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Does a line make a difference? Testing robustness with alternative regime classification.

Abstract The paper is organized as follows. In the first paragraph, a short review of the main issues that scholars face when dealing with the operationalization of the notion of democracy will serve to introduce the puzzle that this work would like to address: the proliferation of measures of democracy and the uncertainty they raise. In the second paragraph, the two most frequently used indexes of democracy will be described and some of the political regime classifications drawn on those continuous measures will be presented. On their basis, the results of an article picked from the long-standing debate on democracy and development will be re-tested. The analysis will contribute to reflect on the concrete effects of decisions concerning the categorization of the regime variable.

Introduction. The measurement of democracy, how and how many. Since the publication of Dahl’s seminal work in 1971, the notion of political democracy seemed to have achieved a clear and specific meaning. A democracy is a political regime characterized by high levels of both contestation and inclusion. Unfortunately the almost universal agreement of the academic community on this definition has not brought about a similar agreement on how to deal with democracy in empirical research. On the contrary, the debate on the conceptualization and measurement of democracy has always been heated and presumably will never end. Many puzzles still hinder the path. Among them, two major issues come immediately at stake, which refer respectively to the breadth and to the relative position of this notion. As a consequence of the decisions taken with respect to those and a number of further issues – such as the selection of the indicators and of the re-aggregation rules (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002) – a plurality of measurement solutions finds room. Concerning the conceptual breadth of the notion, the main distinction is between a minimalist and a substantive view of democracy (Morlino, 2003). The former focuses only on the institutions and procedures of a political regime, while the latter tends to take into account also the outcomes that a political regime produces. Generally speaking, the appropriateness of each of these views largely depends on the research question under examination. Still, despite of the risk of identifying too few attributes, minimalist definitions tend to better suit the aim of clearly isolating causal processes; that is why they are more frequently used by the literature (Clark et al., 2009). Whatever option a scholar might prefer, he will face nonetheless a second, more fundamental issue, which concerns the position that democracy should occupy within the broader spectrum of political regimes. The point is whether to consider democracy as the pole of a simple dichotomy or as the extreme of a continuum along which each regime can be ideally assigned a specific position, i.e. a degree. Even a glance at the literature would be enough to realize that there is neither agreement nor ultimately an hard and fast rule for preferring the former or the latter conception. We can easily find both authors which favor a graded approach to the conceptualization of democracy – such as Dahl, for instance, which defines the concept of Polyarchy as the ‘end of a scale which serves as a basis for estimating the degree to which various political systems approach this theoretical limit’ (1971) or Bollen and Jackman (1985) which consider democracy always a matter of degree – and authors which reject a graded approach as ‘analytically stultifying’ (Sartori, 1984) and adopt a dichotomous classification because democracy, they argue, is a ‘natural zero point’ (Przeworski et al., 1996). At the conclusion of an interesting work on this topic, Collier and Adcock (1999) claims that their analysis does not allow to take a specific position in favor of one or the other. Given the lack of a universal rule, they opt for a commonsensical pragmatic guideline. Accepting the fact that the adequate conceptualization of democracy will always depend on the research purposes but recognizing that whatever conceptual decisions is a real choice that should be explicitly justified.

Unfortunately. They suit the purposes – inevitably limited in geographical and historical scope – of specific research projects. Indices and typologies The number of indices of democracy elaborated by the literature during the last decades is quite large. the third wave has shaped a more complex international system. . The Freedom in the World index has been originally elaborated by Raymond Gastil1 and subsequently developed by Freedom House. and that a ‘political gray zone between democracy and dictatorship’ has emerged (Carothers. ranging from 0 to 7. This awareness resulted in many new classificatory proposals in order to better take into account this unusual heterogeneity. then they usually do not provide other researchers and students with a tool easy to handle for further inquiries. 2002). Diamond’s analysis will be repeated according to a few alternative classifications of political regimes recently proposed by the literature. Matthijs Bogaards (2010) makes a first attempt to explore the consequences of the lack of consensus on a common analytical framework of the regime variable. The score of each component is computed according to a list of questions (ten for PR and fifteen for CL). where 0 represents the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. New Brunswick. As a consequence. Quite surprisingly. many researchers have matched against the troublesome task of measuring democracy. the main methodological concerns referred to the previous issues. this paper aims at repeating the exercise proposed by Bogaards on an article by Larry Diamond about the relationship between democracy and development. however. In other words. NJ: Transaction. along which two or more cut-off points are fixed and a correspondent number of regime categories are drawn. More than to its advancement. rather than representing a simple general shift towards democracy. the proliferation during the last years of these alternative regime classifications seems to have contributed to the mess of the debate. the author investigates how apparently harmless changes in the thresholds along a continuous measure of democracy may affect empirical results. following the thrilling worldwide democratic trend that Huntington has described with the successful metaphor of the ‘third wave of democratization’ (1991). Given the ‘age’ of the article. These attempts use to work on continuous measures as a basis. the Freedom in the World and the Polity. but most of them are ad hoc. and to include these new intermediary types of political regime into a comprehensive analytical framework. when applied to the study of democracy-related phenomena. Apparently. such arbitrariness casts doubts on the very validity of a research’s empirical results. scholars’ attention shifted from the dichotomy-versus-continuum dispute to the question how to go from degrees to types. In order to demonstrate the importance of regime classification. The overall score is the result of the simple average between the scores of the two attributes it is composed of: Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL). this task has received little systematic attention so far. each of them being assigned 0 (very bad) and 4 (very 1 A direct description of the original structure is available in Inkeles Alex (ed. For a long time.). Persuaded of the appropriateness of such an effort. An increasing number of analysts recognized that. this can be the occasion for both an update and a test of the robustness of his results. a brief description of these measures is a necessary preliminary step of the analysis. as it was for the previous issues. On measuring democracy: Its consequences and concomitants. most of the literature seems to regard such a decision as basically pragmatic and arbitrary. Among them. Approaching the end of the 20th century a more skeptical approach to the actual outcome of many recent transitions to democracy has risen into the debate. Since all of them have been drawn one of two very common indexes of democracy. which was published in 1992. Freedom in the World and Polity represent an exception. the interest toward democracy and democratization has dramatically increased.During the last decades. This raised a increasing skepticism and need for clarity. It is a continuous measure of democracy. In a recently published article. 1991. say approximately until the middle of the ‘90s.

the latest version) is a continuous measure of democracy. According to an attempt of systematic assessment of existing large-N datasets on democracy by Munck and Verkuilen (2002). ranging from -10 (as dictatorial as possible) to +10 (as democratic as possible). Inkeles.5). Differently from the previous index. In his work. It is composed of five attributes.0). Bogaards lists a number of alternative ways in which scholars have used Freedom House data to construct regime typologies. Freedom House explicitly assigns greater emphasis to the ‘on-the-ground fulfillment of these rights’. A country is therefore classified as an Autocracy (from -10 to -6).5 to 7. constraints on the chief executive. Partly Free (from 3. 1991. Freedom House provides two additional regime variables. and so on. The former.good) points. Tables 1 and 2 provide a selection of them. On the basis of the overall score.e. The overall score is calculated as the difference between a Democracy score and an Autocracy score. The Civil Liberties attribute covers four dimensions: freedom of expression and belief. Still. plus an overall PR score of 20 out of 40 or better. it is a 21-points index. if in country X the political participation is considered ‘competitive’. political pluralism and participation. regulation of political participation. personal autonomy and individual rights. ‘restricted’ or ‘suppressed’. the Polity measure corresponds to a procedural minimalist definition of democracy. a political regime’s ‘competitiveness of political participation’ may be labeled as ‘competitive’. As a consequence. their extended geographical and historical coverage and their annual updating make these indexes two invaluable instruments and without any doubt the most frequently used by the recent literature. while appreciated for its detailed coding rules and for the availability of disaggregated data which allow replicability. Each attribute’s score contributes a different number of points to a country’s Democracy and Autocracy scores. which both range from 0 to 10. The latter. has been extensively criticized for the non-availability of clear coding rules and of disaggregated data and for its inadequate internal organization (especially the equal weighting of each attribute). associational and organizational rights. ‘factional’. does not provide any justification for its quite convoluted aggregation rules and have some problems of redundancy. fixes a minimal threshold above which a country can be considered as an Electoral Democracy. then country X will be given 3 points for its Democracy score and 0 points for its Autocracy score. In addition to the continuous measure. Also the Polity IV (i.0 to 5. a three-categories classification of political regimes is also provided by introducing two thresholds in the Polity score. 2 For direct description of its original structure see. The latter. therefore it clearly refers to a substantive definition of democracy. the former assigns a country the status of Free (from 1. An electoral democracy is a country that gets a subtotal score of 7 out of 12 or better for the PR subcategory ‘Electoral Process’. it is then converted to a correspondent seven-point scale. approximately as much as the existing different classifications drawn on Polity. As an example. The Polity index has been initially created by Ted Gurr and Keith Jaggers2 and subsequently developed by Jaggers and Marshall within the Polity Project. The Political Rights attribute covers three dimensions: electoral process. functioning of the government. In addition to the continuous measure. The five components are: competitiveness of political participation. Each attribute is assigned a score according to the performances of a country. As to the previous case. both Freedom House and Polity indexes present several shortcomings. all of them referring to the institutional features of a political regime. ‘transitional’. or as a Democracy (from +6 to +10). in evident contrast with Freedom House’s own outcomes-oriented approach. rule of law.0 to 2. again.0) or Not Free (from 5. one categorical and one dichotomous. . Whatever score a country get (out of 40 for PR and out of 60 for CL). similar to the overall one. openness of executive recruitment. competitiveness of executive recruitment. as an Anocracy or mixed regime (from -5 to +5). so that this category includes all the Free countries as well as some of the Partly Free ones.

3.4.5 . 1991 Semi-competitive partly Pluralist Non-competitive partly Pluralist Hegemonic Open Hegemonic Closed Electoral Democracy Freedom House. 2007 Mixed Regime Authoritarian Democracy Zanger. few questions in political science have been studied as extensively as the impact of socio-economic development on political democracy. Lipset’s argument can easily be summarize by its own words: ‘the more well-to-do a nation. but it might serve as a basis for the present purported analysis.Table 1 Regime Typologies Based on Freedom House Author(s) Categories Liberal Democracy Competitive Pluralist Competitive Illiberal Diamond. authors using the Polity dataset use both the single Democracy score and the overall Polity score.3 3. Development and Democracy Reconsidered: a review. authors using the Freedom in the World index use either the combined score (FH) or the Political Rights score (PR).5 ≥4 PR PR FH Table 2 Regime Typologies Based on Polity IV Author(s) Categories Democracy Mansfield & Snyder. it will be possible to test the robustness of the results attained by Diamond’s research.5 .5 5 5.0 . which will be presented in the next paragraph.0 7 ≤2 2.2 2.5 . During the past decades this thesis has been the object of about an hundred of increasingly sophisticated statistical tests. Since the publication in 1959 of Lipset’s seminal article Some social requisites of democracy. 2005 Incoherent Regime Autocracy Democracy Wade & Reiter.5 See above ≤2 3. By repeatedly substituting the original regime variable (Diamond. 1997 Non Democracy Liberal + Electoral Democracy Howard & Roessler.5 .6 ≥ 6. 2000 Anocracy Autocracy Full Democracy Epstein et al. 2006 Partial Democracy Autocracy Score POL DEM POL POL Threshold(s) ≥ +7 within -6 and +6 ≤ -7 within 8 and 10 within 3 and 7 ≤2 ≥ +4 within -3 and +3 ≤ -4 ≥ +8 within +1 and +7 ≤0 As we can see.6. This survey is far from complete. using a variety of development indicators and working on differently . 2006 Competitive Authoritarianism Closed Authoritarianism Liberal Democracy Lindberg. 1991) with those alternative classifications.. the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy’. 2006 Electoral Democracy Electoral Authoritarianism Score FH Threshold(s) 1 1. Similarly.5 .

that is the improvement of life. which should be considered as a simple means of enlarging people’s potential and possibilities. modernization theory remains the main reference point of the debate. Of course. In very general terms. Often. Nonetheless it may represent . 2003). Up to now. More recently. the enlargement of the middle class (i. The basic assumptions of this theory are the existence of a strong interrelation between the economical. there’s no lack of replies. Economic development. Just a few years later Boix and Stokes pointed out a misinterpretation of Przeworski et al. 1991 and Przeworski et al. Development is something more than economic growth. Przeworski et al. Too often. the point is that too often it has remained in the background of the empirical works on development and democracy. triggers some fundamental social and organizational transformation that are crucial for democracy. 1996. Dahl. when accompanied by industrialization. such as an increase in the resources available for investments in education. The aim is to re-focus scholars and policymakers’ attention on the ultimate target of development. 1990). 1968. Barro was the first to support the ‘democracy as a luxury’ thesis: rich countries tend to be more democratic simply because they can afford the negative pay-off of political freedom on economic growth. Bollen. The explanatory side of the development-and-democracy puzzle is without any doubt the weak point of the model. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) found no significant effect of economic development on the emergence of democracy. random. 1963. Boix & Stokes. The most basic of them are to lead a long and healthy life. in other words. 1999). economic development substantially improves a nation’s democratic prospects. Jackman. the magnitude tends to diminish. On the basis of the notion of human development. 1971. the lessening of social conflict. They disentangled the relationship between development and democracy by arguing that development is pretty much irrelevant for a democratic transition to occur but it does help democracy to survive once it has been already established throughout some exogenous. and more recently Burkhart & Lewis-Beck. Jackman (more recently followed by Huntington. we should acknowledge. Przeworski and colleagues contribution probably remains the most remarkable. This view patently challenges the mainstream narrow equation between development and economic growth. these efforts did not succeed. such complex a process has been reduced to the mere growth of per capita income. For decades the debate has been dominated by the modernization theory. the argument goes as follows. Bollen & Jackman. which has been often criticized. 1979.. according to the classic Aristotelian argument). 1997) claimed that the ‘threshold hypothesis’. but in fact all of them contribute to nourish the debate and to keep it alive. Olsen. Whether we find it complete and efficacious or not. results and obtained opposite outcomes by extending the same analysis to the prewar period. At present. to have access to education and the resources needed for a decent standard of living.composed samples of countries (Cutright. although we do not know why (Geddes. but a simple covariance that should be better explained by some omitted variable. social. This measure. at least for the criticisms that followed. 1994. cause. is probably far from being the ultimate solution to the problem of measuring development. the idea of socioeconomic development as a ‘requisite’ of democracy has survived for some fifty years. 1973. According to Burkhart and Lewis-Beck. cultural and political dimensions and of a comprehensive developmental process of which democratization represent the final stage. Surprisingly or not. the UNDP has elaborated a Human Development Index (HDI). Quite remarkable is the notion of human development elaborated by the economist Mahbub un Haq within the United Nations Program for Development (UNDP Global Report. This last remark is far from being irrelevant. Barro. democracy’s natural ally. Democracy seems to actually be more likely in more developed countries. 1986. fits the data much more closely than the linear hypothesis does. according to which there is a threshold of wealth above which the impact of economic development does not produce any further effect on democracy. economic security. Only by the early ‘90s a systematic re-discussion of the concept of development has started both in academic and international institutions circles. 1996. but in fact the magnitude of the effect depends on the location of that nation in the world system: as it moves from the core to the periphery. Most of them attempted to introduce some corrections or further specifications of the original findings.e.

an almost perfect step pattern of association might be identified. After having recoded the Freedom House combined 13-points scale in a 7-types regimes classification and the UNDP Index in a 5 ordinal categories (different from the usual UNDP categorization). as measured by the HDI (significant at the . Results are quite interesting. in turn. achieve and maintain a democratic system for their country (Diamond. All the most developed countries are concentrated into the two most democratic regime types and almost all the less developed countries fall into the two less democratic categories. Moreover. In an early attempt to include the concept of human development into the debate on democratization. twenty years after? How robust are they? Does a line along the regime continuum really make a difference for empirical results? These are the questions that the next paragraph’s analysis will try to answer. Table 3 Human Development and Regime Type (Diamond. Medium/low-HDI countries. Then. 1992) . Diamond can rightfully reformulate Lipset’s thesis as follows: the more well-to-do the people of a country.a starting point for translating the notion of human development into operative terms (as Welzel and Inglehart have already started to do in their reflection on a human empowerment path to democracy).0001 and with a degree of association of . at the opposite pole. Table 3 shows a strong relationship both between high levels of development and democracy and. the author cross-tabulated these two variables. Do these findings hold. on average. between low levels of development and absence of political freedoms.77). are less democratic than the medium-HDI ones but are still more democratic than the low-HDI countries. 1992). Medium/high-HDI countries have a higher proportion of democracies than do medium-HDI countries (which actually appear scattered across all regime type). the more likely they will favor. Diamond (1992) published an article in which he re-tested Lipset’s thesis – with 1990 data and on a larger sample of 152 countries – by using the HDI instead of per capita income. Diamond’s quite simple test show that the improvements in the physical quality of people’s lives are more important than economic development per se. The test confirms that there is a strong positive relationship between democracy and socioeconomic development.

56 are smaller than in 1990. the association between very high levels of development and democracy notwithstanding. whether a country has an high or a medium level of development does seem to make a (slight) difference.77. semi-competitive. The new test confirms a quite strong. in each category countries are quite scattered across all regime types. as on the one hand it let us see how strong the relationship between development and democracy is today and. The first thing to notice is the larger number of countries which ‘populate’ the intermediate categories of political regime. in turn. with a slight tendency to converge toward the intermediate categories (competitive illiberal.Testing the robustness According to the previous questions. As from tables 1 and 2. Before presenting the analysis. First. The old GDP per capita (PPP US $) wealth indicator has been replaced by the GNI per capita (PPP US $). I will re-do the analysis as many times as the alternative typologies listed above. second. To conclude. on the other. The average value of each HDI dimension is discounted according to its level of distributional inequality. This updating is a necessary preliminary step as the article is aged and a re-assessment of the relationship between development and democracy in 1990 would be quite valueless. Since it is a multiple entry tabulation with ordinal categories. . association 3 In the last UNDP Report an inequality-adjusted human development index (IHDI) has been proposed.34 – when the ‘very high’ category is excluded from the cross-tab)5 but still working. has an higher proportion of democracy than the ‘low HDI’ category. 4 All the tables used in the analysis. and even smaller – respectively . The updating of Diamond’s original test represents the key of the analysis.49. . it is the reference point of the further tests4. high. More precisely. With the exception of very high levels of HDI. third and fourth quartile. For a further test. Low levels of development do not correspond to low or null levels of democraticness. from Table 4 to Table 11. it would also be interesting to see how results change by using this measure.19 and . as in both cases it is likely to be a semi-competitive regime. non-competitive). a clear relationship between development and regime type is hardly observable. Education’s measure has been recently modified as the ‘mean years of schooling’ and the ‘expected years of schooling’. Health is still measured by ‘life expectancy at birth’ indicator. The ‘very high HDI’ category contains an higher proportion of democratic countries than the ‘high HDI’ category. but rather the cubic root of their sum. where the number of democracies (liberal and competitive pluralist) is almost identical. The categorization of the HDI variable is also changed from absolute to relative thresholds: the very high. low. and the gamma. The measurement of the overall index is no longer the simple average of the three components. which may represent the opposite of Diamond 7-categories classification. which sounds quite an arbitrary choice3. as it represents a small but significant progress toward a more fine-grained operationalization of human development. association between very high levels of development and democracy and the presence of a fairly good step pattern of association. the re-assessment of these updated results is based on three alternatives typologies drawn on the Freedom in the World index and four alternative typologies drawn on the Polity. I will repeat Diamond’s test using 2009 data. so that the IHDI equals the HDI when there is no inequality across people but is less than the HDI as inequality rises. I will use these thresholds instead of Diamond’s ‘natural breaking points’. At the opposite pole of the table things change. the relationship between development and political regime today appear weaker that twenty years ago (both the tau-c. but actually Diamond does not specify what test he did. but weaker than in 1990. . then I always check for both of them. categories now correspond respectively to the first. Second. 5 The association degree of the original test is . Let’s start with the Freedom House’s dichotomous variable ‘Electoral Democracy’. I presume he chose either the tau-c or the gamma test of association. And even if we look into the middle. Results confirm a strong association between very high levels of HD and Democracy. medium. which displays an higher proportion of democracy than the ‘medium HDI’ category that. whether a country has a medium or a low level of development does not. the task is twofold. a few words on the recent corrections introduced in the measurement of each dimension of the HDI might be needed. are in the Appendix. weaker. but shows also a similar.

medium and low development countries fall into the intermediate category of regime. Epstein et al. it is possible to identify an increasing step pattern with respect to the democracy category and a decreasing one with respect to both the mixed and the authoritarian regime categories. the absolute majority of high. quite. With only one exception. All the four Polity-based typologies fix two thresholds along the continuum. based on the Political Rights index. The medium-HD category. strikingly. Does a line make a difference? The aim of this paper was inquiring the consequences of the proliferation and accumulation over time of alternative typologies of political regime.’s regime typology is particularly strict in defining a country as fully democratic. not only the association between very high levels of development and democracy holds. medium and low levels of development. in the opposite direction. to the Anocracy class. the mode of each development category corresponds to Democracy. Moreover. thus provoking a low overall level of association. more interesting. the association between the two variables sways around weak and moderate levels. The Howard & Roessler and the Lindberg’s classifications are based on three categories. As for high. the simple majority of both the high-HD and the medium-HD countries are democratic. 46%. In this case. tends to enlarge the hybrid type. but. The comparison between the results obtained with Diamond’s classification and those achieved throughout the other seven alternatives leads to the following remarks. Conclusion The question of the heading can finally be addressed.19. which displays quite a large authoritarian class. in turn. however. All the tests confirm the existence of quite a strong correspondence between very high levels of development and democracy (about the 86% of the countries with very high levels of HD are democratic). in general it is possible to claim that they can hardly be associated to different . Additionally. The low-HD countries are all clustered in the intermediate (78%) and democracy (22%) categories. Quite strikingly. Finally. Even weaker (tau-c .33) is the association measured by using Zanger classification. the association between the two variables under examination is almost null (tau-c . The outcome of the second typology. Whether a similar correspondence between low levels of human development and autocracy exists or not seems to depends on how we operationalize the latter (even if that correspondence is never particularly strong). as it decreases to almost null degrees when the tests are repeated without the ‘very high HD’ category. The first. gamma . Mansfield & Snyder draw a quite large ‘incoherent regime’ type. between low levels of HD and autocracy (even if exactly the same percentage of low-HD. is scattered across the three regime types. where the thresholds divide the continuum in three perfectly equal types. although Wade & Reiter draw their regime typology on the Polity’s single Democracy score. This evidence can be rightfully considered as the responsible of the overall force of the association. there is no correspondence between low-HD and authoritarianism. Clear and opposite step patterns of association can be almost always observed between HD and Democracy and between HD and ambiguous regime categories. gamma . The strong association between very high-HD and democracy holds and. but it is also possible to observe a fair correspondence between high-HD and democracy and. similarly to Diamond’s results.08. is similar to that of the dichotomous variable. If we exclude the countries with a very high level of HD. we have to notice that the mode of both high-HD and medium-HD countries is authoritarian.14).between low levels of HD and Non-Democracy. countries fall into the hybrid category). but in very different points. which seems to mean that intermediate socioeconomic performances have no positive effect on the likelihood of a country to be at least partially democratic. the strong association between very high-HD and democracy has no counterpart at the opposite side of the cross-tab. the results are almost perfectly equal to the previous one. First thing to notice. Then. Despite of an only moderate overall association. it seems that only very high levels of HD significantly increase the probability of a country to be democratic. The development variable shows perfect step pattern of association with respect to the Democracy category and.

This paper neither provides a complete review of all the existing alternative typologies.e. 2010). the regime variable is often used ‘in a loose fashion’. or the democratic or even the autocratic type. they might be grouped into either the intermediate. This new re-examination shows that the empirical association between human development and democracy might be highly dependent on how an analyst goes from degrees to types. but not always for the same reason. Any regime classifications yields sometimes slight. Rather it confirms once more the ‘importance of choices made in the conceptualization and measurement of democracy and the way in which regime types are derived from continuous measures of democracy’ (Bogaards. sometimes patently different results. Bogaards concluded his article saying that in the recent literature on democracy and democratization. There is no agreement on where to draw the line in continuous measures of democracy. empirically neutral and theoretically correct – and universal classification of political regimes. nor it contributes to advance any hypotheses on a ‘best’ – i. According to the classification of the regime variable.political regimes. .

4% 4 10.0% 5 12.2% 38 100.8% 0 .6% 13 8.3% 39 100.3% 7 18.0% Medium 21 55.3% 9 23. 1997 HDIcat Very High High 15 39.5% 38 100.9% 0 .7% 13 33.0% 3 7.5% 7 18.3% 16 41.0% 2 5.Appendix Table 4 Development and Democracy today using Diamond.3% 17 44.0% 21 13.7% 38 100.0% 4 10.0% Total 67 43.8% 38 100.2% 153 100.0% 2 5.0% ED Non Democracy Count % within HDIcat 5 13.8% 8 20.5% 153 100.1% 6 15.2% 0 . HDIcat Very High High 2 5.0% Diamond Liberal Democracy Count % within HDIcat 27 71.5% 38 100.0% Electoral Democracy Count % within HDIcat Total Count % within HDIcat .5% 7 4.5% 4 10.0% Medium 0 .8% 86 56.2% 33 86.4% 13 34.0% Low 26 66.1% 36 23. 1991.0% Competitive Pluralist Count % within HDIcat Competitive Illiberal Count % within HDIcat Semicompetitive partly Pluralist Noncompetitive partly Pluralist Hegemonic Open Count % within HDIcat Count % within HDIcat Count % within HDIcat Hegemonic Closed Count % within HDIcat Total Count % within HDIcat Table 5 Development and Democracy today using Freedom House.7% 5 13.0% 38 100.5% 23 60.0% Low 0 .3% 0 .2% 2 5.1% 4 10.0% Total 29 19.0% 9 23.7% 9 23.6% 27 17.3% 39 100.7% 5 13.7% 20 13.

0% 38 100.7% 34 22.5% 7 18.2% 69 45.0% 56 37.4% 38 100.0% Total 78 52.0% 37 100.7% 150 100.1% 11 29.0% Howard Liberal and Electoral Democracy Count % within HDIcat 33 86. 2005 HDIcat Very High High 20 54.0% 5 13. 2006 HDIcat Very High High 11 28.8% 19 50.7% 15 39.0% Mansfield Democracy Count % within HDIcat 33 86.5% 38 100.1% 11 28.4% 0 .9% 38 100.5% 153 100.2% 38 100.7% 32 82.2% 26 66.0% Medium 4 10.2% 0 .5% 6 15.6% 22 57.8% 5 13.1% 153 100.0% Low 8 21.2% 37 100.9% 11 28.0% Low 2 5.2% 38 100.6% 29 78.0% Low 3 7.8% 38 100.6% 16 10.9% 79 51.5% 12 31.1% 4 10.0% Medium 8 21.9% 16 42.3% 16 10.8% 0 .0% Incoherent Regime Count % within HDIcat Autocracy Count % within HDIcat Total Count % within HDIcat .0% Lindberg Liberal Democracy Count % within HDIcat 33 86.7% 39 100.0% Total 50 32.3% 39 100.6% 4 10.0% Electoral democracy Count % within HDIcat Electoral Authoritarianism Count % within HDIcat Total Count % within HDIcat Table 8 Development and Democracy today using Mansfield and Snyder.1% 38 100. 2006 HDIcat Very High High 14 36.0% 5 13.Table 6 Development and Democracy today using Howard and Roessler.0% Total 58 37.1% 23 60.8% 1 2.0% Competitve Authoritarianism Count % within HDIcat Closed Authoritarianism Count % within HDIcat Total Count % within HDIcat Table 7 Development and Democracy today using Lindberg.7% 6 16.0% Medium 17 44.

0% Mixed Regime Count % within HDIcat Authoritarian Count % within HDIcat Total Count % within HDIcat .0% Medium 13 34.6% 38 100.8% 17 45.2% 38 100.0% Total 66 44.3% 37 100.9% 17 45.0% 5 13.2% 38 100.2% 13 34.2% 5 13.1% 9 24.0% Low 17 45.0% Low 3 8.2% 9 23.3% 11 29.6% 4 10.3% 150 100.0% 150 100.3% 44 29.5% 5 13.6% 8 21.7% 44 29.0% 24 16.2% 14 36.1% 17 45.6% 11 29.0% Partial Democracy Count % within HDIcat Autocracy Count % within HDIcat Total Count % within HDIcat Table 11 Development and Democracy today using HDIcat Very High High 18 48.0% Epstein Full Democracy Count % within HDIcat 33 86.9% 37 100.7% 37 100.9% 38 100.0% Low 4 10.5% 37 100.8% 0 .0% Wade Democracy Count % within HDIcat 33 86.7% 37 100.9% 16 43.2% 37 100.8% 11 28.8% 1 2.9% 9 24. 2006 HDIcat Very High High 17 45.2% 12 31.5% 38 100.0% Medium 24 63.7% 38 100..0% 27 18.0% 5 13.Table 9 Development and Democracy today using Zanger.3% 150 100.0% Zanger Democracy Count % within HDIcat 33 86.6% 3 8.0% Total 68 45.3% 38 25.0% Total 99 66.0% Anocracy Count % within HDIcat Autocracy Count % within HDIcat Total Count % within HDIcat Table 10 Development and Democracy today using Epstein et al. 2000 HDIcat Very High High 25 67.8% 0 .0% Medium 13 34.9% 15 40.0% 40 26.

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