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PART 3 POST PARTITION PERIOD

INITIAL PROBLEMS FACED AFTER THE CREATION OF PAKISTAN


INTRODUCTION: Nehru told General Sir Frank Messervy in 1945, his deliberate plan would be to allow Jinnah to have his Pakistan, end gradually makes things so impossible economically and otherwise for Pakistan that they have to come on their banded knees and asked to be allowed back to India. 1. RADCLIFF AWARD (AUGUST 16, 1947):

Background Representatives of Punjab Boundary Commission Pakistan India

Justice Din Muhammad Justice Maher Chand Muhajan Justice Muhammad Munir Justice Tej Singh

Representatives Bengal Boundary Commission Pakistan Justice Abu Saleh Muhammad Ikram Justice S.A Rehman Sir Cyril Radcliff was appointed as the chairman of both the boundary commissions. Both India and Pakistan were agreed to accept the decision of Radcliff in case of deadlock. As expected the representatives of India and Pakistan were unable to reach on an agreement and Radcliff announced his own decisions on 16th August 1947. Analysis of the Boundary Award The award was partial, unjust and unfair to Pakistan Radcliff Award Handed over Some of the Muslim Majority Areas that were Contiguous to the Boundary of Pakistan to India: These areas included. o o o o Sub-district Sub-district Sub-district Sub-district of of of of Ajnala in Amritsar district Nakadar and Jullundur in Jullundur district Ferozepur and Zira in Ferozepur district Batala and Gurdaspur in Gurdaspur district India Justice C. C. Biswas Justice B.K Mukarjee

Radcliff award, allotted sixty-two percent of the area of undivided Punjab to India, with fifty-five percent of the population.

Radcliff Award Paved the Way for the Accession of Kashmir with India: Gurdaspur was a district contiguous to Pakistan. Out of its four Sub-District Gurdaspur, Batala and shakergarh were the Muslim majority and Pathankot was a non-Muslim majority sub-district. At the time of partition the only rail and road communication between India and Kashmir was possible through the district of Gurdaspur, if Radcliff had only awarded the Hindu majority sub-district of Pathankot to India still it would not have had access to the state of Kashmir; by assigning two Muslim majority sub-district of Baal and Gurdaspur

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Radcliff provided India a link with Kashmir. In 1948 India entered its forces in Kashmir through Gurdaspur and annexed the state to India.

The Decision of the Punjab Boundary Commission Caused the Canal Water Dispute between India and Pakistan: Three rivers namely Indus, Jhelum and Chenab enter in Punjab from Kashmir whereas two rivers Ravi and Sutlej enter from Indian held Punjab. Radcliff drew the boundary line in such a way that it cut across the river and canals; making India and Pakistan upper and lower beneficiaries. Radcliff also handed over the Ferozepur (Sutlij) and Madupur (Ravi) head works to India.By giving the control over the river Ravi and Sutlej to India, Radcliff put the economical life of Pakistan in danger. It was not merely a theoretical possibility; it was proved by Indic by cutting off the water supply on 31st March 1948.

City of Calcutta Handed Over to India: Firstly large population of Calcutta consisted of schedule east Hindus that were with Muslim League. Secondly East Pakistan was separate from West Pakistan by more than one thousand miles and for the communication point of view the port of Calcutta was very important for Pakistan. Thirdly East Bengal produced the bulk of raw jute but mostly the jute factories were situated in Calcutta. Boundary Award and Mountbatten's influence? On August 8, Mountbatten's private secretary sent a letter with a preliminary description of the Punjab boundary to Evan Jenkins, the governor of Punjab. This draft showed the Ferozepur area and its headworks going to Pakistan. When the final award was released, Ferozepur was assigned to India. Infuriated Pakistanis were sure that Nehru and Mountbatten had pressured Radcliff to change his line

Announcement of the Award was Delayed: The Award was to be announced on August 12, 1947 but it was mysteriously delayed till August 16, 1947.

Repercussion!
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India and Pakistan had no boundaries for the first two days of their existence. In some places both -Indian and Pakistani flags were raised. In some border regions whose destiny was uncertain Indian and Pakistani citizens were in the dilemma of not knowing which country they were in even on August 15. In some cases officials sent to work in territories that later became port of India or Pakistani. Many administrators joined the last-minute flow of refugees themselves, disrupting administrative system by leaving their posts empty.

Why?

 

To avoid spoiling the joyous celebration of independence by announcing news that would undoubtedly distress' both India and Pakistan. To overlook the British responsibility for the disorder that inevitably would follow the announcement.

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ACCESSION OF THE PRINCELY STATES:

Kashmir : Area of 84,471 square miles, 77% muslims, 4 million population in 1944. The most important state was Kashmir naturally connected with Pakistan. Its ruler was Hindu while population was Muslim. The population inclined towards Pakistan but the Hindu ruler declared to join India. The Kashmiri people revolt against the ruler in Poonch area and soon it became widespread. The ruler sought Indian support. India demanded accession. On October 27, 1947 Indian troops landed in Srinagar. The people continued their struggle for independence and India promised to finally settle the matter with reference to the people under the UN Resolutions. Hyderabad :

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Hyderabad was one of the richest Hindu Majority state covering 82000 sq miles of area, 260 million Revenue. Surrounded by Indian Territory. The state was situated in the south of India. Their rulers were Muslim who were called Nizam. Nizam wanted to maintain independent status for his state but as being Muslim he had desire to accede with Pakistan if ever need arose. Due to the important position of the state, Mountbatten the first governor general of India put pressure on Nizam to accede with India but Nizam refused to do so. On September 13, 1948 just two days after the death of Quaid-e-Azam Indian forces entered in Hyderabad and occupied it forcibly. Pakistan submitted a complaint in UNO against the illegal action of India which is still pending.

Junagadh: Junagadh was a small Hindu majority state covering 3337 sq miles of the area. It situated 300 miles down to the coast of Karachi Indian coast of Kathiawar. The Muslim rulers ruled the state. After independence the request for the accession with Pakistan by its rulers was accepted by the Quaid-e-Azam. Indian government reacted sharply and an economic blockade of the state of Junagardh was imposed that resulted in food shortage. By the end of October 1947 the rulers of the state of Junagadh were forced to leave the state. On 9th November 1947 the Indian army occupied the state. Pakistan took that matter in UNO where it is still pending. 3. REFUGEES AND ACCOMMODATION PROBLEM:

Hindus were angry over the division of the Subcontinent whereas Sikhs were unhappy over the loss of their religious places. Sikhs and Hindu armed with deadly weapons slaughter the man woman and even the small children. Condition in East Punjab was worse than anywhere else where rulers of the states of Alwar, Kapurthala, Patiala and Bharatpure played the most inhuman role in that human tragedy. Due to the communal violence millions of Indian Muslims leaving there property started migrating towards Pakistan. Apart from communal violence another reason for the migration of Muslims was their desire to live in a newly established Islamic state. The arrival of refugees created problem for both the countries but the issue was more serious in the nascent state of Pakistan that was already facing no of problems. It was estimated that only West Pakistani received 5.5 million refugees and one sixth of the entire population of West Pakistan consisted of refugees. It caused economic and administrative problems, as Pakistan did not have sufficient resources to provide food, shelter and medical aid to the growing no of refugees. Quaid-e-Azam moved his headquarter to Lahore to give special attention to this problem. Quaid-eAzam relief fund was also created in which rich people were asked to donate. Temporary relief camps were also established. 4. CANAL WATER DISPUTE:

It had its origin in Radcliff Award which drew the boundary India and Pakistan in way that it cut across the rivers and canal making India the upper beneficiary and Pakistan the lower beneficiary, It also handed over the control over two important head works over river Ravi (Madhupure Head works) and Sutlej (Ferozpure Head works) to India. India proved it by stopping the flow of water in March 1948. Dispute was finally settled when an agreement called Indus Basin treaty. The treaty was signed between Ayub Khan the president of Pakistan and Nehru the Indian Prime Minister on September 19, 1962. According to that agreement India was allocated the use of two Eastern Rivers namely Ravi and Sutlej whereas three western Rivers Indus, Jehlum and Canab were given to Pakistan. To overcome the shortage of water World Bank, India and other friendly countries provided Pakistan financial assistance to construct two dams, five barrages and seven link canals. 5. DIVISION OF ASSETS:

Military Assets: It was announced on July I, 1947 that Indian army assets would also be divided in ratio 65 to 35 in India's favour it was with reference of the communal balance present in the British Indian Army. Field Martial Auchinleck was appointed as incharge of the distribution of military assets. Whatever Pakistan received was nothing but scrap and out of order machines, broken weapons, unserviceable artillery and aircraft. There

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were 16 ordnance factories and all were located in India. Pakistan was given 60 million rupees towards its share in the ordnance factories. Later an ordnance factory was established in Wah. Pakistan received six Armour divisions to India's fourteen, eight artillery divisions to India's forty and eight infantry divisions to India's twenty one. Pakistan also received Staff College in Quetta and Service Corps College at Kakul, which latter became the Pakistan military Academy. Division of financial assets: At the time of division there was cash balance of 4 billion rupees in the reserve Bank of India Pakistan was to get 750 million however after the protest of Pakistan, India agreed to pay 200 million rupees. As the war between India and Pakistan had started on the issue of Kashmir India again stopped the rest of the amount by saying that Pakistan could use it to buy arms. After the protest from Pakistan and the threat of hunger strike by Gandhi, Nehru was forced to pay another 500 million rupees. However the remaining 50 million rupees are still not paid. 6. ISSUE OF NATIONAL LANGUAGE:

Immediately after the establishment of Pakistan language controversy was started between East and West Pakistan when the members of the Constituent Assembly belonged to East Pakistan demanded that instead of Urdu, Bengali should be made national language of Pakistan. Liaqat Ali Khan then the Prime Minister of Pakistan refused to accept the demand, which created resentment among East Pakistan. Refusal of the demand ultimately transformed into a political movement. In March 1948 while addressing at Dhaka, Quaid-eAzam declared, Urdu and Urdu alone would be the national language of Pakistan". Advice of Quaid-e-Azam temporarily took the heart out of language movement but the issue was not settled. It exploded latter after the death of Quaid-e-Azam. 7. ISSUE OF PAKHTOONISTAN:

At the time of partition N.W.F.P was controlled by the "red shirts" the ally of Congress. The Khan Brothers, Dr Khan Sahib and Abdul Ghaffar Khan, were their leaders. Despite the 1947 referendum in which the people of the region voted to join Pakistan, the leaders of the" red shirts" demanded union with Afghanistan or complete regional autonomy. The Afghan Government also supported the issue by saying that the "Pakhtoons" or pathans living in both Afghanistan and Pakistan belong to the same race and the "Pakhtoons" of Pakistan wanted to be the part of the union with Afghanistan called "Pakhtoonistan".

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DEATH OF QUAID-E-AZAM:

Despite of all the problems, Pakistan continued to march under the dynamic leadership of Quaid-e-Azam. Nobody can deny that in the early year predominant leadership of Quaid-e-Azam was a source of strength for Pakistan. Quaid-e-Azam died on 11th September 1948. After the death of Quaid-e-Azam though there were great leaders too, but unfortunately none of them was of the caliber of Quaid-e-Azam.

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THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE QUAID-E-AZAM


Jinnah played an important role in establishing the new country in the world community. He lived only for a year after the creation of Pakistan but even then he did what an ordinary man can not achieve in whole life. In August 1947 few people expected Pakistan to survive as an independent nation and many Indian Politicians actually worked to make that survival even more difficult. Yet Thanks to his unflagging efforts Pakistan not only survived, but prospered. JINNAH AS A LEADER: Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah Held the post of Governor General. This Was intended to be a ceremonial position with few duties. The Governor-General was to be a figurehead acting as an inspiration to nation. The Quaid-e-Azam, however, took the role of chief executive in the new government. He chaired cabinet meetings and was the president of the constituent assembly. Jinnah struggled hard for establishing Pakistan on sound footing in all respect. He proved to the world that he is a real leader who has shown guidance to million Muslims of subcontinent. BUILDING AND STRENGTHENING THE NATION: The Quaid immediately set about dealing with those problems that Pakistan Faced after partition. 1. He stressed the need for everyone in Pakistan to work together to creat the nation. He said people should not think of themselves as fpr example, Punjabi, or Bengali. Instead they should think, feel and act as Pakistanis and be proud of it. He toured all the areas of Pakistan to get across the message that Everyone of us should think feel and act as a Pakistani and we should be proud of being Pakistani alone. Quaid-e-Azam was as opposed to religious intolerance as he was to provincialism and racialism. Even after the movement of refugees Pakistan had millions of non Muslims and India had millions of Muslims. The Quaid called himself the PROTECTOR GENERAL of religious minorities and his advice was often sought by the non-Muslims. He was determined that Pakistan should be seen as a land of tolerance and said that Islamic ideas about justice and equality demanded that any non Muslims who chose to remain in Pakistan should be treated fairly, not prosecuted. To help the newly arrived refugees he set up a relief fund to rehabilitate them as quickly as possible. The people were quick to response with donation in cash and kind. To emphasize rule of Pakistan in the world community, the Quaid secured the membership of the country into the United Nations organization (UNO) in September 1947. This helped it gain recognition and support among the other nation of the world.

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BUILDING A GOVERNMENT: The Quaid-e-Azam knew that there was a great deal of work to be done in establishing a governmental and administrative framework for Pakistan. No Problem Could be solved Unless the country had an administration that could take decisions about the problem and make sure that those decisions were carried out. 1. Liaqat Ali Khan was appointed Prime Minister, and a cabinet was formed. A Constituent Assembly was set up. One of its tasks was to begin framing constitution for the new Pakistan. Karachi became the capital of Pakistan and the central secretariat was set up to run the country. Those people with government experience who chose to move from India to Pakistan were brought to Karachi on special trains and airplanes. The civil services were recognized. In order to run the administration smoothly the civil service rules were drafted. The Quaid was determined that government officials should have the right attitude to their work. He informed them that they had to remember that they were the servants of the people, not the rulers of the country. It was therefore essential that they worked with national spirit. This was

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particularly important because the officials found that they had no office equipment, no furniture, and very little stationery. For many years the Pakistani civil service worked under extremely difficult conditions. Building an Economy: 1. As Pakistan was denied its full share of the wealth of the old british India and their was much work to do in converting Pakistan from an almost completely agricultural country to one with the degree of industrial development. An important step on this path came 1st July 1948 when the Quaid established the State bank of Pakistan, to help develop the economy. In 1948 Jinnahs Industrial policy statement made it clear that he, and the government, saw that it was important to set up industries in Pakistan, as quickly as possible. The Quaid also reached a compromise with India in the Canal Water Dispute which ensured that Pakistans agriculture would not be denied precious water supplies. He also helped persuade the Indian government to hand over the agreed share of financial asserts from pre-partition India.

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ESTABLISHING NATIONAL SECURITY: Although Pakistan had been given poor military equipment and it lacked senior cadre officer for the army, the Quaid worked to ensure that the new country was able to defend itself. 1. The Pakistan Army needed more officer and the gaps were filled by offering temporary commissions and using British officers. He was determined that the army should know that its role was to be the servant of people and warned it that you do not make national policy. The Quaid did not want to see Pakistan become a military dictatorship. Although Pakistans Army was ill equipped, the Quaid was not afraid to use it, and the army saw its first action in Kashmir. Despite being outnumbered and having inferior arms and ammunition, it stood up well and held its own in fighting.

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CONCLUSION: The Quaid died on 11 September 1948. Despite his failing health he had worked tirelessly to establish his new country. By the time of his death a new government and administration had been taken to unite the diverse people into single Pakistani nation and the steps made in developing Pakistans economy. Equally significant was that by the end of 1948 the first fighting had taken place against troops from Pakistans great rival, India. As the English newspaper, the times wrote shortly after his death: No succeeding Governor General can quite fill his place as FATHER OF NATION such was the greatness of Quaid.

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HAD THERE BEEN NO QUAID, THERE WOULD HAVE BRRN NO PAKISTAN:

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Constitution is a set of basic principles and framework for g overnance and exercise of political power and le g al authority . It clarifies the scope of power, relationship among various institutions within the g overnment and society . It has precedence over ordinar y laws and cannot be chang ed like ordinary laws. The Government of India Act (1935) was modified and promulgated in the newly state of Pakistan. The elected members in the 1946 elections made the first Constituent Assembly that faced grievous circumstances. Major Issues The major issues, the first constituent assembly faced, were about: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 1. Federalism There was consensus on federalism but yet there were many issues to be setled. The main was that Pakistan consisted of two territorial parts, East Pakistan (with more population, less territor y but administratively one unit) and West Pakistan (administratively 4 units). Federalism is meant to accommodate such kind of diversity maintaining the unity of the state or countr y. 2. Division o f power: It was the most difficult q uestion that how the power would be divided between Centre and the Provinces. The heritage of British rule g ave the tradition of a Strong Centre. But the provinces were demanding more Autonomy and Provincial R i g hts. In the Interim Constitution and the 1956 Constitution tradition of strong centre continued. 3. Representation Representation a t the federal level was another conflicting issue because East Pakistan and West Pakistan were different in population and size. On the other hand there was diversity in Western part of Pakistan. The provinces of West Pakistan were also different in population and size. A l of them were sensitive to their representation and provincial autonomy . To have a Standard Formula for the representation of units and population the Constituent Assembly (CA) formed a Basic Principle Commitee (BPC) on March 12, 1949. The primar y task of this commitee was to frame a set of basic principles for the future constitution of Pakistan. Federalism Representation Separate or Joint Electorate The National Language Issue Parliamentary or Presidential sy stem The Islamic or Secular State

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First BPC Report:

This commitee presented its first report on 28th September 1950. According to this report two houses of the parliament were proposed. The lower house was to be elected on the basis of POPULATION and the upper house was to be elected on the basis of e q ual representation for a l the provinces of Pakistan namely East Bengal, West Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan. Eq ual powers were proposed for the both Houses. No mention of National Lang uage was made. East Benga l opposed this report and Liaqa t Ali Khan withdrew it.

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Second BPC Report:

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BPC presented its final report on 22 nd December 1952. According to this report two Houses of the Parliament wil enjoy the e q ual status and powers. It proposed e q ual representation to East and West wing . This report also faced reaction in both the wings of Pakistan. The principle of parity was not appreciated in both East Pakistan and Punjab. c. Muhammad A l i Bog ra Formula:

Muhammad Ali Bogra immediately after assuming the office of the Prime Minister presented a formula to resolve the deadlock in constitution making . According to this formula Pakistan would have a bicameral le g islature. In upper house there would be EQUAL representation to each of five units. In lower house population w i l be represented. In this way more representation was g iven to East Pakistan. Both wings would have e qual streng th in joint sessions of the two houses. :: Reaction to Bog ra Formula I t was welcomed in both parts of the country . The principle of parity and representation of the population was appreciated. I t also solved the problem of national languag e by su ggesting Urdu and Bengali both as national language. :: One Unit o f West Pakistan October 1955 One Unit of West Pakistan was established on 14th October 1955. The provinces of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan would be amalgamated in one unit to establish parity between the two parts of the countr y . 4. Separate or Joint Electorate Separate electorate was adopted on the demand of Muslims in 1909 by the British Government. But the minorities did not favour this after independence. Relig ious elements supported this as a part of heritage. East: decided for Joint Electorate. West: Separate electorate. 1957: Joint Electorate was adopted for a l Pakistan by the National Assembly . 5. The National Lang uage Issue Pre-independence: Muslim elite a l over India adopted Urdu. In 1948 Jinnah declared that Urdu would be the national language but provinces could use their lang uages. Opposition ag ainst Urdu was there in East Beng al. This became more pronounced after the death of Jinnah as controversies erupted on constitution making. Language Movement started in East Pakistan Februar y, 1952. There was a complaint about anti Beng ali languag e atitude of the federal g overnment. Two-lang uag e formula was adopted in 1954. Since 1973 Urdu was adopted as national lang uag e along with the support for development of reg ional languag es. 6. Parliamentary or Presidential There was a consensus for parliamentar y s y stem. But there was a limited demand for presidential s y stem. Supporters of Presidential system became dominant after the 1958 militar y takeover. The 1962 Constitution was a Presidential constitution. 6: The Islamic or Secular State From the ver y be g inning of Pakistan Movement there was an ag reement that the state w i l have close relationship with Islam. Muslims defined their national identity with reference to Islam and its heritag e. Some opposition came from the Cong ress members of the Constituent Assembly , and a few secularists. There was a BROAD AGREEMENT that the state wil identify itself with Islam. The Constituent Assembly took time to define the precise relationship between the state and Islam.

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CO N ST IT UT IO N MA K I N G (1 947- 56)
Constitution is a basic document in the handling of domestic affairs. I t sets out the framework for governance and exercise of power. I t gives guiding lines of relationships among the federating units. Law making is alway s within its limits. The modified Government of India Act (1935) became the Interim Constitution of Pakistan in 1947. The Constituent Assembly (CA) was given the task of framing the Constitution. The first meeting of the CA was held on August 11, 1947 a t Karachi. In the lecture 17 we have discussed the constitutional issues that the CA had to deal with, mainly 6 major issues. Now we w i l discuss the stages of constitution making. The process began with the passing of the Objectives Resolution (Lecture 16) in which the Islamic and democratic values were adopted as grounds for the future constitution. The Basic Principles Commitee (BPC) consisting of 24 members was made to work for the constitutional powers. The various sub-commitees on Federal and provincial powers, Franchise, Judiciary, and Fundamental Rights started working. Board of Talimat-i-Islamia was also set up to seek advice on the relig ious maters.

First BPC Report, 1950


1: The Objectives Resolution to be included in the Constitution as the directive principles. 2: Legislature: Two houses of the parliament. Upper: (House of Units) Equal representation for the units Lower: (House of People) On the basis of Population. Both the Houses would enjoy the equal powers. 3: The Head of State elected by joint session would be for five years (Two terms only ). President had discretionary and emergency, appointment and other powers. President was not answerable to anyone, might be a Muslim or non-Muslim, would be assisted by the Prime Minister (PM) and Cabinet that would be answerable to the CA. Parliament may impeach him by 2/3 majority . He was given the power to abrogate the constitution. 4: Cabinet responsible to both the Houses. 5: No mention of national language Criticism: This report was severely criticized throughout the country. It could not satisfy both the wings, East and West. The relig ious group objected that the report contained nothing about Islamisation. On the question of representation, the East Pakistan (EP) protested that their majority had been denied by the Report. They remarked that they were thrown into a permanent minority. The population of EP was slightl y larger than that of the West Pakistan (WP) but i t was treated as the s m a l provinces because both the Houses were g iven equal powers. So the domination of WP was intolerable for the East wing. The language issue proved subversive to the national solidarity. The Eastern Pakistanis condemned the proposal that made Urdu as official language.

Second BPC Report, 1952


1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Head of State would be Muslim and no change in powers. Equal representation to East and West wings: a. UH (Upper House) 60, 60 LH 200, 200 More powers were given to Lower House. Cabinet was made responsible to Lower House. I t was promised that law making would be in accordance with ISLAM. No law would be made in violation of Islamic principles. Advisory Board of five Islamic scholars was founded. Silent on national language.

Criticism:

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The politicians particularly from the Punjab deplored the Report because formation of the UH on the basis of representation was not acceptable. It was declared ag ainst the principle of federation. The WP favoured e quality o n l y for Upper House. The political crisis removed Prime Minister Nazimuddin and atention diverted from the core issue.

Third Report: Muhammad A l i Formula October 1953


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The proposals were revised in the lig h t of the criticism and decided: Upper House: Eq ual representation to a l five units Lower House: More representation to Eastern part While in joint session, both wings had eq ual representation: East Pak West Pak 40 135

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Decision by majority but i t must include 30 percent members from each zone.

Criticism: It su ggested some difficult process but mostly it was widely acceptable. Two languages, Urdu and Beng ali, were approved as official lang uag es that injured the national unity as Quaid-i-Azam had wished Urdu as national language. This is important that after the Formula, the work beg an on constitution drafting because the deadlock was over. CA Dissolution In October 1954, GG (Governor General) dissolved the CA that was chaleng ed in the Sindh court by Maulvi Tamizuddin. The court declared the dissolution ile g a l but the Federal Court upheld the GG action but asked for seting up an elected CA. 2nd Constituent Assembly, June-July 1955 Ghulam Muhammad caled a Convention on May 10, 1955. A l its members were to be elected indirectly (by the provincial assemblies). In this way , the 2nd CA came into existence. One Unit Scheme, October 1955 The presence of different provinces in the WP had complicated the issue of the WP representation in the CA. It was handled by uniting a l the WP units into ONE (One Unit, October 30, 1955). Now both the parts had become two units and could be addressed e qu a l y . Constitution-making One Unit scheme helped the task of constitution making to accomplish successfuly . The previous commitees report helped the new Assembly that completed its work and presented in the 2nd CA on January 9, 1956. It, with certain amendments, was approved on Januar y 29, 1956 and enforced on March 23. With this Pakistan had become an Islamic Republic.

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THE OBJECTIVES RESOLUTION (1949)


The Objectives Resolution was the first constitutional document that proved to be the foundation of the constitutional developments in Pakistan. I t provided parameters and sublime principles to the le gislators. I t made the constitution-making process easy task seting some particular objectives before them that would be acceptable to the people of Pakistan who had suffered a lot under the Hindu-dominated majority. The Resolution was moved by Liaquat Ali Khan, the then Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and approved on March 12, 1949. The Constituent Assembly (1 947-54) The first Constituent Assembl y came into existence under Indian Independence Act 1947. The elections were held in J u l y 1946 to decide the destiny of the A l India Muslim League (AIML) s claim that it is the onl y representative party of the Indian Muslims that desire separate homeland, Pakistan. The members from the districts that became part of Pakistan were declared members of the Constituent Assembl y. The number of such members was 69. I t increased to 79 after the 1947 when some states joined Pakistan and then increase in the population. There were two major parties, Muslim League and Congress in the Assembl y a t that time. This Assembl y had dual functions to perform. Features o f the Objectives Resolution Sovereign t y over the entire universe belongs to Almi gh t y Alah alone. The authority which He has dele gated to the state of Pakistan throu gh its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust. 3. Constitution w i l be framed for sovereign, independent state of Pakistan. 4. The state s h a l exercise its power throu gh the representatives of the people. 5. Principles of Democracy, freedom, e quality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam w i l be f u l y observed. 6. Muslims shal be enabled to organize their lives in accordance with the teachings and re quirements of Islam as set out in the Quran and the Sunnah. 7. Minorities to have freedom to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures. 8. Provisions for safe guarding the le gitimate interests of minorities, backward and depressed classes. 9. Pakistan s h a l be a Federation with autonomous units. State s sovereignty and territorial inte gr i t y w i l be protected. 10. People of Pakistan should prosper and atain their ri ghtful place in the comity of nations and make contribution towards international peace and pro gress and happiness of humanity. Explanation and Importance The Resolution declared the sovereign t y of God as the distinctive political philosophy. The Western democracy gives the notion that sovereign t y lies in the people but this Resolution is important having the concept of the sovereign t y of God. I t clarified that people would utilize powers gifted by God so the y would have to work within the limits prescribed by Him. The exercise of the powers is a sacred trust. The representatives of the people of Pakistan wil manage the affairs under the universal ideology of democracy, freedom, e quality, tolerance, and social justice with the spirit of an Islamic framework. The Resolution pledged to give the due respect and rights to the minorities, backward and depressed classes in the benign society of Pakistan. Their rights, interests, religion and culture were not confuted. I t s important that the Resolution promised the federating units for due powers, autonom y and territorial inte gr i t y. Objections by Non-Muslims The major objection by the Non-Muslims was that the government was trying to mix the religion and politics that was against the spirit of democracy. The non-Muslims objected on the Sovereign t y of Alah and minorities rights, saying i t would promote ine quality in the society. The y were also of view that Shariah was not ade quate for the modern time. The y feared that it would encourage the religious extremists to work for the establishment of a theocratic state. Importance 1. 2.

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The Objectives Resolution is a basic and primary document of the constitutional history of Pakistan. I t is a framework that provides mechanism to achieve goals for a better life of the people of Pakistan. It s important that it embraces centrality of Islam to polity sustaining their links with the pre-independence period. The AIML leaders were modernist Muslims not in favour of an orthodox religious state. Therefore, the y selected the middle way abiding by the Islamic laws and the international democratic values. The Resolution remained Preamble of a l l the constitutions due to its importance.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1: First Eleven Years (1947-58) Pakistan won independence under extremely difficult conditions. The next task was seting up of a new state. There was no administrative structure. Riots, refug ee s problem and economic pressures were chaleng ing for the new state. Ne g ative attitude from Indian g overnment and war on Kashmir created problems in relations with India. The Government of India Act 1935 was adopted as the first Interim Constitution. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah became the first Governor General (GG) of Pakistan and Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister (PM). Governor Generals: 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. M. A. Jinnah Au gust Kh. Nazimuddin Ghulam Mohammad Iskander Mirza President: Iskander Mirza Prime Ministers: 1. 2. 3. Liaq uat Ali Khan Kh. Nazimuddin Muhammad Ali Bog ra (i) (ii) 4. Ch. Muhammad Ali 5. H.S. Suhraward y 6. I.I. Chundrigar 7. Firoz Khan Noon April 1953-Oct 1954 Oct. 1954-Aug ust 1955 August 1 955-Sept 1956 Sept. 1956-Oct 1957 Oct. 1957-Dec 1957 Dec. 1957-Oct. 1958 August 1947-Oct 1951 Oct. 1951-April 1953 Sept. 1947-Sept. 1948 Sept. 1948-Oct 1951 Oct. 1951-Oct. 1955 Oct. 1955-March 1956 March 1956-Oct. 1958

Major Issues
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Constitution-making Elections a t the provincial level o Punjab, NWFP 1951 o Sindh 1953 o East Beng a l 1954 1s t Constituent Assembly (CA) was dissolved and 2nd CA was constituted in 1955. One Unit Scheme October 1955 Economic management, A griculture, Industrialization and Education was a question dealt in 1s t Five Year Plan. Political Instability was there. Weak and short-lived governments shattered the whole political

12 Prepared By: Ahmad Shakeel Babar

y y

s ystem. Decline of Political Parties created bad name for politicians. Instability was also there a t the provincial level.

2: Second Phase (1958-69)

Martial Law remained imposed from October 1958 to June 1962. Constitutional Rule was restored on June 1962 and remained t i l l the 2nd Martial Law on March 1969. Ayub Khan took over as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and the President. He got himself elected through referendum in 1960 and re-elected in January 1965 through presidential elections. Important Policy Measures Important Policy Measures taken by the Ayub g overnment were:
y y

y y

Administrative Reforms which included removal of unwanted officials, some 1662 in number. Restrictions on political activities. Political leaders were stopped from taking part in politics for 6 years on the charge of corruption and other charges under the law named EBDO. Economic planning was done for industrial development and green Revolution. Educational Reforms Constitution was introduced.

Downfall o f Ayub Khan: Indo-Pakistan war started and a t the end of war Tashkand Pact was signed with India. People were not satisfied with this pact. They also resented the election results of 1965. Fruits of economic development were not distributed a t masses level. Wealth of nation was concentrated in a few hands. This brought people to agitation and public demand resulted in resig nation of the president.

AYUB ML AND MILITARY INTERVENTION (Oct 7, 1958 Jun 8, 1962 Nov 1968)
Oct 1957, Iskandar Mirza dismissed Suharwardy appointed I.I Chandrigar as PM On December 16, 1957, Malik Feroz Khan Noon took over the office of Prime Minister from Chundrigar. President Iskander Mirza was distressed by the alliance of Suhrawardy and Noon. ML imposed on Oct 07, 1958. Ayub started his ML with wide support in the masses
y y y y y y

A proper constitution was needed Land reforms to eliminate landlords authority Refugees rehabilitation Educational and legal reforms Capital to be reconstructed Independence foreign policy

AFTER TAKING OVER


y y

Many commissions were set up Smugglers and black marketer were rounded up 1. Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) 2. Public Ordinance Disqualification Order

Economic Development
y y y

Pushed industrialization program Significant increase in per capita income Well professional five-year plans

Land/ Agrarian Reforms

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y Absentee lords exploited the poor 1. Land Reform Commission Oct 1958 a. Reduction of land ceiling irrigated land to 500 acres and irrigated to 1000 acres b. Resumed land to offer to existing tenants 2. Consolidation policy to exchange fragmented policy 3. Mangal, Tarbela and Warsak dam established 4. Extensive programs of tube wells 5. Easy loans through Agricultural Development Corporation and Agricultural Bank

Industrial Reforms
y

y y y y

Gradual Liberalization of economy o Price mechanism o Incentive to traders Investment procedure simplified A bonus voucher scheme o Exporter of certain goods given import license equivalent to 30% of exports NIT established RCD Iran, Pakistan, Turkey established

Constitutional / Political Reforms


y

1959

Basic Democracy system of local self government

BASIC DEMOCRACIES ORDER 1959 Functions 1. 2. 3. 4. Administrative Developmental Local Self Government Constitutional

BD Organizations (4 tiers) 1. Union Councils a. Composition 10 member elected by 10 constituencies of 1000 people each & Five nominated members with a paid secretary b. Functions maintenance of roads, sanitation, water supply, local disputes c. Finance UC could levy taxes & Ad hoc govt grant 2. Tehsil Councils / Thana Council a. Composition all the chairmen of UC and TC & officials and non officials nominated by DC headed by Sub divisional Officer or Tehsildar b. Functions coordination and discussion forum c. Finance No taxation power, Gov,t adhoc grant (Municipal Committees could levy taxes) 3. District Councils a. Composition half elected members (by chairmen UC) and half nominated (service provider dept.) DC as a chairman b. Function coordination between service providers, coordination, develop schemes, review of progress, policy making c. Finance levy taxes land, professional & Adhoc grants 4. Divisional Councils a. Composition elected members from MCs & elected from District councils, other half nominated b. Functions coordination, review progress c. Finance no finance needed, ad hoc grant 5. Muncipal Corporations a. Only for big cities like Lahore and Karachi Constitutional Changes
y y

1962 Constitution 2 Change of Capital 3

1 2

President said, Democracy in Pakistan should be of a type that best suits the genius of the people. Promulgated on June 8, 1962

14 Prepared By: Ahmad Shakeel Babar

Social Reforms
y

Family Law ordinance 1961 o Polygamy prohibited or in special circumstance with approval of first wife o To give divorce one must go through reconciliatory process of UCs Family planning policy o Population control o Family Planning centers Rehabilitation of Refugees o 9 million refuges o Appointed Gen. M Azam Khan as Rehabilitation Ministers

Education reforms
y

y y

Commission recommended o 3 years degree program o Primary education free o Middle compulsory Students agitated Govt withdrew 3 year degree program

Indo Pak war 1965


y y

Run of Kuch Kashmir

Tashkent Decleration (Jan 1966) DOWNFALL OF AYUB


y

y y y y y y y y

Economic policies o Widening the gap (disparity) o Diverting resources of east Pakistan o Sharp rise in Population growth o People demanded equal distribution of resources East Pak not happy on 1962 Constitution Preference of east Pak by international development institutions No health care and sanitation Labour union protests (Mar 1969) Tashkent declaration EBDO 4 Ayub family flagrant indulgence in corruption 5 ZA Bhutto launched PPP in Nov 1967

(1969-71)

Ayub Khan handed over power to Army Chief Yahya Khan. He imposed Martial Law and 1962 Constitution was abrogated. He took some immediate steps:
y y y y y y y y

Removal of officers 303 Provinces Revived: March 30, 1970 Abolition of Parity Lega l Framework Order (LFO) as interim law issued in March 1970 which provided basic principles for: Constitution making Rules and regulations for elections Seats in the assemblies National Assembly 313 (300 plus 13 women seats) o For East Pak 162 plus 7

3 4

Federal Commission on Capital st Completion of ban on Dec 31 , 1966, politicians started agitating 5 Both sons left Army and established business companies

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West Pak 138 plus 6

General Elections General Elections were held in December 1970. Election Results were: Awami League Pakistan Peoples Party 160 general seats 81 general seats

Transfer of power became a major problem. Failure of dialogue for transfer of Power among three top leaders led to confrontation and military action on March 25, 1971. I t ultimately resulted in Civil war and alienation of East Pakistan. India played a very negative role. I t attacked on East Pakistan and India-Pakistan war started which ended with the separation of East Pakistan.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1972-1977:

Z. A. Bhuto assumed power on December 20, 1971. First he became President of Pakistan and also the first civilian Chief Marshal Law Administrator. Major Policies The first task was the Constitution making. In 1972 Interim Constitution was adopted and then the Parliament of Pakistan unanimously adopted 1973 Constitution. The major policy of Mr. Bhuto was Nationalization. His government nationalized:
y

y y y y

Key industries like Iron & Steel, Basic metals, heav y engineering, heavy electrical, Motor Vehicles & Tractors, Heavy & Basic Chemicals, Petro-Chemicals, Cement, Gas, O i l Refinery etc. Life Insurance in 1972 Banks in 1974 Schools and Coleges in 1972. New University Ordinance was issued in 1973. Managing and sub-agencies were abolished.

Labour Policy A new Labour Policy was announced in which more rig hts and concessions were g iven to the working classes. Health Policy Under new Health Policy cheap medicine and facilities were promised to the masses. Administrative Reforms Administrative Reforms were introduced to eradicate corruption in the country. Hundreds of civil servants were removed on the charge of corruption. Problems o f Reforms: Reforms were good in outlook but as their results were not according to the expectations of the masses. Discontentment took the place of initial optimism. 1977 Elections and Agitation: As a result of elections of 1977 PPP won the elections. But joint opposition blamed a mass rigg ing in the election results. They demanded fresh elections. Bhuto in i tia l y was stubborn but later showed inclination to

16 Prepared By: Ahmad Shakeel Babar

compromise but history has taken a U-turn. As he refused to negotiate the elected majority party in 1971, now opposition refused to compromise and took the case to the streets. Urban shopkeepers, businessmen, students, women and even the inteligentsia joined hands against the government. The result was the third Martial Law and end of democracy.

ISLAMIC SYMBOLISM DURING BHUTO RULE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Islamic provisions in Cons 1973 Ahmadis declared non Muslim in 1974 OIC summit 1974 Red cross to red crescent Holy Quran in Hotels Ministry of religious affairs established Sponsored international conference on the life of Hazrat Muhammad (SAW) Visits of Imam e Kahba and Madina Friday declared as weekly holiday

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1977-1985:


Chief of Army Staff General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq took over and imposed Martial Law. He suspended constitution. I t was the longest military Rule in the history of Pakistan. To justify his rule Zia-ul-Haq presented his Agenda about:
y y y

Effective Administration Islam isation Return to Democracy

Major Policies: Zia-ul-Haq promised Elections first within 90 days, and then extended this period after the reforms. These reforms included:
y y

Accountability of the ousted regime; Restrictions imposed on political activities and press.

Islamisation: In his way of Islamisation of the system he introduced many steps for forging cooperation of some Islamic groups. He also introduced Constitutional and legal changes to emphasis on Islamic values in the society. He established:
y y y y y y y y y y y

Shariat benches established in 1979; Federal Shariat Court was established in 1981; Introduced Islamic Punishments; Amputation of hands, Stoning to death and lashing etc; Interest free banking initiated in 1981 on the principle of profit & loss sharing; Zakat deducted on saving accounts & investments; Ushar was imposed on agricultural produce in 1983; New education Policy with Islamic character of sy labus along with Pakistan Studies and Islamiat compulsory for a l the classes up to graduation. Islamisation of Mass media; Prayers break was introduced in offices, and Mohaalah Salat Commitees were formed to observe the compliance of Prayer Ordinance; Pakistan Bat-ul-Mal was established.

Return to democracy

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In order to return to democracy Zia-ul-Haq took the folowing measure:


y y y y y y

Local Bodies elections, 1979. Referendum was held to elect Zia-ul-Haq as president for next five years on December 1984. Then he held elections on non-party basis on February 1985. New National Assembly (NA) was formed and a Civilian government was instaled. Revival of the Constitution Order March 1985 with most controversial 8th Constitutional Amendment was introduced. Withdrawal of martial law, Dec 30, 1985.

1985-1999 Civilian Rule


Democracy was restored but no civilian government could complete its tenure of five years and became the victim of 58-2B of 8th amendment by virtue of that President can dissolve NA and dismiss the elected government. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Junejo March 1985-May 1988 Benazir Bhuto November 1988-Aug 1990 Nawaz Sharif October 1990-July 1993 Benazir Bhuto October 1993-November 1996 Nawaz Sharif February 1997-October 1999

Interim Prime Ministers appointed for holding fair elections were 1. 2. 3. 4. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi: August-November 1990 Bulkh Sher Mazari: April-May 1993 Dr. Moeen Qureshi: J u l y-October 1993 Malik Meraj Khalid: November 1996-February 1997

Civilian government adopted policies for the welfare and beterment of the people but their effects were compromised due to several reasons:
y y y y

Problem of keeping coalitions intact; Weak political parties, which weakened the government; Greater confrontation; Complaints of corruption and misuse of state resources.

1999-2002:
In 1999 again Military Rule was imposed against the civilian governments attempt to concentrate power in the office of Prime Minister. Nawaz government introduced political and constitutional changes to have a complete control on a l branches of the government. Nawaz governments attempt to remove the Army Chief, while he was out of the country and returning from his visit to Sri Lanka, proved counterproductive. General Musharraf took over as the Chief Executive of the country and suspended the constitution. Martial law was not declared. No military courts were established. Political and press freedoms remained intact. Political Priorities: General Musharraf announced his Political Priorities: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Rebuild national confidence and morale; Strengthening federation; Remove inter provincial disharmony; Revival of the economy and restoration of investors confidence; Improving Law and order situation and dispensation of Justice; Depoliticise the state institutions and devolution of power; Swift and across the board accountability.

General Musharraf designed the folowing policies to achieve these goals:


y y

Accountability and return of looted wealth of the state; Revival of the economy through increasing Foreign exchang reducing International debt burden through rescheduling;

18 Prepared By: Ahmad Shakeel Babar

Poverty Reduction and social uplift.

General Musharraf introduced New Local Bodies System, delegation of the power to the district government In the process of Return to Democracy he held:
y y y

Referendum, April 2002. Introduced Lega l Framework Order (LFO) 2002 Held General Elections of National And Provincial Assemblies Oct 2002.

TRAGEDY OF EAST PAKISTAN

The separation of East Pakistan was a great setback to Pakistan. By 1970, sentiments for national unity had weakened in East Pakistan to the extent that constant conflict between the two Wings dramatically erupted into mass civil disorder. This tragically resulted in the brutal and violent amputation of Pakistan's Eastern Wing. The physical separation of a thousand miles between the two wings without a common border, and being surrounded by Indian territory and influences, led to constant political, economic and social conflicts between the two wings; embittering relations bringing the country on the verge of collapse. As a result of the separation of its Eastern Wing, Pakistan's international credit was depleted and the military, being its most powerful institution, suffered a lot. To some, the very concept of Pakistan as the homeland for the Muslims in Southeast Asia no longer appeared valid. Trouble started right at the inception of Pakistan in 1947. Almost immediately, East Pakistan claimed that as their population (55 percent as compared to 45 percent in the West) was greater, they were in a majority. Democratically, the Federal Capital, therefore, should have been in Dhaka and not in Karachi. Since Karachi was the seat of the National Government; ministers, government officials and industrialists exerted immense influence on national and regional affairs, which brought them many benefits. But the East Pakistanis were unable to extract the same kind of advantages, as they were a thousand miles away from the Capital. Moreover, the Capital initially attracted wealthy industrialists, businessmen, administrators, doctors and other professionals who had fled from India. The location of the Capital, it was said, created great economic imbalance, uneven distribution of national wealth and privileges, and better jobs for the people of West Pakistan, because they were able to sway decisions in their own favor. Secondly, Bengalis resented the vast sums of foreign exchange earned from the sale of jute from East, which were being spent on defense. They questioned how the expenditure for the Kashmir cause would be justified, when it could otherwise have been productively used to build dams and barriers to control floods, eradicate poverty and illiteracy, and supply food and shelter for the ever-growing population in East Pakistan. Thirdly, the people of the East believed that it was sheer regional prejudice that all white-collar jobs were taken by West Pakistanis. Many mistakes were made early in the short history of Pakistan. There lived in East Pakistan about 15 million Hindus who, with the help of their fellow West Bengali Indians from across the border, were able to exploit East-West differences that emerged as a result of these mistakes. Grievances were exaggerated to foster antiWest Pakistani feelings that eventually created Bengali Nationalism and separatist tendencies. Bengali political leaders went around depicting the Central Government and West Pakistan as hostile exploiters. However, no effective efforts were made by the Government to check these anti-national trends. Awami League, formed in 1951, was headed by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman. He had always been an ardent Bengali nationalist. He began to attract popular support from Bengalis in East Pakistan. He put forward his Six Points that demanded more autonomy for the Provinces in general, and East Pakistan in particular. He was arrested in April 1966, and soon released, only to be rearrested and imprisoned in June the same year. He languished in prison until February 1969. Being deeply aware of the explosive political situation in the country, the then Chief Martial Law Administrator, Yahya Khan, set in motion moves to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people, and announced that the general elections would be held on October 5, 1970. In all his election speeches, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman reiterated his demand for implementation of his Six Points and provincial autonomy plans. The 1970 elections were postponed from October to December due to heavy floods that caused immense destruction and havoc in East Pakistan. The sheer enormity of the disaster attracted worldwide attention. This gave Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman a golden opportunity to have an international audience for his anti-West Pakistan feelings, which he accused of brutal callousness. The Awami League gained much sympathy and

19 Prepared By: Ahmad Shakeel Babar

benefit out of this suffering, and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman and his people were portrayed on the international scene as victims of West Pakistan's indifference. In the general elections held in December 1970, the Awami League achieved an overwhelming victory. They captured 167 seats, the highest number in East Pakistan and overall. In the West, the Pakistan Peoples Party had won 85 seats. The way was now open to draw up a new Constitution. The Awami League, now overwhelmingly victors, stood firm on its Six Points plan and refused to compromise on that issue. The Peoples Party in the West maintained that the Six Points Program did not really permit a genuine federation. It was in fact a unique constitutional Six points of Mujeeb-ur-Rehman proposal that proposed a federation that had power only over defense and foreign policy. First enunciated on February 12, 1966, the six points are as below: Efforts were made to start a constitutional dialogue and narrow the differences between the two Wings, but all in vain. Mujibur-Rahman's adamant stand in support of his Six Points, and 1. The Constitution should provide for a his proposal that East Pakistan should have a sovereign status Federation of Pakistan in the true independent of Pakistan, further aggravated the situation. sense on the basis of the Lahore Mujib-ur-Rahman launched a non-cooperation movement. The civil administration was totally paralyzed. All government and educational institutions were closed. People were asked not to pay any taxes. The transport system came to a standstill. Factories and shops were shut. All government activities between both the Wings ceased. The Awami League setup a parallel government. Gangs of local Awami League freedom fighters, known as Mukti Bahini, led violent demonstrations and howled racial and anti-West Pakistan slogans, inciting the people to more violence. Amidst these disturbances, Genaral Yahya decided to convene the National Assembly in March 1971. But Sheikh Mujib-urRahman unexpectedly put forward other demands such as the immediate lifting of Martial Law and power transfer to the elected representatives of the people, prior to the National Assembly session. Unfortunately, on March 23, the Republic Day of Pakistan, the Awami League declared "Resistance Day" and Bangladesh flags flew all over the Province. There was a great massacre. East Pakistan had reached a point of no return. To quash the armed rebellion of Awami League militants, the Pakistan Army struck its first blow on March 27, 1971. Yahya Khan chose to use force to bring law and order in the country. Resolution and for a parliamentary form of government based on the supremacy of a directly elected legislature on the basis of universal adult franchise. 2. The Federal Government shall deal with only two subjects; Defense and Foreign Affairs. All residuary subjects will be vested in the federating states. 3. There should be either two separate, freely convertible currencies for the two Wings, or one currency with two separate reserve banks to prevent inter-Wing flight of capital. 4. The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in the federating units. The Federal Government will receive a share to meet its financial obligations. 5. End Economic disparities between the two Wings through a series of economic, fiscal, and legal reforms.

In the meantime, India exploited Pakistan's dilemma to the full. 6. A militia or paramilitary force must It sought to wring full propaganda and strategic value for itself be created in East Pakistan, which at out of the Bengali suffering and misery. India launched an present has no defense of its own. attack on East Pakistan on November 22, 1971. The use of modern Soviet missiles, geographical separation by a thousand miles lying across the hostile Indian territory, and the collusion of Mukti Bahini and the Indian Army, made Pakistan's military defeat in the East almost certain. On December 10, 1971, the first feeler for surrender in East Pakistan was conveyed to the United Nations. On December 17, 1971, a formal surrender was submitted and accepted. Forty five thousand troops and an almost equal number of civilians of West Pakistan were taken as prisoners of war.

The Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission Report [1971]


In December 1971, within a week of replacing General Yahya as the President, Bhutto formed a commission headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Hamood-ur-Rahman. The Commission's responsibility was to ascertain the facts of the 1971 debacle. The commission interviewed 213 persons including General Yahya, Z. A. Bhutto, Chief of Air Force, Chief of Navy, senior commanders, and various political leaders. It submitted its first report in July 1972. Originally there were 12 copies of the Report. These were all destroyed; expect the one that was handed over to Z. A. Bhutto. Neither Bhutto, nor the Army which took over in 1977, made the Report public. Though the Report remained classified, its contents were presumably learned from various writings and memoirs of the military officers narrating their side of the story of what the Hamood-ur-Rahman Inquiry Commission had to say. The report recommended public trials of the concerned officers responsible for the 1971 debacle. The inquiry was reopened in 1974. The Commission again interviewed 73 bureaucrats and top military officers and submitted its supplementary report in November 1974. It was this supplementary report that was

20 Prepared By: Ahmad Shakeel Babar

presumably published by an Indian magazine in August 2000, and afterwards allowed to be published in the Pakistani press. Publicizing of the Report by the Indian media was not a surprise since it had come out at a time when there was international pressure mounting on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Immense human rights violations were being reported by international organizations such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch with reference to the role of Indian Security Forces in the Indian-held Kashmir. The publication of the Report was seen in Pakistan as an attempt by India to divert the world attention from its inhumane and unjustified actions in Kashmir. Volume I of the main report dealt with political background, international relations, and military aspects of the events of 1971. Volume I of the supplementary report discussed political events of 1971, military aspect, surrender in East Pakistan and the moral aspect. A large number of West Pakistanis and Biharis who were able to escape from East Pakistan told the Commission awful tales of the atrocities at the hands of the Awami League militants. It was revealed that many families of West Pakistani Officers and other ranks serving with East Bengal Units were subjected to inhuman treatment. Their erstwhile Bengali colleagues had butchered a large number of West Pakistani Officers. As the tales of slaughter reached West Pakistani soldiers of other Units, they reacted violently, and in the process of restoring the authority of the Central Government, committed severe excesses on the local Bengali population. The Report's findings accuse the Army of carrying out senseless and wanton arson, killings in the countryside, killing of intellectuals and professionals and burying them in mass graves, killing of Bengali Officers and soldiers on the pretence of quelling their rebellion, killing East Pakistani civilian officers, businessmen and industrialists, raping a large number of East Pakistani women as a deliberate act of revenge, retaliation and torture, and deliberate killing of members of the Hindu minority. Having dealt with the claim of General Niazi that he had no legal option but to surrender, the Commission proceeded to consider whether it was necessary for General Niazi to surrender, and whether he was justified in surrendering at that particular juncture, for most of the messages that emanated from the General Head Quarters were studiously ambiguous and designed. Secondly, General Farman Ali had suggested to him that instead of ordering surrender en masse, he should leave it to each Divisional Commander to surrender or not, according to his own circumstances. It was pointed out in the Report, that despite the assurances given by the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army and the terms of surrender, the killing of loyal East Pakistani population, West Pakistani civilians, and civil armed forces by the Mukti Bahini started in full swing soon after Army's surrender. It was maintained in the Report that the defeat suffered by the armed forces was not a result of military factors alone, but had been brought about as the cumulative result of political, international, moral and military factors. The political developments that took place between 1947 and 1971, including the effects of the two Martial Law periods, hastened the process of political and emotional isolation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan. The dismemberment of Pakistan was also accelerated by the role played by the two major political parties, Awami League and the Pakistan Peoples Party, in bringing about a situation that resulted in postponement of the National Assembly session, scheduled to be held at Dhaka on the March 3, 1971. The events occurring between March 1 and 25, 1971, when the Awami League had seized power from the Government, resulting in the military action of March 25, 1971, were deplorable. The Commission also touched upon the negotiations, which General Yahya Khan was pretending to hold during this period with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman on the one hand, and political leaders from West Pakistan on the other. Although he never formally declared these negotiations to have failed, yet he secretly left Dhaka on the evening of March 25, 1971, leaving instructions behind for military action to be initiated as soon his plane landed at Karachi. The Commission declared that military action could not have been substitute for a political settlement, which was feasible once law and order had been restored within a matter of few weeks after the military action. No serious effort was made to start a political dialogue with the elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan. Instead fraudulent and useless measures were adopted. The use of excessive force during the military action had only served to alienate the sympathies of the people of East Pakistan. The arbitrary methods adopted by the Martial Law Administration in dealing with respectable citizens of East Pakistan and their sudden disappearances made the situation worse. The attitude of the Army authorities towards the Hindu minority also resulted in a large-scale exodus to India. Although General Yahya Khan was not totally unaware of the avowed intention of India to dismember Pakistan, he didn't realize the need for early political settlement with the political leaders of East Pakistan. There was wastage of considerable time during which the Indians mounted their training program for the Mukti Bahini and freely started guerillas raids into the Pakistan territory. Pakistan Army was almost unable to prevent infiltration of Mukti Bahini and Indian agents all along the borders of East Pakistan. In the presence of these two factors, the Pakistan Army was obviously fighting a losing battle from the very start. There had been a large exodus of people from East Pakistan to India, as a result of the military action. The results of Indian efforts to propagate this refugee problem on an international level cannot be undermined. The Indian propaganda was so forceful that all endeavors made by the military regime in Pakistan to defuse the situation proved to be futile and left the world unimpressed. The mutual assistance treaty signed between India and the U. S. S. R. in August 1971 further aggravated the situation. No rational explanation was available as to why General Yahya did not take the dispute to the Security Council immediately after the Indian invasion of East Pakistan on November 21, 1971. Nor was it possible to explain his refusal to accept the first Russian resolution, if indeed the situation in East Pakistan had become so critical that surrender was inevitable. The Army High Command did not carry out any in-depth study of the

21 Prepared By: Ahmad Shakeel Babar

effect of these new factors, nor did it pay any attention to the growing disparity in war preparedness and capability between the armed forces of Pakistan and India as a result of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971. The traditional concept of defense adopted by the Pakistan Army that the defense of East Pakistan lays in West Pakistan was never implemented in a determined and effective manner. The concept remained valid, and if ever there was need to invoke this concept, it was on November 21, 1971, when Indian troops crossed the East Pakistan borders in naked aggression. Unfortunately, the delay in opening the Western front and the halfhearted and hesitant manner in which it was ultimately opened only helped in precipitating the catastrophe in East Pakistan. Besides, the detailed narrative of events, as given in the supplementary report, clearly shows that the planning was hopelessly defective. There was neither any plan at all for the defense of Dhaka, nor any concerted effort to stem the enemy onslaught with a Division or a Brigade battle at any stage. It was only when the General found himself gradually being surrounded by the enemy which had successfully reached Faridpur, Khulna, Daudkandi and Chandpur (the shortest route to Dhaka), that he began to make frantic efforts to get the troops back for the defense of Dhaka. The Report maintained that there was no actual order to surrender. In view of the desperate picture painted by the Commander Eastern Command, higher authorities gave him permission to surrender if he, in his judgment, thought it necessary. General Niazi could have opted not to surrender if he thought that he had the capability of defending Dhaka. On his own estimate, he had 26,400 men to hold out for another two weeks. The enemy would have taken a week to build up its forces and another week to reduce the fortress of Dhaka. But evidence showed that he had already lost the will to fight after December 7, 1971, when his major fortresses at Jessore and Brahmanbari had fallen. Detailed accounts of witnesses given to the Commission indicate that Lt-General Niazi had suffered a complete moral collapse during the closing phases of the war. It had been concluded that apart from the political, international and military factors, an important cause for defeat of the Pakistan Army was the lack of moral character and courage in the senior Army Commanders. The process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the armed forces was set in motion by their involvement in Martial Law duties in 1958. These tendencies were intensified when General Yahya Khan imposed Martial Law in the country once again in March 1969. A large number of senior army officers had not only indulged in large-scale acquisition of lands and houses and other commercial activities, but had also adopted highly immoral and lewd ways of life, which seriously affected their professional capabilities and their qualities of leadership. It appears that they had lost the will to fight and the ability to take vital and critical decisions required for the successful prosecution of the war. These remarks particularly applied to General Yahya Khan, his close associates, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Major General Khuda Dad Khan and LtGeneral A. A. K. Niazi, apart from certain other officers. The Commission recommended that these grave allegations be dealt with seriously. The surrender in East Pakistan had been a tragic blow to the nation and had caused, not only dismemberment of Pakistan, but also shattered the image of Pakistan Army as an efficient and excellent fighting force. In the end it was hoped in the Report that the Nation would learn the necessary lessons from these tragic events, and that effective and early action will be taken in the light of the conclusions reached. The Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission Report is a valuable document. It was prepared with the explicit purpose of not repeating the various mistakes committed by the Army, General Yahya Khan and Z. A. Bhutto, which resulted in the separation of East Pakistan. Writings and memoirs disclose that apart from its inquiry into the 1971 crisis, it also makes thoughtful recommendations about the defense of the country as a whole.

The Simla Agreement [1972]


After the 1971 war, India held prisoner around 93,000 Pakistani troops and civilians. In Pakistan there was a growing demand to get these prisoners released with the result that a Summit Conference between Pakistani President, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the Indian leader, Mrs. Gandhi, was held at Simla from June 28 to July 2, 1972. The two countries reached an agreement on July 2. The agreement contained the elements of an earlier Indian draft, but the wording was considerably modified. In particular the clause referring to the ceasefire line in Kashmir was rephrased as to make it acceptable to Pakistan. The broad features of this pact included that the principle and purpose of the charter of United Nations would govern the relations between the two countries. The two countries resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations. The foremost conditions for understanding, good neighborly relations, and stable and lasting peace were laid that no country would interfere with the other country's internal matters on the basis of mutual respect for peace, security, territorial sovereignty, mutual friendship and equality. It was reiterated again in the agreement that efforts would be made to put an end, as far as possible, to all such disputes and differences that have been the cause of dissension between the two countries for the last 25 years. Both governments also agreed to take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. In order to progressively restore and normalize relations between the two countries, it was agreed that steps would be taken to resume communications, postal service, and promote and facilitate travel by sea, land and air. Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields would also be resumed. In order to initiate the process of durable peace, both the governments agreed that Indian and Pakistani forces would be withdrawn to their sides of the international border. The control line between Jammu and Kashmir

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would be the same as was on December 17, 1971. Both the countries would respect the international border and the withdrawal of the armies would be completed within 30 days of the implementation of the agreement. Leaders of both the countries agreed at Simla to meet again at a mutually agreed time so that representatives of both the countries could discuss more arrangements for durable peace, including matters relating to prisoners of war, local prisoners, final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir dispute and diplomatic relations. As a consequence of the clauses pertaining to the withdrawal of forces, Indian troops withdrew from the 5,139 sq. miles of Pakistani territory in Punjab and Sindh it had occupied during the war. Similarly, Pakistani troops withdrew from 69 sq. miles of territory in Punjab and Rajasthan. In Kashmir, India retained 480 sq. miles and Pakistan 52 sq. miles. Pakistan ratified the Simla Agreement on July 15 and India on August 3, after which the agreement came into effect on August 4, 1972

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GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF PAKISTAN.


1. 2. 3. Intro & Meaning Stephen Quote Geographic importance a. Junction b. China c. Cars d. Afghanistan e. Economic Blocs f. Gas pipelines g. Mountains Political importance a. US intersts security and business b. Current political situation of the area Conclusion

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Geo strategic means the importance of a country or a region as by virtue of its geographical location. Geo political is defined as, stressing the influence of geographic factors on the state power, international conduct and advantages it derives from its location. Stephen Cohn describes this importance While history has been unkind to Pakistan, its geography has been its greatest benefit. It has resource rich area in the north-west, people rich in the north-east. Pakistan is a junction of South Asia, West Asia and Central Asia, a way from resource efficient countries to resource deficient countries. The world is facing energy crisis and terrorism. Pakistan is a route for transportation, and a front line state against terrorism.

Geographical Importance: Bridge between South Asia and South West Asia; Iran and Afghanistan are energy abundant while India and China are lacking of. China finds way to Indian ocean and Arabian Sea through Korakaram. China with its fastest economic growth rate of 10%; is developing its southern provinces because its own port is 4500 km away from Sinkiang but Gawader is 2500 km away. Pakistan offers to CARs the shortest route of 2600 km as compared to Iran (4500 km) or Turkey (5000 km). land locked Afganistan now at the phase of Reconstruction, finds its ways through Pakistan..

Economic Blocs: SAARC, ASEAN, ECO. A link between them. Gawader port with its deep waters attracts the trade ships of China, CARs and South East Asian Countries Gas pipelines: 1. 2. 3. IPI: Iran is struggling to export its surplus gas and oil to eastern countries. Pakistan would get 400 million dollar annually if IPI gets success. Qatar Pakistan and Turkmenistan Pipeline project: highlights the position. TAPI:

Mountain Ranges: Himalayas, Hindu Kush in the North are plentiful in providing water and natural resources. Political importance: US interests in the regions to contain the Growing China, nuclear Iran, terrorist Afghanistan, and to benefit from the market of India. Security and Business are two main US interests in the region while Pakistan is playing a front line role against terrorism.

24 Prepared By: Ahmad Shakeel Babar

Today the political scenario of the region is tinged with pre emption policy and US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, Irans nuclear program, Indias geopolitical muscles(new strategic deal with US) to gain the hegemony and to counter the The Rise of China which has earned all the qualities to change unipolar world into Bipolar world. In all these issues, Pakistan is directly or indirectly involved, especially after Al Qaeda operations. The American think tanks have repeatedly accepted that war against terror could never be won without the help of Pakistan. Pakistan has rigorously fought, and ongoing military operation in Wazirstan is also targeting the suspected Taliban in the bordering area. Main threats to Pakistan: 1. Balochistan and Wazirstan conflicts are posing threats to any economic project like IPI gas pipeline. 2. Negative role of India, US, Iran in this conflict ridden area. 3. Kashmir is flash point, accelerating nuclear race in the South Asia. 4. Instable governments in Pakistan have contributed in weakening the strong position. Gwadar is located on the southwestern coast of Pakistan, close to the important Straits of Hormuz, through which more than 13 million bpd of oil passes. It is strategically located between three increasingly important regions of the world: the oil-rich Middle East, heavily populated South Asia and the economically emerging and resource-rich Central Asia.

To the Chinese, Gwadar spells bad economics (constructed with $200 mn, now GOP is trasnfering cargo from Karachi to Gwadar at $40 per ton extra charges - Forex Pak. $ 2bn needed to connect it with Pak industrial cities and $30 million per kilometer to China Gilgit Baltistan Bulliten), premature geostrategic confrontation with the United States and the prospect of becoming the target of a burgeoning local insurgency that just might be receiving covert support from Washington and New Delhi.

(Geo-Strategic and Economic Importance of Gwader Port) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Background (sino-Pak) Recent Developments Geo-Political importance of Gawadar Gawadar: Strategic and Economic interests of China Benefits for Pakistan Importance of Gawadar Conclusion

Background (Sino-Pak): Pakistan recognized China in 1951 and 1961 voted for restoration of Communist Chinas rights in the UN. Sino Indian war 1962 culminated in close friendship; in 1963 an agreement on border was signed. Pakistan, during peak days of cold war (1970), facilitated visit of Henry Kissinger (US Foreign Secretary) to China. This led to Nixons visit to China which eased the rising tension between them. Initially Pak-Chinas strategic partnership was driven by the mutual need to counter the Soviet Union and India. China supported Pakistan in its wars against India with military and economic assistance. China assisted in developing Pakistans Nuclear Program, enhanced trade and investment.

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Recent Developments:
y y y y

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 2005 Neither party will join any alliance which infringes upon the sovereignty, security ant territorial integrity. China role in SCO and pak membership Trade: $ 6 bn in 2010 whereas likely to rise $ 10 bn by 2015 China invested $13 bn in Gwadar

Geo-Political Importance Of Gawadar 1. Dubai is the hub of business not only for Gulf but also for rest of the world including Europe, United States, Africa, China and Central Asian States, simultaneously. The gulf region is facing many political conflicts at the moment and huge disturbances in the current administrative structure are expected in the coming years. In such a scenario, a substitute of Dubai is essential to be located before the crisis hits the finances of millions. The substitute shall be a nearest point probably, to ensure continuous supply line of oil from Gulf to the outer world. Fortunately, Gawadar proves to be the nearest and infact more cost-effective substitute of Dubai, from many aspects. 2. China is emerging as a super economic power of the world in the recent years. Despite occupying a huge area of world's land, it doesn't have any port of hot waters, which can be used the whole year. Gawadar port is only on a distance of 2500 km from China and the port is working for the whole year because of the hot waters here. 3. The central Asian states, after the independence from USSR, are trying to develop their economies. These states are land locked and Karachi was expected to provide them the services through Afghanistan. For the purpose, a highway from Peshawar to Karachi was constructed but due to Afghan crisis, this line couldn't be established. The Afghan situation is till not clear, so, Gawadar being near to Iranian border will provide port facilities to Central Asia as well. Gwader- Strategic and Economic Interests of China: Arrival of US troops in Afghanistan- doorstep of China that it agreed to construct Gwader port in 2002 and funded $ 198 million, with 450 workers and technical assistance, while Pakistan shared $ 50 million for phase 1. Benefit to China: So Beijing will get considerable influence in the Persian Gulf, entrance to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, while closely monitor US naval activity and US Indian maritime cooperation. The port will enable China to monitor its energy shipments (60% of its oil need) from the Persian Gulf, and energy imports from Central Asia. Having no blue water navy, China feels defenseless in the Persian Gulf. President Mushrafs statement, when needed the Chinese Navy could be in Gwader to give befitting replies to every one. US, Iran, India: A report by Pentagon entitled Energy Features in Asia states that Beijing has set up electronic spy posts at Gwader to monitor ship traffic. The Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea heightens Indias feeling of encirclement by China. Iran fears that the development of the port will undermine the value of its own ports as outlets to Central Asias exports. Benefits for Pakistan: 1. 2. 3. The port will help integrate Pakistan into the Chinese economy by import and export through overland links that stretch across the Korakorum Highway. Gwader would inhibit Indias ability to blockade Pakistan and permit China to supply Pakistan by land and sea during war time. The Gwader area is rich in fisheries and the 600 km coastal line will boost fish export.

Importance of Gawadar 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Gwader lying to close to the oil rich Gulf States- could be a potential source of off-shore gas and oil reserves. Gwader as a trade Hub will enable the transfer of Central Asias vast energy to world markets, earning Pakistan transit charges and to investment. Afghanistan will become beneficiaries for international trade to get trasit fee to Central Asia. The oil supply during Iraq-Iran and Iraq-Kowait war was stopped; Gawadar is a best solution Cargo handling capacity of 100,000 tons

Conclusion Finally, Pakistan would have to work the completion of necessary infrastructure to support these plans; it needs effective diplomacy, economic stability with improved Center-Province relationship. Balochistan continues to be crippled by violence with Baloch nationals protesting against the construction of the port supported by Indian elements.

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27 Prepared By: Ahmad Shakeel Babar