CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DEFENCE COLLEGE OF MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY MSc IN GLOBAL SECURITY DISSERTATION

Academic Year 2004/2005

Commander Adriatik Meta

Kosovo final status and its implications for the security of the Balkans

Supervisor:

Dr. Laura Cleary

10 August 2005

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the degree of Masters of Science in Global Security

(21,900 words)

© Cranfield University, 2005. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission of the copyright holder.

i

ABSTRACT

Ethnic conflict has become one of the most significant threats to global peace and international order since the end of the Cold War in the Balkans. This is because nationalist secessionist movements especially in Former Yugoslavia brought destruction and new uncertainties.

The NATO military campaign of 1999 against Serbian army put an end to ethnic cleansing and gave new hopes for Kosovo people to live in freedom. Since the end of hostilities and the entrance of international Kosovo protection force the province is governed by United Nations Administration. Although all the NATO powers had genuinely supported the objective of keeping rump Yugoslavia together, the military campaign of 1999 to drive Yugoslav forces out of Kosovo was hardly conducive to that goal. Nor was the operation by the regime of President Slobodan Milosevic to expel nearly one million of the province‟s Albanian citizens. Serbia‟s dictatorial regime failed gamble, more than anything else, created the moral and practical political conditions that will probably require the international powers, as well as the states of the region, to accommodate Kosovo‟s permanent separation from Serbia.

While the United States and its European allies are hesitating about what to do in relation to the Kosovo‟s final status, there is an urgent need to determine that status as soon as possible. The Albanian majority expects the international community to begin delivering this year on its independence aspirations. Without such moves it may act unilaterally. In such circumstances, given the dismal record of Kosovo Albanians with regard to minorities, Kosovo's Serbs may call upon Serbia's armed forces to protect

ii

them, and the region could be plunged into new turmoil. It is certainly possible that Russia and China will veto Security Council decisions. Such positions would mean that Serbia would formally retain a claim to sovereignty over Kosovo.

The legal basis for discussing Kosovo's future status is UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which explicitly mandates "a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status", thus indicating that the present de jure sovereignty of Serbia and Montenegro over Kosovo is not necessarily permanent.

Some policy makers have expressed concerns that any movement toward granting sovereignty to Kosovo would be seized on by secessionists, irredentists and their supporters elsewhere as a precedent for their cause. On the other hand trying to keep Kosovo within Serbia is not a wise solution taking into account the history of SerbKosovo Albanian bloody relations. The fear is that nationalist conflicts could become a challenge to the territorial or political status quo in the region.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to the Minister of Defence, the Chief of General Staff and the Director of the Defence Planning Directorate of Albania for giving me the opportunity to attend the 6th Global Security course. I owe many debts to the Her Majesty‟s Government of the United Kingdom that sponsored my studies and living here together with my family for one year. I sincerely thank Doctor Laura Cleary, for her sound advice and guidance in the course of this dissertation. Her encouragement helped me overcome difficulties and keep the speed and the momentum. I commend the efforts of the all Security Studies Institute staff in their contribution to the knowledge I gained from the course. Special thanks to Professors Richard Holmes, Christopher Bellamy, Ian Davis, Dr. Steven Haines, Mr Tom Maley. Many thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Graem Olley and Steph Muir, the Course Administrator, for their kind support throughout the course. I thank all my colleagues who in one or another way contributed to making the course interesting for me.

Special thanks to my family, my wife Tefta and my lively daughters, Joana and Klaudia, for their support and encouragement throughout the course.

iv

CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE_________________________________________________________i ABSTRACT_________________________________________________________ii ACKNOWLEDGEMNTS______________________________________________iv CONTENTS_________________________________________________________v LIST OF TABLES___________________________________________________vii LIST OF FIGURES__________________________________________________viii GLOSARY/LIST OF ACRONYMS______________________________________ix

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTON_________________________________________1

1.11.21.31.41.51.61.7-

Background____________________________________________________1 Aim__________________________________________________________6 Objectives __________________________________________________6

Justification for undertaking the study_______________________________ 7 Research methodology___________________________________________ 8 Study structure__________________________________________________9 Review of the literature__________________________________________10

CHAPTER 2 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK___________________________13

2.12.2 2.3 -

Security in the Post-Cold era______________________________________14 Nationalism and self-determination________________________________ 21 The implications of self-determination______________________________26

v

CHAPTER 3 - ALTERNATIVES OF KOSOVO FINAL STATUS_____________ 35

3.13.23.3-

Historical background on relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs__ 35 Kosovo‟s final status____________________________________________38 International key players and their position to Kosovo final status________ 47

CHAPTER 4 - KOSOVO FINAL STATUS AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS__57

4.14.2-

Current security situation in the Balkan region________________________57 Security implications of Kosovo final status__________________________61

CHAPTER 5 – OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES______________________78

5.15.2-

Confronting the past working to build the future______________________ 78 NATO and EU integration – a Balkan without borders_________________ 87

CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS______________100

6.16.26.3-

Conclusion___________________________________________________100 Recommendations_____________________________________________104 Recommendations for further study_______________________________105

BIBLIOGRAPHY___________________________________________________107

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Partners of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe_________________89

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Map of Kosovo_______________________________________________43 Figure 2 Macedonia scenario___________________________________________ 69 Figure 3 Albanian four vilayets under the Ottoman Empire____________________72 Figure 4 New Borders _________________________________________________86 Figure 5 European Integration – the present vision for 2006___________________ 93

viii

GLOSSARY/LIST OF ACRONYMS

EU FRY ICTY IPA KFOR KLA LDK NATO NLA OSCE PDK PfP PISG SAA SiCG SRS SRSG UCPMB UN UNMIK UNSCR USA

European Union Federal Republic of Yugoslavia International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance NATO-led international peace-keeping mission in Kosovo Kosovo Liberation Army Democratic League of Kosovo North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Liberation Army Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Democratic Party of Kosovo Partnership for Peace Provisional Institutions of Self-Government Stabilisation and Association Agreement Serbia and Montenegro Serbian Radical Party (Serbian political party) Special Representative of the Secretary General Presheve-Medvegja Liberation Army United Nations United Nations Mission in Kosovo United Nations Security Council Resolution United States of America

ix

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

1.1-

Background

On June 28, 1914, Serbian nationalists assassinated Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife during their visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was this event in Sarajevo in the summer of 1914 that sparked one of the most destructive world wars. Eighty years later, in the early days of the siege of Sarajevo in the mid-1990s, a photo of a half-ruined post office with three items of graffiti written on its wall captured the imagination of the world. The first graffito read "This is Serbia!” the second stated "This is Bosnia". And someone scrawled underneath, "No, you idiots, it's a post office!" But a European historian of the present added a line of his own, "This is Europe";1 for all of the destruction in the Yugoslav wars has been done by Europeans to other Europeans in Europe.2 The fundamental causes of World War I, however, were rooted deeply in the European history of the previous century, particularly in the political and economic policies that prevailed on the Continent after 1871, the year that marked the emergence of Germany as a great world power. The Balkans were not the powder keg, as is so often believed: the metaphor is inaccurate. They were merely the powder trail that the great powers themselves had laid. The powder keg was Europe.3

Although the conflict between Serbs and Albanians has its origins in rising nationalism or human rights abuses in the 1980s and 1990s, the tendency by both groups to contest their rights to Kosovo is clear evidence of the long-term origins of the conflict. Thus it is not simple hatred of one group for another; instead the meaning

1

of „ethnicity‟, „nation‟, „national identity‟ and so forth all need to be taken into account in order for those living in the twenty-first century to be able to appreciate the origins and the consequences of the war in Kosovo.4 Both ethnic groups have strong emotional attachments to Kosovo and maintain irreconcilable positions on the disputed territory.5

One of the basic characteristics of Kosovo‟s social reality is a complete division of the Albanian and Serbian public opinions, resulting in different perceptions of the situational conflict. The Albanian collective consciousness, as well as, the Serbian one, sees itself as a total victim, antagonized by the opposite side. The greatest divergence are contained in views dealing with the far off past, best illustrated in both groups‟ selective memory of Kosovo as „holy land‟. Albanians claim that ethnic cleansing has long been present in Serbian tradition. They also claim that Kosovo has always been merely Serbia‟s colony. The Serbs in turn point to the forced migrations from Kosovo from 1960s to the 1990s. For Serbs the dominant argument for oppression of Albanians in Kosovo was the need to protect the remaining Serbs there.6 Both Serbs and Albanians have constructed their own „myths‟ around the historical importance of Kosovo for the origins of their nations and their national identity. The battle of Kosovo of 1389 is a case in point. So much myth, symbolism and legend are associated with this battle it is difficult even to this day to separate fact from fiction. The Serbs argue that they have been in Kosovo since the seventh century, that their medieval kings were crowned there and but for the defeat by the Ottoman Turks at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 Serbs would have retained control in Kosovo; while the Albanians suggest that they arrived in Kosovo prior to the Serbs and that they are the direct descendants of the region‟s earliest inhabitants.7

2

Perhaps the most damaging myth as far as the Albanians are concerned, is that Kosovo is historically Serbian land and that the Albanians are newcomers to the region. The site of the 1389 crushing defeat by the Turks of the Serbian medieval kingdom, Kosovo is considered by most Serbs as sacred ground, although at the Kosovo Battle the Albanians fought together with the Serbs against the invading Turks.8 During her travels, at a time when Kosovo was still part of the Ottoman Empire, [Edith] Durham wrote that she found that the Serbs there, „regardless of the fact that in most places they are much in the minority, still had visions of expulsion of all Moslems, and the reconstruction of the great Serbian Empire.9

The myth of Kosovo is so strong that from childhood Serbs are taught that the region was the cradle of Serbia which was liberated in 1912 after centuries of TurkishAlbanian occupation. The Serbs have developed a „Kosovo complex‟ and find it difficult to liberate themselves from the dreadful burden of the Kosovo Battle.10 The Albanians are no less attached to Kosovo than the Serbs. It was in Kosovo‟s Prizren that the Albanian League was formed in 1878, which waged a two-fronted struggle for autonomy from Turkey and for the protection of the territorial integrity of Albanian-inhabited areas from foreign encroachment. The major battle for Albania‟s independence was fought in Kosovo and some of Albania‟s most prominent national figures were Kosovars.11 Besides contested historical claims to Kosovo, there are other major differences between Serbs and Albanians. They speak different languages and have different religion. Most Albanians are Muslim, with a small proportion being Orthodox or Catholic.12

3

Kosovo Albanians do not define their national identity through religion, but through language and have a relatively relaxed approach towards the observance of the forms of the Islamic religion. Neither Islamic leaders nor Islamic theology played a significant role in either the eight-year campaign of non-violent resistance to the Serb occupation regime or the armed resistance of 1998-99.13 Most Kosovo Serbs, even those who are not active religious believers, consider Orthodoxy to be an important component of their national identity. Nevertheless, despite this essential division of religious activities along ethnic lines, it cannot be said that religion per se was an important contributing factor in the conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.14

From the time Kosovo was included into the Serbian state Kosovo Albanians were considered as undesirable foreigners. The Albanians displayed a deep commitment to national values and a strong resistance to Serbian rule.15 When Milosevic came to power in the 1980s his policy toward Kosovo aimed at breaking the will of ethnic Albanians to resist Serbian domination. It blended elements of Serbian ultranationalism, the widespread use of coercion, fear and intimidation, and general disenfranchisement and the use of propaganda to demonise the Albanians. Having restored Serbia‟s control over Kosovo, Milosevic embarked upon a policy of Serbianising the province through a campaign of deliberate economic and social marginalisation of Albanians.16 After the failure of the Rambouillet peace talks in January 1999, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), as the sponsors of the talks between the two sides, finally decided to take sides and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military intervention against Serbia followed on 25 March 1999. It lasted less then three months and ended in complete withdrawal of

4

Serbian government forces from Kosovo. The United Nations (UN) established its interim government and gave Kosovo Albanians the control of the province. The international community entered Kosovo in June 1999 without an exit strategy and has taken only a few uncertain steps toward defining one. Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1244, which mandates an international administration, is ambiguous on the duration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)'s sovereignty over Kosovo.

Continuing international ambiguity and delay over the final status of Kosovo is increasingly untenable. Confusion and obfuscation over whether the territory becomes a long-term UN or EU protectorate, is unilaterally handed over to Belgrade‟s control, or is finally launched on a trajectory for statehood erodes the effectiveness of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), fuels the misplaced hopes for some in Serbia that all or part of Kosovo will again come under the authority of Belgrade, postpones stability in Southeast Europe, and most disturbingly, contributes to increased tensions, political and economic stagnation, and an unhealthy culture of dependence among Kosovo‟s ambitious, youthful, and growing population.17 Ambiguity over the status comes from UN Resolution 1244 which requires that Kosovo society and institutions must demonstrate that they are ready to govern responsibly before discussions of final status.

From the report of the International Commission on the Balkans the situation in the region is described as close to failure as it is to success. For the moment, the wars are over, but the smell of violence still hangs heavy in the air. The region's profile is bleak - a mixture of weak states and international protectorates, where Europe has stationed almost half of its deployable forces.18 But despite the scale of the assistance

5

effort in the Balkans, the international community has failed to offer a convincing political perspective to the societies in the region. The future of Kosovo is undecided, the future of Macedonia is uncertain, and the future of Serbia is unclear. We run the real risk of an explosion of Kosovo, an implosion of Serbia and new fractures in the foundations of Bosnia and Macedonia. There is an urgent need to solve the outstanding status and constitutional issues in the Balkans and to move the region as a whole from the stage of protectorates and weak states to the stage of EU accession. This is the only way to prevent the Western Balkans from turning into the black hole of Europe.19

1.2-

Aim

The aim of this dissertation is to explore security implications for the Balkan region of the possible solutions on the Kosovo final status.

1.3-

Objectives

The objectives of the study are:

To analyse how nationalism and self-determination have contributed to the

increase of insecurity in Balkans.

To assess the security implications for the Balkan region in the light of

Kosovo‟s final status.

6

To identify areas of international responsibility for the increase/decrease of

security in Balkans.

To recommend ways of fostering security and cooperation in the region.

1.4-

Justification for undertaking the study

The debates within academia, among legal practitioners, politicians, international institutions and governments in relation to the fate of Kosovo and the future of Balkans has increased since Yugoslav wars of 1990s and especially after 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. Many annalists and security institutions warn that the situation in Kosovo is explosive and Kosovo Albanians are frustrated with the international community that has been unable to deliver the final status. This dissertation does not suggest that Kosovo final status should be independence from Serbia; instead it provides an opportunity to analyse the security implications for the Balkans in relation to Kosovo final status.

The examination of current literature in relation to the security situation in the Balkans suggests that Kosovo final status is an impediment for the development and integration of the poorest region of Europe and finally there is not an exit strategy from Kosovo. Therefore the study of possible Kosovo status is related to the role of nationalism and international super/regional powers to the security of the Balkans.

Some policy makers have expressed concerns that any movement toward granting sovereignty to Kosovo would be seized on by secessionists, irredentists and their

7

supporters elsewhere as a precedent for their cause. But in fact the circumstances of the Kosovo case are rather unusual and unlikely to be matched by any other case currently troubling policy-makers.

Many authors describe the Balkans as a powder keg and warn that granting Kosovo independence may ignite other ethnic conflicts in the region and fear also the creation of a greater Albania. Being from Balkans was one of the reasons for undertaking this research.

1.5-

Research methodology

Primary and secondary sources were used for writing this dissertation. The primary sources include documents from the UN, UNMIK, and institutions relevant to the study. Discussions with Doctor Laura Cleary gave me useful insights that formed part of primary sources for the dissertation.

Secondary sources of information for the dissertation were primarily from books, journals, the print and electronic news media and the internet. Other secondary sources used were presentations and reports of conference proceedings. The field trip to Northern Ireland gave me some insights into various aspects of ethnic conflict situation and its implications for the security of United Kingdom.

8

1.6-

Study structure

Chapter one gives an overview of historical ethnic conflict between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians and how it has contributed to the ongoing instability and insecurity in Balkans. It also highlights the involvement of international actors in fuelling wars of ethnic nature in the Balkans and their current involvement to resolve the Kosovo final status.

Chapter two is a theoretical framework regarding nationalism and ethnicity as a source of conflict. It reviews the theory of nationalism, self-determination and highlights the linkage between nationalism, the rights of self-determination and its ambiguity in international legal system to the security. Analysis of theory provides the basis for a working definition for analysing the security dimension of people‟s selfdetermination in a given international situation.

Chapter three gives an account of alternatives of Kosovo final status, analysing primarily the independent Kosovo, a Kosovo within Serbia-Montenegro. The role of key international players and their position to final status and their fears surrounding ethnic composition of Balkan states is subsequently discussed.

Chapter four is devoted to the security implications of the possible Kosovo final status alternatives discussed in Chapter three. Main focus is concentrated on the domino effect and the creation of the Greater Albania as result of Kosovo‟s independence.

9

Chapter five identifies the major challenges that the international community is facing in order to foster security in the Balkan region. Attention is placed on European integration of the region and challenges of Kosovo and Serbia and Montenegro to confront the past and the future.

Chapter six brings about the main conclusions reached throughout the dissertation and makes recommendations.

1.7-

Review of the literature

The existing literature on nationalism and movements of self-determination can be subdivided into three types. These were books and journal articles which assessed nationalism and self-determination movements as a potential source of conflict, those dealing with critical reviews and facts, and others investigating the future. Analysis of the relevant publications consulted provided the theoretical framework in Chapter two in particular and for the realization of the objectives of the study in general.

Going through the literature, three main themes were identified. First, there appears to be no consensus as to what extent nationalism as an ideology and desire for selfdetermination generates conflict within a multiethnic state and between states. However, there seems to be broad agreement as to the severity of the problem and the inability of state structures to accommodate minorities. Second, there is a wide divide between the critics and proponents of the rights of self-determination; while critics point to the domino effect of the recognition, proponents of independence defend the democratic right of people to govern themselves. Third, on the case of Kosovo the

10

literature indicates that there is a divide between US and EU on a one hand and Russia and China as UN Security Council permanent members that have kept Kosovo final status unresolved. Despite disagreements all agree that the current status quo is not contributing to security and development for the peoples of the Balkan countries. Finally, despite the new colonial role that EU and Euro-Atlantic structures are taking in the region it seems that Kosovo will remain a black hole in the European map unless its status is decided. The international formula „standards before status‟ it is not working and probably will plunge the region into new turmoil.

Deciding on the future of Kosovo status is becoming a nightmare not only for Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. The international community which appears divided in this issue fears security implications that all possible outcomes of Kosovo final status might have for the Balkans and more broadly.

11

1

Timothy Garton Ash, Bosnia in Europe‟ Future, New York Review of Boods, December 21, 1995

quated in „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.6, at http://www.balkancommission.org/activities/Report.pdf
2

„The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre for

Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.6, at http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf
3

Glenny, Misha, The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, (Granta Books, Williams, Christopher, „Kosovo: A fuse for the lighting‟, in Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley,

London, 1999), p.243
4

(editors), The Kosovo Crisis: The last American war in Europe?, (Reuters, Pearson Education, London 2001), p.17
5 6

Biberaj, Elez, „Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg‟, Conflict Studies 258, February 1993, p.2 Nikolic, Lazar, „Ethnic Prejudices and Discrimination: The Case of Kosovo‟, in Bieber, Florian,

Daskalovski, Zidas (editors), Understanding the War in Kosovo, (Frank Cass London, Portland, OR, 2003), p.54
7

Williams, Christopher, „Kosovo: A fuse for the lighting‟, in Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley,

(editors), The Kosovo Crisis: The last American war in Europe?, (Reuters, Pearson Education, London 2001), p.17
8 9

Biberaj, Elez, „Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg‟, Conflict Studies 258, February 1993, p.3 Judah, Tim, Kosovo: War and Revenge, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2000), p.xix Biberaj, Elez, „Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg‟, Conflict Studies 258, February 1993, p.3 Ibid, p.3 Williams, Christopher, „Kosovo: A fuse for the lighting‟, in Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley,

10 11 12

(editors), The Kosovo Crisis: The last American war in Europe?, (Reuters, Pearson Education, London 2001), p.17
13

„Religion in Kosovo‟, International Crisis Group-Balkans Report, Nr 155, Pristine/Brussels, 31 January 2001, p.ii, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400226_31012001.pdf 14 Ibid, p.1
15 16 17

Biberaj, Elez, „Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg‟, Conflict Studies 258, February 1993, p.3-4 Ibid, p.6-7 Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, Achieving a Final Status Settlement for

Kosovo, Center for Strategic and Inernational Studies, Washington, 2003, p.2, at http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf
18

„The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.7, at http://www.balkancommission.org/activities/Report.pdf
19

Ibid, p.8

12

CHAPTER 2 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Most writers agree that security is a „contested concept‟. For much of the Cold War period most writing on the subject was dominated by the idea of national security, which was largely defined in militarized terms.1 However, since the end of the Cold War, policy makers and scholars have increasingly begun to think about security as something more than military defence of the state interests, which includes political, economic, societal, environmental as well as military aspects and which is also defined in broader international terms.

This Chapter starts with the definition of the nation as a prerequisite of nationalist movements that lead to ethnic conflicts. Nationalism and ethnic conflict have leaped onto the centre stage after the Cold War in many parts of the world, and have become the most significant threats to global peace. The following will develop the issue of self-determination as a right of communities to decide on their fate and to establish an independent state as well as assess the implications for international relations. The right of self-determination goes against the principle of territorial integrity, so it should be balanced by other principles of international relations, such as international peace and security. Along with security implications of self-determination the focus of this chapter are also the challenges of state building and its relations with democracy.

13

2.1 Security in the Post-Cold era

The end of the Cold War brought about the demise of the superpower competition, the freeing of Eastern Europe from Communism and a reinvigoration of the UN as an important global actor. States no longer appear preoccupied by preparation for war. Yet, since the end of the Cold War Europe has witnessed a resurgence of armed conflict.2 Ethnic conflict has leapt onto centre stage due to the structural changes brought about by the end of the Cold War international system and the European colonial system that predated it. These structural changes have promoted, or highlighted, ethnic conflict by challenging the personal identity of the masses, the men and women in the street and encouraging them to act forcefully on the basis of ethnicity. These changes have also given rise to career opportunities for the would-be leaders of all kinds of new political movements, including ethnically based ones.3 Ethnic conflicts are also likely to have at their core secessionist movements or to mutate into wars of ethnic and religious separatism.4

The dual processes of integration and fragmentation which characterizes the contemporary world means that much more attention should be given to „societal security‟. According to this view, growing integration in a region like Europe is undermining the classical political order based on nation-states, leaving nations exposed within larger political frameworks (like the EU). At the same time the fragmentation of various states, like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, has created new problems of boundaries, minorities, and organizing ideologies which are causing increasing regional instability. This has led to the argument that ethno-national groups, rather than states, should become the centre of attention for security analysts. 5

14

Thomas Homer-Dixon hypothesizes that one frequent characteristic of societies vulnerable to internal conflict is scarcities of critical natural resources.6 Unequal economic opportunities, unequal access to resources such as land and capital, and vast differences in standards of living are all signs of economic systems that may be viewed as unfair and illegitimate7, by the more disadvantaged members; thus in turn providing a focus for ethnic groups in opposition to the state.

Demographic factors can also lead to conflict in ethnically mixed states. This is particularly true in areas where ethnic groups are integrated rather than segregated into well-defined areas, where one or more of the groups have a nationalist history, where the groups have different growth rates, and where the central government is relatively weak. Bosnia in the early 1990s, as the Yugoslav central government was weakening, is an example of an ethnic conflict in which demographic factors played a role. Between 1961 and 1991, the Serbian percentage of the population in Bosnia declined from 43 percent to 31 percent, while the Muslim percentage of the population increased from 26 percent to 44 percent. This population shift accompanied the waning of Serbian dominance, and the increasing influence of Bosnian Muslims, in Bosnian politics.8 Although population growth and population density do not generally predict political risk, unequal population growth rates between different ethnic groups, do increase the risk of violent internal political and ethnic conflicts.9

Violent ethnic conflict has become one of the most significant threats to global peace. Ethnic conflict should be understood as a conflict between two or more ethnic groups,

15

one of which possesses the actual state power. The state is the actor who possesses the legitimate monopoly of violence in the society. This legitimate monopoly is contested by ethnic groups.10 The prospects for violence are great, if ethnic groups have ambitious objectives, strong sense of identity, and confrontational strategies. Conflict is especially likely if objectives are incompatible, groups are strong and determined, action is feasible, success is possible, and if inter-group comparisons lead to competition, anxiety, and fears of being dominated.11

Religion as a basis for conflict or discriminatory violence is, of course, as old as religion itself.12 Since some nationalities are defined in religious terms, the presence of individuals of other religions is often portrayed as a threat to national cohesion and hence, they can become the victims of state or societal repression. This was starkly illustrated by the phenomenon of so-called „ethnic cleansing‟ in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s. The Bosnian Moslems, natives of the region whose ancestors had converted to Islam in the fifteenth century and who were no more religiously devout than the Catholic Croats or Orthodox Serbs, suddenly came to be seen as outsiders in their own country because of a societal security struggle between the other two nationalities. Serbian nationalism was reawakened by the break up of the multinational state they had dominated and rallied to its traditional cause of Islamophobia, fuelled by historic memories of centuries of domination by the Ottoman Turks.13

Where ethnicity does define the nation, minority ethnic groups are not likely to be accommodated by or assimilated into the dominant, indigenous national group and risk becoming marginalized. At the lesser end of the scale this might be in the form of

16

being denied the rights of citizenship in their country of residence and in extremis manifest itself in the horrors of genocide and „ethnic cleansing‟.14

According to the ideal of one nation-one state, states engage in active nation-building: they try to implement the idea of one nation-one state. In the process of nationbuilding states try to coerce ethnic groups. They do not allow existence of educational and other institutions based on other ethnic groups' languages and values. This is, however, the least violent policy among a state's options. It is identified as the assimilationist policy.15 If this policy does not succeed in either assimilating ethnic groups or making them invisible on the societal surface, other, more violent policies are used. Assimilation can be a result of deliberate state policy as well as a result of structural inequality in the positions between the dominant and marginalized ethnic groups.16

The perception that a minority nationality is a human security threat to the majority nationality may be perceived as a threat to the economic well-being of the dominant group. Minority nationalities may even be perceived as threats to state security, as in the Nazi and neo-Nazi portrayal of Jews formerly as Communists and latterly as part of a global conspiracy to control economic life.17 The minority nationality may also perceive threats to their human or societal security from the state or dominant nationality. When two or more national groups each perceive that another threatens their lives or identities, a „societal security dilemma‟, can be the cause of conflict. 18 If the ethnic groups realize the danger in time, they confront the state attempts, and a civil war starts. If the genocide eventually succeeds, the residues of the crucified

17

ethnic group, its generations and international community engage in attempts to achieve retribution.19

2.1.1 Nationalism

Nationalism like many other terms in social science is used to describe a set of political principles that movements and individuals espouse, and a social and political movement, a tendency that has affected all societies and transformed their politics.20 To arrive at a definition of the nation Smith proposes the examination of the „individuality‟ component of the nationalist‟ „independence ideal‟.21 He defines the nation as a large, vertically integrated and territorially mobile group featuring common citizenship rights and collective sentiment together with one (or more) common characteristic(s) which differentiate its members of similar groups with whom they stand in relations of alliance or conflict.22 A sense of legal and political community in which members enjoy civil, legal and political rights, and incur legal duties and obligations, together with a sense of equality before the law among members of the community, in short, the notion of citizenship – these are vital elements in the western, civic model of a nation.23 Within the ethnic model that emerged in Eastern Europe after the Cold War, the nation is construed as a diachronically extended family whose members enjoy a common ancestry.24

The terrible experiences of the 1930s and World War II seem to have implanted in us a tendency to think that nationalism must inevitably degenerate into fascism.25 Operating on the axiom that a perceived domestic or foreign threat helps to unite a community, aggressive nationalist leaders promote discrimination against other

18

nationalities and hostility toward neighbouring states. Xenophobic nationalism is more likely to be manifested among groups that live with larger and potentially more threatening minorities, especially where there are deep-rooted historical grievances and seemingly irreconcilable cultural or religious differences. Numerous issues can provoke hostility and confrontation, including questions of land ownership, language policy, and the allocation of power and resources.26

There are close ideological relatives to nationalism as Smith calls them, such as imperialism, fascism and racism. Imperialism as an ideology is carried by an ethnie or a nation, which believes, it has a mission to endow other ethnie or nations with the blessings of its civilisations. Fascism is a further development away from nationalism. Its mainsprings are worship of the State as a corporate entity, belief in the Leader and the elite whose will is infallible, and a sense of what is often described as vitalistic nihilism. Racism holds the doctrine that the world is divided into races, some superior physically and intellectually to others, and therefore endowed with the right to dominate.27

2.1.2 Nationalism and international relations

A consequence of nationalism for the international system is that it has been a source of conflict, and often of war. The hostility to nationalism is all the greater because, as in the German and Japanese cases, ferocious nationalism abroad is often combined with dictatorial and racist policies at home: nationalism is used by dictatorial regimes to crush dissent at home, even as it is deployed to mobilize support for aggression

19

abroad.28 Even in developed, stable democracies of Western civilization national identity is at little risk of disappearing from Europe.29

Nationalism was seen as a thing of the past, a cause of wars in Europe up to 1945, a relic of colonialism in the Third World, an irrational if necessary feature of international relations. It was generally assumed that states would resort less and less to nationalism in dealings with each other and would, instead, use the new institutions of international order, be they the UN or EU, to promote greater cooperation.30 On the positive side, ethnic nationalism may be a cohesive and motivating force in helping a group to assert its cultural identity, regain its national sovereignty, or limit the influence of unwelcome outside powers in domestic affairs. Nationalism may instil a sense of patriotism, community loyalty, and cultural pride.31

The international legal system provides little clarity about what actions the international community will support in relation to self-determination movements of the people and the territorial integrity of the state or about the actions that minority groups and central governments should take. As a result, the contending parties often end up focusing on the principles that would lead each to their most favoured outcomes: secession in the case of minority groups and a centralized state in the case of central governments, because these outcomes are at opposite and irreconcilable extremes, their separate pursuit is likely to generate conflict.32

20

2.2 Nationalism and self-determination

Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.33 Nationalism is above all a moral principle, which claims that nations do exist, that they should coincide with, i.e. cover the same people as, political communities and that they should be self-ruling.34

Traditional European nationalism tried to formulate objective marks of nationhood that would enable any given unit of people to provide a rational justification of its demand for „self-determination‟. These could include language, common origin, historical tradition of statehood, or the like, and could – or so it was hoped – place the democratic edifice on a completely rational foundation. There would exist universally valid objective criteria defining a „fair‟ distribution of territory among peoples; groups or individuals with doubts about their membership in a given nation could find just and impartial standards for resolving them.35

World War I was the occasion on which the principle of national self-determination, hitherto confined to Europe and the white elites of the Americas, was now proclaimed as a universal principle.36During World War I, self-determination became a tool of allied psychological warfare. Then in 1917, to facilitate the Bolshevik cause, Lenin advocated the principles of non-annexation and self-determination for all peoples. Finally, it was legitimized in President Woodrow Wilson‟s Fourteen Points and the subsequent Treaty of Versailles.37

21

Self-determination managed to be included in the UN Charter, although in the Charter language it is couched not as a right, but as a principle. The 1960 General Assembly Resolution transformed self-determination into a foremost human right, with its farreaching effects.38 It stipulates that „all peoples have the right to self-determination: by virtue of the right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. This characterization set a precedent for future human rights documents on the question of self-determination.39

In Western Europe and the USA from 1960s onwards new demands for national selfdetermination, or the recognition of ethnic diversity and rights within states, began to emerge: among the Basques in Spain, among the Catholic population in Northern Ireland, in Scotland, in Belgium, in Corsica. In Canada the French–speaking population of Quebec began to demand greater autonomy and, in many cases, independence. This revival of national and ethnic politics in Western Europe and North America was, for all its implications, contained: in no case did states fragment.40

One of promises of self-determination was that, within the free atmosphere of politically independent units, individuals would find fulfilment in their enjoyment of human rights, including self-respect. But the arrival of postcolonial states, following their tortuous anti-colonial fight, shows that the fate of the individual in international law has not improved.41 It seems that what ultimately determines which minority group has the right to self-determination, and where, still depends – unlike in the decolonization case – on the power of the gun, in the Maoist sense.42

22

2.2.1 Self-determination as a right to choose political status

Some scholars understand self-determination to be the central issue in the globalisation of democracy. For this group, self-determination means liberty and free development for all peoples. They argue that the principle of self-determination of peoples as expressed in Article 1(2) of UN Charter is an absolute legal principle and, hence, a „right‟ whose purpose is to strengthen international peace. Moreover, the right of peoples to self-determination means the right to establish an independent state or the right of a people to select the state to which they wish to belong as well as to choose their own form of government.43 The second catalyst for self-determination, and perhaps the most important one, is the fears and insecurities created by the collapse of multi-ethnic states. These insecurities are exacerbated when the historical background of inter-ethnic relations is one of conflict and hostility.44 Selfdetermination has come to be a universally accepted principle, and the supposed basis of the current international order.45

Demands for autonomy or „self-determination‟ can range from modest to campaigns for linguistic rights to calls for outright self-rule within a federal or loose confederal structure, or even a separate and sovereign state. Campaigns for secession are more likely to develop when previously acquired privileges are under threat or when underprivileged groups seize an opportunity to redress their grievances and push for separate statehood.46 Nationalist movements of self-determination are linked to two extreme ideological and political movements ‘Irredentism’ and ‘Pan’. Both division and „incorporation‟ characterise the situation of irredentism. Many movements have, in addition to their separatist aims, the opposite drive to unification of all co-nationals

23

in one state. Members of the projected „group‟ live within the boundaries of other political units than that in which the main body of the „nationals‟ reside. But „irredentist‟ movements do not stop at advocating the in-gathering of co-nationals into the main area; they also desire to add the territory on which their severed kinsmen reside, especially since it is usually adjacent to the „base‟ area, e.g. Epirus to Greece, Alsace to France and Germany.47The „Pan‟ nationalist demands the unification of separate political units contained within the larger culture area. The line between „Pan‟ and „Irredentist‟ movements is not always strict in a given case.48

2.2.2 Self-determination versus sovereignty

Opposed interests of minority groups and central governments derive from their distinctive interpretations of the principle of self-determination and territorial integrity of the state as well as from ambiguity in international policy. Most commonly, minority groups construe the legal principle of self-determination of peoples to mean that they possess the right of secession from the state to which they are part – an understanding that clearly threatens the territorial integrity of the state. In contrast, central governments typically view the principle of the territorial integrity of the state as prohibiting the implementation of an understanding of self-determination that would permit sub-national groups to declare their own separate, sovereign, and independent political units. Hence, the disparate implications of the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination may promote and even legalise internal armed conflict and violence.49

24

As long as the pursuit of self-determination does not imply secession or any adjustment of the borders of a state, then its pursuit does not come directly into conflict with the protection of the territorial integrity of the state. The behaviour of the United Nations and other international bodies tends to follow these maxims except in some rare and selective instances when outrageous conduct shocks the conscience of mankind and when the geopolitical significance of a region is highly salient to key players.50

The international legal principle of self-determination of peoples, its various interpretations, and the manner in which the principle is put into practice can best be understood against the backdrop of international law that protects the territorial integrity of states. International law pertaining to self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity of the states is expressed primarily in the United Nations Charter and related documents of the United Nations.51

There are two distinct – yet not mutually exclusive – approaches to self-determination each based on a different form of nationalism: the territorial and the ethnic. Territorial self-determination seeks to achieve a particular political status for a defined territory and for all the people who resides in it. Territorial self-determination is consummated when the territorial unit achieves independence or unites with another independent state. This approach remains the basis of a presumed international consensus of selfdetermination built around the UN. Communal groups which have exercised selfgovernment or enjoyed a degree of autonomy in modern history tend to aspire to independent statehood.52

25

2.3 The implications of self-determination

The principle of self-determination has to be balanced by other principles of international relations, such as international peace and security, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.53 Self-determination conflicts defy the civil/international war categorisation. Although they almost always start as conflicts within borders of a state, they inevitably acquire an international dimension.54

Protecting the territorial integrity of states is accomplished through legal statements that prohibit any coercive intervention that might violate the territorial sovereignty of any member state and through a more general prohibition of the use of force that is necessary for preserving international peace and friendly relations among states. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter protects the territorial integrity and political independence of any state from the threat or use of force55 as a matter of an absolute and general principle of international law. The logic of this prohibition follows from the idea that all states are sovereign equals.56

The proliferation of self-determination conflicts challenges some of the international legal principles which provide the basis for the existing international order. The most important of these principles is state sovereignty, a „basic rule of coexistence‟. In reality, however, state sovereignty is never absolute: states often violate each other‟s sovereignty; and sovereignty is undermined by the increasing economic, informational and environmental interdependence of states. States have often supported self-determination movements in other states in pursuit of some national

26

interest, but have traditionally shied away from supporting secession when this was an option.57

Once self-determination conflicts reach the stage where the adversaries have consolidated their control over various parts of the country, and if those seeking secession have the backing of one or more regional powers, then border changes become a possibility. The more vicious and pervasive the prosecution of one group by another, the greater the conviction that the groups should live separately. Armenians and Azeris, and Serbs and Croats seem to have reached the conclusion that they cannot live together.58

In the cases of secessionist movements border changes may be considered only when the new borders are likely to be stable. They have to be accepted as legitimate by the populations of the states concerned. No state will be ever ethnically homogenous and the criteria for recognition have to specify high standards of democratic governance and human rights, and the protection of national minorities to secure their legitimacy. The new borders also have to be defensible and not vulnerable to external aggression.59 It has become exceedingly hard, given the power and logic of

globalization, for state leaders to convince their societies, and even other officials in the state, that those state borders are their social boundaries as well and really worth defending through tremendous self-sacrifice.60

27

2.3.1 State-building and democracy

The 20th century witnessed three waves of state creation, each involving the collapse of empires and each generating a distinct set of issues involving the integrity and viability of the often-fragile new states. After the First World War, the disintegration of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, framed by Woodrow Wilson's rallying cry for self-determination, sparked the century's first wave of new states. Then, following the Second World War was accompanied by a new round of state creation, which included the radical redrawing of the world political map through the independence of multiple new states in Asia and Africa, tripling the total number of states within a generation. Finally, the fall of the Soviet Union, set off the third surge of state creation, centered mostly in Eastern and South-eastern Europe.61

The existence of ethnic or cultural minorities resistant to assimilation can become a serious obstacle to nation-building or state integration, especially if such minorities claim some form of political autonomy. This can arouse the ire of the majority, fuelling inter-communal conflict and possibly generating repression in the form of forced assimilation or explosion of minority groups. Such developments can in turn transform moderate minority autonomists into radical separatists.62

Democracy is about inclusion and exclusion, about access to power, about the privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany exclusion. In severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded. In ethnic politics, inclusion may affect the distribution of important material and nonmaterial goods, including the prestige of the

28

various ethnic groups and the identity of the state as belonging more to one group than another.63 The withholding of political and economic resources from minority leaders can aggravate anti centrist feelings, strengthen the cohesion of ethnic minorities against the adversarial state, undermine the legitimacy of the government, and lead to ever more radical demands. Pressures for ethnic autonomy may then evolve beyond the protection of cultural identity and accelerate toward demands for outright separation.64

The challenges for new states in the first decade of the 21st century, including those stemming from vulnerable borders and increasing global connections through and across state borders leading to weakening norms of sovereignty, put a premium on the ability of state leaders to mobilize their populations while simultaneously undermining their ability to do so.65 Most of the new states do show the same inclination as in the United States and Israel in their early state building to harden the boundary between the dominant nation and "dangerous populations." Leaders in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Croatia and Macedonia, for example, have managed to define minorities making up relatively large segments of the population as outside the nation and dangerous. The new states of the 1990s are not all of a cloth and will fortify, negotiate and transform their social lines in a variety of ways.66

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War, policy makers and scholars have increasingly begun to think about security as something more than military defence of the state interests,

29

which includes political, economic, societal, environmental as well as military aspects and which is also defined in broader international terms.

Nationalism and ethnic conflict have leaped onto the centre stage after the Cold War in many parts of the world. Violent conflict has become one of the most significant threats to global peace. One of the consequences of nationalism for the international arena is that it has been a source of conflict and war. Self-determination as a right of communities to decide on their fate and to establish an independent state is a contested issue in international relations, because it goes against the principle of territorial integrity. So, self-determination should be balanced by other principles of international relations, such as international peace and security and cooperation.

When conflicts of self-determination reach the point where the ethnic groups have irreconcilable positions and one of them has the backing of one ore more regional powers separation is the only viable solution. The new state that results from the border changes is challenged by its ability to mobilize its population, accommodate its minorities, and defend its borders. Minority groups within the new independent state may also demand secession from it and undermine its security.

30

1

Baylis, John, International and Global Security in the post-Cold War Era, in Baylis, John, and Steve

Smith, (editors), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, (second edition), (Oxford University Press, 2001), p.254-255
2

Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline, From Cold Wars to New Wars, in Jones, Clive, and Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline,

(editors), International Security in a Global Age: Securing the Twenty-first Century, (Frank Cass, London, Portland, OR, 2000), p.9
3

Crocker, Cherter A, How to Think About Ethnic Conflict, in

http://www.fpri.org/fpriwire/0710.199909.crocker.howtothinkaboutethnicconflict.html
4

Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline, From Cold Wars to New Wars, in Jones, Clive, and Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline,

(editors), International Security in a Global Age: Securing the Twenty-first Century, (Frank Cass, London, Portland, OR, 2000), p.15
5

Baylis, John, International and Global Security in the post-Cold War Era, in Baylis, John and Smith,

Steve, (editors), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition(Oxford University Press, 2001), p.255
6

Homer-Dixon, Thomas F, Environment, Scarcity and Violence, (Princenton NJ, Princenton University

Press, 1999), p.133
7

Brown, Michael E, The Causes of Internal Conflict, in Brown, Michael E, Cote, Owen R, Jr, Lynn-

Jones, Sean M, and Miller, Steven E, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, (The Mit Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2001), p.9 8 Homer-Dixon, Thomas F, Environment, Scarcity and Violence, (Princenton NJ, Princenton University Press, 1999), p.133
9

Diehl, Paul F., Nils Peter Gleditsch, (Editors), Environmental Conflict, (Boulder, CO, Westview Ter-Gabriel, Gevork, Strategies in „Ethnic‟ Conflict, in http://www.cwis.org/fwj/41/ethnic.html Brown, Michael E, The Causes of Internal Conflict, in Brown, Michael E, Cote, Owen R, Jr, Lynn-

Press, 2001), p.87
10 11

Jones, Sean M, and Miller, Steven E, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, (The Mit Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2001), p.9
12

Hough, Peter, Understanding Global Security, (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and

New York, 2004), p.109
13

Hough, Peter, Understanding Global Security, (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and

New York, 2004), p.110
14

Hough, Peter, Understanding Global Security, (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and Ter-Gabriel, Gevork, Strategies in „Ethnic‟ Conflict, in http://www.cwis.org/fwj/41/ethnic.html Ter-Gabriel, Gevork, Strategies in „Ethnic‟ Conflict, in http://www.cwis.org/fwj/41/ethnic.html Hough, Peter, Understanding Global Security, (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and

New York, 2004), p.107
15 16 17

New York, 2004), p.109
18

Hough, Peter, Understanding Global Security, (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and

New York, 2004), p.109

31

19 20

Ter-Gabriel, Gevork, Strategies in „Ethnic‟ Conflict, in http://www.cwis.org/fwj/41/ethnic.html Smith, Anthony D, Theories of Nationalism, (General Duckworth & Company Limited, London,

1971), p. 171
21

Smith, Anthony D, Theories of Nationalism, (General Duckworth & Company Limited, London,

1971), p. 174
22

Smith, Anthony D, Theories of Nationalism, (General Duckworth & Company Limited, London, Waters, Trevor, „Language and National Identity: A Source of Conflict in Post-Communist Europe‟, Waters, Trevor, „Language and National Identity: A Source of Conflict in Post-Communist Europe‟,

1971), p. 175
23

Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 1998, G48, p.4
24

Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 1998, G48, p.5-6
25

Fukuyama, Francis, Avineri, Shlomo, Comments on Nationalism and Democracy, in Diamond,

Larry, and Plattner, Marc F., (editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy,(The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994), p.26
26

Bugajski, Janusz, The Fate of Minorities in Eastern Europe, in Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc

F., (editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy,(The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994), p. 102-105
27

Smith, Anthony D, Theories of Nationalism, (General Duckworth & Company Limited, London,

1971), p. 261
28

Halliday, Fred, Nationalism, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, The Globalization of World Politics:

An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition(Oxford University Press, 2001), p.446
29

Fukuyama, Francis, Avineri, Shlomo, Comments on Nationalism and Democracy, in Diamond,

Larry, and Plattner, Marc F., (editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy,(The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994), p.24
30

Halliday, Fred, Nationalism, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, The Globalization of World Politics:

An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition(Oxford University Press, 2001), p.441
31

Bugajski, Janusz, The Fate of Minorities in Eastern Europe, in Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc

F., (editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy,(The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994), p. 102-105
32

Basic, Nedzad, Goetze, David, and Smith, Charls Anthony, „Secessionist crises, human welfare and

conflict resolution‟, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol.3, Number 2, August 2003, pp.185-209, p.188-189
33 34

Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, (Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1983), p.1 Halliday, Fred, Nationalism, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, The Globalization of World Politics:

An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition(Oxford University Press, 2001), p.443
35

Nodia, Ghia, Nationalism and Democracy, in Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc F., (editors),

Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy,(The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994), p.7

32

36

Halliday, Fred, Nationalism, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, The Globalization of World Politics:

An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition(Oxford University Press, 2001), p.445-446
37

Hsiung, James C, Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations,

(Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder London, 1997), p.130
38

Hsiung, James C, Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations,

(Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder London, 1997), p.131
39

Hsiung, James C, Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations,

(Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder London, 1997), p.133
40

Halliday, Fred, Nationalism, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, The Globalization of World Politics:

An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition(Oxford University Press, 2001), p.445-6
41

Hsiung, James C, Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations,

(Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder London, 1997), p.140
42

Hsiung, James C, Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations, Basic, Nedzad, Goetze, David, and Smith, Charls Anthony, „Secessionist crises, human welfare and

(Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder London, 1997), p.145
43

conflict resolution‟, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol.3, Number 2, August 2003, pp.185-209, p.192-193
44

Shehadi, Kamal S, Ethnic Self-determination and Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper, 283, December

1993, p.7
45

Halliday, Fred, Nationalism, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, The Globalization of World Politics:

An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition(Oxford University Press, 2001), p.446
46

Bugajski, Janusz, The Fate of Minorities in Eastern Europe, in Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc

F., (editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy,(The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994), p. 102-105
47

Smith, Anthony D, Theories of Nationalism, (General Duckworth & Company Limited, London,

1971), p. 222
48

Smith, Anthony D, Theories of Nationalism, (General Duckworth & Company Limited, London, Basic, Nedzad, Goetze, David, and Smith, Charls Anthony, „Secessionist crises, human welfare and

1971), p. 223
49

conflict resolution‟, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol.3, Number 2, August 2003, pp.185-209, p.188-189
50

Basic, Nedzad, Goetze, David, and Smith, Charls Anthony, „Secessionist crises, human welfare and

conflict resolution‟, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol.3, Number 2, August 2003, pp.185-209, p.190-191
51

Basic, Nedzad, Goetze, David, and Smith, Charls Anthony, „Secessionist crises, human welfare and

conflict resolution‟, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol.3, Number 2, August 2003, pp.185-209, p.188-189
52

Shehadi, Kamal S, Ethnic Self-determination and Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper, 283, December

1993, p.4-5

33

53

Shehadi, Kamal S, Ethnic Self-determination and Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper, 283, December

1993, p.49
54

Shehadi, Kamal S, Ethnic Self-determination and Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper, 283, December

1993, p.49
55

Charter of United Nations, in Harris, D.J, Cases and Materials on International Law, (fifth edition), Basic, Nedzad, Goetze, David, and Smith, Charls Anthony, „Secessionist crises, human welfare and

(Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1998), p.1049
56

conflict resolution‟, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol.3, Number 2, August 2003, pp.185-209, p.189
57

Shehadi, Kamal S, Ethnic Self-determination and Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper, 283, December

1993, p.50
58

Shehadi, Kamal S, Ethnic Self-determination and Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper, 283, December

1993, p.75-76
59

Shehadi, Kamal S, Ethnic Self-determination and Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper, 283, December Migdal, Joel S, „State building and the non-nation-state‟, Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2004, Migdal, Joel S, „State building and the non-nation-state‟, Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2004,

1993, p.75-76
60

vol.58, no.1, pp17-46, p.25
61

vol.58, no.1, pp17-46, p.18
62

Bugajski, Janusz, The Fate of Minorities in Eastern Europe, in Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc

F., (editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy,(The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994), p. 102-105
63

Horowitz, Donald L, Democracy in Divided Societies, in Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc F.,

(editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy,(The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994), p. 35-36
64

Bugajski, Janusz, The Fate of Minorities in Eastern Europe, in Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc

F., (editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy,(The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994), p. 102-105
65

Migdal, Joel S, „State building and the non-nation-state‟, Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2004, Migdal, Joel S, „State building and the non-nation-state‟, Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2004,

vol.58, no.1, pp17-46, p.39-40
66

vol.58, no.1, pp17-46, p.40

34

CHAPTER 3 – ALTERNATIVES OF KOSOVO FINAL STATUS

In order to maintain international order and peace in every case it is preferable to reconcile claims for autonomy and self-government within the existing order of nation states. Accordingly, when conflicts arise, intervening states must always seek to assist parties to find solutions that first seek to reconcile state sovereignty with minority rights and self-government. Minorities can only claim the right of secession when such forms of compromise are clearly shown to be impossible. NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 although controversial showed that states can lose their sovereign rights over national minorities when their treatment of these minorities rises to the level of persistent and brutal suppression of both individual rights and collective rights of self-government.1

To better understand the future of Kosovo final status an account of historical relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs is analysed. The discussion of Kosovo final status is related to UNSCR 1244 which either determine the general framework of the future status or leaves it open. In this respect final status of Kosovo is discussed in full, ranging from an autonomous region of Serbia to an independent state. This assessment takes into account the role of international actors who have been reluctant to confront it openly.

3.1 Historical background on relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs

Relations between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians have been strained for many centuries. During the rise of the Ottoman Empire, each side accused the other of

35

supporting the Turkish enemy. After World War I, Serbs in Yugoslavia suppressed the Albanians, closing their schools in the 1920s and 1930s and seizing their land. Although some Albanians left, this repressive stance did not entirely remove the Albanian presence in Kosovo.2 During the course of the 20th century, the Albanian population of Kosovo gradually rose in proportion to the Serbian population, until Kosovo was granted the status of an autonomous province with voting powers in Tito's Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

After Tito's death in 1980, the complicated 1974 constitution that had maintained the balance of power between the separate republics and provinces was open to exploitation by cynical politicians campaigning on nationalist platforms. In March 1981 Albanian students started their protests at Pristine University. This disturbance spread through many parts of Kosovo and assumed an openly political character. The call for a Kosovo republic set alarm bells ringing, particularly in Serbia and in Macedonia, where there was also a large Albanian minority. Granting Kosovo republican status would mean detaching it from Serbia and conceding that it had the right to secede from the federation.

Milosevic‟s rise to power from 1988, first as head of the Serbian Communist Party, then as President of Serbia, marked a return to a tougher policy on Kosovo.3 Slobodan Milosevic in particular played the nationalist card to consolidate his power within Serbia, making inflammatory speeches to Kosovar Serbs and abolishing Kosovo's autonomous status. As life for Albanians became increasingly difficult during the 90s, they established a parallel state structure in the territory providing schools, hospitals and tax collection outside the jurisdiction of the Serbian state authorities. Led by

36

Ibrahim Rugova, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) carried out a strategy of passive resistance in the face of Serbian hegemony.4 Despite the pressure and discrimination, Kosovo Albanians still demanded the right to secede from Serbia but not from Yugoslavia in 1990.

As Yugoslavia collapsed and fighting broke out, initially with Slovenia, then Croatia and later in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo also made moves towards independence. In September 1991, ethnic Albanians organised a clandestine referendum and on the results declared the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state. Elections were held in May 1992 for a parliament and Rugova declared that the LDK would seek its objectives peacefully. However, in 1995 it became clear to the Albanian political leadership that the Dayton and Paris peace accords were ignoring the issue of Kosovo. This undermined the moderates including Rugova. Incidents of organised violence increased during 1996 and as a result the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged.

In mid-1998, Serb tactics forced the international community to act. An OSCE force was put in place, and talks were held between the two sides. The Rambouillet peace talks collapsed in March 1999, amid Serbia's refusal to accept the terms of an international agreement based on joint administrative structures. NATO launched an air campaign mainly against Serbian industrial, military and infrastructure targets which lasted for 77 days before the Federal government accepted the terms of NATO's demands. Serb forces were withdrawn from Kosovo and a NATO peace keeping force (KFOR) despatched.5

37

3.2 Kosovo's Final Status

Any reflections on the future status of Kosovo have to start from the existing legal framework established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, the day the air strikes against Yugoslavia ended. Of particular importance are those parts of the Resolution which either determine the general framework of the future status of Kosovo or on the contrary leave it open. In fact, Resolution 1244 confirms in very general terms that, all member states of the United Nations reaffirm their commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (and other states of their region), as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and Annex 2 of this resolution.6

UNSC Resolution 1244, as well as those parts of the Rambouillet agreement which concern the future status of Kosovo – of which there is repeated reference in Resolution 1244 – do not set a clearly defined framework within which the final solution of the status for Kosovo must be found. Therefore, in principle, two possible interpretations can be assumed. The first, a Serbian one, relies primarily on the fact that Kosovo belongs to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the inviolability of the territorial unity of the FRY by arguing that this has been repeatedly stressed in the Rambouillet agreement as well as in Resolution 1244.7

Resolution 1244 establishes the main responsibilities of the international civil presence: Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

38

Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648).8 Whereas Annex 2 requires: Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic selfgoverning institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.9

Within this framework we will see all possible options of Kosovo final status.

3.2.1 A Kosovo within Serbian-Montenegrin state

Kosovo as an autonomous region of Serbia

This option must be seen as the restitution of the limited autonomy of Kosovo with the legal and executive subordination of Kosovo as a province under the power of the Serbian government in Belgrade. This was the situation which led to the increased tensions between Kosovo Albanians and the Serb government and finally ended in a state of war.10

UNSC Resolution 1244, as well as those parts of the Rambouillet agreement which concern the future status of Kosovo – of which there is repeated reference in Resolution 1244 – do not set a clearly defined framework within which the final

39

solution of the status for Kosovo must be found. However, neither the Rambouillet agreement nor Resolution 1244 confirms that Kosovo belongs to Serbia!11

Serbia has long substituted rhetoric for policy on Kosovo, repeating the mantra that it can never be independent, while ignoring the political and demographic reality on the ground and the international mood. At the same time, Serbia's failure to confront the past – particularly its ethnic cleansing in the province during 1998-1999 -- has cost it any moral credibility on the issue.12 In 2000 Tim Judah a journalist and writer explained that since 5 October [2000, the fall of Milosevic] there have been a number of influential people now in government [of Serbia] who believe that Kosovo is a millstone around Serbia‟s neck, that it will never be possible for Serbs and Albanians to live together again, and that Serbia should get rid of Kosovo.13 Belgrade politicians want a face-saving solution that would permit them to say they were not the ones to lose Kosovo. They have little desire to return Serbian rule to Albanian-majority areas; their main concern is to find a territorial solution for the three northern, Serbianmajority municipalities and the northern part of the divided city of Mitrovica. Belgrade's politicians desperately want an international conference on Kosovo's final status that will give them the necessary political coverage back home to claim that they had no choice in whatever settlement was reached.14

Kosovo as an autonomous province in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

This corresponds to the status before 1989 under the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Whereas, such a status is categorically rebuffed by the Albanians, it remains for the Serb population in Kosovo a possible,

40

acceptable solution because it provides a security guarantee for its survival in Kosovo.15 This is a status that international community has rejected as an option for the future status of Kosovo.

Kosovo as third republic in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Until 1995-6 there were still some Kosovo Albanian leaders who were willing to contemplate some form of compromise, such as a „Third Republic‟ solution by which Kosovo would achieve equal status in Yugoslavia with Serbia and Montenegro. The emergence of KLA and Serbian military campaign of ethnic cleansing removed forever this option from the table of negotiations between two sides.

This option is supported by a number of countries in the West and corresponds to the restitution of „substantial autonomy‟ under Resolution 1244 while simultaneously preserving the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As a republic within the FRY, Kosovo could in most areas enjoy complete autonomous legal and executive power and freedom. It would only be subject to federal regulations in areas like defence, foreign relation, customs and some taxation.16 Most international lawyers agree that if a new constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were to grant Kosovo the status of republic, it would obtain the right of eventually leaving the Federation if the majority of its population so wished.17

The Kosovo Serbs fear that a Kosovo republic would become an Albanian republic because the new Constitutional Framework does not provide veto rights by minorities in the future parliament. For the Kosovo Albanians this option is still unimaginable

41

considering the fact that a population, half of whom were driven out of their country in spring 1999 by the Yugoslav authorities, could one day consider themselves „citizens‟ of that country.18

Partition of Kosovo

The idea of dividing Kosovo into two or more parts has been on the table since September 1998 inspired by the Swiss model, thereby separating two cultural traditions with different languages, religion and cultures. The second way of dividing Kosovo is its partition into two parts. Like cantonisation, this option is also favoured by the Serbs, but completely rejected by the Albanians. It would see the river Ibar (figure 1), which already divides Kosovska-Mitrovica, as the frontier carving out north-west Kosovo for the Serb population. This would allow the possible attachment of this part of Kosovo to the Republic of Serbia.19

A sustainable solution for Kosovo cannot be based upon the Lausanne principle: the negotiated exchange of territory and population common in post-conflict settlements in the Balkans in the early 20th century. Serb communities in Kosovo will only be viable if the territory remains unified and Serbs are able to participate as full citizens in multiethnic institutions. The stakes are extremely high, both for Kosovo Serbs and for the international community, whose entire strategy in the region over the past decade has been based on a commitment to multiethnic society.20

42

Figure1 Map of Kosovo Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/kosovo_pol98.jpg

3.2.2 An independent Kosovo

Kosovo‟s irrevocable separation from Serbia was probably determined in the early spring of 1999. Well before then, it had become difficult to imagine a viable political solution in which the province remained part of Yugoslavia. By 1996, seven years of intensified Serb repression, and the inability of Western powers to do much about it, had significantly discredited Ibrahim Rugova‟s strategy of non-violent resistance. The events of the subsequent three years – the emergence of the KLA, the Drenica

43

massacre in 1998 that transformed it from a limited guerrilla campaign into a Kosovo wide insurrection and the scorched-earth campaign by Serb security forces to quell it – undermined this moderate possibility.21

According to numerous polls conducted in Kosovo, 85% of Albanians favour an independent Kosovo. The remaining 15 percent prefer unification with Albania. None want autonomy within Serbia. Among Kosovo Serbs, all want Kosovo to remain part of Serbia.22

Although all the NATO powers had genuinely supported the objective of keeping rump Yugoslavia together, a military campaign to drive Yugoslav forces out of the province was hardly conducive to that goal. Nor was the operation by the regime of then Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to expel nearly one million of the province‟s Albanian citizens – unless, of course, Milosevic‟s cruel and reckless gamble had succeeded. Happily, it did not. But that failed gamble, more than anything else, created the moral and practical political conditions that will probably require the international powers, as well as the states of the region, to accommodate Kosovo‟s permanent separation from Serbia.23

Regulation number 1 of 25 July 1999, the first legislative act of United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), determined that all legislative and executive power in Kosovo, including jurisdiction, is exerted by UNMIK under the Chairmanship of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG). De facto Yugoslavia‟s sovereignty over Kosovo was thus suspended.24

44

Resolution 1244 of United Nations Security Council of 10 June 1999 ; Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.25 This point emphasises that Kosovo does not belong to the Republic of Serbia and furthermore states that the formulation of Kosovo‟s association to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the territorial integrity of FRY is temporarily limited to the duration of the interim administration by the international community. The reference to a final solution to the question of status does not imply that Kosovo must forever remain part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the contrary, the wording in the Rambouillet agreement on the basis of the will of the people allows for the holding of a referendum on independence.26

The International Commission on the Balkans27 in its April 2005 Report proposes that negotiations on the status of Kosovo should be concentrating on offering real incentives to Belgrade so that Serbia may find acceptable the prospect of an independent Kosovo as a future member of the EU.28 Within this context, they propose that the independence of Kosovo be achieved in four stages as follow:

The first stage would see the de facto separation of Kosovo from Serbia. In their view this stage is implicit in Resolution 1244, which transformed Kosovo into a UN

45

protectorate. The UNSCR 1244 deals with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and not with Serbia.

The second stage (independence without full sovereignty) Kosovo should be treated as independent but not as a sovereign state at this stage, allowing it to develop a capacity for self-government. The international community should reserve its power to intervene in those essential areas such as human rights and minority protection.

The third stage (guided sovereignty) would coincide with Kosovo's recognition as a candidate for EU membership and the opening of negotiations with Brussels.

The fourth stage (full and shared sovereignty) will mark the absorption of Kosovo into the EU and its adoption of the shared sovereignty to which all EU member states are subject.29

Independence is the declared aim of all the Albanian parties in Kosovo. They disagree on the means and the time necessary to achieve it. The Albanians were promised a referendum on independence at Rambouillet in February 1999 after three years on the basis of the will of people.

Conditional independence

The concept of conditional independence attempts to take into account both the realities of a de-facto detachment from FRY and the fears of Serbs and neighbouring countries. It combines the principle of a transfer of power from the international

46

administration to new, democratically elected institutions in Kosovo and the idea of international control and the implementation of conditions, of which the main ones are:  Explicit renunciation of any modification of borders, and therefore of any idea of a Greater Albania;  Respect for the human rights of all Kosovo citizens, in particular the rights of Minorities (Serbs and others) to equal access to and treatment by the courts, police and administration. Right to a separate culture must be respected in the educational, system, and places of worship protected;  Rejection of the use of force in the settling of internal and external disputes in a regional cooperative framework.30

In the concept of „conditional independence‟, conditionality is as important as independence, since it presupposes, for the Kosovar political elite, renunciation of the classical concept of territorial sovereignty in favour of the twenty-first concept of shared sovereignty. Absolute sovereignty in the Balkans means insecurity, whereas security goes hand in hand with shared sovereignty.31 No independent country is actually free from external constraints, self-restraints or norms of behaviour: in practice, no country in the world enjoys „unconditional‟ independence – except in the political-legal or simplified presumption we call „sovereignty‟.32

3.3 International key players and their position to Kosovo final status

The ethnic conflict in the Balkans has been caused in a significant measure, from the imprecise and often arbitrary definition of borders, in association with the

47

identification of individual national groupings, at the time of the often artificial creation of (nation)-states in the region during the collapse of the Ottoman, AustroHungarian and Russian Empires.33 The cutting and pasting of territories was not a new idea but the steady fragmentation of the Balkans created ever more baffling permutations. The only immutable principle of imperialist cartography was the advancement of great-power interests.34

When the Western Powers took military action in 1999, they claimed as their sole justification the need to avert the forceful subjection of a people by the internationally recognized government of an independent, sovereign state. Whatever views one takes of the honesty or legitimacy of such a claim, it makes the war over Kosovo a unique event in history. Is still the West with substantial interests in every region able to affect the politics, economics, and security of every other civilization or region?35 Whatever position one might take NATO and Western countries saved the Kosovo Albanian people from the last cruellest dictator of the 20th century that is now sitting at the Hague Tribunal. While NATO has achieved an important part of its strategic objective, namely the removal of Milosevic as Head of State, the other part – its commitment to resolving the Kosovo entanglement, and the ramifications that this has for the international community – remains.36 The West, in NATO guise, intervened in order to save a whole ethnic group of people from the repression of the Serbs, bent on mass deportation and the indiscriminate killing of civilians.

According to Shehadi the international community must follow a three-pronged strategy to meet the challenges of ethnic self-determination. First, it should try to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of existing states by reducing the risks of

48

living together for „people who feel profoundly different‟. Second, it should increase the benefits of living together for different ethnic groups. However, in extreme cases where ethnic communal groups have „irreconcilable differences‟, it may be necessary for them to live apart to end the fighting. The international community should then assist secession and the creation of a new state, or the adjustment of borders between states.37

The international community entered Kosovo in June 1999 without an exit strategy and has taken only a few uncertain steps toward defining one. But it did make clear that Belgrade, having violently expelled more than 700,000 Kosovo Albanians in 1999, had lost the right to administer the province, and that following a period of international administration, a political process would determine final status.38

Now, the international community's room for manoeuvre is far more restricted than it would have been if decisive steps had been taken earlier. Reintroduction of violence into the equation has raised the very real possibility that the process may be decided by brute force on the ground rather than peaceful negotiation. The prospects are not encouraging for the local actors themselves to reach an accommodation which the UN Security Council could endorse; still less so are the prospects for the Security Council to reach an agreement which could then be imposed. Although diplomats from most Contact Group countries now admit in private that the final status issue has to be resolved, there is still insufficient political will to drive the agenda.39

49

United States

In relation to Kosovo final status, no one has formulated a more realistic or sustainable policy than that which the Clinton administration put forward in its last year in office. That policy consisted of three simple statements:    First, Washington did not support Kosovo independence; Second, nor did the Americans rule it out; Third, Kosovo‟s final status when it is decided must take account of the views of a majority of the territory‟s population. Although aimed at ambiguity, it is clear enough where this policy leads, for the majority of the territory‟s population is overwhelmingly in favour of independence.40

United States has ruled out a return to the situation before March 1999 and made clear that Kosovo‟s final status must enhance regional stability and contribute to the EuroAtlantic integration of the Balkans. Accordingly, Kosovo‟s final status must:  Be based on multi-ethnicity with full respect for human rights including the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety;   Offer effective constitutional guarantees to ensure the protection of minorities; Promote effective mechanisms for fighting organized crime and terrorism; and;  Include specific safeguards for the protection of cultural and religious heritage.41

United States have invested too much and have too important a stake in the region‟s success in partnership with Europe. The U.S. has unique credibility in the region as

50

we led the effort to end the two wars of the 1990s. It recognizes that it responsibility and will remain centrally involved.42

European Community

Europe has demonstrated the will to take on a greater role in the region, recognizing that the Balkan‟s stability is linked to a future within Europe. The International Commission on the Balkans takes the view that Kosovo's independence should not be imposed on Belgrade. The „imposition‟ of Kosovo's independence is not only undesirable, it is also unlikely to happen, bearing in mind that some members of the UN Security Council (Russia, China) are opposed to it. Moreover, if Belgrade opposes the process, it will significantly increase the chances of trouble breaking out elsewhere whether in Bosnia, Macedonia or Montenegro.43

Russia and China

In their view [Russia and China], the recognition of the independence of Kosovo would signify the ex post facto sanctioning of violent secessionist movements. Both states are also afraid of a possible precedent which could jeopardise the stability and integrity of their own large multinational and multiethnic states.44 Russia is not really interested in the fate of Kosovo but in that of Chechnya. Kosovo is pointed to as an example of „humanitarian interference‟ that threatens national sovereignty.45

It remains to be seen whether Russia's scepticism on Kosovo‟s independence will translate into blocking decisions in the Contact Group. Its stance appears to take little

51

account of realities on the ground; indeed, there almost seems to be a certain pride in distance.46

The 22 September Statement Consultations with Secretary-General Kofi Annan during the General Assembly session in New York on 20-22 September 2004 enabled the Contact Group to put out a promisingly realistic statement on the way forward. The most important paragraph, with its crucial last sentence, was: The basis of any settlement must include the promotion of security and stability in the Balkans. As the "Standards for Kosovo" document states, the future for Kosovo must be one in which all people, "regardless of ethnic background, race or religion, are free to live, work and travel without fear, hostility or danger, and where there is tolerance, justice and peace for everyone".47

The inability of international community to decide on Kosovo final status is today seen by Kosovo Albanians as having gone from opening the way to now standing in the way. It is seen by Kosovo Serbs as having gone from securing the return of so many to being unable to ensure the return of so few, reports to Kofi Annan the UN Ambassador to Kosovo Kai Eide in the summer of 2004.48

Conclusion

The Kosovo war of 1999 symbolized the apex of inimical relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. The peaceful campaign lead by Ibrahim Rugova showed that only a violent struggle waged by Kosovo Liberation Army may end the long oppression after NATO‟s air strikes.

52

The future status of Kosovo has to start from the UNSCR 1244 that reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, and its reference to the Rambouillet agreement which calls for the right of self-government of the people of Kosovo on the basis of the will of the people. From this ambiguous framework are two interpretations; first, the Serbian one that Kosovo belongs to FRY; and secondly, the Kosovo Albanian one that the people should decide the future, which means that Kosovo should be independent since 90% of the people are in favour. In this framework the status of Kosovo ranges from a Serbian autonomous unit to the other extreme an independent Kosovo.

International actors with an interest in the future of Kosovo seem to have different opinions. While the United States and the EU take the position of granting a conditional independence, China and Russia, as permanent members of the UNSC, are reluctant to acknowledge the reality because of their minority problems at home.

53

1

Report of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, at Williams, Christopher, „Kosovo: A fuse for the lighting‟, in Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley,

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm
2

(editors), The Kosovo Crisis: The last American war in Europe?, (Reuters, Pearson Education, London 2001), p.18
3 4

Ibid, p.23 „Kosovo Liberation Army‟, at

http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=%Fcontent1%2Fjanesdata%2Fbinder%2Fjwit%2Fjwit 0561.htm@current.htmProd_Name=JWIT.htm@current&Prod_Name=JWIT&@current&Prod_Name =JWIT&
5 6 7 8

Ibid Altmann, Franz-Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, p.19 Ibid, p.21 Resolution 1244 (1999); Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011 th meeting, on 10 June 1999, at

http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm,
9 10 11 12

Ibid Altmann, Franz-Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, p.26 Ibid, p.21 „Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 39,

Belgrade/Brussels, 23 May 2005, p.4, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf
13 14

Judah, Tim, „Kosovo and its Status‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.55-68, p.65 „Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 39,

Belgrade/Brussels, 23 May 2005, p.5, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf
15

Altmann, Franz-Lothar, „The Status of Knosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, p.26-

7
16 17 18

Ibid, p.27 Ibid, p.28 Rupnik, Jacques, „The postwar Balkans and the Kosovo Question‟, Challiot Papers 50, October Altmann, Franz-Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, „The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity, Territory and the Future of Kosovo‟s Serbs‟, European Allin, Dana H, „Unintended Consequences – Managing Kosovo Independence‟, Challiot Papers 50, Sullivan, Stacy, „Is Kosovo up to Standards?‟, at

2001, pp.69-84, p.82
19

p.28-29
20

Stability Initiative, Berlin/Prishtine, 2004, p.2, at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_53.pdf
21

October 2001, pp.7-18, p.7
22

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo1/2005/0401conditions.htm

54

23

Allin, Dana H, „Unintended Consequences – Managing Kosovo Independence‟, Challiot Papers 50, Altmann, Franz-Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, p.22 Resolution 1244 (1999); Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011 th meeting, on 10 June 1999, at Altmann, Franz-Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, p.21 The International Commission on the Balkans has been founded in 1995 with support of European „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre

October 2001, pp.7-18, p.7
24 25

http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm,
26 27

and American foundations to help transform Balkans of the past into stable and peaceful countries.
28

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.20, http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf
29

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.22-23, at http://www.balkancommission.org/activities/Report.pdf
30

Rupnik, Jacques, „The postwar Balkans and the Kosovo Question‟, Challiot Papers 50, October

2001, pp.69-84, p.82-83
31 32

Ibid, p.83 Dassu, Marta, „Statehood and Sovereignty – Regional and International Dynamics in Kosovo‟s Waters, Trevor, „Language and National Identity: A Source of Conflict in Post-Communist Europe‟,

Future‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.35-54, p.52
33

Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 1998, G48, p.7
34

Glenny, Misha, The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, (Granta Books,

London, 1999), p.144
35

Huntington, Samuel P, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (Simon &

Schuster, New York, 1996), p.81
36

Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley, (editors), The Kosovo Crisis: The last American war in Shehadi, Kamal S, „Ethnic Self-determination and Break-up of States‟, Adelphi Paper, 283, „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

Europe?, (Reuters, Pearson Education, London 2001), p.12-13
37

December 1993, p.59
38

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.2, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf
39 40

Ibid, p.1 Allin, Dana H, „Unintended Consequences – Managing Kosovo Independence‟, Challiot Papers 50, Burns, Nicholas R, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs United States, „Ten Years after

October 2001, pp.7-18, p.13
41

Dayton: Winning the Peace in the Balkans‟, speech given at the Wilson Center, Washington 19 May 2005, at http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/May/20-375965.html
42

Ibid

55

43

„The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre Altmann, Franz-Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, Rupnik, Jacques, „The postwar Balkans and the Kosovo Question‟, Challiot Papers 50, October „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.20, http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf
44

p.30-31
45

2001, pp.69-84, p.78
46

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.4, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf
47

Contact Group Statement, quoted in „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group,

Europe Report Nr 161, Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.3, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf
48

Jordan, Michael J, „Even in Eager Kosovo, Nation Building Stalls‟, in

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo1/2004/0922stalls.htm

56

CHAPTER 4 - KOSOVO FINAL STATUS AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

While in the third chapter we discussed the options of Kosovo status in this chapter the focus will be on the security implications that Kosovo status will have in the Balkans. As seen in the previous chapter Kosovo status takes into account the role and the fear of international community that the future of Kosovo will have for the security of the region. This chapter will assess firstly the current situation in the Balkans and then the security implications of Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia and then Kosovo as an independent state. One part of this chapter discuses the issue of the domino effect that the independent Kosovo may have in the region and concludes with the issue of the Greater Albania, an outcome that is feared that an independent Kosovo might trigger as a result.

4.1

Current security situation in Balkan region

Since June 1999, and in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo has been under an international administration (UNMIK). In theory it might be desirable to perpetuate this situation in order to freeze the situation and gain time. But has time really been gained? Heightened paramilitary activities in early 2003 along the Serbian border and in southern Serbia, continued killings of ethnic Serbs, and the riots of 17-18 March 2004 that killed 19 suggest that some armed factions of Kosovar and Serb Albanians remain.1 The speed with which the March 2004 disorder spread and similarities between incidents imply a degree of organisation on the part of some of the rioting Albanians, frustrated at the lack of progress on the question of

57

Kosovo's status. In reaction, street violence broke out in Belgrade and other Serbian cities, with mobs setting fire to several mosques.2

The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SiCG) is what remains of Yugoslavia after the wars of secession in the first half of the 1990s. After President Slobodan Milosevic was ousted from power in October 2000, and subsequently handed over to the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, the federation entered a shaky period of reform and rehabilitation in the international community, galvanised in March 2003 by the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. The union is extremely fragile and held together by pressure from the European Union; political parties, especially in Montenegro campaign openly for its dissolution. Political will is low in the entities of Montenegro and Serbia for continued union with each other; there is a general consensus that the union is unlikely to survive beyond its legal minimum of 2005.

In Montenegro, while many dislike the union with Serbia, an increasing number are calling themselves "Serb" rather than "Montenegrin", proving that the prestige of Serbia endures at a grass-roots level.3 Related to instability in Kosovo is the precarious security situation in southern Serbia, populated mainly by ethnic Albanians, some of whom are becoming radicalised by perceived poor treatment by the security services, high unemployment and the prospect of independent statehood for their kin in Kosovo.

Macedonia, a small state of 2 million people founded in 1991 as Yugoslavia disintegrated is beset by questions of identity, most importantly over the ethnically

58

divided population. The Albanians who make up more than 25 per cent of the population staged a six-month armed uprising in 2001 demanding equal treatment in Macedonia. The Ohrid Framework Agreement brokered by the international community has prevented a large-scale return to violence. As long as the majority population on both sides remains supportive of the Ohrid Agreement, there is little chance of a return to widespread civil conflict.

In Albania despite the immediate prospects of organised armed revolts on the scale of 1997 and 1998 looking unlikely, the mass armament of the population has contributed to a rise in violent crimes in some cities. In July 2001, the authorities estimated that only 32 per cent of the up to 600,0004 looted small arms had been recovered.

The Balkans are seen as corrupt and inefficient, a region where governments only nominally control sizable parts of their territories, and where organized crime is an indicator of state weakness and also a factor for weakening the state. The region presents a strange mixture of weak states, former failed states, and present protectorates. In this regard the Centre for Policy Studies in Budapest gives the following classification of political regimes in the Balkans:      Countries in an apparently sustainable process of democratization: Croatia; Countries in post crisis process of democratization: Albania; Countries starting the process of democratization: Serbia and Montenegro; Countries recovering from a severe political crisis: Macedonia; Countries with a significant international security and political presence: Bosnia and Herzegovina;  Territories beginning the democratization process: Montenegro;

59

 

Territories that are de facto international protectorates: Kosovo; Political entities within quasi-protectorates: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic Srpska.5

The ambiguity and delay over the final status of Kosovo is increasingly contributing to the unstable situation in the Western Balkans. Confusion and obfuscation over whether the territory becomes a long-term United Nations or European Union protectorate, is unilaterally handed over to Belgrade‟s control, or is finally launched on a trajectory for statehood erodes the effectiveness of the UN Mission in Kosovo, fuels the misplaced hopes for some in Serbia that all or part of Kosovo will again come under the authority of Belgrade, postpones stability in Southeast Europe, and most disturbingly, contributes to increased tensions, political and economic stagnation, and an unhealthy culture of dependence among Kosovo‟s ambitious, youthful, and growing population.6 The region is as close to failure as it is to success. For the moment, the wars are over, but the smell of violence still hangs heavy in the air. The region's profile is bleak - a mixture of weak states and international protectorates, where Europe has stationed almost half of its deployable forces.7

There is an apparent tension between the rhetoric of the international community, which emphasises the desirability of multi-ethnicity, and its practice, which tends to place the emphasis on accommodating various group interests in the interests of security. In the past decade, the general legal and political environment for the harmonious development of interethnic relations has improved substantially in most parts of the Balkans. However, the reality of interethnic relations and minority rights varies greatly. War and ethnic cleansing have resulted in significant demographic

60

shifts. While all countries of the Balkans still contain multiethnic areas, most countries are now nation states with a majority amounting to 80 % or more of the population. Albania, Croatia, Serbia (without Kosovo) and Kosovo (if considered a separate entity) have strong majorities where most minorities live in a relatively compact part of the country and account for 10 to 20% of the population. We can talk perhaps about multiethnic regions but no longer so much about multiethnic countries. Only Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are countries that are multiethnic as a whole but with no or no strong dominance by one community. 8 The results of the survey done for the International Commission on the Balkans powerfully confirm the thesis that interethnic relations are much better on the municipal level than on the level of the country as a whole.9

4.2 Security implications

4.2.1 Kosovo as part of Yugoslav federation

As seen in the previous chapter, one of the options for Kosovo final status is being part of Yugoslav federation (be it an autonomous Serb, Yugoslav province or a third republic in the federation). All of these options are rejected by Kosovo Albanians whose sole objective is an independent Kosovo as an option to live free from Serb oppression. It is suggested that should Kosovo remain a part of the Yugoslav Federation then it is likely that armed conflict will re-ignite the province.

To better understand the security implications of Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia the reader needs to keep in mind that all of the following atrocities that were committed

61

by Serbs in 1912-1913 had transpired previously and were repeated again in the 1980s and 1990s.

Tens of thousands of defenseless people are being massacred, women are being raped, old people and children strangled, hundreds of villages burnt to the ground, priest slaughtered. And Europe remains silent! Countless villages have been razed to the ground, countless individuals have been butchered. Where once the humble cottages of poor

Albanians stood, there is nothing left but smoke and ashes. A whole people are perishing on Calvary cross, and Europe remains silent!10

Albanians remain deeply scarred by the ten years of oppression and the year of war between the Yugoslav military and the Kosovo Liberation Army. The vast majority were displaced by the conflict. Many had their homes destroyed and livelihoods ruined. They have no trust in post-Milosevic authorities in Belgrade and strongly believe that their security can only be guaranteed by independence. Only in the period March 24, 1999 to June 19, 1999, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo estimates the number of killings in the neighbourhood of 10,000, with the vast majority of the victims being Kosovo Albanians killed by FRY forces. Approximately 863,000 civilians sought or were forced into refuge outside Kosovo and an additional 590,000 were internally displaced. There is also evidence of widespread rape and torture, as well as looting, pillaging and extortion. The pattern of the logistical arrangements made for deportations and the coordination of actions by

62

the Yugoslav army, para-military groups and the police shows that this huge expulsion of Kosovo-Albanians was systematic and deliberately organized.11

Some will argue that after the fall of Milosevic‟s dictatorial regime probably the democratization of Serbia may be the answer to Kosovo Albanians desire for freedom and self-government. This comes from the suggestion that democracy unites and dictatorship divides. After what they have suffered at Serb hands, Albanians will be unwilling to submit even to the perfectly democratic domination of a Serb majority.12 How could the Kosovo Albanians believe that the Serbs will forget crimes against Albanians while their parliament has passed the "Law on the Rights of Indictees in the Custody of the International Criminal Tribunal and Members of their Families" which aims to protect the legacy of crimes carried under Milosevic by rewarding financially the families of those who carried out the former president's crimes.13 But democratization can not be the answer to accommodation of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. As Horowitz argues democracy is about inclusion and exclusion, about access to power, about the privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany exclusion.14 In severely divided societies, as that of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs stands, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded.

Even the question of whether Kosovo as part of federal Yugoslavia is the most desirable solution, is not very realistic. First, the idea of Yugoslav federalism may, after a decade of war conducted under its flag, still be popular in Serbia, but it is seen in Kosovo as an instrument of Serb domination. There is not much sense in the Yugoslav idea itself. Yugoslavia was the state of the southern Slavs. Since all the

63

other Slavs have left it, how can it be expected that the only non-Slavs (the Albanians) will remain in an unlikely cohabitation with the Serbs?15 How can one imagine that a population, half of whom were driven out of their country in spring 1999 by the Yugoslav authorities (and whose identity cards were destroyed precisely to make sure that all links with the country were thereafter severed), could one day consider themselves „citizens‟ of that country and ask it for a new passport?16 At its most basic, both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians see Kosovo not as a political problem but as a territorial one. That is to say as a zero-sum game in which winner takes all.17

If even a marginally credible case is to be made for retaining Kosovo within the Serbian state, a huge amount of social and institutional change will be necessary, on which few if any Serbian politicians seem to have focused. Were Kosovo to be reintegrated into Serbia, Albanians could hold up to 20 per cent of parliamentary seats and (with their much younger age profile) would constitute a much higher proportion of army recruits. They would need to be represented proportionately in all government organs, including police. Most Serbs would be horrified at the prospect of Kosovo Albanians heading government ministries or enjoying the right to buy Serbian companies or properties on Belgrade's central street. But Serbia's treaty obligations to the Council of Europe and EU accession conditions would oblige it to offer those rights and more. Albanians may regain the option of demographic expansion out of Kosovo into south Serbia, and lay claim to making Albanian Serbia's second official language.18

So the scenario of Kosovo as part of Serbia or even federal Yugoslavia will result in more bloodshed and will worsen situation much more than it was prior to 1999. A

64

return to provincial status for Kosovo under Belgrade‟s authority cannot be seriously contemplated, as it would almost certainly lead to armed resistance. The creation of a tripartite union with Serbia and Montenegro is likewise a political chimera, as even the current union between these two states is unlikely to survive.19

4.2.2 Independence

The core of Kosovo Albanian demand for independence lies in aspirations for security, dignity, and an escape from poverty: averting a return to Belgrade's repression and avoiding humiliation in a state where they would be lowest in the pecking order.20 While independence is the desired aspiration for Albanians in Kosovo Serb and Roma minorities within Kosovo are adamantly opposed to independence on the grounds that it would be followed, sooner or later, by the forcible expulsion of their entire communities. Independence for Kosovo, when seen through the eyes of the minorities, looks like a recipe for ethnic majority tyranny.21

Taking into account the record of violence of Kosovo Albanians toward Kosovo Serb minority, they in turn, may call upon Serbian armed forces to protect them, and the region may be plunged into new conflict. The current level of violence by Albanians in Kosovo towards the Serbs and other minorities clearly suggests that the independence of Kosovo can only come about under the protection of the international community. Otherwise, constant discrimination and physical threats would continue. A deliberate or even forced exodus of these minorities is thus foreseeable.22

65

The political constraints against easing conditions for Kosovo Serbs, of course, also have other roots. Albanians who have usurped Serb property find it easy to wrap in the flag their personal interests against Serb returns. In most urban areas the best apartments belonged to Serbs; a significant group of usurpers has an interest in maintaining a level of hostility that makes it impractical for the owners to return. Municipal authorities, the police, and Kosovo Albanian society in general find it difficult to resist such interest groups. Kosovo Albanians' need for spatial expansion, driven by rapid population growth, is another factor of minority expulsion.23 Kosovo is by no means the first place to explode as population pressures increased. 50 years ago the Kosovo Albanian birth-rate was staggeringly high, an average of nearly 8.5 children per woman. That has declined today but it is still twice that of the Serbian population. The momentum for pushing out Serbs is most difficult to stop precisely in newer urban environments, where communities are less established or coherent and there has been significant recent migration from rural areas.

On the other hand, of all the options, only independence offers the prospect of a promising future for Kosovo and its neighbours. The creation of an independent Kosovo government, parliament, and judicial and other institutions is the only way to develop a law-abiding society and an inclusive democracy in which all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, are granted the full array of human and civil rights, including the right to return of all legitimate Serb refugees to their homes. 24 There is little prospect for economic development until Kosovo is independent and self-governing, as any other status solution would lead to growing instability. Only statehood for Kosovo would ensure a more durable regional security in the Balkans. With the development of an internal police force and a credible military contingent, threats can

66

be diminished and deterred, and contributions can be made to the international struggle against organized terrorism and criminality.

Conditional independence which is the proposal by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo is the best solution for Kosovo final status because it refers to the security of Kosovo and the region. Full, unlimited and unconditional independence is impossible in the nature of things, because an independent Kosovo state lacks the key property of statehood, the means to defend itself against external attack. It remains dependent, and will continue to do so, on the foreign military presence on the ground and on NATO air and sea power. Moreover, as the security situation in Kosovo since 1999 has made abundantly clear, Kosovo lacks the other capacities of statehood: the ability to guarantee internal order, domestic safety and inter-ethnic peace. For these functions normally exercised by states, Kosovo will remain dependent, for years to come, on some form of international security presence, both police and military. Both its external security and internal human rights regimes will have to be supervised by the international community and by a considerable military presence.25 This is also the position that the International Commission on the Balkans in its April 2005 Report, proposes for the second stage (independence without full sovereignty ) allowing Kosovo to develop the capacity for selfgovernment, with the international community reserving its rights to intervene in areas such as human rights and minority protection.(see Chapter 3 p. 42)

67

4.2.3 Kosovo’s Independence and the Domino effect

Many countries in the west are reticent and fearful of the effects of Kosovo independence on regional stability. It is feared that a sovereign Kosovo could prompt further secessionist movements among the Albanian minorities in neighbouring Macedonia, in the Presevo valley and even in Montenegro. Macedonia, in particular, seems to be extremely endangered and the disintegration of Macedonia could implicate neighbouring countries like Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece.26 Jacques Rupnik holds the position that Kosovo‟s independence would not be a precedent that could affect Macedonia, because destabilisation there happened in 2001 without the question of Kosovo‟s final status being addressed (or precisely because it was not being addressed).27 Aldo Bumci suggests that political agendas of Albanians in Kosovo and in Macedonia are quite different. The political wing of the National Liberation Army that operated in Macedonia in the 2001 crisis, declared that they respected the territorial integrity of Macedonia and were fighting for equal rights of Albanians vis-à-vis Macedonians, and their demands were similar to those of Albanian political parties in Macedonia that participated in state structures.28 When it comes to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia, the survey conducted by International Commission on the Balkans shows that a great majority of Albanians in Macedonia reject the idea of dividing the country (Figure 2). 77.5% of ethnic Albanians (and 85% of ethnic Macedonians) support the territorial integrity of the Macedonian state.29

68

Figure 2 Macedonia Scenario Source: The Balkans in Europe Future, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, at http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf

For Macedonia, the precedent of an independent Kosovo may be unwelcome; but the aggravated conflict that would accompany any attempt to incorporate the province back into Yugoslavia would be even more destabilising for Kosovo‟s neighbours – Macedonia included. Even if no one expects that to happen, stoking Kosovars‟ fears about the future would be unwise.30

Many authors argue that the recognition of an independent Kosovo could not only serve as a precedent for the Albanian population in Macedonia and Montenegro, and maybe even also in northern Greece, but even more for the Bosnian Serbs in Republika Srpska. They could be tempted to follow the example of Kosovo and

69

launch a referendum on unification with Serbia proper, in contravention of the Dayton accords. Similarly, the Croats of Herzegovina could then insist on a referendum for the unification with Croatia, leaving behind a rump Bosnia deprived of two- thirds of its present territory.31 The nightmare of the international community that Kosovo's independence would automatically provoke the disintegration of Bosnia has no foundation in reality. Independence per se is not the issue – the issue is how you get there.32

The acceptance at Dayton of a Bosnian „Republika Srpska‟ – an entity forged through ethnic cleansing – was a terrible precedent. But it was arguably the price to be paid for ending the war.33 Maintaining the de facto integrity of Kosovo will send a strong signal to extremists and ethnic agitators in Bosnia and Macedonia that partition is not an attainable goal. Dividing Kosovo along ethnic lines would only serve to encourage destabilizing elements throughout the region.34

Greater Albania

Another argument against the independence of Kosovo is that a future unification of Albania and Kosovo, maybe in the form of a federation, is extremely probable. 35 The desire of the vast majority of Kosovo‟s population for independence is supported by most Albanians elsewhere in the Balkans. An independent Kosovo, however, is quite a different matter from a Greater Albania, but the wider policy questions remain. Is there a real potential for further Balkan conflict, driven by a “Greater Albania” agenda similar to the “Greater Serbia” and “Greater Croatia” agendas that fuelled the 1992-95 Bosnian war? Or is the Albanian Question now definitively answered, with the

70

exception of the undetermined future status of Kosovo? And what policy measures can and should be taken by the international community to ensure continued stability?36

In theory, now that the Serb threat has gone, there has never been a better time to try to realize a Greater Albania. Yet no mainstream Albanian political party, whether in Albania or Macedonia publicly espouses the idea. Tim Judah rightly points to the disappointment of Kosovo Albanians towards Albanian Albanians during the Kosovo war of 1999 when about 500,000 fled to Albania.37 For the vast majority of them this was their first experience of the motherland they had once idealized. Kosovo Albanians were shocked by the poverty and corruption of Albania and, as many were also robbed there, they were more than happy after the war to leave. Politically, the result of this disappointment was to crystallize in the minds of many Kosovo Albanians the idea that the future of the Albanians as a whole lay not in their unification into one country, bur rather in cross-border solidarity and goodneighbourliness.

Those who are concerned about pan-Albanianism have merely to point to the map. Three and a half million Albanians live in Albania; ninety per cent of Kosovo‟s two million people are ethnic Albanians; there are more than 500,000 in Macedonia; another 60,000 live in Montenegro, and slightly more in Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac, three municipalities in southern Serbia, and in northern Greece.38 Ethnic Albania under Ottomans comprising of 4 vilayets, was penalized by the Great Powers because it was considered part of the Ottoman Empire for almost five centuries. It should also be noted that Albania's neighbours, especially Serbia and Greece, wanted

71

the total partitioning of Albania so that it would no longer exist as a separate entity and nationality.39

Figure 3 Map of Albanian four vilayets under the Ottoman Empire1878 Source: http://www.frosina.org/articles/default.asp?pf=1&id=89

Instead of referring to “pan-Albanianism”, Albanians themselves tend to use the phrase “the Albanian National Question” which the controversial 1998 Albanian Academy of Sciences‟ paper interpreted as the movement for the liberation of Albanian lands and unification into one single national state40. The mainstream political parties in Kosovo are concentrated on independence for their province rather 72

than union with Albania. In Macedonia‟s September 2001 elections, while parties supporting some form of pan-Albanianism did score some successes, a clear majority of ethnic Albanians rejected their policies in favour of an agenda of integration in the context of the Ohrid peace agreement.41

Within Albania, there is little support for ethnic Albanian separatist movements either in southern Serbia or Macedonia. While public support exists for Kosovo‟s independence, this is based more on general sympathy for the situation of Kosovo Albanians rather than any aspirations for unification with Kosovo or Macedonia. Albania is suffering from weak state institutions, rampant corruption, and serious problems with law and order. These huge internal problems provide no room for Albania to divert its attention to Kosovo.42 Albania‟s commitment to regional stability and its opposition to militant supporters of pan-Albanianism have been demonstrated recently by its strong stance against the Albanian National Union Front led by Idajet Beqiri and the Albanian National Army with which it is associated.43

Conclusion

It is undoubtedly true that whatever the final status of Kosovo there will be security implications for the Balkans. Moreover, the current security situation in the Balkans is not healthy enough to accommodate the arrival of another weak state.

The security of the region in the case of Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia, be it an autonomous unit or a third republic, will result in the same situation as prior to the Kosovo war of spring 1999. Even a perfect democratic Serbia/Yugoslavia is going to

73

be seen by Kosovo Albanians as the historic continuation of Serb domination, and the ethnic violence will continue.

In an independent Kosovo taken into account Serb expulsion from Kosovo after war of 1999 and current level of hostility between two ethnicities the Serbian army may take action to protect its community and further spread of war in the Balkans. This is why the conditional independence or independence without full sovereignty will be the best option for securing the independent Kosovo and a more secure Balkan.

Fears of a domino effect in the region have no basis as long as the countries of the region have entered a period of democratization and the international military presence continues. Finally, a Greater Albania is a dream of a handful of men without backing from political and public communities in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia and elsewhere.

74

1

„Collapse in Kosovo‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 155, Pristine/Brussels, 22

April 2004, p.1, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/155_collapse_in_kosovo_revised.pdf
2

„Kosovo After Haradinaj‟, International Crisis Group-Europe Report Nr 163, Pristine/Brussels, 26

May 2005, p.1, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/163_kosovo_after_haradinaj.pdf
3

„Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 39, Belgrade/Brussels,

23 May 2005, p.4, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf
4

http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/BALK_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Albania&Prod_Name „In Search of Responsive Government: State Building and Economic Growth in the Balkans‟, Policy

=BALK&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/balksu/albas010.htm@current#section1
5

Studies Series, (Centre For Policy Studies, Central European University, Budapest, 2003),p.34, at http://www.ceu.hu/cps/pub/pub_polstud_bluebird.pdf
6

Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for

Kosovo‟, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2003, p.2, at http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf
7

„The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre for

Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.7, at http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf
8 9

ibid, p.32 ibid, p.32-33 Doucette, Serge Raymond, „In the Name of God: Serbian Faith-Atrocities‟, in

10

http://www.albanian.com/community/images/hot_spot/DoucetteonKosova.htm
11

Report of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, at Allin, Dana H, „Unintended Consequences – Managing Kosovo Independence‟, Challiot Papers 50, „Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 39,

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm
12

October 2001, pp.7-18, p.10
13

Belgrade/Brussels, 23 May 2005, p.6, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf
14

Horowitz, Donald L, „Democracy in Divided Societies‟, in Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc F.,

(editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy,(The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994), p. 35-36
15

Rupnik, Jacques, „The postwar Balkans and the Kosovo Question‟, Challiot Papers 50, October

2001, pp.69-84, p.81
16 17 18

Ibid, p.82 Judah, Tim, „Kosovo and its Status‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.55-68, p.56 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.19

75

19

Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for

Kosovo‟, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2003, p.4, at http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf
20

„Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.6, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf
21

Report of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, at Altmann, Franz-Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, p.31 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm
22 23

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.7, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf
24

Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for

Kosovo‟, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2003, p.5, at http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf
25

Report of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, at Altmann, Franz-Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, p.31 Rupnik, Jacques, „The postwar Balkans and the Kosovo Question‟, Challiot Papers 50, October Bumci, Aldo, „Regional Perspectives for an Independent Kosovo – Albania and Macedonia‟, in

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm
26 27

2001, pp.69-84, p.78
28

Bieber, Florian, Daskalovski, Zidas (editors), Understanding the War in Kosovo, (Frank Cass London, Portland, OR, 2003), p.287
29

„The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.18, at http://www.balkancommission.org/activities/Report.pdf
30

Allin, Dana H, „Unintended Consequences – Managing Kosovo Independence‟, Challiot Papers 50, Altmann, Franz-Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, p.31 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre for Allin, Dana H, „Unintended Consequences – Managing Kosovo Independence‟, Challiot Papers 50, Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for

October 2001, pp.7-18, p.16
31 32

Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.17, at http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf
33

October 2001, pp.7-18, p.14
34

Kosovo‟, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2003, p.6, at http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf
35

Altmann, Franz-Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, p.31

76

36

„Pan-Albanianism: How big a Threat to Balkan Stability?‟, International Crisis Group, Europe

Report Nr. 153, 25 February 2004, p.ii, at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN014972.pdf
37 38

Judah, Tim, „Greater Albania?‟, Survival, Volume 43, Number 2, Summer 2001, pp. 7-18, p.9-10 „Pan-Albanianism: How big a Threat to Balkan Stability?‟, International Crisis Group, Europe

Report Nr. 153, 25 February 2004, p.ii, at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN014972.pdf
39

Van Christo, „Perspective: Albania and Kosovo‟, at „Pan-Albanianism: How big a Threat to Balkan Stability?‟, International Crisis Group, Europe

http://www.frosina.org/articles/default.asp?pf=1&id=89
40

Report Nr. 153, 25 February 2004, p.2, at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN014972.pdf
41 42

Ibid, p.3 Bumci, Aldo, „Regional Perspectives for an Independent Kosovo – Albania and Macedonia‟, in

Bieber, Florian, Daskalovski, Zidas (editors), Understanding the War in Kosovo, (Frank Cass London, Portland, OR, 2003), p.295
43

„Pan-Albanianism: How big a Threat to Balkan Stability?‟, International Crisis Group, Europe

Report Nr. 153, 25 February 2004, p.11, at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN014972.pdf

77

CHAPTER 5- OBSTACLES AND POSSIBILITIES

A decade of war left the Balkans with a quarter million dead and millions of refugees. Among the main casualties, however, were ideas of a multi-ethnic society and of regional cooperation. The Yugoslav wars affected the entire Balkan region. Just as the war in Kosovo cannot be understood in isolation from its broader regional context, so will the success or failure of post-war recovery and reconstruction also depend on the capacity of local actors and the international community to develop a coherent regional approach.

As has been demonstrated throughout this paper there are two main pillars upon which the future of the region rests. First, it is the people of the region that must be responsible for their future, and secondly, Europe that should consider the Balkans part of the European house. This Chapter develops the idea that Serbia and Kosovo state and society should overcome their past difficulties and work diligently towards a democratic and European future. The European Union has also a major role to play in attracting weak states of the Balkans into European edifice.

5.1 Confronting the past; working to build the future

5.1.1 Serbian position

NATO military intervention of 1999 in Kosovo put an end to the Serbian strategy of war crimes committed in Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia.1 But, for the Serbs the war of 1999 was personal. It was as much against them as it was against their

78

leader Milosevic and other senior government figures.2 The loss of Kosovo has been the most significant defeat of Serbia in the past decade.3 Due to the traumas associated with Milosevic's reign and the distortions of his propaganda machine, many Serb citizens have a highly skewed picture of political reality in the Balkans which affects their attitude toward Kosovo. They see themselves as victims of an unjust NATO "aggression" and an Albanian Islamic fundamentalist terrorist movement designed to create a Greater Albania. There is constant demonisation of Albanians in the media as "terrorists", criminals, and Islamic fundamentalists. The rhetoric of victimisation is transmitted by most leading politicians, including Premier Vojislav Kostunica and President Boris Tadic, both of whom show unwillingness to discuss the recent past realistically.4

In the immediate aftermath of the lost wars and the fall of Milosevic, there was an opportunity for the Serbian leadership in Belgrade to clarify the questions of Serbian statehood. Kostunica and the democratic coalition that came to power in 2000 had the opportunity to do so as part of the process of making a clear break with the Milosevic legacy, but they had little inclination, and came under little international pressure to do so.5 Kostunica could put his nationalist credentials and his democratic mandate to good use by making a clean break with Milosevic era and the myth of Serbian „reconquest of Kosovo‟.6 If the difficult unresolved issue of a lost war is not tackled in its immediate aftermath, while the new regime has strong legitimacy, it will come back to haunt the process of reform later, but in much more adverse circumstances.7

The way the Serbs have lost Kosovo means that tomorrow the Serbs will have no chance to get it back. How could they while it is controlled[in 1999] by 55,000 NATO

79

and other troops? – asks Tim Judah. But what will happen in ten or twenty years? Just over a decade ago no one could have predicted the shape of the world today. So what if, in twenty or thirty years, America is locked in isolationism, Russia is rearmed and strong, and Europe is weak and divided the spirit of revanchism may grow 8, and Serbs may demand revenge. In this strategy may be seen the finances by Serbian state of parallel civilian and military structures of Serbian community in Kosovo and its work to undermine UNMIK's authority among them. There has been no effort to seek constructive engagement with Kosovo Albanian politicians or the international community9 to resolve the future status of Kosovo as long as both sides have irreconcilable positions.

Serbian opposition is not fundamentally different from Milosevic as far as the national question is concerned. Serbia's nationalist delusions require a long "cure de désintoxication."10 The single largest parliamentary party is the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS), and 70 per cent of all deputies come from parties that hold anti-Western views and are sceptical about reform in general and European integration in particular. Security sector reforms have been largely nonexistent, with neither police nor army subject to democratic civilian control.11 The Serbian media typically refers to them as the "hidden centres of power". In essence, each continues to act as a state-within-a-state.12 Crisis Group research indicates the Serbian army and police commands were caught somewhat unprepared in March 2004 and planning for such contingencies. The army and police could use renewed Albanian violence as an excuse to secure the Serbian majority municipalities in north Kosovo and perhaps also to intervene in support of a declaration by Serbs in north Kosovo of secession should the international community signal agreement to an independent Kosovo.13

80

To many in the Serbian establishment, their best tactics appear to be to provoke violence, undermine the credibility of the international guarantees to the Albanians on Kosovo's unity, and tempt the Albanians into unilateral action. The readiness of Russia to advocate postponement of the mid-summer 2005 standards review is consistent with such tactics.14 Although the March 2004 violence left Kosovo Serbs feeling more insecure, the majority of them continue to live and work on their traditional lands, side by side with the Albanian majority.15

With the change of government in October 2000, the U.S. and EU perception of Belgrade changed dramatically. The international community saw the new authorities as the opposition to Milosevic, not those who oppressed and committed atrocities against the Kosovo Albanians. Thus diplomats courted both the Federal Yugoslav and Republic of Serbia governments, seeing a democratic and prosperous Serbia as key to stability in the Balkans. The level of cooperation between Belgrade and UNMIK also changed. The governments of Serbia and Yugoslavia jointly established a Coordination Centre for Kosovo in August 2001, responsible for liaising with UNMIK, overseeing the work of both governments in the province and lobbying to ensure that the rights of Serbs are considered. The official in charge – Dr. Nebojsa Covic, won praise for his role in resolving the crisis in the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia in late 2000 and early 2001, and the international community hoped that he would establish a constructive relationship with UNMIK. However, these hopes were not completely realised.16

81

The year 2003 began with a request from Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic to review UNMIK‟s record in Kosovo and open dialogue with Kosovo politicians to resolve the final status issue. Both Albanian and Serbian politicians reacted with shock and sadness at the assassination of Djindjic. He was widely seen as a pragmatist who would negotiate on Kosovo‟s future.17

Despite the difficulties that Serbian government encounters because of the past there are good signs that it is going to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal to bring war criminals to justice. The compliance of governments of the region with the ICTY is central to development of good relations between the international community and the Balkans. The EU has defined compliance with ICTY as threshold conditionality when it comes to the process of integration. The same holds for Partnership for Peace (PfP) and NATO.18 The Serbian government had actually pressured the highest-profile indictees to turn themselves in late in 2004, but that approach failed. In January 2005, however, prominent Serbian Orthodox Church clerics began to say that the country was suffering because of a few individuals, whose duty it was to turn themselves in so Serbia could move forward. The government also threatened that if they did not surrender voluntarily, they would be arrested and forcibly transferred to The Hague, in which case financial support for their families might not be made available. The government also launched a media offensive. On February and March 2005, fruits of this new policy became evident, when some generals surrendered themselves „voluntarily‟ to the Tribunal due to also positive media coverage.19

82

5.1.2 Kosovo position

The luxury of guaranteed state survival and unchanging boundaries must have quickly turned into a cruel illusion for leaders of the new states of Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Eritrea and others in the immediate postCold War era. From the moment of their independence they had to secure their borders and mobilize their populations to defend the new states from enemies inside and out.20 It is increasingly accepted that effective control of territory entails not merely the ability to defend it, but also responsibility to protect its inhabitants. The EU's approach to recognition of the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav republics in 1991 incorporated requirements for democracy, rule of law, human and minority rights, and good neighbourliness, with additional emphasis on maintaining existing republic borders to discourage irredentism and territorial conflict.21

For Kosovo, and the overwhelming majority of its people, an independent state recognized by the international community is the issue that eclipses all others. Only such a state will be capable of voluntarily integrating into NATO, the EU, and other international institutions. But the achievement of these goals requires a strategy and a vision.22 With no experience of running anything in government and in a society which has long operated with parallel structures, it will be hard for any sort of modern and efficient government to emerge which can administer the province‟s economy, crush crime, and build credible state structures. In this case criminal gangs, in some cases associated with political parties, will continue to flourish.23

83

The lack of a wider vision of what a Kosovo state might be is partly a reflection of the way the Kosovo Albanian parties have developed, as vehicles for patronage and advancement of group interests, and partly bound up in Kosovo Albanians' difficulty in distancing themselves from the posture of victim they settled into in the 1990s.24 Kosovo's society has a residual addiction to the clandestine - a preference for focusing on shadow rather than daylight and upon the hidden rather than the open agenda. During March 2005, extremist elements attempted to destabilise the situation. The latest in a string of post-war phantom armies announced itself with threatening communiqués and calls for all the prior Albanian liberation armies to re-activate: Kosovo's Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Macedonia's National Liberation Army (NLA), and the Preshevo-Medvegja Liberation Army (UCPMB) of south Serbia's Presevo Valley.25 In any case, and as the security situation in Kosovo since 1999 has made abundantly clear, Kosovo still lacks the key elements of statehood: the ability to guarantee internal order, domestic safety and interethnic/inter-group peace.26

Many Kosovo Albanians doubt their own capacity to handle independence well and favour a continued international presence, albeit only in an advisory, monitoring capacity. There is much cynicism about the venality and limited abilities of the political class. Some intellectuals fear that lack of experience could lead to a failed state and criminal haven, "Colombia in Europe … an El Dorado for organised crime".27 Reasons for the constant mobilisation and distortion of institutions into resistance mode include the persistent fear of being pushed back into Belgrade's orbit, but also a failure to imagine the contours of the putative state and so construct reliable institutions to animate it.28

84

Kosovo's politicians, institutions and media tend regularly to call up history to explain events in a narrative which is both hermetic and circular. Thus, on 30 March 2004 Epoka e Re quoted by Crisis Group, led with the headline: "Arrests like in '81". Assembly President Daci also compared the post-riot situation to 1981. The lack of institutional orientation means that for some who are practised in armed resistance a continuation of the methods of 1998-1999 is the only way forward and they see the present situation through the lens of that war.29 As evidenced by the deadly rioting in March 2004, Kosovo Albanians are frustrated with their unresolved status, the economic situation, and the problems of dealing with the past. If 2005 does not see the start of a final status solution Kosovo may return to conflict and generate regional instability.30

Albanian hostility towards Serbs rests on the unresolved psychological effects of the war, including, for some, guilt for failing to engage in it. For Kosovars, Serb guilt for war crimes remains collective, not individual. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the larger KLA successor party, has been more pragmatic at both municipal and central levels regarding Serb returns than Rugova's LDK.31 The survey of International Commission on the Balkans indicates that a majority of Kosovars are keen on living in an "ethnically homogeneous Kosovo" (figure 2).32

To strengthen the sense of unity and purpose, political leaders and opinion shapers in Pristina will also need to define and promote a distinct Kosovar identity. There are at least three possible definitions of Kosovars: as one subdivision of the Albanian nation; as a separate and emerging nation; or as a territory-wide identity regardless of ethnicity.33

85

Figure 4 New Borders Source: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, at http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf

Most Kosovo Albanians blithely assume their ethnic identity is sufficient. Flag, anthem, and Independence Day are borrowed from Albania. Kosovo Albanians contributed much historical militancy to the Albanian national cause; many consider it absurd that Albania alone should inherit the national symbols, including the doubleheaded eagle which they were imprisoned for displaying under Milosevic.34

Kosovars can be transformed into a separate nationality in a prolonged process of ethnogenesis. This can also provide a focus for political unity, territorial stability, and national development. It can also encourage coherence in dealing not only with neighbouring Slavic populations but also with Tirana, other foreign governments, and international institutions. Employing a definition of Kosovar that embraces a state

86

territorial identity and civic-based citizenship regardless of ethnicity can also contribute to building cohesiveness.35

5.2 NATO and EU integration – a Balkan without borders

Frontiers define the nation-state. They are the object of national defence, they mark the boundaries of national resources, and they have excluded and included those individuals who form the „patrie‟.36 But national borders also mark the points of absurdity, contradiction and danger in the national idea. They divide communities; they are the flashpoints of expansive nationalism; and they are fault lines. The patterns of settlement in Europe have never been geometrically convenient: ethnic minorities are not just scattered, but often scattered village by village, street by street, farmhouse by farmhouse.37

For the distinguished Albanian writer Ismail Kadare the stability of the Balkan Peninsula depends on two basic factors: first, the people who live there, and second, Europe - more precisely Atlantic Europe. The Balkans can be considered as, at most, a part of the European house, and at the very least its backyard. But even if it is the latter, it must be taken seriously and therefore also the order and tranquillity of this open space if the house demands those things for itself.38 It is today natural that the Balkan peoples need Europe. But on the other hand the question whether anyone needs the Balkans, or rather whether the Balkans can be of any use to Europe, is rarely posed.39

87

5.2.1 NATO and EU integration

On 10 June 1999, the date NATO forces entered Kosovo, in Cologne forty countries under the EU initiative, issued the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Latter on 30 July 1999 in Sarajevo the summit meeting reaffirmed the Pact. In the founding document, more than 40 partner countries and organisations (Table 1) undertook to strengthen the countries of South Eastern Europe in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region. To all the countries of the region were promised EuroAtlantic integration.

The Stability Pact is the first serious attempt by the international community to replace the previous, reactive crisis intervention policy in South Eastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy. The Stability Pact is a political declaration of commitment and a framework agreement on international cooperation to develop a shared strategy among all partners for stability and growth in South Eastern Europe. The idea for the Stability Pact arose in late 1998 and thus predates the Kosovo war. The NATO intervention acted as a catalyst in strengthening international political will for co-ordinated and preventive action in the region.

The most important instrument of the Stability Pact is the Regional Table with three working tables: Democratization and Human Rights; Economic Reconstruction, Cooperation and Development, and; Security Issues. The EU, which has the leading role in the Pact, undertakes to draw South Eastern Europe closer to the perspective of full

88

integration into its structures, including full membership. The European Union and its Member States are collectively the most important donors in the region.

The countries of the region

Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Serbia & Montenegro

The European Union Member States and the European Commission

Germany, UK, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta

Other countries

Canada, Japan, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, USA

International organisations

UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, UNHCR, NATO, OECD

International financial institutions

World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB)

Regional initiatives

Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC), Central European Initiative (CEI), South East European Co-operative Initiative (SECI) and South East Europe Co-operation Process (SEECP)

Table 1 Partners of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe

89

Countries wishing to be admitted must, however, first meet the conditions defined by the EU Council in 1993 concerning democratic, economic and institutional reforms known as Copenhagen criteria40. As a contribution to the Stability Pact and an interim step towards membership, the European Union has set up a new generation of Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) aimed at the five South Eastern European countries which didn‟t have contractual relationship with the EU (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Serbia & Montenegro). In less than a decade, the prospect of EU membership succeeded in consolidating democratic and market reforms throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The accession process profoundly transformed societies as diverse as the Polish and the Bulgarian, the Romanian and the Slovenian. There is now a widespread consensus that it can do the same for the Balkans. There is, however, one critical difference this time round - the problem of weak states. The EU lacks experience in the integration of weak states and territories like Kosovo.41

As popular anxiety over further enlargement rises in the EU, the European Commission has produced a draft regulation for an Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) which sets down the EU‟s present assumptions and planning for the Western Balkans. It assumes that Serbia-Montenegro and Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina will achieve candidate status around 2010 and membership around 2020 – far behind the expectations of the region.42 This passive approach risks compromising the EU‟s influence in the region at a time when some of the most difficult political steps – such as determining the status of Kosovo – will need to be taken. Serbia-Montenegro and Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania should be given at least the same kind of support in 2007 as Bulgaria and Romania were

90

given in 1997. If member-state building were to begin in 2007, it may be possible for countries of the region to achieve EU membership by 2014, in accordance with the ambitious agenda set out by the International Commission for the Balkans.43

The entire edifice of European Union strategy towards South Eastern Europe rests on the eventual integration of the countries of the Western Balkans into the EU. The promise of EU membership is the basis for all EU conditionality in the region, from compliance with The Hague Tribunal to institutional reforms, from trade liberalisation to the unresolved strategic issues, like implementation of the Ohrid Accords in Macedonia or deciding on the final status of Kosovo. By 2007, with the next enlargement, the region will be surrounded entirely by EU members. It is only the prospect of following the countries of Central Europe and the Eastern Balkans (Bulgaria and Romania) into the EU that gives the countries of the Western Balkans any hope of avoiding becoming a ghetto of underdevelopment in the midst of Europe.44 There is a risk that, instead of catching up with the rest of the continent, the Western Balkan countries will fall further behind, and the goal of integration – and the promise of regional stabilisation it offers – will become even more distant.45

Removing borders, by allowing a freer flow of goods, ideas, people and cultures, would help to reduce clashes between states and erode the differences between states. The Franco-German border today means less and less in economic terms. With the creation of European passports, the need to stop people from flowing across the border is removed. But this very ease of mobility has led to calls for tighter controls at the edges of the emerging European superstate. As it becomes easier to move within the countries of Europe, it is likely to become harder to move between Europe and the

91

outside world.46 There is ample evidence suggesting that integration helps to stabilise a region. But there is also evidence indicating that a partial integration has the opposite effect - it can destabilise an area. A visa regime that builds walls between the Western Balkans on the one hand and accession states such as Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia on the other (see Map 3), acts as a strong disincentive to cooperation, leading to a further deterioration in the social psychology of the already depressed western Balkan region.47 Among the most discouraging findings of the international Commission on the Balkans is that the European generation of the Balkans, young men and women under 30 who share the values of Europe are those who experience the greatest difficulties in visiting the EU. A smart visa policy of the EU that opens its borders to Balkan youth and Balkan businesses while closing them for criminals should be at the very centre of policies that will mobilise popular support for building EU member states in the Balkans.48

92

SerbiaMontenegro BosniaHerzegovina croatia

Kosovo

Albania

Figure 5 European Integration – the present vision for 2006 Source: http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_56.pdf

NATO membership is the second important pillar of integration strategy as part of EU integration. The Partnership for Peace that NATO has launched with countries that aspire to join the alliance is designed to encourage practical cooperation with individual partner countries. The programme has proven to be a vital instrument for bringing partner countries closer to the Alliance and, paving the way for NATO membership.

Two years ago Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia signed the Adriatic Charter with the United States, pledging mutual support as they pursue the political, economic, defence, and social reforms to achieve their eventual membership. The Adriatic

93

Charter has proven to be an especially useful forum for regional security and cooperation. The Charter countries have also reached out to both Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, including them as observers at recent meetings and promoting greater regional cooperation.49 Sending a positive signal to the Adriatic Charter countries would be of greater importance for the future of these countries. This gesture will improve the security of Balkan countries still outside the EU and will support reform in the security sector. NATO played the role of a fast integration track for the Central and East European countries and it should do the same for the Balkans. Paradoxically, membership in NATO is the only available instrument for demilitarising this most militarised part of Europe. But in order for NATO enlargement to fulfil its regional role, the Alliance should offer membership in the Partnership for Peace program to Serbia and Montenegro and to Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as possible.50

5.2.2 The integration challenge

Many will argue that the governments and the citizens of the region are responsible for the future of their own societies, and should bring their own houses in order. In view of the political and financial engagement since the beginning of the nineties and the responsibility the international community has assumed, such arguments are nothing short of cynical.51

The EU provides the overarching political framework within which the difficult unfinished business of the break-up of Yugoslavia can be dealt with. These nations first had a common roof imposed on them by empires of the past; later, Yugoslavia

94

provided a common roof. Now they need a common European roof to complete their nation-state building process.52 But despite the scale of the assistance effort in the Balkans, the international community has failed to offer a convincing political perspective to the societies in the region. The future of Kosovo is undecided, the future of Macedonia is uncertain, and the future of Serbia is unclear.53 There is an urgent need to solve the outstanding status and constitutional issues in the Balkans and to move the region as a whole from the stage of protectorates and weak states to the stage of EU accession. This is the only way to prevent the Western Balkans from turning into the black hole of Europe.54 The integration of the Balkans into the EU is unimaginable in the current circumstances of constitutional uncertainty.55

Conclusion

The Balkans will have a decent future in Europe as the eastern and central Europe had. But it depends as much as to people and governments of the region as well as to the Euro-Atlantic Europe. Current position of sticking with the past, complaining and accusing each other is a big impediment for the future of Kosovo and Serbia and the whole region. While the change of dictatorial regime in Serbia in 2000 was praised by the USA and EU, still many Serbs see themselves as victims of an unjust NATO aggression, designed to destroy Yugoslavia. Nationalism and anti-western views are still very much part of Serbian politics. Despite these obstacles there are good sings of democratic developments and cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. For Kosovo Albanians the only option that they may agree is an independent Kosovo but they have little experience at running a state which is a reflection of the way the Kosovo Albanian politics has developed since the 1990s. Fear of returning under Yugoslavia

95

or Serbian roof continues to keep them hostage of the past due to also to the psychological effects of the war. On the positive side independence may provide an incentive for political unity, territorial stability, and national development.

The prospect of EU membership which succeeded in consolidating democratic and market reforms throughout the Central and Eastern Europe can now do the same for the countries of the Balkans. The EU and NATO can successfully use the promise of membership as the basis for conditionality in the region to foster peace and security. If the Balkans was successfully absorbed into the EU, it would finally banish the possibility of the revival of conflict. The visa regime that builds walls between the Western Balkans and other parts of Europe, acts as a strong disincentive to cooperation, and leads to a further deterioration in the social psychology of the already depressed region.

96

1

Gow, James, The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes, (Hurst & Company, Williams, Christopher, „Kosovo: A fuse for the lighting‟, in Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley,

London, 2003), p.2
2

(editors), The Kosovo Crisis: The last American war in Europe?, (Reuters, Pearson Education, London 2001), p.23
3

Bieber, Florian, „Serbia After the Kosovo War: The Defeat of Nationalism and Change of Regime‟, in

Bieber, Florian, Daskalovski, Zidas (editors), Understanding the War in Kosovo, (Frank Cass London, Portland, OR, 2003), p.325
4

„Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.15, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf
5

Rupnik, Jacques, „The demise of Balkan nationalism? A sceptical view‟, Challiot Papers 70, , Rupnik, Jacques, „Yugoslavia After Milosevic‟, Survival, Volume 43, Number 2, Summer 2001, Rupnik, Jacques, „The demise of Balkan nationalism? A sceptical view‟, Challiot Papers 70, , Judah, Tim, „A brief History of Serbia‟, in Buckley, William Joseph, (editor), Kosovo: Contending

October 2004, pp.99-110, p.108
6

pp19-29, p.26
7

October 2004, pp.99-110, p108
8

Voices on Balkan Interventions, (William B. EErdmans Publishing Company Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge, U.K., 2000), p.95
9

„Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.15, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf
10

Report of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, at „Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 39,

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm
11

Belgrade/Brussels, 23 May 2005, p.6, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf
12 13

Ibid, p.7 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.18, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf
14 15

Ibid, p.18 „The Lausanne Principle, Territory And the Future of Kosovo‟s Serbs‟, European Stability Initiative, „Kosovo‟s Ethnic Dilemma: The Need for a Civic Contract‟, International Crisis Group, Balkans

June 7, 2004, p.3-4, at http://www.esiweb.org/docs/showdocument.php?document_ID=53
16

Report Nr 143, Pristina/Brussels, 23 May 2003, p.4-5
17

Ibid, p.6-7

97

18

„The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.35, at http://www.balkancommission.org/activities/Report.pdf
19 19

„Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 39,

Belgrade/Brussels, 23 May 2005, p.6, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf
20

Migdal, Joel S, „State building and the non-nation-state‟, Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2004, „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

vol.58, no.1, pp17-46, p.21
21

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.7, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf
22

Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for

Kosovo‟, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2003, p.17, at http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf
23 24

Judah, Tim, „Kosovo and its Status‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.55-68, p.62 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.7, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf
25

„Kosovo After Haradinaj‟, International Crisis Group-Europe Report Nr 163, Pristina/Brussels, 26

May 2005, p.4, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/163_kosovo_after_haradinaj.pdf
26

Dassu, Marta, „Statehood and Sovereignty – Regional and International Dynamics in Kosovo‟s „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

Future‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.35-54, p.50
27

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.8, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf
28 29 30 31 32

Ibid, p.9 Ibid, p.10 Ibid, p.1 Ibid, p.7-8 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.19, at http://www.balkancommission.org/activities/Report.pdf
33

Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for

Kosovo‟, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2003, p.17, at http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf
34

„Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.6, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf

98

35 36

Ibid, p.18 Horsman, Mathew, Marshall, Andrew, After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New

World Disorder, (HarperCollins Publishers, 1994), p.44
37 38 39 40 41

Ibid, p.45 Kadare, Ismail, The Balkans: Truths and Untruths, Challiot Papers 46, April 2001, pp.5-16, p.5 Ibid, p.13 „About the Stability Pact‟, at http://www.stabilitypact/aboutstabilitypact/ „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre for

Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.28-9, at http://www.balkancommission.org/activities/Report.pdf
42

„Breaking out the Balkan ghetto: Why IPA should be changed‟, European Stability Initiative, 1

January 2005, p.1-2, at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_66.pdf
43 44 45

Ibid, p.1-2 Ibid, p.1-2 Recommendations: Wilton Park Conference, 10 June 2004, European Stability Initiative, p.1

http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_56.pdf
46

Horsman, Mathew, Marshall, Andrew, After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre

World Disorder, (HarperCollins Publishers, 1994), p.57-8
47

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.28-9, at http://www.balkancommission.org/activities/Report.pdf
48 49

Ibid, p.32-33 Burns, Nicholas R, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs United States, „Ten Years after

Dayton: Winning the Peace in the Balkans‟, speech given at the Wilson Center, Washington 19 May 2005, at http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/May/20-375965.html
50

„The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.15, at http://www.balkancommission.org/activities/Report.pdf
51 52

Ibid, p.2 Rupnik, Jacques, „The demise of Balkan nationalism? A sceptical view‟, Challiot Papers 70, October p.110, at http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai70.pdf „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre

2004, pp.99-110
53

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.8, at http://www.balkancommission.org/activities/Report.pdf
54 55

Ibid, p.8 Ibid, p.18

99

CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 – Conclusion

Nationalism and ethnic conflict has become one of the most significant threats to global peace and security after the end of the Cold War. One of consequences of nationalism for the international system is that it has been a source of conflict and war. Nationalist movements and the fight for self-determination and secession pose a greater risk of internal wars, which in turn can widen to become international wars. The appearance of new states creates a new, less mature regional international system that lacks rules of the game defining the rights and obligations of its members towards one another, and norms of international conduct. Self-determination as a right of communities to decide on their fate and to establish an independent state is a contested issue in international relations because it goes against the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

When conflicts of self-determination reach the point where the ethnic groups have irreconcilable positions and one of them has the backing of one ore more regional powers separation is the only viable solution. The new state that results from the border changes is challenged by its ability to mobilize its populations, accommodate its minorities, and defend its borders. Minority groups within the new independent state backed by their kin state may in turn demand secession from it and undermine its security and that of the region.

100

From the time Kosovo Albanians were incorporated in the Serbian state, they never accepted this reality and have fought continuously for self-determination and liberation from oppression. The unrest in Kosovo in the 1980s and 1990s on the other hand led to a rapid and dramatic rise in Serbian nationalism. Complaining that Serbia had not received a fair share in Tito‟s Yugoslavia, Serbian nationalists demanded the restoration of control over Kosovo and advocated new arrangements to better reflect the Serbian nation‟s „legitimate‟ interests in the federation. Kosovo‟s non-violent and latter armed resistance reached its highest point in the war of 1999 when finally NATO intervened to save Kosovo people from a state genocidal policy. Despite the Yugoslav Army‟s agreement to withdraw in June 1999 the future status of Kosovo and the Western Balkans remains still unclear.

The starting point for the future status of Kosovo is the UNSCR 1244 that reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, and its reference to the Rambouillet agreement which calls for the right of self-government of the people of Kosovo on the basis of the will of the people. From this ambiguous framework result two interpretations; first, the Serbian one that Kosovo belongs to FRY; and secondly, the Kosovo Albanian one that future status should be decided by the will of the people, which means independence since the vast majority are in favour. In this framework the status of Kosovo ranges from a Serbian autonomous unit to the other extreme an independent Kosovo.

While international community condemned Serbian violence and ethnic cleansing and finally NATO intervened to save a people from genocide there is no agreement on the future of Kosovo. International actors differ in their positions on the future of Kosovo.

101

While the United States and the EU take the position of granting a conditional independence to Kosovo, China and Russia as permanent members of the UNSC are reluctant to acknowledge the reality because of their minority problems at home.

Whatever the final status of Kosovo would be it is undoubtedly true that there will be security implications for the Balkans. The security of the region in the case of Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia, be it an autonomous unit or a third republic, will result in the same situation as prior to the Kosovo war of spring 1999. Even a perfect democratic Serbia/Yugoslavia is going to be seen by Kosovo Albanians as the historic continuation of Serb domination, and the ethnic violence will continue. An independent Kosovo is considered by Serbia as a solution that undermines its sovereignty and territorial integrity and a threat to its compatriots. Taken into account the level of hostility between two ethnicities in Kosovo the Serbian army may take action to protect its community and further spread the conflict into the Balkans. This is why the conditional independence or independence without full sovereignty will be the best option for securing the independent Kosovo and a more secure Balkan. Moreover, the current security situation in the Balkans is not healthy enough to accommodate the arrival of another weak state. Fears that an independent Kosovo may trigger other secessionist movements in the region have no basis as long as the countries of the region have entered a period of democratization and the international community maintains a large military contingent. A Greater Albania or Kosovo has not backing from political and public communities in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and elsewhere.

102

The security of the Balkans depends on its people and their governments as well as to the prospect of joining Euro-Atlantic institutions. Current security and economic situation in Western Balkans is not very promising. Serbs and Kosovo Albanians are very much linked to the past. Many Serbs see themselves as victims of NATO aggression and Albanian fundamentalist movement designed to create Greater Albania. Nationalism and anti-western views are still very much part of Serbian politics. The fall of Milosevic regime in late 2000 and lately in 2005 cooperation with The Hague Tribunal are positive signs that the new democratic government in Yugoslavia is moving slowly but in the right direction.

While for Kosovo Albanians the only option they may agree is an independent Kosovo, they have little experience at running a state. This is also a reflection of their dependence of the United Nations mission in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians tend to call history to explain the events in Kosovo due to also to the psychological effects of the war. The calamity which the Kosovo Albanians showed when their prime minister surrendered to the Hague Tribunal is a good reflection of their ability for institutionbuilding.

The prospect of EU membership which succeeded in consolidating democratic and market reforms throughout the Central and Eastern Europe can now do the some for the countries of the Balkans. The promise of EU membership and NATO is the only lever that EU and the US have for conditionality in the region. If the Balkans was successfully absorbed into the EU, it would finally banish the possibility of the revival of conflict. Europe in order to succeed in the Balkans must remove the visa regime that builds walls between the Western Balkans and other parts of Europe. Moving

103

freely from the Balkans to other parts of Europe will act as a strong incentive for the youth of the region that holds strong western views.

6.2 – Recommendations

As long as both Kosovo Albanians consider living with Serbs and within Serbian state impossible, the international community should accommodate a form of independence for Kosovo.

The independent Kosovo must be committed not to unify with Albania, or any other neighbouring territory or state, and this commitment should be stated in the constitution of the new Kosovo state.

International political and military presence should continue to be present in Kosovo and other states of the Balkans in order to fade out the fears of renewed ethnic violence.

Before deciding in the final status of Kosovo, both Serbia and Kosovo should cooperate and discuss together on the issues of common interest.

Guaranty of democratic governance and human rights should be the first priority for the Kosovo government. Serbia should be more cooperative in respect to Kosovo Serbs in order to convince them to participate in Kosovo institutions. International actors especially US and EU countries must pursue the policy of carrots and sticks with Serbia if it doesn‟t cooperate in this area.

104

European community should take more decisive steps towards the Balkans in order to assist in state-building capacities of the weak states of the Balkans. Waiting until countries of the Balkans stand on their feet to join the Europe may be waste of time and the Balkans may deteriorate at getting further not closer to European dream.

6.3 – Recommendations for further study

In the course of the research for this dissertation, the issue of state-building capacity that in the case of Kosovo is called „standards before status‟ kept recurring. In relation to standards before status policy that the international community has put as a precondition for deciding in the future status of Kosovo the issue of guaranteeing the rights and the protection of minorities is the most controversial. The guaranteeing of minority rights is a precondition in order for the governments of the European countries to democratic development and eliminating conditions for ethnic violence and civil wars. While the Provisional government of Kosovo should fulfil this requirement its decisions are ruled by the powers of Secretary General Special Representative of the UN. Also Kosovo is still a country that depends on the economic foreign assistance and has high level of unemployment.

Arising from these observations a question seems appropriate; how can the provisional Kosovo government whose decisions are overseen by a ruling authority develop itself and fulfil its standards requirement? This question merits further study as the status quo is not contributing for the security of Kosovo and the Balkans.

105

Deciding on the future of Kosovo status is not a question of just how to fulfil aspirations of Kosovo Albanians or otherwise those of Serbia and Serbs. The future of Kosovo is a question of security and the future of the Balkans. A decade of Yugoslav destruction war requires much more attention from international community. Fears of domino effect and revival of nationalist feelings in the region in the case of granting independence to Kosovo cannot justify continues ambiguity over the future of Kosovo, Yugoslavia and the whole region.

106

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition (Oxford University Press, 2001)

Bieber, Florian, Daskalovski, Zidas (editors), Understanding the War in Kosovo, (Frank Cass London, Portland, OR, 2003

Booth Ken, The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions, (Frank Cass, London, Portland, OR, 2001),

Brown, Michael E., Cote, Owen R., Lynn-Jones, Sean M., Miller, Steven E, (editors), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, (The Mit Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2001)

Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc F., (editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy,(The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994)

Diehl, Paul F., Nils Peter Gleditsch, (Editors), Environmental Conflict, (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2001)

Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, (Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1983)

107

Gow, James, The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes, (Hurst & Company, London, 2003)

Harris, D.J, Cases and Materials on International Law, (fifth edition), (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1998)

Homer-Dixon, Thomas F, Environment, Scarcity and Violence, (Princenton NJ, Princenton University Press, 1999)

Horsman, Mathew, Marshall, Andrew, After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder, (HarperCollins Publishers, 1994)

Hough, Peter, Understanding Global Security, (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2004)

Hsiung, James C, Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations, (Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder London, 1997

Jones, Clive, and Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline, (editors), International Security in a Global Age: Securing the Twenty-first Century, (Frank Cass, London, Portland, OR, 2000), p.9

Judah, Tim, Kosovo: War and Revenge, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2000)

108

Smith, Anthony D, Theories of Nationalism, (General Duckworth & Company Limited, London, 1971)

Waters, Trevor, „Language and National Identity: A Source of Conflict in PostCommunist Europe‟, Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 1998, G48

Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley, (editors), The Kosovo Crisis: The last American war in Europe?, (Reuters, Pearson Education, London 2001)

JOURNALS

Conflict Studies Research Centre, September 1995, G 48

Conflict, Security & Development, Vol.3, Number 2, August 2003

Conflict Studies 258, February 1993

Civil Wars, Volume 3, Number 3, Autumn, 2000

Adelphi Paper, 283, December 1993

Challiot Papers, 46, April 2001

Challiot Papers 50, October 2001

109

Survival, Volume 43, Number 2, Summer, 2001

ELECTRONIC JOURNALS

Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2004, vol.58, no.1, at http://weblinks3.epnet.com/externalframe.asp?tb , accessed 10/06/2005

Challiot Papers, 70, October 2004, at http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai70.pdf , accessed 15/07/2005

ELECTRONIC SOURCES

„Kosovo After Haradinaj‟, International Crisis Group-Europe Report Nr 163, Pristina/Brussels, 26 May 2005, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/163_kosovo_after_ haradinaj.pdf , accessed 15/05/2005

„Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161, Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_towar d_final_status.pdf , accessed 15/05/2005

„Religion in Kosovo‟, International Crisis Group-Balkans Report, Nr 155, Pristine/Brussels, 31 January 2001, at

110

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400226_31012001 .pdf , accessed 15/06/2005

„Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 39, Belgrade/Brussels, 23 May 2005, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia___spin ning_its_wheels.pdf , accessed 25/06/2005

„The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, at http://www.balkancommission.org/activities/Report.pdf , accessed 20/06/2005

Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for Kosovo‟, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2003, at http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pd f , accessed 15/05/2005

Crocker, Cherter A, How to Think About Ethnic Conflict, at http://www.fpri.org/fpriwire/0710.199909.crocker.howtothinkaboutethnicconflict. html , accessed 28/06/2005

Ter-Gabriel, Gevork, Strategies in „Ethnic‟ Conflict, at http://www.cwis.org/fwj/41/ethnic.html , accessed 28/06/2005

111

The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity, Territory and the Future of Kosovo‟s Serbs, European Stability Initiative, Berlin/Prishtine, 2004, at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_53.pdf , accessed 29/06/2005

Sullivan, Stacy, Is Kosovo up to Standards?, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo1/2005/0401conditions.htm , accessed 07/06/2005

Burns, Nicholas R, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs United States, Ten Years after Dayton: Winning the Peace in the Balkans, speech given at the Wilson Centre, Washington 19 May 2005, at http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/May/20-375965.html accessed 20/06/2005 , accessed 07/06/2005

Jordan, Michael J, Even in Eager Kosovo, Nation Building Stalls, in http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo1/2004/0922stalls.htm , accessed 07/06/2005

Xharra, Jeta, Kosovo Serbs Hail Election Boycott as Triumph, in http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo/2004/1029triumph.htm , accessed 07/06/2005

Resolution 1244 (1999); Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999, at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm , accessed 29 June 2005

112

Doucette, Serge Raymond, In the Name of God: Serbian Faith-Atrocities, in http://www.albanian.com/community/images/hot_spot/DoucetteonKosova.htm , accessed 25 June 2005

Report of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm , accessed 08 July 2005

Pan-Albanianism: How big a Threat to Balkan Stability? International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr. 153, 25 February 2004, at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN014972.pd f , accessed 13 June 2005

„Collapse in Kosovo‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 155, Pristine/Brussels, 22 April 2004, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/155_collapse_in_ko sovo_revised.pdf , accessed 07 June 2005

„In Search of Responsive Government: State Building and Economic Growth in the Balkans‟, Policy Studies Series, (Centre For Policy Studies, Central European University, Budapest, 2003), at http://www.ceu.hu/cps/pub/pub_polstud_bluebird.pdf, accessed 1 July 2005

113

Christo, Van, Perspective: Albania and Kosovo, at http://www.frosina.org/articles/default.asp?pf=1&id=89 , accessed 15/07/2005

Jane‟s web page, http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/BALK_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=A lbania&Prod_Name=BALK&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/balksu/albas01 0.htm@current#section1 , accessed 10/07/2005

114

Master your semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Special offer for students: Only $4.99/month.

Master your semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Cancel anytime.