudite rhetoric on ‘the imperative of democracy’ and the Foreign Office’s weak response to the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, which implicitly backed Brussels’ virtual acquiescence to the revival of Russian imperialism. Following his more recent and widely criticized rejection of the concept of a ‘War on Terror,’ Mr Miliband’s desire to forcefully tackle the key issues and threats of the age has begun to seem increasingly doubtful. It remains to be seen whether a renewed and reorganised Labour leadership or an incoming Conservative government can change this current stalemate, although
35. For example, Linda Melvern reports that the Rwandan government siphoned millions of dollars from the IMF’s World Development Fund to finance the purchase of machetes—a case which has yet to receive any sustained attention by the international community.

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Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague has indicated that his approach to the FCO would be bolder than that of Mr Miliband. Michael Horowitz of the Hudson Institute is particularly optimistic that Hague would better integrate a consideration of human rights into the institutional conduct of the FCO: ‘He understands both the moral and strategic importance of building cross-party coalitions to take a stand on key human rights issues. It’s no coincidence that he is a biographer of Wilberforce – I believe he will bring that Wilberforce-ian agenda back into British politics.’36 Is this failure of British foreign policy symptomatic of a malaise within Parliament regarding foreign affairs? A number of the parliamentarians interviewed for this report have complained that MPs and peers fail to bring sufficient pressure to bear on the Foreign Office. ‘I write a letter to the Foreign Office every week inquiring about the action being taken on my particular areas of interest,’ comments Lord Avebury. ‘And apparently I am one of their most prolific correspondents – so perhaps a better effort could be made towards that end.’ The Foreign Office’s institutional predisposition towards ‘European’ solutions has largely been a consequence of MPs’ failure to exert consistent political pressure on the FCO. ‘The fact is, foreign policy remains completely in our remit,’ explains Gisela Stuart MP, Labour member for Birmingham Edgbaston and a member of the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. ‘It is Parliament which has decided to concede to more joint embassies with the EU, which has abandoned foreign policy in favour of climate change. This is all home-grown.’ Douglas Carswell, Conservative MP for Harwich and Clacton, is a co-founder of the Direct Democracy think tank and sees the reform of the relationship between the FCO and parliament as crucial to constructing a more effective and humane foreign policy. ‘The FCO tends to be on the wrong side of every debate,’ Carswell argues. ‘They have disdain for self-determination, they reprimand diplomats who speak out on human rights issues, and they support an almost totally discredited UN. If we were to introduce reforms such as parliamentary approval of diplomats and the regular re-approval of foreign treaties, we would see the emergence of an ethically sound policy, because it would be a policy endorsed by the people’s elected representatives.’ Others would argue that the EU can and should work together on this matter. While the focus of this paper is on Anglo-American policy, this should by no means
36. William Wilberforce led the campaign for the abolition of the international slave trade, outlawed in Britain in 1807.

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preclude the possibility of pushing for a standing intervention policy on the European level. Indeed, the EU led a successful short-term intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, and Britain has an important role to play in institutionalizing the need for integrated military response capacities using EU forces. In particular, the EU-NATO ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement of 2002 has laid the groundwork for effective cooperation on stabilisation operations, and has the potential to extend to a ‘Rapid Response’ capacity. In the United States, President Obama has the advantage of beginning his presidency in a position of relative strength and cooperation vis a vis the State Department, whose relationship with the Bush Administration was often inhibited by mutual antagonism. Following the public and interdepartmental fallout over the Iraq War, the Obama administration would do well to forge a reflective yet confident policy on these issues at the State Department. Indeed, at this ‘primary stage’ of genocide prevention many strands of policy will be implicated, and various concepts and goals brought together – conflict prevention, economic development, the distribution of humanitarian aid, the dangers of state failure, the presence of ethnic and religious tension, and even response capacity in the case of natural disaster. Ending the scourge of genocide in the long-term should be incorporated into forward-looking strategies to assist nation-building and good governance efforts. While upstream prevention of genocide is important, the establishment of the Responsibility to Protect as an international norm must be rooted in the promise of intervention by force in anticipation of atrocities on a mass scale. Moreover, although development is an important component of the long-term strategy to reduce conditions which can produce genocide, the US and the UK must not relegate the issue to the realm of aid and development, as is the approach of DfID in the United Kingdom. Progress on this issue necessitates a cooperative effort by the intelligence, foreign policy and defence apparatuses, with a definite and detailed commitment to armed contingency plans formulated through the attentive monitoring of these situations. The issue of genocide prevention offers politicians of all persuasions a common ground on which to have this discussion, and gives them the chance to break through the foreign policy inertia created by the polarizing effects of the Iraq War. It is the duty of Parliament and the legislative branch of the United States to bring these issues to the fore. One
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option could be to open up a debate in Congress and Parliament on the Responsibility to Protect. Other more specific actions could be to introduce bills recommending an increase in the number of peacekeeping forces and material support for the UNAMID mission, and for the introduction of a no-fly zone over Darfur and the zones of Sudan with Displaced-Persons camps. On the punitive aspect of this issue, the Aegis Trust is currently campaigning to ‘close the gaps’ in British law, which currently does not extend the notion of universal jurisdiction to suspected genocidaires. To this end, MPs should introduce a bill modelled on the US Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, which empowers the United States to prosecute suspects of genocide in the US courts in the event an extradition cannot be arranged. Additionally, the Home Office’s record of attempting to deport Darfuri asylum-seekers to Sudan must be answered for. It would be in the interest of opposition parties to publicize these shameful decisions, perhaps through a Private Member’s Bill; and it would be in the government’s interest to forestall such a manoeuvre by redressing this practice.

the responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention
In the interest of attracting a broad coalition of adherents in the Global South, proponents of the R2P are keen to stress its soft power elements over the ‘last-resort’ provision of humanitarian intervention. This awareness is informed by sensitivity to the concerns of members of the international community who opposed the Iraq War, and who worry that the coalition’s claims to have conducted a war of liberation has damaged the concept of humanitarian intervention. ‘Our concern is whether or not US support for the R2P will damage support for the concept at the UN or the international level in the aftermath of the Afghan and Iraq wars,’ remarks Sapna Chhatpar. Congresswoman Louise Slaughter observes, ‘The US has lost its moral suasion, but hopefully that will improve with an Obama administration.’ In the article ‘International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides,’ Matthew Krain surveys six alternative strategies for intervention in genocides or politicides, and concludes that interventions ‘...that directly challenge the perpetrator or aid the target

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of the brutal policy are the only effective type of military intervention.’37 Professor Krain also concludes that interventions which attempt to remain impartial – such as the current UNAMID operation in the Sudan – are generally ineffective at reducing the severity of violence against civilians. Does this mean, as some would suggest, that we must commit ourselves to constant, costly military interventions? Moreover, can UN peacekeeping operations – currently at a record level of deployment around the world – be counted on as an effective response force? Mauro De Lorenzo, a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute specializing in refugee and humanitarian polices, has a bold response to these questions. ‘In the event of genocide, there tends to be almost no consideration given to the possibility of using forces already on the ground,’ says De Lorenzo. ‘There’s this utterly baseless assumption that some magic bucket of travel bans and sanctions will stop regimes from doing what they want to do. There has been sustained high-level attention on Darfur for the past eight years and yet the end result is negligible,’ he notes with frustration. ‘So it turns out that the West being mad at you is totally irrelevant.’ Some argue that the proposition of supporting pre-existing forces on the ground – such as providing material assistance to Sudanese rebel groups fighting the Khartoum government – may empower forces which may defy the Geneva Convention. But De Lorenzo argues that this attitude is ‘…a form of racism, assuming we’re here to solve everyone’s problems, when Africa has been quite willing and able to solve its own problems. For instance, if the Rwandan Patriotic Front had waited for the UN to stop the genocide, repatriate the refugees and rebuild the country Rwanda would have remained a basket-case. This illustrates the contrast between a group which takes ownership of its policies as opposed to relying on the UN.’ In the case of Darfur, one could argue that logistical, monetary and moral support from the US and UK might have introduced an element of constraint in the groups’ prosecution of their war, and could therefore be used as a bargaining tool to secure this behaviour from said groups. Citing the Kurdish resistance against Saddam Hussein’s regime, Mr De Lorenzo notes that ‘it’s always better when people liberate themselves, and it can be done at less cost. And if the groups you’re considering supporting have a reasonable track record of treating their own people decently, then
37. Krain, Matthew, ‘International Intervention and the Severity of Genocide and Politicides,’ International Studies Quarterly, Volume 49, Issue 3 (September 2005)

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

we should look to that group rather than some phantom solution at the Security Council.’ However pragmatic such an approach may be, Mr De Lorenzo does not think it likely to be taken up by mainstream politicians in the US or UK any time soon: ‘I’m not convinced that our politicians and pressure groups are prepared to accept ambiguity. They think by not getting involved, or by proposing some useless round of sanctions, they can remain morally pure, when it is usually a way of enabling evil.’ What is the future of peacekeeping operations in the prevention and cessation of genocide? ‘[Then-] Senator Biden said that every time we have gone into a peacekeeping operation we act as if it’s the first time we’ve done it, and when we close it down we act as if we’ll never have to do it again.’ recounts Ambassador Williamson. This observation seems to summarize the consistent problem of the way in which peacekeeping operations have been conducted, and the fickle attitude of policymakers in the US, UK and even in the UN towards peacekeeping operations. ‘I think there is a growing recognition in Congress and the State Department that peacekeeping missions require a well-formulated commitment to operational objectives, as well as a standing civilian component of the relevant experts,’ remarks Ambassador Williamson. As Chair of the Military Issues Expert Group for the Genocide Prevention Task Force, Victoria Holt has employed her expertise on peacekeeping operations to redress the effectiveness gap between conventional military and peacekeeping operations. ‘Whereas militaries are traditionally trained to protect physical areas from being attacked – though not necessarily to protect civilians – peacekeepers are charged with providing protection but not usually equipped to provide full security. Invoking the military option presumes the troops have been trained to stop genocide, yet this is rarely a role for which militaries train,’ Holt explains. ‘The mission then falls somewhere between peacekeeping and war-fighting, involving elements of both, but not the same as either. And with the increased use of Chapter VII mandates as opposed to Chapter VI, peacekeepers are being sent to locations where there isn’t a peace to keep, which the peacekeepers are not trained to handle.’ Holt sees this as one of the great challenges to the international community: ‘We need better training for peacekeepers, more support for them and more guidance. But we also need a commitment by responsible states to take the measures necessary to protect civilians and, ideally, to arrest the progress of the conflict before it can become a case of mass atrocity or genocide.

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Ultimately, this is a matter of backing up these missions – giving them muscle, resources and political support.’ The improvement of peacekeeping operations is one way to address this problem, although it entails a reliance on UN consent which may be either too slow in materializing or non-existent for political reasons. To this end, Victoria Holt notes that ‘there are a lot of mechanisms already available for intervention. We have five multinational organisations which already have authority and ability.’ Genocide can be the result – and the cause – of conflict and state failure, and consequently the regions in which these mass atrocities occur have an interest in halting these actions before the problem spills across borders. ‘We need some kind of neighbourhood policy, and we need to put pressure on those neighbourhoods to show leadership and to be rewarded for that leadership,’ argues Brian Brivati. ‘For instance, Sudan was a huge opportunity for Muslim states to show their commitment to basic human rights and back up the UNAMID force, yet the hybrid force remains almost totally reliant on Western money when wealthy states like Malaysia, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia all could have pitched in.’ However, according to Ann McKechin MP, ‘the problem is, once you get past the US, UK, French and the Russians, there is not a huge amount of trained, high quality troops in the world with the capacity – not to mention willingness – to intervene in someplace like Darfur.’ Liberal Democrat MP Paul Keetch concurs: ‘Humanitarian intervention is always constrained by political realities. When people advocate intervention in Burma or Darfur, there needs to be an assessment of how we can achieve this when our forces are so overstretched,’ Keetch explains. ‘However, just because you can’t do something every time doesn’t mean you shouldn’t intervene when you can and when there is a clear humanitarian case for it.’ How should the US and UK manage these realities and construct a workable plan for intervention in the event of a genocide? In the short term, there is the possibility of coercive intervention by a coalition of the willing, through NATO, or by providing material assistance to forces on the ground or a regional force like the African Union. In the long term, the US and UK could integrate genocide prevention into a broader programme of adaptation to the security challenges of the twenty-first century. For example, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies advocates reforming NATO to include a Rapid Response Force, which would have the mandate to intervene in the event of a genocide or episode

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of mass violence.38 As the experience of the second Iraq War has made clear, interventions without thorough plans for post-war stabilisation can be tremendously damaging, and for this reason the US and UK defence departments should continue their current efforts to integrate a nation-building apparatus into the structure of their militaries and into NATO forces. Another long-term possibility would be to build a crossregional treaty organisation with membership conditional on democratic governance, committed to the principle of ‘sovereignty-as-responsibility.’ Such a venture could be modelled on NATO, and would move away from the paradigm of Western interventionism towards a more inclusive model of collective defence based on shared interest.

The Political Feasibility of Humanitarian Intervention
Political philosopher Professor Norman Geras has described the complacency of the international community towards genocide as a ‘contract of mutual indifference,’ and has dedicated much of his work to arguing against this default mode of international relations. Geras contends that ‘the international community must have the mechanism to say that once you’ve gone beyond a certain point of unacceptable behaviour, you have become a rogue state and have lost your claim to sovereignty.’ In practice, this position has rarely been realized, as there are few cases in which responsible states have acted in order to curb the irresponsible behaviour of other states. This is almost always a consequence of political calculations: ‘It’s very easy to say that the R2P is mandatory, but at the end of the day, will countries be prepared to commit troops in those worst case scenarios?’ asks Ann McKechin MP. ‘With the economic downturn, most of my constituents couldn’t be less interested in sending troops to far corners of the world, so that puts a significant limitation on what we can hope to achieve.’ Twenty years ago the notion of undertaking a humanitarian intervention to stop genocide was far more remote than it is today, both in the halls of power and among the general public. After the massacre at Srebrenica, the US and the UK took a tremendous step forward for the principle of humanitarian intervention by leading the NATO intervention in Kosovo. The second Iraq War was at least partially justified as a war of liberation against a dictator who oppressed his people and had committed
38. Inge, Peter, Lanxade, Jacques, Naumann, Klaus, Shalikashvili, John, Van den Breeman, Henk, ‘Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World,’ Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2007

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acts of genocide against the Iraqi Kurds. However, because the main stated reason for the war given by the coalition of forces who engaged in it was the need to disarm Saddam Hussein’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, this hotly contested claim has complicated and even undermined the attitudes towards the very concept of humanitarian intervention. Regardless of this, the scars of Saddam Hussein’s aggressive and genocidal policies mar the regional stability of the Middle East to this day. The moral case for stopping genocide should be self-evident, but on a purely practical level, our governments must recognize that in a globalized world genocide always becomes a problem sooner or later. One of the most important obstacles to developing a sustained and coherent strategy for genocide prevention is a lack of political will to do so, which is ultimately dependent on the demands of the electorate. The following section addresses the challenges and potential for civil society efforts to advance this cause with the electorate, and to build the democratic momentum necessary to make genocide a permanent top tier issue for the US and UK.

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CHAPtEr two
CIvIL SOCIETy, POLITICAL WILL AND GENOCIDE PREvENTION

the Merits of a Genocide-Focused Campaign
The contemporary world contains a plethora of horrors – starvation, child soldiers, slavery, sex trafficking, war. If genocide only occupies a small proportion of the world’s ills, should it be treated as an issue of singular importance? ‘We must remember that genocide is an entirely different beast, and cannot simply fall under a general category of human rights concerns,’ argues Philip Spencer, Associate Dean and Professor of Comparative Genocide at Kingston University. ‘The lack of awareness of what constitutes a genocide, let alone its uniqueness, is staggering, and it absolutely calls for an international coalition and constituency.’ Genocide-focused campaigns and organisations are on the rise in both the US and the UK. While the UK groups are less visible and lack the funding of campaigns such as the US-based Save Darfur Coalition, a number of outspoken civil society efforts such as Waging Peace and Aegis Trust have brought the issue to the fore in public and in Parliament. This genocide-specific movement did not really exist beyond ad hoc campaigns until relatively recently, when Greg Stanton established Genocide Watch in 1998. ‘We had just had Bosnia and Rwanda, and yet there wasn’t a genocide organisation!’ Stanton recalls. ‘Since founding Genocide Watch, I’ve been able to link up with the growing network of groups which either specifically campaign on genocide prevention or address similar work.’ During its tenyear life-span, Genocide Watch has been the focal point of the International Campaign to End Genocide, and has enlisted the support and involvement of policy experts and scholars, particularly from academics associated with the

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International Association of Genocide Scholars, of which Stanton is President. In addition to his successful proposal to create the UN post of Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, Stanton also submitted a proposal in 2002 to create an international, non-governmental Genocide Prevention Centre. Stanton’s proposal envisions the first large-scale NGO dedicated to investigating, anticipating and preventing mass atrocities and genocide. ‘Individual movements like we see now are a great improvement, particularly bearing in mind the various organisations which have joined the International Campaign to End Genocide,’ says Stanton. ‘But what I think we need is an expansion of that network into a concentrated centre, peripheral to but collaborating with the OSAPG, which works to develop better early warning indicators and a toolbox of genocide prevention tactics.’ Stanton suggests that the Centre should operate as a two-pronged structure, with one component aimed at providing an authoritative source of early warning, and the other proposing policy initiatives in response to ongoing or deteriorating situations. ‘I think the network approach, the sort of non-pyramidal approach used by some of the big NGOs and also by the International Campaign to End Genocide is the right way to go. We could set this up as a mixture of existing organisations with government sponsorship... and experts could focus their efforts on analyzing and providing clear, precise summaries of situations for politicians as a way of engaging them with these issues.’ Iain Levine, Program Director for Human Rights Watch, has expressed a concern that such a concentrated effort would yield diminishing returns. ‘In terms of establishing an NGO focused on genocide specifically, I think you risk a real fragmentation of efforts,’ Levine contends. ‘You end up spending too much of your time focusing on whether or not something is genocide, when what we need to focus on is mobilizing an international response.’ Others prefer to concentrate on the expansion of collaborative networks as the most practical way forward. As one of the first organisations dedicated to coordinating campaigns between different NGOs, Crisis Action provides an important model for NGO cooperation. Its Executive Director, Gemma Mortensen, sees coordinated campaigns as an effective way of mobilizing civil society, although she is sanguine about the prospect of an international Centre: ‘It is a very interesting idea, but given the existing initiatives a genocide-specific centre might be problematic in terms of sustainability,’ Mortensen observes. Human rights barrister, Kishan Manocha, comments that it ‘may be better to concentrate

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on strengthening the legal processes in these areas, and in engaging the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principle in public life.’ As a macro-level approach to this issue, Stanton’s international Centre could certainly provide a consistent and respectable source of analysis and advocacy. Louise Roland-Gosselin of Waging Peace comments that such an initiative ‘...could help provide a focus for particular issues, and on identifying processes as part of an early warning initiative. So that would be a great contribution. Although,’ she adds ruefully, ‘It would of course all depend upon funding.’ In the current economic climate – and with a natural preference for activities which can yield concrete results – the proposition of funding an organisation with an abstract mandate may prove challenging. Chris Chapman, International Officer for Minority Rights Group International, remarked: ‘Genocide Watch has been very committed, but just doesn’t have the capacity to really drive the issue forward on its own. The International Campaign for the Prevention of Genocide is a great initiative but it doesn’t really function as an effective coalition. So an implementable plan involving fundraising focused on the issue of genocide and mass atrocities, spearheaded by some of the leading lights of this movement, could be a way forward.’ One of the most respected American anti-genocide initiatives is the Committee on Conscience, a think tank which operates under the aegis of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum with the mandate to research and publicize policy options for genocide prevention. As director of the Committee on Conscience’s Genocide Prevention Initiative, John Heffernan has overseen an ambitious and creative program which includes an exhibition within the Museum on Darfur, weekly radio podcasts featuring leading experts in this field, publications on the subject and a partnership with Google Earth which allows internet users to view the ravaged villages and IDP camps of Chad and Western Sudan. Mr Heffernan has also been instrumental in helping to create the Genocide Prevention Task Force, which he describes as ‘an unprecedented project.’ The task force is designed to provide specific policy recommendations to the US government by engaging experts in five areas of a genocide prevention rubric: early warning, pre-crisis engagement, preventative diplomacy, military operations and US cooperation with international and regional organisations. ‘A policy initiative on genocide at this extent and at this level has never been tried before,’ Heffernan remarks, ‘and we’re very hopeful that it will influence lawmakers and the new administration.’

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The scope of the anti-genocide campaign in the United Kingdom lags far behind the US, a fact attributable to both a lack of public interest and a dearth of funding. Aegis Trust, Never Again and Waging Peace have adopted forward-thinking strategies for communication, including the use of viral information networks such as social networking sites and email mailing lists, and have received an important boost in creating a united campaign with the assistance of Crisis Action. However, these initiatives lack the capital and name-recognition necessary to transform their efforts into a national campaign on par with Make Poverty History. In this respect, large and well-funded human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch could provide an excellent source of support if they organised their own dedicated campaigns against genocide in concert with the smaller UK-based initiatives. Both of these organisations run dedicated campaigns for issues such as child soldiers, torture and women’s rights – why not include genocide prevention and awareness on that roster? Politicians and individuals active in the NGO community should work to bring this omission to the attention of these larger organisations, and encourage them to take a proactive stance towards genocide.

Anti-Genocide NGOs and the Construction of Early Warning Capabilities
The independence of NGOs enables these organisations to be outspoken in a way that governments cannot or will not be. Consequently, NGOs have an important role to play in building the mechanisms for early warning against genocide, as they are able to communicate that information fully and frankly to the international community. Levels and methods of early warning are diverse, and range from statistical risk assessment models such as Barbara Harff’s widely-respected model, to policy-oriented analysis or assessments such as the Swiss Peace Initiative or the work of the International Crisis Group. The Aegis Trust has constructed a useful guide for genocide prevention by identifying the ‘Primary, Secondary and Tertiary’ stages of prevention. ‘Primary Prevention’ denotes the steps that can be taken to identify, engage with and mitigate the occurrence of a genocide before a situation progresses to a crisis point; ‘Secondary Prevention’ addresses actions taken to arrest a genocide once the process is underway; and ‘Tertiary Prevention’ consists of punitive judicial action after the fact, as well as the promotion of societal healing via the pursuit of justice and

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reconciliation. Of all these steps, ‘Primary Prevention’ is most likely to attract the broadest consensus amongst the diverse array of groups within civil society which could potentially build an anti-genocide constituency, as this stage advocates mostly ‘soft power options,’ whereas secondary and tertiary prevention entails controversial subjects such as military intervention or the jurisdiction of the ICC.39 James Smith hopes to develop this ‘Primary Prevention’ model into a more advanced early warning mechanism. ‘This would make it clear to diplomats who have lost sight of civilian concerns the broader context of developments which indicate the possibility of genocide, and the likely consequences of continued inaction’ Smith explains. ‘And it isn’t just a matter for genocide experts – if and when an early warning system could reach the appropriate level of funding and breadth, it would require an interdisciplinary approach including an analysis of environmental and demographic aspects, so that we can eventually plan ahead twenty or thirty years in advance.’ The International Crisis Group also offers a unique model for the development of a genocide-specific early warning system. Founded in 1995, this organisation was the first of its kind to enlist scholars and former policy-makers to combine on-the-ground research and analysis, policy prescriptions and advocacy aimed at identifying problems before they devolved into full-scale crises. Joost Hiltermann remarks that the International Crisis Group ‘has built up the mechanisms to influence and create political will for engagement in these areas, and is helping to remove the excuses that politicians fall back on when they do not want to act on an emerging crisis.’ The status and treatment of ethnic, religious and political minorities is one of the most important indicators of a potential genocide, and to that end NGOs which focus specifically on minority rights have an important role to play in the genocide-prevention movement. Minority Rights Group International (MRG) is a UK-based NGO which campaigns globally in collaboration with approximately 130 partner organisations for the rights of indigenous minorities by raising awareness, publishing authoritative reports and filing lawsuits on behalf of victimized groups. Conflict Prevention Officer Chris Chapman noted the importance of integrating compliance with minority rights as an indicator of broader human rights and stability concerns. ‘Strangely enough, when donor

39. See www.aegis.org.uk

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governments and international agencies address human rights issues, the status of minority rights is often passed over completely,’ says Chapman. Additionally, MRG’s People’s Under Threat index ranks levels of risk to minorities for conflict, atrocity or genocide by collating existing data into a comprehensive source of information. A similar project has been undertaken by the US-based Genocide Intervention Network, which assembles information from credible sources such as the Red Cross, International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch into an ‘Areas of Concern’ map, accessible on their website. Perhaps the most important function of civil society groups is to engage the general public in the cause of genocide prevention. As James Smith acknowledges, ‘In a way, the problem isn’t so much early warning as the lack of action and the lack of political will to act.’ Matthew Krain concurs: ‘genocide prevention is principally a problem of both political will and information – it isn’t that the information does not exist, or is not being collected, but that it needs to be put in a form that is so obvious and intelligible that it gives politicians less and less room to make excuses. That’s where NGOs can be most helpful.’

Coalition Building and the Challenge of mobilizing Electorates
‘People feel disengaged, mostly because they feel there’s no way they could take on the Foreign Office and prevail,’ says Douglas Carswell MP. ‘People do care,’ Louise Roland-Gosselin insists, ‘but the general public is completely desensitized to violence. And at the end of the day, people feel like they have their own problems, and they don’t want to have to hear about Darfur over dinner.’ For Mary Kayitesi-Blewitt, the founder and former Director of SURF, the situation is even bleaker: ‘This is a bystander culture, and it just allows genocide to happen again and again.’ ‘Fundamentally,’ observes Professor Norman Geras, ‘It’s the “contract of mutual indifference” – it’s difficult to engage with the suffering of others, let alone others whose lives and tragedies are very distant to us.’ What, then, is the way forward in engaging a broad section of society in the cause of genocide prevention? ‘The example I like to use is the abolitionist movement,’ Greg Stanton argues. ‘Back before any of these big organisations existed, individuals in the UK and then in the US organised themselves, primarily through church groups, to put an end

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to slavery. In the UK, most of these abolitionists had never even seen an African before, had never witnessed the evil of slavery with their own eyes. In spite of this, they built the first global movement of conscience.’ Certainly, the abolitionist movement shows the potential for political momentum via consensus building at both the grassroots and national level – a process which has underpinned the modern democratic age. In this sense, this report regards the principle task of civil society in both the UK and the US as consensus-building on the issue of genocide, to create what the Genocide Intervention Network call ‘a permanent anti-genocide coalition.’ When attacks on Darfuri civilians intensified in 2001, Michael Horowitz – the Director of the Hudson Institute’s Project for Civil Justice Reform and Project for International Religious Liberty – knew what to do. ‘My friends Joe Madison, Walter Fauntroy and I chained ourselves to the Sudanese embassy,’ he recalls. ‘Joe and Walter are both left-leaning Democrats and I’m a conservative, and none of us could get any press attention on these atrocities. So we chained ourselves to the embassy, and we were arrested, and when the time came for us to get our lawyers we made a bet – that I could get Ken Starr to represent Joe and that Joe would get Johnny Cochran to represent me!’ laughed Horowitz. ‘And they did! And I tell you this not because it’s a funny story, but because this is my approach – to show that some issues are beyond politics, and to build alliances between communities and energize the electorate.’ Michael Horowitz has drafted and lobbied for the passage of key pieces of human rights legislation, including the Sudan Peace Act, the International Religious Freedom Act, the Trafficking Protection Act and the North Korean Freedom Act. These were bipartisan efforts for which Horowitz enlisted the support of a diverse array of political, religious and ethnic groups in the US. His approach is based on the understanding that some issues – genocide in particular – can achieve a broad level of appeal. In a democratic system this recognition can be translated into significant public pressure for political action. ‘Democracy works,’ Horowitz asserts. ‘I draft these laws in ways that we can win, I don’t settle for white noise, but I do accept that if you can make a few strategic concessions you can bridge ideological gaps to craft achievable policy goals. And you learn that Americans have more in common with each other than Moveon.org or Pat Robertson would like us to know!’ While Mr Horowitz has successfully built coalitions across parties
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and communities, one of the challenges of this approach has been the hostility from some corners of the movement to concessions. ‘Some of my friends – good, dedicated people on the right and left – have been very angry with me because, for instance, I advocated trying to engage the moderates within the Sudanese government. Sometimes, particularly in the human rights community, there’s this need to maintain an inviolable stance above the pragmatic considerations of how to move things forward, build the broadest consensus possible to stop the killing. In the worst cases this represents an almost perverse need to fail, a need to feel that they’re the only ones who care. Well what good is that?’ This tendency to take lofty, non-negotiable stances can be an obstacle to engaging a broad section of the electorate, and reinforces scepticism about the usefulness of these endeavours. ‘Unfortunately, there tends to be two types of human rights activists,’ notes Brian Brivati. ‘Those who are results-oriented, who try to coordinate their message and get changes on the ground, and those who are really only interested in being right. The first type often make themselves unpopular because they talk to government – which is the only thing which can actually change anything – while the second type are ineffective because they constantly kowtow to a political constituency with superficially progressive but ultimately parochial attitudes towards these problems. In the genocide field, that sort of posturing wastes a lot of potential.’ James Smith remarked that the level of collaboration amongst NGOs has sometimes been compromised by ideological disagreements, but notes that ‘the turf wars have diminished over the past decade, and we’ve been able to collaborate on some important campaigns like Save Darfur.’ To that end, Crisis Action coordinates a network of partner organisations ranging from leading human rights and policy groups like Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group, and a second tier of networked members, including think tanks, trade unions and faith groups that mobilize around key movements to bring together diverse political constituencies. ‘We act as the glue between these individual efforts, and by working behind the scenes we are able to keep attention focused on common messages and strategy,’ Gemma Mortensen explains. This strategy has been particularly successful in organising events such as the Global Day for Darfur and in engaging the attention of members of Parliament. ‘As far as consensus-building, our organisational model is to work on two levels – high-level advocacy around specific policy

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recommendations and building a broad-based constituency from which to campaign,’ Mortensen argues. ‘I think our model works because fundamentally it’s action-oriented, and it fuses different types of expertise together in a way which helps all our partners, both individually and in their overall aims.’ The Washington-based Genocide Intervention Network (GINet) has made engaging the electorate its central goal. GI-Net began as an initiative of students at Swarthmore College who were inspired by Samantha Power’s seminal study of American policy towards genocide in the twentieth century, A Problem From Hell. Accordingly, GI-Net has sought to tackle the central problem identified in Power’s book – the lack of political will for action in past genocides. ‘Sadly, few elected officials will take action in the face of genocide unless their constituents send a message,’ remarks Allyson Neville, Advocacy Associate at GI-Net. ‘So we focus on empowering an anti-genocide constituency by providing easily accessible information on the voting records of Members of Congress and various tools to streamline communication with elected officials.’ One of the most innovative aspects of the GI-Net campaign is their online ‘Darfur Scorecard,’ which rates US lawmakers based on their support of legislation relating to Darfur, provides information on the specific legislation cited and lists the contact information for lawmakers. ‘Although ultimately most of the heavy decisions lie with the Executive, this is a way of building a constituency to show that the issue of genocide can affect people’s perception of politicians and even their voting patterns,’ reasons Chad Hazlett, GI-Net’s Director of Protection. ‘The conventional wisdom is that Americans don’t care, but we’ve actually disputed that with hard data – the majority of Americans do care about these issues, they just need to see a simple way that they can do something about it, by giving them the information to act but also by demonstrating a viable mechanism for change on the ground.’ The field of genocide-specific organisations and campaigns in the United Kingdom is growing but remains comparatively limited. Aegis Trust, Waging Peace and Never Again International are Britain’s main genocidespecific NGOs, and work in collaboration with other more broadly-focused human rights, conflict prevention organisations and civil society groups such as faith-based groups and community centres. Waging Peace was formed in 2004 by journalist Rebecca Tinsley in reaction to the void in public attention to Darfur in the UK. According to her colleague, Louise

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Roland-Gosselin, ‘Nothing substantive was happening in the UK at that point – and it was probably the worst point of the genocide in Darfur.’ As one of the leading participants in the Global Day for Darfur, organised protests, petitions and the Sudan divestment campaign, Waging Peace has achieved an impressive level of visibility in only five years of existence. By holding informational sessions on developments in Darfur in Westminster, Waging Peace has taken an important step towards influencing the opinions of parliamentarians: ‘Over the past few years we have seen some improvements in getting the issue addressed in the House of Commons, particularly using the information we have collected on the ground in the IDP camps,’ Louise Roland-Gosselin comments. Waging Peace has been instrumental in bringing Darfur to the attention of the British press, and has achieved significant coverage of their deeply-affecting collection of drawings by Darfuri children which depict attacks on their villages. However, on the whole Ms Roland Gosselin contends that this is ‘an uphill battle, and can be intensely frustrating.’ James Smith of the Aegis Trust remarks that one of the main challenges for the genocide-prevention campaign in the UK is in mobilizing citizens. ‘The activist community in the UK is less vocal and less wellfunded than in the US. Also, there is far less student activism, which is why the Aegis Trust has made student groups a big focus of our grassroots efforts.’ Brian Brivati admits to pessimism on this front, seeing the lack of involvement as indicative of an increasingly bereft political culture. ‘The traditional human rights constituency, the left, has been too consumed by the anti-war and Palestine movements to pay much attention to Darfur. And the right doesn’t mobilize on human rights issues generally, so it is difficult to build these constituencies over here.’ One major reason for this has been the mobilisation of faith groups in the United States, a component of civil society which is larger, more influential and politically active than in the United Kingdom. While Jewish groups in the United States have traditionally mobilized on issues of genocide and civil rights, Britain’s Jewish community has been more reticent. Hannah Weisfeld, Director of Social Action for the London Jewish Community Centre, remarks, ‘While historically I think Anti-Semitism may have reduced the Jewish community’s readiness to attract attention to themselves through social activism, in recent years this trend has undergone a major reversal. The significant Jewish component of UK mobilisation on Darfur is a good example of this change.’

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‘A Guilt Beyond Crime’

Education initiatives could be another important component of grassroots mobilization on genocide prevention. The government-funded Holocaust Educational Trust (HET) has striven to fulfil part of this task by making Holocaust education a permanent and effective component of the UK’s national curriculum. Lord Greville Janner, a former war crimes investigator and founder of the All-Party Parliamentary War Crimes Group, is Chairman of the HET. ‘For me the Holocaust isn’t history, it’s a very real part of my life – most of my family in Europe were murdered,’ remarks Lord Janner. ‘But now that it is history, it is vital that we keep that memory alive, and the Holocaust Educational Trust sends children to Auschwitz every year to see, learn and reflect upon that unspeakable part of our history.’ Conservative Party Leader David Cameron was criticized in May 2008 for referring to these trips as a ‘gimmick,’ – a comment he later clarified as not having referred to the concept of Holocaust Remembrance, which he fully supports – and while former HET Head of Education Kay Andrews notes that there is a danger that the children are not ‘fully reflecting on these experiences,’ she points out that there has been an improved rate of return over the past academic year, particularly with the introduction of undergraduate credits for completed coursework on the Holocaust. There are also worries that the Holocaust curriculum is not being taught in such a way as to emphasize the reoccurrence and persistent threat of genocides. Certainly, the goal of the HET is to promote a curriculum which approaches Holocaust education with ‘historical accuracy and in a way which will encourage students to question their own assumptions.’ To that end, Ms Andrews notes that the Institution for Education, with the support of the HET, has completed a research project on teacher attitudes towards Holocaust education, and will release its results in the second half of 2009. The Holocaust Memorial Day Trust is another government-funded initiative aimed at educating the general public in the history of the Holocaust specifically, as both a memorialisation project and a springboard for genocide-awareness. As CEO of the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust, Carly Whyborn attests to the organisation’s pursuit of a clear and direct programme of public events, including petitions for action in Darfur, and to ‘close the considerable gap in public knowledge about the Holocaust and subsequent genocides,’ Whyborn explains. ‘Through campaign themes like the ‘Dignity of Difference’ and online initiatives such as our ‘virtual memorial candle’ we’ve been able to attract an increasingly large level

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of public interest, including an audience of over 75 million via media coverage.’ Whyborn is encouraged by these developments, and plans to launch further public demonstrations of commitment to the anti-genocide campaign, such as the use of public petitions and an increase in speechmaking by survivors of contemporary genocides. Clearly, the mobilization strategy for Britain must be structured to appeal to a culture which values a more restrained approach to public discourse, and which is sceptical of moralistic language in public life. Americans tend to view the concept of genocide prevention – consciously or unconsciously – through the lens of the country’s superpower status. Consequently, many American citizens operate under the assumption that America has the power to change the world for the better. Whether this represents naiveté or hubris, civil society groups have successfully harnessed this conviction for action on the issue of genocide. In Britain, the sense of moral necessity for political involvement has been most recently dominated by movements such as the campaign against climate change or Make Poverty History. Yet there remains a marked sense of malaise regarding the possibility of achieving change through the democratic process – a formidable obstacle for anti-genocide campaigners in Britain. This gap must be addressed by civil society groups. The introduction of an initiative similar to the GI-Net’s ‘Darfur Scorecard,’ either from an existing organisation or as the basis for an entirely new anti-genocide initiative could provide the tools to galvanize and channel public opinion as a pressure group. Additionally, the Imperial War Museum could commission a policy-research project similar to the US Genocide Prevention Task Force to investigate and advocate specific anti-genocide policies. A joint initiative between the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust, Aegis Trust and any other significant British-based human rights or genocidespecific groups may be the best way to spearhead such a project.

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ConCLuSion
As leaders of the G8, member states of the UN Security Council, and – in the case of the US – the world’s superpower, the United States and UK have both a unique opportunity and responsibility to place genocide prevention on the forefront of their foreign policy agendas. President Obama’s election has been hailed as the beginning of a new era in the exercise of American power, not least by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who is keen to pursue a close and mutually beneficial alliance with the popular new American president. This is often expressed in terms of a promise of renewed American commitment to the processes of the United Nations and to the spirit of multilateralism. However, the realities of present global circumstances have revealed the insufficiency of this approach to addressing the crises of terrorism, aggression and genocide. For these reasons, President Obama and the British government must confront these realities with boldness and vision, and broach the complex issues raised by the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect.’ This report has argued that, for both moral and pragmatic reasons, genocide prevention must stand at the forefront of these broader international shifts. It advocates first and foremost that the international community should move beyond flawed interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, and for the application of the convention’s original intent. The US State Department has made considerable movement in this direction in the aftermath of the monumental policy failures of the 1990s, and this has quite correctly led the US to become the first nation to refer to Darfur as a ‘genocide.’ The UK government would do well to reassess its own refusal to classify the atrocities in Darfur as genocide – at least during the height of the Sudanese government’s campaign against the Darfuris in 2001-2005

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Conclusion

– and join the United States in pushing for an expanded, well-equipped and well-trained UNAMID mission able to fulfil its responsibility to civilian protection.40 The realities on the ground and the genocidal agenda which has compelled the actions of the Janajaweed will not be resolved through the deployment of the UNAMID mission. To that end this report advocates that the US and UK governments reassess the failed ceasefire and peace agreements between the Sudanese government and southern rebel forces, and pressure the leaders of the African Union to unite in cooperation with the UNAMID mission and in opposition to the Khartoum government. It will be no small task to convince those African countries whose attitudes towards the Sudanese regime have been coloured by the influence of Chinese arms and oil contracts to support such a scheme. Consequently, it is crucial that the US and UK emphasize their continued commitment to removing trade barriers with developing African countries, which could provide a counter-balance to the free hand with which China has been able to support dictatorships such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. The inability of the US and UK to forge a consistent genocide prevention policy is linked to a deeply-rooted understanding of what constitutes a ‘strategic interest,’ and the desire to steer clear of messy interventions or those which may upset other members of the international community. Yet contemporary history has demonstrated that, in a globalized world, seemingly isolated problems can quickly become issues of regional and world-wide import. The recent publication of the Genocide Prevention Task Force’s ‘Blueprint for American Policymakers’ report provides a timely and reasonable starting point for realistic strategies on both sides of the Atlantic. Naturally, the British government faces stronger constraints in addressing this issue than the US, and for this reason may benefit from forming a dedicated policy team along the lines of the US task force to propose new approaches to this problem. On this point, the burgeoning anti-genocide movement in British civil society should join forces with the government in an attempt to construct a similar initiative, perhaps using the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Genocide Prevention as a launching point. Additionally, this report recommends that individual parliamentarians cooperate with civil society groups to engender greater media interest in this subject and to raise the issue in both Houses. Parliamentarians have a responsibility to take the legislative
40. Although the conflict in Darfur is customarily dated to have commenced in 2003, attacks on villages by the Sudanese government had been in full flow since 2001.

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initiative on these issues, but the overwhelming momentum for a policy shift of this kind must necessarily be supported – if not actively promoted – by the Executive. In the US, President Obama’s inaugural address promised to forge a foreign policy based on both pragmatism and moral responsibility; he should fulfil this promise by prioritizing an anti-genocide agenda at the State Department, specifically through increased interagency cooperation and resource allocation to the Office of War Crimes Issues. Although the financial crisis has made demands for increased funding of non-stimulus government programmes more difficult, President Obama should choose a prudent time to propose this initiative to his administration, to Congress and to the American public as one of the defining tasks of his presidency. Let us see President Obama use his rhetorical skills to achieve effective change on this issue, and turn US policy away from platitudes towards action. Not only would this initiative be of value in-and-of-itself, but it would enable him to broach more controversial but nonetheless pressing concerns such as the concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility.’ The issue of genocide prevention may also enable politicians to finally address the total failure of the Security Council to fulfil its role under the UN Charter and the UNGC, and to quietly begin to build bilateral and multilateral alternatives to the Security Council for situations requiring swift action by the international community. In the UK, the current Labour government or an incoming Conservative government must reassert a principled and bold foreign policy, and dispel the floundering approach which has unfortunately characterized the Foreign Office in recent months. One way of expanding attention on this issue on an institutional level could be through the work of the Foreign Office’s Responsibility to Protect desk. The US and UK may pursue different approaches to genocide prevention within the confines of their individual governments, but should cooperate to ensure the consistent availability and readiness of interventionist forces in the event of a genocide. If upstream prevention and diplomatic coercion does not yield results and civilians become targets for destruction, the international community must act – either through peacekeeping forces with clear mandates and appropriate training, or through a coalition of the willing. As advocated in the Genocide Prevention Report, any threat of intervention can only be credible, both to perpetrators and to the international community at large, if it is backed by a coherent statement of policy which includes contingency plans by the relevant government departments or through treaty agreements.

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Conclusion

Political will is crucial in creating the momentum for an antigenocide policy to take root, and requires mobilization of the American and British electorates through civil society initiatives. While there are a number of high visibility anti-genocide campaigns currently active in the United States, the UK has had to make do with a few small but dedicated projects. Despite their relatively small size and modest funding, organisations such as Aegis Trust, Waging Peace and Never Again have almost single-handedly promoted the cause of Darfur, and of continued genocide awareness, in the British media. These efforts require expansion in order to exert sufficient pressure for government action, and the gap in funding these projects could be made up by philanthropists, or through investment in this issue by larger NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Additionally, anti-genocide NGOs should expand their advocacy tactics to include approaches which emphasize the individual capacity for action, in line with the ‘Legislative Scorecard’ approach employed by the Genocide Intervention Network. In The Drowned and the Saved, Primo Levi describes a recurring nightmare he experienced after his liberation from Auschwitz. In his dream, Levi returns from the camps and recounts his tale of horror to his remaining family and friends, only to see them turn away in disbelief and, worse still, disinterest. From Primo Levi to Halima Bashir, too many individuals have lived this nightmare; too many more have not survived to tell the tale. As P-5 members and leading democracies, the US and the UK have a responsibility to redress this nightmare by committing to a consistent anti-genocide agenda, and vanquish once and for all this ‘guilt beyond crime.’

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Interview Subjects
Lord Eric Avebury is a member of the Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs team and founded the Parliamentary Human Rights Group as a member of the House of Commons in 1976. He serves on the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Genocide Prevention and has been particularly vocal on the issue of Darfur. Among other honours, he holds the Liberal International Freedom Prize. Dr Halima Bashir is a medical doctor and principal author of Tears of the Desert: A Memoir of Survival in Darfur. She has claimed asylum in the United Kingdom and campaigns for international action to halt the atrocities in Darfur. Mary Kayitesi-Blewitt was the founder and former director of SURF, the fund for the Survivors of the Rwandan genocide. A British citizen of Rwandan origin, Ms Blewitt lost family members in the genocide and has been awarded an OBE in recognition of her efforts to assist Rwandan survivors. Dr Brian Brivati is the Director of the John Smith Memorial Trust, a published historian and frequent contributor to publications including The Guardian. Dr Brivati was also a Commissioner on the Foreign Policy Centre-Channel 4-sponsored ‘Iraq Commission,’ a cross-partisan inquiry into the Iraq War which concluded its work in July 2007. Douglas Carswell is the Conservative MP for Harwich and Clacton, a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and Co-Author of Direct Democracy: an Agenda for a New Model Party and The Plan: Twelve Months to Renew Britain. Chris Chapman is the Conflict Prevention Officer at Minority Rights Group International, a leading NGO working with 130 partner organisations internationally to raise awareness about the rights of ethnic and religious minorities across the globe. Sapna Chhatpar is a Project Manager for the Responsibility to ProtectEngaging Civil Society project at the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy – the primary non-governmental advocacy group for the Office of the Special Adviser for the Responsibility to Protect. Simona Cruciani is an officer of Information Management at the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Dr Francis Deng. Ms Cruciani is primarily responsible for collecting and assessing intelligence from

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Interview Subjects

within and outside the UN, and with forging intra-agency and external NGO cooperation on the issue of genocide prevention. Mauro De Lorenzo is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, specialising in post-conflict development and refugee and humanitarian policy, with a particular focus on Africa. Prof Charles Garraway served for thirty years as a legal officer in the UK Army Legal Services where he advised the Ministry of Defence on operations in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, and was a member of the British delegation to the Rome Conference on the ICC in 1998. He is an Associate Fellow at Chatham House and a part-time Professor at the LSE. Norman Geras is the retired Professor Emeritus of Government at the University of Manchester, and a highly regarded political philosopher. He is author of The Contract of Mutual Indifference: Political Philosophy After the Holocaust, and co-founded the Euston Manifesto movement of British progressives. Jane Gordon is a barrister specialising in human rights and international law. She is a visiting fellow at LSE and SOAS and a Senior Lecturer in Human Rights at Kingston University. She was the Human Rights advisor to the Northern Ireland Policing Board from 2003-2008 and Deputy Director of the Kurdish Human Rights Project from 2002-2003. Louise Roland-Gosselin is the Director and head of research at Waging Peace, one of Britain’s most vocal anti-genocide NGOs. Ms Roland-Gosselin’s research expertise is in the area of human rights and African conflicts. Lord Greville Janner is a Labour peer, and was the founder and Secretary of the All-Party Parliamentary War Crimes Group. Lord Janner is also co-founder of the Holocaust Education Trust and a former President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews. Chad Hazlett is the Protection Director at the Genocide Intervention Network, a leading anti-genocide NGO based in Washington, DC. John Heffernan is the Director of the Genocide Prevention Initiative of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Committee on Conscience, and was formerly a Senior Investigator with Physicians for Human Rights, where he led three investigations in the Darfur region.

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Roger Helmer is the Conservative MEP for the East Midlands. He currently serves on the Committees for Unemployment, Petitions, Constitutional Affairs and the Parliament’s Temporary Committee on Climate Change. Dr Joost Hiltermann is the Deputy Programme Director for the Middle East and North Africa at International Crisis Group, an international NGO dedicated to conflict prevention and the development of early warning capabilities. Dr Hiltermann is an expert on Saddam Hussein’s campaign against the Kurds, and previously served as Executive Director of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch. Victoria Holt is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Centre in Washington, DC, and Co-Director of the Future of Peace Operations Program. Ms Holt headed the expert group on military and defence options for the Genocide Prevention Task Force, and previously served in the US State Department under President Clinton. Michael Horowitz is the Director of the Hudson Institute’s Project for Civil Justice Reform and Project for International Religious Liberty, and has lobbied the US Congress on the issue of Darfur since 2000. Mr Horowitz previously served as an attorney in the Justice Department under President Reagan. Paul Keetch is the Liberal Democrat MP for Hereford. Mr Keetch is a member of the Committee for Arms Export Controls and the Foreign Affairs Committee. Dr Matthew Krain is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the College of Wooster in the United States, and a noted expert on human rights and genocidal conflicts. Iain Levine is the Programme Director at Human Rights Watch, overseeing the organisation’s research and reporting work. Mr Levine’s particular area of expertise is the protection of children and civilians in conflict zones, and he has over ten years of field experience working in Mozambique and Sudan. Dr Edward Luck is the United Nations Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, reporting to the Secretary-General, and the Senior Vice President and Director of Studies at the International Peace Institute. From 1995 to 1997, he played a key role in the UN reform process as Senior Consultant to the Department of Administration and Management of the United Nations, and has written extensively on the subject of the future of UN reforms. Dr Kishan Manocha trained as a psychiatrist before switching to law and is a
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Interview Subjects

practising barrister. He has worked alongside General Romeo Dallaire at the Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University and is a Fellow of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies at Concordia University. Since April 2005, Dr Manocha has served as the General Secretary of the national governing council of the Baha’i community in the United Kingdom. Ann McKechin is the Labour MP for Glasgow North, and former Vice-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Genocide Prevention. Ms. McKechin also serves on the Select Committee on International Development. Linda Melvern is an investigative journalist and one of the foremost experts on the Rwandan genocide. She published the earliest account of the failure over Rwanda in January 1995 and went on to publish two books on the circumstances of the genocide now used as standard texts in universities world-wide, A People Betrayed and Conspiracy to Murder. A consultant to the Military One prosecution team at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, she provided documentary evidence to the court and has delivered testimony in the UK Parliament regarding her on-going investigation into the genocide and the international response. Andrew Mitchell is the Conservative MP for Sutton Coldfield and Shadow Secretary of State for International Development. Mr Mitchell served as a UN peacekeeper in Cyprus, and is author of the 2007 pamphlet “The UN and the Failure to Protect.” He is also the founder of Project Umubano, a Conservative social action project in Rwanda. Gemma Mortensen is Executive Director of Crisis Action, an international non-profit organisation which coordinates global campaigns on issues including the Darfur conflict. Ms Mortensen also worked previously for the ICC, and for the UK Mission to the United Nations in New York. Alyson Neville is an Advocacy Associate at the Genocide Intervention Network in Washington, DC, who contributes to the coordination of the Network’s national campaign in the United States. James Ross is a Senior Legal Adviser at Human Rights Watch, who has previously worked with Médecins Sans Frontières in Holland, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe in Bosnia, the International Human Rights Law Group in Cambodia, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

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Representative Louise Slaughter (D-NY) is Chair of the US House of Representatives Rules Committee, and is one of nine House Congressional members of the Helsinki Commission. Dr James Smith is Chief Executive and Co-Founder of Aegis Trust, the UK’s first dedicated anti-genocide charity, formed after Dr Smith’s experiences as a volunteer physician in Kosovo. The Aegis Trust has established the Kigali Memorial Centre in Rwanda and has been instrumental in the Darfur appeals in the UK. Prof Philip Spencer is the creator of the first European programme of Genocide Studies at Kingston University, and an Associate Dean in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Dr Greg Stanton is the founder and President of Genocide Watch, the United States’ first genocide-specific NGO, Chair of the International Campaign to End Genocide, and President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. As Director of the Cambodian Genocide Project, Dr Stanton was instrumental in helping to establish the Khmer Rouge Tribunals, and while serving at the US State Department from 1992-1999, Dr Stanton helped to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Gisela Stuart is the Labour MP for Birmingham Edgbaston. Ms Stuart is a member of the House of Commons Select Committee on Foriegn Affairs, the Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Transatlantic & International Security and a Trustee of the Henry Jackson Society. Carly Whyborn is the National Coordinator for the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust. Hannah Wiesfeld is the Social Action and Campaigns Coordinator for the Jewish Community Centre in London. Ambassador Clint Williamson is the US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues. Previously, Ambassador Williamson served as Acting Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Relief, Stabilization, and Development at the National Security Council (NSC), and as a Trial Attorney at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

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Written Sources & Further Reading

Written Sources & Further Reading
Arendt, Hannah & Jaspers, Karl, Correspondence 1926-1969, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992) Bashir, Halima & Lewis, Damien, Tears of the Desert, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2008) Chalk, Frank, ‘Definitions of Genocide and their Implications for Prediction and Prevention,’ Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1989) Deng, Francis, Sadikiel, Kimaro et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996) Evans, Gareth, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008) Falkner, Kishwer, Goodhart, David et al., ‘Miliband’s Message,’ Prospect Magazine, No. 151 (Oct. 2008) Fein, Helen, ‘Genocide by Attrition 1939-1993,’ Health and Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1997) Gellately, Robert & Kiernan, Ben, The Spectre of Genocide, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) Geras, Norman, The Contract of Mutual Indifference, (London: Verso, 1999) Greenawalt, Alexander, ‘Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation,’ Columbia Law Review, Vol. 99, No. 8 (Dec. 1999) Harff, Barbara, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955,’ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (Feb. 2003) Hilberg, Raul, The Destruction of the European Jews, (New York: Holmes & Meir, 1985) Inge, Peter, Lanxade, Jacques et al., ‘Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World,’ (Lunteren: Noaber Foundation, 2007)

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Krain, Matthew, ‘State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jun. 1997) Kuper, Leo, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) Laban Hinton, Alexander (ed.), Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002) Lemkin, Raphael, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944) Lemkin, Raphael, ‘Genocide as a Crime under International Law,’ The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan. 1947) Marshall, Will, ‘Obama Needs a Strong Foreign Policy,’ The Wall Street Journal, (7 Nov. 2008) Melvern, Linda, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2000) Power, Samantha, ‘Bystanders to Genocide,’ The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 288. No. 2 (Sept. 2001) Power, Samantha, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, (New York: Harper Perennial, 2003) Rummel, Rudy, ‘Power, Genocide and Mass Murder,’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Feb. 1994) Van Schaack, Beth, ‘The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot,’ The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106, No. 7 (May 1997) Schabas, William A., Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) Shaw, Martin, What is Genocide? (Cambridge: Polity, 2007) Snyder, Jack & Vinjamuri, Leslie ‘Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism

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Written Sources & Further Reading

in Strategies of International Justice,’ International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003) Stanton, Gregory, ‘The Eight Stages of Genocide,’ Yale Genocide Studies Series, (Feb. 1998) Stanton, Gregory, ‘Preventing Genocide: Threats and Responsibilities,’ Options Paper for the Stockholm International Forum on Genocide Prevention (Jan. 2004) Totten, Samuel (ed.), Genocide at the Millennium: A Critical Bibliographic Review (New York: Transaction Publishers, 2004) Totten, Samuel & Markusen, Eric (eds.), Genocide in Darfur, (New York: Routledge, 2006) Staub, Ervin, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) Valentino, Benjamin, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004)

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Official Documents
‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,’ 9 December 1948, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General,’ 25 January 2005, http://www.un.org/news/dh/ sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,’ 10 November 1998, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm ‘2005 World Outcome’ Resolution by the United Nations General Assembly, 24 October 2005, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/ united_nations/ ‘Statement by Edward C. Luck, Special Adviser to United Nations SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon Senior Vice President and Director of Studies of the International Peace Institute (IPI),’ 1 December 2008, http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/ file/409/LArria.pdf ‘The Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,’ February 2007, http://www.iciss.ca/ media-en.asp ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All,’ Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 2005, http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/ ‘Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers,’ Madeleine Albright & William Cohen, Co-Chairs, Genocide Prevention Task Force, December 2008, http://www.usip.org/events/2008/1211_preventing_ genocide.html

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Useful Websites

useful websites
Aegis Trust: www.aegis.org.uk All-Party Parliamentary Group on Genocide Prevention: www.genocideprevention.org.uk Amnesty International: www.amnesty.co.uk Crisis Action: www.crisisaction.org Genocide Intervention Network: www.genocideintervention.net Genocide Watch: www.genocidewatch.org The Henry Jackson Society: www.henryjacksonsociety.org Holocaust Educational Trust: www.het.org.uk Holocaust Memorial Day Trust: www.hmd.org.uk Human Rights Watch: www.hrw.org Permanent Holocaust Exhibition, the Imperial War Museum: www.imw.org.uk International Crisis Group: www.crisisgroup.org Linda Melvern’s Internet Resources: www.lindamelvern.com Minority Rights Group International: www.minorityrights.org Never Again International: www.neveragaininternational.org Office of the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide: www.un.org/preventgenocide/adviser/ The Responsibility to Protect Project: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org Save Darfur: www.savedarfur.org Survivors Fund: www.survivors-fund.org.uk/ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum: www.ushmm.org Waging Peace: www.wagingpeace.info

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‘If you believe in the cause of freedom, then proclaim it, live it and protect it, for humanity’s future depends on it.’
Henry M. ‘Scoop’ Jackson
(May 31, 1912 – September 1, 1983) U.S. Congressman and Senator for Washington State from 1941 – 1983