WINSTON L. S. CHURCHILL: THE UNLIKELY ALLY, 1919-1939 by WILLIAM MICHAEL WATTS, B.A.

A THESIS IN HISTORY Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS Approved

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No, 59 dop'^

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I sincerely appreciate the time, effort and

guidance of the members of my thesis committee. Dr. James W. Harper and Dr. Brian L. Blakeley.

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CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION I. II. III. CHURCHILL: CHURCHILL: CHURCHILL: THE MAN AND HIS CAREER IN HARMONY WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AT ENMITY WITH THE 46 AMERICAN PEOPLE 74 IV. V. CHURCHILL: THE AUTHOR 100 CONCLUSIONS: THE UNLIKELY ALLY 111 SELECTED SOURCES
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1 4 16

111

INTRODUCTION Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill received on the ninth of April,1963, the only honorary grant of United States citizenship that the Congress has ever given. • ' This was a singular outpouring of feeling and honor for the then ailing leader of Britain during World War II, a person who was probably the most famous and popular foreigner in United States' history. At this time it

could be easily recorded that Churchill had a warm and positive relationship with the American people. This thesis will attempt to ascertain the image Churchill cast in the American mind during the period 1919-1939. During this period Churchill gained great He cast a complex, but He appeared to be '

exposure in the American press.

predominately unfavorable impression.

a most unlikely ally of the American people. In selecting the time period 1919-1939, the utmost consideration was to view Churchill's activities before the Second World War began. After the war errupted and

Churchill became Prime Minister, his influence in the Writers and Editorial Staff of the New York Times, Winston S. Churchill: The Man of the Century (New York: Barton Books, 1965), p. 141.

United States grew immensely.

It is beyond the scope of

the present research to ascertain the wartime influence of the British Prime Minister in any depth. Also, an

extended coverage of the pre-1919 era would call into play the war relations of the United States and its allies, clouding Churchill's personal influence. Thus, this time

period was selected as a limited epoch, largely ignored in Churchill's life, in which to view the influence he garnered in the minds of Americans. The problems with "finding the American mind" on any subject were readily discernible. It was difficult to

determine one generally distinguishable attitude of the American people toward Churchill. However, within limits

one could obtain a feeling of the majority of American people by reading the comments of leading periodicals and studying monographs on the issues that arose. Also, one

could discern certain intellectual and political groups which had kindred feelings for many of Churchill's policies and actions. A second problem was the selection of publications that were read by the general public of that age, and were readily available for research. In selecting the New York

Times and the periodicals, the idea of general circulation and mass appeal was uppermost in consideration. The New

York Times was perhaps the leading eastern newspaper; and the head of a large chain of papers, that reflected the

attitudes of the parent paper.

Also, the New York Times It

was the paper most interested in European affairs.

especially dealt with British news, thus Churchill would appear in the Times more than other American papers.2 The

periodicals were selected from the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, the best source of general reading periodicals. As with all research and reporting, a large number of individuals must be acknowledged for their contributions to this thesis. First, I would thank my wife for her pa-

tience, understanding, and long hours of labor in typing and proofreading this undertaking. Also, I appreciate the time, effort and direction offered by Dr. James Harper and Dr. Brian Blakeley. It

was their experience in helping in research that led me through the long hours of labor in completing this work. Finally, I wish to express my appreciation to the libraries at St. Mary's University, Trinity University, The Public Library of San Antonio, as well as the Texas Tech University facilities for the use of their materials. It is only with the assistance of those aforementioned that this project reached completion. ^Oswald Garrison Villard, Some Newspapers and Newspapermen (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1923), p. 4. Oswald Villard, editor of the Nation, and the New York Evening Post discussed the accusation that the New York Times was controlled by British interests, but explained that the paper was owned by Americans who had a great deal of interest in the events of Europe and especially Britain.

CHAPTER I CHURCHILL: THE MAN AND HIS CAREER

Winston Churchill's heritage, beliefs, and the offices he held all had profound influence upon his image in the United States. The future Prime Minister was direct-

ly related to John Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough, a noted and honored hero to the English. This heritage placed

Winston in one of the aristocratic ruling families of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The posi-

tion of his father. Lord Randolph Churchill, also introduced young Churchill to acquaintances in high places. His father

was the rising star of the Tory Party in the early 1880's, until he resigned his post as Chancellor of the Exchequer over a cabinet dispute on the size of army estimates. After his resignation Lord Randolph suffered deep depression 2 and died early in life, a broken man. The death of Churchill's father caused him to make his own way in life, 3 in some cases in spite of his paternal heritage. Winston Churchill's maternal heritage was equally -'•Robert Rhodes James, Churchill: A Study in Failure, 1900-1939 (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1970), p. 8. ^Ibid., p. 7. Lord Randolph Churchill died in January, 1895 at the age of 45 from paresis. -^J.T. Woolf, "Feature Article", New York Times, July 20, 1930, sec. 5, pp. 3 and 22.

as influential, yet not as illustrious as his paternal relationship. His mother was Jeanette (Jennie) Jerome,

the daughter of Leonard Jerome, wealthy part-owner of the New York Times. Winston's m.aternal grandfather was well

known in the political, social, and financial society of the day. He served as consul at Trieste, was known as the

"King of Wall Street", and made horse racing an honorable sport of the elite society, for which he was named "Father of the American Turf".4 The maternal relationship made

Churchill half American and gave him entry into the leading society in the United States; an access which a middle aged Churchill would use to gain support for his views.^ After attending several public schools, Churchill embarked on a military career, entering Sandhurst, the British West Point.^ Graduating eighth in his class of

1894, he entered the twin careers of soldier and war correspondent, which provided him an income for the next few years.' Churchill took a commission in the Fourth Hussars

^Ralph G. Martin, Jennie: The Life of Lady Randloph Churchill, The Romantic Years, 1854-1895 (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 1 and 16. ^Philip Guedella, Harper's Magazine, June, 1927, pp. 21-25. Churchill's maternal heritage, according to Guedella, a biographer of Churchill, gave him his pugnacious personality. ^Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life, A Roving Commission (2nd. ed.. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1958) p. 9. Churchill attended Saint James Preparatory School, Brighton and Harrow and did not distinguish himself at any of the three schools. 7Ibid., pp. 10 and 50.

and immediately went to Cuba to observe the Spanish attempt to stop the revolt that had begun on the island. To supplement his military pay young Churchill also reported his observations to the Daily Graphic a London paper.^ From Cuba he went to Bangalore, India in 1897, where he joined in an expedition against the Pathans, a rebel Moslem group in Northwest India. Denied permission to go in a

military capacity, Churchill once again turned to journalism and wrote as a war correspondent for the Daily TeleQ

graph.

His dispatches were later compiled into a book

on the expedition entitled the Malakand Field Force. The book was very well received in America and in most British circles; but because of its abundant suggestions as to military strategy, not by the military. In 1898 Churchill used his mother's influence to obtain a commission in the Nile Expeditionary Force, over the objections of the commander. General Sir Herbert Kitchener. This episode also led to another book.

The River War, a history of the expedition, and a novel Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Youth (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), p. 256. 9lbid., p. 342 ^^Winston Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force (Longmans, 1898). llchurchill, W. S. Churchill: Youth, pp. 379-380 Lady Churchill spoke to Prime Minister Salisbury and a friend in Parliament Sir Evelyn Wood, to arrange the appointment to the force.
o

12 Savrola. Speaking engagements concerning these adven-

tures and laudatory reviews of his books brought Churchill his first notice in the American press.-'••^ Churchill's last youthful adventure was in another of the "glorious little wars", the Boer War.^^ Once again sword and pen

became Churchill's companions as he took an active military part in the war, as well as reported it for the Morning Post. •- It was during this episode that he was captured ^' by Louis Botha, future general and Prime Minister of South Africa. Also stemming from this escapade were more books The military exploits

on the conduct of the war itself.

of the young Churchill, captured in his books and the legend that he helped originate, served him well in the United States. Persons reading his v/orks and hearing of

him were impressed with this young aristocrat and his love 12 Winston Churchill, The River War (Longmans Green, 1902) and Savrola (Longmans, 1900). • • ^ . Churchill, W. S. Churchill: Youth, p. 524, '•R New York Times Book Review, April 30, 1898, p. 296, January 6, 1900, p. 1. The River War was in such demand that it ran through three separate editions by 1903. Harold Callender, "When Churchill Thunders All Britain Takes Heed", New York Times, November 22, 1936, sec. 8, p. 5. ^^Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life (2nd ed., New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1958), p. 230. Winston Churchill, London to Lady Smith Via Pretoria (Longmans Green, 1900) and Ian Hamilton's March (Longmans Green, 1900).

8 of action. 1 7 This was a time of military conquest in * United States' history, and the many accounts of a Theodore Roosevelt charging up San Juan hill in Cuba illustrate the popular passion for young military heroes. Churchill's ability to play on this emotion through his books at home and in America evoked awe and respect from Britons and Americans. Even before the Boer War, Churchill revealed a boredom with soldiering and desire to enter politics. Unsuccessful in his first campaign, he utilized his wartime notoriety to win as a Conservative candidate at Oldham in 1900. •• He remained a Conservative only until '° 1904, when he "crossed the aisle" because of disagreement with the protectionist trade policies of the Conservatives. 19 Leaving Oldham, Churchill ran for and won a seat as a Liberal in the North West Manchester constituency in the election of 1906. Also in this year he published the

memorial book to his father. Lord Randolph Churchill. 20 17 Each of Churchill's military works during this period received praise in the New York Book Review. In each case the powerful writing was lauded and the accuracy of military writing was mentioned. Also, the reviewers mentioned his personal exploits. New York Times Book Review, April 30, 1898, p. 296, January 6, 1900, p. 82, June 2, 1900, p. 354, January 12, 1901, p. 19, and February 21, 1903, p. 115. 18w. Churchill, My Early Life, p. 360. l^Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Young Statesm.an (Boston: Hough<-op Mifflin Co. , 1967) , p. 78. ^^Winston Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill (MacMillan, 1906).

Churchill also received in this same year an office in Liberal Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman's cabinet, as Under Secretary of the Colonies.^1 When in 1908, the new Liberal Prime Minister Herbert Asquith appointed Churchill to the Presidency of the Board of Trade, Churchill h a to be endorsed in a 'd special election by his North West Manchester District. He lost a close election, but was returned in a by-election from the district of Dundee, insuring his new office in
0 0

the cabinet.-^^

The youthful Churchill's aggressive person-

ality and ability to work led him to the office of Home Secretary in 1910, and to the prestigious office of First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, a time ripe for advancing his career.23 In the year 1911 the first glimmer of war to come had begun to appear and the First Lord was one who caught sight of the approaching world crisis. With the aid of

Sea Lord Sir John Fischer, Churchill began the improvement of the British Royal Navy.^ Acting on his own authority

in preparing the fleet, and placing it in strategic positions, Churchill initiated a series of actions that depicted 21 James, Churchill: 22ibid., p. 25. A Study in Failure, p. 25.

23vice-Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy (New York: Coward McCann, Inc., 1968), p. 44. 24Ibid., p. 44.

10 his brilliant though at times erratic military mind. The war found the fleet ready, but Churchill planning another master stroke did not find the execution so propitious as the preparation of the fleet. The mas-

terly planned but ill executed Gallipoli campaign began Churchill's fall from power to depths from which most politicians would never have recovered.^^ It was Church-

ill's effort and failure to break the western deadlock by an attack at Gallipoli that caused him unwanted exposure and notoriety in Europe as well as in the United States. This episode illustrated a supposedly erratic military strategy in a stubborn mind that would haunt Churchill at home and abroad until he returned to the same office twenty-four years later. This disaster and an earlier

futile attempt to hold the harbor at Antwerp led to his removal as First Lord. Leaving office Churchill took a variety of positions in the government and played an active military part in the war. However, the new Prime Minister of the

National Government, David Lloyd George, recalling the abilities of Churchill from their association in Asquith's 25see Churchill's account in his history of World War I, The World Crisis, for a defense of his actions. Robert Rhodes James gives a differing account in his work, Gallipoli. 2^Churchill was given the office of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and later served with the 6th Royal Fusiliers in France.

11 government, offered the former First Lord the office of Minister of Munitions.^^ Churchill served there until

1918, when he was appointed Secretary of State for War and for the Air Ministry, an important position due to the demobilization and reorganization of the military after the great war and the development of a military policy toward Russia.^^ Still serving under Lloyd George,

Churchill was appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies where he was part of the difficult negotiations with the . ^ Irish. 29 In the 1920's and 1930's Churchill maneuvered in and out of parties showing an independence—or opportunism— that did not go unnoticed in the United States. The Liberal

Party decreasing in power, but still in a coalition government with Conservative support, began to move more toward a Labour position. Churchill, an anti-socialist, split

with the Liberals and started the move that would eventually bring him back into his old Tory Party. Still running as a

Liberal in 1922, he lost his seat in Dundee and a byelection in Leichester during 1923. The movement by the

Liberals toward the Labour Party and his defeat in 1923 by a Socialist caused Churchill to run as an independent 27James, Churchill: A Study in Failure, p. 102.

28Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill: The Years of Preparation (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1958), p. 288. 2^Broad, Churchill: Years of Preparation, p. 306.

12 anti-socialist in the Abbey Division of Westminister, thus breaking his twenty year relationship with the 30 Liberals. Even though he lost the election, Churchill made a very good showing in this dominantly Conservative district. It was no surprise that in the by-election in

Epping Forest, Churchill, running as a Constitutionalist, won a seat in Parliament, returning after a three year absence. The movement between parties caused British and

American observers to doubt Churchill's loyalty and dependability. However, the maneuver to the right in British

politics allowed Churchill to come back into association with the Conservative Party, which won the general election in November of 1924. Upon the selection of the new cabinet of Stanley Baldwin, Conservative Prime Minister, the nation was completely surprised to find Churchill included with the prestigous portfolio of Chancellor of the Exchequer. 31 From this post as the second most powerful man in the government, Churchill was to have great impact on the United States, both from the positions he took on major issues and the exalted office he held. ^Qlbid., pp. 431-432. •^•^New York Times, November 7, 1924, p. 1:1. Churchill would have great economic effect on the United States as Chancellor of the Exchequer. He brought Britain back to the gold standard and negotiated the debt settlements, as well as took part in the General Strike that paralyzed Britain in 1926.

13 Churchill occupied this office from 1924 through 1929, in the second government of Stanley Baldwin. After

the fall of the Conservatives and the coming to power of the second Labour government under Ramsay MacDonald, Churchill served in the shadow cabinet of the Tories. As MacDonald led Labour, the depression struck Britain as it had the United States. MacDonald's government fell At this point King

in 1931 due to the financial crisis.

George V asked MacDonald to head a National government and when the Conservatives agreed to join, Churchill began to move toward an independent position. The final break with

the Conservative Party came with Churchill's opposition to dominion status for India. The once rising star of a not

so youthful Churchill was once more in decline.33 The former Chancellor of the Exchequer was now out of party; out of power. His role seemed destined to

be a "voice crying in the wilderness", a critic of all who held power. Here, in this back bench position,

Churchill fought the battles for the old ruling aristocracy, over India, Edward VIII's abdication and the other issues of the day. It was also from this lonely critic's position

that he began to prophecy the coming of World War II and warn of German rearmament. This warning came at a desperFor Britain it led to

ate time for Britain and Churchill.

a state of semi-preparedness, for Churchill a return to 33New York Times, January 31, 1930, p. 16:3.

14 his old position as First Lord of the Admiralty. " ^ ^ This background of Churchill's life would not be complete without an attempt to capture the man's personality. A man who, as Lord Berkenhead described, was Churchill

"easily contented with the best of everything."^^

was not satisfied only with the' best, but with being the best at everything. His versatility read like the credits He was: an excellent painter,

of a combination of men.

a bricklayer, an orator unequalled in modern British Parliament, a prolific as well as lauded writer, and as has been mentioned a soldier, journalist, and politician. In each area of endeavor the attempt to excel drove Winston Churchill. This attempt to excel led to many misunderstandings and critical mistakes in his career. Churchill's

ability in making the complex, simple and in dogmatically pursuing an idea led many to feel he was of shallow mind, when in reality his was a genius far deeper than most men comprehended. The pugnacity and impetuosity with which Churchill grasped an idea or thought, and the extremes he took to carry it through, caused critics to infer that he was: treacherous, he followed his own star, and he owed allegiance •^"^Ibid. , September 4, 1939, p. 8:4. ^^Ibid., November 29, 1931, sec. 9, p. 2:3.

15 to no one but himself.^^ These were charges that followed Journalists, in speaking of

the entire Churchill family.

Winston Churchill, constantly alluded to the treachery, the militarism, and the depression that shadowed his family; from the first Duke of Marlborough to his father. Lord Randolph. Churchill was at times a pugnacious advocate of an aristocratic time passed, a fighter for an age that had vanished. In other instances he contributed to social He

change and reform in a "Tory democracy" tradition.

was- an adventurer in the military during the "glorious little wars" and this carried over into his political affairs, where he loved political fights. Zealous and

brilliant though sometimes erratic, Churchill often evoked 37
1

mistrust and criticism as a man of no character. However, through all he was loyal to Britain as he imagined her. ^^David John Marshall, "Winston Churchill: A Study of England's Political Bad Boy", Living Age, April, 1929, pp. 96-98. -^•^New York Times, April 4, 1921, p. 12:7. "His effect on men is one of interest and curiosity not admiration and loyalty. His power is the power of gifts, not character."

CHAPTER II CHURCHILL: IN HARMONY WITH THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

One might readily assume that Churchill's tremendous popularity in the United States arose from his performance as a World War II ally. However, a study of

Churchill's image in the American press before 1939 reveals that he had laid a base of popular support in the United States. Churchill's American heritage and his visits to

the United States gave him a distinct advantage in appealing for American support. Through the period 1919-1939,

he cultivated this advantage by calling for Anglo-American amity and cooperation. Most important, Churchill mirrored

and in some cases anticipated American public opinion on a variety of issues ranging from Zionism to economic policy. Thus, the man who would become England's wartime leader won a position of influence and affection among important segments of American public opinion well before the formation of the wartime alliance. Churchill's personal relationship with the American people, through his mother's birth, was a strong contact with the populace of the United States. A review of Church-

ill's book. The World Crisis, by Filson Young brought out 16

17 the importance of this relationship. In his review Young

contended that the book was well received by the American public because of the author's place in English politics and his American heritage.-'In an article for the New York

Times, J. L. Garvin of the Sunday Observer made the same observation. When discussing the relations of Britain

and the United States, Garvin declared that it was well for England and the Empire to have Churchill in office. Churchill, being half American, would be the man to keep the United States and Britain together and keep a strong 2 imperial and maritime policy. The personal advantages of Churchill can be seen in his visit to the United States in 1929. While in New

York he was entertained at the home of the arch-Anglophobe William Randolph Hearst. Only Churchill's background as

a journalist and his American mother's family connections could open the door to the home of the perpetual Britainbaiter, Hearst. When visiting in the United States, Churchill called upon the leading society of the nation. The door

to direct, personal influence was open as early as 1901. The social calls he made during this speaking tour included. New York Times, November 18, 1923, sec. 3, p. 7:1. ^Ibid., January 30, 1921, p. 2:4. ^Ibid., October 19, 1929, p. 12:2.

18 then President William McKinley, Senator Chauncey Depew, and the recently elected Vice-President Theodore Roosevelt. Also, the speaking engagements were a social success, the highlight being an introduction by Mark Twain, at a New York engagement. The noted American author introduced him

by relating, "Churchill by his father is an Englishman, by his mother he is an American, no doubt a blend that makes the perfect man." Later in the 1920's and 1930's Churchill At the Hearst dinner the Astors, the

mixed with the same type of company. mentioned above, the guests included:

Vanderbilts, Jay Gould, Jimmy Walker, and others of economic, political, and social importance. However, these gatherings did not draw a great deal of interest from the press nor the general public but rather from the social and economic elite to whom Churchill mainly spoke. In an editorial on Churchill's

visit in 1929, the New York Times mentioned that his visit was overshadowed by the meeting of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and President Herbert Hoover. The article went

on to say that Churchill, "who loomed in vast affairs years before either of them did, was inconspicuous in New York." The quiet atmosphere of Churchill's trip in 1929 ^R. Churchill, Winston Churchill: Youth, p. 524.

^New York Times, October 19, 1929, p. 12:2. ^Ibid., November 10, 1929. sec. 3, p. 4:6.

19 was almost duplicated in a return visit in 1931. However, in this instance the future Prime Minister was struck by an automobile while crossing the street in New York."^ The

accident and the reports of his recovery kept Churchill's name in the news, and it also called forth sympathetic inquiries as to his health from the American people. Churchill, who has been called "that great embodiment of the partnership" between Britain and the United States, used his American visits to preach Anglo-American cooperation and to bring the two English speaking nations together.
p

Long before he began to warn the world of Nazi

rearmament and the need for cooperation among the democracies of the world, he called for the close interworking of British and American policies. In the two journeys

Churchill made to the United States during this time period, he emphasized the need for international cooperation between Britain and America on the economic problems of the day. However, Churchill's exhortations were not always a call for economic, political, or military cooperation as evidenced in his speech to open an air show in England. Here he noted that the seas divided the Anglo-American people, but it was his belief in the future the air would 'ibid., December 14, 1931, p. 1:7.
D

William Clark, Less Than Kin (London: Hamilton, 1957), p. 3.

Hamish

20 unite them.^ On another occasion he spoke at a dinner

honoring George Washington, whom he called a hero to all English speaking people."*-^ The essence of Churchill's thoughts on Britain's and America's close relationship was found in his article, "The Union of English-Speaking People", for News of the World, a London newspaper, on May 15, 1938. The beginnings of American history are to be found, not across the Atlantic, but where the Thames flows between green lawns and woodlands down to a grey sea. Britain and America are joint sharers in a great inheritance of law and letters. Our political institutions, under the mask of outward difference, bear the marks of a common origin and a common aim. We are both democracies—and to-day our countries are, with France, the last great strongholds of Parliamentary government and individual liberty. It is the English-speaking nations who, almost alone, keep alight the torch of Freedom. These things are a powerful incentive to collaboration. With nations, as with individuals, if you care deeply for the same things, and these things are threatened, it is natural to work together to preserve them. Collaboration of this kind does not imply any formal union of the English-speaking peoples. It is a union of spirit, not of forms, that we seek. There need not even be an alliance. All that is necessary is a willingness to consult together, an understanding that Britain and America shall pursue, side by side, their mutual good and the good of the whole world.H % e w York Times, May 2, 1919, p. 13:2. IQibid., July 13, 1932, p. 11:1. -'-Kay Halle, ed. , Wins•^or> r-hurchill on America and Britain (New York: Walker and Co., 1970), pp 292293 and 300.

21 In an earlier speech in New York on February 8, 1932, Churchill called for the more practical symbol of amity, economic cooperation to help pull the world out of depression. He suggested that a close working partnership

between England and the United States would stimulate international trade and the movement of currency, as well as help bring other nations out of world wide economic . . crisis. 12 The militaristic speeches of Churchill were directed most strongly against Germany in the 1930's, and as early as 1929, he appealed for United States help in naval armaments in a speech to the Iron and Steel Manufacturers Association. In October, 1929, Churchill called

for understanding on both sides of the ocean, as each nation attempted to build navies suitable for their individual needs.13 Finally, Churchill spoke about the needs of the English-speaking people to band together against Communism and the disintegration of Europe. At the time the

former Chancellor said that only the strong leadership of the two English democracies could give guidance to Europe and hold back the movement of Communism. Churchill's themes of Anglo-American political. -'-^New York Times, February 9, 1932, p. 44:1. •'-'^Ibid. , October 26, 1929, p. 3:3. •'•^Ibid. , February 8, 1932, p. 3:5.

22 economic, and military cooperation presaged later diplomatic developments and may have struck a responsive note among certain Americans. Certainly animosity between the

United States and Great Britain had waned since 1900. Moreover, the fact that a prominent British political figure seemed solicitous of the goodwill of the United States pleased American egoes, as well as those who were engaged in promoting an active international American foreign policy. However, political isolationism and

economic nationalism ran strong in America from 19211939 and any calls for an Anglo-American alliance or "unique relationship" would have to await a serious crisis for fulfillment. Yet Churchill's multi-faceted activities and interests took him into many other areas that evoked a much broader appeal and a more deeply felt response from Americans. His actions, statements, and policies on the

Bolshevik revolution, the resumption of the gold standard by Britain, the anti-Nazi speeches of the 1930's, and other issues paralleled opinions of large numbers in the United States. One such concern of the American people and Churchill was the Russian revolution and the power of the Bolsheviks. This fear was to remain open and pronounced until

the attack by Hitler on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1941. At the end of World War I, as the

23 Bolsheviks brought Russia out of the war with Germany, some of the Allies (Japan, Great Britain, and the United States) sent troops into Russia. The reasons given were

to keep supplies at Archangel from falling into German hands, to help Czechoslovakian soldiers entrapped in the interior of Russia, and primarily to reinstate the eastern • IS front against Germany. - The Communists disputed these " reasons and claimed the Allies were attempting to help the White Russians in the Civil War then being waged. Although denied by President Wilson and other allied leaders, there was evidence to support the Moscow alle„^.. „^ 16 gations. The sending of troops into Russia seemed to be well received by the American public until a number of soldiers were killed in clashes with the Bolsheviks. At this point the American populace demanded the removal of American troops, which took place during the next few months. The American people opposed and feared the

15 Leonid T. Strakhovsky, The Origins of American Intervention in Northern Russia (2nd ed.; New York: Howard Fertig, 1972), p. 75. The author concludes that it was the policy of the United States to reinstate the eastern front. However, Britain and France wanted to overthrow the Bolsheviks, as well as continue against Germany. Ibid., p. 75, and Thomas A. Bailey, America Fac^s Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 242-243. Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) , pp. 268-269

24 Bolshevik government because of its communistic nature and because of its advocacy of a world revolution. Also, the

Communist government had concluded a separate peace with Germany and in doing so had repudiated Russia's war debt. These practical reasons were fused with the idealistic American concepts of individual ownership of private property and a belief in God, both of which the Bolshevik government denounced. The American position, both public

and private, then became one of isolation toward Russia and a purge of any Socialist or "foreign" influence within the United States. The American people, in a movement

toward isolation in world affairs, were not willing to return to war to overturn the Communist government in Russia. At this time Churchill was the Secretary of War and Air Ministry of Lloyd George's government, and in this capacity he shared responsibility with the Prime Minister for the actions of the British forces in Russia. The Secretary of War and Air called the placing of troops in the Soviet Union an "interallied action" taken to obtain a government acceptable to the allies in Russia. This

concept of interallied action and the actual use of American troops was attacked by Senator William E. Borah, Republican from Idaho, who was one of the leading critics of the 1R Leonid I. Strakhovsky, Intervention at Archangel (2nd ed. New York: Howard Fertig, 1971), pp. 169-170.

25 United States' policy toward Russia. "" Once the American '^ troops were recalled; however, the continued verbal attacks of Churchill and his use of troops in Russia were greeted in the United States with enthusiasm, as shown by the close attention given to his actions in the New York Times.^^ Many Americans opposed the Bolshevik government and welcomed others who tried to end the control of the Communists in Russia.21 During the period, 1919-1922, the American public plunged into the "Red Scare", a condition perfect for Churchill to gain influence because of his strong stand against Communism. Churchill's animosity toward Russia

was illustrated in journalistic debates with H. G. Wells, the noted novelist and a prominent defender of the political left. Wells attacked Churchill's conservative phi-

losophies, and accused the Secretary of having no alternatives to Communism, but was simply anti-everything. The

novelist claimed Churchill was against Communism because it was new and Churchill was an aristocrat who could not see the truth but only what he wished to see. For this

reason. Wells continued, Churchill had sent troops into Russia and had almost brought Britain into a state of war. l^New York Times, September 6, 1919, p. 4:1. 20Fourteen articles concerning Churchill and his involvement in Russia ran during the year 1919. 2lFilene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, p. 272.

26 with no authorization from the government. Churchill

argued that Communism was a cancer that would kill Russia. The Bolsheviks should be stopped while the time was ripe, before they spread over the world.22 Churchill rejoined that, "they (Bolsheviks) represented the principles of death." Continuing, he stated,

" . . . they closed the gates both to the paths which make life tolerable here below and to those which we hope lead on to serener forms of existance." They "thrust on man-

kind universal slavery, disguised as universal equality "23
• • • •

This debate became the subject of two letters to the editor of the Nev7 York Times, which in both cases backed Churchill's argument.24 This close ideological

identification between Churchill and the public of the United States continued until the 1930's. Robert Murray

in his book. Red Scare, illustrated the opinion of the American public during these later years. 22"winston Churchill v. Wells, Further Echoes of the Controversy over Russia", New York Times, January 9, 1921, sec. 8, p. 2. In conjunction with this debate the Labour Party in Britain had earlier charged that Churchill's holding office was a national disgrace. New York Times, July 26, 1920, p. 2:8. Also, they had asked for his impeachment. New York Times, August 4, 1920, p. 1:2. 23"churchill v. Wells," New York Times, January 9, 1921, sec. 8, p. 2. 24lbid., January 16, 1921, sec. 6, p. 8:2 and sec. 7, p. 3:3.

27 . . . antiradical emotionalism emanating from the Scare affected both governmental and private thinking for almost a decade to come and left its unmistakable imprint upon many phases of American life. Continued insistance upon ideological conformity, suspicion of organized labor, public intolerance toward aliens, and a hatred for Soviet Russia . . . were, partially at least, outgrowths of the Scare period. " ^ ^ It was not until 1933, under Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration that the United States recognized Soviet Russia. Churchill continued his attacks upon the Soviets until

he became more engrossed with Germany, and saw the need for a counterbalance to Germany in the East, Russia. Thus, on this vital issue Churchill and the American people saw eye to eye on the distrust and hatred of Russian Commuism. Another area of agreement between Churchill and the American populace was closely connected to the foregoing discussion of Communism. This issue was the growth

of the socialistic Labour Party in Britain, which Churchill considered a forerunner of Communism. The American people

in the midst of the Red Scare also made this invalid assumption about American labor and Socialism. In reading many of the comments that were made by Churchill, the American people found a champion for an antisocialist position. In a speech to his Dundee constit-

uency, Churchill declared that the Labour Party was "not 2^Robert K. Murray, Red Scare (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), p. 263.

28 fit to rule."26 This statement and later charges that the

Labour Party was part of a plot by Russia against England were probably a part of the electioneering that was taking place.27 However, the idea that Labour was a growing party

and that some Liberals were moving toward that group caused Churchill in 1919 to suggest the formation of a Centre Party. This party, led by Lloyd George, would actively

oppose Labour and consolidate gains made during World War 1.28 This idea of taking the moderates of both the Liberals

and Conservatives met with high praise in an editorial in the New York Times. The article concluded that this new

party would fill a void in British politics and stop the growth of the Labour Party.29 Although Churchill's hope of a Centre Party never became reality, the American people of all political groups continued to watch Churchill's stance against the Labour
. o

Party.

In running for re-election in Dundee in 1922,

Churchill made the front page of the New York Times because he was howled down by some Socialists at a campaign meeting.^0 In 1924 Churchill ran for Parliament as an Independent Anti-Socialist in an election closely watched in the United 26New York Times, February 15, 1920, p. 4:2. 27ibid., November 5, 1920, p. 17:7. 28ibid., July 17, 1919, p. 1:4. 29ibid., July 18, 1919, p. 10:3. 30ibid., November 14, 1922, p. 1:6.

29 States. The coverage of speeches and tactics used by Finally, in defeat

all contestants was extensive.

Churchill once again made the front page of the New York 31 Times. The defeated candidate, who lost to a Socialist in 1923, and who was defeated twice while taking a strong anti-socialist position had many conservative sympathizers in the United States. The American people, paralleling Churchill, had their own purge of Socialism. This was best illustrated

by the removal of five duely elected Socialists from the New York State Assembly on the grounds that they were 32 subversive. The politically conservative post-war United

States was as much against Socialism, Communism, and other "radicalisms" as was Winston Churchill. This anti-

socialist stand lingered on in the United States into the 1930's. Churchill, commenting that Socialism would ruin

Britain, noted that he "pictured the United States as the greatest and most admirable contrast to the Soviet 33 System." The United States was a land that had totally stopped any drift to the left in American politics. Thus,

one was able to see a close continuity in the actions of Churchill and the powerful conservative Americans toward the Socialist and Communist philosophies of government. ^^Ibid., March 21, 1922, p. 1:2. ^Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931), p. 69. ^^New York Times, February 13, 1929, p. 8:1.

30 This ideology held by Churchill and the American political right was perhaps his strongest area of identity with the American people and helped furnish Churchill a base upon which he could build in the war years. Not only the broad appeal of anti-communism and socialism attracted Americans to Churchill, but also his support of various ethnic groups elicited the same response, Churchill's advocation, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, of a Jewish national homeland, and his role in the settlement of the Irish question touched a responsive chord in the United States and won him the respect of two influential groups. In 1921, Churchill, the new Secretary of the Colonies, took an investigating trip throughout the Middle East, During this time he became closely involved in the Jewish quest for a national home. While in Jerusalem in March and

April of 1921, Churchill announced that Britain would continue to back the Balfour Declaration. 34 In 1930, Churchill spoke against Ramsay MacDonald's White Paper, which did away with the Balfour Declaration. This same

stand was continued in 1939, when he called for increased immigration of Jews into Palestine, protesting Neville Chamberlain's strict limitation on the influx of Jews. ^^New York Times, April 1, 1921, p. 2:5. Rufus Learsi, The Jews in America: A History (New York: World Publishing Co., 1954), p. 286. New York Times, November 25, 193 8, p. 13:2. 35

31 Churchill's positions were close to the attitudes within America of Gentiles and Jews alike. President

Wilson in the conference at Versailles was in favor of a Jewish national state in Palestine. The American people

who were knowledgeable of the issue were for the formation of a Jewish state. However, in 1919 no American pressure

on Britain to make a Jewish national homeland was found. Later in 1930 and 1939, the American public berated Britain for the two White Papers previously mentioned. Also, by 1939, most of the Jews in the United States had come to support the idea of Zionism. 37 The American people, Jew and Gentile, had much the same vision for a Jewish national home. Thus, by supporting the Balfour

Declaration, which called for a national home for Jews, and by opposing the White Papers of 1930 and 1939, Churchill mirrored the stance of many Americans, especially the highly influential Jewish population. The other ethnic group in America with which the Secretary came into contact was the continual disrupters of Anglo-American relations, the Irish. Churchill, as

Secretary of State for the Colonies was one of the prime negotiators that undertook the settlement of the age-old dispute between the Irish and Britain, ultimately resulting 36Learsi, Jews in America, p. 286. 37 Nathan Glazer, American Judaism (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1957), p. 104.

32 in dominion status for Southern Ireland. " ^ ^ When discussing the relations between Ireland and Britain, the overall sympathy and support of the American people, both Irish and non-Gaelic, would lie on the side of Eire. That the American people could have a favorable

opinion of a Britisher on the Irish question was paradoxical. However, the treaty of December 1921 gave Ireland

dominion status and interest in the Irish question declined within the United States. In fact some of the

editorial comment after the treaty was in support of the British position and against the Republicans of Eamon de Valera, who led them in a civil war in Ireland in 1922. Churchill as Secretary of State for the Colonies became chairman of a committee to work out the problems of civil war that was being waged in Ireland. He also

was to attempt to settle the boundary dispute between Ulster and the recently formed Irish Free State. 39 Churchill's strong stand against de Valera and his support of the Irish Constitution in Commons garnered praise in the United States. In an editorial in the New York Times

the Irish Republicans were blamed for the problems of 3oEdward Norman, A History of Modern Ireland (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971), p. 284. 39 Mary C. Bromaze, Churchill and Ireland (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), p. 74. "Neither before nor after did he (Churchill) fill the powerful and influential role as far as Ireland was concerned that he did throughout most of 1922."

33 Ireland, and the British and Churchill in particular were praised for their fairness and patience.^^ American became disgusted with de Valera. Even the IrishAs Carl Wittke

in The Irish in America wrote, "In the United States, even Devoy and the Gaelic America became disgusted with the turn of events, and blamed de Valera for continuing a civil war over a quibble."^1 The Secretary also realized the importance of the Irish question in Anglo-American relations. Speaking to

the English-Speaking Union before the treaty was signed, Churchill avowed that the Irish problem hurt BritishAmerican relations; but if promptly solved, relations would be closer than ever.^^ Thus, Churchill managed by

the strong stand he took on Ireland to once again reflect the same opinion as did many Americans. Churchill worked

for and obtained dominion status for Ireland, an option Irish-Americans favored. When civil war broke out in

Ireland, Churchill and the American people, both Irish and non-Irish reacted in the same manner—a complete rejection of the goals of the Irish Republicans. In 1924, Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer ^^New York Times, June 2, 1922, p. 16:2. ' • " a l Wittke, The Irish in America (Baton Rouge: ^'Cr Louisana State University Press, 1956), p. 292. The Gaelic America was the voice of the hard core Irish supporters in America. ^^New York Times, December 17, 1921, p. 6:6.

34 took stands on policies that won both support and rebuke in the United States. On the positive side his support of

the return of Great Britain to the gold standard won much acclaim and goodwill in the conservative dominated Amerlean press. 43^ ^ Britain during World War I had suspended the gold standard that backed the British currency. After the

Treaty of Versailles was signed, there had been some pressure both in and out of Britain for a return to the prewar standard. The generally poor economic conditions in Europe

had delayed the return under the Liberal, Labour, and National governments. The return to gold came in Churchill's first budget as Chancellor of the Exchequer and was received in Britain with the "height of enthusiasm." ^ The return to

the gold standard came under attack in Britain at a later date, but the American people and government were very pleased with the action of their chief trading partner. 4 S The return of Britain to its old prewar rate of exchange made the United States' goods less expensive in the United Kingdom and caused the British export's cost to The negative policy of Churchill concering America was his war debt decision, and will be discussed in the next chapter. ^ % e w York Times, April 2, 1925, p. 1:8. ^--Ibid., May 5, 1925, p. 1:7.

35 increase in world trade markets. Thus, the American public

and press felt that farmers as well as businessmen in the United States would enjoy more prosperity. The public's

pleasure with Britain was illustrated in an editorial in World's Work. The article explained that Britain was one

of the most highly taxed nations in the world, and one who had stood by her debt payments. Now Britain with courage

and endurance had returned to the gold standard and taken its place as one of the banking centers of the world. The

British, led by Churchill, had shown themselves to be courageous and capable of sound economic planning and leadership.^^ The United States' government was also in favor of the gold standard resumption by Great Britain. John Parke

Young, Senate Investigator for the Committee on Gold and Silver Investigation, wrote an article for the New York Times discussing Britain's policy. He concluded that

Britain's return to the gold standard would lead Europe out of economic distress. He also stressed that the move

by Churchill was approved by the government of the United States. The administration felt that not only the United

^^"The British Sovereign Back From the War", Literary Digest, May 9, 1925, p. 9. 47"The Result of Britain's Courage and Endurance", World's Work, June, 1925, pp. 123-]24.

36 States', but the world's economy would be improved."^^ The government also indirectly gave its approval with a loan of gold to back the British in case a run was made on the Pound. The economic move by Churchill created a very warm feeling for Britain and himself in the United States during this period. The New York Times still editorial-

ized on the genius of Churchill's budget and gold standard actions in August of 1925.^^ This later editorial gave

excellent proof of the profound impression Churchill's policy made on the United States. This aurora of good

will lasted until the debt payment problem erupted in 1926 Another issue in which the Chancellor agreed with conservative Americans was in the area of labor relations. During the Chancellor's four years of office, a number of crippling strikes swept Britain. The rash of strikes

that broke out in 1926 were directly related to the economic problems of postwar Britain and Churchill's return to the gold standard, which depressed British exports, especially in the coal industry. Falling wages and

worsening working conditions caused the miners to walk off their jobs on April 30, 1926. This movement to pro-

test the lowering of wages garnered support from fellow ^8John Parke Young, "Gold Extends Its Realm Over the World", New York Times, May 3, 1925, sec. 9, p. 3:1. ^^New York Times, August 18, 1925, p. 18:2.

37 laborers and led to "sympathy strikes" in most of the major industries. Churchill, because of his aristocratic beliefs and the precarious position of his budget, attacked the strikers with his various skills. He was made editor

and publisher of the government controlled Gazette, the 51 only newspaper published during the strike in Britain. Churchill's attack on the strikers in the paper and the subsequent negotiations by the government led to the collapse of the General Strike by May 12, 1926. The majority

of people in Britain supported the actions the Baldwin 52 government had taken. To illustrate this support, many

British people recognized and cheered Churchill for his prominent role in the anti-strike leadership when he appeared at the Empire Theatre. 53 Even though the General Strike ceased, the coal miners continued their walkout through the summer and into the fall months. During this crisis, Churchill also In strong negotiations and with

played a dramatic role.

a show of force, he attempted to settle the issue, only The services struck were: transportation, gas, electricity, printing, construction, and heavy industry. The mass of industries struck caused this episode to be called the General Strike. 51 New York Times, May 11, 1926, p. 4:4. ^^Ibid., May 13, 1926, p. 1:1. ^^Ibid., May 14, 1926, p. 6:6.

38 to have the mine owners balk at a final settlement. September the only other alternative would have been nationalization of the mines.^^ This course of action Once By

was not philosophically attractive to Churchill.

again Churchill was praised by the people and even the Labour Party, which conceeded Churchill was "erratic, but is clever and courageous." man in the government." This statement about Churchill may well have been the feeling of the majority of Americans. Although no He was the "only strong

editorial comment was discovered on Churchill's actions during either strike, many of the American people were definitely in favor of his stand on this issue. The

United States, a few years before the General Strike, had undergone a wave of strikes. These episodes in steel,

coal, and other heavy industries helped lead to the "Red Scare." Also, because of the unsuccessful nature of the

strike and the general prosperity in the United States, 56 the strike was on the decline. The labor unions in

America, who had attempted to gain higher wages and better working conditions through walkouts and strikes, were now declining. 54 The American consumer public had never accepted Ibid., September 8, 1926, p. 4:4. ^^Ibid., October 10, 1926, sec. 2, p. 1:2. Allen, Only Yesterday, p. 176.

39 the strike as a weapon to be used in America. 57

Once again Churchill was very close to the feeling of conservative Americans on the labor issue. His stands

coincided with those of American consumers and industrialists. As mentioned concerning the Communist scare in the

United States, there was a continued suspicion of organized 58 labor that lasted.into the 1930's. The pro-business nation of postwar United States was receptive ground for the labor views of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. After the resumption of the gold standard and the breaking of the strikes, Churchill did not make as great an impression on the United States as he had in the previous years. In 1929 the Conservative Party was defeated It also was during this time that

in the general election.

Churchill split with the Tory Party over the question of India's position in the Commonwealth. Being out of power

the former Chancellor did not have the opportunity to make decisions that would favorably influence and effect the United States. However, two minor issues did arise late

in the 1930's to help draw attention to Churchill and bring him closer into harmony with America. The first issue that won Churchill support among romantically inclined Americans was his stand on the abdi^"^Ibid. , p. 176. 58 Murray, Red Scare, p. 263.

40 cation in December of 1936 of Edward VIII. The King

chose to step down from the throne to marry the twice divorced Mrs. Wallis Simpson of New York. This scandal

in English aristocracy and ruling society had its reverberations in the relationship of Churchill and the American public. Edward VIII, who had just succeeded his father and was about to be crowned, announced he wished to marry Mrs. Simpson. This marriage, deemed unworthy because

Mrs. Simpson was a commoner and not a British citizen, was further hindered by her marital status and her previous divorce. The King renounced his crown because of

family and governmental pressure; but not before Churchill had made a much larger political issue of the whole unpleasant affair. Churchill's attempt to oust the Conser-

vative government of Stanley Baldwin and retain the young King was rejected by Edward and drove the former Chancellor 59 further from power. For whatever reason Churchill attempted his political maneuvering, it helped him in the eyes of the American people. American citizens felt, due to Mrs.

Simpson's nationality, the actions of Stanley Baldwin were a direct snub at the American populace. This time on a

59 New York Times, December 5, 1936, p. 1:8. William Clark, Less Than Kin (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957), p. 57.

41 highly emotional issue, the half American Churchill had come to the defense of a disparaged American woman and a slighted American people. Probably without realizing it,

Churchill had made a very strong tie with the American people. The last appeal to the United States, and perhaps in retrospect the most important, was Churchill's prognostication of a conflict with Germany and the role the United States should play in averting such an event.6 0 Churchill

warned of the growth of the German air force and army, along with his attack on Hitler's and Mussolini's intentions in Europe. Churchill also advocated a strong unified mili-

tary policy by Britain and France working through the League of Nations to oppose the dictators. Finally, Churchill

called for the United States to begin military preparation and take a position against the totalitarian leaders. This

outcry began Britain's preparation and affected America's thoughts on the world situation. The warnings began in 1932, but they were not heeded by the majority of people in Britain or abroad. However,

the actions of the Italians in the war with Ethiopia, fascist support of Franco, and the reoccupation and rearming ^•'-Time, December 14, 1936, p. 21. ^^Chapter III will deal with the adverse reaction in the United States that greeted Churchill's plea for cooperation against Germany.

42 of the Rhineland began to cause governments as well as their populaces to become concerned about Germany and Italy. As early as 1935, the people and press of Britain were speculating as to the probability of Churchill's return to Cabinet position, due to his accurate forecasting of the world situation. Personal clashes between

Churchill and the party leaders caused Stanley Baldwin (1935-37) and later Neville Chamberlain (1937-40) not to have the former Conservative Party member in the Cabinet. Also, Germany's protests of Churchill's remarks and insinuations about her intentions in Europe influenced the party leaders' decision. Thus, because of personal and political

disagreements, the prophet of Germany's future military actions remained out of a position of power. This ostra-

cism was to end in September of 1939, when Churchill returned to power as First Lord of the Admiralty. This return was prompted by the accuracy of his prophecy, the need for a strong organization in the navy, and the pressure of the public on the Conservative Party. After the failure of appeasement, Britain needed a man of Churchill's personality and philosophy.^^ The reaction in The

the United States was much the same as in Britain.

United States, as will be seen, heard and read Churchill's 63 Harold Callender, "Now They Listen to Churchill'-, New York Times, August 13, 1939, sec. 7, p. 3.

43 pronouncements; a few, mostly liberal internationalists, agreed with his judgments; however, the country like Britain did not respond to the call to arms until outside events forced their actions. The influence which Churchill had during this period in America was immeasurable. The future and former In the

First Lord was virtually a one man propagandist.

years from 1931-1939, Winston Churchill visited the United States once, spoke over the radio to the American people many times stressing the menace to the world in the form of Fascism, and wrote fifty articles for magazines. Most

of the articles were for Colliers of which forty per cent dealt with the renewal of militarism in the totalitarian states. In most cases Churchill was cognizant of the isolationist sentiment in the United States. In so being,

Churchill did not attempt to suggest overt actions to be undertaken by the United States; but rather, he stressed the bonds between the nations. From this relationship

Churchill attempted to relay a feeling of responsibility to the American people for their actions in the world. This attempt was well advised. Nevertheless, the

majority of American people both conservative and liberal continued to feel their responsibility was at home and not in Europe or Asia. The American public led by an iso-

44 lationist Congress, as well as the internationally conservative newspapers of the midwest, did not want to become involved in another European war. The disillusionment of

World War I was still evident in the attempts to remain neutral through legislative acts. Most people, as shown

in a poll by American Institute of Public Opinion in September, 1939, were anti-Fascist and pro-British.^"^ Thus, they mirrored the attitude of Churchill toward the totalitarian powers. The depth of their conviction,

however, did not include any support for force to stop the movements of Germany, Italy, or Japan.^^ Churchill, while carrying the majority of Americans with him in his judgments of the dictators, did not receive the response from his transatlantic kinsmen that he had desired. As

world events propelled him to heights of power in Britain, in the United States the Fall of France and Pearl Harbor would transpire before Churchill's admonitions were totally heeded. In the interwar period Churchill's words and actions placed him in the American public eye. Certain

Harold Lavine and James Wechsler, War Propaganda and the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), pp. 42-43. In 1939, the United States favored Britain 84% to 2% for Nazi Germany. Ibid., p. 332. After the invasion of Scandinavia, the American people still did not favor the use of force against Germany. 96.3% of the people were against war with Germany and 3.5% were for war.

45 of his stands received considerable support. However,

his main appeal was to American conservatives—forces driven into retreat with the coming of the Great Depression. More importantly on many other issues the mani-

faceted Churchill evoked a hostile response from the American side of the Atlantic.

CHAPTER III CHURCHILL: AT ENMITY WITH THE AJ4ERICAN PUBLIC

Americans were by no means unanimous in their support of, or affection for Churchill as of 1939. Certain

elements of the Britisher's personality and certain of his positions on key issues provoked distrust, caution, and outright hostility in the United States. The American

press reflected a suspicion of Churchill's opportunism and a strong dissent from his aristocratic critique of democracy. Moreover, some major issues like the debt question

and rearmament separated Churchill from the American opinion. Two key aspects of Churchill's nature cast him in an unfavorable light; his opportunism and his aristocratic nature. The future Prime Minister was accused of following

his own star and of owing allegiance to no one but himself. From his first party change in 1904, through 1939, the Anglo-American leader of Britain was of unknown loyalty. As an editorial stated when Churchill split with the leadership of the Conservatives in 1930, he is the "erratic son of an erratic father." The article also accused him

of shifting parties and implied that he was personally 46

47 "unstable as water."! With the former Chancellor's unpredictability a charge of treachery and deviousness was also called forth. In an editorial for the New York Times,

Elmer Davis alleged that Churchill showed a sinister and "manoeuvre" nature.2 He was also referred to as a "ter-

rible enfant" in British politics.-^ P. W. Wilson, again casting darts at Churchill, wrote that his "philosophy is distilled poison. . . ."4 Another instance of the lack

of trust for Churchill was a review of his book The Afterniath. The Springfield Republican praised his writing and

imagination, but also related "Churchill is not always trustworthy or even sincere."5 These articles gave the

American people the picture of a devious, untrustworthy individual with very persuasive powers. That Churchill followed his own star is open to debate. Robert Rhodes James in his book, Churchill: A _

Study in Failure, 1900-1939, contended that Churchill was continually attempting to achieve position and power with^New York Times, January 31, 193 0, sec. 3, p. 16:3. 2Elmer Davis, "Churchill Holds a Post Mortem", New York Times, November 4, 1923, sec. 3, p. 1:1. 3"Mr. Winston Churchill, Secretary of War, the Terrible Enfant of the British Cabinet", New York Times, August 10, 1920, p. 2. ^P. W. Wilson, "Mr. Churchill Plays With Fire", New York Times, March 17, 1929, sec. 4, p. 1. ^Springfield Republican, April 28, 1929, sec. E, p. 7.

48 out respect to his individual philosophy. However, if

Churchill's career is closely observed his actions were not those that would raise an individual to power, but drive him from it. In most cases his changes in party and

his movement away from his party's direction were called for by loyalty to his own aristocratic idea of the role of government. He was not as unstable as others tended to The American

view him, but loyal to his own philosophy.

people, when reading of Churchill's actions and the comment on his unpredictability, could not see the loyalty to his "cause." Reading the unfavorable comments, the

people of the United States would relegate Churchill to a position of a hack politician, who was interested only in himself. Only when a detailed study of the positions

Churchill took was completed, could one observe the consistency of Churchill. The American people had not reached

the point of looking back in depth at Churchill's career. Thus, Churchill did not enhance his image in America with his opportunism and his movement among parties, due to the reporting of this aspect of his career. The second aspect of Churchill's nature that disenchanted the United States was his aristocratic political theory. Churchill's hostility to democracy and his lean-

ings toward aristocracy and strong man rule ran counter to deep American tradition. His critique of democracy was In November of 1930,

especially strong in the early 1930's.

49 Churchill asserted that Parliament was no longer able to meet the problems of the day. This opinion came during

the dark days of world depression, when he was speaking of economic problems. The former Chancellor alleged that

the electorate was too large and did not consider the great matters of state. He fel't all they were interested Churchill continued in

in was who won the Sweepstakes.^

this vein when he avowed that the governments of Britain had overextended the right to vote. When visiting the

United States on his speaking tour in 1932, he declared that the people could not achieve economic success and that a great man needed to step forth to lead the nation. Most

politicians, he charged, were too worried about getting into office and getting others out to be effective. A

review of his book Amid These Storms brought out this same point. Churchill claimed that the brilliant men were no He alleged

longer going into government, but into industry.

that democracy without leadership followed the course of least resistance. In an editorial on January 31, 1932, the New York Times asserted that Churchill's comments about the need for New York Times, November 20, 1930, p. 13:3. 7 Ibid., March 29, 1931, sec. 9, p. 2:2. g Ibid., January 26, 1932, p. 2:5. ^Ibid., November 26, 1932, p. 13:1.
^ « * « TECH UBR/lfly

50 a great man were unfounded. The editorial alleged that

great leaders were only recognized years afterward, and that the leaders were ones who led the people and did not make decisions arbitrarily. More important than Churchill's conservatism was his outspokenness on a number of disputes between Britain and the United States. These diplomatic conflicts included

problems arising from the failure of Wilson to bring the United States into the League of Nations, the military conflicts over naval armaments and a rearming Germany, and most importantly the debt issue. Churchill took office as Chancellor of the Exchequer at a time when the debts that were incurred during World War I were funded. The debate on both sides of the Atlantic

over this dispute was one of the most serious in AngloAmerican relations. Previous to 1924, Churchill had not In 1921, he had called

been too vocal on the debt issue.

for a meeting of Britain and the United States on financial matters, hoping that it would work out a debt settlement. After the signing of the debt funding agreement between Britain and the United States, Churchill criticized the Commission in Britain for not achieving better terms. Also, he said the Commission should have brought the United States -'-^New York Times, January 31, 1932, sec. 3, p. 1:2. • • ' I i . November 30, 1921, p. 5:5. '••bd,

51 into European counsels to help work out the problems generated by war. 12 On August 1, 1922, after signing the agreement with the United States, Arthur J. Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, sent a notice to Britain's 13 debtor nations. This note, which laid down the British principles for debt settlement, stated that Britain would: (1) take into consideration the amount she owed the United States, (2) take into consideration the ability of the nations to pay her debt, (3) not receive more than she had 14 to repay. This statement of principles, known as the Balfour Note, was to be the guide for all future British governments and their debt settlements. Thus, Britain,

which had argued for a general cancellation of debts, now placed the need for repayment by her debtors squarely on the shoulders of the United States. As Churchill took office, the resentment toward the United States' debt policy was growing. •'•^Ibid. , November 22, 1923, p. 1:2. 13 Harold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, War Debts and World Prosperity (New York: The Century Co., 1932), p. 84. The agreement Churchill so readily deplored was to be a repayment of "the whole amount of the loans made to her by the American Treasury and the unpaid accrued interest from April 15 and May 15, 1919 to December 15, 1922 in 62 annual installments, with interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum during the first ten years and 3.5 per cent during the remaining 52 years." ^^Ibid., pp. 111-113.

52 The United States demanded full payment of the British debt. The American people, led by the Coolidge

administration, felt that the nations of Europe should pay their debts, or the American taxpayer would be the one who paid for the war. Although there was some edi-

torializing in the New York Times for a change in policy, the vast majority of people were for the payment of debts by the Europeans as called for in the Congressional Debt 15 Act of February 9, 1922. The American populace viewed the war debts as a business loan, and in the business minded United States of the 1920's all loans were made with the understanding they would be repaid in full, along with the interest accrued. This attitude of repayment came from

the general business oriented philosophy of most Americans during the "Roaring Twenties." Business was supreme and What was good

all were devoted followers of its supremacy.

for business practices, must likewise be good for governmental policy, both domestic and foreign. After Britain proclaimed the Balfour Note and as the United States continued to have meetings with other nations, the new Chancellor announced that all nations which paid the United States should proportionally pay -'-^New York Times, January 29, 1926, p. 20:1, March 26, 1926, p. 20:1, Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1948), p. 249, and Harold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, World War Debt Settlemen t (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1926), p. 111.

53 Britain. Thus, Britain would be assured of an income

from the European debtors to supply the needed money for payment to the United States. Immediately, Missouri

Senator James A. Reed attacked Churchill for interfering in Franco-American affairs. The Treasury Department, how1n

ever, felt that the statement was logical and obvious and no interference was intended.

In January of 1925, as the allied nations met to distribute the German reparations, Churchill sought a meeting on inter-allied debts. In private talks American

officials granted lower debt payments to England, only to have the United States Senate reject any scaling down of 18 the amount owed. Although angry at his failure to achieve a reduction, Churchill promised that England would still make her payments and the issue of debts seemed to die out. A year later, in March of 1926, Churchill made headlines in America by claiming the United States was a "fabulously wealthy nation which was squeezing stricken 19 Europe." Churchill's outburst, caused by financial and labor problems in Britain, sparked a year long debate. Churchill's budget was about to be prepared and the debt New York Times, December 11, 1924, p. 1:8. •'-^Ibid. , December 12, 1924, p. 1:2. 18 Ibid., January 6, 1925, p. 3:4 and January 19, 1926, p. 1:2.
1 Q

Ibid., March 25, 1926, p. 1:3.

54 dispute would provide a release from the problems facing him at home. The editorial comment on this first outburst surprisingly favored Churchill's position. On March 26, and

April 6, 1926, the New York Times ran editorials stating that Churchill had a good point'. The American government should look a long time at his position and not at the 20 manner in which he stated it. However, as the summer progressed and Churchill became more vocal in his attacks, editorial comment became more anti-Churchill. Even though

his basic idea of general debt reduction was acceptable to the paper, these aggressive attacks began to wear on One article accused Churchill of "setting on edge the nerves of people both at home and abroad." 21 On July 20, 1926, the French government fell and many blamed the United States debt policy for the French demise. On this same date. Chancellor Churchill attacked the newsmen.

Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon for earlier statements he had made about Britain. Secretary Mellon had

charged that Britain spent war loans on commercial activ22 ities rather than the war. This accusation by Mellon 2^Ibid., 1926, p. 28:2. March 26, 1926, p. 20:1, and April 6,

^•'•Ibid. , July 20, 1926, p. 1:6. 22 Stewart Beach, "What the World Is Doing", The Independent, August 7, 1926, p. 166.

55 and a rejoinder by Churchill continued the debate over the debt issue. Through the summer, the argument proceeded between Churchill and Mellon. In the United States Churchill

continued to be berated for his lecturing and his claimed 23 moral superiority. However, -the New York Times continued its support of the basic British premise and criticized the Treasury and Senate for their uncompromising ways.^^ By August of 1926, the uproar subsided and Britain was praised for its return to a sound economic philosophy and its return as the financial center of the world.^^ The next year Churchill and Secretary Mellon once again exchanged verbal blows, this time over the Dawes Plan. Mellon claimed that Britain was not following the

Balfour Note, as her payments from debtor nations were larger than the payments to the United States. Churchill

denied the accusation and attacked the United States for 26 its insistence on full payment. The New York Times in an editorial of great insight alleged that Britain and the Chancellor were playing for the people at home and in Europe.27 They were acting as the spokesman for the frus-

^-^New York Times, July 21, 1926, p. 18:1. ^"^Ibid. , July 24, 1926, p. 1:6. 2^Ibid., August 6, 1926, p. 14:5. 2^Ibid., May 5, 1927, p. 1:7. 2'^Ibid. , May 6, 1927, p. 22:1.

56 trations of the tax burdened Englishman and the resentful economically depressed European. Thus, the attack by

Churchill was not what he wished, but when choosing between his government and his relationship with the United States, the former held sway. The debt issue died out for Churchill after this episode; however, he had damaged his image in the United States. payment. The American people were most definitely for full Churchill would declare when out of office that

Britain should not jeopardize relations with the United 28 States by defaulting in her debt payments. However, the taxpayer could not forget with a few sentences that man who had denounced the United States' policy and had attempted to lower the debt payments. Earlier Churchill had

won support in his financial policies with the return to the gold standard. This praise was greatly outweighed The debt payments

in the United States by the debt issue.

were more readily understood and a more emotional issue to the American people than the nebulous economic advantages of returning to the §old standard. Churchill also caused friction with his views on the military activities of the 1920's and 30's—naval disarmament and a rearming Germany. Churchill's life

28New York Times, February 9, 1932, p. 44:1, and April 24, 1936, p. 10:2.

57 previous to 1919 provided the background for his critics to malign him as a militarist. early life toward the military. Churchill directed his It was a military school

he attended, his first gainful employment was with the military, his fame as a writer first appeared in military accounts, and his leadership in government came as a war leader. The militarism of the future Prime Minister evidenced itself throughout the time period under investigation. Only in 1939, with the approaching war with

Germany, did Americans begin to welcome the presence of this type of individual. Before 1939, a great amount of

comment attacked Churchill for his particular attitude about war. In 1923, P. V7. Wilson, while reviewing

Churchill's The World Crisis for the New York Times, asserted that the former First Lord of the Admiralty loved war. Wilson further observed that Churchill cast

himself in the role of his ancestor Marlborough, hoping, Wilson claimed, to be able to save England as had his 29 illustrious forebearer. Also reviewing the same work for the New Republic, the noted historian and diplomat C. J. H. Hayes called Churchill's mind that of a militarist, and a dangerous one at that.30 In 1927, Ernest 2^P. W. Wilson, "Churchill Casts Up His Account", New York Times, April 8, 1923, sec. 3, p. 1:1. ^^C. J. H. Hayes, "The V7orld Crisis", New Republic, November 6, 1923, p. 48.

58 Marshall, also reviewing one of the volumes of Churchill's history of World War I, stated that he "loves a fight. "^"^ P. W. Wilson, commenting on another of Churchill's works. Amid These Storms, avowed that Churchill was a "lifelong militarist", and he "lives to fight another day.""^^ These comments died out as Churchill ceased writing on the First World War and left office. But, when he began

attacking Germany in the 1930's, the old charges of militarism were aroused. This was exemplified by Clair Prince's article on Churchill in 1934. While generally praising him. Prince concluded though Churchill's convictions often changed, 33 he was consistently at war. Also, two letters sent to the New York Times and The Nation after Churchill's "The Lights are Going Out" speech in 193 8 depicted others' opinions of Churchill. The letters written by William R.

Hearst and Oswald Villard, attacked Churchill's call to the United States for action against Germany and character34 ized Churchill as a militarist.
0"|

Ernest Marshall, New York Times, February 20, 1927, sec. 2, p. 7:1. P. W. Wilson, "Winston Churchill at His Ease", New York Times, December 4, 1932, sec. 5, p. 4. Clair Prince, "A Lion in England's Political Jungle", New York Times, August 26, 1934, sec. 6, p. 8. ^^New York Times, October 23, 1938, p. 19:3, and The Nation, November 5, 1938, p. 4G0. Both men were of social and journalistic prominence; Hearst the head of a large chain of papers, and Villard the editor of The Nation

59 These outbreaks of criticism were balanced with some understanding as the American people became repelled by Nazi Germany. In August of 1938, Harold Callender

editorialized in the New York Times that Churchill was out of power because of his views. As war approached, however, Callender felt Churchi-ll the militarist would be 35 called back into the government. Also, when reviewing Churchill's Step By Step, The Christian Science Monitor wondered openly why Churchill when "inveterately right. . was not taken into the government sooner." The image of a statesman who loved to fight and who supported preparedness was not appealing to the large number of Americans who were disillusioned with World War I and were confident that the treaties of the twenties had diminished the likelihood of armed conflict. In

America "the vast majority believed the elixir of peace had been found in the keep-out-of--war legislation of the 37 30's." Churchill's controversial bellicosity was illustrated in two conflicts with the United States. The first was his disagreement with the naval disarmament ^^Harold Callender, "Now They Listen to Churchill", New York Times, August 13, 1938, sec. 7, p. 3. ^^The Christian Science Monitor, September 9, 1936, p. 16. "^"^Belig Adler, The Uncertain Giant, 1921-1941 (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1965), pp. 284-285.

60 treaties in the 1920's and 30's and the second was his advocacy of preparedness on the part of the United States against Germany. The naval disarmament began with the Washington Conference called by Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, and held in the fall of 1921 through the spring of 1922. It provided for a reduction of captial ship fleets of the France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, 38 and the United States. This was an attempt to halt naval armaments short of joining the League of Nations, and was a continuance of the political isolationism of 39 the American government. The Washington Conference was followed by an abortive conference in Geneva during 1927. The failure to arrive at limits on non-capital ships was partially
op

five signatories:

-'^Merze Tate, The United States and Armaments (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 134. The reduction of capital ships followed a ratio of 5-5-3-1. 75-1.75, with Britain and United States equal, followed by Japan and then Italy and France. 39 In the two conferences which actually produced an agreement, the American people supported the concept of naval armament reduction. They did not always agree on the final terms of the treaties, but the idea of disarmament coincided perfectly with isolation. If a nation did not have a larger navy than the United States, it would be difficult for them to attack America. The best method to keep navies of the world equal was to set limits, rather than building to keep up. Thus, the United States would be safe from attack, and open attack was the only way America could be drawn into war.

61 relieved by the successful negotiations at the London Conference of 1930. The results of this conference were:

a continuation of the 5-5-3 ratio between Britain, the United States, and Japan in capital ships, a 10-10-7 ratio 40 in cruisers, and parity in submarines. Even though it was criticized in all three capitals because each nation felt it had been out traded, the American people supported 41 the meeting and its concept as a protection from war. Even in 1936, as Japan withdrew from all naval agreements the United States continued interest in this idealistic type of war protection. Winston Churchill, former First Lord of the Admiralty and advocate of a strong British navy, consistently attacked the results of the conferences. Because of his

holding office in the government of Lloyd George in 1921 and 1922, he was not able to criticize the pact openly. When in the Conservative government in 1925, the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not criticize the conference, but praised the friendship of Britain, Japan and the 42 United States. As time passed and the Geneva Conference of 1927 was held, Churchill's true attitude surfaced. He felt that a gentlemen's agreement against building was
o

Tate, United States and Armaments, pp. 178-179. 41 Bailey, Man in the Street, p. 291 and 145n. ^^New York Times, May 2, 1925, p. 3:4.

62 better than a treaty. There would be no suspicion of

treaty breaking if there was nothing to hold the nations together. This view was discussed in the New York Times

and accepted as a good alternative if—and only i f — parity could not be reached. However, an attempt to

obtain this type of agreement caused Lord Robert Cecil to be recalled and the Conference disbanded. For this

action Churchill was accused of interference in foreign 44 affairs. Churchill apparently wanted no treaty at all. Realizing the British empire required a navy larger than that of the United States, he was more afraid of parity with the United States than of alienating America by 45 breaking a treaty. This idea of his nation's needs remained with Churchill after the Conservatives lost power. Before

the London Naval Conference of 1930, Churchill, while visiting Ottawa and later Chicago, declared that the United States and Great Britain had different objectives. The best policy would be to allow each nation to build for its own particular requirements. It would not cause

a problem between the two nations because it would be inconceivable that the two nations would ever go to 43 New York Times, July 30, 1927, p. 14:1. 44 1927, sec.Ernest Marshall, New York Times, November 20, 3, p. 3:6. 45Tate, United States and Armaments, pp. 158-159.

63 war. 46 When the London Naval Conference of 1930 met and

reached an agreement on a ratio of cruisers, Churchill continued his attack on equality between the United States and Britain. He felt that the treaty was inferior for

Britain and would not allow good relations between the three nations to continue. For these statements and his

attacks on the treaty in Commons, he was labeled by papers at home and in the United States as a big navy man and
A T

a diehard militarist who does not want peace.

The

debate against the treaty, which he started in Commons, was well followed in the United States. It was recorded

in the Congressional Digest, helping to pass the treaty • A • m America. 48 The disagreement with the treaty continued in Churchill's thoughts throughout the 1930's. In 1933,

he defended the Japanese, accusing the Unites States of limiting the British navy in the Far East and then arguing with Japan over China. Britain,who would have helped the

United States place pressure on Japan, was unable to do so with a limited navy. 49 Churchill also accused the United 46 New York Times, August 16, 1929, p. 6:2, Ottawa, and October 5, 1929, p. 4:5, Chicago. 47 Charles A. Seldon, New York Times, February 27, 1930, p. 2:3, May 16, 1930, p. 1:6, May 18, 1930, sec. 3, p. 6:1, and June 29, 1930, sec. 3, p. 12:1. 48 "British Statesmen Debate the London Treaty", Congressional Digest, June, 1930, pp. 179-180. 49 New York Times, February 19, 1933, p. 29:3.

64 States of having a "two faced disarmament policy." The

United States had all other nations reduce their navies, while it increased its ships and air force.^^ Churchill's

violent attacks were toned down after the London Conference of 1935. At this conference the United States and

Britain did not limit the number of ships each could build, but set limits on tonnage and armaments on the ships Thus, Churchill's idea of each nation building to fulfill its own requirements was partially instituted. Even though the Conference of 1935 began a policy much like the one Churchill advocated, the American people were not pacified. The Conferences of Washington and

London, which Churchill had so vociferously attacked, were of vital importance to the isolationist American people. As Thomas A. Bailey wrote about one of the con-

ferences, "In 1921, a determined citizenry insisted upon 52 the Washington Disarmament Conference." The treaties were designed to keep all other nations away from the United States in case of war. No war would ever entrap Thus, Britain and

the United States through the seas.

Churchill in particular clashed with the disguised nationalism of the United States. Draped in trappings of iso-

50New York Times, November 15, 193 3, p. 9:14. ^-'-Tate, United States and Armaments, pp. 190-192. ^2Bailey, Man in the Street, p. 7.

65 lationism the United States was attempting to spread its own power by limiting the efforts of other nations to build superior fleets. This isolation left the United

States diplomatically and militarily free from international entanglement. Also, it allowed for the American economic Churchill

forces to strengthen their economic imperialism.

with his strong support of British imperialism denounced any relationship that would play into the hands of the American policy, be it military, political, or economic. The second product of Churchill's militarism that differed with American isolationists concerned the rise of totalitarian states. Churchill, despite careful efforts

to avoid alienation of American isolationists, tread sharply upon them when he called for action against the Fascist powers. Speaking in Paris in 1936, he declared that those

countries who governed themselves, France, Britain and the United States, must stand together against those that did not. 53 From this point on Churchill increased his call for close cooperation and support of Britain by the United States. In February, March, and December of 1937, Churchill

requested the United States build "ship for ship, keel for keel" with Britain in order to help defend against Germany.^^ Churchill's call for an integrated naval building program 53 New York Times, September 25, 1936, p. 11:1. 54 New York Times, February 19, 1937, p. 12:2, March 12, 1937, p. 1:4, and December 26, 1937, p. 14:1.

66 led to an attack on President Roosevelt by Representative George H. Tinkham of Massachusetts for his making such an "alliance" between Britain and the United States. This

attack of Tinkham quoted Churchill as stating an "'excellent arrangement' existed between this country and England." Representative Tinkham alleged Roosevelt had pooled the two navies and was a traitor to American interests.^^ Churchill by his call for naval preparation began to alienate members of the isolationist Congress. In another

speech he was to anger two influential men outside of the government. On October 15, 1938, Churchill broadcast one of his memorable speeches to the United States, later known as the "Lights Are Going Out" speech. Churchill urged

the United States to get ready before it was too late. The appeasement at Munich had been completed, and Churchill believed there was little time left. The reaction most

pronounced in the United States was totally against what Churchill hoped. In an article the New York Times reported

that William Randolph Hearst, the arch-Anglophobe, alleged the United States would stay isolationist. He said America

did not like the repudiation of war debts and idealism of World War I. Hearst continued implying Britain could not

^^New York Times, March 15, 1938, p. 1:6. Ibid., October 17, 1938, p. 5.

67 order people around and the United States would not help , . 57 . , ner m a war. In another comment on Churchill's speech,

Oswald G. Villard, editor of The Nation, prominent liberal and pacifist conceded that some would support Churchill's call for help, but Villard charged it would be special interest groups who led the United States into World War I. Villard warned that the United States would not bail Britain out of trouble after the Munich debacle. He finally con-

cluded that it was the United States' duty to remain out of the next war in order to keep democracy safe at home. 58 The isolationist, anti-Churchillian attitude by the three men; Tinkham, Hearst, and Villard, was an example of the sentiment of a large majority of the American popu59 lace as supported in the poll mentioned in Chapter II. The isolationist majority of the populace agreed with Churchill's assessment of the dictators, but they would not respond to his call for cooperation and an active role against the totalitarian states. Churchill alienated the United States by his personality, the debt issue, and his militarism, other than these three major issues, he also disagreed with the American populace on three minor points of which two were ^^Ibid., October 23, 1938, p. 19:3.
cp

^Oswald Garrison Villard, "Open Letter to Winston Churchill", The Nation, November 5, 1938, p. 480. 59 Lavine and Wechsler, War Propaganda, pp. 42-43 and 332.

68 interrelated. The first to surface was Churchill's sup-

port of the League of Nations and his indirect criticism of the United States for not joining. The second of the

two interrelated issues dealt with President Woodrow Wilson and his failures in the treaty negotiations at Versailles. The final disagreement was over India.

Churchill publically supported the League of Nations even after the United States had rejected the Treaty of Versailles. In October of 1924 he claimed that

the League was a sane method to stop the ruin of another war, and this opinion upset many of the isolationist Americans. The statement came during the administration

of Calvin Coolidge, who had succeeded Warren G. Harding. The two men had run for office on a slogan of return to normalcy, a nebulous answer to the problems of the day and the question of joining the League. Whatever the true

feeling of the American people, the administrations of Harding and later Coolidge interpreted the election results as a referendum against the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. When Churchill defended the

^^New York Times, October 12, 1924, p. 26:1. There is still a great deal of debate on the issue of the United States entering the League of Nations. His^-orians have debated the cause of the failure of the Senate to ratify the Treaty. Also, the attitude of the American people toward the Treaty and the League is still in doubt. Thomas A. Bailey concluded in his book. The Man in the Street, that a majority of Americans were for the League in 1919 and 1920. As the soldiers began to return home, a period of disillusionment began which continued until the return from isolation in May of 1940. Bailey, Man in the Street, p. 249.

69 League and attacked the United States for deserting it, he upset the supporters of the Republican Party, who had continued the policy of little or no involvement with the League throughout the 1920's and 30's. Churchill's proLeague stand was not limited to 1924, but continued into the 1930's.^2 Thus, as American sentiment toward iso-

lation grew, Chruchill called for world responsibility on the part of the United States by joining the League. This criticism was sure to alienate those conservative isolationists who were now governing the Harding-Coolidge administrations. However, not only did Churchill disagree with the Republicans, but also estranged the liberal internationalists found mainly in the Democratic Party. This

estrangement came about because of Chruchill's finding fault with President Woodrow Wilson. In The Aftermath

he placed some blame on President Wilson for failures at the Conference of Versailles and for the subsequent refusal of the United States to ratify the Treaty drafted at the French city. Churchill alleged that President Wilson was

too idealistic when in Europe and attempted to completely have his way, rather than playing the diplomatic game of 63 compromise. He also criticized Wilson for his failure 62New York Times, December 12, 1931, p. 15:1, and January 17, 1934, p. 12:1. ^•^Winston Churchill, The Aftermath (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1929), p. 478.

70 to push the Treaty through the Senate. People of America

were quick to criticize their own officials, but they did not like "foreigners" doing so. This especially was true

in this instance, because Churchill was at that time Chancellor of the Exchequer. Thus, even though his book

was a private work, his position in the government gave it added weight. P. W. Wilson, reviewing the book for

the New York Times, accused Churchill of "transforming Anglo-American relations into a political issue." The review of the book by Raymond Leslie Buell of the Foreign Policy Association of New York felt that the book would not have too much influence with the government and leaders of the nation as most were Republicans and held the same opinion. Nevertheless, the common man, who

holds his President in esteem, did not have as great a tolerance for this attack. This was supported in a review

by Lillian Rogers who charged that no one "has ever been more blandly and bitingly rhetorical than this same gentleman on America's part in the war and peace." 66 Those who supported the League favored President Wilson and thus Churchill's views on these two topics 64p. W. Wilson, New York Times, March 17, 1929, Book Review Section, p. 1.
fi 5

Raymond Leslie Buell, "Churchill's Criticism of President Wilson", Current History, June, 1929, pp. 374-380 Lillian Rogers, New York Evening Post, April 6, 1928, sec. M, p. 11.

71 would alienate them. Thus, Churchill's stand on Wilson

and the League managed to alienate both ends of the American foreign policy spectrum. His attack on Wilson

irritated the pro-League internationalists, and his calls for United States entry into the League offended national67 istic isolationists. Churchill's India policy, coming only a few short years after his problems with the United States on the debt issue, his attacks on Wilson, and in the midst of his anti-totalitarian stance, brought forth more disagreement from the United States. In 1930, the Labour When

Party began negotiations with India for home rule.

the Conservatives supported Labour on this issue, Churchill resigned from the Shadow Cabinet of Stanley Baldwin, because this decision was not compatible with his concept 68 of the British Empire. In his attack on the Labour position on India, Churchill was the leader of malcontents in the Conservative Party. His role with the group, while

it kept his name in the paper throughout the 1930's, hurt his influence in the Party, the nation, and in America. In 1933, Churchill finally lost in his bid to lead the Conservatives against the India bill, and this defeat was the subject of an editorial in the New York Times. Con67 A more detailed discussion of this debate is found in Chapter IV, Churchill: The Author. ^^New York Times, January 30, 1931, p. 1:3.

72 trasting Churchill's duplicity with Baldwin's steadfastness, the paper concluded that Churchill had erred in attacking the Prime Minister.^^ Others agreed with the New York Times editorial. The New Statesman and Nation cited Churchill's views on India as an example of how far Churchill was separated 7n from the American stream of thought. In Detroit the Britisher's life was threatened—allegedly because of his 71 hard line on India. There was wide support in America for India's position in the dispute. " 2 Eventhough the American ^ public was not greatly involved, it was always willing to chastise Britain for her colonial holdings.^ The '

thought of America's struggle for independence colored the attitude of the United States' populace. Churchill

when attempting to stop India's homerule, held to an old conservative concept; an idea which was contrary to the anti-colonial thought in Britain and the United States. ^^Ibid., June 30, 1933, p. 14:4. 70 New Statesman and Nation, November 7, 1931,

578

^^New York Times, February 6, 1932, p. 11:5. 72 Julius W. Pratt, "Anti-Colonialism in the United States", The Idea of Colonialism, Robert Strauz-Hupe and Harry W. Hazzard, eds., (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 126. "^-^Clark, Less Than Kin, p. 78.

73 Thus Churchill's personality and his stands on major and minor issues alienated large segments of Americans. Even his natural allies, American conserva-

tives, found fault with his demands for cancellation of war debts and his strong support for internationalism. Liberal and labor groups found other reasons to view Churchill with less than adulation. In many ways the

interwar decade found Churchill far from the mainstream of American thought.

CHAPTER IV CHURCHILL: THE AUTHOR

As Churchill's actions,' personality, and beliefs both appealed to and repulsed the American public at different interludes under study, so too his writings met the same response. Long praised as a master of the spoken Read-

word, he was as accomplished in the literary field.

ers and reviewers alike praised Churchill's writing for his powerful style, his ability to express his thoughts with clarity, and to make his subject alive and entertaining no matter how complex or dry the material. This

chapter will view the reaction to Churchill as elicited by his writings. Whether alienating Americans as he did

with his conservative economic theories during the depression, or drawing praise with his condemnation of totalitarian dictatorships, Churchill kept himself in the American mind with his writings. In his scholarly publications, Churchill wrote primarily of the First World War and the post bellum period in Europe. His works, mentioned in previous chapters,

received varying reviews. The first work of the period. World Crisis, was 74

75 Churchill's magnificent attempt to capture the history of the war from the viewpoint of one who had a direct influence on its transactions .' Causing the most debate "• in the United States, this work was published over a six year period and received at least eighty-one book reviews.^ It was in this five volume work that the British author praised the "moral consequence" of the United States' entry into the great war. Churchill related that in his

opinion if the United States had not come into the war at that particular moment, France could not have lasted the year and the allies would have had to sue for peace, thus insuring a German victory. The benefit of the entry

of America was not "in fact applied in any serious degree to the beating down of Germany . . . ; the moral consequence of the United States joining the allies was indeed the deciding cause of the conflict." The moral consequence

Churchill spoke of was the new, fresh, idealistic spirit of the American republic that poured itself out on the war weary allies, thus giving them hope, and causing fear in the central powers. Churchill's praise was compromised

by his failure to give American fighting men commendation Winston Churchill, World Crisis, 5 vols. (New York Charles Scribners, Sons, 1923, 1927, 1929). 2 Book Review Digest (Minneapolis: H. W. Wilson, Co., 1923-1931, vols. 19-27). 3 . Winston Churchill, World Crisis, vol. 3, p. 23G.

76 for their war effort. Yet surprisingly, Churchill's con-

clusion, which was related by most American reviewers and came eight years after the war's end, caused no furor in American circles. There were no editorial refutations of

Churchill's slight of American military contributions to the war effort. For the most part reviews praised his

powerful style and his readability, while deriding his militaristic personality and attacking his defense of his own actions. An example of this dual praise and reproach

was the review by C. J. H. Hayes for the New Republic: Merits special attention, for at least three reasons. In the first place, it possesses real literary distinction. Secondly, its subject matter is important. Its final and chief value lies in its amazing revelation of the mind of Winston Spencer Chruchill . . . One fact about this important book transcends all others: it bespeaks the mind of a militarist, and militarists are as dangerous now as they were from 1911 to 1914.4 The other reviews in more scholarly journals accused Churchill of defending his actions and policies concerning Gallipoli, Antwerp, and the Coronell incident. Edward Breck reviewing the works in two issues of the C. J. H. Hayes, New Republic, June 6, 1923, p. 48. In the fall of 1914 two incidents hurt Churchill. In October the attempt to hold Antwerp against the Germans failed and Churchill was criticized as the primary advocate of this action. In November two cruisers were destroyed off the coast of South America. The Admiralty was blamed by the official historian for the destruction of the squadron. Churchill deals at length with both incidents in the first volume of his World Crisis. 5

77 American Historical Review claimed first that Churchill's writing is not history as it should be because its language is too "extravagant." He further attacked Churchill's Also,

work as an "apology for administration in office." Breck wrote that:

The layman, especially the admirer of Mr. Churchill's career, will find it a very readable book; but the professional historian, and particularly the professional sailor, will harbor a different opinion.^ The professional historian would debate whether this work indeed was history, and the professional sailor would not hold Churchill's strategy in high esteem. The failures

at Gallipoli and Antwerp along with the Coronell incident in which an entire squadron of ships was lost hurt Churchill's image among the British seamen. In a later volume Breck also related: Admiration for the author's many brilliant qualities must not allow his readers to take his conclusions too readily for granted, for the instinct to defend his own acts and opinions is never quite absent, and as Sir F. Maurice says of him, 'he speaks with equal certainty when his sources of information are good and bad. He mixes gossip and hearsay with real evidence.'^ The American Political Science Review echoed Breck's scholarly criticism of Churchill's writing. ^Edward Breck, American Historical Review, vol. 20, October, 1923, p. 137. 7 Ibid., vol. 32, July, 1927, p. 876.

78 His style, always distinguished and often brilliant, tempts the reader to place unwarranted confidence in arguments more plausible than conclusive, and in facts and figures marshalled to support a thesis with greater artistry than accuracy.8 Thus, scholarly reviewers held Churchill in far less esteem as a historian than did their laymen counterparts. In the small, but sometimes influential realm

of academe, Churchill acquired additional, articulate critics. Another portion of the World Crisis, the concluding Aftermath received the most violent attack in the American
Q

press.

It was in this volume, an analysis of post war

events, that Churchill took his most controversial action, an attack on President Wilson. Churchill published this

work while Chancellor of the Exchequer, thus giving his personal attack an aura of official sanction. The Chancel-

lor's comments were directed at Wilson's failure to bring the United States into the League of Nations, his failure to comprehend the wishes and needs of the leaders of the European allies, his exaggerated belief in his role in Europe, and his lack of leadership in the United States.1^
o

American Political Science Review, vol. 21, August, 1927, p. 689. ^Winston Churchill, The Aftermath (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1929). l^Raymond Leslie Buell, "Winston Churchill's Criticism of President Wilson", Current History, June 20, 1929, pp. 375-380.

79 One of Churchill's strongest accusations was: If Wilson had been either simply an idealist or a caucus politician, he might have succeeded. His attempt to run the two in double harness was the cause of his undoing. The spacious philanthropy which he exhaled upon Europe stopped quite sharply at the coast of his own country. There he was in every main decision a party politician, calculating and brazen. A little of the fine principles and generous sentiment he lavished on Europe, applied during 1918 to his Republican opponents in the United States, would have made him in truth the leader of a nation.H Thus, cynically Churchill debased Wilson for his high idealism and superior magnanimity in Europe, and his high handed partisan rule in the United States, which led to the eventual defeat of his noble aims. Throughout the

work Churchill lays at Wilson's feet the blame for America:' s failure to embrace the League and responsibility in the world. Also, Churchill believed that Wilson had

a misconception of other world leaders, believing they did not represent their own people. Churchill also wrote

"Wilson created world democracy in his own image." 12 Later, Ray Stannard Baker, a pro-Wilson writer of muckraking fame, and the author of Wilson and the World Settlement attacked these charges and Churchill defended them in journalistic exchanges. 13 These exchanges brought

--'W Churchill, Aftermath, p. 148. '-•. -'-^Ibid. , pp. 125, 122, 124. l % e w York Times, February 24, 1929, p. 3:1.

80 forth great interest in Churchill's history. This epi-

sode, which would not hurt the now deceased Wilson, was brushed aside by the current Republican administration but not by the reading public in the United States. Edward Breck in a review mentioned earlier accused Churchill of "jauntily putting aside the explanations of American historians. " ' ^ Four other reviewers taking ex"• ception to Churchill's conclusions accused Churchill of "... transforming Anglo-American relations into a politi-

cal issue", not being " . . . trustworthy or even sincere", being " . . . bitingly rhetorical . . . on America's part showing some absurdity"

in war and peace", and " . . . in his work. 15

The remainder of the twenty-four reviews found dealt with the elegance of his writing, his style, and his powerful prose. Nevertheless, Churchill raised a The clamor

furor in some areas of the reviewing circles.

caused Churchill's image to fall in the minds of the American reading public. Even though the American people

had repudiated the League and liberal idealism was dying, the American public would not tolerate criticism of the Breck, American Historical Review, vol. 32, July, 1927, p. 876. •"•^P. W. Wilson, New York Times, March 17, 1929, p. 1, Springfield Republican, April 28, 1929, sec. E, p. 7, Lillian Rogers, New York Evening Post, April 6, 1928, sec. M, p. 11, The Nation, April 24, 1929, p. 498.

81 part played by the United States in peace. Whether arousing animosity as did Aftermath, or praise as did much of World Crisis, Churchill was read and reviewed in many cities and towns across the United States. The history of the great war in five volumes was so popular that it was revised, abbreviated and republished in 19 31. Once again it received eleven reviews in the Book Review Digest, but there were no new comments on his seemingly self righteous stand. The clamor over Aftermath died away

and the Chancellor continued his publishing of historical research. The fall of the Conservatives allowed Churchill to write in an ever increasing volume. During the next ten

years he published a six volume work on his ancestor, Marlborough, which received many very good reviews. In a sample of four of the reviews, the following give an indication of the praise Churchill received for his ancestral biography. Much of the narrative is military history, on which Mr. Churchill is an authority . . . . His accounts of military operations are marvels of clear exposition; every amateur of military history will find the book fascinating,1^ For all his undisguised admiration for his subject, Mr. Churchill is in general fair in distributing praise and blame and has produced a historical contribution as well as an enduring piece of 16 -^"Winston Churchill, Marlborough, 6 vols. (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1938). R. M. Lovett, New Republic, August 7, 1935, p. 269. 17.

82 literature. •• '^ If Winston Churchill had not had the benefit of a single new document, it would still have been a distinguished contribution to English history.1^ It would be impossible to dismiss the work lightly as the diverting hobby of an ex-minister. It is a careful, accurate biography which many readers will wish to read again.20 Churchill also continued his discussion of World War I with a book on the eastern front, entitled The Unknown War, one of the first and best histories of this area of the war.^-'^ Once again two reviews illustrate the praise given to Churchill for his work. What courage it required to attack such a subject as this? What energy to carry through so vast and dismal an undertaking? Even students of the War are tempted to turn aside from the contemplation of the Russian front. Yet Mr. Churchill has ventured, and the result of his daring is one of the finest and most needed volumes on the Great War.22 The Unknown War forms a sort of epilogue to Mr. Churchill's brilliant and monumental The World Crisis. He has written incomparably the best of World War histories—providing that is, you can accept his premise that the war was exclusively a matter of dynasties, cabinets, and opposing G. H. Q's.23 18 A. L. Cross, Saturday Review of Literature, March 16, 1935, p. 545. l^Springfield Republican, October 6, 1935, Sec. E. P • "• 00 ^Violet Barbour, American Historical Review, vol. 41, January, 1936, p. 332. 21 Winston Churchill, The Unknown War (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1931). 22 H. W. Nevison, New Statesman and Nation, November 7, 1931, p. 587. 23jonathan Mitchell, Outlook, December 23, 1931, p. 537.

83 In this book the Gallipoli campaign was discussed, but no charge of defending his activities or slanting the facts was discovered in the reviews. As shown by the previous reviews of his works, the public read and extolled Churchill for his literary abilities. As World War II loomed on the horizon, Churchill began to publish works on the contemporary world. The

first in 1937, Great Contemporaries, contained the personal reflections of Churchill on twenty-one eminent men of his time. The book led P. W. Wilson of the New York

Times to say it was a " . . . book to agree and disagree with pleasure." Wilson was referring to the clear

style, easily read essays, and to the conclusions of Churchill. Churchill's summaries were purely personal

and Wilson claimed to enjoy the right of disagreeing with Churchill on some of his conclusions, without taking away his literary ability. Wilson later described Churchill

as opinionated, paralleling the view of Leonard Woolf in The New Statesman and Nation. Some of the essays are brilliant; there is something worth reading in every one of them, except the three or four in which his political or economic prejudices have got the better of his judgment, eyesight, and sense of humor, and left him nothing but rather empty rhetoric.25 24 . Winston Churchill, Great Contemporaries (New York: Putnam, 1937). P. W. Wilson, New York Times, November 14, 1937, p. 1. 25 Leonard Woolf, New Statesman and Nation, October 16, 1937, p. 616.

84 The final two works in this period were While England Slept, a compilation of Churchill's speeches on the rearming of Germany, and Step by Step, a history of the movement toward war in Europe.26 While England Slept documents, through Churchill's speeches, the movement to a collective security arrangement with France to protect against Germany. Step by

Step was the compilation of letters written by Churchill fortnightly on foreign policy and defense. Churchill

does not dwell on the United States in either of these publications. In Step by Step he does state that the

United States must stay strong economically and militarily. However, the fight against depression and the

isolationist tendencies of Americans do not indicate any aid forthcoming against Germany, even though most Americans were anti-Nazi. 27 In both of these books the reviewers brought forth the amazing ability of Churchill to predict the growing conflict, when it was so far in the future. In the reviews

of While England Slept this ability was continually expressed. 26winston Churchill, While England Slept (New York: Putnam, 1938) and Winston Churchill, Step by Step (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1939). 2'^W. Churchill, Step by Step, p. 233.

85 . . . when it comes to providing a gift of prophecy there is no denying the amazing prescience which foresaw in '34 and '36 the fearful crisis of '38. Nor can the thoughtful critic dispute Mr. Churchill's habitual clairvoyance in divining the future from an analysis of the past.28 Churchill's speeches, as they are collected in this book, will have a place in history as a noble expression of the British democracy when it was preparing for the decisive battle against fascism abroad and defeatism at home.29 The book, whether its conclusions do or do not receive universal assent, is at least welltimed and it can hardly fail to stir the emotions of democracies, already deeply aroused.3^ In the reviews of Step by Step Churchill also received acclaim for his prognostication of the coming war. This book set out mostly telling how Winston Churchill's voice has been like an incessant foghorn in the 'moist, misty, fogbound island.' It proves him so inveterately right on the most perplexing problems of the difficult period through which we have been passing that one wonders that he was not taken into the Government sooner.31 Thus, Churchill who had been out of political power in the past decade, made his way back into the mainstream of government and public policy, because of his accurate forecasting of events and the people's demand of someone
op

Ellery Sedgwick, Atlantic, January, 1939, p. 76. ^^Arthur Rosenburg, Nation, October 28, 1939, p. 455. p. 5. "^^P. W. Wilson, New York Times, October 9, 1938, 31 E. B. 9, 1939, p. 16. H., Christian Science Monitor, September

86 of his nature to lead them. The preceeding review was written after war had begun. However, previous to actual war, few harkened to The American

Churchill at home or in the United States.

people read his works as shown in the extraordinary number of reviews they received.^^ The American people knew

Winston Churchill, his influence as a writer was felt. However, he was read with historical interest or as a side comment on the 1920's and 1930's. His works did not capture a following of avid supporters during the epoch, but rather received some criticism, especially The Aftermath. Churchill the scholar had a literary following, but

no political influence with the people through his works. It was not until world events proved him correct in his pronouncements in another literary field that a true influence was ascertained. The magazine articles, which

were more readily available to the American reader, brought Churchill's name and opinions into the minds of most Americans. A series of magazine articles throughout the 1930's presented Churchill's observations on world and American 32' The works of Churchill were reviewed in the leading journals and papers of the day. They had some of the highest circulation totals in the United States. Also, two of Churchill's works went through multiple publications: My Roving Commission and his history on the First World War, World Crisis.

87 problems. These articles began shortly after the fall of

the Conservative government and helped the American people view Churchill in the light of prognosticator and social and governmental critic. The former cabinet minister made

his greatest impression on American thought through these articles, especially those written for Colliers during the 33 1930's. The articles consisted of a series of contemporary subjects ranging from economic problems of the depression, social and political reform, and finally to world affairs and the rise of totalitarian states. In "The Dole" an article in Saturday Evening Post, the former Exchequer wrote of the single most important problem in the United States at that time—unemployment . ^ -^ The American people, just beginning the long slide into joblessness and depression, were interested in the methods used in Britain to combat the same problems. Churchill's method of solving unemployment was to provide compensation to workers in order to keep up the national buying power. The compensation was to come from the worker's salary. Churchill's conservative nature would not allow the move•^•^Churchill wrote fifty articles from 1929 through 1939, thirty-one of which were for Colliers, the sixth leading magazine in publication with a circulation of 2,257, 290 in 1930. Peter G. Filene, Ai.iericans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) , p. 289. ^"^Winston Churchill, "The Dole", Saturday Evening Post, March 29, 1930, p. 6. The Post was first in circulation with 2,924,363 subscribers.

88 ment to a complete welfare state, thus a distinction must be made when a worker's compensation was depleted. At

this juncture the government placed the individual on relief roles, at a reduced rate. This served a dual pur-

pose of reducing the statistical unemployment and forcing the laborer to secure work. Churchill advised the poli-

tician to solve the unemployment problem, and be assured of office. them. Almost three years later, Churchill wrote a similar article in Colliers, entitled "Who'll Pay the Jobless".35 In this article the author gave the history of the British "dole" system. When asked if he advocated this method for The simple solution was already outlined for

the United States, he replied that it should be avoided if the depression were of short term. However, if it was

extended then there would be no alternative. The relevance of both articles stood out to the American reading public of 1930 and 1933. Churchill's

dole system, explained in the Post, appealed to the laboring class as a form of relief from the growing trend of unemployment. However, the laissez faire attitude of

early depression industry and government resisted any infringement of management's control of labor, so desperately won in the labor disputes of the early 1920's. 35winston Churchill, "Who'll Pay the Jobless", Colliers, February 25, 1933, p. 9.

89 Industry was attempting to keep men on the working roles to keep up buying power. Relief came from state and local

governments or charity, not from federally run unemployment compensation. Churchill's recommendation of an Americanized The article in Colliers, however,

dole fell on deaf ears.

appealed to the conservative in'dustrialist and politician. This article stressed caution before moving toward the dole. The laborer, on the other hand, enmeshed in the darkest days of depression looked with disfavor on caution, as the Presidential election of 1932 confirmed. Herbert Hoover, incumbent President who cautioned restraint as did Churchill, led the conservative big 36 businessmen in his anti-welfare state policies. The laboring man supported Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic Party nominee who promised swift governmental action if elected. In the election of 193 2, Roosevelt soundly de-

feated Hoover, thus dismissing the policies of Hoover, which were quite similar to Churchill's statements in Colliers. The American people had expressed their will

in the election, they wanted the dynamic action of the federal government that Roosevelt had promised. ^^Jay A. Sigler, ed. The Conservative Tradition in American Thought (New York: Putnam, 1969), pp. 320-323. Hoover made one of his defenses on his conservative program in a press release on February 3, 1931, which was quoted in this book. In it he called for restraint and a continued policy of help to big business and no federal relief for the laboring man.

90 In 1938, Churchill again writing in Colliers, assumed another position mildly against labor. " ^ He declar^ ed that business should accept labor unions so that the unions would not be forced into the hands of extremists. However, labor unions should not be incorporated for they may become a political party of unknown quality, as in Britain. Churchill concluded that it was good for the Demo-

crats to support labor as part of their party, but there should not be a party of strictly laboring men.38 They are not, he surmised, responsible to all the people, but concerned only with the working man's problems. Thus Churchill,

while supporting some of labor's demands—recognition, cast a shadow of suspicion on the ability of a labor party to lead in Britain or the United States. He also

expressed concern that labor would move into extremism; a common fear of industrialists. Churchill in each instance

paralleled the view of the conservative business and political community, while antagonizing the laboring class. An excerpt from Churchill's "The Soapbox Messiahs" in Colliers illustrated his close identification with conservatives in the United States and his estrangement from the liberal and working class of that age. Churchill wrote:

37 Winston Churchill, "England Learns About Labor", Colliers, September 24, 1938, p. 13. 38 Ibid., Roosevelt's New Deal legislation helped labor in many of their demands as illustrated by the Wagner Act, which recognized the right of labor to join in eollev.tive bargaining.

91 • I adhere to the school of those who believe that governments cannot make nations rich; that wealth is gathered only by individual exertion and enterprise; that state expenditure is almost always profligate and wasteful; and that the more freedom enjoyed by the citizen and the less interference of the state the higher will be the standard of the public well-being.39
• «

The effect of this article closely corresponds to another article written for Colliers which was a tribute to John D. Rockefeller, the oil magnate, on his ninetyseventh birthday. ^ The article praised Rockefeller for

his acquisition of wealth and the gaining of power and in turn the philanthropy that Rockefeller undertook. Churchill

defended the industrialist against charges of ruthlessness, and extolled his introduction of new business techniques. Rockefeller was a perfect example of what

"individual exertion and enterprise" could accomplish. The defense of Rockefeller and his method of leadership illustrated the belief Churchill had in an aristocratic, conservative leadership; a country led by enlightened industrial barons helping the less fortunate and those of lesser ability. This attitude would endear Churchill

to those Brahmin leaders, but would alienate him from the majority of people who did not achieve such monetary status. Churchill also drew praise from the conservatives ^^Winston Churchill, "The Soapbox Messiahs", Colliers, June 20, 1936, p. 11. 4%inston Churchill, "eldest and Richest", Colliers, July 11, 1936, p. 21.

92 and estranged the laboring classes in the United States by his analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt's leadership during the depression. In a series of articles for Colliers

Churchill discussed his own conservative theories on government and how far apart he and the President were.^"'- In these articles Churchill stressed the need for reliance upon a constitutional government which would protect individual rights from either Fascism or Communism. Churchill's indiHe wished

vidual rights were those of the propertied class.

to retain the laissez faire doctrines of governmental noninvolvement, hard work, and individual effort. In

this regard, Churchill claimed that President Roosevelt had instituted too radical a reform movement in the social The author felt the President should 43 move conservatively and with more deliberation, Churchill also warned that labor reform instituted by Roosevelt was too much for labor to control. The reforms and economic spheres.

might lead to class warfare and the followers of the President would pull him into a "program of panacea offering" which would resemble a communist state. Thus, Churchill In

returned to one of his greatest concerns. Communism.

"^^Winston Churchill, "While the World Watches", Colliers, December 29, 1934, p. 24. "Why Not Dictatorship,", February 16, 1935, p. 14, "Soapbox Messiahs", June 20, 1936, p. 11, "What Good is a Constitution", August 22, 1936, p. 22 42 Winston Churchill, "Messiahs", Colliers, June 20, 1936, p. 11. ^^Ibid.

93 warning the liberal President, Churchill seemed to align himself with the small conservative minority that feared the movement to the economic and political left in the American government. However, the majority of Americans

continued their support for the reforms of the New Deal. With the warnings directed at the President completed, Churchill in a continuation of the Collier's articles turned his journalistic prowess at others who promised much, the Soapbox Messiahs. While chiding the President for his far reaching economic and social reforms, Churchill lauded Roosevelt for attempting reform within the limits of the Constitution, Churchill did not give men such as Huey Long, demagogic Senator from Louisana, or the Radio Priest, Father Caughlin any praise for their brand of extreme reform. In an admo-

nition to the American populace about the power of these men Churchill warned: The career of this demagogue-dictator, the rasp tongued champion of the "forgotten man" shows how easily in modern America an unscrupulous politician v/ith gifts of oratory and organizing ability may attain dangerous and disastrous power,^4 The author also accused them of grasping at straws and attempting to make shambles of the democratic free enterprise system in the United States, Churchill, who feared the rise of Communism and the political left, also warned against the extreme right. Churchill with his strong attachment to

p. 11.

44 Chruchill, "Messiahs", Colliers, June 20, 1936, ~

94 aristocratic, democratic government could not help but challenge those extremes which pulled at the democratic process in the United States. In this challenge he paral-

leled the opinion of most Americans, but his solutions were much too conservative for the majority of the populace. The American people themselves did not escape the pen of Churchill. . In an attempt to keep the United States in what he believed was sound democratic theory and living under the rule of law; Churchill outlined the need for a lawful government which protected the people, even though it may move more slowly than a dictatorship. He reminded

the people that whatever the speed of change under a dictator it was of no good unless the people had the right to either protest it or enjoy it. In combination with this lesson on basic democratic theory, Churchill warned against letting the executive gain too much power. In an obvious reference to President

Roosevelt's attempt to pack the court, the author admonished the nation against allowing the chief executive complete domination over all branches of the government. that: . . . economic crisis has led to an extension of the activities of the executive and to the pillorying, by irresponsible agitators, of certain groups and sections of the population as enemies of the rest. There have been efforts to extalt the power of the ^^Winston Churchill, "Why Not Dictatorship", Colliers, February 16, 1935, p. 14. He claimed

95 central government and to limit the rights of individuals.4 6 Churchill continued to say that if people would promise attractive things, people would eccept any limitation on their freedom. To protect them a strong independent judiChurchill also wrote in this article

ciary was needed.

that the rigid Constitution of the United States was needed to bring the divergent groups of the nation together and to forestall any drift to dictatorship. Finally,

Churchill made a comparison of the British and American chief executives, but the complete control of British government by the Prime Minister was dismissed by the lack of a formal term for a British government. The chief exec-

utive and legislature in Britain were extremely close to the will of the people through election and the disolving of Parliament.47 With these journalistic endeavors Churchill increased his appeal to conservatives in the United States. The clear preference for a laissez faire type of business community and the downgrading of social action taken by Roosevelt called to those supporters of the previous Republican administrations. The cry for moderation and slow

change was a point of identification for those who felt they had been rushed too far, too fast in the socio46winston Churchill, "What Good Is A Constitution", Colliers, August 22, 1936, p. 22. 47churchill, "What Good Is A Constitution", Colliers, August 22, 1936, p. 22.

96 economic reforms of President Roosevelt. The plea for constitutional government and the fear of dictatorship of the right or left by Churchill corresponded to the ideas of the American people. Except for

the small minorities which followed Townsend, Caughlin, Long and other extremists, the American populace remained aloof from any radical plans to change the democratic system of the United States. However, no matter how close

Churchill and the American people were on the need of a democratic government, they were divided by the amount of governmental action needed to combat depression. Churchill

had the ear of the conservative minority, but only in his foreign policy pronouncements would he gain the approval of a majority of Americans; and then not until outside events of the next few years had transpired. During the 1930's Churchill readily expounded upon foreign affairs.^8 in his writings he attempted to move

the United States closer to his views on the world situation; an effort which had little success. The conservative minor-

ity to whom Churchill had appealed in his political, social, and economic theories would not follow him in his international policies. The American people looked with favor on

Britain but the close cooperation, which Churchill seemed 48colliers, From December 17, 1932 through June 3, 1939, Churchill wrote twelve articles that dealt with the growth of Germany and Japan as • i + n e military adversaries. Fi-r The articles comprised approximately forty percent of the articles he wrote for Colliers during this period.

97 to advocate, was too much to ask of an increasingly isolationist America. Churchill's passionate pleas traversed the spectrum from gentle reminders of the bonds and ties between the two nations to a frank explanation of the world situation and the harsh methods the United States need employ to combat them. In each endeavor the author tried unsuccess-

fully to convey his understanding of the American position and his desire for a more active role by the United States • in world affairs. The chiding by Churchill may be seen in

his attacks on the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937.^9 Churchill alleged that through the Acts, the United States gave up its rights to freedom of the seas and relied on Britain and France to stop Nazi domination of Europe. He

concluded that the United States should look to the future and be ready to add "stability during this era of hazardous transition."^^ This call for preparedness, no matter

how farsighted in retrospect, did not place Churchill in esteem by the majority of Americans, who sought legislative isolation. The congress that wanted neutrality, a reflection

of the will of the American people, cared not for any programs or proposals instituted at home much less abroad by an ousted Conservative leader, that would lead to interna49winston Churchill, "Can America Keep Out of War", Colliers, October 2, 1937, pp. 14-15. SOjbid.

98 tional involvement. As Germany advanced in Europe and Britain responded with appeasement, the United States continued in isolation. Slowly, because of the oppression of.Germany

in Europe, the United States moved toward a role close to Churchill's concept of Amerijca's part in the war. At

this point Churchill was Prime Minister and his influence in the mind of the American people was immense. Churchill

moved toward that period in which he would become the most honored foreigner in United States' history. During the

dark days of war, Churchill drew on the knowledge and understanding developed in the inter-war period in America It was Churchill's literature that was largely responsible for America's concept of this man. Churchill's scholarly writings captured a wide reading audience. His works were praised for their lit-

erary eminence, his subjects were discussed in many reviews. Churchill's journalism thrust itself into the His detached writings on

mainstream of American life.

his Mother's country placed his name in the journals of the day. Churchill in the interbellum period was known The exact impression he cast was as multi-

in America.

51 Advocating a moderate international posture. President Roosevelt, speaking in Chicago, called for a quarantine of the totalitarian nations by the remainder of the world. This attempt to move the American people to world involvement was widely criticized in the United States. Adler, Uncertain Giant, p. 190.

99 faceted as he, but an impression did exist in most American's minds. It was an image that reinforced that which was seen

in Chapters II and III. Churchill's writings mainly appealed to the conservative American and alienated the liberal, with the notable exception of his advocacy of United States intervention into world affairs. Thus, as

the 1930's ended Churchill was far out of touch with the majority of Americans, but the importance of his widespread renown could not be diminished.

CONCLUSIONS:

THE UNLIKELY ALLY

In September of 1939, Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty for the second time. tion after war broke out in Europe. He took this posi-

His entrance into

the Cabinet at the same position he held in World War I culminated a long return to power and came at the prompting of the British people.1 The British people needed

someone with strength and a determination to defend Britain and the Empire—Churchill. They felt he, because of his

past utterances and his undying, bulldogish advocacy of the Empire would be the person to give such an assurance. The belief in Churchill was so strong that naval authorities claimed if Churchill had been recalled earlier the disasters of the sinking of the Royal Oak, and the submarine attack 2 at the naval base in Scotland would have been averted. Later in May of 194 0 as the British people became more and more discontent with Prime Minister Neville -'-Time, July 17, 1939, p. 21. During the summer of 1939, the British people overwhelmingly wanted the return of Churchill to the Cabinet as shown in a poll. For Churchill's return-56%. Against Churchill's return-26%, No opinion-18%. ^Time, November 20, 1939, pp. 20-21. 100

101 Chamberlain's leadership, Churchill was asked to form a new government. Churchill had reached the position he

had always sought at a time when he could bring the full measure of his energies to bear on a great international problem—the preservation of the empire and the destruction of the totalitarian dictators. At this time, through

his magnificent oratory and leadership, Churchill came to symbolize Britain and the Empire. As noted in a number of periodicals of that day: "Young Winnie Churchill's fabu-

lous escape from Pretoria made him world famous . . . But the escape has a wider significance that that. It

symbolizes Winston Churchill as Winston Churchill so aptly and lovingly symbolizes Great Britain's unwillingness to give up when apparently cornered." the essence of the land." "Winston Churchill was

"He restores to the leadership

of Britain the noble man, in its exact sense of being a man and being noble." "Winston Churchill represents the elite of Britain's past, the humble of her present."3 "He was the one man in the British Empire most obviously equipped to lead the Empire to war. . . ."4 " . . . during

the present critical period only a man of Churchill's special genius and character can carry the nation along."^ ^Dorothy Thompson, Time, September 30, 1940, p. 22. 4Time, January 6, 1941, p. 23. ^Life, December 9, 1940, p. 14.

102 "... that it is the undefatigable, versatile, imagi-

native, Anglo-American, Winston Churchill, who had suddenly taken upon himself the very likeness of the legendary John Bull, who has saved the situation, who has awakened us and pulled the country together as no other human being could have done."
*

The praise of Churchill contained in these excerpts was obtained from American journals. The attitude reported

was that of the British people, but it held true in the United States as well. of The Year. Time chose Churchill as its Man

In the article Time praised Churchill for

his leadership and his oratorical ability that had stirred the world and given Britain the will to withstand Hitler's invasion plans. Churchill was given belated praise for

his stands taken between the wars, some of which had 7 earlier antagonized Americans. Churchill was also acclaimed in the United States as a man of destiny. In an article for Current History,

P. G. Moir related that Churchill in the past was a prophet without honor in his own country, but now all were turning to him because of his super patriotism and his passion for
p

war.

His time had come and his place was set in destiny.

^H. G. Wells, "Churchill, Man of Destiny", Colliers, November 2, 1940, p. 17. ^Time, January 6, 1941, p. 23. p P. G. Moir, "Man of Destiny", Current History, May, 1941, p. 10.

103 Even old critic H. G. Wells, writing for Colliers, praised Churchill as a man of destiny. In an article

entitled "Churchill, Man of Destiny", Wells praised the man he had earlier attacked so vehemently over Churchill's policy toward Russia.^ The article was to replace the last

of a series Churchill had written for Colliers during the 1930's. The selection of Wells an earlier adversary, and

his complete support of Churchill, showed the extent to which Churchill had risen above the antagonisms at home and to the same degree in the United States. In a visit to the United States in January of 1942, Churchill appeared before the United States' Congress. In a report of the event. Time summarized Churchill's reception in Congress and in the United States. "Churchill—

like Franklin Roosevelt, not above criticism at home—is, like Franklin Roosevelt in Britain, a man of unsullied popularity in his ally's country." Continuing Time re-

ported, Churchill "was a man Americans liked at first sight and at second." This popularity evidenced in a middle of the road American news journal, also extended into the liberal press. Though they did not cover Churchill's activities

^H. G. Wells,"Churchill, Man of Destin/ , Colliers, November 2, 1940, p. 17. See chapter II for a discussion of the Wells Churchill debate over Russia. Time, January 5, 1942, p. 11.

104 as closely as the news magazines. The New Republic in a number of articles only had admiration for the Prime Minister. Over all the American as well as British opinion of Churchill was extremely high. Churchill had reached a

point of popularity that he had never approached before. The year 1939 marked this dramatic rise in popularity. The right circumstances had called forth an avid following. The people of Britain and the United States knew For twenty years most had opposed

where Churchill stood.

him in these two nations, but as events called for a particular type of leader the people rallied behind him. The

past of scorn and disparagement had vanished and a period of acclaim and honor had come. However, without the basis laid in the interwar period Churchill may not have been the one called forth to lead the western democratic world in its early fight against the totalitarian states. The unlikely ally of

the interwar years had remained the same, the people had changed and come to ally themselves with him. The know-

ledge of Churchill, built largely in opposition in Britain and America now was the basis of support. The unlikely

ally wab now the ally of all the free world. The previous chapters presented Winston Churchill, his policies, ideas, and actions and placed them parallel

105 to the broad spectrum of American opinion and thought. From the comparisons and contrasts of Churchill and American opinion some conclusions as to Churchill's image and influence in America may be deciphered. The interwar era of Churchill's life is the least known and studied today. The young adventurer, the

First Lord of the Admiralty during World War I, the global eminence of Second World War leadership, and the post war direction of an elder statesman are known to most individuals. From 1919-1939, except for the short tenure as

Chancellor of the Exchequer, Churchill is largely submerged in the flow of interwar historical study. submersion is deceptive. This

No man may leap on the world

stage as a foremost actor, without some preparation and training. No man may call forth such an intimate relation-

ship as Churchill had with the United States' public during and after World War II without some base upon which to build. Churchill was a multitalented person, an individual of many interests, abilities, actions, beliefs, and personality traits. In retrospect, viewed as a complete

individual, Churchill was extremely consistent in his personality and policies. However, an individual, relating

to another through periodicals, newspapers, and authored works, only projects glimpses of the entire man. Fragments

of the individual capture the imagination of the public.

106 Thus, it was not surprising to discover the multifaceted Churchill relating to various portions of the American public at different times and for different reasons. Churchill never had in the interwar period for an extended period of time, a majority of the American people supporting his positions. When he championed pro-American

interests, such as anti-Bolshevism and the return to the gold standard, it was not long until Americans criticized him for anti-American stands on the debt issue and the naval pacts. Not only did Churchill not have a majority following

his lead for any length of time, but his appeal to various minority segments of the population lasted but a short period. The above was evidenced by his condemnation of Socialism, Communism, and labor; positions which would endear him to conservatives. His advocacy of the rights

of the propertied class, the return to the gold standard and the laissez faire role of government in economics also called forth praise from the right wing. Churchill's

endearment to the conservatives was also enhanced by his aristocratic heritage. However, Churchill's natural affil-

iation with American conservatives was lessened by his militaristic nature, his pro-European position on the debt issue, and his advocacy of a rearmed United States confronting the totalitarian dictators. These were areas

in which the Anglo-American appeared to the conservative

107 to be anti-American, a liberal, internationalist position the true right wing abhorred. The theoretical relation-

ship of Churchill and the American conservative was weakened by the nationalistic deference to money and armament. As Churchill appealed to the conservative some of the time, he almost continually antagonized others. The common laboring man in America disagreed vehemently with Churchill. Though the prime objective of most Americans

during the 1920's was to join the economic boom and live the life of the independently wealthy, the basic philosophies of the two parties were mutually opposed. Churchill

for all his "Tory democracy" would not cross the line in class relationship. Churchill was an aristocrat with

elitist theories of society, economics, and government; he was above the common man. Churchill had a basic dis-

trust of the laboring man, especially one with political power. Also, Churchill's strong support of the European

and British plan of debt repayment grated on the average man who had fought and suffered in Europe to make the world safe for democracy. Those who would or could not

repay their debt after America's sacrifice only stirred the ire of the American citizen. Finally, as the twenties

passed and the depression exploded on the nation Churchill moved farther away from the needs and demands of the laboring man. His advocacy of slow reform and local relief in

the midst of depression did not warm the hearts of the

108 millions of unemployed in the United States and it ran counter to attitudes of the politically dominant Democrats and then President Franklin Roosevelt. With the division of opinion in America concerning Churchill, there was one point upon which all groups agreed. This concerned the call by Churchill for a rearming of the United States and a need by the nation to face the growing threat of the totalitarian states. The vast majority of American people joined together in joint refusal to commit themselves to such an act. The United States was

completely isolationist; Churchill had little following in his call for action. As the policies of Churchill called forth both criticism and support on the part of the American people, so too his literary works elicited much the same response. As Churchill wrote during this era he was widely read and acclaimed. His books and articles reached out to the

American public of all reading habits to inform, entertain, cajole, and anger. Reviews of his works ran the gamut from However, his prowess as He

high praise to strong criticism.

a writer and skill as a stylist were beyond reproach. was read and discussed throughout the land. America,

because of his literature, knew him and his ideas, no matter the response the literature engendered. In retrospect Churchill's relationship during this score of years was alike unto a roller coaster. He reached

109 heights in his appeal to the American public that most foreigners never achieve, only to fall quickly to depths reserved only for adversaries. Churchill's place in

American thought was much like that of him in Britain: a brilliance that rose, only to be brought down by some action, policy, or stand that was untenable for the majority. As Britain never trusted him in power, so too

the American public could never completely relate to him. However, as world events brought a time for war and dynamic, bulldogish leadership, Britain turned to the prognosticator of the conflict. The British people clamored

for the man who had held on in public life with a bulldog grip. So too in the United States, as the last traces of

isolation were eradicated at Pearl Harbor, the American people turned to awe and respect the Prime Minister of Britain. In fact from the actual outbreak of war in

September of 1939, the American people had begun to change their attitude toward Churchill. He had been with the

American people before, he was known not trusted, read not always believed, heard but not heeded. had his following. Now in war he

The era of 1919-1939 had been a time

of familiarization for the American people and Churchill. The United States' population knt-w what to expect from Churchill and he did not destroy their faith. Churchill's

image was finally cast in the minds of the American public during the dark days of war. His image, however, had built

110 itself throughout his life and the darkest hours were in the interwar years. The time was soon to come when he would

be acclaimed as the most honored and loved foreigner in America, but the interwar era did not achieve that. In this

era he was an unlikely ally for the American people; but he had laid a base upon which t o build, he was known, and ' with outside event's influence he rose to a place of adoration.

BIBLIOGRAPHY In the following bibliography I have included only those works which were cited in the thesis. These include the major works on the subjects discussed in the manuscript and the primary sources upon which most of the information concerning American opinion of Churchill was based. Three of the primary sources. Book Review Digest, New York Times, and Time magazine, were consulted a great number of times and over an extended period of time. For this reason they will be found in inclusive dates. The Book Review Digest included the dates 1923 through 1943. The New York Times, the primary source of newspaper opinion, was cited from 1919 through 1939. sulted from 1936 through 1942. Time magazine was con-

Ill

BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources: Books: Churchill, Winston S. Great Contemporaries. Putnam, 19 37. . Ian Hamilton's March. Green, 1900. London: New York:

Longmans London:

. London to LadySmith Via Pretoria. Longmans Green, 1900. . Lord Randolph Churchill. MacMillan and Co., 1906.

New York: Charles

. Marlborough. 6 vols. New York: Scribners Sons, 1933-1939.

My Early Life: A Roving Commission. 2nd ed New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1958. Sayarola. London: Longmans, 1900. Charles Scribners London: Longmans,

Step By Step. 'Sons, 1939.

New York:

The Malakand Field Force. "1898. The River War. London:

Longmans Green, 1902. Charles Scribners Putnam, 1938. Charles

The Unknown War. 'Sons, 1939. .

New York:

While England Slept.

New York:

World Crisis. 5 vols. New York: Scribners Sons, 1923-1929.

112

113 Periodicals: Alber, Louis J. and Charles Rolo. "Churchill, Lisping Cicero." Current History, February 13, 1941, p. 14. American Political Science Review, August, 1927, p. 689. Barbour, Violet. American Historical Review, January, 1936, p. 33T: ' Beach, C. Stewart. "What The World Is Doing." August 7, 1926, p. 166. Independent,

Book Review Digest. vols. 19-39. Minneapolis: W. H. Wilson, Co., 1923-1943. Brailsford, H. N. "Mr. Churchill in Command." June 10, 1940, p. 787. New Republic,

Breck, Edward. American Historical Review, October, 192 3, p. 137. . American Historical Review, July, 1927, p. 876. Congressional

"British Statesman Debate the London Treaty." Digest, June, 1930, pp. 179-180.

Buell, Raymond Leslie. "Winston Churchill's Criticism of President Wilson." Current History, June, 1929, pp. 375-380. Churchill, Winston. "Can American Keep Out of War?" Colliers, September 24, 1938, p. 13. . "England Learns About Labor." September 24, 1938, p. 13. Colliers,

. "Oldest and Richest.". Colliers, July 11, 1936, p. 21. . "Soapbox Messiahs." p. 11. . "The Dole." 1930, p. 6. Colliers, June 20, 1936,

Saturday Evening Post, March 29, Colliers,

"What Good Is a Constitution?" "August 22, 1936, p. 22.

114 • "While the World Watches." 29, 1934, p. 24. • "Who'll Pay the Jobless?" 25, 1933, p. 9. • "Why Not Dictatorship?" 16, 1935, p. 14. Colliers, December Colliers, February ^

Colliers, February New Republic, March 16,

Cowley, Malcom. "Mr. Churchill Speaks." April 21, 1941, p. 537.

Cross, A. L. Saturday Review of Literature, 1935, p. 545. ~

Fadiman, Cl'iffton. "Letter to Winston Churchill." New Yorker, November 9, 1940, p. 90. Guedella, Philip. Harper's Magazine, June, 1927, pp. 21-25 New Republic, June New Republic,

Hayes, C. J. H. "The World Crisis." 6, 1923, p. 48.

Knox, Bernard. "If Not Chamberlain, Who?" June 28, 1939, p. 207. Lovett, R. M.

New Republic, August 7, 1935, p. 269.

Mark, Jeffery, "Mr. Churchill Runs the War." Life, December 9, 194 0, p. 14. Marshall, David John. "Winston Churchill: A Study of England's Political Bad Boy." Living Age, April, 1929, pp. 96-98. Mitchell, Jonathan. Outlook, December 23, 1931, p. 537. Current History, May, 1941,

Moir, P. G. "Why Churchill?" p. 10.

Nation, April 24, 1929, p. 498. NeVinson, H. W. New Statesman and Nation, November 7, 1931, p. 581. New Statesman and Nation, November 7, 1931, p. 578. Rosenburg, Arthur. Sedgwich, Ellen. Nation, October 28, 1939, p. 455.

Atlantic, January, 1939, p. 76.

115 Sheean, Vincent. "Old Man in a Hurry." Post, October 21, 1939, p. 5. Saturday Evening Literary

"The British Sovereign Back From the War." Digest, May 9, 1925, p. 9.

"The Result of Britain's Courage and Endurance." World's Work, June, 1925, pp. 123-124. Thompson, Dorothy. "There Was a Man." 27, 1941, p. 68. Life, January

Time, December 14, 1936-January 5, 1942. Villard, Oswald Garrison. p. 480. Nation, November 5, 1938, Colliers,

Wells, H. G. "Churchill: Man of Destiny." November 2, 1940, p. 17.

.Woolf, Leonard. New Statesman and Nation, October 16, 1937, p. 616. Newspapers: New York Times, January 1, 1919-December 31, 1939. Rogers, Lillian. New York Evening Post, April 6, 1928, sec. M, p. 11. Springfield Republican, April 28, 1929, sec. E, p. 7. Springfield Republican, October 6, 1935, sec. E, p. 6. The Christian Science Monitor, September 9, 1939, p. 16. Secondary Sources: Books: Adler, Selig. The Uncertain Giant, 1921-1941. New York: MacMillan and Co., 1965. Allen, Frederick Lewis. Harpers, 1931. Only Yesterday. New York: Ithaca: Cornell

Bailey, Thomas A. America Faces Russia. University Press, 1950. . The Man in the Street. and Co., 1948.

New York:

MacMillan

116 Broad, Lewis. Winston Churchill, The Years of Preparation Westport: Greenwood Press, 1958. _ _ • Winston Churchill, The Years of Achievement. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1963. Bromaze, Mary C. Churchill and Ireland. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964. Churchill, Randolph. Winston Churchill: Houghton Mifflin, 1966. Youth. Boston: Boston:

. Winston Churchill: Young Statesman. Houghton Mifflin, 1967 . Clark, William. Less Than Kin. Hamilton, 1957. London: Hamish

Filene, Peter G. Americans and the Soviet Experiment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19 67. Glazer, Nathan. American Judaism. of Chicago Press, 1957. Chicago: University

Gretton, Vice-Admiral Sir Peter. Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy. New York: Coward McCann, Inc., 1968. Halle, Kaye, ed. Winston Churchill on America and Britain, New York: Walker and Co., 1970. Lavine, Harold and James Wechsler. United States. New Haven: 1940. War Propaganda and the Yale University Press, A History. New York

Learsi, Rufus. The Jews in America: World Publishers, 1954.

Martin, Ralph G. Jennie: The Life of Lady Randolph Churchill, The Romantic Years, 1875-1895. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1969. Moulton, Harold G. and Leo Pasvolsky. War Debts and World Prosperity. New York: The Century Company, 1932. World War Debt Settlement. MacMillan Co., 1926. New York: University

Murray, Robert K. Red Scare. Minneapolis: of Minnesota Press, 1955.

117 Norman, Edward. Gables: A History of Modern Ireland. Coral University of Miami Press, 1971.

Pratt, Julius W. "Anti-Colonialism in the United States." The Idea of Colonialism. Robert StrauzHupe and Harry W. Hazzard, eds. New York: Praeger, 1958. Rossiter, Clinton. Conservatism in America. Alfred A. Knopf, 1955. New York:

Sigler, Jay A., ed. The Conservative Tradition in American Thought. New York: Putnam, 19 69. Strakhovsky, Leonid T. Intervention at Archangel. 2nd ed. New York: Howard Fertig, 1972. . The Origins of American Intervention in Northern Russia. 2nd ed. New York: Howard Fertig, 1972. Tate, Merze. The United States and Armament. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948. Villard, Oswald Garrison. Some Newspapers and Newspapennen. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 192 3. Ward, Alan J. Ireland and Anglo-American Relations, 18991921. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969. Wittke, Carl. The Irish in America. Baton Rouge: Louisana State University Press, 1956. Writers and Staff of the New York Times. Winston S. Churchill: The Man of the Century. New York: Barton Books, 1965.

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