SDR: New Chapter Study (March 2002

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Dr. Jeffrey Peter Bradford

New Chapter for the Strategic Defence Review March 2002 Submission by Dr. Jeffrey Peter Bradford

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SDR: New Chapter Study (March 2002)

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1.0 Introduction Following the 14th February 2002 release of the public discussion paper for the New Chapter of the SDR this document contains the authors response to the invitation to respond to the questions raised both within the public discussion paper and its more detailed counterpart “The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter” published on the Ministry of Defence website. Opinions reflected in this submission do not reflect any corporate affiliation – they are solely those of the author. This submission differs from my earlier contribution to the original SDR process which sought to apply systems thinking to four key issues - R&D, recruitment & retention, and the interplay between doctrine and strategy 1 In this submission I have taken the approach of building a clear reasoning structure which approaches the key strategic choices you face from a top down grand strategy viewpoint (the future) as well as a bottom up capability assessment (the past, and present). By taking this route I hope to at the very least validate some of the many decisions you are contemplating with a view to pin-pointing those which are critical. 1.1 Model overview I have developed a model to encompass analytical issues surrounding the key issues raised in your document as well as indicated some of the challenges which require resolution. This model is structured within a tool based framework known as a ‘reasoning architecture’ or RA. This RA shows the process flow and the steps which need to be thought through in order to arrive at meaningful answers to your strategic conundrum.
Figure 1.0: Reasoning Architecture - SDR "New Chapter"

The Architecture should be viewed logically from left to right. The icons in the left side of each box relate to a particular tool used to support analysis or thinking around decision-making. This submission will consider each step in turn, in order to build from the ground up a logical analysis towards the question of how British defence policy should be adjusted to take account of the events of 2001. Prior to this, a brief summary of each step is indicated overleaf:
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Dr J P Bradford, Submission to the Strategic Defence Review (London: House of Commons Library 1998).

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Step Title 2.0 Reasoning architecture 2.1 Support Materials 2.2 Strategic 2.3 Policy Framework 2.4 Legacy Forces 2.5 Regional Analysis 2.6 Military Tasks 2.7 Force Elements 2.8 Region / MT / FE 2.9 Strategic Choices 2.10 Goals for choice 2.11 Resources 2.12 Support materials 2.13 Success

Icon

Icon description Reasoning Architecture Miscellaneous Systemic Analysis Goals

Detail The hub for the process (and electronically the resources comprising this exercise). To ensure transparency, a clear indication of materials drawn-upon in creating the model. The use of influence diagramming to consider priorities in devoting scarce resources to threat analysis. Considering the goals of UK defence policy over multiple time-frames. Questions capability change since SDR and the readiness of those forces for their military tasks. Applying thinking from ‘strategic’ step to construct a model for a hypothetical region. Constructing a strategy space looking at current military tasks. Scenarios around key force multiplier and strategic options for enhancing capability. Merging the three scenario/strategy efforts above to consider the most logical force structure given the military tasks most consistent with the future. Where force development strategies from the above effort are rated against performance goals over three time periods to identify best choices for capability development. Those goals informing strategic choice above. 3D graphing tool depicting resource allocation within defence. Various sources of supporting data. Following the choice of strategy to pursue, this tool assists in identifying implementation risks.

Various

Goals Scenario Planning Scenario Planning Scenario Planning Scenario Planning (merged) Synoptic evaluation

Goals Hotspot Scanning Various Miscellaneous Risk Assessment

1.0 Reasoning Architecture The reasoning architecture can be configured in any number of steps, iterations etc. using the tools encompassed within. This particular configuration places an accent on the challenge of what capabilities must be developed in order to ensure the correct force structure for the tasks envisaged of it, in the most likely operating environment.
Figure 2.0.1 Reasoning Architecture for UK MoD "New Chapter" study.

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In image 2.0.1 on the previous page note the use of colour for the arrows from support materials – this indicates that these steps are not part of the process (linked with Royal Blue lines), but rather supporting evidence and analysis. In each subsequent step the above figure will be replicated with a highlight on the specific step to ensure that the reader understands their current position in the process. 2.1 Support Materials

This step contains the electronic hard copies of resources drawn on in the process. However it is distinct from support materials (2.12) which is focused more on the financial resources and UK defence policy goals issues. This step enables knowledge management (i.e. the addition of further sources) as to with which information and knowledge the problem was approached: The Strategic Defence Review (1997), Ch.2. (from MoD website). The Defence mission (from MoD website). SDR Annex Force levels (from MoD website). SDR Annex Future Capability (from MoD website). Details of “New Chapter” study (from MoD website). British Military Doctrine (DG, D&D). The future strategic context (DG, D&D).

2.2 Strategic

Step 2.2 seeks to apply systemic thinking in a limited manner to the question of threat assessment and associated scenario planning for various theatres of possible operations 2 As can be seen in the miniature reasoning architecture above, this step is informed by the supporting materials and informs step 2.5 Regional Analysis. As a starting point this systemic analysis takes the seven dimensions used as a framework for strategic analysis by the armed forces and examines their interrelationships in order to identify where to focus effort. As a reminder for those who are less familiar, systemic analysis draws upon classic influence diagramming which at its simplest seeks to illustrate the relationship between ‘A’ and ‘B’ using an
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Source: JWP 0-01, British Defence Doctrine, 2nd Edition (JDCC October 2001). Sections 2-1 / 2-3.

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arrow. In the diagram overleaf this thinking is taken a step further using both coloured and varied thickness of arrows (colour – red negative, blue positive and thickness indicating the strength of relationship).
Figure 2.2.1: Systemic Analysis looking at ‘7 dimensions’ for strategic analysis

I have considered this step a necessary pre-cursor to scenario planning (strategic analysis), as currently there is no differentiation explicit in the Joint doctrine manual. It would appear that each dimension requires equal effort and has equal impact on the final assessment. I would posit that given that there are always ‘unknowns’ in terms of intelligence accuracy and availability in a timely manner that some form of prioritisation is necessary. The approach taken above shows the relationships as seen by the author of the seven dimensions of strategic analysis. From the point of view of the New Chapter study there appear to be three principal conclusions: a) Military effectiveness although a dimension in itself is actually the output of a socio-economic / political assessment. Although of relevance to the armed forces below ‘grand strategy level’ planning clearly it is not of first order importance in assessing potential threat. Q: Does asymmetric warfare render this obsolete when thinking of unconventional warfare ? b) Terrain has more importance strategically than is immediately obvious in a pure listing of dimensions. Terrain shapes economic development (stock of raw materials, access to resources, access to trading partners) but also social cohesiveness. When thinking of current events in Asia, a mountainous country, with regions cut off due to weather for varying periods is bound to adopt a clannish, disparate culture which is going to be harder to fight both with and/or against due to cultural differences and approach to war fighting.

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c) The legal, and moral component is often given lip service to, but appears critical in shaping the political dimension, propensity to use military force, and the moral approach to conduct in a conflict situation. d) The political interface also emerges as being vital – which begs the question as to the quality and frequency of exchanges between the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the intelligence agencies – MI5, MI6, & GCHQ and the Defence Intelligence Staff, as well as with their foreign counterparts. In order to use these insights usefully in section 2.5 Regional Analysis, I have applied a further tool – the portfolio analysis, which looks at the elements (within figure 2.2.1) and positions them in a 2 x 2 matrix locating them by the strength of flow into and out from each element of the systemic analysis.
Figure 2.2.2: Portfolio Analysis applied to '7 Dimensions' in Figure 2.2.1

The above 2D image positions each element in terms of the Passive and Active axis. From this image we can observe very passive elements (such as No.4 which is the outcome of inputs from other elements), more active elements (such as No.5 which both influence and are significantly influenced by the system) up to No.3 (legal, ethical and moral influences which has a high active impact on the system and which is influenced by relatively few elements). This analysis assists us in thinking about the weighting applied to each dimension in building scenarios in step 2.5 of this model (regional analysis).

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2.3 Policy Framework

This stage seeks to analyse the policy framework using a tool to supporting thinking about interests, goals and priorities. Note from the miniature architecture above that this stage is informed by the supporting materials, and seeks to support a subsequent analysis of military tasks in step 2.6. This use of the Goals and Priorities Mapping tool seeks to identify key political drivers influencing roles and missions of the armed forces over three time periods - +5, 15, and 25 years 3 Figure 2.3.1 below shows three pie charts representing from top down, the 5, 15 and 25 year perspective. The pie charts themselves represent the relevance placed against each defence objective (leading to the width of the arc) and the likelihood based on current capabilities of fulfilling this objective in each time frame (the depth of the arc – the outer edge of the circle indicating 100%, the centre 0%).
Figure 2.3.1: UK Defence Priorities +5, +15, +25 years

Note: The hierarchy of goals is scored at the sub-goal level, with results being aggregated for the three key priorities – Promote European security, enable economic stability and lastly engender positive foreign relations.

3

Source: Original data and supporting notes from Strategic Defence Review Ch.2. (London HMSO: 1997).

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Observations from figure 2.3.1 based on the author’s assessment are as follows: a) European security retains its relative importance, but the likelihood of fulfilling this goal falls. The current difficulties faced by the NATO Secretary-General in raising defence spending in Europe are compounded by continuing long procurement lead times and delays to important projects (such as the Hercules medium transport aircraft replacement Airbus 400M) by Germany. In the New Chapter is this priority no longer relevant ? The author would assert that it clearly is, but possibly the accent is more upon external rather than internal threats (such as the Balkans commitment which preoccupied planners at the time of SDR). b) Little change occurs to both economic stability and engendering foreign relations given the linkage between the two historically for the UK. It is assumed that based on today’s capabilities that activities to ensure oil flow from the Middle East producers and defence diplomacy activities will continue. In thinking about military tasks in step 2.7 this analysis helps to make sense of the tangle of military tasks which the UK pursues with the objective of identify over-lap and making coherent rationalisation. 2.4 Legacy forces

The last of the preliminary steps, legacy forces applies the tool used in previous step to consider the impact of SDR on force structure and what capabilities are in place today. This step forms the basis of input into step 2.7 ‘Force Elements’ - which aims to develop strategic options for capability management and enhancement. The figure below shows pre- and post- SDR numbers of force elements and takes a view on their readiness. Colouring is as follows; olive drab – Army, light blue – Royal Air Force, dark blue – Royal Navy. Interpret as step 2.3 earlier.
Figure 2.4.1: Composition and readiness of UK Armed forces elements (1997 & 2001).

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Analysed at a macro level it is difficult to discern anything beyond imperceptible change in terms of force elements (aggregate numbers) and their operational readiness. With a view to the New Chapter effort to match the appropriate forces to tasks in the most likely operating environment, the author has broken out this analysis by service.
Figure 2.4.2: Composition and readiness of British Army force elements (1997 & 2001).

Note: Colour key for force elements Above corresponds with segments on the right.

Considering the emerging strategic environment are force elements balanced appropriately ? with sufficient readiness levels ? I have possibly been over-generous in rating the readiness levels of armoured units, and the newly formed NBC battalions. With regard to Engineer regiments I assume that private sector opportunities continue to affect their establishment, and to a lesser extent hospitals and infantry battalions. This analysis would clearly benefit from access to internal information. One observation on force elements is that special forces are not included as a force element – one can only assume that they exist within infantry etc. Possibly there is an administrative need to clearly have at ‘purple’ level within the Ministry an equivalent to the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) which can pursue funding to ensure maintenance and extension of operational capability.

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Figure 2.4.3: Composition and readiness of Royal Navy force elements (1997 & 2001).

Key issues to note here are that for the RN, aircraft carrier capability has declined since the SDR which emphasised ‘out-of-area’ commitments. My knowledge of the availability of RN nuclear attack submarines is not perfect, and the numbers reflect a best guess. I believe also that given the lack of investment in recapitalising the fleet, that readiness figures for destroyers and frigates is excessively generous.
Figure2.4.4: Composition and readiness of Royal Air Force elements (1997 & 2001).

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Given events of the past few months I assume that readiness figures for transport, tanker and offensive air support have increased due to wartime flying and operational use. However, once the current emergency has passed, clearly readiness levels will fall, with the additional impact of greater wear and tear on the airframes. In an emerging strategic environment where warning times will be essential is the reduction in maritime and reconnaissance aircraft linked to greater reliance on satellite borne systems ? In summary this step and the two previous have built up foundations of the current posture of Britain’s defence, identifying objectives, means of strategic analysis and considering force elements provides an understanding of the means which are available to be moulded and developed in the emerging strategic environment of the ‘New Chapter’ study. 2.5 Regional Analysis

This is the first of three steps, which together build an analytical engine, drawing upon the foundation stages previously to generate strategic options for UK defence. This and the next steps utilise a concept of scenario planning called the morphological box. For those unfamiliar with its operation, the concept the drivers of a scenario are at the top of a series of columns. Each column contains a number of mutually exclusive possibilities for each driver atop the column. Choosing one possibility from each column yields a scenario (or if being used in this manner a strategic option). The technique deployed in this contribution has a slight variation. Once the sequence above is performed, a consistency matrix has to be completed ‘behind’ the morphological box. This matrix enables a pair-wise comparison of every alternative with every other relevant alternative. From this a basic algorithm sorts the scenario and strategic option spaces to provide a ranking of alternative scenarios or strategies based upon the consistency values assigned. This step in the model created a scenario space drawing upon the systemic analysis of the ‘7 dimensions’ of strategic analysis discussed in step 2.2. Figure 2.5.1 depicts a scenario space for a region, for the purposes of this analysis called Blue over a period to 2025. Note the grey boxes atop each column containing the drivers – these are ordered in terms of importance from step 2.2. Note also the mutually exclusive options beneath each driver.

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Figure 2.5.1: Scenario space - Regional analysis Blue (2025).

The possibilities in each yellow box conceal considerable information which informs their meaning. In this case, the yellow boxes are knowledge management reference points to which data and information explaining each in turn is stored. Behind the morphological box representation lies the consistency matrix. Figure 2.5.2. shows an element of this matrix to illustrate the thinking process.
Figure 2.5.2: Consistency matrix for Regional analysis scenario Blue (2025).

Having built the morphological box, the consistency matrix is completed by assessing each alternative (yellow box) with the ones in other columns (other yellow boxes). In figure 2.5.2 above the bold blue titles on the left and top correspond to the grey drivers atop columns in figure 2.5.1. and the options below their respective yellow boxes. Consistency is scored from deep red (negative) to bright green (positive).
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Having completed this exercise, it is possible to run the algorithm and look at the possibilities created on the basis of consistency. In figure 2.5.3 below the most consistent expected future scenario for region blue is shown. The possibility chosen in each column is represented by the light blue shading assigned. The consistency between each variable selected and all the others is depicted by the height of the green bar atop the column – the longer the more consistent fit.
Figure 2.5.3: Most consistent outcome for Regional analysis scenario Blue (2025).

With a view to resolving the challenge of the ‘New Chapter’ there is a need to create sophisticated scenarios for all key regions and indeed non-state actors to whom the armed forces need to consider. The example above is based upon Europe and serves to explain both the method and the logical fit with the next steps. 2.6 Military Tasks

Drawing on the existing information concerning UK defence goals and projecting them through time, this stage aims to assess the most consistent military tasks to be performed. The method used is identical to that in section 2.5 previously. Figure 2.6.1 overleaf illustrates the Military Tasks as described in the Strategic Defence Review using the morphological box:

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Figure 2.6.1: UK armed forces Military Tasks strategy space.

However, it is at this point that possible flaws in the development of military tasks come to light. Applying the Minto principle – that of each element being MECE (both mutually exclusive to other elements and simultaneously comprehensively exhaustive) difficulties in the definition of Military Tasks arise. Simply put, it is difficult to see the true difference between tasks such as MT19 and MT20 ? Also MT8-9 and MT 26. From the point of view of the ‘New Chapter’, a consideration of genuine military tasks appears in order. In terms of additions, the author would be inclined to avoid adding new tasks – after all many elements are already captured, albeit in a flawed structure – which could be as much a result of bottom up ‘push’ from the services and political ‘pull’. Figure 2.6.2. overleaf illustrates the resulting most consistent set of military tasks on the basis of consistency scoring for the UK armed forces

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Figure 2.6.2: Most consistent UK armed forces Military Tasks.

This analysis begs the following questions in seeking to adjust military tasks for a post SDR policy; 1. Columns D, F, and H. Are they duplicating activities already present in other areas ? Are they a useful means for justifying obsolescent capabilities ? Are they genuinely valuable categorisations of defence effort ? If the latter answer is ‘yes’ then it could be suggested that they need to be fleshed out as at present they offer no choice – “you either have task H for example or not” – which appears unrealistic. 2. Column A possibly needs to be re-cast in terms of a “homeland defence” e.g. national integrity tasks and “civil-support tasks” e.g. search and rescue, nuclear accident response. Column A appears too much like an intellectual bucket for all manner of tasks.

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2.7 Force Elements

This third scenario space seeks to build on the earlier consideration of force elements comprising the capabilities of the UK armed forces in section 2.4. The morphological box in this instance has been built to consider possible development / upgrade paths for capabilities in light of the changing strategic circumstances. Figure 2.7.1 below illustrates the strategic option space constructed. Note: there could be more or less capabilities analysed in this manner – this sample was based on the author’s own knowledge.
Figure 2.7.1: Strategy space considering future military capability development.

The above options around land systems, power projection capabilities, air dominance and space systems bring together many of the no-doubt ongoing debates on force element design, for example: a) In the land systems field what is the ‘right’ emergent balance between firepower, protection and ability to deploy rapidly ? b) Repeating earlier Whitehall decisions in the mid-1960s what is the balance between sea based amphibious task groups and air transport ?

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c) Has Afghanistan hastened the introduction and re-balancing of air forces increasing the percentage of unmanned platforms ? d) Can Britain successfully access force protection mechanisms for its future structure ? Lighter forces will depend even more on intelligence, and realtime, high availability ISTAR assets to maintain agility. 2.8 Region / MT / FE

This stage integrates the three streams – grand strategic scenario planning for a region (2.2 & 2.5), with policy goals articulated through military tasks (2.3 & 2.6) and lastly possible capability development from its roots in the force element structure of the British armed forces (2.4 & 2.7). The conceptual ability to link these three spaces enables us to rapidly consider the most consistent set of capabilities to develop which support execution of likely military tasks in what is viewed as the likely operating environment. Figure 2.8.1 illustrates the highly granular nature of the model, and its roots from previous efforts.
Figure 2.8.1: Integrated strategy space for region Blue / Military Tasks / New capabilities.

Conceptually if content is not a problem it is conceivable to map multiple regions, coupled with areas such as possible doctrinal developments to build strategies with a larger ‘footprint’ in terms of impact than the one shown above in figure 2.8.1.

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From applying the algorithm, the following insights emerged from the most consistent outcome; a) For region Blue there is some likelihood of a more hawkish attitude to defence and a propensity to use military power. A decade ago Newsnight on BBC television was dramatising scenarios from the leading think tanks positing European preparedness to use force to protect access to raw materials and prevent immigrants entering Europe, culminating in a Cuba-esque confrontation with the United States. A more cohesive Europe seeking to flex its muscles may be more inclined to use force – Europeans are becoming more used following the Balkans and Afghanistan to seeing their armed forces overseas. b) In terms of military tasks, given the island geography of the UK, the emphasis appears to be on evacuating British (and Allied) nationals from emergencies elsewhere in the world. This would seem to justify good quality ISTAR and rapid deployment capability –esp. given the rise in citizens working in remote, sometimes politically unstable regions for Multi-National Corporations. c) From a capability management point of view highly mobile infantry supported by a mix of unmanned aerial vehicles and a ‘super’ JSTARS ISTAR system offered the most consistent mix for challenges in the blue environment through 2025. Section 2.9 which follows emerges from two distinct activities. Firstly there is the stage just analysed which has resulted in the creation of strategy options – the one described above was the most consistent (not necessarily plausible). Others can be identified rapidly – and a sub-set of these strategic responses provides the content for choice in the next stage. 2.9 Strategic Choices

As can be seen in the miniature of the reasoning architecture above, this stage is informed from two directions. The first as indicated in the summary of stage 2.8 is the scenario/ tasks / capabilities modelling effort to create options. The second stream is detailed further in sections 2.10 – 2.12 which follow this stage. These three steps provide the goals against which the strategies will be judged across three time periods (+5, +15, and +25 years). From the previous step 2.8, four particular strategic options have been identified and fleshed out by applying an umbrella description – Incremental strategy, Limited development, Utopian viewpoint and nightmare scenario. These are then scored against the goals identified in the next section – the figure overleaf (9.2.1) illustrates this activity clearly;

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Figure 2.9.1: Synoptic evaluation - UK armed forces development options.

Note: the four strategic options on the left, along the top are the criteria (drawn from the British defence mission), with the grey row immediately beneath them, comprising the weightings assigned in stage 2.10 to the goals. Under each criteria are Three columns representing the value assigned in each time frame. Therefore, in order to understand the three red sliders immediately to the right of the red strategy “incremental strategy” we would ask, “how do you perceive the incremental strategy to perform against the criteria of transparency in defence over the +5, +15, +25 year timeframe”. The output of this scoring effort is a series of bar graphs illustrated below. The bar graphs for each time period show a ranking of the four strategies by calculating the weighting, by score aggregated for each time period.

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Looking to the results we see that the incremental strategy could be the ideal to follow for the next time two time periods, but although it scores closely – the limited development strategy (yellow) offers a marginally more effective option. In terms of the ‘New Chapter’ study strategy yellow – that of defining a niche set of development goals and investing wisely to pursue them is going to be essential. If British forces intend never to go into battle without the USA maybe certain traditional capabilities can be foregone – maybe we should look to their thinking about key systems so as to not have mismatched forces ? 2.10 Goals for choice

Using the goals and priorities tool described and used in earlier stages, it is now applied using the criteria stated in the defence mission as a basis upon which to judge the success of any adaptation of UK defence policy. Figure 2.10.1 below illustrates the visual output of considering the defence mission across three time periods simultaneously:
Figure 2.10.1: UK Defence mission goals viewed from multiple time frame perspective.

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To consider the outputs of the goals exercise with a view to the ‘New Chapter’ study, the following assumptions have been made: a) Through technological and doctrinal developments the battlespace will become a more heavily co-ordinated ‘purple’ sphere. Individual service may not disappear but the emphasis could change significantly from what we see today. For example the US formation of a ‘space command’ in the USAF looked somewhat odd at the time of the ‘star wars’ proposals which lacked the technology behind the presentation, but now is an example of ‘good forward thinking’. b) Value for money will remain a holy mantra into which the ‘New chapter’ must fit. I assume that only the most minimal additional resources (unlike the US situation) will be provided to the Ministry of Defence in coming years. c) The need will become increasingly pressing for the UK armed forces to become involved in the community – as the era of mass warfare temporarily recedes, a generation is emerging which has fought its wars in first-person perspective via videogames. If the armed forces are unable to maintain their place at the back of the public mind, they will find themselves with a personnel shortage which no amount of smart, capital investment can offset. 2.11 Resources This step is if anything more of a guide and reminder of the need to consider the resource question and attempt more creative (positive) thinking about the effective use of existing resources. The ‘New Chapter’ is unlikely to leverage significant new resources, but given how difficult it is to understand where the resources are deployed. It could well be to the advantage of the Ministry to go back over its accounts from 1988 to convert them to resource accounting standards to understand where it has been deploying its resources with a historical perspective through the cold war draw down (and hot war activities) of the 1990s. Using the MoD expenditure reports I have constructed a simple model looking at where the resources have been deployed historically.
Figure 2.11.1: Ministry of Defence resource allocation 1995-2001.

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Clearly this form of analysis at the top level indicates the large sums deployed to the top operational commanders of the services. However a breakdown might be more illuminating when trying to establish where useful economies can be made which feedback directly into a capability investment programme. I personally doubt from my knowledge of serving officers that further significant direct (budget) and indirect (programme delays) can be sustained without the services facing a greater haemorrhaging of their best future commanders. 2.12 Supporting materials This step contains the electronic hard copies of resources drawn on in the process. This step is distinct from the support materials (2.1) which is focused more on the doctrinal and policy issues. This step enables instant knowledge management (i.e. the addition of further sources) as to with which information and knowledge the problem was approached: Ministry of Defence expenditure plans 00-01, and 01-02 National Audit Office, major projects report 2001

2.13 Success This final stage in the process seeks to assess the barriers to implementing a chosen strategy for the ‘New Chapter’. The tool used to illustrate this challenge can be imagined as a probability weighted, critical-path assessment. Risks are identified in a top-down, sequential manner, and the links from risk ‘a’ to risk ‘b’ are assigned a probability of success. This approach tends to lead to pessimistic responses at first from participants, however this approach does enable a quality discussion about what will mitigate the risk of failure. With this in mind the author would make the following assertions regarding implementation risks;
Figure 2.13.1 Strategy Yellow - implementation risk assessment.

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Traditionally, failing to succeed with a strategic agenda tends to lead to it being relegated to life-support funding rather than it being removed from play completely. A good example familiar to us all is that of the Royal Navy’s carrier programme. Despite the RN being forbade to think about carriers following the CVA-01 cancellation in the 1960s – today new carriers are on the drawing board. In terms of the ‘New Chapter’ is it time to genuinely question sacred cows – and if necessary slay them once and for all ? The issue of political support in the fourth and last tier appears most problematic Given ministerial turnover, and life of parliaments against excessively long procurement lead time. A ‘New chapter’ would appear to require committed funds to enable accelerated procurement beyond wartime emergencies (such as upgrading armour on the Challenger 1 and Warrior in 1990). Further the MoD needs to balance technical specifications versus commercial development in the field of defence electronic procurement – I am reliably informed that the laptop this document is being composed on, has greater , and more reliable processing power than the system supporting a Type 45 air defence destroyer in service today with the RN. If the future is going to see longer platform life – then more easily upgraded (and regular) electronics refits are going to be absolutely crucial to maintaining an edge over potential adversaries in terms of reaction times. SUMMARY Having taken the reader through a consideration of force elements, scenario planning, goals, decisions, and implementation issues – what lessons can we offer to the planners drawing up the ‘New Chapter’ ? I think that there a five points: a) Resist the temptation to develop a policy which over-balances UK forces towards a passive anti-terrorist role. There are many other pressures, and positive ways in which the UK armed forces can contribute to peace and stability. By positioning this review in the context of last September’s activity risks allowing one incident to skew thinking is akin to reducing car insurance from a ‘comprehensive’ policy to a ‘fire’ policy after your own vehicle catches fire. b) Do not neglect history, due to immediate pressure to act. The events of 2001 offer differing lessons depending on the speaker. The attack on the US was essentially an intelligence failure not vastly dissimilar to that of the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East in 1973. In interview later with intelligence officers it was acknowledged that it had become an institutional myth that their opponents could not draw up and execute an intelligence plan for war. I believe that the ‘third rate opponent’ myth has been removed in the current situation – where relatively low-tech vehicles become weapons. Conversely the US intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s demonstrated how asymmetric warfare could see high-tech push button weapons being used with no concern as to how they work. c) If the capability cannot be delivered to where it is needed – it is useless. It is probably time to accelerate funding for airmobile and cavalry (medium weight) units over ‘heavy armour’.

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d) Investment into more personnel efficient combat systems is vital. The UK population is expected to shrink for the foreseeable future, and therefore the pool of quality potential personnel will shrink. The Royal Navy especially is in need of a rethink as to the type of platforms it develops for the next halfcentury of service. e) The New York attack was not war – but a terrorist attack. It seems many see this event as a declaration of war. Whilst a heinous act, many such acts of smaller scale have happened over the past century or so. Therefore any ‘New Chapter’ response is as much about better coordination of intelligence and policing activities as it is about using the military. The UK has always enjoyed a beneficial effect from the world-wide coverage of the Iranian Embassy Siege and the employment of military force to rescue hostages. Methodology Given the complexity involved in discussions of this type the author has chosen to use a software based strategic decision support toolset to assist in managing complexity and offering ways of thinking about some of the questions raised in the aforementioned documents. Think Tools is the product of research in the 1980s by the Max Planck Institute of Germany into human cognition and visualization of complex issues. Today Think Tools AG, listed on the Swiss stock exchange is a leader in providing decision making solutions and strategy consulting to major companies and governments. For more details please see the company website (http://www.thinktools.com).

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