Ivan V. Gololobov

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Government University of Essex

Date of Conferment:


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................... 6 NOTE ON STYLE ................................................................................................ 8 ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................... 11

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 13 Setting out the problem........................................................................................ 13 Basic methodological assumptions...................................................................... 18 Regional ideology: defining the term.................................................................... 23 The method and sources to be adopted in the research...................................... 26 The structure of the thesis ................................................................................... 29

CHAPTER 1: RUSSIAN REGIONAL STUDIES AND THE QUESTION OF IDEOLOGY.......................................................................................................... 31 The structure of Chapter 1................................................................................... 31 The question of ideology in contemporary Russian social sciences .................... 32 Regional studies in pre-Revolutionary Russia ..................................................... 35 Regional studies in the Soviet Union: 1917-1991 ................................................ 37


Russian regional studies after 1991: gaining the material ................................... 38 Russian regional studies after 1991: regionalisation is rendered ideological ....... 41 Approaching regional ideologies: the primordialist paradigm............................... 48 Approaching regional ideologies: studies in regional political elite....................... 55 Regional ideologies in focus: Arbakhan Magomedov and the Mystery of Regionalism ................................................................................ 58 Conclusion to Chapter 1 ...................................................................................... 68

CHAPTER 2: IDEOLOGY, DISCOURSE AND SOCIAL CHANGE: INTRODUCTION OF THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK........................ 70 Introduction to Chapter 2 ..................................................................................... 70 Ideology as the ‘greatest of arts […] regulating society’ and as ‘obscure and shadowy metaphysics’ .................................................................. 71 The Marxist encounter ......................................................................................... 73 The post-Marxist critique ..................................................................................... 74 Michel Foucault.................................................................................................... 80 The IDA approach: basic assumptions ................................................................ 89 The concept of dislocation ................................................................................... 94 Social antagonism ............................................................................................... 99 Empty signifiers ................................................................................................... 102


Logics of equivalence and difference................................................................... 103 The notion of the subject ..................................................................................... 105 Hegemonic articulation ........................................................................................ 106 The rise and the fall of democratic hegemony in post-Soviet Russia................... 112

CHAPTER 3: THE IDEOLOGICAL PROJECT OF NIKOLAY KONDRATENKO AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE KUBANIAN REGIONAL DISCOURSE .... 120 Introducing the case ............................................................................................ 120 The structure of the chapter................................................................................. 125 Facing the 1990s as ‘Russian’ ............................................................................. 126 What does ‘to be Russian’ mean for Kondratenko?............................................. 132 Dislocation in context........................................................................................... 138 Naming the enemy............................................................................................... 145 Performing political subjectivity............................................................................ 148 Conducting the struggle....................................................................................... 152 Articulating the regional idea ............................................................................... 156 Drawing out regional difference ........................................................................... 162 Institutionalising the regional identity ................................................................... 163


Conclusion to Chapter 3 ...................................................................................... 171

CHAPTER 4: THE IDEOLOGICAL PROJECT OF YURIY LUZHKOV AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MUSCOVITE REGIONAL DISCOURSE . 173 Introducing the case ............................................................................................ 173 The structure of the chapter................................................................................. 179 Facing the 1990s as a ‘manager’......................................................................... 180 What does ‘to be a manager’ mean for Luzhkov? ............................................... 181 Dislocation in context........................................................................................... 189 Naming the enemy............................................................................................... 198 Performing political subjectivity............................................................................ 205 Conducting the struggle....................................................................................... 209 Articulating the regional idea ............................................................................... 217 Drawing out regional difference ........................................................................... 218 Institutionalising the regional identity ................................................................... 222 Conclusion to Chapter 4 ...................................................................................... 229

CHAPTER 5: REGIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA ........................... 230

....................................... 287 APPENDIX ..... 245 Losing the ideological battle: the political transformations of the regional ideologues................................. 236 ‘Strong state building’ and the decline of regional ideologies................................................... 254 Putin’s administrative reform: losing administrative resources ....5 Introduction to Chapter 5 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 274 Literature ...................................................................................................................................................... 257 CONCLUSION........................................................................................................... 294 .................................................................................................................................. 230 The structure of the chapter....................... 268 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................... 231 The limits of the regional imaginary ....................... 274 Sources .......................................................................... 231 Regional ideologies in the struggle for the post-Soviet Russian nation ................................................................................................

Jason Glynos. from the administrative problems associated with the writing of this thesis. Aletta Norval. Prof. as far as possible. Dr. I am infinitely indebted to her for her precise and patient direction of my work. Prof. most notably . from the faculty of the political sciences at the MSSES who advised my MA thesis. Helge Blakkisrud. kindness and . It could also not have been produced without the people who contributed their knowledge. Ernesto Laclau and Dr. time and effort throughout the long period of my studies. my sincere regards go to Noёlle Quénivet whose love. This thesis is itself a result of intensive study and research carried out at the University of Essex under the supervision of Dr. They are: Dr. Last but not least I want to thank my parents for their constant support of my academic plans.Dr. And finally. in communication with whom many ideas in this thesis were born.6 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This thesis could not have been written without the financial support of the joint PhD programme run by the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences (MSSES) and the University of Essex. as well as my colleagues. I am also grateful to the administrative staff of the joint PhD programme – Lynn Baird. David Howarth. Tatyana Alekseeva. I would also like to thank the rest of the teaching staff of the Ideology and Discourse Analysis programme. Igor Kuznetsov who was my first scientific supervisor at Kuban’ State University. Anna Solodyankina and Gul’naz Kallimullina who excluded me. the Head of the Centre for Russian Studies at the Norwegian Institute for Foreign Affairs where I gained my first experience in the field of political science.

7 attention made the problems with constructing my argument the only ones I encountered during the writing of the thesis. .

k L. a B. like for example Lukoil (Лукойл). g D. о П. K. и Й.8 NOTE TO STYLE Transliteration The text contains a substantial amount of original sources published in Russian as well as significant number of references to the Russian names and surnames. kh Ts. n O. с Т. yu Ya. з И. s T. but bednyi (бедный). й Transliterated equivalents A. ч Ш. у Ф. к Л. d Ye. ъ Э. n P. f Kh. а Б. ch Sh. ь Ъ. z I Y. д Е. р С. м Н. u F. п Р. y ’ unless the word is known in the other transliteration. б В. For this the following system of transliteration is adopted in this thesis.y except when in the end of a word it follows Ы . p R. ё Ж. г Д. ж З. ш Щ. r S. ц Ч. Russian letters А. т У. ya К. щ Ы. m N. я . t U. ю Я. л М. for example Zhirinovskiy (Жириновский). sh Shch. v G. н О. ф Х. eh Yu. ts Ch. then – omitted. l M. e Yo. в Г. b V. or when the proper name is written in a different way by its owner. е Ё. ы Ь. then – I. shch Y. zh Z. э Ю. х Ц. or if this term became used in the other transliteration like ‘perestroika’. like in ‘Yeltsin’ (Ельцин) ’ Eh. yo Zh.

a year of publication and a page referred. oblast’. title. for example: kray. place and publishers. Quoting Quotations exceeding 60 words are given as a special paragraph in font 10. Footnoting The footnoting is done according to the system adopted in the British Journal of Political Sciences. titles of the books and the articles are given in italics. Books are listed by authors. The square brackets contain author’s interventions and comments to the quoted passage. journals. newspapers. gubernia. The other ones are marked in the text by single commas. The proper names of organisations. . zemstvo etc. The international terms like ‘republic’ are translated. Then this word or expression is given in round brackets and in italics transliterated.9 Highlighting and bracketing Sometimes the original Russian expression does not have its adequate equivalent in English. In the text the original Russian terms of administrative and territorial division are untranslated but transliterated.

publisher.10 References to the articles published in collections include author. place. title. as well as the pages of the articles and particular page referred. name of the journal. number and the time published. Newspapers’ articles are listed by author (if any). Internet resources are given as they appear on the web-browser with indications of the date the resource was last visited. . date and the year. pages and a particular page referred. In such cases the first letters are given as they are in the original papers. title. title. Articles in journals are referred through their author. book it is published in (including the editors). newspapers. Some original Russian sources do not contain the full first name of the author. year.

I argue that these identities were brought into being by a particular ideological practice. and of the Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov. Deploying a number of supplementary historical sources I show that this articulation lies at the foundation of the policies which aimed to institutionalise the particular ‘regionalities’. mainly represented in the works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The articulation of regionalist ideas is the result of a particular ideological response to the situation of social dis-identification generated by the dissolution of the USSR and the disappearance of the community of the ‘Soviet people’. and translated into legal and administrative privileges which were given to the ‘subject’ of the regional population. first. which in fact constituted regionalist ideas. the kray representative in the Federal Council from 1994 to 1996 and from 2000 to the present. The thesis concludes with a . The study focuses on two such concrete ‘solutions’.11 ABSTRACT This piece of research is dedicated to the problem of the construction of a new identity in post-Soviet Russia. The genesis of regional identities is the main focus of the investigation. the Kubanian Governor Nikolay Kondratenko. On the basis of a wide corpus of texts produced by the aforementioned politicians the thesis demonstrates how regionalist ideas became a nodal point fixing an entire political logic. namely the ideological projects of. which was incorporated in order to retain the identities which had in fact been born within Soviet discourse and which were unachievable in the transformational atmosphere of the new Russia. the leader of the regional political organisation Fatherland. Drawing on the ‘new theories of discourse’. we will conclude that the articulation of particular ideas of ‘Moscow’ and ‘Kuban’’ is a structural component of the projects. the Governor of of Krasnodar kray from 1996 to 2000.

12 discussion of the hegemonic potential of the regionalist ideologies in question. and their subsequent history. .

and the return to nothing. like all other ‘attempts’. was thought to be the last response to the challenges of the chaos and the final organisation of the eternal world. And the ‘twenty seventh attempt’ to create the world was not the last one. Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (London: Fontana Paperbacks.13 INTRODUCTION Setting out the problem Twenty-six attempts preceded the present genesis. 1 André Neher. In 1991 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. ceased to exist. and this hope. which has accompanied all the subsequent history of the world and mankind. Order out of Chaos. where a formerly stable social order falls into pieces. p. The world of man has arisen out of the chaotic heart of the preceding debris. unpredictable and irreversible events. 1985). all of which were destined to fail. one more time proving the truth of the Creator’s concern. detected in a particular time and in a particular place. The entire subsequent history of humanity consists of eternal struggles between the organising reason seeking to bring a particular order in the world of humans and chaos dissolving this order into a stream of spontaneous. Our research is devoted to one example of such opposition.313. ‘Let’s hope it works’…exclaimed God as he created the World. p. the first socialist state. ‘Vision du temps et de l'histoire dans la culture juive’ in Les cultures et le temps (Paris: Payot. 179. he too is exposed to the risk of failure. . has emphasized right from the outset that this history is branded with the mark of radical uncertainty. which.1 It did not. Quoted from: Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers. 1975).

Soviet Russian nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press. there was only one. 1972). Nevertheless. as well as being developed in numerous academic reflections in the Soviet social sciences. those who were ‘born in the USSR’. see. what is important to mention is that in the strongest way it affected the lives of those directly involved in this historical enterprise. These questions were all the more difficult to answer for those in power. for those placed in the position of leading the people and meant to be able to 2 Many authors agree that the ‘Soviet people’ was indeed the dominant national identity in the USSR. entitled: ‘The Soviet people. they became this debris.CD edition (Moscow: Bol’shaya sovetskaya ehntsiklopediya . 1956). disc no.Glasnet.14 It goes without saying that this event changed the face of the world order. the concept of the ‘Soviet people’ was coined in the official texts of the Soviet state such as the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 315-365. . entry . the Bol’shaya sovetskaya ehntsiklopediya (Moscow: Sovetskaya entsiklopediya. had lost its ground. see for example: Mikhail Kim. ’Who are we?’. But this should happen later. see: ‘Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik’ in Yuriy Kukushkin and Oleg Kuznetsov. in the most explicit way. a whole-union conference was held in Moscow. pp. Many things changed.Sovetskiy narod.novaya istoricheskaya obshchnost’ (Moscow: Politizdat. 2002). However. To a certain degree. expressed the challenge of uncertainty these people had to face. Ocherk istorii sovetskoy konstitutsii (Moscow: Politizdat. ’What are we living for now?’ were the vital questions they asked themselves. 315-317. As an interesting indicator of the reality of the Soviet people one may point. 3. for example: Frederick Barghoorn. out of which the new world had to be constructed. which. for instance. As of now they all are ‘elementary entities’ left without any organising impulse. a new historical unity of the people. and the literature of socialist realism’. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the organisational unity of the ‘Soviet people’2 tied in a common state and guided by the mission of building communism. to the fact that as far back as October 1972. Sovetskiy narod . The ‘elements’ of this society were left on their own. Indeed. 1987). ’Quo vadim?’. 1969-1978) .

These questions inevitably led to the issue of the definition of a new identity – one capable of embracing the population of the lost country in a new social form – being put on the top of the political agenda in one-sixth of the land. strictly speaking. This joke explicitly demonstrates the state of the identity crisis which captured Russian society after the dissolution of the USSR. Another attempt to master the chaos had started. The crisis was also stimulated by the behaviour of the state authorities in the new Russian state who. in Russia.the day of Russian independence .originally set to celebrate the liberation from the Soviet Union. In the absence of ‘conquerors’ from which they should be freed. in fact. It is interesting that June 12 . post-Soviet social order in Russia lays in the centre of our analytic endeavour. a strategy adopted by Yeltsin’s government . However. this answer was. Exactly this attempt to find a new organising reason capable of grounding a new.15 respond to the people’s actual needs and to provide answers to the people’s urgent questions. problematic. This distancing became translated into the strategy of de-ideologising the state. In the former Soviet republics the idea of national revival became the issue that brought together their peoples in the struggle against the ‘empire’. It became the ground for constructing new national societies in the New Independent States. no struggle of national revival could emerge. is to this day ironically perceived by many as the day on which ‘Russia got independent from itself’. as in the ‘mother country’. distanced themselves from the articulation of a new national idea able to set the new mission in motion and also to assist in creating a new form of social identity for the people of Russia.

4 For the parties which ran for Parliamentary representation in 1995 see the database of the Centre for Studies in Norwegian Institute for Foreign Affairs. this project failed to provide a stable frame for new social unity and by the mid-1990s numerous other prospects which responded to the task of looking for the new unity came forward in Russian society. p. a number of political programmes constructed ‘for’ and ‘on behalf’ of social groups representing particular regions5 came forward in the 1990s. and concepts of.nupi. no ideas for. that will be visited in detail in the forthcoming chapters). the North and the South.htm (as of August 15. In order to see this variety one has to look at the suggestions articulated by the various political forces in the parliamentary elections of 1995: the ‘Russians’. forests and plains). Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge. the ‘communists’. 1996). very soon (and due to various reasons. the ‘democrats’.4 Among the range of these various prospectuses.3 When no ideology can be perceived as attached to the state. By the beginning of the 1990s the search for a new identity appeared to be partially fixed in the ideas of the democratic opposition that reached the peak of their popularity in the time of dramatic resistance to the reactionary coup d’etat in August 1991. 2003).16 and stated in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. These projects comprised the uneven choir of voices proposing fundamentally different paths in the quest for new the ‘Christians’ and even the ‘beer lovers’. borders and midlands. 395-429. 397. nor the . 5 In this work region is understood as a unit of the administrative-territorial system of a country (by the end of the 1990s Russian regions were represented by the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation). available at: Russian http://www. Point 3. the ‘agrarians’. Quoted from ‘The Russian Constitution’ in Richard Sakwa. for instance. new identities can be articulated by the state authorities. However. mountains and valleys. 3 ‘No ideology may be established as the state ideology or as a compulsory ideology’ Article 13. It is crucial to say that the regional is neither the physical-geographical division (between.

by the end of the 1990s. Reflecting on the restriction of internal immigration. the Siberians and the midlands’ Russians etc. among which. As some authors mention. arguing their policy on the compulsory registration of visitors to the Russian capital. Observing contemporary public debates further. . One may refer to the example of the Moscow authorities who raised the issue of regional rights in probably the sharpest way ever detected in Russia. become the crucial points in the political programmes of the majority of politicians running for an elected position in the various regions. Neither is it the cultural-territorial division (between the capital and the province. they link the priorities of their legal activities with the ‘rights of Muscovites’. the Pomorians.according to some authors .).6 The programmes where the issue of a region is put in the domain of social unity can be conceived as nothing other than an articulation of particular regional identities. Apart from the articulation of regional interests the political programmes uttered on behalf of a certain region aim at the defence of particular regional rights. the city centre and the suburbs). during the 1990s. advocacy of particular regional interests are probably the most popular ones. Thus. the Cossacks. ‘represents interests of Kuryans – does not represent’ etc. references to regional identities in the Russian mass media outnumbered territorial-economic (between towns and villages. These articulations become a form of response to the identity crisis which gripped Russian society after the disintegration of the community of ‘Soviet people’. the Mayor Luzhkov said that ‘it is not necessary to speak about human rights’ because for him ‘the rights of the Muscovites are more important’.17 These programmes were constructed in different ways. the dichotomies of: ‘defends the interests of the Ryazanians – does not defend the interests of the Ryazanians’. it is possible to say that proliferation of these programmes grew to such a degree that .

). ‘supporter of the President’ and ‘President’s opponent’. In order to demonstrate this relevance I will oppose some arguments that may be put in order to argue the opposite. (1996). point of analytic departure. pp. ‘Svoboda peredvizheniya. Ilyin and 8 The numerous researches referring to the ‘regional self-consciousness’ fall in this group of voices. No. Pod konvoem’ in Novoe vremya. 7 See: Alexandr Logunov. 2001). 10. ‘Rol’ SMI v razvitii protsessov regionalizatsii Rossii’ available at: http://www. Thus one may say that regional identities always exist in society and what is described above is just another example of their quite regular representation in political debates. ‘reformist’ and ‘conservative’. Regional’noe samosoznanie kak faktor formirovaniya politicheskoy kul’tury v Rossii (Moscow: MONF.7 The general problem of this research is thus best formulated in the question as to how a region becomes one of the dominant frames of social identification in the political debates of post-Soviet Russia. 1999). It seems that the constructivist approach is especially relevant to studies as to the process of emergence and dissolution of social identities. See for example: M. It is assumed that any arrangement of social organisation as well as the nature of the elements constituting the latter are perceived as historically and contextually created. Busygina (eds. essentialistic. 11.inguk.18 citations of such identities as ‘Russian’ and ‘Soviet’. The forms of regional 6 Kronid Lyubarskiy. ‘democrat’ and ‘communist’. 10- 12. p. Basic methodological assumptions This research departs from a constructivist methodological background.html (as of June 20. albeit one which is provoked by the specific historical circumstances. .8 In response to this critique it has to be clarified that this is simply not true.

. working people’ or working and ‘exploited people’ (1918) whose demands are reflected in the policies of the Soviet state. 1936. As a matter of fact. In public texts one’s regional affiliation was recognised as nothing else but the specification of his or her class belonging like ‘the Tumen’ workers’. the ‘Krasnoyarians’ etc. created in the USSR. The former refer to identities which are different from the ones approached in this research. regional populations were never regarded as a subject of particular demands in the Soviet Union. 1977) and the RSFSR (1918) these were ‘peoples’ or various class actors. which manifested during the civil war (1917-1922). and the articulation of regional rights and interests that came forward in the regions of Russia in the 1990s. Neither geographically. and it is possible to employ two arguments which support this conclusion. it is essentially wrong to say that the regional differences constituted within the particular system of administrative-territorial division of the country formed discrete social identities. a transition between Cossack. such as ‘workers and peasants’. On the one hand these are the ‘Cossacks’ or the ‘Siberians’. this means that contemporary regions in the way they are understood in this research did not exist always but were created in a concrete historical period. the particular system of regional difference was based upon the particular administrative-territorial division. can these identities be mapped on one another. nor sociologically. it is hardly possible to speak about any long-term continuity between. It was this way which was used to indicated the demands coming from a particular region.9 The special treatment of the Far Northern territories was based on their 9 According to the constitutions of the USSR (1924. for example. in the strict sense of the word. Therefore. or Siberian identities. First of all. ‘the working people of Leningrad’ or ‘the peasants of Voronezh oblast’’ etc. Literally. in the USSR. Secondly.19 identity proposed in the political programmes of the 1990s were essentially specific and new creations. On the other hand these are the ‘Kubanians’.

when the question of a new social unity became urgent after the October Revolution of 1917. rights and interests of the Muscovites as the Muscovites. the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. Thus. on the monument built in honour of the heroes of the World War II in Saint-Petersburg’s Park Pobedy it is stated: ‘ In your honour. but not to the oblast’ or even republic it was located in.did not represent an example in which the regional population was the subject of particular regional demands either. This. As an additional argument demonstrating the historical specificity of the outlined problem. Hence. ethnicity . had little in common with the articulation of the demands. 1937). However. as it united the parts of different regions located in the so-called ‘3rd price zone’.by the beginning of the 20th century .opened this park in Autumn 1945’. in the frame of our research. nation. when it like: ‘The working people of the kray approve decision of the court’ in Krasnoyarskaya pravda (Septebmer 24. another example. Or. again. Moscow obviously blessed with special rights in the Soviet Union . . In fact.divided into gubernias which possessed the status of administrative-territorial creations within the state. These were proposals which had to do with class. the Russian empire was . these privileges were delivered to the capital as ‘the capital’ and as a city which in the Soviet administrative system was subordinated to the Union authorities directly. in fact. both of which factors really had nothing to do with the reference to their regional specificity. none of them came out with proposals for specific gubernia or oblast’ demands.even estates. here we again talking about social identities different from the ones regarded as regional. The very notion of Far North territories was. a cross-regional one. we – the working people [emphasis added] of Leningrad . party.20 economic importance and their geographical differences from the mainland. one may refer to the fact that the crisis of social organisation does not automatically invoke a proliferation of programmes applying to regional identities and articulating their political representation.

as an ‘immigrant’. In the light of these arguments it seems hardly possible to consider the prospects for regional identification as a kind of always-present social phenomenon. in its turn. it also seems especially relevant to examine this problem from a standpoint capable of accounting for the projects of regional identification as socially constructed phenomena. And therefore. since regional identification is regarded as a socially created phenomenon. This implies a precise focus on the problem of politicising a region. as ‘French’ etc. of re-thinking its meaning so that individuals are ready to consider themselves as belonging to that region. it seems necessary to focus on the way ‘the Muscovites’.21 came to the Cossack resistance. but not the regional identities which dominated the competition for social re-unification in the changing society later on. Therefore. The accent on the social construction of a region therefore prescribes the specific focus of our research. It finds its regularities in social interaction. appears to be essentially grounded by the organisation of the communicative space where individuals receive their socially recognised places for speaking and ‘places for hearing’. we feel. not by the ‘divine will’ or any other transcendental source. The latter. or ‘the Ryazanians’ become socially recognisable places for speaking in relation to which the regional identities find their social reality. a ‘president’. Since in contemporary societies to be just a name is not enough to be heard. It takes for granted that the activity of human beings has its particular organisation and that this organisation is not given neither by ‘nature’. rather than to other imaginary communities. . as a member of the ‘unemployed’. And this is the material for a particularly useful intervention. social communication is therefore based upon the political representation of an individual as a ‘worker’.

22 As a preliminary hypothesis it is assumed that the articulation of regional identities in contemporary Russia was grounded in the re-thinking of the meaning of regions. Saratov. the main city in the Volga area. As an example of this idea one may refer to the slogans that like: the Maritime territories are ‘Russia’s Far East outpost’. unique social creations. Nizhniy Novgorod is ‘the pocket of Russia’. ‘Rol’ SMI v razvitii protsessov regionalizatsii Rossii’. As a result of this re-conceptualisation the latter ceased to be seen as pure administrativeterritorial units within the country but came to be perceived as something else precisely as. uniting the dis-identified people in a new social project.10 As an additional example of regional ideas one may point to the ongoing competition of various regions for the privilege to be called the ‘capital’ of broader geographical areas. Precisely such a unity in common regional enterprises made relevant the constitution of particular demands uttered by way of pursuit of the mission given to a particular regional community and not to anyone else. Yaroslavl’ is ‘the centre of European Russia’. It is these ideas which offer the frames for specifying a regional social identity. I believe that the contemporary reconceptualisation of regions so that they come to be linked to unique social creations is embodied in the articulation of particular regional ideas. . Yekaterinburg .as the ‘Urals’ capital’. For instance Samara. Krasnoyarsk is ‘the centre of Russia’. 10 See: Logunov. Voronezh – as ‘the Black-soil’ one etc. Novosibirsk – as ‘the Siberian capital’. To a certain extent this kind of idea became the foundation for new ‘historical missions’. Krasnodar – ‘the Southern capital’. Kuban’ is ‘the granary of Russia’ etc.e. in their own way. Kazan’ and Nizhniy Novgorod fight to occupy the place of the ‘Volga capital’ i.

Thus.12 This work does not aim at bringing clarity to these debates and it does not set the task of finding a universal concept of ideology. no.3 (1971). p. ‘Ideology as a cultural system’ in Clifford Geertz. 1993). . pp. 193-233. The case of “Ideology”’ in American Political Science Review. 12 Terry Eagleton. However.23 Regional ideology: defining the term The aforementioned approach to the process of regional identification in contemporary Russia specifies a particular object to be researched in order to approach it analytically. Eagleton finds that more than a dozen of definitions of ideology are used in contemporary research. for example. 651-681. p. An Introduction (London: Verso.1-2. The Interpretation of Cultures (London: Fontana Press. Clifford Geertz and many other scholars who argue that in social theory one can hardly find a term which is more blurred and undefined in its content than ‘ideology’11 are not so irrelevant. 193. Clifford Geertz. it seems reasonable to focus the research on the genesis of regional ideologies. Ideology. 11 Robert Putnam. Insofar as it is generally assumed that the articulation of regional identities is essentially grounded in the construction of regional ideas. ‘Studying elite political culture. From the very beginning it is necessary to mention that in contemporary social sciences the notion of ideology is far from being unequivocally agreed upon.651. 1991). Indeed the following reviews demonstrate rather serious disagreements on this question. in employing this term in accordance with a particular reading it is still possible to introduce a concise reasoning. The concerns of Robert Putnam.

To illustrate this assumption it is possible to take the following example. Valentin Voloshinov. scientific texts also provide tools which render reality intelligible but it is hardly possible to say that. According to the definition adopted in this research. for example. . or. ideology differs from other spheres of sign communication within a society. In the same way the conceptualisation of anthropological difference between peoples of various ethnic and racial origins as such can hardly be considered an ideology. Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 14 Press. and the entire Bakhtin circle. presented in the form of an experts’ report. For instance. as a field of sign communication which has the power to structure the audience in a particular way. once this conclusion appears to be linked to the social significance of the natural environment and the damage done to it by massive industrialisation. I see ideology in a less general manner . Voloshinov. 194. While 13 Ibid. ideas as such therefore become an ideology only insofar as they are being recognised as a certain ‘manual for social action’. does not constitute an ideology. in frameworks of this research. Einstein’s theory of relativity constitutes an ideology. 1986). However.24 I depart from what Eagleton calls ‘the semiotic concept of ideology’13. to be engaged with the foundation of its particular mode of organisation.14 In general. However. which means that ideology is to be seen as a linguistic phenomenon.that is. A particular academic’s conclusions as regards the way industrial production influences the condition of the biosphere. to put it in another way. p. By the power of structuring its audience. it becomes an ideological belief constituting a ‘green movement’. where its members become ‘the Greens’. introduced by the Russian scholar Valentin Voloshinov. consider ideology as a sphere of sign communication.

known receiver and those addressed to an abstract audience. p.once individuals started defining themselves as ‘workers’ or ‘proletariat’. In the same way the ideas of Tolstoy became the ideology of the Tolstovtsy movement. The abstract audience is an imaginary community whose members are personally unknown to the speaker. 161. This recruitment is concealed in addressing the listeners not as private 15 Mikhail Bakhtin. 169-174. In this moment my research departs from the Bakhtinian account of ideological messages later developed in the Russian semiotic school.5 (Moscow: Labirint. 159-206. ‘Problema rechevykh zhanrov’ in Mikhail Bakhtin. Istoriya i tipologiya russkoy kul’tury (Saint Petersburg: Iskusstvo-SPb. The power to structure the audience is concealed in the essentially public character of its message. Sobranie sochineniy v 7 tomakh.16 Being distributed to the listeners the ideological message has the power to recruit individuals in a particular political community.25 a translation of these differences into actual prospects of social development by privileging one group and discriminating against another becomes a racist ideology. and ‘No future!’ declared as a slogan by the Sex Pistols became the ideology for the ‘punks’ towards the end of the 1970s. Mikhail Bakhtin regards as ideological those messages belonging to the realm of the secondary speech genres represented by complex texts different from ‘simple’ everyday speech.15 The theorists of the Moscow-Tartu Semiotic School consider the division between the primary (everyday) and the secondary (ideological) speech genres as that between the messages oriented to a concrete. The public character of any text is defined by the abstract image of the audience it is referred to. ‘Tekst i struktura auditorii’ in Yuriy Lotman. 2002). 16 Yuriy Lotman. 1997). . It is exactly through this capacity of transforming the audience into ‘classes’ that the philosophical ideas of Marx and Engels comprised the ideology of Marxism . vol.

26 persons but as members of a certain ‘imagined’ unity regardless of its type . in which the main accent is placed upon the question of the internal regularities of the investigated phenomena rather than the examination of their sociological representation in society. ‘Saint Petersburgers’ etc.17 As Lotman comments. on the matter of the abstract message: ‘[it] constructs an abstract interlocutor. the work requires a reliance on sources which are suitable for a deep analysis of the structure of ideological programmes and the place of the regional idea in these sets of beliefs. The method and the sources to be adopted in the research In the light of the task set by the research. ‘people’. and in accordance with the outlined theoretical framework. regional ideologies are considered as political projects addressed to particular regional communities. Thus the research has come to be designed in the form of a qualitative analysis. In such a way.‘citizens’. . Therefore the actual empirical endeavour is comprised by the case studies. 18 Lotman. ‘Tekst i struktura auditorii’ p. the ideological messages recruit individuals into a certain imagined community and set the stage for the alienation of personal experience for the sake of the social unity of a region. 17 This assumption is based on the Aristotelian understanding of the political seen as the realm of polis uniting individuals in a common unity which however is not derived to their separate interests falling into the realm of poiesis where an individual acts as a private person in his or her oikos. which at the point of alienating personal and individual experience corresponds to the Aristotelian idea of politea. It is assumed that through this address. a holder of simply a common memory devoid of personal and individual experience’18. 171. ‘Muscovites’.

These are the programmes of acting politicians that on the one hand contain a relatively elaborated set of proposals for social unity and on the other hand are extensively translated for the audience through the means of printed and electronic media. The prerequisite of extensive access to the audience limits the investigation to the sphere of mass-media production. In the light of the aforementioned assumptions the textual performances of Russian governors comprise the main empirical focus of this investigation. Together these requirements specify a concrete object of analysis that should be touched upon in terms of its details. The Russian Federation consists of 89 regions that by 2003 lived through 3 cycles of governors’ elections. the study . Therefore this research is focused only on a few figures representing the spectrum of the Russian political elite. the case studies are focused upon the consistent programmes extensively translated to their potential audience. herein. A brief review of contemporary Russian political debates demonstrate that amongst the range of public figures whose views have become widely advertised in the media only one group is especially interesting for this thesis. At the same time as being the highest administrative authorities of their regions the Governors possess almost total control over the regional and local media which are the main channels translating their views to the audience in the Russian territories. This group consists of the Governors or Heads of regional administrations. to analyse the entire corpus of texts produced by all Russian governors is an impossible task.27 Due to the particular understanding of what ideology is. However. The requirement for the programme to carry a relatively extended set of views and proposals will cause us to focus upon the authorised texts as it is only there that it appears possible to trace an extended political argument. For it is in the programmes of these actors that the question of regional identity obtains its most advanced elaboration. Notably.

89% in 1999 and about 75% of votes in 2003.96% of votes in 1996. These texts form the main group of sources used in the research. both of them obtained impressive public support during the regional elections of the 1990s. the issues of the regions. On the one hand this choice is explained by the fact that these figures are probably amongst the brightest regional leaders in contemporary Russian history.28 deploys the programmes translated by two Russian Governors: the Mayor of Moscow Yuriy Luzhkov and the Head of the Krasnodar kray administration Nikolay Kondratenko. as in 1996 more than 82% of the voters gave their support to his candidature and only his personal decision to withdraw from the following regional elections in 2000 prevented him from achieving another impressive result. Luzhkov and Kondratenko are chosen for precise analysis because they address in the most distinctive way. On the other hand. addresses and declarations. interests and ‘historical mission’ constitute a substantial part of their two political programmes. Yuriy Luzhkov was elected Mayor three times in a row with 89. The programmes chosen for detailed investigation are fixed in ‘materialised’ manifestations which comprise public speeches. interviews. . their rights. For example. 68. Even a brief review of their programmes indicates that the references to the object of a regional population. in their political programmes. the Muscovites and the Kubanians. as well as memoirs and other authorised works of literature produced by the aforementioned politicians. Kondratenko also came to be regarded as an ‘electoral champion’. Thus.

Chapter 1 introduces existing literature devoted to problem of regional ideologies in contemporary Russia. However. for example. Once identified. the private correspondence of a public person is published as a work of art. It is fair to say that we know of many cases in which a piece of inter-personal communication starts to play an ideological function – as when. The structure of the thesis The argument of the thesis outlined in the introduction is evaluated in 5 chapters. For their contemporaries they remain private and do not produce any ideological effect. the gaps will allow for my research to be adequately situated. in order that it can contribute to the declared problematic in the 19 See for instance. .29 It is important to mention that personal interviews and other ‘exclusive’ materials popular in some works devoted to contemporary Russian ideologies19 are not considered as a valid source in this research. Misteriya Regionaliszma: Regional’nye pravyashchie ehlity i regional’nye ideologii v sovremennoy Rossii: Modeli politicheskogo vossozdaniya snizu (Sravnitel’nyi analiz na primere respublik i oblastey Povolzh’ya) (Moscow: MONF. The review of the available literature makes it possible to identify what is achieved and what lacks in existing literature devoted to the issues of Russian regional ideologies. these transformations usually occur a certain amount of time after these messages have been sent and the texts become ideological for the audience of another epoch. Arbakhan Magomedov. This excludes the confidential information translated by the politicians in one-to-one conversations from the scope of valid sources for the given endeavour focused on the emergence of regional ideologies in post-Soviet Russia. The restriction of the source base to non-confidential public texts is explained by the specific understanding of the ideological. 2000). which constitutes the main sphere of the analytic endeavour.

The historical destiny of such ideological interventions constitutes the main issue addressed in Chapter 5. Proceeding further in this direction. This introduction opens the way for a translation of the outlined research trajectory into the particular steps of the subsequent empirical work. The thesis includes a bibliography consisting of the literature used in the research. In accordance with the formulated programme. . and .30 most adequate manner. the empirical research is carried out in Chapters 3 and 4. It is in these parts that I show how regions are politicised. There I visit the competition between the regional ideologies which had come onto the Russian political scene in the 1990s and Putin’s programme of ‘strong state building’ articulated in the beginning of the 2000s.separately listed – the sources employed in the empirical research. In these parts I demonstrate the way a region comes to be one of the central points in the political programmes of the aforementioned politicians. I introduce my methodological framework in Chapter 2. The results of the research are summarised in the Conclusion.

I argue that the inability to put the issue of regional ideology in the main focus of analytic endeavour is not an occidental misfortune. cultural affiliations or the configuration of political regimes. The crucial gap detected in the reviewed texts is revealed in the tendency to ignore the aforementioned question or to leave it as highly peripheral to the main line of the analysis. who makes the most decisive attempt to focus upon the question of regional ideologies. Analysing his texts I argue that although the author has an encouraging goal. Particular focus is given to the question of the ideological in the context of regional studies. In this paradigm the object known as ideology becomes floating as the authors of these works unavoidably end up examining its ‘underlying’ terrains .31 CHAPTER 1: RUSSIAN REGIONAL STUDIES AND THE QUESTION OF IDEOLOGY The structure of Chapter 1 This chapter is devoted to the introduction of literature that has emerged from the field of Russian regionalism. ‘discourse’ or ‘mythology’ in the overall argument of the reviewed works I explain such indifference as a result of the basic methodological preoccupations of the authors. Showing the place of regional ‘ideology’. to describe the phenomenon of . special attention is devoted to the approach of a Russian scholar Arbakhan Magomedov. It is a logical consequence of the research conducted within the essentialist paradigm dominating these works. Reviewing extensive studies I indicate the advances and the gaps identified in their approach towards the issue of regional ideologies. Nevertheless. that is.such as economic relations. in this Chapter.

ru/works/patr/p2. ideologiya. available at: Istoriya. http://www. 2003). and to the works on 1 Alexandr Verkhovskiy and Vladimir Pribylovskiy. The question of ideology in contemporary Russian social sciences As mentioned earlier. which was heavily associated with. As a matter of fact the academic community in Russia pays little attention to the ideological development of Russian society in general.panorama. first of all.32 contemporary Russian regionalism through the prism of its ideological dimension. Natsional-patrioticheskie organizatsii v Rossii. xenophobic and other extremist ideologies which emerged in Russia during and after perestroika. 1996). The reasons for this failure lie in the absence of a well-elaborated methodological foundation for his study. The first one is nationalistic. As a result. This tension underlines the necessity for a deeper endeavour in contemporary theoretical discussions on ideology.html (as of August 15. a general review of the existing literature exposes a serious lack of works devoted to the problem of the emergence and constitution of regional ideologies in contemporary Russia. the defeated Marxist-Leninist tradition. ehkstremistskie tendentsii (Moscow: Panorama. . which leads the argument into the next chapter. This indifference is a consequence of the post-Soviet ‘allergy’ to the very term ‘ideology’. It is necessary to mention that this problem is not something specific to treatments of regional ideologies. by the beginning of the 2000s the studies in the ideological transformations of the new Russian society appear to be limited to a small number of investigations that mainly cover two general topics. he fails to provide a credible account of the declared problem. In this group of works one could refer to the extensive research projects of the Panorama group1.

This spectrum of issues is visited in the works of Boris Kapustin5 and some other authors6. 2000).33 contemporary Russian racism and nationalism written by Vladimir Malakhov2. Oksana Karpenko and Alexander Osipov (eds. natsionalizm i regionalistskaya ritorika’ in Kavkazskie regional’nye issledovaniya. Ideologiya i politika v poskommunisticheskoy Rossii. neither the first nor the second group of researchers really address the problem of regional ideas and ideologies in the framework of their analytic endeavours. in their key bibliography of Russian regional 2 Vladimir Malakhov. 162-193.45-69. 2002). 250-272. Alexander Osipov. 23 Oksana Karpenko. ‘Skromnoe obayanie rasizma’ i drugie stat’i (Moscow: Dom intellektual’noy knigi. Rasizm v yasyke sotsial’nykh nauk (Saint Petersburg: Aleteya. . Unsurprisingly. ‘Yazykovye igry s “gostyami s yuga”: “kavkaztsy” v Rossiyskoy 30.1999 gg. ‘Ofitsial’nye ideologemy regulirovaniya mezhnatsional’nykh otnosheniy kak faktor razvitiya ehtnicheskoy konfliktnosti (regional’nyi aspekt)’ in Identichnost’ i konflikt v postsovetskikh gosudarstvakh (Moscow: Gendal’f. Neither is this problem adequately reflected in the work of those authors working in the field of Russian regional studies. Neil Melvin and his colleagues from the University of Leeds.) Multikul’turalizm i transformatsiya postsovetskikh obshchestv (Moscow: RAN. However.’ in Vladimir Malakhov and Valeriy Tishkov (eds. 1.4 The second group of papers is comprised by the studies in the Western noncommunist programmes of social development and their implications as regards the ‘Russian soil’.). ‘Kak ehksperty proizvodyat ehtnofobiyu’ in Rasizm v yasyke sotsial’nykh nauk. Alexander Osipov3 and the scholars of the Saint Petersburg Centre for Independent Social Research. 4 Oksana Karpenko. 2002). Izbrannaya sotsial’no- filosofskaya publitsistika (Moscow: Editorial URSS. ‘Krasnodarskiy kray: migratsiya. ‘Konstruirovanie ehtnicheskogo konflikta i rasistskiy diskurs’ in Viktor Voronkov. demokraticheskoy presse 1997 . 5 Boris Kapustin. (1996). 3 Alexander Osipov. 2001). Alexander Osipov. 1997). 81-93.

the ‘language of regional politics’ and ‘regional discourse’ crop up. 6 Tatyana Alekseeva. in their ‘Russia’s Political Regionalism’. by the end of the 1990s the concept of ‘regional ideas’. in the absence of an established academic tradition of studies in regional ideologies. This excursion aims at demonstrating the dominant tendencies in the understanding of contemporary Russian regional ideologies. Boris Kapustin and Igor’ Pantin. 2003). available at: Centre http://www. Politicheskaya nauka sovremennoy Rossii: tendentsii razvitiya (Moscow: INION RAN.9 However.34 studies7. do not specify regional ideology. ‘Politicheskaya regionalistika Rossii: istoriya i sovremennoe razvitie’ in Politicheskaya (1997). Rossiya regionov: transformatsiya politicheskikh rezhimov (Moscow: Ves' ‘Perspektivy integrativnoy ideologii (tezisy)’ in Politicheskie issledovaniya. there is not one single reference to the word ‘ideology’ in the aforementioned work of these authors. Eurasian and Central European Studies).Russia of the Regions.). published in 2000. 9 Vladimir Gel’man. do not mention any research projects focused upon the study of ideas and ideologies. Likewise Gel’man and Ryzhenkov. in many works. 8 Vladimir Gel’man and Sergey Ryzhenkov. nor in their later project . mythology or discourse as a thematic sub-section in their list. 16-27. And the further review is followed by the introduction of these works. no. This seems to be a necessary prerequisite for beginning a theoretically and methodologically credible investigation of the given topic.8 Moreover. The Politics of Russia’s Regions (LUCRECES . 1999). 172-255. 2000). . Sergey Ryzhenkov and Michael Bri (eds. ideas. in various interesting ways.htm (as of August 15. 7 Neil Melvin and Rosaria Puglisi.Leeds University for Russian.leeds.

However. along with cultural translations of territorial differences became some of the main issues covered in the writings of these pioneering Russian fieldworkers. Among the main subjects of these descriptions. Together with the studies in local administrative reforms. The so-called ‘local studies’ became a substantial branch of social research by the end of the 19th century. another direction for regional studies emerged in Russia in the second half of the 19th century. various papers of local statistical committees and local newspapers published materials in which teachers. . In the 1870s. after the establishment of zemstvo – the first institutions of local self-government in the Russian Empire . doctors. The journals like Russkaya starina. along with the paintings of Venetsianov and the group – peredvizhniki. The massive interest in provincial life articulated in the literature of Nekrasov and Saltykov-Shchedrin. diverted much public interest towards the question of cultural differences between territorial communities within the Russian society. Reports of the Russian Geographic Society. the ‘ideas of oneself’ and the perceptions of ‘people from other sites’. state officials and other educated people described the culture of the local population in various Russian provinces. these debates did not touch upon the problem of particular regional ideas and mainly focused on the conceptualisation of the region as an abstract entity in the system of state organisation. at which time a preliminary interest in the general problem of regionalisation or localisation of state power was articulated.35 Regional studies in pre-Revolutionary Russia The history of regional studies in Russia goes back to the end of the 19th century.this problem enters serious academic discussions.

but the October Revolution defined the destiny of the research in a different way. 151 (1903). 59-104. 38-58. 1994).the endeavours to localise the Russian state administration and the ethnographic encounters with territorial identities . . Here he extensively studies the problem of the ‘regional other’ in the folklore of Russian peasants. the first Russian ethnographers did not evaluate their work beyond the terms of reasonably fragmented recordings of a territorially-based self-conception. However. the studies in Russian locality raised questions which stand in close proximity to the ones addressed in this research. Dmitriy Zelenin. ‘Velikorusskie narodnye prislov’ya kak material dlya ehtnografii’ in Dmitriy Zelenin. no. 10 Dmitriy Zelenin. Izbrannye trudy. since they focus on the particular ideas of regionally differentiated communities. Dmitriy Zelenin. ‘Narodnye prislovya o vladimirtsakh’ in Zhivaya Rossiya. In the beginning of the 20th century.characterise the state of regional analytics in the pre-Revolutionary period. It is possible to suggest that the further symbiosis of ethnographic studies in Russian ‘localities’ and political analyses of local institutions could be a fruitful way to account for the problem of politicising the regions. a Russian ethnographer Dmitriy Zelenin devoted several of his essays to the question of regional ideas in the lands of the Volga and the Russian North. Stat’i po dukhovnoy kul’ture 1910-1913.36 Later this focus developed to form the basis of some profoundly interesting research projects. Stat’i po dukhovnoy kul’ture 1910-1913 (Moscow: Indrik. 557-560. Dmitriy Zelenin. The two directions of regional studies .10 As may already be seen. ‘Narodnye prislov’ya i anekdoty o russkikh zhitelyakh Vyatskoy gubernii (Ehtnograficheskiy i istorikoliteraturnyi ocherk)’ in Zelenin.

In the 1920s almost all societies and institutions dealing with studies in the ‘locality’ of the Russian society as well as the journals publishing their materials were closed. The theme of regional ideas in the folk culture. . 236-239. got transformed into a study of general issues of the ‘language world picture’. p. syntax. 174. 124/125 (1903).11 The ethnographic studies in territorial differences detected within the Soviet state faced the same problem. outlined by Zelenin. morphology. as announced in the programmes of Soviet ‘nation building’ (natsional’no-gosudarstvennoe stroitel’stvo). phraseology and other spheres of language organisation detected mainly in the ‘Prikamskiy kray v russkom narodnom yazyke. no. ‘Politcheskaya regionalistika Rossii’. As Gel’man and Ryzhenkov characterise this period in regional studies: ‘The absence of regional political research in the USSR before perestroika is explained by the fact that the elements of the territorial political organisation of the society were regarded by the central power simply as chains connected to the ruling mechanism but not as independent subjects of social life’. 11 Gel’man and Ryzhenkov.37 Regional studies in the Soviet Union: 1917-1991 After 1917 the official Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the supreme power and historical significance of the supranational and supraterritorial classes seriously reduced the level of scientific interest which was addressed to the issues of regionalism. Scientific interest regarding geographical diversity moved towards the study of ‘peoples’ and ‘nationalities’. In this research the questions of regional and wider territorial criteria of social stratification was put at the level of lexicon. in accordance with the political request of the state. poslovitsakh i prislov’yakh’ in Zhivopisnaya Rossiya.

From the very beginning of its existence. they do not see the question of regional ideas as a way to apprehend social reality. One of the first ones was the Centre for Ethno-Political and Regional Studies. After 1993 the 12 Yekaterina Yakovleva.12 Despite the undoubted value of these endeavours for linguistic or broader cultural analysis. they do not attend to the issues of how these modes of conceiving society affects actual practices and attitudes within the community in which they are produced. especially those which contradicted the one true reality of class unity. this organisation focused on reviewing political. In response to this interest there emerged a huge number of centres and institutions which brought the problem of contemporary Russian regionalism to the centre of their scientific reflections. More precisely. because under the pressure of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology. economical and social processes in the ‘hardcore’ of the Russian Federation. formed in 1991 by Emile Pain. Russian regional studies after 1991: gaining the material The dissolution of the USSR and the tasks of building the new Russia diverted massive levels of interest towards the regional dimension of Russian society. no adequate studies in any other ideological formation in Russia. 1994). were possible. Fragmenty russkoy yazykovoy kartiny mira (Moscow: Gnosis. they drove academic attention away from the central question addressed in our research. This is not surprising. .38 artefacts of the ‘traditional culture’. Moreover. The works of Yakovleva represent a good example of this kind of literature. a Russian scholar and a high state official.

predrassudki (Moscow: MONF.mercator. soon joined the Presidential Council where he became responsible for regional counselling. Besides the Institute of Geography. For general information see: http://www. created in 1993 in the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of Russian Academy of Science under the 13 Among the main publication of the Centre for Ethno-Political and Regional Studies it is possible to konfliktnykh mention: Ehmil’ Pain and Arkadiy Popov (eds. in the beginning of the (as of August 15. one may point to the Mercator Group formed in 1992 in the Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences and led by Dmitriy Oreshkin.). unlike the others the Mercator exclusively addressed its research to the Russian (as of Leonid Smirnyagin. protivorechiya. Rossiyskiy federalizm: paradoksy. 2003). in the Russian regions.indem. Thus we should here refer to the Network of Ethnological Monitoring. . The head of this group. 14 zonakh (Moscow: TsEPRI. Thus they have been hardly available to public view. a geographer Leonid Smirnyagin. These projects. some other projects run in the Russian Academy of Sciences should be noted.39 Centre started to publish monthly chronicles of regional life based on mass-media and other publicly available sources in the Russian territories.15 The Group also mainly conducted regional reviews. to a greater or lesser degree. even unto the present. However. 1998). 1994).14 Among the other research centres created for gathering information on the Russian regions.13 In 1992 the analytic group monitoring the situation in the Russian regions was organised under the title: Informational-Analytic Centre of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. 15 More information on the Mercator Group is available at the official web-page: http://www. deal with the problems of regional politics and social change. Gosudarstvennaya politika Rossii v August 15. 2003).

htm (as of August 15. For more information see the official web-site of the IGPI: http://www.40 leadership of Valeriy Tishkov. the Network published papers based on the authorised reports of local experts who had access to a broad number of local data. Ocherki rossiyskoy politiki (Moscow: IGPI. Tishkov managed to create a network of regional experts who became the main authors of the regular reports in Ethnic Tensions and Early Preventions of Conflicts . January.16 Unlike the other centres of regional studies located in Moscow. however Mary McAuley footnotes this archive as. The bulletins of the Network are also available online at: http://www. 2004).17 Besides extensive monthly reviews covering various aspects of regional life in Russia the IGPI also published thematic papers that contained statistical and empirical data on current political issues like Elections – 95. In this group of writings the 16 General information on the Network is available at its official web-page: http://www. 2003). Moscow: IGPI. journalists. .igpi.ras.eawarn. By 1994-1995 the system of local experts had evolved into a huge academic network which united numerous experts from all over Russia including local officials and political activists.18 All these academic initiatives were designed to gain primary sociological and historical material on Russian regional life. 1996. 18 Vladimir Gel’man. for instance. which observed the Russian regions via sources available in the Reviews of Russian Politics etc. The same principle of local expertise is employed in the work of the Political Monitoring run by the Institute for Humanities and Political Sciences in 1993-2000. They produced a valuable corpus of sources for the introduction of the problem of the post-Soviet (as of March 15. 1994).eawarn. This was a crucial innovation of Valeriy Tishkov.htm (as of August 15. ‘Omskaya oblast’ v yanvare 1996 goda’ in Politicheskiy monitoring.monthly papers published by the Institute. 17 Papers of the Politicheskiy Monitoring run by the IGPI are fully available only in forms electronic archive. 2003).

transcending the purely descriptive agenda of the ‘first wave’ of Russian regional studies. in many of the observed texts. for example. communist or other programmes of social development. the main question addressed to the issue of ideology in this group of works can be formulated in terms of whether or not regionalisation stimulates the establishment of social relations advocated in relation to the prospects of democratic transition in Russia. Consequently. speeches. The latter were seen in terms of the public language performances of regional politicians: declarations. emerged. argues that transformations of . this attention appeared to be limited by the question of juxtaposing regionalisation and the values articulated in liberal. interviews devoted to different aspects of regional life. only a few. none of the works from this group raise the problem of regional ideologies in the post-Soviet society in a critical sense. However. Smirnyagin.41 first references towards the problem of regional ideas and ideologies emerged. Russian regional studies after 1991: regionalisation is rendered ideological By the mid-1990s the question of ideology in the context of growing regionalisation came to be visited theoretically with greater frequency. A big group or authors working in this direction consider that the territorial fragmentation of state and society is a necessary step towards destruction of the totalitarian Soviet system. if any. These issues constituted one of the most interesting topics to be reflected upon. In other words. It was rather the later studies in which the first analytical encounters. However. of the works which emerged within the framework of these enterprises aimed at the problematisation and further theoretical conceptualisation of the material gained.

(Moscow: Respublika. on specific issues. 1998).MONF. . which aimed to be constructed in the new Russian state. predrassudki (Moscow: MONF. ‘Mestnoe samoupravlenie: ideya i opyt' in Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya. 8 (1996). no. all of these authors have defended the positive role of ‘real federalisation’.22 In different ways. 21 V. in 3 vol. no. 112-120.21 The other group of works advocating the liberal character of contemporary Russian regionalism comes from studies in the issues of federalism. Dement'ev.20 Drawing extensive historical analogies with the organisation of local power in pre-Revolutionary Russia the authors regard the process of regionalisation as a sign of the democratic transformation of the society. Abramov. 22 Ramazan Abdulatipov and others. ‘O sisteme Sovetov i zemskikh uchrezhdeniyakh v Rossii: vozmozhnye istoricheskie paralleli’ in Gosudarstvo i pravo. 1995).19 The studies in Russian local self-government focused on the problems of institutional design of municipal and regional political systems in general comply with the same idea. A. 1992- 1993). pravo (Moscow: IGPI . Rossiyskiy federalizm. 1 (1997). Thus a number of texts are 19 Leonid Smirnyagin. Paradoksy. (ed. 20 Sergey Ryzhenkov. 120-125. Vladimir Shumeyko.42 political regime are the unavoidable prerequisite for a general modernisation of the Russian state. quite precisely. Federalizm v istorii Rossii. 1998). praktika. This assumption is grounded in the belief that the demands of maximal political and legal autonomy announced by territories serve as a mean to weaken the totalitarian state.) Mestnoe samoupravlenie v sovremennoy Rossii: Politika. Protivorechiya. Rossiyskie reformy i federalizm: sotsial’no-ehkonomicheskie ocherki (Moscow: Slavianskiy dialog. A large group of papers which emerged in this field were written by acting or retired politicians who were directly involved in the processes of the post-Soviet state building. The studies in contemporary Russian federalism are further developed in the works that are focused.

8 (1995). Assymetrichnaya federatsiya: Vzglyad is tsentra. 30-40.). manifested in the regions throughout several cycles of elections and referenda in the 1990s. Federativnoe ustroystvo Rossii. Ustav oblasti (kraya): pervyi opyt (Moscow: INION RAN. Semenov. 27 O. The regions where pro-reformist candidates get more electoral support are considered the democratic ‘blue’ belt of the Russian territories while the regions where the communist opposition receives more votes are perceived 23 Leokadiya Drobizheva (ed.23 Mikhaleva24 and Umnova25. For example. Bogachova. Semenov26 and Bogachova27. 1995). this question is emphatically raised by Drobizheva. respublik i oblastey (Moscow: RAN. no.43 devoted to the problem of ‘asymmetric federation’ and the delimitation of power between the Federal centre and the subjects of Federation. istoriya i sovremennost’ (Moscow: INION RAN. 9 (1994). .) Pravovye problemy sovremennogo rossiyskogo federalizma. between the Russian regions. The theory of the ‘bi-polar split’ becomes one of the most popular frameworks adopted to explain the regularities of the distribution of electoral priorities. This theory is based on a rather simplistic division of the latter into ‘pro-reformists’ and ‘conservatives’. 1995). ‘Ratsionalizatsiya vzaimootnosheniy mezhdu federal’nym i regional’nymi byudzhetami: 26 puti obnovleniya nalogovo-byudzhetnogo mekhanizma’ in Voprosy ehkonomiki. Such a typology finds its source in the differences between electoral attitudes demonstrated toward the reformist policy of the Russian authorities. visit the issues of ‘economic’ or ‘budget federalism’ together with the problems of the financial regulation of relations established between the centre and the regions. and the regional varieties of voting behaviour. 24 Nadezhda Mikhaylova (ed. G. 25 Irina Umnova. 1998). in their turn. ’Stanovlenie rossiyskoy modeli byudzhetnogo federalizma’ in Voprosy ehkonomiki. no. Another big group of authors advocating the benefits of regional separation of the Russian state focus on the question of elections. 38-51.

30 The theory of a bi-polar split receives further elaboration in a number of works published to the end of the 1990s. ‘Political Tendencies in Russia’s Regions: 31 Evidence from the 1993 Parliamentary Elections’ in Slavic Review. Petrov. no. 33 Oleg Grigoriev and Mikhail Malyutin.44 as the conservative ‘red’ one. 20- 32. no. 32 Nikolay Petrov and Aleksey Titkov. the authors locate the trade-oriented areas. Titkov32 and other political geographers extend this theory and draw the line between the ‘reformist’ urban and the ‘conservative’ rural areas. 711-732. ‘Politicheskiy klimat v Rossii v 1991-1993 godakh’ in MEMO. Rossiya na vyborah: uroki i perspektivy (Moscow: Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologiy. 1995). such as Slider. 1995). Regional’naya situatsiya v Rossii posle dekabr’skikh vyborov: analiz novykh tendentsiy i politicheskikh itogov mestnykh vyborov 1994 goda (Moscow: Fond ‘Diskussionnoe prostranstvo’. 30 Michael McFaul and Nikolay Petrov. Some authors. General statements of this theory are given in the works of Kolosov. which is seen by the former as ‘responsible’ for the social and economic transformations of the 1990s. vol. Establishing such a typology. (Moscow: Gendal’f. 53. . 3 (1994).31 conceptualise the blue-red opposition in terms of the ’55 parallel effect’ which divides the regions of the ‘pro-reformist’ North and the ‘conservative’ South.29 McFaul and Petrov. territories rich in natural 28 Vladimir Kolosov. Politicheskiy al’manakh Rossii. 1995).28 Sobyanin. some authors. such as Grigoriev and Malyutin33. Darrell Slider and Sergey Chugrov. 12-14. 1996). study relations between the economic affiliations and the voting behaviour of Russian regions. 9 (1993). The aforementioned scholars link patterns of voting with the development of economic reforms and loyalty of the regions towards the Centre. Vladimir Gimpel’son. for instance. In development of this theme. ‘Vybory prezidentskie I vybory mestnye’ in Presdentskie vybory v Rossii (Moscow: Gendal’f. 29 Alexander Sobyanin.

in fact. no. 36 Vladimir Kolosov. . In demonstrating such complexity. or regions where industry is down on the other.which. through such a procedure. according to Biryukov. Thus.35 Kolosov and Krindach. 4 (1997). numerous authors argue that geographical fragmentation generates a very diversified picture. 6 (1994). and financially important regions with strong market economies at the one pole. 77-96. The Civic Culture (Princeton. and Alexander Krindach. the authors refer to the analysis of regional political subcultures. Biryukov. According to them. the state moves. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ‘Legitimatsiya statusa regional’noy politicheskoy vlasti’ in Vestnik MGU. some authors identify different types of political subculture and then apply these types to explain the variety of policies performed in Russian territories. away from the totalitarian Soviet regime . and rural areas represent the ‘parochial’ political culture. ‘Tendentsii postsovetskogo razvitiya massovogo soznaniya I politicheskaya kul’tura yuga Rossii’ in Polis. very soon the thesis on the democratic and liberal character of Russian regionalisation starts to trigger a serious a democratic Russia. First of all. However.36 big cities demonstrate the ‘participant’ type of subculture. hardly accountable in the simplistic framework of the ‘totalitarian past’ and the ‘light’ democratic and liberal future. 120-133. the ‘subject’ type is relevant to middle towns. 34 Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba. where the diversity of opinions and forms of economic organisation appear to be mapped onto the regional differences.45 resources. seriya 18. and the agrarian areas. represented a unitarian creation . Adopting the framework of Almond and Verba34. To some extent all the aforementioned authors argue that regionalisation of the Russian society is a positive process indicating transition. no. 1963). 35 S.

Through the development of this mode of critique. 38 Yuriy Burtin and Grigoriy Vodolazov. They have also become fully grounded by Kryshtanovskaya. This brings forward a defensible alternative to the simplistic theory of the bi-polar split. On the basis of biographical analysis. ‘V Rossii postroena nomenklaturnaya demokratiya’ in Izvestiya (June 1. ‘Reformiruyem. 51-65. 21 (1994). reformiruyem a dvizhemsya nazad’ in Rossiyskaya Federatsiya. 39 Olga Kryshtanovskaya.37 These views have indeed become crystallised in the relatively solid theory of the so-called ‘nomenklatura revenge’ introduced by Burtin.46 In relation to this typology the authors systematise political development and electoral behaviour in the Russian regions in accordance with the dominant type of settlement. .39 The main idea of these authors is that the newly-emerged political structures in the Russian regions are the result of the immanent transformation of the old communist nomenklatura into a new Russian elite. the scholars come to the conclusion that the key factor of regional politics is concealed precisely in this struggle between the ‘communist old guard’ and the new ‘progressive 37 Irina Umnova. 1994).1 (1995). no. Vodolazov38 and some other authors. many authors do not simply question the validity of the blue-red division of Russian regions. they suggest that political regimes established in the Russian regions after the dissolution of the USSR appear to be unable to solve the tasks of modernisation. ‘Transformatsiya staroy nomenklatury v novuyu Rossiyskuyu elitu' in Obshestvennyye nauki i sovremennost'. but they also step into a direct confrontation with the scholars defending the idea of the pro-democratic character of Russian decentralisation. Umnova radicalises this point and writes that uncontrolled regional authorities are more likely to perform anti-constitutional and conservative activities than to promote democracy in Russia. no. 28-29. By way of a further counter-argument.

no.6 (1995).41 The advocacy of the anti-democratic character of regionalisation in Russia obtains its further elaboration in the works of Afanas’ev who estimates this process through the prism of the growing ‘clientism’. vol. 1996). Shutov.NPO MODEK. The question of regional ideologies permitting a re-conceptualisation of a particular administrative-territorial unit and providing it with a new and socially influential connotation. believe that the territorial fragmentation of the Russian state creates the possibility of the restoration of totalitarian regimes within the borders of a region. ‘Regional’nye ehlity v postsovetskoy Rossii: osobennosti politicheskogo uchastiya’ in Kentavr. for example. 59-66. ‘How regional elites preserve their power’ in Post-Soviet Affairs. 295-311. This opinion appears to be rather popular not only among Russian scholars but also in some academic discussions abroad. are completely out of focus in this group of papers. 40 D. no. ‘Izmeneniya v mekhanizme funktsionirovaniya pravyashchikh ehlit’ in Politicheskie issledovaniya. these works are mainly focused on the problem of the region as an institution of the administrative-territorial organisation of the state and the relevance of this institution to the ideas postulated in different. 42 Mikhail Afanas’ev. Mikhail Afanasiev. However. Badovskiy and A. a principally anti-democratic practice cultivated by regional ‘elite communities’. 41 Marie Mendras. 1997). no.42 In such a way the bulk of the studies which emerged in the middle of the 1990s indicate the growing interest in the analytic encounter with post-Soviet regionalisation. which constitutes its unique idea. Pravyashie ehlity I gosudarstvennost’ posttotalitarnoy Rossii (Moscow – Voronezh: Institut prakticheskoy psikhologii .47 forces’. Mikhail Afanas’ev. . 3-23. 15. ‘traditional’ ideological projects. 6 (1994). 4 (1999). Klientizm I rossiyskaya gosudarstvennost’ (Moscow: MONF. Badovskiy and Shutov40.

‘Predislovie’ in Kul’turnyi landshaft i sovetskoe obitaemoe prostranstvo. 572-575. 43 Vladimir Kaganskiy. p. 2001). elaborates a kind of ‘hermeneutics of the landscape’44 or its ‘phenomenology’45. 23. The original landscape hermeneutics provides for an active comprehension of landscape. Kaganskiy himself summarises his account in the following way: ‘The author’s approach is in line with the Russian school of theoretical geography. It is necessary to mention several groups of works written in this field. p. 46 Kaganskiy. as well as for the active comprehension of all that could be interpreted as landscape space’. The first analytical project touching upon the problems of regional ideologemes is represented in the works of a Russian geographer . 7. ‘Summary. p.Vladimir Kaganskiy. 44 Kaganskiy. conceptual mastery of its variety and the reflection of the country’s space. which presupposes conscious life in cultural landscape.46 In the framework of this theoretical focus Kaganskiy identifies the problem of the territorial separation of society as being one of the most interesting for him. .48 Approaching regional ideologies: the primordialist paradigm The first works that combine the analytic interest in the broad theme of Russian regionalism with a particular focus on regional ideologies come forward only at the end of the 1990s.7-13. 572. in his extensive research. Kaganskiy. Sbornik statey (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie. ‘Mir kul’turnogo landshafta’ in Kul’turnyi landshaft i sovetskoe obitaemoe prostranstvo. Kul’turnyi landshaft i sovetskoe obitayemoe prostranstvo. Cultural landscape and Soviet habitual space (collected articles)’ in Kul’turnyi landshaft i sovetskoe obitaemoe prostranstvo. 45 24-43.43 This particular scholar. endowed with the ‘theory of cultural landscape’.

which. Explaining further the notion of regional discourse the author says that regional discourses are ‘culturally and ideologically stipulated’.49 Approaching this problem in closer fashion. 48 Vladmiri Kaganskiy ‘Regional’naya analitika i videnie regionov’ in Kaganskiy. in its turn. are the less typical of its representations. Evaluating this idea. languages. Kul’turnyi landshaft i sovetskoe obitayemoe prostranstvo. The ‘centre’ is a place of concentrated homogeneity of the culture. 323.48 According to Kaganskiy it is in discourse where the positions of the cultural landscape obtain their social objectivity. ‘Osnovnye zony i tipy kul’turnogo landshafta: tsentr-provintsiya-periferiya- granitsa’ in Kaganskiy. concepts. schemes’. The author introduces two more positions and portrays the geographical fragmentation of society in the form of a fourstep structure: centre-province-periphery-border. . the Russian scholar introduces the notion of ‘regional discourse’ conceived as: ‘a dialogue of expanded spaces. p. This principle is expressed in the social implementation of a systematic territorial structure. perceived in terms of the centre-periphery dichotomy. is regarded as: ‘the ideology and practice of reaching a certain institutional status by real non-state areal communities (usually by 47 Vladimir Kaganskiy. 319-342.47 According to Kaganskiy each of these areas in a certain way structures the life of a community living there. Kul’turnyi landshaft i sovetskoe obitayemoe prostranstvo. he finds that this separation is nothing other than a translation of a certain universal principle of social organisation. The ‘province’ and the ‘periphery’ are the medium phases. The ‘borders’.49 Clarifying this stipulation he depicts it as a process employed in the notion of ‘regionalism’ itself. on the contrary. 60-95. 49 Ibid.

Seriya geografiya. resheniya.3 (1997). 2003). Indeed. i. 282-294. Thus. state)’.russ. This thereby causes him to reduce the former to the pre-given cultural and geographical regularities performed by certain ‘really existing’ communities. As a matter of fact. ‘Vladimir Kaganskiy. This definition with insignificant modifications travels from one article of Kaganskiy to another. Kul’turnyi landshaft i sovetskoe obitayemoe prostranstvo. Such a conclusion however. no. Available at: Prostranstvo.50 ethno-cultural ones). 51 Alexander Averyushkin. Kulturnyi Landshaft i Sovetskoe Obitaemoe Sbornik Statey’ in Znamya. . 4 (2002).e.html (as of August 15. 50 Vladimir Kaganskiy ‘Strana pobezhdayushchego regionalizma’ in Kaganskiy. ‘Osnovaniya regional’nogo analiza i gumanitarnoy geografii’ in Vestnik RAN. reviewing the Cultural Landscape and the Soviet Habitual Space. 42 – 50. Vladimir Kaganskiy. so to say.50 This assumption implies that regional separation is an objective factor in any relatively big social creation placed in the framework of the four-step territorial structure of the cultural landscape. no. p. from the texts of the Russian geographer it follows that the landscape ‘divides itself’. 4-29. for example. Kaganskiy suggests a treatment of ideology as a purely linguistic manifestation of the ‘real’ positions of territorial differences explained through the organisation of ‘cultural landscape’. see: Vladimir Kaganskiy ‘Metodologicheskie osnovaniya regional’nogo analiza kak kul’turnoy praktiki’ in Kul’tura v sovremennom mire: opyt. triggers a serious critique addressed to the entire approach of the Russian geographer. problemy. 222-225. no. ‘on its own’ without any human participation. Averyushkin.51 The general critique of such an approach outlines a serious weakness in accounting for ideological performances within the frames of the ‘cultural landscape theory’. http://magazines. accuses Kaganskiy of a de-personification of the ‘cultural landscape’. 2 (1999). the intention of the geographically and culturally real district to become an institutional one (administrative district.

257-267. Following this trajectory. for example. In the report Comparative Regionalism: Russia – CIS – Europe. Kul’turnyi landshaft i sovetskoe obitayemoe prostranstvo. Kaganskiy does not advance further in elaborating the question of regional ideologies. in fact. levels of development. Hence.51 However. this approach demonstrates its clear inadequacy.Regionov!’ in Kaganskiy. regionalisation in the context of liberal or other traditional ideologies. when it comes to the problem of ideology. regionalism is seen as intrinsically inherent in all types of contemporary nations regardless to their sizes. Andrey Makarychev advocates rather similar views. 53 See: Chapter IV: ‘K mifologii rossiyskogo prostranstva’ in Kaganskiy. 377-514. p. 260. When the idiosyncrasies of ideological formations are being reduced to the regularities of the underlying cultural and geographical factors. Regionalism may exist inside the society without being enveloped in any particular sort of governmental policy. First. this is an organic principle of territorial organisation of social. Although he announces this theme as one of the central of Chapters III and IV of his book52. than the aforementioned remarks suggest. the very problem of the ideological reason becomes secondary and insignificant for the principal line of the research. etc. persistently avoids this theme and concentrates on the general issues of ‘ideology of regionalism’. nevertheless in the articles comprising these parts he.and neo-Soviet society’ etc. Kul’turnyi landshaft i sovetskoe obitayemoe prostranstvo. when defining the notion of ‘regionalism’. and regional discourses.53 It is necessary to say that the reductionist approach elaborated in the words of Kaganskiy is adopted in a number of other investigations. Makarychev and his collaborators repeat the same point. Thus. . economic and cultural aspects of the existence of human communities. political structures. ‘mythology of the post. The later is but a 52 Vladmir Kaganskiy ‘Burzhuaznaya revolyutsiya? . political. Authors [of the Makarychev’s project] suggest to distinguish two dimensions of the word ‘regionalism’.

52 reflection of the organic possibilities that stem from the existence if spatial distribution of the population. Sravnitel’nyi regionalizm.) Sravnitel’nyi regionalizm. 54 Andrey Makarychev. If encouraged. 54 Giving examples of these ‘intellectual streams’ Makarychev divides regional ideologies into two groups. 257 [The style as in the original]. the views of André Frank. according to their works. which in turn define ‘intellectual streams’. totally derived from the regularities of the ‘organic principle of social organisation’. regional ideology and regional ideas appear to be secondary and insignificant problems. in which group the author puts English Fabianism . ‘Vliyanie zarubezhnykh kontseptsiy na razvitie rossiyskogo regionalizma: vozmozhnosti i predely zaimstvovaniya’ in Makarychev. 1997). ’Comparative regionalism: Russia – CIS – Europe. 55 Andrey Makarychev. Second. The other group. p. . ‘the liberal wing’. it is nevertheless already possible for us to say that the authors of Makarychev’s project also fall into the trap of essentialising limits. Thus it is these principles which their academic project becomes mainly devoted to. the anarchists and other ‘de-centrist’ ideological movements. 97-129. The first one consists of ideologies of the ‘left wing’. SNG – Rossiya – Zapad (Nizhniy Novgorod: Mizhniy Novgorod State University Press. regionalism might be used as a generic name of a variety of intellectual streams that are aimed at rational utilisation and implementation of the natural spatial and territorial division within modern societies. More precisely . 255-295.with its ideas of ‘local socialism’. pp. September 1995June 1997’ in Andrey Makarychev (ed. includes the ideas of Jean-Luc Migue and other supporters of regional economic ‘individualisation’. This reduction is inscribed in the concept of the ‘natural spatial and territorial division within modern societies’. regionalism is seen as formation of different centres of regional ‘gravity’ and contributing to democratic attainments. Final report presented to INTAS administration by the Working Group of the Centre for Russian Philosophy. 123.55 Not wishing to get into a deeper analysis of these remarks however.

even in a totalitarian one that suppresses any of its manifestations. p. 58 . The reduction of recent ideological performances to a kind of universal principle of social organisation becomes rather popular among the authors approaching the phenomenon of regional ideas in contemporary Russia in the second half of the 1990s. Levita and Loidberg. The Province Versus the Center in Russia (Oxford: Westview Press. Mikhail Loidberg. Shlapentokh. As a result.58 There is hardly any need to argue that. from the times of Feudal splitting to nowadays. They write: ‘By regionalism we are referring to an ideology as well as to political and economic activity that is geared toward achieving greater regional autonomy. 57 Ibid.53 The essentialist perspective in the approach to regional ideologies is also advocated in the work of Shlapentokh. From Submission to Rebellion. As an additional example of this stream one may refer to the article Russian 56 Vladimir Shlapentokh. represented. Levita and Loidberg totally follow the paradigm outlined in the works of the aforementioned scholars. or greater particularisation of sub-state entities’. Roman Levita. it is nevertheless on the back burner of political actors’ . in this conclusion. If it does not manifest itself in ‘real terms’. precisely. the authors of From Submission to Rebellion do not elaborate the problem of regional ideology beyond some fragmentary remarks which merely support the other main lines of their analysis. p. 1997). Ibid. ‘Regionalism is always present in any society.conclude the authors. by the endeavours as regards an ‘always-present’ regionalism. 5.57 And then they explain their view on ‘regionalism’ as on the ‘ideology as well as political and economic activity’.56 The authors conduct what they call a ‘multidisciplinary’ analysis of the centre-periphery opposition in Russia. 7. In the course of this analysis they give a definition of ‘ideology’ in the context of regionalism.

maturity and destruction’. . Although he call them ‘mythologies’ the issues raised by the authors clearly fit into the concept of ideology to be adopted in our research. it is still hardly possible to produce any comprehensible model for conceptualising articulations of regional ideas and the construction of regional frameworks for social identification. Summarising this excursion it appears possible to conclude that although by the end of the 1990s the question of regional ideology became an increasingly ‘visited’ problem in the works of the Russian scholars. the poverty of the essentialist account of regional ideologies. Malyakin argues that the transformation of regional ideas is governed by the regularities of a ‘cultural cycle’ consisting of ‘creation.59 This article demonstrates. 5. Makarychev and other authors mentioned above. Malyakin creates a number of contradictory analogies with the development of mythology in primitive societies. 1 (2000). Nevertheless.54 Regional Mythology: the Three Ages written by one of the IGPI experts Ilya Malyakin. the authors appear to be incapable of bringing the aforementioned problem into the main focus of their academic investigations. probably in the best way. Unlike Kaganskiy. vol. arguing that the constitution of particular regional ideas is a matter of underlying laws of cultural development. no. In the course of his endeavour. Needless to argue that such wide analogies as are drawn between contemporary Russian political ‘mythology’ and the myths of the Stone Age is a quite weak fundament for any defensible conclusion. Malyakin puts ideological performances in the centre of his analysis. Makarychev and other authors. 109-122. Heavily relying on the essentialist paradigm. Justifying this proposal. which approach regional ideologies from the 59 Ilya Malyakin. despite the outlined problems. the works of Vladimir Kaganskiy. ‘Rossiyskaya regional’naya mifologiya: tri vozrasta’ in Pro et Contra.

55 standpoint of the essentialist paradigm. this type of analysis from the outset takes its bearings from a different methodological standpoint. They assume that their emergence is caused by the particular sequence of events intrinsic to the development of post-Soviet society. 78-91. These events are found in the regularities of political struggle between different elite groups. which came onto the arena of public politics after the collapse of the USSR. Here I speak about the studies in Russian regional political elites. definitely point to the necessity of further studies of regional ideologies. but they also articulate the problem of regional ideas exactly as it is articulated in our research and precisely as a phenomenon of . Malashenko (ed. . For not only do they bring the problem of regional ideologies to the attention of a rigorously analytic endeavour.region ‘re-conceptualised’.60 In his work Kosach regards regional ideas as a complex of idiologemes like ‘Orenburg is the 60 Grigoriy Kosach. in some sense. It is exactly this interest which lays at the foundation of another group of works devoted to the problem of contemporary Russian regional ideologies. Approaching regional ideologies: studies in regional political elite Being aware of the weaknesses of the essentialist approaches of the scholars studying regional elites in Russia. As an example of these papers one may refer to the case study of Grigoriy Kosach. where the author directly refers to the problem of a ‘region reconceptualised’. They do not retain any presumptions as regards the ever-existing or always-present character of regional ideologies but consider these phenomena as particular and. ‘Orenburg: regional’naya mifologiya kak faktor vzaimootnosheniya s sosedyami’ in A. unique creations. 1994).) Chego khotyat regiony? (Moscow: Gendal’f.

1997). Mary McAuley. In the situation of nowadays’ internal state of be the gates to Asia . the regional idea of Orenburg as ‘the gates to Asia’ or ‘the South Palmira’ is accounted for as an instrument used by the regional elite to strengthen its power.63 In this research the ideology as such is seen as an element of the ‘negotiating table’ utilised by the regional elite in their bargain with the 61 Ibid. in reference to their memory. Russia's Politics of Uncertainty (Cambidge: Cambridge Unviersity Press. the same interpretation is invoked to attract the state to the side of a regional elite and to insist that the state legitimates their ‘state initiatives’ […]. The other passage from this remarkable article outlines this assumption even better: ‘the most important element of the Orenburg memory . p. but opposes its own effectiveness to these ‘weaknesses’. p. The interpretation of regional memory suggested by a regional elite not only underlines the ‘weakness and instability’ of the central power.started to define not only the course of the local administrate […] [but] it became the main direction of its activity in the interests of strengthening its power’ [emphasis added]. 61 Thus. 89. and considers these idiologemes as nothing other than an instrument utilised by political actors in their political games. Thus Mary McAuley in her well known-book approaches the ideological constructions of the regional elite through the prism of the struggle for obtaining a greater power.62 This approach becomes rather popular in Russian regional studies as many authors working in the perspective of elite studies refer to regional ideologies in the same way as Kosach does. make an attempt to realise themselves as if they were the leading ‘defender of the Fatherland’.78.56 Southern Palmira’ or ‘the gates to Asia’. Simultaneously. the elites […] of regions. 62 63 . Ibid.

it is the elite studies approach which nevertheless gives birth to the most extended analysis of regional ideologies. ‘Strategii regional’noy identichnosti i rol’ politicheskikh ehlit (na primere Novgorodskoy oblasti)’ in Natalia Lapina (ed. This. It is obvious that the main focus of such endeavours gradually shifts towards the study. However.). .64 Notably. This is best represented in the analytic 64 Vladimir Gel’man. as regards the study of ideologies. Consequently the object of ideology becomes to be moved out of the dominant focus in these research programmes. historically specific circumstances of political arrangement of Russian regionalisation. in fact. these authors also regard ideologies as a secondary phenomenon whose social role is limited by the rational strategies of the struggle for greater power. he writes that beliefs.’ are nothing other than a rationally utilised tool in the political struggle of the elite. Vladimir Gel’man in his later article also develops the same ideas.e. in relation to this notion of power and economic rationality. Needless to say that although the authors studying regional political elites shift the accent from the ever-existing trends of regional division to the particular. they also fail to provide a solid analytical account of ideology. values and whatever are called ‘ideologies of regionalism. Gel’man and others. which mainly concentrate on the mechanisms of elite rational choice. Although they offer a different view on the matter of regional ideas and ideologies. the research coming from this camp suffers the same problem as the one addressed to the essentialist accounts. 30-50. Regional’nye protsessy v sovremennoy Rossii (Moscow: INON RAN. 2002). More precisely.57 Federal power. indicates a serious weakness of the elite studies approach i. like Kosach. of ideological constructions employed in political struggles. as the sphere determining the emergence of regional ideologemes.

. 4 (1996). working paper no. on the Example of Republics and Oblasts of the Volga area.58 project of Russian scholar Arbakhan Magomedov. ‘Politicheskaya ideologiya lokal’nykh pravyashchikh ehlit v Rossii in Rossiya i 66 sovremennyi mir. 47-58. More precisely. whose work deserves special attention. Regional Ideologies in the Context of International Relations.65 By the beginning of the 2000s he had published a number of articles66 and a book based upon his thesis. ‘Lokal’nye ehlity i ideologiya regionalizma: sravnitel’nyi analiz v Rossii’ in Na putyakh transformatsii (politicheskie partii i politicheskie ehlity postsovetskogo perioda) (Mocsow: MONF. 67 Arbakhan Magomedov. they are very unclear in terms of 65 Reference number in the Russian State Library: 71:00-23/31-6. 152 . Arbakhan Magomedov. during a number of empirical investigations. Arbakhan Magomedov. 1997). Arbakhan Magomedov. no. no. as will be demonstrated below. Misteriya regionalizma: Regional’nye pravyashchie ehlity i regional’nye ideologii v sovremennoi Rossii: Modeli politicheskogo vossozdaniya ‘snizu’ (Sravnitel’nyi analiz na primere respublik i oblastei Povolzh’ya) (Moscow: MONF. 2 (1997). despite the special attention given by Magomedov to the issue of regional ideologies his works are highly controversial. Regional ideologies in focus: Arbakhan Magomedov and his Mystery of Regionalism Arbakhan Magomedov is a provincial Russian researcher who in 1999 defended a doctoral thesis titled Regional Elites and Regional Ideologies in Contemporary Russia: a Comparative Analysis. 36-66. However. vol. 2. ‘Obshchestvo regionov’ in Pro et Contra. 2000). 12 (Zurich: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. with the field of contemporary Russian regional ideologies. 2001).176: Arbakhan Magomedov. 67 In these works the author elaborates a particular methodological model and evaluates his encounter.

ehtika. On the one hand obviously influenced by the ideas of Clifford Geertz68 and Paul Ricoeur69. the introduction of his intellectual project is begun with an initial remark on the term ‘ideology’. ‘the pocket of Russia’. 29. A thorough analysis of his investigations allows for the division of these concepts into two big groups.70 In accordance with this understanding. throughout all his writings. ‘the Euroislam’. 1995). the views portraying Nizhnii Novgorod as ‘the capital of reforms’. Magomedov considers ideologies as ‘cognitive guides’ or ‘maps of reality’. 27. ‘economic and legal oasis’. for example. and unfortunately. (Moscow: AO ‘Kamil’. politica. or Saratov. 11. gives us few clues concerning the further implementation of his research. 1993). ‘historical centre’ etc. ‘Ideology as a cultural system’ in Clifford Geertz. or ‘the Tatarstanians become a Nation’. the scholar in question employs several different concepts of ideology. ‘Russian Detroit’. Thus the views in which Tatarstan becomes ‘the new paradigm’. 69 The work cited: Paul Ricouer. ‘the capital of the Volga area’. pp. To demonstrate the aforementioned problems. Magomedov. 13. the ideas of Kalmyk as ‘the corporation of “Kalmyk”’. Germenevtika. 70 . methodology and conclusions which. as ‘the capital of 68 Clifford Geertz. which form the sense and conceptualisation of the modern world which ‘influences policy-making’. all in all. Surprisingly enough. ‘Regional Ideologies’. 193-233.59 terminology. ‘economic wonder’. Magomedov accounts for ideologies by way of ‘cultural systems’ consisting of symbols and images of regions where the latter represent various concepts such as the ‘fatherland’. The Interpretation of Cultures (London: Fontana Press.

Magomedov. Magomedov regards ideologies as flexible sets of ideas produced and disseminated by the elite and opened for interpretations and innovations by individuals or groups. ‘The concept and function of ideology’ in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Robert 72 Putnam. with its ontological inspiration.74 Specifying the latter. Mysteriya regionalizma. ideological projects.71 On the other hand.75 As it happened to be. 111-112. 3 (1971). Mysteriya regionalizma. ‘Regional Ideologies’. the Russian scholar points to the elite which have the supreme capacity to influence ideologies. 20. being seriously influenced by the theoretical scholarship of Robert Putnam.72 and Edward Shils73. create the field of regional interests.60 Volga area’ are all regarded by the author as typical examples of regional ideologemes. becoming the ‘formula of governing’ for local ruling groups. 74 Magomedov. A live mass ideology can emerge only on the ground of actual problematised values. ‘Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of “Ideology”’ in American Political Science Review. 1973). together with an ensemble of illuminating slogans and a specific rhetoric can be completed only though the social elite proceeding in unison with a kind of uneven breath of the people. No. security and wealth. vol. 73 Edward Shils. 651-681. pp. p.76 There is surely no need to explain that this combination of concepts is rather controversial. pp. 101. The Beliefs of Politicians (New Heaven: Yale University Press. […] This ideological ‘assembling’. 75 . Robert Putnam. Thus Putnam himself openly confirms that his approach to ideology has 71 Magomedov. 12. These interests and stimuli bring the struggle for coherent ideals directly to the pragmatic purposes of reaching a greater of authority. 66-76. 7 (1968).

Geertz argues that no one can really escape a particular ideology when it comes to a response the social challenges of the cultural failure. he points at the work Ideology as Cultural System by Clifford Geertz. pp. Coherently enough. ideology is more an instrument used for the political socialisation of the elite. Putnam. ‘Ideology as a Cultural System’. The Beliefs of Politicians.32. For Putnam. in which the author departs from the critique of Stark. ideologies do not emerge from any kind of general cognitive strain but are born in the mind of ruling individuals. Coming to an attempt to ‘fix’ the chronic nonintegration of society invoked by the unsolved antinomies between ‘liberty and political order. stability and change’ etc. on the contrary.. ideology then is seen as a total system. 77 78 . p. but rather a practice carried out by a particular social group.61 nothing to do with the one offered by Geertz. ideology is indeed a cognitive guide to a reality which comes to fill the gaps in the interpreting capacities of a ‘pretty dirty river’. Parsons and Shils who. It is also possible to refer here to the work of Geertz. Mysteriya regionalizma. p.78 In fact a thorough reading of Geertz demonstrates that the American anthropologist regards ideology in an absolutely different manner to the elite analysts. and pointing to the authors of the rejected concepts. approach ideology essentially negatively . according to him. for Putnam it is not a total system of knowledge. Geertz. this practice is 76 Magomedov. 121 – 122. Being just a tool in political struggle. In his The Beliefs of Politicians Putnam states: ‘I reject [emphasis added] […] conceptions of ideology that assume that everyone (or at least everyone in modern society) is equally ideological’77. spread in order to capture everyone in the society. Above all. For Geertz. In fact. 197.

Magomedov. 7. available at: http://www. pp. 2003). vol. ‘The Prosperous Community’ in The American Prospect. In the form in which it is reflected in Geertz and Putnam. Misteriya regionalizma […]’ (review) in Pro et Contra. (2002).81 However. The unreflected contradiction between the two methodological pillars prevents Magomedov from successful completing his ambitious project in practice. no 13 (March 21. 79 Robert Putnam. The uncritical use of both concepts without any detailed elaboration of their (non-)correspondence does not seem to be justified. in the book of Magomedov. 245-249.80 It is obvious that the synthesis of these two approaches therefore requires an adequate reconciliation of the contradicting views as regards the matter of ideologies.html (as of August 15. And the further excursion in his work demonstrates the sharpness of this failure. no 81 3. 4. this gentle remark does not fully uncover the depth of the tensions concealed in the works of Magomedov. It is especially interesting to mention that exactly this approach is heavily criticised by Geertz in his attack on ‘interests theory’. ‘A. ‘Ideology as a Cultural System’. they affect everybody in society. . See: Yuriy Igritskiy. 201-207. pp.62 optional . As Igritskiy mentions in his review of The Mystery of Regionalism. 1993). so to speak . the theoretical and empirical parts live their own life.can be reconciled with the privilege of the pragmatic mind in governing the realm of ideas. 80 Geertz . ideology is either caused by general cultural strain and. vol. or it is produced by the elite for ‘the pragmatic purpose of reaching a greater authority’. in this sense.Putnam refers to ideology as a ‘fig leaf’79 which can be put on or taken off according to its value in a political game.prospect. It is hardly possible to comprehend how the accent on cognitive breakdown caused by events of material character .org/print/V4/13/ nature.

departs from concrete socio-economic problems and categorises them in an inductive way . Concepts of economic pragmatism. The argument of Magomedov triggers more concerns than it resolves. From his analysis it remains highly unclear why different elites employ different modes of regional ideology. Reflecting further upon this criterion. This argument consists of the following proposition . The first group of ideas appeals to a historical ground and systematises political views in a deductive way . belong to the second type of regional ideologies. in which a region becomes ‘the Russian Detroit’ or an ‘economic and legal oasis’.‘from a problem to a theory’. or Kalmyk as ‘the last redoubt of the steppes’ culture’ are the most obvious examples of these kinds of regional ideologies. The other group of views. Magomedov says that regional ideologies vary between themselves because of the specific ‘problematising of values’ performed by politicians. Thus in Tatarstan and Kalmyk’s respective conceptions of regional ideologies. political actors justify their perception of region through excursuses into the long term history of their people and territory. and which thereby result from the articulation of territorial benefits in economic and administrative management by a political elite.63 The main real weakness of his project is concealed in the shaky conclusion concerning the differences between particular regional ideologies.‘from a theory to a problem’. the scholar argues that on the basis of such a mode of problematisation. The ideologemes of Tatarstan as the ‘ancestor of the ancient Turkic civilisation’. on the contrary. Having identified the two types of regional ideologemes.the emergence of particular ideologies . Magomedov faces tremendous difficulties in explaining the origins of this difference. regional ideologies can be divided into two groups.

It is possible to 82 Magomedov. It is this idea which causes these authors sharply to deny the opposition between ‘primitive’ and ‘advanced’ societies widely exploited in social sciences previously. The second and much more serious can be called a moral one and it is grounded in the profound vulnerability of the very idea of measuring human cognition in quantitative terms. Ibid. along with other anthropologists working within the frame of Rousseau’s moral project argue. Magomedov says that the choice between the two modes of ideology is explained by the ‘cognitive capacities’ of the politicians: ‘the higher the cognitive capacities the politicians have the more deductive they are in their thinking. p. 84 The validity of this kind of conclusion seems to be extremely questionable. but their means of analysis change in a more visible way in the dimension which can be called “political style”. only one counter-argument. ‘cognitive capacities’ is a highly immeasurable concept. based upon the dominance of different forms of knowledge: ritual. arts etc. science. First of all. As Levi-Strauss. however. p. Mysteriya regionalizma. The ‘technical’ impossibility of a ‘materialisation’ of cognitive differences is. the cognition of different people in no way can be captured quantitatively. religion. and the more they are in the territory of historical analogies’. Ibid. 83 84 . and actually the already well-quoted Geertz too.83 Uncovering what is to be taken as the ‘index of political style’.64 is a matter of ‘political style’: ‘[…] politicians analyse political problems through different means. 92. What are usually considered as ‘low’ or ‘high’ abilities of understanding are nothing other than qualitative differences in the symbolic organisation of culture.82 Or: ‘the “index of political style” performs the most truthful version of the reasoning writing (prichinnogo pocherka) of ideology’. 86.

but to rely.85 All these and many other omissions lead the author towards a disappointingly superficial and generalising conclusion to his entire project. Mysteriya regionalizma. who wrote his Ideology and Civility in 1958. In the end Russia’s local realities appear to be so heterogeneous that they do not fit into the far-fetched ‘some main tendencies’[…] 87 85 Magomedov. Not being able.65 assume that this critique was unfamiliar to Shils. the nature of regional and egoistic interests.86 The structure and the style of elitistic systems of views seriously vary on the cross-regional basis. interminably pointing out that regional ideologies just somehow ‘appear’ or ‘become’ the formulas of government for local ruling groups.why is it only regional. p. as opposed to any other ideologies. to explain the difference between the various regional ideologies in any other way than through references to the vague argument of cognitive capacities of their ‘authors’. 87 Magomedov. See: Igritskiy. to such a degree. All these circumstances are concentrated in. p. and translated into. then. Magomedov does not reflect on this question in any of his analytical excursions. on such discredited ideas. ideology. 128. Misteria regionalizma’. ‘A.39.249. Magomedov faces serious difficulties in responding to the other crucial question . Magomedov. Regional Ideologies. . the setting of concrete tasks. p. at the end of the 20th century. Each of the reviewed elites is distinct in its individual character. the relevant ideas of friends and enemies. The latter is defined by various circumstances: historical legacy. which come to be employed by the elites in their race for greater power? In fact. The overgeneralisation of the Magomedov’s conclusion has already been mentioned by Yuri Igritskii 86 in his review of Mysteriya regionalizma. does not compliment the relevant scholar.

The question of what regional ideologies really are. Given that the concepts of ‘translation’ and ‘definition’. even in spite of the fact of having done extensive ‘field’ regional ideas become the cornerstone of political programmes . as well as the ones between ‘ideas’ and ‘ideals’ are not explained in the work of Magomedov the academic value of this kind of conclusion seems to be rather doubtful. appear to be hardly compatible with each other. the difference between ‘concrete tasks’ and ‘fundamental goals’.66 Finding the most deep. Magomedov comes out with more than ‘some’ answers which. final explanation (predel’noe obyasnenie) of politics. fundamental goals and other principles which constitute politics’. In the light of these tensions it is impossible to answer the main question of this research .88 In this way. Trying to escape from ‘some far-fetched general tendencies’. On the other hand he assumes that ideologies themselves define ‘ideals. On the one hand he speaks about ‘concrete tasks.within the analytical trajectories of Magomedov’s project. regional and egoistic interests’ and other ‘ideas’ that define ideological content simply by being translated in it. It seems that just to put regional ideologies in the centre of analytical investigation. fundamental goals and other principles which constitute politics. What is necessary in this enterprise is a comprehensive methodological framework for the analysis. in the very conclusion of his Mystery of Regionalism Magomedov brings the reader to the ‘vital’ contradiction of his entire project based on the uncritical reading of structural hermeneutics and the elite analysis approach. what causes their emergence and what does really appear to be shaped by the latter. is not enough to facilitate an adequate analysis of programmes of regional identification. ideology defines ideals. 129. the 88 Ibid. As aforementioned. . however. still remain totally unclear.

313-346. 1965). This focus looks really strange because even a brief review of the literature demonstrates that the main debates on this problem start later. or even before. ‘The Elements of the Concept of Ideology’ in Poliltcal Studies. See: Aletta Norval. ‘Comparative Political Culture’ in Lucian Pye and Sydney Verba (eds. after the Second World War. from the range of theoretical accounts available Magomedov relies on the works of Verba89. 1995). being written at the end of the 1990s.Contemporary Approaches to the 93 94 Analysis of Ideology' in British Journal of Political Sciences. 90 Karl Mannheim. his works reflect the trends of social thought dominant in the beginning of the 1970s. 'Review Article: The Things We Do with Words . 30 (2000). Robert Dahl. In other words this means that the scholar has a weak methodological basis in general and it is this factor which seems to lay at the foundation of the tensions identified in his research. 1961). 18-38. Diagnoz nashego vremeni (Moscow: Yurist. in its turn. seems to be explained by the rather ‘selective’ attitude of the author towards current theoretical debates devoted to the issue of ideology. This reason. 544-548. Among the relatively recent works referred to. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American city (New Haven: Yale 91 University Press. Mannheim90.94 Unsurprisingly.) Political Culture and Political Development (New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Thus apart from the aforementioned papers of Shils.314. p. 92 David McLellan. 1994). there is only McLellan92 and Hamilton93. articulated a wide academic interest as regards the question of the ideological. Dahl91. after the ‘linguistic turn’ in social sciences and the revival of Marxist ideas in the West. no. Malcolm Hamilton.1 (1987). no. Geertz and Putnam. . Ideology (Buckingham: Open University Press.67 failures of the Magomedov’s endeavour are grounded in his inability to provide a clear synthesis of the two different methodological pillars of his investigation. It is rather remarkable that. the amount of works which introduce the notion of the importance of the study of ideology drastically increase by the end of the 89 Sydney Verba.

London: Hutchinson. Ideologies and Political Theory (Oxford: Claredon Press. p. 1993). and the problem now is more one of an overabundance of relevant works. to say nothing of a sociological history of many variations and meanings’ […]. . as is done in the studies of regional political elites. David Hawkes. John Thompson. The Concept of Ideology (Athens: The University of Georgia Press. footnote 2. Ideology: An Introduction. 40 (2001). Michael Freeden. Karl Mannheim complained that ‘we do not yet posses an adequate historical treatment of the development of the concept of ideology. Ideology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. See for example: John Larrain. 1996).96 Conclusion to Chapter I In this way then. 1999). ‘Ideology. G. Mike Cormack. 1991).58. (London: Verso. 1996). and Clifford Geertz: Some Russian Reflections’ in History and Theory. 1979). as early as 1929. the review of existing literature reveals that the problem of regional ideologies in post-Soviet Russia in general does not receive enough academic attention. Jorge Larrain. and others.95 It is this process that is referred to by Andrey Zorin who. (London – New York: Routledge. writes: Interestingly. regimes and various forms of ever-existing regionalism.68 1970s and later. Since that time the situation has shifted to the other extreme. Martin’s press. or it is accounted for by way of a secondary phenomenon that does not deserve special analytical investigation. 57-73. ‘Ideology: An Essay on Definition’ […]. Kendall. 95 From the general works see: Terry Eagleton. Studies in the Theory of Ideology […]. 1992). no. introducing the Russian translation of Ideology as a Cultural System. Chrisopher Pines. The Concept of Ideology. Andrew Heywood. Ideology. in what became a classic work (Ideology and Utopia). Semiotics. Political Ideologies (New York: St. Ideology and False Consciousness: Marx and his Historical Progenitors (Albany: State University of New York Press. 96 Andrey Zorin. It is either present in the form of simplistic description employed by various monitoring groups.

However. The main weakness is that Magomedov does not situate his approach in the broad debates on ideology.69 The only research which is specifically devoted to the study of contemporary Russian regional ideologies – that of Arbakhan Magomedov. Following the aforementioned demand. language and society opened within the linguistic turn and therefore comes to produce an ‘overabundance of works’ devoted to this theme. despite its noble ambitions. we shall continue with an extended introduction of the methodological framework that is to be employed in the examination of contemporary Russian regional ideologies. This introduction aims at defining a clear concept of ideology. The reasons for this failure lies in the weak methodological foundation of its intellectual endeavour. only this makes possible the avoidance of the methodological weakness that is to be detected in the only existing extended academic project dealing with regional ideologies in contemporary Russia. . situated in relation to the other spheres of social life. The navigation of this ‘overabundance of works’ is a difficult task. is still rather insufficient as it does not really give the answers to the questions articulated in the preamble of this work. such as the institutional organisation of the society and the normative regulations of social praxis.

. but also offers sufficient analytic tools to allow us to endeavour in the process of understanding the construction. This. in its turn. I demonstrate that the analytic apparatus introduced by these scholars does not only give a theoretically clear picture of what ideology is. allows one to identify the points that need to be addressed in the forthcoming empirical research. functioning and dissolution of ideological creations. opens the way towards a situation of contemporary Russian regional ideologies in the context of discursive transformations constituting contemporary Russian history. Mouffe and the scholars of the Ideology and Discourse Analysis programme run at the University of Essex. Reviewing the later debates. I show how different authors try to reconcile this contradiction by providing new theoretical accounts of ideological communication. In the scope of approaches offered in the field of discourse analysis I will focus upon the one elaborated by Laclau. This excursion results in the introduction of discourse theory as it is this theory which seems to give the most credible means for solving the problem of the contradictory nature of the key concept of the research. notably those of Marx. which. Lenin. The introduction begins with an outline of a profound controversy in understanding ideology born of the discussion between Destutt de Tracy and Napoleon.70 CHAPTER 2: IDEOLOGY. DISCOURSE AND SOCIAL CHANGE: INTRODUCTION OF THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK Introduction to Chapter 2 This chapter aims at introducing the methodological framework to be employed in the analysis of ideological practice. Gramsci and Althusser. above all.

193-233. ‘Ideology As a Cultural System’ in Clifford Geertz. The Interpretation of Cultures. 3 (1971). were more than relevant to their time. no. or a science explaining their formation. prior to the introduction of the methodological framework. 2 Robert Putnam. ‘Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of ‘Ideology’’. 651. in American Political Science Review. and most notably to those held between Clifford Geertz and Robert Putnam. 658-681.193. . p. This relevance is generally explained by a growing methodological ambivalence which encapsulated the concept of ideology since it became a topic for academic discussion at the end of the 18th century. Selected Essays (London: Fontana Press.71 Ideology as the ‘greatest of arts […] regulating society’ and as ‘obscure and shadowy metaphysics’ As an initial remark. Destutt de Tracy defined ideology as the knowledge as to the origins of abstract ideas formed in the mind. in fact.1 Interestingly enough. although he was in disagreement with Geertz as regards the conception of ideology. p. For as far back as the beginning of the 1970s. the American anthropologist said that ‘it is one of the minor ironies of modern intellectual history that the term “ideology” has itself became thoroughly ideologised’. we could refer to the debates mentioned in the previous Chapter. it is possible to say that these remarks. Moreover. as Thompson comments on this definition: 1 Clifford Geertz. He expressed this by saying that: ‘diving into the cold and dark water of literature on “ideology” is a shocking and disappointing experience for any promising supporter of social science’. Putnam had the same doubt regarding the degree of the clarity of this term. 1993).2 Looking at the development of scholarly debates focused on the issue of ideology.

morality and.5 The polemics articulated by the critical remark of Napoleon set the ground for a profoundly deep split in the understanding of ideology and its role in society. 1. p. 3 John Thompson. ultimately. The question of whether it is the ‘art regulating society’ or it is just an ‘obscure’ and ‘shadowy metaphysics’ which brings society away from its ‘real’ problems became the problem defining further academic encounters with ideology.72 Ideology [for Destutt de Tracy] was to be ‘positive. 1979). that of regulating society in such a way that man finds there the most help and the least possible annoyance from his own kind’. that shadowy metaphysics which subtly searches for first causes on which to base the legislation of peoples. 5 Quoted through Thomson. Ideology and the Modern Culture.3 However. Ideology and the Modern Culture (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. It was also the basis of grammar. 1990). The latter came to be seen as all men of ideas blind to historical realities and who were thereby totally enraptured by the research of abstract truth. rather than making use of laws known to the human heart and of the lessons of history’. 1750 to the Present 4 (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. And the first intellectual tradition where this dualism is clearly articulated is in Marxist social theory. Isaac Kramnick and Frederic Watkins. useful and susceptible of rigorous exactitude’. 31. logic.4 Addressing the Council of State in December 1812 Napoleon declared that: ‘We must lay the blame for the ills that our fair France has suffered on ideology. p. ‘the greatest of the arts…. the social value of this ‘art’ was very soon questioned by Napoleon who made his famous remarks on ‘ideologues’. education. p. since scientific knowledge involved the combination of ideas. 29. . irrelevant to the solution of actual social problems. Genealogically it was the ‘first science’. The Age of Ideology: Political Thought.

The Communist Manifesto (Harmondsworth: Penguin. By introducing the difference between ‘bourgeois’ and ‘proletarian’ ideologies Marx and Engels situate the ambivalent value of ideology within the framework of class theory. they distort and pervert the former. In a society where there are or will be no such contradictions and hence. On the one hand it is being perceived within the Napoleonian framework as ‘false consciousness’. in fact. 1985). 6 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. such as the ideal communist one.6 Here ideology ‘distorts’ and ‘perverts’ the social affiliations constituted by ‘real’ economic relations of production. However. which is to be opposed to a kind of ‘true’ consciousness. If they are uttered by the proletariat. If employed by the bourgeoisie however.73 The Marxist encounter Marxism is clearly concerned with the dual character of ideology. As a matter of fact. on the contrary. they become necessary only in a situation of class contradictions. by explaining the ideological controversy through class theory Marx and Engels. Marxism advocates the assumption that ideology is an accidental translation of the ‘essential’ ground of economic relations. speaking about ‘proletarian ideology’ Marx assumes that unlike the ‘bourgeois’ one it does not ‘distort’ and ‘pervert’ the real order of things but. by their being used to ‘distort’ or to ‘legitimise’ a certain social order. point to the social insignificance of this phenomenon. ‘legitimises’ the latter. Insofar as ideological performances are completely defined by their instrumentality in relation to the class struggle. On the other hand. no classes. . there should therefore be no place for ideology. they legitimise the social changes defined by the objective run of history. wherein the positive or negative nature of ideological performances appears to be defined by the class affiliations of their ‘translators’.

and drives consciousness away from the ‘real’ problem of establishing another social arrangement. p. Lenin obviously thinks of ideologies in terms of their ‘proletarian’ or ‘bourgeois’ character .74 This assumption appears to be translated into many of the subsequent Marxist debates. 1973). For one class a particular ideology may be regarded as ‘naturalising’ and ‘legitimising’ a certain social order while for the others it becomes something which ‘distorts’ and ‘perverts’ reality. . in Marxism.7 In such a way. for example. What is to be Done? The Burning Question of Our Movement (Peking: Foreign Languages Press. purely reflecting the regularities of class composition. very soon this solution becomes revisited as voices appear which question the secondary character of ideological practices along with their total reducibility to the regularities of the underlying economic base. Moreover. The post-Marxist critique However. 7 Vladimir Lenin.48. for Lenin. ‘There is no middle course for humanity has not created a “third” ideology’ states the leader of the Russian Revolution. The first challenge of the original Marxist proposal is linked to the name of Antonio Gramsci. in a society torn apart by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or above-class ideology. the methodological contradiction between the positive and the negative role of ideological practices appears to be solved by situating it in relation to particular social movements and policies undertaken by economically (or in some other way) pre-constituted social actors.

1971). churches etc. while the second type of government is based totally on the use of force. in economic activity and in all manifestations of individual and collective life’. This transformation becomes intelligible after he articulates the distinction between ‘organic’ and ‘non-organic’ or ‘coercive’ forms of social organisation. These ideologies have a psychological validity to ‘“organise” human masses and create the terrain on which men move. recruited to preserve established economic relations.’8 Historically organic ideologies are then seen as the sets of commonsensical conceptions of the world which are ‘implicitly manifest in art. 9 . The theoretical innovation endowed in the idea of the ‘organic state’ inverts the Marxist base/superstructure dichotomy as the totality of social practices and institutions now appears to be determined not by the economic relations of the ‘base’ but also by the development of the ideological superstructure of ‘state and civil society’. etc. The first ones are established by the virtue of ideological domination through the ‘cultural institutions’ or the institutions of ‘civil society’ such as schools. Prison Notebook (London: Lawrence and Wishart. struggle. By admitting this alternative Gramsci designates the theoretical perspective in which it appears possible to account for ideology in terms of the sphere that can 8 Antonio Gramsci. p. p. provides ideology with the same social importance as the relations of material forces. law.. 377.75 The Italian thinker introduces the interesting concept of ‘historically organic ideologies understood as a necessary representative of material class interests which are organically related to social institutions and society in general. in fact. Ibid. 328. acquire consciousness of their position.9 In the concept of historically organic ideologies Gramsci.

Althusser introduces a particular concept of subjectivity based on the ideas of interpellation or hailing. pp. 1969). The Method of Post-Structuralism (London: Routledge. The transformation of ‘raw material’ into ‘determinate product’ occurs as a result of the transposition of particular imaginary relations onto the surface of the ‘real’ world. The next wave of critique targeting the preoccupation with the accidental nature of ideology is presented in the works of Louis Althusser. The French scholar goes further than the Gramscian concern. This concept becomes the focal point of his entire intellectual project. 166. 11 1999). French Discourse Analysis. p. . And exactly these relations appear to be embodied in ideological practice. seen as the manner in which social identities are constituted. Following the direction of the ‘linguistic turn’ Althusser attributes to ideology the character of a language system which forms identifiable phenomena from an indiscreet physical reality. Glyn Williams.11 In development of this idea. The French thinker argues that the process of social identification is a free subjection of individuals to the idea of a subject translated by means of ideological apparatus. Combining Marxist assumptions with the ideas elaborated by structuralists and advanced in psychoanalysis he comes out with a new approach. For Marx (Harmondsworth: Penguin. It is this function which Althusser translates as ‘any process of transformation of a determinate given raw material into a determinate product’10. 70-71. 10 Louis Althusser.76 possess the same importance in the organisation of social relations as that which was earlier completely restricted to the realm of economy.

for the French thinker the ‘ideological state apparatus’ ceases to be just a social alternative but becomes the axis of any social organisation. Yet. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London: New Left Books. 13 . he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognised that the hail was ‘really addressed’ to him (and not to someone else). Moreover. Ibid. you there!’ Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street.12 Thus it comes to be obvious that Althusser endows the material character of ideology with the notion of ‘interpellation’. Being ‘hailed’. ‘peasants’ or ‘bourgeoisie’.in imaginary fashion . subjects construct .181. p. by means of transforming ‘raw’ individuals into ‘subjects’.77 Ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ among the individuals (it recruits them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing. as well as Gramsci. in which they can feel ‘all right’13 as ‘workers’. neither the first nor the second abandons the very basis of the Marxist theory. In this proposal Althusser deploys the Gramscian hint regarding the defining role of ideology in organising social relations. By this one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion. the hailed individual will turn around.174. And it is here that a new methodological 12 Louis Althusser. Having advocated the notion of the profound importance of ideological practices. In the light of these arguments ideology comes to be treated as the sphere which lends organisation to society.their real world. 1971). p. it is possible to say that Althusser. fail to complete the project of rehabilitating the social value of ideology. and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey. most notably the privileging of economy over other spheres of social life.

Discourse. his model is strongly compromised by his insistence that it is the economic system that determines which level is to be the dominant element in any particular society. However. p. in fact. And this tension causes David Howarth to summarise the Althusserian theoretical intervention in a rather critical way: There is no question that Althusser’s theoretical approach reinvigorated the Marxist theory of ideology […]. More precisely. It is evident that this conception fails to transcend the determinism of the Marxist theory of society. and his emphasis on the ‘overdetermined’ character of social contradictions.14 However. political and ideological] that constitutes a social formation. Economy and ideology become contradictory in their function of lending an order to society.78 tension emerges. it raises some key questions which effectively discredit the Marxist solution to the contradictory readings of ideology. (Buckingham: Open University Press. This contradiction remains quite visible throughout the entire work of Gramsci and Althusser. and it is economic processes that still determine ‘in the last instance’ the functioning and reproduction of society as a whole. 97. defines two further perspectives in the study of ideology. If the two ‘faces’ of ideology are determined by the character of economically constituted agents. 2000). 14 David Howarth. . despite these problems in justifying the defining social role of ideology. and this makes their approach to ideology rather vulnerable. Althusser’s theoretical intervention appears to be highly productive for further advances in this field. carried the promise of breaking with the reductionist and determinist model of society epitomised in the base/superstructure metaphor. how then should we treat the very idea that ideology can itself constitute these actors? The answer to this question. His stress on the relative autonomy of the three systems of practice [economic.

it is necessary clearly to indicate the author’s position in this vital theoretical roundabout. and far more detailed investigation than it is allowed by the restriction of this thesis. the authors accept the assumption as to the defining role of ideology ‘at the expense’ of the ‘value’ which would otherwise be left to certain essential domains. for instance. It is obvious that theoretical debates on the ‘true’ of ‘false’ character of each approach requires a special. defines their methodological vagueness. While within the second. Nevertheless. to a great degree. wherein ideology is regarded as a translation of certain underlying social regularities. once announced. To introduce this paradigm a further excursion into . And it is this unawareness. This ‘authoritarian’ declaration seems to be the only way to avoid the tensions and shortcomings identified in the existing examinations of Russian regional ideologies. Following this requirement I declare that the following endeavour is conducted within the second – constructivist paradigm of examining ideologies. which. as it is only afterwards that the general theoretical assumptions appear to be supplied with relevant conceptual instruments. at most. Magomedov (widely criticised in the previous chapter) finds himself. the following indifference as to the crucial methodological difference outlined above would lead the research into the same trap as. Here it is proposed to stay with the classic Marxist materialism. However. This type of approach is generally regarded as constructivist.79 Within the first one the Althusserian theoretical contribution is rejected or. on the contrary. This perspective is realised in the so-called realist approaches. However. recognised as a deviation. the constructivist paradigm needs a clear introduction. it is exactly this split which appears to be ignored in the studies of Russian regional ideologies. The split between the two profoundly different trajectories of apprehending ideologies appears to be unrecognised. In order to avoid this trap.

‘The Order of Discourse’ in Michael J. This activity is seen by Foucault as the construction of a certain structure of the reality we live in. 16 Michel Foucault. What it means is that something becomes thinkable as a particular object only within the framework of a precise structural organisation. xvii. hear. using the intellectual project of one of Althusser’s disciples .80 the theoretical literature will be carried out. are not pre-given to man. 1994). 1984). Foucault places the thesis that things.) Language and Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. The French thinker assumes that objects exist as entities as far as they are structured by socially produced rules and norms that form a certain ‘syntax’ of our world perception.15 The Foucauldian argument states that whatever we see. The Order of Things. this does not mean that there is literally nothing outside a certain norm and that this norm is the only reality. p. 108-138. Michel Foucault Foucault starts his theoretical endeavour with a general critique of the essentialist paradigm. pp. whatever they are. 126-128. but are produced within particular social activity. feel and think as ‘objects’. The Archaeology of Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books. Shapiro (ed. . ‘things’ or ‘events’ become what they are only in the realm of certain structural affiliations which make them thinkable.Michel Foucault. What lies beyond obviously exists but we cannot really objectify it unless it comes to be incorporated in certain structural affiliations by which we can distinguish it from the non-discrete reality of the surrounding world.16 Yet. At the basis of his critique. 15 Michel Foucault.

p. the field of in which we distinguish is regarded by the French thinker as discourse understood as a socially produced structure which perceives the surrounding world. Arguing that the formation of objects emerge only in discourse he says that all objects obtain their identity or. covering the ideas formed in the time from The Order of Things and Archaeology of Knowledge to The Birth of the Clinic. however. in its turn. Thus a ‘schizophrenic’ or a ‘mentally ill person’ is brought into being by the ‘medical’ knowledge explaining why one person is ‘normal’ and why the other is not. . is not always logically clear. and ‘genealogical’ one which. During the archaeological period Foucault attempts to describe the discursive formations of the Modern Era in Europe. 127. ‘The Order of Discourse’. History of Sexuality and other late works. Objects as such are formed by knowledge which ‘demarcates’ reality in a certain way and by this distinguishes what we call ‘objects’.81 Generally. ‘[T]here is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world’ . In so doing he elaborates the ‘order of discourse’ which makes intelligible ‘the bringing of objects into being’.17 Touching upon the regularities of this formation Foucault draws a detailed picture. The major incapacity is concealed in a certain lack of continuity in his thought which causes many authors to divide his entire intellectual project into two parts: the ‘archaeological’. become what they are only in discourse. which. literally. The way objects emerge in discourse in this phase of his intellectual endeavour can be presented in the following way. includes the idea which Foucault expresses in Discipline and Punish. Literally the ‘ill’ and the ’normal’ become objects to 17 Foucault.says Michel Foucault.

19 The conclusions and judgements of a doctor considering one as ‘mentally ill’ represent a clear example of this knowledge. defines whether or not this utterance can be considered as a statement and by this can form a kind of knowledge. This means that knowledge as such exists not only in texts but also in the context of its articulation. Drawing on the distinctions of enunciating linguistics Foucault considers that any meaningful utterance which relates to the relevant knowledge. Foucault puts forward the idea of ‘places of speaking’ understood as positions from where the statements are made. manifests itself in the form of statements or enoncés which express a particular mode of demarcation. A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (New York: Vintage Books. p. The discursive modality. like ‘teacher’. 19 Michel Foucault. 20 21 .20 For example. pp. i. 95-96.21 specified in relations of difference with other modalities. 117 Foucault. ‘policemen’ or ‘patient’ etc. 305-306. Conceptualising this context further.82 be distinguished from the social fabric insofar as they become objects of ‘medical knowledge’. Madness and Civilization. The Archaeology of Knowledge. is inseparable from the context in which it is made. The Order of Things. whatever form it takes. the position of a ‘doctor’ is the place which causes the relevant statement to be understood in a particular ‘medical’ way.e. Foucault. The place is also identified as an enunciative modality. p. 1988).18 The knowledge. The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Tavistock. 1972). 18 Michel Foucault. the place from which a particular voice is heard.

strategies and relations established between discursive modalities. This includes the modalities constituting a particular dispersion of statements and relations established between them. ‘mentally ill’ become. the nondiscursive. at this stage of his research Foucault constantly refers to the situation where discourse affects.‘doctor’. concepts. comes to be seen as external to the discursive. 64-65. This means that discourse in general appears to be defined in relations of difference to what may be regarded as the social. or establishes something outside itself. which probably results from the unintelligibility of this notion within the conceptual framework of his theory. crucial for the intelligibility of discourse. includes everything which lies beyond the field of statements. and nondiscursive insofar as they belong to the realm of social organisation external to discourse itself. 22 Ibid.83 At this point Foucault understands discourse as the dispersion of statements made from different positions. 23 . p. according to the archaeological Foucault. As a matter of fact. put coherently. As Howarth indicates in his analysis of the Foucauldian archaeological project. if all objects are brought into being by a certain knowledge and this knowledge is what constitutes discourse. ambiguously. for instance. having outlined the vital importance of the non-discursive.37. then the objects . Discourse.23 This outside is defined as practices.22 The realm of the non-discursive. However. ‘patient’. both a discursive creation as far as they are thinkable. What makes a ‘doctor’ different from a ‘patient’. Howarth. which. in its turn. Foucault does not provide any positive definition of it. is.

are sometimes juxtaposed with one another. The specification that there is nothing outside discourse except another discourse leads Foucault to the idea that discursive organisation is inseparable from the relations of domination and power. It is the other discourses which distinguish the objects that serve as the discursive modalities for the given one. but can just as well exclude or be unaware of each other’ (Foucault. This idea leads Foucault to the conclusion that discourse finds it limits not in relations of difference from the social. which cross each other.84 And it is exactly this tension which causes Foucault to revisit the concept of discourse in his later works. discursive modalities such as ‘doctor’. as the identities of subject positions presuppose the constitution of meaningfulness as translated by their enoncé. shows that. and especially at the examples used by Foucault for illustrating it. these statements are not ones uttered by the modalities they specify. ‘teacher’. The revision starts with the analysis of relations forming the discursive modalities. as a matter of fact. One discourse penetrates the other insofar as I can dominate the latter or impose my power on it. Foucault argues that the interpenetration of dominated and dominating discourses plays a vital role in bringing 24 See: ‘Discourses must be treated as discontinuous practices. However. 127). relations and practices are placed in relations of mutual interaction. ‘policeman’ are nothing else than indeed the objects recognised in a certain corpus of statements. etc. the reality we live in appears to be presented as a configuration of different discourses where different objects. ‘The Order of Discourse’. A thorough look at the way objects emerge in discourse. In such a way. p. but in its difference from other discourses.24 For instance the state discourse constituted by the bodies of government constitutes the modality of ‘policeman’ whose statements bring into existence a ‘criminal’. . subject positions.

1984). ‘Power […] is not an institution. 26 27 . The Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon. vol.writes the French author.25 This means that the condition of struggle and antagonistic relations established between the powerful discourse and that of resistance form the axis of any discursive arrangement. social struggle and social dynamics. p.27 The discursive character of power grounds the essential role of ‘knowledge’ in constituting social relations. This difference flows from the basic methodological preoccupation of Michael Foucault. generally understood as a capacity of controlling the actions of individuals by means of various institutions of coercion like police. it is necessary to remind that the concept of power in the works of Foucault differs from the ‘traditional’ one. since discourse is organised by in statements. and not a structure. pp.26 is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a particular society’. translated into his strong disregard of any possibility of arguing for the pregiven objectivity of surrounding realities. it is the creation of knowledge which becomes the main instrument in the execution of power. History of Sexuality. Michel Foucault. . 1 (New York: Penguin Books. 94-98. Having dismissed the validity of the idea of an objective world in which individuals are perceived as pre-given objects. . apprehended through the dichotomy of power and 25 Williams. Foucault argues that insofar as discourse is the realm bringing objects into being. army.85 objects into being. 1977). courts etc. understood as autonomous systems of knowledge. Michel Foucault. Yet. The French Discourse Analysis. it is discourse which also provides power with the instruments of its existence. Thus what is usually seen as the sphere of politics. through power’s recognition as to the dominated and the dominating entities. Discipline and Punish. 93.

ideology occupies a place equal to the one of science. advocating this point. p. . Many authors argue that Foucault. Indeed he attempts to prosecute his critical archaeology of knowledge without recourse to any critical 28 Kramnick and Watkins. for example. which for him. comes to be the sphere of competition between different knowledges. about society. constituting knowledge. 2. the dominating and the dominated. avoids a clear separation of ideology and. about the relationship of the individual to the state and society. the very division between ‘science’ and ‘ideology’ becomes insignificant. for example. a demarcation given absolute status in Marxist as well as positivist philosophy. This conclusion brings ideology to the centre of the social. science. constitutes the centre of social structurality. as in his theory they both belong to the realm of ‘statements’ organising discourse. about the relationship of the economy and the polity’28. Being ‘a pattern of political beliefs that introduce normative visions […] of ideal order’. for Foucault. no doubt. It is not economy or any other underlying terrain which defines the arrangement of social inequality and explains social struggle but the interaction of different pictures of the world that leads to the intelligibility of social dynamics. indeed. religion or ritual and through this it is converted into a network of statements which organise social knowledge.86 resistance. which ‘include highly articulated attitudes about human nature. Bell. writes that. Foucault systematically rejects the traditional opposition of science and ideology. The Age of Ideology. as the former is converted into nothing other than a particular form of statements.

336.87 theory of ideology. vol. 30 Mark Cousins and Athar Hussain. Being a science of ideas. p. Ideology does not question the foundation. ideology is not only inseparable from science and other material translations of the knowledge. ‘Michel Foucault: A Philosopher for all Seasons?’ in History of European Ideas. The difference is established by different positions […] The difference between them is. in his reference to Destutt de Tracy. or the laws of society. it expresses the laws of composition and decomposition that may rule it. holding that this analysing of discourse practices made it possible to trace the formations of disciplines (savoirs) while escaping dilemma of science versus ideology. it defines the links that provide its connections. It situates all knowledge in the space of representations. no. in their turn. Michel Foucault (London: Macmillan. or the root of representation. the manner in which they are expressed in words and linked together in reasoning. 1984). but. the limits. 331-346.95.30 And as Foucault confirms himself. the words of language. and by scanning that space it 29 Desmond Bell. it represents the supreme form of the latter. But precisely in so far as its object is ideas. . write that: ‘we are not dealing with a difference between science and ideology. a topographical difference not a difference between knowledge and pseudo knowledge’. it scans the domain of representations in general. as it were. moreover. it determines the necessary sequences that appear there. p. Ideology posits itself both as the only rational and scientific form that philosophy can assume and as the sole philosophic foundation that can be proposed for the sciences in general and for each particular sphere of knowledge. it has validity as the Grammar and the Logic of all possible science. Ideology should be a kind of knowledge of the same type as those that take as their object the beings of nature.3 (1992). 14.29 Cousins and Hussain.

this origin expressed in a continuous discourse is Ideology. Clifford Geertz33 and Jaques Lacan. in all its actual materiality. It is in a sense the knowledge of all knowledge [emphasis added]. ‘The effectiveness of symbols’ in Claude Levi-Strauss. 240-241. 85). He shows that the theoretical perspective designated in post-Marxist studies allows for a response to the initial contradiction in reading ‘ideology’. Yet it is fair to say that Foucault himself does not elaborate the problem of the success or failure of particular knowledges in making reality thinkable. pp. This makes it possible to conclude that the theoretical 31 Foucault.88 formulates the knowledge [emphasis added] of the laws that provide its organization. this perspective obtains its elaboration in the works of other authors like Levi-Strauss32. While in fact. 203-205). 186-205. (Foucault. By being a ‘knowledge’ ideology brings objects into being and through this. it makes reality thinkable. p. and one which proceeds in a different but scientifically defensible way. See also: ‘this foundation underlying all knowledge. The Order of Things. 33 The Geertzean concept of ‘cultural strain’ is understood as the impossibility of apprehending actual reality within the culturally given system of world perception (see: Geertz. 32 Levi-Strauss investigates the case where the health problems that emerge during the process of giving birth become an event unexplainable within the culturally given world picture of the future mother and then he displays how a re-conceptualisation of the reality through a shaman’s ritual assists the women in retaining spiritual and even physical health (See: Claude Levi-Strauss. Under these circumstances its ‘distorted’ and ‘false’ character appears to be defined by the inability to make the actually-happening events and actually-present things intelligible. .31 Concluding the excursion into the Foucauldian intellectual project it appears possible to say that the French thinker suggests a credible alternative to the realist accounts for ideology. ‘Ideology as a Cultural System’. The Order of Things. Structural Anthropology (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1968). pp. a language that duplicates the spontaneous thread of knowledge along the whole of its length’. ideology may be regarded as ‘organic’ and ‘true’ if it manages to objectify and make thinkable the surrounding word. Rather.

89 advances of the Foucauldian intellectual enterprise set a solid ground for an adequate approach to ideologies from the constructivist standpoint. 35 This approach is offered in the works Ernesto Laclau. Aletta Norval. Discourse. David Howarth.36 It is important to mention that at the point of defining what discourse is.34 However. IDA seriously differs from other schools of discourse analysis. discourses constitute symbolic systems and social orders. the most prominent one in which the question of ideological ‘success’ appears to be in the main focus of the research. And the number of works departing from this theoretical ground prove this assumption better than any other argument. Jason Glynos and other researchers in the Essex school of discourse analysis. Thus discourse is apprehended as a sphere ‘[that] includes all the practices and meanings shaping a particular community of social actors. 35 The IDA approach: basic assumptions Drawing on the problems visited in the post-Marxist debates. post-structuralism and psychoanalysis. In these perspectives. Yanis Stavrakakis. . excluding articles. and the task of discourse analysis is to examine their historical and political construction and functioning’. is the ideology and discourse analysis (henceforth IDA) approach. more than 80 books devoted to Foucault had been published. 5. the authors of IDA generally comply with the main concepts elaborated by Michel Foucault. Chantal Mouffe. generally known under the name of critical discourse analysis (hereinafter CDA) and deployed by Ruth Wodak and the 34 A basic search in the catalogue of the Library of Congress (‘Foucault’ in the Title field) indicates that by the year 2004. within the scope of the approaches elaborating the ‘Foucauldian solution’. 36 Howarth.

while subtle and precise.90 authors of the Vienna school. 40 Teun Van Dijk (ed. 7. ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ in Teun van Dijk (ed. as a sphere placed between language grammar and non-linguistic realities. and dominance of course involve more than text and talk. The Handbook of Discourse Analysis (London: Academic Press.40 37 For a review of these approaches see: Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak.htm. discourse features may only be symptoms or fragmentary enactments [emphasis added] of larger problems: inequality. 258 . class differences. racism.38 And the majority of authors working in the framework of the CDA approach indeed regard discourse in the same way. ‘Towards an analysis of discourse’ in Advances in Spoken Discourse Analysis (London: Routledge. available at: http://www. Clarifying this notion Coulthard and Sinclair write. As Van Dijk puts it in his Introduction to the Handbook of Discourse Analysis: Discourse analysis provides us with rather powerful. power. sexism. p. p. 38 John Sinclair and Malcolm 1991).37 Despite some significant differences between these authors it is still possible to say however that there is a point where they clearly meet. They all regard discourse as ‘language in use’ or ‘language beyond the sentence’. Teun Van Dijk. It is here that we witness the realisation of the macrosociological patterns [emphasis added] that characterise our societies.39 In the framework of this definition discourse is regarded as a pure mediation of relations established in non-linguistic domains. 1985). 1997). Certainly. 39 See: What Do We Mean By ‘Discourse Analysis’? in Discourse and Society official web page edited by Teun Van Dijk. 5. Günter Kress and some other scholars.discourse-in-society. in the article introducing their Advances in Spoken Discourse Analysis: ‘We see the level of discourse as lying between [emphasis added] the levels of grammar and non-linguistic organisation’.) Discourse as Social Interaction (London: Sage. in terms of their ends. insights to pinpoints the everyday manifestations and displays [emphasis added] of social problems in communication and interaction. Norman Fairclough. adopted for . It is also possible to mention that the phrases Discourse and Society or Discourse in Society.

. As Jäger states himself: ‘discourse analysis is not (only) about interpretations of something that already exists. no. ‘Impossibility of Society’ in Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory.discourse is society. The authors of this approach focus on the issues of inter-personal interactions or public communication where given positions like ‘man’. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (London: Sage. these are the issues of socially pre-organised communication which are mainly elaborated in the CDA. this terrain is seen as defining its discursive ‘manifestations’ and ‘displays’. vol. ‘teenager’ etc. It is exactly this point at which CDA. 1-2 & 3 (1991). Theoretical and methodological aspects of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis’ in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (Eds. manifest themselves through the text uttered.41 In accordance with this strategy. 36). thus not (only) about the analysis of the allocation of a meaning post festum. hence it is this reality which determines discourse. Being apprehended in terms of ‘larger problems’ of ‘inequality’. p.91 Thus Van Dijk obviously considers ‘macrosociological patterns that characterise our societies’ as an autonomous terrain. 24-27). qualify CDA as a method of sociological reductionism where a study in discursive practices unavoidably has to be reduced to an endeavour in social ‘reality’ external to the discursive affiliations and pre-organised outside them. ‘doctor’. The issues of their emergence and the constitution of particular relations between them are usually out of focus in this body of research. ‘Discourse and Knowledge. as therein discourse and society are principally inseparable . but about the analysis of the production of reality which is performed by discourse’ (Siegfied Jäger. ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’. 15. 258) while the authors of the IDA would say that society is a form of discursive practice (See Ernesto Laclau. the assumption that this organisation defines discourse. 32-62.) differ on this point and stand closer to the IDA approach. ‘woman’. as well as the denomination of the field of the problem in CDA would be a nonsense from the point of view of IDA. It is also important to mention that the works of Siegfrid Jäger and the Duisburg school of discourse analysis. 2001). lying outside discourse. often considered as a part of the CDA(. The possibility for thinkable social reality to be pre-organised outside discursive affiliations and moreover. 41 It is possible to say that in CDA it is assumed that ‘discourse is a form of social practice’ (Fairclough and Wodak.). ‘immigrant’. and mediate the position to the audience. . p. ‘racism’ etc.

does not drive IDA into the debates on the primacy of thought over matter or the other way around. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. or with the realism/idealism opposition. (eds. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exist. here and now. stands in a clear opposition to IDA. but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence. 43 Rom Harre. The fact that all objects are assumed to be the objects of discourse. As Laclau and Mouffe argue the focus on the discursive emergence of objects does not mean that there is no world external to thought. in the sense that it occurs. and Cultural Feelings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. As the authors of the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy put it: The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do [emphasis original] with whether there is a world external to thought. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’. 1979). A Theory for Social Psychology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. p. What is questioned is that the reality external to thought has its meaning independent from the discursive condition of its emergence. 108. John McCarthy and Meyer Zald.92 other ‘positivist’42 and ‘realist’43 approaches towards the analysis of discourse. Mobilizing Structures. A Social Being. . It is discourse which brings all objects of the social into being and makes society what it is. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought. depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. independently on my will. wherein it is argued that society cannot be thought outside discourse. 1985).44 42 Doug McAdam. however. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 44 Democratic Politics (London: Verso. 1996).) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities.


In the light of the aforementioned idea the main focus of IDA appears to be defined by the question of why the materiality of surrounding realities becomes interpreted in this way, rather than another. Why, for example, does the forest standing on the path of a proposed motorway becomes an ‘obstacle’ to be passed by, the ‘nation’s heritage’ to be saved or the ‘object of naturalists’ interest’?45 These differences are assumed to be constructed discursively through the production of a certain knowledge which constitutes the object of the ‘forest’. It is this process which entails the construction and dissolution of things, events, social identities and other things we can distinguish as ‘objects’ from the surrounding realities. The discursive construction of reality, however, is an uneven process. In reference to this unevenness Laclau, in his Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, distinguishes two types of social situation: the ‘period of stability’ and the ‘crisis’.46 In general terms the periods of stability are characterised by the capacity of active knowledge to ‘neutralise’ the contradictions invoked by certain social events, and also the ability of discourse to retain its ideological unity. In other words, ‘stability’ is understood as the time when the totality of happening events is more or less explainable within a given system of knowledge. The crisis, on the contrary, is the time when actual reality and the structures of knowledge appear to be split. This makes events meaningless and meanings unable to be discerned in real practices and relations.47


Howarth, Discourse, pp. 101-102. Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism,


(London:Verso, 1979), pp.102-103.

Ibid, p.103.


The concept of dislocation Elaborating the question of discursive crisis Laclau and Mouffe introduce the notion of dislocation, understood as a disruption of the symbolic organisation invoked by real events which cannot or can be hardly symbolised within a given discursive order.48 To illustrate the concept of dislocation, one may refer to some well-known events from not-so-remote Russian history. For example, the proliferation of repressions and institutions of coercive work under Stalin’s regime were, undoubtedly, events that could be hardly symbolised within the framework of the ‘liberated labour’ ideology which lay at the very foundation of the Socialist revolution.49 As a result, numerous sectors of the Soviet society, which had grown up during the time of cultural and economic liberalisation in the 1920s, faced serious dislocation under Stalin’s ‘iron arm’. The following period of the Khrushchev liberalisation, in its turn, caused a massive dislocation among the admirers of the Soviet dictator. The questioning of the ‘untouchable’ ideas of Marx and Lenin undertaken by young scholars, artists and social activists could not be apprehended from the standpoint of the ‘only correct social theory’.50 In the 1970s, with the conservation of public debates there emerged the dislocation of ideological unity among the so-called ‘new forces’ or the liberals,

See also: David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘Introducing discourse theory and political analysis’

in David Howarth, Aletta Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis (eds.) Discourse Theory and Poltical Analysis. Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 1-24, pp. 13-14.

See Vladimir Lenin ‘Speech at a meeting dedicated to the laying of the foundation stone of a

monument to liberated labour, May 1, 1920’ in Vladimir Lenin, Collected Works, 4th English Edition (Moscow: Progress, 1965), vol. 31, p. 126.

See Hugh McLean and Walter Vickery (eds.) The Year of Protest 1956: An Anthology of Soviet

Literally Materials (New York: Vintage Books, 1961); Rudolf Tokes, Dissent in the USSR: Politics, ideology and People (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1975); Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (London: Penguin Books, 1970).


formed during the time of the Khrushchev’s thaw.51 Grown in the atmosphere of social, artistic and political liberalisation the ‘generation of the 1960s’ (shestidesyatniki) appeared to be unable to reconcile the post-Khrushchev restrictions of public debates with the ideas of humanism, freedom of expression and other issues cultivated during the post-Stalin decade. This excursion aims at demonstrating that ideology becomes ‘false’ in the situation of dislocation where the dissolution of ideological unity leads towards the inability to apprehend ongoing performances of the surrounding reality. It is the situation where the meanings appear to be unrealised in material grounds and things lose their meanings and fall out of the field of intelligibility. According to Laclau, this process invokes the crisis of identity, which is a crucial consequence of the dislocation.52 The actual events dislocating discourse make an actor incapable of representing the ideal frame of his/her ‘self’ in a material fabric of social relations. Taken literally, this means that in the moment of dislocation the social agent is unable to be himself. Being unable to reach his/her identity within an actual social order the dislocated actor faces the impossibility of finding his/her place in society. It is possible to say that the dislocation does not just makes one’s identity impossible but, paraphrasing Althusser, it transforms the social subjects, whatever they are, ‘back’ into just individuals. Being devoid of any ‘subject’ identity these individuals become excluded from the structure of social organisation. By this exclusion they lose their place of speaking

Frederik Barghoorn, ‘The post-Khrushchev campaign to suppress dissent: Perspectives, strategies,

and techniques of repression’ in Dissent in the USSR, 35-95.

Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, p.103.


from which they can express their demands and realise socially accepted practices. This makes them into marginal figures and exactly due to this misrecognition, in the post-Marxist theoretical tradition, the marginalised elements are regarded as subaltern classes.53 In contemporary Russian history it is possible to identify several of such dislocations, resulting in the ongoing growth of the subaltern classes.54 As aforementioned the first one was the conservation of free public debates in the end of the 1960s. It was an event blocking the identity of many actors in the Soviet society. Thus, the liberal intelligentsia appeared to be prevented from being itself because it could not fulfil its social mission within the absence of open social debates and with the growing threat of being prosecuted for dissent. Painters, writers, and other artistic elites faced troubles in realising their artistic ambitions, in the time when socialist realism had again become the ‘only form of art’ which was welcomed in the Soviet state. The blockage of identity and the impossibility of finding a place in the society, which caused the transformation of social actors into subaltern classes, triggered the process of massive dissocialising which, in fact, characterised the development of Soviet society in the post-Khrushchev era. First of all, this dissocialising took forms of


The term first introduced by Gramsci in his Prison Notebook (1971), pp.52-54. Rachel Walker believes that this dislocating energy is concealed in the very core of Marxism-


Leninism due to the ongoing struggle between two groups of demands addressed to ‘a builder of the comunism’. The first one is the demands of revolutionary activity, passion and creativity and the second is quite contradicting demand of almost religious admiration and unquestionable respect to the figures and the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin, seriously restricting the very possibility of any creative debates. See: Rachel Walker, ’Marxism-Leninism as Discourse: The Politics of the Empty Signifier and the Double Bind’ in British Journal of Political Science, No. 19 (April 1989), 161-89.


‘passive resistance’55 and became translated in various kinds of activities aiming at minimising relations between an individual and the society s/he finds her/himself excluded from. One of the most effective, but not the most straightforward, was emigration. Still, the draining of socially active elements from the USSR in the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s, reached such a degree that it was considered the ‘third wave’ of Russian emigration.56 Besides, many of those dislocated by the freezing of social life formed the flows of the ‘internal emigration’ which drained socially active individuals out of the centres of public life, and towards the periphery of social activity. These were they who joined the famous ‘communist building’ - cultivating the virgin lands, mastering the Taiga and exploring the Extreme North. The dissocialising among the Soviet people assumed a threatening scale by the mid1980s. To a large extent this process was forced by the deep economic crisis affected Soviet society by the end of the Brezhnev’s governance.57 As is well known, back in the 1960s Khrushchev had announced his famous slogan that the ‘next generation of the Soviet people will live in Communism’. However, this ambitious declaration had few possibilities to be implemented in reality. Instead of the supposed ‘communism’, Soviet society was faced with a shortage of goods (defitsit), the disintegration of public services, and problems with the food supply. In addition, the impoverishment of the ‘working people’ came hand in hand with the enrichment of the ‘Party aristocracy’. All this made the realities of the ‘communism’ promised by Khrushchev quite different

George Feifer, ‘No protest: the case of passive minority’ in Dissent in the USSR, 418- 438; Howard

Biddulph, ‘Protest strategies of the Soviet intellectual opposition’ in Dissent in the USSR, 96-115.

The first one was caused by the revolution and the civil war of 1918-1922, and the second is related

to the time of the Second World War.

The economic crisis of the period of stagnation is unequivocally indicated by the absolute majority of

analysts writing on the development of the USSR in the last few decades of the 20th century.

the politico-economic dislocation of the 1980s captured numerous sectors of the Soviet discourse and triggered an immense growth of the subaltern strata. .E. Sharpe.98 from what people expected it to be. Gorizonty povsednevnosti sovetskoy ehpokhi. ‘mad’ or ‘hooligans’). 59). As aforementioned. ‘dissidents’. The massive dislocation of the social order and the expansion of the marginal strata comprised by the flows from various ‘de-subjectivated’59 elements led to the deep disintegration of the dominant discourse. Under these circumstances. The massive proliferation of subaltern classes and further expansion of the desubjectivated elements in the society is a contradiction which can be resolved in different ways. 1996). the ‘false’ discourse becomes overthrown by the rapidly growing marginals. only for a new one to come into its place. 1998). Either dominant discourse keeps maintaining its ideological unity by internalising the subaltern classes as different forms of ‘deviations’ (‘criminals’. This implies their re-socialisation through the educational system or isolation from the society by means of penitentiary institutions or by deprivation of citizenship. and the profound 58 Robert Stayer. Or. 138. 59 For example Kozlova attributes the voices which came from the ‘choir’ of the late Soviet everyday life as exactly the voices of ‘de-subjectivated people’ (Nataliya Kozlova. p. This resulted in the collapse of its political embodiment . p. Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse? Understanding Historical Change (London: M. it is also possible that the subaltern classes expand to a degree which is lethal to the dominant discourse. Golosa iz khora (Moscow: RAN.the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Stayer says that by the mid-1980s even workers appeared to be ‘unable to find satisfaction or even expression in the workers’ state’. Commenting upon this ideological disruption.58 And the workers were not alone in this dissatisfaction.

They do not agree that antagonism is a real opposition of two actors with autonomously constituted identities. For them it is rather a situation where the actor A appears to be unable to reach his/her identity because of the presence of the actor B. are literally prevented from ‘being peasants’ and thus experience a ‘blockage’ or ‘failure’ of identity’. then. It is this moment which sets the context for a search for a new. 61 . post-Soviet identity. It is the construction of a new discursive formation which.] peasants expelled from their land by capitalist farmers and forced to become workers in the city. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Howarth. p. Discourse.60 It is necessary to remark that they understand antagonism in a particular way. the new identity is only possible in a new discourse.. becomes the way to retain the intelligibility of social relations in post-Soviet Russia. Illustrating this situation Laclau and Mouffe refer to the peasants’ uprisings investigated by Wolf.61 60 Laclau and Mouffe. 122-127. Neither do they consider antagonism as a logical contradiction.99 discrediting of the Communist ideology united millions of people in a common social project. as is advocated. As Howarth comments. Social antagonism Laclau and Mouffe argue that any discursive unity as such is possible only in the presence of antagonistic relations. It is exactly this moment of dis-identification which was outlined in the beginning of this thesis. Hence.. in the Kantian tradition. for example. 105. And the construction of a new discourse is paradoxically linked to the construction of a new social antagonism. regarding this excursion: ‘[. pp.

preventing this project from its final constitution. New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso.62 A careful reading of this theoretical proposal uncovers a paradox in which the crucial role of the ‘enemy’ in fact makes discursive order unachievable.100 Clarifying the importance of antagonism in constituting a discursive formation. 17-18. the constitution of Soviet society by way of a particular social formation in the 1920s can be regarded as a project run to attain the identity of ‘peasants’. which reveals the limits of intelligible social organisation. This means that society is real only in the process of its building and never in the chimerical state or substance of what is sought to be built. is a never-ending process or an attempt63 rather than a state or a condition. because the necessary presence of the contradictory ‘other’ unavoidably prevents the system from achieving complete closure. For instance. 27. p. The latter becomes ‘true’ and ‘organic’ in the situation of a struggle for discursive unity. In such a way Laclau comes out with an interesting response to the task of defining the ‘true’ and the ‘false’ character of ideology. p. Laclau argues that an identification of the ‘other’ erects a frontier between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of a discourse. 1990). wherein identities become reachable and meanings come to be realisable in practice. The very objectivity of society as such is then thought as possible only by way of a strain which emerges between the necessity to complete its systematic organisation and the actual presence of this ‘other’. radicalises the paradox by suggesting that the very discursive organisation defining a particular social formation. ‘workers’ and ‘liberal intelligentsia’ blocked by the presence of the Tsarism. Once the 62 Ernesto Laclau. The ideology is therefore ‘false’ when the struggle dies and the intelligibility of the social gets dissolved. Ernesto Laclau ‘The impossibility of society’. in fact. Reflecting on this tension Laclau. 63 .

formerly ignored by Soviet society. since one of its co-editors Vyacheslav Igrunov is a former dissident who became one of the leaders of Yabloko . This . justifying their decision by citing the feeling that their Motherland ‘needs them now’. It is also this struggle which opens the possibility for the sectors marginalised during the stagnation period to come back into the society. Being. previously blocked by the presence of the landlords and bourgeoisie. and who. strictly speaking. Re-immigration is one of them. This book as such serves as an explicit example. The Rebirth of Politics in Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997)). like Limonov. Insofar as the discursive construction of identity is possible only in social struggle. is endowed only in social struggle. in which the subaltern classes receive the possibility of achieving their identities and of retaining their social agency. an illusion. objectified the variety of social practices which made the realisation of the blocked identities possible in social struggle with the Tsarist regime. It is this struggle which marks the construction of ‘democratic Russia’ during the time of perestroika. Solzhenitsyn and others came back. It is possible to argue that the ‘workers’ and peasants’ state’ as a social formation really existed only as a project aiming at achieving the identity of ‘peasants’ and ‘workers’. At the end of the 1980s/beginning of the 1990s many of the emigrants of the last wave. the ‘state of workers and peasants’. had little in common with the ideals of the Socialist revolution.101 ‘other’ disappeared from the historical horizon the society therefore went into something rather different from what was originally planned: the communist terror and the establishment of the Stalin’s regime which.they come from the underground . however. indicated in many events. had been prosecuted for their dissent. In the light of the aforementioned conclusions it is assumed that the creation of a new discourse. became more and more active and came to occupy leading positions in the anti-communist struggle (See: Michael Urban. as aforementioned.a Russian parliamentary party.the scene of numerous Rock-clubs.64 The liberal intelligentsia. As for the informal youth with their music and fashions . as dissidents. 64 64 This ‘coming back’ is. in fact. stadiums and pages of youth magazines. it is the concept of the struggle which causes the constitutive presence of the ‘other’ to be reconciled with its blocking force.

the subaltern classes became an integral part of the social antagonism. responsible for this failure. which created the space for the marginalized strata to be brought into society. dissidents. since they were exactly the ones who were opposed to the common ‘enemy’. As a matter of fact. and the designation of an ‘enemy’. Informal youth. . one of the participants of this ‘resocialisation’ who demanded the return of the pure negative identity of the rock-movement by calling for a ‘Back to the Underground’ (Nazad v podvaly). Being identified as non-Party-State apparatus.e. the ‘enemy’ was generally represented in the Party-State apparatus. entrepreneurs. A certain group of statements can effectively mobilise individuals into a struggling force by articulating events which were causing the failure of their identity. makes possible the identification of the dislocated subject. Empty signifiers However. as it sets the stage for the latter to be transformed into a tendentially empty signifier. liberal intelligentsia and other elements misrecognised in the Soviet society became valuable for each other as partners in the same struggle. This term stands for the capacity of problem is pinpointed however in a negative sense by Dmitriy Revyakin. the pure identity of being different from the ‘enemy’ inflicts a specific discursive transformation on the resisting sectors. Explanation of the actual events lying at the foundation of one’s identity failure. in the democratic movement of perestroika. brought on by the presence of an ‘enemy’. in a negative way i. the leader of the music group Kalinov Most. through specifying what it is not.102 The struggle for a new social order attracting the subaltern classes back into the field of discursive visibility is a phenomenon essentially constituted by ideological performances.

For instance. Lidia Ia. 36-47. The newly emerged ‘westernised’ aristocracy had little in common with the aristocracy in the West as regards habits and everyday behaviour. 67–94. or the emptiness of identities in struggle with one another allows the sectors opposed to the ‘enemy’ to find their objectivity in the logic of equivalence to each other. was enough for a nobleman to be considered ‘Westernised’. 1985).103 a signifier to signify a pure absence.44. in fact. Emansipation(s) (London:Verso. In the presence of the actualised ‘enemy’ the opposed forces obtain their discursive visibility by becoming a pure absence-of-the-enemy. Ginsburg. Uspenskii (Ithaca: Cornell University Press.66 Logic of equivalence and difference The absence of positive content. The construction of purely negative identities is. 66 Yuriy Lotman. p. . pp. ‘The Poetics of everyday behaviour in Russian eighteenth-century culture’ in Alexander Nakhimovsky and Alice Nakhimovsky (eds. a widely indicated historical phenomenon. or the possibility for a thing to be nothing other than the absence of the other things. 69-70. This equivalence is concealed in the shared negativity of 65 Ernesto Laclau. analysing the reforms of Peter the Great concludes that the so-called Westernisation of Russia in the beginning of the 18th century was nothing other than an inversion of the rules and norms of ‘old Russia’. However. The Semiotics of Russian Cultural History: Essays by Iurii M.).65 To illustrate the discursive energy of the empty signifier Laclau uses the example from Hobbes whose ‘order’ in the situation of total chaos means literally nothing but the absence of disorder. ‘Why do empty signifiers matter to politics?’ in Ernesto Laclau. Lotman. Boris A. simply to be different from the boyars. 1996). who represented the ‘old rule’. Lotman.

67 67 Laclau and Mouffe. shows and other public performances. ‘circles’. valuables and foreign currency. the sectors interpellated by the anti-communist struggle in the USSR at the end of the 1980s carried out a variety of concrete practices in the course of their struggle. according to the differences in their particular fighting strategies. All these institutions and practices caused the struggling forces to become identified not only as equivalently opposed to the ‘enemy’. but also as different from each other. 127 – 134. This filling is measured in the actualisation of certain practices and relations. Dissidents and liberal intelligentsia found themselves in ‘discussion clubs’. For example. the field of social opposition appears to be split into numerous clusters whose identity comes to be specified not only in terms of their pure negativity towards the antagonist but also in their difference from each other. p. Entrepreneurs got involved in the black market and the exchange of goods. public organisations and attained the space for public debates in the mass media. However. Informal youth put their effort into concerts. This causes an oppositional sector to be identified both in the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. which come to be associated with a particular sector of the wide oppositional movement. this tendency is counterbalanced by the opposite process of filling the empty space with a positive content. .104 the antagonist. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. specifying it according to particular practices undertaken in the struggle. As a result. It is in this filling of the empty space with a positive content that the sectors of the struggle fall into the process of mutual differentiation.

). Discourse. 109. they become those subject positions that turn individuals into social actors with certain characteristics and attributes. 69 Ernesto Laclau and Lillian Zac. a decision taken in the undecidable terrain. It is assumed that the choice of one’s own social sector is a performance of political subjectivity. 70 Howarth. Laclau nevertheless considers that individuals take their decisions in choosing these positions and. in this procedure. 1982). Roland Barthes. perform political subjectivity. p. Once formed and stabilised. In this point Laclau stands in opposition to the other post-structuralists who propose the ‘death of the subject’. 1984). in the sense that the actions of the individual and even his/her self-perception appear to be entirely defined by the surrounding symbolic systems. and that they are indeed provided by discourse.69 In this sense. or to identify with certain political projects and the discourses they articulate – when social identities are in crisis and structures are need to be recreated.142-158. however.68 Having assumed that the Foucauldian ‘subject positions’ exist as such. the subject is not simply determined by the structure. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Brighton: Harvester. nor. Positions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. in fact. . ‘The death of the auhtor’ in Roland Barthes. 208-226. 1981). The subject is forced to take decisions. does it constitute the structure. 1977). The subject and power’ in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow.105 The notion of subject A discursive transition from the pure negative identity of being confronted by the ‘enemy’ to the positive identity of a particular sector in social struggle is regarded in the IDA approach as a process of identification which is. The Making of Political Identities (London: Verso. Image.70 68 Michel Foucault. 28-29. ‘Minding the gap: the subject of politics’ in Ernesto Laclau (ed. It is in the process of this identification the process of political subjectivities are created and formed. Music. Text (London: Fontana. pp. Jaques Derrida. 11-39.

which. hence. in his – ‘Discourse’: ‘Hegemonic practices are […] an exemplary form of political practice. More precisely. it is the decisions of individuals. when a schoolboy paints his/her hair in green. comprise the main corpus of material sources for a study in particular discursive transformations.106 When a person with a degree in physics opens his/her own shoe business. manifested in particular social performances. . puts a sign of anarchy on his/her T-shirt and joins a punk band. which involves the linking together of different identities and political forces 71 It is not surprising that the majority of works written in this tradition of discourse analysis depart in their investigations from concrete ‘authorised’ texts constituting certain political movements.71 It is here that one can distinguish the practice of hegemonic articulation and. Here the authors of this approach propose a particular agenda for applying discourse theory. Hegemonic articulation In very general terms the notion of hegemony can be described as Howarth does. in this way. account for the next step in the process of constructing a new discourse. The particular conception of the subject offered in the IDA approach identifies individuals but not any ‘pre-given’ groups or ‘identities’ as the agents of discursive transition. but do not focus on the abstract impersonalised ‘isms’. when a school teacher re-qualifies herself as a flea-market seller.all these are the performances of political subjectivity where individuals choose their differential positions in the indeterminate terrain of general negativity towards something they are not happy with. or when a farmer enters a political party . A stabilisation of these subject positions and establishment of a certain order in their interrelations results in a construction of a new discursive formation.

such that different resisting sectors appear to be united in a common project. for instance – workers start to strike demanding higher wages. p. Laclau and Mouffe. To introduce the ideological prerequisite of successful hegemonic articulation one has to recapitulate the principles of the systematic unity of a discourse. 73 . what may be called here .the extra-discursive. hegemony is the practice of stabilising a discursive formation through a successful mobilisation of social struggle. On the other. in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Laclau and Mouffe solve the task of reconciling the two states of discursive formation by elaborating the concept of hegemonic organisation. its inside has to be heterogeneous consisting of different elements. and creation of new social orders from a variety of dispersed elements’. The demand is a particular one. and at the same time. the system keeps its homogeneity because particular sectors of the system appear to be placed in relations of equivalence as regards the representing unit. Discourse. 109. it preserves its internal heterogeneity. This organisation is based on the representation of the entire system by one of its differential elements. through this. since this element is still identified in relations of difference with other particular elements of the system. The hegemonic articulation. To be organised as a system a discursive formation has to invoke a certain homogeneity (for only in this way can it be a system).107 into a common project. pp. but in the context of 72 Howarth. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. (a) in the situation of extreme oppression – the Tsarist regime. As an example of hegemonic organisation Laclau refers to a historical situation.73 On the one hand.72 In other words. the very possibility of an actor to stabilise discourse. is defined by two factors: ideological and. 134-145.

Each of these demands is in its particularity. the more the need for a general equivalent representing the chain as a whole/ The means of representation are. We can present this set of relations though the following diagram: T ____________________ D1 Θ=Θ=Θ=Θ… D1 D2 D3 D4 where T stands for Tsarism (in our example). what unites them is that they constitute between themselves a chain of equivalence in so far as all of them are bearers of an anti-system meaning. the circles D1…D4 for the particular demands. the horizontal line for the frontier separating the oppressive regime from the rest of society. only the existing particularities. between its own particularity and a more universal dimension. which is what makes their equivalential . from the very beginning. (b) It is this potentially more universal dimension which can inspire struggles for different demands in other sectors – students for the relaxation of discipline in education establishments. split between a bottom semi-circle representing the particularity of the demand and a top semi-circle representing its anti-system meaning.108 that repressive regime it is going to be seen as an anti-system activity. This is the strictly hegemonic move: the body of one particularity assumes a function of universal representation. (c) However. So one of them has to assume the representation of the chain as a whole. however. and so on. liberal politicians for freedom of press. the more extended the chain of equivalence. unrelated to others. So the meaning of that demand is going to be split. The presence of a frontier separating the oppressive regime from the rest of society is the very condition of universalisation of the demands via equivalents (in Marx’s words: a social sector has to become a general ‘crime’ for the aims of society as a whole to emerge).

New Theories of Discourse: Laclau.76 The second is the transformation of the myth into social imaginary. to the other struggling positions. 281-307. The crucial element in constructing the social imaginary is the disarticulation of the hegemonising sector from its particular content. Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso. Finally. Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek. Universality. 113. identified in the difference between it and the other sectors in the social struggle. ‘Constructing universality’ in Judith Butler. Contingency. This production entails two basic operations. D1 above the equivalent circles stands for the general equivalent (it is part of the equivalential chain. Mouffe. via a logic of equivalence. 1999). The first one is the articulation of the aforementioned social antagonism. 301-303. Ibid. p. 75 Jacob Torfing. Zizek (Oxford: Blackwell.75 As a matter of fact it completely relies on the production of certain ideas which in the state of dislocation and antagonism appear to be taken as a guide for social action by the particular segment of social struggle. which. but it is also above it). but potentially any identity appears able to obtain its social content. pp. in Laclau’s terms. 74 Ernesto Laclau. 76 . To still be seen as ‘one of them’. seen as the horizon in which not just one dislocated object receives its meaningful possibility of fullness.109 relation possible. p. 1999).74 It is this emancipation of the representative sector which makes the construction of hegemonic relations an essentially ideological practice. 115. This disarticulation is viewed as a process of retaining the emptiness which becomes the key factor providing the capacity of the sector to be identified. constitutes the myth regarded as ‘a metaphor of absent fullness [of social identity] that is a fullness which can not be realised at present’. Hegemony.

Articulation of a proposal for the tactical struggle in accordance with the occupied subject position. 303). 5. Articulation of the dislocation depicting the situation in which one comes to be incapable of reaching ones identity. Articulation of antagonistic relations setting the ground for a strategic struggle aimed at retaining the objectivity of one’s identity. 3.6 and 7 are the steps towards constructing a social imaginary capable of constituting a hegemonic formation. The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso 1989). Or as Žižek defines it: ‘the point de capiton is […] a word which. 2. as a word. In such a way. Naming the enemy responsible for the identity failure. This chain consists of 7 elements: 1.5. Suggesting a particular subject position occupied in this struggle. . p. Articulation of the nodal point77 fixing the meaningfulness and giving sense to the particular tactical struggle.110 In such a way it appears possible to conclude that a social identity is a project fixed by a chain of ideological articulations employed to overcome the disruption of discursive order and the crisis of dominant identity. 4. constitutes its identity’ (Slavoj Žižek. 7. on the level of signifier itself unifies a given field. 95). p. The New Theories of Discourse. The first 3 steps comprise the ‘myth’ setting the condition of the unrealised fullness of identity while elements 4. it is seen that 77 The term nodal point is a translation of the Lacanian point de capiton and it corresponds to the signifer capable of fixing the content of a range of numerous objects ‘by articulating them within a chain of equivalence’ (Torfing. Articulation of the subject position to be occupied in the proposed tactical struggle. 6.

can engage in such an enterprise in the field of academic discourse. as aforementioned. to take an example. for example.111 the character of an established hegemony appears to be essentially dependant on the character of these steps. However. Without an enunciative position. or a ‘scientific tradition’. ‘professor’ or ‘scholar’. or ‘place of speaking’. As has been already indicated. These are also the steps through which a particular sector is re-defined in order to mobilise the social struggle in a hegemonic project. Only through having such enunciative opportunities can a person endeavour to mobilise academic debates and complete a successful hegemonic project. As an illustration of this type of account. In the light of the aforementioned assumptions it appears possible to suggest that any hegemonic articulation has to be accounted for not only through its particular internal organisation but also through its inter-discursive context. even if s/he is the most intelligent person on planet Earth. it seems that it may be interesting to look at the establishment of democratic hegemony in Russia in the beginning of the 1990s. Deploying the ideas of ‘genealogical’ Foucault the theorists of the IDA approach assume that the only sphere which limits a particular discourse is the other discourse. provided with a particular power over the students and access to printed media. relies on the presence of the enunciative position of a ‘teacher’. It is all the more . a hegemonic project doesn’t only depend on the character of an articulatory sequence but also essentially relies upon inter-discursive factors. by the discourse of state organisation where the ‘professor’ is being regarded as a state servant receiving money from the state budget. these positions are fixed from outside. a particular academic discourse. Yet. It is here that a particular arrangement of equivalence and difference is established. and form a ‘school’. no one.

any of Yeltsin’s public utterances and actions. regardless of whether he was the Chairman of the Moscow committee of the CPSU or the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic or the President of RSFSR. which . Needless to say. And the success of this move is grounded in the two aforementioned prerequisites: influential enunciative position and effective ideological articulation. as well as any initiatives of the new Russian government became significant ‘events’ for those following the course of the anti-communist struggle. As a result. As regards his place of speaking. the pro-democratic unofficial press. It is argued that the democratic revolution of August 19-21 is a result of a hegemonic move made by the first Russian President Boris Yeltsin. During all this time he remained a strong rival of the counter-reformist Union authorities and the acting ideologues of orthodox communism.112 interesting since this excursion can also serve as a good historical introduction to the main problem to be investigated in the forthcoming empirical chapters. these events were widely translated by samizdat. Once he occupied the position of the highest republican authority Yeltsin utilised its institutional capacities for the purpose of further confrontation. Since the rise of perestroika he always stood in clear opposition to the ‘old communist guard’ gathered in the highest State and Party governmental bodies. There can be no doubt about this. The rise and the fall of democratic hegemony in post-Soviet Russia The term ‘democratic hegemony’ refers to the project mobilising popular protest to resist the reactionary government established in Russia during the putsch in August 1991. it is necessary to mention that by the beginning of the 1990s Boris Yeltsin was obviously the leader of the democratic opposition in Russia.

Yeltsin articulated the project. To illustrate this move one may refer to the remarks of Stayer. A labour awakening articulated the grievances of workers… A cascade of national awakenings sought autonomy and then independence for subject peoples. An environmental awakening pointed to the vast ecological damages wrought by Soviet industrialization. Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse? p. the Communist Party leadership had sought to mobilize society for its own grand purposes. It is this hegemony which mobilised the masses to overthrow the coup in August 1991. which caused his voice to be heard. He argues that at the time of Gorbachev’s reforms : No single voice emerged to represent this awakening of Soviet society. Now various elements of Soviet society were mobilising themselves. from Lenin to Gorbachev. A democratic awakening spoke of those who sought a ‘normal’ western society with its civil liberties and political competition. Throughout Soviet history. and also by some electronic media. A religious awakening sought to fill the spiritual void of discredited socialist and atheist worldview. 138. . but also (and this factor is key) because of the successful ideological articulation conducted by the new Russian president. a medium which was almost entirely subordinated to the Russian republican authorities. and hegemonised the democratic resistance. It is this articulation which allowed him to represent the field of anti-coup opposition.113 by the beginning of the 1990s already constituted a substantial segment of the Russian market of mass-media. this mobilisation was possible not only because of the recognisable enunciative position of its ‘prophet’. more precisely by the second TV channel (VGTRK).78 78 Srayer. From this enunciative position. However. and for purposes that were increasingly odds with those of the country leadership.

russ. 81 The English translation of the Address is available at: http://asia. [The putsch] forces us to proclaim that the so-called committee’s [the GKChP] ascendancy to power is unlawful.war/episodes/24/documents/yeltsin (as of January 20. and the ‘enemy’. available at 80 http://www. Accordingly we proclaim all decisions and instructions of this committee to be unlawful. with the pure confrontation with the putschist regime.81 79 Ibid. he drew a clear frontier between Russian republican power. Putch: khronika trevozhnyh dney (Moscow: Progress.html (as of August 20. with their different interests.114 And then. In his famous address To the Russian Citizens80.cnn. 2003). he writes that: ‘of far greater importance [emphasis added] was the emergence of Boris Yeltsin as a charismatic symbol of democratic resistance [emphasis added] to the coup’. were united in a single movement during the August revolt. 1991). p. .com/SPECIALS/cold. institutionalising his enunciative modality.79 The transformation of Boris Yeltsin into the ‘charismatic symbol of democratic resistance’ became possible after a number of successful articulations produced by the first Russian president. arguing as to the reasons why this range of diverse forces. addressed to the bodies of Russian power. First of all. 2003). 190. issued on August 19th 1991. Yeltsin drew the line of this opposition by associating the reference ‘we’. We are confident that the organs of local power will unswervingly adhere to constitutional laws and decrees of the President of We appeal to citizens of Russia to give a fitting rebuff to the putschists and demand a return of the country to normal constitutional development.

ordinary citizens . no one would save them because no-one needs cowards to be saved.155 (August 23.the headquarters of the democratic resistance. ‘Marsh brokerov napugal putchistov’ in Obshchaya gazeta. made a speech in the hall of the Russian Commodity and Resource Exchange (Rossiyskaya tovarno-syr’yevaya birzha) arguing that if they. 33 (August 16. reading new decrees issued by the Russian government. 2001). created the conceptual framework in which the totality of practices and events appeared to be clearly divided into pro-putschist versus pro-Yeltsin. reactions and social activities during the days of August 19-21. the masses . in the days of the August putsch.were faced with a situation in which almost any public action. it was exactly this popular support given to the 82 This activity includes the famous declaration of the official addresses . the entire personnel and brokers of the Exchange went on the streets with a gigantic Russian three-colour ‘Flag’ demonstrating their support for Yeltsin’s struggle. no. As a result. in its turn. This became a guide constituting attitudes. 2001). It was this feeling which made people in Moscow erect the ‘human shield’ around the building of the Russian Supreme Soviet . First of all. This. came to be estimated in the framework of this opposition.carried out in front of the numerous members of the public around the Russian parliament . even doing nothing at well as the well-known appearance on the tank. . the business elite. the authorities and the elite were forced to take sides in this confrontation. no. ‘Znamya demokratii ostalos’ u Borovogo’ in Novaya gazeta. One may refer to the words of Konstantin Borovoy who. Now this flag is exhibited in the Check Point Charlie Museum in Berlin.115 The decisive actions undertaken by the first Russian President in the first hours of the coup82 resulted in an effective promulgation of the links articulated in the aforementioned passage. 83 Nataliya Rostova. would do nothing in this decisive moment. It was this conception that ‘doing nothing’ constituted passive support for the coup which drove thousands and thousands onto the barricades. 1991.83 Second. In the end.

This emptiness is grounded in the actual character of the republican power in the USSR. For many. it was precisely this incapacity which deprived the object of the Russian power led by Yeltsin of its positive content. No wonder for in the presence of the Soviet state Yeltsin could really do very little to influence the ongoing political and economic processes. grounded by the weakness of the new Russian government and the strength of the Soviet bureaucracy. or absent. freedom of expression. Its relevance to the adequate representation of unity. set the stage for Yeltsin’s hegemonic project to become successful. The second factor explaining the hegemonic success of Yeltsin’s political project was a properly selected nodal point articulated to stabilise the unity of the anti-communist opposition. was concealed in its actual . This equality. Yeltsin and his supporters were associated with what was absent . before August 1991. sought by the protest field. As a matter of fact. This nodal point was ‘democracy’. The success of Yeltsin’s hegemony. in the presence of the Soviet state. market economy etc.116 Yeltsin and the Russian Supreme Council which brought about the inglorious end of the putsch. However. therefore. The first is the particular status of Yeltsin’s government. can be shown to be grounded in two factors. This disengagement with whatever was actually being done opened the possibility of equality with those whose ambitions appeared to be unachievable. In no way were they defined in relations of equivalence as regarded what was actually happening in the country. disassociated from any positive content in terms of implemented policies.democracy. republican institutions were mainly decorative and never had real capacity of implementing their social projects.

quite few people could really say what democracy was. in its turn. Their activity became positively filled and this caused numerous dislocations among those who supported the Russian President in August 19-21. The economic reforms were failing and the living wage in Russia was drastically decreasing. In the absence of the ‘other’. the ‘democratic hegemony’ led by Yeltsin immediately fell into its dislocation.117 emptiness. However. led Yeltsin and the new Russian elite to a loss of their representative capacities. almost everyone could point at what it was not. This was expressed by 84 According to Sakwa by 1992 about 23 regions of the Russian Federation in different forms articulated the slogans of separatist character: Richard Sakwa. This grounded the impossibility of realising the material ambitions that many supporters of the anti-communist struggle put at the top of their demands. This. Yeltsin managed to hegemonise the entire field of popular protest. Having succeeded in the hegemonic representation of the anti-coup demands Yeltsin managed to stabilise the democratic project. 1991. (London: Routledge. 1996). The heroes of the barricades faced the tasks of filling their images with a positive content. the discursive order projected onto the democratic struggle started to be realised in the practice of the routine organisation of a new society. Only for a short period of time however. The growing disintegration of the state was expressed in the ‘parade of sovereignties’84. . Fixing the meaning of the democratic resistance through the objective of ‘democracy’. In the late USSR. by implementing what they have promised in reality. Russian Politics and Society. which inflicted massive irritation upon the democratic project. where this ‘not’ was obviously represented by the existing party-state apparatus of the Soviet state. as this unity of the democratic Russia was never attained again after the failure of the communist coup. Having destroyed the ‘enemy’. 215. p.

the actual policies undertaken by Yeltsin’s government became confrontational towards the demands of its integral parts. defending democracy in the Russian White House in August 1991 .E. Such identities as ‘Russian’ or ‘patriot’ appeared to be seriously damaged by the influx of anti-Russian attitudes in the national republics. Economic. allow for a consideration of the post-Soviet development of Russian society as deeply affected by the crisis of the democratic hegemony. the vice-President Alexander Rutskoy and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khazbullatov . pp. This invoked a sharp confrontation inside the new Russian state power.85 This crisis triggered numerous dislocations. This uprising shows a drastic dissolution of the democratic imaginary in Russia. Even inside the core of the democratic movement. which resulted in the armed conflict between the Parliament and the President.118 those previously attracted by the Russian national and nationalistic ideas. as they were unable to run their business because of the enormous criminalisation and financial instability of the society. Radical Reform in Yeltsin’s Russia. none of them could be properly paid for their work. due to the downfall of industry and agriculture. actively exploited by the local prophets of 85 On the ‘public verdict’ to the Yeltin’s reforms see: Lynn Nelson and Irina Kuzes. This and many other indications.for instance. Sharpe. and Social Dimensions (London: M. People with whom Yeltsin was shoulder-to-shoulder. . and numerous identities appeared to be blocked by the new (dis)order established in Russia after 1991.appeared to be on the other side of the barricades in October 1993. the identities of ‘workers’ and ‘collective farmers’ (kolkhozniki) became hardly achievable in the situation of economic crisis wherein. 1995). 166167. Political. Entrepreneurs faced the same difficulty. Thus.

This. 86 As it is qualified by many authors. Even the identity of the ‘democrat’ became highly blurred in the situation of the sharp antagonisms between different liberal parties.) Institutions and Political Change in Russia (London: Macmillan Press. this battle was rather different from the one against the Party-State monster driving Russian politics in the end of the 1980s-beginning of the 1990s. 11-40. In this situation. 2000).119 sovereignty. ‘The Presidency: the Politics of Institutional Chaos’ in Neil Robinson (ed. invoked the emergence of numerous ideological proposals each of which. tried to reorganise the disrupted unity of the society. In the absence of powerful mechanisms to suppress the dissent during the democratic (dis)order86. in its own way. regional ideologues put forward particular solutions to the task of overcoming democratic dislocation. one which defined the political development of Russia in the last decade of the 20th century. This made the social protest essentially fragmentary and split between different dislocated strata. All these failures generated a new field of social struggle. could be found. few prerequisites for the emergence of a common ‘enemy’. These programmes can be generally viewed as a reaction to the filling of democratic expectations with a positive content. . in its turn. And it is exactly this moment of ‘democratic dislocation’ which inflicted the rise of regional ideologies upon contemporary Russia. see for instance Neil Robinson. However. The construction of ideological projects based on the articulation of regional ideas. recognised by different sectors of this struggle. reflects an attempt to cope with the discursive trauma caused by the unrealised hopes of the post-Soviet transitions. And it is these solutions which we shall turn to next.

it was divided into the Kubanian oblast’ and Chernomorskaya gubernia. a southern Russian region situated in the North-Western part of the Caucasus. the territory was included in the North-Caucasian Republic. The second is formed from the migrants that settled in the region after 1 See Map 1. Then. . when the first group of the Cossacks founded their first stanitsas there. which previously formed a part of Krasnodar kray. the indigenous Caucasian people who survived after the Caucasian war. after the October Revolution. The current kray population was formed from two unequal sources. it was only in 1864. with its present external borders. In 1992 the Adygean autonomous oblast. The first one was comprised by the small group of the Adygs. after the end of the 30-year Caucasian war. Administratively. that the entire territory came under the full control of the Russian Empire. was formed. was recognised as a republic and obtained the status of separate subject of the Russian Federation.120 CHAPTER 3: THE IDEOLOGICAL PROJECT OF NIKOLAY KONDRATENKO AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE KUBANIAN REGIONAL DISCOURSE Introducing the case Kuban’ is the unofficial name of Krasnodar kray.1 It is a relatively young Russian region. Krasnodar kray is a territory with a complex demographical history. Although the first Russian settlements on the banks of the Kuban’ river emerged as far back as in the end of the 18th century. in the beginning. It was only in 1937 that Krasnodar kray.

while the last one indicates a big increase. it is a rare region in Russian terms given that the rural population is constantly growing. centres of IT. trade routes. The unique geographical and successful management of the territory made the kray into one of the most prosperous regions in the USSR. Azeris. available at: http://admkray. Sea ports. marking out the territory from the other Russian regions. fertile soils.124. numerous groups of Russian peasants. which makes it the third most populous region in Russia. .121 it became a part of the Russian state. Moreover. A remarkable feature of Krasnodar kray. Czechs. Armeinans and Greeks.500.html (as of January 28. The census of 1989 gave the number as 2. Kurds. The Northern rural and predominantly agricultural part has a well-developed food industry. the population of the kray was estimated at 5. soldiers. explained by the access to the Black sea linked to the Mediterranean basin. who left Turkey at the end of the 19th/beginning of the 20th century. Abkhazians and other groups who found their shelter here after fleeing from the centres of the post-Soviet conflict zones. small groups of Germans. dense industry. 2 The statistical data is taken from the official web-page of the Administration of the Krasnodar kray. Polls. such that the figure now stands at 2.kuban. the soft climate. 2004). workers coming from different Russian regions. natural recourses and the main Russian resort complex are also all situated in the Southern mountain – the mainly urban part of Krasnodar kray. Krasnodar kray is one of the most populous Russian regions.400 people. Meskhetian Turks. This flow consists of the Cossacks.600.2 Krasnodar kray is a relatively developed territory.384. According to the allRussian census of 2002. Italians. is the substantial size of the rural population.

after he finished secondary school in his own stanitsa. the main character in the forthcoming discussion. representing the most conservative and anti-reformist forces in the late Soviet history. As part of this promotion he received a seat as the Head of the Department of Agriculture in the kray committee of the CPSU and afterwards he became a secretary there. Unsurprisingly. After the military service in 1966. In 1956. which was occupied by Nikolay Kondratenko. Due to his successful party work he was appointed as a people’s deputies candidate. who in 1990 became the leader of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. which were expressed by the population of the region at the end of the 1980s and in the first half of the 1990s. opened after the Polozkov’s promotion. he started to work as an assistant to a tractor driver (pritsepshik) in the local kolkhoz ‘Red Star’. It was this ‘vacancy’. It is rather symptomatic that it was the leader of the Krasnodar Committee of the CPSU. and he also took a seat in the kray Soviet in 1987 where . Kondratenko obtained his first really high-ranking position in 1982 when he became the Director General of the North Caucasus Concern of the Sugar Industry. As a matter of fact. In 1969 he started his party career and soon became a rayon secretary of the CPSU. Having graduated from this institute he came back to his own kolkhoz and worked there as an agronomist. in the 1990s Krasnodar kray was one of the brightest representatives of the ‘red belt’ which persistently supported conservative communist forces. he entered the Kuban’ Agricultural Institute in Krasnodar. Nikolay Kondratenko was born in 1940 in stanitsa Plastunovskaya of Krasnodar kray. rather than as a prospect of improving their way of life.122 The high standards of living established during the Soviet times to a large extent defined the negative attitudes towards the reforms. the odious communist Polozkov. many people saw the economic transformation as a threat to their relatively satisfactory well-being reached in the Soviet times.

5 (1991). could be released. Kondratenko stood in sharp opposition to the reforms. At that time the region was faced with a number of serious problems related to the drastic impoverishment of the population. and to the Yeltsin-appointed regional authorities. It is in relation to this institutional position that Nikolay Kondratenko entered political life in the 1990s. Like his predecessor. 1992).123 he almost immediately became the Chairman. This organisation united ex-members of the Soviet nomenklatura and represented the so-called ‘red’ Cossacks standing in opposition to the democratic reforms. He became one of the leaders of the Kuban Cossack Rada. Kondratenko) in Kubanskie novosi (September 23. after the downfall of the communist revenge by the decree of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation he was dismissed from his position in the regional power. which coincided with new flows of migrants 3 Nikolay Kondratenko. But this did not mean that he could take back his position in the kray council. upon looking into the matter. the judicial authorities declared in 1992 that Kondratenko was not guilty of any crime and. 2-6. . Kondratenko took an active role in the movement of Cossack revival. ‘Eto budet vlast' denezhnyh meshkov’ (Chto govoril dva goda nazad o rynke N. 4 Nikolay Kondratenko. No. Being deprived of power. hence. ‘Chas vybora’ in Kuban’.4 Unsurprisingly. As a result. due to his open loyalty to the anti-constitutional coup he was detained by the authorities. However. in August 1991 Kondratenko was one of the few regional leaders who openly supported the reactionary coup d’etat. His disregard of economic liberalisation and the proposed openness of the country is clearly evident in his early writings: This will be the power of the money-bags3 and The Hour of Choice. the democratic government of the Russian Federation. Moreover.

642 in 1996. which is about 500.620. came out with slogans regarding the protection of the ‘indigenous Russian population’ from the threat which came from the non-Russian ‘guests’. 1996). 6 Data from: Oleg Oberemko and Mikhail Kirichenko. by the Meskhetian Turks expelled from Uzbekistan. 2001). in which the number of deaths seriously outnumbered the amount of births. 156.200. Although the exact number of migrants indicated by the authors may be reasonably questioned. In this situation the Cossack organisations. and from Tadjikistan . Kondratenko became one of the most popular opposition figures in the region. 173. Given that it was the time of demographic crisis in Russia. This popularity allowed him to unite the national-patriotic regional forces in a political organisation known as the ‘Fatherland’ (of Kondratenko)’. by the refugees fleeing from the escalation of the anti-Russian national extremism in Chechnya.800 to more that 5 million. and the Kuban Cossack Rada particularly.059 in 1992-1993.6 Very soon the uncontrolled migration became a big problem in regional politics as it caused some serious tensions between the local population and the newly settled communities. not that high. but some research indicates that only after 1992 did the number of new-comers rise above a million: there were 347. 5 See: Alexander Osipov and Olga Cherepova.260 in 1997. 118. There are no solid statistics covering the general amount of migrants who settled in Krasnodar kray. it is possible to consider that this increase is mainly due to migration. Riding the wave of this ‘struggle’. 111.952 in 1995.5 by the refugees from Abkhazia. 104. Polozhenie meskhetinskikh turok (Moscow: Memorial. since the increase of the population during the last decade of the 20th century is. officially. Vynuzhdennye pereselentsy na Kubani: institutsionalnaya perspektiva upravleniya (Krasnodar: Tsentr universitetskoy podderzhki razvitiya mestnykh soobshestv Kubanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta.torn apart by the civil war between the government and Islamic extremists. p. 138. Narusheniya prav vynuzhdennykh migrantov i etnicheskaya diskriminatsiaya v Krasnodarskom krae. By mid-1990s these flows were comprised by the victims of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 133.000 people.355 in 1999.748 in 1994. it is still rather significant – from 4.124 coming from the former Soviet republics. .

therefore. Yeltsin’s appointee. Kondratenko became the ‘herald’ of the communist-patriotic forces. It was this enunciative position which caused the voice of Nikolay Kondratenko to be heard in the choir of political proposals raised not only at the regional but also at the Federal level. Kondratenko took over the regional media. In a situation of growing dissatisfaction with the reforms and with the reformist Yeltsin-appointed regional government. The leader of the regional opposition had beaten Nikolay Yegorov. The structure of the chapter Our investigation into the ideological project proposed by Nikolay Kodnratenko will follow the steps outlined in the introduction of the methodological framework. All in all. We start with (1) a textual embrace of the dislocation captured the discourse of the Kubanian . with more than 80% of votes. Whatever was said and done by the leader of the local Fatherland immediately became an ‘event’ reflected in the opposition media and discussed in the opposition circles. was almost totally financially dependant upon the regional administration This group included the regional TV and radio company Kuban’. Having occupied the governor’s chair. Kondratenko gained almost limitless access to an incredibly effective channel for the dissemination of his views. It is this ‘from door to door’ communication of the counter-reformist forces which lays the foundation of the impressive performance Kondratenko had on the governor’s elections of 1996. the newspapers Kubanskie novosti and Kuban’ segodnya and some other media.125 This institutional framework made Kondratenko rather ‘recognisable’ in the field of anti-reformist protest. especially those supported from the regional budget and. the group occupied more than two-thirds of the media market in Krasnodar kray. Through this.

I display (6) the nodal point articulated to fix the meaning of the tactical struggle. from the very beginning of his public career Kondratenko represented a clear opposition to the democratic reforms. as Nezavisimaya gazeta mentions7 the reasons why he disregards democratisation are to a lesser 7 ‘Kubanskie demokraty ob’edinyayutsya’ in Nezavisimaya gazeta (November 9. After this I proceed to the programme of restoring the dislocated identity offered by the Kubanian Governor. and then I describe how Kondratenko reflects upon the moment of its actual disruption.126 Governor. I am interested in (2) how he specifies the ‘enemy’ and (3) how he sees its role in the identity blockage. Then I outline its meaningful context. More precisely. Afterwards I describe the general field of equivalence opened by the particular arrangement of antagonistic relations and the perspectives of the struggle set to rebuild the dislocated identity. Notably. I will describe (7) some attempts to institutionalise the regional identity born in the struggle of the Kubanian Governor. Examining such a process I. Then. And finally. Facing the 1990s as ‘Russian’ As aforementioned. It is this moment in which the regional idea comes into play as a political argument. indicate the dominant identity declared by Kondratenko. . In the next step of the empirical work. I visit (4) the moment in which Kondratenko comes to occupy a particular subject position in the field of general anti-‘enemy’ equivalence. I will touch upon the question of political subjectivity performed by Kondratenko. This step aims at demonstrating the way Kondratenko draws up a social antagonism. However. first. 1993). Afterwards I describe (5) the strategy employed to conduct the struggle from the particular subject position proposed by the Kubanian Governor. in the concluding part of this endeavour.

Nikolay Kondratenko. 221. Kuban: Odin god s Bat’koy Kondratom i ego Druzhinoy (Krasnodar: Sovetskaya Kuban’. Kondratenko widely applies the characteristic ‘Russian’ to the group he considers his own. 57. 14 iyunya 11 1995 goda. Nikolay Kondratenko.127 degree explained by his engagement with communist ideas but are rather defined by his sharp nationalistic background. 1998). ’Kondratenko – natsionalist v senate’ in Alexander Verkhovskiy. 1997). ‘Vystuplenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraya N. 5. no.8 Indeed. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. Russian’ (menya. p. 218-231.Kondratenko na vstreche s delegatami uchreditel’noy konferentsii “patrioticheskogo soyuza molodezhi Kubani” 27 fevr. 6 (1998). 1998). Khodil kazak v Kreml’: Razmyshleniya o bylom i nastoyashchem gubernatora Krasnodarskogo kraya (Krasnodar: Sovetskaya Kuban’. p. 91-96 p. Kondratenko. ‘Sionizm ne natsiya a politika’ in Gvardiya.94. Vladimir Pribylovskiy and Yekaterina Mikhaylovskaya. 2000). ‘Krasnodarskiy kray’ in Micheal McFaul. Rodion Mikhaylov. 2000). 9. Nikolay Petrov and others (eds. russkogo)10.I. by saying ‘we. the analysis of texts produced by the Kubanian Governor demonstrates that it is the nationalistic framework which defines his subject position. This identification is evident in many of his texts as he very often operates with the constructions ‘I am Russian’ (ya russkiy)9 and ‘me. p. p.15. 9 Nikolay Kondratenko. Natsionalizm. . since Kondratenko displays a clear tendency of associating his public ‘self’ with the fact that he is a ‘Russian’. 10 Ibid.) Rossiya v izbiratel’nom tsikle 1999-2000 godov (Moscow: Gendal’f. 1998 g. p. 55. Besides. 227-238. ehkstremiszm i ksenofobiya v rossiyskom obshchestve (Moscow: Panorama. ‘Narod Rossii ne ostavit v bede svoyu armiyu” (Vystuplenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraya v svyazi s 53-i godovshchinoy Pobedy sovetskogo naroda v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne) in Viktor Rotov and Petr Pridius. As a matter of fact many authors consider Kondratenko as one of the most remarkable nationalists in contemporary Russian history. Zasedanie dvadtsat’ vtotoe. 59. 106-119.’ in Sel’skaya zhizn’ (April 14. Federal’noe sobranie Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Nikolay Kondratenko. Stenograficheskiy otchet. Sovet Federatsii. the Russian 8 See for example: Yekaterina Mikhaylovskaya. ‘we. Russians’ (my russkie)11.

82. Kondratenko. 90. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. ‘Vystuplenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraya N. 1998 g. p. russkikh)19. russkikh)18. 90. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. Stenograficheskiy otchet. 22. ‘on ours. p.Kondratenko na 13 14 15 vstreche s delegatami uchreditel’noy konferentsii “patrioticheskogo soyuza molodezhi Kubani” 27 fevr. 90. 1998 g. 20 .‘us Russians’ (nas. Nikolay Kondratenko. Russian traitors’. Zasedanie tretye. used to express his views. to Russians’ (nam.20 As an additional illustration of the source of his selfidentity. p. Kondratenko. with Russians’ (s nami. ‘with us. in which he clearly identifies himself with the concept ‘Russian’. in different contexts . Kondratenko often employs such constructions as ‘to us. p. Kondratenko ‘Sionizm ne natsiya a politika’. Khodil kazak v Kreml’ . ‘Vystuplenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraya N. russkogo)17. Kondratenko. Sovet Federatsii. 74. p. russkaya16. 91. as in the phrase ‘what do we have to do […] is to punish our own.’ 16 Kondratenko. ‘our. russkikh)13. 94. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. Russian’ (svoikh. Russian’ (na nashikh.’ 18 Federal’noe sobranie Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Thus in his ‘Hour of Choice’ he writes: ‘total crisis grasped all spheres of our [emphasis added] 12 Kondratenko. it is possible to find numerous other declarations from the Kubanian Governor. 94.128 men’ (my. russkim)14. russkimi)15.I. p. Ibid. Together with these direct references. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. russkie muzhiki)12 and. ‘our Russian’ (nasha. 19 Kondratenko.I. 24 fevralya 1994 goda.Kondratenko na vstreche s 17 delegatami uchreditel’noy konferentsii “patrioticheskogo soyuza molodezhi Kubani” 27 fevr. nashego.

We. 14 iyunya 1995 goda. like there was no human rights anymore? Why is it shameful to say – I am Russian? And we are ..memo. 25 Radio ‘Kuban’’ (March 20..] There is no such country in the World as ours. 24 Federal’noe sobranie Rossiyskoy Federatsii. oil. with no doubt. [emphasis added] begin to destroy ourselves? [. in reference to Andrey Gromyko. Due to 22 23 his open pro-Western policy he came to known. But we. 1998) in ‘Vystupleniya GAKK N. Kondratenko’ in Alexander Osipov.25 21 Kondratenko. There is none.‘you will. gold.Russians by the way. This is our peculiarity. Rossiyskiy opyt ehtnicheskoy chistki: Meskhetintsy v Krasnodarskom krae (Moscow: Memorial.24 What put us in these conditions? Why did we. 2003). has lost our way in Europe. they were expelled from Transcauscasia.129 society […]’21 and a few paragraphs later he continues . from Kazakhstan.htm#_VPID_77 (as of August 20. just keep silent as if nothing happens.4. Sovet Federatsii. nickel. 2. p. who was called ‘Mister No’ due to his sharp non-conformism in relations with the West. I do not see the Russians in the MID [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] either. Ibid. in some circles of the Russian political elite(. Stenograficheskiy otchet. 1999) available at http://www.22 Why it is only Kozyrev23 who defines Russian foreign policy? I have a serious suspicion. p. Zasedanie dvadtsat’ vtoroe. the Russians.) as ‘Mister Yes’. understand the tragedy of the Russian [emphasis added] people’. Except Russia. Russians. which is spread over eleven thousand kilometres. uranium and so on […] The Russians were expelled from the Baltic countries. but the national treasures are in the East – gas. Balkariya.. . woods. So what kind of Russian policy is it? The television is in the hands of the others. ‘Chas vybora’.. p.15. like it was not a nation. Why did everyone keep silent? Why did the democratic mass media shut their mouths.I. [emphasis added] like calf. From 1991 to 1996 Andrey Kozyrev was the head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Russians.

‘we’ and ‘us’. Stenograficheskiy otchet.31 For instance. 27 Kondratenko.130 In addition one may find that in articulating the Russian affiliations of ‘I’. This link is evident in many of his remarks. Kondratenko’. 60. ‘if you are Russian – you are already my brother’30. Zasedanie shestoe. the Kubanian Governor says: ‘Russia always had. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. p. 30 Kondratenko. Radio ‘Kuban’’ (March 20. 29 Kondratenko. and to answer the question what does Kondratenko actually mean when he says ‘Russian’? It is possible to find that Kondratenko obviously links the term ‘Russian’ to the category of ‘nation’.I. Kondratenko.’. p. 1998 g. 90. And it is this identity which becomes dislocated by the democratic transformations of post-Soviet Russia. you have’29. ‘Vystuplenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraya N. 1998 g. it becomes obvious that Nikolay Kondratenko defines his political identity as ‘Russian’. look carefully. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. Thus. has and will have enemies. Sovet Federatsii. what they do with you!’26. Zasedanie devyatnadsatoe.’. . Sovet Federatsii.Kondratenko na vstreche s 28 delegatami uchreditel’noy konferentsii “patrioticheskogo soyuza molodezhi Kubani” 27 fevr. pp. Russian’28. 1 iyunya 1994 31 goda. p. ‘your. 23-24.11. The question is in the other matter: who are we – a nation [emphasis added] or an ordinary 26 Federal’noe sobranie Rossiyskoy Federatsii. 76. ‘with you. ‘Vystuplenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraya N. Russians’27. Stenograficheskiy otchet. Federal’noe sobranie Rossiyskoy Federatsii. ‘Russian. Kondratenko also directly points to the ‘Russianness’ of the audience he talks to: ‘Russians. 1998) ‘Vystupleniya GAKK N. 12 aprelya 1995 goda.Kondratenko na vstreche s delegatami uchreditel’noy konferentsii “patrioticheskogo soyuza molodezhi Kubani” 27 fevr. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. p.I. To demonstrate this dislocation in details one has to look at the meaningful content of the blocked identity.I. Kondratenko.

p. Kuban’: Odin god s Bat’koy Kondratom. Stenograficheskiy otchet. in fact. 36 Kondratenko.Kondratenko na vstreche s 35 delegatami uchreditel’noy konferentsii “patrioticheskogo soyuza molodezhi Kubani” 27 fevr. Sovet Federatsii. The name of this policy – Zionism. We are internationalists. ‘Vystuplenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraya N. some other remarks demonstrate that.I. 34 Apart from the direct references to the ‘national’ affiliations of the ‘Russians’. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. ‘we. 1 iyunya 1994 33 goda.131 crowd?’32. 34 Rotov and Pridius. Otherwise. 4. in defining his subject position. 1998 g. 23-24. Together with this concept 32 Kondratenko. represent a “miracle-nation”’33.’. Zasedanie shestoe. we run away like rats from a sinking ship… 36 It is fair to say that the ‘nation’ is not the only domain categorically embracing the notion of the ‘Russians’ for the Kubanian Governor. Kondratenko. This is a nation! … But we – Russians. in the next elections people were standing hand in hand around the voting stations the entire night until the results of the voting were counted. Kondratenko indeed thinks in terms of the national division of society. [A]ll this comes to be seen as an international plot against Russia and first of all – against the Russian nation. 35 In Spain where there was a time when corruption was eating (raz’edala) the country. . when speaking about the ‘Russians’. pp. it is hardly possible to explain why. p. the Kubanian Governor divides them from other ‘nations’. 88. No need to be scared. 5. p. ‘what is this kind of democracy? I would like to see this democracy dead (khotel by v grobu videt’) if there is no care of my nation! [emphasis added]’. Federal’noe sobranie Rossiyskoy Federatsii. no need to put our head down. We are educated in respect of other nations. Khodil kazak v Kreml’.

88-89. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. pp.Kondratenko na vstreche s 39 40 41 delegatami uchreditel’noy konferentsii “patrioticheskogo soyuza molodezhi Kubani” 27 fevr. p. p. 12. the one specified in its national disposition (tot.I.132 Kondratenko relates the ‘Russians’ to a more general concept of ‘people’37: ‘the technology of destroying the Russian people is not visible in its nature’. There this concept had an absolutely precise connotation. Kondratenko.’. . 1998 g. On the basis of these ideas Stalin gives his ‘classic’ 37 Kondratenko.40 However.Kondratenko na vstreche s delegatami uchreditel’noy konferentsii “patrioticheskogo soyuza molodezhi Kubani” 27 fevr. Ibid. pp. ‘I was educated under the flag of internationalism. these references should not be conceived as a tension as for Kondratenko. 68. kakoy on est pri ego natsional’nom rasklade)’ . Kondratenko refers to the concept of ‘indigenous people’:39 ‘we.’. 28. and other indigenous peoples’. Kondratenko without doubt departs from the background of the official Soviet social theory. Kondratenko.comments the Kubanian Governor. Ibid. 38 Kondratenko. for the concepts of ‘people’ and ‘nation’ are strictly contiguous with one another.38 More precisely. in passionate love to my people. 62. 72. 9. Russians. ‘Vystuplenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraya N. ‘Vystuplenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraya N. 1998 g. 76. It is essentially grounded in the basic Marxist assumption that society is essentially formed through the class relations that appear to be translated in a particular ethnic organisation defined by the development of means and forces of production. Khodil kazak v Kreml’.41 What does ‘to be Russian’ mean for Kondratenko? Applying the concept of his political identity.I.

raised by the Soviet scholars in the 1960s. Koval’chuku i drugim’ in Iosif Stalin. in Soviet social science. Arguing this point. ‘Natsional’nyi vopros i leninizm. 11. Otvet tovarishcham Meshkovu. formed on the basis of the common possession of four principal characteristics. namely: a common language. however. not the final ‘Soviet’ understanding of ‘nation’. stable community of people. 333-355. a nation is a historically constituted. p. vol. he gives the examples of the Poles and the Finns under the Russian Empire. has received general recognition in our Party. The ‘fire of the proletarian revolution’ did not seem to succeed in uniting the working class all over the world. and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture. This theory.133 definition of the ‘nation’ which forms the foundation for the concept of a nation as it appears to have been adopted. as is well known. 1949). for decades: The Russian Marxists have long had their theory of the nation. stood against the idea that ‘nations’ need any political representation. World War II 42 Iosif Stalin. a common economic life. Sochineniya (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoy literatury. It is obvious that this negativity as regards the political property of ‘nations’ is to a great degree grounded in the doctrines of ‘world revolution’. According to this theory. as we know. 333. Stalin. However. a common territory. ‘international workers’ movement’ and the ideal nonstate communist society. by the middle of the 20th century the ideas of the world workers’ international appeared to be rather seriously discredited. The final constitution of this term is deployed in the debates on the question of political representation of a ‘national community’. . the Irish under English governance and other ‘nations’ that do not posses any political representation of their unity.42 This definition comprises the basic but.

Above all. ‘Problema tipov ehtnicheskoy obshchnosti (k metodologicheskim problemam ehtnografii)’ in Voprosy filosofii. 11 (1964). Stalinian. 43-53. p. defined by the growing tensions between the USSR and the Western block made the idea of the non-state world society quite outdated. The concept of ‘nation’ had to be inscribed in the realities of the state-based configuration of the world community.87. fixed in the self-nomination (ethnonym)45 43 The term is first used by Sergey Tolstov in 1946. set new tasks for the Marxist theorists. Ocherki teorii ehtnosa (Moscow: Nauka. This innovation is encapsulated in a number of concepts generally known as the ‘theory of ethnos’. 44 See: Sergey Tokarev. p. in the end. This demonstrated the crucial vulnerability of the ‘communist international’. 1983). . This. Sergey Tokarev in his turn considers that Soviet ethnography emerged even earlier in the 1930s (see: Sergey Tokarev. 45 Yulian Bromley. which is: [H]istorically constituted on a territory.134 showed that the workers of different countries were more than able to kill each other in the interests of their states. definition of national unity with an additional element of its political consolidation. in addition to the awareness of their unity and difference from other identical creations (self-consciousness). 1958). who have not only common features. multi-generational community of people. Ehtnografiya narodov SSSR (Moscow: Moscow State University Press. stable. Then it was further elaborated by Tokarev44 and finally conceptualised by Bromley who defined it as a ‘socio-cultural organism’. but also relatively stable idiosyncrasies of culture (including the language) and psyches. This theory is a product born of the ‘Soviet ethnography’ specified by many authors as a special discipline. no. the geopolitical situation current at the end of the 1940s and 1950s.43 The term ethnos was first introduced by Levin and Cheboksarov in 1957. 58. In response to these tasks the Soviet scholars provided the original.

p. 47 48 .beginning of 20th century). but two nations belonging to one ethnos in a narrow sense of this term). later. Bromley came out with an argument defending the importance of state organisation for the constitution of what he calls ‘ethno-social organism’ writing that ‘this community and state are in indivisible unity’. we already had to answer that in this case we have two ethno-social organisms (and. 62. 70. However. 47 Concerning state sovereignty. the essential importance of the political representation of any national unity became a cornerstone in many debates. consequently. Ibid. Even in the case when a nation does not have its ‘own’ state it has a certain dominating type of relations of production and coherent social affiliations in its characteristics (for example. is situated in the two states) the nation can have different types of dominating relations of production. the Ukraynian nation in the Russian Empire in the 19th .e. However. The term ‘potestarian’. 78-79. not one nation in our understanding of this term. which becomes a synonym of the ‘politico-territorial’ or the ‘state’.46 Deploying this idea further Bromley linked the ‘ethnosocial organism’ with the notion of ‘nation’ demonstrating the vital role of the state factor in constituting the national identity. Though it is possible to argue that if a nation is divided by political borders (i. Ibid. Bromley writes that states as the ‘macro-elements’ of the social consist of ‘politico-territorial (potestarian) communities’48. Does nation represent a socio-economic unity? Understanding nation as an ethno-social organism we obviously have to answer this question positively. p. Thus. is derived by the author from the Greek ‘potestas’ (power) and refers to power 46 Ibid. pp.135 In the beginning this account did not owe much to the political dimension of ethnic composition.

the main political units of the class society .29. ‘Peredacha informatsii kak mekhanizm suschchestvovaniya ehtnosotsial'nykh i biologicheskikh grupp chelovechestva’ in Rasy i narody. and then Russian. In states . p. the ‘collecting’ of the Russian land. 35.50 Summarising this brief excursion. as advocated in the Soviet theory of ethnos. state. in the work of Sergey Arutyunov and Nikolay 50 Cheboksarov. regardless of whether this body is a president and his government. The unyoking from the Tatars in 14-16th centuries and the construction of the independent Moscow. See for example ‘early-bourgeois nations’ etc. as the latter operated within official Soviet social theory. king and his court. Sovremennye ehtnicheskie i rasovye problemy (Moscow: Akademiya Nauk SSSR. establishment of the common national market in the 17th century. culture. understood (in general terms) as the supreme body of authority. differing according to their political representations. Immediately after these debates. 8-30.49 In this way. prime-minister and his cabinet or secretary general and politburo. came into the lexicon of Soviet social science. economy’ and the ‘common government’ translating the principle of the political representation of the community. p. Nation here is recognised as a group of people that has five features in common: Stalin’s ‘territory. Bromley finally fixed the vital importance of the political embodiment of any national community. language. it seems necessary to recapitulate the final convention which was set as regards the term ‘nation’. unification of the common Russian culture and constitution of the Russian language 49 Ibid. the notions of ‘socialist’ and ‘bourgeois’ nations. 1972). .136 institutions which consolidating particular communities (or ‘a particular community’).these institutions are represented by government. It is not surprising that precisely these aspects of national unity are emphasised in the Soviet historical textbooks.

The impossibility of realising the Russian nation in post-Soviet Russia dislocated the political identity enacted by Nikolay Kondartenko. As a matter of fact. understood as a reference to the ‘Russianness’ which was impossible to realise at the time. government.137 ‘on the basis of the Eastern Slavonic dialects’ were the key themes in history taught in the Soviet school. the government he is subjected to. disorder in the institutional establishment of the new Russian state. In a situation of drastic economic decline. as truly ‘Russian’. Kondratenko first constructed the myth. Kondratenko faced tremendous difficulties in identifying these prerequisites in postSoviet Russia. Looking for the discursive fullness of the Russian nation. Perceiving the Russian nation as a community of people that have in common the five aforementioned factors . culture and language. combined with massive flows of migrants coming from the former Soviet republics. Kondratenko refuses to consider the land he is living in. It is this knowledge which constituted the object of the Russian nation for the audience of Soviet social theory. this theme occupies one of the central positions in the political programme of Nikolay Kondratenko. And it is this knowledge which provides Kondratenko with the particularly meaningful connotation . economy. . and the internationalising of Russia. This articulation is embraced by the pinpointing of events which caused the the economy. seen as an attempt to reach a Russian national identity in the situation of post-Soviet (dis)order. This becomes the ‘point of departure’ for constructing a regional ideology.‘Russians as they are in their national disposition’. the culture and even the language enjoyed in contemporary Russia.

28. Ibid. ‘refugees’ and other new-comers by way of a threat to the ‘authenticity’ imposed upon his land. it can explode at any moment. The local people complain because here.138 Dislocation in context The most obvious aspect of the blockage is the loss of the common territory. 52 53 . on Kuban’. Ibid. Let us look into this problem more deeply. who declared the lands left to us by the will of our fathers and grandfathers as a zone of their interests!’51 Besides these forces Kondratenko nominates different flows of ‘migrants’. One of them is the ‘foreign powers’. to the degree that they do in Russia? concretises his fear: I am not exaggerating. in which country. do visitors feel themselves to be masters. notably. pp. and then 51 Kondratenko.53 52 . the Kubanian Governor indicates various actors. the prices of real estate run up in comparison to the middle Russian average. ‘Where. The tension is progressing because the migrants expect not only a place to live but also jobs. land. and now the USA.the land of other nations or foreign forces. food is getting more expensive etc. 33-34. Among those who would pretend to subject this land. ‘Europe’ and the ‘USA’: ‘the Russian people was always an obstacle in the way of Europe. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. The situation with refugees looks like a time-bomb. p. This loss is indicated by the ‘fact’ that this land becomes ‘someone else’s land’. p. 39. and in particular . social security etc. Kondratenko widely articulates these ‘facts’ which indicate the transformation of his land into a ‘non-Russian’ one.asks Kondratenko.

139 I want you to pay attention to the fact that nowadays the great migration of peoples, the mass migration, is an action carefully planned by the enemies of the Fatherland. 54

Articulating the general danger of ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’ the Kubanian Governor calls concrete ‘peoples’ whose presence causes the land to which they come to be seen as ‘their land’. They are, first of all, the ‘Armenians’.55
According to the data of State Statistic Commission [Goskomstat] of the RF there are 241 thousand Armenians on Kuban, but in reality according to the estimations of demographers, including even those of the Armenians themselves, there are about 800 thousand Armenians living in the kray. The intensive population of the kray territory, and especially the Black Sea coast, by the Armenians leads to the violations of the rights of the indigenous population, including the ones of Armenian nationality.56

Apart from the ‘Armenians’ the governor of Krasnodar kray attacks the ‘Meskhetian Turks’.57
The problem with the Meskhetian Turks causes a constant fear. The situation in the places of their compact residence is dangerously unpredictable. As is known, they came to Kuban’ in 1989 after the bloody events in Fergana. A part of them (more than 20 thousand) came to Kuban in fear and risk and in violation of existing laws, instead of the places specially given to them (whilst previously, their special representatives visited Kuban and chose places for their settling in Krymsk, Abinsk and other territories). 58


Ibid. p. 30. Ibid. pp.34-35. Ibid. p. 35. Ibid. pp. 34-39. Ibid. p. 36.





140 Furthermore: first, so to speak, they asked to stay for a while – now some of their leaders even claim the territory of Krasnodar kray, considering it as originally Muslim. They already openly declare to the Slavonic population that they will massacre everyone who will not go away from … their land! 59 In the places where they live, the Meskhetian Turks captured the markets and they behave like the masters, dictating their prices and allowing for offensive references to the local population. 60 The Slavonic population decreases and in families of the Meskhetian Turks 10-12 children is considered as a normal situation. Thus in the village of Kholmsky and in other places, a half thousand of the new born children belongs to the kin of the Meskhetian Turks. As a result, from the academic year 1993/1994 3-5 classes are formed every year in which there are only 2-3 Russian children. Given the low birth rate and high death rate among the Slavonic population, even now it is not difficult to make a simple count - the ethnic composition in the places where the Meskhetian Turks live benefits the latter. 61

Besides the Meskhetian Turks, Kondratenko complains about the ‘Greeks’, the ‘Germans’, the ‘Kurds’ and the ‘Assyrians’ living in Krasnodar kray.62 The presence of these peoples together with the aforementioned ‘foreign powers’ prevents Kondratenko from a full recognition of the land in which he lives as truly ‘Russian’. Along with the ‘common Russian land’, the government under which the ‘Russian nation’ is supposed to be united becomes an object which is unachievable, according to the perspective of the Kubanian Governor. This loss is indicated in his remarks on


Ibid. p. 38. Ibid. pp. 37-38. Ibid. p. 38. Ibid. p. 34.





the contemporary institutions of state power, where Kondratenko obviously shows that for him the latter are seen as essentially ‘non-Russian’.
Who governs us? Look in the faces of those who defines the destiny of Russia now, take a listen to their voices, compare what they say with what they do, and how they live. You will understand who governs us. Will the Japanese, or the Jews keep patience if there were only Russians in their governments? If all channels of their national TV would be in the arms of the Koreans or the Turks. But in Russia it became a norm.63

Among those who ‘govern’ or ‘governed’ Russia, Kondratenko often empathises with some concrete personalities: ‘Judo-Masson Tukhachevskiy’, ‘Judo-massons, tribemates of Yagoda‘, ‘Judo-masson Sverdlov’, ‘ Judo-masson Kaganovich’ etc.64 And then he specifies their group affiliation:
Almost all of them were non-Russians, because among hundreds of narkoms [people’s commissars] and other commissars and their ancestors there were no Russians by kin and tribe [po rodu-plemeni] and if still they were - only in the secondary roles. Exactly as the Russian democrats today gave the first roles in the government of the state to the Zionists of the new generation.65

The ‘Russianness’ of Russian culture also appears to be seriously questioned by the Kubanian Governor. Thus Kondratenko mentions several areas in which other ‘nations’ dominate the Russian culture. This, according to him, results in the ‘distortion’ and ‘destruction’ of the latter. ‘We see less and less Russian faces on the television, we see less and less Russian language and Russian music. The culture of the other


Ibid. p. 69. Ibid. p. 67. Ibid. p. 67.




indigenous peoples of Russia has disappeared from the Moscow screens’66 – says the Kubanian Governor. In the field of literature ‘instead of Russian faces we see the Jews’. Thus, Kondratenko places the blame on the ethnic composition of Russia’s writers calling ‘Rasputin, Bondarev, Belov, Likhonosov, Znamenskiy’ the ‘bloom of the Russian nation’ and opposing to them such authors as ‘Solzhenitsyn, Aksenov, Bukovskiy, Abram Terts, Voynovich and Iosif Brodskiy’ who, in his opinion, do not deserve the public attention they have.67 The accent on the Jewish names ‘Abram’ and ‘Iosif’, along with the omission of the typically Russian names of ‘Alexander’ (Solzhenitsyn) and ‘Vasiliy’ (Aksenov) demonstrates that, for Kondratenko, the Jewish origin of these authors is of great importance. Deploying the concept of the ‘them’ of the ‘Jews’, in Russian culture, Kondratenko says:
[A]ll this [the destruction of the Russian Fatherland] – is against the background of limitless hymns to the ‘chosen people’ and ‘holy land’, genius Rostropoviches, Brodskies, Pasternaks, Tseretelies… And in general: everything theirs – is good, everything Russian - bad. They spoiled [literally ‘shitted on’ - obgadili] Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol’, Sholokhov. We cannot get books of Russian writers – Rasputin, Bondarev, Belov, Proskurin…We do not hear Russian music and real Russian language. The blockage of Russian cultural values and the values of other native people by mass-media may be compared with the occupational regime.68

Apart from in literature, Kondratenko also notes the collapse of the ‘Russian culture’ in everyday life. However, this collapse appears to be linked with the influence of ‘migrants’. Thus, the Kubanian Governor accuses the Meskhetian Turks of ‘subverting’ the Russian cultural values.


Kondratenko, ‘Narod Rossii ne ostavit v bede svoyu armiyu” in Rotov and Pridius, Kuban: Odin god s

Bat’koy Kondratom i ego Druzhinoy, p. 94.

Kondratenko, ‘Chas vybora’, p. 4.

143 They smoke hash [anasha] – it is considered as normal among them, as well as the transportation and distribution of drugs, which leads to a mass spread of drugs among the local youth. After the Meskhetian Turks, murders, robbery, rapes and hooliganism in public places became more frequent. An idea of the so-called sexual availability of the Slavonic women, typical for Middle Asia is widely spread among the migrants from Fergana, which results in a coherent behavioural setting. 69

This attitude toward the ‘Slavonic women’ confuses Kondratenko’s own perception of his people, as he stands clearly against any kind of sexual liberation, and negatively regards recent TV programmes showing ‘sex, violence and porn’ as a great sin of his generation in relation to its predecessors.70 The fourth pillar of Russian national unity, which appears to have been lost in the current social situation, is the common Russian economy. Kondratenko consistently repeats that in his opinion Russia’s economy is totally captured by other nationals. Indicating those ‘conquerors’ he mentions, among others, the Crimean Tatars: ‘when we tried to change the head of the state enterprise “Novorossiysk oil product” (Novorossiysknefteprodukt) we found out that he had run away to America with his cheat companions, and in charge, he left behind him a Crimean Tatar, a former tank driver. The latter employed a security service of 11 people, 8 of which were Crimean Tatars also’.71 The Meskhetian-Turks: ‘And the Turks, firmly settled in a prosperous region, have not thought of planting vegetables - as they promised when they settled here. Trade! This is their target. The Novorossiysk port is closed, there is a lot of


Kondratenko, Khodil kazak v Kreml’, p. 89. Ibid. p. 38. Ibid. p. 77. Ibid. p. 4.




‘the Americans’ and ‘the Europeans’ also belong to those capturing the Russian economy. p. The quality of the European meat is indicated by the discovered diseases that have infected English cows’75 . 34. In one of his speeches the Kubanian Governor blames the fact that in some of the regional schools the Russian language is taught ‘by the Armenians’. rice and grain. speaking about agriculture. Ibid. 23-25. Ibid. This loss reveals itself when Kondratenko appears to be confused by the fact of the non-Russian affiliations of those who teach Russian to children. Ibid.144 space to work!’72 According to the Kubanian Governor. 21.77 and: ‘there is no Russian man’ (Russkogo muzhika net…) 78 says the Kubanian Governor. p. Kondratenko mentions that the ‘American foundation “Skuner” (Boston)’ bought the Timashevsk milk factory73 and that the ‘Americans’ occupied the Russian market of chicken. The common language becomes the fifth point of the identity blockage. (April 13. pp. p. Thus. 72 Ibid. 36. Kondratenko concludes by putting forward the argument as to the actual absence of the ‘Russian nation’ and the ‘Russian man’. ‘There is no Russian nation…’. 27. p. Nikolay Kondratenko ‘Svoy kray kriminalu ne sdadim!’ in Kubanskie novosti.150 thousands tons etc.states Kondratenko. It also loses its ‘Russianness’ for the Head of the Krasnodar kray administration. 2000). 73 74 75 76 77 . Scotland .74 ‘The European distributors of beef cleared the market for themselves: Canada [as in the original] imports 250 thousands tons.76 Indicating the failure of each of the five pillars of Russian national unity. Ibid.

79 Then. Kondratenko defines the ‘enemy’ responsible for the collapse of the ‘Russianness’ in Russia. If we win the Revolution. This is the second step in constructing the ‘national’ myth. 79 80 . ‘Chas vybora’. A politics which is cruel. we will crush Russia. ‘Zionism is politics. p. Kondratenko. 4. in his ‘Memoirs’. according to Kondratenko. to whom we will give such tyranny the horrible despots of the East could not even dream about…We will shed such currents of blood that all human losses of all capitalistic wars would pale and shudder in front of it. The biggest overseas bankers will work in close contact with us. which is generally seen as the ‘Zionists’ who. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. 78. and the power of Zionism with be strengthened on her sepultural ruins and the whole world will go down on its knees in front of this power […] 78 Ibid. he puts a question: ‘[s]o what is this force which commits its devil’s business in Russia during the whole 20th century?’ and then . the words Trotskiy-Bronshtein stated.writes Kondratenko in his The Hour of Choice.80 In other works Kondratenko explains the character of this politics by citing the ‘aims’ of the ‘Zionist leaders’: The goldsmith of the Tsar’s court Aron Simanovich quotes. crafty and dangerous’ . p. The Kubanian Governor assumes that the impossibility of realising the ‘Russian nation’ in post-Soviet Russia is explained by the presence of the ‘other’.145 Naming the enemy Having rendered the dislocation textual. Kondratenko. in a Zionist group: ‘We have to turn Russia into a desert inhabited by the white Negroes. organised a ‘plot’ to ‘destroy the Russian nation’.replies: ‘The name of this force is Zionism’.

4. as ‘an international organisation which occupied Moscow’84. p. p. as ‘an aggressive and insidious force willing a new world order’83. With such pleasure they physically exterminate Russian intelligentsia. academicians. ‘Zionism’ becomes further apprehended as: ‘the force that captured everything in Russia and which functions to erase Russia from the planet Earth’82. Ibid. 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 . p. Gomel’ and Vinnitsa – they can hate everything Russian. pp. 58. Ibid. 81. ‘the Russians who betrayed their national interests’87. p. 78. 90. ‘the ones who created fairytales about the prosperous Russia before the revolution’88 etc. p. p. Ibid. 93. p. 81 Ibid. 80-81. according to Kodnratenko. or as ‘the force that made its own deal disguising it under the slogans of revolution’85 etc. writers!…81 Given that. Ibid. officers. The ‘Zionists’ themselves are being presented as: ‘the ones responsible for the destruction of Russia’86. 80. Ibid.146 By means of terror. bloodbaths [krovavye bani] we will turn the Russian intelligentsia to ultimate stupidity. to an animal state…Our young guys in leather jackets – the son’s of horologer from Odessa and Orsha. Trotskiy is one of the main ‘Zionists’ it becomes clear that the matter of this ‘politics’ appeared to be expressed through the words of the Russian revolutionary. Being an essentially destructive force. to idiotism. Ibid. Ibid.

89 Personification of the ‘enemy’ in concrete actors and institutions makes the former ‘real’ and actually present.‘Zionist’. By this it transforms itself into an empty signifier or a signifier of a pure absence of the actually present ‘enemy’. 1999). This opens the way to the achievement of Russianness through the specification of ones opposition to the ‘Zionists’. the Russian Government. Nikolay Kondratenko.Kondratenko k zhitelyam Kubani’ in Kuban' segodnya. These became some of the most oft-mentioned ‘agents of the Zionist plot’. They may be. pointed to with ones finger: ‘Here is the enemy. in its turn. in which the ‘Zionists’ become the ones whose existence prevents the ‘Russians’ from being themselves. ‘Ostanovit' chernyi peredel: Obrashchenie glavy administratsii kraya N.Yeltsin and his administration. opens the gates for the social struggle where the national identity which is sought appears to be conceptualised in the confrontation with the ‘Zionist’ enemy.I. 1999). Among the latter Kondratenko mentions the Russian Federal authorities. for Nikolay Kondratenko. the Russian President . (September 21. more precisely. ‘Politika: kormyatsya edinitsy. Within this discursive horizon. a stradayut milliony’ in Vol'naya kuban' (March 20. Which ‘is not one among other objects but an absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility and is thus 89 Nikolay Kondratenko.147 Having identified the ‘enemy’ in general Kondratenko ‘personalises’ this notion by calling concrete persons and institutions . Kondratenko comes forward with the original proposal of transforming the ‘national myth’ into a social imaginary. Such a perspective. In the situation of social antagonism the very identity of ‘Russian’ becomes emptied. the Federal TV channels and Federal mass media. and. literally. here he is!’ The materialisation of the enemy creates a situation of social antagonism. .

New Reflections on Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso. for instance. Since the end of the 1980s many voices have been raised which call for a fight against the ‘Zionist plot’. Performing political subjectivity To indicate the specificity of his project it is necessary to mention that in contemporary Russia the struggle against ‘Zionism’. ‘10 let Siono-Fascisma v Rossii’ in Nashe Otechestvo. ‘Programnye printsypy “Soyuza venedov Rossii”’ in Rodnye prostory. In doing so. came out with the idea of rebuilding the entire system of government in Russia and argued for the redistribution of the highest governmental functions to the all-Russian Council. 3 (1992). Within the spectrum of these voices a variety of programmes were proposed. 91 92 . clearly articulating its task as the struggle against Zionism92. Yevgeniy Shchekatikhin. no. in order to restore the ‘Russianness’ of Russia. he sets the framework for social struggle against the specified enemy. seen as an analogue of zemstvo. and for the restoration of the ‘Russian nation’ is rather popular. A brief analysis of the extreme right-wing movements allows for an identification of a variety of proposals to be put forward as part of this struggle. 1990). The Orthodox Russian National Sobor. which represented the organs of self-government in pre-Revolutionary 90 Ernesto Laclau. p. the Union of the Veneds.148 the condition of possibility of the emergence of any object. 40 (1995).'90 Within this horizon of intelligibility Kondratenko finds the possibility of a rebuilding of the discursive objectivity of the ‘Russian nation’. Thus. calls for the ‘gathering of all the Russians inhabiting Eurasia in a united empire with a gubernia division and for the subsequent consolidation with all the Veneds of Eurasia’91. no. 64.

appeals for the construction of the ‘caste-ethnocratic Russian state’.asp?FN=20 (as of August 20. Pribylovskiy and Verkhovskiy. in the struggle with ‘Zionism’. the building of the ‘international North community’ uniting the Slavs As is mentioned by the Panorama research group98. 5 (1993). 2003).such as themselves – with 93 ‘Russkiy Natsional’nyi Sobor.k rasizmu’ in Za Russkoe delo!. Vladimir Pribylovskiy. which comprises ‘a nation’. no. ‘Chto takoe pravoradikal’naya partiya i chego ona khochet’ in K toporu. ‘Ot natsionalizma . ‘Pravo na vlast’’ in Za Russkoe delo!. no. for example. various political forces articulate specific subject positions. Natsional-patrioticheskie organizatsii. in its turn. 46 (1995). as a position from which to fight the Zionism incarnated in the ‘South’. Thus the Orthodox Russian National Sobor identifies the position of ‘orthodox’ as the modality of the fight with the ‘Jewish government’.eu. available at 95 96 97 98 http://xmir.another right extremist organisation. no. ideologiya. Istoriya. there are some quite exotic positions which emerge in this spectrum of social struggle. the Germans.asp?FN=79 (as of August 20.149 Russia. . for instance. Natsional-patrioticheskie organizatsii v Rossii. while the Right-Radical Party specifies the ‘notion of the North. Also.93 Za Russkoe Delo . The Union of the Veneds suggests. no. ‘Kakoy dolzhna byt’ prgramma russkogo kandidata’ in Nashe Otechestvo. Roman Perin. the identification of those opposing ‘the Jewish governance’ . ehkstremistskie http://xmir.1 (1994).org/xeno/kng2F. where 87% of the Russians (excluding ‘foreign mercenaries’) possess all the 2003). from which they may conduct the struggle. 9 (1996).95 Za Russkoe Delo puts the ‘white race’ in the domain of the anti-Zionist struggle96. Programmnoe zayavlenie o sud’be russkogo naroda’ in Alexander tendentsii (Moscow: Panorama. becomes the main point of such a programme.94 Having formulated the programmes for the restoration of ‘Russianness’. 1996) available at Verkhovskiy. 94 Vladimir Avdeev.

which to a certain degree represents a ‘new word’ in the development of contemporary Russian anti-Semitism. Those who fight Zionism as ‘orthodox’ follow quite different proposals from the ones fighting as the ‘Veneds’.95. Thus he fights ‘Zionism’ not as an ‘Orthodox’ or as a ‘white man’ but as the highest regional authority.99 Thus it will be seen that in the struggle with ‘Zionism’. for the restoration of Russia’s national authenticity. various forces propose different positions to be occupied for conducting the combat. p. 4.100 ‘Dear countrymen! For many years I have been in charge of the kray and occupying this position I posses a huge amount of information. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. Rotov and Pridius. those who struggle on behalf of the ‘white race’ or the ‘North’ do not necessarily share the goals of those arguing for ‘Russian Euro-Asian’ unity against the ‘sons of the Zion’. ‘the Veneds’. Kondratenko. Indeed. ‘acts’ or ‘acted’ as the head of the region. Kuban’: Odin god s Bat’koy 100 Kondratom. 99 ‘Programmnye prinstipy “Soyuza Venedov Rossii”’. ‘the Orthodox’ etc. in the spectrum of this struggle the Kubanian Governor comes with his own particular proposal. In his struggle Kondratenko posits himself first of all as the head of the region. An analysis of his text shows that the Kubanian Governor utilises exactly this position in order to engage in combat. p.150 the Slavonic tribe mentioned in the ancient Russian chronicles and noted in a number of historical studies devoted to the Russia of the early Middle Ages. However. According to these positions the struggle appears to be particularised between different sectors: ‘the Whites’. Kondratenko repeatedly mentions that he generally ‘addresses’. .

the conciousness. It is like in a family where the father. Kuban’: Odin god s Bat’koy Kondratom. For Kondratenko. who is not a boss appointed by 101 Nikolay Kondratenko. 102 Rotov and Pridius. first of all. 247.102 Above all. for example. za Rossiyu!: Obrashchenie k zemlyakam v preddverii vyborov v Gos. grazhdane Rossii. 1999). in fact. applied to the image of Kondratenko by artisticallyminded columnists.103 It is interesting to note that after the first years of his governing Kondratenko.151 which is unfortunately unavailable for you’ – says the Kubanian Governor. be engaged in everything? Sometimes I even think: maybe I should leave this position’. he says: ‘The circumstances that allow me to possess great power can shake the trust of my country-men as regards the objectivity of the results of this kind of survey… I understand: the truth about me will be said only when I leave this high position’. Thus. Kondratenko asks: ‘I am in power. which means that I share responsibility [for the Zionism-inspired catastrophe]… Why am I torturing myself? Why have I taken this cross upon myself .101 Then. One may stress the fact that this is not just a journalist’s cliché. the attitude towards the people. 103 . the business. in terms of the duties of the highest regional authority. fully accepts this obligation as one finds in his own reflections on the title: [T]he main things for any leader are the soul. 90. p. Dumu’ in Pravda (December 16.‘father-Kondrat’ (bat’ko Kondrat). Ibid. ‘Vstan'te. he received the nickname . Kondratenko regularly states that he acts as a ‘governor’ and demands an estimation of his activities. in one of his passionate attacks on ‘Zionism’. commenting on the idea of the regional newspaper Volnaya Kuban’ to nominate him person of the year.

51. a 105 106 svobodnuyu in nezavisimuyu…’ in Krasnodarskie izvestiya (April 9. Several actions of the Kubanian Governor indicate further this strategy. 104 Commenting on the nickname. until navigation is closed. at the expense of the kray dwellers […] I declared that I will not accept this discrimination against the kray dwellers. Nikolay Kondratenko ‘Spasat’ nado Rossiyu ne sotsialisticheskuyu i ne kapitalisticheskuyu. the Kubanian Governor says: ‘Personally I think that I am raised up too high . Kondratenko said: I was compelled to supply the Northern regions with deliveries until August 23 i. In August 1991 he issued a regulation restricting the internal export of food from Krasnodar kray to the other regions of Russia. but from the nature. In general terms. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. 1993). in the opinion of the public.he is the patron. The first one goes back to the beginning of the 1990s when Kondratenko was the Head of the kray Soviet of the People’s Deputies. Ibid. from God . Advocating this initiative.152 someone.105 Conducting the struggle Having occupied the position of regional ‘father’. the protector. There I declared the absence of a wish on my part to be related with the genocide of my own people. this programme involves a proposal to preserve Russian national authenticity in his ‘fathered’ territory.106 104 Kondratenko. the be a father of the people. I think that in the critical political situation the people seek to be defended’. Kondratenko comes out with a specific programme of reviving the ‘Russian nation’. 15. . p.e. one has to deserve it really. p. in whom they believe and whom they take as an example.

he says: ‘If I come back from the session and find that the mass disconnection [of electricity] is continuing. The latest ones date from the last year of his governorship. and see how you will deal with it [kak vy budete vykruchivat’sya]’.next to the building of the kray administration there appeared an official consulate (predstavitelstvo) of the rebellious 107 Arbakhan Magomedov. 2002). This policy totally fits with the logic of fighting for the ‘lost Russianness’. . 130. ‘Politicheskoe liderstvo i formirovanie regional’nykh politicheskikh system v sovremennoy Rossii’ in Regional’nye protsessy v sovremennoy Rossii (Moscow: INION RAN. in April 2000 Kondratenko warned the vice-prime minister of the Russian Government: ‘We should close the pipeline [the KTK pipeline]. to blow it to hell [vzorvat’ k chortovoy materi]. p. Thus when making a speech in the Council of Federation. and is related to the affairs Kondratenko has with the officials of the Chechen republic. come to be fully justified. Kondratenko repeatedly stresses the threats of this kind.153 As a matter of fact. and being the one who ‘cares about the regional population’ and defends their interests.107 Moreover. 108 Ibid. or for sabotaging projects of Federal significance.insofar far as the ‘Zionists’ are ‘sitting in the Kremlin’ and organising a ‘plot’ to destroy Russia. p. In the mid-1990s Kondratenko had quite close relationships with Maskhadov. 115-147.108 For Kondratenko . on an absolutely legal basis I am going to prevent the construction of the KTK [The Caspian Pipeline Consortium] pipeline. the initiatives to disobey their orders and to use the governor’s power in the name of a prevention of the internal food export. I will stop the export of oil and oil-products through the ports of the kray’. First of all . 131. to put Cossacks there. the leader of the separatist government of the unrecognised ‘Republic of Ichkeriya’. Another example of this logic comes later.

de facto it was independent. (November 6. available at: http://www. Other things were much more important for Kondratenko. ‘V vykhodnoy den’ gubernator letal k Aslanu Maskhadovu’ in Komsomolets kubani (April 8.154 republic.who then visited Kondratenko? The president of the subject of the Federation with postponed status or the leader of the ‘independent state’? The answer is neither the first nor the second. .111 The question which arises next is . as there were no bodies of Russian authorities present there and the power was entirely possessed by the armed The question of Chechen independence was absolutely insignificant for the Kubanian Governor. Kondratenko v Chechnyu’ in Kuban’ segodnya (April 8. Khronologicheskiy ocherk’. Moreover. in April 1997 the Kubanian Governor visited Chechnya and met Maskhadov and some other leaders of the rebels. ‘Pochemu gubernator Kondratenko stal luchshim drugom vsekh chechentsev’ in Komsomol’skaya pravda (December 19. As is well known. 1997). 110 See: ‘Istoriya Khasavyurta. 2003). seen as the ‘bastion of Zionism’ in Russia.nvrem. The Chechens were fighting with the Federal Above all Maskhadov himself openly declared that in as much as ‘we gained independence’ Chechnya was an ‘independent Islamic republic’. wherein he openly associates himself with the ‘highland fighters’: 109 Dmitriy Dolgov.html as of (August 25. 1997) available at: http://www. One may refer to some interesting remarks addressed by Kondratenko to the Council of the Federation. 1998).polit. religious fanatics and numerous groups of mercenaries. This was important for the Kubanian Governor.109 This situation is especially interesting if one looks at the status possessed by the Chechen republic at that time. ‘Poezdka N.html 111 ‘Zayavlenie Aslana Maskhadova’ in Nevskoe vremya. after the Hasavyurt agreement of August 30. However. 1996 it was de jure recognised as a subject with postponed status. 1997).

send your children and grandchildren from the zone of the Sadovoye ring. would display a ‘father’s care’ to the regional population by rescuing them from Chechen slavery? These actions clearly indicate the particularity of the position occupied by Kondratenko in his political struggles.113 The second crucial thing in the contacts with the Chechen rebels is that these actions. p. this demand is quite irrelevant for those who are calling for the unity of the ‘people’ against the Zionist corrupted ‘government’ etc. as Kondratenko mentions himself.155 No way. It is exactly for these purposes that there was created a position of advisor for rescuing the Kubanians held by the Chechen separatists in the Administration of Krasnodar kray. Not a single Kubanian will raise his hand against a highlander. and we. . against the ‘Zionist South’. together with highlanders. sirs! The Cossacks will not shoot their brothers-highlanders […] It is likely that we. This will be the highest and the most just response to the instigators of war. 113 See also: ‘Pochemu gubernator stal luchshim drugom vsekh chechentsev’. If you want. aimed at assisting in the rescue of the Kubanian prisoners held by the Chechens. Kuban: Odin god s Bat’koy Kondratom. ‘Narod Rossii ne ostavit v bede svoyu armiyu’ in Rotov and Pridius. the Russian men. call them from America. it is hardly possible to realise the initiative of restricting the food supply to the Russian North. from Switzerland. 95. destroyers of our Fatherland. and throw them under Elbrus. will turn our weapon against those villains from politics. Who other than the head of the region. will catch them. Moreover.112 I had plenty of talks with men on Kuban’. on the part of one who is demanding the unity of Russians who are part of the ‘North’. therefore. At the same time it is of 112 Nikolay Kondratenko. As a matter of fact.

for the ‘father of his countrymen’ these actions became more than possible. If one looks at the history of the Chechen uprising. to befriend the anti-government rebels. However. went though like Mamay over our Fatherland? Jeudo-masson Kaganovich! Tens of Kubanian stanitsas . On the same basis. also becomes an option. he speaks about his fatherland.which. fixing the discursive unity of Kondratenko’s ‘struggle for Russia’. comes to represent the project of restoring social reality to the dislocated object of the ‘Russian nation’. whilst identifying himself as a Russian. For instance.156 great concern that the ones fighting Zionism as the ‘Orthodox’ would ever make any alliances with the Chechen rebels. then. Articulating the regional idea The particular position occupied by Kondratenko defines the object which fixes the demands articulated in the course of his struggle. This object is ‘Kuban’ . their leaders expressed hatred towards Russia. Therefore. it becomes a nodal point. in the context of the anti-Zionist struggle of the ‘Kubanian father’. expressing his attitude toward the crisis in Russia Kondratenko says: ‘Who. Thus the Kubanian Governor very often means ‘Kuban’ when. the Russians and the Russian government in general but never towards particular regions and their population. in fact. to cut the food supply of other Russian territories supporting ‘the Zionist government’. whoever they are. for the ‘good’ of the population of his region. at this moment. who to a great degree are organised by radical Islamic fundamentalists. It is possible to say that.the name of his region . suits the strategic political goals of Kondratenko.

85. which is in constant lack in Russia. My generation of the Kubanians used to pull its vein out [tyanulo zhyly iz sebya] for decades to create industry and agricultural complexes in the kray’. Russian kids… Or if we take woods of valuable kinds like the oak and the beech. because the latter are those who appear to be negatively affected by the food export problem. Ibid.116 This passage shows that ‘own people’ for Kondratenko is the ‘Kubanians’. Let us take as an example the restriction of sunflower seeds. rather than the Russians in general. as well as ‘to save the Kubanians’ and ‘to save our 114 Kondratenko. 83. p. Khodil kazak v Kreml’. export of the kray. makes no difference between ‘to export from Kuban’ and ‘to export from Russia’. when he speaks about the tough talks he had in the Federal Government. Following this conceptualisation. Ibid. 115 116 117 . 57. 44-45. Ibid. after refusing to organise the food supply of the Northern regions. A tree is growing for hundred years and we send it for nothing to the same Turkey! We stood like a wall against it…117 In these lines Kondratenko.115 The other evidence is concealed in the references to the ‘Kubanians’ as ‘his own people’. p. the Kubanian Governor says: ‘that’s all. For example. Kondratenko unites the aforementioned problem of restricting internal export of food with defending Russian national interests.114 Or: ‘We were proud of our Fatherland. the high-protein culture. To export sunflower. Without protein cattle farming can not be competitive. p. pp. in fact. I do not want and I will not participate in the genocide of my own people’. I quit. this is a crying mismanagement! And I was thinking in such a way: why should I save the Turkish children exporting sunflower to Turkey? It is better to feed our own.157 and farms have died then from starvation’. protein.

do not make things clear for yourself […] I have nothing to tell you – it looks like a destiny for us. the Poles and others tried to take over the Russian throne. 118 Ibid. In addition one may mention that regarding ‘Kuban’ being ‘the last redoubt of Russianness’ . a few paragraphs later: [I]f you do not want to clarify this now – when another election in the cities and the districts comes to Kuban’. The main thing is in us. in what and how we do it’. the Tatars. Kondratenko is rather sceptical towards the slogans regarding Kubanian independence. the Tatars again. 119 . the Swedish. next.158 own. that after reducing the notion of ‘the Russian’ to the notion of ‘the Kubanian’. It is not surprising. In our behaviour.this ideal state he is trying to build. How may Kuban be separated from Russia if it incarnates the ‘true Russia’ in itself? Emphasising the fact that these proposals are irrelevant. with the elections in ‘the Kubanian cities and districts’ and the ‘decision of the Kubanians’ in the forthcoming elections. confirming the hypothesis that saying ‘Kuban’ he.118 And then he continues. in Russians. they have big money. Thus. the ‘destiny of the Russians’ and the ‘Russian government’. Ibid. p. means ‘Russia’ as such . 94. he says: ‘All the time the Germans if not the Khazars. Russian kids’.Kondratenko widely puts it on display in his numerous historical excursions. the Russians. p. for the Russians! 119 It is obvious that here Kondratenko unites the ‘Russian throne’. 94. without regard for others [bespardonnye]. It was always like this. . the Germans. villains again climb straight into power .if you this time again do not sort them out and do not send them away. they are insolent.they are more active than we are. in fact. the French.

I want to say that those who set the question in this manner take a great sin on their shoulders. which is incarnated by ‘Moscow’. not being able to find the exit. p. 2004).html (as of February 13. . 93. whether or not to give more sovereignty to a Moscow occupied by international Zionism? […] And for us. what Kondratenko really wishes is to separate the ‘wrong’. from the ‘true’ one preserved in ‘Kuban’. available at: http://magazines.russ. it is fair to say that the question of separation as such is not completely alien to the Kubanian Governor. Cherty rossiyskogo regionalizma rubezha XX – XXI 121 122 vekov’ in Novyi Mir. the rest of the Russians. This sets the stage for a construction of a social imaginary in the political project of Nikolay Kondratenko. 93.2 (2004). symptomatically considering the latter as the object representing the ‘people’: ‘We do not like “Lukoil” and other Moscow Rockefellers! We do not like their favorites! The treasures of the kray. to be united in our own Motherland and to elaborate our own economic laws and political approaches’. Neither God nor the Russians will forgive us for this’120. ‘corrupted’. already speak about separation from Russia: as if we need to play with sovereignty. he says: ‘Maybe we should discuss it.121 It is also quite interesting to mention how Kondratenko divides Moscow from Kuban’. p. 120 Ibid. This theme is permanently raised by Kondratenko but in an absolutely different manner. Russia of ‘betrayal’. However. should belong to the people!’122 In such a way it appears possible to conclude that Kondratenko represents the sought fullness of the object of the ‘Russian nation’ in the object of ‘Kuban’. including the oil. [rossiyanam]. No. ‘“Vestfal’skaya” Rossiya. Sergey Markedonov.159 Kondratenko openly confronts related ideas: ‘Some hot Cossack heads. Thus. In fact.

For instance. pp. See the photo album in Kondratenko. for Kondratenko. 91. And the posters ‘Hands off Father-Kondrat . former nomenklatura members and others advertised the fact that they belonged to the struggle of ‘Father-Kondrat’. Kondratenko writes: ‘To stand openly on the terrain of a denunciation of Zionism. as these are the ‘Kubanians’ who. for example. p. in the elections to the regional Legislative Assembly in 1998.says Kondratenko. there was no place for those who disagreed with the Kubanian Governor. 124 125 . according to the Governor.125 No wonder that in debates structured by the question of who is closer to ‘Father’. we hate you!’123 The ones who are able to handle this task are the Kubanians.the protector of all the Russians!’ were normally displayed in numerous opposition meetings in the region. ‘The Kubanians write to me that everything is sold. see the danger of ‘Zionism’. Ibid.160 Thus. At that time it was absolutely normal to see the posters of two competing candidates equally referring to their ideological. about whom Kondratenko mainly speaks. the ‘true and real’ demands appear to be expressed only by the ‘Kubanians’. in the list of the most urgent political tasks which will ‘rescue’ the ‘Russian nation’. professional or personal affiliation with Kondratenko. In 123 Ibid. 48-49. as he does about those who ‘opened his eyes’ to some problems i. those who see the Zionist threat. Cossacks. numerous candidates from very different backgrounds .e. 22. businessmen.collective-farmers. but just to speak openly and loudly: we see you. Khodil Kazak v Kreml’.124 In such a way Kondratenko opens the way for numerous forces who share these regional affiliations. everything is caught’ . we know you. Thus. p. as a means to ensure their victory. You do not have to beat them. teachers. such that they might find their lost social reality to be renewed in his struggle.

127 It might be added that. 2004). The pure literality of the ‘Russian nation’. the ‘Fatherland’ of Kondratenko took 37 out of 50 seats in the regional Legislative Assembly.cgi?action=articul&statya=viewstat&id=id10 (as of February 20. based on the idea of reconstructing the Russian nation within a separately-taken region. ‘Vybory Zakonodatel’nogo Sobraniya Krasnodarskogo kraya’ in Politicheskiy monitoring.11 (82) (Moscow: IGPI. which unites all patriotically-minded citizens of the was the biggest social movement. This regional implication of the social struggle makes possible the designation of the entire ideological project of Nikolay Kondratenko as a transition from national myth to regional imaginary. Kondratenko seems to be right. By the beginning of the 2000s his political was impossible to be mentioned and remembered […] Therefore the support given by the regional movement ‘Fatherland’ (Kondratenko) became the main ‘firelight’ for the voters.126 Moreover. .’ (Alexander Kynev. still remains the most authoritative and influential political force in Kuban’. Kondratenko wrote: ‘The electoral campaign has shown that the public political movement Fatherland (Kondratenko). no. As Alexander Kynev mentions: ‘In the situation […] candidates themselves were not known enough . 126 Timofey Bagrov.161 the end. in the elections of 2002 the candidates supported by this organisation took about 40 seats in the new deputy corpus. in these lines. Commenting on these results. 1998). ‘Krasnodarskie vybory 2002: smena politicheskikh ehpokh’ available at: http://intellectuals. translated into the material perspective of regional struggle opens the way for many political forces to find their social objectivity in the struggle of the ‘Kubanian father’.

The regional idea. Kondratenko does not intend to transcend the particular connotation of ‘Kuban’. ’Doverie opravdaem’ in Kubanskie novosti (December 4. Moreover. These limits are defined through the correspondence of the struggling sector to the geographical particularity of Kuban’. To be ‘Kubanian’ is a relatively fixed quality strongly associated with being born in Kuban or living on the territory. For example. describing his trip from Moscow to Krasnodar he underlines the differences between ‘Tula. However. Rostov. One cannot be considered as a Kubanian if one is not born or if one has another place of registration written in ones passport. Discourse (Buckingham: Open University Press. David Howarth. he stresses its geographical particularity by drawing a line between the ‘good Kuban’ and other ‘bad’ territories. Moscow oblast’ 127 Nikolay Kondratenko. 2000). p.162 Drawing out regional difference The meaningful horizon opened within the social struggle of the Kubanian Governor grounds the emergence of the Kubanian regional discourse seen as the ‘practice and meanings shaping a particular community of social actors’128 . consists in the representation of the sought reality of the ‘Russian nation’ through the notion of ‘Kuban’. 128 . In this way. to be ‘a father for the Kubanians’ will never include being a ‘father’ to those living outside the region. 5. the representation of the sought domain of the national identity in the regional imaginary has it sharp limits that define the particular arrangement of the Kubanian regional discourse. constituting the Kubanian regional ideology.which are the ‘Kubanians’. 2002).

Institutionalising the regional identity By drawing a clear frontier between the ‘Kubanians’ and people from other sites.163 and other regions which are in ‘decay’ and Kuban.from the ‘rotting Moscow’. This is the destiny of Moscow and other ‘rotten’ territories’130 . invented as a means of discrediting all patrioticallyminded people.129 It is interesting to mention that that the frontier between ‘good Kuban’ and other ‘bad’ territories prevents Kondratenko from establishing a reasonable dialogue with many of the ‘non-Kubanian’ sectors in the ‘anti-Zionist’ opposition. he openly criticises Russian National Unity .probably the most well-known Russian anti-Semitic organisation . Introducing these activities. 19. Thus. Zayavlenie chlena Soveta Federatsii Federal’nogo 130 Sobraniya Rossiiskoy Federatsii N.’ In Kubanskie novosti (April 26. p. Kondratenko opens the way for a further institutionalisation of the Kubanian regional identity. .for being ‘Zionistic’. it is this division which becomes connected with some interesting legal and administrative initiatives in the Krasnodar regional administration. ‘I swear to you that in the kray there is no RNE .says Kondratenko. 2002). which is ‘still struggling’ and where the population still ‘preserves the good of the country’.this Zionist creation. one must stress the fact that in 129 Ibid. Kondratenko na zasedanii 24 aprelya 2002 g. Notably. The most remarkable examples of this activity are embedded in the legislative policies of the regional authorities. The Cossack population of Kuban’ cannot allow either RNE nor skinheads nor other carrion in its home. ‘Komu vygodna lozh’ o situatsii na Kubani. because they come from the other Russian regions and more precisely .

2000). as regards a supposed ‘cultural legacy’. One of the most symptomatic legal initiatives is buried in the regional Law on Culture signed by Kondratenko on November 3. created in the past. To demonstrate these privileges one may refer to some of the laws adopted by the Kubanian regional authorities in the second half of the 1990s. 325 .’132 Needless to say. according to this formulation the relevance of a cultural monument or a cultural performance to the process of stipulating the ‘selfbeing of Krasnodar kray’ becomes the dominant criterion. Article 1.КZ (November 3. significant to the conservation and development of the self-being (samobytnost’) of Krasnodar kray and all peoples and ethnic groups living on its territory as well as their impact in the Russian and the world civilisation. Point 2. 132 Zakon Krasnodarskogo kraya o kulture. .429. Article 6. This law articulates the cultural selfbeing (samobytnost’) of Krasnodar kray and privileges the development of a cultural particularity. the monuments 131 The Russian Constitution.164 the Russian Constitution. 2000. it is said that: ‘Each citizen of the Russian Federation possesses all rights and freedoms on its territory […]’131 regardless of his regional affiliations. the regional legislators by-passed this principle and introduced a number of privileges for the regional population in Krasnodar kray. the accent on the ‘peoples and ethnic groups’ living on the territory of Krasnodar kray does not actually recognise as part of a ‘cultural legacy’. which would thereby be subjected to the protection of this law. Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge. Chapter 1. as well as monuments and historico-cultural areas and objects. as is seen in a number of the major aims mentioned in the law. No. Thus. Moreover. the cultural legacy of peoples and ethnic groups living on the territory of Krasnodar kray is defined as: ‘Material and spiritual values. p. 394. cited through Richard Sakwa. However. 1996). 296.

the Legislative Assembly of the Krasnodar kray. it draws a clear line between the Kubanians and the 133 Zakon Krasnodarskogo kraya o kulture. in 1995. hence. led by Kondratenko. An interesting passage is contained in Article 4. 134 . Another illustrative example of the construction of an institutional frontier between the regional population and ‘the rest’ is translated in the regulations which deal with the ownership of land and commercial operations with flats and houses. the regional authorities filled this legal gap with their own regulations. cannot demand legal protection in Krasnodar kray. Apart from the privileging of the ‘Kubanian self-being’. This law has already become the subject of numerous debates. when the Russian Constitution declared the existence of a variety of forms of property.133 According to this statement any civil organisation and ethnic community which is not from Krasnodar kray in fact appears to be excluded from the sphere of application of this law and. Chapter 1. wherein it is stated that the task of the law is: ‘creation of legal guaranties for the free cultural activity of civil organisations and ethnic communities of Krasnodar kray’.134 Due to this lack of a clear legal interpretation coming from the centre. controlled by the political organisation Fatherland. In the course of this law-making. adopted the Law prescribing a particular procedure of registration for those staying and living on the territory of Krasnodar kray.165 produced by those who do not live there. even if they contribute to the development of the Russia’s self-being in general. In fact. It is necessary to mention that after 1993. no Federal law or Charter which might regulate this variety was issued. Article 4. the law on culture clearly identifies the priorities for those actors in the field of cultural production who demonstrate clear Kubanian affiliations. The Land Codex of the Russian Federation was adopted only in 2001.

foreign citizens and individuals with no citizenship. on the basis of this law. the innovations which have institutionalised the regional differences within the Russian population very soon got objected to by those who have actually been discriminated against. permanently registered [postoyanno propisannym] in Krasnodar kray’.136 However. Articles 14. during the official registration of their commercial operation with regard to blocks of flats. 136 Zakon Krasnodarskogo kraya ‘O poryadke prebyvaniya i zhitel’stva na territorii Krasnodarskogo kraya’. which is carried out by the people from other regions. when choosing their place of living on the territory of Krasnodar kray. . Thus in 1998 a group of citizens rejected by the officials of the Sochi notary district. 15. should not violate the legal rights and interests of individuals continuously living within the territory of Krasnodar kray’ – says the law. as separate from the rest of Russia’s population.135 Article 35 states: ‘Access to the piece of land for the individual residential construction is provided only to the citizens of the Russian Federation. ‘The execution of the right of citizens of the Russian Federation. adopted on June 23. In response to these protests the highest juridical body of the Russian state confirmed that in at 135 Zakon Krasnodarskogo kraya ‘O poryadke prebyvaniya i zhitel’stva na territorii Krasnodarskogo kraya’. the Kubanian legislators introduced the category of those continuously living within the territory of Krasnodar kray. in relation to the residential areas. by imposing clear restrictions upon any official commercial operation. 1995. The complaints came from those who did not fit into the category of ‘continuously living’ within the territory of the kray. In support of these privileges. 35. addressed a protest to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. Preamble.166 people from other regions.

9. . available at http://ks.htm (as of March be guaranteed to be used in the interests of the kray population. 2000) “Po zhalobe grazhdanina Manukyana Sogomona Oganesovicha na narushenie ego konstitutsionnykh prav stat’ey 36 zakona “O poryadke prebyvaniya i zhitel’stva na territorii Krasnodarskogo kraya”’ in Rossiyskaya gazeta (August 15. Part 1. no. 13 . vol. this law placed a prohibition upon the ownership and possession of the land of Krasnodar kray by those who have no permanent residence permit in the region. hence. (June 2000).. 1995).ru/opred/o150800. 2004). when the regional authorities adopted ‘The Law on the Special Order of Using the Lands of Krasnodar kray’ which with insignificant modifications was reasserted by the Legislative Assembly of Krasnodar kray in 1998.KZ (August 8. 2000). available at http://ks. 1995). they comprise the basics of life and the activities of its populations and they have: . 116-O (October in the preamble to the law. 15 i 35 Zakona Krasnodarskogo kraya “O poryadke prebyvaniya i zhitel’stva na territorii Krasnodarskogo kraya”’ in Rossiyskaya gazeta (November 3.htm (as of March 15. See also: ‘Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii no. 147 . in Kubanskie novosti (August 25.138 Defending this restriction. 2004).167 least 4 articles this law violates the Federal laws and.O (June 23. the deputies of the Assembly argued that it was being done to ‘protect the interests of the wide strata of the kray population’139 which appeared to be translated. 1998) ‘Po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti polozheniy statey 14. Article 16. In addition to the restrictions outlined above. as this: The lands of Krasnodar kray are a unique and most valuable resource.140 137 ‘Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii no.rfnet. should be revised by the regional administration.rfnet. 1998).137 Another interesting example of the division of legal policies is dated back to 1995. 139 V Zakonodatel’nom sobranii Krasnodarskogo kraya: Informatsionnyi bulleten’ k gorodskim rayonnym gazetam. 138 Zakon Krasnodarskogo kraya ‘Ob osobom poryadke zemlepol’zovaniya v Krasnodarskom krae’.

Preamble. 2002). 13 . ‘Krasnodarskiy kray’ in Konstitutsionnoe pravo: Vostochoevropeiskoe obozrenie. no. on the basis of the absence of the regional residence permit. and the federal laws and the Constitution of the Russian Federation. available at: http://ks. 142 Arbakhan Magomedov. 41-O (February 3. They show that for the regional political elite. no.htm (as of March 15. the former got objected to. 105 . 141 Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii no.142 These cases are rather symptomatic. the issue of the ‘Kubanian land’ was seen as a matter of the interests and rights of the ‘Kubanians’.143 140 Zakon Krasnodarskogo kraya ‘Ob osobom poryadke zemlepol’zovaniya v Krasnodarskom krae’.realisation of the rights of the population of Krasnodar kray in the land’. 2002 it was stated that: ‘ The privileged direction of the land policies of Krasnodar kray are: […] . by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. 2000) po zhalobe grazhdanki Medikovoy Niny Petrovny na narushenie eyo konstitutsionnykh prav polozheniem chasti pervoy stat’i 16 zakona Krasnodarskogo kraya ‘Ob osobom poryadke zemlepol’zovaniya v Krasnodarskom krae’ in Rossiyskaya gazeta (May 16. 2000). rather than the Russian citizens in general. 1995). 143 Zakon Krasnodarskogo kraya ‘Ob osnovakh regulirovaniya zemel’nykh otnosheniy v Krasnodarskom krae’.ru/opred/o160500a. 2004). Very soon this became the subject of other complaints filed to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.108.168 The ones who did not fit into the category – members of the kray population .rfnet. Preamble.KZ (August 8. in commercial operations regarding the land.KZ (October 23.141 After this protest the deputies had to exclude this restriction from the regulations as to the use of regional land. Due to the obvious contradiction between the regional Law on the Special Order of Land Use. 532 . no. A lady from Moscow who wanted to buy a house in Krasnodar kray was refused the right.3 (2000). It is not surprising that in the regional Law on Land adopted in October 23. .appear to be discriminated against.

through the provision of the former with specific rights on cultural activity. . as a ‘people’ entitled to special legal treatment. (December 6. This indicates that the very idea of the ‘Kubanians’ as a specific social identity. or the ‘Kubanians’ from the rest of the Russians. This notion became rather widely accepted not only among the highest authorities of Krasnodar kray but also by the population of the region. 145 ‘Predvybornaya platforma Krasnodarskogo kraevogo obshchestvenno-politicheskogo dvizheniya “Otechestvo” (Kondratenko)’ in Golos Otechestva.the ‘Kubanian people’.144 As a result. became a defining one in the activities of the regional political elite. ‘Ideya Partii rastvorilas’ v interesakh Kubanskogo naroda’ in Kommersant - Rostov-na-Donu.145 The notion of the ‘Kubanian people’. arose in many of the public debates in the beginning of the 2000s. addressing the new corpus of deputies of the kray legislative assembly in December 2002 he encouraged the members of his organisation . Thus. the local TV 144 Yelena Chernaya. 2002). the authorities of Krasnodar kray brought the material ground under the symbolic construction of the ‘Kubanians’ and constituted the object of the regional identity. the rights and interests of the Kubanian population were designated as the primary goals of the Kondratenko-led ‘Fatherland’ in its recent programme published in 2002.169 These examples demonstrate a clear tendency towards the institutional division of the regional population. By transforming the regional population into an independent object of institutional policy. This ‘regionality’ even received its particular name . land and commerce. endowing the subject with its particular rights and interests. A special issue (November 2002). For example. One of the first references to this object can be found in the speeches of Nikolay Kondratenko.‘to leave the party interests aside and to look in the interests of the Kubanian people’.

Novosti kraya from October. Surprisingly enough. it becomes obvious that the ideological texts of Nikola Kondratenko did shape a certain social order by constructing ‘the Kubanians’ and identifying their social mission of preserving ‘Russianness’. resulted in the introduction of specific rules and norms regulating social interaction which completes the emergence of the Kubanian regional discourse understood as a sphere constituting the social particularity of the ‘Kubanians’. called Anya Kovaleva. ‘from the other side’.ru/news/?newsid=196 (as of January 5. 146 GTRK Kuban’. 26. some from the involuntary audience of the Kubanian Governor find themselves interpellated by his proposals. in a particular way.146 Thus. it. This. available at http://www.kubantv.170 company gave a report on the situation in the Belorechenskiy district of Krasnodar kray where a ‘Cossack’. sent to a Russian journal Ogonek. 2002. These actions comprise the movement towards the institutional continuity of the symbolic uniqueness and ‘clarity’ of a particular regionality. The constructive potential of this discourse becomes evident not only in the number of references to the identity of the ‘Kubanians’ and the ‘Kubanian people’ but also in voices coming from the other side of the discursive frontier. Once adopted as a mode of self-identification. constituted the strategies relating to the political actions of those thinking of themselves as of the ‘Kubanians’. in its turn. In fact. in Kondratenko’s sense. 2003). the Kubanian regional ideology implies a powerful discursive exclusion. presenting a gift to the Governor. commented that what he is promoting is no less than: ‘the spiritual strength of the Kubanian people’. As an example of such interpellation one may refer to the letter of a Kubanian girl. . although the debates of Nikolay Kondratenko are rather odious.

by way of an impossible object. Isn't it fascism coming again? 147 A careful reading of this message allows one to see how the symbolic construction of the ‘Zionist threat’ causes the girl to identify herself with the rivals of those fighting for the survival of the ‘Russian nation’.2. p. by naming the ‘Zionist’ enemy. Conclusion to Chapter 3 In the conclusion to this Chapter. . responsible for the collapse of the Russian national authenticity. and the idea of region-based social agency. that a 19 years-old Jewish girl spread her legs in front of the 40 year-old Bukharin. This sets the stage for a social struggle wherein the pure literality of the lost ‘Russian nation’ comes to be 147 Ogonek.171 I am 17 years old. It was my family [emphasis added] the governor of our kray Kondratenko was talking about recently when he made a speech at the forum of Kubanian youth. no. You don’t believe me? I heard it myself. through the articulation of the dislocatory events. Being unable to realise his Russian identity. Thus it becomes obvious that for Kondratenko the regional order. which makes her consider the position she occupies in society as excluded from this social project. He declared that Zhydy [a pejorative and offensive version of the ‘Jews’] and Judo-Massons are guilty of everything. 12 (1998). Then he depicts the situation as one of social antagonism. it is possible to recapitulate the main results revealed by the empirical investigation. that young Jewish women get closer to Russian guys. my mother is a Jew. is the perspective designed to achieve the Russianness dislocated by the social and political perturbations of the post-Soviet Russia. He said that in the government and in the mass media there are only Zionists who destroy the Communist party and the church. Kondratenko constructs a national myth which renders textual the ‘Russian nation’. father – Russian.

as opposed to the rest of the country. seen as the ‘proper Russians’ and as conducting a proper anti-Zionist struggle. It is this interpellation which obtains its institutional response in the policies of regional authorities. decisions and actions. which is consequently seen as ‘corrupted. . through which the translation of a strategic demand. he introduces the Kubanian regional idea. Within the horizon of this opposition Kondratenko performs an act of political subjectivity and employs his position as highest regional authority by way of a subject position from which to wage the articulated struggle. The tactical struggle adopted by Nikolay Kondratenko represents an attempt to reconstruct the framework of Russian national authenticity within the region of which he is in charge. It is this modality which serves as a bridgehead. Combined with the ideological performances of the Kubanian governor. rotten’ and ‘betraying the people’. related to the saving of the Russian nation. The regional idea becomes an interpellator. The benefits of being a ‘Kubanian’ and the misfortune of coming from the other regions came to be socially objectified in the fields where the discriminatory policies of the regional administration were applied. becomes translated into tactical policies. Fixing the meaning of this struggle. wherein Kuban’ comes to be seen as the only authentic Russia. these activities support the prospect of constructing the Kubanian regional discourse in places where the regional society appears to be organised by the difference between the Kubanians and ‘people from other sites’. capable of recruiting individuals into a community of the Kubanians.172 transformed into a social imaginary which gives meaning to the ‘anti-Zionist’ social resistance. administrative and then – economic status. aiming at providing Kubanian regionality with a specific legal.

Sevastopol’ and all capitals of the Union 2 Republics. kray or republic. which is the most important. cultural and. . known as Moscovia or the Moscow Rus’. In the Soviet system of territorial and administrative division Moscow was a city of direct state subordination. Moscow became the capital again in 1918 when Lenin decided to emphasise the break with the ‘Tsarist Russia’ by moving the Soviet government from the ‘city of palaces’ to the old capital. situated in the heart of the old-Russian lands.1 In the 14th century Moscow was the city which united divided principalities in a common state. To Moscow.173 CHAPTER 4: THE IDEOLOGICAL PROJECT OF YURIY LUZHKOV AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MUSCOVITE REGIONAL DISCOURSE Introducing the case Moscow is a historical capital of Russia. after the lifting of the Tatars’ yoke in 15 century. governmental institutions in its territory. which meant that it was directly subordinated to the highest Union authorities but not to the republican ones like oblast’. The concentration of actual and potential jobs in the capital and the prestige of living in the capital made Moscow one of the centres 1 See Map 2. It was the main Russian city until 1712 when Peter the Great moved the capital to the newly built Saint Petersburg. Moscow was given the status of special subject of the RSFSR only in 1931 when it was excluded from the Moscow oblast’. Apart from Moscow such status was given to Leningrad.2 The special status of the city was given due to the high concentration of financial.

Despite the fact that in the times of the Soviet Union Moscow was one of. by the end of the 1980s it became the centre of democratic struggle. On the one hand this situation was grounded in the expectations of the intellectual elite 3 According to the data of State Statistic Committee (Goskomstat) on June 1.174 of internal migration. received the promotion to come to Moscow to work. The first one was the movement of the elite. artists. stayed in Moscow and became the ones who by the end of the 20th century call themselves Muscovites. An absolute majority of those promoted to Moscow or who came ‘within the limit’ (po limitu) by different by the end of the 20th century the Russian capital became one of the biggest world’s cities.000 people. In 1922 this went down to a million.3 In the Soviet Union migration to Moscow was generally limited to two big flows. scientists and other intellectual workers. According to the last census conducted in the Soviet Union in 1989 the population of Moscow comprised 8. However. 2004). available at http://demoscope. These people were supposed to provide the ‘working hands’ for the growing city infrastructure. in which the word ‘deficit’ was known much less than in the other places. . if not the richest city in Russia.000.php#6 (as of March 12. The movement of people led by the already idiomatic slogan ‘to Moscow.000 people.538. Numerous state servants and party officials. to Moscow!’ defined an immense demographic explosion which the Russian capital experienced in the 20th century. In 2001 this number went down slightly. 2001. The second flow was comprised by the low-skilled personnel invited to Moscow on the basis of short-term limited contracts: the so-called limita or limitchki. to 8.000 people living in Moscow. In the beginning of the 20th century there were about 2.967.

mayoralty was introduced. It was at this time that he started to become the leader of the democratic movement. The transformation of the social and political system. objected to by the orthodox communist Yegor Ligachev with the famous: ‘Boris – you are wrong! (Boris. Moscow and Saint Petersburg became the bridgeheads where. And in the first elections for mayor in June 1990 the people of Moscow voted for Gavriil Popov. a passionate Yeltsin supporter and one of the experienced activists of the democratic movement in Moscow. On the other hand. The popular protests in the Russian capital were stimulated by the actions of the Moscow City CPSU committee. In March 1989 the Muscovites elected Yeltsin as their representative on the congress of the people’s deputies of the USSR. to replace the old system of city soviets. The reform of local self-government was one of the first steps in de-Sovetising society. for the low-skilled workers. at the legendary 19 Party conference held in June 1988. as the latter has been described in one of the previous chapters. According to the new regulations the mayor of the cities had to be elected directly by the population. Yeltsin came out with his famous speech. in the course of these reforms. the anti-regime struggle opened the way to fulfil their economic and civil ambitions. Together with Popov.175 concentrated in Moscow. Soon. who were inspired by the perspectives of liberalisation and democratisation opened in the struggle with the party-state apparatus. in which the newly appointed 1st secretary . debated in the time of perestroika. the Muscovites voted for a . suffering the discriminatory policies of the Soviet administration and sometimes devoid of elementary human rights.Boris Yeltsin – started to raise the demands of radical democratisation. ty ne prav!)’. became then a matter of institutional implementation.

In 1991. From this time onwards Luzhkov became seriously involved in the public life of the Russian capital. Gubkin from which he graduated in 1958. After secondary school he became a student in the Oil Institute named after I. the main character in the forthcoming investigation. In the beginning he was a research fellow in the ‘Institute of Plastic Masses’. Yuriy Luzhkov was born in 1936 in Moscow.176 vice-mayor. From 1974 till 1980 he led the Experimental Construction Bureau in the Concern Khimavtomatika and in 1980 he became the acting head of the Concern. he nevertheless obtained his first really significant public position only in 1987 when he became vice-chairman of the Moscow city soviet. Luzhkov occupied the position . in this short energetic man who always wore a cap. At that time few people could see. after Gavriil Popov became the first mayor of Moscow.M. This man was Yuriy Luzhkov. a person whose name would be inseparably related to the following 15 years in the history of Moscow. There he took over the city committee of cooperative and individual activities and later he was promoted to the administration of the agro-industrial complex of the city. Then from 1964 he became a leading specialist at the State Committee of the Chemical Industry and afterwards he obtained a position of the Head of the Department of Automatisation in the Ministry of the Chemical Industry of the USSR. presented to them as a person responsible for the economic aspect of the city governance. From that time he started to work in the chemical industry. In 1986 Luzhkov joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Although since 1974 Luzhkov had been a deputy in both Moscow City and the Russian republican soviet. In 1990 he was elected chairman of the Moscow city soviet.

grew .html (as of March 15. available at: http://www.echo.000 offices of foreign companies and more than the banks. according to the holding agency Sindica. more than 220. However. The cooperatives. Moscow experienced an incredible influx of new forms of economic activity. extensively created in Moscow during the time of perestroika. Thus according to Mikhail Vyshegorodtsev. available at: http://www. by 2002 there were more than 4. Moscow industry was declining. and joint enterprises. Unsurprisingly. on the other 2000). but in the Russian capital these processes were more distinct and their contradictions were more sharp. Luzhkov was nominated Mayor of Moscow. On June 6. by 1998.177 of the vice-mayor. On the one hand Moscow had lived through the period of massive dissolution of old economic and social affiliations. The new Mayor found a city in which all the troubles and benefits of a country in transition met together. . or Moskvich (which produced the cars) and ZIL (which made the trucks) were cutting jobs. The gigantic factories such as of joint enterprises registered in Moscow. The old Soviet rules were abandoned but the new ones were not created yet. machinery and other modes of complex production were stagnating. 2004). trade companies.bdm. it was Moscow 4 Radio Ehkho Moskvy (November 9. 2004).6 The decline of the state sector and the growth of the private business initiative took place everywhere in Russia. Moreover.html (as of March 15. the chairman of the budget and finance committee of the Moscow city duma. This led to the disintegration of the social security system.000 small commercial enterprises4 and 959 banks5 registered in the capital. 5 According to the data of the Bankovskoe delo v Moskve. and infrastructure of the city. there were. The construction sector. exchanges. 1992 Popov retired and through the special decree of the Russian President.msk.

Afterwards. It is this answer which 6 See: http://www. It was this event which marked the beginning of a truly political career for the Moscow Mayor. Such discursive visibility was to a large extend explained not only by his clear engagement with the ideas of radical democratisation. Luzhkov created a discursive position recognised by an audience much wider than just a group of his direct subordinates. which evolved into the bloody confrontation in October 1993. he ceased to be seen as a man who was in charge simply of the economic affairs of the Russian capital but also as a politician addressing such vital issues as ‘democracy’. According to them. which therefore had to be destroyed. on TV-shows and at other public events. since that time onwards Luzhkov became one of the most widely-noticed regional politicians in Russia.sindika-holding. constitutes the theme of the following 2004). He became a frequent guest at public meetings.php (as of March 15. . As a matter of fact. one of the centres of Russian capitalism. together with the Kremlin and the Ostankino TV-centre. Yuriy Luzhkov took the side of the Russian President and offered the municipal police for the suppression of the revolt. the revolt identified the Moscow Mayor’s office as one of the first targets to be captured. Initiated by the communist majority of the Russian Parliament and supported by the numerous nationalistic movements. it was.178 which became the centre of the political battles between reformist and reactionary forces. but also in the last instance by his particular answer to the demands of the post-Soviet transition. ‘reforms’ and the future of the country. Through this. As part of these dramatic events.

wherein Luzhkov occupies a particular subject position offered in the general area of anti-‘enemy’ confrontation. In accordance with this issue. In this step I specify the field of equivalence set by the Moscow Mayor in his struggle with the ‘enemy’ and (4) the performance of his political subjectivity. hypothetically equal in his individuality to any other person. After this I investigate (5) the particular strategy of confronting the antagonist employed by the Moscow Mayor in accordance with the subject position occupied. Luzhkov was faced with the necessity of ‘wearing’ a public face. when addressing the abstract audience of his potential supporters or rivals he had to declare his position through the configuration of various identities. Then it describes (3) how Luzhkov articulates the struggle that aims at confronting the outlined antagonist. In other words.179 The structure of the chapter Having entered the field of political debates. First the investigation deals with (2) the constitution of the ‘enemy’ pointed to as the one responsible for the identity blockage. And in the conclusion to the second empirical investigation I visit some attempts undertaken by the Moscow regional administration to institutionalise the regional differences imposed by the particularly articulated regional idea. apart from the individual Yuriy Luzhkov. . In this step the construction of social antagonism is visited in details. He had to identify who he was. the chapter starts with an investigation in the dominant political selfidentity declared by Yuriy Luzhkov. Then I display how Yuriy Luzhkov fixes this struggle by articulating (6) a particular regional idea. An introduction of the meaningful context of the political Self deployed by the Moscow Mayor allows a specification of the moment of dislocation and the points where his identity becomes disrupted. Then the research proceeds to a treatment of the programme of restoring the damaged self-identity.

Olga Dmitrieva. Gregory Feifer.180 Facing the 1990s as a ‘manager’ From the very beginning of his public career the Moscow mayor defined himself first of all as a khozyaystvennik. at the session of the Moscow soviet on April 26 the future Head of the Moscow administration was asked by the deputies: ‘which platform are you loyal to? Are you a democrat or a communist? Or maybe you are independent?’. My deti tvoi. 177-178. Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1999). The manager’s one […] I do not see any political aspects in this business. 1995). one finds references to the group identity of ‘us’ as ‘managers’. ‘Yuri Luzhkov and Continuity in Russian Bureaucratic Behavior’. ‘The man who rebuilt Moscow’ in Washington Post. p. 1996). interviews and memoirs. April 4-5. 165. as a manager’. pp. Paper prepared for the 13th Annual Graduate Student Symposium. I am a practical person [praktik]. a manager’10 etc. VA. Moskva. when being asked by a journalist from Moskovskiy komsomolets to clarify his identity and precisely to give an answer to the question of whether he is a politician or a manager Luzhkov replies: ‘Of course a manager!’. My deti tvoi. in the discourse of the Moscow mayor. I am from the party of managers!’8 In fact. 1998).11 Along with the identification of ‘I’. In one of his interviews. February 24. ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: Rossiya proela i razvorovala zapadnye kredity’ in Komsomol’skaya 9 pravda (October 5. 1997. Charlottesville.7 As far back as 1990. 11 . a term which is usually translated in English as ‘manager’. ‘I. 10 Luzhkov. 8 Yuriy Luzhkov. 1997. Harvard University. for example: ‘For us – for 7 Timothy Colton.9 ‘I have already said that in my nature I am not a dissident. David Hoffman. Luzhkov rather often calls himself a ‘manager’ in the speeches. The reply of Yuriy Luzhkov was: ‘I have always been loyal and I remain loyal to one platform. Moskva (Moscow: Vagrius. University of Virginia. ‘Yuriy Luzhkov : Ya – tolstokozhiy’ in Moskovskiy komsomolets (June 6.


managers’ (Dlya nas - khozyaistvennikov).12 Moreover, in his address to the deputies of the Moscow city soviet Yuriy Luzhkov rather clearly defines the group he feels himself belonging to as ‘managers’: ‘You - deputies, be politicians. Discuss, defend your positions, form new mechanisms. But we, managers, will introduce them and, until everything will be adequately worked through, we will keep the city from the decay’.13

What does ‘to be a manager’ mean for Luzhkov? The references to the opposition between ‘managers’ and ‘politicians’, indicated in the aforementioned passages, are not accidental. They in fact reflect a particularly meaningful connotation of the term ‘manager’ employed in contemporary Russian political debates. Therein, a ‘proper manager’ is strictly differentiated from those generally recognised as ‘politicans’ - a pejorative rephrasing of ‘politicians’ who, in their turn, are seen as ‘demagogues’, the ones who ‘cannot do things’. This opposition is clearly indicated by many key persons in Russian political life of the 1990s. Thus, for example, the leader of the ‘The Union of the Right Forces‘ - Irina Khakamada, commenting on the electoral situation in Russia, refers exactly to this opposition: manager – politician: ‘This image [of the manager] is the most popular [in Russia], for


An opening remarks by Luzhkov on the interregional conference ‘The role of social partnership in

social and economic development and regulation of social and labour relations, 1998. Stenographic report, available at: (as of October 28, 2002).

Luzhkov, My deti tvoi, Moskva, p. 143.


exactly through this did our governors win all the elections - we are not big politicians, we are managers, we solve problems’.14 The difference between a ‘manager’ and a ‘politician’ appears to be translated in the idea that the first gets the thing done while the second ‘just talks about it’. It is exactly this ‘doing‘ of things, which becomes the dominant idea of a ‘manager’, in political debates of the 1990s in Russia. As, for example, is stated in the report ‘Moscow: the system of city management 1991-2001’: ‘When approaching the term ‘firm manager’ [krepkiy khozyaystvennik] correctly from the positions of administration, we may suggest that […] a man, a manager ‘who succeeds in doing things’ can be defined by these words’.15 The Moscow mayor quite clearly reflects this opposition between ‘managers’ and ‘politicians’. Apart from the aforementioned frustration invoked by the unawareness of the correspondent as to his credo: ‘a manager or a politician? – Of course a manager!’, one finds a remark from Luzhkov in which he blames the ‘politicians’ precisely for ‘not doing things’. ‘Unfortunately, there has been formed a group of “politicians” after whom no one can remember any single concrete thing done - neither a tree planted, nor a bridge built, nor a pavement asphalted. Just words, intrigues, rumours’.16


‘Mozhno li shchitat’ otstavku Yevgeniya Nazdratenko rezul’tatom ego konflikta s rukovodstvom RAO

YEEhS?’ Interview with Irina Khahamada in Temya Dnya (February 6, 2001), available at (as of September 1, 2003).

‘Mehr goroda’ in D. N. Bobryshev (ed.) Moskva: sistema upravleniya gorodom 1991-2001. Simptom,

no. 12 (18) (2001), availbale at: (as of September 1, 2003).

Larisa Voloshina, ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: Esli uchitelya vovremya ne poluchat zarplatu – vsem nam pridetsya

uyti’ in Uchitel’skaya gazeta (December 17, 1999).


Hence it becomes clear that to be a manager for Luzhkov is to ‘get things done’. This capacity provides the meaningful connotation of his manager’s identity. However, it is necessary to mention that the ‘doing of things’, which clarifies the meaning of being a manager, is a specific form of activity rather different from what may, at first sight, be understood under such terms. To underline this specificity one has to remark that the very notion of khozyaystvennik as it came into the active vocabulary of contemporary Russian political debates is a product of the Soviet epoch. The Soviet origins of the term khozyaystvennik are clearly reflected by many scholars. Thus, for example, Mikhail Krasnov, the president of the INDEM Foundation, says: ‘the notion of “firm manager” [krepkiy

khozyaystvennik], which is quite popular among the corpus of governors, is a notion from the Soviet period’.17 The Moscow authorities ‘confirm’ this continuity as well. As is stated in the guidelines to the management of Moscow: ‘we are used to this term [krepkiy khozyaystvennik] from the Soviet times’.18 Hence, it is the Soviet past of the term khozyaystvennik which identifies a certain framework for ‘doing things’ prescribed to a manager. Precisely this framework defines Luzhkov’s understanding of being a manager. As Jensen, for example, mentions: ‘Luzhkov’s education and career path mark him as a product […] of the Soviet administrative apparatus’.19


Interview on the radio station ‘Ehkho Moskvy’ (December 20, 1999, 13:15-13:45), Correspondent:

Irina Merkulvova, available at: (as of September 1, 2003).

‘Mher goroda’ in D. Bobryshev (ed.) Moskva: sistema upravleniya gorodom 1991-2001. Simptom, no.

12 (18) (2001), availbale at: (as of September 1, 2003).

Donald Jensen, ‘The Boss: How Yuriy Luzhkov runs Moscow’ in Conflict Studies Research Centre, E (December 1999), available at:

105 (as of November 25, 2003).


Therefore, to find the particularities of what is really understood under ‘being a manager’ one needs to look at the system of Soviet administration. Most notably, it is necessary to focus on the system of economic organisation as the ‘building a bridge’, ‘asphalting the pavement’ or ‘planting a tree’, mentioned above. For the examples Luzhkov gives of ‘doing things’, are obviously also examples of economic activity. The system of Soviet economy was essentially organised on the basis of the total penetration of the state in all spheres of economic activities. According to Shubin: ‘the political and economic structures of the USSR were created as super-state and overcentralised, [where] the monopoly of power aimed at being absolute’.20 The overcentralised system of economic administration was clearly expressed in the wellknown forms of the ‘planned economy’ and the ‘command-administrative’ rules of economy-creation, in which all business initiatives were totally designed through the orders of the highest Party-state apparatus. It is this character of economic organisation which caused some authors to translate the term khozyaystvennik as ‘economic executive’21, as indeed, execution was the dominant demand addressed to a manager in Soviet economy. Due to the subordination of economic activities to the decisions of the Party-state apparatus the ‘things’ to be done by a manager appeared to be specified as the orders given ‘from above’. To build a bridge or to asphalt a pavement would not be considered as things to be done if this activity were not to be articulated as a ‘task’ for a manager. Moreover, personal initiatives in economic activities were considered a

Alexander Shubin, Ot zastoya k reformam: SSSR 1917-1985 (Moscow: Rossiyskaya politicheskaya

ehntsiklopediya, 2000), p. 718.

Ilya Milstein, ‘Luzhkov in the bear’s clutches’ in New Times (Autumn 2003). Available at: (as of September 5, 2004).


deviation and even a crime. ‘Using public property in their personal interests’ was a crime in the USSR and given that there was no other big property apart from that of the public, any use of it in relation to ‘personal interest’ became prohibited. As a result of this factor, a manager in the Soviet economy appeared to be totally restricted, in his activities, by the tasks and demands articulated by the highest authorities. Since the business of a manager was in no way perceived as his own, but rather that which had been ‘entrusted’ to him by the state, the demand of a ‘master’s attitude’ towards the given public business became one of the main requirements addressed to economic executives in the USSR. The vital importance of the ‘master’s attitude’ was clearly translated in the official documents promoting the ‘master’s feeling’: ‘The party will persistently form the feeling of the master over the public possessions in working collectives and in each worker’22 or ‘it is important to cultivate the communist attitude towards labour, the desire to treat public property after the manner of the master, in each worker’.23 The principle of the ‘master’s attitude’ grounded the demand for coherent care and responsibility for the administered business, which was addressed to a Soviet manager. This demand appeared to be translated via many of the official texts of the Soviet state. For example, in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU passed during the 24th congress: ‘We have to increase the level of responsibility


Programma Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Ptinyata XVII s’ezdom KPSS (Moscow:

Politizdat, 1988), p. 32.

‘Iz direktiv 23 s’ezda KPSS po pyatiletnemu planu razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na 1966-

1970-e gody’ in KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s’ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK , vol. 11 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), p. 38.

the latter was perceived in the form of a certain bi- 24 ‘24 s’ezd KPSS 30 marta .26 This ‘never mind how’ reflects the difference in understanding the concept of ‘doing’ between a Western person and a Soviet manager. repeated this point: ‘each manager has to be fully responsible for running a well-ordered business’. 36. However. he may be considered as the one who really ‘gets things done’. And the programme of the CPSU adopted in the 27th congress. More precisely. in 1988. Iz resolyutsii ‘Po otchetnomu dokladu tsentral’nogo komiteta KPSS’ in KPSS v resolyutsiyakh…. Jensen. p. This idea prescribed a specific realisation of the actual economy in which a manager is working. 77. these things will be done and ‘never mind how’.9 aprelya 1971. 25 Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (1988). p.25 In the light of the aforementioned remarks it is possible to say that responsibility for the ‘entrusted’ business was what defined the proper ‘doing’ of the ‘things’ for a Soviet manager. 12. 26 . vol. ‘The Boss: How Yuriy Luzhkov runs Moscow’. If a manager cares and demonstrates enough responsibility for the business delegated to him by the highest authorities. Jensen mentions that whilst getting things done is a crucial feature characterising Luzhkov. A road may have plenty of holes a week after it has been asphalted. if a manager demonstrated enough personal care and responsibility in every little detail of this process.186 placed upon personnel for the running of a well-ordered business’24. the task of asphalting the road is considered as done. Thus it appears possible to conclude that this particular idea of ‘doing things’ has constituted the meaning of being a khozyaystvennik implied in its application to a person who can carefully and with enough responsibility administer business ‘entrusted’ to him by the highest authorities.

In this terrain the competence of a particular manager was outlined: steel but not agriculture. dominates’. so to say. the author writes: ‘one cannot deny that in the USSR industrial society was built. the re-appointments he had to face at the beginning of his public career invoked substantial frustration and brought real discomfort for the future Mayor of the Russian capital. p. spread over the sphere of production.187 dimensional terrain. ‘horizontally’ differentiated from the businesses of other managers. The new positions he was offered hade little in common with his direct speciality. As he writes in his memoirs. . chemistry but not trade etc. Defining the entire Soviet society as ‘industrial’ and clarifying this intervention of the economic sphere in the organisation of the society as a whole. For example. Ot zastoya k reformam. To demonstrate how this location was made. Luzhkov also demonstrates a clear apprehension of his sphere of professional competence.90. Under this term I mean a society in which industrialism or a social system based on narrow specialisation [emphasis added] and administrative hierarchy [emphasis added]. Interestingly enough.27 ‘Narrow specialisation’ and ‘administrative hierarchy’ were those two dimensions that constituted the terrain in which one locates the position of a particular manager. in which the subject position of a particular concrete manager was specified. concerning one of 27 Shubin. it is necessary to present this system in detail. The ‘narrow specialisation’ specified the sphere of one’s business or one’s area of responsibility in which the latter was. In order to introduce this system one may refer to the remark of Shubin.

Ibid. it was the first mistake’. Within this system a clear idea of the body whose orders a manager had to follow was established.30 Thus it is possible to conclude that within the bi-dimensional system of the Soviet economy. p. The importance of this system is evident for Luzhkov as he obviously regards many of his own activities in reference to the highest authorities whose orders and tasks he is actually following. Ibid. In other words one might call him a ‘manager’ only as far as he was able to realise his sphere of narrow specialisation and his position in the system of subordination. 141. 136. Luzhkov says: ‘when I was torn out from chemistry. so they [the Moscow soviet . the clarity of a manager’s position appeared to be dependent upon the clarity of this system. wherein it would be made clear as to whose orders to follow.the highest authority (at that time) for Luzhkov] shunted [vparili] […] to me this commission to public service’29.28 Apart from the ‘horizontal’ delimitation of one’s duty the Soviet economy was marked by the system’s ‘vertical’ subordination. or ‘Saykin [his boss at the time] determined [emphasis added] me as the main engineer of his enterprise’. This system constituted the second dimension of ‘economy’ for a Soviet manager.188 his re-appointments. Moskva. It is enough to look at the vocabulary the Moscow Mayor uses when speaking about the things he does: ‘I am just a deputy. wherein an executive hierarchy was established. 28 Luzhkov. constituted by a clear realisation of one’s sphere of competence and one’s position in the executive hierarchy. 29 30 . p. My deti tvoi.

When I was the director of “Khimavtomatika”. Tell me […] why the state has to put in so much effort. Tyazhel’nikov. 251. 137-138. 32 ‘Such was my surprise when in the end of 1986 I left my favourite speciality and came to the executive power. As Sokolov and Tyazhel’nikov comment. he did not appreciate these changes in his career much32. p. Kurs sovetskoy istorii.31 The economic liberalisation lead to a gradual dissolution of the framework for ‘doing things’ established in the Soviet economy. I considered it as my business. My deti tvoi. in relation to this process: ‘[…] the idea [of the Gorbachev reforms] was the removal of party conservatives from power and the substitution of the commandadministrative socialism with a kind of a Soviet model of democratic socialism employed to emancipate the economic and social potential of the society’. generally speaking. 1999). But here they suggested the department of science and technics . I did not want to leave. spending money preparing a person for a work in a particular field.fine. […] Me . This in its turn prevents Luzhkov from reaching his ‘manager’s’ identity in the realities of the transformational society. Despite the fact that. Sokolov and V.189 However. only then to send him into city management where he has knowledge like that of a fish as regards umbrellas! [smyslit kak ryba v zontikakh]’ in Luzhkov. a specialist on the machinery of chemical production. Dislocation in context One has to mention that the forms of economic management became one of the main issues of the Gorbachev reforms started in 1986. precisely this clarity in the realisation of the bi-dimensional system of ‘economy’ appeared to be seriously damaged during the social transformations of perestroika and the following transition to the market engineer-mechanist. Moksva. having been put 31 A.1991 (Moskow: Vysshaya shkola. pp. But you may shoot me and I will not go further […]. His first ‘appointments’ did not bring many problems. 1941 . .

reflecting on his first re-appointments Luzhkov presented the situation in the modality of a dialogue between his current ‘boss’ Bespalov . demonstrated personal ‘business initiative’ (delovaya initsiativa) in ‘doing things’. More precisely. which was the head of the Moscow city administration and the highest state authorities.190 in charge of the food supply and the organisation of a co-operative system in the capital. For example.137-145.beginning of the 1990s should not be regarded as a form of disobedience to a higher instance or any other ‘revolutionary’ inventions in economic management.the minister of chemical industry and the supposed new one . these were the demands of ‘acceleration’ (uskorenie).Yeltsin. However. it was a careful execution of the demands formulated by the highest state authorities in the rise of perestroika. They were deciding who would ‘take’ Luzhkov.receiving a task and then . on the contrary. the ‘business initiative’ shown by Luzhkov in the end of the 1980s .33 Here one may object that Luzhkov did not necessarily always precisely follow the highest orders and. pp. Thus. he obviously recognised an instance higher than him. . as aforementioned. This demonstrates that the ‘knowledge‘ to whom he was or was going to be subordinated was of vital importance for Yuriy Luzhkov. ‘self-financing’ (khozraschet) 33 Ibid. Moreover his first activities in the organising of co-operation in Moscow were clearly described in the mode of having a meeting with the Chairman of the executive committee . Contrariwise. Luzhkov was still able to operate in accordance with the framework of the Soviet economy. who was the chairman of the Moscow city soviet.executing the latter.

Luzhkov is able to find visible limits to his field of competence while working in the Moscow soviet. sciences. Interestingly enough. However. p.34 Along with the recognition of the executive hierarchy. My deti tvoi Moskva. organisational and economic level.a bunch of 26 enterprises most important to the city. See for 36 example Jensen ‘The Boss: How Yuriy Luzhkov runs Moscow’. cemeteries. Machinery. transition to the rails of intensive development. In brief . achievements of the highest world level of production of public labour. Thus he clearly reflects on the business he is ordered to do: ‘the business is simple: launderettes. Invoking the bidimensional universe of Soviet economy in relation to his new position. consequently leading the line of the extension of their rights and economic independence [samostoyatel’nosti]. strengthening responsibility and motivation in achieving high final results’ (p. some authors also qualify this event in terms of an ‘appointment’.35 Thus it can be seen that Luzhkov faced few problems in realising the bi-dimensional framework of the Soviet economy as an executive official in the Moscow soviet. The strengthening of the role enterprises and their managers have to play in the rebuilt socialist economy is translated in the following way: ‘the party will actively introduce the means of raising the role of the main chain . Administration of the city plan. quality of products and effectiveness of the production’ (p. 142.191 and ‘increasing the role of the main element in production’ which constitutes the enterprise as such. . the new ‘appointment’36 of Yuriy Luzhkov created substantial obstacles to his seeing himself as a ‘manager’ – that of mayor of Moscow. 35). 25). and he also 34 The principle of uskorenie was formulated in the Programme of the CPSU (Moscow: Politizdat. dangerous and unsettled. 1988): ‘the rise of the public economy on the principally new scientific and technical. Luzhkov failed in specifying the ‘horizontal’ frontiers of the area he was responsible for. chemical launderettes’ or ‘I received everything which was unclear. 35 Luzhkov. Plus here came the “individual labour activity” and other novelties of the perestroika’.concerns and enterprises. Labour resources.

the ‘horizontal’ delimitation of the ‘business’ for which he was responsible appeared to be blurred.207. 37 Yuriy Luzhkov. from city services. Moskva. each crack in the asphalt’. 38 39 . warm the heating system in the houses.192 faced serious problems in identifying the ‘authorities’ whose orders he was supposed to follow in order to ‘get things done’. clean the roads. regardless of whom this asphalt actually belongs to. And it is like this to the end the city consumes food. does a mayor have to be in charge of if not the economy of the city?’37 Clarifying the notion of the ‘city’ he is in charge of. Ibid. Luzhkov encountered severe problems in mastering his sphere of responsibility. every single centimetre of the territory. Thus it is possible to say that Luzhkov quite clearly apprehended the sphere of responsibility as ‘the city’. First of all.39 These remarks indicate that Luzhkov assumes his personal responsibility for. Luzhkov says: ‘the city is like a child which needs constant care. but a “master”. in your opinion. everything happening in Moscow. Luzhkov. the Moscow mayor states that: ‘If the mayor is guilty in everything happening in the city he is not a formal head of the executive power. obliged to feel his personal. 2000). food and energy supply to ‘every crack in the asphalt’. p. Someone has to supply its shops with bread regularly. ‘Filosofiya svobodnogo vybora’ in Moskovskiy komsomolets (March 7. services. asking ‘and what. as there emerged numerous actors ‘questioning’ his authority of being a ‘master’ of ‘every problem’ and ‘every centimetre of the Moscow territory’. However. 174. My deti tvoi.38 Commenting on this notion further. p. having assumed his personal engagement with everything happening in the city. energy’. basically. almost homely involvement [domashnyuyu prichastnost'] in every single problem.

This difficulty was grounded in the very idea of being a mayor .the Head of the Moscow city administration. This distortion was concealed in the ambiguous position of the people seen simultaneously as the instance which orders the mayor’s activity and those whom a mayor had to take care of. which reemerged in Russia after the adoption of the ‘market course’ (rynochnyi kurs). In such a way the set of independent economic actors was converted into a kind of competitor to the Moscow Mayor. Apart from the dissolution of the ‘horizontal’ contours of his manager’s position Luzhkov faced serious difficulties in identifying a system of subordination. private actors created the sphere of independent management within the borders of the Russian capital. It has been already mentioned that Luzhkov quite clearly recognised the highest authorities when he was an executive manager in the Moscow city soviet.193 The main flow of such actors came from the sphere of private business. once he becomes the highest executive official in the city himself. It was the Chairman and later . It is this idea which to a great degree conveyed the demands of the democratisation of the state apparatus in post-Soviet Russia. the identification of an instance whose orders have to be followed became difficult. . any enterprise is perceived by Luzhkov as his responsibility. enterprises and properties. Through this. Being the ‘masters’ of their own businesses. they entered into the field of competence. in which it is ‘the people‘ to whom a mayor is supposed to be responsive. being situated in Moscow. in relation to his supposed care over each ‘centimetre of the city territory’.seen as a head of the people’s selfgovernment. and it was this idea which distorted the executive hierarchy a ‘manager’ had to be part of in order to ‘get things done’. since. in which a higher instance giving orders and formulating the ‘things’ to be done was supposed to dwell. However.

the head of Moscow in the 19th. we have to recognise citizens as the clients [zakazchiki]40 of the power service’. doklady. if already on the next day the Muscovites offer the position of the city’s head to the professor […]! And one week later they officially suggest his candidature’.Luzhkova zhurnalu “Vlast’”’ in Yuriy Luzhkov. chtoby ponyat’ koren’ oshibok nuzhno ponyat’ rol’ gosudarstvennoy sobstvennosti v Obraz tseli rossiyskikh reform i strategiya upravleniya tendentsiyami social'no- doreformennoy Rossii”.mos. is derived from the word zakaz . 42 Luzhkov. translated in English as ‘customers’ or ‘clients’. ehkonomicheskogo razvitiya Rossii ( p. indicating that these are the Muscovites whom he was subordinated to. 2003). My deti tvoi. ‘So which kind of public needs a liberal leader (“democrats” as we used to say not a long time ago).41 In some other remarks Luzhkov sees the local population as the ones responsible for someone’s ‘appointment’ to be a mayor. . 41 ‘“Dlya togo. in a rather picturesque way. 199.M. available at: http://www. with the ‘needs’ of the Muscovites. Looking back in history he relates the appointment of Chicherin.).htm ( as of September 5. vystupleniya. 40 In Russia the term zakazchiki.42 In addition one may refer to the well known remark of the Moscow mayor made in the Russian parliament where he openly discarded the attempts of the deputies to give him orders.Moskva.194 Thus Luzhkov indeed understands the local population as the instance whose orders he is following: ‘If we want to build the city power acting in the interests of the population.‘order’ and directly means ‘the ones who order something’. upon this episode in his memoirs. Luzhkov reflects. interv'yu 1994-1997 gg. And then one of the people’s electives takes a word: What if we dismiss this Luzhkov! Right now! I put forward this suggestion! I ask to bring this to the vote! Who is for this! And I started to laugh. Vyderzhki iz interv’yu Mehra Moskvy YU.

As an additional example of this separation one may refer to another passage from the memoirs of the Moscow mayor. he [the city] becomes so to say capricious. p. meeting the people […] The specific close distance in relations […] which is spread in both directions and touches upon the 43 Ibid. in which he reflects some peculiarities of his work: ‘I feel it every day visiting remote districts. you cannot do this.and instead of the reasonable city dwellers you meet a crowd with its mad aggression. One may refer to the aforementioned analogy where Luzhkov regards the city as ‘a child’. Luzhkov perceived the local population as an object of care ‘mastered’ by the highest city official. Which means that for the entire country.195 They say that very loudly. he does not listen to explanations. In the development of this idea he says: Once the settled supplement [of the city] with the benefits of civilisation is broken. he does not look into our difficulties. in fact. Together with the assumption of their ordering role. Straight to the microphone. this ‘instance’ did not completely fulfil the function of the ‘highest authorities’. draws a clear line between the ‘city dwellers’. 174. to phantom fears. Ibid. 44 . pp.43 However. Once you cannot get it on time . despite the obvious privileging of the Muscovites as the clients of his activities. 209-210.44 Thus it is seen that Luzhkov. - I am sorry. It was not you who elected me but the Muscovites! Now only they can dismiss me. He is quick to panic. to hysteria.

In accordance with its particular understanding these events touched upon the clarity of the bi-dimensional structure of economy. Facing the impossibility of finding the foundations of his manager’s duty in the realities of the changing Russia.45 The division drawn between the ‘city dwellers’ and their ‘authorities’. This becomes the second point of dislocation impeding Luzhkov from reaching the identity of a manager. in which the latter is seen as the instance responsible for the local population distorts the idea of the ‘Muscovites’ as those giving orders to the mayor and regulating the mayor’s activities. notably the dissolution of the old system of soviet management and the proliferation of independent business. Among these events Luzhkov indicates that the process of de-nationalisation led to the proliferation of private business and resulted in the diversification of formerly unified public property: 45 Ibid. prevents Yuriy Luzhkov from a clear identification of the hierarchical system of subordination. . The identity of the higher authorities formulating the ‘things’ to be done appears to be damaged for the Moscow Mayor. 206. This articulation commences by pinpointing the dislocatory events. in his position as Head of the Moscow city administration. In so doing he starts with articulation of the ‘manager’s’ myth. simultaneously as the ‘crowd with its mad aggression’.seen as an object that cannot be realised at present. p. seen as the ones who entrust power and. Luzhkov creates the ground for retaining its discursive fullness.196 population and [emphasis added] the authorities’. with whom he has to deal as a ‘boss’. This ambiguous attitude to the local population. seen as the construction of the literate space for the ‘economy’ . thereby causing the impossibility of founding a ‘proper’ economy.

nakonets. M. . the Moscow Mayor pinpoints the general mismanagement of the state officials. precisely for not being able to fulfil the duty of the highest authorities by being a ‘subordinate’ to the decisions of Albert Gore or Michel Camdessu.’ in Obraz tseli rossiyskikh reform. 48 Ibid.48 This translates 46 ‘“Davayte.e.V Lomonosova 26 fevralya 1997 goda’ in Yuriy Luzhkov. under ‘parasitic capital’ Luzhkov understands the sphere of private business.indicating the inability of the high strata of the Russian power to execute their direct duties. as the ones who are above cannot and the ones who are below do not want (verkhi ne mogut a nizy ne khotyat) .197 Our formerly ‘all-people possessions’ did not disappear without trace. It is due to their mistake that the managers are faced with tremendous difficulties in doing their job. ‘Private owners work not better but worse than the state officials in the past’ .mos. factory office .into a complex of offices etc. Luzhkova na nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii “Pyat’ let vauchernoy privatizatsii” 17 dekabrya 1997. but almost entirely went to the hands of parasitic capital. Doklad Mehra Moskvy YU. M. or to rebuild it in terms of a primitive system giving straight profit (factory plant . voz’memsya za um! Promedlenie mozhet dorogo oboytis’”.)46 Needless to say.says Luzhkov. who ‘failed to execute’ their function in state administration. Vystuplenie Yu. Luzhkova na zasedanii uchenogo soveta MGU im.M. which cannot use it effectively except to export its biggest part abroad (directly or indirectly). 47 ‘“Privatizatsiya ne samotsel’. a sredstvo povysheniya blagosostoyaniya naroda”. 2003).ru/majorlujkov/doklad-1994-7. available at http://www.47 This attack demonstrates the irritation invoked by the dissolution of the clear-cut system of responsibility implied in the principle of unified property.htm (as of November 20. Apart from the events threatening the ‘horizontal’ dimension of ‘economy’. It is rather interesting but Luzhkov blames for example the Russian prime-minister Chernomyrdin. Obraz tseli rossiyskikh reform.into warehouse. Concluding his attack the Moscow Mayor estimates the situation in state administration in Lenin’s terms i.

breakdown [razlad]’.49 Commenting further on the collapse of the economy and management in Russia Luzhkov states that according to his opinion: ‘Everything went according to the books of Gaydar’s grandfather: “Down to the basement and then …”’. p. 50 .50 ‘Down to the basement’ are words taken from the Russian version of The Internationale. and then we will build our own new one’. at the very peak of the decay [razval]. The articulation of the dislocatory events is again embraced in the remarks on the collapse or crisis of the ‘economy’ and ‘management’ in the state. These remarks translate the belief in the actual impossibility of economy-building (khozyaystvo) in present Russia. Ibid. in which the entire line runs . This ‘other’ appeared to be generally embodied in the image of the Federal authorities who come to be seen as the ‘enemy’ answerable for the chaos in the system of management which emerged during the years of reforms.‘We will destroy the whole world of violence. down to the basement. The general reflection that ‘everything is in the decay [vsyo v rasvale]’ are followed by the concrete remarks: ‘In the Spring of 1990. 233. Thus Luzhkov openly opposed the Federal 49 Ibid. 174. p.198 the growing chaos in the system of executive subordination which is the second pillar of economy in the eyes of Luzhkov. Naming the enemy Once he had articulated the dislocation and the impossibility of ‘economy-building’ Luzhkov announced the project of restoring ‘proper management’ which in its turn starts with naming the ‘other’ as responsible for the recent crisis.

leads the former to the ‘terrible mistakes’ in the organisation of state management. . the Kremlin administration tries to find support in a narrow circle of people devoted only to 51 ‘Obraz tseli rossiyskikh reform i strategiya upravleniya tendentsiyami social’no-ehkonomicheskogo razvitiya Rossii’ lektsiya YU. according to him. 1999 he accuses the Russian powers of not listening to the ‘managers’ voice’. ‘radicalmonetarists’ not knowing real economy. M. the officials of the Federal Government did not behave themselves ‘in a manager’s way’.M. and not knowing the value of their own people. Luzhkova v Finansovoi Aakademii 29 dekabrya 1997 g in Luzhkov. 27. Luzhkova na uchreditel’nom s’ezde obshcherossiyskoy politicheskoy obshchestvennoy organizatsii “Otechestvo” 19 dekabrya 1998 goda’. The first thing that the new authorities did was to refuse using experienced employees in every sphere of state management and the people’s economy […] practically all industrial and economic managers were banned from their work. Doklad Yu. reactionary 1999). This.199 authorities to the ‘camp of managers’. as a matter of fact.mos.byt’! I byt’ protsevatyushchey svobodnoy stranoy. characterising current socio-political situation in Russia.htm (as of September 5. ‘bookish. according to the Moscow Mayor. Their places were occupied by the representatives of. available at: http://www. For example. 2003). 53 In different forms in many of his speeches and interviews Luzhkov accuses the Kremlin. Authorities regarded them as the ones who bare the outdated. Thus. he states: ‘Rapidly losing the trust of the Russian population. Obraz tseli rossiyskikh reform. false education [obrazovan’shina]’. on his lecture in the Financial Academy on December. See for instance: ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: davayte smelo glyadet’ pravde v glaza’ in Trud (August 20. 52 ‘Rossii .52 Apart from the ‘Federal authorities’ the Moscow Mayor blames the ‘Kremlin administration’53 for state mismanagement.51 The further attack on the federal authorities was focused on the issue of their mismanagement and it put an accent on the fact that.

tolstokozhiy” in Moskovskiy komsomolets (June 11. No need to be a prophet to understand that this is the end.:] Why? [L.55 Above all Luzhkov criticises the ‘Kremlin story-writers’ in terms of the ‘dirt’ spread on the rivals of the Federal Government and a wrongful attitude towards their own people: The Kremlin story-writers. To illustrate this attack one may refer to an interview given by Luzhkov to the newspaper Tribuna: [Journalist:] It looks like the campaign against you continues? [Luzhkov:] It continues.200 them.:] They wanted me to retire. It’s a pity that the whole country is obliged to observe this dirt. They feel some sort of pathological hatred towards me. 56 . 1999).54 Furthermore. ‘My budem borot’sya za kazhdyi golos’. za kazhdyi region’ in Nezavisimaya gazeta (October 13. They have many stones in their pockets which they will take out once needed. 1999). since Luzhkov regards his relations with the ‘Kremlin’ as those of enmity: ‘[…] now in the Kremlin they are ready to support anyone just to cut the wings of Luzhkov […] There is only one enemy [for them] .56 The general critique addressed to the Federal authorities and the ‘Kremlin’ appeared to be ‘personified’ in the names of several officials who in different times and for various reasons were linked to the ‘Kremlin’. And this is another example of the real attitude of current power to its own people. 54 Yuriy Luzhkov. Yuriy Luzhkov . working hard for their bread. [J. 55 ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: “Ya .Luzhkov and the “Fatherland”’. ‘My budem borot’sya za kazhdyi golos. expect that someone will believe them. Boris Berezovskiy became one of the main targets of Luzhkov’s personal assault. and in the structures of force [silovye struktury]’.

a diablo whose evil forces examine Russia’. or. including.:] Why do they attack you? What did you do to them? [L. as in the following remark: 57 ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: “oni ispytyvayut ko mne nenavist’” in Tribuna (February 29. 1999). 1999.57 In one of the other interviews Luzhkov expresses his attitude towards Berezovskiy in a much sharper manner: [Journalist:] Not long ago you called Berezovskiy a ‘Satan.:] […] What is the concrete damage done by Berezovskiy? [L. his activities. 2000).. I think that everything Boris Berezovskiy does.htm (as of September 1. November 10. 59 ‘Luzhkov nazval Berezovskogo “satanoy” i “d’yavolom”’ in Lenta.58 Blaming Berezovskiy the Moscow mayor introduces some powerful epithets which he applies to the antagonist: the aforementioned ‘Satan’59.lenta. available at: http://www. we were not heard. in Chechnya have already been shown and estimated. All this is organised by Berezovskiy. the person ‘whose macabre shadow is standing behind the Hasavyurt agreements’. [Luzhkov:] Well. 2003). the betrayal of the Russia’s his work in the zones of armed conflicts. […] [ . Yelena Korostashevskaya. but a concealed one. ‘Skandal’nyi chelovek Luzhkov uzhe davno ne poluchaet nikakikh 58 priglasheniy ot Yeltsina’ in Segodnya (November 17. The macabre shadow of Boris Abramovich was standing behind the Khasavyurt agreements. Unfortunately. his politics.201 [J.:] They have another goal. […] We were saying that the Khasavyurt agreements were a capitulation.:] What? It is enough to remind oneself how the first part of the Chechen problems was solved. Decipher this thought please.

2000). ‘Skandal’nyi chelovek Luzhkov uzhe davno ne poluchayet nikakih priglasheniy ot Yel’tsina’. the state will become better and cleaner’. One of them is the Head of the Joint Company of United Energy Systems of Russia. However.202 ‘generally I consider Berezovskiy as a horrible examiner sent to our state. Luzhkov convicts in the most crushing way the authors of the privatisation conducted in Russia under the Yeltsin governance. the former Vice Premier and the former Head of the Presidential Administration Anatoliy Chubays. These persons were . Indeed. And if we pass the examination. I said then that vouchers were a great speculation [afera]’62 or: ‘Everyone knows the struggle of the Moscow Government with the principles that were realised by mister [gospodin] Chubays regarding the privatisation of the state property. 61 ‘Ya razoryu Dorenko! . According to the Moscow mayor they are the authors of the total disorder in Russian state and society. . the Head of the Kremlin complex Borodin and some other figures. Among those who failed the reforms in Russia Luzhkov expresses a precise critique toward several politicians.Skazal Yuriy Luzhkov v heksklyuszivnom interview MK’ in Moskovskiy komsomolets (November 5. Thus Luzhkov openly confirms his negative attitudes towards this person and his politics: ‘Indeed. if you remember.the former Head of the President’s security service Korzhakov61. I used to criticise Chubays sharply for the development of the privatisation – he represented the authorities at that time. 1999). 62 Korostashevskaya.60 Apart from Berezovskiy Luzhkov condemns the other persons who at different times had surrounded Yeltsin. the principles at the base of that 60 ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: “pochemu by mne ne druzhit’ s Putinym?”’ in Komsomol’skaya pravda (June 18.

65 I think that enterprises that were privatised even in violation of those bastard laws introduced by Chubays in 1992-1993 need to be back within the state property. 65 ‘Oborona Moskvy’ in Ehkspert (December 13. ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: pochemu by mne ne druzhit’ s Putinym?’ ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: Pochemu by mne ne druzhit' s Putinym?’ 66 67 . calling his politics a ‘Judah’s plot’. The results of the privatisation have to be an object of analysis for state services. Moreover in one of his interviews the Moscow mayor calls the laws adopted by the Chubays administration ‘bastard’ (ublyudochnye). Ministry of Internal 1999).203 privatisation are sinful […]’63 In his Image of the Aims of the Russian Reforms Luzhkov opposes himself and the Moscow government in general to the ‘principles of the Chubays privatisation’.says Yuriy Luzhkov. ‘Since the times of Gaydar and Chubays economy and the whole social organisation of Russia are steadily collapsing’ 63 ‘Vestuplenie Mehra Moskvy na sobranii prepodavateley i studentov MGU 11 oktyabrya 1995 goda’. responsible for this area. including the General Prosecutor’s Office. Luzhkova v Finansovoi Academii 29 dekabrya 1997 goda’ in Luzhkov. destroying the economy of the country’.67 Along with Chubays the Moscow Mayor put the blame on Yegor Gaydar. 2003). M. 64 ‘Obraz tseli rossiyskikh reform i strategiya upravleniya tendentsiyami sotsial’no-ehkonomicheskogo razvitiya Rossii. available at: http://www. Ministry of State Property etc. ex-prime minister in Yeltsin’s government.64 ‘The privatisation in a moment broke all these [economic] connections and practically paralysed the economy’ .htm (as of September 5. Lektsiya Yu. regarding the latter as ‘the biggest swindle of the century.66 In his speech Five Years of the Voucher Privatisation Luzhkov pinpoints that Chubays was the one who was guilty in the overall failure of the Russian economic transitions. Obraz tseli rossiyskikh reform.mos.

to think of it in positive terms becomes impossible. M. Luzhkova na zasedanii Mezhdunarodnoy Konferentsii 19 noyabrya 1999’.68 These figures became the ultimate incarnation of the managers’ ‘enemies’. It is this actual presence which prevented ‘managers’ from ‘getting things done’. ‘Yuriy Luzhkov : Nel’zya vnukam peredavat’ svoi problemy’ in Trud (February 22. ‘each gaydar knows’. Vystuplenie Mehra Moskvy Yu.69 or he uses them as an ordinary noun – ‘the chubays-styled privatisation’70. Luzhkov articulated a social antagonism through which his own identity appears to be unachievable because of the presence of the ‘other’. 71 72 73 . In this situation the notion of ‘economy’ becomes empty as. M. in the presence 68 ‘“Moskva .Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletiy”. 69 ‘Rossi Byt’! I byt’ protsvetayushey i svobodnoy stranoy’. ‘gaydaronomics’ 73 etc. 70 ‘Obraz tseli …’ in Obraz tseli rossiyskikh reform.apart from the ‘failed reformers’ or ‘failed managers’ who drove economy and social organisation in decay Luzhkov categorises the names of Gaydar and Chubays by introducing such terms as ‘gaydarisation’. Ibid. p. Vystuplenie Yu. Having identified the forces responsible for the collapse of the economy in Russia. objective and actually present. Generalising the name of the antagonist . Moskva.71 ‘figures of Gaydar’s sense’ (vykrutasy gaydarovskogo tolka)72. Luzhkova na Uchreditel’nom s’ezde OPOO ‘Otechestvo’. when the former is ‘in decay’.204 .ru/major-lujkov/doklad-991119. available at plenarnom http://www. Luzhkov. The personification of the antagonist made the latter real. However.mos. 2001).writes Luzhkov.htm (as of November 10. 2003). My deti tvoi. 231.

1998). ‘Chubayses’ and the other figures of the ‘Kremlin’ was probably one of the biggest forms of social protest in post-perestroika Russia. set the stage for the organisation of a struggle aimed at restoring the positive character of ‘economy’ in its opposition to the ‘failed reformers’. ‘Gaydars’. The political death of the ‘reformers’ is not so far away. the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia75 led by Zhirinovskiy and even the ‘democratic opposition’ represented.205 of the ‘enemy’ this notion could be realised as a pure absence. It was exactly this struggle which formed the context of Luzhkov’s political enterprise. in its turn. in the heart of Russia. This. for 74 ‘In the Kremlin. 75 ‘Compatriots! The time of ‘reforms’. To satisfy their own ambitions these people are ready to put to a bet the whole of Russia. It is enough to indicate that these ‘enemies’ constituted the programme of the People’s -Patriotic Union of Russia74. . 1998). it is necessary to state that the struggle against the ‘failed reformers’. our country has become dismembered and defenceless” in Programma LDPR (adopted on the 8th congress of LDPR on April 25. which impoverished our country is unavoidably coming to its end. Performing political subjectivity Introducing the strategy attached to the Moscow mayor’s struggle. […] That struggle conducted today by the Russians against the yeltsins. there still operates a savage and irresponsible group of favourites [vremenshchikov] surrounding an incapable president. kokhs and berezovskiys still continues’ in Andrey Zyuganov ‘Manifest NPSR. Politicheskiy doklad vtoromu s’ezdu narodno-patrioticheskogo soyuza Rossii’ in Zavtra (November 21. For power and money they are ready to start a huge massacre in Russia. or the lack of the actually present antagonist responsible for the collapse of the economic affiliations. As a result of the betrayal unprecedented in history. This empty space opened a perspective in which might be retained the reality of economy by restricting and confronting the enemies in their ‘Judah’s plot’. chubayses.

10-11. insisted on the reestablishment of the state regulations and state control of production. 78 ‘To reestablish state control over the production and income […] To change the economic course. p. puts forward 76 ‘We are an opposition to the President […] we remain in opposition to the economic course of the Government. However. by Yabloko76.htm (as of October 25. 33. to achieve the set goal various sectors of political opposition propose different programmes for reconstructing the collapsed economy. all these forces identify the collapse of the national economy as the main ‘sin’ of the antagonists. p. the institutional core of the People’s-Patriotic Union of Russia.206 example. The to introduce urgent means of state regulation in order to prevent the decrease of production. Or ‘The privatisation was conducted in an economically senseless and socially broken “nomenklatura” variant […] The behaviour of the reformers was defined by: strict engagement with theoretical schemas along with the negligence of the economic realities of Russia [and] an absence of attention to the social consequences of economic transformations [which indicates] the failure of all plans and promises of the President and the Government of Russia’ Ob’edinenie “Yabloko”. Reformy dlya bol’shinstva (Moscow: EPIcentre. This created a huge area of discursive equivalence where numerous forces find their likeness in the struggle against the ‘failed reformers’. being a ‘democratic opposition’. available at: http://www. also identified the re-nationalisation of economy and reestablishment of the state’s ‘leading role’ as ones of the main priorities in their political programme. for example. 77 ‘LDPR principally stands for the strengthening of state control and the management of economic processes. The state regulation is a norm of the modern economy and not an ‘artefact (perezhitok) of the totalitarian past’ as the failed-reformers of the democratic wing try to prove to us’ (Programma Liberal’no-Demokraticheskoi Partii Rossii. 2002).ldpr.77 The Communist Party of the Russian Federation. They all became equal in their antagonism as regards the Kremlin government. which puts the task of restoring the system of economic management at the top of their political agenda. In different ways. to fight inflation and to raise living standards’ in ‘Programma politicheskoy partii “Kommunisticheskaya partiya . 1995).78 Yabloko. […] We stay in opposition to the majority of the Federal congress’ in Ob’edinienie “Yabloko”.

p. 2003). 79 ‘In the free’ in Pravda (October 7. is the state power? On the side of the working people or on the side of a group of robbers?’ in ‘Gennadiy Zyuganov: Tezisy o privatizatsii’ in Polit. Or ‘since 1993 the Russian communists have their faction. declared that they carry out their struggle on behalf of the ‘people’ which was further specified as the ‘working people’80. . available at http://www.10. Zhirinovskiy and the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia indicated that they would fight those ‘reformers’ whose ‘political death’ was inevitable on behalf of the ‘people’ as Rossiyskoy Federatsii”’. http://www. in liberal economy we see the creative force able to mobilise the huge labour and natural resources of Russia for the creative work’ in Ob’edinenie “Yabloko”.ru (February 17. 15. In the competition between the programmes aimed at restoration of the state economy there have appeared numerous subject positions to be occupied by the struggling forces.79 This diversity of concrete proposals for fighting the ‘failed reformers’ has torn the field of the oppositional movement into a number of different.shtml (as of September 10.kprf.shtml?print (as of September return the power in the country to the working people’ in ‘Postanovlenie Prezidiuma TsK KPRF “O 85-letii Velikoy Oktyabr’skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii”. These positions corresponded to the identity of those on behalf of whom the particular combat was actually conducted. 2003). in proposing the nationalisation of state economy. 2002). Thus. in private property. 2003).kprf.2002’. Press-sluzhba TsK KPRF 07.11. on which side. 80 ‘It is time to define: with whom. understood as the decentralisation of economic management and the gradual extension of market relations into new spheres of production and services. the People’s-Patriotic Union of Russia. They honourably represent and defend the rights of the working people in the Russian parliament’ in Gennadiy Zyuganov.207 the idea of ‘structural modifications’ to Russia’s economy.html (as of September 10. particular projects. Or ‘On this base the CPRF marching in the avant-garde of the people’s-patriotic forces of the country is able to fulfil its historical mission . available at: http://www. 2002). ‘Postanovlenie o 10-letii 2 chrezvychainogo available s’ezda at: Kommunisticheskoy partii Rossiyskoy Federatsii 28.

represented in the title of their programme . He openly accepted exactly this obligation by declaring that: ‘I am the Mayor of Moscow and therefore I need to take care of the Muscovites’. of the capital was capable of experiments that could bring harm to the Muscovites?’ 84 81 ‘LDPR is a party of all people but not of a group of the “new Russians” who lost control of what they are doing (zarvavshikhsya nuvorishei) or “professional revolutionaries” fallen into an senile decay [vpavshikh v starcheskiy marazm “professional’nykh revolyutsionerov”]’ in ‘Programma Liberal’no demokraticheskoy Partii Rossii’ (Prinyata na VIII s’ezde LDPR 25 aprelya 1998). which represented another subject position offered in the struggle. ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: Esli uchitelya vovremya ne poluchat zarplatu – vsem nam pridetsya uyti’ in Uchitel’skaya gazeta (December 17. in their version this ‘people’ was more ‘the Russian people’.htm (as of December 5. In this variety of subject positions offered in the spectrum of opposition to the ‘failed reformers’82. the programme of the LDPR repeatedly refers to the ‘state-forming character’ of the Russian nation and the defence of interests of Russians in Russia and abroad is indicated as one of the main priorities of the party. in their turn. 1998). 1999).Reforms of the Majority . 82 Of course this spectrum is much wider and it includes many more sectors than those embodied in the aforementioned forces. . 1999). argued for the supposed benefits to the ‘majority’. Thus. 83 Larisa Voloshina.ponedel’nik (August 16. available at: http://www.81 calling for a greater marketisation of economic relations.83 Identifying further his position in the battle for proper economic management Luzhkov says: ‘And you think that in this situation I as a mayor […] of Moscow city. razoslannye vsem uchastnikam informacionnoy voiny’ in Novaya gazeta . Luzhkov undertook an original move and devoted himself to the struggle which ought to be conducted by a ‘Moscow mayor’. Yabloko.issued in 1995. However in this research it is important to demonstrate the variety of possible strategies rather than to conduct an extensive endeavour as regards the simple extent of these sectors. 84 ‘Mehr i Kreml’: prichiny razdora.208 well. Yuriy Luzhkov pervym otvechaet na nepriyatnye voprosy nashego korrespondenta Yeleny Afanas'evoy.ldpr.

These actions could be generally characterised as attempts to organise reforms alternative to the ones organised by the ‘enemy’ and designed by the Federal government. April.htm (as of November 15. 85 Yuriy Luzhkov. he proposed some initiatives to retain the clarity of the bi-dimensional model which led to a restoration of narrow specialisation and to a rebuilding of the hierarchical system of subordination in the environment in which he is Thus. 2003). within the political power of the ‘Fatherland’. People can see with their own eyes the differences between the ways chosen by Moscow and by Russia […]’. Here. different from the Federal one’. 2003). I mean the experience of Moscow.86 Moving forward in this ‘different way’ Luzhkov initiated some effective steps in reconstituting the lost domain of the ‘economy’. ‘O politicheskoy is sotsial’no-ehkonomicheskoy situatsii v strane I zadachakh organisatsii’ Doklad na vtorom s’ezde OPOO ‘Otechestvo’.mos. of course. Luzhkov undertook specific actions in order to confront the ‘enemy’. 1999.htm (as of September 5. available at: http://www. .ru/moscowsprav/moscows2000/moscows2000_002. Luzhkov called this alternative ‘our own model’ elaborated in Moscow: ‘In Moscow we elaborated and tested by practice our own model of economic reforms and management.209 Conducting the struggle As ‘Moscow mayor’. undoubtedly.85 Or as a ‘different way’ chosen by the capital: ‘Such a component as a real productive experience in developing a number of cities and regions is. available at: http://www. 86 Yuriy Luzhkov. 24. ‘Dorogaya moya stolitsa' in Moskovskiy spravochnik 2000.mos.

mos. after Luzhkov was promoted from Vice Mayor to the position of the highest Moscow official he kept the premiership he had held under Popov. 2003). Climbing to the top of the system of executive subordination Luzhkov redesigned the structure of Moscow administration in order to facilitate the acquisition of maximal power resources within the city. 1995 the regional authorities adopted a Charter of Moscow city wherein it was stated that Moscow held a double status. as he then occupied the top of the hierarchical pyramid himself. being both a component of the federation and simultaneously . In fact.a municipal creation. The first steps in this redesigning date back to 1992. The Moscow supermayorate becomes further empowered by the declaration of the ‘double status’ of Moscow introduced in the middle of the 1990s. available at: 88 http://housing.210 The executive hierarchy appeared to be reconstructed through its reduction to the structures of the Moscow administration. facing the problem of identifying the highest instance of the administration. ‘The Boss: How Yuriy Luzhkov runs Moscow’. Article 6 of ‘Ustav goroda Moskvy’ adopted on June 28. Although the City Charter provided for the positions of both Mayor and Premier.88 This step was aimed at the acquisition of a 87 Jensen. wherein the head of the city has enormous 30000O0003OHGBD279E0SF3V3D99S1H96316 (as of September 10. 1995. This allowed Luzhkov to accumulate so much authority that some authors87 have designated the system of Moscow governance as ‘supermayoral’. On June 28. See also the comments . Through this step Luzhkov in fact eliminated the very necessity of specifying the highest instance whose order he had to follow. straight after Luzhkov became a mayor. Luzhkov solved this tension by attaching to his position the status of highest authority in the system of Moscow management.

211 greater independence from the Federal authorities.A. See: In his case it meant the ‘unification’ of Moscow’s economy which had to reduce the presence of economic actors independent from the Moscow authorities and thereby keeping Luzhkov from full of the Moscow vice-premier on the self-government in Moscow in Moskovskiy spravochnik 2000. became an actor who was highly independent in his decisions. quoted from Richard Sakwa. 1996). ‘[w]ithin the limits of its powers local self-government is independent’89. as Rabko and Fyodorov mention. Mezhdunarodnyi nauchnyi zhurnal. By imposing the status of local selfgovernment upon the system of Moscow administration. Rabko and A. p. No. 2004).com/paper. In this way. available at http://www. this double status is in no way prescribed by the article on the special status of the capital of the Russian Federation. thenceforth giving such ‘orders’ to his subordinates. Once occupying the position of the supreme instance in the Moscow ‘economy’.htm (as of September 10. Fyodorov. This move completed the elimination of any ‘highest authority’ standing above the Moscow mayor as he.mos.5 (2001). in relation to any branch of the Federal power. according to the Russian constitution included bodies of self-government which ‘do not form part of the system of bodies of state power’.shtml?a=5_2001&o=310551 (as of March. It is necessary to say that. 2003). Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge. in fact. Luzhkov now represented the level of self-government which. 12. since. being the Head of the municipal creation. Moreover. Article 12. available at: http://www. Luzhkov started to restore the second blocked element of his ‘manager’ identity. Luzhkov in fact now had the opportunity to be highly independent in his decisions. which means that it is totally the initiative of the Moscow government. . which is the clarity of ‘horizontal’ delimitation. ‘Gorod Moskva: problema izmeneniya konstitutsionno-pravovogo statusa’ in Pravo I politika. 89 The Russian Constitution. the disruption invoked by the dissolution of the clear idea of ‘whose orders to follow’ becomes neutralised as Luzhkov himself becomes the ‘highest authority’ within his sphere of responsibility.


control over his area of competence. In so doing he introduced the idea of alternative privatisation, different from that conducted by the Federal government. In general terms the alternative Moscow privatisation was designed to maintain a bigger part of the privatised enterprises within the city property. As Gafurov comments: ‘In the Moscow model of privatisation from the very beginning not 29% [as was done in the rest of Russia] but 12-15% of shares were put on the cheque auctions. The city kept big shares which later were sold on the special auctions and investments competitions’90 Luzhkov did not conceal the fact that this initiative aimed at keeping a greater control over the privatised enterprises. This was supposed to be the means to prevent the ‘mismanagement’ of the property in the capital. Moreover, in one of his interviews the Moscow Mayor openly named de-privatisation as one of the strategies adopted by the Moscow authorities.
[Journalist:] Honestly, what did the ‘Chubays-style’ privatisation give us and what will be the results of the ‘Luzhkov-style’ privatisation? [Luzhkov:] I have been talking a lot about the results of the ‘Chubays-style’ privatisation. And concerning the ‘Luzhkov-style’ privatisation - it is absent. We do not deal with privatisation as such. We conduct commercial operations with the city property and as a result we increase the effectiveness of its use. But whether it goes from public sector into private or the other way around - it is a question of accounting and profit with respect to the interests of the city.91

Municipal control over the process of privatisation allowed the Mayor to keep in hand the independent economic actors who, in the end, were seriously limited in their


Said Gafurov, Opyt sravnitel’nogo analiza privatizatsii i formirovaniya rynka korporativnykh tsennykh v razvivyushikhsya i post-sotsialisticheskikh stranakh. 1991-1996, available at:

bumag (as of September 1, 2003).

‘Iz otvetov Mehra Moskvy Yu.M. Luzhkova na voprosy chitateley gazety “Trud” (sentyabr’ 1997 goda)’

in Luzhkov, Obraz tseli rossiyskikh reform.


activities. Reducing further the sphere of uncontrolled business in Moscow, Luzhkov introduced various restrictions and innovations aimed at monopolising the Moscow market. As the research group ‘The Moscow Alternative’ mentions:
Since 1996 one may notice a gradual expulsion of market relations from the spheres of land rights, investment processes, huge food contracts etc. The number of GUPs (state unitarian enterprises) is being increased in the spheres in which such monopolisation is not implied at all. Such ‘exotic’ structures as ‘Glavmosotdelstroy’ receive the status of GUP. The GUPs eject privatised enterprises in the sphere of book-trade, but the true masterpiece in this regard is the Decree of the Moscow Government No. 626, 013.07.1999 ‘On the creation of the state unitarian enterprise “The Centre of Design and New Technologies in the Production of Sport and Special Clothing”, adopted in a situation in which several firms that have already proved their effectiveness in this field are already operating in Moscow. It is absolutely obvious that the formation of GUPs aims at monopolising the market and restricting free competition as regards the quality of services and prices in the customers’ market of Moscow.92

By taking control of the independent business initiative in Moscow Luzhkov moved forward in nurturing the reality of ‘Moscow city’ as being the sphere of his competence wherein he became fully in charge of every ‘centimetre of its territory‘ and ‘every crack on the asphalt’. The relative success achieved by Yuriy Luzhkov in his project of reconstructing the bidimensional universe of the Soviet economy in Moscow, causes him to bring this issue to the centre of many of his appeals. Thus, for example, in the introduction to the Moscow Manual (Moskovskiy spravochnik) - 2000 Luzhkov writes:


Moskva: tendentsii 90-kh i alternativnye puti razvitiya. Doklad expertnoy gruppy Moskovskoy ‘Chapter 4: Ehkonomicheskaya politika gorodskikh vlastey’, available at:


214 The phenomenon of Moscow, the results achieved by the city dwellers in the hard times of the reforms are mentioned by friends of Moscow, critics and political opponents. It is well known that the capital is the most dynamically developing region in the Russian Federation. Ancient Moscow transforms into a modern megalopolis – one of the centres of European post-industrial civilisation. The most comfortable conditions for business and a high quality of life are made in the city.93

The success of the ‘Moscow model’ allows Luzhkov to represent the forces devoted to the struggle for proper economy-building or, in other words, all those ‘loyal to the manager’s platform’. The first signs of this mode of representation can be dated back to the mid-1990s, when Luzhkov, with some success, established numerous ‘horizontal’ economic links between the Russian capital and other regions.94 To a great extent these links were based on the personal popularity of Luzhkov among the ‘managers’ in the power structures of other regions. This popularity was rooted in a definite admiration of the results achieved in preserving proper economy-building in Moscow. The loyalty to the Moscow experience in preserving the proper economy created a relatively wide range of support of the Luzhkov’s policies. As a matter of fact, along with Kondratenko, Luzhkov is one of the electoral champions in post-Soviet Russia. In (as of September 10, 2003).

Yuriy Luzhkov, ‘Dorogaya moya stolitsa' in Moskovskiy spravochnik – 2000, available at : (as of November 15, 2003).

As a matter of fact Luzhkov was one of the main supporters of the idea of horizontal co-operation

between the regions(,) established without any participation of the Federal centre. By the end of October 1998 Luzhkov had concluded economic cooperation agreements with more than 70 of Russia’s 88 other regions. Former Prime Minister Kirienko alleged that between 1994 and 1998, the Moscow mayor’s office guaranteed almost 2 trillion roubles in city loans to other regions.


the mayoral elections of 1996 he gained more than 90% of the vote. In the next elections in 1999, the head of Moscow received more than 70%, which, despite the slight decrease of popularity, is still a rather remarkable result. The dry numbers may be supported by the remarks of Leionid Radzikhovskiy, a popular Russian publicist, who writes that:
The creative reason behind that ‘criminal-nomenklatura’ capitalism [prescribed to Luzhkov’s Moscow but in Radzhikhovskiy‘s opinion - reflecting the development of the whole of Russia] has fully expanded in Moscow in particular. There are many symbols of nomenklatura, it is - a face, I repeat - a generalised one. But the symbol of the nomenklatura which creates is this one - Yu. M. Luzhkov personally. And if he will indeed build 70,000,000 square metres of residential accommodation as he promised (and Luzhkov keeps his promises, as horrible it may sound), the history of Moscow will be divided into three periods: from Yu. Dolgorukiy [the Prince who founded Moscow in 1147] to Yu. Luzhkov, the period of Luzhkov - and the period after Luzhkov. So what are the reasons for not being proud […]?!95

By hegemonising the ‘managers’’ struggle Luzhkov sets the stage for the establishment of a new equivalence which now becomes positive. The range of this equivalence becomes a social base for constructing an all-Russian political movement ‘Fatherland’96 - formed by the Moscow Mayor in 1998.97 Its public support is indeed quite fascinating. In the official brochure it was stated that by the end of 1999 the


Leonid Radzikhovskiy, ‘Apologiya Luzhkova’ in Vremya MN (September 5, 2001). Surprisingly enough, the political organisation of the Moscow Mayor has the same name as the one


of the Kubanian Governor Nikolay Kondratenko, mentioned in the previous chapter. However, it is important not to confuse the ‘Fatherland’ of Luzhkov, which is a all-Russia political organisation, with the one of Kondratenko - which is a Kubanian regional public-political movement.

It is interesting to note that the emblem of Luzhkov’s ‘Fatherland’ consists of the contours of Russia

drawn in an oval with a huge star whose centre outlined by a circle indicates the geographical location of Moscow.


organisation brought together about 380,000 individual members and 22 collective members, including the Union of Labour, The Battle Brotherhood, Great Power (Derzhava) and others. The offices of the Fatherland were organised in every region apart from Chechnya. In the spectrum of the political parties, this movement defines itself as ‘centrist’. Specifying their position in the spectrum of Russian politics the Fatherland clearly differentiated themselves from the Communists, Liberal-Democrats and Yabloko. The crucial point dividing the organisation of Luzhkov from the biggest social movements on the federal scale was that ‘Fatherland’, unlike the others, ‘gets things done’. This assumption appears to be later translated in the main electoral slogan of the united block ‘Fatherland - Whole Russia’: ‘trust only what is done’ (ver’te tol’ko delam). Due to this specificity the organisation very soon came to be regarded as ‘the party of managers’ (partiya khozyaystvennikov). In this ensemble of managers the figure of Yuriy Luzhkov was definitely the central one and its constituting role was to a large extent based exactly on the value of the ‘Moscow experience’, gained in the reconstruction of a ‘proper economy’. This value was intrinsically translated in the programme of the ‘Fatherland’ by the slogan: ‘we did it in Moscow – we will do it in Russia too!’98 The same formula was repeated in other documents: ‘We did it in Moscow, so we will do it in the whole of Russia!’ - said Luzhkov in one of his interviews.99 Elaborating this proposal further he gave some recommendations for the bringing about of the smooth transmission of the Moscow model:


Yuriy Luzhkov, ‘O politicheskoy is sotsial’no-ehkonomicheskoy situatsii v strane I zadachakh

organisatsii’ Doklad na vtorom s’ezde OPOO ‘Otechestvo’, April 24, 1999.

But incomparably more effective than the current Federal one. Indeed. but recently lost. According to Mikhaylovskaya.100 Articulating regional idea The regional imaginary put forward by the Moscow Mayor in his struggle over the ‘economy’ lays the foundation for the regional idea articulated by Yuriy Luzhkov. incarnates (in direct sense – becomes the face of) Russia. It is possible to suggest that Moscow in the eyes of Luzhkov. Therefore. Luzhkov does not perceive Moscow through the prism of Russia’s interests but on the contrary Russia is being regarded as a certain extension of Moscow as it comes to be ‘incarnated’ in the capital. levels of governance of Russia’s economy. obviously reflected in certain remarks.217 To reproduce our model of economy-building for the entire country will be difficult. unfortunately. less effective then the Moscow one. the new economic model will be. Only after providing it with necessary. It is always like that when a man who is proud of his ability to ‘manage [hozyaystvovat’] the land’ (in particular – in the city) […] perceives Russia though the prism of his own Moscow. That is why the view of 99 ‘Bitva za Mosckvu’ ‘Bitva za Moskvu’ 100 . the idea to transmit the ‘economy-building’ which had been successfully restored within the limits of Moscow city to the rest of country causes some authors to suggest a deeper conclusion as to the way in which Luzhkov constructs relations between the capital and the rest of the country. This idea portrays Moscow as the ‘proper’ and in some sense ‘ideal Russia’.

p. whose organisation is measured by the perspectives and conditions of economy’102 the correspondence between Moscow. the idea of Moscow as a certain oasis of ‘proper economy’ lays the foundation of the social imaginary in which society is perceived in terms of an ‘economic organism’. which materialises the myth of ‘economy’. My deti tvoi. and an ideal Russia becomes clear. 184. representing the ‘ideal Russia’ and the most 101 Yekaterina Mikhaylovskaya. Drawing out regional difference The regional idea of Moscow as an ideal Russia. Proektirovanie mifa’ in Vladimir Aleksandr Verkhovskiy. as the only place of economic revival. a large economic organism or as ‘a system. Rol’ tserkvi (Moscow: Panorama. ‘Moscow’ becomes an ‘ideal society’ or in some sense ‘ideal Russia’. 1999). . Honestly speaking. Predstableniya liderov. Politicheskaya ksenofobiya. In fact. Radikal’nye gruppy. 2003). This discourse is seen as a totality of practices and meanings shaping a particular community of social actors. In the case of the Muscovite regional discourse this community appears to be represented in the ‘Muscovites’. Mikhaylovskaya pinpoints an incredibly important conclusion to be borne in mind when approaching the public speeches of Russian politicians as regards the search for an ideal Russia.218 Luzhkov as regards an ideal Moscow may be clearly imposed upon his view of an ideal Russia. lays at the foundation of the Muscovite regional ‘Ideal’naya Rossiya v tekstakh politikov. available at: http://xmir.asp?FN=205 (as of September 10.101 Given that for Luzhkov society in general is seen as. first of all. Pribylovskiy. for Luzhkov. 102 Luzhkov. Moskva. Yekaterina Mikhaylovskaya.

who ‘regret the past’ and do not ‘take care of the future’. As Alexander Braginskii. for decisions on how much food. in agreement with Luzhkov: ‘First of all the state [emphasis added] needs the residence permit.219 successful economy-building. transparent and we have to start strengthening them from the capital. the population level. It is here that the country in practice starts bringing to order its important sphere of internal life . The borders of Russia [emphasis added] today are just symbolic.control over the migration of other nationals on its territory […] Our only desire is to protect Moscow from the uncontrolled entrance of people dangerous 103 This policy will be discussed below in detail.gzt?id=12550000000003894 104 as of (September 10. In other words they protect ‘Moscow’ from ‘visitors’. available at: http://gzt. using Luzhkov’s ‘grumble’ but do not ‘work’. 2003).Mikhail Serov . ‘Propisku otmenyayut’ in Gzt. 104 Then announcing the task of ‘protecting Russia’ they indeed defend its ‘ideal’ version from the ‘corrupted’ influence of the imperfect ‘rest of the country’. regarding the introduction of compulsory residence registration in the capital: I believe that although this decision […] is explained by extraordinary circumstances it is the only one which is possible and relevant to international practice. schools and transport the city needs [emphasis added] is related to it’. the Moscow authorities first link this restriction to state interests: The head of the passport office of the GUVD [City Department of Internal Affairs] in the capital . in contrast to the ‘rest of the Russians’ who. the vice-premier of the Moscow government comments. . the entire infrastructure dealing with the control of the crime situation. advocating their well-known policy of compulsory registration of visitors to Moscow103.

ru (May 1. the high professional and intellectual level of working people. the only force that succeeded in preserving the society-constituting ‘perspectives and conditions of economy’.107 Since Moscow became the ideal Russia. For example. 106 ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: Moskva ne zhivyot za shchet Rossii. 2003. Moreover. Lenta. . strictly speaking. is the most attractive place to start projects of huge scale’. It seems that Luzhkov sincerely believes in a certain superiority of Moscow over the Russian State. through its successful combination of political and social stability. no 6 (2002).105 Since ‘Moscow’ (as of September (as of November 15. naprotiv. ‘…I gosti nashego goroda…’ in Otechestvennye zapiski. 107 Yuriy Luzhkov. the ‘Muscovites’ came to be seen as the ‘best’ in the competition for restoring the state ‘economy’. the statistics evidently say that the visitors [emphasis added] play the main role in the increasing number of crimes in Moscow. Rossiya zhivyot za shchet Moskvy’ in http://lenta. available at: http://www.strana-oz.220 for stability and law here. available at 2003). the constantly improving infrastructure. this 105 Cited through: Oksana Karpenko. the rest of the country appeared to be divided from the capital on the basis of its ‘imperfection’. in a particular tradeunion meeting he declared that ‘Moscow does not live at the expense of Russia. As a matter of fact. and the hospitality of Muscovites. ‘Dorogaya moya stolitsa' . Thus Luzhkov states: ‘Among other regions of Russia the capital. as Interfax reports on May 1. Russia lives at the expense of Moscow’. 2003). on the contrary. 2003).106 The superiority of ‘Moscow’ appeared to be translated in the outlining of the exclusive honours of the capital dwellers in comparison to results (mis-)achieved by the population of the ‘other regions’. thereby hinting at the qualitative superiority of Moscow over the other territories.

We took the other way. it takes in other cities] but take care of the future’. that information. 109 Ibid. 1999). Yuriy Luzhkov. 2000). Luzhkova na sobranii prepodavateley i studentov MGU 11 oktyabrya 1995 goda’.ru/major-lujkov/doklad-1994-7-4. It is not engaged in the common psychosis. 111 ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: ya gotov na kompromissy’ in Argumenty I fakty (February 2.htm (as of September 5. estimates these or those events. for these are the very Muscovites who appear to be included in the system of ‘proper management’ constructed by Yuriy Luzhkov: ‘Today Moscow experiences not less. za kazhdyi region’ in Nezavisimaya gazeta. the enforcement of opinions. 110 (October 13. 109 Also ‘socio-psychologically’. available at: http://www. M.221 frontier is clearly evident as in his public debates Luzhkov persistently draws the line between Moscow and the other Russian regions. They do not grumble [read . 2003).mos. But the Muscovites overcome difficulties with their own work. .like in other cities] but they work. We privatised our city property in small quantities and earned the city budget 1.5 trillion roubles’. they do not regret the past [again read .111 108 ‘Vystuplenie Yu. and maybe to some extent even more problems than any other city. autonomously. And in this regard it radically differs from Russia’.110 The division between ‘Moscow’ and the ‘rest of Russia’ is emphasised in the conclusion that: ‘Moscow has demonstrated in the preelectoral period that it has an autonomy [samostoyatel'noe] of thought. positions. ‘My budem borotsya za kazhdyi golos. This line divides Moscow and Russia ‘economically’: ‘Moscow earned from privatisation one-and-a-half times more than the whole of Russia!’108 or ‘The whole country in 1994 got about 900 billion roubles from privatisation.

400). 2001). in the Russian capital. 1997. in Moscow this freedom becomes seriously limited by the decisions of the regional authorities. privileged due to their ‘more successful’ performance in restoring the ‘proper economy’.222 Institutionalising the regional identity The Muscovite regional idea articulated by Yuriy Luzhkov becomes an interpellator through which the new social identity may be recruited. “O neotlozhnykh merakh po obespecheniyu poryadka registratsii grazhdan.31. ‘Litso Moskovskoy natsional’nosti’ in Moskovskiy komsomolets (April 13. ‘Rasporyazhenie Mehra Moskvy N. 1999). The most remarkable example of this policy is the compulsory registration. Russian Politics and Society. The identity of Muscovites. p. 2002). 114 ‘Postanovlenie pravitel’st Moskvy i Moskovskoy oblasti no. ‘Each person who is legally present on the territory of the Russian Federation has the right to travel 113 freely and choose a place to stay and residence’ says Article 27. 1996 and May 6. or the ‘persons of Moscow nationality’112 by the institutional division of the Moscow population from the ‘rest of the Russians’.113 receives its prospects of institutionalisation in the actions and policies of the Moscow authorities. .8407 (as of October 20. vremenno prebyvayuschikh v g[orode] Moskve”’ (September 13. a policy widely advertised by the regional authorities and indicated in some of the aforementioned passages. In general terms these policies aim at fixing the ‘Muscovites’. with some insignificant changes from December 17.mos. the 112 Yelena Egorova. available at: http://www. It is this strategy which appears to be embodied in the policies of ‘protecting’ Muscovites from the ‘visitors’. Point 1 of the Russian Constitution (Quoted through Sakwa. 1007-RM.114 Although the Russian laws imply the system of notification-based registration. 1995). 1030-43 “O registratsii i snyatiya grazhdan Rossiyskoy Federatsii s registratsionnogo uchyota po mestu prebyvaniya i po mestu zhitel’stva v Moskve i Moskovskoy oblasti“’ (December 26. The Russian constitution confirms the freedom of movement for the citizens and legally present foreigners within the country.

the space requirement in Moscow was fifty-four square feet of living space per person] The requirements for permanent registration are similar. ‘Life in Russia’s “Closed City”: Moscow’s Movement restrictions and the Rule of Law’ in New York University Law Review. to the regional officials.” depending on whether one is visiting or planning to live in the city. . whereby the registrant must prove that there is a certain amount of space available for each person in the residence.353.223 Moscow regulations leave the right to prevent one from registering. except that one must show either a lease or deed. 115 If a visitor fails to pass through one of these requirements.[…] In 1996. proving that he or she either rents or has purchased an apartment. There is also a space requirement. or written permission from the owner and everyone registered at the residence. Registering temporarily in Moscow requires payment of a small fee and proof of residence. an official in the city administration may easily deprive him of the right to stay in Moscow. if one is staying with relatives. he or she must register with the City Department of the Interior within three days. p. The rules allow for two types of registration: ‘temporary’ and “permanent. vol. (April 2001). When a non-Muscovite arrives in Moscow. if one is renting a place in Moscow. 76:344. Proof of residence may be in the form of a lease. and by this to make ones stay in Moscow illegal. It is necessary to mention that the policies of permission-based registration established by the Moscow authorities in the capital became an object of protests to 115 Damian Schaible.

html (as of march 15. 713’. available at: http://ks.html (as of March 15. Yuriy Luzhkov openly declares that despite the protests of the Constitutional Court the system of compulsory permission-based registration will be preserved in Moscow. As Shaible mentions in his Life in Russia’s ‘Closed City’: ‘the restrictions result in a class of Moscow inhabitants who effectively are treated as ‘Po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti ryada normativnykh aktov goroda Moskvy I Moskovskoy oblasti I goroda Voronezha.117 The institutional division between the Muscovites and the ‘visitors’ leads to the establishment of a real social frontier between these two groups. 12 i 21 Pravil registratsii i snyatiya grazhdan Rossiyskoy Federatsii s registratsionnogo uchyota po mestu prebyvaniya i mestu zhitel’stva v predelakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 17 iyulya 1996 goda No. 2004). 4-P (February 2. 9-P (April 4. 1998) ‘Po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti punktov 10. 2004). 1996). Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii No. prebyvayushchikh na postoyannoe zhitel’stvo v nazvannye regiony’.rfnet. as mentioned. widely varying estimates place the number of unregistered in Moscow somewhere between 116 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii No. reglamentiruyushchikh poryadok registratsii . available at: http://ks.224 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation116. This class of people whose civil rights are violated by the registration regime is not a small one. However this did not make the Moscow government change their way of registering visitors to the capital. Advocating this decision the Moscow Mayor argues: What we are doing in Moscow absolutely corresponds to the norms of the laws and the Constitution and falls within what any civilised country has […] The registration is undoubtedly justified because it has the purpose of protecting the Muscovites from chancecomers [gastrolery] and bandits in a situation in which the borders of the Russian Federation are transparent and Russia still remains the communicating yard [prohodnoy dvor] of the world.

000 and three million’. ’The Boss: How Yuriy Luzhkov runs Moscow’.ru (October 4. the Moscow authorities institutionalise this difference by introducing the system of legal privileges that materialises the line between the Moscow dwellers and the ‘visitors’. grounds the social objectification of the ‘Muscovites’ as an actually existing social identity which through various means.pod zashchitu zakona’ in Obozrevatel’ .HTM (as of September 5. 2001. 1999).ru/oboz/N12_97/12_5. no. 119 120 12 (1997). available at: http://www. in fact. available at: http://www. p. ‘Prava Moskvichey na zemlyu .htm (as of September 2003). has become a cornerstone of many debates initiated by the Moscow administration and aimed at introducing various specific rights for the regional population.adopted by the Duma on January 31. Interestingly enough. This in. ‘Life in Russia’s “Closed City”’. the deputies of the Moscow City Duma. Thus Dobrov. it seen that having distinguished the ‘Muscovites’ from the rest of the Russia’s population.Observer.119 Thus.120 Some other officials 117 ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: registratsiya priezzhikh ne protivorechit zakonu’ in Lenta. The legal privileges of the Muscovites. differs from the rest of the population. (‘Moscow. 358. 2003). 118 Schaible.225 100. argue that by introducing the 10-year limit upon permanent residence they merely ‘defend the rights of the Muscovites whose efforts the city is being built with’.lenta. its turn. Jensen. The deputies are not agree with the decision of the court’ in . and first of all in the access to certain rights.118 The discriminatory policy of the Moscow administration is also indicated by Jensen who mentions that in November 1997 the regional authorities threaten severe fines for firms hiring unapproved residents who do not have permission to live in the capital. Petr Dobrov.nasledie. in the debates devoted to the regulation of home improvements in Moscow . member of the Commission of the Moscow administration and the Administration of the City Duma on the Normative Base of Land and Estate Legal Relations (Komissiya administratsii Moskvy I Moskovskoy gorodskoy dumy po normativnoy baze zemel’nykh I imushchestvennykh pravootnosheniy) openly calls for legal protection of the rights of the ‘Muscovites’ on the land.

html?mid=1741391&s=2 (as of September 5.123 Needless to Available at: http://www.inmarsys.mos. aims not at the better management of communal transactions but is also designed to substitute for proof of a person’s identity.asp?filename=rad9F977. Many authors agree that the policy of the Moscow a Moscow city official. one can hardly find a better way to institutionalise the division between the Muscovites and the ‘rest’ than to provide a special proof of identity for the regional population. the city authorities announced the idea of introducing the ‘card of a Muscovite’.ru/cgi-bin/pbl_web?vid=2&osn_id=0&id_rub=1&news_unom=4454 (as of September 5. 2003)). .226 argue for state guarantees as to other ‘rights of the Muscovites’. 2002). Some of them radicalise this inequality to the degree of ‘ideological deprivation of citizenship’.ru/news/news. available at: vozraste ot 6 do 18 let’ in Rossiyskiy obshcheobrazovatel’nyi portal hosted by the Ministry of Education of http://moscow. which is strongly orientated towards the privileging of the Muscovites. available at: http://www. 121 ‘S 1-go sentyabrya v Moskve mozhet byt’ vveden ezhegodnyi personal’nyi uchyot vsekh detey v the Russian Federation. calls for the state to guarantee the special rights of the Muscovites regarding education. ‘21 iyunya v Moskovskoy gorodskoy dume sostoyalos’ zasedanie komiteta po zhilishchnoy politike’ at the official web server of the The Moscow City Duma.121 Besides these rights the ‘Muscovites’ become the object of ‘rights to living conditions’122. 2003). 2003). 122 Lyubov’ Fomina. 2003). as regards those Rambler-media (June 26. according to Luzhkov. To make the access to the special rights of Muscovites more effective. 123 ‘V Moskve vvedut kartochnuyu sistemu!’ in Cnews. (October This document. Thus Lyubov’ 2001). leads towards the establishment of inequality between the regional population and the ‘visitors’.asp?wci=doc&tmpl=text&d_no=153 (as of September 5.xml (as of September 1. available at: http://duma.

ru or 125 http://www.nelegal. clearly apprehended by those identified as the ‘guests’ or ‘visitors’.html (as of March 15. There are also some other internet resources vocing the position of the outlaws. The name of the programme has changed. 124 In general Pribylovskiy is right. Thus. We are about three million in Moscow and we have no intention to keep silent any longer.227 who have no Moscow registration permit.[…]’ is. in fact. not people. We are the people who on various accounts have to live in 124 Vladimir Pribylovskiy. . 1999). see for example: http://doloypropisku. 2004).ru/index. This position is clearly reflected in the documents of the ‘outlaws’ or ‘illegals’ (nelegaly)125 .the organisation of those who do not follow the discriminatory obligations of the Moscow authorities concerning compulsory registration in the capital. but the lexicon of the Mayor did not. no-one at all. ADDRESSED TO EVERYBODY The outlaws of Moscow address you. 2004). due to its boredom.narod. In the society portrayed in the Muscovite regional ideology and institutionalised in the policies of the city administration the nonMuscovites came to be perceived as ‘nobodies’. If the provincials would watch this programme. even a little bit. The negative preposition of ‘not . commenting on the personal TV show of Yuriy Luzhkov. This constitutes a second subject position of the Muscovite regional discourse.nelegal. He is still ‘meeting the city’ and the ‘people’ for him are only the (as of March 15. formerly ‘Meeting the city’ [Litsom k gorodu] on the TVC [TV-Centre]. The documents of this movement are presented on their own web-page http://www. ‘Separatist Luzhkov’ in Russkaya mysl’ (October 7. without even visiting the capital they would understand that they are not citizens in Moscow. Pribylovskiy says: Its a pity that in the province few people watch the personal TV programme of Luzhkov ‘Meeting the people’ [Litsom k lyudyam].

2003 they adopted a regulation ‘On the order of employing the people from other sites and foreigners in Moscow’. According to this regulation the enterprises were prohibited to hire the non-Muscovites without official permission being given by the Moscow authorities in the same form as it is given to the foreign workers. available at http://www. On July 29. ‘inscribe within the framework of the law […] an extortion and humiliation […] of the second-class Russians’. 127 Maksim Sokolov. 126 It is necessary to notice that this subject position differs from the one known from the Soviet times as limita or limitchiki – legally-qualified industrial workers from the provinces employed in industry situated in Moscow. As Maksim Sokolov comments on this decision the Moscow authorities. tough though it may sound. available at http://www. 2003). while the category of the ‘outlaws’ basically covers anyone who has no permit of registration in Moscow. parentage and nationality. In sociological terms the notion of limitchiki corresponds to a particular group of those working. regardless of the purpose of his being (as of September 1. In some papers this law has already been described as the law on the ‘Ryazanian foreigners’127 as in fact. 128 Ibid. ‘Durnoy vkus vedet k separatizmu’ in Globalrus.globalrus. in the Moscow enterprises. on a time-limit. It is interesting to note that the remark of Pribylovskiy on the non-citizen status of the outlaws in Moscow seems to have come to be heard by the Moscow sex. We are people of various age. 2000).nelegal.128 126 ‘An Open Letter of “Moscow Organization of Outlaws”’.ru. .html (as of December 20.228 Moscow without registration. we are the people who are deprived of human rights. this legal ‘innovation’ renders the visitors in the Russian capital as equal to foreign citizens.

Therein. Departing from a different basic identity than does the Kubanian Governor. seen through the prism of economic organisation. and their quite different underlying political views. It is this programme which appears to be translated in the aforementioned initiatives concerning the residence and work permits introduced by the Moscow authorities in the middle of the 1990s. such activities constitute the prospect of constructing the Muscovite regional discourse. this idea becomes the nodal point fixing the struggle of the Moscow Mayor. Seen as the transmission of the sought national order. a person experiences the material character of his regional identity. Luzhkov experiences a different kind of dislocation and comes to the articulation of a different enemy and the construction of a different antagonism. In the course of this struggle Luzhkov advocates a programme which establishes an institutional division between the Muscovites and ‘the rest’ of the population. In this sphere the difference between the Muscovites and the ‘new-comers’ comes to be objectified in the moments translating the discriminatory policy of the city government. .229 Conclusion to Chapter 4 By way of conclusion to this second empirical investigation it is possible to say that. then he makes the same moves as Kondratenko and employs his position as highest regional authority in order to conduct a struggle and to articulate a similar kind of regional idea. despite the huge difference in socio-economic context between the regions. paradoxically enough. However. Yuriy Luzhkov in general follows the steps of Nikolay Kondratenko in the issue of re-thinking the region. Along with the ideological performances of the Moscow mayor.

. a region begins to signify not just an administrative territorial unit of the Russian Federation.unity appears to be represented in the unity of a might say ‘national’ . in relation to which Russian-ness may be defined. The regional ideologues seek the social basis for national unity. However. but comes to substitute for an ideal and desired Russia. The gap in which it was possible to take decisions in an undecidable terrain was remarkably wide. some visible differences aside. As a result of such re-conceptualisation. But in the collapse of the old framework of national identity and in the absence of the existential ‘other’. In some sense they both wish to be Russians. they also share a similarity in the form of the response given to the tasks raised by the dislocations which captured the Russian society in the beginning of the 1990s. the regional ideologies under examination have many things in common. Looking for the framework of a new. They show identical structural organisation.230 CHAPTER 5: THE REGIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA Introduction to the Chapter 5 Our empirical research demonstrates that. And it is this gap which made it possible for Nikolay Kondratenko and Yuriy Luzhkov to articulate a programme which called for the construction of an ideal Russia in their governed regions. which seems to be inherent to any chain of ideological articulations. post-Soviet identity. this identity becomes heavily dependent upon the subjective choices of the politicians. the regional ideologues constructed programmes wherein the desired popular .

what I am first going to do in this chapter is to analyse the hegemonic capacities of the examined regional ideologies. The latter are understood in terms of the capacity to . identifies the next task which will be addressed in our study. the success or failure of an ideology is related to its hegemonic capacities. regardless of whether the latter is seen through the prism of an ethnic disposition or of economic affiliations.231 The wish to express the meaning of the national unity. the Kubanian and the Muscovite regional ideologies became parts of rather fragmented debates that in a different way addressed the issue of the post-Soviet Russian national unity. The structure of the chapter In order to carry out the aforementioned task. Qualifying regional ideologies as projects looking for an articulation of new national unity it becomes important to show the place of the regional ideologies in the general field of the struggle for the Russian nation. Precisely put. I argue that it is this programme which defined the destiny of the Russian regional ideologies in the middle of the 2000s. which prevented various regional programmes from joining a really popular national struggle conducted under the regional slogans. in fact. I will demonstrate the limits of the regional imaginary. The limits of regional imaginary As is assumed in discourse theory. Then I describe the gradual dissolution of these debates which followed the strengthening of Putin’s ideology of ‘strong state building’. I show that. a struggle which had expanded in the Russian political scene by the end of the 1990s.

in fact. Hence. appears to be defined by the character of the nodal points articulated to fix the tactical struggles of the governors. These limits are concealed in the particular social exclusions drawn by the regional ideologies. quite similar programmes appear to be more and more fixed in relations of equivalence with the ‘enemy’. in situations where an ‘ideal Russia’ is expressed through the idea of a particular region. the imaginaries set by such articulations have their clear limits. the non-Kubanian or non-Muscovite movements from their own struggles. being detached from the regional ideas. It is these nodal points which put into action a certain way of conceptualising realities which in the end results in the construction of a particular social discourse. Such dissociation becomes even sharper for. This sets the stage for the regional ideologues to dissociate. most coherently seen as the struggle for the ‘Russian nation’. Precisely such a consequence is explicitly . First of all.232 structure a community of social actors. respectively. the hegemonic potential of the regional ideologies. in Krasnodar. the forces incapable of identifying relations of equivalence with a concrete region appear to be excluded from the particular struggle. and notably their limits. even if this struggle is shaped by the same general slogans expressed in the proposals of the strategic combat. which is primarily defined by the articulation of nodal points put forward to fix the project of social struggle. in Moscow. Looking at the nodal points articulated by the regional ideologues it appears possible to see that. and a ‘proper economy’.

Such a contradiction directly leads to the establishment of antagonistic relations between supposedly identical regional political projects. the construction of ‘a proper economy’ succeeds in Moscow and the ‘Moscow model’ becomes the ground for retaining the identity of an ‘economy’ as such. The popular character of the struggle for ‘preserving the Russian nation’ or ‘constructing a proper economy’ comes to be strictly tied to the regional affiliations of a particular combatant. . However. for example. in terms of a force which comes from ‘Moscow and other rotten territories’. at the same time it may be considered a true ‘enemy of Russia’ by the ‘fighters’ of region B. including my own one …’. However. But after the phrase: ‘We have everything in the Sverdlovsk oblast’’ he could not stand it anymore and he replied: ‘But we have a better situation with honey-production. A force in region A may consider itself as really ‘fighting for Russia’. Zayavlenie chlena Soveta Federatsii Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii N. Kondratenko na zasedanii 24 aprelya 2002 g. It is interesting to illustrate this kind of antagonism with reference to a conversation held in Yekaterinburg between the Moscow Mayor Luzhkov and the Sverdlovsk Governor Eduard Rossel’. if the former does not share the ideas of the particular regional uniqueness of B.1 This exclusion prevents the establishment of proper relations of equivalence between the various comparable kinds of political programmes.233 demonstrated by Kondratenko in his attack on the Russian National Unity (RNE). If.’ in Kubanskie novosti (April 26. Right now I am going to send to children the honey harvested on the bee-gardens near Moscow. 2002). As Peskov reproduces it: […] Rossel’ was showing and Luzhkov was observing. 1 ‘Komu vygodna lozh’ o situatsii na Kubani. the success of the other regional models in the same competition becomes antagonistic.

because their presence becomes an obstacle in fixing the ‘exclusive success’ of his own management. blaming his rivals in the anti-Zionist wing of Russian nationalism. This antagonism is concealed in the experience of the other regions which puts into question the ‘exclusive’ capacities of a particular regional ‘management’. 2001). any otherregional force articulating a programme of ‘Russian national revival’ comes to be antagonistic to the author of the Kubanian regional ideology. even in relation to an aspect as minor as honey-production.234 irritated. In other words. Rossel’ cut off this attack: ‘This year we harvested 600 tons of honey. 2004). stresses their ‘Moscow’ if ‘economy’ is ‘properly constructed’ only in the capital. This. The same is relevant to the struggle of Nikolay Kondratenko. Kak stat’ i ostatsya gubernatorom (Chelyabinsk: Ural LTD. Therefore. available at: http://www.newimage. a factor which causes Luzhkov effectively to propose his candidature for hegemonising the struggle of all ‘managers’. any proposal for a proper Russian ‘national disposition’ which comes from other regions would trigger serious doubts in the exclusive ‘Russianness’ of Kondratenko.htm (as of march 15. Do you need it?’2 This dialogue is an excellent illustration of how Luzhkov gets irritated by the presence of the other-regional project of constructing a ‘proper economy’. Therefore. the Kubanian Governor. There can be no two ‘one 2 Quoted in: Yevgeniy Minchenko and Irina Vyboyshchik. any other successful example of rebuilding economic affiliations becomes a serious irritant to this ‘properness’. If the ‘real Russia’ is preserved only in Kuban’. . in its turn hits the managerial confidence of Yuriy Luzhkov and causes the authors of the alternative projects to be perceived as antagonists. ‘Psikhologicheskaya kharakteristika Ehduarda Rosselya’ in Yevgeniy Minchenko.

The social exclusion of the ‘other-regional‘ does not create a space in which the other identical programmes coming from the other territories might enter a particular political project. In the light of this definition it may seem that regionalism represents a kind of unified project fixed by common goals. discursively ‘invisible’ and the society aiming to be constructed by the regional ideologues is designated as the ‘society of a region’. even when this ‘Russia’ is understood in the same way. In this sense the term ‘society of regions’ which is applied in some endeavours in contemporary Russian politics3 seems to be slightly incorrect. It consists of an ‘enemy’ and a mother-region incarnating the ideal social order. The other regions become. contemporary Russian regionalism is more likely to be an ensemble of isolated programmes rather than a unified movement of the regions for obtaining a greater autonomy from the centre. No. ‘Obshchestvo regionov’ in Pro et Contra. unavoidably implied in the examined regional ideologies. this view of Russian regionalism seems to be rather incorrect. . this term is understood as a policy aiming at achieving a greater autonomy for the regions. all aiming at an adequate representation of the national idea. shared by all regional leaders. In such a way it is possible to see that the social imaginary constructed by the regional ideologies becomes seriously limited by the unavoidable reduction of the universal 3 Arbakhan Magomedov. However. 47-58. to a greater or lesser extent. makes it necessary to revise the notion of regionalism as it is applied to the post-Soviet history of Russia. 2 (1997). which is. In the conditions of reciprocal antagonism growing between various regional movements. so to speak. Traditionally. with no place for other projects of regional uniqueness.235 true Russias’ in different regions. The social exclusion.

aim at nothing other than the reconstitution of the social reality of ‘Russianness’. However. the Moscow and the Kubanian regional ideologues. in the Russian political arena. In order to situate the examined ideologies in the corpus of these programmes. in a situation where identical projects are discursively ‘invisible’. The social exclusion born in this tie prevents any possible political ‘reciprocity’ between particular regional ideologies and other politically similar projects. this issue became a focal point in many other political programmes. These tendencies are defined according to the differences in identifying the ‘enemy’ to whom the ‘Russians’ .236 claims for national unity to the particular regional representation of the latter. To a large extent the inability of establishing non-antagonistic relations with other identical programmes has defined the political weakness of the regional ideologies. respectively. Regional ideologies in the struggle for the post-Soviet Russian nation Looking at the debates which convey the sense of trying to find a new meaning of ‘Russianness’ one may specify several dominant tendencies. In the end all possible relations come to be either antagonistic or absent. by the end of the 1990s. Being unable to establish solid inter-regional inclusion by the end of the 1990s. seen. in fact. As is demonstrated in the previous chapters. it is necessary to introduce the latter first. either as a certain ‘national disposition’ or as an ‘economic organism’. they variously entered into competitions with the other groups of programmes which dealt with similar issues of post-Soviet ‘Russianness’. This blockage affects relations with the possible allies which have either grown in the field of common opposition to the ‘enemy’ or in the argument in favour of special regional rights and defending particular regional interests. (as of February 18. pp. economic and state nationalism. popular. the short-term movement of nationalist 4 General information is available at the official web-page: http://www. 2004) and http://www. ‘export’ nationalism. See also: Luke March. leader – Alexander Barkashov4. this form of nationalism is represented by extreme-right movements. The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russia (Manchester: Manchester University Press.rnebarkashov. 2002). Mainly these are the ethnic minorities which embrace the image of rivals. In introducing these trends. Apart from the aforementioned Russian National Sobor. The first one can be called ethnic nationalism. it is possible to divide them into five big groups: ethnic nationalism. This field of the struggle for the Russian nation includes the programmes that situate the meaning of ‘being Russian’ in the framework of the struggle with the ‘enemy’ endowed in the objects of other nations or other ethnically and racially specified groups. 2004).237 are thought to be (as of February 18. 2002). the Union of the Vendes and other relatively marginal organisations.rne. 5 General information is available at the official web-page: http://www. such as the Russian National Unity (RNE). preventing the Russians from achieving social ‘harmony’.org (as of February 18. the communist-patriotic opposition including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF)5. Natsizm v Rossii (Moscow: Panorama. Each of them now has to be introduced in detail. See also: Vyacheslav Likhachev. 2004).cprf. .

Occasional Papers. ‘beasts’. 7 Alekey Malashenko and Galina Vitkovskaya (eds. Quoted from: http://www. in order that we might understand the prospect of Russian national revival which is articulated in this perspective: The main aim of our movement is to prove the present and the future of the Russian Nation. or as ‘market-sellers’.rnebarkashov. 8 For further information see: Vladimir Pribylovskiy. the Caucasians and Middle-Asians. One may quote some passages from the Textbook of the Russian Nationalist. with variations – the Judes. according to the same logic. some Cossack movements7 and some regional leaders.238 ‘centrists’ – Motherland. Kratkiy slovar’-spravochnik (Moscow: Panorama. 9 The pejorative and offensive nomination of the Asians and the Caucasian peoples. Insofar as the Russian People was deprived of its historical role artificially and forcefully. written by Barkashov.10 6 See the official web-page of Sergey Glaz’ev. These enemies appear to be personified in the images of the Jews. Russkie national-patrioticheskie (etnokraticheskie) organizatsii I pravo-radikal’nye organizatsii.htm (as of March 15. 1995). […] which is to return to the Russian People its historical place in the state and in the World […]. 10 . the Judo-Massons and the ‘Zionists’. seen as ‘blacks’.ru/azbuka05. The enemies of Russia understand this and try finally to destroy the national unity of the Russian People. 23.Rogozin and Glaz’ev6. the Russian People has to see returned everything which was taken out in the same way. leaders . 2004). No. 2004). Carnegie Moscow Center.) Cossack Revival: Hopes and (as of February 18. September 1998.glazev.8 Looking at the programmes of these movements it is possible to see that in a grand articulation of the threat brought by other-ethnic elements is included a certain constitutive axis. one of the most distinct nationalists in Rodina: http:// www. churki9.

‘We Russians versus Us Russians. The second type of nationalism articulated in post-Soviet Russia can be regarded as ‘export’ nationalism. all Slavs. (August 2000). This form of nationalism is represented in the programmes that are in some sense ‘inverse’ to the ones of ethnic nationalism. 604. oppress their respective Russian-speaking populations. . they do not seek to fix the meaning of Russianness by fighting with the national minorities. NUPI working papers no.htm (as of March 14. according to them.12 It is possible to say that despite his personal confrontation with ‘rotten Moscow’.rnebarkashov. RNE. first. Ivan Gololobov and Indra Overland. but call for struggle against the national majorities of the New Independent States. Nikolay Kondratenko and his political organisation the Fatherland (Kondratenko)13 clearly fall into this category and form a particular sector in this area of political debates. 2004).11 There is hardly any need to indicate the remarkable similarities between the programme of RNE and the agendas of other anti-Semitic nationalists mentioned in the previous ‘Jewish nationalities’ responsible for the genocide of the Russian people and. Patriotic Discourse and 12 13 Electoral Support in Krasnodar kray’. more generally. which appeared as minorities after the dissolution of the USSR. 11 Quoted from: http://www.239 Specifying the ‘enemies’ Barkashov indicates the personae of. These are the non-Russian majorities that. More precisely. Notably those mentioned in Chapter 3.

Articulating the programme of its recreation Limonov suggests that at the moment there is no ground for the national revolution inside Russia. However. ‘”A Nation Split into Fragments”: The Congress of Russian Communities and Russian Nationalist Ideology’ in Europe-Asia Studies. No.nbp-info. See also: Likhachev. 465-472. 687-74. pp.240 This form of nationalism was first translated by the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) leaders – Alexander Lebed and Sergey Glaz’ev. 1998). Vol. consider that at the moment Russia is being sold to world capital. Anatomiya geroya (Smolensk: Rusich. to Moscow. 16 Ehduard Limonov. 15 See the official web-page http://www. the leading force now is the National Bol’shevik Party (NBP) with their leader Eduard Limonov15.63 – 107. the capital of 14 See: Alan Ingram. It is important to mention that neither personally nor institutionally the NBP has nothing to do with the KRO of Lebed’ and Glaz’ev. The natsbols.14 dissolved after the electoral failure in 1995 and finally disappeared after the death of its leader in 2002. The ideal place for this is Crimea. Russian autonomy in Ukraine. . Therefore its rebuilding has to start in one of the New Independent State where Russians have become an oppressed (as of February 18. as they call themselves. Russia has to be recreated. The national ideology of NBP can be expressed by the slogan popular among many of its members: ‘Russia has always been and it will always be. but at the moment there is no Russia’. Today we cannot start the rebellion in Moscow due to many reasons. 51. 4. 2004). Natsizm v Rossii. First of all the flame of rebellion has to be set outside Russia.16 It is in the framework of such proposals that the natsbols organised their antigovernmental actions in Crimea. we have to understand that the emergence of the conflict between the Russian population and the Ukrainian occupation forces is not the final aim but just an unavoidable first step of the armoured uprising to change the government in Moscow […] The Crimea will be our SierraMaestra from where we will come to our Havana. in Minsk. pp. therefore Russia as such is the target for the struggle.

Thus. where they indeed face open or concealed discrimination. However.Sweden17.htm (as of February 18. See: http://www. the NATO secretary general.pcn-ncp.nazbol. After the failure of this attempt. this did not put out his ‘revolutionary flame’ and after his release he came back to active political activity. See: http://www. It is also possible to outline populist nationalism as a specific field of political debate.up. See: http://nbp. 2004). 2004). implementing their policy of ‘direct action’.com (as of February 18. in the Baltic countries. It is not surprising that the NBP have departments in Western Europe . looking 17 See: http://www. and . and even in Israel21. These were the natsbols who. 2004). during his press-conference in Prague in (as of March 14. threw tomatoes at George Robertson. See: (as of February 18. in (as of February 18.bolcheviques. found a very powerful ideological tool for mobilising the Russian national movement outside Russia. In this situation their opposition to the national majorities of the New Independent States contains a huge amount of social energy that can be used in the struggle for the Russian nation.nationalanarchist. There are several tens of millions of Russians living abroad and in many different countries such as Latvia. it is possible to say that the natsbols. predominantly populated by Russian speakers. And indeed. This programme is an eclectic project which.the most famous project – the Russian revolution in Northern Kazakhstan. Estonia and Middle Asian countries. formed in Russia in the 1990s. 2004). France18. Limonov was arrested and spent 2 years in prison. United Kingdom19 and Spain20. 18 19 20 21 . 2004).com/CNB/index.241 Belorussia. the exported activity of the NBP outside the CIS countries is not limited to formal ‘party building’.

ru (as of February 18. 2004). 1993). He threatened to store nuclear products on the borders of the new Baltic states.‘Don’t even dare to shoot Baghdad.25 However. 59-82. Available at: http://mp3. 22 Official web-page http://www. the state’s leading role etc.mp3 (as of February 23 24 18. populist nationalism refers to various Enemies.utl. 2004). together with the hard-right nationalist rhetoric Zhirinovskiy exploits the other grounds for nation-building. Zhirinovskiy does not limit himself to the ‘parliamentary lexicon’. 2 (1996).ru/DON%27T%20SHOOT%20BAGDAD%21/tbilisi. No. re-articulates the issues raised in various other spectrums of ideological struggle. its better to f***k up Tbilisi altogether’. 25 See: A.ldpr. which become relevant in different communicative contexts. The main force expressing the ideas of populist nationalism is the aforementioned Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR).e.242 for short-term popular support. Blaming the West. In accordance with the flexibility of its political platform. which has been mixed into a techno-song by an unknown person24. the Jews. . ‘O sobiratelyakh zemli Russkoy. the Chinese and many other ethnic groups as being those who have brought threats to the Russians. Altunyan. leader – Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Accusing foreign and other-ethnic powers.22 In the very beginning of his political career Zhirinovskiy came forward with sharp nationalistic slogans directed against as many enemies as possible. In accordance with his promise that if he became Russian president the Russian soldiers will wash their boots in the Indian Ocean. Zhirinovskiy kak publitsist: analiz politicheskikh statey’ in Voprosy literatury. economic priorities. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. he published a book . i. Many can remember his speech . the leader of the LDPR specifies the Caucasians.The Last Charge to the South23. Posledniy brosok na yug (Moscow: Pisatel’.

html (as of February 18. in order to make clear the difference between ethnic nationalism. These are the forces whose mismanagement lies at the foundation of the current crisis the Russian society is living through.26 Now. into a passionate defender of all Jews see: http://www. it is necessary to touch upon the latter in detail. like the Governor of Saint Petersburg Vladimir Yakovlev. regardless of its ‘internal’ or ‘export’ versions. quoted by vokruginfo. No wonder that in some of his speeches Zhirinovksiy finally reveals his famous ‘my Mother is Russian and my father is lower’. boycotting the minute of silence devoted to the Holocaust victims announced in Russian available at: http://www. identical ideas concerning the meaning of ‘being Russian’ were translated by the other clusters of the parliamentary block Fatherland – Whole Russia (OVR) and their leader Yevgeniy Primakov.asp (as of February 18.243 In this area. the Governor of Yaroslavl’ oblast’ Anatoliy Lisitsyn and some influential mayors of big cities. signifying that on the father’s side he comes from the Polish Jews. 2004).ru/news/news531. 26 Interview given to the Israeli newspaper Ha”aretz. the Mayor of Krasnodar Valeriy Samoylenko and others. It is exactly this kind of nationalism which appeared to be translated in the regional ideology of the Moscow Mayor.vokruginfo. and the economic and state programme of building the Russian nation. Apart from the the Fatherland of Yuriy Luzhkov. 2004). which is sought in order to fight the ‘failed reformers’ who are driving the country into a state of economic collapse. also by some of the governors.jewish. for example. old ‘enemies’ cease to be antagonists and rather become allies. the ex-mayor of Saint Petersburg Anatoliy Sobchak. Economic nationalism is a project drawing the object of the Russian nation against the background of economic unity. . For an extended review of Zhirinovskiy’s transformation from a clear

culture. tradition etc. we do not have it. being particular in their regional reference. it becomes obvious that by the end of the 1990s the regional responses to the dislocations of the post-Soviet transition. for its unity. such discursive composition did not last long.27 Thus. However. .Putin’s ideology of strong state building. which came to be the most powerful political project in Russia in the beginning of the 2000s. Due to the essentially fragmented character of ethnic and economic nationalisms. (February 13. So far. but on what can be defined as prosperity of life. accompanied by an attack on the ‘empty talks’. unfortunately. However. The Kubanian regional ideology generally followed the perspective of ethnic nationalism. also form part of different strategic proposals regarding the creation of a ‘Russian’ identity.244 Due to the obvious priority of ‘concrete things done’. the prophets of economic nationalism failed to create a clear corpus of ideological messages embracing their political platform. the aforementioned debates on the Russian nation did not form a stable popular movement. they lost out in relation to the fifth prospect of national unity . a general atmosphere of satisfaction with life and the country you are living in. As a result. It is not the absence of the national idea. this intention emerges […] not only on the basis of common language. but the lasting poor quality of life which is the main danger for the future of our country. torn apart from inside by regional and other antagonisms.. Therefore so many Russians of all nationalities want to leave the country (at least for some time). Still it is possible to illustrate their view on the nature of the new Russian nation with the words of Anatoliy Sobchak: For him the nation is: A conscious will of individuals to be a united people and to live together. Although many disputed the very existence of a clear political platform on the part of the new Russian 27 Anatoliy Sobchak. ’Impreskaya nostal’giya’ in Nezavisimaya gazeta. 1998). while Moscow joined the struggle for a ‘nation economised’.

‘Upravlyayemaya demokratiya v Rossii: stala li ona pri Putine effektivnee chem pri Yeltsine?’ The materials of the round table in Literaturnaya gazeta (April 17. the main components of his programme will be discussed in the same way as was done in the case of the analysis of the regional ideologies. The Centre for the European Policy. Therefore it seems important to visit this programme in depth as this introduction will allow for a demonstration as to how the ‘regions politicised’ gradually came to meet their decline in the Russian political debates of the 2000s. Yekaterina Mikhaylovskaya and Vladimir Pribylovskiy. . Marius Vahl. 62 (March 22. ‘Putin’s pragmatism’ in Newsweek (November 16. Rossiya Putina: Pristrastnyi vzglyad (Moscow: Panorama 2003).ru/roundtable/art2. Following from this. it has become obvious that these doubts are rather irrelevant. available at: http://www.29 The role of Putin’s political project in the historical destiny of Russian regional ideologies is crucial. I start with the identification from which Putin’s political enterprise arises.php (as of August 12. 2001). http://www. ‘Prezidentu Putinu potrebuetsya ideya’ in Segodnya. and the growing amount of special research devoted to various aspects of Putin’s ideology illustrates the inadequacy of these concerns. ‘Strong state building’ and the decline of regional ideologies In order to situate Putin’s political project within the general methodological framework adopted in this research.htm (as of October 10. ‘Putin’s Russia’ in CESP Commentary. 2000). 4-79. pp. 29 See: Yekaterina Mikhaylovskaya.245 President. I analyse Putin’s reaction to this situation and the way it reconstructs the reality of his ‘original’ subject position in contemporary social circumstances. No. ‘Govoryashchiy Putin: Informatsiya k razmyshleniyu’ in Alexander Verkhovskiy. 2003). 2000). I then discuss the dislocations and antagonisms defining the limits of this identity. Thinking Ahead of Europe. 28 Christian Caryl. Finally. 2003). Andrey after the first years of his government.

Ot pervogo litsa: razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym (Moscow: Vagrius. The growing gap between industrialised countries and Russia is pushing us into the ranks of Third World countries’ .246 It appears possible to say that throughout his entire political career Putin clearly presented himself according to the official position he occupied.russiaeurope.again to university. In accordance with this subject position. and 30 Thus Putin briefly describes his life. This continued after he was promoted to the position of Prime Minister. it is Russia and more precisely the Russian state. To the President’s office [upravlenie delami]. available at: an http://www.o. This happened when he worked in the office of Saint Petersburg’s mayor. As he reflects on this matter in his first address to the Russian parliament: ‘only an effective head of state has the right to set policy tasks for the bodies of power. Now I am the acting [ Moscow. 2003). 2000). After Sobchak . available at: http://www. can be said about the first years of his presidency. 2003). ‘Another serious and persistent problem is the economic weakness of Russia. Then . And it is exactly this object that appears to be dislocated. or as an official in the presidential administration.dosye. . Then .htm (as of November Sobchak [the Mayor of Saint Petersburg].] President.went to the KGB. 31 Vladimir Putin’s State of the Nation Address to the Federal Assembly ‘The State of Russia: A Way to Effective State’ presented on July 8.mid.says the Russian President.30 The same. and he alone has the real possibility to organise their effective fulfilment’31. as Putin obviously regards the state he received as weakened. no doubt. Putin clearly recognises his identity as head of state or as Russian President. indicating first of all the positions he occupied: ‘As a matter of fact I have had a very simple life […] I finished school and went to university. That's all!’ (Vladimir Putin. confirming that it is his position as Russian President which conditions his current political the administration of the (as of October 20. Finished university . 2000. Finished the KGB . which serves as a meaningful predicate for being its President. Then I was appointed the prime-minister.

if someone does not like the word ‘strong’. […] Our stand is absolutely clear. the ageing of the population. ‘The State of Russia: A Way to an Effective State’ .32 Apart from the general remarks on the current weakness of the Russian state Putin specifies numerous precise problems which embrace this weakness. 2001. The ensemble of the troubles blocking the development of the Russian state makes Putin consider the real danger of the total disintegration or even dissolution of the state as such. the Moscow. which consists of building a strong or ‘effective’ state in Russia. This task is clearly formulated in his address to the Federal assembly: ‘The strategic task of the previous year was to strengthen the state’33.russiaeurope. presented on April 3. political and economic 34 Putin. 2003).mid.html (as of October 20. Having articulated the moment of dislocation capturing the very object of the ‘Russian state’. available at: 33 Kremlin. Only a strong. strong and confident.247 then adds: ‘If Russia remains weak. etc. Putin announces his strategic goal. we will indeed have to make the choice. But it will be a choice of a weak state.34 32 Putin. weak civil society. effective . ‘The State of Russia: A Way to an Effective State’ President Vladimir Putin's Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. financial dependence upon the developed state. http://www. They include the criminalisation and ‘informalisation’ of the economy. weak army. It can create conditions for a prosperous life for the people and for the prosperity of the Homeland. we will say that only an effective and democratic state can uphold civil. the choice of the weak’. This is also repeatedly stressed in ‘The State of Russia’: Russia's only real choice should be the choice of a strong country.

‘Govoryashchiy Putin’. These obstacles comprise the ‘ineffective taxation system’. It dismantled all its bodies of 35 Many authors mention that this problem is the constitutive one for the political programme of the new Russian President. See for instance: Mikhaylovskaya.35 This obstacle obtains the most precise articulation in Putin’s speech. from the very beginning of his career as a politician of national weight. the Russian President outlines the situation of antagonism. BBC news. articulating the obstacles that prevent an immediate achievement of the sought results. you and I very well know what was happening over the previous decade in the Caucasus. It is the problem of World edition. In 1995 Russia did not recognize de jure. For in these remarks he renders ‘material’ the enemies directly responsible for the weakening of the Russian state. available at http://news. 36 Translation taken from ‘Putin’s Chechen Remark Causes Stir’. ‘ineffective relations between the Federal and regional authorities’ etc. . ‘bureaucratisation of the state institution’. answering the question of Susan Glassner from the Washington Post in the interview with the chiefs of the leading American media he says: Well. One may recall the picturesque expression he coined: ‘to flush away [the terrorists] while they sit on their toilets’36 (uttered in September 1999).stm (as of August 12. by completely withdrawing from there. Putin expresses his radical antipathy towards these forces. 2002). but actually accepted the independence of Chechnya. Later. p. As a matter of fact. the Russian President repeats his attitude towards them in many other well-known speeches and 2003). among these problems Putin explicitly points to one which is especially worrying the Russian President. Thus. in the same passionate way. However. These enemies are ‘terrorists’ or ‘separatists’ conducting the anti-constitutional combat activities in the Southern Russian republic. Europe. (November 13. entirely.248 Having specified the project of constructing the strong and effective state.

because there were no borders there. available at: . which had turned out to be absolutely beyond the control of any authorities. but Russia failed to react to this as well. the courts. prosecutor's office. Monday. Practically at once there began in almost daily mode. that’s certainly going to extremes. We will no longer allow this territory to be used as a bridgehead for attack on Russia. But. each day. police. 2001. the Kremlin. We encountered in fact the physical destruction of the Russian-speaking population in Chechnya. but Russia did that in order to attain reconciliation. We won’t allow it! 37 37 The President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. the question of Chechnya's dependence or independence from Russia. look. June 18. Moscow. People simply began to sell their houses and leave. What did it end in? It ended in a large-scale attack of several thousand armed people on Dagestan under the slogan of tearing away from Russia some additional territories and creating a new state from the Black to the Caspian Sea.249 power and administration there. as they call it. they even feared crossing the border when hot-pursuing criminals. Absolutely everything was dismantled. creating. But Russia again failed to react. Interview with Bureau Chiefs of Leading American Media. it’s simply an outright aggression! […] To us it is absolutely of no fundamental importance as of now. Russian Federation. There was no one with whom to raise the matter of grievances. Only one matter is fundamental to us. I must tell you that this looks like a national humiliation. Essentially it was in shock after 1995. it was in about the same condition as America had been after the Vietnam war. From the territory of Chechnya. as there was no authority in Chechnya. there began the criminal development of the economy of Russia itself. attacks on the contiguous territories of Russia: Dagestan and Russia’s other regions. More serious processes began. There was absolutely no one to talk with. united states of Islam. And our law and order bodies there were absolutely powerless. pulled out the army. Russia encountered other problems.

rosinformcenter.250 In the situation of sharp social antagonism. Chechnya: Belaya kniga (Moscow: RIA Novosti . 39 See for instance the photo albums in Chechnya: Belaya Kniga and Chechnya: Belaya kniga II. The protest arose after the explosions in the civilian buildings in Moscow and some other Russian cities. 2003)). committed in 1999 by terrorist groups coming from Chechnya.V. murders and public executions of Russian soldiers. Needless to say.mid.russianembassy. Putinym’ (Moscow: Olma-politizdat. and presenting it to the Russian population. http://www. 2003). The inclusiveness of this field appears to be stipulated by the informational policies of the Russian mass media. Almost the same opinion is represented in Putin’s response to one of the questions in ‘direct line with the President’ held on December 19. 2003). and in his response to one of the questions raised on the joint press-conference with Jaques Chirac held in Paris on January 17.htm (as of October 20. available at It is necessary to mention that the latter.Rosinformtsentr. 2000). Boris and at www. . This ‘materialisation’ underlines the ‘popular’ character of the slogans uttered by the Russian President. 2002 (Vladimir Putin: Razgovor s Rossiey: Stenogramma ‘Pryamoy linii s Prezidentom Rossiyskoy Federatsii V. 2000). Chechnya (The special issue) (February 23-28. pp. unlike the majority of their Western colleagues.rian. 2000).russiaeurope. VV: Kavkazskiy krest (Moscow: Delovoy ekspress.html (as of October 20. 2002 (the transcript is available at: (as of October 20. the articulation of the existential ‘enemy’ has generated a strong public protest against the growing power of the terrorists in the North Caucasus. 41-44). throughout the entire second military campaign in the North Caucasus. 2003). widely displayed the brutalities committed by the so-called ‘rebels’.ru/RussiaEurope/speech9. 38 Ogonek.38 The confiscated films documenting tortures. civilians loyal to the Federal power and hostages39 became the best instruments for materialising the ‘enemy’. where the identity of the ‘strong state’ appears to be to a large extent blocked by the presence of the ‘terrorists’ Putin sets a wide field of equivalence for anyone dissatisfied with the current impossibility of building a ‘strong Russia’.

The elimination of the ‘corrupted’ content starts with the attack on the oligarchs. obtained in the previous years. Precisely this field became hegemonised by the ‘steely’ policy of the Russian President. the regional ideologues demonstrate . Such a divorce results in the effective emptying of the object of ‘power’ from its ‘personified’ connotation. However. These views probably have some merit. This re-articulation consists of breaking the equivalence established between the ‘Federal power’ and the ‘enemies’. the adequate response to the public demand of confronting the terrorists is the main but not the only explanation of the social success demonstrated by the Putin’s political enterprises. as in the case with the ORT or the Most media group. for instance.this object was strongly identified with the names of concrete persons: Yeltsin’s ‘family’. Putin rids the highest executive branch of the Russian power of this ‘remarkable’ content.251 The struggle against terrorism and the criminal power of the warlords set a huge field of social equivalence. This sets the prerequisites for the actual popular struggle to be hegemonised precisely by this sector. represented in its entirety by the President. uniting everyone in hatred towards the terrorists. or the ‘brightest’ oligarchs like Berezovskiy. aimed at defeating the stronghold of the armed gangs in In Yeltsin’s Russia . For some this attack may be seen as an attempt to limit freedom of expression or to restrict free economic initiatives. including the ones investigated in this research. specified in numerous debates in Yeltsin’s Russia. since the alienation of the oligarchs from power does affect their media empires. his favourites. Another factor laying at the foundation of its popularity is the effective re-articulation of the object of ‘Russian power’. In some cases this reform leads . Gusinskiy and others.

The ‘revolt of Putin’s majority’ against the ‘expert minority’. like the Union of Right Forces or Marching together (Idushchie vmeste). announced by Pavlovskiy. The names of Gref. They were ‘grey horses’. It is this representation that is sought by the Russian President when he says: ‘We have grown used to regarding Russia as a system of the bodies of power or as an economic . This process goes hand in hand with the distancing of the Russian President from the other ‘marked’ figures of the Yeltsin’s epoch. not wishing to enter the debates on the correspondence of these actions to human and economic rights. They result in the dissociation of state power in Russia from the negative figures of the ‘corrupted’ oligarchs. Thus Putin never identifies his personal affiliations with any of the existent parties and movements. even with those declaring themselves as pro-Putin. Kasyanov and other politicians promoted to the highest executive structure of Russian power could have said very little to the majority of the Russian population in the time of the Putin’s political growth. However. The detachment of the object of Russian power from any figures engaged with the disposition of Yeltsin’s epoch is strengthened by the maximal de-personification of the executive power. these initiatives are highly effective. since now the widest sector of this ‘majority’ receives a suitable representative. gains its discursive possibility. precisely this personnel policy makes it possible for the state power to represent the wide popular demands raised in the antagonistic confrontation with the ‘enemies’. it is simply necessary to say that as a component of a hegemonic operation. as the Russian President equips the new Government with faces absolutely unknown before.252 to a radical transformation or even disappearance of some of them. However.

which he widely advertises: ‘I would like to speak about one more major subject. I am convinced that the development of society is inconceivable without accord on the common goals.41 Above all. at the beginning of the 2000s Putin obviously became one of the most popular politicians in Russia. he connects this proposal with the particular concepts of broad ‘social agreement’ and ‘common goals’.businessmen. 41 42 . confronting the brutal expansion of terrorism.’40 By promoting the popular character of the state power in Russia. As a matter of fact. ‘The State of Russia: A Way to an Effective State’. […] A policy based on open and honest relations of the state with society will protect us from repeating past mistakes and will become the fundamental condition for a new social agreement’.253 organism. The people who regard it as their home. On this occasion some authors even introduce the 40 Putin. and makes his political enterprise highly inclusive and popular. This lays the foundation for the successful hegemonic move undertaken by the Vladimir Putin. Ibid.will deeply feel our responsibility to the country…’. Any power. Their prosperity and befitting life is the main task of power. the power structures and all citizens . Ibid. But Russia is above all its people. into a project uniting the wide range of Russia’s population under the leadership of the state power with the President at its top.42 These declarations make the policy of the ‘strong state’. the proliferation of poverty and further disintegration of the society. in the direct sense of this word. Putin includes in his project numerous particular ‘struggles for Russia’ which have flourished in the last decade of the 20th century. The Russian President directly calls for this inclusion: ‘We must do everything so that we all .

254 term putinomania to indicate the degree of public sympathy towards the Russian President. On special occasions a visitor could demand a chop [otbivnaya] ‘Boris Berezovskiy’.43 As it is reported. he becomes a successful commercial ‘brand’. Putin becomes a favourite character in poems. or an alcohol free milk-cocktail ‘When Vovochka [diminutive from Vladimir] was a little boy’. 44 Vladimir Pribylovskiy. Moreover. but unfortunately the city officials did not understand the humour and did everything in order to get it to close. the other political forces playing the game of national identification were faced with two options. . p. In fact within the growing success of Putin’s hegemony. songs and other works of the political folk art.was linked to the image of the Russian President. Indeed.from its interior to the menu .44 Losing the ideological battle: the political transformations of the regional ideologues The incredible popularity and inclusiveness of Putin’s project defines its unbeatable advantage in the competition with other identical programmes. the restaurant was very successful. ‘Putinoslavie: Khronika proslavleniy Putina Vladimira Vladimirovicha’ in Rossiya Putina. 43 In Russian the word otbivnaya is used as a synonym of beaten enemy: To make otbivnaya from someone .201. Thus a guest could try a meal ‘The Vertical of the Power’ (Vertikal’ vlasti) consisting of seven pieces of meat according to the number of federal districts introduced by Putin’s federal reform. in Chelyabinsk some students opened a restaurant called ‘Putin’. for instance. pp. probably being afraid that Putin himself would not like it. beat him down. In this place everything .

the movements that in the 1990s formed the opposition to Russian state power . Along with deliberately ignoring formal politics. Providing a particular response to the task of looking for a new Russianness in the post-Soviet society. To a certain degree the same destiny was prescribed to the regional ideologues.255 The first one was to go into sharp opposition to the new Russian President. this option was taken by the NBP. In the end such a position drove the national-bolsheviks to the extreme margin of the political field. plus some former allies of the KPRF in the People’s Patriotic Union of Russia. the OVR and all its organisational components – became loyal supporters of Vladimir Putin. personally. a part of the Motherland and. Thus by the presidential elections of 2004. The same marginalisation struck the RNE and other extreme nationalists who did not manage either to propose their own representatives in the electoral circles of the 2000s or to delegate their support to the ones coming from the other sectors.the LDPR. In the clearest manner. Dmitriy Rogozin. since the boycotting of any elections became their official policy by the mid-2000s. they lost their individuality in the highly inclusive project of the new Russian President. The other option opened in the new political arena was to join Putin’s struggle for the ‘strong state’. Looking at the arrangement of Russian public debates in the first half of the 2000s it is possible to say that many of the forces leading various struggles for the Russian nation indeed fell into the hegemonising stream of Putin’s policies. which takes the example of the Kubanian Governor: […] Kondratenko had nothing to put up against Putin […] Both of them applied the ideas of mobilising the bureaucratic apparatus and the population […] Kondratenko defended the . in one of his latest articles. It is rather interesting how Magomedov reflects on the procedure. articulating the programme of ‘Russia without Putin’. their political demands were also expressed by voting ‘against all candidates’.

to becoming its loyal supporters. In the same way the Russians supported Putin […] The mobilisation and consolidation of the Russian society around the figure of the future president under the slogans ‘The Fatherland is in danger’ was achieved […] Then there was a shift in the public consciousness of the Russians: for millions of citizens Putin became a kind of a doctor playing the role of ‘defender’ of the people and fighter against terrorism […] Pulling the public sympathy towards himself. . the regional ideologies. politika. In this situation.). Luzhkov clearly demonstrates that he is ‘on the one side’ with the new Russian President. 2000). contradicting each other in their separate existence. his place of the ‘people’s defender’ has become occupied. Being transformed from the forces oppositional to the Federal state power into the participants in the latter’s own struggle.256 Kubanians from the external symbols of evil: ‘world backstage [zakulisa]’. asking: ‘Why shouldn’t I be a friend of Putin?’46 And in his latest book he openly declares his devotion to the President’s policy. It seems that the Kubanian leader […] has understood that. both governors move from clear opposition to the Federal power. Putin ‘rendered naked’ the charisma of Kondratenko and narrowed the latter’s field of public politics. Moscow oligarchs. the regional ideologies lose their discursive independence and become highly subordinated to the regularities of the ‘strong state’ discourse.128. uncontrolled migration. 46 ‘Yuriy Luzhkov: “pochemu by mne ne druzhit’ s putinym?”’ in Komsomol’skaya pravda. p. 2002) 115-147. vlast’ (Moscow: INION RAN. with the emergence of Putin. The very title of this book is rather interesting: ‘A way to an Effective State’ – a copy from 45 Arbakhan Magomedov. ‘Politicheskoe liderstvo i formirovanie regional’nykh partiynykh sistem v sovremennoy Rossii’ in Natalya Lapina (ed. find themselves on the same side of the discursive frontier and become equivalent participants in the unified project driven by the Russian President. Regional’nye protsessy v sovremennoy Rossii: ehkonomika. Yeltsin’s policy.45 Once covered by Putin’s struggle. (June 18.

It's true. will support you. then we. 48 The structural subordination of the struggle for the Russian nation to Putin’s project of ‘strong state’-building pushes away the strategic relevance of the regional responses to the post-Soviet identity crisis. we. In order to demonstrate the peculiarities of this attack. the Kubanians. the Kubanians.47 Kondratenko. there was a talk like this. if in real life you conduct a policy considering the national interests. we will come to Moscow’ […] Vladimir Vladimirovich looked at me and said: ‘Well. admiring the fact of Putin’s attention to his problems. Thus.257 Putin’s key speech. also demonstrates his loyalty to the new Russian President. Putin’s administrative reform: losing administrative resources The crucial matter in Putin’s reforms is the policy of ‘strengthening vertical power’. I mean not only the Russians. I said: Vladimir Vladimirovich. but all indigenous people. despite his sharp confrontation with the ‘Zionist Government’. 2003). which have resulted in the discrediting of the ‘intermediate’ subject position of the highest regional authority. Put’ k effektivnomu gosudarstvu. 48 Nikolay Kondratenko. 2002). reflecting on his meeting with the President he says: In Sochi. having a cup of tea with the President of Russia. The ideological attack on regional ideologies becomes strengthened by some institutional transformations. Plan preobrazovaniya sistemy gosudarstvennoy vlasti I upravleniya v Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Moscow: MGU. ‘Nas razdelyayut nashi vragi’ in Zavtra (March 27. . thanks for this at least’. leading towards the gradual reduction in the status of the heads of regional 47 Yuriy Luzhkov. Even if your rivals will place an obstruction in front of you. some issues in Putin’s administrative reforms are to be visited in detail below.

In general this issue is discussed in: Robert W. 50 Alexandr Tsipko. this body of the parliament was formed by governors and leaders of regional legislatures. Previously. The first one is the construction of the system of federal districts. 2000). The second attack on the institutional benefits of the regional leaders is shown in the actual removal of governors from active participation in the political life of the state. 2000. . like governors.258 administrations. this initiative leads to the actual removal of governors from direct 49 The decree from May 13. introduced in 2000. 2003).jamestown. Putin suggests the equipment of this chamber with the professional senators elected separately in the regions. This reduction. available at: http://www. To a certain extent the heads of the Federal districts become the ‘tsar’s eyes’50 in the Russian provinces. is shown in several initiatives include in Putin’s federal reforms. become the instance observing the activities of the regional leaders and relaying the wishes of the President directly to the administrations of the Russian territories. issue 11 (November 28. Dynamics of Russian politics : Putin’s federal-regional reforms (Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield.49 These districts are supposed to form the intermediate level of power between regions and the Federal centre. The heads of the newly created institutions. their presence becomes a serious factor in limiting governors in their decisions. ‘Putin rebuilds a unitary state in Russia’ in Prism. 6. 2003). Although formally the appointees have not much power over the This initiative gets developed in the project of reforming the Council of Federation. Once adopted.htm (as of October 20. Orttung and Peter Reddaway (eds. seriously limiting their capacities to conduct a ‘regionally specific’ struggle. Rejecting this principle.). but directly appointed by the President. in fact. vol. The heads of these districts are not elected.

these factors condition the gradual decline of the regional ideologies in Russia in the beginning of the 2000s and the political defeat of the regional ideologues. . This campaign results in the revision of numerous regional laws. this disconnects them from a significant channel through which they might promote their political programmes. in its turn. The laws fixing the differences between a particular region and the rest of Russia’s population have become one of the main targets of this revision.259 participation in the process of law-making. The policies of restricting the institutional resources of governors’ power find their further translation in the well-advertised campaign of making regional legislation correspond to the Federal. 51 Valid for October 13. According to this law the President of the Russian Federation obtains the right to dismiss any elected governor. a channel which. The third innovation of Putin’s reforms as regards the elimination of the institutional base of the regional ideologues. in fact. eliminate the institutional grounds for the social continuity of the regional ideologies. These transformations. albeit through an application to the procurator’s offices. Together with the structural subordination of these projects to Putin’s programme of ‘strong state’-building. Although until now51 no governor has been sacked by the President. 2003. As a matter of fact. 2001. is expressed in the law signed by Putin on February 1. the very legal possibility makes the leaders of the regional administrations much more careful in their expression of the ‘Russia’s one true will’. clearly follows Putin’s intention of restricting the governors’ to ‘building roads’ – the purely economic affairs of the regions.

but keeps up his engagement with the strategic struggle for the ‘Russian nation’. 127. representing the CPRF Kondratenko does not articulate any ideas of regional exceptionality anymore. This devotion cropped up in 2003. p. He almost completely takes the regional theme out of his political language and ‘returns’ to the situation of dislocation. Despite a massive social request. strangely. in his aforementioned article published in 2002: ‘[…] today his [Kondratenko] role in the political life of the region is visibly decreasing’. However. Thus. explaining his decision. when 52 Magomedov. persistently stressing. he was included in the Federal election list of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. as having to do with ‘health problems’. he rose to number two in this list. The Kubanian regional theme appears to be employed by Alexander Tkachev. . Kondratenko no longer enters any serious public debates. Tkachev widely refers to the identity of the ‘Kubanian people’. He withdrew his candidature from the next election for Governor. ‘Politicheskoe liderstvo i formirovanie regional’nykh partiynykh sistem’. the ‘Zionist threat’ to the ‘Russian nation’. Nikolay Kondratenko left public politics. in his latest appearances. In the electoral campaign of the forthcoming parliamentary elections.260 Facing the impossibility of competing with Putin’s programme of building the ‘strong state’. and being incapable of organising a strong protest movement to defend his political proposals. for example. of 2000. As Magomedov says. in his unexpected return to public politics. Moreover. in the position of the Kubanian Governor. Kondratenko did not change his decision to leave. Although he kept his position as a ‘professional senator’ in the Council of Federation for the next couple of years. expressed in numerous ‘letters from the people’ and voiced in a number of meetings organised to indicate public support for his candidature. the descendant of Nikolay Kondratenko.52 Thus Kondratenko has lost the institutional grounds for conducting his tactical struggle as a Kubanian father.

html (as of August 20.54 In ‘Kuban’ segodnya . In general the new Kubanian Governor defines his political mission as ‘patriotic’. the new Kubanian Governor seriously revises the regional idea inherited from his predecessor. ‘V budushschee Kubani smotryu s optimizmom’.kuban. ‘V budushchee Kubani smotryu s optimizmom’ in Volnaya Kuban’ (September 11. 1993). 1993). This revision is triggered by the different ideological context of the Tkachev political enterprise.53 Speaking about the Meskhetian Turks he adds: ‘It looks like the traditions of these people to a certain degree differ from those of the multinational Kubanian people’.55 However. In the entire corpus of his speeches there is not one single reference either to the problem of the ‘Zionism’ or to the tasks in the struggle of the ‘Russian nation’. available at: with all our Kubanian people. Tkachev is obviously indifferent to the struggle with the ‘Zionist threat’ and is not that inspired by the idea of ‘reviving the Russian nation’. but patriotism is seen ‘not as declarations from pedestals [s tribun] but a concrete business aimed at improving the living standards of our compatriots [although under compatriots Tkachev means first of all regional population]. we will overcome this disaster.261 advocating his political proposals. . it is possible to point at the speech made by Tkachev on the occasion of the flood-damage to many districts of the krai. 54 Anatoliy Mel’nikov. available at: http://admkrai.kuban. ‘The Kubanians are a talented people […]’ says the new head of the kray administration.56 As a matter of fact. at the beginning of the 2002: ‘Altogether. 56 Tkachev. in one of his addresses.odna bol’shaya stroyposhchadka’ at The Official Web Page of the Administration of Krasnodar kray. And Kuban has all the conditions for its further development’.html (as of August 20. this common trouble’. economic development 53 Alexander Tkachev. 2002). ‘Vmeste protiv bedy’ at The Official Web Page of the Administration of Krasnodar kray. 55 Alexander Tkachev.

2003) organised and led by the Krasnodar regional administration and Tkachev personally. In the absence of the strategic devotion to the confrontation with the ‘Zionists’. Formulating the tasks for the future and reflecting on the things done. .58 Where Kondratenko accused foreign capital of ‘capturing’ Russia and Kuban’. 57 For the year 2001 Tkachev himself estimates these investments as amounting to 60. As a result. One may mention that in the years of Tkachev’s governance Krasnodar kray has experienced an incredible increase in investments coming from Moscow and foreign companies.7 billion roubles.59 Moreover.262 constitutes the cornerstone of Tkachev’s political project. moreover. he does not list the ‘battles’ won and lost to the enemies. but points to the numbers as regards the economic growth of his region: the number of registered firms and enterprises. Tkachev personally promotes his region in Moscow and abroad. 59 Tkachev. In the situation where the task of further development is articulated as the main one. Tkachev proudly says: ‘There are more than 300 joint enterprises on the territory of the kray. which had been constructed in the region. 58 One may refer to the Economic forum Kuban’-2002. and The Days the Krasnodar krai in Germany (March. he seeks support there. visiting investments fares and economic forums. quantity of investments etc. responding to one of the questions. Among the biggest one may cite “Chevron”. as it is from Moscow that the investments or state protection are coming. ‘V budushchee smotryu s optimizmom’. becomes unproductive. as his predecessor did. which is approximately 2 billions of dollars (Tkachev: “V budushschee Kubani smotryu s optimizmom”). “Philip Morris”.57 Moreover. “Knauf”’. amount of harvest. Tkachev never opposes himself to ‘Moscow’ and. the opposition between the ‘Zionist centre’ and the ‘only true’ Russia. Tkachev is not interested in the idea of Kuban’ as it had been articulated by his predecessor.

. But what about the economic security of Krasnodar krai? [Tkachev]: […] I am not worried about this. Alexander Tkachev: “Nel’zya vse regiony strich’ pod odny grebenku …”’ in Kubanskie novosti (July 5.61 In the context of this policy ‘Kuban’’ ceases to replace ‘Russia’ for Tkachev and again becomes one of its regions. Deripaska has invested […] 100 million roubles [3.263 addressed to the Kubanian governor by his compatriot. I hear that Deripaska has already bought the entire Ust-Labinsk district. He does not kick people out from kolkhoz. especially if we take into account that we speak not about buying but about renting the land. [The question]: […] The Kubanian lands are actively bought by Russia’s oligarchic structures. develops the economy of Kuban’’. 2003). We are glad to see those investors who come to the krai with money. ‘Kuban’ is a strategic region of Russia’62. as khozyaystvennik experiences. pays taxes to the regional budget. budem. under Moscow’s thumb. 2002). ‘Krasnodar kray is one of the most significant regions of Russia’64 - 60 ‘Gubernator Krasnodarskogo kraya Alexander Tkachev: Kuban’ stanovitsya interesna miru . in a rather harsh way.60 And in another part of the same interview Tkachev advances this theme even further: ‘We have to open our potential to the whole world […] Why it is bad when an investor builds a factory on Kuban’? He gives jobs. ‘Kuban’ .3 millions of dollars] in the district. zhit’ luchshe’ in Komsomol’skaya pravda .znachit. the holding is run by a respectable person. ‘Kuban’ is a special region’63. distances himself from the isolationist ideas of his predecessor. Aren't we going to stay with nothing. 61 Ibid. 62 63 2002).strategicheskiy region Rossii’ in Kubanskie novosti (September 25.Kuban’ (July 23. the material basis of the enterprises gets improved. this is almost the yearly budget of Ust’-Labinsk. Tkachev.

it means that there are other entities of the same kind. rather than the unique material incarnation of the desired Russia. Luzhkov lives through Putin’s reforms in a different way than Kondratenko did. Unlike Kondratenko.the amount of investments. . ‘the most …’. ‘the best …’ etc. ‘We are glad to notice that our krai is among a number of regions [emphasis added] which are developing in the most dynamic way’67 etc. Although for him Kuban’ is a ‘special region’. for example. ‘Kuban’ has a fertile soil’66.. ‘V budushchee Kubani smotryu s optimizmom’ Alexander Tkachev and Vladmir Beketov. If it is the best. Kuban’ finds itself on the same level as Russia’s other territories and to a great extent retains its ‘original’ meaning as an administrative-territorial unit of the state. The ‘only one’ cannot be ‘the best’. 2002). 65 ‘Krasnodarskiy kray . The social exceptionality of Kuban’ becomes reduced to the geographical and economical peculiarities of the territory: ‘Kuban’ is a significant transport junction’. Tkachev employs purely quantitative parameters . However.264 says the new Kubanian Governor. moreover. Or. in the course of his political survival. albeit ‘the best of them’. built houses etc. 2002). The modality of ‘one of’ is evident in the remarks in which Tkachev compares Krasnodar kray with other regions. ‘Kuban’ is situated between two seas’65. By being a region. it is still a region. He keeps his position as Moscow Mayor and.territoriya ehkonomicheskogo rosta’ Tkachev. whose comparison is drawn in the opposition of ‘dead’ and ‘alive’ Russia. the 64 ‘“Krasnodarskiy kray .terriroriya ehkonomicheskogo rosta”: Doklad Aleksandra Tkacheva na ehkonomicheskom forume “Kuban’-2002”’ in Kubanskie novosti (October 5. on the TV show ‘Without a tie’ he stresses that ‘Kuban’ is a Russian region’. ‘On Kuban’ we have grown an incredible harvest’. ‘Slavsya otechestvo nashe svobodnoe’ in Kubanskie 66 67 novosti (June 11. in 2003 he puts forward his candidature for the third term.

pp. there is no reference to ‘Moscow’ as such. only through a careful execution of our laws’70. Luzhkov repeatedly mentions the ‘one-off’ character of Moscow. 2003). earlier to be found in the speeches of the new Kubanian Governor. p. Posobie dlya budushchego mera. Moreover. Ibid. published in 2002. And in the next passage he openly discards his own idea on the economic exceptionality of the Russian capital. but as one out of many subjects of the Federation. More precisely. he even reproduces Putin’s key message. 5. only through the Federation. As has been already mentioned. p. Dvenadtsat’ besed v biblioteke (Moscow: 69 70 Moskovskie uchebniki. Yuriy Luzhkov.68 It is also possible to find that in his latest texts Luzhkov indicates the same symptom of de-ideologising a region. .265 Moscow Mayor in fact changes his political platform and abandons the Moscow regional ideology for the sake of the ‘ideology of the effective state’. in Luzhkov’s The Way to an Effective State. is ‘a subject of Federation’.‘An Instruction for the Next Mayor’. 280.69 In his latest text. It is not surprising that the second chapter of this book is called ‘The ideology of state-building in the new stage of Russian history’. He says: ‘Even now Moscow does not represent an independent actor in the global economy: it belongs there only as a part of Russia. the Moscow Mayor does not regard the capital as the only incarnation of an authentic Russia. As a matter of fact. called . Moreover in the main text of this work he openly declares his devotion to the ideas of state-strengthening. in the title of his book. formulating a new 68 Luzhkov. Put’ k effektivnomu gosudarstvu. The only modality for the region there. 41-48. there is not one single reference to the ‘unique Moscow experience’ and ‘special Moscow interests’ anymore.

in 2001 his political organisation the ‘Fatherland’ founded an alliance with the pro-Putin movement ‘Unity’. The trick in this situation is concealed in the fact that in the elections of 1999 there two competing ‘parties’ . I believe that here Putin means the ‘Unity’ party. Thus.the pro-Putin Unity and the oppositional ‘Fatherland Whole Russia’. it is necessary to state that due to his status of being the ‘defeated’. and the remark itself indicates the distribution of roles in the new political party. This decline of Luzhkov’s regional political project is indicated even in the media loyal to the Moscow Mayor. ‘Vechno molodoy. This integration has resulted in the creation of the new block ‘United Russia’. has a place which is quite far away from the top of its power hierarchy. in which Luzhkov. vechno trezvyi’ in Moskovskiy komsomolets (September 21. where it is ‘Unity’ which is assumed to be the political and institutional axis of the new party.266 regional idea: ‘Moscow is not an “island of stability”. purposeful but not “bolshevik” reforms’71. Thus even Moskovskiy komsomolets questions the relevance of Luzhkov’s political experience in the beginning of the 2000s: ‘Now even Luzhkov himself does not know why he came to power’. Having put the Moscow regional ideology aside from the main line of his new political programme. Putin makes a speech where he says: ‘In the last elections I voted for your party’. Luzhkov does not receive any leading positions in this project. It is rather remarkable to note that before the parliamentary elections of 2003. Luzhkov appears capable of integrating his struggle into the project of ‘strong state’-building. honestly saying. However.72 71 Ibid. during the last twelve years Moscow was a bridgehead for decisive. on the occasion of the congress of the ‘United Russia’. 2001). 72 .

267 Conclusion to Chapter 5 In such a way it is possible to conclude that the transformations of the Russian political scene in the beginning of the 2000s seriously affected development of the regional ideologies. which had dominated political debates in the 1990s. The prospects of its ideological inclusion together with effective institutional limitations of governors’ power made Yuriy Luzhkov and Nokolay Kondratenko incapable of maintaining their struggles for an ideal Russia built in frames of a separate region. ethnic and economical nationalism. these projects failed to contribute to consolidation of wider political projects of. As a result. Due to the aforementioned limits of the regional imaginiaries articulated by the regional ideologues. regional ideologies as programmes aimed at shaping the imaginary communities of particular regions. the time when these lines were written. Forming dis-attached parts of these rather disorganised projects they failed to enter an adequately competition with the growing programme of the strong state building. . they put aside regional ideas as the key points of their political programmes. articulated by the new Russian President. This permits the conclusion that by the mid-2000s. respectively. arrived at their historical defeat.

but represents a rather complex phenomenon. 2. responsible for the failure of the identities. They depart from the dislocation of the existing identities of the regional ideologies and end up in the discursive construction of a new. in other words. 4. This step completes the articulation of the antagonistic situation. The empirical research undertaken as part of this project demonstrates that the regional ideologies. regional identity. This recruitment is the process of creating social identities. 3. An articulation of the strategic struggle aiming at retaining the social objectivity of the lost identities of the politicians. The analysis of the two Russian regional ideologies demonstrates that this process is. selected for detailed investigation. This component empties the domains of self-identity and sets the scene for an articulation of the situation of social antagonism. or steps: 1. consist of a subsequent chain of articulations. not given in a simple Athusserian ‘interpellation’ of individuals. preventing them from ‘being themselves’. An identification of a particular subject position occupied by the actors in confrontation with the ‘enemy’. Naming an enemy. or. . An articulation of the dislocation preventing the actors from achieving their identities. however. This process includes seven components.268 CONCLUSION Ideology has the power to shape society by recruiting individuals into a certain imaginary unity.

decay and collapse of the national economy Naming the ‘enemy’: The ‘failed-reformers’ Articulation of the strategic struggle: restoring a ‘proper economy’ Articulation of the subject position occupied in the strategic struggle: the Moscow Mayor Proposal of the tactical struggle in accordance with the occupied subject position: construction of the ‘economic oasis’ in Moscow Articulation of the nodal point. A designation of a particular subject position for the ‘regionality’ offered for occupation. Specifying the tactics in order to conduct the strategic struggle in accordance with the occupied subject positions. in the strategic struggle: The Kubanians. or components.269 5. fixing the tactical struggle: Kuban’ is the only (authentic) Russia Articulation of the subject position offered for occupation. may be depicted in the following table: Table 1. the Kubanian people The Muscovite regional ideology of Yuriy Luzhkov Articulation of the dislocation: The crisis. An articulation of the regional idea. in the articulated struggle. These ideas displayed the capacity to fix the tactical struggle by giving it a . These steps. 7. serving as a nodal point fixing a particular strategy in relation to the struggle.the ‘last redoubt of Russianness’ Articulation of the nodal point. fixing the tactical struggle: Moscow is the ideal Russia Articulation of the subject position offered for occupation. 6. The components of the Kubanian and the Muscovite regional ideologies The Kubanian regional ideology of Nikolay Kondratenko Articulation of the dislocation: The collapse of the national authenticity of the society Naming the ‘enemy’: The ‘Zionists’ Articulation of the strategic struggle: restoring the ‘Russian nation’ Articulation of the subject position occupied in the strategic struggle: the ‘Kubanian father’ Proposal of the tactical struggle in accordance with the occupied subject position: restoration of Russian national authenticity to Kuban’ and defending this . in the strategic struggle: The Muscovites Within this structure it appears possible to respond to the question of how regional ideas became constitutive points in the political programmes of some Russian politicians.

in the new Russian state.of retaining the lost identities . governed by the idea of the regional dissemination of power. Within the framework of this process. in its different translations.towards the strategies of ‘region-based’ struggle with the antagonists. adopted in the Soviet Union. This conditions . However. This context consists of two main components. Once occupied. was influenced by a specific arrangement in the discursive context of these ideological projects. This. It is the dislocation of this discourse. the question of how the idea of a region came to dominate the search for a new identity. provided the regional ideologues with the ‘points of departure’ for their political enterprises. create the basis for Kondratenko’s identity as ‘Russian’. a question which inspired this research. which become the subject positions employed by the politicians in their ‘tactical’ struggle. in its turn. which.270 material shape and by opening the possibility for an institutionalisation of this struggle in ‘material’ policies. prepares the ground for the forthcoming emergence of social antagonism. 1. the positions of the Heads of regional administrations. The discourse of Federation-building. while Luzhkov’s identity as ‘manager’ was brought into being by the normative and institutional organisation of the Soviet economy. in the time of post-Soviet social transformations. that triggers a search for new frameworks of social unity. Soviet discourse. The Soviet theory of ethnos and the praxis of ‘ethnic disposition’. 2. resulting in the articulation of regional identities. which had been constituted within the Soviet discourse. are created. requires additional clarification. these positions direct the programmes . These points are their ‘original’ subject positions. translated in the impossibility of the political actors achieving their identities. The filling of the nodal point with a particular content.

The discursive context of the regional ideologies may be presented in the form of the following table: .271 the emergence of the ‘region-based’ proposals to reconstruct the ‘national arrangement’ and ‘economy’ precisely in terms of this discourse of Federation building. which sets the perspective of institutionalising the social projects of the regional ideologies. in the governed subjects of Federation.

‘Russian’ Dislocation (intervention of the non-discursive): The impossibility of reaching the identity of ‘Russian’ Articulation of dislocation: The collapse of the national authenticity of the society Naming the ‘enemy’: ‘The Zionists’ Articulation of the strategic struggle: restoring the ‘Russian nation’ Articulation of dislocation: The crisis. education and social services. the structure of economic activity and the identity of ‘manager’ (khozyaystvennik) Dislocation (intervention of the non-discursive): Impossibility of reaching the identity of ‘manager’ Russia’s discourse of Federation building: the ideas of separation of power between the Federal centre and the subjects of Federation and the position of the Head of the regional administration Articulation of the subject position occupied in the strategic struggle: the ‘Kubanian father’ Proposal of a tactical struggle: restoring the Russian national authenticity in Kuban and defending this the ‘last redoubt of Russianness’ Articulation of the nodal point. the Kubanian people Russia’s discourse of Federation building: the idea of the separation of power between the Federal centre and the subjects of Federation and the position of the Head of a regional administration Constitution of the Moscow regional discourse: Introduction of the system of institutional privileges to the Muscovites and discrimination against the peoplefrom-other-sites: freedom of choosing a place to live. access to jobs. decay and collapse of the national economy naming the ‘enemy’: The ‘failed-reformers’ Articulation of the strategic struggle: restoring the ‘proper economy’ Articulation of the subject position occupied in the strategic struggle: the Moscow Mayor Proposal of a tactical struggle: construction of the ‘economic oasis’ in Moscow The Soviet discourse: Soviet economic theory. fixing the tactical struggle: Kuban’ is the only (proper) Russia Articulation of the subject position offered for occupation in the strategic struggle: The Kubanians. freedom of movement.272 Table 2. Constitution of the Kubanian regional discourse: Introduction of the system of institutional privileges to the Kubanians and discrimination towards the people-from-othersites: freedom of choosing a place to live. the ideas as to the national disposition of the society and the identity . fixing the tactical struggle: Moscow is the ideal Russia Articulation of the subject position offered for occupation in the strategic struggle: The Muscovites . The regional ideologies. commercial interactions with real estate Articulation of the nodal point. construction of regional discourses and their discursive context Discursive context The Kubanian regional ideology and the construction of the Kubanian regional discourse Articulation of the ‘original’ self-identity: a Russian The Muscovite regional ideology and the construction of the Moscow regional discourse Articulation of the ‘original’ self-identity: a manager Discursive context The Soviet discourse: Soviet theory of ethnos.

is defined by the interplay of the individual experience of the ideologues and the institutional context of the new Russian state-building. At least we know what we have lost. since even small fluctuations may grow and change the overall structure. at other times. They did not manage to win the battle to set the new framework for social unity and were defeated by the successful hegemony of the new Russian President and his programme of ‘strong state-building’. and in the end .1 1 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers. On the other hand. this is also a threat. We know that such systems are highly sensitive to fluctuations. this does not undermine the value of the research. let us conclude our endeavour with the words of Prigogine and Stengers who say: We know now that societies are immensely complex systems involving a potentially enormous number of bifurcations exemplified by the variety of cultures that have evolved in the relatively short span of human history. Due to many circumstances outlined in the previous chapters. precisely this response will dominate the search for a new identity in a dis-identified society. individual activity is not doomed to insignificance. but perhaps only the same feeling of qualified hope that some Talmudic texts [the ones mentioned in the preamble of our thesis] appear to have attributed to the God of Genesis. Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (London: Fontana Paperbacks. permanent rules seems gone forever. Order out of Chaos. p. and their particular character. We are living in a dangerous and uncertain world that inspires no blind confidence. 1985).who knows maybe in other circumstances. 313. . In this regard. since in our universe the security of stable. This leads both to hope and a threat: hope. However. As a result. these responses did not appear to be satisfactory for the majority in Russia.273 Thus we see how particular responses to the task of re-identification were developed. The given research demonstrates that the emergence of regional ideologies in postSoviet Russia. in other places.

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Krasnodar kray .294 APPENDIX Map 1.

Moscow .295 Map 2.

296 Statistics: Ivan V. . 2004. University of Essex Words: 70.530 with footnotes As of August 11. Gololobov REGIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA: IN SEARCH OF A POSTSOVIET IDENTITY A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Government. 643 without footnotes 82.

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