You are on page 1of 11

Committee on NFPA 407

MEMORANDUM
TO: FROM: DATE: SUBJECT:
NFPA Technical Committee on Aircraft Fuel Servicing Jeanne Moreau-Correia February 8, 2010

NFPA 407 A11 ROP Letter Ballot

The ROP letter ballot for NFPA 407 is attached. The ballot is for formally voting on whether or not you concur with the committee’s actions on the proposals. Reasons must accompany all negative and abstention ballots. Please do not vote negatively because of editorial errors. However, please bring such errors to my attention for action. Please complete and return your ballot as soon as possible but no later than Monday, February 22, 2010. As noted on the ballot form, please submit the ballot to Jeanne Moreau-Correia, e-mail to jmoreaucorreia@nfpa.org or fax to 617-984-7110. The return of ballots is required by the Regulations Governing Committee Projects. Attachment: Proposals

That definition is the same in the 2007 edition of NFPA 385 thus no update is needed (Part 1 of the proposal). To conform to the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. (Part 2 of the proposal). Committee Proposal 407-2(Log #CP6) shows updates for Chapter 2 and Annex C. NFPA 407 has one definition that is extracted from NFPA 385 for . Printed on 2/5/2010 1 . Review entire document to: 1) Update any extracted material by preparing separate proposals to do so. The committee prepared a separate 407-2 (Log #CP6) to update the referenced documents. and 2) review and update references to other organizations documents.Report on Proposals – June 2011 NFPA 407 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-1 Log #CP2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Technical Committee on Aircraft Fuel Servicing. by preparing proposal(s) as required.

Revised 2006. Standard on Airport Terminal Buildings. . NY 10016-5990. NFPA 418. Provide updated references to other organizations documents in Chapter 2 and Annex C as follows: The documents or portions thereof listed in this chapter are referenced within this standard and shall be considered part of the requirements of this document. . ANSI/UL 913. 2000 2007 edition. Hazardous (Classified) Locations. API/IP Std 1529. Revised October 2003. West Conshohocken.. 2005 2008 edition.. 100 Barr Harbor Drive. 1 Batterymarch Park. NFPA 10. 11th edition. 4th floor. Box C700. NFPA 385. Inc. Merriam-Webster. 100 Barr Harbor Drive. Revised August 20042006. NFPA 30. MA 02169-7471. Quincy. 2000 2007 edition.3 . Miami. American Petroleum Institute. NFPA 77. The documents or portions thereof listed in this annex are referenced within the informational sections of this standard and are not part of the requirements of this document unless also listed in Chapter 2 for other reasons. P. National Fire Protection Association. ASTM International. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. ASTM D 86. Underwriters Laboratories Inc. 1998. MA 02169-7471. U. ASTM D 380. 1220 L Street. Title 49. 333 Pfingsten Road. and Stray Currents. 1998. Standard Test Methods for Rubber Hose.W.W. Fueling Ramp Drainage. 2002 2008 edition. 1220 L Street. 2007 2010 edition. LeJeune Road. Aviation Fueling Hose and Hose Assemblies. Revised 2007. DC 20005-4070. New York. 1 Batterymarch Park. Standard for Heliports. 1994. Aviation Fueling Hose. 6th edition. Standard for Tank Vehicles for Flammable and Combustible Liquids. 2. Standard on Airport Terminal Buildings. Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.Report on Proposals – June 2011 NFPA 407 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-2 Log #CP6 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Technical Committee on Aircraft Fuel Servicing. MA.10. Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static. Washington. PA 19428-2959. National Electrical Code®. New York. American Petroleum Institute. 1993. Revised 2008. API BULL 1529. West Conshohocken. Specification for Bare Aluminum and Aluminum Alloy Welding Electrodes and Rods. 2002 2008 edition. NFPA 30. Aviation Fueling Hose. 2007 edition. Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code. 2005. Printed on 2/5/2010 2 . Process Piping. American Welding Society. NFPA 415.W.O. Northbrook. 2006 edition. IL 60062-2096. DC 20402. Washington. 2005 2008 edition. Quincy. PA 194282959.. ASME B31. Standard for Intrinsically Safe Apparatus and Associated Apparatus for Use in Class I. NFPA 70. 2002. National Fire Protection Association. American National Standards Institute. 19921999. Government Printing Office. and Loading Walkways. Standard for Tank Vehicles for Flammable and Combustible Liquids. N.O. Inc. Springfield. Code of Federal Regulations. AWS A5. ASME. NFPA 70. 2003 2008 edition. . Washington. N. 1995 2009. NY 10036. NFPA 385. Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery Piping. P. 2004 edition. 25 West 43rd Street. 2003. API BULL 1529. II. Standard Test Method for Distillation of Petroleum Products. National Electrical Code®. NFPA 415. Recommended Practice on Static Electricity. 1998. ANSI B31. FL 33126. NFPA 410. 3 Park Avenue. 2008 ASTM International. and Loading Walkways. API RP 2003. 1991 2008. Standard on Aircraft Maintenance.1 ANSI Publications. 2003 2008 edition.. Lightning. and III Division 1. Box C700.S.3.3. Fueling Ramp Drainage. Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers.. Revised 2006. 550 N. DC 20005-4070.

02. 67 Alexander Drive. Underwriters Laboratories Inc. Zones 0. ANSI/ISA-60079-11 (12. Standard Specification for Aviation Turbine Fuels.W.01. Box 7500. and III Division 1. ANSI/UL 913. IL 60062-2096. 3650 Mansell Road. Standard for Instrinsically Safe Apparatus and Associated Apparatus for Use in Class I. Static Electricity in Fueling Superjets. Hazardous (Classified) Locations. 5285 Port Royal Road. 2002. Revised 2008. IL 60062-2096. Standard Test Method for Vapor Pressure of Petroleum Products (Reid Method). Hazardous (Classified) Locations. 333 Pfingsten Road. Linden. RI 02919. Johnston. and Class I. 1972.3. C. G. VA 22161. NC 27709. Intrinsically Safe Apparatus and Associated Apparatus for Use in Class I. 1992. ANSI/UL 60079-11. 583. 1. ASTM D 910. .1999. Research Triangle Park. Washington.. . Springfield. Alpharetta. 1993. The committee will review the list again during the ROC preparation meeting. Printed on 2/5/2010 3 . _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-3 Log #5 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Bob Eugene..&2 Hazardous (Classified) Locations—Intrinsic Safety “i”. 1995 2009. Exxon Research & Eng. II. NJ. GA 30022. Zone 0 & 1 Hazardous (Classified) Locations. N. ASTM D 1655. 2009. 1994 2008. Revised August 2004 2006. K.. P.O.O. Coordinating Research Council Inc. 100 Barr Harbor Drive. 333 Pfingsten Road. West Conshohocken. Suite 140. DC 20005-4070.01). Underwriters Laboratories Inc. Venting Atmospheric and Low-Pressure Storage Tanks: Nonrefrigerated and Refrigerated. & III Division 1. FM Class 3610. 2002. Northbrook. Revised August 2004 2006. Electrical Apparatus for Use in Class I. 2. They are not a part of the requirements of this document. ASTM International. ANSI/UL 913. API STD 2000. P. Co. Brochure. Standard Specification for Aviation Gasolines. Aircraft and Refueler Bonding and Grounding Study. Update referenced standard to most recent revision.. Northbrook. II. Bachman. Explosive Atmospheres Part 11: Equipment Protection by Intrinsic Safety “i”. Dukek. FM Global. and W. National Technical Information Service. CRC Report No. Electrical Apparatus for Use in Class I. An Evaluation of the Relative Fire Hazards of JETAand JET B for Commercial Flight (N74-10709). ISA. 1301 Atwood Avenue.Report on Proposals – June 2011 NFPA 407 ASTM D 323. 2009 ANSI/ISA 12.02.&2 Hazardous (Classified) Locations—Intrinsic Safety “i”. and III Division 1. II. The following documents or portions thereof are listed here as informational resources only. Revised 2008. 1220 L Street. PA 19428-2959.5 UL Publications. Underwriters Laboratories Inc. 1. American Petroleum Institute. 1995 2007. Box C700. Standard for Intrinsically Safe Apparatus and Associated Apparatus for Use in Class I. Zones 0. (Reserved) This proposal updates the documents that are referenced in NFPA 407 to reflect the currently available editions.

Adopt the preferred definition from the NFPA Glossary of Terms as follows: The pressure at which a hydraulic component fails due to stresses induced as a result of the pressure. The committee suggests that the term be removed from the definition.Report on Proposals – June 2011 NFPA 407 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-4 Log #CP1 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Technical Committee on Aircraft Fuel Servicing. The revised definition should be able to work for any NFPA TC that is concerned with component failure under a pressure condition. Revise the proposed definition from the NFPA GOT group as follows: The pressure at which a hydraulic component fails due to stresses induced as a result of the pressure. [ 2009] This definition is the preferred definition from the Glossary of Terms. A component could be under pneumatic pressure and fail as well as under hydraulic pressure. Changing the secondary definition to the preferred definition complies with the Glossary of Terms Project. Printed on 2/5/2010 4 .

the vehicle shall be permitted to return to normal service. or a minimum of 15 m (50 ft) from any other building.  The emergency that exists is that these units are already in use with no current regulation. Printed on 2/5/2010 5 . The AHJ should designate the size and number of DPF regeneration pads and determine whether a centralized facility is advantageous.  The potential for a life threatening event is real and regulation must be put into effect to minimize the possibility of a multiple fatality event.) high and shall be of a color contrasting sharply with the sign background for visibility.4. The area shall be in a remote location that is a minimum of 30 m (100 ft) from the nearest aircraft parking location. when in the regeneration mode. This TIA will address the operational issues with the regeneration sequence that will provide a measure of safety for the fuel handlers as well as the airfields they operate on.  In the event of a spill with vapors. any Jet-A leaked onto any part of the system would cause a fire.  Both of these are hot enough to ignite Jet-A vapors or fuel (if dripped onto exhaust system components). Aircraft refueling operations shall not be initiated if the regenerative system indicates regeneration is required.6. The regeneration cycle shall be performed only by trained personnel who shall remain with the vehicle until the regeneration cycle is complete. soil. The vehicle shall be visually inspected for any signs of fluid leaks under or around the vehicle before initiating regeneration. either the exhaust gases (between 371 and 649 degrees C (700 and 1200 degrees F)) or heat off the exhaust pipes themselves could start a fire. or flammable storage. The size of the DPF regeneration area depends on the equipment being used (fleet size).4. The immediate area surrounding the DPF exhaust outlet shall be concrete or other high-temperature resistant material and shall be clear of any grass. The area shall be clearly marked with a minimum 61 cm by 30 cm (2 ft by 1 ft) sign reading “Vehicle DPF Regeneration Area” and shall have letters at least 75 mm (3 in. DPF regeneration shall be performed only in area(s) designated by the Authority Having Jurisdiction.  Exhaust gas temps.7.6. Problems occurring during the regeneration cycle shall be corrected prior to the vehicle returning to normal service. airport terminal. These units will have the potential of introducing an ignition source due to the extremely high temps generated by the exhaust system. These requirements need to be sent out to the end users as soon as possible. Aircraft refueling vehicles with these new exhaust requirements are now being used on airfields. Chicago Fire Department Diesel Particulate Filter (DPF) regeneration equipped vehicles shall have a lockout mode which would prevent automatic regeneration while operating these vehicles within 30 m (100 ft) of aircraft parking areas. Once a regeneration cycle is started. that requires the filter to be cleaned at high temperature (regenerated) while installed on the vehicle shall meet the requirements of 5. it shall be completed without interruption.Report on Proposals – June 2011 NFPA 407 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-5 Log #8 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Fred A. DPF regeneration system piping shall be shielded from engine discharge manifold to the outlet at the tailpipe. reach over 1200 degrees inside the system and exhaust gasses are over 700 degrees.1 through 5. All vehicles that have engines equipped with an exhaust after-treatment devices such as a DPF. Cnota. DPF regeneration shall not be performed within 30 m (100 ft) of any aircraft refueling operations. DPF regeneration equipped vehicles shall have a listed diffuser installed at the outlet of the exhaust tailpipe. After the regeneration process is successfully completed. not only the exhaust gasses but the pipes themselves. DPF regeneration shall not be initiated if there are any signs of any fluid leaks on or beneath the vehicle. or flammable materials.

The USDA Forest Service. Group D locations. It has been brought to my attention that a TIA to rewrite 4.3. and switching devices. and electronic controls other than those covered in 4.6.6 as follows: Lamps. Printed on 2/5/2010 6 . monitoring devcies and the like might be present and such devices can really not be designated as a lamp or a switch. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-7 Log #CP3 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Technical Committee on Aircraft Fuel Servicing. the governmental body who regulates the spark arrestor standard. Add new Annex material as follows: The requirement for spark arresting exhaust systems is not intended to extend to diesel engines equipped with turbochargers. Chicago Fire Department 1. weatherproof type.3.3.3.3.6.6. Revise 4. Previously. gasketed.3. The committee notes that more electronic components are are now installed on the fueling vehicles than when the requirement was first added.7 is necessary in an emergency nature. Revise text of 4.7 stated that “all engines on fuel servicing vehicles shall be provided with flame and spark arresting exhaust systems.7 as follows: Non-turbo charged diesel engines on fuel servicing vehicles shall be equipped with flame and spark arresting exhaust systems. This section has caused great confusion and has almost shut down airports due to interpretation of the rule by inspectors. Other electrical components shall be of a type listed for use in accordance with NFPA 70 Class I.7. clearly identifies that all diesel engines with a turbo charger and no waste-gate (also clearly identified therein) are exempt from the requirements to have an additional spark arresting device.4 and 4. Cnota.6 specifically states gasoline engines are required to have such a system. shall be of the enclosed. Division 2. This would eliminate the confusion that it is causing.Report on Proposals – June 2011 NFPA 407 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-6 Log #2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Fred A.7. 2.” Notice that 4. 4.6.5. Electronic gauges.7.3.

3. The issue is not necessarily limited to tankers that may be carrying Jet A fuel. Dempsey.1. operational restrictions pertaining to vehicles or a combination thereof appears to be airport specific. Printed on 2/5/2010 7 . Private autos and other vehicles that make approaches to the terminal at LAX are another example of how tunnel safety needs to be considered in a broader context. The task group will consult with airport operators and make a review of related NFPA documents including NFPA 415.4. DTS Refueling System. Numerous aircraft fuel servicing vehicles.4 Jet-A tankers shall not be allowed to travel through enclosed roadways longer than 100 feet. the situation would put firefighters at greater risk of injury or loss of life due to the extreme heat buildup and limited access in such a location. Such an incident would cause loss of life to all persons in said enclosed roadway should an explosion or fire develop.1.8 to read as follows: Aircraft fuel servicing tank vehicles shall be equipped with having a positive displacement product pump shall be equipped with a product tank low level shutdown system that prevents air from being ingested into the fueling system. unlike positive displacement pumps. the reason for 5. As air enters the suction port. thus presenting no threat of dispensing air in lieu of fuel into the aircraft.1. The problem is you could have a catastrophic failure of a tanker carrying thousands of gallons of fuel in an enclosed roadway. It would be impossible to redesign each airport.4 IF current past practice requires said tankers to travel through enclosed roadways. NFPA 424 and NFPA 502 among others. By adding this requirement. 5. Damage to the supporting roof structure would require shutdown of the surface area above due to possible collapse. I realize that this situation may already exist at some airports. lose prime and cavitate when the tank is emptied of product. If the tunnel was under a runway. Tunnel design. Chicago. the runway surface would become compromised and cause aircraft damage or destruction with an even greater loss of life. However. the delay in firefighting would be unavoidable and loss of life would occur. The layout and available space at vehicle approach points to the airport property and on the airport property itself will dictate limitations on what vehicles can or cannot use any tunnels. Overall. The committee understands that the operators of Miami International Airport do not allow fueling vehicles of any sort to use the tunnels.1. pump output effectively stops. Centrifugal pumps. have been unnecessarily removed from service after inspection by “the authority having jurisdiction” because of the NFPA 407 paragraph cited above. The committee agrees that tunnel safety is an important issue. built with centrifugal pumps. The committee has agreed to form a task group to further research and study this issue and see what changes might be considered at the ROC stage.1 The AHJ may allow a variance to 5.16. the tunnel has to be safe for passage by any vehicle that may be using it.1. Additionally. NO VARIANCES for NEW design or construction will be allowed. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-9 Log #7 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ David A.Report on Proposals – June 2011 NFPA 407 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-8 Log #1 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Chris Dukes. IL New text to read as follows: 5. Not even addressed are the environmental concerns a spill would create.4. LLC Revise 4. Even if the enclosed roadway had a standpipe system. airport delays and expense would be great. If this surface is a runway or taxiway. a potential life threat is avoided in new construction or redesign of airfields.

due to its relatively low vapor pressure. In the event that a spill continues. the system emergency fuel shutoff shall be actuated. Employee #1 was using an Allen wrench to loosen the bolts on the fuel pump lead when he created a spark that ignited the gas fumes in the manhole. causing an explosion. Use clean spark-resistant tools to collect absorbed materials. When working with flammable gases. government as a Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory (NRTL) for scientific research and product certification. while the coworker watched from outside the manhole.2. Product approval from a NRTL assures that products meet consensus-based standards of safety to provide the assurance. ● NFPA 407 can better mitigate the flammability hazards by specifying the use of spark resistant tools. required by OSHA. These tools provide a solution in place of ferrous tools in flammable environments. kerosene POTENTIAL HAZARDS FIRE OR EXPLOSION .3 states that “…. Where this hazard exists. Employee #1 and a coworker.Use clean non-sparking tools to collect absorbed material. Section B. ● NFPA 30. which serves as a guide to aid first responders in identifying the hazards of the materials involved during the initial response phase of an incident.the standard grades of aviation gasoline do produce flammable vapors in ignitable amounts at normal temperatures and pressure……With JET B turbine fuel.” ● The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) office of Hazardous Materials Safety and its counterparts in Canada and Mexico publish The Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG).S.” ● NFPA 407. In the event that a spill continues from a hydrant system. 2002 revised. dusts or vapors resulting from sparks created by iron and steel hand tools. FM Approval Standard 7910. Chapter 5 Basic Fire Science Table 5. ● ERG Guide 128 Flammable Liquids (Non-Polar/Water-Immiscible) for gasoline. ● OSHA inspection #300965795. These companies clearly recognize the need for spark resistant tools in working with and around motor fuel products. the fuel servicing shall be stopped immediately by release of the deadman controls. Valero. Annex B Aviation Fuel. These tools prevent the ignition of flammable materials. The supervisor shall be notified at once. dusts or vapors by mechanical sparks created by the use of iron and steel hand tools slipping or striking a surface. ● FM Approvals LLC.1 Reported Burning and Sparking Temperature of Selected Ignition Sources under Mechanical Sparks lists a Steel tool temperature at 2550°F. (FM) is an international organization recognized by the U. liquids or vapors.. ● A few documented incidents of steel tools as an ignition source in flammable environments: ● OSHA inspection #124728437. arms and legs in the explosion and was hospitalized. Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations 2008 Edition. and CITGO regularly require the use of “non-sparking” tools under Accidental Release Measures in the MSDS’s for their jet fuel products. ● Recognizing the potential for steel tools to be an ignition source in flammable environment. that these products are safe for use in the United States workplace. formerly Factory Mutual Research Corporation. “iron and steel hand tools may produce sparks that can be an ignition source around flammable substances. Spark Resistant Tools is used as guidance to evaluate tools intended for use in environments where there is a risk of ignition of flammable materials. an employee in the process of cleaning loose material from drill piping with a Printed on 2/5/2010 8 . spark-resistant tools should be used. Ampco Safety Tools Add new text as follows: Where a spill is observed.5. hands. were working in a 30 inch by 36 inch manhole at a gas station. ● NFPA 921. the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) provides guidance in booklet 3080 Hand and Power Tools. Chevron. the equipment emergency fuel shutoff shall be actuated. Employee #1 suffered burns to his face.Report on Proposals – June 2011 NFPA 407 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-10 Log #3 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Mindy Wang.76. Without this specification.1.1 lists frictional heat or sparks as sources of ignition of flammable vapors and precaution shall be taken to control ignition sources.HIGHLY FLAMMABLE: Will be easily ignited by heat. EMERGENCY RESPONSE SPILL OR LEAK . the vapor-air mixture above the liquid surface under normal temperature and pressure conditions frequently is within the flammability range. and the operation shall not be resumed until the spill has been cleared and conditions are determined to be safe. ● Jet fuel manufacturers such as ExxonMobil. a potential hazard arises because of the possibility that sparks produced by steel or iron tools can become an ignition source. sparks or flames. Chapter 6. both maintenance mechanics. steel tools are likely to be used which can be an ignition source. Section 6. Employee #1 was trying to change a fuel pump. Flammable and Combustible Liquids.

The proposed text better controls the potential of ignition source from steel tools.2] the bonding sequence is to bond the aircraft and vehicle fist then connect the pit coupler. and then connect the hydrant coupler to the hydrant system. other subjects such as personnel hazards. Section 5. clean up procedures and use of all of the proper tools and equipment work in harmony to provide a safe cleanup process. The scope of this proposed change is too narrow.4. All three employees received first and second degree burns on their face. the saw created a spark that caused an explosion of gasoline vapors in the wing fuel tank. “Where a hydrant servicer or cart is used for fueling. While spark resistant tools might be one part of providing a safe work condition. Both employees were engulfed in the fireball. Employee #2 also received some third degree burns. ● OSHA inspection #607366. The bonding sequence when hydrant fueling is being done in North America is slightly different than what is used primarily outside North America at this time. ● OSHA inspection #2272953. The API/EI undertook an electro static review to determine which sequence would be the safest. Employee was killed in the explosion on site.4. In the hopes of aligning practices globally the committee has introduced this REJECTED committee proposal in order to introduce the subject so it can be commented on. The investigation states that non-sparking tools were not provided for the employees. In API/EI 1540 [9.1 of NFPA 407 as well as the training criteria of CFR 139 would cover the use of the proper tools and equipment for a given situation. an employee was sawing an airplane wing into sections with a portable powered hand saw. In NFPA 407 [5. While striking the pipe with a hammer.Report on Proposals – June 2011 NFPA 407 metal hammer. Employee #3 came to the area to assist the other employees. two employees were assigned the job of tending a 100 gallon (water jacket) reactor kettle of methyl methacrylate in the mixing room. Modify existing text as follows in 5. steel tools are likely to be used which can be a source of ignition. which was immediately followed by a massive “fire ball”.4] it says to connect the pit coupler before bonding the equipment. The Technical Committee has formed a task group to review this work to see if it should revise its current bonding sequence practice. Employee #1 used a metal wrench (visegrips) to pry open the cover of a kettle. Employee #1 killed and Employee #2 injured in explosion and was hospitalized. It says that in most instances that there is no difference from a safety stand point in the sequence except in one particular condition the sequence described in API/EI 1540 is safer.1. bond the hydrant servicer or cart to the aircraft. Without the specification for spark resistant tools. arms and abdomen. The API/EI document will be provided to the committee for review.2. Printed on 2/5/2010 9 . All three employees were hospitalized. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-11 Log #CP5 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Technical Committee on Aircraft Fuel Servicing. an explosion occurred. The task group will report back during the ROC meeting later in 2010 and decide what changes to NFPA 407 might be in order. Employee #2 noticed the spark. The wrench handle struck the angle iron support for the agitator motor.4. producing a spark.

II. Revise text of this one sentence only (no other changes to text before or after this sentence) as follows: Where this is done. 333 Pfingsten Road. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-13 Log #6 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Bob Eugene. 1. Electrical Apparatus for Use in Class I. & 2 Hazardous (Classified) Locations—Intrinsic Safety “i”. Hazardous (Classified) Locations. Fueling Ramp Drainage. Standard for Intrinsically Safe Apparatus and Associated Apparatus for Use in Class I. 2002. Update referenced standard to most recent revision. Northbrook. Underwriters Laboratories Inc.2. C. IL 60062-2096.1. Printed on 2/5/2010 10 .7 UL Publications. and III Division 1. This change is necessary to correlate NFPA 407 with NFPA 410.Report on Proposals – June 2011 NFPA 407 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 407-12 Log #CP4 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Technical Committee on Aircraft Fuel Servicing. Revised August 2004 2006. ANSI/UL 913. ANSI/UL 60079-11. with regard to placement of fire extinguishers. Zones 0. Standard on Airport Terminal Buildings. Revised 2008. Standard on Aircraft Maintenance and NFPA 415. the maximum distance between extinguishers should not be over 60 90 m (300 200 ft). 2009. and Loading Walkways.. Underwriters Laboratories Inc.