Armed Forces & Society

Civil−−Military Relations in the United States and Russia : An Alternative Approach
Dale Herspring Armed Forces & Society 2009 35: 667 DOI: 10.1177/0095327X09332140 The online version of this article can be found at:

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Civil–Military Relations in the United States and Russia
An Alternative Approach
Dale Herspring
Kansas State University

Armed Forces & Society Volume 35 Number 4 July 2009 667-687 © 2009 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. All rights reserved. 10.1177/0095327X09332140 hosted at

The key to understanding civil–military relations in polities such as Russia and the United States is military culture. Military culture includes a variety of characteristics or norms of behavior. Some such as executive leadership, respect for military expertise, and a clear chain of command are critical and exist in both the American and Russian militaries. Looking at two periods in both countries (Yeltsin and George Bush II, and Putin and George Bush I), this article maintains that in those instances when military culture was ignored in either country (e.g., a lack of executive leadership, little respect for military expertise, and lack of a clear chain of command), conflict not only existed but also was acerbated. Conversely, in cases where the civilians were firmly in charge but respected military culture, conflict was minimized. Senior military officers felt free to express their opinions and had the perception that their views were always taken seriously. Keywords: U.S. military; Russian military; civil–military relations; military culture

If a lion stands at the head of an army of lions, victory is assured. If a lion stands at the head of an army of asses, the chances are fifty-fifty. But if an ass stands at the head of an army of lions, you can call it quits. General Alexandr Lebed, “On Leadership” (Russian, no date)

Traditionally, there has been an aversion to the idea of conflict when studying civil–military relations in established political systems. To some, its mere existence suggests that those in uniform are either refusing or threatening to refuse to carry out the orders of their civilian masters. This, in turn, can lead to an overemphasis on the idea of control. As James Burk put it, “The question raised is whether (or to what degree) uniformed elites follow the command of civilian political elites.”1 While there is no question that political control is important, this article argues that conflict is healthy when it is regulated in a mature, stable political system such as the United States or Russia.

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to what degree a general is able to persuade his or her civilian Downloaded from afs. it follows that focus should be on nature of interactions between the military and its civilian masters. it is to channel it in a positive direction.ISS on August 30. and the civilian leadership must decide how much and on what to spend its treasury. That does not mean an absence of conflict. The same may be true of the means for achieving national goals. Civilians tend to look at force and the use of force differently from those in the military. In other words. The key to healthy civil–military relations is to create and maintain a situation in which the relationship between the two sides is constructive and both sides respect the other.4 While there is no doubt that military influence is important— for example. The first characteristic is that military and civilian elites are definable but not necessarily homogenous it their views of the policy process. even when policy actions appear wrong headed. they think alike. Civilians may prefer more emphasis on the use of force. The third characteristic is that civil–military relations are interactive. although not always adopted. and the army more troops. The navy always believes it needs more ships. Every country’s budget is finite. 2010 .com at Kings College London . acerbated or unregulated conflict between the civilian and military leadership can undermine military effectiveness. it would be overly simplistic to assume that because a group of individuals all wear the same. tanks. or similar. Rather. However. Here. some civilians are more hawkish than the military. It is a given. the task is not to eliminate conflict. Perhaps the best way to define healthy conflict is to state its primary characteristics. institutional decay in the American or Russian militaries refers to anything that inhibits the military from carrying out its mission.668 Armed Forces & Society As a consequence.2 Focus on Conflict Conflict between civilian officials and the military’s high command is ubiquitous. control is seldom the critical issue. while others will do almost anything to avoid the use of force—and the same thing is true of the armed forces. On the other hand. I am talking about a situation in which the civilian leadership makes the final decision. That inevitably brings the civilian leadership into conflict with the military. the air force more planes. The second characteristic is that the military agrees with Clausewitz. every individual who takes the oath of office as an officer in a mature political system agrees to accept civilian supremacy. and other weapons. influence is not the critical issue. After all. uniforms. only to learn that senior military officers are in favor of greater use of diplomatic means. but senior military officers feel free to express their opinions and have the perception that their views are taken seriously. It can lead to what Zoltan Barany called “institutional decay.sagepub.3 For officers in political systems where the process has been bureaucratized and routinized.” As Barany defined the term. it is always subordinate to civil authorities.

they are both prepared to compromise. at Kings College London . While it was useful in its day.”6 To effectively utilize military power. they will need someone from the other side to point out a policy’s problems. one runs the risk of overlooking the interactive nature of the relationship. and the definition of war.”8 As the authors noted. There are times when both military and civilian officials will be wrong. It is the interaction between civil and military leaders that helps define “healthy conflict. Comparing Militaries In the past. and Russian Civil–Military Relations 669 counterpart to purchase this or that weapon—if too much emphasis is focused on military influence (which is another word for control). political objectives.S.”7 So where does this leave us? Short of a military coup. others did not.”5 The fourth characteristic is that the policy process need not be a zero-sum game.Herspring / U. as Gibson and Snider noted.S. if that is absent—perhaps the military is forbidden to speak up or is ignored by political authorities—civilians run the risk of ordering the military to do something for which it is not prepared. Then there was an effort to look at the impact of revolutions on civil–military relations as well as a number of books that looked at geographical regions. demography. Unfortunately.9 Huntington wrote the section on the U.sagepub. a constructive political engagement is one in which senior officers feel free to express their opinions while accepting civilian supremacy in decision making. while insuring that the military has an appropriate and realistic role in the political decision-making process.10 The latter usually included an introduction that laid out a common conceptual framework (often the question of how democratic civil–military relations are).” The goal is to ensure that the interrelationship is symbiotic. the book lacked a common conceptual framework. the two sides will be involved in what they called an “Area of Overlap and Tension. it is necessary to relate issues such as national resources.11 Downloaded from afs. Instead. One of the first was the book cowritten by Samuel Huntington and Zbiniew Brzezinski. to the military tools available to achieve foreign policy goals. military. Deborah Avant emphasized the positive impact of the military when she observed that “a military that uses its expertise to influence policy may be a good thing if it creates policy more likely to achieve a country’s goals in the international system. when it comes to most issues. both sides are interested in learning from the other and that when positions are put forth. the approach that will provide the highest extent of military interaction is one in which there is what Sarkesian and Connor called “constructive political engagement. “The problem is to develop a relationship that is appropriate and acceptable to both civilians and the military. 2010 . there have been a number of attempts to compare civil–military relations in different countries. In other words. while Brzezinski wrote the chapter on the Soviet military. This assumes that while civilians are in charge. including strategy.ISS on August 30. while some contributors tried to incorporate this conceptual framework.

How do we ensure that we are looking at the same political processes in the two countries? In a recent book he edited on civil–military relations in Latin America. Furthermore. While Desch is to be commended for making the effort to compare this process in four different polities. Third. and the culturalist. for example. and Russian experiences is warranted. philosophies. customs. it is not clear that one will be able to obtain such data in depth in more than one polity. there are serious problems with the analysis. the Russian and American militaries resemble each other in many ways. institutionally. have created shared individual expectations within the Downloaded from afs. traditions and structure. Military Culture In their study of military culture in the United States. with the exception of General Douglas MacArthur.ISS on August 30. Comparing the United States and Russia There are a number of reasons why a comparison of the U. the structuralist.670 Armed Forces & Society There also have been efforts to compare civil–military relations in different countries. 2010 . which studies institutions. The key question is how to compare these two militaries.12 The Problem The real problem. They are both highly bureaucratized and institutionalized militaries. it seems to me that many officers obey for neither reason but out of a sense of duty.sagepub. Second. is what kind of a conceptual framework to utilize in comparing civil–military at Kings College London . which focuses primarily on the decision maker.15 look at rewards and punishment in an effort to determine how and why military officers obey their civilian leaders. For example. I am not suggesting that they are on a equal plane when it comes to war-fighting capability. Collins. that over time. Political obedience has been a sine qua non.14 While rationalist studies. First. Ulmer. one of the best known is Michael Desch’s much acclaimed Civilian Control of the Military. both militaries are prepared to (and have) engaged in conflict. Desch’s look at civil–military relations in Russia during the Yeltsin period was superficial. and Jacobs defined culture as “the prevailing values. neither has faced a serious problem with political obedience from the military. They are clearly not. Russia is far behind the United States when it comes to modern weapons and equipment. however. such as the now classic work by Peter Feaver.S.13 David Pion-Berlin suggested in his introduction that the study of civil–military relations could be broken down into three parts: the rationalist. without having done in-depth research on the topic. which looks at the subject.

To a large degree. by definition. and Russian Civil–Military Relations 671 institution about appropriate attitudes. for reasons of space we look at only three shared by both countries. The remainder of this article focuses on American and Russian military culture. The political leadership has the option of treating the military however it wishes. Some of them exist in all armed forces. Executive leadership. military leaders will be more likely to speak openly and provide their views on critical issues to the political leadership. military culture is different from culture in other organizations. they determine how military personnel interact with each other.sagepub. is structured to enable the military to fight wars.19 Military culture is the key for creating the healthy conflict that is critical to operationalize constructive political engagement. In this sense.” This means that the military’s organizational culture.S. which is not surprising. Others are unique to a particular country.”16 In another study. culture is learned behavior. However. let us turn to these characteristics or norms. Recognition of the norms of military culture is not a panacea for creating a symbiotic civil–military relationship. This is critical for all militaries. perhaps most important.18 Military culture is a set of norms that regulate the lives of those in uniform. Critical Characteristics of Military Culture20 1.ISS on August 30. To a large degree. After all. and by and large it will obey. what kind of behavior they expect from the civilians with whom they come in contact. In the case of the armed at Kings College London . if the norms of military culture are respected. the soldier must act in a certain manner and may be required to lay down his or her life.Herspring / U. In the process of fighting a war. While this writer had identified at least six characteristics in the United States and perhaps ten in Russia. the organization’s mission is often referred to as “to kill and break things. 2010 . one would expect the characteristics of military culture to differ as well. personal beliefs. some countries share some aspects of political culture but not others. Military culture includes a variety of characteristics or norms of behavior. and behaviors. Inside the military. Militaries are based on a hierarchical structure. However. even though they may comprise many. civilian respect for these norms will maximize communications and result in healthy conflict that will optimize political and military inputs to policy decisions. Now.”17 In other words. The level of conflict may also decrease because the military officers will come away believing they have had their day in court. ever-changing individuals. military culture is a result of the organization’s effort to prepare its members for its end goal. military service is unique because in carrying out his or her mission. Since military culture is a reflection of civilian society. Nick Jans and David Schmidtchen noted that “organizations that endure— have distinct and stable personalities that govern most of their behavior. how they carry out their missions. There will always be a conflict between the norms of military culture and those of the civilian leadership. how they see the outside (civilian) world. members are socialized so that they learn how to “act properly” inside the confines of the various services. and. and it is absolutely critical that the civilian executive and his Downloaded from afs.

is the power to persuade.672 Armed Forces & Society or her deputies lead.sagepub. while in the other instance (the Yeltsin and George W. 3.ISS on August 30. key officers who are left out of the decision-making process can become obstacles to the smooth enactment of political decisions through bureaucratic obfuscation. Furthermore. creates confusion and even chaos inside the armed forces. whether Russian or American. what can military culture tell us about each country individually and. commented that “the power of presidential politics. Comparing U. Nothing upsets military operations more than unclear orders or a confused chain of command. Respect for military expertise. about comparing civil–military relations? It is also important to emphasize that the methodology used in this article is qualitative. primary materials including newspaper articles. this is something the military expects. Similarly. a minister of defense. more important. at times chaotic. this study focuses on two different periods in Russia and two in the United States. as the commanders try to figure out what the senior officers or civilian officials wanted them to do or whose orders they should obey. rather than attempting to quantify the degree of respect or disrespect. Bush or Bush I and Putin periods). The question therefore is. It was the late Richard Neustadt who. Each of the characteristics noted above is analyzed during all four periods. What that means is that while the military is prepared to carry out whatever order it receives. W. given space limitations. and secondary materials including a variety of articles and books. they also expect civilian officials to show respect for the expertise they have gained in 30 or more years of military service. Clear chain of command. The commonality between them was that in one case civil–military relations were more or less symbiotic (the George H. 2. not quantitative. 2010 . The data are taken from a wide variety of sources.”21 A president. Second. each of the three country discussions evaluates the level of Downloaded from afs.S. It creates confusion and even chaos. it expects civilian authorities to listen to what they say and take it into consideration as they make key national security decisions. Bush or Bush II periods) relations were very at Kings College London . While generals and admirals acknowledge the primacy of civilian leadership and are prepared to follow whatever order they receive from such authorities. official sources. with the American polity in mind. the data. more important. Failure to do so not only undermines morale but also. and Russian Civil–Military Relations First. or secretary of defense will have a better chance of getting senior military officers to accept his policies enthusiastically if the generals and admirals believe they are part of the process.

Yeltsin repeatedly cut the military budget. the case of military reform. and Russian Civil–Military Relations 673 respect on a national basis. W. for example. Yeltsin provided almost no political leadership for the military during his tenure.e. As General Rokhlin commented. Bush and Boris Yeltsin administrations would seem to bear striking similarities. the Army and Navy) have been reduced to a desperate state.. “That amount would not even cover the cost of six months of the salaries and benefits mandated by Russian law. Bush and the Vladimir Putin administrations.7 billion. “If military reform is now at an impasse and the Armed Forces. a 98 percent decrease!26 The bottom line was that it was disingenuous for him to expect the Army to remain combat capable at a time when he was starving it for funds. Executive leadership. and a bank would supply the military’s hats and boots during the first war in Chechnya. for example.5 billion. Just how similar were these administrations. Downloaded from afs. how similar or different were the four periods? Based on intuition alone.Herspring / U. In 1997. but also the president’s office would be needed to overcome bureaucratic obstacles within the military. and in 1994 it was $71.”25 By the end of his tenure. If the generals hoped to be successful. The Case Studies22 The key question to be asked is. the George W.ISS on August 30. this is primarily the fault of the country’s political leadership. in 1993 it was down to $74. he ignored them. he cut the budget another 20 percent. As Colonel General Igor Rodionov put it.S. the military budget had fallen from $142 billion dollars in 1992 to $4 billion in at Kings College London . In 1991 the military budget stood at $324.24 Indeed. the preponderance of evidence indicates that the Yeltsin regime showed little respect for military expertise. and how much does an examination of these four periods tell us about the value of military culture as a vehicle for comparing diverse political systems? The Yeltsin Administration 1. they had to have strong support from the president. which has completely removed itself from the management of military reform. These conclusions are charted to see what factors were most associated with the creation of “constructive political engagement” and which ones undermined it. 2010 . the situation with the budget would get so bad that soldiers would be sent out to pick mushrooms.sagepub. Take. as would the George H.1 billion. per se (i.93 billion. Not only was money involved.”23 What is even worse than his lack of leadership is that Yeltsin provided a military budget that created chaos and made military reform impossible. The next year it was down to $86. When the generals begged him for more money. Consider the following: instead of providing the money for military reform and thereby giving the generals the stability and predictability any senior officer needs to plan.

146 men had been killed and another 374 were missing and presumed dead. Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev.. They may not have liked the direction he would have taken the military. it was given ambiguous and fine-sounding language. Yet Yeltsin insisted. The situation between Yeltsin and the military became so bad that retired General Lev Rokhlin mounted an unsuccessful effort to have him removed. The military was looking for at Kings College London .27 The generals were especially upset at Yeltsin’s refusal to consider their advice when it came to the First Invasion of Chechnya.29 As the generals had predicted. Indeed. he asked himself. instead. most of it was vague.674 Armed Forces & Society Take another example. too unpredictable. This was why General Grachev demanded that Yeltsin put his order in writing. The military was so upset about being ordered to invade when there were insufficient weapons. As a consequence. equipment. This became evident in the aftermath of his order that Russian Army tanks become involved in the 1993 attack on the state Duma. who was ordered to take command of the operation but refused). They complained about the operation—the Army was in no condition to carry out such an operation. Yeltsin called for the formulation of a National Security Concept. most of all. while it provided some idea of where Yeltsin was taking the country. Respect for military expertise. regulars. he made it clear that he did not respect the high command and made no effort to hide it. By February 24. and they would probably have fought him behind the scenes.sagepub. 2010 . the Deputy Commander of Ground Forces.g. In May 1996. Yeltsin was convinced the cold war was over and therefore did not need the military as might have been the case in the past. 2. However.30 Yeltsin then blamed the army for the serious losses suffered by Russian troops in Chechnya. Yeltsin’s leadership style was too chaotic. too focused on keeping himself in power to effectively deal with the country’s deep-seated problems. the invasion was a military disaster. why worry about the armed forces? They would not be needed in the immediate future. The generals wanted no part of being involved in politics and felt Yeltsin would not listen to them. the generals found Yeltsin seriously lacking. training that approximately 540 officers resigned rather than serve in the war—including some of the most senior generals in the army (e. reservists. The military resented Yeltsin’s attitude.31 Yeltsin further undercut the generals’ ability to deal directly with their troops in 1994. 557 officers had been fired. 1. Russian officers believed that at least they had a right to expect the president to show leadership. 1995. With that in mind. airborne. border guards were put in the same unit).28 By April 1995. specific guidelines. naval infantry. Not the kind of leadership from Yeltsin that the military was seeking. When he came to power. Troops who had never trained together were sent to fight together (e. They were not about to have him—like Gorbachev—use military force and then blame them if anything went wrong. The military was excited. Finally a document that will define the course of Russian security policy! Unfortunately.. and.ISS on August 30. when it came to leadership.g. when he issued a presidential decree that “subordinated all ‘force organs to the Downloaded from afs. and criminal proceedings had begun against 11 of them.

“there were over eight changes of senior command” in Russian forces. Grachev was not only named commander of a potential invasion but also told to negotiate with the Chechens about the region’s future as well. One of the first things he did was to call a meeting of all of the agencies involved in the war in Chechnya to try to impose some order on military operations. In fact. Throughout the Chechen operation. This was standard procedure for Putin—intervene. They now worked directly for the president. To make matters worse. The Russian General Staff had a variety of functions. Yeltsin and the Security Council tied his hands to such a degree that he was unable to be effective. Between 1994 and 1996. let alone modernize and reform it.32 It was organizational chaos. The First Chechen War illustrated the chaotic nature of command relationships in the Russian Army under Yeltsin.Herspring / U. So in 1995 Yeltsin told his colleagues that he intended to detach the General Staff from the Ministry of Defense and create two parallel structures. The Armed Forces were in a disastrous condition as a result of Yeltsin’s refusal to listen to his generals or provide even the minimal amount of money necessary to keep it going. but only if absolutely necessary. 2010 . for the military. Military morale was at rock bottom. but even if they were operational they were traditionally subordinated to the defense minister. at another it was the Interior Ministry—and then that changed back to the army.sagepub. The consequence was organizational chaos. 3. he left behind ten years of neglect. the Putin administration was a breath of fresh air. The Chief of the General Staff and the defense minister sometimes had differences of opinion—and that happened frequently when General Igor Sergeyev was defense minister and General Anatoli Kvashnin was Chief of the General Staff. Beginning with his emergence as Prime Minister in 1999. Downloaded from afs. Who were the soldiers supposed to follow? The defense minister or the Chief of the General Staff? When Yeltsin left the scene. then back to Interior. 1. it gave the defense minister too much power.ISS on August at Kings College London . the military lost its ability to be heard by members of the legislative.S. Executive leadership. it was clear that Putin was prepared to provide executive leadership. At one point it was under the command of the army.’” As a result. He also announced he would accept personal responsibility for Chechnya. Clear chain of command. and Russian Civil–Military Relations 675 president. Yeltsin interfered and countermanded the generals’ orders. The 1996 Law on Defense did exactly that. and rebuilding the armed forces would be a very long and difficult undertaking. a positive change. the chain of command constantly changed. Yeltsin was concerned about this arrangement. Over time this would result in constant confusion and at times even chaos as the line of authority became blurred.33 The Putin Administration Compared to Yeltsin’s.

It is impossible for senior military officers to plan if they do not know how much money they will receive or what is expected of them. perhaps the most important one. but it remained far below civilian salaries in large part because of inflation. most generals tend to be flexible and nonideological. Many think that it was this decision to use fuel oil explosives “that did the trick. While some generals (Kvashnin comes to mind) did everything they could to undermine this “experiment. Putin sent Interior Ministry troops to Dagestan. then use it. The important point is that Putin showed leadership. On August 16. large armies based on the use of mass forces backed up by hundreds if not thousands of tanks and artillery were a thing of the past. Putin also pushed hard for salary increases. the military budget was (in billions of rubles) R146. which. “Another factor.36 In contrast to Yeltsin. believing that the future was in high technology—not in the mass of troops. for the success of the invasion was the resolve and direction demonstrated by the political leadership in Moscow.”37 Most pleasing from the generals’ standpoint was Putin’s response when they asked to use the highly destructive fuel oil explosives. Putin’s approach in dealing with the high command was in striking contrast to that of Yeltsin. 2. Similarly.ISS on August 30.”34 Another observer. and since that time the Russian military has gradually moved in that direction (in spite of many problems and stops and starts). in discussing his leadership in dealing with Chechnya. Putin also showed that he was a leader when it came to budgeting money for the military. His approach to making changes in the military was gradualistic. This was also Putin’s pragmatic approach to leadership: If this idea worked. and that was the idea of professionalizing the Russian armed forces. by 2006 it was up to R498. This was a politically risky action. The military’s salary was raised several times. once it appeared that the senior military staff was Downloaded from afs. Putin made it clear to the generals that he was interested in their ideas on the use of force. commented. Similarly.”35 There was one area where Putin pushed the generals. In 2000. emphasized his connection to the war.sagepub. Putin demonstrated his leadership role in dealing with Chechnya while he was still Prime Minister by flying “down to Grozny in a jet fighter. where they. Respect for military expertise. if nothing else. the generals ran the military.676 Armed Forces & Society Once he took over as president. together with local security forces and some military units.76. 1999. It involved “Russian heavy aerial bombing. Forget about its ideological significance. Fighting lasted three at Kings College London . Putin’s primary goal was to reintroduce stability and predictability into the military. namely Vladimir Putin as acting Prime Minister. while Putin may have been the major lever pushing the military to become a professional force. 2010 .”38 For Putin. when Putin assumed the presidency. For Putin and many of the generals. engaged the Chechens.” others were in favor. rocket attacks from Russian helicopter gunships and artillery assaults. It not only was out of date (look at the Western militaries) but also cost too much. Putin approved the plan and made it clear to them that they were the ones fighting the war.

Furthermore. He gave them time to adapt and listened to them. Early on in his administration. the Duma changed Article 13 of the Law on Defense to mention only the Defense Ministry: “Oversight for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is carried out by the defense minister via the Defense Ministry. in spite of Putin’s comments. as Bing West put it. Bush is the first president with an MBA. For the first time since 1999 they were getting back to the world of stability and predictability. No longer would senior officers have to put up with the confusion and inefficiencies that come from not knowing who to obey.40 He was replaced by Sergei Ivanov.”41 From now on the Chief of the General Staff worked for the defense minister. the battle between the two senior officers raged on. a former KGB general and a close friend and confident of Putin. Kvashnin continued to fight with the defense minister—in this case Ivanov. Putin may have argued with this or that general about what he believed should be done. The generals and admirals were not overjoyed at some of the ideas Putin forced on them—for example. Consequently. “President Bush presided more than decided. 2010 . Executive leadership.”39 However. He “let it be known that he favors a corporate model of political leadership. Bush was not about to get involved in how Rumsfeld ran the Pentagon. The same was true of training exercises—which had been almost nonexistent from 1999 to 2001. and Russian Civil–Military Relations 677 dedicated to the idea.”44 The primary result of this leadership style was that it placed primary control of the military in the hands of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He found the money for them. The Second Bush Administration42 1. That removed one part of the problem. Bush did meet with senior Downloaded from afs. 3. 2001. on March 28. a professional military—but they were appreciative of his leadership. this meant. Furthermore. but from all appearances he appears to have treated all of them with at Kings College London . on June 14. Putin receded in the background and permitted the generals who understood the military to implement the new program. he ordered both generals to “silence their debate and come up with realistic policy proposals. Once he selected an option. Putin then fired Kvashnin. Clear chain of command. . . the Kremlin announced that the defense minister had stepped down to become a presidential advisor. The senior officers also appreciated the clear chain of command that he created. Finally.sagepub. the first who had been a CEO. operational matters were taken away from the General Staff and given to the Ministry of Defense.ISS on August 30. Unfortunately.S. Putin understood the importance of a clear chain of command. . acting like the chairman of the board rather than the chief executive. Georg W. it was clear to him that the constant bickering between Kvashnin and Sergeyev had to stop. he considered his job done. but it was up to the generals to decide what kind of exercises to put on.Herspring / U.”43 For practical purposes.

when the U. on which planes or ships.sagepub.”46 As a result. To make matters worse.S. The most notable characteristic of Rumsfeld’s reign was his almost complete distrust of the uniformed military. the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). “The TPFDD for Iraq was an unbelievably complex master plan governing which units would go where. in planning for the invasion. but he left it up to Rumsfeld to decide how and what advice the Pentagon would provide to the president. they lacked both numbers and the right kinds of troops.ISS on August 30. and with what equipment. He did his best to exclude the Army’s Chief of Staff. General Eric Shinseki.. greater reliance on high tech weapons that would compensate for large numbers of troops). Furthermore. thereby showing that his high-tech “shock and awe” policy was not only viable but also the best way to fight a war.678 Armed Forces & Society officers on more than one occasion. almost nothing had been done. he cancelled a key weapons program under less than honorable conditions. To make matters worse. For example. and he provided general guidance on policy. Rumsfeld was determined to prove the superiority of his transformation policy. He believed the military’s task was simply to carry out his orders.g. the generals were often excluded from meetings with the secretary and the president and therefore in many cases did not know what had been decided.000—far too few to deal with the postcombat period. 2.” It was then up to the military to quietly implement it even if was undefined and even if doing so made it impossible to carry out the missions assigned to it. He began his administration by holding secret meetings on the future of the military while excluding the generals from them. he openly interfered with the Army’s massive planning document. 2010 . He also convinced Franks not to deploy the 17. Rumsfeld provided too much leadership. This is why he refused to accept Tommy Frank’s number of 480. On issues such as transformation and the war in Iraq. In fact. He primary concern was implementing a policy of “military transformation (e. Unfortunately.45 Meanwhile.500 troops of the First Cavalry Division in Iraq—an action that deprived the military of troops badly needed to stabilize the country. forces arrived in Iraq. Rumsfeld and his colleagues assured the Army that the issue of posthostilities operations (or Phase IV as the military called it) had been fully taken care of prior to the invasion. when. Respect for military expertise. who had made considerable headway in transforming the army from a tank-heavy force to a lighter force. so that everything would be coordinated and ready at the time of attack. Why? Because Rumsfeld had pulled them out of the TPFDD. from the military’s standpoint. he told the military not only what he wanted but also what conclusions he expected them to reach. Rumsfeld was also dismissive of military advice in the lead up to and in the invasion of Iraq.000 troops and instead beat him down until the United States invaded with about at Kings College London . The United States would invade Iraq with minimal numbers of troops. The civilians had ignored the military’s concern because they were convinced what an Downloaded from afs.

Herspring / U. Bush expected to be consulted on policies involving the use or the threat of the use of military force. forces in the Panama Zone. Rumsfeld wanted only officers who agreed with him in key assignments. It is not surprising that the military reacted negatively to Rumsfeld’s interference and attempts to micromanage its actions in Iraq. There were problems with the chain of command under Rumsfeld. Clear chain of command. The First Bush Administration—George H. Bush 1. W. Rumsfeld and his colleagues—in particular Jerry Bremer. but he was closely involved in making key decisions.S. 3. The result. consider the invasion of Panama. This was evident in the invasions of Panama and Kuwait. First. On many occasions. One of the worst examples of the confusion of this situation came from the first attack on the city of Fallujah by the Marines. Furthermore. while Bremer was dealing directly with Rumsfeld or Condi Rice at the White House. that the new Iraqi government would quickly take over. Although he did not try to micromanage security policies. Rumsfeld continued to ignore those who disagreed with him throughout his time in office. who had been sent to Iraq to set up the Coalition Provisional Authority—took two steps opposed by the military that had disastrous results—the disestablishment of the Baath Party and the dismemberment of the Iraqi at Kings College London .”47 He also went out of his way to select officers he believed he could control—the most obvious being General Richard Myers. he passed on the promotion of all officers at the three-star rank and above. and neither was on speaking terms with the other. After Panamanian strongman Manuel Antonio Noriega’s forces had attacked U.S. Bush permitted the military and the defense department to work out policy recommendations. The result was a constant bureaucratic struggle between the army and the State Department. Worst of all. especially from the latter action.sagepub. The Marines reported through a military chain of command. and that the Americans could leave shortly after liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party. was an influx of thousands of Iraqis into the insurgency. Executive leadership. and Russian Civil–Military Relations 679 Iraqi refugee had told them—that they would be greeted with open arms.ISS on August 30. neither was in charge of operations in Iraq. George H. 2010 . both reported to Rumsfeld. W. the officer was doomed to retirement. “If he did not like a senior officer’s political views or approach to transformation or leadership. Another example comes from Iraq. General Colin Powell met with Bush Downloaded from afs. a devotee of high tech and an Air Force officer who believed in showing deference to the civilian leadership. As a result. Rumsfeld participated in the selection of officers at the two-star level. While General Ricardo Sanchez was in command of American troops and Paul Bremer was in charge of the Provisional Command Authority.

He allowed the military professionals to handle operational matters. by suddenly expanding his order.”48 The situation was similar when it came to the decision to oust the Iraqis from Kuwait.ISS on August 30. The planning and implementation of military actions was almost entirely in the hands of Powell and Schwarzkopf. Clear chain of command. This was evident in both military actions. 3. Finally. with the president in attendance. Bush expected the military to come to him with plans. But the important aspect of this military action was that Bush trusted his commanders. George H. Bush asked for the input of all of his advisors and commanders. the chain of command was clear. General Norman Schwarzkopf. Bush was not a micromanager. Powell argued for a massive use of force. but he himself made the decision to break off hostilities. the day after the Iraqis had crossed into Kuwait. let’s do it. He asked them to come up with an invasion plan that the chiefs approved. After hearing Powell’s explanation of the situation on the at Kings College London . Powell laid it out for the president. During this Bush administration. As was the case in the invasion of Panama.sagepub. it is also worth noting that when it came to terminating the successful effort to oust Saddam.”49 After Powell had discussed the additional resources required. and work out new force structures and military doctrines. and Bush approved. expanding his charge to the armed forces to not only keep Saddam Hussein from invading Saudi Arabia but also. and Powell briefed it to the president.S. When it became obvious that there was a high probability that military force would be used to get rid of Panamanian dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega. decide to build up—go for an offensive option—this is what we need. if you. 2. In planning the invasion of Panama. Bush was careful to get inputs from his generals before calling a truce in this military action. Bush would frustrate the military. W. 1989. Bush insisted that the United States respond. throw the Iraqis out of Kuwait. the individual in charge of U. Bush asked only to be kept abreast of what was happening while leaving the fighting to the military. as noted above. the National Security Council met. For his part. Mr. “Okay. forces in the region. During the Panamanian invasion. “Now. Bush’s prime concern was to avoid a repeat of the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran as well as to preclude the kind of interservice rivalry that had taken place in Grenada. Bush said. The National Security Council (NSC) met again on October 31. briefed the president on the situation. Bush and Powell met from time to time to polish various aspects of the operation.680 Armed Forces & Society the afternoon of December 16. This is evident from several examples. planning for the First Gulf War was left almost entirely in the hands of Powell and Schwarzkopf. President. Furthermore. Bush approved and told Powell to get to work on the operation. He brought Bush up to date on what had happened. justify the military budget. Respect for military expertise. At that meeting. Powell met privately with Generals Maxwell Thurman and Carl Stiner. the Downloaded from afs. True. 2010 . On August 2.

then a violation of military culture may be inevitable. the Marines would have liked to divert some of their forces that were returning from the Far East to take part in the operation. the Marines’ offer was politely declined. but Scowcroft insisted. conflicts will ensue. Downloaded from afs. however. one would be presented with a “state within a state. In such at Kings College London . Almost all militaries. There were only two attempts to circumvent this chain of command. However. in spite of the different Russian and American political systems and political cultures. there is the issue of change. it is important that executive leadership be followed up by respect for military expertise and a clear chain of command. permit me to use the following chart (see Table 1). evolutionary change is another thing altogether. As is evident from the Bush II period.Herspring / U. The first question that must be asked is what kind of change. Second. Powell checked and was told by Thurman that they were not in danger. At Powell’s request. to Generals Thurman and Stiner.50 So what does this chart tell us? First. to Powell (with the Joint Chiefs being informed of what was taking place by Powell). Radical change is one thing. executive leadership is critical but not sufficient. at least in a situation in which civil authorities were in charge. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney called Scowcroft. military culture can be a useful vehicle for isolating or at least pointing to the factors that acerbate conflict in civil–military relations. Without executive leadership. in the process three soldiers were wounded and a Spanish photographer killed. It is hard to imagine a situation similar to that which existed under Yeltsin in which there would be a lack of executive leadership but respect for the military and a clear chain of command. NSC advisor Brent Scowcroft intervened on behalf of a major newspaper to ask Powell to come to the aid of some newspaper reporters who were holed up in a hotel. and Russian Civil–Military Relations 681 chain of command ran directly from the president. The military sent out a rescue group and extracted the journalists—who were not in danger. If the goal is radical change. during the operation.S. asking him not to issue any more orders from the sidelines. tend to resist change. But because they would take too long to arrive in Panama and delay the operation’s schedule. Second. Conclusion: Comparing Russian and American Civil–Military Relations For purposes of clarification. 2010 . First.” with the military enjoying complete autonomy. and that certainly includes the American and especially the Russian military.sagepub. To produce the kind of constructive relationship discussed above.ISS on August 30. The most they can do to limit conflict is to find military officers who are respected by their colleagues and leave it up to them— not civilians—to implement changes. but civilian authorities may be able to minimize conflict by respecting military culture to the maximum degree possible.

For example. The difference between the two countries is that Yeltsin’s lack of leadership and disrespect went far beyond that of Rumsfeld.S. bring in new equipment and training techniques. for example. Take. Lest the reader get the wrong impression. despite Rumsfeld’s arrogance in dealing with the military. and. + = military attitude toward regime behavior is generally positive.S. Putin’s approach.ISS on August 30. it went on not for six years but for almost ten years. This brings us back to the hypothesis presented in the beginning of this article. and Admiral Crowe was furious when he found out that General Woerner had been fired without him having been consulted. There was. as much as Rumsfeld may have been determined to introduce change in the U. military. This kind of disagreement will always be a part of civil– military relations in every country. Similarly. However. He knew what he wanted and was not concerned about the uniformed military’s response. namely. Similarly. This certainly happened under Yeltsin and Bush II. The result was constant conflict. when faced with the seemingly never-ending conflict he had between his two most senior officers. more professional military. the opposite took place under Putin and Bush I. and changed the relationship between the General Staff and the defense ministry. He wanted change but in a direction that appears to have coincided with the views of the majority of senior officers. just as important. It was far worse in Russia under Yeltsin than it was in the United States under Rumsfeld. the level of conflict or institutional decay has not been the same in both countries.682 Armed Forces & Society Table 1 Comparison of Military Attitudes Military Attitude toward: Characteristic Executive leadership Respect for military expertise Clear chain of command Yeltsin - - - Putin + + + Bush I + + + Bush II + - Note: – = military attitude toward regime behavior is generally negative. Washington continued to buy weapons systems. This is not to suggest that there was no conflict in the civil–military relationship in either country during those four administrations. that violating the canons of military culture acerbates conflict. He was careful to respect military culture while pushing for change. he gradually removed the first. at Kings College London . and pay the military well by standards of Downloaded from afs. he simply did not care what the military thought. military is continuing to fight two wars despite a plethora of problems. Evolutionary change is different. 2010 . there were Russian officers who strongly opposed Putin’s favoritism toward conventional forces over the Strategic Rocket Forces or his strong push for a smaller. The U. despite the foregoing. then the second. Powell had run-ins with Cheney.

1 (Fall 2002): 7. to validate it. 2007). it is important to keep in mind that this story is incomplete.Herspring / U. See Dale Herspring. and the army did not train for more than ten years. for example. it must be applied elsewhere in other polities to determine its universal validity.S. Zoltan Barany. bureaucratized military force—that of Canada. and Russian Civil–Military Relations 683 the past. 77-78. Statesman and Cold War Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press. For an essay arguing the critical importance of “influence. “The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil-Military Relations.” Armed Forces & Society 29. meanwhile.” see Kobi Michael. in turn. Bush (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. all polities are culturally bound. Canadian Forces went through a period when senior civil authorities showed open disrespect for the country’s military leaders as the various services were forced to unify. 2010 . do rewards and punishments mean the same to military officers in Brazil or Ghana or China as they do in the United States? We are scratching the surface when it comes to understanding the dynamics of civil–military relations. Feaver’s model mentioned previously represents a major contribution to the field. an action that led to mass resignations on the part of Canadian officers. Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military (Princeton. 2. Richard K. It is based on an in-depth study of civil–military relations in two countries during two time periods. 4. Commanders. one of the characteristics of civil–military relations in Germany has been an effort to civilianize military culture by introducing the concept of Innere Führung. 5.51 It would be useful to compare that period using the three characteristics of military culture presented here and compare the Canadian and German experiences with the American and Russian. Similarly. However. Truman—but that was a rare exception to the rule in both of the countries discussed here. of course.” Naval War College Review 55 (Summer 2002):8-59. such a study would demand the same in-depth knowledge of another polity that Feaver has of the American system. But at least it is a beginning. Finally. The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Russia.ISS on August 30. 81. Other country studies along the same line would also be useful. Downloaded from afs. ships did not sail. 2005). See Timothy Colton. James Burk.sagepub. Whether we want to admit it or not. NJ: Princeton University Press. That. “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today. 3. the clash between these two men was more of personality conflict that a civil–military dispute. But does it hold for other polities? It would. but as Timothy Colton argued in his major work on the Soviet Main Political Administration.” Armed Forces & Society 33. MA: Harvard University Press. Notes 1. One can. at Kings College London . 1979). Betts. Unfortunately. and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge. 4 (2007): 518-46. Planes did not fly. Some have seen parallels between MacArthur and Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov. Someone once said that the comparative approach is the ultimate test for any model or paradigm. In 1968. did little. “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations. 7. Soldiers. point to the actions of Douglas MacArthur in openly defying the orders of his commander in chief—President Harry S. requires languages and in-depth knowledge of another culture—for example. 1991). 5. be very useful to look at the experiences of another established. Richard Kohn.

1. CO: Lynne Rienner. “Military Culture Does Matter. Civilian Control of the Military (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. esp. The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Agency. Adelman. Armies and War (Boulder. Timothy Edmunds. ed. 19. War. Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker. There are. The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc (Boulder. eds. 2 (1999): 195. The Political Role of the Military (Westport. 13. Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment (Princeton. then a constructive relationship is very unlikely. 12.g. 2002). 1998).com at Kings College London . 2 (1990): 110.. and that is why some of the military’s cultural characteristics are shared by police forces. Connor. Jr. Revolution. Christopher P. 8. J. of course.” Armed Forces & Society 24. Sam C. Careers. Ulmer. 2003). see Thomas Langston. 1996). “Must US Military Culture Reform?” Orbis (Winter 1999): 43. Snider. Walter F. Also see Edgar Schein. 2nd ed. Communist Armies in Politics (Boulder. “The Civilian Side of Military Culture. 2001).sagepub. 3. Feaver. 199).” Armed Forces & Society 25. 10. In the end. Guarding the Generals (London: Palgrave. NJ: Princeton University Press. 7. chap. 9. “Conflicting Indicators of ‘Crisis’ in American Civil-Military Relations.. Peace and Politics. 11. 1988) has had a major impact on scholars of civil–military relations all over the world.” FPRI Wire 7 (January 1999): 2. of course. Collins.” Ibid. Downloaded from afs. Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Michael Desch. 1982). Jonathan R. 2002). Gibson and Don M. it was in a state bordering on chaos given Yeltsin’s lack of leadership and respect for the military. 39. 16. Ibid. Sarkesian and Robert J. see Williamson Murray. John Hillen. 17. However. “Does Military Culture Matter?” Orbis (Winter 1999): 27. Samuel Fitch. That is true. Peter D. Joseph J. E. and Climate and How They Affect Military Capability (Canberra: Australian National Defense University.” American Psychologist 45. CT: Greenwood. 1999). Democratic Control for the Military in Post-communist Europe. 1-35. if the lines between the military and civilians are entrenched. and T. the military is more removed from civilian society and is trained to use more complex forms of violence. For a more detailed discussion of military culture. Zbiniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington.684 Armed Forces & Society 6. NJ: Princeton University Press.. 39-66 and compare his analysis with this writer’s The Kremlin and the High Command (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. The US Military Profession into the Twenty-first Century. American Military Culture in the Twenty-first Century (Washington. importance obstacles to strategic assessment are absent. 1996). 2006). Alfred Stepan’s Rethinking Military Politics. ed. One may argue that paramilitary forces such as the police also require the individual to put his or her life on the line in carrying out his or her duties. 17 15. Civil-Military Relations in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Deborah Avant.. in which she argues that “when divergence over security and corporate interests are not entrenched and profound. and Anthony Forster. “Organizational Culture. CO: Westview. MA: Harvard University Press. Nick Jans with David Schmidtchen. For a discussion of civilian military culture. Jacobs. Constantine Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson. 2006). 3 (1998): 383. and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge. http://www. Strategic and National Studies Centre. DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press. the Russian military was far less of a threat to political control than Desch assumed. 2000). “Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-making Process. CT: Greenwood. Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner. 2010 . 1982). and Williamson Murray. 14.. eds.” Parameters (Autumn 2000): 21 19.ISS on August 30. Obviously. Armed Servants. The Real C-Cubed: Culture. CO: Westview. In fact. 18. Adelman.fpri. Oversight. (London: Routledge. Jonathan R. For example. Brooks.. hundreds if not thousands of single-country studies. A similar argument is contained in Risa A. David Pion-Berlin. 2008). Andrew Cottey. Political Power: USA/USSR (Westport. eds.... see esp. 5. 1985).

8. Also see articles in Peter Feaver and Richard H.” The World and I 14 (September 1999): 311. ed. The Kremlin and the High Command.” Olga Filippova. Statesman and Cold War Crisis. 2 (October 1997).” in Russian Military Reform. the author has relied on his own extensive contact with Russian military officers as well as a variety of academic studies. 1992–2000. 2 (2006). “Reform and the Russian Ground Forces. 2004).ISS on August 30. As one Russian writer put it.” Brookings Review 15 (Fall 1997): 46-48. Herspring. 1992–1993. Statesmen. “The Challenge of Small Wars for the Russian Military. eds.” National Interest 61 (Fall 2000): 29-37. Navy and a variety of academic studies.” Washington Times. 293. for example.sagepub. Kohn. Robert Barylski. The following statement of the main characteristics of U. for example. NJ: Transaction Publishing. Nevertheless. Thomas E. 2001). February 2002). and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press. 2002). “The Russian Military Outside Politics: A Historical Perspective. Betts.” PostSoviet Armies Newsletter 5. Civilian control is defined not only in the narrow sense.” Slavic Military Studies 14.S. Alexandr Golts. 2002). Presidential Power and the Modern Presidency: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press. It is important to note that the Russians. Jans with Schmidtchen. 4 (April 1990): at Kings College London . 57-58.Herspring / U. UK: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. 80. Edgar R.” in The Russian Military Power and Policy. 1998. Richard Neustadt. 11. and Russian Civil–Military Relations 685 20. November 20. how similar or different is the process in both countries? Are there certain commonalities that are critical to creating symbiotic civil–military relations? If so. 136. citing General Vrobyev. Christopher C. 1 (March 2001): 1-26. ed. Michael Orr. 2003). Anatol Lieven. Aldis and Roger N. “CivilMilitary Relations: The Comparative Analysis of Russian and Foreign Approaches to the Issue. “The Social and Political Condition of the Russian Military. while in foreign studies this term has a broader meaning.” Atlantic Monthly 280. e. Gregory D. The critical question is. Conflict Studies Research Centre.. Cited in Michael J.g. 1992–2000. Bacevich. have had little to say about military culture or civil–military relations. Rodionov and Reform.” Journal of Democracy 4. Algorithm. “The Military and Modern Society. MA: MIT Press. CA: Presidio.” Military Review 70.” PONARS Policy Memo. Soldiers. C92 (Camberley. 22. 2003).S. 9-12. Anne C. what are they and what is their impact in more than one polity? 23. See.” in Russian Military Reform. including many discussions with military officers as well as the author’s thirty-three-year association with the U. Miller and Dmitri Trenin (Cambridge. 21. “Concept. John Allen Williams. “The Gap. 1998). For comments on Russian military culture. Foster. McCermott (New York: Frank Cass. Ricks. The Soldier in Russian Politics (New Brunswick. American Generalship: Character is Everything: The Art of Command (Novato. 1992– 2002. The Real C-Cubed. no. ed. “How Democracies Control the Military. Aldis and Roger N. Kohn. 189-202. 1-43. A. Orr. 3. Peter Feaver. 157-58. Civilians and Their Mutual Misunderstanding. military culture is based on a variety of sources. Puryear. Manpower Problems in the Russian Armed Forces.. Baev. McCermott (New York: Frank Cass. January 1999). “Russian authors tend to view the military as a closed system separated from the rest of society. 1990). Indecision: Why Military Reform Has Failed in Russia Since 1992. the interaction between the whole society and the military. D62 (Camberley. “Failed Expectations: The Crisis of Civil-Military Relations in America. 1998). “The Widening Gap between the Military and Society. Steven F. “Tradition Abandoned: America’s Military in a New Era. MA: MIT Press. Pavel K. 8 (1997): 140. “Army Values and American Values. Brian Taylor. Anne C. Losksley. Chechnya: The Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven.” National Interest 58 (Summer 1997): 3. Downloaded from afs. Soldiers. See. Supreme Command: Soldiers. J. no. and Elliot Cohen. either civilians or military. “Russian authors mainly stress the problem of civilian control of the military. Richard H. “Cultural Demolition in the Military. as a control of the government over the military and this understanding implies an elected civilian head of the military. CT: Yale University Press. 1 (July 1997): 66-77. UK: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.” Or as she put it elsewhere in her article. a reading of Russian materials or discussions with Russian officers makes it very clear that they expect civilian authorities to respect their organizational culture. 42-53. Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge. Peter Maslowski. So civil-military relations are mainly understood as an interaction between the government and the military. Michael Orr.S. 2010 . Conflict Studies Research Centre.

UK: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. 2008). 1-42. Steven J. 174. This section covers up to March 2007. 2004). 2001). He also changed the relationship between the defense minister and the Chief of the General Staff so that the latter was not only clearly subordinate to the former but also forbidden to interfere in operational matters. He gradually forced the defense minister out. February. 26.” April 24. 362. Bush: A Pre and Post 9/11 Comparison. http//www. Part I—The “Invasion of Avaristan.” in The Russian Military Power and Policy. 39. 27. CA: RAND. ed. 127-29. Robert V. 2010 . 359.” Dale R. 26. The Soldier in Russian Politics. he responded. Fred I. “Moscow’s Military Power: Russia’s Search for Security in an Age of Transition. via Johnson’s Russia List. Blandy. W. As cited in Herspring. 40. Anne Aldis. Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya (Ft. “Civil-Military Relations—Who Are the Real Principals? A Response to ‘Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of Downloaded from afs. 45. The Kremlin and the High Command. 2003). 36. 2001. The Wolves of Islam (Washington. There has been a debate on the appropriateness of Shinseki’s testimony in Armed Forces & Society: see discussions by Damon Coletta. Shinseki would later testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 11. Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper 40 (London: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute: September 2000). 32. 2004). When asked by Senator Levin (D-MI) how many troops were needed for an invasion of Iraq.” Armed Forces & Society 34. 42. Chechnya. W. MA: MIT Press. 2001. 17. no. Greenstein. and Wolfowitz undercut him by stating that his views were “wildly off the mark. Steven E. While Robert Gates adopted a very different approach—much as Minister of Defense Dmitri Serdyukov has in Russia—events are too current to permit the kind of conclusions needed for a study of this type. Brian D. Wittkopf and James McCormick. 9-10. His approach to making changes in the military was gradualistic. July 9. Conflict Studies Research Centre. 101. Herspring. Eugene R.” in The Second Chechen ed. MD: Rowman and Littlefield. C. “Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki’s Testimony before the Iraq War. 29. “The Changing Leadership of George W. “Something on the order of a hundred thousand. Barylski.” Moscow Times. 1 (October 2007): 109-21. 2004. 478. Blandy.” Moscow Times. 38. 1996. Politics. C. 74. March 29. and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House. 25. “Hope Glimmers for Reform.sagepub. The Storm. As quoted in Lieven. Gregory J. Moscow Times. Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Main. Bing West. as cited in Steven Miller. Celestan. Conflict Studies Research Centre. 2003). Paul Murphy. and a short time latter forced the Chief of the General Staff to retire. 35. 2008). 124-25. March 2000). KS: Foreign Military Studies Office. DC: Brassey’s. UK: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.. March 29. and Paul Camacho and William Hauser. Russia’s Chechen Wars. Miller and Dmitri Trenin (Cambridge. 1994–2000 (Santa Monica. 37. ed. For the Yeltsin period. 1991–2002. Herspring.ISS on August 30. 2004). The Strategic Rocket Forces. The Kremlin and the High Command. 1996. Leavenworth.” in The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy. D66 (Camberley. 41. August 1996).” no.shtml. The Kremlin and the High Command. 111. 28.” Rumsfeld was furious.” Global Security. The primary focus is on Donald Rumsfeld’s tenure as Secretary of Defense. this writer relied on “Russian Military Budget. (Lanham. Taylor. 30. who continued to serve under newly elected president Dmitri Medvedev. 33. “Moscow’s Failure to Comprehend. 11. Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press. at Kings College London . 308. 4th ed. P30 (Camberley.686 Armed Forces & Society 24. “Putin and the Chechen War: Together Forever. April 18. “Federalnyi zakon ‘Ob oborone. 43. when Ivanov was replaced by Anatoliy Serdyukov. 41. Olga Oliker. The Strongest Tribe: War. 44.

Kansas State University. 1 (January-February 2004): 15.sagepub. Department of Political Science. and Russian Civil–Military Relations 687 General Shinseki’s Testimony before the Iraq War. Herspring. is the author of 12 books and more than 80 articles dealing with U. Address for correspondence: Dale Herspring. Colin Powell. 13..S. 49. Ibid. Dale Herspring. My American Journey (New York: Random House. I am not trying to quantify the relationship. Rather. a university distinguished professor at Kansas State University and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. 48. and Polish civil–military relations. 47. This term is almost impossible to accurately translate. 46.” but in practice it is tied to the German effort to civilianize military culture to the maximum degree possible. German. KS 66506. As has been stressed previously.ISS on August 30. e-mail: falka@ksu. “Blind into Baghdad.S. 2010 . 1 (October 2007): 122-37. Manhattan. Downloaded from afs. Technically it means “inner leadership. this is a notional charge. James Fallows. 50. Rumsfeld’s at Kings College London .edu.” Atlantic Monthly 293.’” Armed Forces & Society 34. 425.Herspring / U. Russian/Soviet. based on the preceding material. 51. 1995). nor to show correlations. Waters Hall 240.

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