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The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate Author(s): Yahya Sadowski Source: Middle East Report, No.

183, Political Islam (Jul. - Aug., 1993), pp. 14-21+40 Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012572 . Accessed: 09/09/2011 01:45
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"collapse of communism" in 1989 and the victory The over Iraq in 1991 sparked a wave of triumphal decla? rations by Western pundits and analysts who believed that all "viable systemic alternatives to Western liberalism" had now been exhausted and discredited. Some then tried to sketch a foreign policy appropriate to the "new world order."1 A consistent theme of this "new thinking" was that the peoples of the developing countries must now acknowl? edge that liberal democracy is the only plausible form of governance in the modern world. Accordingly, support for democratization should henceforth be a central objec? tive of US diplomacy and foreign assistance.2 This trend was not welcomed by all. Autocrats in the Arab world, particularly the rulers of the Gulf states, were appalled at the thought that Washington might soon be fanning the flames of republican sentiment. "The prevailing democratic system in the world is not suitable for us in this region, for our peoples' composition and traits are differ? ent from the traits of that world," declared King Fahd of Saudi Arabia in March 1992.3 The king's stance suits many US policy makers just fine. Former secretary of defense and CIA chief James Schlesinger spoke for more than him? self recently when he asked whetherwe seriouslydesire to prescribedemocracyas the prop? er formofgovernmentforother societies. Perhaps the issue is mostclearlyposed in the Islamic world.Do we seriouslywant to in change the institutions Saudi Arabia? The briefanswer is no over the years we have sought to preserve those institutions, sometimes in preferenceto more democratic forces coursing throughoutthe region. Schlesinger goes on to cite the king's views as endorse? ment of his own.4 For their part, some partisans of Israel feared that US endorsement of democratic trends in the Arab world might abet the rise to power of "Islamic fun? damentalist" regimes. (They may also privately worry that Arab democratization might erode Israel's claim to US sup? port as "the only democracy in the Middle East.") Those who oppose democratization initiatives in the Middle East could, moreover, turn for support to Western academic "experts." "[A]mong Islamic countries, particu? larly those in the Middle East," wrote Samuel Huntington in a typical dismissal, "the prospects for democratic devel? opment seem low."5 The thesis that Middle Eastern soci? eties are resistant to democratization had been a standard tenet of Orientalist thought for decades, but in the 1980s a new generation of Orientalists inverted some of the old assumptions and employed a new vocabulary which allowed them to link their work to a wider, international debate about the relationship between "civil society" and democ? ratization. These updated arguments sought to prove not only?as neo-Orientalist Daniel Pipes put it?that "Muslim countries have the most terrorists and the fewest democ? racies in the world," but that they always would.6 Strong State, Weak Society

There are dozens of theories about what factors pro? mote democracy. A country may be more likely to become democratic if it becomes richer, or redistributes its wealth Middle East Report ? July-August 1993

in an egalitarian manner, or specializes in manufactur? ing consumer durables, or rapidly converts its peasantry into proletarians, or switches to a nuclear family struc? ture, or gets colonized by England, or converts en masse to Protestantism.7 Scholars quibble endlessly about which recipes are most effective, but generally concur that democracy thrives in those countries that possess a "civil society." The term civil society has been bandied about recent? that has not made its meaning ly with an enthusiasm any clearer.8 For most scholars, civil society refers to the collection of autonomous social organizations that resist arbitrary exercises of state power. This conception goes back to the 18th century, when thinkers like Montesquieu

curb the powers of the state. Groups are common enough in all human societies, but those with a level of internal organization and assertive? ness that enables them to challenge state power are rare. For several centuries the consensus of Western scholars was that such groups were missing in the Orient. This lack of civil society, they contended, was the primary reason why governments in the region were so prone to despotism.10 Until recently, Western experts argued that in Islamic societies groups were in different from theirsupposed counterparts Western strikingly Their leaders were spokesmen,notdirectors. history. Entryinto such groups was seldom marked by any formalobservance, or datable from moment.Men belongedto such groups any specific

and Thomas Paine argued that the despotic tendencies of Europe's absolute monarchs could be checked if "inter? mediate powers" such as the nobility, the bourgeoisie, the churches, and the press unitedHo assert their inde? pendence.9 Today corporations, labor unions, chambers of commerce, professional syndicates, public action groups, local governments, lay religious fraternities, voluntary associations and assorted collectivities would all be con? sidered elements of civil society inasmuch as they help to at is of fellow the Yahya Sadowski, an editor thismagazine, senior Institution Washington, and author Political in DC, of Brookings and in of Businessman Bureaucrat theDevelopment Egyptian Vegtables? 1991). Agriculture (Brookings, Middle East Report ? July-August 1993

because they identifiedthemselves and others as belongingto or certainaccepted categoriessuch as "merchant" "scholar";and, in general, theyrallied to such groups onlywhen the categories were threatened.11 with which theyidentified Weakly organized and lacking strong corporate identities, social associations in the Middle East tended to be "infor? mal, personalistic, and relatively inefficient as a means of winning support and extracting resources from the pop? ulace."12 They were too feeble to challenge the power of the state and constitute a civil society.13 Rather than challenging the ruler's authority, the argu? ment went, groups in Islamic societies tended to be vehi15

nor or associationsflourish unhin? cles of supplication and collaboration. The most common tryside; couldcraft professional the dered,since theywould always be suspected oflimiting sway form of political organization was the clientage network, ofthe government over its subjects.22 whose members traded their loyalty for the patronage and The upshot of the suppression of such groups was a despot? protection of some notable.14 In this setting, apparently modern organizations such as unions, peasant associa? ic regime in which "the state is stronger than society."23 tions and professional syndicates only provide a patina Among Western experts, the idea that in the Middle that disguises the continuing struggle of atomized clients East the weakness of society assured the dominion of the to secure the sponsorship of elite patrons.15 state persisted until quite recently, although there had Why were groups in the Middle East so weak? Western always been a handful of unorthodox scholars who argued that the prevailing consensus underestimated the real experts offered several distinct answers, but the prevail? Islam ing one was that proffered by the Orientalists: strength of society. They insisted that groups, solidari? accounted for this weakness in Middle Eastern society, ties and classes had been historically influential and that their collective action remained a critical force.24 The just as it explained the region's other peculiarities.16 was implicit in the very core of Islam. After all, size of this minority grew as political scientists found Despotism the very name Islam came from the Arabic word for "sub? studies of clientage networks increasingly unsatisfy? mission." The image that Islamic doctrine presented of the ing and began to identify authentic interest groups in Islamic societies.25 Historians began to question the idea pious believer?fatalistic, prostrate before God, obeying His every whim?served as a trope for discussing not that the state had always been dominant. Ervand Abrahamian only religious but also political behavior in societies where noted, for example, that although a late rulers acted as "the shadow of God upon earth."17 In the 18th-century Qajar Shah could execute anyone who words of the definitive Orientalist cliche, Islam was not attended his court, he probably enjoyed less real control over the countryside surrounding his capital than did just a religion but a total way of life. The totalistic char? acter of the faith seemed to imply that a contemporary French monarch.26 a The popularity of these dissident only a totalitarian state could put its AA f+oy* 4.~L0 jr ideas exploded after the Iranian rev? dogmas into practice.18 Islam, morenu in n rpvnlii' the formation of olution of 1979. Until then, most stuover, discouraged dents of Iran shared the Orientalist groups that might have resisted tiOTl, Western ZXpertS quick7 assumption that Islam had the effect despotism, since 7 7 ,7 th eir VieWS, . ,' ana , T, . ly reversed ^ 0f promoting despotic authority and Islamic law knows no corporate , legal shows no counpersons;Islamic history claimed that Twelver Shi'ism was, if TIOIV * DOrtrCL ^ sd Iran V as a cils or communes,no synods or parlia. ,7 j anything, an even more quietistic ments,norany otherkindofelectiveor qq j^ y^trV whei %e SOCWty aaa ^ faith than Sunni Islam.2? After the representative assembly. It is inter' revolution Western experts quickly esting that the jurists never accepted StronS traditionally J been theprinciple majority of decision?there reversed their views, and now porwas no point,since the need fora proaTld the State WeaiZ. trayed Iran as a country where soci? cedure ofcorporatecollectivedecision never arose.19 ety had traditionally been strong and the state weak. The Iranian clergy and its supporters Thus, groups such as the ulama (Islamic jurists), the among the traditional bourgeoisie of the bazaar and the military and the provincial notables, who might have shared new urban middle classes formed a genuine civil society an interest in restraining the authority of the sultan, lacked capable not only of challenging the state but of toppling any practical foundation for organizing to do so. As a result, it. Shi'ism, with its cult of martyrs and delegitimation of "the political experience of the Middle East under the secular authority, was now an ideal revolutionary ideol? caliphs and sultans was one of almost unrelieved autoc? ogy that had a long history of encouraging insurrections.28 racy, in which obedience to the sovereign was a religious This revisionism was not confined to Iranian studies. as well as a political obligation, and disobedience a sin as During the 1980s, three new trends were discernible in well as a crime."20 Middle Eastern studies. First, as Islamic or Islamist move? The classical Orientalists argued that orthodox Islam ments grew more potent and challenged the ruling author? promoted political quietism. Supposedly the great medieval ities, a host of studies of "radical Islam" appeared to reveal Islamic thinkers, horrified by the periodic rebellions and how Islamic doctrine disposed believers to form militant civil wars that wracked their community, decreed that obe? groups and contest the authority of the state. Second, as dience to any ruler?even an unworthy or despotic one? oil prices declined and government revenues dried up, was a religious duty. "As the great divine Ghazali (d. lill) scholars came to appreciate that states in the region were declared: 'The tyranny of a sultan for a hundred years caus? less powerful than they had once appeared.29 Finally, as es less damage than one year's tyranny exerted by the sub? the intellectual foundations for the idea of "weak" Middle jects against each other.' "21As a result of this blanket pro? Eastern societies collapsed, there was a slow growth of hibition of all dissent, interest in studies of mafias, mobs, interest groups, soli? there could be no question of representative bodies being set darities, and classes that might act as the equivalents of up to carryon a dialogue betweenrulerand subject;neithercould "civil society" in the region.30 there be institutionsoflocal self-government town or counin 16 Middle East Report ? July-August 1993

In 1987, the Social Science Research Council launched a major program to fund research on the now-trendy theme of "Retreating States and Expanding Societies" in the Middle East. There was already a sense that the grow? ing weakness of states would create opportunities for civil society to assert its independence in the region-.31 Today most scholars confidently affirm that both intermediate powers and autonomous social groups exist in the Middle East. Both Harvard and New York University are spon? soring large-scale research projects on these questions.32 An articulate minority of scholars are even prepared to argue that civil society is sufficiently well grounded to serve as a platform for the development of democracy in the Middle East.33

against these excesses. They won enough support for these ideals from the mass of Muslims, urban and tribal alike, to prevent any dynasty from legitimating its empire.37 Conforming to this critique of political power, ordi? nary Muslims offered only tepid and intermittent support fortheir rulers. Unable to raise sufficient troops from among their subjects, Muslim rulers were forced to import mili? tary slaves, mamluks, to staff their armies. These slaves edged aside civilian dynasties before being replaced them? selves by other warrior factions. "[B]etween foreign slaves and alienated secretaries," Crone writes, "politics degen? erated into mere intrigues and bickerings for the proceeds of a state apparatus which neither party could permanently control, both parties squandering resources on an impres-

Strong Weak

Society, State

Middle East Many Western experts, though, remained skep? tical about the democratic poten? tial of the region, and found intel? lectual comfort in a new trend, which began even before the Iranian revolution, to reform and This new update Orientalism. generation of Orientalists were uncomfortable with their prede? cessors' claim that Islam pro? moted political submission? while sharing the conviction that with Islam was incompatible democracy. Patricia Crone is probably the most persuasive and rigorous of these younger Orientalists.34 One of her central themes is that Islamic civilization is unique in the way that it forcefully refus? es to legitimize political author? ity. She traces this characteris? tic back to the eighth century when the Abbasid dynasty seized power from the Umayyads and the shari'a (Islamic law) was first Taekwando between and Kristie Burns at women Cairo match University. University American codified. The ulama of this peri? sive scale while few indeed were reinvested in the state."38 od were men of tribal origin, she argues, and the law they Crone writes mainly about early Islamic history, but drafted reflected their "profound hostility to settled states."35 bold? another of the young Orientalists?Daniel Pipes?has the ulama defined God's law as haqq al-'ar ab, the law of the out the contemporary implications of this research ly spelled his Arabs,just as theyidentified language as the Usartal-'arab, the normativelanguage ofthe bedouins*the consensus being in medieval politics. When Pipes was writing his own that where God had not explicitlymodifiedtribal law, he had doctoral dissertation, also about the mamluks, he read endorsed The resultwas a tribalvisionofsacredpolitics....Kings it. Crone's thesis and concurred with her general argument.39 wererejectedas Pharaohs and priestsas goldencalfs,whileGod's He claimed that the mamluk institution was a phenome? was envisaged as an egalitarian one unencumbered community of non unique to Muslim societies and reflected the perni? byprofaneorreligiousstructures powerbelow the caliph,who was himselfassigned the dutyofminimal government.36 cious influence of the ulama and of Islamic doctrine. "While The ulama portrayed all secular rulers as prone to cor? all religions postulate ideals that human beings cannot ruption and despotism and volunteered to act as guardians consistently maintain," he writes, "Islam alone of the Middle East Report ? July-August 1993 17

universalist religions makes detailed political ideals part of its basic code, the Shari'a."40 By establishing ideals that are impossible to fulfill, Islam ensures that Muslims will view any form of government, sooner or later, as illegiti? mate.41 Sincere Muslims consequently tend to withdraw support from their rulers. Since Muslims declined to serve in armies, slave soldiers had to be recruited. This bred both political instability and weakness. This political infirmi? ty of Islamic civilization would eventually allow European civilization to outstrip it. Pipes' analysis of the contemporary Islamic resurgence argues that the medieval failure to develop stable poli? tics continues to be one of the "difficulties Muslims face in modernizing."42 This view has proved congenial to the

implications of Crone's work for contemporary societies. In Hall's apt phrase, Crone has shown a religion, Islam was essentially "monotheism with face."45 Islamic history was the story of a strong society that consistently withheld its support from polit? ical authority. "Government thus has very slim roots in society," he wrote, "and stability came to depend upon such solidarity as the rulers of society could themselves achieve, as is true of most conquest societies."46 Hall argues that the strength of society in Islamic civilizations not only made the state unstable; it also obstructed the development of true "civil society" and democracy. Precisely because soci? ety remained aloof from the state, and because dynasties tended to be very unstable, no "organic state" could emerge in the Middle East. Europe alone possessed an state,in place organicstate,a stronger over long periods oftime, and forced to provideinfrastructural servicesfor society,both because ofthe pre-exis? tence ofa civil societyand because of the need to raise revenue to compete in war with other similarly stable states. In Islam such stable states did meant notexist.The fearoftribesmen thaturban stratacould notrule them? was accordingly selves,and a premium placed uponmilitary power.The states that resulted were transient and predatory.47 "Transient and predatory" states, lacking the cooperation of society, cannot be good candidates for democ? ratization. The development of cap? italism and democracy ultimately depends upon a pattern of collabo? ration between state and society. Hall derived this vision of the ori? gins of democracy from the work of SaidElatab/Middle Photo his mentor, Ernest Gellner. The East impact of Gellner's vision of histo? is evident in many aspects of neo-Orientalism and par? ry ticularly in the idea that the cooperation of the state and society is crucial to development.48 Gellner has argued that in most agrarian societies the commercial elite was doomed as soon as it began to grow wealthy and powerful enough to tinker with the social order.49 Either the ruling military elite reacted to the danger of the rising commercial class by exterminating it, or the commercial elite triumphed and turned itself into a landed aristocracy. Either way, the ten? dency toward capitalism found among merchants usual? ly snuffed itself out. The Protestant ethic, however, made the rising capitalist elite of Europe in the 16th to the 18th centuries different. For peculiar ideological reasons, this set ofproducerscontinued to be such even when grownrichenoughto become powerful and to enjoy the fruitsoftheirprevious accumulation. They turned profitsneither into swords nor into pleasure nor into ritual display.Theyhad an innercompulsionto carryon, and the mod? ern world was the byproductoftheir obsessional drive.50

out the Islamic that, as a tribal

inNew Muslims demonstrating Jersey. framers of elite opinion in the US, and Pipes has been able to purvey his ideas about "Muslim anomie" to an evera consultant audience?as to the State widening Department, as a director of the rightwing Foreign Policy Institute in Philadelphia (and editor of its journal, Orbis) and as a contributor to the Wall Street Journal, The New Republic, Foreign Affairs and other outlets.43 While Pipes has had the highest public profile among propagators of neo-Orientalist ideas, others have labored to spread them within the academic community. Patricia Crone is closely associated with a group of neo-Weberian scholars that includes some of the hottest young talents in several disciplines?J.G. Meriquor (political philosophy), Michael Mann (political sociology), and John Hall (politi? cal science).44 These colleagues propagated Crone's ideas among the wider scholarly community and enriched them by weaving them into a broader argument about the evo? lution of societies. John Hall in particular deserves credit for drawing 18

Middle East Report ? July-August 1993

es that neutralized the peril of inflation.57 Students of European capitalists were not inclined to abandon com? merce and demand entry to the aristocracy. And, equally Austria and the Low Countries admired their model of "consociational" democracy, in which strong regional or important, this class "did not oblige the encompassing state to control and dominate it in sheer self-defence. It did religious loyalties limited the degree to which parties could not create a political dilemma in which the new commer? compete for broad public support. Under consociation, no cial class either had to eat or be eaten by the old powersingle party could hope for an outright majority in elec? holders."51 This permitted the state and the emerging eco? tions, so most parties are forced to enter into broad coali? nomic powers not merely to tolerate one another but tions that dilute special interests and promote corporatist to collaborate. negotiating patterns.58 increasingly the This broad intellectual shift, which emphasized Gellner's argument mobilizes Weber's old (and some? what discredited) Protestant ethic thesis for a new pur? virtues?even the necessity?of curbing the autonomy of social groups and the growth of their demands on the state, pose: to explain the origins of the modern state rather than created a receptive audience for the neo-Orientalists. Their the rise of the modern economy.52 This subtle shift has dramatic implications. It suggests that the success of devel? argument, that tribes, mullahs and mamluks had demand? in the West was a result not of aggressive-assertive ed too much autonomy and created a crisis of governabiliopment ones. societies, but of passive-quiescent ty in Islam, sounded plausible because Westerners could discern a trend toward It implies that capitalist development ^e same *^s m their own society. was most likely not where society conLI / /e lnjip ^ ^n CL<?? time 'for The irony of this conjuncture needs strained the state but where society to be savored. When the consensus of avoided Scholars ti.> abandon authority. antagonizing ,i social scientists held that democracy Gellner's argument stands the old ideas mi pat ffir tho m\tQ " ' J and development depended upon the about civil society on their head. He porof strong, assertive social actions terioilS "eSS ences" that trays "civil" society not as a raucous -, Orientalists held that such assothat check the band of solidarities groups, uei TlOCratlZapreveilZ elations were absent in Islam. When the state's tendency toward despotism, but consensus evolved and social scientists of groups as a "civilized" assemblage tion ill the A liddle East that expand production without threatthought a quiescent, undemanding sociaTlCL ZILTTt ZO trie matterety was essential to progress, the neoening state power.53 Orientalists portrayed Islam as beam? ideas about Gellner's revisionist of nf-fact iteil lizdtion Protestantism in the Baroque Era had ing with pushy, anarchic solidarities. th lat promote the forces Middle Eastern Muslims, it seems, were been prompted by his observations of doomed to be eternally out of step with in his own time: an epoch of England Qr retard fh ion^ mno e e intellectual fashion. economic stagnant high inflation, growth, and growing political uncer? tainty. Gellner, like many other scholars, blamed these ills State? or Strong Strong Society on the excessive growth of demands by special interests: farmers seeking crop subsidies, businessmen seeking tar? Today there is a broad empirical consensus among Western and Middle Eastern scholars about political conditions in all?labor unions demanding iffprotections, and?above the Middle East. They agree that states are weak and, and benefit increases. These demands triggered wage as their economic crises grow worse, getting weaker. They stagflation and arrested economic growth, and their increas? concur that the weakness of the state partly reflects and for a larger share of a dimin? ingly desperate competition partly encourages greater assertiveness by social groups: ishing social surplus was leading to a crisis of "governmovements like the while the states are paralyzed, ability."54 This anxiety about economic and political paralysis trig? Islamists appear to have seized the initiative. Some think the growing energy of social groups can be harnessed to of the virtues of democracy. Some gered a reassessment scholars claimed that it was precisely because authori? help forge democracies in the region. The neo-Orientalists, in contrast, assert that the proliferation of social move? as Japan and Germany) had sup? tarian regimes (such ments will discourage any trend toward power-sharing the autonomy of social groups that they seemed pressed and greater tolerance in the region, if it does not breed especially likely to enjoy economic growth.55 While few civil war and anarchy. that the West would be better offabandoning democ? argued It is clear that the neo-Orientalist argument is seriously to dampen demands and help the state racy, many sought flawed. Crone, Pipes, and Gellner have retained exactly of Germany, to resist such pressures.56 "Students those ideas that vitiated classical Orientalism. They too Switzerland and other economically successful states wrote portray Islam as a social entity whose "essential" core is warmly of their "corporatist" pattern of organization in fed? immune to change by historical influences. Crone describes which a handful of large industrial cartels and labor how the ulama wrote their tribal biases into the struc? erations represented business and labor. By focusing and claims that this bias con? ture of Islamic doctrine?and the demands of their constituents, these amalgamating tinued long after the Arabs settled down, the ulama grew bodies could negotiate industrial compromiscorporatist Middle East Report ? July-August 1993 19

was "just right?" Studies of state-society relations almost sedentary, and Muslim society became largely detrib? alized. Like the classical Orientalists before them, the invariably issue sweeping judgments: "In the Arab home? neo-Orientalists portray Islam (the religion) as a kind of land, the State means everything and it monopolizes almost all facilities, while the society means very little."63 family curse that lives on, crippling the lives of innocents Some critics suggest that there is no way to determine generations after the original sin that created it. They claim that Muslim efforts to build durable states?from the optimum strength of civil society because there is Ibn Khaldun's no fixed balance of power between state and society. Albert radical insights in the 14th century to Ottoman tax reformers in the 17th century or Islamist Hirschman has argued there is a cyclical pattern in which revolutionaries the public and private sectors alternate in strength.64 not, and never can, bring today?have about a change in the essential anti-state and there? Periods of expanding state authority are followed by cor? fore anti-modern core of Islamic dogma.59 recting periods of liberalization. (The evolution of the con? As a corollary of this essentialism, the neo-Orientalists cept of civil society may even reflect these cycles: suc? also (like the classical Orientalists) downplay the impor? tend to emphasize either the cessive generations or the civility of society.)65 tance of imperialism. A fairly consistent refrain in independence The relationship between Orientalist analyses is that "in the Middle East the state and society may be more 4i Decent complex than the classic mod? impact of European imperi? els allow. Not only may the alism was late, brief, and for the most part indirect."60 For l.comtsgflufou*0?L relationship evolve over time but the state and society may Orientalists of all varieties, be antagonistic and collabo? there is no point in dwelling on the fact that half the pop? rative in distinct areas simul? ulations of Libya and Algeria taneously. "The British fiscaldied during the course of military state," noted John their colonial occupation. Brewer in a brilliant study of The fact that the Ottoman the role of taxation in British and Qajar Empires state formation, were as it emergedfrom the polit? effectively deindustrialized ical and militarybattles that when European imports marked the struggle with wiped out their proto-indusLouis XIV, lacked manyofthe trial manufactures during features we normallyassoci? ate with a "strongstate," yet the 19th-century era of "free therein lay its effectiveness. trade" is irrelevant to issues The constraints on power of economic development.61 meant that when it was exer? According any weight to cised, it was exercised fully. As long as the fiscal-military these events would tend to Berber state did not cross the bul? pacet0nowep; line staptlnB -i ppfval post. Nadjib undermine the claim that theAlBepla's warks erectedto protectcivil obstacles to development are overwhelmingly internal and militarization was givenits due. Yet itwas watched it from society withperpetualvigilancebythose who,no matterhow muchthey have not changed during the 1400 years of Islamic histo? lauded its effectiveness foes,were deeply afraid against foreign Essentialism and the dismissal of Western colonialism ry. ofits intrusioninto civil society.66 and imperialism are commonly paired together, since each makes the other more plausible.62 Perhaps the key to combining state building with democ? ratization is not the Goldilocks solution of finding the "just Neo-Orientalist analyses do not prove that states in the Middle East must be weak, any more than classical right" balance, but a more subtle question of finding an Orientalism proved that states had to be strong. But does optimal "division of labor" between state and society.67 Students of the Middle East can be forgiven for not hav? this mean that the alternative proposition?that the strong societies of the Middle East provide a groundwork for ing easy answers to these questions. After all, they study a region where practical experience with democracy is rare. democratization?is correct? The fact is that both tradi? of civil society are But they should not be excused from attending to these tional and neo-Orientalist analyses flawed. Both claim that the key to building effec? questions. The fact that democracy has not flourished in deeply the Middle East does not mean its development is impos? tive states and successful democracies lies in the proper sible. If Middle East experts look for models of how to study balance of power between state and society. They disagree democratization in the region, they will find some admirable only over what the proper balance is, over how strong soci? ones without much trouble. It is long past time for seri? ety should be. The traditionalists claim that society must not be too weak; the neo-Orientalists claim it must not ous scholars to abandon the quest for the mysterious be too strong. Perhaps there is a narrow range where soci? "essences" that prevent democratization in the Middle East and turn to the matter-of-fact itemization of the forces that is neither too strong nor too weak but "just right." ety ? How could we determine if the strength of civil society promote or retard this process.68 20 Middle East Report ? July-August 1993

Moore Waterbury grew and later disenchantedthe with clas? Thomas Callaghy, State-Society M. The Zaire Struggle: in Footnotes sical Orientalist of society undertook vision civil and stud? Comparative Columbia (New Perspective York: University 1 Francis "The The to independence of social Press, and Fukuyama, Endof History?" National iesthat greater Shue Reach the Sketches gave emphasisthe 1984); Vivien The of State: Interest (Summer p.3. 1989), see "Clientelist and of Chinese Politic the Stanford forces; Clement Moore, (Stanford: Henry Ideology Body University Political Fictitious inEgypt Tunisia," Press, Networks and Change: 1988). 2 See Larry An Diamond, American Foreign Policy for inErnest Gellner John and Patrons and eds., Waterbury, Democracy (Washington: 1990); Clients Mediterranean Progressive Institute, Policy numberworks toapply American of tried the in Societies (London: Duckworth,30Agrowing andJoshua Muravchik, tradition of Exporting Democracy: See Fulfilling 1977), 255-273; John Bianchi, group and Waterbury, The pp. EgyptNasser Interest "interest analysis." Robert of America's The Destiny (Washington:American and Enterprise and in Groups Political DevelopmentTurkey Sadat: Political The Two (Princeton: Economy Regimes of Institute 1992). Press, Princeton and (Princeton: Press, University 1984); Sarnia Princeton Press, University 1983). Man Misr?! Dar Sa'id, Yamluk (Cairo: al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 3 Foreign Broadcast Service, Information March 1992. 16Another 30, was theory of Arab a growing interest popular explanation the hydraulic 1986). Although authors developed Also A.H. see "The and Just Wall Fahad, Arabs the Despot," which the over of influence social to with despotism, attributed state's power society inthe groups, tended concur they Street October Journal, 9,1990. toitsorganization of essential works. locus the classical Orientalists these that lacked nec? the irrigation The groups classicus concept Wittfogel, Despotism:essary to of 4 "The this isKarl for Post-Cold Foreign a Oriental War for democratizationArab the World; of Quest Foreign powerpress Policy," A Comparative ofTotal Power Haven: Yale seeSa'dal-Din (New 72,1, Affairs p.20. Study Ibrahim, Al-Mujtama'wal-Dawla fil-Watan For of concept, see al-'Arabi Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda Press, (Beirut: University 1957). a historythis al-'Arabiyya, 5 Samuel Huntington, More P. Countries Become "The " in "Will 'Asiatic Mode Production' Perry of and K. "Slow in Arab Anderson, 1988); MustaphaAJ-Sayyid, Thaw the Democratic?"PoliticalQuarterly Science 99(Summer 1984), Lineages the State World Fall For of Absolutist (London: Verso, 1974), pp. World," Policy Journal, 1991, 711-738. pp. A of prospects democracy for p.216. survey the published 462-550. anexceptionthis to generalization, seeRachad Antonius on Africa Latin volumesAsia, and America did include but not and "A at Pan-Arab Level? Qussai Societythe studies the the of Middle because of Islamic TheRole Samak, Civil East "with excep? 17This the became, any literally,textbook description of Non-Governmental inHani Organizations," see A. and tion of and culture; James Bill Robert perhapsEgypt, Lebanon, certainly (which political Springborg, Turkey Arab Nationalism the and Future the Faris, ed., of Arab in Middle in Asiavolume), Islamic York: the countriesthe Politics the of East,3rd (New ed., appears our Harper World (1986), 81-93. pp. Middle andNorth East Africa lack 1990), generally much previ? Collins, pp.156-7. ousdemocratic and to little 18The that written the for project: von Peter experience, most appear have think-piece idea Islam a totalitarian isaccept? 31 Seethe state requires of even States and Societies: The Sivers, prospect transition tosemidemocracy." (Larry edby some modern those Muslims, particularly associated State "Retreating Civil Expanding the Juan Linz, Seymour J. and Martin in Dialectic Middle Diamond, eds., with Lipset, Autonomy/Informal Society but some that Eastand recognized inDeveloping vol. Africa North [Boulder: thisMawdoodi, even Orientalistsa 1987). Democracy Countries,2, Africa," (unpublished mimeograph, is anhistorical novelty, appealing to minority,Similar only are in conclusionsevidentanother written for Rienner, pp. 1988], xix-xx.) Lynne paper rather something than in inherentIslam. W.M. See Watt, the SSRC Emanual "The Sivan, Islamic Resurgence: Political 6 "The Muslims Coming! Muslims Coming!" Islamic are The are Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UniversityCivil project: Strikes Journal Back," of Society Contemporary History 42 National Press, 1968), 120-123. Review, (November1990), 29. 19, pp. p. 25(1990), 353-364. pp. a 7For tongue-in-cheek Samuel Huntington, 19Bernard The East the (New see P. The Lewis, Middle and West York: 32The list, NYU a regular which Bulletin, can project publishes Third Wave:Democratization Twentieth inthe Late Torchbooks, p.48. 1964), Century Harper beobtainedwriting Civil in Middle to the Societythe East by of Oklahoma 1991), 37-38. 20Ibid. (Norman: Press, University pp. of 715Broadway, 414, Room Politics, Project, Department NY10003. 8 Thegrowing of conceptcivil of society 21For concise the is popularity a statement traditional of the Orientalist posi? in and Keane, analyzed John Democracy Civil Society tion, Elie "A Viable see Kedourie, and Political Culture 33Asad AbuKhalil, Islam, Partnership: Democracy DemocracyArab B. Adam Seligman its describes (London: 1988). Verso, Arab Harvard 15 International Review for Institute Near EastPolicy, andthe World," (Washington: Washington useas a kind shibboleth of inEastern in Idea Europe The Muhammad Muslih and (Winter 1992/93), 22-23, 65; pp. The The 1992). (New 1992). ofCivil Society York: FreePress, Richard "The for Democracy," Augustus Norton, Need Arab on conceptanalyses develop? 22Ibid., 8. reliance this in of increasing p. #83 and Foreign Policy, (Summer pp. 1991), 3-19; Michael countries isdescribed Kohli, inAtul India's ing Democracy:23Ibid. also the Gulf War: Prospects for See P.J. Islam the (London: C. Hudson,"After Vatikiotis, and State An Relations Analysis of Changing State-Society (Princeton:Croom inthe Democratization Arab Middle Journal East World," and The Helm, 1987), Bernard Lewis, Political Princeton Its Arab Press, University 1988). spread among 45(Summer pp. 1991), 407-426. of of (Chicago: Press, University Chicago intellectuals evident; the is also see special issue civil Language Islam on of No. (April Al- 1988). 34Crone's book, first Hagarism: Makingthe The society Al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi, 158 1992); of Islamic alal-Arabi wa-Dawruhu 24Tomention two the prominent, essays World Mujtama' Madani fil-Watan fi (Cambridge: Press, Cambridge University 1977), see the only of most Markaz that Dirasat Islam a Judaic was al-Wahda collected dedicat? (Beirut: Tahqiq al-Dimuqratiyya heresy inClaude musulmans I'his- argues originally dan Cahen, Lespeuples Ibn for Arabs that Palestine the and Muhammad al-'Arabiyya, and 1993); Markaz Khaldun, reclaiming Al-Mujtama'toire medieval Institut FrancaisDamas, de (Damascus: 1977) edto al-Madani wal-Tahawwul al-Arabi (which, but who al-Dimuqrati fil-Watan prophet just a messenger doesnot include pioneering was notits major his unfortunately, Dar the of Messiah ibn (Cairo: Su'ad 1992). (Umar alal-Sabah, "Mouvements et urbain l'Asie announced appearancethe dans populairesautonisme This controversial did win accep? thesis not wide duMoyen Arabica, [1958-9]); S.D. Khattab). 4-5 and Age" 9 John Keane an of evolu? Musulmane provides excellent historythe but gain for erudition lucid and analy? in and Goitein, (Leiden: tance, itdid respect her History Institutions tion the of concept in and The "DespotismDemocracy:Origins E.J. Studies Islamic sis.Crone's recent more have much wider writings won 1966). Brill, andDevelopment Distinction of the between Society Civil see A Islamic support, R. Steven Humphreys, History: andthe in and State," John Keane, Civil ed., Society the 25 Clement Banks: "Islamic and FrameworkInquiry Financial Moore, Henry Princeton (Princeton: for University State(London: Keane slights Political Verso, 1988),though in Intermediation Countries," 29(1988), Press, Arab Orient 1991), 84-5. pp. who both Montesquieu, contributed tothe conceptualiza? 45-57. pp. tion civil of society to foundation and the of 35Slaves Horses: Evolutionthe Orientalism. De on The of Islamic Polity 26"Oriental the of Case Qajar International Despotism: Iran," did employ term society," his "civil the but Tocqueville not (Cambridge: Press, Cambridge University 1980), 62. p. JournalMiddle Studies(1974), 3-31; East 5 of andidem, inAmerica York: pp. (New Democracy Books, 1945), Vintage pp. Feudalism Middle and Eastern about "European Despotisms,"36Ibid., 62-3. especially 198-206, have pp. may influenced thinking and 39 An 37For chronology events, Patricia and 1975), 129-156. how associations political more any Science Society (Summer civic affect pp. a of these see Crone power than numberstudents were sup? Martin of of Iran large other unusually early study. God's inthe Caliph: Religious Authority of the tradition emphasizedpoten? first Hinds, that the porters dissident centuries Islam of (Cambridge: Cambridge University 10The of does cy social in Middle See, example, this that society early development idea, civil of forces the East. for Ervand Press, 1986). in Orient,brilliantly not exist the is in analyzed Patricia Abrahamian, Crowdthe in Persian "The Iranian Revolution," Western and the Prince Studies Springborg, Republicanism Oriental on 2(Autumn pp. Hamid Religion 38Slaves Horses, 84. p. 1969), 128-150; Algar, of Texas Also (Austin: 1992). seeBryan andStateinIran,1785-1906 Press, University of (Berkeley: University 39For of idea the criticism the "mamlukism," that medieval and ProblemCivil "Orientalismthe of in Turner, Society," California 1969); Nikki and Iran: Press, Keddie, Religion, mamluk institutionbehypostatized asa model can toserve Assaf Islam Hussein, Orientalism, andIslamists Politics Society ed., and Frank (London: Cass, 1980). for Arab see The Gerber, Social contemporary politics, Haim Amana (Brattelboro: Press, 1984), 23-42. pp. Modern Middle (Boulder: Rienner, East 27For Leonard while the Originsthe of Lynne Binder, acknowledging example, 11Roy in Mottahedeh, andLeadershipanEarly participation religious and Loyalty of Shi'i in leaders insurrections 1987), 149-161; Jean-Claude "The such Garcin, Mamluk pp. Islamic Princeton (Princeton: and Society Press, of Muslim University 1980), as the Revolt the and Iranian Tobacco revolution of1905, Military System theBlocking Medieval inJean John and p.4. dismissed activism: some such "while ulama were Mann, promi? Society," Baechler, A.Hall, Michael andthe RiseofCapitalism Basil in nent these (Oxford: actions the Europe against Qajar dynasty, never eds., they 12 Robert of "Patterns Association the in Springborg, acted nor they for alone did press unfettered power Blackwell, pp.113-130. 1988), political Political inGeorge Political Elite," Egyptian ed., Lenczowski, the basis a religious of of See political in Middle (Washington: Elites the East American and The a Enterpriseon Iran:Political theoryina legitimacy." 40Slave Soldiers Islam: Genesis Military of System his Development Changing Society (New Institute, p.87. 1975), Haven: University 1981), 62. Yale Press, p. of California 1962), 74. Press, (Berkeley: University p. 13An of this is intelligent notion the between and that gap unusually summary thesis Sherif 28SeeJuan Cole Nikki ideals p. R.I. and R.Keddie, Shi'ism and 41Ibid., 70.The eds., Civil in Ottoman and Mardin, "Power, Society Culture the realities particularly inIslam was acute a well Social Protest Haven: University 1986); established inOrientalist wasalready Yale (New Press, Studies and (June Martin Empire," Comparative inSociety History theme although Pipes and ed., Resistance, Revolution deduced implications literature, E. von Kramer, Shi'ism, 258-281. 1969), new from see Gustave pp. it; Westview 1987). (Boulder: Press, "The Law in Politic: andtheState," Grunebaum, Body 14 Clement "Authoritarian in Politics Moore, Henry of Islam John "The State' the Medieval (Chicago: and Press, Chicago 1965), University example, Waterbury, 'Soft The Unincorporated Society: CaseofNasser's Egypt," 29For Door: with pp. Open Egypt's Experience Economic Liberalization, 142-169. Politics Comparative 6 (1974), 207. p. Politics 1974-1984," Comparative 18(October pp. 1985), 65- 42Inthe of Islam Political (New and Power York: 15Two the of classic studies this in tradition Clement 83;and S. Migdal, are Joel Societies Weak and States: Basic Path God: 187-8. a critical Strong For see Books, 1983), response Tunisia Independence:Dynamics State-Society Since The and Relations State inthe Moore, Henry Capabilities Third Edward Said, pp. W. "Orientalism inFrancis Reconsidered," Government of California World Princeton For Barker, of One-Party (Princeton: (Berkeley: University Press, University 1988). etal.,Literature, Politics Theory and (London: and The the related studies other on Press, see 1965); John of Waterbury,Commander countries, Alfred developing 1986), 210-229. The in Political AStudy SegmentedStepan, Stateand Society: The Elite, Peruin Comparative Methuen, pp. Faithful: Moroccan Politics York: Columbia Both Perspective (New Princeton Press, University 1970). (Princeton: Press, University 1978); Continued onp.40 Middle East Report ? July-August 1993 21

political activities and speech of Jews and Jewish organizations in the US, obtained data from confidential police records and maintained close rela? tions with the FBI (and perhaps the CIA as well). the ADL was preoccupied While with damage control, the Amer? ican Jewish Committee (AJC) was tak? ing the offensive in the campaign to whip up anti-Muslim hysteria as the basis for a renewed and reinvigorated US-Israeli "special relationship." The AJC recently released a report entitled "Hamas: Terror in the Service of God," written by Michael Oren, director of its Israel Office.

The report demonstrates mainly the author's profound ignorance and is of little interest, but Oren's remarks at an AJC meeting in New York are worth noting. Islamic fundamental? ists, he declared, "present a threat not just to Israel, but to the United States and to the West as a whole.... These organizations want to destroy Israel, a U.S. ally, and ultimately western civ? ilization as well." Oren went on to say that "the principles and norms Amer? icans hold as sacred may be as inap? in an and inappropriate plicable Islamic setting as an Islamic funda? mentalist government would be in Washington, D.C." Oren concluded with a call to arms: "If the 20th cen-

tury's battle was with communism then I believe that the 21st century's battle between the West and Islam will be far more dangerous. Unlike the com? munists, with whom we could sit and talk at the same table and speak the same language, we do not share the same lexicon with these Islamic fun? damentalists." Israeli officials and pro-Israeli lob? byists have been pushing this line for months now, and the campaign will likely escalate. Oren made his agen? da exceedingly clear when he de? clared that US officials should be aware that US allies in the Middle East (read: Saudi Arabia) are fund? ? ing Islamists.

Continued from Sadowski,p.22 in 43See,for his About 55Mancur The and of (New Democracy: Olson, Rise Decline Nations Questions of Society Egypt," example, "Fundamental Contrasting Conceptions Wall October 1992, All; Haven: University 1982), 75-76. Yale East #179 Muslims," Street Journal, 1992), 30, Press, p. During Middle Report (November-December pp. pp. Can't the the and 2-10. America Save Kurds," Street Wall 1970s 1980s, continued the economic of Journal, "Why growth Japan, and Wall Arabs and bred ll, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore a growing 60Bernard April 1991; "Why Aren't Rioting," Street South East The West, cit., Lewis, Middle andthe op. but in China West, also Communist Journal, 22,1991. January respect?not inthe just has on idea, arguing expanded this andthe Soviet Union?for virtues strong the effectivep.31.Lewis recently of about of since to 44SeeJ.G. Foucault have "real" reasonscomplain University states. the that economic Merquior, (Berkeley: For idea the of the that, Muslims no effectiveness Western must California 1985); Michael The their of the Press, Mann, SourcesSocial state these of imperialism, resentment West be in societies ona "soft rested authoritarianism" Volume I (Cambridge: rooted irrational in of Power, Press, which Cambridge growing University feelings "humiliation?a of policymakers the and A. Powers Liberties: Causes ers, insulated other from demandswork? awareness, the The of and heirs anold, and dom? 1986); John Hall, proud, long and see consumers, cranky groups, Chalmers inant among and the of West of and been civilization, overborne, Consequences Rise the (Harmondsworth: of having overtaken, MITI the and Japanese Stanford Miracle (Stanford: Johnson, of These scholars several share sources inferi? overwhelmed whom regardedtheir those as 1985). Penguin, inspi? University 1982). by they Press, rationcommon, in the of Gellner The ors."See "TheRoots Muslim of (see includingworksErnest Rage," Atlantic, and Jones, European The 56 and version Miracle: Samuel below) E.L. Environments, See Michel Crozier, 1990, Huntington, Joji September p. 59.Fora neo-Orientalist of inthe Economies Geopolitics History and and The on feel? Muslim radicalismchildish on Europe Asia Watanuki, Crisisof Democracy: of Report the this argument, blaming of and Democracies Trilateral tothe Commissionings envy magical seeDaniel 1981). Press, (Cambridge: Cambridge "Dealing Governability of thinking, University Pipes, York: York New James M. with Middle Eastern (New Orbis, 1975); Theories," 36(Winter Press, University Conspiracy 45Hall, op.ci*.,89. p. inDeficit: 1992), 41-46. Buchanan Richard Wagner, and E. Democracy pp. The Political (Academic 1977); 61For Press, 46Ibid. of Keynes LegacyLord The see Bennoune, Making casualty figures,Mahfoud andOlson, andDecline, cit. type analysis Rise op. This of 47Ibid., 102. Cambridge Contemporary 1830-1987 (Cambridge: Algeria, p. to the rationale the for neo-con- of helped provide intellectual The Lisa Press, University 1988), 35-43; Anderson,State pp. stud? of and For critical Reagan Thatcher. more 48Gellner's contributions direct toMiddle studies servatism East 1830-1980 and Social inTunisia Libya, Transformation and H. the of and see Hirsch John his include classic of High iesof politicsinflation,Fred anthropological Saints the study Princeton Press, University 1986), 201,215. eds., of Economy Inflation (Princeton: impactimperialism, pp. work of and Atlas 1969) his Goldthorpe, ThePolitical Press, (Chicago: University Chicago For economic of the the single best and Harvard Press, University 1978); Leon isRoger The brilliant of Ibn Muslim (Cambridge: resurrection Khaldun's sociology, 1800East World Owen, Middle inthe Economy, and S. eds., PoliticsInflation 1914 of Lindberg Charles Maier, The Press, Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 1981). andEconomic (London: Methuen, but seeHuri 1981); also IslamogluThe (Washington: Brookings Inan, The Stagnation Gellner also a has been major inanalytic voice philosophy, and World Economy ed., Ottoman Empire the 1985). Institution, of and studies. science, EastEuropean philosophy Press, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 1987). C. 57Philippe Schmitter, a Century "Still of Corporatism?" Gyan an of argument against wider the 49For instancethis set as the 62 Prakash defined has Orientalism "fabrica? 36 and 1974), 85-121; Peter tion the of of Gellner's of see Plough, ReviewPolitics (January pp. background philosophy history,his invulnera? of Orient terms founding in of essences Industrial Small in Markets: and The Human Sword, Book: Structure History (Chicago: Katzenstein, States World of bletohistorical in Post-Orientalist in Cornell (Ithaca: Press, Policy Europe University 1985). Histories the change," "Writing from of 1988). Press, University Chicago of Third World: Perspectives Indian For attemptapply conceptcorporatism tothe an to the of and Studies Comparative inSociety History Historiography," 50Ernest "A contract insearch anidiom: Middle of Gellner,social East,seeRobert Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism:32(April p.384. isone the impor? thedemise theDanegeld of in and Associational Twentieth Egypt in Oxford tant 1990),of Imperialism of mostmust state," Spectacles Century (Oxford: Life mechanisms historical that change Orientalists Predicaments: (Cambridge: University 1989). Essaysin Social Theory Press, discount. Press, Cambridge University 1980), 286. p. 58SeeArend World 63Bassam "Political "Consociational Democracy," Lijphart, inArab Arab Freedom Societies," 51Ibid., 287. "On 21 Politics (1969), 207-225; Daalder, Building Studies Tibi, 6 Hans p. pp. (Summer p.225. 1984), Quarterly of Netherlands and Nations: Cases the The the? Consociational 52For classic of Weber's ethic the Protestant critiques 23 International Social Journal(1971), 64Albert Private Hirschman, Involvements: Interest Shifting see and Action Switzerland," Gerhard Science sis, Kurt Samuelsson, Religion Economic and "ConsociationalandPublic Lembruch, Action Princeton (Princeton: Press, University York: (New Harper Rodinson,pp.355-370; Conflict the Torchbpoks, and 1957); Maxime Class in and New Democracy, Corporatism," 1982). Islam Capitalism York: and 1973). (New Pantheon, and C. eds., Lembruch, Trends 65 PhilippeSchmitter Gerhard and Keane, "Despotism Democracy." was of that Intermediation Hills: 53Hegel similarly skeptical claims political Toward Corporatist (Beverly Sage, social assertiveness groups national produced progress; 1980), 53-61. pp. by and 66John The Brewer, Sinews Power: Money the War, of The see Manfred Between Revolution Tradition: and Riedel, AlfredKnopf, A. State (New 1989), The English 1688-1783 York: 59For Khaldun, Yves Ibn see Ibn Lacoste, Khaldun: Political Hegelian (Cambridge: Transformation Philosophy of xx. Birth History the of Third and Past the World (London: p. of Press, Cambridge University 1984), 129-158. pp. tocon? 67Measuring strength For Ottoman 1984), 92-131. the Verson, pp. attempt of state the orresponsibilities and an see Rifa'at society 54Richard "Overloaded The fiscal and Government:Problem front crisis build absolutist Rose, monarchy, of a isbound bemade difficult lack agree? to more The ment how distinguish theby see debate Formation the State: Studies Newsletter 5 (1975), Outlined," pp. 'AliAbou-El-Haj, of Modern European the over to between two; Samuel "The Contradictions Ottoman Sixteenth to Centuries 13-18; Brittan, Economic Empire Eighteenth (Albany: provokedTimothy "The Limits the of State: Mitchell, 5 of A. Beyondby Approaches Their of "British JournalPolitical New and Science(1975), State Press, 1991); Jack Democracy of University York and American Statist Critics," The Goldstone, andWest the "East in Seventeenth James "Review Article: Century: Political Douglas, pp. 129-159; Science Review (March 85 1991), 77-96. pp. in and Overloaded British Journal Political Science Political Crises Stuart Ottoman Crown," England, Turkey, of and Stephens, 6(1976), 498-500; Philippe Schmitter, C. "Interest Ming and Studies Rueschemeyer, Huber Evelyne China," pp. Comparative inSociety History 68SeeDietrich and D. in some and Islamists producing of and John Stephens, are Capitalist Development Intermediation Regime Governability Con? 30(1988), 103-142. pp. of Press, 1992); in the in and North most onstate-society relationsthe Democracy (Chicago: Chicago Western University America," Europe original thinking temporary Nicos Mouzelis, P. Politicsthe in Semi-Periphery: Suzanne Berger, Organizing D. in Hasan Early InterestsWestern contemporary see, example, Turabi, ed., "Islam, and world; for inthe Late and 1 the and West," Middle Policy Parliamentarism Industrialization Balkans East Press, (Cambridge: Europe Cambridge University 1981), Democracy,State the andLatin America York: Martin's, St. 1986). (New the & and (1992), 49-61; Sami Zubaida, "Islam, State pp. 40 Middle East Report ? July-August 1993