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Sequential Tripping of Steam Turbine Generators: Working Group Report

Everett Fennell, Member, IEEE, Kevin Kozminski, Munnu Bajpai, Steve Easterday-McPadden, Walt Elmore, Charles Fromen, Jon Gardell, Wayne Hartmann, Joe Hurley, Patrick Kerrigan, Kumul Khunkhun, Charles J. Mozina, George Nail, Subhash Patel, Gary Pence, Al Pierce, Don Smaha, Sahib Usman, Phil Waudby, and Murty Yalla

Abstract The practice of tripping the generator breakers immediately following a boiler/turbine trip exposes a steam turbine generator to a potentially damaging overspeed operating condition. This paper describes the use of the sequential trip mode as a means of minimizing the exposure to possible unit damage following a boiler/turbine trip. Included is a comparison of the application of devices used by several major steam turbine generator manufacturers in accomplishing sequential tripping of the unit. This paper also discusses the differences in the devices used in implementing the tripping scheme and those applied as backup motoring protection. Additionally, the paper provides guidance in the selection of which functions should and should not be used to initiate sequential tripping. Index TermsExhaust hood temperature, generator overspeed, sequential tripping, simultaneous tripping, unit separation tripping, valve limit switches.

I. INTRODUCTION S POWER PLANT unit sizes increased and feedwater/steam cycles became complicated, the shutdown process for steam turbine generating units became more critical. These issues made a more orderly shutdown of the turbine generator desirable, if not a requirement. The traditional practice of tripping the main unit breakers immediately following a boiler/turbine trip could needlessly expose the unit to a potentially catastrophic overspeed condition and other unnecessary stresses. There are several reasons for the increase in importance of the shutdown process. Most unit trips are the result of boiler and turbine mechanical problems, rather than problems in the generator and associated high-voltage equipment. Another
Paper ICPSD 9808, presented by C. J. Mozina at the 1998 IEEE/IAS Industrial and Commercial Power Systems Technical Conference, Edmonton, Alta., Canada, May 38, and approved for publication in the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS by the Power Systems Protection Committee of the IEEE Industry Applications Society. Manuscript released for publication June 15, 1998. This paper was also presented at the 1998 IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer General Meeting, San Diego, CA, July 1216. This paper is also scheduled to appear in the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY. The authors are members of Working Group J4 of the Rotating Machinery Protection Subcommittee, Power System Relaying Committee, Power Engineering Society. E. Fennell, Chairperson of Working Group J4 is with ABB Power P&D Company, North Brunswick, NJ 08902-6005 USA. Publisher Item Identier S 0093-9994(98)08108-0.

reason is the introduction of rened turbine blading designs which, while more efcient, are not as rugged as earlier, simpler blade designs and are not able to withstand overspeeds much higher than 120% of rated speed. Finally, given the added complexity of multiple steam admission paths with the associated stop and control valves, it is more difcult to insure the complete shutoff of steam ow to the various turbine sections. Given these concerns, turbine generator manufacturers became increasingly concerned about the normal operating practices of the electric utilities and, in the 1970s, manufacturers sent recommendations to their customers that strongly suggested that the utility should develop sequential tripping schemes for taking units off-line. These schemes would allow an automatic, orderly shutdown and isolation of the turbine generator unit following a turbine trip. While these notices did not give any detailed design information, their prime focus appeared to be associated with the normal, controlled shutdown of the unit. These recommendations had many interpretations, which resulted in substantially different sequential trip scheme designs being implemented from utility to utility. Some utilities had part or all of the normal protective relaying initiating sequential tripping. There were, however, attempts to develop some standard practices for control and protection functions initiating sequential tripping on these larger units [1]. The purpose of sequentially tripping a turbine generator is to minimize the possibility of damaging the unit as the result of an overspeed condition following the opening of the main generator breaker(s). This method is also commonly used as the normal shutdown mode for many units with different types of prime movers. This method of isolating the unit from the power system is used for operating conditions where delayed tripping of the generator will not result in increased damage to electrical equipment. Sequential tripping is accomplished by rst tripping the prime mover (turbine) followed by tripping the generator and eld breakers after a brief period of deliberate motoring to ensure that all residual driving power is drained off the turbine. Equipment manufacturers have indicated that the overspeeding of a turbine generator is a more damaging operating condition than a brief motoring of the unit. A brief period of deliberate motoring to reduce the likelihood of excessive

00939994/98$10.00 1998 IEEE



overspeed will not cause damage to the turbine. Manufacturers have incorporated this philosophy into their sequential tripping recommendations. In addition to sequential tripping, there are three other methods of grouping electrical and mechanical protection devices for activating a trip/shutdown of a steam generator. These four common trip/shutdown modes of isolating the generator from service following the detection of an unacceptable abnormal operating condition or electrical fault are described below. Simultaneous Tripping: This provides the fastest means of isolating the generator. This tripping mode is used for all internal generator faults and severe abnormalities in the generator protection zone. Isolation is accomplished by simultaneously tripping the generator breakers and eld breaker, shutting down the prime mover by closing the turbine valves, and transferring unit auxiliary loads to standby power. Generator Tripping: This mode of isolation usually trips the main generator and eld breakers. The scheme does not shut down the prime mover and is used where it may be possible to quickly correct the abnormality, thereby permitting the reconnection of the machine to the system in a short period of time. This protection trips the generator for a power system disturbance, rather than an internal generator fault/abnormality. This mode can be used if permitted by the type of prime mover, boiler, and governor control systems and requires that the unit be capable of quick response following a load rejection. Unit Separation Tripping: A variation of the generator tripping scheme is one where only the main generator breaker(s) is opened. It is recommended for applications where it is desirable to maintain the unit auxiliary loads connected to the generator. The advantage of this scheme is that the unit can be reconnected to the system with minimum delay. As with the generator tripping scheme, the unit must be capable of a quick response following a load rejection. Sequential Tripping: This mode is primarily used when delayed tripping of the breakers has no detrimental effect on the generating unit. It is generally used for normal unit shutdowns and tripping for prime mover problems, where high-speed tripping is not a requirement. When the turbine control system indicates that the turbine has been tripped, tripping of the generator breakers followed by the eld breaker is initiated. Inclusion of a reverse power relay in series with the mechanical signal indicating that the turbine has been tripped provides security against possible overspeed of the turbine by ensuring that steam ows have been reduced below the amount necessary to produce an overspeed condition when the generator breakers are opened. Thus, by using the sequential tripping mode of isolating the unit from the power system for noncritical operating conditions, it is possible to provide a safe, orderly shutdown without exposing the equipment to an unnecessary risk of overspeed. For turbine problems, this is the preferred mode. A survey conducted by the Rotating Machinery Protection Subcommittee of the Power System Relaying Committee (PSRC), IEEE Power Engineering Society, found that sequential tripping is being initiated by a variety of protective relays, some of which clearly require immediate tripping

of the generator and eld breakers. While there are some instances where sequential tripping could possibly be initiated by generator protection relays, generally, the recommended practice is to initiate simultaneous tripping of the unit. Several concerns have arisen recently regarding the application of devices and the logic behind sequential tripping schemes and unit motoring protection. These concerns are as follows: the level of misunderstanding in the industry as to what electrical and mechanical protective devices should or should not initiate sequential tripping; the differentiation between the control logic in a sequential tripping scheme and the protective logic for motoring protection; the inability of certain devices to correctly activate under certain operating conditions. Designers and operators of power plants today must be concerned with the failure of control and protective devices to operate, the failure of a breaker to trip, protective devices out of service, and operator error. For these reasons, backup protection and supervisory devices are critical for any sequential tripping scheme. This paper provides guidance in the application of the trip functions for electrical and mechanical devices that detect abnormal conditions and initiate sequential tripping. Special attention is given to the interaction and differences between devices used in the control logic of a sequential tripping scheme and the devices used in motoring protection. Critical concerns regarding the use of this type of tripping scheme are identied in this paper. Additionally, recommendations are made that will ensure that a rst-order contingency, such as the failure of a device to operate or the failure of a breaker to trip, will not prevent generator isolation from the power system. Refer to [4] and the equipment manufacturers publications for additional information on the appropriate applications for the simultaneous, generator, unit separation, and sequential tripping modes. II. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF SEQUENTIAL TRIPPING Sequential tripping of a unit can be initiated by either a plant operator, boiler/reactor trip, or turbine generator mechanical problem. Normal unit shutdowns can be accomplished safely and automatically simply by an operator initiating a boiler/turbine trip. This additional tripping mode provides another choice of action between an alarm-only indication and a simultaneous tripping mode. Abnormal operating conditions, which do not require immediate generator shutdown, could be set to initiate a sequential trip. These include most abnormal mechanical conditions, but they could also include some electrical conditions. Examples of some of these mechanical problems are as follows: 1) loss of fuel to the boiler; 2) boiler ame out; 3) low lubricating oil pressure; 4) high lubricating oil pressure; 5) high shaft vibration; 6) thrust bearing wear;



Fig. 2. Sequential tripping control logic.

Fig. 1. Order of events in sequential tripping scheme and devices used for control and protection. TABLE I SURVEY OF MANUFACTURER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TYPICAL SEQUENTIAL TRIPPING AND CONTROL SCHEMES

7) low condenser vacuum; 8) loss of boiler fans; 9) loss of generator coolant. The order of events in a sequential shutdown of a turbine generator is shown in Fig. 1. Also shown in Fig. 1 are those devices which indicate that a particular shutdown event has occurred. As steam ow through the turbine stops, the unit begins to motor, drawing real power from the electrical system to keep the shaft spinning at synchronous speed. Four major manufacturers of steam turbine generators were surveyed on their recommendations regarding sequential tripping control logic and the devices used in that logic. Table I summarizes the responses from the four manufacturers. All manufacturers surveyed recommend a similar control logic in their sequential tripping schemes (Fig. 2), i.e, a mechanical device indicating a turbine tripped condition, supervised by an electrical reverse power relay, initiates the shutdown of the generator and the transfer of unit auxiliary buses to a standby power source. It is important to remember that these devices are part of the control logic and are not performing a protective function. Refer to Section IV for a discussion of protective devices. The following is a brief description of devices recommended for use in implementing a sequential tripping scheme. Valve Limit Switches: A limit or position switch on each turbine valve provides an indication that steam ow through that path has been shut off or reduced to harmlessly low

levels. Given the complexity of steam-ow circuits in modern steam turbines, concern has been raised about the susceptibility of this method to the failure of one switch. Generally, the manufacturers recommend using indications from multiple limit or pressure switches in a series-parallel arrangement to indicate that the turbine is tripped. By using an appropriate series-parallel arrangement of these limit switches, the failure of one switch will not disable the control logic or initiate a nuisance trip. Turbine Steam Flow/Pressure Switch: Steam ow less than the synchronous-speed, no-load steam ow is an indication that the unit is being motored. Generally, a differential pressure switch which measures the pressure drop across the highpressure (HP) turbine element is used to detect a low steam ow condition. Exhaust Hood Temperature: Steam ow through a turbine not only powers the unit, but it also removes the windage losses developed by the rotating blades. With little, or no, steam ow through a rotating turbine, the losses result in a signicant temperature increase, which is generally most severe at the exhaust ends of the turbine. A temperaturesensing device located in the turbine exhaust hood can detect this low steam ow/high temperature condition. Measurement of the exhaust hood temperature to indicate low turbine steam ow is a common method of alarming. Reverse Power Relay: By denition, a generating unit is motoring when real power ows into the generator from the power system. The generator performs as a motor, driving the turbine. Power required to motor depends upon the friction and windage losses of the steam turbine generator, typically in the range of 0.5%3% of rated generator power output. A sensitive electrical relay which can detect reverse power ow into the unit is the best means of detecting a motoring condition. All manufacturers surveyed recommend that an electrical reverse power relay supervise the mechanical device(s), see Fig. 2, since it may not be possible to set the mechanical devices to accurately measure the point where reverse power ows into the machine. The reverse power relay must exhibit the necessary sensitivity to detect a reverse power condition and incorporate sufcient time delay to avoid nuisance tripping. It is typically set to pickup below machine rated motoring power, by a margin, to insure that there is not sufcient steam



Fig. 3. Ideal reverse power relay pickup.

ow into the turbine to cause an overspeed when the generator breakers are opened. Some older steam turbine generators are not equipped with stop valve limit switches. For those units, a reverse power relay should be used at a minimum as the method of detecting a motoring condition. A time delay is also used in the logic circuit to provide maximum security against a possible overspeed condition. Since permissible motoring times for most units are on the order of minutes, the additional time delay (typically, 13 s is recommended) will not increase the likelihood of equipment damage. Should a main generator breaker fail to open in the sequential trip shutdown process, the generator will operate as an induction motor after the eld breaker trips. This type of operation can result in a severe local system voltage depression, and damaging currents can be induced in the generator rotor winding and body. To protect against this possibility, one can supervise the eld breaker trip by using auxiliary b contacts from the generator breaker(s). Delayed tripping of the eld breaker will not result in any additional damage to the unit. Breaker failure should be initiated by the sequential tripping scheme lockout, as shown in Fig. 2. III. PERFORMANCE OF REVERSE POWER RELAYS WHEN SUPERVISING SEQUENTIAL TRIPPING The performance of a reverse power relay is affected by the reactive power ow of the turbine generator during a motoring condition. Real power consumed by the motoring unit is extremely small compared to the units continuous rating. The magnitude of var ow and resultant operating power factor for the motoring condition are determined by the level of generator excitation when the turbine is tripped. An ideal reverse power relay set to detect motoring should pick up at a real power level independent of the var output of the machine. Fig. 3 shows the ideal operating characteristic of the reverse power relay. The real power pickup current is in phase with the terminal voltage and is component given as

Fig. 4. Deviation in reverse power relay pickup.

where machine armature current; real power component of the armature current and used to operate the relay; machine terminal voltage; angle between machine terminal voltage and armature current. If the reverse power relay characteristic deviates from the ideal characteristic by an angle , as shown Fig. 4, then the magnitude of the real power current at the same power factor angle must increase in order for the reverse power relay to pickup. The magnitude of the new pickup value of real power current for angle deviation from ideal is given by

where machine armature current with no deviation from ; ideal equivalent machine armature current with a deviation from ideal of ; machine terminal voltage; angle between machine terminal voltage and armature current; deviation of relay characteristic from ideal; real power component of the armature current required to pick up the relay with no deviation from ; ideal equivalent real power component of the armature current required to pick up the relay with a deviation form ideal of .



Assume that a machine is running at rated megavoltamperes ) and the with a lagging power factor of 0.85 ( reverse power relay is set to pick up at machine motoring losses of 1.5% of rated megavoltamperes. On a loss of prime mover, the real power will decrease in magnitude and reverse in direction. If the reactive power does not change following will the loss of prime mover, the power factor angle increase from 31.79 to 88.37 . For a deviation of from the ideal characteristic, the relay pickup would be 260% of the setting. However, the relay would operate at 62% of the . pickup value for a deviation of Depending on the relay applied, the actual quantities may be single or three phase. The relay may be an electromechanical relay with appropriate angle of maximum torque, a static analog relay, or a digital relay calculating power based on derived phasor quantities or other techniques. It is apparent that, unless the relay has an ideal characteristic, the real power required to pick up the relay when the power factor is low can be substantially higher than that required at unity power factor. Any practical relay will have some inherent error. In addition, errors may be introduced by the instrument transformers. If there is a small deviation from an ideal characteristic of the relay, it would not be unusual for a reverse power relay to fail to pick up under conditions of high machine var ow [2], [3]. As part of the sequential tripping procedure, it is recommended that the var output of the machine be reduced by control or operator action. In addition, operators should be alerted to the possibility of reverse power relays not operating and be trained in procedures to manually open the generator breaker after carefully checking that power ow is into the machine. IV. PROTECTIVE RELAYS INITIATING SEQUENTIAL TRIPPING As stated earlier, manufacturers do not generally recommend initiating a sequential trip with most generator protective relays. The reason is that the sequential shutdown process typically requires over 3 s to complete. Usually, only devices protecting the unit from an abnormal mechanical operating condition (such as high vibration, thrust bearing wear, or loss of generator coolant ow, etc.) will initiate a sequential trip. That is not to say that a generator protective relay cannot sequentially trip the unit; it is just a question of having sufcient time to progress through the shutdown process without causing further damage to the unit. The effect of a delayed electrical trip on power plant and system equipment must be analyzed and equipment manufacturers consulted prior to the use of any sequential tripping scheme. The list of generator protective relays which can initiate sequential tripping has changed over the years. This is due to changing power plant designs, increasing size and complexity of generating units, and more detailed knowledge about potential abnormal power system and unit operating conditions. From the PSRC survey, it appears that sequential tripping is being used improperly in some instances. The following is a discussion of those protection functions which are associated with abnormal electrical conditions that may not necessarily involve a fault in the generator and have

been considered by some users as candidates for initiating a sequential trip of the unit. Loss of Field (40): When excitation is lost on a synchronous generating unit, it continues to supply real power to the system as an induction generator. Its speed increases above rated as it obtains its excitation from the system. The unit becomes a large reactive drain on the system. This large reactive drain causes problems in the machine, adjacent machines, and the power system. Operation as an induction generator causes induced currents to ow in the eld winding and the rotor body (rotor teeth, wedges, retaining rings, etc.). The high reactive component of the armature current can also overload the stator winding. The permissible time before damage can occur depends on the type of machine, type of excitation loss, turbine governor characteristics, and system conditions. This time can be as short as seconds. Of course, should the loss of eld condition be caused by a short circuit in the excitation system, tripping should occur as soon as possible to minimize damage at the point of the fault. Additionally, a large reactive drain on the system can cause low system voltages which, if excessive or prolonged, can cause system instability or problems of reactive supply on other portions of the system. Due to the immediacy of the effects of the abnormality on the generator, the unit should be tripped from the power system by means of a simultaneous trip or a generator trip. Especially important is that all excitation power be removed, since it is possible that the exciter power is feeding an internal fault. Unbalanced Currents (46): The ultimate problem associated with unbalanced-current conditions is the temperature rise in the surface parts of the generator rotor. This condition is caused by the negative-sequence current in the stator winding which, in turn, creates a magnetic ux wave in the airgap which rotates in the direction opposite that of the rotor at synchronous speed, inducing double-frequency currents in the rotor surface. With sustained negative-sequence armature current, the temperature of the rotor slot wedges, for example, can reach a point where the wedges lose their mechanical strength and fail. Surface currents, crowding around the transverse exibility slots and the retaining ringrotor body interface can also cause severe mechanical distress. It becomes important to analyze the effects of different types of abnormal conditions resulting in unbalanced currents owing in the machine and the maximum time the unit can operate without any type of damage. The tripping time for a negativesequence condition varies based on the magnitude of the unbalanced current. Generally, the cause of these currents is an unbalance in the system. To adequately protect the machine, it should be removed from the system as quickly as possible. A unit separation trip allows for a quick resynchronization if the system abnormality has been eliminated. Loss of Synchronism (78): During an out-of-step condition as the swing angle between the generator voltage of a machine changes with respect to that of other units in the system, the armature current in the unit varies in magnitude. The current surges that result are cyclical in nature, with the frequency being a function of the relative rate of slip of the poles in the machine.



The resulting peak currents and off-frequency operation can cause generator stator winding stresses and transient torques, which can excite mechanical resonances that can be potentially damaging to the turbine generator shafts. It is recommended that the generator be removed from the system quickly, preferably during the rst slip cycle. A unit separation trip can be used if it is desirable to quickly resynchronize the unit after the system returns to a stable condition. Overexcitation (24): Overexcitation of a generator or transformers connected to the generator terminals will occur whenever the rated volts-per-hertz ratios are exceeded. Saturation of the generator and transformer magnetic cores can occur, and stray ux can be induced in nonlaminated components which were not designed to carry ux. This can cause severe overheating in the generator or transformers, with eventual breakdown in insulation. For a generator which is operating near full load, the eld current during the overexcitation can also be excessive. In addition to voltage regulator failure, overexcitation can also occur during a complete load rejection which leaves transmission lines connected to the generating unit. Under this condition, the volts-per-hertz ratio may exceed 1.25 pu. With the excitation system control in the automatic mode of operation, the overexcitation will generally be reduced to safe limits in a few seconds. With control in the manual mode, the overexcitation may be sustained and equipment damage can occur. Excessive volts per hertz will result in equipment failure and should be treated as a severe electrical problem. The generator and transformer should be removed from service as quickly as possible using a simultaneous or generator trip. If the condition occurs when the unit is off-line, the eld breaker should be immediately tripped. Generator and transformer manufacturers will generally provide overexcitation capability limits for this equipment. Abnormal Frequency (81): Departure from rated speed under load will bring stimulus frequencies closer to one or more of the natural frequencies of the various stages of turbine blades and result in vibratory stresses appearing in these elements. As vibratory stresses increase, fatigue damage is accumulated in the blades, which may lead to cracking in the turbine blading structure. Underfrequency operation of a synchronous generator is certain to be accompanied by high values of load currents. This could result in exceeding the short-time thermal capability of the generator. Since the short-time thermal capability of the generator is less restrictive than the possible vibratory damage associated with the turbine, the unit tripping mode will be based on the protection of the turbine elements. The primary concern associated with abnormal frequency operating conditions occurs after system disturbances which produce system separation and severe overloading on remaining system generators. Since it is difcult to dene every possible system conguration during this abnormal condition, the recommended tripping mode must balance system needs versus the undue risk to which untripped generators are exposed. For extreme cases of higher or lower frequencies, the turbine is only allowed seconds of operation. A unit separation


(1) May be connected to trip, per generator manufacturer.

trip is the safest means of protection against extreme frequency excursions. The turbine manufacturer should be contacted for further protection recommendations. Field Ground (64F): The eld circuit of a generator is an ungrounded dc system. A single ground in the eld circuit will not result in immediate damage, but it indicates the presence of weakened insulation or mechanical failure. If a second ground fault occurs, a portion of the eld winding will be short circuited, thereby producing unbalanced airgap uxes in the machine and resultant vibration. A sequential trip may be used as long as the operator is willing to assume the associated risks. From a protection viewpoint, the safest step to take after detection of a eld ground is to initiate a unit trip. Many utilities alarm when a eld ground has been detected and provide instructions for operators to shut down the machine as soon as system conditions permit. High-Impedance Stator Ground Faults (59GN): Historically, the ground fault is the most common type of fault to which a generator is subjected. A single ground on a high-impedance grounded stator indicates the presence of weakened insulation or mechanical failure. If a second ground fault occurs, it could result in a potentially damaging stator multiphase or turn-to-turn short circuit. Additionally, severe mechanical torsional shocks to shafts and couplings can occur. The minimum isolation time of the unit from the power system for this condition should be such that the machine is exposed to minimum damage if a second ground occurs. There is further consideration that a large percentage of stator ground faults will occur at a location at which the shorting of the complete winding by a second ground is not possible. The fault of greatest destructive potential involves a ground at the neutral, simultaneous with a ground at the line terminals. Taking into consideration the severity of damage due to a second ground fault and the elevated dielectric stresses imposed on the machine, it is recommended to trip the unit without signicant delay after a ground fault has been detected. While there are some instances where sequential tripping could possibly be initiated by generator protection relays, generally, the recommended practice is to initiate one of the other trip/shutdown modes for isolation of the unit. The eld ground protection function is the only candidate discussed above which could be considered for sequential tripping of the unit. See Table II for the recommended tripping practices, per [4], for these protection functions. Final decision on the tripping/shutdown mode of a particular protection function





Note: Manufacturer B recommends that the motoring protection initiate sequential tripping, rather than the simultaneous or generator trip. Also note that the reverse power relays used for motoring protection are separate relays than those used for sequential tripping control logic.

should be based on the recommended practices of the turbine generator manufacturer. V. TURBINE TRIP BACKUP PROTECTION The main function of backup protection is to ensure that, in the event of a failure of the sequential tripping scheme, the unit will be isolated from the power system. Backup protection should be, as far as possible, applied independent of the primary tripping scheme, with as few common components as possible. Manufacturers use various electrical and mechanical protective devices to detect the failure to isolate the steam turbine generator from the power system following a turbine trip. Most turbine trip backup functions are performed by measuring, or other means of determining when power is drawn from the power system and motoring the generator. As shown in Table III, three of the manufacturers surveyed (manufacturers A, C, and D) recommend a reverse power relay as backup protection for excessive motoring of the unit. This reverse power relay will initiate either a simultaneous or generator trip, and it is set to be less sensitive or set at the same sensitivity with a longer time delay than the reverse power relay used in the sequential tripping control logic. Generally, this relay will be supervised by a generator breakers closed signal. One manufacturer (manufacturer B) recommends monitoring HP turbine differential steam pressure as a means of providing backup protection for a motoring condition. The detection of a low differential steam pressure condition initiates a sequential trip after a time delay. A sequential trip initiated by the HP turbine differential steam pressure, as recommended by manufacturer B, will not take a unit offline. Manufacturer B does not provide independent backup protection for failure of the sequential tripping control logic. For this reason, manufacturer B recommends redundant control logic circuits by using multiple reverse power relays to reduce the probability that device failure will prevent breaker tripping. The application of reverse power detection for backup protection should utilize a time delay. Typically, 30 s can be used to prevent operation during power swings caused by system disturbances or when synchronizing the turbine generator to the system. VI. CONTROL

recognize where automatic systems provide backup and where manual action by plant operators is required. The following issues should be considered when applying sequential tripping schemes and motoring protection: 1) the failure of the sequential tripping control logic to function and 2) the inability of reverse power relays to detect certain motoring conditions. Issue 1: When a turbine trips, it is possible that there could be a failure of a device used in the sequential tripping scheme, thus disabling the sequential tripping control logic. Again, by combining multiple devices in an appropriate series-parallel arrangement, the probability of device failure rendering the control logic inoperable is sharply reduced. Motoring protection which initiates a generator or simultaneous trip (for manufacturers A, C, and D) functions as a backup to the sequential tripping control logic and will trip the generator breakers, preventing excessive motoring. Issue 2: The four manufacturer schemes for both sequential tripping and motoring protection are rendered inoperable for any operating condition where reverse power relays may not operate. It has been documented that reverse power relays may not detect motoring conditions when the machine var ow is high. All four manufacturers recommend that alarm circuits alert plant operators to a motoring condition. Operators need to be aware of the consequences of excessive motoring and the responses required should the sequential tripping control logic or the motoring protection fail to operate. Each user needs to evaluate the degree to which automatic or manual actions will provide backup to the units control and protection schemes. VII. CONCLUSIONS In general, it is recommended that generator protective relays initiate nonsequential trip modes for unit isolation. However, sequential tripping provides a useful means of taking a steam turbine generator off-line for a limited number of abnormal operating conditions, where delayed tripping of the generator will not result in increased damage to the turbine generator or other electrical equipment. The reason for sequentially tripping a steam turbine generator is to avoid the overspeed condition that results when the generators main breaker(s) is tripped while steam is applied to the turbine. Proper control logic is critical to the design of a sequential tripping scheme and requires some sort of mechanical turbine tripped indication (i.e., steam stop valve limit switches, trip oil system pressure switches, etc.) which is supervised by an electrical reverse power relay. This relay is normally set to detect very low power levels and incorporates a brief time delay on the order of several seconds for added security. The performance of reverse power relays was explored in some detail relative to several documented cases of the relays failure to operate for legitimate motoring conditions. This is primarily due to the difculty of measuring very low levels of real (reverse) power when accompanied by high levels of reactive power (leading or lagging). It has been recommended that generator protective relays initiate one of the other tripping/shutdown modes for isolation of the unit due to electrical faults. Only devices protecting


Users must be aware of the limitations inherent in their control and protection schemes. It is important that the user



the unit from an abnormal mechanical operating condition or an abnormal (as opposed to faulted) electrical condition or a normal shutdown should initiate a sequential trip. A survey of four turbine generator manufacturers indicated that turbine trip backup protection should also be included as part of an overall generator protection package. Such protection, according to the survey, can be provided by electrical or mechanical means, with an electrical reverse power relay being the means more broadly supported by the survey. As stated earlier, the main objective of implementing sequential tripping control logic is to eliminate the possibility of turbine generator overspeed during shutdown and its potential for causing catastrophic damage. However, the nal decision on the tripping/shutdown mode of a particular protection function should be based upon the recommended practices of the turbine generator manufacturer. REFERENCES
[1] Steam Station Protection Working Group, Minimum recommended protection, interlocking and control for fossil-fuel unit-connected steam stationPart I: Overall protection, IEEE Trans. Power App. Syst., vol. PAS-92, pp. 374380, Jan./Feb. 1973. [2] R. V. McGrath, N. A. Izquierdo, and G. L. Wirth, Reverse-power relay response under high-VAR unit conditions, in Proc. Amer. Power Conf., Apr. 1991, pp.298299.

[3] A. K. Julka and T. P. Aiken, Antimotoring relay (32) susceptibility to VARs, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Syracuse, NY, Rep., presented at the 1992 IEEE Symp. Nuclear Power Sytems. [4] Guide for AC Generator Protection, ANSI/IEEE C37.102-1995.

Charles J. Chuck Mozina (M65) received the B.S. degree in electrical engineering from Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. He has more than 25 years of experience as a Protective Engineer at Centerior Energy, Cleveland, OH, a major investor-owned utility. He is also a former Instructor in the Graduate School of Electrical Engineering, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH. He is currently Manager of Application Engineering for Protection and Protection Systems, Beckwith Electric Company, North Largo, FL. He is responsible for the application of Beckwith products and systems used in generator protection and intertie protection, synchronizing, and bus transfer schemes. He has authored numerous papers and magazine articles on protective relaying. He is the U.S. representative to the CIGRE Study Committee 34 on System Protection and chairs a CIGRE working group on generator protection. Mr. Mozina is an active member of the Power System Relay Committee (PSRC) and is the past Chairman of the Rotating Machinery Subcommittee of the IEEE Power Engineering Society. He also chaired the IEEE task force which produced the tutorial The Protection of Synchronous Generators, which won the PSRCs 1995 Outstanding Working Group Award. He was also the 1993 recipient of the PSRCs Career Service Award.