U:\2012REPT\10REPT\10REPT.

020 101
DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION
(GROSS)

Appropriations, 2011 Camml1:tec
~])o(lS

Budget esti.m8.te, 2012 House alluwlll'lClll

_

"'

1IeCOmmend!!;thm

Wlt jnr.ludl! l'eIICiRBian of $81.900,000

" under Public Ln"" 112-10. REVENUES)

_-'

..

.

1 $250,139,000

240,623,0(1)

.. ..

2a,7,.623,OOO

00,374,001'1

(WSCELLANEOUS

Appropriations,

l:!i:t~=::~.~~ .. ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :n~:~:8~
Comrnitt.ea recommendatio.1) -111,883,000 NET APPROPRIATlON AppropriatioDB; :2011. Budget estima~, 2012 _ . .
1$130,698;000

2011

_.............

- $119,G01,OOO

House £Illowance
llJl\I'oR

Comm.itteerelXlmmelll'latio.!l1

"'

""

_

.

.

128,740,000 -48,009,000 ].26,740,0001

not Include teseissiou of $81,9001000 under Publie Lnw 112-10.

·The Committee reeom.m.ends $237,628.0001 for Departro.ent Ad" miIlistnltio:ll. - An Independent .Review of DOE Oversight of National Laboratori.es,-DOE accomplishes most of its activities through a network of Government-owned, contractor-operated laboratories and facilities aerass the United States .. In providingar; appropriate level of oversight of thee:eoontractor"operatedfacilitiea, DOE must ,carefully balance the need to protect the Government's intellests wlille not mredy burdening conttactors at ,depriv:icug them of theabilit-y to oper.ate most effectively and. efficiently. The Co!tllnld.tt.ee nates that the National Laboratory Directors Council has expressed eeneerns about overly burdensome oversight and 'operational requ.irements. The Committee directs the Secretary of Energy to eontractwith NAPAlbr a study that assesses its pl'OOeSSE:S for reviewing contractor perfonnanoo,including performance memes currently being used by DOE Ior that purpose', as well as assesses the validity and applicability of thefindiings and recommendations .'of the l'eeent Laboratory Directors' .report. The Committee has included $1,10010,000 within the funds available to carry out this activity. NAPA shall submita lIeport to the Committee w.ith findings in. the above areas and recommendadons for improvement no later than 9 months after DOE has contracted with NAPA pursuant to this eli reetive,
OF.FleE OF THE INSPECTOR. GENERAL ApPJ:opriati.O'OII,

20.11 Budg.ct estimate, 2012 House amount

"

CoJlJJl'1littee· J:l"£lJrnme:oda,tion

,............................................................. ,

""

"

,

"

",..
,

$42,764,000' 4ll,774,OOO 41,774,000
41,774,0001

The Committee reoommends $41,774,000 for the Office of the Inspector General.

U:\2012REPT\lOREPT\10REPT.021 102
WEAPONS ACT1VIT1F..8
AP"EropriatioDS, 20l.1 Budget estimate, 2012

__

_._

HoUDeallowance , Comrni:ttlle recommendntio.ll

,................................................... _.............................................................

__

__

_

__

_ .._

_.......

_. l$6,9'46,398,000

27,131,993,000 7,190,000,000

27,629,7:1.6,000

'DoeR not include J'MciSllion of $5OIOOO,()()()under Publlc Law .112-10. a Docs DOt Include p.I'OpIlIV!dI1I6Cie81on of *,,0,332,000 •

. The Committee recommends $7,190,000,000 for National Nuclear Security Administration's [NNSA] Weapons Activities. The Oemmittee recognizes the iml>Ortant contributions that advanced eomputing and experimental facilities have made in the last few years to·the SUcce!lB of the stockpile Bt?wardsbip P!o~~ and to increase confidence 1tt the safetyt security, and rehabl.lity C1f the nuclear weapons s~i1e, After investing billions of dollars over more than. a decade, critical capabilities are in /. lace to respond to nuclear weapoastssuea without undergroun . nuclear weapons testing. Petascale com.puting capabilities allow weapons scientists and engineers to conduct weapons simulatiOJlB with reasonable efficiency and resolution, In tlie past year, the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test facility at Los Alamos National LaboratOry successfully completed four e;periments that resolved a long open significant finding investigation, improved the basis for the assessment of several stockpile systems, and provided data to better understand multipoint safety options for possible 11$ein future life extension programs. The past year also marked the execution of the BaroIo series of subcritieal experiments at the Ula underground facWty at the Nevada. Na~onal SeCW'it! Site ..These exverim.ent8 .ptovided data. on the behavior of plutonium driven by high explosives, which is critical to understanding primary Implosions, The National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory also a.uccesBfully comple,ted its. firat set of weapon-releve.ntlhysicS experiments to help Validate eomputer modele that resolve one of tbe most critical areas of uncertainty in assessing nuclear weapons
performanceDIRECTED STOCK.PILE WORK

The Committee recommends $1,804,882,000 for directed stockpile work. Life Extension Program..~.-Th.e Committee recommends $437,039,000 for the Life Extension Program. 861 Life E:xtension Program.-The Committeets concerned about NNS~'8 plans ,to incor,P0rate new safety and s~ty features in the life extension version of the B61. The BSl life extension program will be the most ambitious and extensive refurbishment a weapon system to date. Fo1' example, the B61 has three times as many major components that must be replaced as the W76. Fur. ther complicating matters is the ambitious timeframe fa·r replacing these components before they Teach the end of their life and affect weapon reliability. In a May 2011 stud)"the Government Accountability Office identified significant challenges in building the first refurbished weapon by 2017, including manufacturing critical materials ~d co~~nts, meeting productio~ requirements, ens:uring the quality of _ . ed products, and coordinating the production of bomb components between NNSA and the Air Force. Adding to this

of

U:\20t2REPT\lOREPT\10REPI'.021 103 ambitiollil swpe. of work, NNSA plansta incorporate untried. technologies and design featu.res to iJ:lprove thesa£ezy and security of the nuclear stoekpile, The COmmIttee supports enhanced. surety of weapon systems to avoid accidents. and. unauthorized use~. b1:1,~ it should. not CODle at ~he expeJl8e?f long-~r:m weapon !eliability. New safety and .secunty features should be mcorporated til weapon systems when feasible, but the IPrima:ry goal of a life. extension 1'I'rogram should be to increase confidence in warhead performance without und~ergronndnnclear testing. For these: reasons, the' Committee reeommands $180,000,000 fo.r the Bel life extension program, a reduction of $43,56.2,000. T.be Committee directs that: -the JASON group of scientific advisers submit a classif'iedand unclassified assessment by February 1, 2012 to the House and Senate ApPl'opriatiOlls Committees tbat determines whether pl'oposedfutrinsic nuclear. warhead safety and securityfeatures for t!be B6l bomb will affect the long-tel'll'l safety, security, reliability, and operation of the weapon., whether those surety features are justified when measured agalpst the planaible range of deploym,e.n:t S~OB and threats likely:to. confrunt the tl.ltute B61 stockpile, and the! benefits outwelg'h the costs of installing such features, and -the Administrator of NNSA and the laboratory directors from Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia cettifyto the House' and Senate Appropriations Com.mittees that the benefits of install~ ing intrinsic safety and. security features outweigh the costa and there are no less Cdstly and. etrect:ive alternatives to surety that can be accomplished without introducing intrinsic surety features in. the B6l by March 1, 2012. In addition, when NNSA completes its Phase '6.216.2A study for the B6l life extension program, the Committee Wr¢ct$ NNSA to submit to the Committee both a classified audunclassi6.ed. report 90 days e.fter the completion of tbe study with: -a description of the safety and security features NNSA would add to a refurbished BSl and ' -.a eeat and benefit analysis of installing theproposed features in the warhead. . The coat and benefit analysis should. include: ~the costs of science,teehnology, and engmeering to install new safety and security features, -the costs of assessing the impact. the n~w features may have on the performance of the nu.clear explosive package at the nationa 1 laboratories, -the extent to which the proposed safety and security fea:tures address specific safety and secm'ity concerns, and -whyculTent safety and security features would not be sufficient. Stockpile Systems.-The Committee recommends. $472,109,000. Of these funds, at lea.st$175,OOO,OOO shall be used for surveillance activities. The Committee commends NNSA for sustaining Increased fundiu,g for surv-eillau,ce activities in the usee] year 2012 fI.equ.est.T. e Committee encourages. NN SA to c.ontinue developing h .•.. and using non-destructive evaluation technologies to economically obtain greater quantities of assessment data whUe retlucing war-

U:\2012REPT\10REPT\

lOREPT.021 104

head or component destruction. The Committee also recommends $26,000,000, .a decrease of $25,087,000 below the request, for the planned W78 life extension program because of delays in coma pleting the Phase' 6.1 study. Weapon.s Dismantlement.-The Committee recommends $56,710,000 as requested, Stockpile Service...~.-The Committee recommends $838,964,000. Within these funds. at ~east $64,000,000 shall be used to Sllpport surveillance activities. The, Committee understands tbat NNSA completed building the last W8S war reserve )lits in fiscal year 2011a.o.d is preparing to transition to build the W87 pit. However, the Conunit_tee is co~~rned a~utNNSA's. a,bility to maintB;in a I?~t manufacturing capability dttt:tng thetraruntion. The COl'Dl'Wttee rects NNSA to provide a report to the Committee 90 daysafter ,en.actment that: -describes how NNSA will maintain a pit manufacturing capa-

w-

=-asaesses the costs of maintaini.y.g a pit manufacturing capability w:ithout pit Jl,roouction, and ---.€valuates the costs of developing pit manufacturing capabilities for future requirements.
~AIGNS

bility without

manufacturing

pits,

Science Oampaign.-The Committee recommends $847,055,000. Within these funds, at least $44,000,000 shall be used for pluto-. mum and other physics experiments at Sandia's Z facility. The Committee commends Sandia National Laboratory for successfully ~d safely ~~otnri.ngtwo p.lutonium experiments at the refurbished Z facility, The Committee understands that these expenments yielded fundamentally new and surprising data about the behavior of plutonium at high pres,sureand this new: data has be~n one of the most valuable contributions to the stockpile stewardship program. The Committee continues to strongly support the weapons physics activities at Sandia's Z facility that are critical to Sl\SWDing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile. N(J,Iunding shall be used to design, prepare, or execute a scaled experimen.t. The Committee is concerned that a sealed experiment, which is a type of subcritical e?Q?eriment that uses plutonium pitlike designs, may not be needed for annual asseasmentsof the CUl'" rent stockpile and a Dew program. for scaled eX}lsrimenw may interfere with achieving the Nuclear Posture ReVIeW'S goals and schedule. In addition, the Committee is concerned that NNSA does not have the diagnostic equipment at tbe Nevada National Security Site to collect the necessary data for scaled experiments. Hundreds of' millions of dollars and several years may be needed to install new radiographic capabilities to conduct scientifically meaningfuJ scaled experiments. These eests .are n~t included. in budget projec~ fOJ: future years and the Comnuttee IS concerned that adding this additional requirement will come at the expense of higher priorities. The Committee direets NNSA to wait until the JASON study group completes its review of scaled experiments before making a decision on whether to proceed with scaled experiments. If NNSA

The Committee paigns.

recommends

$1,716,407,000

for NNSA Cam-

U:\2012REPT\10REPT\10REPI'.021

105
decides to conduct scaled experiments, the Committee expects NNSA to submit a plan e::q>laiuillg the scientific value of scaled ex~ents for stockpile stewardship and meeting the goals oftha Nuclear Posture Review, the costs of developing the capabilities fOf and condu~ scaled: ~ents, and the impact on otber .stockpile stewardship activities under constrained. budgets If scaled 'experiments are pursued. . Engineering C(lmpaign.-The OmnmJttee recommends $143,078,000 as requested.'

Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High-yield Campaign,The Committee recommends $476,274,000 as requested.

·Witbin thesefunda, at least $62,500,000 and $48,.000;000 shall be tilled for inemal confinement fusion activities at the Universilty of Rocheaters Omega faciljty and Sandia National Laboratory's Z faciliity, respectively. The Committee encour~es NNSA to increase pulsed powetcapabillities at the Z facility by increasing available current and .attalnable pressures and radiation, especially for new radiographic: capabilities. The Committee also recommends. at least :$5,000,000811 requested .for the NaV'aJ[ Research Laboratory te eontiinue operating 1e&::I' acilities foc~sed o~ laser pl~s:m.a int..emctions. f targetb.ydr .. c:lynamICB, and matenalS-1BBues w.bich are unpol'tant o for ignItion. :rhe Committee re~g;nizes and supports the important work of medium seale laser facilities such as Tndent at Los Alamos National La.bot~~. cry, Jupitar at Lawrence: Livermore National L~b. oratory, and Nike at, the Na.val Research Laberatory tc provide independent peer review of experiments at larger scale facilities, such. as the National Ignition Facility, and ·helpresolve scientific barriers to achieving igniti'@n. . The Committee recognizea the National Ignition Facility's impo:rtant contributian to resolving a critical stockpile .stewardship issue r.elated to radiation transport. Scientists used the National Ignition F.acility to conduct non-ignition experiments, which do not !require using the full capabilityillf the facility, to achieve temperatures and pressures that ueeeded .any other facility a.nd address one of the largest sources of uncertainty in calculating weapon performance. These experiments validated ph.y5iC8~based models and increased NNSA'a confidence in assessing the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile. Despite t.bis .succees, the CouJmittee remains concerned about NNSA's ability to achieve ignition-the primary pu.r~ pose of constructing the facility-by tbe end of fisca1 year 20.12 when the National Ignition Campaign ends and thefaciility should! trnnsitiOD to reguJ!ar. ignition operations and pursues broad scientific applications. The CommiLtee direets NNSA to establish an independent advisory board by January 1, 2012 that can evaluate experiments planned at the National Ignition Facility pre- and post-ignition, identi(y potential weaknesaes with the experimental plan, and recommeed, i1neeessary,alternative approaches to admess scientific and technical challenges. The Committee also strongly supports the ,advisory com.mittee"s role :wsettmga sua" tegie direction for inertial confinement fusion and high-energy density physics research and detennining bow best to use current facilities to advance this scientific field.. If the National Ignia.on Facility does not acllieve ignition by the end of'fiscal year 2012 using a cryogeniclill.y layered deuterium and tritium target that produces

U:\2012REPT\ 10REPT\ lOREPl'. 021 106 a neutron )ield with a ~ greater. than 1, the Committee directs NNSA to submit a report by November 30, 2012 that (1) explains the scientific and technical barriers toachleving ignition, (2) the steps NNS~ will take to achiev~ ignition wi~h a revised schedule, and (3) the Impact on the stockpile stewardship program. The Oon.tn.'l.ifteecommands NNSA for taking the first steps m soliciting coIll]etitive bids for its full portfolio of target fabricaFion contracts. The C01tUnIttee encourages NNSA to consider vanous criteria when awarding contracts, $uc:h.as the extent to which the contract spurs innovation, lowers costs, reduces teebntcal risk, and mainta.ill.s a competitive nrulti-vendor market to avoid relying on one contractor for all future target fabrication needs. The Committee also encourages NNSA to take advantage of existing and presently underotilized fabrication capabilitles to ~e~t increased demands for tlll'gets rather than. developing and building new infrastructur,e- The CoIIlJll.ittee also urges NNSA to develop a longterm plan that assesses the demand for targets for inertial confinement. fuBiop fac}litiestbat support the stockpile :stewar~hip' program and Identifies ways to meet that demand WIthout slgruficant cost increases, . Advanced S.imulation and Computin.g.-The Committee recommends $625,000,000. High-performance computing underpins NNSA's a~ili.ty to scientifically!esolv~ outstandmg w~~~ns performance Issues, address material agmg and compatibility challenges, conduct future life extension program. activities, and rapidly address results from Significant FiRdings Investigations. As the stockpile continues to age, NNSA will require a thousandfold improvement over today's modeling and simulation capability,.com~ monly referred to as exascale, Therefore, of the funds provided, the Committee recommends $36,000,000 as .requested for the exaseale initiative. Readiness Campaign.-The Com.nrittee recommends $125,000,000 for the Readiness Campaign, Within these funds, no more than $60,000,000 shall be used for tritium production efforts.
R~ADINESS IN TECHNICAl" BASE AND FACILITIES

The Committee recommends $2,170,546,000. The Committee is concerned about the escalating costs for two new nuclear facilities to handle plutonium and uranium. The new cost estimates for tbe Chemistry and Metallurgy Research ~alaceme:ot-Nuclear Facility .at Loa Alamos National Laboratory the Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12 are two to three times more .than previous estimates and constructions for these two facilities alone may exceed $12,OOOjOOO,OOO the next decade. An independent Corps of Enover gineers study that concluded tha.t the cost range for the Uranium Processing Facility is between $6,500,000,000 and $7,500,t000,OOO only adds to the Committee's concerns. Since completing life estension progr~ to m.~tai.n ~e _safety, security, and. relia~mw ?f the stock.plla rs the highest pnonty and fiscal constraints WIll UJUlt construction funding, the Committee directs NNSA to submit a contingency plan by February I, 2012 that would. identify the COD" sequences to cost, scope, and schedule of delaying project implementation and the impact of sequencing construction of these two major facilities on stockpile requirements.

U: \2012REPT\10REPT\

lOREPI'.021

107
The Coromittee supports NNSNs decision to reaeh the 90 percent engineering design stage before establishing a project baseline and initiating construction of these two nuclear facilities. Initiating con$truction before designs are largely colllple~ contributes to ~ereases costs and schedule delays. The Committee also agrees WJ.th NNSN:s decision not to forward fund these projects until a project baseline has been established and Congress has a more complete understanding of the costs. The Committee encourages NNSA to develop a plan by the end of fiscal year 2012-consistent with NNSA's ~ay 2011 strategic plan-to create an open, unclassified research and development space known as the Livermore Valley Open Campus that would in· crease interllctiO;nB anq _partnerships between Lawrence Livermore and. Sandia/California. National Laboratories as well as the private sector and academia. This type of campus would help Livermore and Sandia maintain leadership in science, technology, and engineering in a wide variety of areas, including high-performance computing, energy and environmentaleecurity, an.a. cyber security, and attract the workforce needed to fulfill the laboratories' NNSA misAcqu,isition. Strategy.-The Committee lS concerned the Department took steps to implement a major new contracting strategy in the absence of complete information, Specifically, DOE was urged to await a Governro.ent Accountability Office review of tb.e cost savingB NNSA claimed it would achieve by combining the Management and Operations contracts at the Y-12 and Pantex production plants. GA.O's p.rclirninary findings did not validate that these savinga were achievable and GAO has informed the Conunittee that efticie.nci.es could be achieved through existing contracting mecba?isms. ~II?~ever, NNSA has decided to proceed ~yway. Many critical activities are a.t stake as NNSA begins to nnplemene the requirements of the Nuclear Posture Review and the New START Treaty, while a contract overhaul likely will cause significant disruption and put these activities at risk. While the Committee strongly supports efforts to implement ad.:ministr~tive efficiencies at all NNSA sites, efficiencies will come about in large part when NNSA improves its oversight of contracts. . R.egarci1esBof.the. outcome of the acquisition strategy, the Committee expects allefforls will. be taken to ensure a minimum of disruption to work. associated with. the Uranium Processing Facility to keep this facility on time and on budget. Operations and Maintanance.-'rhe Conunittee recommends $1,1555,278,000 for the Readiness in Technical Base aO.d Facilities Operations and Maintenance account. Of these funds: Operations of FCLCilities.-The Committee recommends rrogrom. Readine88.-The Committee recommends the requested amount of $69,170,000. Material Recycle and Recovery.-The Committee recommends

sion.

$1~11,OOO,OOO.

$80,000,000.

$30,289,000.

Containers.-The Commit.tee recommends the requested amount of $28,979,000 as requested. St"orage.-The Committee recommends tb.e requested amount of

U:\2012REPT\

10REPI'\

10REPl'.021 108

COl'l$truction.-The Committee recommends $.1>51,108,000. Project 12-D-:JOl; TRU Wasil! Facilitf£s, Los Alamos, New Mex· ico.-The Committee recommends $9,881,000 as requested to begin construction of a new tranauranic waste faciJity to meet regu lat.ory requirements of the State of New Mexico. Project I1-D-801, TA-65 Reinvestmen.t Project, LoB Alamos. New Met:ico.-The Committee recommends $10,000,000 to begin the second phase of this effort to mitigate safety risks to workers identiobligated funds that can be used to fund additional upgrades to the fa.cility. Project lQ....D-501, Nuclear Fa,ciliiy Risk Reduction, Y-12, Oak Ridge, Tenne8Bee.-The Committee. recommends $35,287,000 as requested to upgrade equipment and infrastructure in buildings 9212 and 9204-2E for continued safe uranium operations until the Dew Project 09-D-404, Test Capa.bi.lities Reuitalization Phase 11, Sandia Na.tional Laboratories, Albuquerque, New MEl3;icQ.-The committee recommends $25,168,000 REi requested to refurbish nonnuclear capabilities, such as rocket sled tracks and mechanical shock facilitdes, to teat waaponscomponents needed for the BS1 and future life extension programs. Project OB-D-802 High Explosive Pressing Facility, Pantex Plant, Arn.ariUo, Texa.s.-The Committee reconunends $66,960,000 as requested to build a new facility to make high explosive hemispheres for nuclear weapons that is more reliable and can meet the projected workload for life extension programs,
j

fied by the Defense

Nuclear. Facilities

Safety Board. NNSA hag

00-

Uranium

Processing

Facility

is operational,

Locaiion.s.-The
to

Committee recommends $3,518,000 as requested complete design work on the Transuranic Waste Facilities Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Committee recommends $160,194,000 requested.

Project 07-D-140, Project Engineering and Design [PED], Venous

Ridgt!, Tennes6ee.-The

Project 06-D-141, PED, Uranium. Process Facility, Y-12, Oak
as

funds, $35,000,000 is to complete equipment installation at the Radiological Laboratory, $125,000,000 is for design activities to reach '90 percent design maturity by the end of the fiscal year, $40,000,000 is for long-lead procuremsnts, and $40,000,000 is for site preparation, SEOURE TRANSPORTATION A..ClS.ET The Committee recommendation for the Secure Transportation Asset program is $251,272,000, the same as the budget request.
NUCLEAR COUNTERTERRORISM mCIDENT RESPONSE

Project 04-,0-125 Chemistry and Me.tallurgy Facility ReplCt.cement Project, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamo«, New Mexioo.-The Committee recommends $240,000,000. Within these

terrorism

The Committee

$222,147,000

incident

recommends

as requested.

response

program.

full

f'un.d.ing of the nuclear counter-

The

Committee

provides

U: \2012REPT\ 10REPT\ 10REPT.021 109
FACILITIES AND lNFRASTRUCTURE RECAPITALIZATION

The Committee recommends $96,380,000 for Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization activities, consistent with the budget request. The Committee is concerned about an increasing backlog of deferred maintenance costs within NNSA's nuclear weapons laboratories and production facilities. Baaed OJ) a March 2011 NNSA assessment, deferred maintenance costs are expected to increase by $70,000,000 a year. The Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program has 'only reduced some of'the backlog in deferred maintenance and this progr,am will end in fiscal year 2013. To increase transparency in NN"SA's effor.t.s to sustain existing physical infra$tructure~ the Committee directs NNSA to identify funds for maintenance aDd operations by site as separate line items under the Readiness in Technical Base and FaCilities Account starting with the fiscal year 2014 budget submission. The sites irlcludethe three national seeu.rity labs, the Y~12 National Security Complex, the Kansas City Plant, the Savannah River Site, and th.e Nevada. National Security Site. The budget justification shall include an explanation of how NNSA plans to manage deferred maintenance costs, including ways NNSA will stabilize defe:r.red maintenance for mission, critical facilities and dispose of excess capacity. Further, the budget shall include total deferred maintenance backlog and how much NNSA is spending ateach site each year to reduce deferred maintenance. The Committee recommends usittg the Office of Science's Science Laboratories Infrastructure budget information on deferred maintenance as a model. Further, the Committee is concerned by a recent Government Accountability Office finding that NNSA does not have accurate, reliable, or complete data on the condition and replacement value of its almost 3,000 weapons activities facilities. The Committee directs NNSA to develop standardized practices for assessing the condition ,of its facilities and review the sites' methodologies for. determining replacement value to ensure consistency. accuracy, and completeness through the CO'!1lplex.
SITE STEWAROSfUP

The Committee recommends $90,000,000. The Committee supports NNSA's efforts to conaolidate and dispose of NNSA special nuclear material that is no longer required. for the nuclear weapons mission.
BAFEGUAIIDS AND SECURIT'l

The Committee recommendation for the Safeguards and Security Program is $828,366,000. Defense Nuclear Security Opertuions and Ma,intelUlnce.-The Committee recommends $701, 752,000. The Committee support NNSA's efforts to reduce costs related to securing nattenal laboratories and production sites while still maintaining effective physical security measures at each site. The Committee encourages NNSA to continue €IIiminating unnecessary costs While still protecting facilities'assets and resources against theft, sabotage, and other criminal acts, .

U;\2012REPT\10REPT\10REPl',021 110

Con8truction.-The Committee tecommenri<l,$11,752,OOO as requested. . . Project 08-D-701 Nuclear Materials Safeguard.,; and Security Up. grade:;; Project Phase II, Lo..<: Alam.os, New Mexico.-The Committee recommends the ftlguested level of $11,752,000 for this project. Cybersecurit,y.-The Committee recommends the full request of $126,614,000.
SCIENCE, TF.cHNOLQGY. AND ENGINEERING CAPABILITY

'Th.e Committee recommenda $10,000,000 for Science, Technology, and Engineering Capability. activ;ities. The. Co~tte.e supports NNSA'e efforts to levarage Its science, engmeenng, and technological expertise to work with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and intelligence agencies to improve the Nation'acounterterrorumcapabillties. The CoJllDlittee also supports activities to build and sustain analytical capabilities at Los Alamos, Sandia, and Livermore to assess the nuclear and biological weapons capabilities of foreign adversaries to support the intelligenceoommunity.. The Committee notes that $30,000,000 was provided in the. 2009 ~pplemental Appropriations Act to help build the technical capabili~ ties for nuclear and biological weapons assessments. The' Committee is concerned, however, that DOE's Office of Intelligence is not fully utilizing these newly constituted capabilities and sustaining the human talent needed to address national security issues. The Committee encourages DOE's Office of Intelligence to further develop the analytical capabilities needed to fully utilize these improved scientific, technical, and engineering capabilities at the national security labs.

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