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US orders GIMO by Aide Memoire, actual control Aide Memoire of June 27, vol II, p188 http://digicoll.library.

wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1950v06&entity=FRUS.FRUS1950v06.p04 29&q1=formosa&q2=theater%20commander http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1950v07&entity=FRUS.FRUS1950v07.p02 08&q1=188 611.94A/6-2750: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Embassy in China TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 27, 1950-1 a. m. Telcan 39. Top secret and eyes only for Strong.' You are directed to seek an interview at once with the Gimo 2 and to communicate to him the fol msg, of which a copy shld be left as an aide-mmloire. "I have been directed by my Govt to communicate to your Excellency the fol: The attack of the North Korean forces against the Republic of Korea raises problems concerning the security of the Pacific area to which the United States, in view of its responsibilities in Japan and its general interest in the peace of the area, cannot be indifferent. For this reason, the United States Seventh Fleet has been ordered to prevent any attack from the mainland against the island of Formosa, and the necessary dispositions have already been made. Your Excellency will understand that a continuation of air and sea operations by forces under Your Excellency's command against the Chinese mainland or against shipping in Chinese waters or on the high seas wld not be compatible with the discharge by the Seventh Fleet of the mission assigned to it. The US Govt is therefore confident of your full cooperation in the issuance of the orders necessary to effect the termination of such operations, and its forces have been

instructed to proceed on the assumption that such orders have been issued. Your Excellency will appreciate that these steps are motivated by a deep concern not only for the peace and stability of the Pacific area but also for the future freedom and well being of the peoples of China and Formosa." ACHESON 'Robert C. Strong was Consul at Taipei and Charg6 at the American Embassy in the Republic of China. 2Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had resumed office as President of the Republic of China on March 1, 1950.

THI CHINA AREA 794A.00/8-350: Telegram The Acting Political Adviser in, Japan (Sebakd) to the Secretary of State TOP SECRET PRIORITY ToKYo, August 3, 1950-7 p.;m. 315. ReDeptel 180, August 2 [1]. General MacArthur has advised me that as theater commander his discussions with the Gimo and Chinese military authorities were entirely limited to arrangements for effective military coordination 'between the American and Chinese forces respectively -under his and Chinese Nationalist Government command, as envisaged in the press statement and aide-memoireI and that he was most meticulous in confining his discussions with Chinese Government officials to military problems of a technical nature. With reference to his main discussion General MacArthur has pointed out that he invited the Army, Navy, and Air attaches of the Embassy to be present and that Strong would undoubtedly be in a position to report the consensus of their views. As ancillary to his visit General MacArthur told me in confidence

of his definite impression of deep resentment in Chinese official circles resulting, from what was taken to be an attitude of general hostility on the part of State Department representatives in Taipei. Without entering into any discussion of the relative merits or demerits of the issues which may be involved, he believes there has been a very definite failure to establish a relationship based upon that degree of confidence and cordiality which is so essential to diplomatic success. He is particularly concerned over the adverse effect the continuance of such a situation might have upon his efforts to maximize the military coordination indispensable to the success of joint operations in the defense of Formosa. SEBALD 'Reference is to Chinese statement accepting the terms of the United States aide-m~moire of June 27, vol. V p. 188.