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Max A.

Freund

A Complete and Consistent Formal System for Sortals

Abstract. A formal logical system for sortal quanti ers, sortal identity and (second

order) quanti cation over sortal concepts is formulated. The absolute consistency of the system is proved. A completeness proof for the system is also constructed. This proof is relative to a concept of logical validity provided by a semantics, which assumes as its philosophical background an approach to sortals from a modern form of conceptualism.
Keywords : sortal logic, conceptualism, semantics for sortals.

Introduction
Within the framework of standard rst order predicate logic with identity, adjectives, common nouns and intransitive verbs are all represented as monadic predicates. Several authors has raised several objections to this approach and argued that sortal terms should be distinguished from other predicate terms. (See, for example, Geach (1980) and Strawson (1959)). The main characteristic which sets those two kinds of terms apart is that the former is constituted by linguistic expressions supplying criteria enabling us to distinguish and count objects that have not been previously individuated, while the criteria supplied by expressions belonging to the latter presuppose that the distinguished objects had been already individuated. Accordingly, common nouns (such as `man', `horse') would, in general, constitute sortals terms, but not adjectives and verbs (such as `white' and `run'). Based on the above distinction, further distinctions have been drawn between sortal and standard predication (e.g., between `is a man' and `is red'), sortal and absolute identity (e.g. between `x is the same man as y' and `x is identical to y') and, nally, sortal and absolute (classical) quanti cation (e.g., between `every man', `some man', and `every individual' and `some individual'). As a response to the above discussion and from a modern conceptualist philosophical framework, Nino Cocchiarella has introduced the notion of a sortal concept , by which he means an intersubjectively realizable cognitive capacity whose use in thought and communication is associated with certain identity criteria, i.e., criteria by which we are able to distinguish, count and classify objects. (See, for example Cocchiarella(1977), (1995) and (1998).)
Presented by Melvin Fitting Received February 5, 2000
Studia Logica 65 c Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
: 367{381, 2000. 2000

Cocchiarella has analysed sortal quanti cation in terms of what he calls referential concepts . stand for such referential concepts. the notion of identity relative to identity criteria provided by a sortal concept is developed. sortal concepts and predicable concepts are not the only ones which are formed in the above mentioned process.. intersubjectively realizable cognitive structures that enable us to refer to objects distinguished and classi ed by sortal concepts.. Logical notions are also developed in this process and at di erent stages. . where sortal quanti cation is found. `some horse' and `any horse'. in a process of di erent stages in which conceptual structures at a later stage are in general not explicitly de nable or reducible to those at the earlier they presuppose (as conceptually prior bases for their construction). i.e.. Moreover. In other words.g. `every individual' and `every object'. the notion of an object a being simpliciter the same as b (in symbols. Among the rst notions to be formed there is the concept of relative identity or identity relative to a sortal such as `a is the same horse as b': once sortal concepts are formed. given the formation of sortal concepts. Moreover. linguistic expressions such as `every man'. the construction of absolute identity pressuposes a prior construction of another two notions: sortal quanti cation and (second order) quanti cation over sortal concepts. a = b). in the words `everything'. Now. a = b) is constructed. Sortal as well as predicable concepts are formed. A. Accordingly.368 M. `every horse'. In other words.e.. the notion linguistically expressed. the earlier stages are not thrown out but rather retained as still important and useful parts of the overall conceptual framework. an important point in the present philosophical framework is that the notion of sortal quanti cation is supposed to be formed earlier than the notion of absolute quanti cation. then (where S is a sortal term such as `man') the notion that an object a is S the same S as b (in symbols. sortal quanti cation is considered to be conceptually more basic than absolute quanti cation. As in the case of absolute identity. i.e. i. at any given stage of conceptual development. e. Relative identity is considered to be formed earlier (in the process of conceptual development) than the notion of absolute or unrestricted identity. Now. Freund The above distinction between sortal and other predicate terms is explained by him in terms of that notion: sortal terms are the only expressions standing for sortal concepts other kinds of predicate expressions stand for predicable concepts. according to Cocchiarella's conceptualist framework. absolute quanti cation also presupposes construction of the notion of second order quanti cation over sortal concepts. the notion of relative identity is considered to be conceptually prior to the notion of absolute identity. In this way.

i.. where reference in this latter expression should be understood implicitly counter-factual). Concerning absolute quanti cation. A kind of absolute identity is constructed in these stages as the notion of identity with respect to some sortal or other. i.. but also to those which we can in principle construct. a stage is reached in which reference to sortal concepts is given. it is left open whether there is a level of concept formation in which the notion of absolute quanti cation as reference to all objects in general (i. the possibility that there is a more mature stage of conceptual development at which we come to refer in an absolute way that is independent of sortals (i. with respect to a cognitive capacity which can in principle be constructed and can provide identity criteria. after the notion of sortal quanti cation has been formed. a kind of this notion is formed in the above stages as reference to all objects of any sort (i. Accordingly.A Complete and Consistent : : : 369 In the process of conceptual development. reference to all objects that might fall under sortals which could in principle be formed).. According to this view. This can de nitionally be expressed as 9 ( x)' =df ( S )( xS )' where the symbols xS stands for sortal quanti cation with respect to the sortal S (and should be read as \for every S ") and the symbol S stands for universal (second order) quanti cation over sortal concepts which might in principle be constructed (and so should be read as \for every sortal concept ".e. In other words. to refer to things that might never be of any sort at all) is not precluded.e. this notion can be de nitionally introduced as follows S (x = y) =df ( S )(x = y) 9 where the symbol S stands for (second order) existential quanti cation over sortal concepts which might in principle be constructed.. reference to all objects irrespective of whether or not the objects fall or might fall under a sortal concept) has been constructed.e. sortal identity and second order quanti cation over sortal concepts have been developed. one rst learns to refer to things of the di erent sorts and then to refer to the sorts themselves.. I should note that the notion of second order reference to sortal concepts is understood to be implicitly counter-factual. Now. even though the notion presupposes the philosophically problematic view that things might exist for which there 8 8 8 8 8 . reference is not only to the sortal concepts already constructed. stages of conceptual development arise in which the concepts of absolute identity and quanti cation can be formed.e. Once the stages at which the notions of sortal quanti cation. in the present philosophical framework. on the other hand.e.

It is important to note that absolute quanti ers and absolute identity are not included in the aforementioned semantic systems and. in particular. A. It should also be noted that Leibniz's law is preserved under relative (sortal) identity in the semantic systems and so it agrees in this regard with the view.. S in symbo ls. i.g.e. consistent formal systems together with completeness proofs with respect to concepts of logical validity (provided by Cocchiarella's own system as well as by the particular semantic systems derivable from it) have not been :9 .(For a detailed discussion of the ideas in this and previous paragraphs see Cocchiarella (1997). a language having the classical propositional operators and no intensional operators in their logical syntax. in the above philosophical framework. I should add that a semantic clause for sortal predication is not included in the di erent systems because in Cocchiarella (1977.. e.(1995) and (1998). in the restriction to a fully extensional language. Finally. However. sortal quanti cation and (second order) quanti cation over sortal concepts has been formulated in Cocchiarella (1977) and constitutes a semantic system for a language containing (in its logical syntax) the past and future tense propositional temporal operators as well as the now operator.370 M. of Cocchiarella (1977) and Wiggins (1980) and is opposed to that one of Geach and Routley. the notions of sortal identity. moreover. In general. i. formation of the notions of absolute identity and absolute quanti cation is viewed as not having a development independent from the three above mentioned logical notions.e. Several semantic systems are clearly derivable from Cocchiarella's system by restricting it to languages with fewer propositional operators in their logical syntax and. 446) it has been de ned in terms of sortal predication and sortal identity. in particular. S (x = x) is consistent in the restricted semantic system. p. in this latter restriction the system allows that an object (in the sense of a value of a free individual variable) may not be identi able by any sortal concept at all. The same applies to the concept of absolute identity between objects in general. This is to be in accord with the above mentioned position of not precluding the possibility that at a stage of concept formation we might come to refer in an absolute way independent of sortals.) Therefore. to a fully extensional language.. Now. Freund will never be identity criteria . they constitute the basis for the construction of a certain kind of these two latter concepts. A set-theoretic semantics for sortal identity. These notions are considered to be conceptually prior to (and more basic than) absolute quanti cation and absolute identity and. sortal quanti cation and second order quanti cation over sortal concepts appear as primitive (and basic) logical notions constructed in a process of di erentstages of conceptual development.

if such a w exists. I shall make use of lower case greek letters '. I shall say that is free for in '. I shall assume denumerably many individual variables. : ! 8 _ $ : ! 8 8 8 8 8 8 . an individual variable and a sortal term variable. If and are variables of the same type. respectively. : : : . In this article. In a given context.A Complete and Consistent : : : 371 constructed. I shall focus on the above mentioned restriction of Cocchiarella's original semantic system to a fully extensional language. (. =. `y' and `z ' with or without numerical subscripts to refer (in the metalanguage) to individual variables and upper case letters in italics (such as `S ' and `H ') to refer to sortal term variables. and otherwise ' is ' itself. are in the set and where x and S are. the atomic w S (a = b) should be read as \a is the same S as b". the expressions xS and S formally represents. I shall formulate an axiomatic formal system. to refer to predicate variables and upper case greek letters . prove its consistency as well as its soundness and completeness with respect to this restriction. respectively. (' ). respectively. Syntax and semantics The set of primitive logical symbols will consist of the symbols . xS' and S' are in the set whenever '. As stated in the introduction. I shall usually drop the use of parentheses whenever there is no danger of ambiguity. Having speci ed the syntax. xn are individual variables. disjunction and material equivalence will be represented by the symbols `&'. I shall use `x'. 1. . . As noted above. where S is a sortal term variable. Hereafter. and de ned in the usual way. for each positive integern. where a and b are individual variables and S is a sortal term variable or of the form x1 :::xn . sortal quanti cation with respect to S and universal quanti cation over sortal concepts. and to refer to sets of w s. . . this system has as its philosophical background the assumptions already outlined in the introduction. Accordingly. then by ' is meant the w that results by replacing each free occurrence of by a free occurrence of . S Atomic w s are expressions either of the form of a relative identity (a = b). The set of w s is the smallest set containing the atomic w s and such that '. where is an n-place predicate variable and x1 . nplace predicate variables. I now proceed to describe the semantic system for sortals. the expression xS should be read as \for every S " and S as \for every sortal concept ". and to refer to w s. sortal term variables and. if ' is not ' unless is . for any given sortal term variable S . ). The classical propositional operators of conjunction. The concepts of a bound and free occurrence of a variable are understood in the usual way. As stated in the introduction. ` ' and ` '.

for each individual variable x. empty or otherwise and (2) S P(D ) (where `P(D )' stands for the power set of D ). I shall de ne the truth-value of ' in A (in symbols. h i 2 2 2 hh i i h i hh i i hh i i 2 h i 2 : ! : 8 8 2 2 2 . Clause 2 set-theoretically represents predication with respect to predicable concepts. where a is either an individual or a sortal term variable. (2) A (H ) S . and a set . Val( ' A) = 1 i Val(' A) = 0 4. Val( x1 :::xn A) = 1 i A (x1 ) : : : A (xn ) A ( ) 3. By A(d=a) I shall understand the ordered pair D S A (d=a) . there is no need for a semantic clause corresponding to predication with respect to sortals because it can be de ned in terms of sortal quanti cation and sortal identity. Val( xH' A) = 1 i for every d A (H ). A ( ) P(D n ). Obviously. Let A be a C-model D S A . for short) I shall mean an ordered pair A = D S A . Val(' A)) as follows: S 1. Val(x = y A) = 1 i A (x) = A (y) and A (y) A (S ) 2. As the reader might have noticed. A. Val(' A) = 1 i either Val( ' A) = 1 or Val( A) = 1 5. for short). As already remarked in the introduction. Val(' A(d=x)) = 1. clause 1 set-theoretically expresses the notion of sortal identity. in a given assignment sortal terms variables would stand for (set-theoretically representations of) sortal concepts. . where A is an assignment in the C-frame D S . and (3) for each positive integer n and n-place predicate variable . in any C-model the set S set-theoretically represents the set of sortal concepts which have been and might in principle be constructed with respect to the domain D (in a certain process of conceptual development). By an assignment (of values to variables) in a C-frame D S I shall understand a function A with the set of variables (of all types) as domain and such that (1) A (x) D . for each sortal term variable H . Then.372 h i M. Val(' A(d=H ) = 1 6. a w ' is said to be C-valid if and only if Val(' A) = 1 for any C-model A. for every ' . as a structure D S such that (1) D is a domain of discourse. Val( H' A) = 1 i for every d S . Clause 5 above would set-theoretically capture the concept of (second order) quanti cation over sortal concepts. is C-satis able if and only if there is a C-model B such that Val(' B) = 1. By a Cocchiarellan sortal model (C -model . Finally. Freund I shall rst de ne a restricted Cocchiarellan sortal frame (C-frame. clause 6 would express universal quanti cation over all the objects falling under the sortal concept a given sortal term variable stands for. relative to one of such assignments. In this way. where A (d=a) is like A except for assigning d to a.

where ' is obtained from ' by replacing one or more free occurrences of x by free occurrences of y. ! Definitions 9yS' =df :8y :' 9S' =df :8S :' The notion of a theorem (relative to SQ) will be de ned in the customary way as follows: a w ' is a theorem of SQ (in symbols. ` Convention. n such that every member of the sequence is either an axiom of SQ or follows from previous members of the sequence by one the rules of SQ and ' is n . . : : : . provided y does not occur free in ' ' S'. a proof requiring reasoning in accordance with classical propositional logic will be denoted by PL. 8 9 ! 8 ! 8 ! 9 8 ! ! 8 8 ! ! 8 8 ! 8 ! ! ! 8 ! $ 8 8 Rules: UG from ' infer yS' UG(s) from ' infer S' MP from ' and ' infer . I will now show that several principles instrumental in the completeness proof for SQ (with respect to C-validity) are theorems of the system.A Complete and Consistent : : : 373 2. where y is a variable other than x ( S' ' H ). System SQ I shall now formulate an axiomatic system (which I shall call SQ) and prove its absolute consistenty. provided S does not occur free in ' S S x=x yS (y = x). In the next section. Axioms A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 LL All tautologies S xS yS (y = x) ' yS'. From now on. SQ ') if and only if there is nite sequence of w s 1 . I will show that SQ is complete with respect to C-validity. provided H is free for S in ' S S S x=y x=x xS (' ) xS' xS ) S (' ) ( S' S ) S x = y (' ' ). The existential quanti ers are de ned as usual.

PL. A1. PL. A8. A2) H . UG. Recursively de ne the function t as that function whose domain is the set of w s such that: S t(x = y) = (x = y) t( x1 :::xn ) = x1 :::xn t( xS') = x(t(')) t( S') = S (t(')) t( ') = t(') t (' ) = t(') t( ) where S is the rst monadic predicate variable new to '. PL) S S T4 x = y ! 9zS (z = x) (by A6. PL) S S S T5 (9S (x = y )& 9S (y = z )) ! 9S (x = z ) (by LL. PL. UG(s). Proof. PL) S S T7 9S (x = y) ! 9S 9zS (z = y) (by T4. A8. A3) S H S T11 9zS (y = z ) ! (9H (x = y) ! (x = y)) (by LL. A6. SQ is relatively consistent to standard second order logic. de nition) S S T9 9yS (x = y) ! x = x (by A6. provided z is free for y in ' and does not occur T1 8yS' $ 8zS' y free in ' (by UG. PL. provided y is a variable other than x free for x in ' (By LL. A5. A2. 8 8 8 8 : : ! ! . UG(s). Freund Theorems S y T0 9xS (x = y) ! (8xS' ! ' x ). Now. PL) S H S T8 x = y ! (9H (x = y) & 9zS (z = y)) (by T4.374 M. T9. A. as the proof to the following metatheorem shows. T2) S S T6 9zS (y = z ) ! 9S (9zS (y = z )) (by A5. A8. provided H is free for S in ' and does not occur T2 8S' $ 8H' S free in ' (by UG(s). A4. T0. A5. A3) It can be easily shown (by induction on theorems) that SQ is sound with respect to C-validity. then ' is C-valid. SQ is relatively consistent to standard second order logic. if ' is a theorem of SQ. de nition) S S T10 :9S (x = x) ! 8S (:9yS (y = x)) (by T9. PL. UG(s). Metatheorem I. A3. UG) z . A5. (Soundness Theorem) For every w '. UG(s). Metatheorem II. A7. A3) S S T3 x = y ! y = x (by LL.

then '( ) ] = '. Consequently. SQ is consistent if standard second order logic is consistent. ( ) If ' is of the form . If ' is of the form . Completeness theorem for SQ I shall now construct the completeness proof for SQ. in Cocchiarella (1986. then t( ). . That is.A Complete and Consistent : : : 375 Clearly. . Let . and (ii) if 9S' 2 . 3. . Corollary. then '( ) ] = ( ) ]. UG(s) and UG rules preserve theoremhood under the translation function t. SQ is absolutely consistent. Also. The set . 182)). . be a set a w s. If ' is of the form zS . (9xS (x = y) & ' x ) 2 . either ' 2 . is SQ consistent and for every w '. Let ' be a w and an individual or sortal term variable. the MP. Definition 3. I must rst state the following de nitions: Definition 1. if t(') and t(' ! ) are theorems of second order logic. SQ is absolutely consistent. then : : ! ! '( ) 8 < ]=: 8 zS 8kS 8 ( ) ( ) ] if z it not ] k if z is and k is the rst individual variable new to ( ) ] and '. for every w '. As shown in Church (1958). . However. t(') is a well formed formula of standard second order logic. t(') is a theorem of standard second order logic. both (i) if 9xS' 2 . is a SQ-maximally consistent set of w s of SQ if and only if . is !-complete if and only if for every w '. standard second order logic is absolutely consistent. Consequently. S Definition 2. before doing so. or :' 2 . t(8xS') and t(8S') are theorems of standard second order logic as well. I shall de ne the expression ` '( ) ]'. then '( ) ] = ( ) ] ]. p. given Metatheorem II. Therefore. then for some variable y other that S y x free for x in '. then there is a sortal term T free for S in ' such that ' T 2 . which intuitively should be understood as the result of rewritting all bound occurrences of by variables new to ' of the same type as . . if ' is a theorem of SQ. By recursion. The reader can easily verify that t(') is a theorem of standard second order logic (as described for example. whenever ' is an axiom of SQ. If ' is an atomic w .

Then. For any w '. Freund If ' is of the form S . Let C = fn 2 ! j for any w ' and C-model A = hD L A i if ' is of complexity n and y is an individual variable free for x in '. ) are fairly simple. Note 1. then y is free for x in . such that ( 1 & & n ) ' is a theorem of SQ. Val( zS A(A (y)=x)) = 1 if and only if for any d A (S ). (in symbols. t 2 C . For any individual variable x. Val( zS A(A (y)=x)) = 1 if and only if Val( zS x A) = 1. n . So let n 2 !.376 8 M. Val( x A(d=z )) = 1. Definition 4. Lemma 1 can be proved using T1 and Lemma 2 using T2. then Val(' A(A (y)=x)) = 1 if and only y if Val(' x A) = 1. If x is free for y in . y y x. 8 8 2 2 2 2 8 8 Proof. for Lemma 3. then x (x) ] is (x) ] x and so by Lemma 1. 377{380. then y Val(' A(A (y)=x)) = 1 if and only if Val(' x A) = 1g. Lemma 1. So suppose ' is zS . A(d=z ) is a C-model and is of complexity less than n. S ]S H $ S H. A. On the other hand. only the cases where ' is either 8zS or 8S . Val( A(A (y)=xd=z )) = 1. For any sortal term variable S . if A = hD L A i is a C-model and y is an individual variable free for x in '. then `SQ ( ) some w will be shown. (x) x ]y SQ y 8 8 ` 2 ! ` $ ` $ ` $ Note 2. SQ (x) ] . Since cases where ' is either an atomic w or of the form : or ! (for w s . for any d A (S ). since y is free for x in '. Clearly. ' is a SQ-theorem of . S (S ) H ] is ( ) S ]S H and so by Lemma 2. then 8 () < S ] if S it not if S is and H is the rst '( ) ] = : H ( ) ] H sortal variable new to ( ) ] and '. by de nition. . for any d A (S ). for some w . : : : . Lemma 2. SQ ') if and only if there are w s 1 . x and y individual variables and suppose that ' is a w of complexity n in which y is free for x in '. A = hD L A i is a C-model and assume that for every t < n. Val( y A(A (y)=x)d=z ) = 1 if and only if for any d A (S ). by the inductive hypothesis. By strong induction it will be shown that ! C . y Therefore. By induction on the complexity of . . SQ (S ) ] . If S is free for H in . I shall now state several lemmas indispensable in the completeness proof on pp. Then.

is and that the replacement set for . if A = D L A is a C-model and H is a sortal term variable free for S in '. . it can be shown that for every n !. is consistent if . : : : . Now. Assume that . then Val(' A(A (H )=S )) = 1 if and only if Val(' H A) = 1. 1 if and only if Val( S x 2 2 2 8 8 The proof for the following Lemma proceeds in a way analogous to the proof for the previous one. yn .n+1 = . Val( S A(A (y)=x)) = y A) = 1. De ne a chain of sets . : : : be an enumeration of the w s of the form yS' or S'. for every d L .n yS' ( yS (y = x) & ' x ) y where x is the rst individual variable new to . n . : : : . for every d L . (Completeness Theorem for SQ) If . Hn. .n is consistent: by assumption. If n is of the form yS'. Val( A(A (y)=x)d=S ) = 1 if and only y if for every d L . Then. n ). Lemma 4. : : : . (Otherwise for each k ! replace the k-th individual variable and the k-th sortal term variable in all the w s in . : : : as follows. .0 = . S Given the above lemmas and de nitions. is consistent.n n ). If n is of the form S'.0 . for some w . Assume the hypothesis of the theorem.n+1 = . by the inductive hypothesis. since y is free for x in '.n is consistent and also h i 2 9 9 9 f9 ! 9 g f g 9 f9 ! g f g 2 . It can then be easily shown that . suppose there are denumerably many individual variables y0 . By weak induction. is C-satis able.0 is consistent. : : : . the completeness of SQ can now be shown. A(d=S ) is a Cmodel. and is of complexity less than n. then y is free for x in . . : : : which do not occur in . Metatheorem III. is satis able if and only if the replacement set for . Proof. Then. by the 2k-th individual and sortal term variable. by de nition. is SQ-consistent. . Therefore.n S' ' H S where H is the rst sortal term variable new to . then .) Let 0 . . Val( S A(A (y)=x)) = 1 if and only if for every d L . respectively.n. S . Val( x A(d=S )) = 1. Val( A(A (y)=xd=S )) = 1. Without loss of generality.A Complete and Consistent : : : 8 8 2 377 Suppose now ' is S . : : : and denumerably many sortal term variables H0 . Also. For any w '.

n yS'. . Note that by construction is !-complete. 2. If :9S (x = x) 2 . Given that x does not y S x ) (by U.. First suppose that . extend . and so x = x.n . = is symmetric. to a maximally consistent set . then S by T10 and PL. Then. then by PL.G. Suppose now that that . PL. By Lindenbaum's method. A8.. for every individS ual variable x and z : Assume x = z . Freund f9 ! that . then S S S by T5. for every individual variable x. yS (y = x) & ' y and ( yS (y = x) & ' y n ( yS' S . y S by PL.n+1 = . . A2. S Then by PL. 1. i. S S 8S (:9yS (y = z ) & :9yS (y = x)) 2 and so z = x. Consequently. x = x for every individual variable x: Since S S is maximally consistent. UG(s) and A8. . UG(s). If 9S (x = z ) 2 .n S' and . S S If 9S (x = x) 2 .378 9 g ` 9 ! 9 M. de nitions and A8) 9S (z = x) 2 and so z = x. Then. from .e. i. if x = z .n+1 = . But then by PL. If S S 8S (:9yS (y = x) & :9yS (y = z )) 2 .. which is impossible because . A7. T1 occur in . A3 T2 and de nition) it follows that . PL.n S' ' H .n 'H=S (by UG(s).. is consistent.e.e. If 9S (x = z ) 2 and 9S (z = w) 2 . then x = w. for some w . by PL 9S (x = x) 2 or :9x(x = x) 2 . either 9S (x = z ) 2 or S S S 8S (:9yS (y = x) & :9yS (y = z )) 2 . four possiS S bilities should be considered. then by de nition x = x. S S 8S (:9yS (y = x) & :9yS (y = x)) 2 . 9S (x = w) 2 .n+1 is not consistent.n S'.n ( yS' ( yS (y = x) & ' x )) . both either S S S S 9S (x = z ) 2 or 8S (:9yS (y = x) & :9yS (y = z )) 2 and either 9S (z = S S w) 2 or 8S (:9yS (y = z ) & :9yS (y = w)) 2 . From . A8.n yS' and . UG(s). Then.n . = is transitive. Clearly. = is re exive. = is an equivalence relation in the set of individual variables. De ne a relation among the set of individual variables as follows: ! ` 9 ! 9 ! : ` 9 ` 9 ! : ` 9 ! : ` :9 f9 ! g ` 9 ` : ` : ` :9 x=z i S either S (x = z ) or S S S ( yS (y = x) & yS (y = z )) 9 2 8 :9 :9 2 : Lemma 5.n yS' S S x) x ) . S Set .n is consistent by assumption.n ( yS (y = x) ' x ). then (by S T3.n ( yS (y = x) 'y and de nition) it follows that . w and z : Assume x = z and z = w. = n2! . Proof. Accordingly. by above . A. then z = x. Assume now 9S (x = z ) 2 and 8S (:9yS (y = z ) . A1. 8S (:9yS (y = x)) 2 . which is impossible by assumption. if x = z and z = w. 3. i.n 'H=S .

then by PL. Let A be the function whose domain is the set of variables such that A (x) = x].A Complete and Consistent : : : :9 2 9 2 379 8 :9 S S & yS (y = w)) .) S Let I = { ! for every w '. A8 and de nition) it follows that S S yS (y = z ) . S 1. So suppose k !. then Val(' A) = 1 i ' . Therefore. for some individual variable y other than x . Now. (Where A is the above de ned C-model. There are six cases to consider. S ( yS (y = x) & yS (y = w)) . PL and the consistency of . x = w. A is a C-model. SimiS S lar reasoning applies when both S ( yS (y = x) & yS (y = z )) and S S (z = w ) . S ( zS (z = x) & zS (z = y)) . S S S S If S ( yS (y = x) & yS (y = z )) and S ( yS (y = z ) & yS (y = S S w)) . UG(s). the second and third possibilities are impossible. 2 Let x] be the equivalence class of x determined by = in the set of individual variables. if zS (z = y) .) Statement 2. Therefore. Now. Val(' A(CH =S )) = 1 if and only if V al( '(H ) ] H A) = 1. Clearly. Set D = x] x is an individual variable for every H sortal term variable H . S S S So if zS (z = y) and either S (x = y) or S ( zS (z = x) S S S & zS (z = y)) . D = x1 ] : : : xn ] (x1 :::xn ) and L = CH H is a sortal term variable . Let A = D L A . from S (x = z ) (by T7 and PL) it folS S lows that S yS (y = z ) . i I . from S ( yS (y = z ) S & yS (y = w)) (by PL. which is impossible because is consistent. Before continuing with the completeness proof. ' is of the form x = y: Val(' A) = 1 if and only if (by de nition) A (x) = A (y) and A (y) A (S ) if and only if (by de nition) x] = y] and S S y] CS if and only if (by de nition) zS (z = y) and either S (x = y) S S S or S ( zS (z = x) & zS (z = y)) . A ( ) = D and A (H ) = CH . UG(s) and A8. if ' is of complexity {. For any sortal term variable H . rst note that the following statements concerning A follow from Lemmas 1{4 and the Soundness Metatheorem for SQ: 9 9 2 :9 9 2 :9 2 8 :9 :9 2 9 2 8 :9 :9 2 8 :9 :9 2 8 :9 :9 2 f j g f 2 j 9 2 g fh i j 2 g f j g h i Statement 1. then S S by A5. then zS (z = y) and S (x = y) and f 2 j 2 g 2 2 2 2 9 2 9 2 8 :9 :9 2 9 2 8 :9 :9 8 62 9 2 9 2 :9 :9 2 9 2 9 2 . For any w ' and for any individual variables y and x. On the other hand. CH = x] D yH (y = x) . Val(' A( x]=y)) = 1 if and only if Val( '(x) ] x A) = 1. I will show by strong induction that ! I . (Where A is the y above de ned C-model. ' is a w of complexity k and for every i < k.

if x] A (S ). maximality and consistency of ) . by above. then Val( (x) ] x A) = 1 if and only if (by de nition) for every individual y S variable x. ' is of the form S : Val(' A) = 1 if and only if(by de nition) for every CH L . Val( (H ) ] H A) = 1 if and only (by the S inductive hypothesis) for every sortal term variable H . if x] A (S ). . Freund S S therefore by T11 x = y . (H ) ] H if and S only if and only if (by Lemma 2. Lemma 1. if zS (z = x) (for some variable z other that x). 2. . !-completeness. Val( A(d=y)) = 1 if and only if (by de nitions) for every individual variable x. A5 and T2) S . !-completeness. then (x) ] x if and only if (by T0. ' is of the form : Val(' A) = 1 if and only if Val( A) = 0 if and only if (by the inductive hypothesis) if and only if (by maximality and consistency of ) . if x = y . ' is of the form x1 :::xn : Val(' A) = 1 if and only if (by de nition) A (x1) : : : A (xn) A ( ) if and only if (by de nition) x1 ] : : : xn ] D if and only if (by de nition) x1 :::xn . 5. UG. UG. then Val( A( x]=y)) = 1 if and only if (by Statement1) for every individual variable x. for every . then (x) x Val( ] y A) = 1 if and only if (by the inductive hypothesis) for every S individual variable x. h i 2 h i 2 2 : 62 : 2 ! 62 2 : 2 2 ! 2 8 2 2 2 9 2 9 2 2 8 2 8 2 2 8 2 2 2 Acknowledgments. . 4. Note 2 inmediately following Lemmas 1{2. Since by construction. which proves the metatheorem. y Note 1 inmediately following Lemmas 1{2 and T1) yS . Val( A(CH =S )) = 1 if and only if (by Statement 2) if for every sortal term variable H . On the other hand. A.380 2 2 9 2 9 2 M. . for every w '. Therefore. if zS (z = x) (for some variable z other that x). then Val(' A) = 1. I am grateful to the referees for their comments and suggestions. then by T8. S S zS (z = y) and S (x = y) . 3. Val(' A) = 1 if and only if ' . ' is of the form : Val(' A) = 1 if and only if (by de nition) either Val( A) = 0 or Val( A) = 1 if and only if (by the inductive hypothesis) or if and only if (by maximality and consistency of ) or if and only if (by PL. 6. ' is of the form yS : Val(' A) = 1 if and only if (by de nition) for every d A (S ).

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