Outline for our powerpoint presentation: Title and Group Members Why Question: 1.

) Why was Quezon a Dictator? (verbally say: why did he become a dictator?) 2.) In what way was he a dictator? Framework: 1.) Why was Quezon a Dictator? (verbally say: why did he become a dictator?) · Personal interests got mixed in with politics · Government structure allowed him to be a dictator—transition government, needed someone who knows what to do. And he slightly abused his freedom to implement new policies. · The war situation that time (dictatorship was needed for the government to work) 2.) · · · · In what way was he a dictator? Personal Motives Under the Guise of National Aspirations Use of patron-client relationships to rise to power Party Politics Policies

Body: 1.) Why was Quezon a Dictator? · Simply, he hungered for power · Government structure allowed him to be a dictator o Patronage was embedded in society § Tammany Hall compared to Nacionalista Party § Tradition of having a few people control the government · The 1935 Constitution allowed him to be a dictator · The situation at that time (dictatorship was needed for the government to work) 2.) In what way was he a dictator? *Starting slide: Fits the dictionary description of a dictator (merriam webster) o a person granted absolute emergency power o one holding complete autocratic control o one ruling absolutely and often oppressively · Personal Motives Under the Guise of National Aspirations

o Resident Commissioner—Even before Quezon became President, he already had a history of pushing for what he wanted. In 1909 with the opening of the Philippine Assembly the opportunity for Quezon being appointed resident commissioner at Washington was gradually rising. However, Sergio Osmena was opposed to the idea of sending Quezon. The result was that Quezon canvassed among individual members of the Assembly with his characteristic savoir faire, so that when the final votes were taken he won the position. Used this opportunity to rub elbows with the American politicians. (Enosawa, G.H., Manuel L. Quezon: From Nipa House to Malanan. Tokyo, 1940. Japan Publicity Agency, p.44). He knew very well that becoming Resident Commissioner would establish his ties with American politicians. He

The Harrison Administration. 355-356.reached Washington on December 1909.” o Osmena’s autocracy as threat to Quezon’s rise to power—In 1922 Quezon fought his great and good friend Sergio Osmena on the sole issue of whether the Nationalist Party would have . They fondly called him Casey—insisting that it was the English version of Quezon. Quezon City: R. New York.H. c1970. P. resulted in an autocratic rather than a democratic political system. Guerrero. (Goettel. Tokyo. G.) o Osmena’s autocracy as threat to Quezon’s rise to power (using the independence platform) —At the general convention of the Nationalista party held in 1921. All measures which received Osmena’s approval were enacted into law and no legislation could be approved without his consent. Japan Publicity Agency.” In History of the Filipino People. p. This. there was some doubt as to who should be the leader. In December. Quezon pointed out the political blunders of Osmena and attacked the latter as the most despotic of autocrats. p. the platform of Osmena was limited to general political improvements to which he expressed his satisfaction whereas Quezon advocated the policy of making his party platform more concrete. could even encroach on the power of the senate to confirm appointments made by the governor-general. Tokyo. or the distribution of authority and responsibilities among the various agencies and leaders in the government. “Chapter 17.. 87. In 1911. Quezon campaigned on the issue of collective leadership and won. The governor-general constantly sought his counsel. Osmena had almost become a “Kaiser” in the government. but with the creation of the senate by the Jones Law. Two issues were involved in the break between the two leaders: how Filipino leadership in the government should be exercised and who should be the leader. In other words. Manuel L.H. Quezon: From Nipa House to Malanan. 5th Ed. Quezon: From Nipa House to Malanan. proposing to demand more definitely the independence of the Philippines. (Enosawa.. Teodoro A. 1982. Quezon therefore advocated collective leadership.P. Quezon simply wasn’t satisfied with his current position as “second fiddle” to Osmena. Quezon publicly launched his revolt against Osmena’s leadership. he pointed out. as party president.60) o Osmena’s autocracy as threat to Quezon’s rise to power (pro-colectivistic)—Osmena’s leadership remained peacefully unchallenged until 1916. Manuel L. declaring further that in a democracy it could not be tolerated for one man to decide all political questions without consulting the other members of the party such as Osmena was doing. whom Manuel knew well.59) o Osmena’s autocracy as threat to Quezon’s rise to power (anti-autocratic)—In the growing friction between the two individuals. Japan Publicity Agency p. Quezon was re-elected Senate President and Osmena was elected senate president pro-tempora. The speaker. with Osmena playing the “second fiddle. (Enosawa. G. Eagle of the Philippines: President Manuel Quezon. 1940. The department secretaries followed his advice and did nothing against his opinion. the Democrats gained control of the House of Representatives. 1940. 1921. The opportunity was lost on account of the political situation in 1922. Messner. It seemed that Quezon’s victory in the elections would end the fifteen-year monopoly of power by the Nacionalistas. Elinor. Garcia Publishing) o Osmena’s autocracy as threat to Quezon’s rise to power—In the elections of 1922. Quezon averred that party control of the government was unwise and improper because it violated the provision of the Jones Law regarding distribution of powers and placed in the hands of an on-official person authority which legally belonged to specific individuals and agencies of the government. (Agoncillo. became Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs. Congressman Jones of Vrginia. Quezon was now the top Filipino leader. It wasn’t long until he became a Congressional favorite. and Milagros C.

Osmena and Abad Santos to demand a redefinition of cabinet responsibility. Quezon City: R. 315316). When Leonard Wood was governor general of the Philippines. Garcia Publishing) o Wood as Obstruction to Quezon’s Rise to Power—Quezon’s belief in the necessity of a strongly centralized government was not consistent. Quezon. (Enosawa. knowing that Wood would veto them. and won the fight. 1933. and moreover export duties regulated in the law would destroy both industry and trade in the Philippines. in his fight with Wood. Teodoro A. it didn’t take him long to reduce the legislative branch to a completely subordinate position. Formed a committee of himself. 1982. Quezon tendered his resignation as President of the Senate in order to start his movement and also to sound out the confidence the Senate reposed in him. 2006) o Wood as Obstruction to Quezon’s Rise to Power—the open break between Wood and the Filipino leaders led by Senate President Quezon was not unexpected. The political world of the Philippines faced a serious crisis because of this law which in fact was to decide for good which of the two—Quezon or Osmena—should be the ultimate leader of the nation.362-383.” In History of the Filipino People. Manuel L. and Milagros C. But he later assumed the single leadership of the party himself.” Quezon saw the chance to embarrass Wood and strengthen his waning leadership among the members of the legislature. However as Quezon’s political conviction was guided by the principle of enlarging the autonomy of the Philippines. of which Wood defied. The question as to whether the law should be accepted or not. (Marquardt Fritz. harassed the latter by having the legislature purposely pass defective laws. apparently without the slightest idea that he was being inconsistent. Guerrero. 1982. Quezon: From Nipa House to Malanan. Quezon opposed the acceptance of the bill. The Wood Administration. “Chapter 17.P. it was but natural that there should arise collisions and disputes between him and the governor general. p. the pros and antis. 5th Ed. or single leadership. Colonial Politics: Towards Complete Autonomy. (Agoncillo. (Agoncillo.” In History of the Filipino People. 2006) o The Hare-Hawes-Cutting Law as threat to Quezon’s Rise to Power—On 1931.H. the Os-Rox mission took home the Hare-Hawes Cutting Law. was having trouble assuring his ascendancy among his own followers and political rivals within the Nacionalista Party.65) o Wood as Obstruction to Quezon’s Rise to Power—In order to dominate the Legislature. Teodoro A. Garcia Publishing) o Wood as Obstruction to Quezon’s Rise to Power—General Wood devoted himself toward regaining the administrative rights lost through Harrison and exerted himself to realize his objective taking advantage of every available opportunity. when Quezon became the chief executive. “Chapter 18. p. split the whole country into two factions. Quezon fought him bitterly all the way down the line on the the theory that the legislative leaders--including Quezon--should be supreme over the executive. 8th Ed. Guerrero. the Filipino members of the cabinet submitted their resignations. And upon Quezon’s advice. August 19. However. and attempted to concentrate power in the hands of the executive.. Osmena led the others in giving his consent to Quezon’s resignation and at the same time violently attacked the . Roxas. Japan Publicity Agency. Then he attacked Wood as uncooperative and anti-Filipino. in 1922. August 19. Quezon. In July. Quezon insisted that it shouldn’t. Quezon reconciled with Osmena’s Nacionalistas. Tokyo. (Marquardt Fritz. His reason was how America would still hold military and naval bases in the Philippines even after the latter’s independence. 1940.“unipersonalista”.P. and Milagros C. G. Quezon City: R. a move his followers considered an “outrageous betrayal of the people’s trust.

can only be understood within the context of Philippine politics and Quezon’s “temper and ambition. However. House. p. was consistent only in self-interest. “declining to accept” the independence act offered by the United States.” (Agoncillo. Quezon City: R. fully aware even before then that no better law was available. Japan Publicity Agency. Familiar with this prevailing political psychology of the Filipinos. Quezon: From Nipa House to Malanan. in his book Between Two Empires. Quezon made a bold move to cross over to America all by himself and started for Washington to secure an independence law which would be more favorable to the Philippines. p. He had advanced three possible courses of action in his report of November. as bases for criticizing the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act in 1932-1933. enjoying undisputed control of the party machinery and the government since 1921 would be to revert to the role of “second fiddle. The Os-Rox and Quezon Missions. Garcia Publishing) o Tydings McDuffie Law as Popularity Boost and means to power—Theodore Friend. the Senate supported Quezon who remained in his office with the confidence of a large majority of the senators. Theodore. Manuel L. the dominion plan and immediate independence. (Enosawa. G. o Tydings McDuffie Law as Popularity Boost and means to power—Quezon knew very well that the acceptance of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act was tantamount to handing to Osmena on a silver platter the presidency of the Commonwealth Government that was to be established in 1935. 1929-1934. Manila: Solidaridad Pub. in order to win his final test with Osmena and Roxas. “Teddy” Roosevelt’s successor. Quezon: From Nipa House to Malanan. (Agoncillo. 1940. the enactment of which the people thought he had brought about singlehandedely.. Teodoro A. 5th Ed. 1929-1946. The outcome was that the Philippine Legislature eventually voted against the acceptance of the H. was forced to resign his office. in the form of the TydingsMcDuffie Law. The third course—“independence bill in any form”—could be used as rationale for accepting the TydingsMcDuffie Act in 1934.78) o Tydings McDuffie Law as Popularity Boost and means to power—Since the antis commanded a large majority in the House and as there was still a whole year before the following election. Guerrero. the head of every mission secretly nursed the hope that he might “bring home the bacon. Henceforth. Quezon convinced Governor General Frank Murphy. 394.H. o Tydings McDuffie Law as Popularity Boost and means to power—Why Quezon rejected the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act only to secure its reenactment in 1934. Manuel L. Law—Concurrent Resolution #46.H. Quezon was not disposed to surrender his position to Osmena. Japan Publicity Agency. To do so. 1982. 1969. G.” In History of the Filipino People.” a role that Quezon obviously did not relish. 1940. He had used the two most contradictory courses. c1965. . fathomed Quezon’s innermost thoughts: Quezon’s erratic behavior during the discussion of independence. Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines.P. 1931.latter’s attitude as that of an opportunist. to call a special session of the legislature for the express purpose of acting on the Tydings-McDuffie law. Tokyo.80) o To make sure that his faction would win in the June elections. to the Legislature. “Chapter 19. Tokyo. He accepted a compromise that did not comport with his best judgment. His very success in bringing home the Jones Law in 1916..” fully aware that that would earn him power and popularity. had “laid something of a curse” on the independence missions sent to the United States. Speaker of the House and friend of Osmena.C. and Milagros C.H. Roxas. (Enosawa. (Friend. if not the prime position in the governemnent that would be established in accordance with the independence law.

Teodoro A. Onely four out of the forty-eight provincial governers were Osmenistas or Pro candidates. Garcia Publishing) o If you can’t beat them. 1940. 5th Ed. “Chapter 18. Of the eleven seats in the senate which were contested. 1935). join them—The Tydings-McDuffie Law contained provisions that specified various steps or conditions which must be fulfilled before the establishment of the Commonwealth. join them—Quezon declared to his own party men that they should forget all troubles and enmity and cooperate for a common cause. Quezon. G. Quezon: From Nipa House to Malanan. they won only nineteen. The Wood Administration.112) o The constabulary as maintenance of power—Quezon started his administration with the execution of his plan on national defense. p. The Wood Administration. join them—On November 15. Quezon: From Nipa House to Malanan. It is superfluous to state here that the re-tieup of the two champions was enthusiastically welcomed by the Filipino people.P. 394 Quezon City: R. who. (Agoncillo. Tokyo.P. One of these was the hold a general elections for the officers of the Commonwealth government. Manuel L. and Milagros C. He also declared that he would not run as a candidate for president unless Osmena consented to run with him as a candidate for vice-president. p. It was in this way that a coalition of both factions was brought about. The Wood Administration.” In History of the Filipino People. 5th Ed. The overwhelming victory of the Partido Nacionalista Consolidado. 1982. (p. (Enosawa. the purpose of which was “to confront any potential . Osmena and Roxas and the Partido Nacionalista Pro-Consolidado which they founded suffered a severe trouncing in the elections. suggested the idea of a coalition to Osmena. 5th Ed. 1982.84) • If you can’t beat them. 398 Quezon City: R.. 395 Quezon City: R. Guerrero. G. “Chapter 18.H. Garcia Publishing) o If you can’t beat them.. Garcia Publishing) o Tydings McDuffie Law as Popularity Boost and means to power—With the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Law and its subsequent ratification by the Philippine Legislature. Japan Publicity Agency. 270-271) Ilustrado Politics • o The constabulary as maintenance of power—On his inaugural address on the same day (November 15. 5th Ed.P. Quezon emphasized that reverence for law as the expression of the popular will is the starting point in a democracy. acquiesced to Quezon’s proposal “for the sake of the country” and agreed to run for vice-president in a coalition ticket with Quezon. and that sufficient armed forces will be maintained at all times to quell and suppress any rebellion against the authority of this Government or the sovereignty of the United States. in the elections of June 4. Teodoro A. Teodoro A. 1935. 1935. confirmed beyond question Quezon’s leadership. Guerrero. 1982. and Milagros C. 395 Quezon City: R. (Enosawa. “Chapter 18. Garcia Publishing) o Quezon’s quest for national political leadership focused on the same two objectives: consolidating local political power and pursuing a wider national reputation.H.” In History of the Filipino People.” In History of the Filipino People. Quezon won a total victory over his opponents and retained supreme leadership over the Nacionalista Party and the government. the party headed by Quezon. 1940. 1982. The Wood Administration.” In History of the Filipino People.Teodoro A. the Commonwealth was inaugurated with Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmena as its president and vice-president respectively. through intermediaries. and Milagros C. (Agoncillo. and of the eighty-nine elective members in the lower house. Guerrero. Guerrero.P. (Agoncillo. “Chapter 18. Japan Publicity Agency. they won only three. after some hesitation. Manuel L. Tokyo. and Milagros C.

H.The effect of this system is illustrated in the fate of the elected administrations that could not afford to alienate the local clans that controlled political factions (and often private armies) in the country side.attack with the ccertainty that the losses to be incurred in conquering the Philippines would be so great as to make such a venture politically and economically unprofitable. and Joel Rocamora. 1996. Japan Publicity Agency.” In Anti-Marcos Struggle. Quezon: His Life and Career. (Enosawa. Paul D. of course Quezon City. Manuel L. Quezon: From Nipa House to Malanan. (Nicole Cu Unjieng. 2009) As Patron: In exchange for campaign contributions. 17.) As patron: Quezon started his political campaign at Cebu. stood as a candidate for the Senate.. Mark R. Manuel L. the very base of Osmena’s stronghold.ix. neither centralized nor decentralized. G. (Hutchcroft. P. G.. Quezon distributed government favors to his business cronies.. (Manuel L. Julie’s book) o As client: In 1920. including choice of plots of land in the new capital named. p. It is said that Quezon’s appointment to the presidency of the Senate was made possible by a strong backing of Governor General Harrison. links powerful presidents and powerful local bosses in a relationship that is both symbiotic and highly variable. Tokyo. .” Journal of East Asian Studies 3 (2003): 259-292. Ferdinand Marcos: Apotheosis of the Philippine Historical Political Tradition. 202) · Use of patron-client relationships to rise to power o This strange political system. p. (Thompson. Tokyo.58) o o As client: Quezon refined the use of state patronage to assist his allies and harassed his opponents through government regulatory agencies.. (Thompson. Quezon: From Nipa House to Malanan. Osmena feeling the precariousness of his being returned to the House. 1940.H. Japan Publicity Agency.60) • • • o he personified the new Philippine state that was being formed by the clever cultivation of personal loyalty to him (rather than loyalty to the institutions of the state) (p. • President Quezon applied his native use of patronage to national-level government resources and even leveraged his control over regulation agencies as favors and/or threats. “Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines.” Devoted to the security and defense of the Commonwealth were the Philippine Army with its citizenry army “capable of transformation upon emergency call into an effective field force”. (Enosawa. “The Rules of Pre-Martial Law Philippine Politcs. the discord in political views between Osmena and Quezon became more and more apparent. Quezon City: New Day Publishers. 1940.

working in opposition to the interests of their rivals for national political power (in most cases Federalistas). Ferdinand Marcos: Apotheosis of the Philippine Historical Political Tradition. “The Rules of Pre-Martial Law Philippine Politcs. 342) o Interplay of multiple interests and political machinations (Osmena and Quezon rejected the proposal to recommend a Filipino commissioner [kasi probably Federalista]) (p. 340) . Quezon effectively secured the Nacionalista party’s dominance in the legislature and dealt with provincial politicians to win local vote banks and outmaneuver other national politicians.” In Anti-Marcos Struggle. Osmena and his close associates dominated the political scene to the exclusion of a minority of prominent ilustrados who had played major roles in both the Federal Party and in the urban Manila opposition over the past six years.Ilustrado Politics With control of about three-fourths of the assembly delegates and. Unlike most of their provincial colleagues. 2009) • Osmena and Quezon were already operating on at least three levels: pursuing policies directly related to their own interests and to those of their provincial backers. they were fully aware of the implications of this growing influence.Ilustrado Politics • Osmena and Quezon emerged from the governors’ convention as the leading provincial politicians.) · Party Politics o Additionally. the party apparatus. 323) . 1996. (p. (p. 1-32. and representing the interests of their American friends and associates in the colonial government. controlling bureaucratic patronage at all levels of government (including some success at influencing the appointments of American governorsgeneral). (p. (Nicole Cu Unjieng. For both groups expedient political and personal objectives and tactics consumed their ideological commitments. (p. Both fully intended to exploit that influence in their bid for leadership in the future Philippine Assembly. and increasing the centralization of governmental functions that came under their control. Osmena and Quezon continuously worked to expand their power at the national level through manipulating nationalist discourse. 277-278) . allowing for his firm control over the body. 276) .Ilustrado Politics . 328) . Quezon City: New Day Publishers.Mark R.Ilustrado Politics o Over the next thirty years. Osmena and Quezon devoted considerable effort to imposing a set of “czarlike rules” of order that placed significant power in the hands of the Speaker. thereby.Ilustrado Politics • o Collaboration sustained both and led to the manipulation of ideals that both espoused throughout the encounter.Ilustrado Politics • o Confident that they would dominate the leadership. 256) . (p. (p.

18. (Thompson. Quezon City: New Day Publishers. Capital.Ilustrado Politics o o . which the first Commonwealth President. would be able to exploit later in 1935. Elected president. Quezon took over executive power from the American authorities who.” In Anti-Marcos Struggle. “The Rules of Pre-Martial Law Philippine Politcs. who were supportive of Quezon’s rule. offering them good jobs if they joined up with him. which were lifted directly and almost in full from those of the colonial governor-general. (Marquardt Fritz. Quezon’s presidency veritably molded the strong executive office. Mark R. Filipino Politics: Development and Decay. Quezon did not wait long to use his authority to secure his party’s hold on office. 170) . (Wurfel. JohnT. threatening them with a political Siberia if they refused. David. August 19.o Corruption and the arbitrary exercise of power increased as the Partido Nacionalista monopolized politics during the Philippine Commonwealth inaugurated in 1935.” a line item veto that the U. So powerful was his party in the last elections that it elected all of the Senators and ninety percent of the Representatives to the new Congress. • • .) o After his election as President. essentially had relinquished control of their colony. Quezon envisioned a strong executive branch even prior to his election and consistently pushed the constitutional convention to create a stronger president than that of the White House. President does not have. p. it soon became apparent that the “nationalists” were in a much better position to co-opt. 1988:11) o Granting legislative and judicial powers to the executive branch o The 1935 Constitution ascribed to Quezon. discretion over the disbursement of budgeted funds. and a supervisory control over local government units. Quezon was always the Head Man. although they retained veto powers. Manuel Quezon.Ilustrado Politics o One-party politics · Policies • The institution of a strong presidency resulted from its modeling after the role of the Commonwealth governor-general. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. o As events developed. 2006) o Majority of the Senate were Nacionalista party members. (Sidel. “the authority to disapprove individual items in appropriation bills. Yet. he brought all the important politicians into his own party. Quezon enjoyed wildly expansive powers.S. 1996. manipulate and/or control politicized elements in society than were the Federalistas (p.

comes the desire to see their names projected down the corridors of time. Quezon: His Life and Career. (Manuel L. and a Quezon Preventorium (to prevent tuberculosis from developing among the children of tuberculuar parents). Stanfrod: Stanfrod University Press. o Once the National Assembly passed a daylight-saving law and Quezon signed it. The movement soon gained momentum and before long. (Thompson. 1996. sooner or later. “The Rules of Pre-Martial Law Philippine Politcs. a Quezon Sanitarium. P. August 19. (Thompson.” In Anti-Marcos Struggle. o Quezon declared that opposition parties and individual liberties were “fetishes” of democracy that had to be abandoned. since the Constitution only allows the president to hold office for two consecutive terms of only eight years.) o Policies to stay in power (1941 re-elections)—In 1940. 221) o Policies to stay in power (emergency powers)—He later persuaded the Philippine Congress to give him emergency powers. Quezon City: New Day Publishers. Quezon: His Life and Career. P. because he couldn’t find the light switch.) o Block voting—Introduced the easily manipulated block voting (allowing one vote to be cast for a party’s entire slate of candidates). There was even a Quezon Society. it was widespread.18. 1999: 16-17) • o Against the recommendation of every city planner whom Quezon imported from the United States--and he had some of the best--the new government center was moved from Manila to nearby Quezon city. data and information about its namesake. (Manuel L. The Philippines acquired a Quezon City. P. Mark R. he ordered the restoration of standard time. dedicated to the collecting of biographical material. 1996. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.” In Anti-Marcos Struggle. p. a Quezon Bridge. a Quezon Avenue.18. among others. “The Rules of Pre-Martial Law Philippine Politcs. (Manuel L. After stumbling downstairs.Coercion and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Not long after the law went into effect. with only one year left for Quezon to complete his term of office as President of the Philippines. helped the Partido Nacionalista win an overwhelming victory in the 1941 legislative elections. 202) Quezon was re-elected for his second term of office constituting the next two years ending in 1943. her arose at 5:30 in the morning while it was still dark. . 2006) o To all great men. p. a strong move by the people to amend the Constitution so as to allow a re-election for the chief executive among other things was initiated. Quezon: His Life and Career. creating much interest among people. (Marquardt Fritz. 202) o Policies to stay in power(1941 re-elections)—The proposed amendments provided for the shortening of the term of office of the President from six to four years and permitting his re-election for a second term. Mark R. a Quezon Boulevard.

1940 . Mark R. c1970. granting President Manuel L.) o The dedicated Sergio Osmena soon devised a plan whereby Quezon could legally continue in office. 494. five days before the president’s term expired.” he told his Cabinet from his bed in the Shoreham Hotel. He.Declaration of martial law upon invasion of Japanese forces. would ask the U. Messner. and Manuel Quezon remained the exiled President. 21. 1941 . granting President Manuel Quezon emergency powers o Re-election yet again in 1943—Manuel Quezon’s term as President was due to expire in November.Commonwealth Act No.) o Quezon. seriously ill on November 1943. Washington.Commonwealth Act No. “As long as my people are not free. Congress obligingly did. “The Rules of Pre-Martial Law Philippine Politcs. 1943. I should remain President. 600. more than any other man. 30. he felt that it was his duty to continue in office. Elinor. 18. Congress to pass a resolution suspending the presidential succession in the Philippines until normal conditions were restored. o June 6. symbolize Filipino independence. 496. New York. 499 and 500. Eagle of the Philippines: President Manuel Quezon. granting President Manuel Quezon broader emergency powers Sept. 498. Messner.1941 . 671. 16. c1970. 205. 1939 — Commonwealth acts Nos.” In Anti-Marcos Struggle. o Dec. asked Osmena to wait a little longer. Osmena consented to recommend to President Franklin D. (Goettel.S. Roosevelt the extension of Quezon’s term beyond eight years which was formalized by a resolution of the US Congress on November 10. (Goettel.) o January 1942 . and the rest of Quezon’s Cabinet. 1943. o Aug. . P. P. New York. 620. 205.Commonwealth Act No. Eagle of the Philippines: President Manuel Quezon.Emergency Powers Act. Elinor. 1996. Quezon more emergency powers.(Thompson. and as long as I. but sick as he was from tuberculosis. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.

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