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Julia Gillard, PM Email c/o "R.McClelland.MP@aph.gov.au" <R.McClelland.MP@aph.gov.au>
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23-8-2011

Cc: Ted Baillieu Premier ted.baillieu@parliament.vic.gov.au
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Ref: 110823 Education funding -etc- VELVET REVOLUTION Part 6
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Julia, I became aware of The Age 23-8-2011 page 2 article “Garrett calls probe into Islamic school” which refers to charges of the various schools having dramatically escalated by the owners of the sites being AFIC (Re Islamic Council) and I am concerned as to the investigation if it is actually conducted appropriately. . You may not be aware of it but (as a CONSTITUTIONALIST) on 19 July 2006 after a 5 year epic legal battle I defeated the Commonwealth in regard of FAILING TO VOTE in that the legislation was unconstitutional, as s116 doesn’t allow religious discrimination: Therefore if any person can oppose to be compelled to vote upon basis or religion then one can also refuse the same upon basis of non-religion (consider s116 of the constitution)
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QUOTE
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=398&invol=333

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U.S. Supreme Court WELSH v. UNITED STATES, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)

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398 U.S. 333 WELSH v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 76. Argued January 20, 1970 Decided June 15, 1970 Petitioner was convicted of refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces despite his claim for conscientious objector status under 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. That provision exempts from military service persons who by reason of "religious training and belief" are conscientiously opposed to war in any form, that term being defined in the Act as "belief in a relation to a supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation" but not including "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal code." In his exemption application petitioner stated that he could not affirm or deny belief in a "Supreme Being" and struck the words "my religious training and" from the form. He affirmed that he held deep conscientious scruples against participating in wars where people were killed. The Court of Appeals, while noting that petitioner's "beliefs are held with the strength of more traditional religious convictions," concluded that those beliefs were not sufficiently "religious" to meet the terms of 6 (j), and affirmed the conviction. Petitioner contends that the Act violates the First Amendment prohibition of establishment of religion and that his conviction should be set aside on the basis of United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 , which held that the test of religious belief under 6 (j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption. Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp. 335-367. 404 F.2d 1078, reversed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, joined by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concluded that: This case is controlled by United States v. Seeger, supra, to which it is factually similar. Under Seeger, 6 (j) is not limited to those whose opposition to war is prompted by orthodox or parochial religious beliefs. A registrant's conscientious objection to all war is "religious" within the meaning of 6 (j) if this [398 U.S. 333, 334] opposition stems from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and these beliefs are held with the strength of traditional religious convictions. In view of the broad scope of the word "religious," a registrant's characterization of his beliefs as "nonreligious" is not a reliable guide to those administering the exemption. Pp. 335-344. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concluded that: 1. The language of 6 (j) cannot be construed (as it was in United States v. Seeger, supra, and as it is in the prevailing opinion) to exempt from military service all individuals who in good faith oppose all war, it being clear from both the legislative history and textual analysis of that provision that Congress used the words "by reason of religious training and belief" to limit religion

23-8-2011 Page 1

Ref: 110823 Education funding- etc - VELVET REVOLUTION Part 6

PLEASE NOTE: Until our website Http://www.office-of-the-guardian.com has been set up to operate the website Http://www.schorel-hlavka.com will be the alternative website for contact details. help@office-of-the-guardian.com Free download of documents at blog http://www.scribd.com/InspectorRikati

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to its theistic sense and to confine it to formal, organized worship or shared beliefs by a recognizable and cohesive group. Pp. 348-354. 2. The question of the constitutionality of 6 (j) cannot be avoided by a construction of that provision that is contrary to its intended meaning. Pp. 354-356. 3. Section 6 (j) contravenes the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by exempting those whose conscientious objection claims are founded on a theistic belief while not exempting those whose claims are based on a secular belief. To comport with that clause an exemption must be "neutral" and include those whose belief emanates from a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. Pp. 356-361. 4. In view of the broad discretion conferred by the Act's severability clause and the longstanding policy of exempting religious conscientious objectors, the Court, rather than nullifying the exemption entirely, should extend its coverage to those like petitioner who have been unconstitutionally excluded from its coverage. Pp. 361-367. Again 4. In view of the broad discretion conferred by the Act's severability clause and the longstanding policy of exempting religious conscientious objectors, the Court, rather than nullifying the exemption entirely, should extend its coverage to those like petitioner who have been unconstitutionally excluded from its coverage. Pp. 361-367.

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In this case I also did set out extensively the issue of funding for religious education. To the Commonwealth it makes not one iota of difference if a school is being charge $10.00 or $1 million rent because its concern is that any education funding must be provided for nonreligious purposes such as schoolbooks without religious content. Therefore any funding that is provided to any school (religious or not) must be monitored that not a single cent is contributed to any religious matter. (Ample of USA decision are on record regarding this where they have the equivalent of s116 in its constitution). As such, the commonwealth must ensure that none of its education funding is paid in any way to benefit a religious body. It is not relevant if the Islamic Council therefore increases it rents because the Commonwealth cannot fund any rent where this is a religious body and it clearly increased its rent dramatically as to get more monies. More over any backdated rent would be in my view unconstitutional as no retrospective charges can be made (As the Framers of the Constitution made clear) and clearly the retrospective charges were for no other purpose but to drain the Commonwealth funding for education for religious purposes. As such all monies that were used for the rent increases, for so far diverted from Commonwealth education funding must be returned to the Consolidated Revenue Funds. Again, no funding, being it for public or religious or other private education can be used for religious matters, neither so indirectly. As the USA courts made clear that monies provided to a religious school could not be used for financial benefits of the religion itself and had to be restricted to financing non-religious books, etc. where the rent is charged by a religious organisation which owns the school then no funding can therefore be provided for this as it would indirectly benefit the religious organisation and its extraordinary increases from one year to another and backdated from $24,000 to $260,000 as an example clearly shows a deliberate infraction into education funding. While the States themselves are not bound by s116 nevertheless a state such as the State of Victoria separated Church and State even prior to federation and continued to do so when making church and state independent of each other.. Actually any tax deduction for religious donations and even taxation exemptions for religious organisations are unconstitutional (including Hill Song Church and Church of Scientology) as while the High Court of Australia made a decision regarding the State of Victoria it is a different matter for the Commonwealth, because of s116! Do we need a VELVET REVOLUTION to finally get our taxation monies back from religious bodies because any unconstitutional deduction means other hardworking Australians ending up to pay more taxes to make up for the shortfall! Let’s get it right now before We the people have to take charge and do it instead, where you and other members of the government are unable to act appropriately as agent for us in compliance with constitutional provisions!
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Awaiting your response,

G. H. Schorel-Hlavka (Gerrit)

23-8-2011 Page 2

Ref: 110823 Education funding- etc - VELVET REVOLUTION Part 6

PLEASE NOTE: Until our website Http://www.office-of-the-guardian.com has been set up to operate the website Http://www.schorel-hlavka.com will be the alternative website for contact details. help@office-of-the-guardian.com Free download of documents at blog http://www.scribd.com/InspectorRikati