Energy and Resources Group Master’s Project

Mark Stout 5/25/1997

Comparative Power Analysis of the California Electric Utility Industry Deregulation Process

“The Electric utility is changing. But unlike the evolution of species, conscious collective choice can influence the evolutionary drift of the industry.” Rodney E. Stevenson and David W. Penn (1995)

Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................ 4 OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................................................. 5 HISTORY OF ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY REGULATION................................................................. 8 THE BIRTH OF STATE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS................................................................................................ 8 FEDERAL POWER ACT OF 1935................................................................................................................................. 9 PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935................................................................................................... 9 PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY POLICIES ACT OF 1978 ............................................................................................ 10 ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 1992 ............................................................................................................................... 10 CPUC “BLUE BOOK” PROPOSAL............................................................................................................................ 12 FERC MEGANOPR .............................................................................................................................................. 13 CPUC MAY 1995 DRAFT PROPOSALS AND STAKEHOLDER RESPONSES .................................................................... 14 CPUC DECEMBER 1995 DECISION AND CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 1890............................................................. 17 RECENT STATE AND FEDERAL ACTIVITY ................................................................................................................ 20 FACTORS BEHIND THE DRIVE FOR DEREGULATION........................................................................... 21 LARGE CONSUMER PRESSURE ................................................................................................................................ 21 TECHNOLOGY ....................................................................................................................................................... 23 ECONOMIC RENT ................................................................................................................................................... 23 ACADEMICS & IDEOLOGUES .................................................................................................................................. 23 EXISTING COMPETITIVE FORCES ............................................................................................................................ 24 OTHER INDUSTRIES AND COUNTRIES ...................................................................................................................... 24 FEDERAL REGULATORY POLICY ............................................................................................................................. 24 STATE REGULATORY POLICY ................................................................................................................................. 26 ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................................................................... 27 SELECTION OF STAKEHOLDER GROUPS ................................................................................................................... 29 OVERVIEW OF WHAT THE STAKEHOLDERS WANTED AND WHAT THEY GOT ............................................................. 29 STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS CLUSTER ANALYSIS .................................................................................................... 36 OFFICEHOLDER STAFF INTERVIEWS ........................................................................................................................ 40 Officeholder Staff Comments on Who Got What They Wanted and Why:.......................................................... 41 Synthesis of Stakeholder & Staff Comments on Who Prevailed, and Why:........................................................ 43

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Officeholder Staff Comments on Who Got Rolled Over, and Why: ................................................................... 44 Synthesis of Stakeholder & Staff Comments on Who Got Rolled, and Why:...................................................... 46 RESTRUCTURING STAKEHOLDER CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION/GIFT ANALYSIS ........................................................... 52 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................... 60 BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................................................. 61 APPENDIX A: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS............................................................... 66 STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS ................................................................................................................................... 66 OFFICEHOLDER STAFF INTERVIEWS ........................................................................................................................ 66 APPENDIX B: STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS............................................................................................ 67 INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES ................................................................................................................. 67 Pacific Gas & Electric..................................................................................................................................... 67 San Diego Gas and Electric ............................................................................................................................ 70 Southern California Edison ............................................................................................................................. 74 MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITIES ............................................................................................................................ 76 California Municipal Utilities Association - Interview #1 ................................................................................ 76 California Municipal Utilities Association - Interview #2 ................................................................................ 79 Sacramento Municipal Utility District ............................................................................................................. 80 UTILITY LABOR UNIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 85 Coalition of California Utility Employees - Interview #1 ................................................................................. 85 Coalition of California Utility Employees - Interview #2 ................................................................................. 86 INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS .................................................................................................................................... 88 American Wind Energy Association................................................................................................................. 88 Independent Energy Producers........................................................................................................................ 92 LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS .......................................................................................................................... 96 Agricultural Energy Consumers Association.................................................................................................... 96 California Industrial Users.............................................................................................................................. 98 California Large Energy Consumers Association - Interview #1 .................................................................... 102 California Large Energy Consumers Association - Interview #2 .................................................................... 104 California Manufacturers Association ........................................................................................................... 107 SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS........................................................................................................................ 111 Latino Issues Forum ...................................................................................................................................... 111 The Utility Reform Network ........................................................................................................................... 114 ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES ............................................................................................................................ 119 Environmental Defense Fund ........................................................................................................................ 119 Natural Resources Defense Council - Interview #1 ........................................................................................ 122 Natural Resources Defense Council - Interview #2 ........................................................................................ 125 Sierra Club/Center for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technologies ........................................................ 127 Union of Concerned Scientists....................................................................................................................... 133 STATE INSTITUTIONS ........................................................................................................................................... 137 California Energy Commission...................................................................................................................... 137 University of California, California Institute for Energy Efficiency ............................................................... 141 ANONYMOUS STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ............................................................................................................. 144 Anonymous Comments #1: Parties who could have improved their performance ........................................... 144 Anonymous Comments #2: AB 1890 funding levels for Public Interest RD&D............................................... 144 APPENDIX C: OFFICEHOLDER STAFF INTERVIEWS ........................................................................... 146 California Public Utilities Commission ......................................................................................................... 146 Legislative Conference Committee, Office of Senator Steve Peace ................................................................ 148 Legislative Conference Committee, Office of Senator Byron Sher.................................................................. 152 Legislative Conference Committee, Office of Senator Bill Leonard ............................................................... 153

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Anonymous Officeholder Staff Interview #1 ................................................................................................... 155 Anonymous Officeholder Staff Interview #2 ................................................................................................... 156 APPENDIX D: CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEW DATA................................... 159 APPENDIX E: RESTRUCTURING STAKEHOLDER CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION/GIFT ANALYSIS DETAIL............................................................................................................................................................ 162 Table 1: Assemblymember Jim Brulte, 1995 Campaign Contributions........................................................... 162 Table 2: Assemblymember Jim Brulte, 1996 Campaign Contributions........................................................... 163 1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Assemblymember Jim Brulte ..................................................... 164 Table 3: Senator Steve Peace, 1995 Campaign Contributions ....................................................................... 164 Table 4: Senator Steve Peace, 1996 Campaign Contributions ....................................................................... 165 1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Senator Steve Peace.................................................................. 166 Table 5: Senator Byron Sher, 1995 Campaign Contributions......................................................................... 166 Table 6: Senator Byron Sher, 1996 Campaign Contributions......................................................................... 166 1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Senator Byron Sher................................................................... 170 Table 7: Senator Bill Leonard, 1995 Campaign Contributions ...................................................................... 170 Table 8: Senator Bill Leonard, 1996 Campaign Contributions ...................................................................... 171 1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Senator Bill Leonard................................................................. 171 Table 9: Assemblymember Mickey Conroy, 1995 Campaign Contributions.................................................... 172 Table 10: Assemblymember Mickey Conroy, 1996 Campaign Contributions.................................................. 173 1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Assemblymember Mickey Conroy.............................................. 173 Table 11: Assemblymember Diane Martinez, 1995 Campaign Contributions ................................................. 175 Table 12: Assemblymember Diane Martinez, 1996 Campaign Contributions ................................................. 176 Table 13: Assemblymember Steve Kuykendall, 1995 Campaign Contributions............................................... 177 1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Assemblymember Diane Martinez ............................................. 177 Table 14: Assemblymember Steve Kuykendall, 1996 Campaign Contributions............................................... 178 1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Assemblymember Steve Kuykendall........................................... 178 1994/1995 Stakeholder Gift Information for CPUC President Daniel Fessler................................................ 179 1994/1995 Stakeholder Gift Information for Commissioner Gregory Conlon ................................................. 181 1994/1995 Stakeholder Gift Information for Commissioner Jesse Knight, Jr. ................................................ 181 1994/1995 Stakeholder Gift Information for Commissioner Norm Shumway .................................................. 181 1994/1995 Stakeholder Gift Information for Commissioner Josiah Neeper .................................................... 181 1994/1995 Stakeholder Gift Information for Commissioner Henry Duque ..................................................... 181

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fossil fuel-based electricity generation is currently the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions and the largest source of air pollution in the U. there will probably be significant winners and losers as a result of this legislation. 1995 Electric Restructuring Decision. Governor Pete Wilson signed into law California Assembly Bill 1890 (AB 1890). which sets in motion a process of electric utility deregulation beginning in 1998. 1 2 CPUC RD&D Working Group. 1995 3 Flavin and Lenssen.Introduction On September 23.S. 1994 4 WWW page: http://www. This bill is an important milestone in an ongoing process towards electric utility deregulation in California. 1996. The vision of electric utility deregulation legislated in AB 1890 is significantly different from that contained in the California Public Utility Commission’s (CPUC) December. contrasting the results of CPUC process resulting in their December.4 Given the stakes involved with this industry. Various stakeholder groups. with varying success. which will be superseded to a great extent by the details of AB 1890. acid rain and climate change.3 According to the Environmental Defense Fund. 1995 Decision with the California legislative process resulting in AB 1890. representing a spectrum of private and public interests attempted to influence both the CPUC and legislative processes. This paper develops a comparison of which stakeholder groups got what they wanted. a product with well documented environmental impacts including local air pollution. and why.html ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 4 . California electric utilities have a combined annual revenue of roughly $23 billion dollars1.org/programs/Energy/green_power/a_better.edf. 1996 California Energy Commission. selling 250 billion kWh of electricity per year2.

Objectives
• Evaluate which stakeholder groups got what they wanted: Each stakeholder group influencing the process pursued policy outcomes that they felt were in their self-interest. This paper determines which groups had their requests granted, and which had their requests ignored, looking at both the language of AB 1890, as well as the CPUC December, 1995 decision. Groups that fared better in one arena than the other are highlighted. Determine why or why not a stakeholder group was successful in getting what they wanted out of each policy process: In many cases, interest groups were able to influence outcomes in the legislative and/or CPUC forums through well reasoned comment filings, direct lobbying, campaign contributions, as well as other avenues. This paper explores what mechanisms the different interest groups used to influence these policy outcomes, contrasting differences in techniques applied between the Legislature and CPUC, focusing on whether each decision making body or individual had particular avenues that were most effective.

Methodology
In order to answer the questions of which stakeholder groups got what they wanted and why, I based my research on an analysis of three categories of data: 1) background utility regulation literature, 2) semi-structured interviews with stakeholders as well as CPUC and legislative staff, and 3) archival analysis of CPUC filings, legislative language and videos, and state officeholder filings. Rather than approaching the data with a hypothesis to verify, I compare and cluster the data to allow patterns to flow out that can then generate theories. I compare the CPUC and legislative policy processes, determining similarities and differences in how each party fared in each forum, as well as why each party fared as they did. This data-driven approach to the generation of theory is based on the work of Glaser and Strauss, who contrast the use of data to

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generate grounded theory with the use of data to verify logico-deductive theory.5 Below I describe the use of each of these data types. Background literature on electric utility regulation is used to provide a historical context for California’s electric utility deregulation, which is presented in the next two sections of this report, History of Electric Utility Industry Regulation and Factors Behind the Drive for Deregulation. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 26 representatives of different stakeholder organizations. The semi-structured format allows flexibility in altering the flow of the interview, following up on interesting points as they arise. I selected an initial set of organizations to contact, trying to cover as wide a spectrum of stakeholder groups as possible, based on my experience representing a stakeholder organization on the issue of electric utility deregulation in the CPUC and legislative arenas. Most interviews were conducted in person, while several where over the phone. As I conducted interviews, subjects referred me to additional representatives to contact, both in their organizations as well as in others. An interview guide was used for

recording notes, which were typed up later. Questions were developed for the interview guide to determine for each organization what outcomes were sought, what outcomes were obtained in each of the policy decisions, and what methods and strategies were used to influence each policy decision. A list of questions for the semi-structured stakeholder interviews is included in

Appendix A. A full transcript of these interviews is included in Appendix B. These interview subjects are clustered into the following categories for analysis: investor-owned electric utilities, municipal electric utilities, utility labor unions, independent producers, large electricity consumers,

5

Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Glaser, 1978.

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small electricity consumers, environmental advocates, and state institutions. The organizations represented by each interview subject are listed, by category, in the Table of Contents for Appendix B. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with two staff of the CPUC and three staff of members of the legislative Conference Committee on Electric Industry Restructuring. An

interview guide was used, with questions developed to determine which stakeholder organizations were perceived by the staff as being most effective in influencing the respective policy outcome, and why; which stakeholder organizations were perceived as being able to set the terms of the debate, and why; as well as which stakeholder organizations were perceived as least effective in influencing that policy outcome, and why. A list of questions for the semi-structured officeholder staff interviews is included in Appendix A. A full transcript of these interviews is included in Appendix C. Finally, an archival analysis was performed on the CPUC formal filings, Fair Political Practices Commission records, Secretary of State Political Reform Division records, proposed and final legislative language, as well as legislative conference committee videos. The CPUC filings can be used to cross-check what each major interested party had originally requested from the process, tracking how that may change over time, as well as to determine policy outcomes from the CPUC. The California Fair Political Practices Commission archives an annual Statement of Economic Interest for each state office holder. The EIS forms for the CPUC Commissioners and Conference Committee members were examined to determine which organizations used trips, events, meals, and other gifts to gain access to decision makers. The California Secretary of State Political Reform Division keeps Officeholder, Candidate, and Controlled Committee Campaign Statements on file for each elected state officeholder and candidate. These Statements were ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 7

March. Cities would grant multiple franchises to electricity companies. 1997. History of Electric Utility Industry Regulation Before examining which stakeholder groups were able to influence the California electric utility deregulation process. Proposed AB 1890 language was examined to get a flavor for who was making proposals. they were not always viewed this way. 1997 report on Lobbying Expenditures and the Top 100 Lobbying Firms6 also gives a big-picture view of overall lobbying expenditures by stakeholders. as Davis explains: “Prior to World War I.. The result was not healthy competition keeping down the consumer’s bill.examined to track campaign contributions to the legislative Conference Committee members. a historical look at Federal and state electric utility regulation is in order. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 8 . and how much of it was getting incorporated into the final AB 1890 language. The Birth of State Public Utility Commissions Electric utilities have been considered natural monopolies over most of this century. most cities believed regulation was superfluous.. In the face of this trend local governments began to view 6 California Secretary of State. but many weak companies that were soon bought out by a strong one. cross-check interview impressions. The Division’s March. thus leading to a monopoly. Competition could keep prices down. due to decreasing marginal costs and the savings gained by avoiding redundant distribution networks. However. and experience the witty banter between Senators Steve Peace and Bill Leonard. The legislative Conference Committee videos were used to gain insights into the dynamics of this public hearing process.

8 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 In order to establish market power which would otherwise have been illegal under antitrust law. this act expanded the role of the Federal Power Commission to regulate wholesale electric transfers. large nonutility companies such as electric equipment contractors.7 Federal Power Act of 1935 The growing interconnection of local utilities in interstate grids. led to the passage of the Federal Power Act.” The early 1900s were marked by the rapid increase in electric utility regulation by state public utility commissions (PUCs) to address this natural monopoly character. A number of these holding companies owned. Beginning in 1907 with New York and Wisconsin. “Before passage of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA). State and Federal regulation of rates and securities failed to keep up with sophisticated holding company attempts to evade regulation. Hempling explains. 166-167. This being the case the best solution seemed to be regulation by public commission. electric utilities developed a pyramid scheme based on holding companies that was effective at obscuring market dominance.” This legislation sought to avoid market abuses by limiting the size and 7 Davis. Based on the Interstate Commerce Clause. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 9 .utilities as natural monopolies and hence inevitable. a small number of holding companies owned most utilities in the United States. with at least 20% of electricity crossing state lines in 1935. or were owned by. by 1922 47 states and the District of Columbia were regulating electric utilities.

Hempling. 11 Pechman. PURPA aimed to set standards for state PUC ratemaking that would promote energy savings and be partial to residential consumers over industrial consumers. PURPA was very significant in creating a market for non-traditional generators. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). recent successor to the FPC. 166-167. 343. 17. which is critical for wholesale competition. It also created new 8 9 Pechman.investment options of utilities so that each was confined in scope to an “integrated public-utility system. 16. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 10 .”910 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 Passed by Congress as part of President Carter’s National Energy Plan. It also opened the door for more widespread wholesale competition by requiring that regulated utilities purchase power from Independent Power Producers (IPPs) classified as Qualifying Facilities (QFs) at avoided cost. In capacity constrained systems. Qualifying Facilities were primarily cogeneration and small renewable energy electricity producers. this was the marginal cost associated with procuring new generation capacity. was charged with writing the rules required to implement this legislation.11 Energy Policy Act of 1992 EPAct continued the Federal trend. This legislation allowed FERC to order utilities to provide transmission access at non-discriminatory rates. started by PURPA. 10 Davis. towards more competition in electricity generation.

. which compares supply. Energy efficiency is often underinvested in due to the high transaction costs of decentralized customer decisions.”15 EPAct attempts to correct this supply-side/demand-side imbalance by encouraging state Public Utility Commissions to consider.12 While encouraging wholesale competition. One prominent utility regulator remarked on the situation that had developed in the 1980s: “In the current scheme of regulation. regulated utilities were discouraged from pursuing demand-side resources because of a profit structure that was directly linked to the amount of energy sold. Stevenson.. 14 Also. 14 Cavanagh.13 and the transient nature of short term building owners and renters.” 356-357.” 407. 356. Utilities lose money when customers engage in conservation... utilities make money in only one way--selling [units of energy].. These lead to what the National Association of Regulatory Commissioners calls the “payback gap”: substantially higher rate of return expectations for energy efficiency measures compared to supply-side investments... “Energy Efficiency Solutions. “1) implementing Integrated Resource Planning (IRP)..and demand-side options systematically when seeking least-cost energy 12 13 Stevenson.classes of IPPs including Exempt Wholesale Generators. “Global Warming and Least-Cost. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 11 . inadequate information available to customers. allowing larger generation plants to be exempt from traditional regulation.” 521. 15 Cavanagh. EPAct also aimed to level the playing field for supply-side and demand-side (energy efficiency) resource options. They likewise lose money when the encourage customers to engage in conservation. “Discretionary Evolution. “Social Goals. This money-losing proposition is not significantly improved by any of the conservation cost recovery or incentive mechanisms now in use.”.

A more definitive policy statement was 16 17 Haddad. industrial customers taking power at the transmission level eligible on January 1. the CPUC issued a staff proposal regarding electric utility deregulation known as the “Blue Book”. 2002. This utility restructuring involves the divestiture of utility electricity generation facilities into separate companies from the original utility which would still be responsible for transmission and perhaps distribution. with large.”16 CPUC “Blue Book” Proposal California’s Public Utility Commission is widely viewed as a trend-setter for state PUC electric utility regulation. all residential consumers eligible on January 1. and if successful. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 12 . customer class-staged schedule for direct access implementation. 6. 1999. 18 Mydans. and 3) rate changes to encourage efficiency and distribution of power.18 The proposed deregulated electricity market would allow individual customers to choose their electricity generation supplier using bilateral contracts in a system known as retail wheeling or direct access. Hoffman. 55. 1996. especially since the California regulators have been considered in the past to be one of the leading regulatory commissions and many states have followed their recommendations.17 A security analyst noted that the release of the Blue Book will: speed up the deregulation of the industry. sending “a shockwave through the electric industry”. 2) providing cost recovery for energy efficiency programs that are at least as profitable as supply side measures. all commercial customers eligible January 1. In April of 1994. The Blue Book laid out an aggressive.supplies. These generation companies would then compete with Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to provide power to a central electricity grid operator based on a combination of pool-based wholesale competition as well as direct contracts with individual customers.

“a vibrant market exists for energy efficiency services”. This process tempered the CPUC’s frenetic timetable. 21 CPUC. including private and public-interest organizations.22 FERC MegaNOPR In March of 1995. which requires the CPUC to engage in a series of public hearings.scheduled to be issued by the CPUC in August of 1994.21 This stakeholder response. 1995. 1994. FERC released a dual-issue Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The first issue addressed open access to the transmission system 19 20 CPUC. and documentation resulting in a report back to the Governor and Legislature by January 31. prompted the Assembly Committee on Utilities and Commerce and the Assembly Committee on Natural Resources to hold a joint oversight hearing on May 23.20 Many stakeholders. coupled with a lack of prior coordination with the state Legislature. which had been dubbed the MegaNOPR. numerous other states have also proposed electric utility deregulation. 1994. and asserted that. 1995. pushing back their goal for a policy decision until September of 1995. where CPUC President Fessler and Commissioner Knight testified on their proposal. Wagner. where customers voluntarily pay more to promote renewables. 1994. In their place. environmental organizations were frightened by the Commission’s decision to move away from the current IRP process and mechanism for decoupling utility profits from sales volumes. the CPUC proposed. evidentiary hearings. This led to the passage of Assembly Concurrent Resolution 143. Blue Book. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 13 .19 Since the release of the Blue Book proposal. 1. Status Report. Blue Book. were concerned about the content and timetable of this proposal. “alternative frameworks based on ‘let the market decide’”. such as “green pricing”. For instance.

A common price for all electricity in the state would then be set by the market clearing price based on the bids. favored by CPUC President Fessler and two other Commissioners. 24 CPUC PoolCo Proposal ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 14 . in May of 1995. Stranded costs are past investments rendered uneconomic (market value less than book value) by the competition brought about through deregulation. Although stranded costs due to wholesale competition would be much smaller then those posed by retail competition. which is usually considered state jurisdiction. is based on a common wholesale power pool. All power purchases would be made through the pool. Generators are scheduled into the pool based on time-based bids submitted to the ISO. The majority proposal known as PoolCo. forcing utilities to allow non-utility generators to use their transmission systems on a “comparable basis” at standard tariffs. some thought the MegaNOPR ruling may set a precedent for 100% stranded cost recovery at the retail level. Asmus and Smeloff. 1995. meaning the utilities could not discriminate against other electricity suppliers. Status Report. Retail contracts with a particular generator could be handled with separate “contracts for differences”. scheduled and dispatched by an independent system operator (ISO).for wholesale transactions. 1997. The MegaNOPR also granted utilities the ability to collect 100% of their stranded costs due to wholesale transactions. the California Commissioners released two draft proposals for pursuing rate deregulation in California.23 CPUC May 1995 Draft Proposals and Stakeholder Responses As a result of the Blue Book CPUC staff proposal.24 22 23 CPUC.

and low-income weatherization would be funded at 25 CPUC Direct Access Proposal ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 15 . California Manufacturers Association. although generators would submit projections to an independent system operator (OPCO).Commissioner Knight’s alternate proposal is based on direct access contracts between generators and customers. In structure.25 In response to the Commissioner proposals. as well as a central. 1995. including bilateral contracts for direct access customers. Southern California Edison Company (one of three regulated. who is responsible for maintaining transmission system reliability. and the actual generation scheduling and dispatch decisions would be made by a separate Independent System Operator based on transactions mediated by the PX as well as direct access contracts. and Independent Energy Producers. or through the creation of optional pools which could manage bids in a manner similar to the PoolCo proposal. Bids for generation into the pool would be processed by a Power Exchange (PX). met to iron out differences between them and draft their own industry restructuring proposal. low-income ratepayer assistance would be funded at an uncapped. funding levels for energy efficiency. California Large Energy Consumers Association. wholesale pool. The MOU also proposed a nonbypassable charge to fund public policy programs. it is a hybrid of the two proposals. investor owned utilities in California). renewables. the only IOU signing the MOU. know as the “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU). and R&D were not to exceed 3. as-needed basis. at the prompting of California Governor Pete Wilson. Full stranded cost recovery is agreed to for Edison. Prices would be determined either through bilateral contracts between direct access customers and generators. a group of seemingly influential special interests. Out of this surcharge. No central entity would schedule power generation.3% of total utility revenue requirements as of January 1.

As in the MOU. does not actually propose a specific electric utility industry structure. The Framework calls for less than 100% stranded cost recovery. a new mechanism is to be developed. including residential and small commercial consumers. with utility shareholders accepting some of the burden for past. in the spirit of the existing Electric Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (ERAM).1995 levels. 1995. To enhance energy efficiency efforts. 1995. 26 27 MOU Parties. a non-bypassable systems benefits charge is proposed. to decouple utility profits from sales volume. including NRDC. By combining this with effective Performance Based Ratemaking. Framework Parties. EDF. and at the level of attention given to the MOU. uneconomic investments. The Framework calls for equitable opportunities for small consumer participation in any move to allow direct access. (PBR).27 Outraged that they had been left out of the MOU negotiating process. A minimum level of renewables is proposed for each IOU supply portfolio to return the states resource diversity to 1993 levels. but spells out a set of public interest concerns that should be addressed by any industry restructuring including mitigation of market power. continuation of low income programs. UCS. as a response to the MOU.26 The CPUC held a full-panel hearing to focus on the details of the MOU in September of 1995. Utilities Consumer Action Network. The Framework. but with increased funding levels to restore energy efficiency and R&D spending at pre-Blue Book levels. and Towards Utility Rate Normalization (TURN) submitted a “Framework for Restructuring in the Public Interest” to the CPUC. and continued progress for energy efficiency and renewable resources. small customer equity. a coalition of public interest groups and renewable energy advocates. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 16 . should see short and long term rate reductions. the Framework demands that each individual utility customer.

1996 levels.expand renewables development above 1993 levels while commercializing new renewable energy technologies. nor a renewables purchase requirement level. For public purpose programs. so that input can be made to the Legislature. with several key implementation areas to be hammered out by stakeholder working groups. the Decision proposed a nonbypassable “public goods charge” (PGC). through a Competitive Transition Charge (CTC). The December Decision mirrored the market structure defined in the MOU. which should. as well as a “minimum renewables purchase requirement”. The Decision also called for the voluntary divestiture of 50% of fossil fuel generation plant owned by the two largest IOUs. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 17 . the CPUC released a policy decision on December 20. PG&E (Pacific Gas and Electric) and SCE. based on a wholesale Power Exchange. requesting input from stakeholder working groups. direct access contracts. Aside from funding levels for low-income rate discounts.28 CPUC December 1995 Decision and California Assembly Bill 1890 Building on their previous proposals and stakeholder input. 1995 which laid out a more defined vision of a deregulated ut ility environment. The Decision called for 100% stranded cost recovery by IOUs over a five year period. 1995. A legislative conference 28 Framework Parties. and an Independent System Operator centrally controlling California’s transmission system. while the state Legislature took up the issue of electric utility deregulation on their own terms. with financial incentives tied to the level of divestiture. bilateral.29 The spring and summer of 1996 saw a flurry of deregulation activity as PUC working groups fleshed out options for moving towards the PUC vision. and allow for uncapped low-income programs. coupled with an IOU rate cap at January 1. the Decision does not define any public program funding levels. “be based on need”.

December. 33 CPUC press release. other market participants. omnibus legislation which preempts much of the PUC vision31. arguing that it should not be used as a national model for protection of residential and small commercial consumer interests. 1996 Roadmap CPUC press release. While the pace of the PUC process was tempered so that their final policy decision could better reflect stakeholder interests. cutting deals with the stakeholders that would be required to “deliver the votes” within the committee."33 However. Pete Wilson signed AB 1890 on September 2330. and especially residential and small commercial California ratepayers. but some have argued that the environmental organizations are not effectively representing the interests of their constituencies32. since it was perceived as a best effort compromise between the two main political parties. 1996 34 TURN press release. neither process involved substantial public education or participation.34 There is concern that 29 30 CPUC. compared to the reckless pace of the legislative wrangling. and confidential correspondence with stakeholder representative. small consumer group. TURN. a prominent. 1996 31 Rader. California Public Utilities Commission President Conlon praised members of the legislative conference committee: "It is through their tireless efforts that this legislation was crafted to provide balance of interests between utilities. Several public interest organizations served as advocates for small consumer and environmental protection. 1997.committee on deregulation worked at breakneck speed. 1995 Decision. As the PUC stakeholder working group process drew to an end. 1996 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 18 . the final product of this bipartisan conference committee handily passed on the Senate and Assembly floors with minimal debate. Even given the large economic and environmental stakes. 1996 32 Weisman. has criticized AB 1890.

substantial market power exists among California electric utilities35. From some perspectives. which may lead to higher electricity rates for small consumers purchasing out of a centralized Power Exchange envisioned by both the CPUC Decision and AB 1890 . to ensure the maintenance and growth of this renewables base37. including renewable energy and energy efficiency. 1996. AB 1890 author Jim Brulte. as well as the loss of a strong policy mechanism. An argument can be made that the final legislation will result in lower funding for public purpose programs. than would have occurred under the CPUC’s December 1995 vision.”38 Some public interest advocates would argue that moving ahead with the deregulation process. with a mix of shortcomings and unexpected benefits in the legislation. Large industrial customers are also likely to benefit disproportionately because of their ability to take advantage of contracts made directly with low cost electricity generators. 1996 37 Rader. said that the Legislature was going to. “roll over renewables” and “roll over enviros. indicate that electric utility shareholders faired better in the negotiations than small consumers 36. endorsed in the CPUC Decision. 1996 38 Asmus. is in the public interest since it moves California utilities away from the “paralysis and backsliding on our 35 36 Borenstein. 1995 Rader. this is difficult to say. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 19 . renewable energy concerns faired poorly in AB 1890. along with a guaranteed 100% cost recovery for uneconomic utility assets. AB 1890’s questionable protection against utility market power. Such an outcome was not unforseeable. but due to the Decision’s lack of clarity about support levels. with uncertain funding allocations that may not be able to support the existing base of California renewable energy generators. in a speech before the California Manufacturers Association. Weeks before the passage of AB 1890.

and 15% consumer-side incentives. 1996 CEC. including a prominent one authored by Representative Dan Schaefer (R-CO). 1997. 30% new technologies.environment/equity agenda” which had gripped the industry since the release of the Blue Book in 1994.40 On May 6. In March of 1997. “Primed for Congressional Battle” ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 20 .41 There are currently several electric utility restructuring bills in Congress. The overall levels are: 45 % existing technologies. chair of the House Energy and Power Subcommittee. “If the bill had failed.”39 Recent State and Federal Activity Since the signing of AB 1890 into law. As Carter and Cavanagh have noted. 1997 41 Marshall. the CPUC released its latest restructuring decision which surprised stakeholders by announcing that all customers. the CPUC and California Energy Commission (CEC) have been working towards the implementation of this legislation. 1997 42 Weisman. 10% emerging technologies. the CEC released a report to the legislature with policy recommendations for the allocation of up to $540 million renewables funding codified in AB 1890. It divides up this amount into four accounts that vary over four years of funding.42 This bill includes a "minimum renewable energy generation 39 40 Carter and Cavanagh. the California PUC was on a clear course to abandon all [funding for public purpose programs] on grounds of lack of statutory authority. 1998. 1997. would be eligible for direct access January 1. including residential and small commercial consumers.

“12 companies--most foreign-owned--that really soak up the juice. Davis explains their reasoning: “the electric companies are inefficient..” Barbara Barkovich.requirement". “Discretionary Evolution. too conservative. and overcapitalized due to state regulation. It has an incentive to build a new plant even if it is not really needed. There is literally no profit in it for them. if a company wants more revenue it must invest more capital. cement. the companies have no incentive to be efficient. services.”. and one of the largest gold mining firms in the world. Retail wheeling sits at the top of the agenda of this coalition of steel. a consultant representing CLECA explains their 43 44 Levison. The state commissions typically calculate a company’s profits as a return on investment. 1997. Many forces have come together to create the push for electric utility deregulation in California. Because the PUCs determine the rates. “DOE Restructuring Bill” 45 Stevenson.43 The Department of Energy (DOE) has also been circulating a draft bill that includes a Renewables Portfolio Standard.44 Factors Behind the Drive for Deregulation Now that I have reviewed the history of Federal and state electric utility regulation.”46 In California.45 Large Consumer Pressure Large industrial energy consumers have the most to gain from the lower electricity prices that may accompany greater industry competition. 355.. “Restructuring Hearings on the Road” Levison. Therefore. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 21 . it is time to gain a fuller understanding of why California has proceeded down the path towards deregulation. and future expansion. 1997. these concerns are represented by the California Large Energy Consumers Association (CLECA).

24-25.” to existing public interest programs. Now they found 46 47 Davis. As Davis notes. 1995. John White. “Balancing the demand for federal standards with the urgent need to reduce emissions in California was one of the primary challenges confronting Congress and the executive branch. they will have to gulp and swallow elsewhere. executive director of the Center for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technologies remarks.. V.”47 The Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 set a precedent for Federal legislation following California’s leadership on environmental programs. Asmus. has no respect for the environment. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 22 .. ELCON.”. are now competitive. 192.” A consultant who shares White’s perception of ELCON notes that they want to push California to adopt a policy as.” CLECA’s national counterpart is the Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON). such as wind power... The California Air Resources Board’s old tailpipe emissions standards for new cars and light-duty trucks sold in that state were adopted by Congress in 1990 as the standard to be met by all new vehicles.. and they say they know renewables. “We just want to use competition to get the best price for power. “Retail wheeling. There are some who are concerned about ELCON’s environmental ethics in pursuing electric utility restructuring.. “In the past the commissions had found their main constituents to be residential customers.”48 Davis describes the transition that has occurred in the influence of state PUCs.viewpoint. “uncompromised as possible because they fear the California plan will become a model for the country. “We do not advocate a slash and burn approach. on the other hand. 24 companies that account of over 4% of the nation’s electricity use. That’s one reason why they want to cut their own deals. “At least you can talk to CLECA. If there are provisions for renewables and conservation here.

Advancements in transmission line technology now allow the efficient transmission of electricity for distances of hundreds of miles. greatly increasing opportunities for bulk power sales. 447-475. 356-357. Davis. Gordon. 50 Flavin and Lenssen.”. Hoffman 55-62. 52 Gilbert. This reduction in scale has brought down the capital requirements of entering the electricity generation industry. 51 Stevenson. ”49 Technology The development of gas turbine generation technology has greatly reduced the scale requirements for efficient electricity generation. 195. 1994.50 Economic Rent The potential to capture higher profits offers a significant incentive for well-positioned electric utilities to pursue an end to price controls and enhanced opportunities to sell excess power outside of their service area. 150. basing their arguments on welfare economics as applied to the changing electric utility landscape.. 84-108.52 The “new industrial organization” espoused by these economists has served as 48 49 Davis. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 23 . 1993. 1993. but now had to pay higher rates.intense pressure from large industrial customers.. enabling increased competition. “Discretionary Evolution. who in the past had enjoyed privileged status with cheap rates.51 Academics & Ideologues Neo-classical economists have argued since the 1970’s for the deregulation of the electric utility industry.

“Discretionary Evolution. 357. competition takes on several forms in this market. the camel of competition forced its nose under the monopoly tent.”. 355-356. as well as those on the border of service districts.54 Since 1992.. 1994.. There is significant competition in the wholesale electric generation market. such as natural gas for space heating. the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act greatly invigorated the wholesale market for electric power. “With this act.56 Federal Regulatory Policy By requiring utilities to pay avoided costs to the new class of qualifying facilities. allowing frequent comparisons between the California Blue Book’s proposed wholesale pool and a similar pool already implemented in the UK.. over half of new U. 55 Flavin and Lenssen. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 24 . Examples of national electric utility deregulation have already been provided by the United Kingdom and Norway. non-utility providers.53 allowing a policy trend that emphasizes markets rather than social welfare. and it was only 53 54 Stevenson..the academic rationale for the recent flurry of deregulation activity being pushed by free-market ideology. Stevenson. Many electrical applications have substitutable fuels. generating capacity has been supplied by alternative.”.55 Other Industries and Countries The deregulation of the telecommunications and natural gas industries serves as an analogy to the potential for electric utility deregulation.S. Utilities compete for industrial customers who are relocating. “Discretionary Evolution. Existing Competitive Forces Although electric utilities are often viewed as pure monopolies.

a policy it had already implemented in its natural gas decisions. 195. 58 Davis. Davis notes that it became used as a tool to inject competition into a regulated system. Schaefer held nine legislative hearings and heard from dozens of witnesses on the issue of breaking up the electricity monopoly. including the Exempt Wholesale Generator. 1.a matter of time before it worked its way inside. The resulting testimony convinced Schaefer that the current monopoly system is harming consumers.”57 The qualifying facility clause of PURPA was originally intended to encourage generation resource diversity. Federal legislation could force states into retail competition on a set timetable. 78. by requiring that utilities provide non-discriminatory transmission access for wholesale transactions. FERC vigorously supported competition for electricity. in order that they maintain control of the regulatory process at the state level.”58 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 built on this competitive momentum. the ascension of Reagan administration advocates of competition amplified the effect of PURPA. A recent announcement from Representative Schaefer’s office reads. The recent restructuring bills in Congress have given incentives to state governments to act. Cook. He has since introduced legislation (HR 655) that will give all consumers choice of their electric provider by December 15. “Ironically. 59 Levison. 1997. creating new classes of larger non-utility generators. Under Chairman Martha Hesse in the late 1980s. 2000. the product of President Carter and the Democratic Congress. “Restructuring Goes on the Road” ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 25 .”59 As one environmental representative 56 57 POWER Working Group. “During the 105th Congress. and deleting portions of the Public Utility Holding Company act to facilitate establishment of EWG/IPPaffiliates by regulated utilities.

In 1994. “Retail wheeling. the same year that California’s Blue Book proposal was released. Massachusetts. a proceeding in which the Commission attempts to determine how much capacity will be needed and structures the acquisition process in great detail. an analyst with CPUC’s Division of Strategic Planning. and Wisconsin. Michigan initiated a five year retail wheeling experiment involving two utilities.61 California Public Utility Commissioners Jesse Knight and Norm Shumway. Calls for bids have often been oversubscribed by a wide margin. 24..”60 State Regulatory Policy Bidding programs for wholesale electric generation have been established in California... 62 Asmus. Maine. Commissioner Knight. They “became increasingly perplexed about the arcaneness and gridlock that seemed to pervade the utility resource planning process. New York.. 1997.”. 355-356.”62 a form of integrated resource planning know as the BRPU.63 This move towards greater reliance on the marketplace to make supply decisions is clearly in line with the free-market ideologies of the Republican Governor.”. Connecticut. “DOE Restructuring Bill” Stevenson. 60 61 Levison. though it urges states to consider retail competition. “the DOE bill does not mandate retail markets by any date certain.has noted. Dassovich explained that they were frustrated with the “myriad of complex and controversial balancing accounts and rate adjustment mechanisms they had to contend with every 12 months” as part of the rate-making process. 1995. One of the stated proposals of the Blue Book is to eliminate the Biennial Resource Planning Update (BRPU). according to Jeff Dassovich. “Discretionary Evolution. both appointees of Governor Pete Wilson. were the key retail wheeling champions within the CPUC. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 26 . Colorado.

nineteen state legislatures have reviewed bills in response to the potential for greater competition in the electric utility industry. A15(Western).. it was clear that the general public was not very involved in the process. as well as interviews for this analysis. 32. Knight. There are limits to this approach. “Freeing Californians from the monopoly grip of the utilities and granting consumers direct access to competitive power suppliers will greatly benefit the state’s economy and enhance the quality of life in my state. As a staffperson for a prominent officeholder noted during our interview. including authorizations for legislative and regulatory study committees as well as direct access for certain customers to alternative generators. As it was too esoteric a topic. Many of the outcomes of the deregulation policy formulation were a result of negotiations between organizations representing different stakeholder groups.65 Analysis The California electric utility deregulation experience has often been described as a stakeholder-driven process. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 27 . October 9.”64 As of October. “There was not enough education or public involvement. in that not all interest groups who might be impacted by the process participated in the 63 64 CPUC Blue Book. as well as the staff of the officeholders they were trying to influence. so there was not enough press coverage. 1995.” [see Anonymous Officeholder Staff Interview #1] Because of this stakeholder-representative orientation. writes. Based on my experience as a representative for an environmental organization. Jesse J. Wall Street Journal. 1995. letter to the editor.in a fit of political posturing. I decided it would be insightful to interview people who represented stakeholder organizations that were active in the process.

even without observable actions or non-actions by that institutions agents. p. it seems to me. 1980. As Polsby has written. opening up the analysis to the second view of power.. Goventa. on Lukes’ “second face” of power. presumably people participate in those areas they care about the most. power may be analyzed by looking at. be more effectively objectified. “A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do. but only at a superficial level. 1974. cannot. but he also exercises power by influencing.. Lukes has argued that there are three views or dimensions of power. who gains and loses. “by which power is exercised not just upon participants within the decision making process but also towards the exclusion of certain participants and issues altogether. 3-32 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 28 .”66 By talking with active stakeholder representatives and officeholder staff. “who participates. I primarily focused on Lukes’ first dimension of power. or determining his very wants.. Their values. The officeholder staff were also able to add insight on who was able to set the terms of the debate (who decided which issues were excluded). he argues. shaping.” Lukes’ second.” In Lukes’ third. most “radical” view of power. and who prevails in decision-making.. As Goventa comments. 2. two-dimensional view of power accounts for the development of a “mobilization of bias” explaining how a political institution can systemicly be biased towards a particular outcome. Lukes. observable actions between participants. Unfortunately. in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude. His onedimensional view of power is based around observable actions by stakeholders.negotiations. eloquently expressed by their participation. these interviews do not shed much light on the 65 66 Sikkema.

68 I have broken oil and natural gas companies out as a separate category in the tabulations of campaign contributions. small electricity consumers. and the final AB 1890 language.. Status Report. independent producers. large electricity consumers.exercise of power from Lukes’ most “radical” view. and a state institutions. one important subcategory emerged because of its dominance: Oil and natural gas companies are often both large energy consumers. 1995. Overview of What the Stakeholders Wanted and What They Got Before analyzing who got what they wanted. environmental advocates.. since such a broad analysis would be outside of the scope of this project.. as well as independent producers. 1995 CPUC Decision. 1995.. Status Report.. 1995. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 29 .. Selection of Stakeholder Groups In selecting stakeholder groups to focus on. the December. 69 CPUC. CPUC. 67 68 CPUC. I chose these categories based on personal experience representing a stakeholder organization in the process. talking with at least one prominent representative from a number of categories: investor-owned electric utilities. Status Report. as well as considering those used in a status report from the CPUC to the Legislature. I tried to cover as wide a range of participants as possible. their comments on restructuring filed with the CPUC69. I first review what the different stakeholder groups wanted and got in both policy outcomes. municipal electric utilities. based on 26 stakeholder interviews [see Appendix B]. utility labor unions.67 As I extended my analysis with a summary of campaign contributions from stakeholders to the conference committee members.

including billions of dollars in rate settlements for PG&E’s Diablo Canyon and SCE’s SONGS nuclear plants.” The inclusion of direct access was not embraced by munis. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 30 . where there was considerable support for staying clear of muni autonomy: “We have previously acknowledged that we do not have the authority to impose our vision on municipal or public power entities. A five year phase-in to direct access may have been a little too fast for Edison. While recovery period is limited to four years may limit their ability to achieve the full 100% cost recovery. • December Decision outcome: The CPUC Decision did not address municipal utilities. they are comforted by a negotiated settlement that was reached to avoid future litigation.• Investor Owned Utilities: The IOUs want to protect shareholders by maintaining their stock price and maximizing profits. except for on the subject of reciprocity for allowing direct access. while ensuring their financial solvency. Most resist retail competition. • AB 1890 outcome: The legislation codified the utilities opportunity to recover 100% of stranded costs. and pursue 100% stranded cost recovery from ratepayers. who are also their “shareholders”. • Municipal Utilities: The munis want to retain their autonomy in making their own policy decisions. which was the strongest proponent of starting with a wholesale-only PoolCo proposal. Most resist retail competition and pursue the ability to recover 100% of stranded costs from ratepayers. • December Decision outcome: The IOUs did get the ability to recover 100% of stranded costs. Under legal mandates which we scrupulously respect the governance of these entities and their relation to their customers are committed to their duly constituted governing authorities.

As the lobbyist for the Sacramento Municipal Utility District points out. They resist retail competition.• AB 1890 outcome: The municipal utilities lost autonomy in making decisions about direct access as a tradeoff to ensure their ability to collect stranded costs. leading to an overlap of their interests with public interests. it does not focus on maintaining system reliability. An unexpected positive outcome was the improved leverage munis gained over IOUs. Appendix B] The inclusion of direct access was not embraced by munis. enhancing our stature at the federal level. • AB 1890 outcome: The legislation allows for the collection of IOU employee severance and retraining costs in the CTC. • Utility Labor Unions: Unions would like to protect the income of their members while faced by a down-sizing industry. since AB 1890 required the munis and IOUs to work together on joint filings to FERC for the Power Exchange and ISO. while going further to directly support the goals of system reliability through adequate inspection and maintenance.” [see interview. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 31 . They are strong proponents of maintaining system reliability as this requires adequate staffing. and pursue ratepayer support for worker severance payments and retraining. we can point to the legislation. AB 1890 also requires that IOU-divested generation plants come with two-year contracts for operation and maintenance by the existing staff. • December Decision outcome: Although the Decision does allow for the collection of IOU employee severance and retraining costs in the CTC. “If the IOUs do not respect the munis.

while having access to new customers willing to pay more for “green” power. • December Decision outcome: Although the CPUC supports the renegotiation (buyout) of Standard Offer contracts with qualifying facilities. • Renewable Technology Independent Producers: As a subset of independent generators. it leaves these negotiations as voluntary.• Independent Producers: Independent generators want to protect the sanctity of their existing contracts. Direct access with community-based aggregation of load would help facilitate the development of bilateral “green” pricing contracts with residential customers. ensuring their continued financial well-being. • AB 1890 outcome: The legislation nearly mirrors the CPUC Decision in terms of impacts on independent producers. They would like continued funding to reflect the public goods benefits offered by their technologies (such decreased air pollution). Independent producers gain access to new customers through the adoption of direct access. protecting the sanctity of the QF contracts. resulting in generally higher prices paid to generators. Short-run avoided cost (SRAC) payments to QFs are to be set to the market-clearing price in the Power Exchange. although a lack of specificity in the policy language with regard to percentage levels for the minimum renewables purchase requirement was a cause for concern. Most are proponents of direct access. while having access to new customers made available to them. As with non-renewable ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 32 . • December Decision outcome: The CPUC’s endorsement of the Renewables Portfolio Standard was applauded by existing renewable energy generators. the renewables industry would like to rebound from difficult financial times many of them are facing due to the sunset or failure of previous policy support mechanisms.

competitive market possible to drive down rates. renewables funding through a systems benefits charge.25 years greatly increased large electricity consumers’ satisfaction with the deal. They support granting the IOUs less than 100% stranded cost recovery. allowing bilateral. • December Decision outcome: Large customers did get the market structure they desired. large customers won on the inclusion of direct access. but limiting the competitive transition charge (CTC) cost recovery to 4. As in the December Decision. with one that had known costs. SRAC set according to the Power Exchange market clearing price should result in higher payments to QFs under contract. IOUs still have the opportunity to collect 100% of their stranded costs. As with non-renewable independent producers. and AB 1890 does provide a significant amount of money to existing renewables developers to help mitigate any downsizing in the industry. However. the RPS. this industries financial woes are not solely because of deregulation. SRAC set according to the Power Exchange market clearing price should result in higher payments to QFs under contract. • Large Industrial & Agricultural Customers: The large consumers want the most efficient. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 33 . direct access contracts. making them the strongest proponents of direct access. • AB 1890 outcome: Again. • AB 1890 outcome: Many renewables generators were disappointed with the replacement of a policy mechanism that had known outcomes. Some argue that the level of funding is too low to maintain the current state renewables base and will end in 2002. and want a choice of their electricity supplier.independent producers. which could extend until 2005. They lost out on rather generous terms for collection of stranded costs by the IOUs. resulting in an industry shakeout.

small consumer and low income advocates lost in their opposition to a market structure allowing direct access. with no cap on low income rate assistance. • December Decision outcome: Small consumer and low income advocates lost in their opposition to a market structure allowing direct access. They resist retail competition. In principle. Funding for low income programs was good. want an equitable user class phase-in schedule for direct access. and support community aggregation for residential ratepayers to take advantage of bilateral contracts with low cost generators. although more specific details were required. Low income consumer advocates want IOUs to continue their low income assistance programs (baseline rate. • AB 1890 outcome: As in the CPUC Decision. as well as in their opposition to 100% stranded cost recovery by the IOUs. and have adequate customer education programs and protection from fraud put into place. Small consumers benefited from the inclusion of language on community aggregation to allow residential customers some benefits from direct access. Funding for low income programs was good. although the anti-slamming language in the bill may make this unworkable if it is not fixed in this session’s cleanup legislation. the consumer education and protection language was well received. Language on consumer education and protection did not go far enough in addressing the needs of a deregulated market. with no cap on low income rate assistance. Small consumers benefited from the inclusion of language on community aggregation to allow residential customers some benefits from direct access. low-income weatherization) on an as-needed basis. as well as in their opposition to 100% stranded cost recovery by the IOUs. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 34 .• Small Consumers: Small consumer advocates want any restructuring that occurs to have net benefits for even the least well off individual.

The inclusion of the Renewables Portfolio Standard was heralded as strong renewables policy by some environmentalists. Most groups resist retail competition and support continued funding for new renewables. The rift in the community that had developed regarding renewables policy was only torn wider by renewables funding ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 35 . as well as in their opposition to the tying of stranded cost recovery to continued operation of nuclear plants. These groups want to accelerate the removal of coal and nuclear plants from operation. They want the idea of leastcost planning through IRP to be protected. Direct access threatens to undermine both IRP and sales volume/profit decoupling. although a lack of specific funding levels was troubling. as well as in their opposition to the tying of stranded cost recovery to continued operation of nuclear plants. There is a significant rift that has developed over whether existing renewables generators should continue to receive subsidies. Environmentalists would like to see an end to the backsliding that has occurred in utility energy efficiency and R&D budgets. while others perceived it as continued charity for poorly-run businesses that had already received more than adequate support. and public interest RD&D. • AB 1890 outcome: Environmental advocates lost in their opposition to a market structure allowing direct access. DSM. Mechanisms that continue to decouple utility profits from volume sales are pursued because of the positive impact they have on demand side management efforts (DSM).• Environmental Organizations: Environmental organizations want the electric utility industry to evolve into a form which is environmentally and socially sustainable. The application of a public goods charge to pay for energy efficiency and public interest RD&D was good in principle. • December Decision outcome: Environmental advocates lost in their opposition to a market structure allowing direct access.

the following cluster analysis should only be used to point out rough trends. grouping the stakeholder interviews into categories allowed some overall patterns to emerge from this set of data. Because of the time-intensive nature of this research. and the small number of organizations per category.levels that may not support the existing base of generators while allowing some new development to be placed on line. The raw coded data for this analysis is included in Appendix D. This clustering also allowed for a better correlation with a review of the officeholder staff comments. in the table of contents for Appendix B. Appendix B has a full transcript of each interview. large electricity consumers. each clustered category has a small number of organizations. but there is ongoing debate as to whether the adopted levels represented too much of a compromise with more powerful players. The application of a public goods charge with statutory spending level floors for energy efficiency. Because of the subjective interpretations required to code qualitative interview responses. and a state institutions. Stakeholder Interviews Cluster Analysis Given the large amount of interview data to absorb from 26 stakeholder interviews. renewable energy. combined with limited time and resources available. small electricity consumers. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 36 . public interest RD&D. and low income programs was well received. by category. I used my original categories for this cluster analysis: investorowned electric utilities. The organizations represented by each interview is listed. municipal electric utilities. environmental advocates. utility labor unions. independent producers.

and the remaining minority claim that their organization got rather little. When combined with comments filed by that organization early in the restructuring process at the CPUC. Figure 1: How much of what your organization wanted was in the CPUC December Decision? Rather Little Figure 2: How much of what your organization wanted was in the December Decision? STATE INSTITUTIONS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES Most SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Rather Little Mixed/Unclear Most Mixed/Unclear INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS UTILITY LABOR UNIONS The stakeholder representatives MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITIES were then asked how much of what their organization wanted was included in the CPUC December. as well as the majority of large electricity consumers. nearly half of the representatives say that their organization got most of what it wanted from the December Decision. this provides a baseline to determine if they got what they wanted. Figure 2 shows that all of the investor-owned utilities and independent producers. As INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES 0 1 2 3 4 5 Figure 1 indicates. 1995 Decision. a slightly smaller number of representatives report a mixed or unclear outcome. say that their organizations got most of what they wanted ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 37 .The stakeholder representatives were asked what outcomes their organizations wanted to obtain from the California electric utility restructuring process as it was just unfolding.

say that their organizations got most of what they wanted from AB 1890. The small consumer and environmental organization representatives appear to have taken a step backwards in terms of getting what they wanted compared to the CPUC December Decision policy outcome. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 38 . nearly half of the representatives say that their Rather Little Figure 3: How much of what your organization wanted was in AB 1890? organization got most of what it wanted from AB 1890. as well as the majority of large electricity consumers. As Figures 3 indicates. The stakeholder representatives were also asked how much of what their organization wanted was included in AB 1890.from the December Decision. The utility labor unions and municipal utilities representatives reported receiving relatively little from this policy outcome. a similar number of representatives report a mixed or unclear outcome. Figure 4 shows that all of the investor-owned utilities and utility labor union Mixed/Unclear Most representatives. and the remaining minority claim that their organization got rather little.

either the CPUC December Decision or AB 1890. As Figures 5 indicates. Figure 6 shows that the only organizations interviewed that prefer the December Decision are among the environmental and UTILITY LABOR UNIONS MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITIES INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES independent power communities.Figure 4: How much of what your organization wanted was in AB 1890? One of the interview questions asked which policy outcome was STATE INSTITUTIONS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES preferred by the subject’s organization. most organizations preferred the INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Rather Little Mixed/Unclear Most language of AB 1890. as opposed to the nonbypassable surcharge funding mechanism adopted in AB 1890 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 39 . It is 0 1 2 3 4 5 clear from the interview transcripts Figure 5: What Policy Outcome Does Your Organization Prefer? No preference / Unclear CPUC December Decision that those few organizations that stated a preference for the December Decision did so based on their support Portfolio selected for the Renewables that was Standard by the Commissioners as a renewables AB 1890 policy.

STATE INSTITUTIONS Figure 6: What Policy Outcome Does Your Organization Prefer? “Although the CPUC Decision was financially easier on PG&E. As excerpted from the PG&E stakeholder interview. Natural Resources Defense Council #1. PG&E and SDG&E indicated that part of their preference for AB 1890 was to avoid future litigation. evolutionary the step INVESTOROWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES 0 1 2 3 4 5 ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS CPUC December Decision AB 1890 No preference / Unclear INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS UTILITY LABOR UNIONS MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITIES from December Officeholder Staff Interviews Officeholder staff interviews are another data source that I now use to cross-check the previous cluster analysis on who did and did not get what they wanted out of the restructuring process. and to begin to build theories for why. as well as three subjects ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 40 . restructuring as envisioned in the CPUC Decision would have been less likely to take place in an orderly manner due to legal wrangling and ongoing filings at the CPUC. forward Decision. and Union of Concerned Scientists interviews].[see American Wind Energy Association.” Many of the other stakeholders consider AB 1890 an incremental. I interviewed two subjects who were on the CPUC staff during the two years leading up to the December Decision.

Stan Skinner. they were able to then get retailers and agricultural groups on board. CMA’s energy committee got parties together. with no ex parte rules during the pure rule-making period before December 20. were the focus of this staffer from Senator Peace’s office.who were staff for members of the legislative Conference Committee during the 1996 legislative session.... He alludes to the financial resources required to fly in these business circles. There was a lot of lobbying. so that the [legislative] Members and Governor bought in that restructuring would be good for California businesses.. was personally engaged. Lobbying access is only as good as a Commissioner’s willingness to meet. Coalitions were very important... networking with utilities. who then initiated the “very important” MOU process. Large customers were less influential. Officeholder Staff Comments on Who Got What They Wanted and Why: • This CPUC staffer points to IOUs and large customers as wielding the most influence in the CPUC process.” • Large industrial customers. PG&E’s President. CLECA. The allusion to lobbying (“politically educate”) is joined with a theme of officeholder resonance to a pro-business message (“good for California businesses”): CMA and CLECA jointly made utility restructuring the issue for business. A connection is made with obtaining the Governor’s buy-in.. The following are excerpts from the full interview transcripts in Appendix C. The preferential access to Commissioners also stands out: IOUs were most influential.. who was also the President of CMA at one time. IOUs and large customers.. CMA. resulting in the most influential stakeholders being granted the most access. Large businesses articulated the issues. The MOU process was very important because fighting parties came to an agreement. It was conspicuous that an Edison employee always traveled with President Fessler on his trips to Europe.. 1995. WSPA made an effort to politically educate officeholders. and Edison set the ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 41 .. mostly focusing on market structure.. This offered a substantial opportunity for access. particularly by negotiating a deal between them. The level of influence on AB 1890 was a function of who was in the Conference Committee hearing room. As a member of CMA’s energy group ($10 thousand membership fee). resulting in a partial phase in of Direct Access.. The Memorandum of Understanding was a major event that brought together two worlds.

and access to the Governor’s office: The IOUs were able to pull people together. as well as an acceleration of recovery. campaign contributions. they had the manpower to make sure their positions were taken care of. Once again. and staff time to network anytime.. This had to be shaped by pressures on the Legislature. a long-time defender of environmental interests. • The IOUs’ were able to get what they want.. through networking resources.. according to this staffer from then-Senator Bill Leonard’s office. no one was happy. the IOUs are pointed out for their influence in shaping the agenda.. The momentum created by the Governor’s office initiating the MOU process is noted once again: ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 42 . Linking up with the Governor’s office was critical. • A staffer from Senator Byron Sher’s office highlights the ideological CPUC appointments by Governor Pete Wilson as drivers for the process. Mark Timmerman [CMA]. This was the greatest expression of coalition building. They were a guiding light. encouraging other people to accept the process who otherwise would not have. Renewables and energy efficiency were also guaranteed protection. The Decision by the PUC was going to be implemented unless the Legislature was able to deliver a package. • The large customers and IOUs were able to get what they want again. IOUs very quickly were able to get 100% stranded cost recovery firmed up. Many stakeholder interviews also alluded to the fear that a lack of legislation would result in a worse fate defined by the CPUC: The PUC laid out the framework for restructuring in the Blue Book. but this time they are joined by clean power interests. When the PUC December Decision came out. They also were able to offer a lot of help with technical drafting. A lot of their lawyers did technical language work in coalition with the legislative counsel. because of their financial resources can buy three things: lobbying of politicians. anywhere. says this anonymous staffer. legal expertise. based on the free market-driven ideologues on the Commission. who were afforded protection by Senator Sher. and Bob Foster [Edison].tone. It would not have happened without DJ Smith [CLECA]. The utilities established early on the full reimbursement for stranded costs. This put everything on the table.

This supports the findings of the stakeholder cluster analysis.. IOUs and large consumers.. they accounted for 2/3 of the people in the hearing room. • Another anonymous staffer focuses on the usual suspects. oftentimes because of superior staff and financial resources. The Committee staff did not write the first draft of the bill. while the large customers got the ability to go first on direct access. in the coffee shops at three AM. Ann wrote it and brought it to the Committee for consideration. ability to marshal staff resources.. it was all over. such as irrigation districts and economic development rates. and legal expertise: IOUs and large consumers got everything they wanted. Once the Governor’s office was behind the MOU.. Ann sat down and read from the draft during the conference committee. except that the labor unions which appear to fare well in the earlier analysis are not called out in any of the officeholder staff interviews. Synthesis of Stakeholder & Staff Comments on Who Prevailed. Between the large manufacturers and utilities.. and look for ways to get around paying the CTC. but the resources that could be allocated. He gives several reasons for their influence.. and Why: A familiar pattern emerges from these staff comments.. But it was not the number of people in the room that mattered. The IOUs got complete stranded cost recovery. This was the first time for the Members to be looking at actual language. These influential players relied on a “fairness and competition” argument. who deal daily with issues of economic development... as well as their ideological resonance with a conservative Governor’s office.. The Governor has the same goal: empower people for economic development.Large customers and the utilities both had the most money to spend. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 43 . Senior Legal Counsel for Edison. Political clout can be bought with lobbying and campaign contributions. This had validity for Committee Members. A key witness before the Committee was Ann Cohn.. you can be part of the decision making process.. If you had the resources to be there. including connecting with a free-market Governor. The ability to fund politicians helped. IOUs and large customers are often cited as victors.

They did not want to participate. small consumers are the recipients of a bogus rate-cut that they are self-financing: Low income advocacy groups did not make their issues big and high-profile like structural issues became. could not address the problem of a competitive market and participation. The rate reduction bonds may not yield net present value benefits. The renewables players were probably asking for too much of the old world the PUC had engaged in. The clean power community was cited again for a lack of ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 44 .. LADWP was trying to cause trouble with restructuring. They waited until late in the process to get organized. • The clean power community’s inability to resolve differences between them has hampered their abilities according to a staffer from Senator Steve Peace’s office. but for different reasons. The low income groups may not have the staff resources to lobby effectively. for their inability to articulate positions. yet were not in the hearing for one minute..The big mistake for these small consumer groups was letting Pete Wilson get elected and stack the PUC with right wing ideologues. but just result in rate deferrals for 10 years.. according to this CPUC staffer. These groups could not come to a resolution. • A staffer from Senator Byron Sher’s office also brought up the municipal utilities.. . and the renewables community was perceived as not being able to make a paradigm shift.. He also touched on the un-level playing field created by a free-market ideologue Governor: The environmental and renewables communities made the Committee punt... In AB 1890. as rates were supposed to come down due to the QF cliffs anyway. The California Municipal Utilities Association folks lacked effectiveness also.. but did not do hall walking to the extent of other groups.Officeholder Staff Comments on Who Got Rolled Over. and Why: • Low income organizations and the renewables community could have improved their performance.. .. they had full opportunity.CalPIRG and some other consumer advocacy groups criticized the process without participating.. He also chided municipal utilities and some small consumer advocates for resisting the process and not fully participating. This was very irresponsible.. The low income groups participated on paper through filed comments. The 10% rate reduction for small customers was final packaging to sell the bill for voters.

. This dissipated their effectiveness. When the train was leaving the station.. Peace was demanding in terms of defining your position. They needed to realize the process was happening. the playing field was tilted. If they were there and could contribute.. Later on in the Committee. small customers and the people who serve small customers.. Large.. Small consumer advocates and brokers did not participate in a timely manner. At first.. and they subsequently came around with an articulated position a day later. echoing Senator Peace’s staffer quoted above: Early on the munis were not able to define a single coherent position or proposal. environmental and small consumer’s initial resistance to deregulation hindered their ability to articulate positions in the new environment: The renewables community fractured itself as far as coming together behind a proposal. • A lack of unity in the clean power community. the residential ratepayers also had trouble. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 45 . driven by an inability to compromise. so there was not enough press coverage. • A staffer from then-Senator Bill Leonard’s office pointed to public interest organizations for opposition despite non-participation. It had too many purists that need to learn the art of compromise. As it was too esoteric a topic. and pay attention to it then.. due to the Governor and his CPUC appointees. The environmental and consumer advocates did not have a clear idea of what they wanted. such as CalPIRG and one of Ralph Nader’s organizations. It was very unhelpful to have put themselves in that position. He threw the munis out. Groups that opposed the bill without participating also were ineffective.unity. There was not enough education or public involvement. Also.. the fact that the renewables and environmentalists were divided was damaging. To a lesser extent.. Finally. and the much-maligned municipal utilities for an inability to articulate proposals. This schism was a recipe for having the least influence. they were all against restructuring. in this anonymous staff comment. not after the fact. caused them problems. powerful interests already had an advantage from the PUC Decision. which did not help.. they did not know what seat they wanted to sit in. anyone could have influence. Small consumer advocates faced an un-level playing field. The munis had a hard time articulating how to maintain an exit fee [for direct access customers leaving their electricity procurement service] without joining the ISO.

We didn’t do grassroots letters. and Why: A pattern consisting of three stakeholder groups who may not have received what they wanted emerges from the staff interview data. most of the environmental organizations did not expend much effort in using their grassroots activists to challenge the large customer groups and IOUs.” ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 46 . The municipal utilities had trouble articulating proposed solutions to their concerns in the AB 1890 Conference Committee. but were able to recover when pressured by Steve Peace. mice stay away’. First. The American Wind Energy Association and Environmental Defense Fund interview transcripts provide ample evidence of a rift in the community. there was not enough time. This pattern of stakeholder groups is consistent with the results of the stakeholder cluster analysis. Things were changing too fast. but depended on a consensus-based. Some public interest (small consumer/environmentalist) advocates were not in the game at all. A careful examination of the interviews with stakeholder representatives for environmental organizations draws out two other factors that may have impaired these public interest groups.. leaving it up to the lobbyists and insiders to cut a deal. in large part due to the free-market ideology of Governor Wilson’s office which has been passed down to the CPUC Commissioners over years of appointments.Synthesis of Stakeholder & Staff Comments on Who Got Rolled. but we have learned ‘when elephants dance. along with small consumer advocates.. faced an un-level playing field all along. and were relegated to complaining after the deal was done. “insider” strategy: • A volunteer on the Sierra Club California Legislative Committee noted. The clean power community (renewables industry and environmentalists) were held back by a lack of unity in the face of more monolithic stakeholders. The clean power advocates. “Some volunteer leaders wanted to be more vocal on stranded costs. minimizing this group’s losses.

didn’t want to ruffle any strategies. because he. “NRDC did press work through editorial boards including the San Jose Mercury News. it did become clear that NRDC’s strategy was based on coalitions of insiders. and the Sacramento Bee focusing on public purpose programs.” Later in my interview with Ralph. We were on separate tracks with industrial customers to ensure no cost shifting occurred. NRDC had no media strategy. we could have killed it. the San Francisco Chronicle. In the end. San Francisco Examiner. made no attempt to build clout.” 70 Weisman. Critical stakeholders who could have derailed did not. but relied on their name instead. “wanted a win. We were in constant contact.” • Ralph Cavanagh has served as a lightning rod for praise and criticism of the environmental community’s focus on an insider strategy. If environmental groups collectively walked. there was not enough activity.” • Cavanagh offers a different perspective on NRDC’s substantial media work. “Environmentalist Defends His Stance” ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 47 . one on one. not turning it into a media tank battle. largely because no public interest group was willing to oppose the bill. The environmental groups and consumer groups such as TURN worked well together. “Past EDF’s filing comments.70 [also see numerous comments in interview transcripts] An American Wind Energy Association representative was disheartened that Cavanagh would not pull NRDC’s endorsement for AB 1890. It was strong going in and going out of the process. NRDC’s relationship with the IOUs was important. AWEA endorsed the bill reported out of the conference committee. not grassroots activists: “It was a consensus-based process. 1997.• A senior analyst for the Environmental Defense Fund comments on their participation in the CPUC process.

” Goventa has commented on the hazards of consensus-based processes for less powerful actors. Critical consumer interests were not present. utilities. it could have been shaped or manipulated.• A representative from a Latino advocacy group comments on NRDC’s consensus-based. may be malleable. also questioned the validity of the “consensus” process during our interview. IPPs. i. taking care of small consumers would have led to compromise. ‘Real’ consensus implies a prior process of agreement or choice. “If you can get all of the big dogs to reach consensus.. nobody gave anything up. Through the invocation of myths or symbols.71 An attorney with the small consumer advocacy group. only a consistency that certain potentially key issues remain latent issues and that certain interests remain unrecognized--at certain times more than others. or other mechanisms of power.e. especially vulnerable to the manipulation of the power field around it. From this perspective. unions. AB 1890 was a deal cut in back rooms between powerful players. a consistently expressed consensus is not required for the maintenance of dominant interests.. The Utility Reform Network (TURN). the use of threats or rumors. even as it emerges. “Ralph Cavanagh was influential in making sure that public purpose programs stayed on the plate. etc. which in a situation of apparent consensus may or may not have been the case.” One staff member at the CPUC gives some credit to NRDC’s insider strategy. insider-coalition strategy. 19+29 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 48 . “Latino Issues Forum did not actively participate. the ‘consensus’ could be maintained by power processes. like an armadillo in the middle of the road. it is tough to stop the momentum.. they just loaded up the plate. 1980. The process may not have occurred. big customers.” 71 Goventa. Public purpose concerns become peripheral. the powerful may be able to ensure that certain beliefs and actions emerge in one context while apparently contradictory grievances may be expressed in others. The “consensus process” was just everybody taking. such as public interest advocates confronting large corporate interests: .. Ralph Cavanagh carried our torch primarily.the consciousness of the relatively powerless.

72 At this point late in the game. The 3% [it was actually a cap of 3. During the Conference Committee hearings. a representative from the American Wind Energy Association argued that customers paying more on their electricity bills to support renewable energy should cause an impact in terms of more kWh of renewable energy produced.A prominent example of a failed consensus was the 11th hour changes to the funding levels that had been agreed to in the Memorandum of Understanding. The August 15 language from a coalition of powerful interests. including IEP. EDF. As a Sierra Club California legislative chair recounts on meetings between CMA. and the Sierra Club. TURN was one of several public interest organizations who opposed the change. not simply subsidizing other consumers or increasing IOU shareholder profits 72 Confidential binder of proposed language and other stakeholder notes ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 49 . CLECA.. the public interest groups did not have much leverage to oppose the dissolution of this consensus since they did not have an engaged constituency of activists to back them up. RD&D. hot days of August in the 1996 Conference Committee reveals that this “consensus” funding level took a large hit on August 15. “We reached a consensus on.1% of IOU revenues. funding for public purpose programs: low income. A legislative outcome related to “green” pricing for renewables provides another example of an ephemeral consensus. Industrial Users.. agricultural consumers. a perusal of legislative language that was proposed during the long. renewables with an incremental cost estimate from the BRPU.. reduced funding to an average of 2. roughly $660 million a year for the IOUs alone] of utility revenues for public purpose programs in the MOU came out of these discussions. and energy efficiency.3% of utility revenues. less than two weeks before the Bill would be reported out of committee.. These got translated into dollars.” However.

States simply must provide the conditions that facilitate capitalist investment and economic growth. She pointed out the public relations/marketing dilemma that would result if “green” customers found out they were having no real impact on increasing the use of renewable generation.74 Dryzek has voiced concern that by accepting a seat at government policymaking tables. without making it at all clear if these voluntary contributions will actually decrease the amount the IOUs must contribute towards renewables support funding from their frozen revenues. the final language of AB 1890 allows IOU customers to voluntarily contribute money to support renewable development.. This had 73 74 California Senate TV video of August 10.73 However. As noted earlier.. if they pursue antibusiness policies.. subdivision (e) 75 Dryzek... 1996 Conference Committee on Electric Restructuring AB 1890. To the extent that public policy remains under the sway of state imperatives. As he explains. They may be allowed to participate in the policymaking process.. 1996 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 50 .for a static amount of renewables capacity. then they are punished by “capital strike”. “. section 381. but outcomes will be systematically skewed against them..influential players relied on a “fairness and competition” argument.” An anonymous staffer’s comment also resonated with this state imperative. one Senator’s Chief of Staff revealed. groups whose inclusion coincides with no imperative will not easily acquire the tangible goods they value. so that the [legislative] Members and Governor bought in that restructuring would be good for California businesses.the first imperative facing states in capitalist systems is what post-Marxists call “accumulation”. falling tax revenues. 75 The state imperative of “accumulation” came up several times during interviews with officeholder staff. recession.. and unpopularity in the eyes of the public. . “Large businesses articulated the issues. public interest organizations have been “co-opted or bought off cheaply”. There was no significant opposition to this point during the hearing. receiving “symbolic rewards only”.

” As Peace said himself during the Conference Committee’s August 10. it will not inure to your benefit for those differences to still exist on Monday..”. the loss is harder to justify. bottom-up manner: the group may have to develop a more hierarchical internal structure in order to produce a stable leadership which government officials will recognize and deal with. under the threat of retribution. According to an NRDC analyst who was interviewed. and nobody would have been happy. where he bullied advocates for the Renewables Portfolio Standard. Senator Peace’s response to this policy mechanism was along the lines of. The democratic loss experienced by entry into the state can... Dryzek also notes the impact that this “democratization as inclusion” has had on the ability of progressive organizations to function in a democratic. Peace was threatening to handle renewable energy policy himself. 1996 meeting.. 1996 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 51 . “It was very clear that if everyone did not work together. But if there are no instrumental benefits. the RPS is a “non-starter” because San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) does not like it”. I read accounts of public hearings chaired by Peace. “quit beating a dead horse. and Senator Peace represents a district in the San Diego area. Inclusion in the life of the state is. who deal daily with issues of economic development. During my experience representing an environmental stakeholder organization in this process. then. bought at the expense of relatively unrestricted democratic interplay in the oppositional public sphere. “For those of you who have intra-familial differences. The Governor has the same goal: empower people for economic development.validity for Committee Members. they may lose out altogether. We will 76 Dryzek.76 Another factor that impaired the public interest groups was that Conference Committee Chair Steve Peace was able to coerce these groups into accepting compromises they would not have otherwise. be justified by the instrumental benefits thereby achieved.

Jim Brulte (R-Ontario). these tables cover the years 1995 and 1996 for the author of AB 1890. and Controlled Committee Campaign Statements filed at the California Secretary of State Political Reform Division.. and my rule is when we are forced to unilaterally resolve issues. in terms of complicated problem area. Candidate. The other thing is. A full breakdown of contributions for each legislator is included in Appendix E. So for those of you who have been working on other issues I encourage you all to be helpful in that area if you can.. obviously there is going to be many political philosophies on that issue. if there is something you can bring to the table. everybody should suffer except for us. Where data is available. no attempt has been made at determining total annual contributions from all sources to each officeholder. and the six members of the Conference Committee on Electric 77 California Senate TV video of August 10. Because of the difficulty of tracking the transfers of funds between different office-holder controlled accounts. is clearly renewable folks. even though there some parts they might hate.. Our largest problem area. in order to move forward with a product. 1996 Conference Committee on Electric Restructuring ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 52 . OK?.77 Restructuring Stakeholder Campaign Contribution/Gift Analysis One way to track influence of elected officials is to look at the organizations paying for their campaign expenses and providing them with gifts such as meals and trips.. The following campaign contribution summary tables were compiled from Officeholder. Senator Peace implored all of the parties to become “enthusiastic advocates” for the package. I’m sure there are lots of votes in the legislature that would just as soon do electric restructuring without a renewables component.start unilaterally resolving issues.” That same hearing session. Gift information is also provided based on Statement of Economic Interest Forms filed at the Fair Political Practices Commission.

reference titled.ca. Mickey Conroy (R-Orange). or CIU member companies. Norm Shumway. Only donations from organizations involved as primary stakeholders in California’s electric utility deregulation are included.Industry Restructuring. The three Senators on the Committee were Steve Peace (D-El Cajon). CMA. Campaign contribution totals for organizations include donations by employees and volunteer leadership. but rather include a sampling of member company contributions. Josiah Neeper..html ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 53 . These compilations do not provide comprehensive coverage for CLECA. The California Energy Commission has compiled a useful. and Henry Duque. This web page78 was used as an additional check of which organizations have actively participated in influencing state energy legislation.energy. 78 http://www. Gift information is also compiled for the five Public Utility Commissioners presiding over the years 1994 and 1995 in Appendix E. “California Lobbyists and Representatives in Energy-Related Legislation”.gov/energy/cectext/lobbyist. and Bill Leonard (R-Upland). The three Assemblypersons were Diane Martinez (D-Alhambra). yet dated (12/18/95). Jesse Knight Jr. and Steve Kuykendall (R-LA). Governor Wilson’s five appointees are President Daniel Fessler. Byron Sher (D-Palo Alto). Gregory Conlon.

745 $68.819 $0 $323.374 $1.500 $533.075 $4.675 $384.180 $0 $209. Generating Company San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Mission Energy/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITIES California Municipal Utilities Association Imperial Irrigation District Modesto Irrigation District Northern California Power Agency Sacramento Municipal Utility District UTILITY LABOR UNIONS California State Association of Electrical Workers California State Pipe Trades Council PAC Int.079 $13.112 $3.758 $2.370 $648 N/A $0 $208.630 $300 N/A $0 $5.470 $10.102 $0 $73.964 $0 $40.818 $0 $65.000 N/A $0 $18.149 $3.S.000 $1.000 $480.000 $562.101 $495 $10.110 $34.952 $1.031.1995 Lobbying Totals INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas General Electric (nuclear plants) Joint Electrical Industry Fund Pacific Gas & Electric/U.000 $634.516. (geothermal) California Solar Energy Industry Association Enron Capital & Trade Resources Independent Energy Producers Kenetech Windpower Modesto Energy Limited Partnership (tire burning) Pacific Lumber Company/MAXXAM (solid fuel biomass) SeaWest Energy Corporation (windpower) Solar Turbines Incorporated LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Adams Steel Agricultural Energy Consumers Association California Cement Producers Association California Farm Bureau Federation California Industrial Users California Large Energy Consumers Association California Manufacturers Association California Mining Association PAC California Retailers Association California Steel Industries (CLECA member) Californians for Competitive Electricity Fontana Steel Kaiser Cement Corporation Louisiana Pacific (CMA member) Mitsubishi Cement (CLECA member) National Cement (CLECA member) Riverside Cement (CLECA member) Conference Committee Campaign Total California Contributions Lobbying Expenses $59.079 $950 $14.675 $736.416 $5.308 $516.592 $846 $0 ERG Master's Project Mark Stout 54 .405 $0 $722.479 $2.500 $190.835 $1.752 $0 $51.239 $0 N/A $0 $89.995 $596.496 $8. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (various locals) Utility Workers Union of America INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS CalEnergy Co.096 $971.203.157 $0 $188.500 $78.500 $1.092 $3.981 $1.741 $21.559 $0 $246.000 $225.595 $0 $21.000 $681.272 $0 $64.153 $750 N/A $8.608 $3.163 $0 $25.166 $5.588 $500 $32.181 $0 $160.500 $263.000 $62.419 $13.125 $0 $4.000 $0 $70.

000 $0 $15.167 $500 $25.230.197 $500 N/A $2.003.000 $0 $171.271 $0 $12. (CLECA member) Tamco Steel (CLECA member) OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES ARCO California Independent Oil Marketers Association California Independent Oil Producers California Independent Petroleum PAC Chevron (CMA member) Exxon Kaiser International Corp.000 $0 $6.319 $0 $10.551 $12.083 $0 $20. (gasoline refining and marketing) Tower Energy Group (oil.400 $100 $79.600 $32.495 $27.492 $0 $66.675 $0 $1.000 $383.000 $37.947 $500 $281.1995 Lobbying Totals RMC Lonestar (CLECA member) Southwest Portland Cement Co.291 $3. natural gas.081 $1.326 $0 $100.145 $5.665 $0 $262.207 $5. (bulk terminals) Mobil Texaco Tidelands Oil Tosco Corp.203 $5.519 $11.600 N/A $5.000 $526.850 $1.000 $524.099 $12.401 $1.938 $0 $118.250 $0 $30.500 $0 $0 ERG Master's Project Mark Stout 55 .055 $0 $151.000 $20.362.495 $1.723 $0 $38.596.716 $39. diesel) Unocal (CMA member) Western States Petroleum Association SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Greenlining Institute The Utility Reform Network (TURN) Utility Consumer's Action Network (UCAN) ENERGY SERVICE COMPANIES (ESCOs) Appliance Recycling Centers of America ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES California League of Conservation Voters Center for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technologies Environmental Defense Fund Natural Resources Defense Council Planning and Conservation League Sierra Club California Union of Concerned Scientists STATE INSTITUTIONS Note: N/A = not available Conference Committee Campaign Total California Contributions Lobbying Expenses $0 $4.203 $0 $30.701 $0 $5.

195 $401.500 N/A $0 $211.331 $0 $97.717 $500 not applicable $0 $138.000 $85.905 $30.000 N/A $100 N/A $7.118 $0 $144.750 $267.748 $32.000 $209.100 $144.100 $0 $500 N/A $100 $0 $500 N/A $2.200 $837.626 $0 $8. Dist.460 $50.281 $1.917 $300 $5.025.179 $0 $3.589 $26.500 N/A ERG Master's Project Mark Stout 56 .750 $1.017 $1. McQuat.1996 Lobbying Totals INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas Electric Power Research Institute General Electric (nuclear plants) Pacific Gas & Electric/U.611 $1.782 $981.500 $29.862 $21.286 $3.571 $500 N/A $200 N/A $1.845 $452.229 $100 N/A $1.250 $148.) Imperial Irrigation District Modesto Irrigation District Northern California Power Agency Sacramento Municipal Utility District Turlock Irrigation District UTILITY LABOR UNIONS California State Association of Electrical Workers California State Pipe Trades Council PAC Int. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (various locals) Southern California Pipe Trades United Assoc. (gas-fired) American Wind Energy Association Bechtel (gas-fired) Bonnie Hays Consulting (Clean Power Day organizing) CalEnergy Co.000 $50. (member of IPPs of NY) United American Energy Wadham Energy Limited Partnership (biomass) Zond Windpower Conference Committee Total California Campaign Lobbying Expenses Contributions (Jan-Sept) $145.724 $500 not applicable $500 $57. Generating Company San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Mission Energy/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITIES California Municipal Utilities Association Gualco Group (lobbyist: Imperial & Modesto Irigatn.000 $35. (biomass) Destec (gas-fired) Edson + Modisette (lobbyist for indep.819 $921.400 $1.454 $3.605 $250 N/A $1.060 $6.159 $3.600 $276.250 N/A $100 N/A $2.543 $29. and Hamrin.147 $500 $739. EVs) Enron Corporation (gas fired) GWF Power Systems (oil and coal-fired) Hansen.750 $418. Inc (consultants) Independent Energy Producers Kenetech Windpower Modesto Energy Limited Partnership (tire burning) Pacific Lumber Company/MAXXAM (solid fuel biomass) SeaWest Windpower Sithe Energies Co.000 $33.S.590 $5.882 $15. producers.032 $0 $172.450 $566. (geothermal) California Cogeneration Council California Solar Energy Industry Association Cannon Energy (windpower) Colmac Energy Inc.240 $0 $178.000 NA $500 $0 $2. of Jrnymn & Aprt Underground Utility/Landscape Utility Workers Union of America INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS AES Pacific/SF Energy Co.

209.989 N/A $9.138 $1.925 $0 $44.721 $748.000 $22.050 $949.000 $500 $456.250 $34.000 $233.137 $550 N/A $5.643 $1.384 $2.1996 Lobbying Totals LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Adams Steel Agricultural Energy Consumers Association California Cement Producers Association California Farm Bureau Federation California Industrial Users California Large Energy Consumers Association California Manufacturers Association California Mining Association PAC California Portland Cement Co. (CLECA member) California Retailers Association California Steel Industries (CLECA member) Californians for Competitive Electricity Fontana Steel Kaiser Aluminum Kaiser Cement Corporation Louisiana Pacific (CMA member) Mitsubishi Cement (CLECA member) National Cement (CLECA member) Riverside Cement (CLECA member) RMC Lonestar (CLECA member) Schnitzer Steel Industries (CLECA member) Southwest Portland Cement Co.500 $251.417 $9.750 $23.296 $800 $25.072 $918.521 $1.500 $47.636 $0 $103.878 $12.438 $500 N/A $0 $1.761 $0 $73.861 $1.750 $37.347 $9.780 ERG Master's Project Mark Stout 57 .050 N/A $0 $214. Texaco Tidelands Oil Tosco Corp.995 N/A $100 N/A $0 $3.016 $1.495 $22.689 $2.177 $300 N/A $0 $29.705 $19.885 $300 $207.754 $4. Western States Petroleum Association SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS California Nevada Community Action Association Greenlining Institute The Utility Reform Network (TURN) Utility Consumer's Action Network (UCAN) Conference Committee Total California Campaign Lobbying Expenses Contributions (Jan-Sept) $41. (CLECA member) Tamco Steel (CLECA member) OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES ARCO California Independent Oil Marketers Association California Independent Oil Producers California Independent Petroleum PAC Chevron (CMA member) Exxon Mobil Southern Counties Oil Co.334 $498 $1.532 $4.500 $277.661.407 $200 $61.478.521 $0 N/A $50 $87.800 not tracked $3.900 $1.521 $14.900 $0 $21.958 $2.950 $3.181 $1.960 $2.712 $100 N/A $200 $16. natural gas.650 $3.245 $335.000 $76. diesel) Unocal (CMA member) Victory Oil Co. (gasoline refining and marketing) Tower Energy Group (oil.573 $2.090 $749 $38.000 $65.622 $67.511 $1.

000 $900 N/A $400 N/A $500 N/A ERG Master's Project Mark Stout 58 .448 $424.378 $100 $21. California Institute for Energy Efficiency California Integrated Waste Management Board (biomass) Note: N/A = not available Conference Committee Total California Campaign Lobbying Expenses Contributions (Jan-Sept) $1.068 $14.066 $500 N/A $250 N/A $22.000 $15.000 $700 $117. of California.438 $4.462 $208.000 $2.585 $33.462 $500 $14.250 $21.790 $100 $14.066 $500 $21.1996 Lobbying Totals ENERGY SERVICE COMPANIES (ESCOs) Appliance Recycling Centers of America Onsite Energy (energy service company) Preferred Energy Services (energy service company) ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES California League of Conservation Voters Energy Foundation/The Tides Center Environmental Defense Fund Natural Resources Defense Council Planning and Conservation League Sierra Club California Union of Concerned Scientists STATE INSTITUTIONS U.

regulators. for $7. “though the CPUC had imposed a ban on communications regarding the Biennial Resource Plan Update (BRPU). alternative energy producers.800 each. as well as the legislator breakdown tables and gift descriptions in Appendix E show that IOUs and large consumers. 1996.79 From 3/16/94 to 3/27/94. 1996. and Privatization” took AB 1890 author Jim Brulte and Conference Committee 79 80 Asmus. CFEE is a “non-profit. and small consumer groups. a clean power auction the CPUC repeatedly postponed upon the urging of the utility. government ministers.As one would imagine. 4 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 59 . and Paris. 4 Asmus. According to investigative writer Peter Asmus. their “Travel project to Europe on Electric Restructuring. and Inner Mongolia.”80 In April of 1995. One example of the type of access to officeholders that money can buy is the junkets run by the California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy. the lobbying summary tables above. paying up to $7. CPUC President Fessler and Commissioner Gregory Conlon were taken by CFEE on an excursion visiting London. including oil and natural gas companies.167 per guest. Conservation. and environmental groups to discuss the British experience with deregulation of electricity. Brussels. From 3/28/96 to 4/8/96. CFEE took Fessler and Conference Committee Assemblyman Mickey Conroy on an 11 day trip to talk with Chinese central government and provincial leaders in Beijing. charitable organization 501(c)(3)” funded by Edison to push Edison’s preferred wholesale PoolCo style market structure. Shanghai. an Edison lobbyist was added to the international travel party at the last minute. to meet with CEOs of the electricity industry. were able to far outspend environmental organizations (who were usually spread thin over many issues).

such as the CPUC proceedings and legislative Conference Committee. stakeholder-driven processes. and Budapest. Conclusion This project synthesized data from several sources including semi-structured interviews with stakeholder representatives & officeholder staff. it appears the investor owned utilities. This analysis generates the hypothesis that these parties were most influential because of superior staff and financial resources. Based on interviews with officeholder staff and a cluster analysis of stakeholder interviews.490 per guest. at the mere cost of $7. Because these stakeholder groups support the capitalist state imperative of wealth “accumulation”. along with small ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 60 . Rather than attempting to verify a pre-determined hypothesis. Using the same officeholder staff interviews and stakeholder interview cluster analysis. as well as their ideological resonance with a conservative Governor’s office. they are well suited for influencing inclusive. Sweden. It is not so surprising that these “thousand pound gorillas” did well in the process.Assemblymember Steve Kuykendall to London. large industrial customers. These clean power advocates. state government archives. in order to find out which stakeholder organizations got what they wanted from California’s electric utility deregulation policy formulation process. and labor unions were the most influential in the deregulation process. The clean power community (renewables industry and environmentalists) were held back by a lack of unity in the face of more monolithic stakeholders. several patterns emerged regarding which groups got far from all of what they wanted. and academic literature. and why or why not different groups were successful. my analysis uses patterns in the data to create emerging theories.

consumer advocates, faced an un-level playing field all along, in large part due to the free-market ideology of Governor Wilson’s office which has been passed down to the CPUC Commissioners over years of appointments. These stakeholder organizations do not have the financial resources to support the level of policy staff, legal experts, and lobbyists that the larger commercial interests were able to bring to bear in order to gain and maintain access to decision-makers. Because they do not represent capitalist state imperatives, these alternative energy industry and public-interest organizations should not find inclusive, stake-holder driven processes such as California electric utility deregulation to be particularly fruitful for obtaining their objectives.

Bibliography
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. AB 1890)? Why? Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings.e. or over time? What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? Officeholder Staff Interviews • • • • • Which stakeholder groups do you think were most effective in influencing the policy formulation process of ____________ and what were they able to obtain from the process? What methods or strategies did these effective groups use to influence the process? Was any particular method or sets of methods most influential? Which stakeholder groups do you think were best able to set the terms of the debate. 1995 Decision? How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. and how could they have improved their approach? Was it always clear what outcomes each stakeholder group wanted from the process? ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 66 .Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Questions Stakeholder Interviews • • • • • • • What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. CPUC vs. and why? Which stakeholder groups do you think could have been more effective in influencing the policy formulation process.

81 CPUC Renewables Working Group. E-1. PG&E had two main goals from the California deregulation process: 1) an orderly transition to a restructured generation environment. PG&E provides gas and electric service to more than 13 million people in northern and central California. PG&E’s experience with the restructuring of the gas industry provided valuable insight that shaped this approach. they want to be able to shape the outcome more effectively according to Kathy. PG&E initially said no to gas deregulation. “Pacific Gas & Electric is a California Investor Owned Utility Company. Now that PG&E has realized electric utility deregulation is inevitable. PG&E does not want to have to automatically take the blame when reliability issues arise. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 67 . and 2) coverage for utility stranded costs and obligations. PG&E wants to avoid the stranding of deals that were made in an era of an intact regulatory compact. Secondly. eventually giving in to it while creating tensions with some parties.Appendix B: Stakeholder Interviews Investor-Owned Electric Utilities Pacific Gas & Electric Kathy Treleven is the Assistant to the Vice President for Policy Coordination & Regulation at PG&E.”81 What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? According to Kathy. For one.

Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. what they perceive as significant funding for renewable energy support. Several areas of compromise for PG&E included irrigation district exemptions for collection of the Competition Transition Charge. but had to compromise a little more than in the CPUC decision. and own up to what they would let go.. “Steve Peace forced everybody to confess what was important to them.” according to Kathy.e. Also. Kathy indicated that the Decision included a plan for an orderly transition to a deregulated generation environment that PG&E desired. PG&E largely got what it wanted. restructuring as envisioned in the CPUC Decision would have been less likely to take place in an orderly manner due to legal wrangling and ongoing filings at the CPUC. and a shortened period for CTC collection. CPUC vs. AB 1890)? Why? Although the CPUC Decision was financially easier on PG&E. compared to the four year collection period in AB 1890. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 68 .How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. increasing the risk to full stranded cost recovery. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? In the formulation of AB 1890. Kathy said that it was important for the Legislature to use a process which brought disparate parties together. the CPUC Decision allowed for more generous stranded cost recovery with a 5 year collection period. 1995 Decision? PG&E got what it wanted on some of the more important issues in the CPUC’s Decision.

in Kathy’s view. PG&E relied upon lobbying at the Commission. “compromises that generated internal dissent. The most important strategy behind all of these tools was the use of a collaborative process to refine the organization’s thinking. the Working Group process. PG&E had a core set of negotiators for AB 1890. this flexibility combined with the pressures of negotiation sometimes resulted in. and responses to Commission requests for input. However. The legislative process can be even messier. PG&E was able to maintain a consistent position on issues throughout the CPUC and Legislative process. discussions in open forums. that sometimes leaked. However.Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. For the formulation of the CPUC Decision. and outside conversations. “way to advance goals with a ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 69 . the negotiating team was given complete freedom to make policy. while the concept of a wholesale-only pool [President Fessler’s original PoolCo proposal] was to be resisted. formal filings. This more inclusive process is a. at finer levels of technical detail. there was consensus within the organization on the basic decisions: direct access was to be supported.” What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? To influence the CPUC Decision. According to Kathy. she indicated that there was an occasional rough edge. The collaboration that went into the MOU was an example of this approach. PG&E approached other parties to float proposal ideas by them.” outside of the organization. “healthy internal debate. She thought this was due to the nature of the regulatory process: workshops. however. Kathy said that there was a. which was required because of the Conference Committee environment created by Chair Peace. More so than in the past. or over time? At a macro level. Although they checked back in with company officers.

San Diego Gas and Electric Jim Cassie is the Director of State Governmental Affairs for SDG&E. Jack. while holding on to what they really wanted. 1996. E. “a subsidiary of Enova Corporation. “People who influenced the outcome were present. It allows an organization to get buy-in from other parties in advance. SDG&E. and willing to be straightforward on what they can give on. “Uncertain road ahead for utilities” and Enova Corporation 1996 annual report. Kathy said that what mattered most in influencing the formulation of AB 1890 was responsiveness to Steve Peace’s requirements. a gas utility which serves a territory largely overlapping with Southern California Edison’s.” according to Kathy. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 70 .”82 Enova Corporation has announced a merger with Pacific Enterprises.reasonableness check. App. and gas service to 0. 1996. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? In contrast. 82 83 CPUC Renewables Working Group. Sirard. SDG&E provides service to 1.” Organizations had to be able to make decisions right on the spot to shape the outcome. the parent company of Southern California Gas Company83.15 million electric customers in San Diego and southern Orange Counties.7 million customers in San Diego County. is a California Investor Owned Utility Company founded in 1881.

everyone should pay. except for electricity purchases from Mexican geothermal generators. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. 84 CPUC Renewables Working Group. SDG&E was a supporter of the PoolCo market structure along with Edison. and got it struck down. if you are a broker. High priced renewables are OK if you are not moving to a competitive future. with the exception of the legislation’s mechanism for a rate reduction. SDG&E wanted to become the lowest priced California IOU. This would put us at a competitive disadvantage compared to PG&E and Edison. so we would have to buy energy or credits.What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? Our main goals were stranded assets recovery and the creation of a new marketplace where we could compete. The lucky Arizona utilities went with coal. but are not viable with competition. [The CPUC’s proposal in the December Decision would have required roughly 10% of all retail sales to be backed up by tradable credits for renewables. We were very opposed to the BRPU. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 71 . 1996. 1995 Decision? The PUC was on the right track.84] SDG&E does not have any renewables. We went to FERC. When Tom Page came in as CEO in 1981. we had the highest rates in the nation. they did not get there by investing in high cost renewables. AB 1890 mirrors the Decision in many ways. it would be difficult to get 5% renewables. Also. We were strongly opposed to the RPS. It does not make sense for SDG&E alone to go out and acquire more expensive renewable resources. Throughout the ‘70s.

If the Legislature had not done what it did to reconcile competing interests. tried to talk with everybody as much as possible. Whether this happens is up to SDG&E’s operation. Enova [Enova Energy. SDG&E took part in a series of hearings. the Commissioners have no authority over municipal utilities. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i.How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? AB 1890 provides a framework set to achieve our goals. the goals of an unregulated affiliate may be different than a utilities. AB 1890)? Why? We supported the December Decision. The PUC was not the right forum for this. We tried to participate in the process. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. The PUC had fallen into low esteem with the Legislature. CPUC vs. which has formed a joint venture with Pacific Enterprises. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 72 . These differences were worked out internally with our affiliate. the process would have been smoother. and AB 1890 extended it. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? In addition to the filing formal comments. or over time? In getting ready for competition. We have one 85 Enova Corporation 1996 annual report. Had there been more coordination between the PUC and the Legislature.. there would have been litigation or more legislation.e. Energy Pacific85]. we have started a non-regulated business At times. but we stepped all over each other internally.

If they did not solve them. Peace created a mood that we could get the package done. in that their money goes away in 2002. because of the different characteristics of different states. Peace would. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? We stuck to our two goals as the most important priorities. A delegation has taken AB 1890 to DC. We have a $1/4 billion to invest in the ISO. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 73 . We are asking Congress to leave California alone. all of the delegates have signed on. SDG&E had eight people involved in the process. nobody knew where it was going. He was adamant against the RPS. at which time they must get competitive. Steve Peace would pick an issue. I will not be surprised if they push for new legislation in 2001. try to resolve it. If it could not be resolved yet. and need to hit the 1/1/98 deadline. The Republicans did not want any renewables funding. and nobody would like the outcome. As AB 1890 started.or two full time staff in San Francisco. The renewables community has a problem. supported by regulatory attorneys and experts brought in when needed. The Conference Committee provided a forum for stakeholders to solve their problems in a collaborative approach. he created momentum with no recess. but Byron Sher needed appeasement. Jim Brulte and Bill Leonard wanted to bail on them. he would move on. Over time. Have sold it that AB 1890 is not a model for the nation. with three officers who had good control over what we were doing. Peace became an advocate for resource diversity. because of the BRPU experience. This was an exercise that none of us want to do soon.

Our three principles. Over time. and other energy service providers. If any customers are to benefit. not “the big guys eat first”. 000 square mile service territory has a population of more than 11 million. We could have been perceived as opposing direct access. restructuring came to be viewed as inevitable. The 109-year old investor owned utility serves more than 4. we adopted a principled approach that recognized the interests of Edison. This is best implemented under a transition. we were positioned as an anti-restructuring. large and small customers. a manifestation of these mutual interests. be we did get a principled ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 74 . “the nation’s second largest utility. First. and SCE investors as well as independent energy producers should have the opportunity for a return on investment. and served as a basis for AB 1890. With the encouragement of the Governor’s office.”86 What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? In early 1995. opportunity. creating a level playing field. were equity. 1995 Decision? Those three principles were significant components of the December Decision. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. let’s do this the right way. based on number of customers. The regulatory compacts that we entered into need to be recognized. all customers should at the same time. We also pursued the opportunity for a return on investment. don’t rock the boat utility. The utility’s 50.Southern California Edison Tommy Ross is the Director of Public Affairs at the Sacramento office for SCE. with a phase-in to direct access.2 million customers in Central and Southern California. equity. and return on investment. I would not say we got everything we wanted. so we decided if this was going to come into play.

All AB 1890 represents is an unfolding framework. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. or over time? Absolutely. and CTC exemptions. it is best to adopt a principled approach. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? Edison worked to ensure that the Commissioners and Legislators understood that the interests being served by our proposals were more than just our own. We made sure they knew 86 CPUC Renewables Working Group. We could always ask what principle is driving a requested amendment. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 75 . we do not know how it will turn out. App. we were very consistent. CPUC vs. Generally. it validated the direction taken by the December Decision. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings.e. putting language in the statute made it more likely to get a known outcome. in terms of headroom for shareholder returns. Since regulatory changes are subject to regulatory whims.. We will not know how Edison faired until after the transition. Since there are still issues for Edison around stranded cost recovery.approach which recognizes the different parties interests. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? The same is true for this legislation. 1996. otherwise you may open up doors to places you do not want to go. E. This allowed us to be consistent. This made for touchy meetings with the parties. AB 1890)? Why? We were satisfied with AB 1890.

On average. which ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 76 . and a Proposition 13 clause stating that local governments can not charge more than the cost of service for utility customers. we have a small. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? In the political arena. San Francisco.Interview #1 Stuart Wilson is the Assistant Executive Director for CMUA. For both the Commission and Sacramento. CMUA members had a debate at the beginning of 1996 as to whether to pursue our own legislation. on-site staff. Municipal Electric Utilities California Municipal Utilities Association . stranded costs are a bigger issue for municipal utilities than for the IOUs. We put in legislation to prevent customers from avoiding CTC payment. What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? This was a mix of internal and external politics.that everybody was giving up something. and DC offices also have weekly meetings to coordinate strategy. even now we have weekly meetings with corporate officers to discuss implementation. not getting all they wanted. regulatory. This is why we were so successful in helping resolve issues. and legal expertise from the corporate offices. excluding electric co-operatives. a lobbying organization representing all but three of the municipal utilities in California. Edison strived to keep it simple. working with broad-based coalitions. supported by policy. There were two areas of concern: physical bypass. We also involved people at the highest levels. for instance with the MOU partners. The Sacramento. with customers removing themselves from our distribution service.

Federal power. AB 1890 also includes a requirement for our munis to begin direct access by January 1. referring to access to tax-exempt bonds and inexpensive.. as well as a longer transition period for direct access. App. We had to stay at the table in order to ensure that our concerns were addressed. AB 1890 has good stranded cost recovery language which includes physical bypass. What 87 CPUC. public benefits programs. 1995. an argument which CMUA refutes. and an outline of flexible. other than not wanting deregulation to happen. Status Report on Restructuring. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. we will end up playing defense. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? There was no time limit for municipal utility CTC recovery.. We wanted to avoid mandates or language on an “un-level playing field”. 2000. The Legislature did not need to mandate this.. The direct access reciprocity requirements were expected. Also. Our proposal included voluntary participation in the PoolCo. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 77 . we avoided “level playing field” language on tax exempt financing. [IOUs have made arguments about unfair competition from municipal utilities. our customers would have insisted on direct access because of competitiveness concerns.could be used to disallow CTC collection.87] CMUA also sought the option of long CTC recovery periods for its members. This forced the munis to support full stranded cost recovery in the IOU CTC. CMUA decided that if we do not take a more proactive approach. in order to get the legislative authority for CTC recovery. We came up with a proposal to prepare for the December Decision. a quid pro quo for CTC protection. 1995 Decision? CMUA had no clear objective at the CPUC. 3.

. The legislation also allowed the ISO to be an independent entity before the FERC filing. We did not have huge problems with their Decision. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 78 . giving munis leverage. CPUC vs. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i.e. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. We agreed to collection of public purpose program funds as a percentage of revenue at a level at least as high as the lowest IOU. which would have caused transmission constraints. Municipal utility representatives attended working group meetings. We also appeared at full panel hearings. short of wishing deregulation would all go away. Without us. except for its accelerating the transition period on IOUs. AB 1890)? Why? The PUC did not do anything directly to munis in the December Decision. including our proposal. but we were forced to concede on the ISO issue. with allocation decisions retained by the local municipal utility leadership. We are not worse off from the legislation. the ISO would control transmission assets for only 2/3 of the system.was not anticipated was the requirement for munis to be part of the ISO. or over time? In general. We had to agree with the IOUs on the FERC filing for the ISO. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? CMUA filed formal comments. This was a compromise reached with Ralph Cavanagh. quickening their move to a competitive posture. This would not have passed the market power test at FERC.

Interview #2 Jerry Jordan is the Executive Director of CMUA. muni levels rising. CMUA lobbied people.What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? The Conference Committee had a meeting in Anaheim to focus on muni issues. California Municipal Utilities Association . What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? “Blundering”. The pending rate decrease for IOUs provided a cushion for restructuring. Peace blew up when he realized he was dealing with an equation that would not balance. IOU levels dropping. CMUA presented a slide graph showing rate forecasts. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? The PUC had no reason to listen to us as they do not regulate us. and their final Decision had the suggestion of both a wholesale pool and bilateral trades [direct access]. CMUA went in very concerned about collecting stranded costs. but were perfectly willing to see no ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 79 . The only alternative was to walk away from the deal completely. Because of this. CMUA filed comments. forcing the legislation. It was better to stay with it than not have any leverage. Stuart Wilson [see previous interview] recommended that I speak with him also to gain additional insights. Edison made threats that AB 1890 would be just as prescriptive for munis as it was for IOUs. spending more time negotiating with other parties. Munis have overlap constituencies in ratepayers and citizen shareholders. but did spend significant time with Committee members. We had sponsored legislation to assure no customers could avoid paying the CTC. we did not oppose the Decision.

created in 1946. volunteering to do public purpose programs in exchange for other concessions. see interviews]. beat up. 1997. and regulated by an elected district board which sets policy and rates for this electric utility. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 80 . and sent out to negotiate. Our mantra was lockstep with the California Municipal Utilities Association [CMUA. Reinventing Electric Utilities. SMUD also wanted to ensure that the ability to preserve our financial integrity was not adversely affected. SMUD has a notable history of investing heavily in renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies. We were prepared to oppose the bill if it did not include local control for municipal utilities. in other words we wanted to be able to recover our stranded costs. CMUA had two lobbyists. We were called in by the Committee. In the Conference Committee meetings there were also 10 to 15 of our members present at any one time.88 What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? We had one guiding principle: Preserve the autonomy of SMUD and other munis to determine their role in a restructured environment. but were concerned that legislation would handicap our ability to recover them. We never questioned that there would be stranded assets. 88 Asmus & Smeloff. Stuart Wilson and me. SMUD is a Publicly Owned Utility for the Sacramento region. 1993. It was difficult to imagine how the Legislature would perceive a muni’s need. Sacramento Municipal Utility District Allan Lind has been SMUD’s contract lobbyist since September. CMUA did not have the army of people Edison did.legislation passed. We maintained flexibility.

How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20.Going into the process. It created an environment of uncertainty. SMUD is very committed to renewables. The munis are in a foreign land with the PUC. with board candidates who run on platforms of clean energy and social responsibility that our consumers want sustained. Assemblyman Steve Kuykendall was direct in his comments. There was also a concern that munis would be constrained to the same clock as the IOUs in terms of the duration of the CTC recovery period.clean energy. this made the question go away. there was a questioning of what role. that some other source should pay. this impacts munis. philosophical debate. By constructing a brave new world for IOUs. what equity or fairness issues were raised by them being in the marketplace. it is planned that PG&E will drop their rates below SMUDs by 2002. we have to resolve this by 2002. The Legislature did not elevate this to a well-reasoned. should a public agency have in a restructured environment. SMUD will finish recovering our CTC by 2002. SMUD would have been well served if the PUC jacked up IOU commitments for ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 81 . SMUD responded. It is difficult to maintain public purpose programs if everyone else abandons them. But in reality. energy efficiency -. there was a question of whether we would get 100% stranded cost recovery. 1995 Decision? There is nothing of direct benefit to SMUD in the Decision. it seemed obvious that these principles were a gimme. We are a consumer elected entity. Since our rates were 25% below PG&E’s. ‘96 Rate Restructuring Settlement. This is a classic question of public versus private decision making. SMUD’s territory is a small island surrounded by PG&E. Even though municipal utilities have the authority to recover costs. if any. In the June. This was the bottom line. he does not see a role for munis in a deregulated world. Some would argue that the SMUD customer did not decide to open Rancho Seco.

For us. this gives us political standing. AB 1890 has language written that denies a muni’s ability to impose a CTC unless they allow direct access.public purpose programs. How this is playing out. This is an infringement on municipal autonomy. If we do not go to direct access. This is not a problem for SMUD. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 82 . enhancing our stature at the federal level. this is not onerous or burdensome. This is arguably a meaningless statement. This is a profound shift in how munis and IOUs relate to FERC. not to say that we can’t operate as business as usual. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? It’s not like we were asking for a whole lot. But this language could burden us with litigation. but got more than we asked for. but it might be for others. it would not have put this in. because the repayment of current debt could be viewed as a CTC. If the IOUs do not respect the munis. a cloud that we do not need. As I mentioned. AB 1890 also set time limits on the duration of CTC recovery. The state’s regulation of Investor Owned Utilities differs from a muni’s ability to decide how to serve. but arguably gives standing to third parties to contest SMUD’s approach to restructuring. I do not know. we can point to the legislation. and conditions on CTC recovery. SMUD did get something more than we asked for also. We did not get everything we wanted. Going in. someone can accuse us of having rates too high. nobody saw the munis as co-equals to the IOUs. AB 1890 states that filings to FERC would be jointly between the municipal utilities and the IOUs. A lot of AB 1890 is not crisp. If the Legislature had respect for the municipal affairs doctrine. It would have been difficult for the IOUs to keep up with us on these programs and bring down rates.

businesses will make location decisions based on electricity costs. As for 100% stranded cost recovery for the IOUs. Since munis could recover 100%. I would find that the IPPs see this as a huge giveaway. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. The rate reduction bond is no skin off our nose either. it was used as a basis in the argument for 100% cost recovery by the IOUs. principles for reciprocity on direct access. CPUC vs.” I think we got used. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 83 . saying “What is good for the goose is good for the gander. it codified that customers must sign up to a CTC. since it places a premium on their bill extending into the future. but would not want to change the outcome. It works to SMUD’s advantage to keep their rates high.e. This was no small feat for the IOUs. or over time? I think so.. It skews the time until true competition. but residential customers will not leave their jobs. AB 1890)? Why? We prefer AB 1890 because of the language which was added to our benefit: The joint filing with FERC. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. The strategy of reducing rates to industrial customers. while keeping residential rates high works just fine. it would have been appropriate for the Legislature to allow some lower percentage. This could not have been done by the CPUC.The bill does a couple of profound things.

putting in 1/3 to 2/3 of my time. The thing that sets people off is that LADWP transfers $100 million a year to their general fund from their utility revenues.What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? We participated in workshops and in written testimony. Assistant General Manager. I was the point person in lining up meetings that several of us would attend. which does not include campaign contributions. including through the CMUA. The IOUs have more resources to devote to this. LADWP is a creature of LA. but came in for visiting with the staff and members two or three times each. We met with legislative staff and members. Munis can be divided into two groups: those that are creature of city governments. We do not have a lobbyist at the CPUC. As a public agency. Comments on municipal utilities and taxation: LADWP [Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. They were not camping out at the Capital. SMUD is an independent special district that can not do that. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? SMUD did the lobbying and advocacy that public agencies are allowed to do. California’s largest municipal utility89] is a favorite whipping boy of some of the members from Southern California. and those that are independent. but do send attorneys to represent us. so be it. we have to play things straight up. In addition to myself. causing concern with other munis. there were three other people with direct contacts: SMUD’s General Manager. There are also hybrids that fall in between such as ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 84 . If the city council needs this transfer to balance the budget. more at stake. and Director of Public Affairs. We also networked our position with other utilities.

Propositions 64 and 218 create a cloud over a muni’s ability to collect taxes. building inventory is stupid. the city has imposed a duty on SMUD to collect this tax. With deregulation. a coalition of labor unions whose members work at all of the electric utilities in California. saying this would jeopardize the bill.the Santa Clara Municipal Utility District. like protecting the jobs of meter readers. In cases where fights would be inevitably lost.Interview #1 David Marcus is a technical consultant to CUE. In a competitive system. with city council members as their board of directors. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 85 . Highlights of Restructuring. 89 CMUA. no one is responsible for reliability. owner interests do not. They would not take munis in. you need to create a structure to ensure reliability. What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? The California unions decided early on that digging in our feet against deregulation was a bad strategy. as it was expected to pass. driving up prices.. which is a standalone district. Existing regulated rate systems have incentives for reliability through excess capacity. not jobs. we decided to go for retraining. Utility Labor Unions Coalition of California Utility Employees . SMUD collects a utility tax for the city of Sacramento. The ultimate idea of our strategy is to protect jobs. By passing a tax. The strategy then was to protect people. Generators want to keep reliability on the edge.. David was referred to me by Carl Blumstein as playing a central role in this labor coalition’s strategy [see interview with Carl]. There was a bill in the Assembly to immunize the IOUs against Prop 218. but this is a case when union interests and public interests coincide.

We already had viable wholesale competition. we shifted to focus on generation. The legislation also attempts to ensure the reliability of the system by building in responsibility for inspection and maintenance into the new regulatory structure. We are willing to compete. transmission.Interview #2 Marc Joseph is an attorney actively representing CUE through both the CPUC and legislative tracks. and how the market should be shaped. but criteria of reliability and quality of service. there are no savings to customers to be gained from retail competition. and distribution reliability. We pointed out that the only part of the industry subject to competition was the variable cost of energy. Coalition of California Utility Employees . a result where the only criteria was not cents/kWh. Also. We initially focused on whether. and to what extent. As it became clear that this argument would be lost. when a utility plant is divested to a new company. a technical consultant to CUE [see preceding interview]. Marc was referred to me by David Marcus. the existing unions get a contact for two years of plant operation. What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? We hoped to shape restructuring policy to minimize the adverse impacts on utility employees while still achieving the goals of the Commission: Lowering rates while protecting employees. Most customers want more than incremental savings. Enron now agrees with us. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 86 . and responsiveness to customer inquiries. increasing efficiencies without sacrificing reliability and service. but with a rational transition.How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? Getting CTC recovery for worker retraining and severance packages was a major victory.

It recognizes the need for divested plants to be operated by capable people. 1995 Decision? Not very much. dedicated workforce. Some things were being addressed in other proceedings. AB 1890 provided for recovery of reasonable employee transition costs. with a 2 year continuation of the existing staff. and quantitative reliability measures were beginning in another rulemaking. It calls for the adoption of standards for the inspection and maintenance of distribution and transmission. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 87 .How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. distribution reliability was in a separate rulemaking. CPUC vs. we supported AB 1890. But no standards were discussed for inspection and maintenance. The Decision also did not recognize the importance of maintaining local generation throughout California.. For example. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? Most of what we sought. ‘98 start date because of that. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. The Decision fell considerably short of where it needed to be. AB 1890 also gives the ISO the responsibility to achieve Western Systems Coordinating Council (WSCC) standards for planning reserve criteria. and have committed to the January 1. or the value of a highly skilled. AB 1890)? Why? Yes. The CPUC is required to ensure that generation reliability is maintained before plants leave their jurisdiction.e. It attempted to address the means for employees to be provided with assistance to handle their transition. and it did not provide for generation supply reliability.

CMA. AB 3153 providing employee transition cost. that was one of the basis for AB 1890. and AB 2610 dealing with generation reliability. and the oil companies. including PG&E. This collaborative effort resulted in the June ‘96 PG&E rate restructuring settlement. Earlier in the summer. “has represented all facets of the U. wind energy industry since 1974. CUE also took part in a coalition. We have had no trouble with consistency. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? CUE marched in the Steve Peace death march. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 88 . or over time? CUE has always spoken with one voice.Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. that held together. spending all of August working hard. CLECA.S. Independent Producers American Wind Energy Association Nancy Rader is the West Coast Representative for the American Wind Energy Association. that featured a rate freeze in exchange for a finite CTC collection period. we sponsored two bills. We participated fully in the Committee hearings and drafting of language. AWEA. but did some personal lobbying before the December Decision. with three or four representatives in Sacramento much of the time. All comments we filed had yellow covers to stand out in stacks. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? CUE took part in the process with many written comments as well as in a full panel hearing. We participated fully in the public process at every opportunity. We did not do much.

Although she says the Decision language was vague. 10 project developers/operators.” EDF led a coalition with the only non-MRPR proposal in the CPUC Renewables Working Group. efficient policy mechanism. 22 consultants. 1995 Decision? Nancy was successful in getting the RPS embodied in the CPUC’s Decision as a minimum renewables purchase requirement (MRPR). She mentioned that another stumbling block for the 90 CPUC Renewables Working Group. including 155 members in California. and is a long-term.” for supporting renewable electricity generation.AWEA’s 750 members. with implementation details to be worked out through a CPUC stakeholder Renewables Working Group process.”90 What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? Nancy says AWEA sought to attain a “strong renewable energy policy. includes 7 turbine manufacturers. The RPS. However. 12 accessory parts manufacturers. such as the Renewables Portfolio Standard. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 89 . the MRPR was. academicians and interested individuals. “corrects market failures and market barriers. which Nancy and I found to be clearly outside of the purview of the Working Group’s charter. “undermined by EDF [the Environmental Defense Fund] who actively sought to increase opposition to the policy in order to build support for their competing policy.” from the California electric utility deregulation process. the essential elements of the RPS were included in the MRPR so that AWEA could largely get what they wanted. Nancy had developed the RPS concept for AWEA since being hired on. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. E-1.

along with Jane Kelly of UCS. and that she was not certain of his support at the time. Nancy remembers that the meeting with President Fessler resulted in a “vague discussion”. “productive discussions”. The RPS. AWEA’s position in the CPUC and Legislature has been consistent since October of 1994. and that consequently UCS’s support of the RPS was critical. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? To achieve AWEA’s objectives at the CPUC. Nancy. or over time? According to Nancy. and ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 90 .RPS was a lack of support from the Sierra Club. It amounted to nothing more than a deal. leading to no long term policy. Nancy relied mainly on written testimony filed with the Commission. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? Despite AWEA’s success in the CPUC Decision. they were not able to get any of what the organization originally wanted in the bill’s language. In comparison. when Nancy was hired to develop a strategy for how renewables policy would be structured in a competitive industry. is a long-term. whose outcome was dependent on allocation by a state agency. the meetings with Commissioner Knight’s staff were. comprised of detailed arguments. in comparison. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. market-driven policy. Nancy said that the allocation of Systems Benefits Charge money for renewables in AB 1890 was a temporary pile of dollars. arranged for personal meetings with CPUC President Fessler and the staff of Commissioners Knight and Conlon.

” What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? In contrast.Nancy feels that. had killed the RPS before any discussion began. resulting in very little control for AWEA. “trusted in the process. she was able to get rid of the Renewables Marketing Agent concept without insulting its creator.” The Committee Chairman. but Peace killed it again. Steve Peace. Nancy continued to describe the process: “Time was too short. “Knight was sold on the RPS concept because he is a believer in markets. AWEA lobbyist Joe Caves was able to get John White’s customer rebate proposal pulled from the draft language.” Nancy did feel that AWEA got things derailed out of the conference committee that would have been worse than what eventually emerged. There were major egos on the Conference Committee with pre-formed opinions. and it worked. The new CPUC President Conlon tried to put the RPS back on the table for discussion. By melting down the proposed language. and people were not listening to arguments.” She was also invited to participate in a full panel hearing on public purpose programs. At one point towards the end of the Conference Committee process. Nancy remembers that the conference committee meetings were occurring in an. with many issues being ironed out at once.” One issue that hampered Nancy was that the Independent Energy Producers (IEP) representative “had control of the pen for draft language. Peace threw all of the stakeholders out of the room and told them to come back in one hour with their deals already ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 91 . Nancy said she. “incredible time crunch. Chairman Peace. the Legislative process in the summer of 1996 was a “nightmare” according to Nancy. In retrospect. AWEA relied mainly on Senate and Conference Committee hearings as well as input on draft legislative language to influence the policy outcome.

California Manufacturers Association (CMA). because he. in order to come up with the $540 million allocated for renewables support over the four year transition period. “wanted a win. She was disheartened that Ralph would not pull NRDC’s endorsement. “California’s oldest and leading trade association representing the interests of developers and operators of independent energy facilities. she offered to walk away from the table and pull AWEA’s endorsement if Ralph Cavanagh of the Natural Resources Defense Council. IEP’s primary goals are to safeguard the interests of operating independent energy projects. 91 CPUC Renewables Working Group.”91 According to Jan.made. NRDC had no media strategy. In the end. IEP was formed in 1982. the key advocate for energy efficiency funding. as well as independent power marketers.” Nancy added that if TURN had not endorsed the report. This resulted in furious horse-trading between Southern California Edison (SCE). Independent Energy Producers Jan Smutny-Jones is the Executive Director of IEP. E. She was also disappointed that no discussion happened amongst legislators outside of the bipartisan conference committee. When Nancy saw the public goods money being stripped away from energy efficiency. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 92 . largely because no public interest group was willing to oppose the bill. didn’t want to ruffle any strategies. AWEA endorsed the bill reported out of the conference committee. made no attempt to build clout. App. but relied on their name instead. 1996. AWEA would have dropped their endorsement also. The utilities were able to obtain a three month extension on to recovery of the Competition Transition Charge. along with gutting energy efficiency funding. and Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E). would do the same. resulting in little debate on the Assembly or Senate floor. and ensure that California remains a healthy market for the development in the independent energy industry.

300 MW set aside for renewable generation. IEP was invited to the meetings. the CPUC Biennial Resource Plan Update. For IEP. IEP did well from restructuring. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 93 . [SCE succeeded in killing the BRPU at the Federal level in 1995.] What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? It was clear that the way we were doing things was not working well. By allowing utilities an opportunity to recover 100% of their stranded costs. but not allowed to talk. Initially. A large portion of the MOU is reflected in the December Decision. we influenced the Memorandum of Understanding that was released in August of 1995. IEP also sought to maintain a policy for resource diversity in the mix of generation. 1995 Decision? Overall. and included a policy for maintaining resource diversity. Ensuring the sanctity of existing contracts is our highest priority. independent producers were better off working with customers. to spending millions of dollars developing California’s integrated resource planning process. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. Direct access is a tool for future development. Over time. the MOU allowed the restructuring process to move forward. the Decision allowed for a direct access market developing. the Governor’s office convened a meeting due to the hostilities between large customers and Edison at a time when Pete Wilson was trying to run a Presidential campaign.and represents a diverse group of gas and coal-fired cogeneration and renewable energy plants. In May. The BRPU had resulted in 1300 MW of contracts before being struck down. Over time. they had moved from using California’s Standard Offer process as a vehicle for the expansion of the independent power sector.

which was not supported by IEP or customer groups who feared that we would wind up with a market structure which would cause unraveling. we had historically tried to take the high road on public policy issues. or over time? Yes. AB 1890)? Why? IEP prefers AB 1890. It was necessary to provide an underpinning. leading to an almost unanimous understanding of the need for legislation. but do not want their contracts challenged by the IOUs or have the IOUs driven into bankruptcy. on the issue of full stranded cost recovery. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. For example. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? Our primary focus was through the MOU. a “settlement negotiation with a critical mass of interest groups”. some members do not agree with this. The municipal utility issue also needed to be dealt with.. as well as support for resource diversity.e. We also made a myriad of filings. Dan Fessler was a proponent of the PoolCo.How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? Much of the same applies to AB 1890. Overall we did well in terms of direct access to customers. The legislation also includes language on a method for calculating SRAC [short run avoided cost. There continues to be opportunities to take potshots over a lack of consistency. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 94 . the amount paid to QFs such as many IEP members under PURPA law]. CPUC vs. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings.

even if construction of their plant started before December 20. First. Developers will be much better off selling to people who want to buy renewable energy rather than forcing it down utilities throats. which would have happened without restructuring.What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? A lot built on the MOU. The Renewables Portfolio Standard was put in at the last minute. 1995. with the creation of an expanding core group of people who decided this was the right way to go. The RPS lasted about seven minutes at the Legislature. Three fascinating things have occurred since the issuance of AB 1890. The $540 million surcharge for renewables was Plan B. there are the three or four merchant gas plants will be built in California in the next five years [see Edie Lau. CMA and CLECA offered to carry the CTC forward [three months] in order to include renewables funding in the public goods charge. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 95 . I believe the vast majority of developers will survive the 11th year QF cliff. An issue that had not been dealt with well at the CPUC was renewables. Tactically. who would still be required to pay the CTC or an exit fee. which is how the RPS was perceived. there is a move away from command and control. The cogeneration-CTC waivers in AB 1890 were for the companies that were stuck in the predicament of having begun construction of new generation. General comments: In the December Decision. and not enough talking with other market players. but there will be an industry shakeout. anybody going to self-generation would have to pay the CTC. using oblique language. It did not have political legs within the Commission. The renewables community was like a family with a rich uncle dying and no will. there was too much fighting with the Sierra Club and EDF. Strategically.

To the PUC. This is based on input from growers. Then there is the announcement by SCE that they will be divesting 100% of their generation. three have. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. a lobbing group representing all farm groups in California except for those represented by the Farm Bureau. and distribute electricity. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 96 . This got traded away. Giving choices to folks will lower rates. which has significant power to buy. independent power developer] bought Zond [wind turbine developer] speaks of significant market potential. Now others are precluded by the non-bypassability of the CTC which will not allow for competition.“Law generates push for gas-fired power plants”]. sell. The IOUs were able to protect the whole concept of CTCs. We also desired that the IOUs share in some of the burden of their stranded costs. the nukes were not. While we recognized that contracts with QFs were forced. the fact that Enron [large. non-bypassable meant something. An irrigation district is a type of water district. Large Electricity Consumers Agricultural Energy Consumers Association Michael Boccadoro is the Executive Director of AECA. who have a choice in all of their other commodity inputs. playing a significant role in planning and cost overruns. Finally. Although more than 70 irrigation districts never have sought to utilize this power. Agriculture had been fuel switching for a number of years. 1995 Decision? AECA got direct access with a slow phase-in. What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? AECA was a strong advocate for direct access. but lost everything else.

it can file for a rehearing. unlike at the PUC. AB 1890)? Why? AECA preferred AB 1890. This can go to the state supreme court if it is not dealt with early enough. We were leading. the CTC issue would not be resolved with less than 100% stranded cost recovery. Agriculture got the overwhelming majority of the CTC exemptions.. so we left it alone. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? AECA approached things differently than the other intervenors. vocal opponents to the PoolCo. but we did not get less than 100% CTC recovery. Diesel and natural gas use was exempted.e. We made direct testimony at the PUC.How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? AECA won on direct access. with a grassroots effort generating letters to and from the Legislature. We lobbied at the Governor’s office. We were able to carve out roughly three hundred megawatts of CTC exemptions for irrigation districts. approach was very political. CPUC vs. or over time? AECA recognized that in the legislative debate. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. as did almost everybody except for Edison. although ideally there would be no limits. The CTC could have been challenged as an exit tax. What kept the utilities at the table was that if a party disagrees with the PUC. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. Our ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 97 . based on something in a Decision not supported by the record.

We also had a strategy based on financial market leverage. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 98 . we could have pulled a lot of agricultural votes on the floor otherwise.What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? The legislative debate was different. A friendly analyst provided us with a fax list for Wall Street. The irrigation district CTC exemptions was one of the last amendments added. IOUs care more than anything about their stock price. A couple of the Conference Committee members did not have a clue what was in the bill. sending press releases to Wall Street analysts. We were one of the last groups hanging on the outside. but stayed out of the MOU. The political leverage of agricultural votes was critical. Brand. traditionally most active with CPUC proceedings. an organization that was formed in the late 1970s to represent industrial natural gas and electricity users. but managed to get its language in thanks to Curt Pringle. AECA participated with a customer coalition. California Industrial Users Phil Stohr of Downey. This was too complex a bill for a split conference committee. We then made sure that anything negative about the utilities made it out to the analysts. which has evolved into an electricity-oriented group. Seymour & Rowher is Counsel for CIU. It is amazing how much time the CEOs of IOUs spend on Wall Street. We had an irrigation district bill which the utilities had previously killed. Steve Peace kept saying it would go with a unanimous Committee vote or it was not going to go at all.

representing 24 companies that consume over 4% of U. with Direct Access pushed out on the horizon and tied to a range of contingencies. The draft Decisions [May. the development of an option that would permit industrial customers to look somewhere else than the UDC for electricity generation. resulting in the PG&E rate restructuring settlement. the parties were involved in many conversations. but in general was a step forward. Much of that related to the MOU. This was a new element which brought a new dimension: a rate freeze with a well- 92 Asmus.” ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 99 . “Retail wheeling:. this sent the Commissioners scurrying. 1995. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20.What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? We sought retail wheeling.S.. Retail wheeling served as a muted backdrop. This was not perceived as realistic before the Yellow Book. 1995 CPUC proposals] were a major disappointment because of the dominance of PoolCo. electricity92] mentioned retail wheeling to the CPUC. The work between May and September was critical. The overwhelming majority of our activity has been on traditional rate cases. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? The element at the core of AB 1890 came about as the result of informal negotiations between the December Decision and AB 1890. there was no forum in which to advocate for it. The December Decision had aspects which gave us pause. Between May of 1995 and the Decision. In 1986 when ELCON [the Electricity Consumers Resource Council.. 1995 Decision? Quite a lot in terms of basic concepts.

e.defined period of time in which CTC obligations would be disposed of. In terms of process.. The provisions presenting a definite time period within which the CTC would have to be recovered were critical. Each brought a new dimension and set of sub-issues to be absorbed into our area of interest. CIU was not a signatory to the MOU. for instance both included language regarding no cost shifting. Provisions of the MOU had a lot to do with the process moving to the Legislature. CPUC vs. To fully answer. AB 1890)? Why? The December Decision advanced the cause another step. many parties felt legislation was necessary to assure a measure of permanence in the Commission’s policy Decision. Incorporation of the Commission’s policy and some additional elements into the Bill took California another big step down the road towards restructuring. need to get into the specifics of the bill. There were a lot of areas of overlap between the December Decision and AB 1890. or over time? CIU had no problem speaking with one voice. There was a perception that Edison’s zeal reflected a concern that their hard-fought victory for 100% CTC recovery might be ephemeral. We have seen our position evolve at each major waystation. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. But the basics of our position have remained unchanged throughout ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 100 . Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. This carried over directly to AB 1890. Along with the rate freeze concept. and that they needed a legislative backstop. laying out requirements for the parties to get specific Legislation. this time frame foreshortened the transition to the new competitive market and meaningful customer choice.

but had no idea of the magnitude of tasks in the implementation phase over the last 18 months. some were at the request or demand of the Committee. and filed comments at every opportunity. Some of these meetings were spontaneous. it felt like “we’ve been here before”. able to draw on experts knowledgeable on energy policy and acquisition. Early on. we had member company representatives participate in several full panel hearings. as well as the caucusing and preparatory sessions amongst parties. we commented on the Yellow Book.What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? We were involved in all formal proceedings. particularly in the collateral coalition meetings. but our concerns at the time were still rate-case focused. We have also met with the Commissioners. CIU took part in most full panel hearings. We were there for the great bulk of the hearings. The raw material of the initial bill came from coalition participants. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? Our participation was largely a matter of being present and accounted for. due to the length of the policy phase proceedings. The issuance of the Blue Book sent seismic waves through the community. It is important for the Commissioners to hear from the people actually running the businesses whose electricity needs have been our focus. At some points. We have occasionally lobbied on more specific issues. We thought that we were busy during the policy phases of restructuring. and made our contribution. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 101 . This applies to the formal Committee. Our members are business entities with a nationwide presence. for instance on the rate restructuring settlement. Rather than have counsel speak. bringing member company representatives in from time to time to discuss broader agendas.

cost-based rates. We have made some legislative appearances. and there was a perception of considerable influence emanating from the Governor’s office. President Conlon was there in the wee hours of the morning.This time spent. direct visits with the members. What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? CLECA wanted lower rates in the long run. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 102 .) California Large Energy Consumers Association . has been very useful in the implementation phase. The Governor’s office was also party to several discussions. representing CLECA during the process leading up to the CPUC December Decision. Inc. (SB 960 was pulled together over several days following the AB 1890 deliberations. aside from being painful. This recent process marks the first time the Legislature has taken such a broad role interacting with the CPUC. there has been a warming in the cordiality of the relationship between the Legislature and the Commission. In the course of this process. It is remarkable how much AB 1890 was a product of broad-based discussions. CIU has never really included in its agenda a strong presence at the Legislature. however. industrial electricity customers. and have monitored the legislative process but have chosen to focus on the Commission. CLECA is an organization representing large.. such as in September of ‘95 at the SONGS hearings. We were interested. There will likely be follow-up at the Legislature principally with respect to SB 960 which dealt with PUC reform.Interview #1 Dianne Hawk was a Utility Regulatory Consultant for Barkovich and Yap. Some aspects of the Bill developed in off-line.

1995 Decision? The institutions in the Decision were designed with enough flexibility to give the opportunity for lower rates. We did not have the expectation that it would happen tomorrow. CLECA did not want a single market. there was not as much coordination or compromise amongst stakeholders. We also wanted the separation of the ISO and PX. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? In addition to filing formal comments. Barbara Barkovich also took part on numerous full panel hearings before the Commissioners. The MOU set the tone for that. Prior to this proceeding. [See interview with Barbara] Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. They were based on a consistent thread of how to organize a market. but we came closer. or over time? CLECA’s positions were consistent. I am unsure of whether it will happen. It used to be that the IOUs were driving everything. we met directly with Commissioners. I suggest you speak with Barbara Barkovich. The defining of industry structure for competition to drive prices down was important. given the PoolCo structure in the May. nothing changed significantly from the CPUC Decision. even over time. but wanted multiple ways to purchase electricity.How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. On this question. 1995 CPUC majority proposal. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? With regards to market structure. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 103 . There was a lot of compromise. but would trade off short term for long term gains.

California Large Energy Consumers Association . I spoke with Barbara to build on the base of insights into CLECA’s positions that Dianne Hawk provided. What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? CLECA was one of the first parties to advocate retail wheeling. they are seeking the same for electricity. We had experienced with the regulatory proceedings in the past. This was a big objective for the legislation. Our members are used to multiple suppliers for everything else. extending them to include more of the AB 1890 process.. It seemed premature before then.Interview #2 Barbara Barkovich is an Energy and Utility Regulatory Consultant with Barkovich and Yap. avoiding cost shifting. Rates are very high in California. 1995 Decision? Competition was there. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. There was some language about ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 104 . based on the concern that stranded cost recovery would be shifted onto industrial customers. and we see competition as the only way to bring them down. but no detail. it was very much influenced by the MOU. which is why the MOU happened. CLECA wanted to make sure unbundling and stranded cost recovery were done with no cost shifting. Inc. The May CPUC Proposal was lacking. representing CLECA throughout California’s electric utility restructuring process. We did not want customers to pay any more than they had been. as early as our comments on the Yellow Book in the Fall of 1993.

A residual CTC is left over when the PX price. I am not sure how much residential customers wanted cost reductions paid for by bonds. transmission. based on paying for the CTC with the same rates large customers are paying now. allowing for a 2001 date for the end of CTC recovery. This was absolutely essential for the legislation. in general AB 1890 is a good bill. with a lower CTC payment. It calculates CTC costs based on the residual method CLECA proposed. not bail out developers that did not create a reserve with their subsidies. Many of the existing renewables companies have been managed poorly. just like more pigs at the trough. The legislation did a good job buying off people. The rate restructuring for Diablo Canyon was along the lines of the residual method for CTC setting. and public purpose programs are subtracted from the frozen rate. The December Decision does not treat the CTC using the residual method. One things I was disappointed with was the rampant green/renewable payoff. CLECA wanted to make sure small customers pay off their own bonds to finance the 10% rate reduction.How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? More than in the December ‘95 Decision. We did pretty well. AB 1890 also includes comparable CTC treatment for direct access and non-direct access customers. Public purpose money should go to the next generation of technologies. distribution. Our members will not experience the rate increase they would have if this went away. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 105 . We also kept interuptable rates in place for 5 years.

Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i.e., CPUC vs. AB 1890)? Why? AB 1890. Some things were not addressed in the December Decision. recovery went on too long, we wanted it time-limited, not stretching till 2005. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings, or over time? Yes, CLECA is a small and cohesive organization. We had to give up on 100% stranded cost recovery, resulting in more of an opportunity for utilities to recover than we would have liked. We were not prepared to agree to the levels of public purpose funding in AB 1890; we also did not want funding floors, we wanted caps. Till the end, we did not like renewables money going to existing plants. A major win was that fuel price increases would not get passed through. If this eats into the CTC headroom, that is the utility’s problem. This does not guarantee full stranded cost recovery by a long shot. A lot of formulation went into the rate restructuring settlement. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? Of course, CLECA filed formal comments. The most important thing we did was Also, CTC

negotiating the MOU. Even though the December Decision was not perfect, it was much better than the May, 1995 proposal as a result of the MOU. The May proposal was based on a PoolCo concept, with wholesale competition. This proposal was supported by Edison, SDG&E, and UCAN, but it angered the industrial customers. CMA hired Flanagan to talk to the Governor’s office and plan a campaign against Edison. Edison sent a letter to CMA’s board telling them that their members were, “off the reservation.” CMA fired a response back. Edison ran ads

supporting PoolCo, and CMA was about to retaliate, which Pete Wilson did not want when he ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 106

was running for President. CLECA did not want the utilities to have full stranded cost recovery, but this was negotiated before I was even at the table. Edison was not even willing to talk without it. Another big issue was the SONGS [SCE’s San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station] settlement, extending recovery for this stranded asset. Important elements of the MOU were the proposed market structure and phase-in of direct access. The 1/1/98 date to begin was CLECA’s idea. It was critical that the Power Exchange, ISO, and direct access all start at the same date so that you do not end up with a PoolCo. We went to the Legislature and the PUC, including direct meetings with the Commissioners, in order to explain the MOU. Since this was a rulemaking, ex Parte rules were not in effect. We also met with non-MOU parties to see what it would take to get them on board, but they all wanted too much. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? An important step was negotiating a rate restructuring with PG&E, CMA, labor, oil, agriculture, and other groups. The legislative process had an awful lot of horse trading in a public, political environment. Steve Peace wanted it done in front of him. Many more parties were involved in this process.

California Manufacturers Association
Karen Lindh was CMA’s energy and environmental policy director through the CPUC and AB 1890 process, representing the organization in this area since 1976. CMA is an 800 member

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organization, representing mainstream California industries before the CPUC and Legislature.93 CMA has been involved in energy intervention since 1970, making arguments on cost of service rates and rate increases. What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? CMA wanted to achieve utility rates in California for gas and electricity in order to compete with out of state industry. It became clear that customer choice was the only way to do this. Services that are natural monopolies should continue to be regulated on a cost of service basis, on a customer class basis. We desire a free market for everything else. In 1984, CMA was involved in a battle for the customer choice of gas, a ten year effort. We then turned to electricity to pursue the same goals. At the time the electricity restructuring process began, California electricity rates were 40-50% above the national average. Our members’ electricity usage is very different by industry, with electricity comprising a varying percentage of input costs. How much customers paid was also dependent on their load factor. For many members electricity is a primary cost. Coincidentally, the CPUC Division of Strategic Planning was thinking about

restructuring the electric utility industry, resulting in the Yellow Book. At the same time, CMA started a project for restructuring, and became involved in a series of workshops at the PUC. Our longer term goal is a reduction in costs. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20, 1995 Decision? CMA got direct access and non-discriminatory ISO access to the transmission grid. I would say 75%. There were some flaws in the Decision, but there was tremendous progress since

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Asmus, “Who are the De-Regulation Advocates: Profiles...”.

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the May draft. This was seen as a 100% improvement. The Decision had a lot of weakness on direct access phase-in. We were also concerned over the level of the CTC. CMA had worked out a methodology, but a lot of work was needed in the December Decision. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? AB 1890 added additional gains. The rate freeze put utilities at risk for recovering 100% of their stranded costs through the CTC. CMA did not want to pay any more for electricity than we were already paying. AB 1890 was an incremental improvement over the Decision. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings, or over time? Because of CMA’s long background dealing with energy issues, we had worked out many positions in advance. Along the way, some issues that were brought up had the potential for derailing the process. Some Eastern members thought they had been sold down the river by 100% stranded cost recovery, some thought it was politically possible to outmuscle the IOUs. We had to arrive at decisions cooperatively. Membership was voluntary, so people had to work with other members of the group. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? The primary thing was the MOU, which became the baseline for the December Decision. There were a series of meetings with the Governor. He did not want industries at a loggerhead, wanted us to go for a win-win solution. The Governor’s office sat in as a moderator on the negotiations, which went from May to August. SCE was the only utility involved; they did not want to give up their merchant plants and were opposed to direct access. The industrial

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chief counsel at the PUC was Keith McCray. Groups were influential by being at the table. and come to the table with a solution. We worked by bringing PG&E into the process. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 110 . The market structure agreed on was a power exchange and a separate ISO that would ensure non-discriminatory access to the transmission grid. Steve Peace held marathon sessions. and I was involved as an energy analyst. The important thing was to make a positive contribution to the bill. and were not able to articulate what they wanted. as well as other customer groups. The municipal utilities represented by CMUA were too diverse. technical support was provided by Glen Shearon of Inland Paperboard. using a different formula. CMA filed formal comments. Inter-member briefing was also important. no attempt was made to jam something down someone’s throat. not just contracts for differences. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? CMA was involved in every AB 1890 negotiation. The actual stranded costs are asset values that are no longer economic. with supra-economic assets netted out. and participated in two full panel hearings to explain the MOU to the Commissioners and the public. The customers agreed to 100% stranded cost recovery. The IOUs suggested a revenue stream approach to CTC calculation. Even in the legislation.customers wanted direct access. There was a problem if you did not know what you wanted. Our chief representative was Mark Timmerman. helping others to resolve their issues. including Lenny Goldberg from TURN. Each party got what was most important to it.

We realized it was not realistic to resist retail competition as TURN had tried in telecommunications. but it was realistic. In some ways this was not a very lofty goal. “the devil is in the details”. The interview subject preferred to remain anonymous. everything was included. need-based level.Small Electricity Consumers Latino Issues Forum Latino Issues Forum. we strove to put as much consumer education and protection in place as possible to guard against the market abuses we are seeing in the deregulated telecommunications sector. In addition. a non-profit organization advocating for Latino Californians. 1995 Decision? In an outline form. Jane Kelly of UCS [see interview] recommended that I talk with someone at this organization. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. our goal was to protect as much of the old programs as possible. What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? Latino Issues Forum wanted to try to maintain as many public programs for low income and vulnerable populations. We also wanted to fund low-income weatherization programs at as high a level as possible. such as non-english speaking customers. We wanted to keep the CARE (California’s Alternative Rates for Energy) program funded at an uncapped. and add needed education and protection programs in order to at least maintain the status quo for small consumers. The December Decision did a fairly good job in recognizing low income ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 111 . but as Dan Fessler was fond of saying. Overall. I do not think small consumers will benefit from retail competition.

Significant consumer protection and education is needed to protect the abuses happening in telecommunications today such as slamming.and vulnerable population issues. AB 1890 did not go far enough. since we had a mantra that we recited at every chance: Deregulation had to be equitable. Latino Issues Forum did not actively participate. AB 1890 was a deal cut in back rooms between powerful players.. but did not go far in addressing them with specific solutions. as the whole process has been sequential. Small consumers had to at least be unharmed if not better off. At this stage perhaps it was not meant to. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 112 . In terms of consumer education and protection. or over time? Probably ad nauseum. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i.e. AB 1890)? Why? It is not entirely correct to contrast them. Ralph Cavanagh carried our torch primarily. It did have the benefit of good language on low income rates and energy efficiency programs. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. It did not go nearly far enough in consumer protection and education. This needs to be cleaned up in this year’s legislation. The December Decision was a blueprint in recognizing these needs. CPUC vs. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? Not as much. Public purpose programs for low income consumers must be maintained.

This Division was actually using AT&T language translation. had short hours. We are also a member of the Greenlining Institute [a non-profit organization representing low-income communities of color]. After a meeting with the Consumer Services Division of the PUC. we found out that the staffing for PUC complaints was utterly inadequate. and testified whenever we had the opportunity. It caused some embarrassment because of the total inadequacy. mono-lingual english only. This may come under attack in the future. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? Latino Issues Forum depended on Ralph Cavanagh to articulate positions there.What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? We filed dozens of briefs in the last few years. We also had small consumers mail in postcards to the Commissioners on rate issues. a very expensive service. and spoke to the press on critical issues. only part time. The utilities were hoping that they could administer CARE and low income weatherization. have historically focused on the PUC. Our letter to the Commissioners sparked modification and an investment of resources as part of the PUC’s internal restructuring plan. We also wrote letter to Commissioners that have been influential. At times. We also participated with the Commissioners in community briefings to inform the public of upcoming changes. They were understaffed. but because of a lack of resources. a possible profit source for them. Some of this year’s cleanup legislation will exclude municipalities from the anti-slamming ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 113 . which has partnership agreements with PG&E and Edison that they will represent some of Greenlining’s issues. we interacted with the Legislature. and had no 800 numbers.

The utilities argument for full recovery is based on the notion of a regulatory compact with a quid pro quo of cost recovery. making the regulatory process impossible to track. Currently. Our reaction to the Blue Book was that restructuring must provide competitive options for small customers. TURN has called for a single annual rate-setting. This would allow all customers to benefit. There is also a need to deal with the market power of utilities. The Utility Reform Network Bob Finkelstein is a staff attorney specializing in electric utility issues for TURN. getting rid of the multiple proceedings. TURN took a firm position calling for the PUC to start regulating the utilities. many annual. These risk-based cost of capital decisions got more explicit in the ‘90s and were very explicit by ‘93 and ‘94.language. proposed by the Yellow Book. and not grant them 100% stranded cost recovery. With what we see as a failure of will by the regulator. I think we can safely exclude municipalities. This annual rate setting would be based on cost of service with an TURN was against the notion of retail wheeling opportunity for profit and a risk of loss. there are different set of simultaneous proceedings. which could result in large customers leaving the system and smaller customers left holding the bag of higher cost resources. and that small customers should not suffer. 100% stranded cost recovery for the IOUs does not make any sense because they already had a risk-adjusted rate of return. What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? The Yellow Book laid out four options for the California electricity utility industry’s future direction. a nonprofit organization advocating for residential and small commercial utility ratepayers. California needs better regulation. I am concerned about fly-by-night companies. But they can only point ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 114 . Although we need as many consumer protections as possible.

Regulated entities can achieve their own version of the truth by repetition. everyone except for small consumers. 1995 Decision? There was good language on the non-bypassability of the CTC. We had advocated a community access model. but the incentives were weak. but did include language describing it. in concert with oil companies. amounting to $10’s of millions for divesting an industry segment with revenues in the billions. with incentives for divestiture of utility generation. it was OK for regulators to deny full recovery. including low income. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 115 .to Supreme Court decisions allowing a “reasonable chance of recovery”. Under these decisions they cite. Some commercial customers had wanted aggregation for different locations. The PUC was vague on aggregation. The Decision made a good commitment to maintaining public purpose programs. although by July. it was clear that the Legislature would be moving forward. TURN was able to knock out an earlier Brulte bill. and its inclusion of giveaways to large customer groups. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? We fought AB 1890 because of its putting in place items from the PUC’s December Decision that we hated. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. We thought there would not be comprehensive legislation that year. TURN also did not like it because we got a rate freeze. TURN applauded the focus. It also included a recognition of the importance of market power. based on geographical region. but TURN did not like the allocation of CTC costs to different classes. for aggregation of small customers to take advantage of direct access. as opposed to the rate cap in the PUC December Decision.

. We had suggested that community access provide an out for people that did not want in. It turns out that independent generation plants are run with much less staff. Edison gets coal cost increases. PG&E gets a $0. Unions got a huge bone by having the cost of retraining and severance included in the CTC. In the end. On the good side. leading to a heated internal debate. into a very bad bill. This raises a substantial barrier for municipalities to aggregate their residents’ loads. On the bad side. there were some self-generation projects in the pipeline. signed document with independent verification that a customer wants to be included in an aggregation. but Edison successfully created this barrier under the guise of anti-slamming language.So we were stuck with a bill that we hated.5 billion increase. Since we felt that it was incrementally better than the December Decision. firmed up the nonbypassability of the CTC. requiring a written. Some customers got away with no CTC. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 116 . but a narrow set of projects. very bad bill. so he was amenable to this. Peace’s residence had gotten slammed a couple times. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. TURN felt it had turned AB 1890. its anti-slamming [slamming is a practice of switching a customers utility provider without their consent] language is really anti-community access language. we decided not to oppose. a very. and offered a good commitment to low income programs. Also. We had the option of opposing it and jeopardizing the concessions in it. divested power plants must come with a contract for the original staff for the first two years. it limited CTC recovery to a shorter period of time.e. AB 1890)? Why? At the end of the process. but had to be in the debate. CPUC vs. we did not oppose or support AB 1890.

trickling down to smaller customers. The Commissioners were appointed with a viewpoint: “Do what’s right for business. Unfortunately. large customers attacked the pool. This led to the small customer groups scrambling to get things covered. while the utilities where up at the PUC everyday. PG&E requested direct access for large customers immediately. and you’ll do what’s right for California. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. We also appeared at full panel hearings. Nobody gave enough reason for TURN to change its position.” The result is that the most favored groups. he arranged ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 117 . 1995. When Wilson got wind of the CMA [California Manufacturers Association] fighting Edison. Edison and SDG&E asked for a wholesale pool with transition to direct access. the process was difficult to track. In their first round comments to the Blue Book. We did not do extensive lobbying due to a lack of resources. These positions were locked until May. with an Edison nuke settlement going on at the time. but just have more refined positions. leading to an evolution of positions. everybody at TURN wishes we had opposed this bill kicking and screaming. Fessler’s PoolCo was what Edison wanted. when the PUC proposals were released. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? TURN made formal comments at most opportunities.In hindsight. or over time? The terms of the debate changed. utilities and large industrials. The process of adding restructuring on top of our normal work is skewed to favor the utilities. get attention. We would still agree with our Yellow Book and Blue Book comments. people were getting handed new language instantaneously for discussion.

TURN tried to marshal support with kindred groups UCAN [Utilities Consumers’ Action Network. like an armadillo in the middle of the road. Lenny was in the Conference Committee every day. Hearings were going on till two or three AM. they just loaded up the plate. Several times people did leave the negotiations. Critical consumer interests were not present. big customers. What was eye opening about working with the Framework Parties [Framework for Restructuring in the Public Interest] was the divergent positions of the environmental groups. TURN contracted with Lenny Goldberg. issue specific attorneys with support staff. with a troika of large customers. So much of the deal had been cut in advance by large powerful interests. I went up three or four times. taking care of small consumers would have led to compromise. another small consumer advocacy group] and Greenlining Institute/Latino Issues Forum [low income and minority community advocates]. There were waves of utility employees. utilities. nobody gave everything up. The “consensus process” was just everybody taking. If you can get all of the big dogs to reach consensus. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? TURN hoped that if you knocked out enough of the gifts. IPPs. the whole thing would fall apart with parties leaving the table. it is tough to stop the momentum.for the meetings leading up to the MOU. Once Edison was on board for Direct Access. it was all over. supported by the appropriate staff. unions. utilities. creating a huge advantage to have a fresh mind. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 118 . Public purpose concerns become peripheral. making it very easy for the Republican Commissioners to adopt. and IPPs [Independent Power Producers].

and 4) incentives for uneconomic sales promotion minimized. more than 55. “There is no reason to proffer the benefits of competition first to only selected classes of customers. we are in favor of competition. It gave us nothing until the Legislature tells us otherwise. EDF links science.”94 What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? EDF sought an environmental quid pro quo.Environmental Advocates Environmental Defense Fund Dan Kirshner is a Senior Economic Analyst for EDF. EDF has participated in California energy policy issues since 1975. EDF supports the earliest possible implementation of direct access for all classes of customers.000 of whom live in California. 1995 Decision? Almost nothing. If focusing 94 CPUC Renewables Working Group. E-1. “a leading non-profit organization. and punted on the details to the Legislature. Assuming these problems are resolved. 3) externality accounting should ensure that customers weigh external costs in their decisions among alternate suppliers.000 members nationwide. As stated in EDF’s first round comments on the Blue Book. economics. The Decision was vague. and law to create innovative. yes. depending on interpretation. if restructuring is implemented properly: 1) energy efficiency investments should continue. [which] represents 300.”95 How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. 2) an Integrated Resource Planning process should exist for energy efficiency. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 119 . economically viable solutions to today’s environmental problems.

Energy efficiency funding was lower than the historical peak. Deregulation is not especially helping energy efficiency.. but left to the Legislature. I am hopeful that buying “green” electricity would be similar to recycling. and we got 1/2 billion. the PUC did not intend to choose a percentage requirement on the RPS. For renewable energy funding. Vol. it is a continuation of utility programs with different players. CPUC vs. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 120 . The envisioned split for renewables was about $100 million per year. that would result in roughly 9% of the electricity sold coming from renewables. we wanted one billion.e. There is nothing else to point to for renewables policy. we were tied to the language in AB 1123. However. The Legislature does have an environmental bone in its body.on a funding level. but the PUC has no environmental bones in it’s body. AB 1890)? Why? If the PUC was God.. which was never going to get past the industrial customers or utilities. the industrial customers thought that 1/2 billion was right. but in the realm of what we would settle for. This was informally agreed to by the big boys. the Decision had the Renewable Portfolio Standard. 95 CPUC Status Report on Restructuring. 2. At best case with 25% of residential customers purchasing “green”. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? About 70%.. the Decision may have been better. By the time of December Decision. There is a difference between what you ask for and what you expect.. which dedicated about 3% of utility revenues to public purpose programs. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i.

The process was like watching a movie. Most direct contact was after the Decision. It was the threat of a gun that got AB 1890 done. there was not enough activity. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 121 . I spoke several times with Jeff Dasovich in the Strategic Planning Division.Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. I am surprised that AB 1890 came out as well as it did. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? Past EDF’s filing comments. EDF did suggest draft language. The selection of the RPS in the Decision gave comfort to people who had a worse uphill climb. CEERT is a diverse organization. but time will tell on the legislative response. Policy Report on AB 1890 Renewables Funding]. I was concerned that fighting for all renewable funding go to new projects may have caused a backlash. being difficult to influence the outcome. This helped to keep a warm spot with free market ideologues. I took part in as many full panel hearings as I could get on to. or over time? Yes. I am liking the CEC report [California Energy Commission. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? I left the point contact to John White [the Executive Director of the Center for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technologies] and Ralph Cavanagh [NRDC’s Energy Program Director]. The outcome was a compromise that nobody liked much. making it difficult to get agreement. EDF stated that we were for competition. and were sincere about it. from the beginning.

Advocates of ‘retail wheeling’ systems propose a return to the days when electricity service was run on the discredited principle of ‘the more you use. but supported the introduction of competition through wholesale restructuring.Interview #1 Sheryl Carter is a Policy Analyst in the Energy Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council.” Specifically. NRDC advocated for a non-bypassable charge to cover the costs of public purpose programs in such areas as energy efficiency. From their 25 year report. 1995.”96 What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? Initially. 96 Natural Resources Defense Council. the lower the unit cost. Sheryl noted that for energy efficiency and renewables.’ Such systems would be a strong disincentive to utility investment in efficiency and renewable resources--and would not deliver savings to residential customers. the rules had to be set so that there will be no diminishment in public purpose programs. giving interested parties a chance to. “For retail restructuring to occur. Sheryl argues that it did not make sense to jump to retail competition before wholesale.Natural Resources Defense Council . NRDC opposed the move to retail restructuring. NRDC is a nonprofit organization that has made a name for itself as a public interest environmental advocate in the courts and policy arenas. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 122 . “see how that works.” As it became clear that opposition to retail restructuring was a losing battle. and universal access. NRDC adapted with a new position. low income customers. “NRDC has emerged as the national leader in fighting proposals to restructure the utility industry in environmentally destructive ways. RD&D. renewables. as Sheryl explains. where distribution utilities buy power in a competitive wholesale environment for resale to end-use customers in their territory.

which was unclear in earlier proposals. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 123 . For renewable energy. NRDC had taken the position that the Renewables Portfolio Standard and a non-bypassable systems benefits charge can work together. It was not perfect. although these were down from pre-Blue Book levels. They did not take a position on the percentage level of stranded costs recovery by utilities. however. the included systems benefits charge was a re-affirmation of public purpose programs. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? NRDC got most of what it wanted in terms of policy mechanisms. although the levels for public purpose programs were not what they seeked. and not as high as merited. with systems benefits charge funding used for the development of emerging technologies. and not everything they were pushing for. The December Decisions language on nuclear plant rate structuring did make this link. but had advocated that recovery not be linked to the continued operation of uneconomic plants. NRDC can live with AB 1890. 1995 Decision? NRDC got most of it: a reaffirmation of the need to continue public programs funded through ratepayers. Funding levels were roughly the levels being spent by utilities when the bill was drafted.a non-bypassable charge mitigates for a lack of integrated resource planning excluded by retail competition. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. They supported this legislation because it set a good precedent.

In a perfect world.e. low income. They tried to get a mixture of environmental. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. In response to the MOU. NRDC entered into a public-interest coalition known as the Framework Parties to draft the “Joint Motion for Consideration of Framework for Restructuring in the Public Interest and for Further Public Process. but instead ensure that the rules were set up to achieve a good outcome. NRDC relied on consistent people and tried to be clear throughout. and consumer advocates in these coalition visits. Ralph Cavanagh.. with coalitions of varying members depending on the issue. Another tactic was a joint public outreach mailing with other environmental organizations including the Union of Concerned Scientists that resulted in letters and telegrams targeted at the Commissioners. AB 1890)? Why? AB 1890 expanded the rift in the renewables community. They decided to not oppose restructuring. Joint Response to Memorandum of Understanding”. and herself have similar ideologies. and talking with staff. Sheryl noted that Peter Miller. NRDC also relied on formal comments. It is not looking at what is best for the future of sustainability.Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. or over time? Yes. participation in full panel hearings. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? One key approach was talking with the Commissioners themselves. The detailed language on renewables left much to be desired. may have been better to specify goals for a renewables policy. They also wanted to make sure the different proposed renewables policies not set up to be exclusive. CPUC vs. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 124 .

they may lose out altogether. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? For energy efficiency funding. and increased Edison from $50 million to $90 million per year. During the drafting of Byron Sher’s Assembly Bill 1123.What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? The big thing was groundwork prior to the formulation of legislation. Natural Resources Defense Council . Ralph Cavanagh was important in pulling parties together. as I spoke with other stakeholders. This got the municipal utilities signed onto the systems benefits charge. Peace was threatening to handle renewable energy policy himself. as well as testifying in legislative committee hearings. I selected him as a second interview subject for this organization because. it created problems. AB 1890 locked in PG&E and SDG&E where they were [$106 million and $32 million per year. it became clear that he played a central role in organizing the public interest community during the California restructuring process and would have personal insights that should not be omitted. It was very clear that if everyone did not work together. and nobody would have been happy. If the other parties had not understood NRDC’s position. NRDC also talked one on one with legislators and aids. The total funding level for public purpose programs increased $600 million ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 125 . there would be no chance of consensus on a compromise.Interview #2 Ralph Cavanagh is NRDC’s Energy Program Director. respectively]. energy efficiency funding levels dropped as soon as renewable energy was placed into the mix of public purpose programs. Long meetings were held to make sure renewable energy funding was not left out. During the debate. When Steve Peace said no to the RPS.

in a public forum. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? In addition to the formal comments. There were other ways we put pressure on the Commission. San Francisco Examiner. There was not much one on one with Commissioners or their staff.e. and was unusual in that regard. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. Meetings between For instance.. All public purpose funding levels were converted to floors instead of ceilings on spending. energy efficiency programs had The three critical Legislators were the Senators. funding levels laid out. AB 1890)? Why? AB 1890 had distinct improvements. stakeholders were important for ironing out details. Over time. NRDC did press work through editorial boards including the San Jose Mercury News. Sher was critical in supporting the environmental agenda. NRDC took part in two full panel hearings. including a letter written in the Legislature by Byron Sher and Glen Moore after the Blue Book. and the Sacramento Bee focusing on public purpose programs. CPUC vs.per year over ‘96. More importantly. and this would have been heading to zero if AB 1890 was not passed. Steve Peace ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 126 . a broader coalition of 80 parties on market structure. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? This process occurred over three weeks. It was negotiated by six legislators with an audience of stakeholders. the San Francisco Chronicle. and a utility/ESCO/public purpose coalition on energy efficiency focusing on using a non-bypassable systems benefit charge to sustain historic momentum. we worked in three broad coalitions: the Framework Parties.

Critical stakeholders who could have derailed did not. May/June 1997. It was strong going in and going out of the process. We were on separate tracks with industrial customers to ensure no cost shifting occurred.became more supportive. page 4. these positions are substantially similar to those of CEERT. orderly development of energy conservation and clean power resources. and protect the wild places of the earth. If environmental groups collectively walked.” CEERT’s members include EDF. It was a consensus-based process. We were in constant contact. The environmental groups and consumer groups such as TURN worked well together. stating that although there were some divergences between the Sierra Club and CEERT positions. 97 Sierra Magazine. During our interview. we could have killed it.”97 CEERT is. The Sierra Club is a national. and UCS. Sierra Club/Center for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technologies Rich Ferguson is the Energy Chair of the Sierra Club California Legislative Committee and the Research Director of CEERT. to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural and human environments. “a non- profit public education organization dedicated to the sustained. one on one. Rich spoke as a representative of Sierra Clubs positions. not turning it into a media tank battle. to practice and promote the responsible use of the earth’s ecosystems and resources. NRDC. non-profit organization chartered. “To explore. enjoy. the Sierra Club. Campaign contributions were meaningless. as well as members of the energy efficiency and renewable energy industries. NRDC’s relationship with the IOUs was important. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 127 .

there was opposition. and CEC [California Energy Commission]. We had built a commitment to renewables at the Legislature. I was approached by CMA. These got translated into dollars. We reached a consensus on the need for independent administration of energy efficiency programs. averaging 1993 and 1994. and was built into AB 1123 [Byron Sher’s restructuring bill]. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 128 . the CPUC. RD&D. The 3% of utility revenues for public purpose programs in the MOU came out of these discussions. Our response was that economics was not the environmental issue. we wanted to restore investments at pre-Blue Book levels. renewables with an incremental cost estimate from the BRPU. as well as funding for public purpose programs: low income. as long as environmental commitments were honored. There were several qualitative outcomes we sought. Energy efficiency budgets had already been cut. CLECA. Dan Kirshner [see Environmental Defense Fund Interview] and I started meeting with them. When the Renewables Portfolio Standard was mentioned. and agricultural consumers to find out what the environmental community reaction to the restructuring proposal was. There is a lot of waste in some energy efficiency programs. consumer groups aired their pet peeve with environmental programs. but considered it a “think piece”. and energy efficiency. About the time of the Blue Book. California’s implementation of Integrated Resource Planning (IRP)]. Industrial Users.What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? We did not pay much attention to the Yellow Book. with funding levels based on calculations from the BRPU [Biennial Resource Plan Update. In a series of meetings. I was concerned that this may become a backdoor way to beat up on environmental programs.

and we won’t need this regulation stuff”. People close to Sacramento knew the RPS did not have a chance. but you have to be a political pragmatist. I knew the consumer groups and power marketers hated it. In the PUC Decision. A deal was made with the consumer groups and IOUs: Take a wait and see approach on the duration of renewable and energy efficiency funding. Perhaps Commissioner Conlon latched onto the idea of spreading out QF costs amongst different players. we didn’t want it or not want it. so Senators Peace and Sher sent a letter to the CPUC pulling the sunset language out for energy efficiency. creating a tension. There was a concern that the RPS was seen as ratcheting up the compact of the BRPU [Biennial Resource Plan Update. It is a hard call from a policy standpoint: Sierra Club members would love the RPS. There always was a disconnect between what Nancy Rader [West Coast Representative for AWEA. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? Because of the lack of acceptance for the RPS. The customer groups had the same attitude. while the latest CPUC Decision sunsets energy efficiency. 98 Personal communication with Sierra Club Committee members. environmental programs are seen as transitional. I do not know why the PUC put it in the Decision.How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 129 . Energy efficiency and RD&D funding does not sunset in AB 1890. 1995 Decision? The Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) was included in the Decision as a renewables policy [the Sierra Club California Legislative Committee had voted to endorse AB 1202. an earlier legislative vehicle for the RPS98]. “set up the market. see interview] thought she got and what she got from the Commission. We did not want to have to pass new legislation. the RPS Working Group is not reality.

you need to make sure you have Plan B. but if CMA and CLECA go along. I said. the public interest community wanted a figure closer to the historical average [1994 California IOU ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 130 . The SF Bay Guardian [a long time opponent of PG&E] picked up this article. I said that if you want competition. The IOUs wanted only $10 million per year. The magnitude of the CTC collection is bothersome. and asked me where to get the money from. Fessler did not get the rate of return reduction he wanted. Peace poo-pooed the idea at the time. On public interest RD&D funding. in case Plan A [the RPS] does not work out. AB 1890 delivered the $3 billion laid out in the December Decision. I and others agreed. saying that if stranded cost recovery is to be guaranteed. The most outrageous part is special rates for the nukes. how can you guarantee above market rates for the nukes. but then unearthed it for AB 1890. Low income advocates insisted their programs were outside of the 3% of revenue cap for other public purpose programs. and got angry because PG&E would get paid large sums. Peace would send the hagglers off. CTC money is defined as a property right so that future attempts to repeal it can be secured against as a taking. one needs to reduce the rate of return on utility investments. On stranded costs. and we would go to IEP’s [Independent Energy Producers] office. President Fessler was livid. When the MOU came out. Ralph Cavanagh [NRDC Energy Program Director. the Sierra Club is not going to make much of a difference.California’s implementation of integrated resource planning (IRP)] that everyone had agreed to. Peace had a hearing back then. In AB 1890. I wrote an article for the CEERT newsletter a few years back on how much money could be saved by shutting down Diablo Canyon and paying PG&E by giving them all of their money back. When developing a strategy. see interview] did much of the speaking for low income programs. “Do a revenue bond”.

CPUC vs.RD&D expenditures = $140 million. there is the presumption that energy efficiency money would die in the CPUC Decision. This was a sore point that had to be finessed between players. Renewables did well funding-wise in AB 1890. The Framework language [Framework for Restructuring in the Public Interest] said that they would consider an Independent Administrator. I felt double-crossed. Since the IOUs got some money for “reliability”. Ralph Cavanagh and I agreed not to go to war on who would handle administration of funds. An argument ensued on how much of this figure would be under their control. App. we didn’t actually get pre-Blue Book levels. The details were left out of AB 1890 on allocation of this money. Ralph advocating for utility administration.. arriving at an agreement of $62. In the negotiations.]99. the DSM funding levels got dinged. First. AB 1890)? Why? Overall. but the utilities 99 CPUC RD&D Working Group. I would have wanted to see what was done with the RPS. The final stake through the heart was where the RECs [Renewable Energy Credits] where going. fearing that if administration of this funding was confused. In the end. and the Sierra Club didn’t endorse. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 131 . which will be handled separately as regulated RD&D. while I preferred independent administration. including RD&D for transmission and distribution. III-3. we would lose dollars. On energy efficiency. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. Having QF developers getting them was a political miscalculation.e. we don’t think AB 1890 is a good deal. the legislation does a better job. they agreed.5 million. The value of the RECs should go to the contract holder. There was an offer on the table for renewables that had been agreed to. John White [Sierra Club lobbyist and CEERT Executive Director] was on the fence because of a split in CEERT members.

meetings going on morning. I would not chime in. We had influence by having IEP. We got the Sierra Club level. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? We didn’t do grassroots letters. The legislators outside of the Conference Committee did not have a clue what was in the bill. noon. There were many discussions between parties. CLECA and CMA build funding levels in. nobody wants to reopen it. For developing Sierra Club policy. and the IOUs continued their CTC collection for three more months. There was a huge number of meetings between parties. we also had contact through meeting with President Fessler. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings.wanted less. and then making sure they did not get booted off the table. mice stay away”. see interview] and ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 132 . leaving it up to the lobbyists and insiders to cut a deal. or over time? Yes. and night. and schlepped it around internally. but we have learned “when elephants dance. Things were changing too fast. If I had nothing new to say at a hearing. there was not enough time. We attended the first restructuring weekend down in LA during the summer of ‘94. The Sierra Club will be more successful if we focus on the environment. Jan Smutney-Jones [Independent Energy Producers Executive Director. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? In addition to filing formal comments. there is a white paper process. The legislative process lets you get your oar in the water. I wrote a paper with goals. Some volunteer leaders wanted to be more vocal on stranded costs. cutting deals.

manifest in California as the Biennial Resource Plan Update (BRPU).000 in California”.John White were the front folks. was just beginning to be used as a policy option in several states. Union of Concerned Scientists Jane Kelly is the California Policy Coordinator for the Union of Concerned Scientists. pointing towards a future based on environmentally cleaner electricity generation and energy efficiency. Byron Sher was fine. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 133 . Peace was the idea person. Integrated Resource Planning (IRP).100 What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? According to Jane. UCS has 100. UCS’s overriding goal was to ensure policy were developed that would provide for continued environmental protection with regards to renewables and energy efficiency. Jane conjectured that one of the driving forces behind deregulation was to do away with utility requirements that were designed to protect environmental quality. Deregulation of the electricity industry threatened to tear this house of cards down.000 sponsors nationwide. including 13. As the deregulation process unfolded at the CPUC. UCS was also opposed to 100% “stranded cost” recovery for utilities. As long as the Sierra Club and other groups were happy. E-3. a policy decision that is widely viewed as a financial 100 CPUC Renewables Working Group. The level of renewables support included in the BRPU served as a target for UCS. “an independent nonprofit public interest organization which works on issues where science and technology play a critical role. UCS’s initial position after the release of the CPUC Blue Book Proposal was that the deregulatory roadmap laid out in this proposal was too hasty.

She also noted that no stakeholders seemed to resist the lack of a cap on surcharge collection for low income programs. 1995 Decision? UCS was pleased that the CPUC’s December Decision called for a minimum renewables purchase requirement. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. Jane indicated that. As for renewable energy.. “did not set public policy so much as doling out money in the transition period. “Environmentalist Defends. with no support for commercialization over a longer duration. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? UCS was not at all pleased with the poor support for renewable energy and energy efficiency codified in AB 1890.” She said the whole battle for continuing renewables support will need to be refought in a few years. and Latino Issues Forum. 101 Weisman.101 To Jane. an allocation that was “responsible public policy”. Jane said the inclusion of the renewables purchase requirement was.. the legislation. The Greenlining Institute. “despite other interpretations. so UCS also supported low income program protection as defined by coalition partners. based on the Renewables Portfolio Standard devised by UCS’s coalition partner Nancy Rader of the American Wind Energy Association.bailout for poor investments in nuclear power generation. Jane said that environmental organizations were.” ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 134 . development. and demonstration (RD&D) funding. “one of a few good pieces UCS was in a position to defend”. “thrown a bone” with the moderate level of public-interest research. AB 1890 was not a victory” for environmental goals. and no guaranteed market for renewable energy. working in progressive coalitions was important for UCS.

and a huge decision was being made behind closed doors. stating that the CPUC made a public policy decision for environmental protection. or over time? When asked about UCS’s ability to maintain a consistent position over the CPUC and legislative policy formulation process. an organization representing small ratepayers. AB 1890)? Why? Jane contrasted AB 1890 with the CPUC Decision. while AB 1890 simply doled out ratepayer dollars according to disparate levels of power that special interest groups could bring to the Legislature. The small consumer advocate community also experienced this rift. Jane noting that The Utility Reform Network. CPUC vs.Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 135 . clearly articulated position on the desirability of retail wheeling.e.. while some see it as an opportunity for renewable energy generators to increase their markets. didn’t have a unified. Jane said that her organization stood firmly behind the stance that the Renewables Portfolio Standard was the best policy for supporting renewables. there was a real split in the public interest community as to whether retail wheeling was good or bad for social welfare. relying heavily on Nancy Rader of AWEA and their jointly commissioned lobbyist Joe Caves to represent this position in the heat of the 1996 summer Conference Committee meetings.” An alternative strategy that Jane considered would have been to oppose retail wheeling all the way along. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. a process that she said environmentalists do not usually fare well in. However. [Committee Chairman] Steve Peace was banging heads together. the press had gone home. Some environmentalists think retail wheeling threatens environmental protection. “In the end.

To compliment this public participation strategy. asking them to respond to the CPUC through a Western Union automated fax number. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? UCS made use of a similar outsider/insider strategy to influence the legislative outcome. UCS’s insider approach was composed of elements such as filed comments and full panel hearing testimony by UCS senior energy analyst Donald Aitken. 143 adopted.What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? UCS used a dual approach outsider/insider strategy to influence policy formulation at the CPUC. One interesting outcome of the meeting with President Fessler was that he started to lobby Jane and Nancy to support his position.000 faxes to the CPUC demanding that the environment not get forgotten in the policy formulation process. UCS took part in a mailing to 60. as well as meetings arranged jointly by Jane and AWEA’s Nancy Rader to lobby for the Renewables Portfolio Standard with then-current CPUC President Fessler. which Jane believes was a response to the effectiveness of UCS’s outsider strategy to generate public support for the RPS. UCS volunteers and staff were active at over a number of 1996 Earth Day events throughout ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 136 . the CPUC deregulation process was thrown open to a much wider spectrum of public input than initially envisioned by the public utility commissioners. as well as generating a large number of letters to the CPUC. By helping to get Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. UCS then planned an outsider strategy that included turning out large numbers of supporters at public hearings. as well as staff people for Commissioners Knight and Conlon. Jane thought this amounted to a level of public pressure that was outside of the usual institutional experience at the CPUC.000 environmentalists in California. resulting in over 2.

Thousands of UCS California activists received letters asking them to write their state senator in support of the Renewables Portfolio Standard. Because of splintering and infighting within the public interest community. resulting in over two hundred letters to Sacramento. I worked for UCS coordinating our participation in Clean Power Day. which had passed the Assembly the previous year.California in April. demanding continued environmental protection and renewable energy development after the transition to a deregulated industry. counting only those copied to UCS. While Joe continued to lobby Senators. Thousands of UCS Northern California activists and supporters were informed about this opportunity to lobby legislators on renewable energy and energy efficiency issues in a coordinated way. as included in Assembly Bill 1202. He is currently the counsel for the Oversight ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 137 . a legislative education and lobbying event in early August. UCS worked closely with AWEA at a June 1996 Senate Utility Committee hearing with both lobbyist Joe Caves and myself advocating for the Renewables Portfolio Standard and AB 1202. State Institutions California Energy Commission Eric Saltmarsh was serving as Staff Counsel in the CEC during the prior CPUC proceedings as well as the past Legislative session. She went on to say that if the whole environmental community was working under a unified strategy. “progressive legislators did not have the usual suspects all opposing it”. Jane believes that Clean Power Day was the one unifying experience for environmental and renewable energy organizations throughout an otherwise splintered legislative lobbying process. the legislative outcome would have been different. at the very least they could have stopped AB 1890 from passing unanimously. gathering dozens of hand written letters from California residents to their state legislators.

the completely distinct power exchange and ISO. and the unbundling of rates and services.Board which has been created as a result of AB 1890. The wholesale pool is not really a buyer. What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? Well before the December Decision. as has been put into place in foreign nations as well as US regional pools. We did not share the sentiments as to the structure of the December Decision. except for voltage support to let transactions occur. I can understand the concern for the concentration of power in one entity that drove this separation. There is a need for much of the same information in both entities. There is an added cost of having two mandatory entities. customer direct access. The CEC is a state agency that implements state energy policy and collects data on California energy usage and generation. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 138 . but had trouble applying it to this situation. and the ISO winds up making schedule changes for physical feasibility anyway. reciprocity for direct access. We were more inclined to a unified structure. including open transmission access. 1995 Decision? The commission did not like the discrete power exchange and ISO. it is really just a clearinghouse. the Energy Commission had been supportive of core aspects of the proposed generation deregulation. The commission has been supportive of investments with payouts over time for energy efficiency and RD&D.

We had the luxury to legitimately decide on generalized principles. the Commission got the outcomes it wanted. CPUC vs. In core concepts. In general terms there was substantial RD&D funding. all input was technical. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 139 . Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. AB 1890)? Why? AB 1890 happened in real time. There was no opportunity for the Energy Commission to make a policy statement. or over time? Our positions were consistent. while the decisions of government institutions generally do not happen that way in terms of scheduling. they were supportive of their being a real benefit to public purpose RD&D. 1996 PG&E Rate Restructuring Settlement. [It flowed in large part from the June.e. The CEC was not in a position to come up with detailed solutions. A large percentage of AB 1890’s time was taken up on a few issues where the CEC had no positions. While the Commissioners may not have endorsed a particular funding level.How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? The same concern with the separation of the power exchange and ISO applies in this case also. See interviews with Barbara Barkovich and Phil Stohr. We only took generalized policy positions. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. The calculation of the CTC was not actually addressed in AB 1890. but generalized.] The CEC did believe in the opportunity for reasonable cost recovery. since this would require holding a meeting with 10 day meeting posting requirements.. that there has not been an excessive amount of money spent in the past.

put in by the renewables community. a simple majority is to be unaffiliated with generation. transmission. The legislative language has multiple categories that should be included on the power exchange and ISO boards. however. including Assistant Chief Counsel John Chandley. our Public Affairs Director. were called up to testify on specific issues as an information source only. except for when I read into the record a statement for the Energy Commission Chair on the governance of the ISO and PX: they should have a significantly disinterested makeup in order to remove market power influence. They also killed the state agency renewable purchase requirement. They weighed in against the minimum renewables purchase requirement. We also made testimony and participated in CPUC hearings as an examiner. These board members will not certainly be disinterested. some of which would be “interested”. outside of a disinterested role in hearings and filings. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? We were technically relevant in the process. Edison and PG&E made arguments on takings [with regards to less than 100% stranded cost recovery] and coerced divestiture. and I. There was no advocacy at all. The Governor’s office’s participation was punctuated. This would have required state agencies to ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 140 . or distribution companies. if any other forum we took part in.What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? The Energy Commission was a party in every comments filing. For the ISO. some members perceived it as a tack-on. The legislators were in a vacuum trying to figure out how the allocation of public program funding got made. There was little. A few people. our Executive Director.

purchase a given percentage of their electricity. phasing in over time. 1995 Decision? We agreed with the stated principles of the Decision. the Vice-Provost of the UC system. How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included (or represented) in the California Public Utility Commission’s December 20. In the process of recent years. there was no attempt to amend it. there were no dollar figures given for public interest RD&D. We were fighting for restoration of this funding from October of ‘94 to December of ‘95. utility funding for CIEE had been cut off. Consequently. from renewable generators. he is not representing the position of the University. What outcomes did your organization want to attain from the California electric utility restructuring policy formulation process? The general policy of the University has been that public goods R&D is a good thing that should be preserved. University of California. AB 1890 passed unanimously on the floor. it was vague. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 141 . It could have gone further by laying out steps needed in legislation. for instance by Jud King. California Institute for Energy Efficiency Carl Blumstein is the Associate Director of the California Institute for Energy Efficiency (CIEE). One would need to augment budgets so the agencies were not hit. This has been affirmed in statements by University Provosts. a group at the University of California involved with energy efficiency research and development (R&D).5 million public purpose RD&D annual budget. contacts between the two commissions has been informal. This R&D funding cut provided a concrete example of what was being lost in the move to deregulate the electric utility industry. but is instead offering personal observations. Also. In this interview. After the passage of AB 1890. The CEC has a role allocating the lion’s share of the $62.

CPUC vs. We have good people involved in research. In the February 14. realizing the dollars available for public purpose programs were limited. The funding for public interest RD&D will be reviewed after three years. stating that their intent was that the PUC retain authority for energy efficiency funding.8 million per year. More money could have been spent on public interest RD&D. Fessler attended one earlier. very committed. not end this authority after four years.How much of what your organization sought to obtain from the process was included in Assembly Bill 1890? The University supported AB 1890. briefings to the IOUs were a standard part of the communication.. but it was a reasonable outcome.e. AB 1890)? Why? I would see them as an appropriate sequence of decisions. ‘97 Decision on public purpose programs. Conlon attended a briefing a few years back. Steve Peace and Byron Sher recently sent a letter to the PUC. the Legislature or PUC could modify. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization's goals and objectives in the CPUC hearings and the subsequent decision? We invited the Commissioners and public interest groups to briefings. compared to just 0. Also.7 per year to the utilities. Whether or not the Legislature intended this was a point of contention. There is an agreement that the PUC could continue funding after 4 years. or over time? I think so. Is your organization more comfortable with one policy decision over the other (i. most public interest RD&D money was allocated to the CEC: $61. ‘95 decision. we did not change our stance. Duque was very ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 142 . Neeper did after the December. Was your organization able to publicly maintain a consistent position or set of positions in the two sets of hearings. working well together. and this comes through in our briefings.

The University has a counsel on the PUC service lists. In practice. For the conference committee we had an attorney representing the University. but nobody dedicated to the PUC proceedings. We filed comments. about five people in the meileu. The Governor can appoint one Commissioner a year. We had informal contacts with the CPUC staff. but they permitted some very big cuts in R&D funding in late 1994. who handle all University issues. The University is represented by a legislative affairs office. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 143 . they have usually been good.interested in technology and became a CIEE board member. We had a presence. allowing for inertia. supplemented by several support staff. myself and another University employee were there off and on. They have been favorable in principle the whole way through. and spoke at one public hearing. and commented publicly at the Conference Committee. What methods and approaches were used to advance your organization’s goals and objectives in the Assembly hearing and the subsequent issuance of AB 1890? We were part of many informal groups discussing the bill. Would you say that there is a noticeable difference between Governor Wilson’s CPUC appointees and those from the previous administration? There is no big difference between the two governor’s appointees in sympathy towards public goods R&D. The office has two advocates. These cuts were part of the utilities' cost cutting efforts that followed the April 20th decision. and their was a steady chatter amongst parties. but not an overwhelming one.

After they finally recognized the problem ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 144 . pre-Blue Book. “Do people have to fail intelligence tests to run a muni?” Anonymous Comments #2: AB 1890 funding levels for Public Interest RD&D The initial funding levels being discussed for public interest RD&D were very low. but they were too busy negotiating other aspects of AB 1890 to followup on my requests for further discussion of RD&D. The IOUs wanted to use post-Blue Book. SDG&E and PG&E RD&D funding fell from over $120 million in 1994 down to just over $60 million in 1995102]. For example. They probably thought that this funding level included regulated transmission and distribution RD&D. and a representative told Peace that the group still had not come to an agreement on who would present the proposal that they still had not negotiated. at one point Steve Peace threw all of the renewables community out of the room to resolve an issue. After seven hours of negotiation. but they allowed me to put in definitions derived from the CPUC RD&D Working Group Report on RD&D [which distinguished between public interest and regulated T&D RD&D] and other language. University of California representatives and I advocated for higher. current levels for moving to a future restructured market. the renewables community cam back in. They proposed to me funding at current RD&D budget levels. The municipal utilities angered Peace so much that he asked. The renewables could have fared much better if they stuck together as a coalition.Anonymous Stakeholder Comments Anonymous Comments #1: Parties who could have improved their performance The renewables and municipal utilities were very poorly represented in hearings. historic levels [combined SCE.

5 million in public interest RD&D.several nights later. at approximately 11:30 PM. I believe that this was done by the IOUs. all of the language that I had inserted earlier was removed. preserving $62. would be included back into the bill.5 million per year funding level for public interest RD&D. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 145 . including the $62. 102 Chart by Carl Blumstein based on 1995 CEC and PG&E data. I went before the Conference Committee during discussion and it was explained as an error in redrafting. All parties agreed that the earlier negotiated language.

Lobbying access is only as good as a Commissioner’s willingness to meet. In this interview. when ex parte rules are in effect. Which stakeholder groups do you think were most effective in influencing the policy formulation process of the December 1995 Decision and what were they able to obtain from the process? IOUs were most influential. but is instead offering personal observations. It was conspicuous that an Edison employee always traveled with President Fessler on his trips to Europe. except for a rate cap that was set high anyway. He later acted as a project manager of support teams analyzing the drafts of AB 1890. What methods or strategies did these effective groups use to influence the process? Was any particular method or sets of methods most influential? There was a lot of lobbying. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 146 . Senate Bill 1960 legislates that there must be a record of who was granted and who was denied ex parte communication. resulting in the most influential stakeholders being granted the most access. There was nothing for small customers. he is not representing the position of the Commission. 1995. Large customers were less influential.Appendix C: Officeholder Staff Interviews California Public Utilities Commission Tom Thompson was a project supervisor in the CPUC’s Commission Advisory and Compliance Division during the December 1995 Decision formulation process. This offered a substantial opportunity for access. resulting in a partial phase in of Direct Access. with no ex parte rules during the pure rule-making period before December 20. mostly focusing on market structure. personal meetings with the Commissioners.

with PG&E and SDG&E more willing to move forward on direct access and Edison resisting. adding so much certainty to stranded cost recovery. Ralph Cavanagh was influential in making sure that public purpose programs stayed on the plate. with the rest of independent power producers looking to a new world of deregulation. fixed price to much lower short run avoided cost]. Which stakeholder groups do you think could have been more effective in influencing the policy formulation process. while diverting some money to public purpose programs. The renewables players were probably asking for too much of the old world the PUC had engaged in. and why? The Memorandum of Understanding was a major event that brought together two worlds. and how could they have improved their approach? Low income advocacy groups did not make their issues big and high-profile like structural issues became. Was it always clear what outcomes each stakeholder group wanted from the process? The independent power industry was split. a rate freeze created extra revenue for the CTC. as opposed to a revenue freeze. It featured a phase-in of direct access.Which stakeholder groups do you think were best able to set the terms of the debate. It is important to keep in mind the history of Edison and SDG&E being able to kill the Biennial Resource Plan Update (BRPU) at the FERC. but did not do hall walking to the extent of other groups. preferring to punt them to Sacramento. Since rates were poised to come down due to the 10-year QF cliffs [when qualifying facility contracts go from a high. As a result. even though the duration of the CTC recovery period got ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 147 . IOUs and large customers. The Commissioners may not have been predisposed to dismantle low income programs. It included a rate freeze for the IOUs. The low income groups participated on paper through filed comments. General Comments on AB 1890 AB 1890 endorsed much of the December Decision. The investor-owned utilities were split also.

Legislative Conference Committee. The level of influence on AB 1890 was a function of who was in the Conference Committee hearing room. The Office of Ratepayer Advocates’ [Tom’s current CPUC division] position is that there is no link between a rate reduction and these bonds. The rate reduction bonds may not yield net present value benefits. as rates were supposed to come down due to the QF cliffs anyway. since the FERC will approve their structure. so that the [legislative] Members and Governor bought in that restructuring would be good for ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 148 . the current criticism of QFs ignores the real competition that they founded. It is tough to sell delayed gratification. A stakeholder representative recommended that I speak with him because of his level of involvement with the Conference Committee.shorter compared to the December Decision. The utilities would fight this interpretation. The PX/ISO’s insertion into Federal jurisdiction was arrogant. Large businesses articulated the issues. utilities were fine with the rate freeze. As a sidenote. CMA and CLECA jointly made utility restructuring the issue for business. The utilities are trying to get an untaxed ruling from the IRS on these bonds. CLECA. but just result in rate deferrals for 10 years. The 10% rate reduction for small customers was final packaging to sell the bill for voters. claiming that they are linked. Office of Senator Steve Peace David Takashima is Senator Steve Peace’s Chief of Staff and a former Edison lobbyist. the PX/ISO Oversight Board is not important. Which stakeholder groups do you think were most effective in influencing the policy formulation process of AB 1890 and what were they able to obtain from the process? CMA. This reduces the risk of stranded cost recovery to the IOUs. and WSPA [Western States Petroleum Association].

was personally engaged. agricultural consumers. who was also the President of CMA at one time. Activity at the PUC did not create the political momentum. most utilities opposed restructuring. causing Edison to get very active. The utilities. The MOU process was very important because fighting parties came to an agreement. PG&E tried to make a lot of accommodations to CMA. DJ Smith of CLECA and Mark Timmerman of CMA were able to organize people. No one would support the December Decision. CMA’s energy committee got parties together. PG&E was the first to come along. they were able to then get retailers and agricultural groups on board. The Legislature became the place to find a solution. As a member of CMA’s energy group ($10 thousand membership fee). There was a lot of legislation in process. so it brought the situation to everyone’s attention. causing chaos and uncertainty as to what would happen. This made Edison and SDG&E very uneasy. and retailers were all opposed to each other. PG&E’s President. No one in the Legislature was taking a lead on the issue. These parties hoped the Legislature would ratify the MOU as opposed to the PUC vision. All the parties went to the Governor’s office to criticize the PUC. The Legislature did not know whether to engage in this issue.California businesses. Stan Skinner. Initially. all of it spot bills as opposed to comprehensive legislation. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 149 . George Dunn and Phil Romers from the Governor’s office encouraged the parties to sit down and talk. eventually Edison made the decision. What methods or strategies did these effective groups use to influence the process? Was any particular method or sets of methods most influential? Coalitions were very important. There was not much debate or serious discussion in the Assembly. WSPA. The Governor’s office needed to figure out if the December Decision needed to stand. WSPA made an effort to politically educate officeholders.

The Committee engaged in months of hearings issue by issue. and Edison. and why? CLECA. They waited until late in the process to get organized. and Bob Foster. LADWP was trying to cause trouble with restructuring. and how could they have improved their approach? The environmental and renewables communities made the Committee punt. Senator Peace was making a decision. They were a guiding light. DJ Smith [CLECA] and Bob Foster [Edison] wanted to make a case to ratify the MOU. It was unclear whether consensus among the Committee Members was going to happen. Senator Peace decided on a process with long discussions. It would not have happened without DJ Smith. Peace’s mind was made up. and Edison set the tone. encouraging other people to accept the process who otherwise would not have. The California Municipal Utilities Association folks lacked effectiveness also. decision makers at the table.During the summer recess in July. All of the munis were trying to figure out what to do in a restructured world that will not allow residential ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 150 . Peace’s past experience with workman’s comp reform involved an extensive hearing process. He had a conversation with Senator Lockyer to staff up the Conference Committee. you could get four votes. but not all six. Which stakeholder groups do you think could have been more effective in influencing the policy formulation process. getting everyone engaged for buy-in. Most parties felt that with the right bill. Mark Timmerman. CMA. CLECA. Which stakeholder groups do you think were best able to set the terms of the debate. He wanted people who would get engaged. could not address the problem of a competitive market and participation. They did not want to participate. CMA. we have to get everyone to sign off on the bill. These groups could not come to a resolution. John Rozsa and I were brought on board. having conversations with the Governor’s office. The Conference Committee tried to put together legislation that made sense.

If the Committee could do something for labor. oil companies. They were helpful and gave useful recommendations. they could get the unions. the conference committee had to balance all interests: IOUs. they could compare AB 1890 with the December Decision. They feared the PUC would get jurisdiction over them. Lenny Goldberg [TURN] was exceptional. or labor unions. The MOU signatories did not include PG&E. It took a special relationship and trust between Senators Peace and Leonard to keep things together. This was very irresponsible. they were willing to do the Death March to find the Land of Oz. They did not know what they were willing to settle for. a longer period would discount them as marketable stocks. but no one knew what the end product would look like. TURN and UCAN participated in every which way. labor. IOUs wanted full stranded cost recovery.subsidies on the backs of industrials. As for consumer groups. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 151 . CalPIRG and some other consumer advocacy groups criticized the process without participating. they had full opportunity. Was it always clear what outcomes each stakeholder group wanted from the process? Stakeholders knew what they wanted. The big mistake for these small consumer groups was letting Pete Wilson get elected and stack the PUC with right wing ideologues. PG&E proposed a shorter CTC collection period to please Wall Street. The oil companies had lost their CTC exemption at the PUC. On the other hand. irrigation districts. All of the parties went for an acceptable negotiated solution to avoid litigation or disputes at the PUC. Agricultural consumers wanted CTC exemptions on pumping. but knew if they did not resolve things at the Legislature this would happen. A shorter CTC period was beneficial for utilities. Most parties did not want to go back to the PUC Decision. They did not think this was going to happen. They felt if they were willing to participate. yet were not in the hearing for one minute.

lawyers. Office of Senator Byron Sher Kip Lipper is Senator Byron Sher’s Chief of Staff.Legislative Conference Committee. Which stakeholder groups do you think were most effective in influencing the policy formulation process of AB 1890 and what were they able to obtain from the process? None were terribly effective. then your voice was heard. Some groups also used press conferences. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout This had to be shaped by pressures on the 152 . Groups participated in coalition building. The IOUs spent millions on astroturf such as “Shareholders for Equity”. getting a place at the table. due to the egalitarian nature of the structure. and Bill Leonard were the masterminds. and why? The PUC laid out the framework for restructuring in the Blue Book. One strategy was to get bills established early on in the session. all of the outside lobbying did not matter. A lot of PR and press consultants got rich from this. Senators Byron Sher. If your case fit into the unfolding structure. Because of the genius of the legislators. A stakeholder representative recommended that I speak with him because of his level of involvement with the Conference Committee. establishing a level playing field. and accountants. The template was in large part formed by the CPUC’s December ‘95 Decision. but it mainly was a waste of money. Which stakeholder groups do you think were best able to set the terms of the debate. What methods or strategies did these effective groups use to influence the process? Was any particular method or sets of methods most influential? All employed lobbyists. Steve Peace. There were also “grassroots” astroturf groups based on utility shareholders. based on the free market-driven ideologues on the Commission. Senator Peace established a process that was a model of openness.

Was it always clear what outcomes each stakeholder group wanted from the process? Peace forced clarity. Renewables and energy efficiency were also guaranteed protection.Legislature. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 153 . It was very unhelpful to have put themselves in that position. Office of Senator Bill Leonard Delaney Hunter is a Legislative Aide for Republican Assemblyman Bill Leonard. This schism was a recipe for having the least influence. Leonard was a Senator on the Conference Committee during the summer of ‘96. the fact that the renewables and environmentalists were divided was damaging. Legislative Conference Committee. As a general matter. Since several interview subjects described Bill Leonard as a powerful. The Decision by the PUC was going to be implemented unless the Legislature was able to deliver a package. Large. The utilities established early on the full reimbursement for stranded costs. Peace was demanding in terms of defining your position. powerful interests already had an advantage from the PUC Decision. large entities had unified positions. To a lesser extent. He ended up doing quite well. and they subsequently came around with an articulated position a day later. Which stakeholder groups do you think could have been more effective in influencing the policy formulation process. considering the situation. Later on in the Committee. He threw the munis out. but the playing field was tilted. fiscally conservative member of the Conference Committee. it is illuminating to get a perspective from one of his key staff who was quite active on the Committee. Lenny Goldberg from TURN was stellar. as when he threw the munis out of the Committee for their inability to articulate what they wanted. and how could they have improved their approach? Early on the munis were not able to define a single coherent position or proposal. the residential ratepayers also had trouble.

He represented himself well in the hearings and actually helped to draft language that made it into the bill. Groups that opposed the bill without participating also were ineffective. Wayne Rafesberger. If they were there and could contribute. The Committee Members took some things from the Decision. This was the greatest expression of coalition building. and Working Assets were just not there when their issues came up. They needed to get their nukes off of the books. no one was happy. and how could they have improved their approach? Power marketers such as Enron. anyone could have influence. NEVs. and why? When the PUC December Decision came out. IOUs very quickly were able to get 100% stranded cost recovery firmed up. could not go to a competitive market with a debt hindrance. This put everything on the table.Which stakeholder groups do you think were most effective in influencing the policy formulation process of AB 1890 and what were they able to obtain from the process? The IOUs were able to pull people together. They also were able to offer a lot of help with technical drafting. a small generation developer. was a one-man machine. A lot of their lawyers did technical language work in coalition with the legislative counsel. as well as an acceleration of recovery. such as CalPIRG and one of Ralph Nader’s organizations. Which stakeholder groups do you think were best able to set the terms of the debate. they had the manpower to make sure their positions were taken care of. To contrast this. Which stakeholder groups do you think could have been more effective in influencing the policy formulation process. The full recovery of their stranded assets was very important to them. The munis had a hard time articulating how to ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 154 . What methods or strategies did these effective groups use to influence the process? Was any particular method or sets of methods most influential? Linking up with the Governor’s office was critical. otherwise blew it up.

Anonymous Officeholder Staff Interview #1 Which stakeholder groups do you think were most effective in influencing the overall policy formulation process and what were they able to obtain from the process? Large customers and the utilities both had the most money to spend. it was very interesting how the environmentalists and renewables fought each other when it was clear the money had to be split.maintain an exit fee [for direct access customers leaving their electricity procurement service] without joining the ISO. Labor wanted to protect their employees. Was it always clear what outcomes each stakeholder group wanted from the process? Yes. while the large customers got the ability to go first on direct access. The ability to fund politicians helped. Once the Governor’s office was behind the MOU. It looks most likely that it will be adopted. SB 90 is the vehicle to make the CEC report on allocating renewables funding into statute. Bill Leonard did not historically support ratepayer funding for renewables. you must play. Political clout can be bought with lobbying and campaign contributions. such as irrigation districts and economic development rates. it was all over. Bill Leonard said that if you want to charge an exit fee. The IOUs got complete stranded cost recovery. He walked out at one point to force the munis to make up their mind. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 155 . However. and look for ways to get around paying the CTC. causing chaos. There was a lot of play between SMUD and the large customers. The IOUs were clear that they wanted full recovery. What methods or strategies did these effective groups use to influence the process? Was any particular method or sets of methods most influential? Getting the help of the Governor’s office.

not after the fact. you can be part of the decision making process. There was not enough education or public involvement. If you had the resources to be there. the large customers and utilities.Which stakeholder groups do you think were best able to set the terms of the debate. When the train was leaving the station. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 156 . influencing the CEC’s report to the Legislature. and pay attention to it then. This dissipated their effectiveness. and why? Again. They needed to realize the process was happening. IOUs got 100% stranded cost recovery. As customers learned more about what was going on. so there was not enough press coverage. Once something like AB 1890 is done. At first. small customers and the people who serve small customers. they did not know what seat they wanted to sit in. it is too late to change. which did not help. Anonymous Officeholder Staff Interview #2 Which stakeholder groups do you think were most effective in influencing the policy formulation process of AB 1890 and what were they able to obtain from the process? IOUs and large consumers got everything they wanted. they were all against restructuring. As it was too esoteric a topic. they did respond with thousands of cards and letters. Also. Which stakeholder groups do you think could have been more effective in influencing the policy formulation process. while large customers got to move forward with direct access. It had too many purists that need to learn the art of compromise. The environmental and consumer advocates did not have a clear idea of what they wanted. Was it always clear what outcomes each stakeholder group wanted from the process? No. and how could they have improved their approach? The renewables community fractured itself as far as coming together behind a proposal. in the coffee shops at three AM.

and the conference committee comes back with a 10% rate reduction instead. A key witness before the Committee was Ann Cohn. and why? The same stakeholder groups ran the discussions. but the resources that could be allocated.What methods or strategies did these effective groups use to influence the process? Was any particular method or sets of methods most influential? These influential players relied on a “fairness and competition” argument to Committee members: equity in access to the grid allowing competition to bring prices down. Senior Legal Counsel for Edison. Ann wrote it and brought it to the Committee for consideration. who deal daily with issues of economic development. This was the first time for the Members to be looking at actual language. Which stakeholder groups do you think could have been more effective in influencing the policy formulation process. The Committee staff did not write the first draft of the bill. Which stakeholder groups do you think were best able to set the terms of the debate. Often what groups indicated that they wanted was not what they actually wanted. and how could they have improved their approach? Power marketers and brokers were not as involved. However. Ann sat down and read from the draft during the conference committee. The Governor has the same goal: empower people for economic development. For example. TURN would say they want “X”. This had validity for Committee Members. But it was not the number of people in the room that mattered. they accounted for 2/3 of the people in the hearing room. Between the large manufacturers and utilities. Along the way the draft was changed of course. So ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 157 . the ratepayer groups did not jump up and grab it. Was it always clear what outcomes each stakeholder group wanted from the process? No.

while the Members were trying to do the right thing. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 158 . it appeared as if they were not doing that at all.

Interview #2 INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS American Wind Energy Association Independent Energy Producers LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Agricultural Energy Consumers Association California Industrial Users California Large Energy Consumers Association .Interview #1 Coalition of California Utility Employees .Interview #1 California Large Energy Consumers Association .Interview #1 Natural Resources Defense Council .Interview #2 California Manufacturers Association SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Latino Issues Forum The Utility Reform Network ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES Environmental Defense Fund Natural Resources Defense Council .Appendix D: Cluster Analysis of Stakeholder Interview Data How much of what you wanted was in the December Decision? INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric Southern California Edison MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITIES California Municipal Utilities Association .Interview #2 Sierra Club Union of Concerned Scientists STATE INSTITUTIONS California Energy Commission University of California.Interview #2 Sacramento Municipal Utility District UTILITY LABOR UNIONS Coalition of California Utility Employees . California Institute for Energy Efficiency Total note: 1 selects column Rather Little Mixed/Unclear 0 0 Most 3 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 1 1 8 1 0 3 10 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 159 .Interview #1 California Municipal Utilities Association .

Interview #1 California Large Energy Consumers Association . 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 9 10 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 160 .How much of what you wanted was in AB 1890? INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric Southern California Edison MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITIES California Municipal Utilities Association . California Institute for Energy Efficiency Total note: 1 selects column Rather Little Mixed/Unclear Most 0 0 3 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 .Interview #1 California Municipal Utilities Association .Interview #2 Sacramento Municipal Utility District UTILITY LABOR UNIONS Coalition of California Utility Employees .Interview #2 INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS American Wind Energy Association Independent Energy Producers LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Agricultural Energy Consumers Association California Industrial Users California Large Energy Consumers Association .Interview #2 Sierra Club Union of Concerned Scientists STATE INSTITUTIONS California Energy Commission University of California.Interview #1 Natural Resources Defense Council .Interview #1 Coalition of California Utility Employees .Interview #2 California Manufacturers Association SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Latino Issues Forum The Utility Reform Network ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES Environmental Defense Fund Natural Resources Defense Council .

Interview #1 Coalition of California Utility Employees .Interview #2 INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS American Wind Energy Association Independent Energy Producers LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Agricultural Energy Consumers Association California Industrial Users California Large Energy Consumers Association .Interview #2 California Manufacturers Association SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Latino Issues Forum The Utility Reform Network ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES Environmental Defense Fund Natural Resources Defense Council .Which Policy Outcome Does Your Organization Prefer? INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric Southern California Edison MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITIES California Municipal Utilities Association .Interview #1 California Large Energy Consumers Association .Interview #2 Sacramento Municipal Utility District UTILITY LABOR UNIONS Coalition of California Utility Employees . California Institute for Energy Efficiency Total note: 1 selects column ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 161 .Interview #1 California Municipal Utilities Association .Interview #1 Natural Resources Defense Council .Interview #2 Sierra Club Union of Concerned Scientists STATE INSTITUTIONS CPUC DD AB 1890 No preference/Unclear 0 3 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 3 14 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 California Energy Commission University of California.

500 $1.495 $1.000 $4.000 $1.000 $495 $950 $696 $2.000 $1.000 $2.000 $2.191 $2.000 $0 $0 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 162 .000 $3.896 $3.800 $1.429 $498 $1. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (various locals) INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS CalEnergy Co.000 $3.000 $7.500 $22. (geothermal) Pacific Lumber Company (solid fuel biomass) LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Adams Steel California Farm Bureau Federation PAC California Manufacturers Association California Mining Association PAC California Steel Industries (CLECA member) Fontana Steel Louisiana Pacific (CMA member) Mitsubishi Cement (CLECA member) National Cement (CLECA member) Riverside Cement (CLECA member) Tamco Steel (CLECA member) OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Co.495 $10.) California Independent Oil Marketers Association Chevron (CMA member) Mobil Unocal (CMA member) SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES $22.Appendix E: Restructuring Stakeholder Campaign Contribution/Gift Analysis Detail Table 1: Assemblymember Jim Brulte.995 $21.000 $500 $1.000 $3.000 $1. 1995 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas General Electric (nuclear generation) Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises UTILITY LABOR UNIONS Int.495 $7.995 $300 $12.

495 $4.017 $749 $750 $3.500 $47. (geothermal) Pacific Lumber Company (solid fuel biomass) LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Adams Steel California Manufacturers Association California Mining Association PAC California Steel Industries (CLECA member) Fontana Steel Mitsubishi Cement (CLECA member) National Cement (CLECA member) Riverside Cement (CLECA member) Southwest Portland Cement Co.995 $2.000 $1.990 $1.000 $1.460 $200 $500 $750 $2.500 $6. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (various locals) Southern California Pipe Trades INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS CalEnergy Co.995 $0 $0 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 163 .750 $4. 1996 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises UTILITY LABOR UNIONS Int.250 $2.) California Independent Oil Marketers Association California Independent Petroleum PAC Chevron (CMA member) Exxon Mobil Texaco Unocal (CMA member) SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES $28.000 $1.500 $1.995 $14.000 $8.000 $10.000 $3.000 $2.500 $800 $498 $200 $9. (CLECA member) Tamco Steel (CLECA member) OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Co.Table 2: Assemblymember Jim Brulte.500 $1.000 $2.511 $3.995 $1.

000 $1.000 $1. (geothermal) Indpependent Energy Producers OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES California Independent Petroleum PAC Chevron (CMA member) Unocal (CMA member) SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES $11.490 “Travel project to Europe on Electric Restructuring.750 $750 $1. 1995 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises UTILITY LABOR UNIONS Int. Brulte was taken on a $7.000 $1. as well as an event.000 $750 $0 $0 103 Asmus.250 $500 $1. and Privatization” visiting London. by the California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy.1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Assemblymember Jim Brulte In 1995. Conservation. Sweden. Table 3: Senator Steve Peace. Chevron treated Brulte to two meals. From 3/28/96 to 4/8/96. charitable organization 501(c)(3)” funded by Edison to push Edison’s preferred wholesale PoolCo style market structure103. Not to be outdone. AB 1890 author Assemblyman Jim Brulte accepted no gifts from stakeholders.000 $3. Paling in comparison. Mobil treated Brulte to a $60 event in 1996.750 $2. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (various locals) INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS CalEnergy Co. CFEE is a “non-profit. 1996.000 $2. totaling $101. and Budapest.750 $3.000 $2. 4 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 164 .500 $1.

250 $7.000 $500 $2.100 $2.000 $300 $1.000 $750 $750 $750 $1. (geothermal) California Solar Energy Industry Association Cannon Energy (windpower) Destec (gas-fired) Independent Energy Producers Pacific Lumber Company (solid fuel biomass) SeaWest Windpower Zond Windpower DSM ENERGY SERVICE COMPANIES (ESCOS) SESCO (energy services) LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS California Manufacturers Association California Retailers Association California Steel Industries (CLECA member) OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Co.450 $7.500 $8.815 $750 $6.500 $3.500 $16.250 $750 $500 $1.115 $18. 1996 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises UTILITY LABOR UNIONS Int.250 $1. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (various locals) Southern California Pipe Trades Utility Workers Union of America INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS CalEnergy Co.600 $2.050 $3.000 $4.250 $2.000 $6.750 $0 $0 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 165 .000 $1.Table 4: Senator Steve Peace.072 $2.) California Independent Petroleum PAC Chevron (CMA member) Unocal (CMA member) SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES $48.572 $1.

SDG&E pulled on Peace’s ear over a sports event and meal totaling $89. In 1996. taking Steve to 11 meals. Peace began a practice of reimbursing all utilities for meals and outings starting with Edison in 1995. Table 5: Senator Byron Sher.000 $5. as well as chair of the Senate Energy and Utilities Committee. In 1995.900 . 1995 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES Southern California Edison/Edison International UTILITY LABOR UNIONS California State Pipe Trades Council PAC INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS Indpependent Energy Producers LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES California League of Conservation Voters $500 $500 $500 $500 $500 $500 $0 $0 $5.100 $2.450 166 ELECTRIC/GAS $6. SDG&E had Peace out to six meals.000 Table 6: Senator Byron Sher. IEP made a gift of $241 for his speech at a conference. Peace was treated to a $52 sports event by Mobil Oil. while Edison treated him to five meals and a sports event. Southern California Edison was granted a high level of access. 1996 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) General Electric (nuclear plants) Pacific Gas & Electric ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout $250 $1. he maintained a pretty low profile in 1995 and 1996 in terms of accepting gifts and trips.1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Senator Steve Peace Given Steve Peace’s prominence as chair of the Conference Committee on Electric Utility Restructuring.

(geothermal) Colmac Energy Inc.500 Int. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (various $9.000 $500 $1. of Journeymen & Apprentice Underground Utility/Landscape INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS AES Pacific/SF Energy Co. EVs) Hansen.600 $13. Inc (consultants) $200 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 167 .000 locals) Southern California Pipe Trades United Assoc.000 $100 producers. (gas-fired) American Wind Energy Association Bonnie Hays Consulting (Clean Power Day organizing) CalEnergy Co.000 $500 $500 $9. (biomass) Edson + Modisette (lobbyist for indep. and Hamrin.100 $500 $2. $2.482 $100 $1.San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises UTILITY LABOR UNIONS California Workers California State Pipe Trades Council PAC State Association of Electrical $1. McQuat.882 $100 $1.

000 $100 $100 $500 $1.000 $1.250 $100 $50 $500 $500 $250 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 168 .000 Large Energy Consumers $3.000 $1.000 $100 $1.250 (ESCOS) Appliance Recycling Centers of America Onsite Energy (energy service company) Preferred Energy Services (energy service company) LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Adams Steel California Association California Retailers Association California Steel Industries (CLECA member) Louisiana Pacific (CMA member) Schnitzer Steel Industries (CLECA member) OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES $1.000 (tire $1.Indpependent Energy Producers Modesto burning) SeaWest Windpower United American Energy Wadham Energy Limited Partnership (biomass) Zond Windpower DSM ENERGY SERVICE Energy Limited Partnership $1.500 COMPANIES $1.

(gasoline refining and marketing) SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS California Association ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES California League of Conservation Voters Energy Foundation Environmental Defense Fund Natural Resources Defense Council Planning and Conservation League Sierra Club California Union of Concerned Scientists STATE INSTITUTIONS U. of California. California Institute for Energy Efficiency California Integrated Waste Management Board (biomass proponents) Nevada Community Action $1.000 $700 $4.448 $14.Tosco Corp.000 $300 $300 $22.585 $100 $500 $2.462 $100 $900 $400 $500 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 169 .

but his Statement of Economic Interest reveals large holding of oil and electricity stocks. NARUC treated Sher to a two day trip to DC for another meeting.400 $750 $150 $1. and GE. totaling $2608.300 $500 $1. Sher received no other gifts that year from energy utility stakeholders. Mobil.000 in each of Amoco. Exxon. Sher holds over $100.500 $300 $0 $0 $2.500 $0 $0 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 170 . totaling $758. In 1996. Table 7: Senator Bill Leonard. 1995 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas Pacific Gas & Electric Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises UTILITY LABOR UNIONS INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS California Steel Industries (CLECA member) Riverside Cement (CLECA member) Tamco Steel (CLECA member) SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES $3.000 $1.1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Senator Byron Sher In 1995. the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) bought Sher two plane tickets for quick trips to the Steering Committee meetings of the Electric Utility Restructuring Project.

Edison again ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 171 . (geothermal) Pacific Lumber Company (solid fuel biomass) LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS California Mining Association PAC California Portland Cement Co.000 $2. 1996 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises UTILITY LABOR UNIONS Int. Edison’s lobbyists got to spend a little more quality time with Leonard for their money. SCE treated him to a $30 beach party and a $20 lunch with lobbyist Bob Foster.000 $2.000 $1.650 $2.000 $500 $500 $4.000 $0 $0 1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Senator Bill Leonard In 1995.000 $5.080 $10. saving up for a $77 dinner with head lobbyist Bob Foster. SDG&E bought Leonard a $125 ticket to the Pete Wilson Inaugural Gala.000 $2.Table 8: Senator Bill Leonard. WA paid $734 for Leonard to moderate a conference session on utility deregulation.730 $2. (CLECA member) California Steel Industries (CLECA member) Mitsubishi Cement (CLECA member) Tamco Steel (CLECA member) OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Co.650 $500 $1. for a paltry $20.500 $500 $1.) Texaco Unocal (CMA member) SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES $19.000 $1. extending his stay from 12/8/96 to 12/13/96. Senator Leonard was courted a little more heavily by energy stakeholders in 1996. and a $75 dinner at the American Legislative Exchange Council’s annual meeting. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (various locals) INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS CalEnergy Co.500 $150 $500 $3. SCE treated Leonard to dinner and lodging for Legislative Ski Day. The Pacific Rim Conference of Seattle. While the Senator was there.

250 $750 $0 $0 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 172 .250 $1. They also had Leonard out for two meals in Sacramento. paying $44 for two meals and lodging.600 $750 $750 $500 $1. including lunch with Bob Foster. ARCO treated Leonard to a $19 meal at a reception.000 $750 $750 $650 $150 $500 $3. 1995 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas Joint Electrical Industry Fund Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises UTILITY LABOR UNIONS California State Association of Electrical Workers INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS Indpependent Energy Producers LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Adams Steel Louisiana Pacific (CMA member) OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Co.had Senator Leonard out for Legislative Ski Day. Table 9: Assemblymember Mickey Conroy. PG&E took Leonard out to a Kings game.000 $1.600 $1.750 $1.000 $1.) Chevron (CMA member) Unocal (CMA member) SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES $6. for the modest tab of $56.000 $1.

700 $750 $450 $250 $250 $1.500 $2. CFEE is a “non-profit. two meals for $44. 1996 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises UTILITY LABOR UNIONS California State Pipe Trades Council PAC Int.700 $500 $300 $550 $2.Table 10: Assemblymember Mickey Conroy. PG&E treated him to a basketball game with $51 tickets. 4 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 173 . 1996.000 $5. Unocal (CMA member) SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES $9.000 $2.000 $0 $0 1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Assemblymember Mickey Conroy In April of 1995. and to 104 Asmus.000 $500 $750 $250 $500 $2.600 $3. $7. and Inner Mongolia.300 junket to talk with Chinese central government and provincial leaders in Beijing. (CLECA member) California Steel Industries (CLECA member) Louisiana Pacific (CMA member) Tamco Steel (CLECA member) OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Co.600 $500 $1. Shanghai. the California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy took Conroy on an 11 day. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (various locals) Southern California Pipe Trades INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS Destec (gas-fired) Pacific Lumber Company (solid fuel biomass) LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Adams Steel California Portland Cement Co. charitable organization 501(c)(3)” funded by Edison to push Edison’s preferred wholesale PoolCo style market structure104.000 $500 $2.) California Independent Petroleum PAC Chevron (CMA member) Southern Counties Oil Co.000 $3.050 $1.

Edison wined and dined the Assemblymember with four meals at $134. SDG&E.000 each in Edison. and Westinghouse Electrical. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 174 . four rounds of “refreshments” for $30. After such a busy social calendar in 1995. and less than 10. it is surprising that no electric utility deregulation stakeholders made any gifts to Assemblymember Conroy in 1996. costing $99. Chevron took Conroy out for two business meals. Pacificorp.000 in Orange & Rockland Utilities. the Assemblymember seems to have a penchant for electric utilities and nuclear power plant manufacturers. and $25 of cookies and candy. In terms of investment. General Electric. with investments of greater than $10. Kansas City Power & Light. $10 in candy.make sure Conroy kept a sweet spot in his heart for them.

000 $1.750 $1.750 $2.000 $1.250 $1. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (various locals) INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS CalEnergy Co.675 $2.750 $1.750 $4. 1995 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises UTILITY LABOR UNIONS California State Pipe Trades Council PAC Int.750 $2.750 $750 $500 $500 $750 $0 $0 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 175 .000 $1.250 $1.175 $500 $1.) Chevron (CMA member) Mobil Texaco Unocal (CMA member) SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES $7. (geothermal) Indpependent Energy Producers OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Co.Table 11: Assemblymember Diane Martinez.

000 $0 $0 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 176 .250 $1.500 $1. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (various locals) Utility Workers Union of America INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS CalEnergy Co.000 $4.500 $500 $500 $1. (CLECA member) California Steel Industries (CLECA member) Tamco Steel (CLECA member) OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Co.500 $1. 1996 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITIES Gualco Group (lobbyist: Imperial & Modesto Irigatn.000 $500 $500 $500 $500 $500 $3.000 $1.000 $500 $3.500 $6.000 $5.000 $1. (geothermal) Destec (gas-fired) Enron Capital & Trade (gas-fired) GWF Power Systems (oil and coal-fired) Pacific Lumber Company (solid fuel biomass) Sithe Energies Co.750 $1.000 $500 $500 $5. Dist.500 $1. (member of IPPs of NY) Zond Windpower LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS California Manufacturers Association California Portland Cement Co.) Chevron (CMA member) Mobil Texaco Unocal (CMA member) SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES $20.000 $4.Table 12: Assemblymember Diane Martinez.000 $1.) UTILITY LABOR UNIONS California State Association of Electrical Workers Int.000 $7.500 $1.000 $500 $1.

000 $500 $500 $1. The Assemblymember enjoyed no such gifts from deregulation stakeholders in 1996.467 trip to Northwestern University to discuss the deregulation of public utilities.Table 13: Assemblymember Steve Kuykendall.600 $1.500 $1.100 $100 $1.208 $0 $0 $1. the Illinois Energy Association flew Martinez out for a $1. diesel) Unocal (CMA member) SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES $7. 1995 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas General Electric (nuclear plants) Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises UTILITY LABOR UNIONS INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS Louisiana Pacific (CMA member) OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Co.600 $500 $0 $0 1995/1996 Stakeholder Gift Information for Assemblymember Diane Martinez In 1995.000 $8.500 $1. (bulk terminals) Mobil Tidelands Oil Tower Energy Group (oil.) California Independent Oil Producers Chevron (CMA member) Kaiser International Corp. natural gas.058 $500 $500 $1.900 $3.000 $1. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 177 .850 $1.

374 $4.000 $2.443 $6. Sweden.) California Independent Oil Producers California Independent Petroleum PAC Chevron (CMA member) Mobil Texaco Tidelands Oil Tower Energy Group (oil.000 $500 $2.374 $500 $2. Kuykendall was taken on a $7.000 $1. and Budapest.254 $200 $500 $4. However.250 $100 $500 $35.500 $1.000 $19. and Privatization” visiting London. From 3/28/96 to 4/8/96.000 $1. 1996 Campaign Contributions INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC/GAS UTILITIES El Paso Natural Gas Pacific Gas & Electric San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Southern California Edison/Edison International Southern California Gas/Pacific Enterprises UTILITY LABOR UNIONS INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS Bechtel (gas-fired) Pacific Lumber Company (solid fuel biomass) LARGE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS California Farm Bureau Federation PAC California Mining Association PAC Kaiser Aluminum Louisiana Pacific (CMA member) OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Co.Table 14: Assemblymember Steve Kuykendall. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 178 . natural gas.350 $500 $1.490 “Travel project to Europe on Electric Restructuring. Conservation.500 $0 $1. Kuykendall’s social calendar was destined to pick up in 1996.500 $1. diesel) Unocal (CMA member) Victory Oil Co. Western States Petroleum Association treated Kuykendall to a reception and a dinner totaling $62.989 $500 $500 $0 $0 1995/1996 Kuykendall Stakeholder Gift Information for Assemblymember Steve In 1995. SMALL ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES $10.000 $1.

in Aspen. known as the Council of States Government . and environmental groups to discuss the British experience with deregulation of electricity. Brussels. government ministers. for $610. According to investigative writer Peter Asmus.051 to fly the President out to New York City for a ConEdison Management Conference. The Aspen Institute. CO. wholesale PoolCo model.WEST. “though the CPUC had imposed a ban on communications regarding the Biennial Resource Plan Update (BRPU). The California 105 Asmus. The Large Public Power Council. and Paris. 1996. was very interested in California moving to the UK-style. spent $1402 to fly Fessler to Charleston. 4 ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 179 . Another non-profit organization. a clean power auction the CPUC repeatedly postponed upon the urging of the utility. regulators. a trade association for publicly owned utilities.by the California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy. The California Mining Association took him out for an evening of recreation and dinner costing $89. A trade association. Edison. to meet with CEOs of the electricity industry. paid $1. Chevron treated Kuykendall to two dinners for $131.167 junket visiting London.916 for the Assemblymember to speak and moderate a panel discussion on electric utility deregulation. SC to address their membership. by the California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy. 1994/1995 Stakeholder Gift Information for CPUC President Daniel Fessler From 3/16/94 to 3/27/94.”105 The Consolidated Edison IOU spent $1. spent $516 to fly Fessler to a “Series on Energy Efficiency in the 21st Century”. Fessler was taken on a $7. The Energy Foundation flew him to Colorado twice for “Future of Utilities” and “Utility Futures IV” meetings. an Edison lobbyist was added to the international travel party at the last minute. one of CFEE’s funders.

Fessler holds over $10. Shanghai. spent $314 to bring him to speak at their Spring Conference. spending $291. ZEV’s and Rethinking the Environment Conference.000 in Ohio Edison stock. spending $1006. Synergics Resources Corporation had Fessler out to Princeton. DC. Finally. the California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy took Fessler on an 11 day. for $323. The Energy Foundation brought him to Dallas and Salt Lake City for the “Utility Futures V and VII meetings.802 junket to talk with Chinese central government and provincial leaders in Beijing. $7. a utility association. The Cato Institute. a libertarian think-tank. DC. had Fessler speak at their conference in Washington. a utility planning association. Fessler was flown to The National Association of Energy Service Companies for $249 to speak at their annual conference in Boca Raton. Finally. On the investment side.Energy Coalition flew him to Wyoming to join roundtable discussions at an Aspen Accord Working Group meeting. for $467 airfare. The Western States Coordinating Council. PG&E had him out for two lunches. CO. The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy spent $120 for Fessler to make it to their Energy Policy Forum in Washington. The Illinois Power Company spent $427 to bring the CPUC President out to speak at the Edison Electric Institute Joint Executives Symposium. for $61. NJ to speak at the 1994 DSM Implementation Conference. EEI is a trade association representing investor owned utilities. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 180 . and Inner Mongolia. in Fort Collins. the Center for Resource Management flew him to Midway. spent $249 to fly him to their annual meeting in Las Vegas. Utah to speak at the “Utility Restructuring. In April of 1995. The Rocky Mountain Electrical League. Kansai Electric utility spent $222 to fly Feeler to roundtable discussions at the NARUC/Kansai Electric Senior Executives Meeting in New York City.

wholesale PoolCo model. was very interested in California moving to the UK-style. Conlon was taken on a $7. Unocal. regulators. 1994/1995 Stakeholder Gift Information for Commissioner Josiah Neeper Knight did not report any electricity deregulation stakeholder gifts in 1994 or 1995. He does own more than $10. Knight did not report any electricity deregulation stakeholder gifts in 1994 or 1995. the Northwest Electric Light and Power Association flew Shumway to their 3rd annual Non-Utility Generation Conference. and Paris. 1994/1995 Stakeholder Gift Information for Commissioner Henry Duque Duque did not report any electricity deregulation stakeholder gifts in 1994 or 1995. Brussels. to meet with CEOs of the electricity industry. PG&E had him out to three meals for $71. utility and General Electric stock.000 in each of Chevron. spending $258.167 junket visiting London. by the California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy. 1994/1995 Stakeholder Gift Information for Commissioner Jesse Knight. He does own less than $10. In 1995. and less than $10. 1995.1994/1995 Stakeholder Gift Information for Commissioner Gregory Conlon From 3/16/94 to 3/31/94. Edison. and Schlumberger oilfield services stock.000 in each of Montana Power Company and Exxon stock. ERG Master’s Project Mark Stout 181 . Jr. The Edison Electric Institute spent $279 to fly the Commissioner to a conference on the results of State Competition in Boca Raton. He left office on February 23.000 in each of Central & Southwest Corp. and environmental groups to discuss the British experience with deregulation of electricity. one of CFEE’s funders. government ministers. 1994/1995 Stakeholder Gift Information for Commissioner Norm Shumway In February of 1994.

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