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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA CASE NO.

: DIVISION: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. Plaintiff, vs. DAVID L. ANDERSON, et. al., Defendant(s). ________________________________________/ MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; MOTION TO STRIKE CLAIM FOR RESERVATION TO ENTER DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT COMES NOW, the Defendant, David Anderson (Defendant), by and through their undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rules 1.110, 1.120, 1.130 and 1.210, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and files this Motion to Strike and Dismiss the Plaintiffs Complaint for Foreclosure, or in the alternative a Motion for More Definite Statement and Motion to Strike Claim for to Enter Deficiency Judgment, and, as grounds therefor, the Defendant states: Failure to Plead Plaintiff is Owner and Holder of Note; Distinction Between Requirement of Ownership for Purposes of Foreclosure and No Requirement of Ownership to Enforce a Note that is a Negotiable Instrument 1. In order to state a cause of action for foreclosure, the Plaintiff must plead that it owns and holds the note and mortgage. See, e.g., Your Constr. Center, Inc. v. Gross, 316 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1975)([W]hen plaintiff files his complaint, he must necessarily allege he is the owner and holder of the note and mortgage in question. 22 Fla.Jur., Mortgages 314 (1958). Should defendants have any allegation to the contrary they may join issue on it, and obtain adjudication as to the ownership.); Law Office of David J. Stern, P.A. v. Sec. Nat'l Servicing Corp., 969 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 2007)(Lewis, C.J., concurring in result only)(A mortgage foreclosure action requires only that the claimant be the owner and holder of the note and mortgage and that the mortgagee has defaulted on that note and mortgage.) citing Chemical Residential Mortgage v. Rector, 742 So. 2d 300, 300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); BAC Funding, supra (in reversing summary judgment stating: Further, it did not file any supporting affidavits or deposition testimony to establish that it owns and holds the note and mortgage. Accordingly, the documents before the trial court at the summary judgment hearing did not establish U.S. Bank's standing to foreclose the note and mortgage....)(emphasis added); 16-2010-CA-5181 FC-E

Form 1.944, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; Florida Supreme Court's Administrative Order No. AOSC09-54, In Re Final Report and Recommendations on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases (discussing issues of the underlying ownership of notes as it relates to document exchange for managed mediation program in foreclosure cases).1 See also Bank of America v. Bernard, Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, entered March 22, 2010, Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Clay County Florida, the Honorable William A. Wilkes. 2. In the instant case, the Plaintiff does not allege that it is the owner and holder of the note and mortgage. The Plaintiff, instead, merely alleges that Plaintiff is now entitled to enforce the Mortgage Note and Mortgage. This allegation is meaningless for purposes of the foreclosure and is insufficient to state a cause of action for foreclosure because: a. First, to the extent that the Plaintiff is seeking to claim that it has a right to pursue foreclosure because it is entitled to enforce the note under the terms of 673.3011 it is erroneous. Section 673.3011 only deals with who is entitled to enforce an instrument not who is entitled to foreclose on real property. b. Second, unlike what the Florida Supreme Court has clearly provided in foreclosure cases such as Your Construction (that is, that one must be owner and holder to foreclose)2, the plain language of 673.3011 explicitly states that one does not need to be owner of an instrument to enforce the instrument. Specifically, 673.3011 states: A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument.... (Emphasis added).

Any argument that pleading ownership is not required so long as one is a holder based upon Chemical Residential Mortg. v. Rector, 742 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) and its progeny, such as Philogene v. ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc., 948 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla. 4th DAC 2006), is without merit. The Rector opinion was premised upon the default of the defendant, as made clear by the following language: W e find that the complaint properly stated a cause of action for foreclosure by the holder of the note and mortgage. W hen they [The Rectors] did not timely respond to the complaint, the appellees/mortgagees waived any denial of its allegations that the appellant was the owner and holder of the note and mortgage and that the appellees had defaulted on the note and mortgage. Rector at 300 (emphasis added). That is, what Rector and its progeny stand for is the proposition that when a plaintiff has alleged it is the owner and holder of the note and afterwards the defendant defaults, that the defendant may not later claim the plaintiff was not the owner of the note because the defendant admitted ownership by virtue of the defendants default. Likewise any reliance on Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Azize,, 965 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), for the proposition that a mere holder is entitled to foreclose on a mortgage is also misplaced. In Azize, the plaintiff alleged it was the owner and holder of the note. The Azize decision merely addressed whether a legal ownership interest was sufficient in the absence of a lack of beneficial ownership, concluding that legal ownership was sufficient. See also the discussion regarding one of the purposes of Fla. Sup. Ct. Order SC09-1460 and SC09-1579, p. 3-4, being to encourage plaintiffs to verify the ownership of notes prior to filing foreclosure actions.
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c. This distinction between, on the one hand, what the Florida Supreme Court states about the requirement of ownership of the note for foreclosures in Your Construction and, on the other hand, the Legislatures lack of such a requirement of ownership to merely enforce the instrument in 673.3011 results in the inescapable conclusion that there are two different standards depending on whether the plaintiff seeks the remedy of foreclosure or the remedy of a money judgment! In the instant case, the Plaintiff seeks to foreclose on real property, not simply enforce the note! In order to foreclose the Plaintiff MUST allege it is the owner of the note. If the Plaintiff wants to merely seek the remedy of a money judgment, then ownership of the note is irrelevant but that is not the case here. 3. To again state the Defendants position on the ownership issue: without conceding whether the note is a negotiable instrument under Floridas version of the Uniform Commercial Code vel non, 673.3011 clearly indicates that one who is entitled to enforce an instrument need not be the owner. Thus, merely pleading a right to proceed on account of 673.3011 does not meet the pleading standard set forth by the Florida Supreme court as stated in Your Construction Center Inc. and the other authorities set forth above. That is, the Florida Supreme Court clearly and unequivocally requires an additional pleading element in a foreclosure action that is not present in an action to enforce a negotiable instrument, to wit: the Plaintiff must own (not just hold) the instrument. 4. In any event, Plaintiffs allegations regarding its standing are nothing but impermissible pleadings of a legal conclusion, versus the proper pleadings of ultimate facts. See Maiden v. Carter, 234 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) ("It is a fundamental principle of pleading that the complaint, to be sufficient, must allege ultimate facts as distinguished from legal conclusions which, if proved, would establish a cause of action for which relief may be granted."); Agrofollajes v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., So.3d [No So.3d cite as of Sept. 1, 2010],34 Fla. L. Weekly D 2578 (Fla. 3rd DCA Dec. 16, 2009)(also noting that matters should be plead with sufficient particularity to allow defendant to prepare defense). The Plaintiff should be required to clarify the facts upon which it relies in stating that it is entitled to enforce the Mortgage Note and Mortgage. Specifically, to the extent that the note is a negotiable instrument, which again is not conceded, 673.3011 governs who is a person entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument, stating: The term "person entitled to enforce" an instrument means: (1) The holder of the instrument; (2) A nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder; or (3) A person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to 673.3091 or 673.4181(4), Fla. Stat. . . . (Emphasis added). As Plaintiff is traveling under Section 673.3011 in maintaining this suit, which Defendant suggests is not permissible, the Plaintiff at the least should be obliged to clarify under which of the three subparts of Section 673.3011 Plaintiff qualifies by the pleading of ultimate facts.

5. Accordingly, the action for foreclosure should either be dismissed or, at the least, Plaintiff should be required to clarify that it is either the owner and holder of the note and mortgage,

or that it is bringing the action on behalf of another that is the owner and holder of the mortgage and/or if traveling under Section 673.3011, the facts which give rise to Plaintiffs claim that it is entitled to enforce the note. Failure to Plead Capacity 6. Moreover, because the Plaintiff has not alleged that it is bringing this action as the owner and holder of the note, it is not clear in what capacity the Plaintiff is bringing this action. The Plaintiff should be required to clarify its capacity in bringing this action. 7. Rule 1.120(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Pleading Special Matters provides: (a) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, except to the extent required to show the jurisdiction of the court. (emphasis added)The initial pleading served on behalf of a minor party shall specifically aver the age of the minor party. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party, the capacity of any party to sue or be sued, or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, that party shall do so by specific negative averment which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge. 8. To the extent that Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a the owner of the note, Defendant specifically avers that the Plaintiff lacks capacity to maintain this suit. 9. Capacity to sue is an absence or legal disability which would deprive a party of the right to come into court. 59 AM .JUR.2d, Parties 31 (1971). This is in contrast to standing which requires an entity have sufficient interest in the outcome of litigation to warrant the court's consideration of its position. Keehn v. Joseph C. Mackey and Co., 420 So.2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). 10. Because there is a paucity of case law in the State of Florida regarding the issue of capacity, other Circuit Courts have resorted to Federal Court opinions interpreting Rule 9(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Wachovia Mortgage FSB F/K/A World Savings Bank v. Mattacchiero, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp 101a (Sixth Judicial Circuit December 15, 2009). As stated by the Court in Mattacchiero: The issue of capacity to sue may be raised by motion to dismiss where the defect appears on the face of the complaint. Hershel California Fruit Products Co. v. Hunt Foods, 111 F. Supp. 603 (1975), quoting Coburn v. Coleman, 75 F. Supp. 107 (1974); Klebano v. New York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d (2nd Cir. 1965).

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As also stated by the Court in Mattacchiero: Failure to raise the issue of a Plaintiff's capacity by a specific negative averment has been held to constitute a waiver of that defense. McDonough Equip. v. Sunset Amoco West, 669 So.2d 300 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1996); Plumbers Loc. U.N. 519, Miami Fla. v. Serv. Plbg., 401 F. Supp, 1008 (1975); and see Sun Val. American Land Lease, 927 So.2d 259 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 2006); Shaw v. Stutchman, 105 Nev.128 (1989).

12. Accordingly, it is proper for Defendant to raise the issue of capacity in a motion to dismiss in order to avoid the issue being waived. 13. Finally, to the extent that the Plaintiff seeks to bring the instant claim for foreclosure on behalf of another party, the Plaintiff must necessarily allege its representative capacity to bring this action on behalf of the owner. See Dollar Sys. v. Detto, 688 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1997). Moreover, the unnamed owner is a real party in interest who must either be joined in the action, or, the Plaintiff must fall within the list of parties able to bring the claim on behalf of the unnamed owner in its own name by virtue of the plain language of Rule 1.210, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts which suggest that it falls within the list of parties able to bring the claim on behalf of the owner in its own name by virtue of the plain language of Rule 1.210. 14. Because the Plaintiff has failed to allege within the body of the complaint its capacity to bring this action as well as any jurisdictional allegations, the Plaintiffs Complaint should be clarified. The Complaint Should be Dismissed Based on the Authority of Jeff-Ray Corp. v. Jacobson Because the Mortgage Attached to the Complaint is Not Made in Favor of the Plaintiff 15. In the instant case there is no dispute that the mortgage attached to the Complaint is not made in favor of the Plaintiff and that there is no assignment of mortgage made in favor of the Plaintiff attached to Complaint. 16. The Fourth District Court of Appeal opinion in Jeff-Ray Corp. v. Jacobson, 566 So.2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) is on all fours with the instant facts.3 In Jeff-Ray, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Jeff-Ray stated: We also reverse and remand on the second point raised by appellant; that is, that the trial court erred in denying defendant's March 9, 1988,

See also U.S. Bank National Assn v. Rose, 16 Fla. L. W eekly Supp. 1044a (Fla. 9th Jud. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009)([T]he Jeff-Ray court held that it is error not to dismiss a foreclosure complaint for failure to state a cause of action where the assignment is not in existence at the time the complaint was filed. W M Specialty Mortgage, Inc. v. Salomon, 874 So.2d 680 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (interpreting Jeff-Ray, supra).).

motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Appellees complaint for mortgage foreclosure was filed on January 4, 1988, and alleged an assignment of the subject mortgage to them in 1986. However, it was not attached to the complaint. When the alleged assignment was finally produced, it was dated April 18, 1988, some four months after the lawsuit was filed. Our opinion in Safeco Insurance Co. v. Ware, 401 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), would support dismissal of the action based on failure to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.130. Given the scenario before us, appellees complaint could not have stated a cause of action at the time it was filed, based on a document that did not exist until some four months later. 17. There are no conflicting opinions from any district courts that detract from the binding4 application of Jeff-Ray Corp. to the instant case. In fact, the only case which distinguishes

See Pardo v. State, 596 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1992)(The District Courts of Appeal are required to follow Supreme Court decisions. As an adjunct to this rule it is logical and necessary in order to preserve stability and predictability in the law that, likewise, trial courts be required to follow the holdings of higher courts -- District Courts of Appeal.... [I]f the district court of the district in which the trial court is located has decided the issue, the trial court is bound to follow it.); Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1258 (Fla. 2000) rev'd on other grounds, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S. Ct. 525, 148 L. Ed. 2d 388 (This Court has determined the decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the law of this State unless and until they are overruled by this Court, and therefore, in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts.);Inquiry Concerning a Judge Re: Daniel W . Perry, 641 So. 2d 366, 368-70 (1994), quoting In re Turner, 421 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Fla. 1982)(W e [Judges] must administer our offices with due regard to the system of law itself, remembering that we are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law.) quoting American Judicature Society, H AN D BO O K FO R J U D GES 82 (1961); State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1976)(The trial court is bound by the decisions of this Court just as the District Courts of Appeal follow controlling precedents set by the Florida Supreme Court. . . . To quote our erstwhile brother, Judge Mann, in Johnson v. Johnson, Fla.App. [2nd Dist.] 1973, 284 So.2d 231, we receive the interpretation of the law from our Supreme Court, agreeing with some, disagreeing with some, following all....) quoting various authority; State v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2005)(Concurring opinion)(Moreover, in the absence of interdistrict conflict, decisions of the district courts represent the law of the state, binding all Florida trial courts.)(citing Pardo, supra, and Gore, supra.); Aurora Loan Servs. LLC v. Senchuk, 35 Fla. L. W eekly D 829 (Fla. 1st DCA April 23, 2010)(Further, regardless of the Picker decision, the trial court was required to follow Suntrust, as it was a controlling decision of a district court in Florida.) (citing Pardo, supra); Putnam County Sch. Bd. v. Debose, 667 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(Under the doctrine of stare decisis, lower courts are bound to adhere to the rulings of higher courts when considering similar issues even though the lower court might believe the law should be otherwise.)(citing State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1976); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).); Omni Insurance Company v. Special Care Clinic, Inc., 708 So.2d 314 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1998) citing Allstate Insurance Co. v. Mazorra, 599 So.2d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)([A] failure of the circuit court (acting in its appellate capacity] to follow an established principle of law causes a material injustice.); Bunn v. Bunn, 311 So.2d 387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (Necessarily, the views and decisions of an appellate court on issues which are properly raised and decided in disposing of the case are, unless reversed or modified by a higher court, binding on the lower court as the law of the case. Additionally, under the doctrine of stare decisis, an appellate court's decision on issues properly before it and decided in disposing of the case, are, until overruled by a subsequent case, binding as precedent on courts of lesser jurisdiction.); Metropolitan Dade County v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 683 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (Although courts are free to express their disagreements with decisions of higher courts, trial courts are not free to disregard them in the adjudicatory process.); see also State v.

Jeff-Ray Corp. is WM Specialty Mortgage LLC v. Salomon, 874 So.2d 680, 682-83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), which held that notwithstanding Jeff-Ray Corp., a plaintiff in a similar procedural posture states a cause of action for foreclosure where the complaint alleges an equitable assignment was made in favor of the Plaintiff prior to the filing of suit such that there was an unconditional transfer of the rights under the mortgage. In the instant case, there is no allegation within the four corners of an equitable assignment of mortgage to the Plaintiff so as to implicate the application of WM Specialty. 18. Accordingly, without going outside the four corners of the Complaint in the case sub judice, the Complaint should either be dismissed pursuant to Jeff-Ray Corp., without prejudice to file an amended complaint, or the Plaintiff should be required to provide a more definite statement regarding the facts surrounding Plaintiffs acquisition of its interests in the mortgage.5 Failure to Plead Jurisdictional Allegations 19. There are no allegations whatsoever regarding the legal status of the Plaintiff. The Complaint should be dismissed as it fails to make required jurisdictional allegations. Rule 1.110(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the courts jurisdiction depends.... The Complaint does not allege whether Plaintiff is a resident or nonresident
Lopez, 633 So. 2d 1150, 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (The decision of a circuit court acting in its appellate capacity is binding upon all county courts within that circuit.). The Plaintiff may be able to state a cause of action upon amending. That is, to the extent that the Plaintiff claims an interest based on assignment of mortgage executed and recorded after the filing of the instant law suit, Florida law is clear that a cause of action may be stated if the complaint alleges sufficient ultimate facts to show that an equitable assignment was made in favor of the Plaintiff prior to the filing of suit such that there was an unconditional transfer of the rights under the mortgage. See W M Specialty Mortgage LLC v. Salomon, 874 So.2d 680, 682-83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Numerous trial courts around the state have held accordingly. See Branch Banking and Trust Company v. Jenkins, 16 Fla. Law W eekly Supp. 642a (Fla. 4th Jud. Cir. May 6, 2009)(Here, the plaintiff makes no allegation of physical delivery within the holding of W M Specialty Mortgage. The plaintiff's allegation of pre-suit payment for a mortgage does not rise to the standard of showing an unconditional transfer of the assignor's rights, since the payment did not ensure that the assignor would physically deliver the mortgage or execute a written assignment. And merely reciting in a post-suit assignment that there was an assignment before the suit was filed must fail as insufficient. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(b) requires a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The plaintiff, which seeks relief under a theory of equitable assignment, must plead those ultimate facts establishing the equitable assignment.); Bank of America, N.A. as Successor to Lassalle Bank NA as Trustee v. McKenna, 16 Fla. Law W eekly Supp. 833c (Fla. 6 th Jud. Cir. July 13, 2009)(to similar effect); Credit Based Asset Servicing and Securitization, 16 Fla. L. W eekly Supp. 1147a (Aug. 19, 2009 Fla. 14th Jud. Cir. 2009)(Merely filing or asserting an existence of a post-suit assignment before the suit was filed must fail as insufficient. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(b) requires a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A plaintiff, who seeks relief under a theory of equitable assignment, must plead those ultimate facts establishing the equitable assignment.) citing W M Specialty Mortgage v. Salomon, 874 So.2d 680 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); The Bank of New York Mellon as Successor by Merger to the Bank of New York as Trustee v. Barnich, 17 Fla. L. W eekly Supp. 100a (Fla. 6 th Jud. Cir. December 2, 2009)(There exists no allegations of ultimate fact in Plaintiff's complaint showing or establishing elements of an equitable assignment of the mortgage to it before the filing of the complaint.); Suntrust Mortgage, Inc. v. Fullerton, 16 Fla. L. W eekly Supp. 1146b (Fla. 6th Jud. Cir. Oct. 28, 2009)(There exists no allegations of ultimate fact in Plaintiff's complaint showing or establishing elements of an equitable assignment of the mortgage to it before the filing of the complaint.).
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of the State of Florida; whether Plaintiff is or has been registered to do business in the State of Florida or whether Plaintiff has posted a bond as required by Section 57.011, Florida Statutes, in order to prosecute the instant case. 20. Pleadings must be pled with sufficient particularity for a defense to be prepared. By failing to assert basic allegations of residency, Defendants are prejudiced in their ability to determine whether to raise various defenses, including a defense based upon the Plaintiffs failure to post a cost bond pursuant to Section 57.011. Failure to Verify Complaint 21. Plaintiffs Complaint is not verified.

22. Plaintiff has failed to conform to the newly instituted Florida Rules of Civil Procedure concerning foreclosure complaints. 23. The Florida Supreme Court has recently adopted a new Florida Rule of Civil Procedure for all mortgage foreclosure complaints involving residential real property some of which became effective immediately with the publication of the opinion. The new Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(b) requires the utilization of verified complaints and became effective on February 11, 2010. See Fla. Sup. Ct. Order SC09-1460 and SC09-1579. 24. Rule 1.110(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically provides: When filing an action for foreclosure of a mortgage on residential real property the complaint shall be verified. When verification of a document is required, the document filed shall include an oath, affirmation, or the following statement: Under penalty of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing, and the facts alleged therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 25. stating: The primary purposes of this amendment are (1) to provide incentive for the plaintiff to appropriately investigate and verify its ownership of the note or right to enforce the note and ensure that the allegations in the complaint are accurate; (2) to conserve judicial resources that are currently being wasted on inappropriately pleaded "lost note" counts and inconsistent allegations; (3) to prevent the wasting of judicial resources and harm to defendants resulting from suits brought by plaintiffs not entitled to enforce the note; and (4) to give trial courts greater authority to sanction plaintiffs who make false allegations. The Florida Supreme Court explained the reasoning for amending Rule 1.110(b),

See Fla. Sup. Ct. Order SC09-1460 and SC09-1579, p. 3-4 (emphasis added). 26. Plaintiff's Complaint was filed with the Court following the effective date of the Fla. Sup. Ct. Order SC09-1460 and SC09-1579. 27. As such, Plaintiff's Complaint should have been verified pursuant to the amended Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(b). 28. Failure to properly verify a complaint is properly attacked via a motion to strike. TRAWICKS FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE , Sec. 6:14 (Verification). Motion to Strike Claim for Reservation to Enter Deficiency Judgment 29. In the first paragraph of its Complaint, Plaintiff states that this is an action in rem. However, in its Wherefore clause, Plaintiff seeks the Court to retain jurisdiction to enter a money judgment against the Plaintiff, which is a remedy that exceeds in rem jurisdiction. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 30. Defendant has retained the undersigned to represent him in this action and have agreed to pay a reasonable fee for services, for which reimbursement is sought from Plaintiff. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been delivered by United States Mail to Alan J. Hardman, Esquire, Florida Default Law Group, P.L., P.O. Box 25018, Tampa, Florida, 33622, on this ____ day of November, 2010.