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6 6.0 INCIDENT INVESTIGATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 8.1 8.0 8.0 5.4 5.3 PRECAUTIONS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 7.0 3.0 INTRODUCTION SCOPE REFERENCES DEFINITIONS STANDARDS/GUIDELINES 5.0 2.1 SOURCE OF AIR 6.3 8.4 DOCUMENT CONTROL AUDIT REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT RENEWAL PROCESS DEVIATION PROCESS Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking .2 5.1 NEW PROJECTS AND MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING Page 3 3 3 4 6 6 SYSTEMS 5.5 5.PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 2 of 15 SAFE WORK PRACTICES ON LINE BREAKING TABLE OF CONTENTS # 1.0 4.3 5.0 TRAINING JOB PLANNING SYSTEM PREPARATION LOCKOUT/ISOLATION JOB EXECUTION 7 7 8 8 9 12 12 13 14 14 14 14 14 15 15 HAZARDS ON WORKING ON FLARE LINES 6.2 8.2 6.
0 INTRODUCTION Spreading of flange joints.0 REFERENCES − KPC HSE Document No. Mandatory rules are characterized by the word “SHALL” throughout the text.0 SCOPE To provide the minimum provisions for planning and executing all line breaks and to specify the line break considerations to be addressed at an early stage in the design process of new and modified equipment. Advisory rules or recommendations are indicated by the word “SHOULD”. Line Break Procedure − Maintenance Work Practices. Accidents have occurred due to negligence of safety aspects during such jobs. 2. Equivalent designations shall be applicable for other locations/ sites. − KNPC Design Engineering Practices − SWP on Work Permit & Risk Assessment SHE-TSSA-06-2029 − SWP on Plant Operations SHE-TSSA-05-2002 − SWP on Confined Space Entry SHE-TSSA-04-SP-2007 Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking .PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 3 of 15 1. Zero Energy Test KNPC-SMM-1-PRC-0404 − Procedure for Multi-Lock System in Refineries MAA-ELAC-03-1330 − PPE Program SHE-TSOH-04-1315. − Maintenance Work Practices. Various designations mentioned in the document are refinery based. Lock-Out/Tag-Out KNPC-SMM-1-PRC0403. disconnecting unions and removing spool pieces or bends in process and utility lines are required during most maintenance activities and tie-in related to project activities. The words shall and should have been used to remain in line with the terminology used by the American National Standards Institute. 24. All parties involved in such jobs shall ensure appropriate precautions. 3.
or mists. − Atmospheric pressure has been attained. especially gases in pipes and vessels. a possibility of fire or explosion. The bleed serves as an indicator of the integrity of the upstream block valve.. and/or airborne combustible dust are reduced to acceptable levels. The bleed consists of an open block valve and terminates with an open end or pressure gauge.e. block valve/controlled bleed/block valve) or block valve and blank/blind flange. Examples of hazardous processes or systems include. where appropriate.PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 4 of 15 4. or an off-site hazard. corrosiveness. 4.4 Engineered process plug—a means of isolating process flow by solidifying a portion of the process in a pipeline in a controlled. vapors. 4. flushed. 4. flammability of gases.3 Double isolation—double block valve and controlled bleed (i. and made ready for hotwork as applicable and the following criteria are met: − The system’s temperature is lower than 140°F (60°C) and higher than 14°F (-10°C).5 Front-end loading—design activities before final design and approval executed to uncover possible hidden problems and expense. Selection and positioning of the bleed termination point are dependent on the hazards associated with the process material and local conditions at the time of the line break. corrosive and/or flammable substances. − Hazards associated with toxicity. that is meeting normal operating conditions. but are not limited to. 4.0 DEFINITIONS 4. an environmental hazard. drained.6 Hazardous process or system—a process or system that contains any material at any pressure that could cause an injury to an individual(s). and other lines that could contain Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking .2 Controlled bleed—a valved opening (bleed) located between two block valves. 4. and approved manner. compressed fluids. predesigned.1 Cleared—all lines and equipment associated with a system are verified by standard practices to have been positively isolated and. and/or purged of hazardous material.
including fluid whose temperature is higher than 140°F (60°C) or lower than 14°F (-10°C). the following: − Breaking flanges − Removing one or more bolts from flanges − Removing valve bonnets and non-return (i.e.e. 4.g.9 PPE—Personal Protective Equipment.. but are not limited to. and experience have successfully demonstrated their ability to solve or resolve problems related to line breaks in accordance with this document. manually valved and/or blanked or blind flanged etc to completely isolate the line or equipment from the process material and documented such isolation by blind lists and locations clearly identified by tags. replacing packing on a valve) 4. blanks) − Breaking pipe joints − Removing slip plates (i.8 Line break—opening cleared or uncleared lines or equipment that has contained any fluid at a volume. training. plugs. blind flanges.10 Qualified personnel—those who by extensive knowledge. 4.PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 5 of 15 material that is hazardous on contact or inhalation. instrument orifice plates.. double block and bleed system.. and caps − Disconnecting tubing − Disconnecting loading and unloading process hoses − Penetrating a line by mechanical or other means − Opening inspection ports − Making subtle adjustments (e. removal of section of piping (along with blinding the live end). blanks).7 Isolation—Complete obstruction and elimination of flow to system (piping or equipment) ensuring full protection against the release of fluid to the system by means such as blinding.e.. pressure or temperature capable of causing injury or damage to property by actions that may include. 4. Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking . check) valves − Turning spectacle plates (i.
solidifying the process) If neither double block valve and controlled bleed or block valve and blank/blind flange isolation is feasible./ Process Engg. Double block valves d. Examples of secondary energy sources include steam and electric tracing and jacketed vessels and pipe.. Isolation and clearing shall be primary considerations during project front-end loading activity.PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 6 of 15 5. Double block valve and controlled bleed b. then appropriate safeguards Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking . Single block valve e. 3. − All systems shall be designed with the ability to isolate secondary energy sources. Block valve and blank/blind flange c. Engineered process plug (i. the benefit of providing additional connections for flushing and clearing access to systems and equipment. 2. additional hazards introduced as the result of adding additional valves. The following points shall be considered: 1.e. − The design shall include the ability to isolate secondary energy sources for polymer and melt systems where the material is “frozen” (i. The design team shall consider the following hierarchy for isolating hazardous processes.e.1 NEW PROJECTS AND MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING SYSTEMS Operations Dept. Systems shall be designed and built to enable isolation and clearing of the hazard.0 STANDARDS/ GUIDELINES 5. The decision should be based on the level of protection to people and environment vs. − The design shall consider the balance between added potential leak points (catastrophic and fugitive) vs. solidified) to eliminate the hazard. Division shall work with Asset Custodian Dept/ Division during the design and engineering stages of a project so that line break issues are considered in both new projects and modifications to existing systems.. a.. Experienced field operators and mechanics shall be involved in the front-end loading efforts.
− Planners/schedulers. 3.PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 7 of 15 (for example regular testing of single valves) shall be provided. health. and environmental issues shall be prepared and implemented for all line breaks on hazardous processes and systems. 5. Training shall be documented. The Issuer and Executor shall ensure that the plan details are communicated to all the Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking . including supervisors. Refresher Training shall be provided every 3 years. 2. 3. 2. documented. There should be a system to check that the training had been effective. Initial training shall be provided for − Operating personnel. Personnel performing the work shall be made aware of the safety. The topic shall be included in the SHE training program at SHE Training Center. and included as a part of the Hazop study. 4. and environmental requirements. A written Risk Assessment that specifically addresses safety. − Personnel who issue line break permits. including planning and execution. health. A line break permit shall be issued and precautions as per the Risk Assessment shall be mentioned in the Permit. Key elements for determining personnel qualifications are listed below: 1.2 TRAINING Team Leader of the Executing Dept shall ensure that qualified personnel perform all work on hazardous processes or systems.3 JOB PLANNING 1. This shall be as per document: SHE-TSSA-06-2029 SWP Work Permit & Risk Assessment. − Maintenance and construction personnel. 5. − Contractors and contract administrators. including supervisors. Team Leaders of Executing and Asset Custodian Departments shall also ensure that training is provided to persons involved on line break procedures.
Procedure for Multi-Lock System in Refineries MAA-ELAC-03-1330 . Zero Energy Test KNPC-SMM-1-PRC-0404 . elimination and verification of chemical hazards. flushing and clearing. Tagging procedure: Systematic tagging of blinds used for positive isolation of lines and equipment. and standby person responsibilities. Key elements for proper system preparation include establishing and verifying acceptable levels of cleanliness. b. Team Leaders of the Custodian and Executing Dept shall ensure that a process is in place to do the following: a. 3.KNPC Blinding Deblinding Procedure The following points shall be considered in isolation: 1.4 SYSTEM PREPARATION The system must be properly prepared before line breaks are made on any system. cathodic protection etc) energy sources shall be identified.PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 8 of 15 personnel involved. These details include lockout points.g. electric tracing. The following documents shall serve as a guideline in this regard . Periodically review the Risk Assessment for inclusion of all mandatory requirements of this document. The bleed (drain/ vent) valve (for block & bleed) for the isolated system shall be maintained in the open position and the line cleared to prevent trapping process material in the line/equipment. 2. steam tracing. The clearing and draining of pipelines and equipment must follow approved waste management procedures to protect the environment. 5. Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking .Maintenance Work Practices.5 LOCKOUT / ISOLATION All systems prepared for line breaks shall be properly isolated.Maintenance Work Practices.. . 4. Document the line break training and periodic retraining of the people performing the routine line break jobs 5. Lock-Out/Tag-Out KNPC-SMM-1-PRC-0403. The specific steps for isolating all primary and secondary (e. Blanks and blind flanges shall be tagged as described in the above document.
plug valves. If clearing cannot be accomplished as Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking . is given under 5.e. 5.SHE-TSSA-06-2029 . not isolating all sources of pressure or hazardous process material.SWP on Confined Space Entry:SHE-STSA-04-SP-2007 .SWP on Work Permit System and Risk Assessment. the surrounding area (including its electrical classification).1 (3). Examples of manual valves used for isolation are gate valves. A listing. Permit issuer shall ensure that the system is properly prepared before any line breaks are made. 4. from the most protective to the least protective. the added chance of leaks from additional isolation valves. or not draining the low point and venting the high point. including worst-case scenarios and contingency plans. and ball valves. . 5. These incidents have a variety of causes. Experience has shown that incidents still occur after the first break is completed. the frequency of the line break. The following documents shall be referred for further guidance.PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 9 of 15 This is especially important in polymer and melt systems that are “frozen” (i.6 JOB EXECUTION The first break does not always verify that the system or equipment is free of hazard.SWP on Plant Operations: SHE-TSSA-05-2002 Rev 1 (Sec 8: Safe Operating Practices) 1. solidified) to isolate them and for acids that can vaporize if cooled and then reheated. Where work on hazardous systems is to be performed behind a single blocking valve. The degree of isolation depends on the hazards of the material being isolated. including trapped pockets of pressure or hazardous process material. Various means of isolating systems or equipment that contain hazards can be used.. 6. The use of control valves for isolation is not allowed. and the experience gained from past line breaks. the configuration of the piping system. the line break permit or procedure shall indicate how the hazard is to be mitigated.
4. loosen the bolts without fully removing them and spread the joint slightly to check that it has no pressure. The work should proceed only after Operations has clearly identified the flanges that are to be opened. The location shall be monitored continuously for presence of toxic or flammable gases if required by the permit. 3. 2. authorize. 11. Note the location of safety shower before commencing work on chemical lines. Maintenance personnel should never break a line without obtaining a work permit from the Operations Supervisor. document. Proper protective clothing and equipment are worn if toxic. Ensure that both sides of the flange are properly supported/anchored to avoid falling or spring action. Lines and equipment are drained or depressurized of all possible contents of flammable. Operations supervisor assures to the Maintenance personnel that there are no naked lights. 6. Workers should remain upwind. Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking . the job shall be stopped and the following steps shall be performed: re-plan. 7. 10. 9. The area shall be barricaded to warn people not involved in the line break of any unexpected release of hazardous material. and communicate. especially downwind of the line of the equipment to be opened. 12. Hot work Permits shall not be issued within this radius. 5. corrosive or other harmful substances could be present. Necessary monitoring equipment shall be available at site. fires or other sources of ignition within 15m radius. corrosive liquid and toxic contents or asphyxiating gas before opening.PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 10 of 15 expected. Presence of permit issuer is essential at the work site during the commencement of line break and also during lining up after completion of job. 8. All parties involved in the line breaking shall be made aware of the status of the equipment and the hazards involved.
Gas tests shall be conducted during spreading of the flange and precautions & procedures determined accordingly. 14. Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking . 15. Water lines including Sea Water). (providing drip tray. 21. Use non-sparking tools when working on hydrogen. Steam Lines: It is possible that there could be presence of hydrocarbons in steam lines. Waste management guidelines issued by Environment Division shall be followed in the handling and disposal of waste. It is therefore advisable to conduct gas tests during blinding/ deblinding of steam lines also. diking. If it appears that the line is under pressure. Precautions are taken to contain the leftover material/sludge and minimize spillage. This occurs when process units are subjected to emergency shutdowns including the steam system. 17. The joint shall be opened very slowly to ensure that there is no hold-up of gas or liquid and that block valves are holding. When work spans over two shifts the next shift people shall be made aware of the ongoing job. ethylene. 22. The Risk Assessment will have to be reviewed again before proceeding further in such cases. Nitrogen line. Do not remove the last bolt until inserting a wedge at far end to remove any remaining content. the joint should be closed immediately and reopened only under the direction of Operations supervisor after corrective action has been taken. Slacken the bolts farthest away from the person first. Instrument Air. This could create vacuum conditions in the steam line sucking in hydrocarbons. Other Utility Lines: (Plant Air. All utility lines shall be considered as hydrocarbon contaminated.PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 11 of 15 13. 18. Lines or vessels shall be considered full or hazardous until proven safe for work 20. 19. In such cases the job plan shall be reviewed. etc) 16. acetylene and carbon disulphide lines. Work above the flange and not below.
Union shall be disconnected and capped/plugged at the danger end. Content between valve and the blind shall be emptied before deblinding. 27. Air is most likely to enter when a section of the system is to be gas freed to permit 'hot work' on lines or equipment in preparation for Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking . While venting equipment (for example during start-up) into the flare system 4.0 HAZARDS OF WORKING ON FLARE LINES Work on flare lines is far more susceptible to mishaps than are most other plant piping arrangements. Hazards associated with such work and means of carrying out the work safely are mentioned below 6. drains or other connections 2. 25. Unions: Inserting a disc between union faces is not considered as positive isolation. 26. 24. 6.1 SOURCE OF AIR: Keeping air out of a flare system is of paramount importance. 5. Through open vents. Air is most likely to find its way into a flare system in one of the following ways: 1. Any passing material will be vented instead of reaching the danger end. for example hot bolting where required. Double Block & Bleed: Some high pressure or hazardous content lines are provided with two block valves separated by a spool piece that has a bleed connection vented to a safe location. When taking into service. Modified Blinds: Large volatile hydrocarbon lines with passing valves shall be blinded with modified blinds which have a draining/depressurising connection especially when the system is under pressure beyond the isolation valve. Blinds that were in position for a long time should be removed and inspected before being used as positive isolation.PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 12 of 15 23. When flare lines are opened for maintenance or other system repair 3. By the rapid condensation of hot vapour inducing a vacuum and pulling air back into the system through the flare stack and seal. the system shall be checked at full operating conditions.
PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 13 of 15 entering system vessels or in connection with work on the flare and its auxiliaries. before permitting entry of air).2 PRECAUTIONS Flare lines should be purged with steam or inert gas before connected equipment or lines are opened (i. A continuous water curtain shall be provided between work area and adjacent operating refinery units. 6. Blind all flare header inlets from the units as per the blind list and notify all concerned personnel of the system's status. Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking . A combustible mixture can reach the flare during blinding or gas freeing of lines. More than one ladder shall be provided to work platform as a means of emergency escape. 8. All personnel during blinding/deblinding jobs shall wear airline masks or SCBA and fire retardant clothing. All mobile equipment shall be located upwind wherever possible. 6. Water spray systems and other fire protection shall be available at location. Proper access facilities and work platforms shall be provided. 7. The procedures given below shall be followed during shutdown and maintenance activities:1. Purging is especially important as flare streams contain H2S or pyrophoric iron sulfide deposits providing an ignition source when air is admitted.e. Purge gas shall be maintained at all times during the blinding operation. Extinguish flare pilot. 9. All connected unit personnel are alerted before the start of the job. not just to the main collection header. Shutdown all units serviced by the flare system before the flare is taken out of service or else line up standby flare system if available. 2. 10. 5. Replace sweep gas with purge gas and continue until all system bleeders test as safe. 11. 4. Ensure that purge gas gets into all laterals in a complex flare system. 3.
7. 13. 6. continue without stopping until the job is completed. While water washing of flare lines and KOD. not later than three years from the date of the last revision. Even with pilots extinguished and no pyrophoric material present.3 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1. All material are available on site before work starts. 8.1 DOCUMENT CONTROL Records shall be retained in compliance with the KNPC Document Control Programme.0 MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 8. Once work has begun. Sufficient bolts shall remain while a gradual opening is made by the use of a flange spreader. Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking . 8. at a minimum. autoignition still can occur so long as oxygen is present. hydrogen sulfide and ammonium salts are released. 3.0 INCIDENT INVESTIGATION All line break incidents shall be investigated according to KNPC Incident Investigation Procedure.2 AUDIT REQUIREMENTS Compliance with this document shall be audited as part of SHEMS audit program. It is possible that units and facilities get contaminated with hydrogen sulfide as this wash water is carried enroute to Waste Water Treatment facilities. 14. The contact for this document is the KNPC SH&E Department. Lines from knockout drums to flare stacks and the flare stacks themselves should drain back by gravity to the knockout drum. 8. Hydrogen and hydrogen sulfide are especially hazardous due to their broad flammability limits in air 4-74% and 4-45% respectively. 2.PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 14 of 15 12.3 DOCUMENT RENEWAL PROCESS This document shall be reviewed and revised by KNPC SHE Dept as necessary and. 4.
4 DEVIATION PROCESS Deviations from this document shall be authorised by the Manager SH&E. Deviations shall be documented. and documentation shall include the relevant facts supporting the deviation decision. Reference: SHE-TSSA-07-2026 ( Rev 0) Date of Issue: June 2007 Title: SWP on Line Breaking .PRINTED COPY NOT CONTROLLED KUWAIT NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY Page 15 of 15 8. Deviation authorization shall be renewed periodically and no less frequently than every three years.