This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
Psychopolitics: Peter Sedgwick’s legacy for the politics of mental health
Mark Cresswella,* and Helen Spandlerb
a Sociology, School of Applied Social Sciences, Durham University, 32 Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HN, UK. E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org b Department of Social Work, University of Central Lancashire, Preston PR1 2HE, UK. E-mail: email@example.com
Keywords: social movements; crisis tendencies; mental health; anti-psychiatry; political alliances
Introduction: Peter Sedgwick and Psychopolitics
Peter Sedgwick (1934–1983)1 was a Marxist, a trained psychologist and the translator of the revolutionary Victor Serge (1963). Unlike most Marxists, Sedgwick took a personal and political interest in the fields of psychiatry and mental health, bringing his ‘great wit, compassion and political precision’ (Widgery, 1991) to bear on a historically neglected field: the welfare of the
r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health www.palgrave-journals.com/sth/ Vol. 7, 2, 129–147
Abstract This paper re-considers the relevance of Peter Sedgwick’s Psychopolitics (1982) for a politics of mental health. Psychopolitics offered an indictment of ‘antipsychiatry’ the failure of which, Sedgwick argued, lay in its deconstruction of the category of ‘mental illness’, a gesture that resulted in a politics of nihilism. ‘The radical who is only a radical nihilist’, Sedgwick observed, ‘is for all practical purposes the most adamant of conservatives’. Sedgwick argued, rather, that the concept of ‘mental illness’ could be a truly critical concept if it was deployed ‘to make demands upon the health service facilities of the society in which we live’. The paper contextualizes Psychopolitics within the ‘crisis tendencies’ of its time, surveying the shifting welfare landscape of the subsequent 25 years alongside Sedgwick’s continuing relevance. It considers the dilemma that the discourse of ‘mental illness’ – Sedgwick’s critical concept – has fallen out of favour with radical mental health movements yet remains paradigmatic within psychiatry itself. Finally, the paper endorses a contemporary perspective that, while necessarily updating Psychopolitics, remains nonetheless ‘Sedgwickian’. Social Theory & Health (2009) 7, 129–147. doi:10.1057/sth.2009.7
1976). 1 – Signifying a British context that had witnessed the end of the ‘long boom’ of post-war affluence predicated upon the emergence of the welfare state (see Coates. and (iii) a crisis of psychiatric legitimacy. 7. while in certain respects history has problematized this critique – and we specify that problematization – Sedgwick’s approach to questions of political strategy retains its value today. his critical focus turned to the conservative undercurrents of the radical theorists associated with 1960s ‘antipsychiatry’ (for example.Cresswell and Spandler Historicizing Psychopolitics Sedgwick (1955) first deployed the term ‘psychopolitics’ in the 1950s when criticizing the tendency to explain away political activism via individual psychology. 2. 1972. Rowbotham et al. the penultimate section explores the value of his critique in the contemporary context. The 130 A U r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 TH O Social Theory & Health Vol. drawing attention to the ways in which communist sympathizers had been pathologized in the West. while updating Psychopolitics. Viewed in this way. The final section argues the case for a politics of mental health which. each axis signifying certain ‘crisis tendencies’ of his time (see Habermas. Psychopolitics sums up this analysis. which sought to dismantle that state while simultaneously exposing it to the ‘chill winds of market forces’ (see Gamble. The next section historicizes Psychopolitics within the British context of the 1980s. 129–147 R ‘mentally ill’. 2007). Jurgen Habermas’s notion of ‘crisis tendencies’ (1976) is deployed to specify Sedgwick’s critique in terms of. C O PY . We argue that. This critique. 1975). three ‘crises’: (i) a crisis of British welfarism. The paper is structured in the following way. Sedgwick understood any human experience as combining the personal and the political and carried over that perspective into his analysis of psychiatry. Sedgwick. Given that Sedgwick’s work is historically specified. 1991) and the rise of a ‘New Right’. 1980). Later. while nevertheless insisting upon a humanistic appreciation of mental distress. respectively. is posited as transecting these crises. embodied in the figure of Margaret Thatcher. this paper re-evaluates Sedgwick’s contribution and re-considers the implications of his critique for a contemporary politics of mental health. Like the contributions of second-wave feminism (for example. 1990). Using his book Psychopolitics (1982) as the stem text. Psychopolitics transects three inter-woven axes. He took seriously the value of political theory for understanding this field. 1973. Axis no. which is outlined in the subsequent section. The historical specificity of the book is central to its understanding so that any attempt to re-consider it requires its contextualization as the political critique it was doubtless intended to be. remains nonetheless ‘Sedgwickian’ (Spandler. (ii) a crisis of Leftwing politics.
2001). was intervening upon similar terrain and responding to particular problematics within the organized Left of his day. then. 2 signifies a Crisis of the Left. which had become fractured with the rise of the ‘New Right’ and the calling into question by social movements of a ‘class-first’ policy insensitive to emerging identity-claims (see Hall. then. 7. 182) to one situated at the interface of the state and civil society. In an important sense.D. To fully situate Psychopolitics within debates on the Left.Peter Sedgwick’s legacy for the politics of mental health subsequent Crisis of Welfarism heralded the marketization of welfare (see Leys. including mental health movements. 1967) and the emerging ‘patient’s movement’ represented by such groups as the Mental Patient’s Union (see Crossley. 2005) – was becoming. Laing (for example. 1976. If Axis no. Lynne Segal and Hilary Wainwright’s (1980) Beyond the Fragments. demands which. The notion of ‘crisis tendencies’ refers to that dynamic within advanced capitalism (Habermas. apropos Habermas’s later amendments (1981). as a sub-species of social crises. Axis no. but are. in the case considered here. 1 signifies a crisis in British welfarism. 3 – Signifying the field of mental health politics and the emergence of social movements organizing around themes of human distress. the rise of new social movements. A r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 U TH O R C O PY Social Theory & Health Vol. Legitimation crises. and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Laclau and Mouffe. a legitimation crisis is a crisis of a democratic polity. Stuart Hall’s (1979) ‘The great moving right show’. 33–94) for ‘system crises’ to undergo a displacement from their economic ‘base’ (Marx. crises at the level of social integration. both a contested and visible ‘field’ (Crossley. Spandler. 1968. arise insofar as the democratic outputs of the state fail to meet the democratic demands of civil society. p. are stimulants of legitimation crises to the extent that. Axis no. 2. 1984). movement-articulated demands are precisely those demands for democratic outputs from psychiatry. Axis no. Sheila Rowbotham. 1996). to a large extent. 2006a. Such contestation signifies what may be called the Crisis of Psychiatric Legitimation. pp. b). do not threaten the capitalist system as such. a calling into question of its democratic status. 129–147 131 . in an era of ‘community care’. Sedgwick was fully au fait with both the counter-cultural phenomenon of ‘anti-psychiatry’ associated with the figure of R. pp. welfare state intervention triggered in the first place (Offe. 2006). 2 – Signifying a context of Left-wing activism. Such developments ensured that psychiatric power – hidden for so long behind the ‘gigantic water-tower’ of the Asylum age (see Bell and Lindley (eds. considered as a welfare state apparatus. As Crossley (2005. it is necessary to note that it appeared within a time span which also included Eric Hobsbawm’s (1978) ‘The forward march of Labour halted’. rather.). Such ‘social crises’. 2006a. 40–50) points out. which psychiatry is frequently unable to meet. Sedgwick. in contrast to ‘system crises’. 1985).
1). For. PY . pp. he evaluates a number of radical critics of psychiatry (the ‘anti-psychiatrists’) and finds them guilty of insinuating into psychiatric debates a nihilistic form of critique. 2) while never losing sight of the wider context beyond. Sedgwick rejects the mind–body duality upon which their ‘psycho-medical dualism’ 132 A U r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 TH O R C Social Theory & Health Vol. 3 – the field of political action ‘in and against’ psychiatry (‘psychopolitics’) – is always the foregrounded axis so that the elucidation of a distinct ‘psychopolitics’ constitutes the books most lasting achievement. Goffman et al. Sedgwick is not offering a philosophy of psychiatry here in the analytical vein (for example. This move proves decisive because. 3). Sedgwick advances a definition of mental illness. he is also able to specify these tendencies both for the mental health field (Axis no. in the next section. Sedgwick’s analysis is exemplary. On the other hand. 7. his rejection of psycho-medical dualism in favour of the unitary conception of illness noted above. Not only is he sensitive to these crisis tendencies at the interface of the state and civil society (Axis no. Laing (1967).Cresswell and Spandler Central Critique of Psychopolitics Psychopolitics may be divided into three parts. specifically. are Erving Goffman (1961). we must not misconstrue his philosophical discourse. It is only within the overall context of the ‘great moving right show’ and the urgent tasks faced by the organized Left in an era of both Right-wing resurgence and proliferating identity-claims. 3) and for Left-wing activism within it (Axis no. operating within a Marxist tradition of social critique (Marx. Accordingly. the explication of Axes 1 and 2 is absolutely necessary to the critique insofar as it contextualizes the significance of this specific ‘field of contention’. 2. 43–65). in Psychopolitics these axes interweave in the following way. Axis no. These ‘ideological celebrities’. Having despatched these critics in turn. First. Fulford et al. He thus adopts a unitary conception of illness beneath which is subsumed both physical and mental aspects. 2003).D. Sedgwick finally considers the current state of ‘psychopolitics’ itself along with its future prospects. Sedgwick offers a distinctively political epistemology (Lecourt. 1975) of the concept of ‘illness’. R. Rather. In order to grasp the value of Sedgwick’s critique. to the details of Sedgwick’s critique. but the upshot must. 129–147 O In this respect. The minutiae of this argument need not detain us. in the second part of the book. contra Laing. We will keep these axes of contextualization always in view as we turn. 1969). that the import of Sedgwick’s analysis fully swings into view. Michel Foucault (2006) and Thomas Szasz (1974). which refuses to erect a strict dualism between mental and physical health. p. which he calls ‘psycho-medical dualism’ (1982. as Sedgwick dubs them (1982.
Sedgwick is pro-medicine precisely to the extent that he envisages a radically socialized medicine applicable equally to physical and mental health. the latter is deviancy labelled by power.. as such. (ibid. Hence.Peter Sedgwick’s legacy for the politics of mental health Sedgwick’s conception is subtle and needs to be carefully rendered. On the other hand. emphasis added) C O PY rests. original emphasis) It is this injunction – that a political epistemology should lead to ‘demands’ – that moves Sedgwick to a decisive indictment of the anti-psychiatrists. for Sedgwick. therefore.). 7. 2. psycho-medical dualism posits medicine as a scientific realm of ‘fact’. (ibid. it is not his intention to disregard its scientific credentials. Thus. neither is he endorsing psychiatry’s epistemological claims. in subsuming a diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’ within the illness framework. which. before anything else. p. rather. the anti-psychiatric critics themselves are wrong when they imagine physical medicine to be essentially different in its logic from psychiatry y mental illnesses can be conceptualized within the disease framework just as easily as physical maladies. takes as its referent the uniqueness of the human mind.. inextricably connected to the conditions of possibility for future political work. the anti-psychiatrists have pointed out that psychopathological categories refer to value judgements and that mental illness is deviancy. This is why Sedgwick’s unitary conception of illness is. 40): I am arguing that without the concept of illness – including that of mental illness y we shall be unable to make demands upon the health service facilities of the society in which we live. In stressing the value-laden-ness of medicine. According to this perspective. Sedgwick works in the opposite conceptual direction to ‘anti-psychiatry’. 39) and ‘the provision of a pure water supply and an efficient sewage disposal’ (ibid. p. which takes as its referent the materiality of the body. there is a world of difference between a value-neutral diagnosis such as ‘diabetes’ and a value-laden one such as ‘schizophrenia’. 129–147 133 A U TH O R [q]uite correctly. a political epistemology and. equally laden with value: .. ‘[t]he insertion of windows into working-class houses’ (ibid. original emphasis) and. At the same time.. he takes its basic motif – that of ‘value-laden-ness’ – and drives it into the heart of medicine itself. 32. For r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. the productiveness of the concept of ‘illness’ resides in the prospect of ‘politicizing medical goals’ (ibid. all illness ‘is essentially deviancy’ (1982. 38. and to this it contraposes psychiatry as a realm of ‘value’. Such examples of socialized medicine include. p. The former is a scientific classification. Briefly. for Sedgwick.
he argued. Sedgwick was equally critical of the ‘considerable crudity’ with which issues of mental health had been politicized by those sections of the Left. Sedgwick remained adamant that the field of mental health must be a site of activity for the organized Left. he did not automatically assume that the resolution of the Crisis of Psychiatric Legitimation would be effected by ‘economistic’ means – say. Such approaches tended to ‘romanticize’ madness. not only does he identify the limitations of ‘antipsychiatry’.. p. than ‘the ritualistic evasion of the serious questions of 134 A U r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 TH O R C O Social Theory & Health PY Vol. He was pessimistic about the prospects of mental health movements acting alone. 129–147 . pp. the radical who is only a radical nihilist y is for most practical purposes the most adamant of conservatives.. their defensive assertion of ‘negative rights’ (ibid. 230). 7. Sedgwick fretted over the ‘extraordinary burden’ such expectations placed upon the mentally ill: they were to be either (i) inserted epiphenomenally into an already given class ideology in which the specific content of their distress was forever elided. or else (ii) co-opted as ‘a cadre in the assemblage of counter-forces y in antagonism to our y oppressive society’ (ibid. he refused to ignore reactionary tendencies among workers and health trade unions in relation to mental health: [t]he mental-health services now comprise a constellation of partial staff interests. At the same time. which sometimes supported ‘anti-psychiatry’ along with its central motifs. pp. they are bereft of any productive demands of their own: [t]he sociological critics of the mental illness concept are y deeply cynical y and the cynic cannot really be a critic. (ibid. reifying the dissident mental patient as a substitute revolutionary force. pp. Despite his own political commitments. p.. Always sensitive to its personal and political aspects. 203). Notwithstanding these reservations..Cresswell and Spandler despite their brilliant deconstructions of ‘schizophrenia’ et al. 218–221) amounted to nothing more. but also he is critical of the organized Left’s long-standing neglect of the mental health field. p. by a ‘workerist’ defence of ‘jobs and conditions’ (1982. 2. 42) In relation to the axes of contextualization sketched out above. 234–235) Although Sedgwick recognized the importance of the economic ‘base’ for psychiatric provision ‘via the operations of general systems of public assistance’ (1982. 237–238). (ibid. whose trade-union representation runs along the lines of this alienated institutional order y In this era of psychiatric monetarism y the mental health worker is forced into a defensive y stance because of a fear that a more adventurous approach will further worsen his or her conditions. Sedgwick’s analysis is exemplary because.
Sedgwick observed that we need both of these sectors precisely because they answer to different questions: the ‘base’ question of political economy (that is. 7. yet.. for it looks both towards reclaiming the state (see Wainwright. 252). professionals and the organized Left in order to pursue collective welfare demands. 1982. then. With this aim in view. resource allocation) as well as ‘wider y questions of medical politics’ (ibid. 1908) to insist upon the ‘countervailing power of voluntary social initiative. original emphasis). Yet he was also acutely aware of the: . finally. Such cross-sectional alliances meant. p. via its central critique and the axes of contextualization outlined above. that is to say.. 243) alliances with patients. Janus-faced. With characteristic comprehensiveness. Psychopolitical struggle. and even less in the way of inspiration. 2. it was precisely responding to this latter question that necessitates both reclaiming the state and emancipatory experimentation.. despite its pretension to possess a reasoned and principled overview of the social order’ (ibid. (ibid. Kropotkin. p. p. Sedgwick analysed the processes and paradoxes of making ‘psychopolitical’ demands. 129–147 135 A U TH O R C dilemma of all innovators for whom the present state-run facilities offer little in the way of a model. 244–255. materially implemented’ (ibid.. p. in the guise of ‘publicly funded y social-welfare provision’ and towards emancipatory experiments emanating primarily from the ‘voluntary’ sector. original emphasis) O PY long-term psychiatric care’ (ibid.Peter Sedgwick’s legacy for the politics of mental health Thus.. p. 245. ‘working within the publicly funded system of heath and social-welfare provision’ (ibid. for Sedgwick. an obvious question r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. is that of engineering a voluntary alternative model of care which will not abdicate from the broader responsibility of posing more general and long-term demands. p. Yet he bemoaned the fact that the task of integrating cross-sectional demands ‘has never been undertaken by the organized left. to build cross-sectional (ibid. These ‘wider questions’ do not concern the quantitative question solely (resource allocation). practices which were ‘voluntarily conceived. 236). 2003). 194). 195). but also the qualitative question of ‘what kind’ of psychiatric services we need (ibid. 241). he ended Psychopolitics with some prefigurative examples of ‘mutual aid’. drawing upon the anarchist tradition (for example. pp. p. Yet. For Sedgwick. carers. He endorsed the need for active social movements able to politically transect the axes of contextualization sketched out above.. outside the bureaucratic compass of the state’ (Sedgwick. p. ‘Psychopolitics’ Today We have grasped the specificity of Psychopolitics. is. in the first instance.. 256).
an escalation of ‘Thatcherism’ in the form of a ‘market-driven politics’ (see Leys. 1998. 2008. Axis no. However. 1: Re: Crisis of British welfarism We have witnessed a consolidation of neo-liberal hegemony with regard to the Crisis of Welfare. pp. 2003) which make both distributive and identity-claims. could not have foreseen. perhaps. 7. remain extant today. 2008). 248–249). alongside a proliferation of ‘even newer’ social movements for example. 1989). This has led to a proliferation of ‘3rd sector’ (voluntary) service provision. Mckeown et al. 2001) has penetrated what had hitherto been bureaucracies (for example. Axis no. 2. through. for example. campaigning in defence of jobs and services and against privatization and ‘cuts’ (Coleman. the Left have. At the same time a ‘mixed economy’ of care has become the common-sense of governmentality (see Burchell et al. when. How should we survey the field of ‘psychopolitics’ today? The intervening 25 years have seen profound global and national transformations as well as changes in the mental health field – transformations that Sedgwick. This is not the same as saying that they have just remained the same. However. it 136 A U r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 TH O R C O Social Theory & Health PY Vol. far from being resolved. but also to a failure to re-orient political strategy in an ‘age of movements and networks’. 1991) in the wake of the economic constraints imposed on the public sector by. We stress the historicity of crisis tendencies rather than their structural inertia. Left-wing activism in Britain has persisted. the NHS) and the endorsement by New Labour post-1997 of that entrepreneurial form of governance described as the ‘new public management’ (see Du Gay. 129–147 . In the British context. 1996). failed to engage with the broader politics of mental health of which Sedgwick was so acutely aware.3 With some notable exceptions (for example. various attempts at ‘unifying’ the Left in Britain (for example. 2: Re: Crisis of the Left We have witnessed a deepening of the Crisis of the Left with regard. We view ‘Blair/Brownism’ as an escalation of ‘Thatcherism’ rather than a qualitative ‘break’. then the ‘Respect’ coalition) have not been sustained and it remains unclear whether such organizations interact with social movements in a politically meaningful way. we would analyse these changes in the following way. by and large. the ‘crisis tendencies’ that contextualized Sedgwick’s original intervention. with predictable vicissitudes.2 Far from ‘dying the death’. anti-globalization networks and ‘eco-politics’ (Crossley.Cresswell and Spandler remains. nor the organized Left. As such. the NHS & Community Care Act (1990). first. McKeown. SHA. although the specific transformations of that sector are not of the type he may have foreseen. of a type alluded to in favourable terms by Sedgwick (1982. Neither the ‘anti-psychiatric’ critics. the ‘Socialist Alliance’. not only to internal sectarianism. for example.
for the British experience. the mental health field has witnessed an explosion of such resistance with a proliferation of networked. expanded the ‘illness’ category into hitherto undiscovered fields of human experience while simultaneously bolstering its claims to scientificity via a thoroughgoing biologism and its claims to legitimacy via the extension of lawful coercion. at one and the same time. 2. Such developments have also challenged Sedgwick’s insistence that a ‘unitary conception of illness’ is the necessary precursor to politicization of the mental health field. The Hearing Voices Network (James. nor (ii) that a nihilistic conservatism inevitably follows adoption of ‘anti-psychiatric’ motifs. 2001). The increasing heterogeneity of user groups has resulted in recent attempts to unify the ‘user voice’ through a national forum. pp. which is always against psychiatric ‘abuses’ but never for psychiatric ‘uses’ (Sedgwick. These strategies have encountered resistance. Romme and Escher. Moreover. although such movements have been highly autonomous. p. have adequately responded to Sedgwick’s critique. 1993) pursued via non-medical. 1995) and Mad Pride (Curtis et al. 218–221). consensual means. 129–147 137 . b) and ‘coping with voices’ (Blackman. 7. such as hearing voices or self harm. these have led to the ‘development of new programmes. 1999) or even ‘madness’ A r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 U TH O R C O PY Social Theory & Health Vol.Peter Sedgwick’s legacy for the politics of mental health seems. In fact. Indeed. movements and groups. On the contrary. ‘demands’ which Sedgwick neither realized nor anticipated (Sedgwick. a move which has provoked controversy regarding issues of democratic representation and the dangers of co-optation (Pilgrim. deploying alternative concepts and frameworks such as ‘mental distress’ (Campbell. 2007. These developments have not borne out Sedgwick’s pessimistic views about: (i) the possibility of autonomous political action by service users. Axis no. have been Survivors Speak Out (Campbell. the organizations noted above have explicitly rejected the notion of ‘illness’. Some of the most significant of these. 3: Re: Crisis of Psychiatric Legitimation In response to that crisis. 1982. For example. 2005a. but rarely hierarchically co-ordinated. the politicization of issues such as ‘selfharm’ and ‘hearing voices’ – which psychiatry traditionally subsumes beneath ‘illness’ categories – has resulted in a number of self-help strategies and practices such as ‘harm minimization’ (Cresswell. 2000). the National Self-Harm Network (Pembroke. ‘negative-rights’ based agenda. 2005). nor (iii) that patients groups would necessarily adopt a purely defensive. service users and political activists (notably feminists). although psychiatry continues to experience its Crisis of Legitimation. 222). demands and services’ from service users and workers alike. 1989). psychiatry has. 1989. 1982. and have sought instead to locate the specificity of experience. Plumb. they have been simultaneously the product of alliances between workers.
coercion and consent) and technological (for example. as well as iatrogenic degradations experienced within the mental health system itself (see Breggin. like a ‘conjoined twin’ (Szasz. However. ethical (for example. The mobilization of such groups has revolved around the discursive ensemble ‘trauma/abuse/distress’ rather than the Sedgwickian ensemble ‘illness/disease’ (see Cresswell. Let us be clear on this point. Such proposals. 2006). with mental health laws that enable and enforce coercion. Psychiatry and medicine must be distinguished at the level of material practices and these practices consist of epistemological (for example. These are often underpinned by the Sedgwick-sounding mantra: ‘mental illness is an illness like any other’. an unprecedented step in English law (Szmukler. It is not the deployment of the category of ‘illness’ that necessarily leads to coercion – it does not in medicine – rather. of course. 1979). Such campaigns seek to bolster the legitimacy of a reductive biological approach within psychiatry. alienating in the process many user movements and groups while not necessarily fulfilling their anti-discriminatory aims (see Read et al. Cresswell (2008) has argued that Thomas Szasz’s own brand of ‘psychomedical dualism’ – despite the limitations of Szasz’s own Right-wing ideology which Sedgwick critiqued (1982. 2008). where treatment is rarely imposed. that continue to deploy the ‘illness’ category as part of a strategy of ‘psychiatric expansionism’ (Castel et al. For it has been liberal campaigners as well as. 2004. the point to be emphasized is that psychiatric coercion is both legitimized by the state while being notoriously prone to abuses (see Johnstone. b). 129–147 . pp. the concept of ‘illness’ is problematic. the ‘unitary concept of illness’ has persisted in a powerful quarter of the mental health field. psychiatry itself. Although Sedgwick was right not to erect a crude dualism between the mental and physical per se. contra Sedgwick. 2000). 138 A U r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 TH O R C O Social Theory & Health PY Vol. 53). 2004. especially in socalled ‘anti-stigma’ campaigns (see Pilgrim and Rogers. 7. Cresswell. psychiatry and medicine do not exist on a par in quite the way that Sedgwick’s ‘unitary concept of illness’ would have us believe. Recent years have witnessed an attempt by New Labour to render it lawful for certain categories of ‘patient’ to be coercively treated in the community – hitherto. Regarded in this sense. 2005c). This fact strikes to the heart of the Crisis of Psychiatric Legitimation but is somewhat elided in Sedgwick. 2000). diagnosis and treatment) aspects. 149–184) – is defensible for a number of reasons. Such frameworks attest to the importance of personal histories of trauma and abuse (Herman. independent of that critique. Moreover. p. and this is not just a deconstructivist obsession with language. 2. for example. 2005a. 2005). 1994). scientific). psychiatric technology is bound up. it is precisely opposition to the extension of coercive powers that has unified various organizations within the mental health field. Indeed.Cresswell and Spandler (Curtis et al. Unlike medicine.
To open up possibilities for productive transformation transecting these axes. in the current policy context. a Sedgwickian approach would continue to emphasize the necessity of public assistance for people experiencing mental distress. 1982. through the development of local ‘3rd sector’ self-help organizations.4 Concerns about coercion also led to the formation of the Critical Psychiatry Network in 1999. more specifically. we argue for an approach that. continuing attacks on collective provision.Peter Sedgwick’s legacy for the politics of mental health Strategic demands In the context of a Crisis of Welfarism and. p. 2007). For example. 2005. for example. MIND). in other words. Double. 7. We posit the public sector in this way not out of any partiality or preference but out of the realization that disputes in that sector possess maximum potential for universalizing the content of collective welfare demands. to aspire to a ‘cross-sectional’ impact. while necessarily updating Psychopolitics. The final section specifies the meaning of this by analysing the conditions of possibility for a new Psychopolitics. the Royal College of Psychiatrists) and service user groups (for example. The development of mental health politics post-Sedgwick has often focused attention on activism ‘outside the bureaucratic compass of the state’ (Sedgwick. a group of dissident psychiatrists who argue that psychiatry has failed to meet the challenges posed by its critics and thus remains deeply mired in its Crisis of Legitimation (Bracken and Thomas. such potentiality makes it truly Sedgwickian. we want to emphasize that it is the public sector that constitutes a privileged point of political action. 2005) to signify both the importance of demands made in the direction of the state (centrally and locally) and demands which crystallize into disputes within the A r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 U TH O Although we relate the following conditions to each of the three axes outlined above. . a progressive psychopolitics must continue to make concrete welfare demands. As should become evident. We deploy the notion of ‘welfare demands’ (see Laclau. 2006). one that promotes ‘individual responsibility’ rather than ‘socialized provision’. any single intervention in one axis is intended to possess a universalizing potential. professional collectives (for example. resulted in sustained opposition from a heterogeneous alliance of ‘3rd sector’ advocacy organizations (for example. 252). the United Kingdom Advocacy Network) combining together beneath the rubric of the Mental Health Alliance. 129–147 139 PY embedded in new mental health legislation in England and Wales (Mental Health Act. R C For a New ‘Psychopolitics’ O Social Theory & Health Vol. Notwithstanding the importance of these. 2. remains nonetheless Sedgwickian.
the imbrication of the two. Women at the Margins. Such disputes. for example. trade unions. the capacity to ‘make demands’ is predicated upon the development of specific cross-sectional alliances – to which point we now turn. 129–147 A U TH O R C O PY . Although such a plea may sound either ‘obvious’ and/or paradoxical. 3rd sector organizations are increasingly incorporated into the public sector – through complex funding dependencies. 2004). which may mobilize a relatively ‘critical mass’. It is clear that mental health movements cannot fight such battles alone.5 Therefore. social movements. such ‘demands’ are rejected (See Barker. 236). 2. for instance – a move which makes them both newly constitutive of welfare demands and less likely to pioneer those emancipatory practices of which Sedgwick so rightly approved. a progressive psychopolitics also needs to reconstitute its understanding of what we mean by ‘the public sector’. It should be clear by now that movements come and go and cannot be evoked as some self-evident answer to the problem of creating effective agencies of social change. a Sedgwickian approach must defend both collective welfare provision and open up spaces of innovation and contestation ‘outside the bureaucratic compass of the state’ (Spandler. 7. In an era of ‘mixed economies’. the importance of trade union mobilization within it and an organized Left armed with a ‘reasoned and principled overview of the social order’ (Sedgwick. the 3rd sector is not the undiluted sphere of mutual aid that Sedgwick envisaged. 1982. Indeed. 2004). carers groups. 2008). black and minority ethic groups and radical disability groups to mount specific challenges to psychiatric legitimacy (see Sisters of the Yam. p. we would argue that it is precisely a lack of ‘cross-sectionality’ in this respect that holds back a progressive psychopolitics today. It follows from this that we must take seriously the defence of the core institutions of welfare: the NHS and local authority provision. possess the widest possible potential for alliance-formation – they ‘suck’ into the public sector. ‘the 3rd sector’ and. fights against privatization and so on) when. increasingly. Thus. the independence provided by the 3rd sector has enabled a number of women’s organizations. That Sedgwickian point has been re-emphasized recently by Hilary Wainwright: [w]e cannot point to ‘social movements’ to get us out of a tight spot. the Left and so on – and. But neither is it just a way for the state to ‘marketize’ the public sector through threats of ‘competitive tendering’. centripetally as it were. On the positive side. 2004. via strategies of governmentality. permit strategic welfare demands to be made which possess the widest possible political force. hence. However. 140 r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. This requires an active workforce committed to a radical psychopolitics.Cresswell and Spandler public sector itself (strikes.
possess a national. 129–147 141 . thus. it has to be noted. and (iv) the Residential workers strikes and campaigns against ‘cuts’ in Sheffield of the 1990s based around networks of service user groups and a strong trade union (NALGO) in which the organized Left was both a significant force and able to mobilize nationally (see Harrison.6 Not only is this sort of ‘cyberactivism’ here to stay (see Papacharissi. emerged a plethora of small social movement organizations which. p. which will foster the development of active and productive alliance. A r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 U TH O R C O PY Social Theory & Health Vol. that heterogeneity is constitutive of the political field under conditions of advanced capitalism and that this has to be accepted as a political point of departure. painstakingly built. Cross-sectional alliances. ‘sweep’. Indeed. 1992). However. Some of the most productive cross-sectional alliances in the field of mental health have emerged in precisely this painstaking way – from the formation of: (i) the Mental Patients Union in 1973 based upon networks of service users. because of ICT. 1999). 2007). even a globalized. along with Laclau (2005). 1995) and psychiatric survivors (see Campbell. we would suggest that it offers psychopolitics the ‘Techno-Political Tools’ necessary for the mobilization and maintenance of cross-sectional alliances (Fuster and Morrell. nevertheless. 171). Mental health movements are constitutively heterogeneous and although this tendency was already apparent when Sedgwick penned Psychopolitics. are not the result of an immaculate conception. 2002). There is no one great mental health movement and no charismatic ‘leader’ that we could take you to. neither can they be conjured into existence at a point of political rupture – for instance. sometimes. radical professionals and 3rd sector groups (for example. Cross-sectional alliances are founded upon the mobilization of pre-existing communicational networks. such heterogeneity is problematic for the Left in that their dispersed constitution makes mental health movements difficult to liaise with and. There is no point in underestimating the paradoxes that underlie this process. There has. 2. and they have to be always already present at the point of political rupture if that mobilization is to constitute a case of transformative power (Freeman. 1989/90). 2000. in a moment of management victimization or a public sector strike. even to locate. it has increased exponentially with the ‘quantum leap’ of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) since the mid-1990s (see Castells. MIND). radical professionals and the activist Left. we would say. (iii) the ‘self-harm survivors’ based upon the confluence of Bristol-based feminist activism (see Wilton. A number of consequences attend heterogeneity. 7.Peter Sedgwick’s legacy for the politics of mental health Organization and alliance In the context of the Crisis of the Left a progressive psychopolitics requires us to consider the forms of political organization. (ii) Survivors Speak Out in the 1980s based around networks of ‘psychiatric survivors’.
p. the concept of ‘illness’ now exists within. it must transform its conceptual structure in response to the actual ‘experience’ of history. placed his hopes in ‘equivalence’. 7. Being ‘Sedgwickian’. ‘survivors’. see also Brown. however. it makes it difficult to problematize how psychiatry constructs and colonizes human distress in the first place (see Parker et al. to substitute a teleology of ‘illness’ (‘the future belongs to illness’ as Sedgwick predicted (1982. to a teleology of. ‘Illness’ may do that job. Sedgwick anticipated this dialectic of ‘equivalence’ and ‘difference’ alongside its prospects and threats. it also requires a political epistemology worthy of the task. therefore. 166–167). Conceptual resources and ethical commitments Finally. In the final section of Psychopolitics. 2008). The new discursive ensemble that has arisen as paradigmatic of this contestation – trauma/abuse/distress – may also ‘do the job’. Rather than erect a duality between ‘illness’ and ‘trauma’. a logic that is perpetually subverted by the ‘logic of difference’ which gives rise to their differential politicized identities in the first place (Laclau and Mouffe. has done that job. in 142 A U r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 TH O R C O Social Theory & Health PY Vol. ‘trauma’ (‘the future belongs to trauma’). In other words. amounts to a problem of political strategy. We would repeat our problematization like this. also Skeggs. especially if its deployment alienates those individuals and organizations required for cross-sectional alliances to form (McKeown. nevertheless. 39)). any ‘demands’ and ‘alliances’ must attend to the specificities of the mental health field plus the conditions of possibility for future political work. 1985. Left activists. despite our valuation of Sedgwick’s critique.). Further. say. For alliance-formation is precisely the task of constituting a ‘logic of equivalence’ between heterogeneous political agents (trade unions. 129–147 . 1995). We choose to do the same.Cresswell and Spandler The difficulty of constituting cross-sectional alliances. A Sedgwickian epistemology today must attend to the contemporary paradoxes of the mental health field. we argue that a political epistemology must first be historicized. feminists. could do that job. Deploying ‘illness’ as an epistemological point of departure obscures the potential to radicalize how we view human distress. ultimately. Laclau (ed. 1995). 2003. means making ‘psychopolitical demands’. But it is not the only way. It is not our intention. professional groups). That is to say. that is to say. if a progressive psychopolitics requires us to make collective ‘welfare demands’. a bio-medical framework which is increasingly contested. and is legitimized by. 1997. No such category universalizes itself to such an extent that it does not provoke paradoxes all of its own (see Furedi. We would not want to be misunderstood on this point. pp. In being realistic enough about ‘difference’ he. precisely because it makes it difficult to challenge psychiatry’s claims to legitimacy. This is precisely what Sedgwick grasped when he reached for the unitary conception of illness noted above. 2. 1994.
Just as he de-formed the nihilistic conceptions of ‘anti-psychiatry’ via his ‘unitary conception of illness’. 129–147 143 A U TH O R C O PY . 2006). From a psychopolitical perspective we would say that radical reflexivity is a politico-ethical stance (see Agamben. mental health and gender studies. Although we may not agree with all of Sedgwick’s critique. She is the author of Asylum to Action: Paddington Day Hospital. He means ‘to break down and reconfigure’ it. March 17–19.Peter Sedgwick’s legacy for the politics of mental health response to the ‘working through’ of those very crisis tendencies noted above. (ibid. By ‘deform the concept’. Therapeutic Communities and Beyond (JKP. 11–14) – where a progressive duty is predicated upon a commitment to the radically socialized psychopolitics that we have outlined above. examine these concepts condition of application. Shorn of the sheen of scientificity. 2008. Acknowledgement A version of this paper was delivered at Alternative Futures and Popular Protest 13th International Social Movements Conference. it turns out. and above all incorporate a concept’s conditions of application into the very meaning of the concept. so he simultaneously de-formed the figure of the ‘mentally ill’ as it appeared stereotypically both in the passive imaginary of the organized Left. and as the romanticized revolutionary subject of ‘anti-psychiatry’.. 7. Radical reflexivity. Bachelard does not mean. 1999. we are suggesting a politically salient version of Gaston Bachelard’s (2002) notion of ‘radical reflexivity’ in the process of scientific concept-formation: [W]e must y deform our initial concepts. ‘render it misshapen’. It retains its value today. original emphasis) Analytic precision is necessary here. For Bachelard. we do aspire to be as reflexive. Psychopolitics provides both a crucial resource for such a critique and a positive framework for future political work. About the Authors Mark Cresswell is a lecturer in Sociology in the School of Applied Social Sciences at Durham University. He researches and publishes in the fields of psychiatry. Manchester. pp. is synonymous with Sedgwickian. p. Helen Spandler is a senior research fellow in the School of Social Work at the University of Central Lancashire. the scientist’s ‘radical reflexivity’ is nothing less than an ethical stance – whose ‘duty’ is predicated upon a commitment to science’s epistemological norms. Such a politico-ethical commitment constitutes Sedgwick’s finest achievement. r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health Vol. 2. 69.
redpepper. 144 A U r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 TH O R C Social Theory & Health Vol. accessed 11 March 2008. (2005) Post Psychiatry.html. Chicago. Burchell. Gordon. (1989) The self-advocacy movement in the UK. C. OpenMind 42: 18.co. 2 See ‘Any Respect Left’ by H. and Thomas. M. New York: Springer. 4 For more details see http://www. http://www. (2002) The Formation of the Scientific Mind. New York: Columbia University Press. References Agamben. D.Cresswell and Spandler Notes 1 An internet archive devoted to the Sedgwick’s life and work can be found at http:// www. G.co. G. http://beehive. UK: Clinamen. (2005a) Psychiatric ‘survivors’ and testimonies of self-harm.petersedgwick.uk/article689. (1979) The Psychiatric Society. Bell. Castel.org/index. Campbell.selfharmony. (1991) Running the Country. accessed 5 March 2008. and Lindley. Castel. available at http://www. Barker. P. 129–147 O PY . 6 To name just a selection. 5 See ‘Rethinking Political Parties’ on the Red Pepper website http://www. R. In: A. (2008) Goliath Sometimes Wins: A Strike of Community Mental Health Workers in Manchester. Manchester. Princeton.asp?WCI=SiteHome&ID=5423. Blackman. (1989/1990) Self-harm. A. Manchester Metropolitan University.org/detail_pub. P. IL: Chicago University Press.thisisessex. New York: Zone Books. ‘Lifesigns (Self-injury Guidance and Network Support)’. Oxford: Blackwell..uk/.html?var_recherche=rethinking%20political%20parties. Body and Society 13(1): 1–23. (1998) Politics of the Madhouse. Bachelard.org. Manchester. http://www. (eds. accessed 7 March 2008 edited by Hilary Wainwright et al. http://www. Castells.. L. accessed 18 April 2006. A.html. G.uk/. 7. P. Oxford: Oxford University Press.uk/aboutus/index. Coates. P. (2000) The Rise of the Network Society.uk/ article1017. and Lovell. P. (1999) Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive.org/. and Miller.siari. Brown. (2007) Psychiatric culture and bodies of resistance. Gloucester. Breggin. Electroshock and the Psychopharmaceutical Complex.) Mental Health Care in Crisis. accessed 18 April 2006. accessed 11 March 2008. accessed 18 July 2008.org. C.) (1991) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Brackx and C. ‘Self-Injury & Related Issues (SIARI)’. P. (eds. London: Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health. (1995) States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. W. Grimshaw (eds.) (2005) Beyond the Water Towers: The Unfinished Revolution in Mental Health Services 1985–2005. Cresswell. Alternative Futures. P. ‘Equilibrium’.org. accessed 17 April 2006. Bracken.tni. London: Pluto. accessed 17 April 2006. Social Science & Medicine 61: 1668–1677. NJ: Princeton University Press. F. Coleman. Wainwright. UK: Handsell.redpepper. London: Hodder & Stoughton in association with the Open University.uk/default. organizing around the issue of ‘Self-Harm’: ‘Self-Harm Alliance’.mentalhealthalliance. http://www. (2008) Brain Disabling Treatments in Psychiatry: Drugs.selfharm. M. Popular Protest: 13th International Conference.html_. R. 2.phtml?know_id=39. Campbell.co. 3 Such questions are addressed in an interesting way in the Transnational Institutes Networked Politics.
(1978) The forward march of Labour halted. (1976) Legitimation Crisis. (2006a) Contesting Psychiatry: Social Movements in Mental Health. (ed. Laclau. C. Hall. N. E.uk/. London and New York: Taylor & Francis. N. 1988–1996.selfharmony. Du Gay (eds. (2001) Raising Our Voices: An Account of the Hearing Voices Movement. Dellar. Sadler. E. and Mouffe.org/detail_pub. Esther. In: H. London and New York: Routledge. London: Spare Change Books. Vol. London: Verso. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38(1): 23–43. E. Fulford. T. E. N. Hobsbawm. and Morrell. N. 7. London: Sage. Social Science & Medicine 62(3): 552–563. Marxism Today. M. K. Telos 49: 33–37. Red Pepper 130: 30–31. M. Johnson (eds.F.. Berlinguer.B. New York and Basingstoke. Subirats (eds. University of Salford. Freeman. E. Double. (2000) Users and Abusers of Psychiatry: A Critical Look at Psychiatric Practice. (2003) Therapy Culture: Cultivating Vulnerability in an Uncertain Age. Cresswell. J. Harrison. Herman. USA: Rowman and Littlefield. J. Habermas. and Watson. A r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 U TH O R C O PY Social Theory & Health Vol. Laclau. Johnstone. Morrell and J. R.tni. http://www. Freeman and V.) Questions of Cultural Identity. 22. Equilibrium.L. Reyes. Goffman. (2005) Key Concepts in Critical Social Theory. (1996) Introduction: Who needs identity? In: S. (1994) Trauma and Recovery. M. Sheffield. (1979) The great moving right show. P. Fuster. L. J. (1996) Consumption and Identity at Work. (2006) Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. Crossley.W. Hall. September: 279–286. UK: Handsell. (2006b) The field of psychiatric contention in the UK. London: Pandora. Dove. Laclau. UK: Department of Politics and Contemporary History. K. Harmondsworth. Crossley. capitalist crises and the remoralization of society.co. Marxism Today. Occasional Papers in Politics and Contemporary History. Social Theory & Health 3: 259–285. A. Amsterdam. In: J. Wainwright. M. UK: NALGO. James. (1992) Sheffield NALGO Residential Dispute. January: 14–20. (1990) The contradictions of Thatcherism. D. (2008) Szasz and his interlocutors: Reconsidering Thomas Szasz’s ‘myth of mental illness’ thesis. (2005c) Scare in the community. A. 1992. Crossley. (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Habermas. http://www. B. (2003) Even newer social movements? Anti-corporate protests. J. F. Crossley.. London: Sage. (2000) Mad Pride: A Celebration of Mad Culture. I. Furedi.) Waves of Protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties. Cresswell.phtml?know_id=39.. the Netherlands: Transnational Institute. (2003) Nature and Narrative: An Introduction to the New Philosophy of Psychiatry. London: Routledge. Gloucester. Foucault. M. London: Routledge. (2006) Critical Psychiatry: The Limits of Madness. London: Sage. L. Organization 10(2): 287–305. Salford. Hall and P. Maryland.Peter Sedgwick’s legacy for the politics of mental health Cresswell. and Stanghellini. Oxford: Oxford University Press. J. S. (1908) Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution.) (1994) The Making of Political Identities. (1999) On the origins of social movements.M. M. (1961) Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates.. P. London: Heinemann. 129–147 145 . (1981) New social movements. London and New York: Verso. G. (2005) On Populist Reason. F. A. London: Heinemann. O. Gamble. M. (2005b) Self-harm ‘Survivors’ and psychiatry in England. UK: Penguin. Du Gay. Kropotkin. 1960–2000. Curtis. 2. Morris. (2007) Techno-political tools. S. London: Verso. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.) Networked Politics: Rethinking Political Organisation in an Age of Movements and Networks.
) Beyond the Water Towers: The Unfinished Revolution in Mental Health Services 1985–2005. Plumb.opsi. V. (1973) Illness. Popular Protest: 13th International Conference.gov. Harmondworth. J. Marx and F.) K. Marx & F.gov. P. Sedgwick. (2001) Market-Driven Politics: Neo-Liberal Democracy and the Public Interest. P. (1995) National self-harm network. http://www. R. London: Sage.uk/acts/ acts1990/ukpga_19900019_en_1. (1968) Preface to a contribution to a critique of political economy. McKeown. In: K. London: Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health. mental and otherwise: All illnesses express a social judgement. P. and Stowell-Smith. L.marxists.htm. Pilgrim. 12).. London: Merlin. (1969) Theses on Feuerbach. M. London: Mind. (1975) The social analysis of schizophrenia. and Davies.. Boyers and R. B. (2005) Protest and cooption: The voice of mental health service users. In: A. http://www. London and Thousand Islands. H. Amsterdam. D. Sedgwick. (1963) Memoirs of a Revolutionary. http://www. Moscow: Progress Publications.D.. Laing: Self. Z. Mental Health Today. (1984) Contradictions of the Welfare State. C. New Media & Society 4(1): 9–27. Bell and P. Georgaca. (1993) Accepting Voices. (1999) New mental health legislation. (1989) Goodbye to all thaty? London: Socialist Health Association. Oxford: Oxford University Press.. London: Pluto Press.. K. Social Science and Medicine 61(12): 2546–2556. http://www. D. Orrill (eds. Engels (eds. (2007) (c. Vol.uk/aboutus/index.mentalhealthalliance.) On the Origin of Schizophrenic Psychoses.. In: H. McLaughlin. Serge. (1997) Formations of Class and Gender: Becoming Respectable. (2005) Psychiatrists as social engineers: A study of an anti-stigma campaign.freeserve. (1975) Marxism and Epistemology: Bachelard. D. A lifesaver? Changing paradigm and practice. Marx and F. Offe.M. Alternative Futures.. Mental Health Act. L. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 114(5): 303–318.) Laing and Anti-Psychiatry. (1967) The Politics of Experience and the Bird of Paradise. London: Verso. UK: Penguin.) Selected Works. Sedgwick. Sedgwick. H. (ed. Manchester Metropolitan University. Marx. Canguilhem and Foucault. A. SHA. Spandler. and Rogers. Mental Patients Union (MPU).opsi. and Escher. symptom and society. P. N. Read.org/archive/sedgwick/ 1955/xx/psychopolitics. 1. (2006) Prejudice and schizophrenia: A review of the ‘mental illness is an illness like any other’ approach. T. Sayce. (1982) Psychopolitics. M. McKeown. Harper. D. (1995) Deconstructing Psychopathology. the Netherlands: De Erven Bohn. Lecourt. (1955) Psychopolitics. Parker.htm. M. Social Work Education 18(4): 459–478. (2008) Alliances in Action: Opportunities and Threats to Solidarity between Workers and Service Users in Health and Social Care Disputes.D. In: K.uk/acts/acts2007/ukpga_20070012_en_1. E. London: Lawrence & Wishart. S. Mental Health Alliance (MHA). Skeggs. 146 A U r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 TH O R C O Social Theory & Health PY Vol. London: New Left Books. In: R. (1980) Beyond the Fragments: Feminism and the Making of Socialism. London: Hutchinson.html. Pembroke. C. and Wainwright. A. E. Engels (eds. UK: Penguin Books. 2. (1973) The need for a mental patients union. 7. M. P. 19).org. Rowbotham. (2002) The virtual sphere: The internet as a public sphere. I. S. Engels: Selected Works.uk/id90. Romme. Hastings Centre Studies 1(3): 19–40. pp. Clarion Trinity. Haslam. (2008) View point. Leys. 19–40. Marx. van Praag.co. March: 41. Papacharissi. L. (1972) R. CA: Sage. and Cresswell. ctono. Openmind 73: 13. Sedgwick. Lindley (eds. Segal. M. 129–147 . (1990) (c. http://www. K. National Health Service & Community Care Act. Harmondsworth. Pilgrim.Cresswell and Spandler Laing. 1901–1941.
http://www. H. (2004) Women at the margins: Women and personality disorder. 2. the Netherlands: Transnational Institute. London/Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Wainwright. Chicago. 129–147 O R Sisters of the Yam. Wainwright.org/articles/biographical/DavidWidgery. Women at the Margins. (1995) Madness and feminism: Bristol crisis service for women.redpepper.html?var_ recherche=rethinking%20political%20parties. In: J. Psychiatry 3(3): 16–19.redpepper. http://www. H. Wainwright. (2004) Friend or foe? Towards a critical assessment of direct payments. Critical Social Policy 24(2): 187–209. T. http://www. IL: Open Court. (2004) Mental health legislation in the era of community care. 7. H. H. (1991) Twice met: Serge & Sedgwick. http:// www. (2004) Sisters of the Yam. Verso: London. In: G.org/detail_pub. Medical Sociology online 2(2): 3–16. Rethinking political parties.html. ASYLUM: The Magazine for Democratic Psychiatry 14: 4. (2003) Reclaim the State: Experiments in Popular Democracy.A. T.Peter Sedgwick’s legacy for the politics of mental health A r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1477-8211 U TH Vol. Wainwright. (2006) Asylum to Action: Paddington Day Hospital. Amsterdam. (2007) From social exclusion to inclusion? A critique of the inclusion imperative in mental health. Therapeutic Communities and Beyond. (2004) Reply to Kendell. London and Bristol: Taylor & Francis. C O PY Social Theory & Health 147 . Spandler. ASYLUM: The Magazine for Democratic Psychiatry 14: 3. (1974) The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct. Spandler. Griffin (ed.uk/article689. The Victor Serge Centenary Group Newsletter. H. Szmukler. Szasz. T. Wilton. H. Szasz. G.tni.html.petersedgwick. D. H.uk/article1017. Schaler (ed. New York: Harper & Row.org. Spandler.) Feminist Activism in the 1990’s.) Szasz Under Fire: The Psychiatric Abolitionist Faces His Critics. et al (eds.org. Any respect left.) (2007) Networked Politics: Rethinking Political Organisation in an Age of Movements and Networks. January. Widgery.phtml?know_id=39.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue listening from where you left off, or restart the preview.