UNIVERSITY OF PADUA

FACULTY OF AGRICULTURE Departments of Land and Agro-forestry Systems

Erasmus Mundus International Master on “Sustainable Tropical Forest” (SUTROFOR)

The Legal System for the Implementation of Forest Carbon Schemes within REDD+ Projects in Indonesia: Will it secure property rights?

Supervisor Prof. Paola Gatto Co-Supervisor Dr. Marco Boscolo Francesca Felicani Robles Master student Ivonne Melissa no. 624814 Academic Year 2009 – 2010

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Index Abbreviation and Acronyms ................................................................................ 6 Summary .......................................................................................................... 11 1. Introduction............................................................................................... 13 1.1 Background ........................................................................................ 13 1.2 Problem statement and objectives of the thesis ................................. 15 1.3 Structure of the thesis ........................................................................ 16 2. Theoretical and conceptual background: property rights, land and forest tenure issues in the context of REDD ....................................................... 19 2.1 Reducing Emissions form Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) .............................................................................................. 19 2.2 Rights, property rights and natural resources..................................... 25 2.3 Property regimes and forests ............................................................. 29 2.4 Forest tenure, tenure security and its importance in REDD implementation .................................................................................. 33 2.5 Carbon-sequestration rights ............................................................... 38 2.6 The Australian approach to the issue of Carbon-sequestration rights 44 2.7 Identification of research questions .................................................... 46 3. Research methodology ............................................................................ 47 3.1 Case-studies as a research method ................................................... 47 3.2 Criteria for choosing case studies ...................................................... 48 3.3 Data collection.................................................................................... 50 3.4 Data analysis and limitations .............................................................. 52 4. Indonesia: current realities ....................................................................... 55 4.1 Indonesia at glance ............................................................................ 55 4.2 Forest in Indonesia............................................................................. 56 4.3 Land and forest tenure system in Indonesia ...................................... 60 4.4 Legal framework in Indonesia ............................................................ 67 4.5 REDD in Indonesia............................................................................. 69 5. Results and Discussions .......................................................................... 77 5.1 Descriptive analysis of chosen case studies ...................................... 77 5.1.1 REDD in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem, Aceh................................ 77 5.1.2 REDD in Meru Betiri National Park, East Java .......................... 80 5.1.3 Berau Carbon Forest Program, Kalimantan .............................. 85 5.1.4 UNREDD Carbon Project in Central Sulawesi .......................... 88 5.1.5 REDD Project by WWF in Jayapura Regency, Papua .............. 91 5.2 Readiness of Indonesian institutional framework to implement REDD ........................................................................................................... 93 5.3 An assessment of project performance in terms of property rights security .............................................................................................. 98 6. Conclusions and recommendations ....................................................... 131 6.1 Conclusions...................................................................................... 131 6.2 Recommendations ........................................................................... 132 Quoted literature ............................................................................................. 133 Web sites........................................................................................................ 141 Annexes ......................................................................................................... 143 Annex 1 - Terminology ................................................................................... 143 Annex 2 – Questionnaire ................................................................................ 148

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.............. Ownership regimes of Carbon sequestration adopted in Australia and their tradability..... Proposed framework for assessment of project performance in terms of property rights security . and Informed Consent (FPIC) ......................... 89 Figure 16.................................................. Community tenure security in 2 REDD project sites in Indonesia and in Australia ....... Result analysis of community tenure security in 2 REDD projects in Indonesia and in case of Aborigin community.................... Location of Central Sulawesi ........................................................... 72 Figure 8.......... 123 Figure 20.................. REDD voluntary activities in Indonesia .................... 23 Box 3......................... 74 Figure 9........ 75 Table 6.................... 41 Table 2..... 96 Table 7.............................. Project quality assessment of five selected projects ....................... 36 Figure 2. 102 List of boxes Box 1................................. Detail of project quality assessment of five selected projects ............. Voluntary and local government initiatives ................................................... 85 Figure 14............................ Free................. 50 Figure 4.................................................................................... Possible Forest Management Regimes ... 78 Figure 11... Framework for stakeholder consultation ..................... 70 Figure 7. Demonstration activities in Indonesia ...... Map of project area of Ulu Masen Ecosystem ... Actors and Actions in securing community tenure ............................................ REDD plus strategy readiness phase (2009 – 2012).............. 74 Table 5................................. REDD Demonstration Activities in Indonesia ... 38 Figure 3...................................................................................................................... Road Map of REDD Indonesia-phased approach ................... 45 Table 3........................................................ Map of Indonesia ............................................ A picture of possible ownership regimes of Carbon sequestration potential ... UNREDD NJP Programme Structure ... 125 List of tables Table 1............................. Australia ............ 87 Figure 15........................................... Location of the five case-studies .... 32 4 .................... 92 Figure 18............................ 99 Table 8..................... Prior................................ 97 Figure 19......... Elements of Community Tenure Security ...................................... Location of Meru Betiri National Park .. 91 Figure 17....................... 76 Figure 10........... 82 Figure 12............. 58 Figure 6................................................... Result of project quality assessment of five selected projects .......... 150 List of figures Figure 1.................................... Forest management models for local community participation ............................ 72 Table 4............... Steps of a REDD supply-chain .......................... 83 Figure 13.............................. Phases of development of Berau Carbon Forest Program .. 24 Box 4....................... Strategy REDD Indonesia ..... Map of Jayapura Regency ..................................................... 21 Box 2.................................. Location of Berau District ..............................Annex 3 – Community tenure security assessment . A characterization of the phases for implementation of forest carbon policy and programs ... 55 Figure 5.......

Box 5.... Lindsay‟s characteristics of secure community tenure .......... 61 Box 8.......................... Adat regulation in managing forest . 43 Box 7................................. REDDES (Reducing Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhanching Environmental Services in Tropical Forests) ................................................... 84 5 ............... Forest Zones vs State Forests ..................... 35 Box 6............................................... Steps towards establishing carbon ownership in a given legislative context .......... 65 Box 9.....................................................

Common Pool Resource Civil Society Organizations Demonstration Activity Government office at regency or provincial level Forestry office at regency or province District. In other part of Indonesia this is equivalent to kecamatan Direktorat Jendral Planologi Kehutanan (Directorate General for Forest Planning) Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim (National Council on Climate Change) European Union Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (of the World Bank) Forest Dependent Peoples Flora and Fauna International Focus Group Discussion Forest Management Unit 6 . upheld through social sanctions. A non-codified collection of rules of formal behaviour. The supreme decision-making body of the UNFCCC. Community and Biodiversity Alliance (Standard that currently being used to in the validation process of REDD proposal through voluntary market mechanism) Climate Change Trust Fund Clean Development Mechanism C Camat CCBA CCTF CDM CER CIFOR CO2 COP CPR CSOs DA Dinas Dinas Kehutanan Distrik DGPLAN DNPI EU FAO FCPF FDP FFI FGD FMU Certified Emissions Reduction Centre for International Forestry Research Carbon dioxide Conference of the Parties. varying from time to time and place to place World Bank Multi-Donor Fund‟s Aceh Environment and Forest Project Afforestation/ reforestation Bali Action Plan Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah (Regency Planning and Development Planning Agency) Badan Pertanahan Nasional (National Land Administration Agency) Head of a district or city Carbon Head of Kecamatan (sub-district) Climate.Abbreviation and Acronyms AD Adat AFEP A/R BAP BAPPEDA BPN Bupati Avoided deforestation Custom.

Education.FORDA FPIC FRA FRIS GHG GoI GoJ GoN HA HCVF HGU HKm HK HL HM HN HP HPA HPH HPT HPK HR HTI HTR HU ICRAF IEC IFCA IIED ILO IPs IPCC ITTO IUPJL Izin garap JPD Kabupaten Forest Research and Development Agency Free. Prior and Informed Consent Forest Resources Assessment Forest Resources Information System Greenhouse Gas Government of Indonesia Government of Japan Government of Norway Hutan Adat (customary forest) High Conservation Value Forest Hak Guna Usaha (plantation licence) Hutan Kemasyarakatan (one of Indonesia‟s community based forest management programmes) Hutan Konservasi (Conservation Forest) Hutan Lindung (Protected Forest) Hak Milik (right of ownership) Hutan Negara (state forest) Hak Pakai (use right) Hutan Produksi Alam (Natural Production Forest) Hak Pengusahaan Hutan (logging concession) Hutan Produksi Terbatas (Limited Production Forest) Hutan Produksi Konversi ( Convertible Production Forest) Hutan Rakyat (one of Indonesia‟s community based forest management programmes) Hutan Tanaman Industri (Industrial Plantation Forest) Hutan Tanaman Rakyat (one of Indonesia‟s community based forest management) Hak Ulayat (customary authority over land) World Agroforestry Centre Information. The administrative unit in Indonesia which is situated immediately below the provincial level 7 . and Communication Indonesian Forest Climate Alliance International Institute for Environment and Development International Labour Organization Indigenous Peoples Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change International Tropical Timber Organization Izin Usaha Pemanfaatan Jasa Lingkungan (Permit for Utilization of Environmental Services) Right to cultivate Joint Programming Document District.

FMU) Kawasan Suaka Alam (Nature Reserve Zone) Lembaga Alam Tropika Indonesia Lead Implementing Partner Land Use.Kawasan Kawasan hutan Kecamatan Keucik KPA KPH KSA LATIN LIP LULUCF m Masyarakat adat MBNP MRV MoA MoFor MOU MT Mha NCAS NCASI NCCC NGOs NICFI NJP NPB NPD NTFP ODA OED Ondoafi PEB Perdasus PDD PHKA PP PSP RED Region or area Forest area Sub-district. Administrative unit which is situated immediately below the district level Village leader. Land Use Change and Forestry Meter Customary communities Meru Betiri National Park Measurement Assessment Reporting and Verification Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Forestry Memorandum of Understanding Mega tonnes Million hectares National Carbon Accounting System National Carbon Accounting System Indonesia National Council for Climate Change Non-governmental Organizations Norway International Climate and Forest Initiative National Joint Programme National Project Board National Project Director Non-timber forest product Official Development Assistance Oxford English Dictionary Traditional chief in Jayapura Project Executive Board Peraturan Derah Khusus (regional autonomy law) Project Design Document Perlindungan Hutan dan Konservasi Alam (Forest Protection and Nature Conservation) Peraturan pemerintah (Government Regulations) Permanent Sample Plot Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 8 . Also known as Geucik in Acehnese Kawasan Pelestarian Alam (Nature Conservation Zone) Kesatuan Pemangkuan Hutan (Forest Management Unit.

REDD REDDI REDDES REL RIL RLPS R-PIN RPJM R-PLAN RRI RS RTRWP RUPES SFM TA Tahura Tanah ulayat TB TGHK TLAS TNC UN UNDG UNDP UNDRIP UNEP UNFCCC UN-REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Indonesia Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhancing Environmental Services in tropical forest Reference Emissions Level Reduced impact logging Rehabilitasi Lahan dan Perhutanan Sosial (Land Rehabilitation and Social Forestry) REDD Project Idea Note Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah (Midterm Development Plan) REDD Plan Rights and Resources Initiative Remote Sensing Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Propinsi (Provincial Level Spatial Planning) Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services (of ICRAF) Sustainable Forest Management Technical Assistance Taman Hutan Rakyat (provincial park) Customary land Taman Buru (Game Reserve Park) Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan (Consulted Forest Planning) Timber Legality Assurance System The Nature Conservancy United Nations United Nations Development Group United Nations Development Programme United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples United Nations Environment Programme United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries Verified Emission Reduction World Bank World Resource Institute World Wildlife Fund VER WB WRI WWF 9 .

In this opportunity. networking. and to all organizations and individuals for giving me some useful information and suggestions. Zulfira Warta. Dr. Marco Boscolo and Ms. Francesca Romano for giving me input regarding questionnaire and information on forest tenure issue. Germany and University of Padua. To Prof. I hereby would like to give special thanks to Mr. Paola Gatto. Mr. Kirsfianti L Ginoga . Mr. giving me some inputs and suggestions. patience. and classmates in both TU Dresden. William Sunderlin. guidance. and friends whose love. Michael Martin and Mrs. Alberto Sandoval and Mrs. Marguerite FranceLanord for helping me establishing contacts with some key stakeholders on REDD in Indonesia and helping me composing draft message to those contacts. I also particularly grateful to Dr. I also would like to thank Mrs. suggestions for the research topic and methodology. Mr. Dr. My deepest appreciation goes to Allah SWT. support. for giving me tutorship. Finally. Mr. my supervisor. Rebecca Rutt. Tomoyuki Uno.Acknowledgement With the completion of my thesis follows the end of two years fruitful studies. Alain Karsenty. Besides. To Rogier Klaver. Italy for giving me these two years memorable study time. Francesca Felicani Robles. I would like to say thank you and give my special appreciation for her kindness. Rudi Syaf. Mrs. Mr. and Mr. Fakhrizal Nashr. thank you for giving me some feedback for the questionnaire. Fabian Schmidt. I also would like to thanks Mr. my co-supervisors. Machfudh for being respondents of the interview. Then to Janice Saich. Maulahikmah Galinium. I would also like to convey my heartfelt appreciation to my family. The Almighty for his bless and guidance for every step in my life. I give special thanks to European Commission for sponsoring my two-year Masters programme. Tullia Baldassarri and other staffs in Forestry Department thank you for friendship and your kindness during my stay in FAO. 10 . and goodwill have brought me this far. Susy Tafuro. Helmut Dotzauer. Jesper Tranberg. Samoa Perucca. Mr. Arif Aliadi. Mr. and some related reading materials during my study in FAO headquarter. to all my professors. Eva Muller for giving me opportunity to conduct my study while doing voluntary in FOEP (Forest Economic and Policy) division. valuable advices and support in all the time of the research and writing of the thesis. Forestry Department FAO for five months. Cecile Girardin for giving me some inputs regarding REDD issues. encourage. Mr. Mr. and linking me with some contacts. Johan Lejeune and Ms. tutors. Rohni Sanyoto. I also would like to thank Dr. I have a lot of gratitude to express to everyone who gave me support and made significant contribution to the success of this thesis and my study period.

a C right separate from land ownership. In fact.establishing. as much as possible and in compliance with the existing legal and institutional framework. All projects developers have been interviewed through phone and email. Collected information have then been analyzed by using concept of better REDD implementation in national level by Streck (2009). However. contested and overlapped. 11 . In addition. there is the need of. this aspect is particularly delicate being almost all forest area owned or controlled by the State. and having a very complex stratification of official and customary and tenure titles and right distribution.Summary Recognition of property rights and tenure security are key elements for successful REDD implementation. However. 2) contributing towards the identification of an analytical framework for assessing whether and to what extent REDD projects can be a tool for delivering significant benefits for Indonesian local populations. In order to answer to the study‟s objectives. concept of carbon rights in Australia. and CCBA REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards for assessing project performance in addressing property rights issue. Unclear issues that have not been addressed so far are benefit sharing mechanisms and legal implementation and undertanding on REDD. Early efforts in enhanching current system including legal system in order to be ready for implementing REDD has been taken. concept of community tenure security by White (2004). it is anticipated that. project documents and some relevant literature have also been used as additional source of information. To be more advanced in benefiting from REDD mechanism. The results of the study show that technically Indonesia is ready in implementing REDD but until now the readiness including new establish legal system on REDD still can not address property right security for local community. in Indonesia. there are still some doubts whether the system under development is able to address issue of property right security. At project level. both demonstration and voluntary activities are concerned with property rights security in their planning phase. five REDD projects in Indonesia have been selected as case studies. The situation also happens in Indonesia where some conflicts arise due to unclear property right and contradictive regulation. Therefore the study aims at: 1) analyzing how well Indonesia is addressing the issue of property right security in its readiness phase. forest property rights and tenures are often unclear.

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Sunderlin et al. But. overlapping or simply unenforced (White & Martin. 1. Forests also maintain ecosystem balance. 2009. 2005). policy. making it a major driver for anthropogenic climate change (Scholz & Schmidt. Starting with integration of RED concept into Kyoto Protocol at the UNFCCC COP 11 in Montreal in 2005 (Scholz & Schmidt. It will lead to sub optimal investment in improving 13 . It is also considered as the second most important contributor to climate change after the combustion of fossil fuels and the largest source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission in the developing world (Houghton. Inclusion of Avoided Deforestation (AD) and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation (RED) is vital for tackling climate change (Richards. 2005 cited in Ebeling & Yasue. 2007). Deforestation accounts for approximately 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC.1 Introduction Background Forests play an important role for human life. Forest and tenure stand out as a key issue in both global and national REDD+ debate (Angelsen et al. 2008). 2009). and maintain aquatic productivity). 2008).. provide watershed services (control soil erosion. and also help reducing green house gases in the atmosphere. Property rights to forest lands and resources are often not clear. and institutional failure.1. 2002). Free riding and other mechanisms that lead to the undersupply of public goods may also lead to the overuse of common pool resources (Strener. They provide some products and services that can be utilized by humans to support their need and economic life. deforestation occurs almost everywhere especially in developing countries. which make costs for conserving forests or for implementing sustainable forest management (SFM) higher than cutting down trees. 2008). 2009). landscape beauty. 2008). because of combination of market. the debate has continuously gained momentum until adoption of concept Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD) in 2007 and REDD plus in 2008. 2009).. 2002. contested. Therefore emission reductions will not be achieved without reducing forest lost and degradation (Cotula & Mayers. Angelsen. prevent flood. Forest and the ecosystem services generated by forest resources are often considered as externalities or as public goods (Ostrom.

in addition to their contribution to generation of co-benefits (Angelsen et al. 2009). their leverage in formulating national policy on REDD+ is limited (Sunderlin & Atmadja. Recognizing forest tenure rights. particularly in implementing REDD+ means identifying people who will represent groups that hold rights (Sunderlin et al. 2002). 14 . 2009. Therefore understanding tenure issues and trends is essential for all actors concerned with forests (White & Martin.. “At a national level. reforming tenure.. improving national tenure information and holding public consultations on REDD is key to sustainable REDD+ success (Sunderlin et al. 2009). and facilitating deforestation (Ostrom & Hess. 2007). 2005). 2009)..resources.. 2009). 2009. Multilateral. bilateral. sanctioning rule-breaking behaviors.. insecure tenure and conflict destabilize forest management systems (Sunderlin & Atmadja.. These situations will reduce the 3 E+ criteria outcomes of REDD+ policies: climate effectiveness. Mehta & Kill. Streck. on paper and in practice. cost efficiency and equity outcomes. Clarifying tenure before implementing REDD+ including measuring and anticipating the consequences of inaction. According to the Stern Review (2006). 2009). This should involve local communities. Sunderlin et al. Ostrom.. 2009. Heavy handed state control. 2009. respect informal rights and social structures working with development goals and reinforce the process of protecting the forests (Sunderlin et al. lack of respect for customary forest management practices. Another main concern is who will hold the power in terms of managing and distributing benefits. monitoring use. Sunderlin & Atmadja. 2007. do long term investments in sustainable management become worthwhile”. 2009. Streck. When people living in forests have no tenure rights. communities and loggers. Eliasch (2008) states. Angelsen et al. is key to effective forest management. 2009). 2009. defining property rights to forestland and determining the rights and responsibilities of landowners. identifying the obstacles to clarifying tenure. Similarly.” Only when property rights are secure. 2009). The state still dominates many of the current national REDD+ proposals (Peskett & Brockhaus. and national policy documents on REDD+ readiness also stress the need to clarify tenure before implementing REDD+ (Sunderlin et al.

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Problem statement and objectives of the thesis
Political will is another key for REDD+ to succeed (Sunderlin et al., 2009). The implementation of REDD+ at the national level involves more than just clarifying existing rights to resources, it also should bring to the creation of a set of new legal rights that relate to the reduction of GHG emissions and sequestration potential of a particular activity (Streck, 2009; Järvinen, 2008). The schemes must also engage legitimate stakeholders whose claims to forest benefits (Sunderlin et al., 2009). In New South Wales Australia, for instance, the government established legislation regarding with property rights to forest carbon services in 1998 (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002). With nearly 90 million hectares under forest cover, Indonesia has the world‟s third largest area of tropical forest, as well as extensive carbon rich peat lands. However, Indonesia is also the world‟s largest emitter of CO2 from deforestation and forest land use change (Barr et al., 2010). Through REDD+ Indonesia has a unique opportunity to generate revenue, reduce the loss of forest cover and, in doing so, make a significant contribution to reducing global carbon emissions (Barr et al., 2010; Boccucci et al., 2008). Supported by several bilateral donors and the World Bank, Indonesia took up the challenge to enhance its preparedness by developing policies and strategies to implement REDD+ at the national level (Murdiyarso, 2009). Early efforts have led to the establishment of regulatory framework and national institutions, including the National Council for Climate Change (NCCC) under the president‟s office and the REDD committee under the Ministry of Forestry. But their performance and effectiveness, in relation of their authority and coordinating roles, are untested. Unclear national standards and policy framework, non transparent application and approval processes, overlapping authorities, poor information flows, and unclear property rights remain huge challenges for Indonesia (Murdiyarso, 2009; Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002) which need to be addressed. Therefore in this context, the overall objectives of this thesis are to analyze how well Indonesia addressing issue of property right security in its readiness phase and to contribute towards the identification of an analytical framework for assessing whether and to what extent REDD projects can be a tool for delivering significant benefits for Indonesian local populations especially

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through enhancing security of property rights and land tenure regime (Larson et al., 2010). These objectives will be achieved through the following steps: 1. examining the situation of current forest tenure system, both theoretical and operational viewpoints 2. understanding how the needed reform of forest tenure system has been implemented to cater for the needs of the implementation of carbon rights 3. analyzing the feasibility of implementing some pioneering carbon property rights regime, e.g. that developed in Australia, within the Indonesian institutional/ legal context 4. assessing, at a broad institutional scale, the readiness to implement REDD projects of Indonesia in terms of property rights assignment and land tenure 5. developing an appropriate set of principles and indicators at project level through which to assess project performance in terms of securing property rights to local population. Based on this experience the final outcome of the thesis will be the identification of problems, the suggestion of rules and modalities and the provision of recommendations on how to establish a legal system of carbon rights in Indonesia and the answer to the question whether it will be able to increase security of tenure for local population.

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Structure of the thesis
The thesis is organized in 6 chapters. Chapter 1 sets out the research problems based on the background information on REDD and importance of tenure clarification in REDD implementation. The research objectives are then stated. Chapter 2 introduces the relevant theories in the study which include general information on REDD, rights and property rights, property regimes, land and forest tenure, tenure security, carbon rights, and also carbon rights regime in Australia. Concept of carbon right in Australia is used as reference for analyzing feasibility of implementing the regime in Indonesia. This chapter is closed by identification of research questions. Chapter 3 describes the research methodology. A brief description of case study as a research approach is in the beginning of this chapter. Then, criteria for choosing case studies, data collection methods, data analysis methods and research limitations are

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discussed. Description of current realities in Indonesia including general information on land and forest tenure system, legal framework, and REDD implementation in the country are found in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 sets out details of the results and discussions. Descriptive analysis of five selected REDD projects in Indonesia begins this chapter, followed by analysis of readiness Indonesian institutional framework of property rights to implement REDD project and ends with assessment of case-studies‟ performance in term of property right security. Finally, the conclusions that have been drawn from the results of analysis, limitations of this study and the suggestions for future research are presented in Chapter 6.

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2009. Countries that demonstrate verifiable reductions in deforestation. nor at stopping planned conversion of forests to other economic uses (MoFor. 2009. 2008 in Cotula & Mayers. 2009). 2008) started at the UNFCCC COP 11 in 2005. 2009. 2009). or maintenance of forest cover. 2009) which referred to forest regeneration and rehabilitation. 2008. 2008). Scholz & Schmidt. the Bali Action Plan adopted in December 2007 at the UNFCCC COP 13 taken first step in including Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD) in the post 2012 regime (Mayers et al. 2007). 19 . Theoretical and conceptual background: property rights. land and forest tenure issues in the context of REDD Reducing Emissions form Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Concern on inclusion of Avoided Deforestation (AD) and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation (RED) as vital for tackling climate change (Richards. As it became clear that forest degradation in some countries was an even bigger problem than deforestation (Wertz-Kanounnikoff & Angelsen. „Plus“ sign indicates there could be climate benefits not only from avoiding negative changes (deforestation. REDD+ became official language at the 2008 COP14 in Poznan (Angelsen & Wertz-Kanounnikoff. 2008).1 market/financial incentives to reward developing countries with large forest area as well as with high deforestation rates that reduce their emission of greenhouse gases from deforestation and forest degradation (CIFOR.2. REDD is a mechanism that uses 2. 2008). 2009). degradation) but also from enhancing positive changes (Angelsen & Wertz-Kanounnikoff. REDD is not directed at stopping the use of forests for timber. 2008). carbon uptake.. would be paid compensation through a global and /or regional fund or would be allowed to sell carbon credits that permit additional emissions elsewhere (Mehta & Kill. negative emissions. 2009). carbon removal or just removals (Angelsen. negative degradation. The concept of REDD has been expanded to REDD plus the role of conservation. sustainable management of forests (SMF) and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) (Minang et al. In some versions REDD+ will also include peat lands (Minang et al. 2009). The Stern Review on the economics of climate change noted that REDD could be a costeffective route (Cotula & Mayers. Richards. Richards. Scholz & Schmidt.

third. with respect to a defined baseline representing past rates of loss or projected rates of loss. Other goals. 20 .g. Three core concepts are at the basis of a REDD development: 1. addressed through reducing the rate of emissions from deforestation and degradation rather than preserving carbon in a specific piece of forest. is another way to increase forest carbon stocks. meaning that forest area is reduced. i. A/R). and more respect for the rights of vulnerable groups. REDD+ actions and forest conservation might have socio economic benefits such as reducing poverty. meaning that carbon density is reduced. known as co-benefits are also important. 2008). through aforestation and reforestation. Permanence. supporting livelihoods and stimulating economic development.Three types of changes are included in REDD+: 1) deforestation. forest conservation provides other environmental services such as preserved biodiversity. Carbon credits associated with REDD are different from A/R CDM in which they derive not from growing new trees but from avoiding deforestation and reducing the size of the carbon stock lost as the biomass of forest ecosystems is degraded (IFCA. REDD+ is not only about climate change.e the extent to which forest permanently store carbon. REDD carbon credit is produced through a REDD supply-chain which essential steps are described in Box 1. it can boost the capacity of both forests and human to adapt to climate change (Angelsen. political change toward better governance. less corruption. consistent with national strategic development directions. meaning that carbon density is increased. but A/R is not part of REDD+ (Angelsen. fourth. second. Four types of co-benefits are: first. 2009). and 3) regeneration and rehabilitation. 2) degradation. 2009). Enlarging the area of forests (e.

Meridian institute. 2. implementation scale.. Meridian Institute. i. development of a carbon market system capable of handling the trade.Box 1. the level against which the impacts of REDD policies and measures are assessed to determine whether participating countries have reduced emissions and should receive financial rewards (Angelsen. 2009 cited in Irawan & Taconi.e. development of an organizational/ management infrastructure capable of: • setting a baseline against which annual emissions can be measured . identification of those activities. that systematic issues of governance such as transparency is addressed and that carbon transactions are safeguarded. National reference levels have been developed based on national factors including: historic emissions 21 . Reference levels: i. that change supply and demand. 2008. 2008. Steps of a REDD supply-chain (IFCA. 2009). and 4. 2008). REDD caused either by project activities that essentially force outside boundary deforestation the project (activity shifting). development of a system of forest governance that ensures that law is enforced. • managing the sale of carbon credits • distributing the incomes from the trade in carbon credits to those agencies or groups responsible for achieving the reductions. financing options. 2009 cited in Irawan & Taconi. and implementation phases are other key elements which need to be considered when implementing a REDD process (Parker et al. the fact that activities claiming REDD credits must show that reduced deforestation rates attributed to the project would not have occurred in the absence of carbon finance. Leakage. 2. 2008) 1. 2008.. 2009). 2008. or by market effects 3. A number of additionality tests exist under the CDM and voluntary standards that can be used to test for additionality under REDD (MoFor. 3. possible i.e. increase the in emissions in an area outside the the boundary activity. Host countries with deforestation rates above the global average will be compensated for the reduction of the national rates during the commitment period as compared to pre-commitment period. Reference levels.e. 1. MoFor. especially recognizing the nature and source of potential buyers. Countries with past deforestation rates lower than the global average will be rewarded for not increasing their deforestation rates higher than the precommitment level (Irawan & Taconi. • monitoring the changes with sufficient precision to deliver confidence and quality to the tradable carbon credits. Additionality. or organizational and industry changes necessary to achieve a reduction in emissions. 2009). Parker et al.

experience is gained. In a fund-based mechanism. REDD certified emissions reductions (CERs) could be used by companies and national governments to meet emission reduction targets in their national cap-and-trade systems (Murray et al. 2009 cited in Irawan & Taconi. A hybrid approach will be adopted in the medium term followed by a move towards compliance markets as capacities are strengthened. In a carbon market-based mechanism. 4. provincial. Three phases have been proposed (Box 2.and removal rates. 2009). 2009).. 2010). The implementation of REDD only at the project level might not lead to a significant reduction of deforestation in a country because it cannot address underlying causes occurring at the district. considering two options: i) national-based and ii) project-based (UNFCCC. Paker et al. ii) fund-based. Financing options: with three alternatives: i) market-based (either voluntary or compliance). 2007 cited in Irawan &Taconi. National based implementation is better suited to address the issue of leakage within host countries because it enables a complete measurement and monitoring of emission reductions within a country as a whole. 2. 3. 2009). National based implementation requires the national government to develop a national carbon accounting system and a national management system to implement REDD projects and to distribute revenue generated to relevant stakeholders within the country. 2009). 2007 cited in Irawan & Taconi. the successive phases according to which a REDD mechanism should be implemented in order to ensure an effective and result-based mechanism (UNFCCC. official development assistance (ODA) or a separate and additional tranche of resources are not tied to any compliance obligations (Murray et al. Project based implementation allows buyers to interact directly with an independent entity verifying the credit generation (Myers. it is likely that REDD will be financed through fund-based approaches and that over time these will shift towards a market-based system. expected future trends and capacity for emission reductions such as GNP per capita (Irawan & Taconi. In the short term. 2009).). 22 . and consensus emerges (FAO & RECOFTC.. 2009).. 2009). and national levels (Irawan &Taconi. forest cover. Implementation scale. Implementation phases: i.e. Most of the proposals of REDD mechanism support the national based approach for the implementation of REDD. 2009. and iii) hybrid combination of both (FAO & RECOFT 2009).

Varghese. relationship between the central and sub-national levels (Irawan & Taconi.payment for reduction Paying for performance on the basis of forest emission reductions relative to an agreed-upon national reference level (market based mechanism). UNREDD. FAO & RECOFTC. 2009). The implementation process can involve a topdown or a bottom-up model. The involvement of the sub-national level in the implementation of REDD can vary depending on the extent of authority devolved in forest management. Angelson et al. 2009). Financing can be through global compliance markets tied to national cap. 2009 cited in Irawan & Taconi. national guarantee intact and governments that forests should remain on a standing permanent basis. For successful REDD regimes.National strategies for REDD should include sub-national actions and strategies that are consistent with national development goals (UNFCCC.implementation Implementing policies and measures proposed in the national strategies using sustained funding from a global facility supported by binding financial commitments from developed countries. which should be situated within a framework of intergovernmental. including national dialogue and local stakeholder consultation.trade policies or other compliance-linked mechanism the authority to develop local implementation implementation bottom up plans them and a under The model. 2009. the process of obtaining „Free. and the use of forests and forest products for their livelihoods. and demonstration activities mostly funded through voluntary contributions through such mechanisms as the World Bank‟s Forest Carbon Partnership Fund (FCPF). In contrast. strengthening institutions. and other bilateral arrangements Phase 2. local governments implement REDD based on certain prescription provided by the national government. Although the greatest focuses attention on currently the changing behaviours of countries with the highest deforestation rates. developing REL. and Informed Consent‟ (FPIC) (Box 3.and.. Prior. A characterization of the phases for implementation of forest carbon policy and programs (Olander et al. 2009. 2010) Phase 1.Planning Development of a national forest carbon strategy (REDD readiness). In top-down model. 2009). a well- designed international REDD regime should also seek to reward countries traditionally maintaining their forests. and human capacity. local governments„ involvement in the implementation of REDD is under the national-based approach. Those developed country commitments may be tied to a national cap and trade policy and financed by revenues generated therein. 2009.) has 23 . It is essential also to recognize local communities and indigenous people‟s rights of tenure over forest areas. Phase 3. designing MRV system and forest carbon accounting. Developing country use of these funds would be based on demonstrated commitment and continued performance assessed using indicators of emission reductions. local governments have Box 2. For this reason. so that they are not under pressure to cut their own forests (Costenbader. technical.

intending them as „rights of storage and to the commercial benefits that may flow from such storage‟. 2010). many countries can take essential initial steps by removing existing legal norms providing incentives for deforestation and forest degradation (Costenbader. these provide valuable experience and lessons for countries preparing for REDD+ in terms of understanding methodological and implementation issues. size. This process may include the option of withholding consent. Moreover. before creating any new laws. By phasing such work in the coming years in their programs to achieve full REDD functionality. Indeed. Since REDD pilot projects can only sell carbon credits through voluntary markets. this does not necessarily require that countries rewrite their existing legislative and regulatory frameworks.become a major topic in REDD+ discussions (Cotula & Mayers. Free. Legal clarity is also a pre-requisite for a successful REDD implementation. 2009. Significantly. not always consistent with the legal framework of property rights and land-tenure arrangements of those countries wanting to take advantage of this instrument. Prior means consent has been sought sufficiently in advance. Prior. as opposed to the more traditional Ostrom and Schlager‟s (1996) cited in Sterner (2002) „rights of withdrawal‟ or to Honoré‟s (1961) „rights of use‟. Hepburn (2008) has defined a new category for C-rights. However. 2010). but especially for forest tenure reforms and the clarity over rights to trade in carbon credits (FAO & RECOFTC. 2010) Free means no coercion. 2009. FAO & RECOFTC. Box 3. 2009). Iza. 24 . pace. 2009). harmonization or reinterpretation of existing laws (Iza. reversibility and scope of any proposed project or activity The reason(s) for or purpose(s) of the project and/or activity The duration of the above The locality of areas that will be affected Consent: consultation and participation are crucial components of a consent process. intimidation or manipulation. considering time requirements of indigenous consultation/ consensus processes Informed: information is provided that covers (at least) the following aspects: The nature. raising awareness and strengthening capacities of all forest right holders and stakeholders before implementation of REDD activities also needs attention. countries should be able to design and implement regulatory systems providing the best fit for their unique national circumstances. the present situation is very complex. and Informed Consent (FPIC) (UNREDD & MoFor. including the need for stronger local capacity in monitoring carbon stocks and for more efficient and reliable local governance systems. being C-credits new emergences. from the national legal viewpoint. be they entirely or new legal instruments amendments. Indeed.

the rest of this Chapter will continue by dwelling upon the meaning of the concept of land property rights and its connection with forestland.Starting from acknowledging the need for innovation. mostly in its economic connotation (Alchian and Demsetz. that is to say is property in land and attachments to land. at the end of the Chapter. When one has a right. which is property in all 25 . The theoretical analysis and the literature review will allow. to identify some key-elements to serve as basis for the assessment of the Indonesian REDD implementation and approach to C-rights.‟ or. and duties.2 Rights. a power permissibly exercised over the thing (Boydell et al. Subsequently it will lay stress on land-tenure security and its implications in REDD implementations wanting to involve local populations. hence the fact of owning a thing. Western Law recognizes two basic kinds of property. 1973). FOPER (2007) also stated that property is a right to a benefit stream that is only as secure as the duty of all others with respect to the conditions that protect that stream. responsibilities. 2009). property is a set of rights and responsibilities concerning a thing itself. based on the theory of property rights. like trees or buildings.. „it can be the right – especially the exclusive right to the possession. use or disposal of anything‟ (Ellsworth. In the opinion of Bruce (1998). 2. 2007). The other is „personal‟ (AngloAmerican law) or „movable‟ property (European civil law). both in law and practice. It refers to a degree of power that is recognised in law. As a further step it will try to collocate the emergent approaches to the definition of C-rights in the context of the general theory of property rights. or at least for adaptation of the legal framework. 2004). One is „real‟ (Anglo American law) or „immovable‟ property (European civil law). relationships. property rights and natural resources The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) says property is „a condition of being owned by or belonging to some person or persons. one has the expectation. being rooted in national legal arrangements. The economic theory of property rights is very well developed in the literature of the western world. Finally it will describe the approach to the problem undertaken by various pioneering Australian States. then it will explore the different property right regimes and how they result in land tenure systems. that his/her claims will be respected by those with duty (FOPER. pertaining rights.

imposed by the owner or negotiated between the owner and the individual or group desiring the use of the property. This process is often referred to as „enclosure of the commons‟ (Boydell et al. 2009) and has occurred in historical times.g. etc. Different bodies of law apply to real and personal property (Bruce. Access right (can also be considered as part of use or withdrawal right): the right to use or enjoy the property for direct utility. growing subsistence crops. White. see e.1993 cited in FOPER. Property rights are usually treated as „bundle of rights‟ (Sheehan.. gathering minor forestry products. 1996 cited in Sterner.. The argument postulated by von Benda Beckmann et al. 1998). 2002): the right to access the resource. 2007). (2009) is that all human societies have a property system comprising three elements: the social units (individuals. groups lineages. corporations. the construction of valuables as property objects. withdraw from a resource. Governments in countries with large amounts of forest have traditionally chosen to transfer access and withdrawal rights 26 . The definition of property rights is closely related to concept of externality and the development of these rights over time is related to the transition from common property to private property. with emphasis on the immoveable nature of the „property‟ concerned such as land. the „enclosures movement‟ in England in the XV century. buildings and minerals (Sheehan.other things. or Withdrawal right (Ostrom & Schlanger. often grouped into: 1. cited in Boydell et al. 2004). 2. or exploit a resource for economic benefit. 1996 cited in Sterner. although the process is typically very slow. Sterner (2002) commented that property rights are institutions that can be affected by policy. This category also includes use of rights defined in spatial or temporal terms (Ostrom & Schlanger. 2002. Property rights as generally understood include titled rights to land or to natural resources exploitation. Use right (Cubbage et al. 2001). Commonly these rights are referred to by the legal language as „real estate‟. the different sets of rights and obligations social units can have with respect to such objects. 2001). and control such as rights to use the land for grazing. states) that can hold property rights and obligations.

1996 cited in Sterner. so to set up and modify rules for the use of a property 5. In return. thus reallocating use. 2002). Profits à prendre: this usufruct right gives the holder the right to remove products of natural growth from another‟s land. c. 6. Transfer right (Cubbage et al. Types of usufruct are: a. 2007). The focus of an easement is upon the right which runs with the burdened land. firms typically promise to pay royalties and other fees to the government (White & Martin. 1996 cited in Sterner. 4. companies have long term rights to access. 2007). or Management right (Ostrom & Schlanger. It may include the bundle of rights allowing an entity to explore and exploit the potential that natural sources have to store carbon: moreover. 3. . This right typology is one of the solutions used in some Australian States for allocating Crights in the existing legal framework 27 . Lease: a party may lease a parcel of land for some purpose e.1993 cited in FOPER.g. control and exclusion rights.together with management authority to large scale private forest industry through logging concessions. 2002): the right to make decisions about how the land should be used (including deciding what crops should be planted).. and managed. to convey the land to others through intracommunity reallocations. 2002). 2002): the right to sell. to transmit the land to heirs through inheritance. Usufruct rights: the legal right of using and enjoying the fruits or profits of something belonging to others (FOPER. A positive easement (such as a right of way) involves a landowner going onto or making use of something in or on a neighbour's land. In most concessions. being often perpetual. 2007). Exclusion right: the right to exclude some users and set rules for access to a property (Ostrom & Schlanger. Easement: a right enjoyed by one landowner over the land of another. concession agreements granted by government or private landowners for logging. harvest timber and exclude the public. manage the land. easements can be relevant in terms of the permanence condition with relation to REDD b. 1996 cited in Sterner. or Alienation right (Ostrom & Schlanger. A negative easement is essentially a right to receive something (such as light or support) from the land of another without obstruction or interference. Control right (Cubbage et al. mortgage or lease the land. 1993 cited in FOPER.

thefreedictionary. which can not be enforced against a reluctant party without suit‟ (www. Covenants may be positive or restrictive. Transferability is the measurement of the market for the sale or leasing of the particular property right. are types of property rights adopted in Australia for C-rights (Lawcom. a personal right to a thing not reduced to possession. or a right to demand it by action at law. can have some characteristics normally associated with property rights. but only a right to it. Flexibility highlights that a property right is susceptible to modification and/or alteration. Boydell et al. If we look at property rights in relation to natural resources.d. ii) an ability to receive income or benefits. A high value would indicate that the demand 1 „A thing of which one has not possession or actual enjoyment. Duration indicates the period. In varying degrees all “property rights” result in the conferral of three qualities or capacities. Convenants: a contractual right burdening or benefiting the land to which it relates. that the property right is held. and clearly it is conceivable that the full benefits of the right may under certain circumstances be constrained. The covenant constitute a separate „chose in action‟1 which is only enforceable against the land in circumstances where a court is prepared to accept that a party shall not be permitted to use the land in manner inconsistent with the contract. The degree to which these three qualities are evident in a particular property right regime depends on the mix of fundamental characteristics that the particular property right contains (Sheehan. namely: i) a management power. This characteristic is directly relevant to property rights in natural resources. and iii) an ability to sell or alienate the interest. Such rights are constrained by the availability of the natural resource. Quality of Title refers to the descending level of security as the tenure falls away from the optimum of notional freehold. the six relevant characteristics of property rights identified by Sheehan (2001) appear particularly relevant: 1. Covenants. where restrictive. too. 2. or damages for a tort. but recoverable by suit at law. which is the object of thesis.com). 5. and. 28 . Clearly. and hence represents a profit or saving to the holder. 2010). a reduction in the exclusivity will reduce the profit or saving enjoyed by the holder. 2009). Exclusivity is the inverse of the number of holders of the same or similar property right.gov. 4. as a right to recover money due on a contract.uk cited in Robles. 2001.. usually in years. 3. and especially to generation of C-rights. and which does not exist at the time in specie.

3 Property regimes and forests A property regime is the structure of rights. at least to the group to whom it is common (FOPER. duration (usually unlimited) and transferability (Romano. where rights usually associated are exclusiveness. 6. duties and privileges characterising the relationships between individuals with respect to a specific good or resource. openaccess resource is a resource whose use is unregulated and 29 . Common property implies relatively open access. 2007). 2002). like for example forests (Vatn. It may also be possible for the holder to divide his right on the basis of seasons or in the case of fishing rights. p. 1991): State property regimes. where ownership is in the hands of the state Private property regime. four property regimes types can be identified (Bromley. One important feature of CPR is that each person‟s consumption reduces availability of the resource to others. another category of property right regimes. and relies heavily upon the amelioration of government constraints on transfers to other parties. It refers to a situation where there are controls over the use of the resources (Strener. A relevant difference between community systems and open access. 2010) Common property. In the context of property rights in natural resources. 2. is that under a community system the non-members of the community are excluded from using the common areas (FOPER. or no-property. 2007). 2005. where individuals have both privileges and no rights with respect to the resource. 255). & Reeb. With reference to Western property concepts. Open Access. ie private property for a group of co-owners. on the basis of particular marine species. this characteristic could also be referred to as tradability. also referred to as Common Pool Resource (CPR). Divisibility refers to the possibility that the property right is shared between a number of holders over one territory or the territory itself maybe subdivided and each new part held separately. and that the mere creation of a market and hence tradability in itself enhances the value of the particular property right.reaches well beyond the original acquiring group. Buttoud-Kouplevatskaya. therefore. In other words.

Private property is often inaccurately called „common‟ property. 2004). regional. Public ownership is all lands owned by central. 2004. White. Common Pool Resources can have costly exclusion. a well designed. In this latter category. including indigenous groups. governments retain ownership and the entitlement to unilaterally extinguish local groups‟ rights over entire areas. When referring to forest property regimes. in several respects. and mining (RRI & ITTO. 2009). a CPR may simply have lower transaction and other costs and thus be more efficient than private property (Sterner. FOPER. using a simplification we can distinguish between two basic legal categories of property in use in the world today: public and private (White. or local government (White & Martin. but conditional.unmanaged such that anyone may freely use it without distinction or hindrance (Ellsworth. 2002) because when the costs of protecting private property are high or when the yields are low and very variable. 2004). 1968). 2002. giving rise to Hardin‟s Tragedy of the commons (Hardin. Under this arrangement. 2004). well functioning Common Pool Resource (CPR) is like private property (Ostrom & Sclanger 1996. The public category is further divided into two subcategories. while keeping some forest under common management (White. 2007). 2002). but the goods produced with these resources are consumed individually (as private goods). for example protected areas and forest lands awarded as concessions for logging. RRI and ITTO. 2002. on semipermanent. when communities usually allocate private rights to households for agriculture and some forestry. mostly based on the work of Nobel-graduate Elinor Ostrom states that. and this distinction is particularly relevant in tropical forest areas: lands administered by government entities and lands set aside or reserved for local communities. 2009). unless institutions are strong enough to limit access by the users. The first category typically includes all forests in the legal forest estate that are owned and administered exclusively by the government and that are not designated for use by communities or indigenous peoples. agroindustrial or silvicultural plantations. basis (White & Martin. A vast flow of literature. Free riding and other mechanisms that lead to the undersupply of public goods may also lead to the overuse of CPR. Murty 1994 cited in Sterner. local groups typically lack rights to sell or otherwise alienate land through mortgages 30 .

Private ownership is held by individuals. 2002). In many cases where private lands are said to be owned by communities or indigenous peoples. 31 . private lands owned by communities or indigenous peoples refer to forest lands where rights cannot be unilaterally terminated by a government “without some form of due process and compensation. Similarly. and that a broader framework is necessary. 2007) over a specific area that cannot unilaterally be terminated by a government without some form of due process and compensation (White & Martin. there are some situations where not all of these rights are awarded to private landowners.”(RRI & ITTO. 2009). Communities that hold private rights generally have more leverage when negotiating with governments or outsider investors and much stronger claim to the benefits of ecosystem services and opportunities generated by their forests as well as control over more traditional uses than do communities on public land (White & Martin. & Reeb (2010) reported in Box 4. therefore. 2009). 2009). that the simple distinction between public and private forestland ownership is not enough to allocate all the different existing forest management regimes which can be found in forestry. groups of people. the state is considered to be the ultimate owner. 2004. White. withdraw resources and exclude outsiders. RRI & ITTO. and others where some of these rights are conferred to people on public. 2004. ButtoudKouplevatskaya. manage. under statutory law. RRI & ITTO. 2002. private landowners typically “have rights to access. However.” (White & Martin. White. Private ownership category is also subdivided into two categories: forest areas owned by indigenous and other local community groups and those owned by private individuals and firms (White & Martin. It is clear. sell or otherwise alienate. designated for community-use forest land. 2002). or corporate bodies (FOPER. White. though the communities and indigenous peoples are recognized as the lawful right holders (RRI & ITTO. 2002. as shown by the work of Romano. 2004. 2002. 2009). 2009). in the real world. RRI & ITTO.or other financial instruments (White & Martin. In theory.

Include forests allocated for extraction purposes through licences or timber concessions. 2010) Owner is the manager The owner retains management rights and responsibilities within the limits specified by legislation Owner is the exclusive The owner is the sole manager of the resource(s). Also includes partnerships between private processing companies and smallholders for the production of commercial forest products from private or communal forests (out-grower schemes) Devolved management Includes forests in which management is devolved to a group other than rights the owner. and convey many rights. Property and management rights are not transferred Joint forest management Forests where management with local communities foresee a degree of with communities. no subsistence or manager. with agreements management. gather dead regulated through licences and permits wood and NWFPs Forest management Forests in which the management decisions remain solely with the through contracts or owner. Joint/collaborative management does not alter the ownership state. no extraction commercial use/extraction rights are allocated/granted to others rights for others Non-commercial. Private company permits Agreements allocate temporary rights for specific forest products or forest harvesting licence activities. Forest managed by local communities according to leases or forest management management agreements. Agreements are usually renewable. with concessions management rights and responsibilities and some property rights transferred to the companies Others Forests that do not belong to any of the management categories mentioned above 32 . usually for more than 10 to 20 years. user rights and responsibilities and some property rights transferred to the communities Private company leases. user User rights allocated to satisfy local people‟s needs for forest products rights. and do not allow commercialization by the users. Forest managed by private companies according to leases or forest management management concessions. The agreements community timber allocate temporary exploitation rights for specific forest products or other concessions or licences activities. Such rights might be permits to hunt. Usually private companies are given licences or short-term scheme concessions to harvest for commercial purposes. but management activities are executed by a different group partnerships with the owner according to an agreement. Possible Forest Management Regimes (Romano.Box 4. devolution in the execution of forest operations. customary rights. & Reeb. and includes a negotiated transfer of benefits. Local communities may be given licences or short term concessions to harvest for commercial purposes. usually for more than 10 to 20 years. but overall property rights remain with the owner Community forest leases. Buttoud-Kouplevatskaya.

and transfer. derived from the Latin word „tenere‟ meaning holding or possessing (Bruce. we may argue that „tenure‟ is. 2009). costs. To a certain extent. 2004). Being based on the types of tenure recognized by a national and/ or local system of law taken together (Bruce. as the concept is said to refer to „the system of rights. Ellsworth. Dunlop. involving relationships among people with respect to land and its resources and implying reference to complex social institutions – based on both tradition and custom as much as formal law or a combination of the two – (Dunlop. ii) the conditions under which they use those resources and participate in the benefits deriving from them. as well associated responsibilities and restraints‟ (Bruce. In most cases. 2009 cited in Romano. and especially that of „land tenure‟ seems to go over and beyond that of property regimes. 1998. 2009. In addition. use. 2004. 2009. a synonymous to property regimes. 2004). 1998). NRLA. & Reeb. Natural resources tenure is broadly defined as i) the arrangements through which people gain legitimate access to natural resources. Buttoud-Kouplevatskaya. obligations. to a certain extent. 2009). Originally. Buttoud-Kouplevatskaya. however. SIDA cited in Romano. and other duties. iii) the bundle of both rights and obligations when it comes to using resources in such a way so as to not harm others and when paying taxes. NRLA. the Oxford English Dictionary adds tenure is „the action or fact of holding anything material or nonmaterial‟ and also allows for tenure to mean „terms of holding‟ or „title‟ (Ellsworth. the word was taken from English feudalism. 1998. 2010). rules. 2009.2. the concept of „tenure‟.4 Forest tenure. and iv) the institutions and process for the management of those resources (SIDA. it also means the duration of those rights over time and across generations (Devlin cited in Ellsworth. two types of tenure systems can be 33 . control. 2009). 2009). it is a key to shaping the distribution of risks. 2010). Therefore it can be considered also a reflection of power structure in a society because land and other natural resources are central to social and cultural identity and economic wealth (NRLA. and benefits of financial transfers linked to forest conservation (Cotula & Mayers. institutions and processes regulating resources access. fees. Dunlop. tenure security and its importance in REDD implementation In order to connect with the above discussion over property regimes. & Reeb.

2009). 1998. These three elements of administration (rights. The rules of tenure are applied and made operational through the administration of tenure. political. governance (Cotula & Mayers. largely determines who benefits from natural resources and is an essential prerequisite of any effective forest policy at local level (Bruce. loan. and social systems producing it and influenced by it (Bruce. delimitation of boundaries. 2006. Therefore. 2009). gathering of revenues through property taxation and adjudication of valuation and taxation disputes. 34 . 2009). and values) are interlinked. Changing one may affect the others (NRLA. 2009): tenure security allows the landholders to make decisions (White. NRLA. gift. return from natural resources (Cotula & Mayers. statutory tenure systems are applied by governments and are codified in state law (RRI and ITTO. and is conditioned by. 2009). through sale. and rights to. a tenure system cannot be understood except than in relationship to the economic. The concept of tenure applied to forests implies that tenure includes ownership. This administration. land reform). tenancy and other arrangements for the use of forests. 2009. including the allocation of rights. including assessment of property values. for how long and under what conditions (Romano. whether formal or customary. inheritance. Dunlop. defined as the certainty that a person or a community has to continuous use of land or resources. regulated uses. Forest tenure determines who can use what resource. 1998): eventually. lease. and adjudication of doubts and disputes regarding rights and parcel boundaries. 2009). transfer of rights (e. The valuation and taxation methods. and adjudication of land use conflicts.identified: i) customary and ii) statutory tenure systems. concessions.g. The regulated use of land and other natural resources. it will give individuals or communities greater leverage in relations with government and the private sector in controlling over. Customary tenure systems are determined at the local level and are often based on oral agreements. Security of tenure. Dunlop. tenure relies on. therefore. will be recognized and protected against challenges from individuals or the state. sharecropping. including planning and enforcement of land use regulations. 2004). addresses the systems and processes to administer: Rights to land and other natural resources.

Finally. lay the foundation for stable and predictable investment. Lindsay (1998) cited in White (2004) has identified as many as nine characteristics of secure community tenure (Box 5. A corollary to exclusivity is that there must be certainty both about the boundaries of the resources to which the rights apply and about who is entitled to claim membership in the group 7. Security requires that the rights are exclusive 6. FAO. Security requires that there be clarity as to what the rights are 2. Sunderlin et al. Security requires that the law recognises the holder of the rights. 2009). and contribute to national and regional economic growth (RRI. It also ensures long-term permanence of the environmental benefits. robustness and exclusivity have been identified as the main legal elements for secure tenure arrangements (Wiersum & Ros-Tonen. 35 . 2009). Security requires certainty that rights cannot be taken away or changed unilaterally and unfairly 3. Another corollary to exclusivity where comanagement concerns government land is that the government entity entering into the agreement must have clear authority to do so 8. addressing land and resources disputes and creating tenure security for all stakeholders can resolve violent conflicts. 2005 cited in RRI & ITTO. affordable and fair avenues for seeking protection of the rights. Security means that rights need to be enforceable against the state (including local government institutions) – that is. 2004) 1. RRI. This implies confidence in the legal system and lack of worry about loss of one‟s rights. sustainable forest management. Lindsay’s characteristics of secure community tenure (Lindsay. Box 5. a lease for one month. and cultural survival of indigenous peoples (Jenkins. but if the leaseholders can be certain that they will be able to keep the land for the one month. Security of tenure relates also to the time needed to recover the cost of an investment. Security is enhanced if the duration of rights is either in perpetuity or for a period that is clearly spelled out and is long enough for the benefits of participation to be fully realized 4. The tenure itself may be short.). 9. then the tenure is secure. for instance. for solving disputes and for appealing decisions of government officials. Cotula & Mayers. 2004. 1998). social identity. 2009a).Duration. 1998 in White. the legal system has to recognize an obligation on the part of the state to respect those rights 5. personal security. and perhaps most daunting. 2009). economists say that the landholder lacks security of tenure (Bruce. as well to leverage poverty alleviation (International Law Firm Baker & McKenzie cited in Dunlop. 2009. assurance. and ethnic minorities 2007. security requires accessible. When tenure is too short or too uncertain for most investments. Moreover. Securing clear land tenure and local access to and control of forest resources are fundamentals to achieve forest conservation. 2008.

and a supporting political constituency. uses and customary laws and the multiple benefits of forests for climate. for indigenous and other local communities and their supporters who want legal recognition of community rights and broader political participation. All initiatives under REDD are expected to secure the recognition and implementation of the human rights of indigenous peoples. It can help to address legal uncertainties surrounding REDD projects.Tenure security is also a key underlying issue for REDD (Dunlop. Figure 1. for governments that seek to promote sustainable use. ecosystems. ownership. for environmental organizations that seek conservation without undermining local tenure rights. the presence of independent judicial arbitration systems. 2009). This will not only empower forest dependent communities but will also benefit governments. Therefore understanding tenure issues and trends is essential for all actors concerned with forests. 2004) 36 . According to White. Elements of Community Tenure Security (White. recognition of land title according to traditional ways. and for investors seeking low-risk investment opportunities (White & Martin. 2004 (Figure 1). 2009). combat illegal logging and quell local unrest. for private industries requiring reliable sources of timber and fibre. effective regulatory mechanisms and institutions. 2009). REDD project developers and investors (Dunlop. 2002). including security of land tenure. the key elements or building blocks needed to achieve community tenure security include: effective internal institutions of the community. legal recognition and support of community rights. and peoples before taking any action (Indigenous Peoples‟ representatives cited in Dunlop. for sustainable forest management certifying bodies that want to ensure they do not unwittingly reinforce unjust claims.

new technology.and bilateral agencies. to be successful. Tenure will remain secure even if several elements are absent. so long as internal institutions are in place (White. White (2004) also suggested to link the emerging networks of community tenure advocates to build a concerted international and political constituency able to leverage new funds. White (2004) also suggested to collect data on property claims and ownership at local. Figure 2. 4. it also depends on the way national legislation and other systems of resource tenure that may not be reflected in legislation but may enjoy legitimacy for local people are actually applied on the ground (FAO. Supporting working groups to transform bureaucracies that manage common property. This means that. 2007). Regarding this point. the availability of funding. The importance of other elements will depend on a number of factors. including the degree to which the government is generally and sincerely supportive of community rights and the degree to which the community interacts with modern economic and financial systems (White. tenure arrangements must consider local customs (Romano. These data are necessary to formulate and promote arguments for advancing community claims 3. Mapping of community lands to document customary rights. and global scales. 2007). regional. Promoting public education and lobbying to develop a shared understanding of solutions to tenure problems. 2006. the capacity levels of the local stakeholders and the prevailing political structure (FAO. 2004).) stated a number of strategies that have been used with success by NGOs and community-based organization or other advocates for community tenure: 1. 37 .As illustrated in Figure 1. Supporting legal activism 2. these elements connect property rights officially held by communities to the relative security of those rights. Regarding this point. Furthermore.. Regarding this point. FAO. Ellsworth (2004b) and White (2004. White (2004) also suggested to educate government officials and donors on the issues of community rights and the very feasible possibilities for enhancing their livelihoods with tenure reform. 2004). 2007). and new political openness to expand community rights and also develop new partnership with governments and selected multi.

to property boundaries. extraneous to country boundaries or. 2004) can. CO 2 relevance as a public bad has a transboundary dimension. or better a public bad at the root of insurgence of global warming and climate change. Building civic mobilization around better management of the commons. and often does.5. CO2 is certainly a public good. 2004) 2. improve wellbeing and provide the means to exclude outside claimants and improve forest management and conservation (Lindsay. Strengthening politically active coalitions of cause leaders. and to local authorities (Jenkins. even more. White & Ellsworth. 38 . Given the free circulation of air into the atmosphere. 2009a). in order to achieve tenure security.5 Carbon-sequestration rights Being a component of air. Figure 2. organizations and networks 6. RRI. 2004. substantial legal reform accompanied by support to local communities or to small holders in forest management from relevant institutions. 1999. Piloting working models that illustrate successful commons management 7. Through a naturally-occurring photosynthetic process. Actors and Actions in securing community tenure (White. Beside those strategies.

39 . while it is not clear whom sequester C belongs to. 2009).. herbaceous flora and organic matter in soils. Conflicts arise because. focused on Emission Reduction and related financing mechanisms. 2009 in press). From the economic theory viewpoint. that is to say entirely rival and excludable.. poses new challenges to the old conception of property and to the old systems of property law (Rosenbaum et al. Boydell et al. actual or potential. sequestration on. when third parties are involved in the property right regime. whilst the owner of land can instead sell the subsidiary right in carbon sequestration in. One of these conditions imposes that the good exchanged is a private good. and release from a specified parcel of land (Bailey & Rayner.. The financial value of sequestered Carbon has a meaning where a market for greenhouse gas emission offsets has been created. They have the characteristics of not being fungible (Robles. 2009 in press).. for example. trees. provided that the conditions for the good functioning of the market mechanisms are respected. felt. In turn.vegetation is able to sequester Carbon and stock it into growing trees. a land indeed already subjected to a certain property rights regime and tenure arrangements. 2009 in press). Therefore the ownership of intangible resources such as sequestered Carbon. vegetation grows on land. as the contrary of the traditional „right‟ to pollute the environment (Boydell et al. or taken away. the landowner can be forced to take over him/her self the responsibilities and the restrictions to ensure that his/her activities do not impact on the loss or diminishment of that carbon right (Boydell et al.. and this is particularly relevant in the context of REDD programmes. a possible new source of income for owners of the land on which vegetation or soils accumulate carbon from atmosphere. At the same time. A C-sequestration right can be intended as a form of property right of the benefits and risks arising from carbon absorbed from the atmosphere. This process produces a potential economic good (stored Carbon). they can be meant. to a certain extent. Boydell et al. or as rights of storage as opposed to the more traditional Ostrom and Schlager‟s (1996) cited in Sterner (2002) „rights of withdrawal‟ or Honoré‟s (1961) „rights of use‟. 2010. differently from CO2. 2009 in press). Cotula & Mayers. 2004. this implies that property rights on it are fully defined and allocated. in the sense that they cannot be touched. 2001.

2008). This may happen through the sale of a usufruct right or profit à prendre. acts but also contracts must clearly establish who may be permitted to own forest carbon rights. Rosenbaum et al. alienable property right. The legal framework consisting in constitutional provisions. Conceiving Carbon-sequestration rights accurately will have implications on the future institutional arrangements of governments and on national law (Rosenbaum et al. A modified and adapted version of this picture is presented in Table 1. (2004) have provided a comprehensive picture of possible ownership systems of Carbon sequestration potential from a forest. 2001). When the ownership of the carbon stock is transferred. Carbon ownership may either be a separate proprietary interest. If the carbon stock is subject to a separate. 2010). regulations. 40 . independent of the property of the forest. governed under the laws concerning land ownership or under general property rules. new owners may or may not have the right to affect the use of the forest to protect or enhance its existing potential (Robles. the clarification of forest tenure rights. The most effective way of formalising and responding to the carbon interest as a property right is through the implementation of specific regulatory provisions detailing the form. content and scope of this unique and important natural resource interest (Hepburn.The objective in recognizing carbon as „property‟ is to provide secure title for carbon sequestration rights through registration on the land title system (Sheehan. particularly the ownership on forest lands is crucial to determine who will be the parties involved in contracting carbon rights derived from forests (Robles. laws. It is a prerequisite to guarantee the control over the circulation and trade of the carbon rights whether in regulatory or voluntary carbon markets.. showing the high complexity of the different approaches to the problem. Moreover. the owner could sell that right without conveying forest ownership. 2004). or a proprietary interest linked to forest or land ownership. 2010).

41 .Table 1. governed by landownership laws C-rights separate Public good owned by the Stat (regardless of landownership) Government take credits for C-stock On public land C-rights proprietary interest linked to forest or to land ownership Covenants On private land Source: Rosenbaum et al. (2004). A picture of possible ownership regimes of Carbon sequestration potentiall Obligations towards forest management aimed at increasing Cstock GovernmentForm of obligation regulatory powers between private on landowners parties Contracts Covenants (running with land or persons) Easements Government can have inalienable regulatory power to regulate or enhance C sequestration C-right ownership regime Forms through which C-right is sold Profit a prendre Completely new property right established through a covenant Government acts as trustee (profit to landowner Government sells credits (profit to Government) C-rights are chose in action linked to vegetation unless a covenant is signed The owner cannot sell or give C-stock away independently of the property Private good owned by landowner. are more readily tradable. especially on what regards the juridical context of land ownership. this aspect has a strong direct impact on the transformation of the C potential into a C-credits and therefore on its tradability: „Carbon rights which are verified as separate property interests. which depends much on the country‟s legal and institutional framework. 2008). modified and adapted In synthesis. enforceable against or over the land. they are not encumbered by the management and conveyance burdens associated with the transfer of full corporeal ownership of the land‟ (Hepburn. The fact that sequestered carbon is considered a private good owned by the land owner or a public good belonging to the society at large The legal possibility of imposing obligations constraining the land owner to follow specific forest management practices specifically aimed towards increasing C-sequestration. the key-elements of possible C-ownership regime are: The separability of the C-rights from land-ownership.

In this context. C. such as a usufruct right of the profit à prendre type. covenants that runs with the land. alienable property right. i. ii The owner of the carbon has no inherent right to affect how the forest is used. easements or servitudes. which may attach to a dominant estate or to a person. These obligations could be in the form of: contracts. 42 . This means that C cannot be sold independently of the forest. In this case.e.Three most-frequently occurring solutions can be identified in the following: A. B. the carbon sequestered in the forest may be transferred independently of any land transfer. In the latter case. The owner can sell that right without conveying land ownership. In this context. the carbon sequestered in the forest is a publicly owned asset and: The government holds the forest carbon stock as trustee for the benefit of forest owners or of the public. The carbon sequestered in the forest is again a separate good from other forest products. two different options may be envisioned:   The government has no particular power to require landowners to protect or enhance sequestration. with no power to sell it or give it away. but the right is governed under general contract law. the land owner may separately grant this right through some legal mechanisms that bind the property owner. When referring to privately-owned land. However. The carbon sequestered in the forest is a proprietary interest linked to forest or land ownership. the owner may or may not be forced to undertake the obligation to manage the forest in a way to increase the carbon stock. or to enhance it. product separate from other forest products. The carbon sequestered in the forest is a private good owned by the landlord. the object of a separate. or The government has the power to regulate the use of land to protect or enhance carbon sequestration. two options may be envisioned: i The owner of the carbon has the right to affect the use of the forest to protect the existing forest carbon stock. governed under the laws concerning land ownership. covenants that attaches to persons. binding anyone who owns the property in the future.

NGOs interested in environmental protection. The governmental capacity to deal with abstract forms of landownership. Assess what. 4. 2004): 1. The nature of the demand for carbon sequestration. “banks” chartered to deal in mitigation credits. 43 . These assume particular relevance in the context of the present work. Steps towards establishing carbon ownership in a given legislative context (from Streck and O‟Sullivan (2007) 1. In this connection. 4. registering certain rights over the land. unstable currency poorly developed markets. or other subjects that may have rights over the land or the forests. Check whether or not there are restrictions on the transfer of carbon sequestered in the forest. 3. coming to an agreement with customary owners. If the major goal of a country is to encourage foreign governments to invest in forest based mitigation projects. This may include buying or leasing the land. Furthermore. C-policies developers have recommended that establishing C-sequestration ownership in a given legislative context should be guided by a series of steps. indigenous peoples or other groups of forest stewards. or restricting the use of the land or forests to certain purposes for a given amount of time. it needs to be taken into account that the choice of how to shape the nature of property rights in carbon sequestration depends on several factors (Rosenbaum et al.B The government has the power to sell or give the forest carbon stock away. it will be impractical to set up a national system based on tradable rights. The nature of the local economy: as in the country with or an Box 6. 2. 3. needs to be done to protect and maintain unencumbered legal title to the carbon sequestered in a forest. and government to government dealings are the desired outcome. which will play a major role and may constrain the choice 2. if anything. Check whether there is any definition of carbon sequestration rights in domestic law.. Check whether the benefits associated with carbon sequestration are assigned to landowners or to any other subject. The framework of existing laws and legal traditions. a system vesting ownership of sequestration in the national government may be appropriate. presented and discussed in Box 6. two main options may be configured:   The acquisition of carbon stocks may be open to anybody. which seeks to understand which is the most appropriate legislative milieu for the development of REDD projects in Indonesia. such as entities emitting carbon and desiring offsets. Only a limited number of entities may be eligible to own carbon stocks.

2001) to formalise the separate proprietary existence of carbon rights within the context of the forestry legislation (Hepburn. developing countries seeking private investment may wish to vest ownership of sequestration potential in private hands. Legislation in New South Wales.6 The Australian approach to the issue of Carbon-sequestration rights Australia was one of the first countries to establish carbon rights as part of land use strategies both within rural and urban areas (Boydell et al. Neither the Australian Capital Territory nor the Northern Territory has specific legislative provisions recognising the proprietary status of carbon sequestration rights. constituting common law profit à prendre interests. (reference can also be made to the general framework of Table 1. 2. 2008). the Australian experience can provide interesting insights in this field and show possible development paths to be applied to our problem. 2009 in press). although the correspondence between typologies is not always straightforward.. the C potential is considered a chose in action..If developed countries adopt laws that encourage individual emitters of GHG to seek offsets. This country has also developed a concept of recognition of carbon as property right in its legislation system (Bredhauer. In Southern Australia. 44 . carbon rights are not validated as separate land interests but exist as components of the underlying forest property agreement and therefore remain characterised as “choses in action” (Hepburn. Tasmania and Queensland deems forestry carbon rights as a separate right from the bundle of forest rights. Types of usufruct rights foreseen imply mostly covenants. 2000 cited in Sheehan. The various Australian States and territories have chosen different solutions to the problem. as shown in Table 2. being the solutions very articulated and sometimes only slightly but substantially different). the proprietary validation of this new carbon right is contingent upon registration of the underlying C-covenant. which can occur on both freehold and Crown land. constructed around the specific statutory provisions outlined within the legislation. Legislation in Western Australia and South Australia articulates the carbon right as a new property interest. In Western Australia. 2008). In Victoria. Being a pioneer in C-rights definition. a potential linked to forest vegetation up to when a forest property agreement is signed to separate it from forest vegetation and giving rise to a new property right.

2008 - 45 . can occur on both private or public land (freehold or Crown) Possible but not necessary. becoming covenant running with land when registered YES. unless a forest property agreement is signed to separate C ownership from ownership of forest vegetation. but not necessary Contractual. subcategory of forest property right. but a land interest. 2009 Hepburn. not running with land. 2001. thus becoming a new property right Not an independent right. parties forest management Yes. but not necessary + Possible (and necessary according to a restrictive interpretatio n of the law) Necessary. specific Csequestration enhancement. subject to common law provisions Profit a prendre. C-Convenants necessarily Robles.Table 2. 2005 Tradability New South Wales (and Tasmania) Queensland Profit a prendre. 2010. Ownership regimes of Carbon sequestration adopted in Australia and their tradability Forms through which C-right is sold Form Need for registration Obligations towards forest management aimed at increasing C-stock Possibility of Form of obligation specific between private obligations for Lit Ref. 2008. incorporated into „natural resource products‟. necessary to separate Cownership from that of forest vegetation Hepburn. established through „forestright agreements‟ and subsequent „C-right agreements‟ Possible. 2004 enhancement Hepburn. State of Western Australia. Bailey & Rainer. 2008. 2008 Victoria Possible. but general maintenance Hepburn.. Hepburn. subject to common law provisions A new property right. a forest-proprietary interest separate from other forest products. finalised toward Rosenbaum C-sequestration et al. not 2008. a proprietary interest. between parties. statutorily established A chose in action linked to vegetation. Can be used to give priority to cright holder on holders of other rights lease Western Australia C-Convenants Are established through registration of a C-covenant Southern Australia C-Covenant. Queensland Government. obligations.

to be intended as research questions. 46 . these research questions imply that two levels of analysis are implemented throughout the work: the first one (a) at institutional (broad) scale.2. have highlighted some key-issues in relation to the final objective of the thesis: to assess whether and to what extent REDD projects can be a tool for delivering significant benefits for Indonesian local populations especially through enhancing security of property rights and land tenure regimes. are: a) Is the Indonesian institutional framework of property rights ready for the implementation of REDD? How can this readiness be assessed? From this point of view. the second one (b) at project level.7 Identification of research questions The theoretical analyses on institutional solutions to the problem of C-rights allocation. Both level of analysis will contribute to cast light on the most effective patterns of implementation for REDD projects. These key-issues. on forest tenure and its importance in REDD implementation. what lessons can be learned from countries which have adopted pioneer solutions in this field like for example Australia? b) Have the REDD projects already in place (both demonstration and voluntary activities) in Indonesia sufficiently considered the issue of forest rights? And are they effectively contributing towards an improvement of tenure systems for local populations? Clearly.

when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 1994. 3. a researcher is able to go beyond the quantitative statistical results and understand the behavioural conditions through the actor‟s perspective. 1994. In addition. Through case study methods. 2007). 2007). 2007). 2007). As an alternative to quantitative or qualitative research. case studies provide very little basis for scientific generalisation since they use a small number of subjects. they present data of real-life situations and they provide better insights into the detailed behaviours of the subjects of interest (Zainal. One of the reasons for the recognition of case study as a research method is that researchers were becoming more concerned about the limitations of quantitative methods in providing holistic and in-depth explanations of the social and behavioural problems in question. some conducted with only one subject (Yin. The case study method is useful particularly in studies of reallife situations governing social issues and problems (Zainal.1 Research methodology Case-studies as a research method Yin (1994) defines the case study research method “as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. 47 . and in which multiple sources of evidence are used”. In most cases. 1997 cited in Zainal.Third. First. a case study method selects a small geographical area or a very limited number of individuals as the subjects of study (Zainal. reconstruction and analysis of the cases under investigation (Tellis. case studies are often labelled as being too long. 2007). Case studies are considered useful in research as they enable researchers to examine data at the micro level. case studies are often accused of lack of rigour and the tendency for a researcher to have a biased interpretation of the data (Yin. In contrast. difficult to conduct and producing a massive amount of documentation (Yin. case study helps explaining both the process and outcome of a phenomenon through complete observation. case studies have received some criticisms. 1994). 2007). Second. Zainal.3. By including both quantitative and qualitative data. case studies can be a practical solution when a big sample population is difficult to obtain. 1997 cited in Zainal. Tellis.

3. this study was decided to operate through case study because the method provides holistic and in depth explanations of social problem including tenurial and property right issue without depend on statistical result. Tah ura). HTI. National Parks). the term refers specifically to the few pilot projects that have received official approval by the government of Indonesia (Madeira. 2010. e. oil palm estate and HTI).. estate crop plantation. Therefore. in this case all on-going REDD projects in Indonesia. or community based HTR) 48 .Based on the argumentation above. 2008 cited in Madeira. 2010).g. To consider both demonstration and voluntary activities which have different policy in handling tenurial and property rights issues. e. The method also enables data examination at micro level represented big sample of population. Scheyvens.g. 4) Project (for example with forest management units such as individual HPH.e. The aim of the implementation of demonstration activities is to test and develop methodologies relating to reduce carbon emission through controlling deforestation and forest degradation (Masripatin et al. 2010). Demonstration activities refer to pilot projects with a clear objective to directly reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation in a specific geographic area (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Kongphan-Apirak. HPH. 2009).. reliable data which covered many possible situations is able to be obtained in cheap way. 2009). 2) Province (forest activities in areas that cross districts. 2010). although full inventory could not be conducted. To have a good spatial representation i. The criteria according to which case-studies have been selected are: 1. community forest area.2 Criteria for choosing case studies The conducted study was focusing in Indonesia with a reason that Indonesia is one of the main players on REDD+ discussions and in 2008 became the world‟s first country to design a legal framework for REDD (Creagh.2 2 Based on an analysis of responsibilities of the three strata of government Demonstration Projects should be undertaken at four levels of potential future activity: 1) National (for example with land management units managed from national government. In Indonesia. Maximum period for a demonstration activity is 5 years (Scheyvens. 3) District (forest activities that occur within a district (HPH. to select case studies able to capture the geographic distribution of projects across the archipelago in Indonesia. 2.

will be managed as one homogenous area. 3 In these activities: the projects set their own commitment in achieving emission level. 2009). less central government involvement because transactions are more likely to be between international buyers and projects. motivations for implementing projects are social and environmental co-benefits. and deforestation drivers vary. accessible project documents and possibility to establish contacts with project leaders. 2009). namely: 1. Kalimantan (demonstration activity.000 ha with an average size of approximately 80. It may incorporate a very large area in which several measures are undertaken to reduce emissions. 2008). 4. 3. REDD in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem. and 5.In the other hand. site level). 3. voluntary activities3 are driven by social responsibility concerns to reduce emissions Individuals. but the area affected by those measures is much smaller that the reported project size. of which three demonstration activities and two voluntary activities were selected as focus of study. Aceh (voluntary activity. The forest areas are geographically contiguous. To consider both site level intervention and landscape level intervention Site level interventions aim to generate emissions reductions based on slowing or stopping DD in a localized area. rather than with national governments as seller themselves and activities are not accordance with government objectives. Tropical Forest Conservation for REDD and enhancing carbon stocks in Meru Betiri National Pak. and do not dependent on international negotiations (MoFor.000 ha to 200. and have the same legal classification at the end of project. landscape level).000 ha (Madeira. East Java (demonstration activity. corporations and other organizations without mandatory emission targets may enter into these markets. as much as possible. 2. Berau Forest Carbon Program (BFCP). In contrast. landscape level). To consider case-studies having. legal clarification. They are much larger than site level interventions (Madeira. To consider case-studies which could be expected to have relevant tenurial issues or have produced information on tenure. Based on these criteria. 49 . five REDD projects. project managers and NGOs involved in it. They range from 10. landscape level interventions aim to generate emissions reductions across a heterogeneous landscape where forest type.

reports. UNREDD Carbon Project in Central Sulawesi (demonstration activity. NGOs.) from recognized organizations and other credible official sources regarding REDD+ mechanisms. diversity on scale and scope. diversity on REDD type (national based or project based). 2010) 3. the approach to information collection was based initially on secondary sources of information and then on field collection of primary data which have to be collected on site.4. Kalimantan REDD in Papua REDD in Meru Betiri NP UNREDD in Central Sulawesi Figure 3. 5. also has made official agreements with some level of the Indonesian government to develop REDD+ activities. Location of the five case-studies (modified from Sarsito. 50 . (2009).3 Data collection In order to achieve the thesis‟s objectives. Each one of the chosen projects has diversity of actors driving project development (such as private project developers. landscape level). landscape level). These selected projects are part of REDD projects that are used in study of Dunlop (2009) and Sills et al. Secondary sources of information used in this study are published literature (journal articles. Papua (voluntary activity. and bilateral aid organizations). institutional/legal context in Indonesia. REDD in Ulu Masen BFCP. etc. REDD project by WWF in Jayapura Regency.

tenure system. respondents were asked to give information about benefit sharing mechanism and how tenure issue are affecting this mechanism. objective. four were interviewed through phone and one through email: 1. attention has been paid to have. Although there was no specific criterion established a priori for selection of respondents. and carbon in Indonesia as established in Australia. The questionnaire is organized in four parts. one of main actors of REDD project in Meru Betiri National Park. rights. type of project. 51 . main components. The questionnaire has been specially designed for representative of project developers after discussing with some experts on this issue in FAO headquarter and having feedback from pilot questionnaire. aimed at collecting information on issues on which there isn‟t sufficient published literature (specifically. All interviews were conducted once for every respondent. was interviewed through phone on 16 June 2010. Contact with all representatives of project developer was established by using FAO‟s network. All interviews was conducted through phone and email directed to project proponents. Those secondary data are used for understanding current tenure situation and institutional/ legal context in Indonesia regarding tenure and REDD. Total interviewed respondents are five. property rights regime. 2. as respondents. The last part is designed to get information about REDD influence in triggering tenure reform and possibility to have different rights for land. information on tenure system and other challenges on project site. Primary data were collected through interviews using a semi-structured questionnaire (see Annex 2 for details of the questionnaire). property rights. Representative of REDD project in Jayapura Regency was interviewed through phone on 26 June 2010. the respondents were asked to provide general information of REDD project (area of project. First.). and benefit sharing mechanisms). tenure system and community access in REDD project site. people who are in charge of representing the project or to appear as primary contact written in project document. In the third part. Representative of LATIN. etc. projects‟ conflict management mechanism. stakeholder participation. main challenges. carbon rights issues and finally project documents from selected REDD projects. forest. The second part is designed to get information about the REDD scheme and how tenure system is expected to affect the implementation of REDD.

Therefore. 5. one main actors of REDD project in Meru Betiri National Park. was not able to fill the sent questionnaire. study on this project is conducted by using project documents and validation audit report by SmartWood. readiness of Indonesian institutional in implementing REDD in terms of property rights assignment and land tenure is analyzed by confronting information available with concept of better implementation of REDD in national level by Streck (2009). representative of REDD project in Berbak National Park. inability of respondent to be interviewed. 3. References is also made to the implementation of carbon rights in Australia. and some other factors beyond control. representative of REDD project in Ulu Masen. Due to time constraint. 1994). Representative of FORDA. answered the questionnaire on 2 July 2010.4 Data analysis and limitations The primary data was crosschecked with available project documents to ensure consistency of information. 4. Dispite there is no interview result for REDD Project in Ulu Masen. 2010). The key property rights aspects of the expected patterns have been described in Chapter 2. interview results and some more information from project 52 . considered as a possible model to adjust/ reform current Indonesian system to be fit to work with REDD. Kalimantan was interviewed through phone on 30 June 2010. Representativeof UNREDD in Central Sulawesi was interviewed through phone on 2 July 2010. Jambi was not able to finish answering all questions and Chief of Task Force REDD in Aceh. Secure tenure and property right issues have been confronted with the concept of elements of community tenure security developed by White (2004) which again already described in Chapter 2. Only five questionnaires were obtained in the end although it was supposed to have initially seven interviewed respondents. Team leader of BFCP.3. Data collected in this research has been prepared for analysis paying attention to both qualitative and quantitative data. Then they have been analysed mostly using pattern-matching techniques (Yin. In addition. In assessing project performance in terms of property right security. this project is still selected as one of case studies since it was the first REDD pilot projects in Indonesia to take voluntary market approach and the first REDD project in developing country to meet CCB standards (Atmadja & Wollenberg.

participant observation. archival records. interviews. Overall. and physical artefacts) (Yin. only three sources of evidence are collected in this study. the study is conducted based on desk analysis of some documents. The more the options fulfil the element of community tenure security and criteria of REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards. direct observation. from six sources of evidence that should be collected in case study methodology (documents. The study methodology has some limitations which should be acknowledged: due to time restrictions and inability to visit the case-studies‟ site for direct observation. literature review. In addition.documents have been confronted with the adopted and modified criteria of REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards by CCBA and CARE International (2010) described in Chapter 5. and gathering completing information from interview of some key stakeholders. it has been able to provide interesting grounds for analysis and discussion. 53 . data about property rights and tenure security on REDD projects in Indonesia will only focus on five selected REDD projects. 1994). analysis of project records. Despite these limitations. the greater chance of the options to secure tenure and property right.

54 .

2 special regions (daerah istimewa). 2003. Bandung (2.7 million) and Medan (2.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/indonesia_pol_2002. It comprises more than 17.utexas. Sulawesi.606 sq km area which is consisting of 1. It covers 5. Surabaya (3 million).2 million) (CIA. 2009). 55 .000 islands. 2010). CIA. Java and Madura are the most densely populated areas and the largest cities are Jakarta (8.166.1 Indonesia: current realities Indonesia at glance Indonesia is a unitary republic with some provincial autonomy. there are 5 large islands like Sumatra.9 million). it is the world's fourth most populous country (Martin. Among those islands.lib. 2009). 2009).4. democratic system divides power between the president and parliament (CIA. Kalimantan. 2009). Map of Indonesia (http://www. Each province is subdivided into district and municipalities. of which 6. and Papua.163 sq km sea area (Martin. and 1 special capital city district (daerah khusus ibukota) (CIA.jpg) With a population of around 240 million people (US Census Bureau 2009 estimate).443 sq km land area and 3. which are further.070. 4. Figure 4. subdivided into sub-districts (kecamatan) and village groupings (either desa or kelurahan).000 km from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean at the equator (Chrystanto & Justianto. Java.000 are inhabited.904. Indonesia is administratively divided into 33 provinces which consists of 30 provinces. 2010). they are spread out over 5.

8 percent of Indonesian total land (88. Around 300 distinct language and ethnic groups populate the archipelago. 2009). Hindus are only 2% from total population and they are mainly concentrated in Bali and small minority also found in Central and East Java. medium.780 – 3. while there are also significant communities descended from immigrants including Chinese. with two districts monsoonal wet and dry seasons. 2009.3% for the GDP. 2006). forest covers 48. language. Buddhist is 1% and mostly they are Chinese descent (CIA. North Sumatra and North Sulawesi.Indonesia‟s people are extremely diverse in culture. but very humid and torrential rain and storms are common (CIA. Between 1990 and 2000 the annual net loss of forest area was 1.000 (2009 estimates). Most communities of Indonesians are related to people of eastern Asia and Malay family. 2009). It is hot and mostly dry from April to October.3 million (2009 estimates) (CIA. Labour force is 113. Lying along the equator. The national language is Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia) and nowadays English has become second language.99 percent) (Sardjono. 2010).52 percent). Sulawesi (9. Kalimantan (31. 2006) which consists of a mixture of high.6% and services 37. and Papua (30. ethnicity and religion. Indonesia is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and also a member of G-20 major economies. Arabs. The forests are mostly found in the outer islands of Sumatra (18.175 millimetres (70 -125 in) and up to 6. Christians are only 8 % and they are majority in few regions such as East Nusa Tenggara. and low-density planted and non-planted forest.100 millimetres (240 in) in mountainous regions (BBC. Indians and Europeans (CIA. 4. but most people in eastern islands are Melanesian.1%.77 percent of total forest cover). 2004a cited in Simorangkir & Sardjono. Almost 88% of Indonesians are Muslims.495 million hectares) (FAO. From November to March it is slightly cooler. industry 47.2 Forest in Indonesia Indonesia is counted as one of three largest tropical forest countries after Brazil and Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2010). Indonesia‟s estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita for 2009 is $4. Agriculture contributes 15. According to FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment in 2005.99 percent).Average annual rainfall in the lowlands varies from 1.7 percent while between 2000 and 56 . 2009). Britanica. Indonesia has a tropical climate.

There was 1. was 3. there was still no forest owned by communities and indigenous groups (RRI. public forest administered by government was increasing into 121. 2007). In 2008. community forest plantations and customary forests. 2007). MoFor. This situation also links with reduction of growing stock which between 1990 and 2000.309 hectares (Fey. These land use zones are designed to increase the economic stake which local people may have in the national forest estate and to thereby promote greater levels of community based forest protection as a means of combating illegal (Fey.2005 it was increasing into 2 percent (FAO. timber and Non Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) as well as licenses for collecting timber and NTFPs (thus having more certain legal tenure) over 73. 2007). there was improvement in private forest ownership. 2007.61 m3/ ha/year (FAO. public forest designated for use by communities and indigenous groups was decreasing become 0. 2008). 57 . All forest land in Indonesia is owned by the state.71 millions of hectares of forest owned by individuals and firms however. Government data on forest cover (2004) indicated that there are approximately eight million hectares of forest located in non-forest zones.89 millions of hectares. Communities have also been granted licenses for commercial utilization of forest areas. 2006). There was no forest area owned by private in 2002 for both group individual and firms and communities and indigenous groups. These can be categorized as private forests that could be owned by communities as well as by companies (Fey.23 millions of hectares through classifications including: collaborative management of protected areas. In the other hand. Public forest administered by government in 2002 was 104 millions of hectares and 0. 2009). community forests. 2006. During 2008.33 m 3/ ha/year and between 2000 and 2005 was 4.60 millions of hectares of the forest area were designated for use by communities and indigenous groups.

Forest management models for local community participation (Sardjono. 2008.. Production forest In 2005. 2006). and Industrial Plantation Forest (Hutan Tanaman Industri – HTI). b. this forest covers 53. Production forest is divided into two secondary categories: a. 2009). Permanent production forest for which sustainable forest management is intended to maintain forest ecosystems within the forest estate. Convertible Production Forest (Hutan Produksi Konversi – HPK). communities. 000 ha (FAO.707. Limited Production Forest (Hutan Produksi Terbatas – HPT). 2006) The forest land is designated into three primary functions. 1. cooperatives. This forest zone is not intended to remain in the State Forest but can be 58 .9 percent of total forest coverage or about 47. Masripatin et al. individuals. Permanent Production Forest is managed as: Natural Production Forest (Hutan Produksi Alam – HPA). The utilization of the production forests is undertaken through forest concessions that are granted to private companies. Concessions are granted for 20 to 55 years over natural forests and for up to 60 years over HTI (MoFor.Figure 5. 2004b in Simorangkir & Sardjono. or state enterprises concerned with the forest sector.

Each of these types of protected area is managed directly under the authority of the central government.394.788.788. It covers 27. riversides and steep upper slopes of mountains where uncontrolled human activities or logging could easily create critical land through erosion (MoFor.8 percent of the forest area) (FAO. wood and non-wood forest species domestication (MoFor. medicinal plants. Grand Forest Parks and Hunting Parks. 2006. These include a range of protected area types specified in Act No.. 2008. estate crops (e. and they have their own budget allocation (MoFor. such as agriculture. 59 . 2009). Beside primary forest. coffee.. The management of Protected Forests has been devolved to Local Government (Kabupatan/ Kota).5 of 1990.000 ha (18. 2006).4 million hectares of forest plantations (about 3.000 ha semi-natural forest and 3. oil palm. 2008). The decision to release HPK from the forest estate is subject to ministerial approval based on proposals from industry (MoFor. Protected forest. 2009). The types of protected areas are: National Park.5 percent of total forest coverage or about 40.g. 2009) 2.converted to other non-forest uses. Masripatin et al. A further protected area type of grand forest park. 000 ha in 2005 (FAO. ecological processes. 2006). Conservation forest. Recreational Parks. Protected Forest has been set for the preservation of essential ecosystem functions. Wildlife Sanctuaries. nature-based tourism. 2007). 2008. 2008.6% of total coverage) (FAO. 3. termed TAHURA or Provincial Park. Indonesia has 36. rubber) and settlement. such as watershed protection and protection of beachfronts. Strict Nature Reserves. has been identified in a number of provinces by the Ministry of Forestry. Masripatin et al. Their major purposes are to conserve biological diversity. Masripatin et al.. and its management allocated to provincial government. Limited human activities are permitted including the taking of rattan and the secondary forest products at non-commercial scales.. It is about 40. and the source of genetic resources needed for food crops. which have rights to license use of and payments for environmental services (MoFor. 2008). National Parks form a distinct type of protected area because unlike all other categories they are managed by staff dedicated to the NP.

caco. unstable forest zones due to spatial planning processes. Nationally. 2006). However. poor forest governance.3 Land and forest tenure system in Indonesia Under the Dutch. strong will and big effort from government to tackle those problems are needed. small scale community-based agriculture (e. 1993). Fey (2007) also states that there are several problems that Indonesian forestry is still dealing with: forest fires which occur throughout the country particularly in Sumatera and Kalimantan. timber for pulp and paper). rates of forest loss have exceeded 1 million ha per year for the last three decades and have approached 2 million ha per year in recent years (Simorangkir & Sardjono. overcutting of forests. cutting in unauthorized areas and theft. 2007). a dual system of land laws permitted non Indonesians to register and obtain title for lands on the basis of Western civil law principles. rubber. However. and un-conducive investment policies for forestry development. The dual system was intended to protect peasants from alienation of their land. large number of poor people living in and surrounding the forest.g. 60 . accounting for almost 10 percent of total gross domestic product (GDP) (Simorangkir & Sardjono. whereas Indonesian ownership was governed by adat (custom). 4. industrial plantations (e. based on unwritten village practices (Box. and coffee).7). oil palm. high demand for forest land from other government agencies.g. not all forest zones have management units nor community-friendly forest utilization approaches. forest conversion to other uses. mining in forest land. the more flexible. communal based adat system also permitted the Dutch to rent communal village lands by contracting only with the village headman (penghula) (Frederick & Worden. 2006. Colchester & Fay. and uncertainty in property rights and forest policies cause deforestation and forest degradation. Therefore. Beside those illegal activities.Forestry sector has been a major contributor to the national economy over the last three decades.

(Thornburn. 2002). The BAL also recognises the collective rights in land of customary law communities but threats as weak usufructs on State lands subordinate to State plans and interests (Colchester & Fay. area boundaries. These are based on the principle that residents have equal rights to a healthy environment. should the area remain unused for an extended period. In the case of dry-field gardens. there is no need to seek outside approval of the plan unless it involves major expansion of the land base. Adat regulation in managing forest (Deschamps & Hartman. and planning process. the law set limits on the size of land ownership. or even specific trees. and registered. Adat are developed by the residents of the host community. mapped. Land certification.The Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) of 1960 was the first major legislation provides the principles and direction for government action on agrarian reform and national forestry legal and policy development yet legal options for the communities continue to be primarily directed towards sharing management responsibility over state forests (Fey. before changes to the adat are made. the right of use may be taken away from the user and redistributed among other residents of the host community. 2007). however. 1993). legally protected only so long as customary systems still exist and their exercise is consistent with the national interest and with legislation (Colchester et al 2006 cited in Cotula & Mayers. individuals may lay claim (hak milik) for the use of land. Adat details rights and responsibilities with regards to resources extraction. 61 . In addition. and control the rights. but provided a new certification process under which land was to be surveyed. All unclaimed land reverted to government ownership. Although private holdings are not permitted in the forest. 2007). 2006) Adat is set of traditional laws created by the community and administered by a local council of adat elders that regulate nearly all aspects of life in the community. 2009). These regulations include both traditional and legal laws. extensive discussions of the nature and need for the change must be held before an adat council makes a decision. depending on the population density of the region and the type of land (Frederick & Worden. The BAL provides for the recognition of individual rights to use and own lands and for business tenures as long term renewable leaseholds. Often this right can be passed along to family members or traded/sold to other members of the same village. responsibilities. namely use and protect the community forest and participate in the planning. It also defines the size. Amendment of adat must go through the adat council before being approved. was not compulsory and registration was still far from complete by the end of 1980s. and are not necessarily restricted to natural resources use. In addition. within the area with permission from the appropriate representative. the law recognizes previous ownership rights under both adat and Western systems. location. at the direction of the Adat council. are The also communities allowed to register their land as they see fit. and harvest locations of forest products . Under BAL. However. Extraction of forest products from traditional use area is restricted to resident of host community. implementation. customary land rights are also Box 7. and legal sanctions of people residing inside and outside of the host community.

the ministry then has the authority to lease concessions within State forest areas to individuals. Private ownership is proved by personal landownership certificates or specific institutions. Many laws require that such publication is made before a decision of the government may have legal effect. 2006). 2008). 2002. The Act and Forestry Law No. regulate and manage forest land and resources. 2006. The event or decision announced is thereby deemed to be public knowledge. 2002). 1986 cited in Thornburn. Colchester. 2006). Enclaves of rural and forest dwelling people within the state forest have been accommodated in a number of ways since the 1967 Basic Forest Law (MoFor. (Simorangkir & Sardjono. there 4 Gazettement refers to the publication of an official announcement in as state gazette or official journal. The Ministry of Forests has the responsibility to determine which parts of Indonesia are forests and assign them to the category of forest areas (kawasan hutan) and then determine which areas are rights forests and which are state forest areas through the process of gazettement4. Certified rights to land were granted for only 20 years. which states” Land and water and natural riches therein shall be controlled by the state and be made use of for the greatest welfare of the people” (MacAndrews. Cotula & Mayers. cooperatives and state owned enterprises (Deschamps & Hartman. Hutan Negara. Deforested land could be included as official forest land area if it was designated for reforestation. and non forest land (MoFor. 2002. gazettement usually indicates that a forested area has been designated for protection by the state or other public authorities according to relevant legislation in force (Leonard & Longbottom. 2004 cited in Deschamps & Hartman. Currently. This gave the government of Indonesia authority to control. private companies. Indonesia has divided its land area into two for administrative purposes: the national forest land. 2000). for purposes of „national good‟ social function (MacAndrews 1986 cited in Thornburn. 62 . 2008). a few of which the government acknowledges as being equivalent to communal permanent rights. so certified forest land was meant to be returned to the State in 1980 (Simorangkir & Sardjono. 2009). 2006). Simorangkir & Sardjono. 2006). Following the gazettement.The implementation of BAL is amplified Article 33 of the Indonesian Constitution. As far as forests are concerned. whether on public or private lands. such as customary land (Simorangkir & Sardjono.5/1967 led to the declaration of all forest land in Indonesia and untitled land. Technically the National Land Administration Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional) has responsibility for the tenure of all land. 2006). Since implementation of the law. land surveying and the issuing of entitlements. are state forest land and subject to jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forests (Thornburn.

2007).are different types of documents and rights (hak) that exist: hak milik (right of ownership). agriculture. both TGHK and RTRWP had been synchronized in all provinces except North Sumatra. hak buka tanah (right of opening up land). ketitir. In the early 1980s. it was developed and applied in a top down manner that did not involve local stakeholders. and a mind-boggling variety of tax register documents (Thorburn. hak guna usaha (right of exploitation). 2006. Fey. The accuracy of TGHK has always been questioned (Fey. the government synchronized the TGHK and RTRWP. By July 2003. (Fey. 2007). Leter C (proof of ownership documents maintained by village governments in most of Java and parts of Sulawesi. Furthermore. Riau. mining. crediet verband (mortgage and credit security arrangements still referred to in the original Dutch) and the array of girik. hak menempati (right to occupy). Fey. 2006). 2007). The ministry of forestry began to re-gazette forest land areas in collaboration with local authorities. land use allocation based on harmonization 63 . Hence. hak bangunan (right of building). (Simorangkir & Sardjono. The 120. also hipotik. also dating back to the colonial period). The TGHK also became problematic with the introduction of the Provincial Spatial Planning (RTRWP). hak pakai (right of use). The confusing landownership and rights regime has led to many land tenure conflicts. taking RTRWP into account (Simorangkir & Sardjono.35 million hectares designated as forest zones are the product of such consensus. in 1999. This resulted in the „Paduserasi‟ or the harmonization of TGHK and RTRWP. The final TGHK of each province approved by the governor and the minister included maps delineating all the forest land areas in each province according to their classification (Simorangkir & Sardjono. and the vested interests of sectors such as forestry. Lack of skill. a process named TGHK (Consensual-basis of Forest Land Use) allowed forest boundaries to be designated through desk studies and consensus among government agencies (Simorangkir & Sardjono. Many long established forest dependent communities suddenly found that they lost their rights to the land and/or their traditional access to land and natural resources. 2007). 2006). hak bagi hasil (sharecropping rights). 2006). 2002) still exist. and transmigration have resulted in overlapping and conflicting land allocations and uses between forest and non-forest zones as mentioned in both the TGHK and RTRWP (Simorangkir & Sardjono. 2006. to minimize land use conflicts among different authorities and stakeholders. and Central Kalimantan (Simorangkir & Sardjono. 2006).

protection. Colchester & Fay. the results being declared through gazettement (ITTO. 2008) 2. State ownership State forests are forests located on land without private rights. should give forest peoples a maximum level of control although in all cases there are provisions for such rights to be removed by the state for public purpose on payment of compensation (Cotula & Mayers. 2007). 2005. Under the 1999 Basic Forestry Law (replacement of Basic Forestry Law of 1967). 2003). settlement). forests are classified and delineated under the jurisdiction of the Forestry Department which has the authority to assign certain areas –forested or not as forest zones. is provided based on Indonesian legislation. such ownership rights. Colchester & Fay. Private ownership Private ownership of forestlands. State forests are designed for production (timber and non-timber). 1. In theory. 2003. Once land is released from the Forest Estate it becomes subject to land use decisions which are largely in the hands of local governments (Kabupaten/Kota) and are subject to a regulated process known as spatial planning. This is due to the long and cumbersome procedures required to establish private ownership. or to change the status of such forest zones into non-forests and to zone forests according its functions to whether they should be for production. the primary source of authority and guidance for all forest administration and regulations and legal basis for forest land use planning. 2009). whether individual or collective. namely land registration. This land is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry (Cotula & Mayers. protection or conversion (e. whereby land is allocated over a 5-year time frame and within 25 year long term strategic plans to contribute to economic and social development (MoFor. to food crops. 2007). and established procedure for deciding which they are. The majority of Indonesia‟s land area has been classified as “State Forest Zone”. Private land ownership may be very limited in practice. Article 5 of the law sets out two types of forest tenure: state and titled. 2009).g.between TGHK and RTRWP may need further consultation with district governments (Chrystanto & Justianto. conservation or conversion (Chrystanto & Justianto. 64 .

including forest designation (penunjukan kawasan hutan). “state forests”. In addition. If the MoF argues that the state forest is its exclusive jurisdiction. this law mandated that forest be regulated by the state taking into account the rights of indigenous people. Box 8. and it refuses to grant any land rights on the forest. 2007) There are several misleading concepts about “forest zones”. The law recognizes “customary law communities” as stated in Article 18B (2) of the Constitution”: “The State recognizes and respects customary law communities along with their traditional rights”. there is no guarantee that the land is free from private claims. Indonesian land law recognizes this as the horizontal principle of property rights. This is a common practice in the customary land tenure system as well (Fey.Land ownership may not automatically translate into tree ownership (Cotula & Mayers. Therefore. which is merely the initial stage of declaring certain areas as forest zones. and the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry (MoFor).. to the extent that they still exist and it does not conflict with national interest (Masripatin et al. there is a question about the legal status of such government land. it limits these rights according to a broad notion of “societal development” (Dunlop. only 12 million hectares or 10% of forests have been legally declared as forest zones. As of 2005. it accommodates the dynamic of community aspirations and participation. state claims on non-forested land is legally inconsistent. Forest Zones vs State Forests (Fey. its claims may be seen to have no legal basis In addition. however. the government undertakes forest gazettment (pengukuhan hutan) – a process that consists of a series of stages. This is the legacy of the old Indonesian Forestry Law (Law 5/1967). First. state forests are not the same as MoF jurisdiction. 2010) as stated in Article 28I(c): the “cultural identity and traditional rights of adat communities are respected and protected by the State as human rights (Dunlop. To support its tasks and function. and stipulation of the final legal status of forest zones. but it should have the rights. the existing Indonesian forest zones are legally problematic. 2007). namely the right to manage (hak pengelolaan) or right to use (hak pakai). MoFor assume that all land within the forest zone is state forest. Therefore. Therefore. It should be noted that the legal notion of public land is significantly different with government land. Obviously. The law states that. Only after the land is free from such claims can it be declared as state forest zone. Second. The MoF has done neither. Yet. Public land refers to land without registered private rights. 65 . The remaining 108 million hectares are still at the status of designation. Those who hold rights to forest resources cannot claim rights over the land. mapping. provided they ask the government to grant the rights. 2009). 2009). the government can control the land. Third. there must be a delineation process for verifying whether the land is free from other individual or community claims. This means that there are different property rights on land and forest resources. People can obtain rights on the public land. when the status of 108 million hectares is in the designation process. it seems that such forests are located on government land – not on public land. putting state claims on those 108 million hectares is inconsistent with the Forestry Law. which is a onesided decision of the government. stating that state forests are forest zones and forests located there can hold no-ownership rights. Indonesian land law clearly states that the government should have the hak pengelolaan or hak pakai and should register the land with the National Land Agency (BPN). in order to provide legal certainty to the status of forest zones. The new Forestry Law state that the “state forest” must have forests on it as defined by the law. boundary demarcation. After the designation stage. 2009) and vice versa.

and establishes adapt courts. 2009.”The Law protects adat rights. some local governments have recognized adat forests. Different interpretations lead to radically different levels of control over forest resources by different institutions and actors. but does not specify when community law will prevail over formal statutory provisions (Takacs. 2005. For example. regulating. 2005).. In practice. until now. 2009). Existing forest boundaries are perceived as definitive by the Ministry of Foresty. covering the right to utilize the land. 2009). The origins of this disagreement lie in large part in simplistic interpretations of the definition and location of both Indonesia‟s forests and the jurisdiction of the Department of Forestry (Contreras-Hermosilla & Fay. 66 . 2009). given legal recognition to adat communities. since the implementation of the Forestry Law. Indonesia still has weak local tenure in practice and weak local tenure “on paper“ (based on policy and law) (Cotula & Mayers. Even so. 2009). Papua‟s Special Autonomy law acknowledges the adat communities as “the members of the Papua natives living in and bound to a certain area and adat with high solidarity among its members.customary and cultural. Dunlop. 2009). and also granted community forest licenses to non. local people and NGOs) is rarely recognized by the authorities (Forestry Planning Board of the Ministry of Forestry in this case) (Leimona et al. 2009). and social values in accordance with national norms. which is the living environment of its members. forest and water and all their contents according to statutory regulations (Takacs. 2007). Leimona et al. but involved very little community participation during the field mapping while forest bundary mapping initiated by third parties (e. Conflicts over control of land and natural resources due to uncertainty of ownership (state or community) will remain unless a serious effort is organized to rationalize the State Forest Zone through a clear action strategy (Contreras-Hermosilla & Fay.” and acknowledges adat law as “the verbal regulations or norms prevailing within the adat law community. also ensures rights to sustainable forest products and compensation if these communities‟ areas become designated as national forest areas (Takacs.g.. binding and maintained and bear sanctions. The law also acknowledges the right of association controlled by a certain adat community over a certain area.indigenous communities (Fey. Moreover. conflict and disagreement over who should control and manage the country‟s forests and forest lands underlie many of the tensions.

2010). Land rehabilitation and forest conservation 4. Mitigation and adaptation to climate change 8. In line with climate change mitigation. Curbing illegal logging and its associated trading 2. Strengthening forest institutions (Masripatin et al. Conservation of biological diversity 5. Empowerment of people in/surrounding forest 5. Strengthening forest boundaries to secure forest areas (Masripatin et al. 2010. namely: 1. 3 of 2008. Strengthening forest boundaries to secure forest areas 2. there are three Ministry of Forestry (MoFor) regulations and decisions which directly refer to REDD: 67 . Forest protection and fire management 4. 41 of 1999 concerning forestry.. Moreover. Siswanto.. law no. 6 of 2007 and the amendment in PP no. has provided strong legal framework and grounds in mitigating the impact of climate changes by reducing the greenhouse gas emission from deforestation and forest degradation which involves the provision of access and management of forest resources to people around the forest (Masripatin et al. The eight prioritized policies are as follows: 1. 2010). Revitalization of forest utilization and forest industries 6. the forest sector has set and implemented five prioritized policies since the 2000. Empowerment of indigenous peoples and local communities 7. These laws are necessary to clarify the law and policy framework needed to attract REDD investment. 26 of 2007 concerning Area Planning. the five prioritized policies have been amended into eight prioritized policies which address the problems encountered and future challenges.4 Legal framework in Indonesia In order to cope with challenge in the forestry sector for the past ten years and to anticipate potential problem in the period of the next five years. 2010). Restructuring of the forestry sector through enhancement of timber plantation development and forest industry 3. law no. Currently. Rehabilitation of degraded forest and improving carrying capacity of watershed 3. Government Regulation (PP) no.. Starting from the end of 2009. Indonesia has also established the world‟s first national laws relating to REDD.4.

MoFor Regulation 68/2008 which provides an umbrella for voluntary REDD initiatives and demonstration pilot projects (REDD Demonstration Activities) currently under implementation or being developed (11 December 2008) (MoFor. UNDP.. 2007). UNEP. maximum size and are granted for a term of 30 years (Dunlop. UNDP. Takacs.. It entitles holders to store and absorb carbon in both Production and Protection Forests of 1000 ha. Government of Indonesia‟s new legislation on forest planning. IUPJL is a licence to exploit environmental services including carbon storing and absorbing (Rafli et al. MoF Regulation 30/2009 on Procedures for REDD (1 May 2009). 2010). 2009). It does. management and use (Government Regulation PP 6/ 2007) provide a key legal basis which authorises provincial and district governments to issue Permits for the Utilization of Environmental Services. 2008). The group comprises all Directorate Generals (DG)s within the Ministry (MoFor. FAO. UNEP. MoF Decision 36/2009 on Procedures for the Granting of Utilization of Carbon Sequestration or Sinks in Production Forest and Protected Forest (22 May 2009) (Dunlop. called Izin Usaha Pemanfaatan Jasa Lingkungan (IUPJL) (Rafli et al. FAO. 2009) Concerning carbon rights. 13/Menhut-II/2009 which establishes a Climate Change Working Group within the Ministry of Forestry (MoFor) (12 January 2009). 2007) both in production and protection forest (REDD Monitor. allow for local government to participate in approving REDD projects. 68 . 2009. The policy sets out an extensive list of potential participants. Ministry of Forestry Decree SK. Masripatin et al. from managers of community forests to those who hold timber or ecological restoration concessions.. While there is no clear statement in the regulations that an IUPJL for carbon storage entitles the holder to all carbon rights. except in decisions concerning officially designated Forest Management Units (KPHs) (Atmadja & Wollenberg. It stipulates the categories of forest land where REDD projects are authorised. it is generally accepted that an IUPJL carries carbon ownership rights. 2010). 2009. however. 2009). The decree says little about the responsibilities of the Ministry. or cross-sector coordination. sets out various procedures to establish a REDD project. The Climate Change Working Group aims to develop initiatives to deal with issues related to climate change including REDD. and defines the roles and responsibilities of national and international project proponents.

Moreover. 2008. 2010). this does not necessarily mean that the same percent of carbon revenues will return to the Province (Takacs. (Takacs. Australia and Germany (MoFor. It was funded by the World Bank. civil societies.The province of Aceh finds itself in a similar situation. 69 . private sectors. United Kingdom. it still is not clear whether or not this means the provincial government has total legal control to enter into and profit from forest carbon projects on government land. Masripatin et al. 2008). Indonesia together with a multitude of partners has invested tremendous efforts in preparing for REDD (Atmadja & Wollenberg. Atmadja & Wollenberg. while these regulations add some clarity over carbon rights in protection and production forest. Although the Special Autonomy Law grants 80% of forestry taxes to the Province. and consultation of the stakeholders in discussing the REDD issues. in terms of methodology and policy. Until now. central government has still not reached decisions or agreements with the local governments on how forests in general and forest carbon in particular will be regulated and benefits shared from REDD investments. 2008) to conduct initial steps in REDD Readiness. 2010).5 REDD in Indonesia Since at least 2007. 2010. National REDD Strategy has been elaborated (MoFor. has conducted a series of important studies on different aspects of REDD organized through working groups. and formed Indonesia Forest Climate Alliance (IFCA) in July 2007 (MoFor. 2009). 2009). including the progress and output of the REDD study on that year. IFCA is a forum or umbrella for communication. scientific institutions and international partners (MoFor.). outside of these areas the situation is unclear (Dunlop. As follow up of Bali Road Map and REDDI (REDD in Indonesia) Road Map. 4. Indonesia has performed a quick study/ analysis concerning its preparedness. consisted of governments. 2009). The IFCA. The IFCA is coordinated by the Ministry of Forestry.. The study outputs were integral parts of the material presented for discussion by the Ministry of Forestry (REDDI Roadmap) when Indonesia hosted the UNFCCC 13th Convention of the Parties (COP 13) in Bali in December 2007. 2008). resulting an initial outline of what was called a REDD supply chain (Box 1. coordination. While the central government has granted Aceh a greater degree of autonomy than any other province.

(See Figure 6. MRV system. Siswanto. institutional setting.. Road Map of REDD Indonesia-phased approach (Masripatin et al.) (Masripatin et al.In its REDDI Roadmap. A post 2012 agreement would use a market based approach including 70 . funding and incentive distribution mechanism. Figure 6. policy.. Readiness activities would leverage ODA (Official Development Assistance) through bilateral and/or multilateral channels. 2010. Indonesia has communicated the concept of phasedapproach in implementation of REDD in Indonesia which consists of 3 (three) phases: Phase 1 (preparation phase): quick analysis on the preparedness of Indonesia. carbon accounting. participation of the stakeholders including people in/surrounding the forest (2009-2012) Phase 3 (full implementation): full implementation according to the rules and procedures decided by COP when REDD/REDD-plus has become part of the UNFCCC scheme post 2012. 2010). Demonstration Activities. in terms the Status of Science and Technology and relevant policies (2007 -2008) Phase 2 (readiness phase): preparation of instruments necessary for the implementation of the third phase: establishment of REL/RL. capacity building. A transition phase would use both ODA and voluntary based funding mechanisms and transition to a pre-2012 market. 2010) Those phases of activity would require three separate financial resources.

taking into account relevant regulations.domestic. c. and the infrastructures which must be prepared in implementing REDD/REDD plus. b. 2010). Readiness strategy includes both methodology and policy aspects. Legal and other institutional structures. The Readiness strategy of REDD Indonesia (REDDI) will also forms a part of the strategy and efforts of Indonesia to achieve Sustainable Management of forest for sustainable development (Masripatin et al. Transactions would take place with the central government. Risk management options (MoFor. Transactions would be carried out with lower government levels or directly with projects. 2008). Based on management of forest functions: National <> National forestry authority <> Local forest management units.. regional or international emissions markets. 71 . Regarding issue „who will be the seller“. 2. Revenue allocation. 2. REDDI strategy for Readiness Phase is aimed at providing guidance concerning policy intervention required in the effort to address drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. Domestic project-based with the nation as re-seller on the international market: National authority <> Project entities <> local actors (MoFor. Following the government administration hierarchy: National <> Provincial <> District government <> Village. This strategy also integrates all actions related to REDD/REDD plus including the activity funded from foreign sources. 2008). 2009). there are two options: 1. and implementation of Demonstration Activities.. Financial transfer mechanisms at different scales. Forms of payment and timing. and supporting activities such as capacity building and communications with stakeholders. 4. accompanied by deeper targets for Annex I Parties (Parker et al. The design of the Indonesian national REDD payments system will involve decisions over: 1. and 5. Then redistribution of funds can take place in three ways: a. 3.

GOI. Policy intervention to tackle drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in different landscapes of forested areas 2. Methodology (establishment of National REL and MRV system): GOI-Australia. etc. Korea. FCPF. Institutional (capacity building. The strategy in each level is shown on Table 3. UNREDD 4. REDD plus strategy readiness phase (2009 – 2012) Level National National approach Strategy category 1. Co-benefits.): GOI -FCPF Provincial 1. UNREDD 5. 2010 Figure 7. Institutional arrangements (financing. WWF. Demonstration activities (GOI.TNC. risks. Source: Siswanto (2010). Analytical works (REL. 2010) 72 . capacity building.. voluntary carbon projects District 1.MRV. Masripatin et al. voluntary carbon projects. Institutional (capacity building. stakeholders communication or coordination among REDD institutions. national registry. stakeholder consultation) 3. Strategy REDD Indonesia (Masripatin et al. ITTO. including distribution of incentives and responsibilties.. REDD regulations (REDD guidelines and REDD commission): ministrial regulation on REDD 3. stakeholders consulatation) 3.The strategy of REDD Indonesia is implementing at the sub-national level (Province/District/Management Unit) and further will be integrated to the national accounting. Table 3.Germany. Methodology (establishment of provincial REL and MRV system Sub-national 2. UNREDD). stakeholders communication and implementation coordination among REDD indtitutions. stakeholders communication and coordination among REDD institutions. Methodology (establishment of district REL and MRV system) 2. stakeholders consultation): GOI –Australia. Demonstration activities. FCPF.

2009) 2. UNEP. 6. Development of Demonstration Activities (DA) as learning by doing facility and means of building commitment and synergy of stakeholders. there are 9 demonstration activities on going in Indonesia as shown in Table 4. 2010). 73 . Atmadja & Wollenberg. The government has created the Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund (MoFor & TNC. Masripatin et al. 2010)..) (MoFor. The Ministry of Forestry has issued National Regulations on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in order to guide implementation of national REDD policy (Chapter 4. 9. FAO. UNDP.Since 2008. 7. 2010). UNEP. In June 2008. 2009. 5. Indonesia has been doing some progresses: 1. 2009. and other activities under FMU system development and Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS). RLPS. The Ministry of Forestry developed other programs to support REDD indirectly. Indonesia and Australia agreed to develop a Roadmap for Access to International Carbon Market (MoFor. FAO. In March 2009.4. FORDA) and ICRAF under a Rewarding the Upland Poor for Environmental Services (RUPES) project. For examples. 3. MoFor. particularly to carbon measurement through various projects. 8. UNEP. 2010). FAO. UNDP. The Ministry of Forestry in cooperation with the Government of Australia has developed Forest Resource Information System (FRIS) and Indonesia National carbon Accounting System (INCAS). As of March 2010. Indonesia was amongst the five nations granted US $18 million in UN pilot funding for REDD capacity building (Atmadja & Wollenberg. Indonesia was admitted to the second tranche of countries to participate in the Forest and Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) (Atmadja & Wollenberg. REDD ALERT project. DNPI has become the UNFCCC focal point. 2009) 4. UNDP. The government established cross-ministerial National Climate Change Council (Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim or DNPI) led by President of the Republic of Indonesia to provide inter-ministerial climate change coordination and to advise and oversee implementation of both climate change adaptation and mitigation policies (MoFor &TNC. collaboration between the MoFor (PHKA. 2009. In March 2009.

BOS. UNEP. Kalimantan Figure 8. Berau Forest Carbon Program REDD Projects by FORCLIME in Kapuas Hulu East Kalimantan Kapuas Hulu. FAO. Lin (2010). South Sumatra Jambi. Wetlands International TNC/ICRAF/Sekala/University Mulawarman/Winrock Int‟l/ University of Queensland German DC Agencies (DED)/CIM/Inwent Implementation WWF and Eco Consult Malinau Avoided Malinau. South Sumatra East Java Lombok Central Kalimantan GTZ Australian government ITTO/Forestry Research and Development Agency KOICA Australian Government partnering with GoI. 2010) 74 . UNDP. UNDP (2009). Inhutani II/Malinau Deforestation Project Kalimantan Regency/KfW/FFI/District Government/GTZ/Tropenbos International/Global Eco Rescue/Borneo Tropical Rainforest Foundation UNREDD Carbon Central Sulawesi FAO.Table 4. UNEP. Demonstration activities in Indonesia (Sarsito. and Project Ministry of Forestry Source: MoFor. East GER/PT. Implementation partners are CARE. REDD Demonstration Activities in Indonesia Project Province Institutions Involved Merang REDD Pilot Project (MRPP) Sumatra Forest Carbon Partnership Meru Betiri National Park KOICA REDD Project in Lombok Kalimantan Forest and Climate Partnership Musi Banyuasin. Sarsito (2010) Berau Indonesia Climate Action Project.

South Sumatra Kampar Ring. South Sumatra Jambi. There are several voluntary pilot REDD initiatives in Indonesia that are in the early stages of design and implementation as shown in Table 5.RHOI (Restorasi Habitat Orangutan Indonesia) formed by BOS WWF Global Green Papua West Sumatra Jambi.A sustainable development model based on responsible peatland management Tesso Nilo Pilot ProjectREDD Reducing Carbon Emissions from Deforestation in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem – A Riau ZCL/DEFRA/LIPI/Berbak National Park/US Fish and Wildlife Service Burung Indonesia/The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds/Birdlife International/PT. West Kalimantan East Kalimantan East Kalimantan East Kalimantan FFI/Macquarie Bank WWF Global Green PT. HKM: Heart of Borneo Global Green in East Kalimantan Hutan Lestari untuk Orangutan Jayapura Pilot Project Global Green Ecosystem Restoration Project Berbak Carbon Value Initiative Harapan Rainforest Project Province Central Kalimantan Institutions Involved Infinite Earth/Oramgutan Foundation International Starling Resources Central Kalimantan Central Kalimantan Central Kalimantan West Kalimantan West Kalimantan RARE/YAYORIN/Clinton Foundation WWF/Sebangau National Park FFI/David and Lucile Packard Foundation FFI/Macquarie Bank Ketapang. Table 5. Voluntary and local government initiatives Project The Rimba Raya Biodiversity Reserve Project Katingan Conservation Area: A Global Peatland Capstone Project Lamandau REDD in Sebangau National Park West Kalimantan Community Carbon Pool Conservation of the Upper Kapuas Lakes System Rehabilitation of the Sungai Puri peat swamp forest Kutai Barat.Concern on REDD implementation has been given also by some private sectors and NGOs in a form of developing voluntary based REDD demo activities. Carbon Conservation.REKI/ Yayasan KEHI APRIL Riau Aceh WWF Aceh provincial government. FFI 75 .

Lin (2010) Figure 9. 2010) 76 .Triple Benefit Project Leuser Ecosystem REDD Project Gorontalo Establishment and Management of Nantu national Park Sustainable Management of Poigar Forest: REDD in North Sulawesi Perpetual Finance for Carbon Benefits Mamuju Habitat TEBE Project (Towards Enabling Mitigation of Climate Change Through Promotion of Community Based Economic Growth Aceh Gorontalo North Sulawesi Global Eco Rescue/ Government of Aceh Gorontalo University/YANIYayasan Adudu Nantu International ONF International/ Green Synergies Papua West Sulawesi East Nusa Tenggara New Forests Asset Management/ PT. REDD voluntary activities in Indonesia (Sarsito.Emerald Planet PT Inhutani I KYEEMA Foundation/AusAid/Yayasan Peduli Sanlima/Yayasan Timor Membangun (YTM) Source : Griffiths & Martone (2009).

The project‟s activities are predicted to reduce deforestation of the Ulu Masen forest by 85% (Atmadja & Wollenberg. increased monitoring and law enforcement. 2007). Aceh.000 ha of forest in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem and peripheral forest blocks located in five northernmost districts or kabupaten of Aceh Province.. restoration. Indonesia)”. 2008). Aceh Barat.Fauna & Flora InternationalCarbon Conservation in Ulu Masen Ecosystem (Aceh Province. landscape level) This brief description of REDD in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem. 2010). reforestation. The Ulu Masen project is proposed to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. whilst maintaining significant biodiversity values and enhancing community development opportunities through reinvestment of the proceeds from carbon sales and small scale extraction and development of community managed enterprises within forests approved for such purposes (SmartWood. the project is expected to off-set 3. S. E. in 2007 entitled “Reducing carbon emissions from deforestation in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem. and acquired certification in February 2008. By using land use planning and reclassification. and Niles. in 2010 entitled „Indonesia“. Aceh is based on papers prepared by: Rafli... namely Aceh Besar.5.P. The project area focuses on 750. and Wollenberg.. Usher. The forest areas within the project 77 . Atmadja.1. Aceh Jaya. Community and Biodiversity (CCB) standards.369 million tonne/year or about 100 million tonne of CO 2 emissions over the next 30 years. G. and Pidia Jaya. Pidie. 2007).O. The Ulu Masen Ecosystem was the first REDD pilot project in Indonesia to take a voluntary market approach.1 Results and Discussions Descriptive analysis of chosen case studies REDD in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem. and sustainable community logging (Rafli et al. SmartWood in 2008 entitled “Validation audit report for Provincial Government of Nangroe Aceh Darussalam. The project area is situated between 4‟‟20‟3 N and 5‟‟30‟0 N between 95‟‟20‟0 E and 96‟‟30‟0 E (Rafli et al. 5. J.1 5. It is also the first REDD project in a developing country to meet Climate. Indonesia: A triple benefit project design note for the CCBA audit”. T. Aceh (voluntary activity.

991 state forest lands that are zoned in various classes of protected status.include: 428. start-up and carbon finance (Rafli et al.. 2010). Fauna and Flora International (FFI) and Carbon Conservation Pty Ltd (SmartWood. and 310. Figure 10. FFI will facilitate participatory processes for community development. 2008).. 2007).757 hectares of unprotected state forest lands which were allocated to natural forest concessions (HPH) for industrial scale logging. Atmadja & Wollenberg. 2008. development. Aceh. but are currently not active or operational. Map of project area of Ulu Masen Ecosystem (Rafli et al. 78 . Carbon Conservation Ltd. yet for which actual protection is weak and ineffective (SmartWood. 2010): Strengthen land tenure and resource access of forest-dependent communities and those with customary rights. collaborative law enforcement and community-based forest management. The Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project. state forest lands allocated to commercial and community conversion logging licenses (HTI or HPK). Pty is assisting with project design.. spatial and land use planning. Project activities are to (Rafli et al. 2007. which are the Government of Aceh. 2007). Atmadja & Wollenberg. has been developed by three parties working together. biodiversity conservation.

July 2007 to December 2007). Phase 2: Develop benefit sharing mechanisms. This stage will include four overlapping phases: Phase 1: Information gathering. technology and skills transfer and development of project proposal and structures. forest governance and forest law enforcement processes at provincial. It is mostly found in areas around the Ulu Masen Ecosystem (Dunlop. this 2008-2012 stage will focus on procuring finance from bilateral and multilateral funds. philanthropic sources. Establish legal and regulatory frameworks for trade in carbon rights and carbon credits. district and Mukim5 (subdistrict) levels. The first stage will build on and extend foundations established by FFI and its partners under the World Bank Multi-Donor Funds‟ Aceh Environment and Forest Project (AFEP). implement legislative and regulatory changes. district and Mukim levels. preparation for community forestry. In addition to project design and implementation. Support the development of community forestry. re-evaluate and improve 5 Mukim: An administrative/ governance structure that was originally part of Aceh sultanate system. set up a system for forest and carbon stock monitoring. including rezoning conversion forest to protection forest or limited production forest as appropriate. reforestation and agro-forestry projects. Develop land use plans at the provincial. It is loosely equivalent to the kelurahan or kecamatan elsewhere in Indonesia. baseline rates of deforestation and forest degradation. institutional framework. Develop and test mechanisms to ensure equitable and transparent distribution of benefits from carbon trading through consultation with stakeholders. agroforestry and other livelihood initiatives. and identifying land for community forest management. 2009) 79 . implement planning processes. based on historical trends in comparable areas. and financing (6 months. and voluntary credits. a pre-REDD credit stage (from 2008 to 2012) where fungible early-action REDD credits may or may not be available. Develop capacity for carbon accounting and monitoring.Strengthen forest management. reforestation and community agroforestry. Determine. A mukim traditionally covers all villages that are linked to the main mosque in the area. and a second stage after 2012. The 30 years project accounting period will also be divided into two stages.

. 2008). carbon finance from sale of Verified Emission Reductions (VERs) must be secured to provide immediate and substantial incentive payments to all relevant stakeholders who help arrest deforestation and increase forest protection in the project area including forest dependent communities and those with customary (adat) rights to forest land (Rafli et al. forest product value adding. the expectation is that after 2012.1. 80 . the project will be included in Indonesia‟s baseline (reference emission scenario) and fungible post-Kyoto/UNFCCC carbon credits will be available (Rafli et al. (2012). The project will also get support from AFEP (Rafli et al. After the initial phase of the project.“baseline” rates of deforestation for the project area. enhanced efforts to control illegal logging in combination with forest monitoring and assessment (18 months. SmartWood. Project development. design and initial implementation will be initially funded from Official Development Aid (ODA) funds. 5. East Java (demonstration activity. Phase 3: Ongoing forest and carbon monitoring including movement toward IPCC Tier 3 understanding of forest carbon stocks. 2007. reforestation and community agro-forestry. January 2009 to December 2011). and synthesize understanding of current biodiversity and livelihoods. promotion of sustainable community forest management. Phase 4: Continuing implementation of project activities and transfer to 2nd commitment period REDD credits or appropriate outcome of UNFCCC negotiations. site level) This brief description of REDD in Meru Betiri National Park. financed through the sale of voluntary Verified Emission Reductions (VERs) or early-action credits. January 2009 to July 2009). move toward IPCC Tier 2 carbon stock measures.2 REDD in Meru Betiri National Park. monitoring „virtual‟ carbon funding (ODA funds) disbursed through incentive mechanism.. (three years. 2007). East Java is based on papers prepared by: FORDA and ITTO in 2010 (a) entitled “Leaflet of Tropical Forest Conservation for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhancing Carbon Stocks in Meru Betiri National Park.. 2007).

2010 d). this park has faced serious threat such as illegal harvest.1 (F)” FORDA and ITTO in 2010 (b) entitled “Public private partnership for measuring and monitoring carbon and biodiversity” FORDA and ITTO in 2010 (d) entitled “Stakeholders consultation to identify most viable scheme for conservation carbon-biodiversity and livelihood.O. biodiversity conservation Ma. forest fire. 7&i Holdings to work with Indonesia for enhanced forest carbon stocks.000 ha which is rich in biological diversity across several landscapes with different vegetation types. 81 . H. This situation. O. The park area consists of approximately 58. In 2010 entitled “ITTO support to REDD demonstration activities in Indonesia”. The illegal harvest of timber and non-timber forest product from the Park is mostly due to poor law enforcement and lack of sustainable income sources. ITTO in 2009 entitled “News release: Partnership to conserve tropical forests launched ITTO. Indonesia surrounded by two heavily populated districts of Jember and Banyuwangi. in 2009 entitled “ITTO thematic programme on Reducing Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhancing of Environmental Services (REDDES)”. On 9 October 2009. contributes to rapid degradation and deforestation in the park (ITTO. encroachment. a REDD conservation project in Meru Betiri National Park (MBNP) was launched at the Indonesian Embassy in Tokyo. and land slide (FORDA & ITTO. The Meru Betiri NP is located in the southern part of East Java. directly or indirectly. H.Indonesia : A public private partnership ITTO Program PD 519/08 Rev. However. 2009). Ma.

2010) in collaboration with LATIN (a NGO) and 7&i Holdings (7 Eleven. Budget for the project is US$ 973. 2010 a): Participation of community in conservation forest management improved. 2009). To this end.798. reportable and verifiable system for monitoring emission reductions from deforestation and forest degradation and enhancing forest carbon stocks in MBNP (Ma. Japan) (Ma. As part of newly established ITTO Thematic Programme on Reducing Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhancing Environmental Services in Tropical Forests (REDDES). Location of Meru Betiri National Park (FORDA & ITTO. this project is designed to contribute to conservation of tropical forests for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and enhancing forest carbon stocks through enhanced community participation in conservation and sustainable management of the MBNP as an integral part of the larger landscape in which the communities live (ITTO.388 with contribution from ITTO US$ 814. 2009). the project specifically intends to improve the livelihoods of local communities living inside and in the surrounding area of MBNP through participation in avoiding deforestation. 82 . Forest Research and Development Agency (FORDA) and Ministry of Forestry (MoFor) will be the executing agencies (Ma. 2010 a) This Public-Private Partnership project will run within 3 years from January 2010 until January 2013. The expected outputs of the program consist of (FORDA & ITTO. and to develop a credible measurable.Figure 11. 2009). degradation and biodiversity loss.590 and from Government of Indonesia US$ 158.

Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and multi-stakeholders workshop. Framework for stakeholder consultation (FORDA & ITTO. The consultation process is conducted to five groups. Stakeholder consultation and partnership in conservation through various forms and methods including in person discussion.Alternatives sources of income to improve the livelihoods of local. Conduct training and institutional building for resources base inventory for related stakeholders. Determine project boundary and baseline by establishing representative Permanent Sample Plots (PSPs). communities living inside and in surrounding area of MBNP developed. 7. 5. Review existing schemes and lessons learned from the surrounding areas. local NGOs. Capacity in resource base inventory and carbon accounting improved in measurable. and religion leaders. Report on comprehensive baseline data and estimation of emissions reduction and carbon enhancement of the national park prepared. as follows: local government officials. management officials of MBNP. teachers. Figure 12. academicians. 2. 2010 d) 3. 83 . 6. Conduct awareness raising training and institutional building for REDD and REDD plus. Scale up lessons learned and disseminate good practice gained. System of monitoring emission reduction and enhancement of carbon stocks established and validated Main project activities are: 1. Illegal logging and forest encroachment reduced and reported. local community nearby and inside the park. Develop standard operational procedures for measuring and monitoring. reportable and verifiable form. 4.

Phase 2 (2012 -2013) Develop comprehensive capacity (communities. and private) Develop comprehensive capability (all pools and applied tool) Dissemination Box 9. Expected outcomes of this programme: Reduced deforestation and forest degradation and increased area of forest under sustainable management in tropical timber producing forest Improved livelihoods for forest dwellers and other stakeholders directly involved in the supply of environmental services through the sustainable management of tropical forests Improved resilience of tropical forest ecosystems and forest dependent communities Improved capacities to develop and implement policies and incentives mechanisms to promote environmental services through sustainable forest management Improved practices to promote community involvement in the supply of environmental services from SFM 84 . (2) reduce forest degradation. Specific objective: to strengthen the capacity of ITTO developing member countries and their stakeholders to: (1) reduce unplanned deforestation.8. Conduct validation to assess the applied methodologies by a selected standard (FORDA & ITTO. Estimate emissions reduction and enhancement of carbon stock. forest restoration and other related activities. and (4) contribute to the social and economic sustainability of forest dependent communities by increasing forest values through forest restoration and rehabilitation as well as payments for forest-based environmental services. Phase 1 (2010 -2011) Establish a comprehensive framework for stakeholders engagement Establish of PSP and data collection for carbon accounting 2. enhance environmental services and help improve forest dependant livelihoods through sustainable management of tropical forests. public. 9. FORDA & ITTO (2010 b) states those main activities will be conducted in 3 stage plan: 1. 2009) General objective: to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. Transitional (2011 – 2012) Consolidate phase 1 Develop activities for phase 2 (applied methods for carbon accounting) 3. REDDES (Reducing Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhanching Environmental Services in Tropical Forests) (Ma. (3) maintain and enhance climate change mitigation and other environmental services of tropical forests. 2010 a).

landscape level) This brief description of Berau Carbon Forest Program is based on a paper prepared by MoFor RI and TNC in 2009 entitled “Berau Forest Carbon Program: Delivering practical solutions to support development of a national level REDD framework in Indonesia”.500 orangutans). The Berau Forest Carbon Program (BFCP) is a partnership between national. with funding of $ 50 million.3 Berau Carbon Forest Program. including mechanisms for data coordination by different levels of government 2. protects critical watersheds and areas of high biodiversity value (including habitat of 1. The vision is an integrated district-scale forest carbon program that. by 2015.5. and creates improved economic outcomes and opportunities for communities living near forests. Location of Berau District (MoFor & TNC. brings at least 800. 2009) There are several activities in realizing this vision: 1. emission reduction programs. provincial and district governments. and the private sector (REDD Working Group) which aims to enable Berau district.1. capacity and institution building to support sustainable land use planning: supporting improved spatial and natural resources planning and decisionmaking. Kalimantan (demonstration activity. avoids emissions of 10 million tons of carbon dioxide over five years. comprising of the following activities: 85 .000 hectares under effective management. Figure 13. civil society. province of East Kalimantan to meet its development goals while sustainably managing its forests by developing a carbon finance mechanism that delivers effective incentives to reduce emissions from forest loss.

developing incentives for improved management of protection forests h. Developing mechanisms to share revenue from carbon credits equitably with all relevant stakeholders including creating diverse forms of benefit sharing that are not tied to land ownership in order to resolve key types of land conflicts. paying for environmental services from High Conservation Value Forests and other special management areas within concessions areas planned for non. 86 .g. Investing in alternative livelihoods programs in target areas to support low-carbon development strategies d. community involvement into overall program decision making. b. and more broadly directed towards low-carbon development strategies: a. Strengthening community institutions to facilitate effective participation c. d. Establishing governance structures and consultative mechanisms to include communities in overall program decisions b. implementing a comprehensive set of mutually-reinforcing strategies for sustainable land use management that aligns with economic development aspirations i. working closely with the Ministry of Forestry and international experts to develop an integrated methodology for REDD+ carbon monitoring and accounting that nests within national and international accounting systems and is verified with leading standards. site-based incentive agreements. developing a Reference Emission Level (REL) that effectively incorporates planned and unplanned deforestation and degradation. improving forest management within timber concessions g. bundling of carbon rights from individual project-scale emissionreduction strategies or land use categories to achieve transactional efficiency e.forest uses 3. producing a baseline of estimated historic and anticipated emissions under “business-as-usual” activity. f. developing legal mechanisms for conservation-based payments to land users that forego legal economic opportunities e.a. measuring avoided emissions from multiple strategies in different sites under a unified carbon accounting framework c.

Figure 14. and a range of civil society organizations through a variety of activities and governance mechanisms. With regard to conservation strategies: while widespread support exists for including financial incentives for forest conservation and management in emerging climate policy frameworks. including policy. government officials and agencies at all levels. The Berau program will engage communities and people living in and near forest areas. many institutions are lending technical. different from the other projects: It is a district-scale program based on the development of a district-wide carbon accounting framework that captures emissions from a range of strategies and land types. Phases of development of Berau Carbon Forest Program (MoFor & TNC. The University of Queensland. which will dramatically reduce concerns about leakage (shifting activities to other locations). and aligns these efforts with economic development aspirations. planning and governance issues. 87 . the World Resources Institute. Universitas Mulawarman. academic. It will involve also scientific. and charitable institutions. private sector investors and employees. Sekala. Winrock International. many uncertainties exist about the exact form. An inclusive partnership approach between all stakeholder groups. socioeconomic. and other critical knowledge to the program. It is based on a “No regret” strategy for all participants. including: ICRAF (The World Agroforestry Center). It is based on more integrated model that deals with the key underlying deforestation drivers. 2009) The Berau Forest Carbon Program has some unique features. As regards to the involvement of government entities. World Education.

Local capacity is reasonably strong. the global United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD Programme) was launched aiming to assist tropical forest countries in establishing a fair. and timing of future forest carbon funding. landscape level) This brief description of UNREDD carbon project in Central Sulawesi is based on a report prepared by in MoFor. the program is focused on attracting financial support for program design and institutional development that are critical foundations for any form of carbon finance. UNEP. Deforestation process is ongoing but a significant forest cover has remained. 5. Indonesia is one of the nine pilot countries for the initial phase. This 20 months programme (October 2009 – May 2011) will be supported about 5.1. in order to generate rapid results 88 .g. In this program.. 2. Carbon density is relatively high 3. The demonstration province of this programme is central Sulawesi which fulfils the following criteria: 1.4 UNREDD Carbon Project in Central Sulawesi (demonstration activity. On 24 September 2008.scale. Therefore. Local political support is strong 4. With regard to funding sources: given uncertainties about future forest carbon markets. FAO.6 million USD by Government of Norway as part of Norway‟s International Climate and Forest Initiative which was announced during the UNFCCC conference at Bali in 2007. especially from potential market mechanisms. Reduced Impact Logging and maximizing use of degraded lands which are currently used for oil palm to achieve multiple environmental and economic benefits. but plans to play a smaller role in implementation and does not seek to own carbon rights from the program in order to maximise the role of local stakeholders. The Nature Conservancy (TNC) has played a significant role as project developer and consultant in the program design and development. UNDP in 2009 entitled “Indonesia UNREDD National Joint Programme”. equitable and transparent REDD regime. the Berau Forest Carbon Program is focused on aligning its efforts with existing goals and programs that are consistent with long-term sustainable development e.

Outcome 1: Strengthened multi-stakeholder participation and consensus at national level This outcome is particularly focused on reaching consensus on key issues related to REDD at the national level. but also ensuring participation of civil society organizations. 7. GOI policy on REDD demonstrations and UN-REDD objectives) Figure 15. GOI preference and location of other initiatives (based on agreements reached in IFCA on criteria for demonstration site selections. The outcomes are designed to strengthen stakeholders at both vertical and horizontal levels. The outcomes are intended to strengthen stakeholders at national level (outcome 1). provincial and district level for technical implementation of REDD. It will create a common understanding among the stakeholders. It is designed also to provide linkages between national. three outcomes with respective outputs and activities will be pursued. Location of Central Sulawesi (http://www.indonesiamatters. The intended Outputs are as follows: 89 .com/images/sulawesi-map. provincial level (outcome 2) and district level (outcome 3). Drivers can be addressed relatively easily 6. REDD can result in significant co benefits within the project site. from national to grass root levels and vice versa.5. 1. particularly among stakeholders from central and local government.png) In order to secure the objective.

The objectives of this outcome are to support Indonesia in being ready to report emission reduction to UNFCCC. agriculture and rural advisory services. Outcome 2: Demonstration of establishing a REL. Key partners will be the district government stakeholders such as the DPRD. Reporting and Verification System (MRV). Outcome 3: Capacity established to implement REDD at decentralized levels The project will develop capacity at the local government level through demonstrating the legal process of spatial planning in a number of districts in the demonstration province.2 (FAO) Reference emissions level (REL) c. Output 1. Output 1. Output 2. Assessment.3 (UNDP) Multi-stakeholder-endorsed District plans for REDD implementation 90 .1 (FAO) Improved capacity and methodology design for forest carbon inventory within a Measurement. Output 3. Output 2. and to strengthen systems that have already been developed by GoI such as NCAS and FRIS to achieve a standardized system.1 (UNDP): Consensus on key issues for national REDD policy development b. to support Indonesia in developing a REDD national implementation system. Output 2. a. forestry services. Output 2.3 (UNEP): Communications Programme 2.1 (UNDP) Capacity for spatial socio-economic planning incorporating REDD at the district level b. Output 3.2 (UNDP) Empowered local stakeholders able to benefit from REDD c.4 (UNEP): Toolkit for priority setting towards maximizing potential Carbon-benefits and incorporating co-benefits. including sub-national pilot implementation b.3 (UNDP) Harmonized fair and equitable payment mechanism at provincial level d. a. Output 3.a. MRV and fair payment systems based on the national REDD architecture This Outcome will include analytical work and institutional capacity building on a number of key elements for REDD implementation in Indonesia.2 (UNDP): REDD lessons learned c. Output 1. such as biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation under MDG 3.

Each of those Implementing Partners is accountable to the Lead Implementing Partner relating to the funds released for the delivery of a specific set of outputs and for management of inputs.5 REDD Project by WWF in Jayapura Regency. 2009. landscape level) This brief description of REDD project in Jayapura is based on a report prepared by WWF Indonesia in 2009 entitled “REDD Project Proposal in Jayapura Regency: Baseline Information”. Provincial and District agencies. UNEP. Papua (voluntary activity. including the Ministry of Forestry. through the participating UN Agencies. The programme will be managed in accordance with the 2003 UNDG Guidance Note on Joint Programming and executed by several “National Implementing Partners”.24 91 . the head of Jayapura Regency and representative from WWF Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for a ten-year commitment to develop REDD mechanism in Jayapura Regency. Figure 16. i. On July 3. and UNDP. A National Project Director (NPD) will be appointed by the GoI to direct the programme and carry overall accountability on behalf of the GoI for the programme to report to the Project Executive Board (PEB).The Lead Implementing Partner of this Programme will be the Ministry of Forestry. UNREDD NJP Programme Structure 5. FAO. The total area of proposed REDD project in Jayapura Regency is approximately 465.1.e.308.

Therefore. in the near future. 92 . and Nimboran. Nimbokrang. Kemtuk Gressi.hectares or about 0. This proposed project boundaries falls within five districts : Unurum Guay.wordpress.jpg) 97.files. In general. Sause. However.03 percent of the total land area of this regency. and enforcement of forest use are not in conflict with their promise to reduce carbon emissions from the forestry sector. Gresi.112 people live within and around the proposed REDD project area: Orya (majority). forest cover is still in good condition. Map of Jayapura Regency (http://hepuru. Kaure. At least six villages with a total population of 2. industrial livestock.com/2010/07/map-wp3.5 percent of this area is still covered by primary and secondary forests. permit processes. greater deforestation might happen because the Papua provincial government has proposed development plans for 2006 – 2026 that aim to convert a significant percentage of the forest area within the REDD proposed boundaries to largescale plantation (particularly oil palm). Prevent forest from conversion to oil palm plantation and logging concessions while mitigate carbon. monitoring. Elseng. focus activities of REDD project by WWF are: 1. 2. and Kaureh. The Ministry of Forestry designated the area as “State Forest Land” and about 68. Improve and enhance natural resources governance in order to make sure that government policies in regard to planning. Figure 17. and other development projects. Nimboran.90 percent of this forest area was allocated for production function.

In implementing those activities. 2) newly defined rights. providing other necessary instruments and infrastructures and formalizing policies regarding property rights that will be affected by REDD+. Gadjah Mada University. on issue of property rights. In this concept. two case studies from Indonesia (Aceh and Papua) are assessed by giving different scores based on some evidences regarding with the five elements of community tenure security. Jayapura University. supporting instruments and infrastructures. Streck (2009) states that several requirements should be fulfilled in order to achieve a better implementation of REDD+ at a national level. In term of assessing newly defined rights such as carbon or carbon sequestration rights.3. These two case studies are also compared with a case of Aborigin community in Australia. First is concept of better implementation of REDD+ in national level by Steck (2009). WWF will work together with local communities. namely: 1) forest tenure and rights to the existing forest . the third concept of carbon right in Australia is used as model. timber.2 Readiness of Indonesian institutional framework to implement REDD Indonesia‟s readiness in implementing REDD is assessed by using three concepts. 93 . Contribute to policy approaches (community based forest production) and to benefit distribution mechanisms 4. such as carbon or carbon sequestration rights and rights to exploit the benefits of GHG emission reductions and removals in general. 2010). 5. These requirements include improving regulatory framework. This concept is used to assess the readiness with regard of issues on regulatory framework. Engage with local stakeholders and enhance community capacity in development planning and implementation in both institutions: village level government and adat system. As part of assessing the first concept. Manokwari Research Institute and WWF Netherland (Zulfira Warta. and 3) associated rights to international payments for REDD+. and land resources. and policies including property rights. the second concept of community tenure security by White (2004) is applied. The first concept is explained now.

For instance. policies as well as establishing special national institutional to conduct initial steps in REDD readiness e.4). it has actively participating in developing some demonstration activities. But their performance and effectiveness. coordinating roles and addressing issue of property rights security. point 1) forest tenure and rights to the existing forest . Indonesia has been actively developing strategies. 2009). 2009). As a matter of fact.The analysis starts from considering improvement of regulatory framework.g. Since 2008.like establishment of REDD Demonstration Activities. procedures on REDD and procedures for the granting of utilization of carbon sequestration in production and protection forest (see Chapter 4. In addition. the regulations are more focused on technical issues . the location must fulfill the right criteria for REDD and they must draw up a REDD implementation plan (prepared both in English and in Indonesian) (REDD Monitor.5. Indonesia is enhancing its readiness in implementing REDD+. in relation of their authority. IFCA as forum discussion on REDD issue and National Council for Climate Change (NCCC) as focal point for UNFCCC. In addition. and land resources is analyzed now. are untested (Murdiyarso. Regards of property right issue. 2008). Policies on forest tenure 94 . timber. It is deemed that they failed either in acknowledging rights of indigenous people to land and forest area that will be proposed for REDD or in creating requirements that will be easily fulfilled by community: Ministry of Forestry lists adat forest as eligible for carrying out REDD but. it has taken early effort in establishing legal framework for REDD. these REDD regulations are in contradiction with new local law which has moved strongly towards the recognition of customary forest resource rights. With support of existing legal framework in mitigating climate change. government and civil society organizations critized these regulations for their failure to acknowledge and accommodate the special autonomy status of Papua province (WWF. methodology.than on legal aspects. in the Papuan context. it requires the community to be adat forest license holders. In terms of providing other necessary instruments and infrastructures. all these conditions are very difficult to be met by local population. which are already mentioned in Chapter 4. Although considered the first legal framework developed on REDD in Indonesia. To get this. they must have official documents stating they have adat forest management rights and a recommendation from the regional government.

it is not fully supported and recognized by state law. Regulations and regulatory mechanisms and institutions in securing customary rights are either still unclear or less supportive. effective mechanism in handling internal disputes. Statutory law. The agent is normally the group leader or head of village.and rights in Indonesia are developing towards recognition of customary rights of indigenous people who live in and surround forest area. 2010). Although it is so.41/1999 takes into account the rights of indigenous people but in reality the ultimate power is still in state‟s hand. most land owners do have local land documentation such as Surat Keterangan Hak Milik (Letter of Evidence of Ownership Right) signed by the Keucik or Camat (sub-district head) but it is not recognized by state. has opened some opportunities for legal integration (Marfo et al.. since establishment of Law No. Forestry Law No. Then. and a leader in decision making. As described in Chapter 4. 2010). the state is starting taking into account agents who then represent the customary groups. and administrative assistance either in securing customary land. For instance in case of Ulu Masen ecosystem. the state merely recognizes customary lands and local norms but because of conflicting pressures.. Moreover. which previously denied all customary rights in forestry. Even so. policy. Result of analysis shows that communities in both Aceh and Papua have unsecure community tenure.3. In the end. the Law leaves ultimate power to the state. 2008 cited in Marfo et al. existence of customary communities was recognized. both of them have strong and effective internal situation including strong capacity to define and implement its own rules. Majority landowners in communities do not have neither land title certificates from National Land Agency (BPN) nor clear customary land boundaries. Initially. no communities have yet managed to obtain formal recognition of their customary forests (Van Noordwijk et al. 41/ 1999 on Forestry.. there is no legal. Aceh and Papua. Local government have initiated in establishing province level regulations on customary rights and taking into account community participation in decision 95 . Although. This fact is confirmed also by the results of the analysis of community tenure security in two REDD project sites. Local communities as well still have low understanding of law even the ability to lobby and effectively defend their rights. there is positive trend that can be seen from both cases.

A value judgement (the detail of the assessment) is reported in Appendix 3. Results have been benchmarked towards a third case. It has been supported by some NGOs and CSOs who have initiated participatory land use planning process in some areas in the provinces. see § 2. that of Aborigin community in Australia and are plotted in Figure 18. 2004) Case 1 (REDD project in Ulu Masen Ecosystem. Effective internal institution score Legal recognition and support score Regulations. based on White (2004)„s five elements of community tenure security (the second concept. Aceh) Case 2 (REDD project in Jayapura Regency. 3.4). Result analysis of community tenure security in 2 REDD projects in Indonesia and in case of Aborigin community. Element of community tenure security (White. A one to five scale has been worked out in order to assign each project. 2. Papua) Case 3 (Aborigin community in Australia) 1.making. regulatory mechanisms and institutions score Independent arbitration or judiciary means score Political constituency for community rights score √ 5 ↔ 2 x 2 ↔ 4 x 1 √ 4 ↔ 2 ↔ 3 ↔ 4 x 1 √ 5 √ 4 √ 5 √ 5 √ 5 Note: √ ↔ x Statement Fulfill all criteria clear unclear no Fulfill almost all criteria 4 Fulfill criteria partly Fulfill few of criteria Fulfill no criteria at all 1 Score 5 3 2 96 .. Australia No. Table 6. 5. An attempt to provide a quantitative assessment of these issues in presented in Table 6. 4.

2010): 1. In order to maximize benefits from REDD mechanism. and supervising the following sectors (Alexander. Community tenure security in 2 REDD project sites in Indonesia and in Australia Situation in the both cases is significantly different with the case of Aborigin community in Australia. regulating. forest management system to enhance Carbon sequestration stock 2. The state thus has authority to create policy. a license to exploit environmental services including carbon sequestration in both production and protection forest which has been described briefly in Chapter 4. Based on the regulation. reservation and conservation of carbon 3. utilization. relation between persons and legal acts concerning carbon. newly defined rights will be considered now.4. The second point of Streck (2009). the appropriation. managing. aimed at administering. carbon is counted as part of natural resources that is controlled by the state. it can be concluded that the 97 . relations between persons and carbon 4.. Indonesia has provided a key legal basis which authorizes provincial and district governments to issue Permits for the Utilization of Environmental Services (Izin Usaha Pemanfaatan Jasa Lingkungan -IUPJL). Aborigin not only has strong and effective internal institution but the rights of this community is supported and recognized by state law.Figure 18. The community also has a council which gives assistance in establishing legal forms to hold native titles. After confronting this fact the classification of possible ownership regimes for carbon sequestration presented in Table 1.

in Indonesia. The concern to take into account community‟s rights in benefit sharing mechanism is still a long way to go. Australian) solutions to ownership regimes in relation to Carbon has highlighted that the need to establish.e. the Indonesian situation is regards to C rights is still immature and deserves further definition. Concerning payment mechanism from REDD. At the end.3 An assessment of project performance in terms of property rights security The assessment is conducted to get an overview of how good each project is in meeting standards referred to property rights security issues and to perform a comparative analysis. a C right separate from land ownership. It is anticipated that.ownership regime in Indonesia is an hybrid of different solutions. Land user partnership: enter into an agreement with the land users with the existing carbon rights to develop a carbon project and share the carbon credits produced by the project. this aspect is particularly delicate being almost all forest area owned or controlled by the State. Chapter 4. In developing its future strategies it is important that Indonesia takes into account the results by Madeira (2009) who has identified the following three alternatives to establish long term carbon rights in REDD projects: concession model: acquire forest concession rights for the REDD project government partnership interventions (government is the statutory landowner): enter into agreement with the landowner with the existing right to carbon to develop a carbon project and share the carbon credits produced by the project.4). but with a very complex stratification of official and customary and tenure titles and right distribution (see Chapter 4. Australia (see Table 2.). as much as possible and in compliance with the existing legal and institutional framework.). the third point mentioned by Streck. to which the closest is the “contract” type or “lease” type as implemented in Queensland. However. the assessment gives a comprehensive 98 . 5. on this. The exam of potential and practical (i. until now central government has not either provided supporting regulation or reached decisions or agreements with local government how benefits shared from REDD investments should be shared (see.

picture of how REDD implementation in Indonesia tackles the issue of securing property rights in practice. The assessment is operated by confronting results of interviews, together with some related information from project documents, with a framework of principles and criteria developed on purpose by modifying REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards published in 2010 by CCBA and CARE International. Taking into account the purpose of the thesis, the framework has been adapted to include only principles and criteria related to property rights and land tenure issues. The proposed framework for assessment is shown in Table 7. Table 7. Proposed framework for assessment of project performance in terms of property rights security
Principle 1: Right recognition 1.1 The REDD+ program effectively identifies the different rights holders (statutory and customary) and their rights to lands, territories and resources relevant to the program 1.2 The REDD+ program recognizes and respects both statutory and customary rights to lands, territories and resources which indigenous people or local communities have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired 1.3 the REDD+ program requires the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples and local communities for any activities affecting their rights to lands, territories and resources 1.4 The REDD+ program identifies and uses a process for effective resolution of any disputes over rights to lands, territories and resources related to the program and does not proceed with any activity that could prejudice the outcome of the dispute resolution process. 1.5 Where the REDD+ program enables private ownership of carbon rights or separate ownership for carbon, these rights are based on the statutory and customary rights to the lands, territories and resources that generated the greenhouse gas emissions reductions and removals Principle 2: equitable benefit sharing 2.1 The projected costs, potential benefits and associated risks of the REDD+ program are identified for relevant rights holder and stakeholder groups at all levels using a participatory process 2.2 Transparent, participatory, effective and efficient mechanisms are established for equitable sharing of benefits of the REDD+ program among and within relevant rights holder and stakeholder groups taking into account costs, benefits, and associated risks 2.3 There is transparent and participatory monitoring of the cost and benefits of the REDD+ program, including any revenues, and their distribution among relevant rights holders and stakeholders Principle 3. Attention to well being of indigenous people 3.1 The REDD+ program generates additional, positive impacts on the long term livelihood security and well being of indigenous peoples and local communities with special attention to the most vulnerable people Principle 4. Contributes to protection of human rights and good governance objectives 4.1 The REDD+ program leads to improvements in governance of the forest sector and other relevant sectors

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4.2 The REDD+ program contributes to respect and protection of human rights 4.3 There is strong government commitment to the REDD+ program 4.4 The REDD+ program is coherent with relevant policies, strategies and plans at all relevant levels and there is effective coordination between government and other agencies/organizations responsible for the design, implementation and evaluation of the REDD+ program and other relevant government agencies/ organizations Principle 5. Participation 5.1 The REDD+ program identifies and characterizes the rights and interests of all rights holder and stakeholder groups and their relevance to the REDD+ program 5.2 All relevant rights holder and stakeholder groups that want to be involved in REDD+ program design, implementation and evaluation are fully involved through culturally appropriate and effective participation 5.2 All relevant rights holder and stakeholder groups that want to be involved in REDD+ program design, implementation and evaluation are fully involved through culturally appropriate and effective participation 5.4 The relevant rights holders and stakeholders groups have a good understanding of the key issues related to the REDD+ program and the capacity to participate effectively 5.5 Design, implementation and evaluation of REDD+ program builds on, respects and supports rights holders‟ and stakeholders‟ traditional and other knowledge, skills, and management systems including those of indigenous peoples and local communities Principle 6. Access and transparency 6.1 Adequate information about the REDD+ program is publicly available to promote general awareness and good governance 6.2 Rights holders and stakeholders have the information that they need about the REDD+, provided in a culturally appropriate and timely way, to participate fully 6.3 Rights holder and stakeholder group representatives collect and disseminate all relevant information about the REDD+ program from and to the people they represent in an appropriate and timely way 6.4 The REDD+ program makes sufficient resources available to provide and collect information in a timely and appropriate manner Principle 7: Compliance with existing framework in local and national law 7.1 The REDD+ program complies with applicable local law and national law 7.2 Where local or national law is not consistent with the standards, a review process should be undertaken that results in a plan to resolve the inconsistencies 7.3 Relevant rights holders and stakeholders have the capacity to understand, implement and monitor legal requirements related to the REDD+ program

The above principles and criteria are covering important key elements in term of property rights and tenure security described in Chapter 2. They have been developed by taking into account rights recognition of both statutory and customary rights, equity concept, participation of all rights holders and stakeholders, and access for every relevant stakeholders. They also have strong link with FPIC concept of UNFCCC in addressing property right security issue in implementing REDD mechanism which also has been described in Chapter 2. In order to use at best the information collected through the interviews and, at the same time, provide a synthetic quantitative assessment of the projects, beside a qualitative ones, a scale of scores has been developed. Scores are

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given to each project based on their achievement in fulfilling all criteria in each principle. Scores range from zero to five and are assigned based on judgment after analyzing the evidences. Five is the highest score showing the project is considered fulfilling all criteria in a principle. In contrast, zero is the lowest score showing the project cannot fulfill any criteria at all. Although each principle consists of different number of criteria, every principle is deemed to have the same weight in the overall assessment. The result of the assessment is shown in Table 8 and in Figures 19 and 20.

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Ginoga. East Java 4 Yes 2 Not yet 2 Not yet 3 Not yet 3 Not yet National Park is owned by state. 2010) Lands in Berau district are owned by local government and communities however there is still unclear ownership for customary land (Fakhrizal Nashr. 2010) So far. 2010) FFI has been initiated participatory land use planning process. Result of project quality assessment of five selected projects REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards (adopted and modified from REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards by CCBA and CARE International. food security. Aceh Papua Tropical Forest Conservation for REDD and enhancing carbon stocks in Meru Betiri National Park. forest zone. territories and resources relevant to the program Evidences from interviews and project documents Demonstration activities Berau Forest Carbon UNREDD Carbon Program. Kalimantan Project in Central Sulawesi Voluntary Activities REDD in the Ulu REDD project by WWF Masen Ecosystem. 2010) Principle 1: Right recognition Score 1.Gurusam. government have made zoning system for purpose of sustainable development. This area is overlapping with customary lands. The ownership is clear and acknowledge by community. Within national park area. Project site has not been decided yet therefore all rights holders in the site have not been inventarized yet (Machfudh.1 The REDD+ program effectively identifies the different rights holders (statutory and customary) and their rights to lands. and developing multistakeholder management structure by involving communities and Mukim leaders (Rafli et al. in Jayapura Regency. core zone. 2007) This process has been completed MoFor designated the area as state forest land and was allocated for production function. WWF has conducted community mapping activities in three villages (Beneik. establishing jointly agreed boundaries and land use patterns. rehabilitation zone.e. 2009) Rest of areas have yet to be mapped . and Guriad) to show boundaries of their adat (customary) lands (WWF. i.Table 8. there is no single agreed-upon map of Berau which take into account factors such as community perspective.. and utilization zone (Kirsfianti L. special use zone.

2010) Majority of the project site is designated as national forest land (Hutan negara) and there is potential for conflict over land status where local communities regards adjacent forest lands as traditional/ customary lands (Rafli et al.. 2010) This situation will lead to conflict/ dispute later due to claim by communities (Machfudh. 2010) No clear management right of land and forest (Arif Aliadi. 2010) No sufficient mechanism in place to guarantee the ownership rights of indigenous people to 103 .biodiversity goals and economic development planning (MoFor & TNC. 2007) New Autonomy Law Aceh recognizes the role of Mukim as key There is no clear tenure system (Zulfira Warta. 2010) Overlapping tenure (no clear ownership between de facto and de jure) (Fakhrizal Nashr. 2009) Not yet No clear regulation to save right of community who live in closest village in accessing and utilizing land that have been rehabilitated by them during 1998 2000(Arif Aliadi. 2008) Not yet (WWF. 2010) Customary lands are not recognized by central/ local government (it becomes a challenge for the project) (Machfudh.. occupied or otherwise used or acquired Evidences from Interviews and project documents No No No only in district of Aceh Jaya (Rafli et al. 2007) Formal agreements with all the district governments for spatial planning had not been reached yet (SmartWood.2 The REDD+ program recognizes and respects both statutory and customary rights to lands. 2010) There are still some conflict among tribal group regarding ownership of the land because of different social history as well among tribal group and government (Zulfira Warta. 2009) 1. territories and resources which indigenous people or local communities have traditionally owned. 2010 This situation will lead to conflict/dispute later due to claim by communities (Fakhrizal Nashr.

FAO. and informed consent of indigenous peoples and local communities for any activities affecting their rights to lands. 2009) The project concern of FPIC concept (Fakhrizal Nashr.. 2008) New Aceh provincial Government have moved strongly towards recognizing customary forest and land rights (SmartWood. 2009) Not yet There is agreement between local communities and MBNP agency in developing and managing rehabilitation zone within national park to undertake agroforestry system unique to MBNP such as tetelan (an The program will establish governance structures and consultative mechanisms to include communities in overall program decisions (MoFor & TNC.3 the REDD+ program requires the free. Adhere as much as possible to FPIC although at this point UNREDD NJP activities have not been articulated enough to allow issues such as size. pace. and reversibility to be debated in a meaningful manner (MoFor. 2009) 104 . 2009) Article of Papua Forestry Law stipulates that the Adat Community has the ownership rights over forest in their own customary land boundaries but local community cannot automatically exercise this right and use their forest as they please (WWF. Prior informed consent based on customary land tenure arrangements and resource access rights of local communities must be sought prior to the establishment of carbon forests or other substantive change in land use (Rafli et al. 2007) Project is developing mechanism to implement FPIC from local communities for all of development projects (WWF. UNEP. UNDP. prior. territories and resources Evidences from Interviews and project documents Yes Not yet Not yet Yes their land and forest (WWF. 2008) 1.structure to regulate land access (SmartWood.

. 2007) Establishing jointly agreed boundaries and land use patterns (Rafli et al. 2010) There is unwritten agreement between WWF and community therefore lead to community acceptances (Zulfira 105 . all related stakeholders will participate and tenurial conflict is expected will be solved (Machfudh. Evidences from Interviews and project documents agroforestry land use system) with main tree among others is Kedawung (Parkia timoriana). territories and resources related to the program and does not proceed with any activity that could prejudice the outcome of the dispute resolution process. 2010) Stakeholder consultation (Fakhrizal Nashr. 2007) Developing multi- Adaptive management (Zulfira Warta. 2010) Giving incentive Community participation (Fakhrizal Nashr. 2010) Model management of tenure claim (Zulfira Warta. which is a mutipurposes tree species (Arif Aliadi. 2007) Involving communities and Mukim leaders in participatory land use planning processes (Rafli et al. 2010) Special team will be established to handle conflict (Machfudh. 2010) Giving attention to role of each community in rehabilitation effort (Arif Aliadi. 2010) Yes 2010) Yes 2009) With FPIC approach. 2010) Yes Work together with Mukim as representative of local communites in participatory spatial planning (Rafli et a l. 2010) Follow CCBA standards (Fakhrizal Nashr. Ginoga.4 The REDD+ program identifies and uses a process for effective resolution of any disputes over rights to lands. 2010) Stakeholder consultation (Arif Aliadi. 2010) Need support from regulation especially on tenure and benefit sharing issues (Zulfira Warta. 2010) Community consultation collaborated with Mukim leader (Rafli et al.1.2007) Yes Yes Two ways communication collaborating with NGO and local government (desa/village and kecamatan/ subdistrict) (Kirsfianti L. 2010) Stakeholder participation and consultation (Machfudh.

2008) Participatory spatial planning. 2010) Project will facilitate owner of land and forest who would like to be active player in carbon trading.(services) to community who do not join any program (Arif Aliadi. 2009) Village institution capacity enhancement so they would be able to facilitate interests among the villagers Not yet 1. 2008) Warta. without It is quite difficult to implement separate carbon ownership in context of national level carbon mechanism No regulation and possibilities in having separate carbon ownership so far (Machfudh. 2010) Papuan government signed the law called Special Law regarding SFM in Papua but it is still unclear whether this law would effectively reduce tensions and confusions who has ultimate authority to manage Papua‟s forest (WWF. these rights are based on the statutory and customary rights to the lands. 2010) stakeholder management structure (SmartWood. territories and resources that generated the greenhouse gas emissions reductions and removals Evidences from Interviews and project documents Not yet Not yet Not yet Not mentioned There is possibility in having multiple right for carbon since from conservation point of view. followed by final public consultations and district parliament approval has been started to arbitrate conflict and define boundaries and land use patterns (SmartWood. The 106 .5 Where the REDD+ program enables private ownership of carbon rights or separate ownership for carbon.

local communities. 2010) during the pilot phase. 2010) application to get license in entering carbon market should be done by themselves (Zulfira Warta.removing the tree from national park area community can still collect NTFP from forest including benefiting from carbon sequestration (Arif Aliadi. and CSOs need to be encouraged and supported to participate fully and actively in the development of distribution mechanisms for avoided deforestation finances(SmartWoo It is still in plan that benefit will be equally shared based on role of each stakeholder (Zulfira Warta. 2010) 2 Not yet 2 Not yet 2 Not yet 2 Not yet It is still in a plan that benefit will be shared and proportional to roles.1 The projected costs. 2010) No regulation supporting this case yet (Arif Aliadi. contribution. 2010) Need consideration social landscape (Fakhrizal Nashr. 2010) it is still in a plan that benefit sharing will be discussed with all related stakeholders (Fakhrizal Nashr. and responsibilities of each stakeholders (Arif Aliadi. 2010) 107 . 2010) Indigenous people. potential benefits and associated risks of the REDD+ program are identified for relevant rights holder and stakeholder groups at all levels using a participatory process Evidences from Interviews and project documents 2 Not yet (Fakhrizal Nashr. 2010) Principle 2: equitable benefit sharing score 2. the program will seek support for performance-based incentive programs primarily from public it is still in a plan that benefit sharing will be discussed with all related stakeholders (Machfudh.

carbon No clear regulation about benefit sharing yet (Zulfira Warta.. then later will be informed to all member to avoid misunderstanding and money minded) (Arif Aliadi. 2009) Not yet d.2. FAO. 2010) Since the regulatory framework for carbon rights has not yet been finalized in Indonesia. and associated risks Evidences from Interviews and project documents Not yet and private donors (MoFor & TNC. 2010) 108 . 2010) So far informal discussion about benefit sharing is done gradually with leader of group ( important and unclear issue will be kept temporarily in this level. 2008) Not yet Not yet Not yet Regulation about benefit sharing will be disbursed by Ministry of Forestry (Arif Aliadi. benefits. 2007) After the initial phase of the project.2 Transparent. 2009) It is planned to create diverse forms of benefit sharing that are not tied to land ownership Regulation about benefit sharing will be disbursed by Ministry of Forestry (Machfudh.2010) Clear mechanism is not yet available (Machfudh. 2010) In the future the benefit sharing will be adjusted with legal and customary right to fulfill equity and fairness aspect (Zulfira Warta. 2010) Carbon financing are to be further planned and developed over the next years (Smartwood. 2010) Payment system will be developed at provincial level (MoFor. including forest dependent communities and those with customary rights to forest land (Rafli et al. 2009) Benefit sharing could be not in cash (services and facilities) (Machfudh. effective and efficient mechanisms are established for equitable sharing of benefits of the REDD+ program among and within relevant rights holder and stakeholder groups taking into account costs. it is unclear what benefits could accrue to private investor from a REDD project in Indonesia at this time (MoFor & TNC. UNEP. 2010) Still not clear because the project is multisectoral (Fakrizal Nashr. UNDP. participatory. 2010) No benefit sharing mechanism so far because it is sensitive issue (Zulfira Warta. 2008) All project proponents are committed to ensuring that benefits are equitably shared among stakeholders.

analysis of potential socio- Project is attempted to help communities develop forms of livelihoods based on new or One of project objectives is to be able to conserve forest biodiversity and livelihood of people whose lives 109 .(MoFor & TNC. Attention to well being of indigenous people score 3. including any revenues.3 There is transparent and participatory monitoring of the cost and benefits of the REDD+ program. 2007) Not mentioned Not mentioned 4 Not yet 4 Not yet 3 Not yet 5 Yes 4 Yes One of project objectives is to improve livelihoods of local communities living inside and One of project objectives is creating improved economic outcomes and opportunities for However issue on well being of indigenous people is not the main concern.1 The REDD+ program generates additional. and their distribution among relevant rights holders and stakeholders Principle 3. 2009) 2.. positive impacts on the long term livelihood security and well being of indigenous peoples and local communities with special attention to the most vulnerable people Evidences from Interviews and project documents Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned finance from sale of VERs must be secured to provide immediate and substantial incentive payments to all relevant stakeholders who help the project area arrest deforestation (Rafli et al.

agroforestry. 2008) 20% of credit reserve is to be used to fund local carbon projects to promote alternative livelihoods to avert leakage( SmartWood.. reforestation. 2010) communities living near forests (MoFor & TNC. plantations which may preclude their participation in unsustainable logging practices (SmartWood. certification and marketing of sustainably harvested-wood (MoFor & TNC. such as community forestry.surrounding area of Meru Betiri NP (Kirsfianti L. Contributes to protection of human rights and good governance objectives score 4. market and technology (Arif Aliadi. 2009) alternatives practices. 2010) It is still a challenge for the project to find out how to improve livelihood through improved existing activities familiar to them in term of productivity. 2007) dependent on these forests (WWF. UNEP. 2009) Principle 4. Ginoga. FAO. 2009) economic impacts of REDD on communities will be conducted (MoFor.1 The REDD+ program leads to improvements in governance of the forest sector and other relevant sectors Evidences from 2 Not mentioned 4 Yes 4 Yes 5 Yes 4 Yes Using REDD as Using REDD to Some of project One of project‟s 110 . UNDP. 2009) The program will invest in alternative livelihoods programs in target areas to support low-carbon development strategies (MoFor & TNC. 2009) Berau Program will develop additional financial incentives and contractual arrangements for concessioners to move towards improved management. 2008) There are several incentives to local villages for their involvement in forest protection (Rafli et al.

2007) Yes objective is to assist the local government in designing an effective pro-poor. FAO. and village level (Rafli et al. 2009) Assist local governments with preparing and piloting REDD activities on the ground (MoFor. community property or government property Rely on CCBA standard as basis of project implementation which require respectful of tenure and social aspect on REDD design 111 .Interviews and project documents vehicle of decentralization (Fakhrizal Nashr. forest governance and forest law enforcement processes at provincial.2 The REDD+ program contributes to respect and protection of human rights Evidences from Interviews and project documents Yes Yes Yes activities is developing capacity of relevant provincial government. UNDP. 2009) Yes Implementation of REDD in every forested land would have positive implication on tenurial as it would create more incentive for REDD can be trigger tenurial reform because through incentive based mechanism will trigger clear ownership (Fakhrizal Nashr. 2010) The project will design a governance structure that generates effective decisions supported by a wide range of stakeholders (MoFor & TNC. identifying and documenting opportunities to strengthen forest management. Mukim. supporting establishment of FMU (MoFor. district. 2009) enhance capacity of local government in managing forest in context of local development planning. 2009) 4. UNEP. UNEP. FAO. 2010) Project guarantee that there is no encroachment uninvited on private property.. REDD will give positive influence to tenure reform if well implemented (Machfudh. environmentally sound. UNDP.. 2007) Project activities have been designed to develop effective and accountable governance (Rafli et al. and good governance development planning process (WWF.

UNEP. 2008) Project guarantee that there is no plan to relocate or move people out from the project management areas (SmartWood. 2010) Yes Local government is supporting REDD activities on site (Arif Aliadi. local government stops giving new license for oil palm plantation which support REDD program(Zulfira Warta. Since 2009. 2008) The project will build off the “process framework” to ensure community and individual concerns can easily be directed to the project and are ensured a timely and fair process for review and project modification if necessary (Rafli et al. 2010) Government of 112 . FAO. UNDP. 2007) Yes (Zulfira Warta.management of land in more sustainable way (Arif Aliadi. UNEP. Aceh established REDD working groups.. 2009) While waiting for a guideline of national REDD mechanism. FAO. 2010) Berau District is interested in moving towards more sustainable outcomes and REDD is enable to achieve these outcomes (Head of district‟s statement Provincial and district governments are developing policies and have shown interest in developing REDD (MoFor. UNDP. namely Green Aceh (MoFor.3 There is strong government commitment to the REDD+ program Score Evidences from Interviews and project documents Yes Yes Yes (SmartWood. 2010) 2010) 4. 2010) REDD will give positive influence to tenure issue (Zulfira Warta.

4 The REDD+ program is coherent with relevant policies. This working group is now formally linked through Joint Working Group with MoFor representatives (MoFor & TNC. 2009) Not yet Sometimes policies of local government The project is trying to link the low Project outcomes. implementation and evaluation of the REDD+ program and other relevant government agencies/ organizations Evidences from Interviews and project Not yet Not yet Not yet Yes Papua is actively pursuing REDD and is in the process of developing a REDD policy which is well embedded and linked into a national program (MoFor.1/534/2007 commits to provide information on land tenure allocation and design (SmartWood. 2008) 4. 2007 number 522. particularly spatial The project has or expect to secure Unsynchronized interpretation of 113 . the Bupati of Berau created a REDD Working Group to explore opportunities for developing a REDD pilot program in Berau. strategies and plans at all relevant levels and there is effective coordination between government and other agencies/organizations responsible for the design. FAO. UNDP. 2009) Government representatives in Jayapura regency were interested in this idea and willing to sign agreement with WWF Indonesia for 10 years‟ commitment to develop REDD mechanism (WWF. 2009) 2009) Governor‟s Decree of October 31. 2009) In April 2008. 2008) Provincial government commits to reduce legal logging licences (SmartWood. UNEP.in Tharyat & Siswanto.

Ginoga. implementation of Papua special law on forest management. 2009). and REDD procedures and governance and its distribution of financial flows between central and local government (Zulfira Warta. (WWF. 2010) There is no synergy between local/ district aspiration with forestry law and REDD program (Fakhrizal Nashr.1 The REDD+ program identifies and characterizes the rights and interests of all rights holder and stakeholder groups and their relevance to the REDD+ 3 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 3 Yes 114 . 2010. 2009) Coordination between offices in the development planning process is weak (WWF.documents relating with management of area surround national park lead to open access of the park and leakage which is still become a challenge (Arif Aliadi. UNEP. 2009) 2 Yes Principle 5. project proponents will help Aceh achieve a sustainable future that also preserves critical and highlythreatened habitat for biodiversity and develop a sustainable community model for the use and conservation of forest (Rafli et al. 2007) authority to manage forest resources. Participation score 5. forest property and land tenure rights. 2010) planning in line with MoFor policy to sustain forests and its management such as the ongoing KPH development program(MoFor. UNEP. approval from appropriate authorities (SmartWood. palm oil plantation.. 2009) In formulating the REL at provincial level. 2008). 2010) emissions program with provincial/ district spatial planning in order to avoid leakage(MoFor & TNC. 2009) There are several concessions. UNREDD will ensure it will be synchronized with what has been developed by GOI at national level(MoFor. By preventing deforestation. 2010) coordination among public private partnership technically and institutionally in Measuring Reporting and Verifying (MRV) is still need to be improved (Kirsfianti L. 2009) Overlapping and contradicting of authorities and policies between central and local government is still a challenge for project (Fakhrizal Nashr. FAO. UNDP. WWF. and mining areas within REDD project boundaries got license from national govt. FAO. UNDP.

forest monitoring (Arif Aliadi. and NGO will support UNREDD activities (actively and passively) (Machfudh. and private sector. 2009) UNREDD is aware of the concerns raised by local communities and CSOs of an emerging REDD scheme in Indonesia (MoFor. all of their interest will be addressed (Zulfira Warta. 2010) BFCP will engage communities and people living in and near forest areas. 2007) Yes Project is consist of different stakeholder and in process of stakeholder discussion. NGOS/CSOs. 2008) Project is supported by a tri-partnership of government. 2010) 5. implementation and evaluation are fully involved through culturally appropriate and effective participation Evidences from Interviews and project documents Yes Yes Yes Yes Communities are taking part in several activities e. non. and range of CSOs (MoFor & TNC.2 All relevant rights holder and stakeholder groups that want to be involved in REDD+ program design.g. 2009) The project has a strong component towards increasing a range of community interest and stakeholders in the project implementation (SmartWood. business company. FAO. CSO.. 2010) Collaborative forest management among government. and community (Fakhrizal Nashr. government officials and agencies at all levels. UNDP. UNEP. an in-depth stakeholder consultation with Project has been conceived to ensure that stakeholder confidence and commitment will be built through participatory and transparent process REDD governance concept is discussed widely with the key stakeholders in Papua (WWF. 2009) Finding of study is discussed with all 115 . private sector investors and employees. reducing illegal logging. Every partners has their own role and interest (Rafli et al.governmental. 2010) On 20 May 2009. 2010) Communities. lowering carbon emission.program Evidences from Interviews and project documents The project will engage all stakeholders in all activities however it is still a challenge to integrate all different interest from each stakeholders (Arif Aliadi.

management. taking account of statutory and customary institutions Evidences from Interviews and project documents Yes Yes local community representatives and CSOs was conducted as part of development of UNREDD Programme (MoFor. UNEP. the process and mechanism by which they will participate and be represented in relation to the REDD+ program. 2009) Yes Not mentioned Community can choose their representative in stakeholder consultation process (Arif Aliadi. and governance (MoFor & TNC. UNDP.. FAO. FAO. 2009) Relevant right holders and stakeholder groups will be members of National Project Board (NPB) (MoFor.5. 2007) Project has a wide range of activities and all of those activities done in conjunction with communities (SmartWood.UNDP.3 The relevant rights holder and stakeholder groups determine. UNEP.UNDP. 2007) All levels of govt and civil society have been invited to contribute to the design and implementation of project activities (Rafli et al. 2009) Mukims in the project area have taken apart in participatory spatial planning. 2009) Yes (Rafli et al. and that others have taken part in spatial planning workshops 116 . in a verifiable manner.. UNEP. 2010) Communities will be linked more effectively to land use planning. 2008) key stakeholders (WWF. 2009) Initiatives relevant to UNREDD activities developed by local community representatives. FAO. NGOs and CSOs is inserted to logical framework (MoFor.

UNEP. 2010) Not yet or in mitigating human-wildlife conflicts (SmartWood. 2009) Not yet Community will be represented by their community organization (Machfudh. 2010 a) Currently. UNDP. 2009) 117 .4 The relevant rights holders and stakeholders groups have a good understanding of the key issues related to the REDD+ program and the capacity to participate effectively Evidences from Interviews and project documents Not yet Collaborative management between communities and companies in timber concessions and between communities and government (MoFor &TNC. the knowledge on REDD is still very limited and the interpretation of what REDD can bring in terms of benefits but also responsibilities is still very diverse (MoFor. 2008) Mukims and communities are taking part in consultation process (Rafli et al. 2008) Not mentioned Not mentioned Currently. 2010) Information about REDD is still not clear in community level. Therefore socialization is needed to be done in the beginning of the project (Machfudh. Therefore the project developer need to be careful in giving information and community need to be clever in understanding the mechanism (Fakhrizal Nashr. the knowledge on REDD is still very limited therefore the project is conducting some awareness raising training and institutional building for REDD and REDD+ (FORDA & ITTO. 2010) Currently. FAO. information about REDD is still not clear in community level.5.

and management systems including those of indigenous peoples and local communities Principle 6.2 Rights holders and stakeholders have the information that they need about the REDD+. 2009) Not mentioned Communication among UNREDD stakeholders still need to be strengthened especially between local community representatives/NG Os/CSOs and local government (MoFor. respects and supports rights holders’ and stakeholders’ traditional and other knowledge. skills. 2009) Not mentioned 6.5. FAO. the governor‟s office and posted on these two offices websites (SmartWood. Access and transparency score 6.1 Adequate information about the REDD+ program is publicly available to promote general awareness and good governance Score Evidences from Interviews and project documents Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned 3 Yes 2 Not yet 2 Not yet 4 Yes 1 Not mentioned Consultation process with communities and other stakeholders has been undertaken to increase self motivation and understanding as well as benefit of REDD (Arif Aliadi. provided in a All non-proprietary documents will be publicly available and in Bahasa language at the offices if FFI. UNDP. as well as at the CCB website. UNEP. 2010) Not mentioned Program partners are now evaluating options for local pilot to support the national Forest Resource Information System (early stage of development) (MoFor & TNC.5 Design. 2008) Not mentioned Not mentioned 118 . implementation and evaluation of REDD+ program builds on.

workshop. education and communication materials. to participate fully 6. also through cadre of experts (MoFor & TNC. People in the Mukim level meeting decided who should be the representative for their Mukim to attend the intermukim meeting Yes Yes Information on good practice gained and scale up lessons learn is distributed through training. 2010) Yes Yes Yes 6. and Information will be distributed through educational and training initiatives. 2009) 119 . institutional building. REDD information. capacity building. and publications in local and/or national media (SmartWood.culturally appropriate and timely way.4 The REDD+ program makes sufficient resources available to provide and collect information in a timely and appropriate manner Evidences from Interviews and project documents Information that was generated from the Mukim level planning was then discussed in an inter-Mukim meeting. Information is distributed through training. having opportunities to accept or refuse (Machfudh. workshop (WWF. Information will be distributed through training.3 Rights holder and stakeholder group representatives collect and disseminate all relevant information about the REDD+ program from and to the people they represent in an appropriate and timely way Evidences from Interviews and project documents Not mentioned Not mentioned Not yet Yes Not mentioned Participation is normally through representation and it sometimes lead to risk that not every household can get the information or even express their opinion/ideas. 2009) Information will be distributed through social marketing campaign. community development.

FAO. FAO. 2009) All programme asset and services Government Regulation PP 6/ 2007 provides a key legal basis for the implementation of this project(Rafli et al.publications (MoFor & ITTO. 2010) The project will 120 . UNDP. FAO. 2010) Reformation of forestry law and All program will link with existing regulation on REDD in national and local level (the grelated regulations as guideline) (Fakhrizal Nashr. UNEP. Project Management Unit (PMU) responsible for reporting UNREDD funds in accordance with the rule and regulations for nationally implemented project (MoFor. 2010d) conference or panel discussion.. 2009) Consultation minutes is distributed by email to the local community representatives/CSO participant for further input (MoFor. UNDP. 2009) 2008) Principle 7: Compliance with existing framework in local and national law score 7. 2010) Unclear regulation which is supporting national park and environmental friendly activities (Arif Aliadi. training. and publication on lesson learned (MoFor.1 The REDD+ program complies with applicable local law and national law Evidences from Interviews and project documents 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes All activities are arranged integrating with exist regulations (Kirsfianti L. Ginoga. UNEP. 2010) However there is no synergy between local/district aspiration with forestry law (Fakhrizal Nashr. UNEP. UNDP. 2007) Special autonomy law for Province of Aceh provides a further important legal basis for the retention and equitable sharing of funds generated Activities of project should be additional to what would have already been required by current government regulations and policy (WWF. 2009) REDD program will comply all regulation which link with REDD to get legitimating (Zulfira Warta.

2010 121 . and regional levels of government (SmartWood..other related regulation and recognition of customary land and customary land are needed in successful of REDD implementation (Arif Aliadi... provincial. 2010) through REDD carbon financing within the province (Rafli et al. 2008) Project is lead by provincial government to ensure compliance with and integration with governmental and regulatory structures (Rafli et al. 2010) 2010) shall be procured in line to GoI and UN rules and regulations (Machfudh. 2007) Governor‟s decree for new provincial spatial plan provides the authority to carry out most core project activities related in terms of participatory forest management process (Rafli et al. 2007) Current legal arrangements need integrate with Indonesia‟s regulations and policies concerning REDD development procedures (WWF. 2009) however current regulation and policy regarding environmental services and REDD is biased toward forestry sector (Zulfira Warta. 2007) Project will not broke existing laws and will keep low conflict between authority in central.

2007) Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Note: Consideration Score Fulfill all criteria 5 Fulfill almost all criteria 4 Fulfill criteria partly 3 Fulfill few of criteria 2 Fulfill only one criteria 1 Fulfill no criteria at all 0 122 .. negotiations will be undertaken with those responsible for relevant legislation at provincial and national level (Rafli et al. implement and monitor legal requirements related to the REDD+ program Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned strengthening.7. a review process should be undertaken that results in a plan to resolve the inconsistencies 7.3 Relevant rights holders and stakeholders have the capacity to understand.2 Where local or national law is not consistent with the standards.

Project quality assessment of five selected projects 123 .Figure 19.

b. d. 124 . c. c. d.a.

c. Figure 20. Aceh. in Jayapura Regency. in Berau District. In Meru Betiri National Park.e. East Java. b. Detail of project quality assessment of five selected projects a. in Central Sulawesi. Kalimantan. in Ulu Masen. d. Papua 125 . and e.

. In addition. The biggest issue in this project is not the land ownership but more the unclear management rights of rehabilitation land which was managed together with local communities during 1998 – 2000 (Arif Aliadi. In Aceh. but there are some positive movements in recognizing customary land and taking into account local community institutions shown in case of the two voluntary projects. Ginoga. East Java has the higher score in right recognition compared with others because the ownership of the area is clear and communities acknowledge it. the projects are on the stage of giving much attention to right recognition of related stakeholders especially local communities and developing effective resolution of any disputes over rights to lands.REDD project in Meru Betiri National Park. 5/ 1990 article 34 and Forestry Law No. this project is one of site level intervention projects which focuses only on the area of national park compared with landscape intervention projects which cover wider area with more complex land ownership. territories. Although there are 12 villages in buffer zone and 6 villages on border of national park area. Based on Regulation no. Gurusam. FFI has initiated participatory land use planning processes. 2010). and resources however almost all of them are still in planning phase.41/1999. and Guriad) to show boundaries of their adat (customary) lands (WWF. However there is still tenurial conflict and claim in almost all project sites. establishing jointly agreed boundaries and land use patterns. and . not yet implemented in practice. territories. and developing multi-stakeholder management structure by involving communities and Mukim leaders (Rafli et al. At the moment. national park is forest area part of state forest and managed directly under the authority of the central government. 2010). 2008) and Article of Papua Forestry Law which stipulates that the Adat Community has the ownership rights over forest in their own customary land boundaries (WWF. 2009). 2009). The same activities have been initiated by WWF in three villages in Jayapura Regency (Beneik. Local government in the two areas also supports this movement by establishing New Autonomy Law Aceh which recognizes the role of Mukim as key structure to regulate land access (SmartWood. 2007). All projects is concerned in implementing the concept of the Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) of indigenous peoples and local communities for any activities affecting their rights to lands. there is no overlapping of land ownership in the project site (Kirsfianti L.

resources e. Ulu Masen REDD program has prepared clearer program in developing livelihood of local communities such as community forestry. contributions and responsibilities. At this phase. reforestation plantations to preclude communities participation in unsustainable logging practices. Benefit sharing is another important concern in implementing REDD mechanism. some projects proposed to share the benefits in form of services not in cash. 2007). stakeholder consultation and participatory programmes in order to get support and success in benefiting from REDD mechanism. giving incentives for forest protection. mechanisms should be able to address all rights of related stakeholders including forest dependent communities and those with customary right and to share the benefit proportionally based on their roles. The planned mechanisms vary from one project to the other. not yet a main concern. BFCP and REDD project in MBNP also have more or less the same programme. 2009). Aceh is the best example for its attention to the well being of indigenous people followed by BFCP in Kalimantan. and even allocating 20% of credit reserve to promote alternative livelihood (SmartWood. REDD Project in Ulu Masen proposed to have secure carbon finance from sale of VERs to provide immediate and substantial incentive payments (Rafli et al. Although there is an idea of promoting separate carbon ownership as part of NTFPs in rehabilitation land in REDD project in Meru Betiri National park . and REDD project in Jayapura Regency. agroforestry. Therefore. This is because there is no clear regulation and mechanism on this issue yet even in international level. the issue of private carbon right recognition and separate carbon ownership are still in controversial since there is no clear regulation and mechanism supporting this case yet.. Berau Carbon Forest Program proposed to have diverse forms of benefit sharing not tied to land ownership to facilitate complex land and forest ownership (MoFor & TNC.g. To be equitable and fair. all selected projects has the same. all projects stated that the mechanism will be discussed with all related stakeholders and equally shared based on their role. discussion on benefit sharing has been done gradually with community group leaders (Arif Aliadi. this issue is still in planning. REDD project in MBNP. quite low score. Based on the assessment‟s result. REDD project in Ulu Masen. 2008). 127 .Then. 2010). In Meru Betiri National Park.

Similar positive support is also shown by two local governments: the local government of Berau District is creating REDD working group to explore opportunities for developing REDD pilot program in Berau (MoFor & TNC. forest monitoring. It has been approved by SmartWood auditors as well. not all of them have good understanding of key issues on REDD program. and in Central Sulawesi. 2009) while the local government of Jayapura Regency is signing an agreement with WWF Indonesia for 10 years commitment to develop REDD mechanism (WWF. 2010). Although all projects have proposed activities coherent with relevant policies and strategies. Therefore socialization is needed in the beginning of project design. and committing on reducing legal logging license . part of Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC). Although in general. and lowering carbon emission. Eventhough good mechanisms of involving all relevant rights holders and stakeholders have been established . Consultation and participation are crucial components of consent process (UNREDD & MoFor. projects‟ achievement in addressing participation is only at a medium level. all projects shows concern in identifying and charaterizing rights and interests of all rights holder and stakeholders also involving them fully in REDD design and implementation. overlapping and unsynchronized policies between national and local governments remain as one big challenge in implementing REDD. 2009) and stopping giving new license for oil palm plantation since 2009 (Zulfira Warta. This project is able to fulfill all criteria and it has good program which leads to improvement of governance and contributes to respect and protection of human rights. There are various activities that have been conducting together with all rights holders and stakeholders starting with collaborative forest management including reducing illegal logging. Berau Forest carbon Program. stakeholder consultation and taking into account initiative REDD program by local communities. NGOs and CSOs. establishing Governor‟s decree on land tenure and design. 128 . This success is achieved also because of strong will and commitment from local government in developing REDD in Aceh by establishing REDD working group namely Green Aceh.REDD project in Ulu Masen also became best example for its contribution to protection of human rights and good governance. 2010). It can be seen in cases of REDD projects in Meru Betiri National Park.

129 . the best practice is also shown in Aceh where Mukim as representative of local communities collect and disseminate all relevant information from and to people they represent. there is no project among the five builds its REDD program taking into acoount also the respect and support of rights holders‟ traditional and other knowledge. until now. In case of using cadre as information agent. Results of assessment show that each project has different achievement in fulfilling this principle. Those information are publicly availabe through website of project proponents (Aceh government and FFI) and some publications. it seems that relevant rights holders and stakeholders don‟t have the capacity to understand. In case of REDD in Ulu Masen Aceh. information is also disseminated through training. which link with providing adequate and important information to all rights holders and stakeholders. Moreover. and management system. campaign. there is no information whether all rights holders and stakeholders have the knowledge they need or not. contradicting and overlapping policies and regulations in local and national level as effect of decentralization process still are an obstacle to all projects in implementing REDD mechanism in project site. 2007). Moreover. Regarding legal issues. Although all projects has disseminated the information through different medias and mechanisms. all projects are complying applicable local and national law in carrying out their program. There is no information about any review process undertaken to resolve this inconsistency. However. REDD project in Ulu Masen. capacity building. and cadre.. workshops. project is lead by provincial government to ensure compliance and integration with governmental and regulatory structures (Rafli et al. Aceh is the best example in providing adequate information about REDD in Bahasa and in English. implement and monitor legal requirements in REDD either. skills. Access and transparancy are also part of FPIC concept.Unfortunately.

.

1 Conclusions and recommendations Conclusions The result of this study indicate that technically Indonesia is ready to implement REDD. issue of property right and tenure security especially for local communities has not yet been a concern so far. . there are some positive initiatives from local government toward recognizing and supporting existence and rights of local communities by establishing province level of regulation on customary rights and taking into account their participation in decision making. 6. their concern still lacks in issue of benefit sharing and compliance with existing law. it is better to have separate carbon ownership as implemented in New South Wales. To get higher tradability.6. These initiatives also supported by NGOs and CSOs. studies from Australia show that carbon can be a seperate object from forest and land and that forest owner can take advantage from various carbon ownership regimes. it seems delicate to do so because of the complexity of the issue and of the specific Indonesian situation. It is not because they are not concerned with those issue but because they are still more into technical problems especially unclear supporting regulation and mechanism. participation. In practical level. Although this mechanism can be considered as a model in reforming existing carbon ownership regime in Indonesia. attention to well being of local communities. However. Policies and regulations on this issue are contradictory at the two levels the local and the national ones. Here. From concept of Streck (2009) on better implementation of REDD in national level. However. In terms of property rights security. Property rights and tenure system is still unclear and community tenure security is still low. also access and transparency. almost all forest area is owned or controlled by the State and a very complex stratification of official and customary and tenure titles and right distribution exists. contribution to protection of human rights and good governance. results of REDD projects assessment show that both demonstration and voluntary activities have medium level of concern on issue of property rights and tenure recognition. although it is obvious that Indonesia fulfilled all of the points.

dissemination of information. with time limitation. In case of using interview as tool in collecting data. Moreover. It will be better for further research to use the concept of a reference country that has more or less same situation and legal system on property rights. some development would be better to be done in the future especially in addressing some issues which can be covered so far in this reserach like monitoring. the earlier phase of development of REDD mechanism. It can be an idea to assess the performance after REDD implementation on ground. Improvement for further research can be done by widen selected project area which can cover some big islands in Indonesia. However. 132 . content of questionnaire and respondent selection are also needed to be set properly in order to get better result. implement. However. impact assessment. Finally. Good criteria which cover all situations should be set in order to ensure validity and representativeness of result.Overall. it was quite difficult to adopt a concept from two countries that have different situation and legal system on property rights e. review process for inconsistency. In fact . only partial picture of Indonesian situation is obtained. criteria for selecting the cases developed in this thesis have allowed an appropriate representativeness of result. carbon rights in Australia. and monitor concept and legal requirement for REDD 6.g.2 Recommendations Since the study is operated by using an approach based on case studies method. acknowledgement of local knowledge. all projects are now in readiness phase therefore the focus of this thesis and the assessment of project performance are limited on planning phase. interviwer should be active in contacting respondent in order to get all of them have time for interview or even for filling the questionnaire and sending it through email. information availability for all relevant rights holders and stakeholders. methodology and analysing concept are good tools to answer reserach questions. and capacity of the relevant rights holders and stakeholders on REDD to understand.

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Legally binding emission reduction obligations for Annex B countries range from an 8% decrease to a 10 % increase on 1990 levels by the first commitment period of the Protocol. 2008). Annex I and Non Annex I: Under the Kyoto Protocol. 2010). developed countries. Baseline: a projection of emissions from deforestation and degradation and serves as a reference for measuring reductions in emissions based on a designated reference year of period. t C) (IPCC. anthropogenic emissions are distinguished from natural emissions. wood products. seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources (UNFCCC. referred to as Annex I countries (the 36 industrialized countries and economies in transition. Trading occurs when an entity has excess allowances. 2008). Aforestation: the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50 years to forested land through planting. where the total allowances is strictly limited or “capped”. 2008 -2012 (IFCA. Carbon rights: the rights to enter into contracts and national or international transactions for the transfer of ownership of greenhouse gas emissions reductions or removals and the maintenance of carbon stocks (CCBA. In the LULUCF-GPG. who have a non-binding commitment to reducing their GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000) and developing countries. Many of the greenhouse gases are also emitted naturally. Annex B Countries: the 39 emissions-capped industrialized countries and economies in transition listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. 2000). and atmosphere. Anthropogenic: from the consequences of human activities. varying from time to time and place to place (Dunlop. Dunlop. Carbon dioxide (CO2): this greenhouse gas is the largest contributor to man-made climate change. It is only the increments resulting from human activities additional to natural emissions that may be perturbing natural balance. 2009) or an action or practice that has taken place since time immemorial and that is not regulated by the state or other authority outside the social group. 2009) Akta tanah: land ownership document (Dunlop. 2009). Akta jual beli: sale and purchase agreement. Cap and trade: A Cap and Trade system involves trading emission allowances. referred to as Non-Annex I countries (who have no binding greenhouse gas emissions and may participate in the Clean Development Mechanism) (IFCA. It is function of projected area change combined with the corresponding change in carbon stocks and will need to be negotiated among Parties (IFCA.. Carbon pool: A system which has the capacity to accumulate or release carbon. 2008). all emissions and removals of managed lands are seen as anthropogenic. 2008). and sells them an entity requiring allowances because of growth in emissions or an inability to make cost effective reductions (IFCA. soils. 143 . national governments are separated into two general categories.g. A non-codified collection of rules of formal behaviour. upheld through social sanctions. emitted from fossil fuel burning and deforestation (IFCA. 2009). Often used as evidence of ownership at the village level (Dunlop. In the IPCC guidelines.Annexes Annex 1 . 2008). Examples of carbon pools are forest biomass.Terminology Adat: Custom. The units are mass (e. 2008. either through actions taken or improvements made.

Carbon Stock: The absolute quantity of carbon held within a pool at a specified time (IPCC, 2000) Certification: the written assurance by third party that, during a specified time period, a project activity achieved the reductions in anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases (GHG) as verified (IFCA, 2008). Certified Emissions reductions (CERs): tradable units issued by the UN through the Clean Development Mechanism for emission reduction projects in developing countries. Each CER represents one metric ton of carbon emissions reduction. CERs can be used by Annex 1 countries to meet their emissions goals under the Kyoto Protocol (IFCA, 2008). Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): A provision of the Kyoto Protocol that allows developed countries (Annex 1) to offset their emissions by funding emissions reduction projects in developing countries (non-Annex1) (IFCA, 2008). The CDM aims to not only reduce emissions but also contribute to the sustainable development of the host country (Dunlop, 2009). Commons: Land or other natural resources used simultaneously or serially by the members of a community (Bruce, 1998) Co-ownership: Joint ownership by more than one legal person (Vatn, 2005). Costs, benefits and risks of the REDD+ program include those that are direct and indirect and include social, cultural, human rights, environmental and economic aspects. Costs should include those related to responsibilities and to opportunity costs. All costs, benefits and risks are compared against the reference scenario which is the most likely land use scenario in the absence of the REDD+ program (CCBA, 2010). Customary land: land where uses are regulated by customary, unwritten practice, rather than written, codified law (Dunlop, 2009). Customary rights: to lands and resources refers to patterns of long-standing community land and resource usage in accordance with Indigenous Peoples‟ and local communities‟ customary laws, values, customs, and traditions, including seasonal or cyclical use, rather than formal legal title to land and resources issued by the State (Dunlop, 2009). Deforestation: the direct, human induced conversion of forest vegetation to non-forest vegetation. This definition means a reduction in crown cover from above the threshold of what is defined as forest to below this threshold. Deforestation causes change in land cover and in land use. Common changes include: conversion of forests to annual cropland, conversion to perennial plants (oil palm, shrubs), conversion to slash and burn (shifting cultivation) lands, and conversion to urban lands or other human infrastructure (IFCA, 2008). Degradation: long term direct human-induced changes persist in a forest, cause a loss of forest carbon or other values but do not reduce canopy cover below the defined threshold of what is forest. Degradation would represent a measurable, sustained, human induced decrease in carbon stocks, with measured tree cover remaining above the minimum required to be considered forest. The IPCC presents five potential definitions for degradation: 1. A direct human-induced loss of forest values (particularly carbon), likely to be characterized by a reduction of tree crown cover. Routine management from which crown cover will recover within the normal cycle of forest management operations is not included. 2. Changes within the forests that negatively affect the structure or function of the stand and site, and thereby lower the capacity t supply products and/ or services. 3. Direct human-induced activity that leads to a long term reduction in forest carbon stocks 4. The long term reduction of the overall potential supply of benefits from the forest, which includes carbon, wood, biodiversity, and any other product or service. 5. The overuse or poor management of forests that leads to long term reduced biomass density (carbon stocks) (IFCA, 2008). 144

Decentralization: the transfer of both decision-making authority and payment responsibility to lower level of government. Although still involving the government, it provides a stronger role for local bodies, which are presumed to have greater accountability to the local populace, including both users of the resources and others who live in the area (Sterner, 2002). Effectiveness: defined as the extent to which the emissions reductions and other goals of the program are achieved (CCBA, 2010) Efficient: defined as achieving the target with minimum cost, effort and time (CCBA, 2010). Emissions trading: a provision of the Kyoto Protocol that allows Annex 1 countries to trade emissions reduction credits in order to comply with their Kyoto assigned targets. This system allows countries to pay and take credit for emissions reduction projects in developing countries where the costs of these projects may be lower, thus ensuring that overall emissions are lessened in the most cost-elective manner (IFCA, 2008). Equity and equitable: defined as just, impartial and fair to all parties (CCBA, 2010) Forest: all land with woody vegetation consistent with national standards for canopy cover, canopy height and area. It also includes vegetation that could potentially reach, the threshold values used by a country to define the forest. Forest includes lands covered with mixed species natural forests and plantations of single species for A/R CDM (UNFCCC in IFCA, 2008). A forest is defined as a minimum area of land of 0.05-1 hectares with tree crown cover (or equivalent stocking level) of more than 10-30 percent with trees with the potential to reach a minimum height of 2-5 metres at maturity in situ. Actual definitions can vary from country to country as the Kyoto Protocol permits countries to specify the precise definition within these parameters to be used for national accounting of emissions. Forest land: a category that includes all land with woody vegetation consistent with thresholds used to define Forest Land in the national greenhouse gas inventory. It also includes systems with a vegetation structure that does not, but in situ could potentially reach, the threshold values used by a country to define the Forest Land category. For the purpose of the Kyoto Protocol, it was determined through the Marrakech Accords that Parties should select a single value of crown area, tree height and area to define forests within their national boundaries. Selection must be form within the following ranges, with the understanding that young stands that have not yet reached the necessary cover or height are included as forest: 1. Forest area: 0.05 to 1 ha (Indonesia decided on 0.25 ha) 2. Potential to reach a minimum height at maturity in situ of 2 -5 m (Indonesia decided on 5 m) 3. Tree crown cover (or equivalent stocking level): 10 to 30% (Indonesia decided on > 30%) Under this definition a forest can contain anything form 10% to 100% tree cover, it is only when cover falls below the minimum crown cover that is designated as non-forest. However, if this is only a temporary change, such as for timber harvest with regeneration expected, the land remains in the forest classification (IFCA, 2008). Forest management: A system of practices for stewardship and use of forest land aimed at fulfilling relevant ecological (including biological diversity), economic and social functions of the forest in sustainable manner (IFCA, 2008). Forest dependent people: People who live in forests or in rural areas close to forests, including customary and indigenous peoples. Also referred to as local communities for the purposes of this study (Dunlop, 2009) Fungible: Being of such a nature that one part or quantity may be replaced by another equal part or quantity in the satisfaction of an obligation. Oil, wheat, and lumber are fungible commodities. Throughout this book we refer to the fungibility of a tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e).

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Good governance: includes accessibility, people‟s participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, predictability, justice and sustainability (CCBA, 2010) Holding: all land held by a household or person, whether owned, leased, or held on some other basis. Kyoto Protocol: an international treaty that requires participating countries to reduce their emissions by 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2012. The protocol, developed in 1997, is administered by the Secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (IFCA, 2008). Marginalized people or groups: those that normally have little or no influence over decisionmaking processes. Marginalization may be related to gender, ethnicity, socio economic status and/or religion (CCBA, 2010). Masyarakat adat: translated variously as customary communities, traditional communities, or indigenous peoples. AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara- Alliance on Customary Communities) defines adat communities as people who live in their ancestral teriitory, excert soverignty over their land and natural resources and govern their community by customary laws and institutions which sustain the continuity of their livelihood. General characteristics of adat communities include: Self-inditification and identification by others as being part of a distinct social or cultural group The display of a desire to preserve that cultural identity Social, cultural, economic, and political traditions and institutions distinct from the dominant culture Economic systems oriented more toward traditional menas of production Unique ties to traditional habitats and ancestral territories, and to the natural resources in these habitats and territories Shared values and netweorks of relationships, embedded in local social structures Self governing or at least use of traditional local institutions and processes of deliberation (mufakat) and concensus (musyawarah) for decision making and dispute resolution (Dunlop, 2009) Mortgage: a contract that commits land as security for a loan. Normally, the land remains with mortgagor until that person fails to repay the debt. Under posessory mortgage, the lender takes possesion of the land as soon as the mortgage is made and holds it until the debt is repaid (Bruce, 1998). MRV: measure gains from baseline in CO2-e supported by data from GHGs inventory and institutional building. MRV involves all emission reduction from all activities (FORDA and ITTO, 2010). Mufakat: discussion to reach an agreement. Part of customary decision making in Indonesia (Dunlop, 2009) Musyawarah: A customary process of deliberation and discussion to resolve village level disputes (Dunlop, 2009) Parcel: a unit of land legally defined bu its acquisition as a single contigous area of land under a uniform cropping pattern with no legal implication. Parcels can be broken into smaller pices. This process, which may occur at inheritance by division among heirs or by sale of part of the parcel, is called partition or subdivision. Fragmentation exists when a holding consists of several separate parcels (Bruce, 1998). Reference Emission Level (REL): baseline against which reductions in emissions are measured. It is a function of forest area change combined with the corresponding carbon stocks of the forests being deforested or degraded. A REL may be established by (i) taking an average of past conditions over an agreed time frame; (ii) modelling based on unplanned (unsanctioned) activities and planned land use to

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more carbon is flowing into it than is flowing out (IPCC. 2008) Voluntary offsetting: offsetting purchases made by individuals. 2008). 2000). by the proposed project activity or actions leading to the implementation of such an activity (IFCA. Vulnerable people or groups: those lacking secure access to the assers in which secure livelihoods are built (social. 2010) 147 . Carbon sequestration refers to the absorption from the atmosphere of carbon dioxide by vegetation and soils and the storage of carbon in vegetation and soils (Hepburn. businesses. during a given time interval. or after completion of an inventory that can help to establish its reliability for the intended applications of that inventory. VERs is linked neither to the Kyoto Protocol nor to the EU ETS. by an independent third party. 2008). A given pool (reservoir) can be a sink for atmospheric carbon if. which describes its design including its baseline and monitoring plan.meet development goals over a specified time frame. human. 2008). that may affect these assets and people‟s ability to use these assets. financial.g. and institutions that are not legally mandated (IFCA. 2008). or a mixed REL where emissions from planned and unplanned drivers of deforestation and degradation are considered differently and separately. before the implementation of project against the requirements of a specific standard (IFCA. cultutal. including comparisons with estimates made by other bodies or with emission and uptake measurements determined from atmospheric concentrations or concentration gradients of these gases (IFCA. groups. reforestation activities will be limited to reforestation occurring on those lands that did not contain forest on 31 December 1989 (UNFCCC. 2008). For the first commitment period. Rights holders: those whose rights are potentially affected by the REDD+ program and stakeholders are those whose interests are potentially affected by the program (CCBA. In many situations marginalization exacerbates vulnerability e. seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources. are sold on the voluntary market. Reforestation: the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested land through planting. physical and political) and/or having high exposure to external stresses and shocks. methods external to the inventory are used to check the truth of the inventory. or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere. Forest dependency may be an important factor affecting vulnerability particularly where the REDD+ program itself may change access to forest resources. Verification also means provides an independent third party assessment of the expected or actual emission reductions of a particular abatement project (IFCA. Sequestration: The process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon pool other than the atmosphere (UNFCCC. 2008). 2010). 2008). on land that was forested but that has been converted to non-forested land. an aerosol. natural. including individuals. marginalization gender (CCBA. VERs is sometimes referred to as Voluntary Emissions Reductions. or likely to be elected. Verification: refers to the collection of activities and procedures that can be followed during the planning and development. Verified or Voluntary Emissions Reductions (VERs): reductions that. Emissions from unplanned activities are measured against a REL based on historical unplanned emissions. or an average of historical emissions (IFCA. unlike CERs. 2008) Sink: Any process or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas. 2008). Stakeholders: the public. or communities elected. Typically. including climate change. Voluntary market: the non-regulated market for carbon credits (especially VERs) that operateds independently from Kyoto and the EU ETS (IFCA. Validation: the assessment of a project‟s Project Design Document.

indigenous. Objective of questionnaire The purpose of the study is to better understand the linkages between land. and carbon tenure systems in Indonesia.Annex 2 – Questionnaire Questionnaire Carbon Legal System for the Implementation of Forest Carbon Scheme on REDD Projects in Indonesia: Will it secure property right? Date: ……………………………… Indonesia is a high forest cover country that also has high rate of deforestation and forest degradation. For filling all of the questions. I will also compare the Indonesia case with other international experiences (e. Australia) to analyze alternative options to adjust/reform the current system to be more fit to develop and implement a REDD scheme in Indonesia.g. main components. Thank you in advance for your participation . General question: what are the objectives of the project. management responsibilities. Your information is crucial to better understand the legal. policy. forest. you will need about 30 minutes. Questions Situation 1. management. The whole results of this study will be shared with you. Therefore. In particular. Because of this situation. Can the community access some forest resources for their use from REDD project site? 148 . private. main actors: state. What type of tenure system is in place in the project site? (Ownership. Indonesia is actively exploring the opportunity to benefit from the emerging REDD (Reduction Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing countries) scheme. etc) and what type of agreements are in place? 3. communities. The information provided will be treated confidentially and will only be presented in a summary form (there will be no mention of individual project data). please answer the following answer carefully. in general? 2. I am interested to see how REDD could influence the resolution of land tenure issues.. and property right security implications of carbon rights on REDD in Indonesia. and what are the main challenges in achieving these objectives.

What happens if there are competing rights (customary vs.g. and if so. tree. laws. 149 . statutory)? 11. environmental service license . Does Indonesia recognize carbon rights as different from rights to land or trees? a. regulations. I would appreciate if you could share these documents with me as well. Who are the potential beneficiaries and what are the conditions to access benefit sharing (e. competing customary rights) will influence your benefit sharing arrangements.g. are these rights in some way officially recognized? 5. Who takes part in the processes to design the REDD scheme? How are these actors involved in the various phases? 7. and land rights? if you have any documentation that contains information that address some of these questions.g. etc)? 10. how will carbon rights be allocated? 14. What are the processes or regulations that specify how benefits will be shared (e. Do you think that the implementation of REDD mechanisms in Indonesia may trigger or influence any sort of tenure reform? is this happening and if so in which way? 13. Are there conflicts or disputes between stakeholders due to tenure issues. and how? Tenure impacts 12. if different. titles.4. Do the local communities have customary use rights in the project site and if so. Do you expect that tenure situation (e. Do you think that customary tenure system can affect the implementation of REDD schemes and how? Benefit sharing 8. are there any mechanisms for conflict management in place? Design (Process) 6. How do you plan to address these issues with multiple claims to carbon.IUPJL)? 9.

dictate the nature of social interactions and acts as the basis of Indigenous social. extinguishment and subsequent compensation is that acts which serve to extinguish the recognition of native title only really operate to extinguish recognition in the domain of Australian law. especially where musyawarah or dispute resolution is necessary (Dunlop. 1 Element of community tenure security Effective internal institution a. can be granted to community members for long term use and ownership (Dunlop.Annex 3 – Community tenure security assessment No. 2009) b. The implications for land management. Six ethnic groups probably have customary land rights to the land within the REDD proposed areas: Orya (dominant). The Imeum Mukim.Use rights to permanent community land may be granted to community members for a specific period of time then land must be returned to the community) and free community land (still under community authority. Gresi. which wipes . Sause. communal title is formally vested in Aboriginal Land Trusts comprised of Aboriginal people who hold the title for the benefit of all the traditional landowner (Central Land Council. the Indigenous laws continue to operate regardless of the intrusions of Australian law. Kaure. (ii) permanent community land (owned collectively by the community and intended to be held in trust for future generations. Most private companies in Papua could not extract time or gain access to their forest concession without obtaining an "informal permission" from the respective adat leaders and adat community who claim the land as their own (WWF. Village leaders play a key role in the administration of adat land rights. 2009) Case study 5 (Papua) √ a. often consensus -based and guided by assemblies that represent households. strongly influenced by a community's capacity to define and implement its own rules Case study 1 (Aceh) √ a. Elseng. That is. a grant of an interest or a right under Australian law. 2010) b. Tuha Lapan and Tuha Peut were also noted as being involved in land administration matters. cultural and political identity. Communities identified the Keucik as key authority in relation to land administration. or diminated by local chief or specialized subcommities of elders or forest users b. 2009) b. Local communities who lived surrounding the forest in Papua have felt strongly that they are the right owners of the lands and forests within their adat boundaries despite the fact that their rights are not acknowledged by the state.It continues to allocate rights and interests in country. 2009) Australia √ a. community based tenure system involves a mixture of communal and individual property rights.Acehnese custom distinguish between: (i) ownership rights and use rights. andn Nimboran (just a few) (WWF.

penghibahan (gifting). Access to the land owned by Ondoafi is only possible with his permission. (iii) individual ownership rights over land that often are used for farming or other purposes. Great Ondoafi does not have the right to intervene in a decision made by other Ondoafi. All member of clan have the rights to utilize the land and natural resources within their clan's land boundaries . 2009) d. Ondoafi give permissions to anyone who needs access to land and natural resources within adat jurisdiction (WWF.(ii) tenure land right system falls under the control of the Ondoafi (the chief of the ethnic clan). peugala (pawning). Aboriginal legal systems are inextricably linked with religion. adapt to new situations and deal effectively with external forces. particularly the government c. publoue (selling.out the recognition of native title over that land. (over who gets to make the rules. 2001) c. Ondoafi seems to have freedom to rule the clan. 2001) d. Adat land right can be acquired through pusaka (inheritance). Three major types of land tenure ownership system: (i) ethnic clan (marga) ownership rights. success is indicated by the degree to which community rules and resource boundaries are accpeted as legitimate . and disputes regarding interaction with the government and outsiders) d. Outsider maybe granted use rights following a decision by community leaders and payment of compensation which depends on the size of the land (Dunlop. the effectiveness can be measured by their efectiveness in handling internal disputes. gantoue penunayah (compensation). 2009) c. Aboriginal societies tend not to divide the spiritual and the temporal in the way that societies (Sheehan. only members of the local community can acquire ownership rights to village land . mawaih (sharecropping) and peuwakeuh (grant of wakaf land) (Dunlop. and by whether communities can practice exclusive. are clear cut and enforced. may not necessarily do so under Indigenous law (Sheehan. 2009) c. 2009) 151 . This type of ownesrhip over land is held by the male lineage (by the husband or by brother from the husband side or by the oldest son in the family) (WWF.

e. where customary systems interact with formal state systems, security is affected by the degree to which a community acts in a coherent and organized manner and by the degree to which the state recognized the legitimacy of local rules and enforcement

e. use rights over permanent community land or free community land under adat authority are granted following a process of public notification in which the prospective rights-holder shows a sign of intention to cultivate (tanda dong tanoh in Acehnese). Three to six months after making sign of intention to cultivate, the candidate can report to the village leader for a decision. If there is another claimant to the land, the sign must be removed and a musyawarah is undertaken to decide who has the right to the land. If there are no other claimant to the land, the Keucik can grant use rights to the applicant (Dunlop, 2009) f. there are 3 customary institutions which operate with the Mukim that have rimary role in relation to forests: Peutua Seunubok, Panglima Uteun, and Kejreun Blang (Dunlop, 2009).

e. Other information regarding traditional tenure system : (i)women practically do not have rights to own land but they have usefruct rights by obtaining permission from their male relatives; (ii) people who have recently migrated to a village can be granted access to use land by cheif of clan for building houses or farming, but no rights to transfer land to other parties; (iii) the concept of selling and buying land is not common practice in these communities, although very few exceptions of selling land exist where the land owner sold his land to a private company or govt institution (WWF, 2009) f. checks and balances in adat institutions seem very weak. Some members in the community, in particular women, are considered to have no rights to participate in adat decision making process, let alone in her husband's clan. To develop REDD mechanism, this situation could create problems as the success of the project to control deforestation and forest degradation will depend on whether members of the adat communities participate and feel their concerns are bing accomodated. REDD project would also need to ensure that the future

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financial benefits generated would flow equally to the members of adat communities and not just to a few elites (WWF, 2009) g. The majority of intra community and inter community disputes in villages are resolved through village concensus (musyawarah) which invloves a process of discussion, negotiation and agreement. According to the community, disputes are usually resolved at the first customary meeting which is attended by the Keucik, Mukim, Tuha Peut, Imeum Mesjid, and Petua Seunubok as well as disputing parties. If the dispute is not resolved ate the first meeting a second meeting is held which is attended by the same village leaders who attend the first meeting as well as the Camat (subdistrict head) (Dunlop, 2009) 2 Legal recognition and support a. it is necessary for the state law to recognize local ownership and access rights and to identify those with rights to speak for communities ↔ a. the government's perspective of the boundary delineation process is not always consistent with that of local village leaders. According to custom, forest without specific owner is customary forest as it is managed collectively by the community.Whatever land that was not cultivated by the community would later be allocated to other community members or from other villages outside the area. However, this initiative did not come to fruition because it was not ↔ a. Special Forest Law for Papua improves the rights of the indigenous people over land and forest. The article number 5 stipulates that: " the Adat Community in Papua Province has the ownership rights over forest in their own customary land boundaries. The article no. 6 further stipulates Government of Papua still has the authority to regulate the management and utilization of the forests that are √ a. Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 was a significant step in legally acknowledging Aboriginal rights to land and has helped pave the way for Indigenous peoples around the country getting back rights to their traditional lands (Reconciliation Australia, 2009 Central Land Council, 2010)

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b. legal framework should be designed as enabling tools . With regard to community property, laws should recognize ownership, but then reflect customary rules and provide legal space for locally defined regimes within that ownership

supported by the provincial government (Dunlop, 2009) b. ordinary community members often feel excluded from the process of drawing forest boundaries. They saw the boundaries as a product of unilateral decision-making by the State in relation to forest dependent communities and a continuation of colonial policies about forest areas. This shows that even when State law is understood it is seen as a to-down process and is thus treated with indifference or disregarded (Dunlop, 2009)

c. Important that legal frameworks give equal support to private community rights and private individual property, a "leveled playing field"

c. there has been a weakening of the role of these adat institutions in the management of the forest due to the centralized legal structure of the New Order Era, the conflict which removed people from the forest area, current distortion of customary values and lack of regulatory clarity. Additionaly, there is a lack of clarity in relation to forest boundaries for adat forest which often do not match up with official government boundaries (Dunlop, 2009)

owned by the indigenous Papua (WWF, 2009) b. Special Forest Law for Papua still has a number of unresolved issues concerning : (i)restrict local rights where private sectors hold a valid forest use permits granted by Ministry of Forestry; (ii) the status of past forest use permits that are still valid in the hand of private sectors. Tensions might increase if there is no effort to resolve the current conflict over land rights claims that have emerged between private sector, government and local communities; (iii) local communities must use and manage their forest resources sustainability therefore puts some limits on cumminities to exercise their rights in order to prevent unsustainable use practices by communities (WWF, 2009) c. The special autonomy legislation, Law no.21/2001, outlines an independent governance structure of the Papua People's Council (MRP), an indigenous/ local legislative and judical system, and rights over management of natural resources. Unfortunately the implementation of this special autonomy law is marred by percieved central government indecision, leading to the creation of new provinced

b. Native Land Title Act, adopted in 1990s give greater recognition to existing institutional forms, providing very basic requirements and guidelines but leaving the details of internal group functioning to the group itself (Fingleton, 1998 cited in Lindsay, 1999)

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2008) g. This process has begun predominantly in Aceh Jaya District (Rafli et al. 4/ 2003 establishes Mukim as legitimate stakeholders with defined roles in forest management (Rafli et al. lack of coherence between adat laws in relation to forest management and the national forestry and agararian laws. Governor's decree of October 31.through another law that many Papuans see as having weakened their position both politically and economically (Latumahina and Chapin. Law on the Governance of Aceh (UUPA 11/ 2006) provides special autonomy over the use and allocation of benefits from natural resource management and formally recognizes the position of the mukim in local governanve.In terms of participatory forest management process. 2007) 155 .. 2007) f. The new provincial Government has moved strongly towards the recognition of customary forest resource rights and lands and legal basis for equitable benefit sharing.1/534/2007 commits a forestry re-design team to work towards predicting how existing land tenure will be allocated or designed before the end of 2008 (Smartwood.. 2007 number 522. Quanon no. 2006) d. e.

they actually have increased the level of conflicts b.3 Regulations. as well as (2) areas suitable for large scale investment. Some community members have no documentation whatsoever to land that they consider is legitimately under their ownership (Dunlop. can enhance tenure security and are increasingly important for communities that are enaganged in modern markets and formal financial systems x a. designated of integrated Forest Management Units (KPH) is a priority for the Ministry of Forestry under the current administration. and to clarify ruled of the game of addressing the overlaps between community and other (commercial and conservation) interests (Latumahina and Chapin. This reflects the fact that many rural Papuans do in fact want to do business with investors. Provincial Forest Department is promoting the development of enabling legislation which mandates the mapping of customary territories. No land maps identifying geographic areas of customary authority (IDLO. but that. Formal ajudication and title registry has taken place in the absence of understanding complex natural resources or in the presence of competing claims. regulatory mechanisms and institutions a. Community owns the land as inalienable freehold title (could not be acquired. sold. 2009) 156 . Papuan stakeholders have seized this as an opportunity to secure management space for local communities. 2009). It also establishes mechanism for customary authorities to work wirh government in determining (1) areas that must be aside for longterm community management. 2006) b. 2009) ↔ a. government protect people's interests in land by giving legal tenure to the land through Acts of parliament. 2009) b. Majority of landowners in communties around the Ulu Masen Ecosystem do not have Land title certificates from the National Land Agency (BPN)(Dunlop. mortgaged or disposed and title should be communal) (Reconcilliacion Australia. they wish to reserve the right of first refusal (Kayoi. 2006) √ a. official manifestations of rights such as property surveys and titles. as customary land owners. well intentined surveys and titles have not only failed to deliver tenure security. Most land owners do have local forms of land documentation such as Surat Keterangan Hak Milik (Letter of Evidence of Ownership Right) signed by the Keucik or Camat (sub-district head).

2001) ↔ a.) (IDLO. Garusam and Guriad to show the voundaries of their adat (customary) lands. 2007) c. Lands are owned by communal and majority of landownners do not have land title certificate from BPN (Takege. etc. 2009) √ a. activist-oriented public interest lawyers have been key players behind legal actions to provide communities with tenure security (White. they also noted their main limitation that they can not be used for more formal purposes such as rising a mortgage over land (Dunlop. while the rest of areas have yet to be mapped (WWF. valleys. gorges.c. FFI has been initiated participatory land use planning process. presence of independent third party to sift through local claims for various products and resources ↔ a. and developing muti-satekholder management structure by involving communities and Mukim leaders for avoiding conflicts of forest resources. Customary land boundaries are often identified through traditional of demarcation (for example rivers. 2009) d. 2009) 4 Indipendent arbitration or judiciary means a. establishing jointly agreed boundaries and land use patterns.. Use rights are documented through a "Letter of Evidence of Permission to Cultivate (Surat Keterangan Izin Garap or Surat Garap ) granted by Keucik. While communities noted that Surat Keterangan Izin Garap can be used to resolve disputes through village justice system. 2004) 157 . WWF Indonesia has conducted community mapping activities in three villages -Beneik. large trees. This process has been completed in the district of Aceh Jaya and the resulting spatial is in the final public consultation process before being approved by district parliament (Rafli et al.

2006) 5 c. local communities and their advocates need a sophisticated understanding of law and the political landscape. 2001) √ a. a once-removed arm of local government. This can be legal system of customary justice.1999) b. to allow indigenous groups to develop legally recognizable bodies which reflect (Aboriginal people's own culture and do not require them to subjugate this culture to overriding Western European legal concepts (Lindsay. 2001) 158 . 2009) x a. company or individual) (IDLO. and decisions must be accepted as legitimate by the state Political constituency for community rights a. provincial. the maps have informed and influenced the development of legal and institutional mechanism for recognizing adat territory and re-classifying forest land in ways that better accommodate adat ownership and management system in Papua (Latumahina. Aboriginal councils and associations act of 1976 establishing legal forms for indigenous groups to hold native titles. or an independent artbitrator of some kind b. policy and administrative asistance is usually necessary. Unclear land ownership status (uncertainty over who owns a particular area of land. 2009) b. Unclear land ownership status ( no land title for communal land ) (Tekege. national) are often inconsistent(IDLO.land ownership records between different levels of government (village. additional legal. sub-dictrict. b.government. local communities don't have understanding of law and even cannot defend their right from land encroachment by government (Tekege.b. along with the ability to lobby and otherwise effectively defend their rights. even if legal recognition has been secured and lands have been demarcated and registered x a. independent courts. The idependent third party must have the skill to come up with locally acceptable solutions to disputes.

customary communities have difficulty accessing new areas of land (IDLO. 2009) e. 2009) Note: √ x ↔ clear no unclear 159 .communities have limited information about land/ forest boundaries and the status of forest (IDLO.HPH. community access to forests is restricted by government authorities responsible for managing the ecosystem (IDLO. 2009) d. 2009) f. low level of involvement of communities in the process of forest management led by government including in decision about the issuing of HGU.c. and HTI (IDLO.

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