ENGLISH TRANSLATION

,
WITH THE

SANSKRIT TEXT,
/

OF THE

TATTVA-KAUMUDI
(SANKHYA)
OF

VACHASPATI MISRA,
BY

GANGlNlTHA

JHl, M. A.;

F.T.S.
;

GOVERNMENT SCHOLAR

N. W. P. (1888-90)

MEDALLIST OP THE UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD

J

MITEA MEDALLIST AND VIZIANAGRAM SCHOLAR (QUEEN
LIBRARIAN, RAJ DARBHANGA.

S

COLLEGE,

Published for the

BOMBAY TEEOSOPHICAL PUBLICATION
"

FUND>\

BY

TOOKABAM TATYA,
1896.

F.T.S.

Price 2 Rupees.

BOMBAY:
PKINTED AT THE
"

TATTVA-VIVECHAKA

5>

PRESg.

PREFACE.
FOR
Is

the

little

we know

of Vachaspati Misra
;

the reader
it

referred to the Sanskrit Introduction

wherein

is

shown

that he was a Maithila Brahrnana and flourished somewhere

about the 9th Century A. D. For Udayanacharya the author of the "Parisuddi" on Vachaspati Misra s Tatparya-Tika,"
"

Lakshinana Sen of Bengal, of whose era we have just commenced the 8th century and at least a century must have elapsed before a work could
flourished in the reign of king
;

deserve

the honor of a

commentary

at

the

hands

of

Udayanacharya.

I take this opportunity to thank my friend Balu Govindadasa of Benares, to whom I owe more than I can express,

who has been

chiefly

instrumental in

my

undertaking and

finishing not only of the present translation, but also of the Kavyaprakasa and the Nyaya -Muktavali, and some works on

Mimansa.
of

My

Bombay

for his publication of the
" "

thanks are also due to Tookaram Tatya Esq. work, and also to the
Theosophist
of

proprietors of the

Madras

for allowing

a

reprint of the translation

which

first

appeared in the

columns

of that excellent journal.

RAJ LIBRARY, DARBHANGA
1st July 1896.

:

}

V
)

GANGANATHA

JHA.

LIST

OF CONTENTS.
PAG1.

Introduction

KARIKA
I.

xvii

xxxii

1

Senediction
Introduction to Karika I
Necessity of Scientific Enquiry Threefold Division of Pain
...

2

1
...

3

2 2
*

4 5 6
7

Objection-Inquiry Superfluous

Reply
Auspiciousness of the beginning

word
II.

4

KARIKA
8
9
10
of

Objection- Adequacy Similarity of the Vedic with the Obvious means

Vedic means

4
...

5

11
12 13

14
15

Impurity, Decay and Excessiveness of the Vedic means ... The Impurity of animal slaughter in Sacrifice Nonpermanence and Excess of the results of Vedic rites Immortality from Vedic rites means long-durability ... Discriminative wisdom the only means Literal Interpretation of the Karika ...

... ...

... ...

6
6

7
...

...
...

7
7

8
8

16

Source of discriminative Knowledge...

KARIKA
17

III.

18

Fourfold Division of Categories The Productive (1)

9

9
9

19 20
21

The Productive-product (2) The Products (3) The non-product non-productive
f

10
(4)

10
IV.

KARIKA
22 23

The three kinds
Proof defined

of Proof

10

H
...

24
25 26
27

The

three- foldness of proof Only three kinds of proof

11

H
...

The inclusion
The order
of

of all other proofs in the above-mentioned Necessity of enquiry into the different kinds of proof

12
12

28

Explanation

12

KARIKA
29
Specific definitions of the proofs
"

V.
12
...

UO

Perception,"

defined

...

...

13

VI
PAGE.
31
Insentience of Buddhi
Differentiation of w Perception from the other forms of proof Inference as a distinct form of proof ...
"

13
...
:

32 33

14
14 15

"

"

34
35

Inference defined

36
37

38
39

The three kinds of Inference The first Division of Inference The Negative a posteriori Inference The Affirmative a priori Inference Valid Testimony based on Inference
"
"

15
16
... ...

...
...

16
16
17
18

40
41

Self -evidence of Sruti

42
43

Srutis and Puranas included in Valid Testimony Pretended Revelations
Differentiation of Valid Testimony from Inference Other kinds of proof set aside or included in above

...

18 18
18

44

...

...

19 19

45
46

Analogy, included in Valid Testimony included in Inference "Apparent Inconsistency
"

...

...

...

20
21

47 48
49

"

"

Negation

included in
"

"

"

"

Probability Eumour discarded

Perception in Inference

22
22

KARIKA
50 51
52
Introduction

VI.

22
Nature
&c.,

Knowledge Knowledge

of

through Inference
...
...

of others

by Revelation

...

23 23

KARIKA
53
Objection

VII.
senses, are

Nature

&c., being not amenable to the

... ... ... ... non-existing ... 54,55 Different causes of non-perception of objects by the Senses 56 Non-perception of an object, no proof of non-existence

23 24

25 25

KARIKA
57

VIII.
(

Objection-existence of Nature can be denied like that of skyflowers-started, and set aside there are effects bearing testimony
:

to the existence of Nature

...

26
, ,

68

Such

effects

mentioned

26

KIRIKA
59 60
61

IX.
26 27
28

Different views with regard to the nature of an effect

Impossibility of the existence of Nature being proved in accord ance with the Vedanta and Bauddha tenets
Effect declared to be a

permanent Entity
,

...

...

62
63

Bauddha view refuted Vedanta view refuted

28 28

VII
PAGE?
64
65
j

66

67
68

69

70
J

71

72
73

Yoga and Vaiseshika views criticised and the Sankhya view established the first argument in favour there of ... The second argument in favour of the effect being an entity The third argument ... ... ... ... ... ... The fourth argument ... The fifth argument ... ... Proofs of the non -difference of cause and effect ... The effect only a particular development of the cause Difference of purpose and action no ground of difference Objection based on the nature of the manifestation of the effect...
;

29

29

30

30
31
31
32r

33

33
34 34 34

74
75

Objection set aside as being common to both theories Production of the cloth not identical with the cloth
Necessity of causal operation Conclusion of the Karika
...
...

...

...

...

...

...

...

76

35
X.
...
...

KARIKA
77

Introduction to the consideration of the Manifested

35
35 35 35
35

78
79 80
81

The Manifested-as having a cause
being non-eternal
active
...
...

... ...

...

...

non-pervading...

...

82

multi-form

83 84

dependent
predicative
... ...

...

85
86 87
,.

conjunct subordinate
of the

...

...

...

36 36 36 36 36

The contrary nature

Unmanifested

37

KAKIKA
88
Introduction to Karika
Similarities
(i)

XI.

XI
...
...

3T
...
...

89 90

between the Manifested and the Unmanifested
...
...

having the three constituent attributes
...

37
37

91 92
93

... being indiscriminative ... Objection based on the Bauddha idealism

(ii)

38 38

(iii)

Insentient

(iv)

Productive
... ...

38
..,

94 95 96

Similarity with Nature stated ... Dissimilarity of these from Spirit

Objection based on similarity of the Spirit with the Manifested

...

38 38 39

KARIKA XH.
97 98
99
Introduction to the consideration of the Attributes

Construction of the Karika

39 40
...

100
101

Character of the Attributes as love, aversion and stupefaction The functions of the Attributes

40

The methctf

of operation of the attributes

40 42

Vlll

PAGE.

KARIKA
102
103
Introduction to Karika XIII
Properties of Goodness Necessity of the properties of
"
" "

XIII.

104
105

Foulness

"

...
"

...

42 42 43
43

Necessity of the properties of

"

Darkness

106
107

Objection based on the impossibility of the co-operation of Attri butes of contradictory properties ... Necessity of postulating the three Attributes

43

44

KARIKA XIV.
108
109

Question of the Indiscreetness and other properties of the Attri butes

110

Proof of the existence of such properties Question of the Existence of Nature

...

...

45 45

46

KARIKA XV.
,111

112
113 114

Why not accept the atomic theory Proofs of Nature s Existence (1)
union of cause and
(2)
effect
is

1

...

47

initial

Separation and final re

48
49
:

Because Evolution
:

Objection
(3)

due to Energy ... These two reasons might rest with Buddhi. Eeply

115

(4)

from Finiteness Because of homogenity

50
50

KARIKA XVI.
116

117 118

Operation through the Attributes By a blending of the Attributes
Objection
:

...

...

51
,..

51
51

How
?

can an attribute of uniform nature

produce
... ...

diverse effects

Keply

...

KARIKA
119

XVII.
f

120
121

Proofs (1)

Introduction to the Proofs of Spirit s Existence Because all composite objects are for other
:

...

52 52 63

s

purpose.

122
123

(2)

Objection and reply Because there must be supervision (3) Because there must be one to feel

54
55
55

124
125

A different interpretation
(4)

of proof (3)

Because of the tendency of writers and sages towards Beatitude

55

KARIKA
126

XVIII.
56 57
57
...

127 128
129

Question of the number of the Spirit raised (1) From allotment of brith, death and the organs (2) Since Activity is not Simultaneous
(3)

Because the modifications of the Attributes are differert

58

IX
PAGE*

KARIKA XIX.
130
introduction to the consideration of Spirit s Properties in the Karika this
" "

68 58
58
59 59

131
132
133
134

Explanation of the force of

... Necessity of so many Properties Absence of the attributes leads to Emancipation

Neutrality

KARIKA XX.
135 136
Objection
Intelligence

The

feeling referred to

and Activity always coexistent by the objection must be a mistake

59
...

60

KARIRA XXI.
137
Objection

what

is

the need of union
"

?
"

138
139 140

Force of the Genetive in

Pradhanasya

Explained

60 60

The need of union explained The creation of Buddhi &c.,

61 61

KARIKA
141

XXII.
61 62

The Process

of Creation.

...

142

Process of the production of the Elements

KARIKA
143
144

XXIII.
62
...

Introduction to the "definition of Buddhi
Definition of

145 146 147
148

Buddhi explained Properties of Buddhi Virtue &c Four kinds of Dispassion Eight kinds of Power Reverse of the above qualities

...

63
63

63 64
64

KARIKA XXIV.
149
Definition of Self-consciousness

65
65

150

Direct effects of Self -consciousness

KARIKA XXV.
IB f Production of Senses
152

65
;

Objection

:

Purposelessness of Passions

and Reply thereto

...

66

KARIKA XXVI.
153
Sense defined

66

B

PAOE,

KARIKA XXVH.
154
155

Double nature of mind

...

.,

...

*

67
67 68

Mind

defined
:

... ...

156 157 158

Objection Why make mind a sense? and Reply thereto Whence the multifarious effects from Egoism ? ., Destiny also a modification of the Attributes

68
68

KAEIKA XXVHI.
159

Functions of the ten sense

organs

69

KARIKA XXIX.
160
161
Reflection
of

Manas,

Self-consciousness
to all

of

Ahankara and
70 70

Determination of Buddhi

The

five vital Airs

common

KARIKA XXX.
162
163
164

Function of the organs (2) Gradual

(1)

Instantaneous

71
71

With regard

objects function of the internal or gans independent of the external ones
to
visible

71

KARIKA XXXI.
165 166
167

Objection

:

Functions permanent or otherwise

?

71

No

collision of the functions of the organs...
:

72
72

Objection motives

How

can insentient organs comprehend each others

1

Reply thereto

KARIKA XXXII,
168

169
170

Division of the organs introduced The thirteen organs and their functions

73

73
73

Objects of these functions

KARIKA XXXIII.
..,.,,.,
c

171 172

Sub-divisions of the organs introduced The three external organs

...

74

74 74
internal
<

173

The ten external organs
External organs operating at the present time, and the at all Times

174
175

74

Time not a

distinct principle

75

KARIKA XXXIV.
176
177 178 Objects of external organs introduced Specific and gross objects of the functions of intellectual organs

75
75

explained do. Do.

organs of action

<

75

XI
PAGK.

KARIKA XXXV.
179 ,The importance of the internal organs

76

KARIKA XXXVI.
180
181

Predominance of Buddhi The external organs as affections

77
of Attributes

77

KARIKA XXXVII.
182 183

Further grounds for the Superiority of Buddhi Objection: absence of Mukti Reply thereto

78

78,79

KARIKA XXXVIII.
184 185

186

The Subtile character of the Tanmatras The gross Elements produced out of the Tanmatras These are Specific because soothing terrific and deluding
.

79

79
...

79

KARIKA XXIX.
187

Three sorts of Specific Objects
Subtile bodies are permanent
...

80
...

188

80

KARIKA XL.
189

190
191

Objection Question
Astral

Astral body unconfined and permanent Two bodies unnecessary, and reply How does the Astral Body migrate ? Reply
:

81
...

82

:

82
82

192

Body Dissolving

at each Pralaya

KARIKA
193

XLI.
83

Existence of the Astral Body proved

KARIKA
194
195

XLII.
...

Reason and manner of the migration of the Astral Body Power of the Astral Body due to Nature

84 84

KARIKA
196

XLIII.

Incidental and Essential Dispositions 11V*- Flesh, blood &c., related to the gross body

85

85

KARIKA XLIV.
%
,

198
199

Consequences of the various means introduced Virtue leads to higher planes and vice, to lower

85
85

200
9

From

the reverse, the reverse

the threefold bondage

86

Xll

PAGE.

K A RIKA XLV
201 202
203

Absorption into Prakriti from Dispassion Transmigration from Passionate attachment

"87

...

...

...

87
87

Non-impediment from Power

KARIKA XL VI.
204 205
Error, Disability, Contentment Fifty Sub-divisions of

and Perfection

88 88

KARIKA LXVH.
206

The Fifty forms

of Error

89

KARIKA
207

XLVIII.
...

The Sub-divisions

of Error

&c introduced

89 89

208

209

210
211

Eight forms of Ignorance Eight forms of Egoism Ten forms of Attachment
Eighteen forms of Jealously Eighteen forms of Abhinivesa

90
90 90 90
91

212
213

The

total

coming to sixty-two

KARIKA XLIX.
214
215 216
of Disability Eleven forms of disability, those of the sense organs

The twenty-eight forms

91 91 91

The seventeen forms

of disability of

Buddhi
L.

KARIKA
217 218 219 220

Nine forms of Contentment Four forms of internal Contentment

92 92
92

(l)Ambha
(2)Salila

92
.

221 222 223
224 225 226 227 228

(3)Ogha...
(4) Vrishti

...
f

93 93
93

Five forms of external Contentment
(1)
(2)

Para

93
...

(3)

Supara Parapara

...

...

,94 94

(4)
(5)

Anuttamambha Uttamambha

94 &*

KARIKA
229

LI.

Forms of Power introduced 230 The eight forms of Power
(l)Tara
Study...

94
95

231

95

Xlll

PAGE.
252 233
234
(2) Sntara

Word
Reasoning
Acquisition of Friends
...

95

(3) Taratara
"(4)

95 95
95

Ramyaka

235 236 237 238

Sadamudita Purity The three consequent on the suppression of three kinds of pain The first five forms otherwise explained Error &c. are hooks to the Powers
(5)

96 96 96

KARIKA
239

LII.

240

Necessity of the Linga (InteHectual creation) Proofs of the above

97

97 98

241

Objection of reciprocality let aside

KARIKA
242

LIII.

243

244
245

Forms of the intellectual creation introduced The eight Divine sorts Five of the Lower Animals Mankind single

98
98

98

98

KARIKA
246 247
Six Heavenly Regions

LIV.
99

Threefoldness of the intellectual creation introduced

99

KARIKA
248

LV.
...

249

250

Creation productive of pain ... ... ... Imposition of pleasure and pain on Spirit due to Spirit s non-discrimination Do.

99
100

100

KARIKA
251
Question of the

LVI.
100
101

Maker

of the Universe introduced

252
253

Creation due to Nature
Creation for another
i

s (Spirit s)

sake

...

101

KARIKA
254

LVII.

255

.Reply

Objection instance oi the flow of milk

incapacity of insentient

Nature of creation

...

...

101

102

255# View of a personal God overthrown 256 Freedom of the Sankhya theory from faults
*">

1^2 103

KARIKA
257
"

LVIII.
103

How for

Spirit s purpose

"2

Explained

KARIKA
258
<{

LIX.
"?

Whence

the cessation of the operations of Nature

Explained.

103

XIV
PAGE.

KARIKA LX.
259
"

Nature acts for no

compensation"...

.,.

...

rr)4

KARIKA
260

LXI.
104

No reappearance

of

Nature with regard to an emancipated Spirit

KARIKA
261
fying Spirit

LXII.
e

Objection: emancipation and bondage
is

not possible to unmodi...

105
105

262

Reply:

"No

Spirit

bound, nor migrates

&c."

...

KARIKA
263
"

LXIII.
&c."

Nature binds herself by seven forms

106

KARIKA LXIV.
264 265 266 267 268
"Truth"

explained
of to false

,.

...

wisdom explained Objection based on the eternal tendency The form of discriminative knowledge
"Completion
"of

The purity

107 107
107
107

knowledge

...

the knowledge

108

KARIKA LXV.
269

Cause of the cessation of Nature

s

operation

108

KARIKA LXVI.
270
271
Objection

though one set of objects has been enjoyed, others remain to be enjoyed" ...
"

109

Reply: "The Spirit having attained to wisdom, there to further action
"

is

no motive
110

KARIKA
272 273

LXVII.

Objection: The body dissolving on the attainment of wisdom, could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature ?

how
110
"

Body continues in obedience
ous

to the

momentum imparted by

previ-

Karma

Ill

KARIKA LXVIH.
274
Final release of the Spirit

112

KARIKA LXIX.
275

The precedence

of Kapila

...

112

XV
PAGE.

KARIKA LXX.
276

Importance of the Sankhya

doctrine

113

KARIKA LXXI.
277
"Arya"

explained

113

KARIKA LXXII.
278

The Treatise

is

a whole, not a part

...

113

ERRATA.

P. 26
J5
55

Line
1

3 for
!J

"

unction
>J

"

(in rhetoric)
>J

read
W

"taste"

>J

P.

56 to the

left of line

IS

read

"

(126),"

INTRODUCTION.
THE lucid writing of Vachaspati Misra does not stand in need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the
cardinal doctrines of the

Sankhya Philosophy,

in

the hope

that a reading of this resume would prepare the mind of the student for the of the abstruse truths, in which the reception Tattvakaumudi abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for
alteration &c., will be

most gratefully

received.

To begin with, the Sankhya lays down a fourfold division of categories based on their respective causal and productive This division is into (I) Productive (2) Produc efficiency.
tive

and

Produced
called
since

(3)

Produced

(4)

Neither Productive
all the twenty-five

nor

Produced. This classification includes

Tattwas, being the the Sclnkhyas allow of no other purely productive agency. The Productive and Produced are the other Principles Buddhi &c. These partake of the nature
Principles
productive,

Prakriti or Nature

of both
evolves

thus Buddhi Ahankara and

is

productive in as
in as

evolves out of Prakriti.
ples

are the

eleven

produced The purely non-productive Princi sense-organs and the five elements.

it is

much as much as

out of
it

it

itself

These are purely non-productive because none of these can give birth to a substance essentially different from them.

The Purusjha
fact
it is

without attributes.

lu (Spirit) is neither productive nor produced. All accessories are the effects of

the three Gunas, and the Spirit isby its very nature free from these ^ind as such without any accessories.

Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn to tile consideration of the various principles separately.
First of all then

we must examine the nature of

the all

-powerful creative agent of the Sankhyas or, more properly, the creative force of the Universe. Then first of all how is this
force constituted?
It
is

naturally

made up of

the

three

a

XV111

Gnnas
in its

Sattwa, Rajas, and Tamas and when the Pradh&na is natural state, lying dormant, these three attributes are
;

in

an equilibrium.

When occasion

presents jtself

i. e.

when the

Adrishta of the soul acts upon the Pradhana, the equilibrium is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the
various kinds of creations.
is

The diversity of created objects thus rendered quite explicable. As already mentioned, all accessories are due to the predominance of one or other
of the three

Gnnas

to the kind of creation

the predominance of Sattwa giving rise in which that attribute predominates,

and

Without proceeding any further, we must stop to consider the nature and properties and the Modus operandi of these Gunas.
so forth.

The three

attributes

Sattwa, Rajas and

Tamas have

re

spectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delu sion; and have their operations characterised respectively by en

lightenment, activity and restraint and are so constituted that the one always operates in suppression of the other, and at the
;

same time depending upon this latter. To explain this con The universe would be in an unceasing trariety of properties
round of
activity,
if

the only operating force were the Rajas

;

in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a restraining agency in the shape of the Tamoguna which by
its

nature

is

dull

and passive.

The natures of the

different

objects of the universe are thus ascertained in accordance with the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if

enlightening agency in the shape of Sattwa, Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind force acting in a haphazard manner. Thus we have established the
necessity of the three Attributes.

there were no

Here an objector comes forward and says How can the endowed as they are with mutually counteracting properties, cooperate and bring about such a grand and stupen dous structure as our Universe ? The reply is that it is a very common fact that two or more substances though mutually con
attributes,

tradictory, do cooperate towards a single end

e.

g. the

wick

XIX
and the
they
oil both taken separately are as ranch against the action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together

In the same manner, help to brighten the fire. though the Gauas are mutually counteractive, yet when com
bined, they
deficiencies.

act

towards a single end, supplying each other

s

The necessity of postulating three
supported by another reason.

different forces is further

We

see that in nature there are

three distinct properties All of pleasure, pain and dulness. other properties are reducible to these three heads. Again we find that these are properties so much opposed to one another that all could never be the effect of a single agency. Thus then

we must postulate three different forces or constituent elements of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three distinct properties. To these three constituents of Nature we
find in the Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas. give the names universe the above three properties, and as all the properties of the effect must be a direct resultant of a like property in its

We

cause, so

we

at once arrive at the conclusion that the cause of

the

Universe

the Pradhana

must be endowed with the
Gunas.

three Attributes.

So much
stone of the

for the action of the

We

must now turn
the

our attention towards the all-important Prakriti

Key

Sankhya Philosophy.
"

What, then, is this Prakriti ? Does it stand for the Theistjc Or for the Bauddha Sensations ? Or does it corres to theVedantic "Maya" ? To all this we reply It is pond all these, and It is neither of these. It resembles the Vedantic in asmuch as it is the one root of the Universe, which is Maya asserted of Maya also though, as of an illussory world. But

God ?

"

its being the root of the Universe is akin to that of the Sankhya-Prakriti. It is not the God. Since it is said to be without intelligence, a mere dead Matter equipped

the fact of

with certain
Prakriti
is

potentialities

due to the Gunas.

In short,

the one rootless Root of the Universe (objective as well as subjective) endowed with the three Guiias and evolv-

XX
ing through these, every kind of existence
save of course, the

Pnrusha

Spirit.

The next point that we have to consider is How do the Sankhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternality
of this Prakrit!
? Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless root itself nnmanifested and yet manifesting all objective and subjective existence ? Proofs of this are given at length in

works on the Sankhya Philosophy, and it will not fee al But together out of place here to briefly sum them up. before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Sankhya doctrine of causality, the point on which rests the whole fabric
all

of Prakriti.

the effect

then is the cause and how is it related to Cause is defined as a substance in which the effect subsists in a latent form. Thus then the effect must be said to be eternally existent primarily in a latent con

What

?

dition, in

the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then commonly recognized as the effect. How to prove that the effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been

newly produced by the cause
Firstly.

?

What

is

to say that into existence. brought
is

That

nonentity can never be made an entity which has never existed can never be

What

remains to be done by the

operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect that is to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular cause.

And

this

from the

kind of manifestation we find in the production of oil different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto
r

lying latent.

Secondly. always find that the effect is always in one or the other related to the cause. way Now, this relation
if the effect were a nonentity ; for a nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of certainly the effect with the cause were not necessary then every

We

would not be possible

effect

case there
confine
effects.

would be possible from every cause. Since in that would be no restrictive qualification which would
the
operation
this

of particular

causes to particular

Thus then

would lead

to

an absurdity.

XXI

we cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what .Thirdly. does this efficiency consist in ? It cannot be anything other
than the existence in the cause of the
condition.
effect in

a latent
oil,

For the difference of

seeds,
it is

sand, lies merely in the fact that

from only in the seeds and
as cause of

not in the sand, that the

oil subsists.

Fourthly. the effect is non-different from the cause ; and the latter being a entity, the latter must be so also. To

take an example, the cloth composing it. Because it

is

non-different from

the threads

is

neither

heavier than the latter,

nor

is any other relation than that of inherence possible between the two and it is only between two different things
;

that any other relation as that of conjunction &c., is possible. Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The difference of properties and actions cannot establish any

For though a single thread cannot do the action of cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection of threads and we see that what a single man cannot do,
difference.
;

can be done very well by a number of them together e. g. a man cannot carry a palanquin, which work can be single
;

very well performed by a number of men together. Thus then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed cause and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect.
;

This identity of cause and effect
"

is declared by Sir William Hamilton also, who says when we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence, But what does constrained* to believe that it has a cause. the expression, that it has a cause, signify ? If we analyse

our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we eannot^conceive any new existence to commence, therefore, all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance had
are utterly previously an existence under a prior form. unable to realise in thought the possibility of the complemeut of existence either increased or diminished. are unable

We

We

on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something or on the other something becoming nothing

XXH
There
effect
is
is

and

thns conceived an absolute tautology between the its causes. We think the causes to contain all that
;

contained in the effect
in the

the effect to contain nothing ^ which

was not contained

causes."

Lectures on Metaphysics

XXXIX.

Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the the Sankhyas employ the fact in proving the existence of their Pradhana. The effect being only a develop
cause,

must have
is

ed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all existence its unmanifested condition in its cause. That
to
say, the elements lie in

Self-Consciousness, which lies

we go on increasing the series we would be landed in a regressus ad infinitum. In order to avoid this we must postulate the existence of a principle which must be uncaused and which must be the final substrate of
in Buddhi.
if

Now

the undeveloped state of all other substances. Thus then we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature unmanifested, the final cause of all; and to this the Sankhyas
give the names
"

Pradhana,"

"Prakrit!"

or

"

Avyakta."

Secondly we find that all the substances from Buddhi down limited and are the wards are development of some and this is Pradhana. further ultimate Principle

Having thus proved the Existence
define its

Pradhana we must and properties as well as those of its Effects
of
;

see wherein lies the difference.

In order to do this we must
of

first

the

Manifested

Principles

the

consider the properties Pradhana. effects of

These are caused and as a necessary consequence of this
transitory, limited, mobile, many, dependent (on the activity of the Pradhana), made up of parts-, these are the characteris tics where the Pradhana differs from the Manifested Principles,

Buddhi and the rest. Pradhana is the uncaused must be eternal. And as

For,

as

already

root of the Universe,
all

explained, the and as such,

Universe

is

the result of Its

XXlll

must be all-pervading as a necessary conse of this it is immoveable i. e. Cannot move, in the sense quence of goirfg from one place to another. And further, since it is,
evolution, It
;

It is independent all-pervading it must be one. only on the activity of its own constituent Gunas.

depending

These are the points difference. Those of agreement are, that the Pradhana as well as the manifested principles are the
resultants of the various actions of the three Gnnas.

Second

ly, since without intelligence, both must be without discrimi nation, since discrimination is the result of intelligence.

Thirdly both these present objects for the enjoyment of the Fourthly since they are without intelligence, they can Spirit.

and

never be the observers, they must always remain the observed, This is technical and requires some as such common.

explanation. Every object that is observed is so, not differently by different individuals, but are common objects of observa tion for all, and are common in that sense. Fifthly they are

the only Principle endowed with in without intelligence the Spirit. Sixthly they are prolific i. e. telligence being The Spirits are without this. endowed with evolving energy.

These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference be tween the Pradhana on one hand and its effects on the other.

Now we must consider the nature of the Spirits and see what the Sankhyas have to say as to their existence, number and But before we proceed with this, we must first properties.
see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that

presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any princi For certainly Intelli ple that will supply the intelligence. cannot belong to the Buddhi for it is material, being gence

the effect of Prakriti

which is essentially non-intelligent, and what is absent in the cause cannot manifest itself in the effect. So we must have a distinct Principle of Intelligence.
*

Secondly.

we

corporeal we have seen

is for
.

see in our every day life that all that is the use of another, as a bed, a chair &A And before that all the principles from Prakriti

XXIV
downwards are
bodied.

Though

this sounds a little absurd as

regards Prakriti, Buddhi and Ahanakra, yet we must not forget that the body of the apparently immaterial principles
is

made up

of the three Gunas-which are as material as

any

such being the case, we must postulate the thing. existence of an unbodied or incorporeal principle. And this is Purusha, the Spirit, and as we have not yet had an Intelligent

And

principle,

we

attribute intelligence to this incorporeal

Spirit.

And

the Spirit

must be unbodied because
is

it is

devoid of the
is

three Attributes, for whatever found to be bodied.
Thirdly.

affected

by the Gunas

have come across in daily life with the general proposition that whatever is naturally connected with
is supervised over by some and we have also seen that all the principles from the thing, Prakriti downwards are made up of the three Gunas, and as such necessarily, affected by pleasure, pain or delusion and so these must have a supervisor. And in order to escape a regressus ad infinitum this supervisor must be himself un touched by pleasure &c.; and as such must be something over and above Prakriti. And this is Purusha, the Spirit.

We

either pleasure, pain or delusion,

;

Prakriti and the rest are objects of enjoyment Fourthly. and as such they necessitate the existence of an enjoyer, who again must not be an object himself. And the enjoyer must be the intelligent principle. For a non-intelligent

;

principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the enjoyer. And this again must be something not made up of pleasure &c.
latter being

Which can never be the case with Buddhi and the rest. These made up as they are of pleasure, pain and delu
;

for that will involve sion, cannot be the enjoyer of these the absurdity of self-contradictory actions one made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be only pleased or pained ;

for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase of the constitution of Buddhi. And so we must have an

enjoyer over and above Prakriti and the rest.
Spirit.

And

this is

XXV
Fifthly

and

lastly.

All systems of philosophy,

and

all

the

great

men

of the past

Now

this is not possible

we find striving after final Release. of Prakriti or Buddhi. For these

latter ar e constituency made up of pain and as such can never be released from this. So the object of final Release must be

one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its con stituent element; and such a principle is the Spirit alone.

We

"have

principle in the

thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct shape of Purusha, over and above the Prakriti.

The next thing, we have to consider is What is this Purnsha ? How is it constituted ? What are its properties ? ^ What its aim ? arid finally, how and when does it attain final Release ? We must take each of these questions one
by one.
(1)

What is Purusha
that
is is

?

It

is

thinking belongs to the mind.
principle since

not the thinking principle, since Nor is it the determining

alloted to Buddhi.
It
is

The character

of the Spirit
still
it

a very unique one.

is

the

the

principal

necessary factor in all agent of all functions, mental

none of these, It then is of these.
as

well as

it

organic. It is the agent who feels, thinks and wills. Without no functions would be possible, specially consciousness.
is

In short Spirit
intellecting
(2)

necessary factor in

the source of intelligence, and as such, the every function of the mind feeling,

and
is

willing.

Ho^v
is

this Spirit constituted ?

As a matter of

fact the

of intelligence pure and simple, and Spirit is free from every other qualification and encumbrance.
constituted
(3)
it is

are its properties ? These are thus enunciated : free from the three attributes, possessed of discriminative

What

faculties, non-objective, singular, intelligent and non-produc If the Spirit were not naturally free from the action of tive.

the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis would be Since pain constitutes the very nature of the Attri possible.
butes and as

such can not possibly be separated from

it.

D

XXVI

And

thus no liberation being possible, there would be mo necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of
if

And again philosophy are devoted. equipped with discriminative faculties,

it

the Spirit were not could never attain to

the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical systems, which would thus become useless.

Next
that

as to the aims of the

Spirit,

It has

been laid down

Spirit mistakes the fluctuations of the Attributes and thus comes to be constituting Nature, to be His own

the

;

by pleasure, pain &c., which in reality do not affect him, under the influence of the different kinds of delusions the modifications of Buddhi. Now the one all-absorbing aim of every Spirit is the attainment of wisdom that would help
affected

him

to

discriminate

between Himself and the fluctuations of

the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure and pain caused by these in their true light and be no longer affected by them.

The next question that presents itself to us is how does Pur usha attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipation? This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sankhya philosophy, when the Attribute of Goodness is paramount in one s constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist. The Purnsha then sees Nature and its constituents in their true light and finds out His mistake, and so shakes off all mistaken preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self, imposed bonds of Bnddhi, and finally retries from metempsycosis and attains final Beatitude.

Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakriti and Purusha, we must look a little into the details of the process
of creation.

We
the

have already said that Prakriti is the rootless Root of Universe. From this Prakriti emanates Buddhi, to

which the technical name of Mahat or the Great Principle is given. From this Buddhi proceeds Akankara or the princi From this again emanate the eleven senses ple of egoism. and the five subtle elements of sound, smell, taste, colour

XXVll

and touch.
elements

And from these latter five, proceed the five gross Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Akasa.

in the scale

Let us now examine the nature of these principles. First comes Buddhi. This is defined as the principle
"

This term literally means ascertainment and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the determination that this is to be done by me." It would thus
of adhyavasdya.
"

"

appear that the functions of this principle are the same as

But by Western psychologists to will. is not mere will. It is Will and In tellect combined. For in the opinion of the majority of Western psychologists specially of those belonging to the Intellect contemplates the circumstances Kantian School Will for action and provides the rule of conduct calling
those attributed

the Sankhya Baddhi

"

:

controls the disposition harmony with the dictator of in The Sankhyas attribute both these functions to telligence." That Buddhi resembles will, is further their Buddhi.
in

made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Saukhyas. These properties are Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. As we have said already will decides the course of action and
as

such the virtuousness

or

otherwise

of

actions

belong to this principle

alone.

Again we

find that

must wisdom is

described as both restrictive and directive and so to attribute

the property of wisdom to Buddhi is to give it the dual character of Intellect and Will. Dispassion and Power again

must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course of action an$ in this too we find Buddhi cognate with In tellect and Will combined.
The
It
is

th

principle that we have to consider next is that of Egoism I are due. It principle to which all notions of the
"
" "

corresponds with Kant s "apperception" and Hamilton s "selfthat is to say the notion of self in every form consciousness of consciousness: The idea that "/have the consciousness,"
;

As immediate effects of this principle of we have the eleven sense-organs and the five Egoism,
"/

feel

&c."

subtle

elements.

The eleven

sense- organs

consist

of the

XXV111
intellectual (subjective) senses

five

the

eyes,

the ear, the

nose, the tongue, the skin, and the five of action (objective) the hands, the feet, speech, the yjZt excretory organ The eleventh sense is Manas, and that of generation.
.

(mind). The five subtle taste, colour and sound.
five

elements are those of smell, touch From these latter again proceed the
;

gross elements Earth, Air, Water, Fire and Akasa and Before these have the subtle elements for their properties.

proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the eleventh sense-organ, the mind or the reflective principle. Here first of all we must consider why we should call mind

a

sense

at

all ?

The

ple of

Sankhyay Egoism under the influence of the attribute of Goodness and this differentia we find in Manas as well as in the ten organs generally accepted as senses. Next let us consider
;

define sense as the

answer is not far to seek. The immediate effect of the princi

what
then

are
is

the

functions

of this

eleventh

sense

?

Manas

the only faculty that partakes of the nature of both kinds of senses the objective and the subjective. If it were not so, none of the senses would act, for it is only when
these
are

influenced

by

the

operation of the

mind that

towards their various objects. It would not be Act they quite accurate to say that the senses do not act. do, but these operations are not taken cognizance of by
they act
the agent, and as such having
their

actions purposeless,
to be

they out action.
called in

may

for all intents

and purposes, be said
this

with

The function of

principle

is

Sankkya

"reflection"

or

"thinking."

technically This is

further explained
first

when we

first

look upon an object the

impressions in
is

connection therewith are all indefinite

and without

qualifications

impression and the different qualifications are* imparted to it by the This process follows so reflection (or thinking) of the Mind. that one can scarcely mark the process ard instantaneously
;

very soon rendered definite

(Rff^FT). This indefinite and vague and this definiteness

thinks that the
finite, just

first

impression he has had was
it.
-

all

along de

as he latterly comes to perceive

XXIX
It need not be repeated that the mnltifariousness of creations
is

due to the diverse actions of the Attributes.

The next question that is started is whence proceeds the action of the senses ? If their action were eternal then the
creation would never cease. If not eternal,

what

is

it

that

causes the operations to begin? The reply given is that all these organs have a certain sort of anxiety for the fulfilment of each

and this anxiety leads to the action of each is no external impetus save that of the pur discriminative wisdom and hence emancipation of the pose Purusha. If there were no action of the different emanations from Prakriti, the Spirit would be at a loss to discriminate between itself and the inanimate Prakriti. So we see that the only impetus from without is supplied to the senses by the purpose of the Spirit, and thenceforward they are led on in
other
s

actions

;

of them.

There

their active path

by their own anxiety.

Altogether then

we

see that there

are

thirteen

organs

three internal, Buddhi, Ahankara and Manas, and the ten external the ten sense-organs. Of these the latter operate

only in the present time, whereas the former act with regard to the past, present and future. Of the external organs, the five subjective senses operate towards subtle as well as gross
substances, whereas the objective ones only towards gross ones.

Of

the thirteen organs, the

palm of supremacy

is

given

to the internal ones, since these are applicable to all kinds of

substances

;

and another cause of supremacy we have already

viZn the one with regard to time. Of these internal organs again, the Buddhi is supreme, since the principles of

noted

Reflection operate towards their objects and then present these experiences to the Buddhi, which finally presents them with its own additions and alterations to the discriminat

Egoism and

ing eye of the Spirit.

^

Thus we find that Buddhi is the chief and brings about all his worldly enjoyment, finally leading to His discrimination of self from tbe emana tions of Prakriti, and thence to final liberation. Thus of all the is organs, Buddhi supreme.
agent of the Spirit

XXX
Having thus described the organs, we turn onr attention towards the gross substances. These are of three kinds Of these the Subtle, Parent-born and the Great Elements. first is eternal, and the second and third and transient. fading
of the Sankhyas resembles to a great the "Astral Body of Theosophical litera extent, believe, It is born before the visible body and lasts till the ture. Pralaya and till then it presents the astral body of the
"subtle

This

body"

I

"

;

Ego

in all its reincarnations
so,

during that Kalpa.

If this

the actions of one incarnation could not act upon the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by

were not

For the actions were done by the body and the organs of the former incarna tion and these dying with the Body, wherein would the
the actions of one incarnation in another.
;

traces of the former actions be left

?

So we must postulate
"Linga-Sarira,"

the existence of a substrate in the form of the

equipped with subtile counterparts of all the sensory and motor organs. And thus then we shall have the Linga-Sarira imprinted with all the effects of the actions of one birth. And

body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent in it is but natural that the fruits of past actions should affect the Spirit though the Spirit cannot be affected,
since
this

carnations,
r

;

he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he thinks all the affections of Buddhi to be his own. The LingaSa^rira thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so
}

et so long as

as to bring out their
is

effects

in a future

incarnation.

This

substrate of the different organs Linga-Sarira again which are subtile in their nature, and as such could not subsist

the

without a substratum.
c

Let us now see how the Sankhyas treat of the idea of means and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit
ascends to higher regions. By higher regions here is of course meant a more highly spiritual life. Vice leads the other way. Emancipation results from discriminative
" "

*

wisdom.

This wisdom

consists

of deep

insight

into

the

XXXI
character of the Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent from which perception of the difference between the two
results the Spirit s perception of

His own true nature, which

is

above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thral dom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been
gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and be

comes
state,

free of the Attributes,

which

gence. By the subtler elements of Nature.
for

and thereby attains to His proper one of pure uninterupted and unmixed intelli mere dispassion is gained a state of absorption into
is

A

Spirit thus transformed

a time a state of unintelligent rest, and is bora enjoys under the same restrictions and with the same bondage again
as before the absorption. If on the other hand, the Spirit is under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attri
it is that it falls into the stingy darkness of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine are all labouring under this category. ray of wisdom.

bute of Passion, then

We

The Sankhyas have further entered into a very elaborate enunciation of the various manifestations of Buddhi dividing

them
five

into no less

than

fifty

forms.

These

are

made up of

kinds of obstruction, twenty-eight of incapacity ( result from the disability of the organs), nine of contentment and ing Of these, again there are 62 forms of eight of perfection.
obstruction alone.

So

muc]?L

for

intellectual

creation.

The elemental

or

material creation comprises the eight kinds of divine celestial beings, the five of the lower animals, and one, the human
kind.
^

excess or otherwise of one of the attributes.

The various grades of creation are attributed to the Thus the attribute

of Goodness predominates among the gods, that of Passion among men, and that of Darkness in all lower creation.

All this elaborate process of creation is began by Nature solely for the sake of the Spirit s emancipation from the miseries of metempsychosis miseries inevitable to Him when born in a
^

XXX11

human
for

caring for
conies

Nature is described as a great benefactress, not return of services from the Spirit, and working any His emancipation ont of her own sweet will, till He
body.
to perceive
;

from the scene

her true character when She retries an actress who has played her part, and never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the Spirit to be His own. By His very nature He is free from all
like

internal fluctuations, in as

much

as

He

is

above the Attributes,

whose

effect these fluctuations are.

After the attainment of

discriminative wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition.

But the body continues
previously imparted to
virtue &c.

for a time on account of the
it.

impulse

And

the attainment of

wisdom

having put a stop to the operation
the operation of which
falls,
is

of all such agents as a necessary cause of

rebirth

the body

character,

and

attains

to

and the Spirit regains His true absolute and eternal beatitude,

never to return to the cycles of metempsychosis.

THE TATTWA-KAUMUDI.
[SANKHYA].

AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION*

Bed, White and and also to the Unborn Black, producing many children; Ones Who have recourse to Her, and renounce Her on having enjoyed the pleasures afforded by Her.
(1).

KEVERENCE

to the

One Unborn,

to Panchasikha
reverence.

To the Great Rishi Kapila, and his disciple Asuri, as also and Iswara-Kriskna, to these we bow in

(2).

In this world, that expounder
audience,

is

who

offers

listened to by the expositions of facts

K JnSL

UCti0n

t0

whose knowledge is desired by them. Those, on the other hand, who expound undesired

doctrines, are given up by them, as mad men, or as men unacquainted with science and custom. And that science is

desirable which being known, leads to the attainment of the final end af man. Consequently, as the science to be (here
after) explained supplies the

means

to the final goal, therefore,
:

the author introduces the desirability of the subject-matter

KARIK!
There being
(in this

I.

the three kinds
->

world) an impediment caused by of pain, (there arises) a desire for

enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if (it be urged that) the enquiry is superfluous on account

[34]

2

[KARIKA

i.]

of (the existence of) obvious means, (we reply that because these (latter) are neither absolute it is) not so
:

nor

final.

(3).

The subject-matter of science would not be enquired into (1) if there existed no pain in this world or ( 2 ) if tnon g h extant its removal were not desired or (3) even if desired, its
5
>

;

removal were impossible, such impossibility arising either from the eternal character of the pain, or from ignorance of
the means of alleviating it or (4) notwithstanding the pos sibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of science did not
;

afford the adequate means ; or (5) lastly, if there and easier means elsewhere available.

were other

(4).

Now, that there

is no pain and that its removal is not universally desired, are opposed to facts.

kinds of pain."

this view {i is declared "There an impediment caused by the three being The three kinds of pain constitute (what is
:
>

With

triad of pain." ordinarily called) the The nature-intrinsic (Adhyatmika), (2)
"

And
The

these are:

(1)

naturo-extrinsic

Of (Adhibhautika), and (3) The super-natural (Adhidaivika). these the naturo-intrinsic is two-fold, bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of the various humours, wind,
due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-preception of particular objects. All these are called intrinsic on ac
bile,
;

and phlegm

and mental pain

is

count of their admitting of internal remedies.
:

Pains submit

extrinsic, and super ting to external remedies are two-fold human. The extrinsic are caused by men, beasts, birds rep tiles and inanimate things and the superhuman ones owe their
, ;

existence to the evil
class of elementals.

influence

Thus the

of planets and the various fact that pain, a specific
is

modification of the attribute of Foulness (Rajas)

experi

enced

by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. "Impediment" (Abhighata) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the

[5]

3

[K. i.]

consciousness of disagreeableness caused by the three kinds of Thus then this idea pain residing in the internal organs. of disagreeableness constitutes the cause of the desire for the alleviation of pain. Though pain cannot be absolutely

prevented, yet
"

it is

possible to alleviate
it is

subsequently. into the to be made)
"

Thus

as will be explained it concluded that (enquirey is going
" "

kinds of pain). In the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordi nate factor in the preceding compound, yet it is mentally the more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to to the other and primary factor of the it in
preference

(the three alleviating it the particle tat refers to Tadapaghatake

means of

compound). The means of alleviation, and none other, derivable from science,
"

too,

are only those

(5).

Objection:

On

account
is

enquiry
Objection: inquiry
e flU

of obvious remedies, suck That is to say : superfluous"

senc i

of

^bvFS

we grant the existence of the triad of pain, and also the desirability of its
removal, as also the possibility thereof; we go farther, and grant that the means

means.

derivable from the

With
fluous

all this,
;

Sastras are adequate to the removal. however, the present enquiry becomes super because we have easier obvious means for the removal

of pain, and farther because of the difficult character of the means prescribed in the Sdstra a full knowledge of abstruse
philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Says a popular

maxim

:

When

a

man

can find honey in the house, wherefore

should he go to the mountains ? So, when the object of desire has been attained, which wise man will make any further * Hundreds of easy remedies for bodily pain are attempts ?

down by eminent physicians for the mental pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the
laid
;

such as women, desirable food and drink, objects of enjoyment dress and the like. Similarly of the extrinsic pains we have such as acquaintance with moral and political ep.sy remedies
* Vide the

Nydya-latiM, in

loco.

[6-8]

4

[K. i.]

science, residence in safe places, &c.

In the same manner, of superhuman troubles we have remedies in the shape of gems and charms, &c.
(6).
:

Reply : Not

so

"

:

Because

these

are

neither
;

absolute

Obvious Reply means are not abso-

nor

final"

Absoluteness (of the
;

means)
.

consists in the certainty oi its eiiect

and

its

the finality consists in the non-recurrence r of

pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is de The universal noted by the expression "Ekdntatyantobhdvah. The upshot of the whole affix tasi has a genitive force here.
"

is this

:

On

different kinds of pain, even

account of not observing the unfailing cure of the on the employment in the pre

manner of medicines, &c., mentioned before,- we predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby and similarly from the recurrence of the pain once cured, we infer
scribed
;

non-permanence of the cure. Thus, though easily available, the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal
of pain.
fluous.

Consequently, the present enquiry

is

not super

(7).

Though the mention of the word pain
beginning
worS!
is is

in the very

f ^rpatory

inauspicious, yet that of the means as leading to its removal
;

auspicious

and

as such quite

appro

priate at the

commencement of a

treatise.

(8).

Objection

:

We
;

grant the

inadequacy of obvious

Vedic Objection nieans adequate to
:

means but we have others prescribed in the Yedas such as Jyotishtoma, &c. which
,
,

,

,

.

removal of pain.

l as ^

for a

thousand years

.,

a whole host of

Vedas.

And

these

these forming the Ritualistic portion of the means verily will remove the triad of pain

absolutely and finally. Declares the
:"

S ruti

:

"Desiring

Heaven

one must perform sacrifices and Heaven is thus describedan the Bhattavartika "Pleasure, unmixed and nninterspersfed with pain, and attainable by pure longing for it, is what ^is
:

19]
expressed by the word

5

[K. ii.]

Heaven"

Heaven thus

consists

in

pleasure, diametrically opposed to pain, which by its very existence extirpates all kinds of pain ; nor is this pleasure drank the Soma for, declares the Sfruti short-lived,
"

:

We

and became

[Atkarvasiras III]. And if the celestial were short-lived, how could there be immortality ? pleasure Hence the Vedic means for the removal of pain, which can be
immortal"
4

gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a are easier than discriminative knowledge, which can year,
ing over

be attained only by a long course of traditional study extend many lives. Thus then the proposed enquiry again

becomes superfluous,

Reply

;

KARIKA

II.

The revealed

is like

the obvious

;

since

it is

connect

ed with impurity, decay and excess. A method con consisting in descriminatrary to both is preferable,
tive

knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested,
(Spirit).*
"

and the Knowing
"

(9).

Anusrava

is

that which

is

heard during

the

tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher,
is

and

ifklihe

obvtaf

therefrom.
is

not done ( wr itten). Anusravika = relating to Anusrava or Veda, that which is known The list of religious rites laid down in the Vedas
;

both being equal to the obvious (means, mentioned before) inefficient in the absolute and final removal of the equally

triad of pain.

Though the
"J,

("

yet the ritualistic portion of it because descriminative knowledge also forms part of the Veda (which of course is not what the
;

Anusravika

it

text uses the generic term Vedic" to be taken as implying only ought
"

author means).
This
Rui-ika"

Says the

S ruti

"

:

The

Spirit

ought to be

L*Kapila
f

embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle philosophy, according to which final emancipation is attainable not by religious rites, but by descriminative knowledge as explained by Kapila.
s

[1011]

6

[K.

ii.]

known and descriminated from Primordial

Matter"

(Brikadd-

ranyaka 2-4-5); (by so doing) "the agent does not return, yfca does not return (into this world)" (Chhdndogaya 8-15).
,

he

(10).

Eeason

for the

im ure Because decaying and exces-

above assertion is given; "since it is connected with impurity, decay and excess" The impurity lies in the fact of the Somasacrifice, &c.,

being accompanied by animal-

slanghter, and the like. Says the revered Panchasikhacharya:
It (the sin attendant upon slaughter) is slightly mixed, The slight mixture is that of destructible and bearable."
"

the principal effect (Apurva, i.e. merit) of the Jyotisktoma, with the minor apurva, the cause of evil, due to (ftf.,
animal-slaughter. The epithet destructible implies that the sin is removeable by certain expiatory rites ; but if some how, these are neglected, then at the time of the fructifica
tion of the principal
7

Karma

(merit), the evil

element (demerit,
;

caused by the slaughter) also bears its fruits and as long as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with patience hence the epithet bearable. Experts (in rituals)
;

dangling in the nectar- tanks of Heaven attained to by a host of virtuous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of pain brought about by the element of evil (in the rituals).
(11).

It cannot be

The impurity
of animal-slaughter in

a sacrifice.established.

urged that the generic law "Kill not an ^ anim is set aside by the specific one, Kill the animal for the Aqnishtorfia,
al,"
"

"

other

;

and

it

is

j i because they do not contradict each only when two laws are mutually con
,

,,

,

.

i

,

In the pre tradictory, that the stronger sets aside the weaker. sent instance, however, there is no contradiction, the two laws
treating of two entirely different subjects. For the negative law "Kill not, &c.," only declares the capability of the slaugh
ter to

produce evil, and hence pain but it does not do away with the fact of its being necessary for the completion of th^ sacrifice and in the same manner, the following injunction Kill the animal, &c.," declares the necessity of animal;
;
"

[1214]

7

[K. ii.]

slaughter in the sacrifice, but does not negative the fact of its being productive of sin. Nor is there any contradiction between

the productivity of sin and the capability of helping the comple tion of a sacrifice. Animal-slaughter can produce sin in the

man, and at the same time, quite consistently help a
(12).

sacrifice.

The

properties excess

decay

(

non-permanence
;

)

and

belong really to the effect
.

but are
fact

Non-permanence

and
SUltS

here attributed to the means.

This Non01

shown
action

excess to apply to
f

permanence
Jyotishtoma,

is

inferred

from the
entity.

Vedi

Heaven bein g a caused
&c.,

are the

means

Further, to the
&c.,

attainment

of

Heaven

only,

whereas the

Vdjapeya,

lead to the attainment of the

what
one
s

constitutes the

"excess"

kingdom of Heaven. This is spoken of. The greatness of

magnificence

is

a source of pain to another of lesser

magnificence.
(13).

In the passage
a
lii

"

Drinking Soma, we became im
is

mortal"

as^rTsutt
action
is

of Vedic

^

as

immortality implies long-durabideclared elswhere: "Immortality
till

only long-

is

durability

the final dissolution of all
finite)
existence."

elemental
the

(or

Hence

Neither by deeds, nor by children, nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone they got immortality" [Makd"

S rutii

narayana Upanishad X.
secluded valley
enter.

and again Swarga shines in a at a distance, which the ascetics alone
"

5]

;

By

actions did the

wealth, get death.

ascetics with children, desiring Therefore those other learned Bishis, who

were above
(14:).

all action,

got

immortality."

With
y

all this

in view,

it is

declared:

"

A

method

deJcr

i

m nTtTve
i

contrary to both is preferable consisting in descriminative knowledge of the Manifested,
the

wisdom.
{

Unmanifested,
refers

and

the

Knowing"

Tasmdt

to

the Vedic means
the impure

of

removing pain.

A

method,

contrary to

Soma-

[1516]
sacrifice, &c.,
is

8

[K. ii.J

bringing about excessive and short-lived results,

unmixed with evils due to animal-slaughter, pure, and leads to results non-excessive and everlasting as is clear from the S ruti precluding all return to metempychoThe sis for people possessing clescriminative knowledge. based on the said result being a caused entity cannot argument
i. e.,
f

be urged as a ground for its non-permanence because this holds
;

only in the case of the effect being an entity in the present the removal of pain is a case, however, the consequence And such negation putting an end to negation, a non-entity.
;

causal efficiency, there can be no further effect, in the shape

of more pain. For it is a fact admitted on all hands that the causal activity lasts only till the attainment of deseriminative knowledge. This will be explained later on. (Kari-

ka LXVI.)
(15).

The

literal

meaning of the Karikd, however, is this: The means of removing pain, consisting in
the descriminative knowledge of the Spirit,
as apart

eaninS
of

ttwrari

from Matter,

is

different

from the

is

and hence is preferable. The Scriptural inasmuch as it is authorised by the Veda and as such good The descri capable of removing pain to a certain extent. minative knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is
scriptural means,

also good.
(16).

Of

these two, the latter
:

is

superior,

Question

"Whence

does such descriminative

know

mintive
ledge.

^-

lede

arise"?

Answer:

"From

descriminative
ike UnmaniKnowledge of

knowledge of the Manifested,
fested,

and

tJie

Knowing"

the Manifested precedes that of its cause, and from the fact of both of these (Mani fested and Unmanifested) being for another s purpose, we infer

the Unmanifested

;

the existence of the

Spirit.

Thus then we

find

that these

three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the ledge thereof. The upshot of the whole then is this
distinction knowledge from descriminative knowledge

know
:

The
ari
.e

of the

of Spirit

from Matter

consisting in

meditation

[17

19J

9

[K.

m.]

and contemplation uninterruptedly and patiently practised
for a long time, of the Manifested, &c., previously heard of in the S ruti and Purdnas, and then established by scientific

reasoning.

This will be explained in detail in Karika

LXIV.

(17).
categories.

Having thus decided Philosophy

to be needful for

Fourfold division of

the enquirer, the author, with a view to commence the work, sets down, in brief, the

import of the system, in order to concentrate the attention of the enquirer.

KAHIKA
"

III.

Nature or Primordial Matter, the root of all, is not produced; the Great Principle ( Mahat, i. e., Buddhi) and the rest are seven, being both producer and pro

and the sixteen are the produced neither the producer nor the produced."
duced
; ;

Spirit is

Briefly, the objects treated of in the

system are four-fold.

Some

of

them

others both

some merely products, and products, and others, neither tlie productive
are merely productive,,

one nor the other.
(18).

It being asked
is

-What

is

the productive?

The answer
is

Nature or Primordial Matter

the root
;

Matter

itself

of the Universe, an aggregate of effects of there is no root, or else we would be landed in
infinitum.
both productive

an unwarranted regressus ad
(19).

How many
""

are the objects that are

and products, and which
answer
is

these ? The The Great Principle and the

are

rest are both. As the Great Principle the cause of Self-consciousness (Ahankara) ^JBuddhi) being rs the effect of Nature ( Prakriti ), so is Self-consciousness

[2022]

10

[K. Hi.]

the cause of the five subtle Primary Elements (Tanmatras) together with the eleven sense-organs, and at the same time, the effect of the Great Principle; and so are the five- subtle

Primary Elements the cause of the grosser elements, Vril* (Akasa) and the rest, and at the same time, the effect of Selfconsciousness.
(20).

How many

are the productions, pure
It is
1

The Products.

what are they ?

said
i.

and simple, and The produ
"

ctions are sixteen

e. t

the

five

gross

elements (earth, &c.) and the eleven sense-organs, these are mere products or modifications not productive. Though cow,

and so are curd and and seed respectively, yet these facts do not touch our position since trees, &c., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term Prakrit? stands and further, cows, trees, &c., do not differ from each other in their
pot,
trees, &c., are modifications of earth,

sprout, of milk

;

;

essence, since they have, in

common, the

properties, grossness

and

perceptibility.

(21).

The form of that which
duct,^ now

is

stated.

neither productive nor pro The spirit is neither
"

a product nor productive. be explained later on.

9

All this will

(22).

In order to prove the above statements, the different kinds of proof ought to be noticed. Nor s can there be a specific definition without a
*

general one.

Hence the

definition of

proof in general -follows.
sure to
"

*

Though

this translation of the

word Akasa
fiction

ears, as

borrowed from a work on
it in,

I

have put
"

since I could not find
is

"

expressive enough to denote all that Astral Light," Inane," Ether,"
"

jar upon European The Coming Kace"), yet any other word in the English language connoted by the Sanskrit word Ak^,a.

is

(Lytton

s

."

Space,"

&c.,

do not sufficiently represent

the active character of the Sanskrit Akdsa..

[2325]

11

[K. iv.]

KARIK! IV.
o
"

i

Perception,

Inference,

and Valid Testimony are

admitted to be the three kinds of proof necessary ; because they include all kinds of proof. It is by proof
that a fact
is ascertained."

(23)

.

Here, first of all, we have to explain the word Pramdna,

which explanation would form
Proof defined.

its definition.

Proof, then,

is

right notion is the cause or means of all correct right notion is that is either doubtful,

defined as that by which determined it thus becomes
;

This definitecognition. a mental condition free from the contact of all

self-contradictory or unknown ; this too belongs to the human agent, and the result comprehension thereof is right notion; and that which leads to such right

notion

is

Proof.

all that leads to

Thus the term Proof is differentiated from wrong notion, viz., doubt, misconception,
like.

memory, and the
(24).

The author now
to the
"

rejects the different views with regard

number
is

T
of

e three f0ldneSS ro of

~that
neither

of proofs

"

:

Of three
This

"

kinds,

of P roof there are three
less.

kinds
>

more nor

we

shall

explain in detail after the specific definitions of the particular kinds of proofs.
(25).

Now,

it is

asked, which are the three kinds of proof ? The answer is Perception, Inference, and The above is an ex Valid Testimony. -of what is popularly known as position
"

proof; and a philosophical system is expounded for the The cognitions people, since thereto is its province confined.
of the great sages, though realities, do not, in any way, help t of the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of jiose
1/ere.

.[2629]
(26).
The
all

12

[K. Y,]

Objection.

We grant
n0 ^
^ ess

that the
three
5

number of
The

proofs

is

inclusion of other proofs in the

^ian

but wherefore should
different

it

not be more than three?

(Upamana), &c. This will be further explained of proof
"

schools do lay down others, as Analogy Since these three include all kinds Reply
"

later on.

(27).

Now

an altogether

en e quiry into the differ)f

different question is raised Why should the philosophic system enquire into the nature and kinds of proof, when it is

proot

launched forth with the express purpose
i. e.,

of explaining the Prameya,
(.
is
.,

the

correct cognition)

?

To

this it

is

subject-matter of proof Since a fact replied
"

ascertained only by

proofs"

[Siddhi= determination or ascertainment.]
The order
planation.
of

Ex-

The explanation of the Karika (28). follows the sense, not the order of the words.

(29).

Now

The
finitions

,

specific of,,

on the occasion of the definition of the special kinds of proofs, the author of the Karika, de*

the

first

of

all,

defines

Perception,

since

it

Inference, &c., precedes which, therefore, are dependent upon it and further since there are no two opinions with regard to it.
;

all other Proofs,

V.
is definite sense -cognition (/. #., cogni of particular objects through the senses) ; Infer ence is declared to be three-fold, and it is preceded
"

Perception

tion

by (based upon) the knowledge

of the major premiss [asserting the invariable concomitance of the Linga (the Hetu, i. e., the characteristic mark, the middle
r

term,) with the Lingi (the Vyapaka or the Sadhya, i. e , the major term, in which the characteristic inheres] ani l

[30-31]
the minor

13

[K. v.]

of the premiss [asserting the existence characteristic in the Paksha, or the minor term] ; and
Valid.

Testimony
"

is

true revelation (S
"

ruti)."

The mention of Perception is only the statement of the the remainder being the definition, by term to be defined which word is meant the differentiation (of the term defined) from things of the same class or species, as well as from
:

those of other classes.
(30).
fined as

The

literal

"Perception"

dethe definite

cognition of particuiar objects obtain-

definition of Perception) be thus broken up objects (Vishaya) may are those that bind or connect the subject -^ (Visfiayi) with their own forms, ^. ., they
:

meaning (of the

,-,

ed through thesenses.

mark

out tne

su bj e ct
subtle

;

such are earth,

pleasure, &c.,

belonging to us. are no objects (of sense) to us,
different objects,
i. e.,

The

Primary Elements

and the Gods.

though they are so to Yogisis that which is Prativishaya applied to
the organs of sense.

Application here

is

close proximity, or direct communication, Prativishaya, thus meaning, the sense-organ applied to, or in communication

with, the object (perceived)

;

and the

definite cognition

based

on

This Prativishayadhyavasdyah" or knowledge, which is the result of an exercise of the cognition Intellectual Faculty (Buddhi), is defined as consisting in the
this

(proximity)

is

"

preponderance therein, of the attribute of Goodness following on the subjugation of that of Darkness resulting from the proximity of the sense-organs to the objects of perception.
This proximate existence (Vritti) is also called cognition. This is a Proof and right notion results from the apprehen sions of the sentient faculty by means thereof.
;

(31).

Intellect

(Buddhi), being a modification of, oremanation from, Nature (Prakriti, Primordial
Matter),
are
its
.

t

JiSctfand
T
f the Intellect

is

insentient

;

and

so,

therefore,
,

the re flection of the Spirit therein.

(

And similarly cognitions, jar, &c. _ IMS * i the different modifications or productions are insentient. The Spirit pleasures, &c.,

[32-33]
(Parusha),

14

[K. v.]

however,
is

having no

real

relation

with

these
in>

This Spirit, being reflected the Intellect, appears to be actually affected by the cognitions and pleasures, &c., really belonging to the Intellect which
pleasures, &c.,
sentient.
latter, therefore, are said

to

Spirit.
Spirit,

Through

this

reflection in the

favour an intelligent entity, the intelligence of the

the non-intelligent Buddhi and its cognitions appear endued with intelligence. This will be further explained in

Karika
(32).

XX.
In the definition, the mention of
sets as
.

The above

tion

definidifferentiates

Perception from all other forms of cog-

definite cognition! a ^ doubtful knowledge, because the latter* is not definitely comprehended

^e

,

or well-defined,
"

and hence

is

uncertain.

By
non

saying
entities,

objects,"

their contraries, all

prati* and thereby implying proximity of the sense-organs to the objects are excluded Inference," and Trustworthy Assertion." Thus * is a complete the definite cognition of particular objects
are

excluded; as by saying
"

"

all other things

definition of Perception, since it serves to distinguish of the same, as well as of different

it

from

classes

The

given by other philosophical Perception are neither impugned nor defended, for fear of being systems
definition of

u

"

too prolix.
(33).
Inference

How
is

can one, denying Inference as a proof,
Materialist
be
certain of the

viz.,

the

esta-

Wished as a distinct

ignorance, doubt or erroneousness of another man ?
Since, these

ceptible to

our mortal eyes

;

are not per ignorance, &c. nor can any other method of

is

proof be applied to this case, since no other (than Perception) accepted as such (by the Materialist). And not knowing

the ignorance, &c., of others, and thus going about addressing people at random, one would be despised by the enquirers as a mad man. Consequently, (we assert) that the ignorance,
&c., of others are inferred

from such marks or

characteristic^,

as difference of

meaning

or speech, &c.

Thus, however unwilfj-

[3435]

15

[K. v.]

ing, the Materialist is constrained to accept Inference as distinct method of proof.

a

(34).

And
finition

Inference following directly from Perception, its definition must follow close upon that of
f

jJm, Jf

Perce P tion
particular

;

tnere a g ain

>

on account of the
"

definition

being based on the
It is
"

general one, the author gives the latter

first

preceded

the middle by (a notion of) the middle* and major terms; term being the Vyapya or pervaded, and the major term, the

Vyapaka
is

or pervader. the pervaded ( Vyapya) is that which to its own natural sphere, after the removal of all brought

dubious

and
is

assumed

Vyapya
be

thus brought
"the

mention of

and that by which the The ( Vyapaka ). mark and the marked," both of which must
conditions
;

in, is

the pervader

objects,

indicates

objective or

substantive cognition.

Inference proceeds from the knowledge of smoke as the per vaded (the mark) and the fire as the pervader (the marked).

Lingi (the marked) must be twice construed in the definition, in order to imply the minor premiss [in which is stated the
relation of the
(Hetti)~\.

be thus:
(i. e.,

-

minor term (the PakshcC), with the middle term Thus the general definition of Inference comes to -Inference is (a method of cognition) preceded by

based on) the knowledge of the relations of the major minor (Paksha) and the middle (Hetu) terms with one another." [That is to say, Inference is the know
(Sdcl/iya), the

ledge derived from the major and the minor premises],
(35).
Inference
(2)

^he author now sketches the
"

The three kinds of (i) The

divisions which have been laid down by other systems also
c

The ! posteriori (Seshavat), and (3) The inference from the perception of spe-

^

Inference

is of three kinds" i. 0., the spedivisions of Inference are three-fold

(A The a r priori L [Purvavat the inference v ,, ~. c e of the eflect trom the cause, as or ram from
.

..

-

the gathering of the clouds], (ii) The a the inference of the posteriori [Seshavat ause, from the effect, as of rain from rise in the river], and

f

"

Literally

the

mark and the

marked."

[36

38]

16

[K. V.]

Inference from the perception of species or class [Inference based on relations other than the causal, as of substantiality
(iii)

<

from earthiness].
(36).
fi

First of
dil

all,

of ^nference.

The (1) and (2) the Negative Affirmative (Vita) (Avita)* That which is based on| affirma tive concomitance, is Vita and that based
is
:

Inference

of two kinds

;

on negative concomitance, the Avita.
(37).

Of these, Avita
Negative-

is
is

The
The a

Seska

Seshavat (a posteriori or analytic). thafc which remains; and the

posteriori In-

Inferential

knowledge
is

havino-

this

re

mainder

for its object

called

Seshavat.

As

is

"

declaredf:

The cause

in question being excluded,

and

(the qualification) not found elsewhere, the idea of the remain

ing (object)
Sutras.]
tion,

[Vatsayana Bhashya on the Nyaya Inference, founded on nega will be given later on Karika IX].

is Parisesha."

Examples of this Avita

(38).

The Vita

The AffirmativeThe a priori and
that from the
6pecies -

tic

per-

two-fold (1) Purvavat (a priori or syntheand ( 2 ) rom the perception of species. Of these Purva is that whose obiect is J
is

f

ception of the

~u such as has ji the characteristics of
i 1

its

spe-

known; and the Inferential knowledge as from the exis of which this forms the object i^ Purvavat
cies
;

tence of smoke the mountain,

is

inferred the existance of an individual fire in

the characteristics of the species

fire

hav

ing been previously perceived in the culinary hearth. The second kind of Vita the Inference based on the perception
of the species
*
is

that

which has
its

its

object,

such as has
c

The Vita has an

A

proposition for

major premiss

;

and the Avita, an

A

proposition, converted, per accidens.

sound has earth for f As for instance, in a proposed inference of the formthe possibility of sound being in earth being substrate, since it is a quality excluded on the ground of its never being concomitant with smell, the quality
its

specific of earth

;

and there being no

elsewhere,

we have

possibility perceived, of sound residing the notion of sound, being a quality specific of Vril (AkAsd)

asPariscsha,

[30]

17

[K. v.]

the characteristics of
of this

kind are

all

it3 species (previously) inferences with regard to

unknown
the

;

sense-

organs^; because in all inferences of this kind, the existence of the cause of the perception of colour (i. e* vision) is inferred

from the fact of
sarily caused).

being an effect (and as such neces Though the characteristics of instrumental
its

cause in general have been perceived in objects like axes, &c., yet those of the species of the particular kind of such causes the sense-organs which are inferred to exist as

causing the perception of colour, &c. are nowhere perceived. Nor are the individuals the particular sense-organs form

ing the class Sense, perceptible to our mortal eyes as are In this lies the difference between those of the class Fire.
;

4

the Purvavat (a priori) Inference and the Sdmdnyatodriskta, though they (Inference based on the perception of the species)
;

resemble each other, inasmuch as both are Vita (affirmative).

,

Here (in Sdmdnyatodriskta) driskta = darsd?ia, i. e., perception ; and Sdmdnyatak^ofSamanjs^ i. e., species or class; to Sdmanya is added the universal affix Tasi.* Thus then the term The Inference, consisting in the comprehension by means
the individual of a species whose general characteristics are All this has been fully explained by us in the not known. and is not repeated here for Nydyavartika-tdtparyatika
"

;"

fear of being too prolix.

(39).

Since the comprehension of the connection of words (in a sentence) is preceded by a process of inference with regard to the cause of action of the experienced youth directed, on hear

ing the words of the experienced director, and further, since the comprehension of the meaning of a word is due to the

knowledge of

therefore Valid Testimony, is denotation, preceded by, and based upon, Inference. Hence, after having defined Inference, the author next defines Valid Testimony.
its

*

Here, of course, having the force of the Genitive.

[4043]
"

18

[K. v.]

V

Valid Testimony is true revelation." Here the mention of Valid Testimony is merely a statement The definition of n n the rest terming 01 the term to be defined Trustworthy Asserin the turn, given the definition. True means proper explained. hence true revelation means proper
/,
.

,

,

n

,

,

,

/,

;

;

Karika",

,

.

,

revelation.

S rut?

is

the comprehension of the meaning of a

sentence by means of the sentence.
This
is

(40).

self-evident.

It is true

;

since

all

apparent
to

discrepancies and doubts with regard
ifc

human.

its proceeding from the Veda, which is super Thus also the knowledge obtained from Smritis,

are set

aside b ^ the fact of

Puranas, &c., which are founded on the Veda, becomes true.

To the primeval Kapila,
Smritis and Puranas included in
*

in

the beginning of the

Kalpa, we may

attribute the

reminiscence
<

of the S ruti studied in his

Anta-Vachana

previous birth,

"

occurrences

of the
his

Jaigishavya, in

previous day. And so did the revered conversation with Avatta, speak of his
"

reminiscence of his births extending over such a long time as ten Mahakalpas By me, evolving through ten Mahakal:

pas,

&c."

(42).

By saying

true revelation, all pretended revelations such as those of Sakya, Bhikshu, c., have been set aside. The invalidity of

these systems is due to their making un reasonable assertions, to want of sufficient basis, to their mak ing statements contradictory to proofs, and lastly to their

being accepted only by Mlechchhas or other
(43).
Valid

mean
"

people.

V distinguishes
of
-,

Differentiation

Testimony
be
its

from Inference.

Valid Testimony from Inference. Tll Caning of a sentence is the Prameya sentence or (the fact to be proved): word is not its property and as such cou
"

,

,

,

;

not

mark

or predicate.

Nor does a

sentence, e

[4445]

10

[K. v.]
/

pressing a meaning, stand in need of the comprehension of the connection of the mark and the marked which are the neces

sary conditions of Inference

;

since the sentence of a

new

poet,

previously unknown, expresses the

meaning

of

sentences

touching unknown regions.*

(44).
P
systems shown to bo included in the three
already defined.

Having

poIuLedX

ht

generally
,
,

thus defined proofs, as well as specifically, the other
,

kinds of proofs, Analogy and the rest, , T T postulated by others, can be shown to be
-,

,

i

-

included in the above.

(45).

Analogy (Upamdnd)

&^
Testimony."

is exemplified as The gavaya, of ruminants analogous to the (a species
)

is

like

tlie

Cow

-

But

tlie
is

kllOW-

led e

P roclllced ty

tllis

statement

nothing

more than that produced by our "Valid The knowledge that the term gavaya

denotes some object resembling the cow, is also nothing more than Inference. The object with reference to which

experienced persons use a particular term, comes to be denoted by that term, in the absence of any other object

ed by

(that could be so denoted), e.g., TJT^ (the class In the same manner experienced TJT.
"the

cow

) is

denot

people having

asserted that

sembles the

cow,"

object denoted by the term, gavaya re the term gavaya comes, to denote some
;

and this knowledge is purely In thing resembling the cow ferential, .The cognition of similarity of the perceived gavaya with the cow is the result of mere Perception; hence,
the cow being recalled to memory, the cognition of the gavaytfs* similarity thereto becomes perception, pure and simple. And it cannot be further urged that the similitudef
*

Whereas Inference can belong only

to objects previously

known.

f This is levelled against the assertion of Mandana Misra in his Mimansa* mtkramani, that the object of analogy is not either the gavaya or the cow, Irjit the similarity of the one in the other, which cannot be said to be ameM:

tale

to perception.

[46]
existing in the

20

[K. v.]

cow

is

different

from that in the gavaya

since

the similarity of one species with another consists in both of them having a common mode of the conjunction of their

common method of conjunction can be one only and this being perceived in the gavay must be the same in the cow also. Thus (we find) that nothing is left to be proved where Analogy could be applied to advantage. Hence Analogy is not a distinct Proof.
various parts; and this
; ,

(46).

Similarly Apparent Inconsistency (Arthapatti) is not a distinct Proof. For the case of the

shown

JSSwrtfiSv to be included
To
us,

assumptiou of the living Chaitra being outside, when he is not found at home, is
cited as
this is

tency.

Sankhyas,

an instance of Apparent Inconsis nothing more than Inference.

non-pervading or finite, when not found in one place, must be in another. The major premiss in the form, that a finite object being in one place cannot be
object being in another
is easily got at, with reference to our own bodies. Similarly the cognition of the external existence of an existing" object, is inferred, from the mark of its not being in the house ;

A particular

and this process is purely Inferential. Chaitra s existence somewhere else cannot set aside the fact of his non-existence in the house and as such, non-existence in the house could, very
;

reasonably, be urged as a reason for his being outside. Nor does the fact of his non-existence in the house cutoff his exist

ence altogether

;

retain itself outside.

and consequently his entity could be said to For Chaitra s non-existence in the house

contradicts either his existence in toto, or merely his existence in the house. The former alternative cannot stand, the subjects

of the two propositions being different.* If you say that by the general assertion "he must be somewhere" (without any
definite place
*

being mentioned), any particular place
are

even

It

is

only

when two statements

same

subject, that they

contradict each

other

dthe made, with regard to one and which is not the case in
;
tfi<

present instance.

[47]

21

[K. v.]

the house
the house

may

be implied

;

and as such the non-existence in

becomes uncertain; and thus there being co-objectivity between the two propositions noticed above, they would con we reply No: because the non-existence tradict each other, of Percep in the house having been ascertained by evidence cannot be set aside, on the ground tion in the present instance
:

of uncertainty, by the doubtful fact of his existence therein. It is not .proper to assert that his proved non-existence in the house, while overthrowing his uncertain existence therein, would set aside his existence in toto and set aside all doubt

Because Chaitra s existence in the (of his existence in space). house, being contradictory to his proved non-existence therein, is overthrown by this latter ; not so his existence in toto ; since
this latter fact is altogether ence in the house. Thus it

disconnected with the non-exist
is is

very proper to say that the
inferred from its characteristic
assertion

external existence of an entity of internal non-existence.

Hence the

that the

subject of Arthdpatti is the removal of contradiction after due consideration of the strength of two contradicting proofs is
1

between the parti ; for there is no real contradiction cular (the proof of non-existence in the house) and the general (that of mere existence). The other examples of Arthdpatti
set aside

may
it is

Hence similarly be shown to be included in Inference. established that Apparent Inconsistency (Arthapatti) is not a proof distinct from (Disjunctive) Inference.

Negation (AbMva) again is nothing more than mere Perception. The Negation of a jar Negation (Abhdva) js nothing more than a particular modificashownt^be includf tion oi the Earth characterised by ed in Perception. (its) absence. Since all existences, with the
(47).
single exception of Consciousness or Intelligence {Chit Sakti)^ are momentarily undergoing modifications, all of which are

perceptible to the senses
<

;

therefore there

is

no ground

left

un-

overed by Perception for which we should postulate a distinct Iroof in the shape of Negation (Abhdva).

[4850]
\

22

[K. vi.]

(48).

"Probability"

(Sambham)-e.
existence

g.,ihz knowledge

of

the

of

lesser

weights in

bhl^lown
included
in

to*

be"

Infer-

S reater ones is also an instance of InferThe heavier weight is known as not ence.
capable of existing without the lesser ones;
of the latter

and

this fact leads to the belief in the existence

in the former.

(49).

That

is

called

Rumour (Aitihya) discarded, as affording doubtful
testi-

by the Sankhyas whose lirst speaker is unknown, and j^ ^ is handed down by mere tradition3 e. g., a Yaksha resides in the Vata tree.
"Rumour"

(Aitihya),

?

This Rumour is not a proof since it is doubtful owing to the fact of the first speaker being unknown. "Valid Testimony," however, is that of which the speaker Thus the three-foldness of proofs is known to be veracious.
;

is

established.

(50). Thus have been defined severally the different kinds of proof, with a view to demonstrate the existence of the Ma?iiOf these, the fested, the Unmanifested and the Knowing.
Manifested even to the
are perceptible in their true form, And similarly the a priori Inference with regard to the existence of fire in the mountain, could easily be arrived at through the mark of the smoke. Such
earth, &c.,

common ploughman.

being the case, a system of philosophy, propounded for the sake of these, loses much of its importance and necessary
character.

Hence what is difficult to be got at (by ordinary should be explained by philosophy. Consequently methods) the cases of application of the different proofs are laid down.
c

KARIKA VI.

Knowledge
01 app acases of application of the differ-

of

The j.ne

super sensuous objects through Inference the
,

is

obtained
1

7

.

Tj
7

-TTTI ^ T71

toaris/ita.
is

W

ent proofs,

,. nl hat is not proved by thi
,

Sdmanya/-,

proved by revelation.

[5153]
(51).

23
t

[K. vl.]

The

particle

from

Perception

and

Samanyatodrishta Pradhdna* (Primordial Matter or Nature), and the Spirit both of which transcend the senses, and this knowledge is of Bucldhi reflected in Consciousness clue to the
^

distinguishes the Samanyatodrishta Inference a priori. Through the Inference there arises knowledge of

f

operation

The above implies the appli Chaitanya (belonging to Spirit). cation of the Seshavat (Negative) Inference also.
Inference alone Then, does the Samanyatodrishta ? If so, we shall the senses apply to all objects transcending have to deny the existence of the Great Principle (Mahat), in heaven, in the as also of Heaven, Destiny and the Gods

(52).

<fec.,

case of which the inference does not apply. and as a simple by this By this,
" "

Hence
"

it is

said

would

suffice to

<fr.,"

the give the required meaning, *to Seshavat (Negative) Inference.!

^

must be taken as

referring

sky-flowers, &c., leads to their being as non-entities; in the same way we might infer the accepted non-existence of Nature, and the rest (which are like skyflowers not amenable to perception). This being the case, why

(53). Objection tion of such objects as

-Granted

all

this.

But the non-percep-

* Henceforth Pradhana, Prakrit! or Avyakta be translated as Nature.

will, for the

sake of simplicity,

tiftn of this

I difference of opinion among Commentators as to the explanait, Vachaspati Misra, as we Karika, especially the first half of we have a knowledge of supersensuous objects, have scan, explains it as i-ghta Inference. Gaudapada takes it the same way. the

f

There

is

.

through

Sfaitdnyatodi

But NaruJyana Tirtha explains thus
(generic) This last

"In

Siimdmjatali? the

aftix

*tas?

is

substituted for the genitive case-termination. Thus the meaning is that of all we have a knowledge from Per cation. objects amenable to the senses,
is

the sense accepted by Davies in his

translation.

But the

former interpretation appears to be the more reasonable. Because it cannot be said that Inference does not apply to objects amenable to the senses. Davies, in a foot-note in loco, says that Shm&nyaJ "does not mean, &c." But he loses
;

si/Yht of the

fact

that

"

Saint ft i/atodrishta

is

the technical

name

of a parti-

cilar kiinl of Inference.

[54]
*

24

[K. VIL]

have recourse to the various kinds of Inference
these latter?

for the sake of

The reply

is

KARIK! VII.
"(Non-perception

arises)

from excessive distance,

extreme proximity, destruction of the sense-organs,
absence of mind (inattention), subtlety (or minuteness), intervention (or the existence of some intermediate

predominance (of other intermixture with with other like
barrier),
"

objects),
objects."

and from

(54). The non-perception" of the following Karika is to be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim
of the
"

looking (back) of the

lion."*

A

hird soaring

high, though existing, is yet not per ceived on account of extreme remoteness.

Extreme
of objects, explained.

(off)

must

also be taken

with

proximity (somipya) e. g., the non-per-. ception, through extreme nearness, of the

collyrium (anjana) in the eye.
"

Destruction of organs"

e. g.,

blindness, deafness, &c.

a person, under the of influence of (some very strong) desire, &c., does not perceive objects, even in bright daylight, though quite within the , range of his senses.
mind"
"

"

From

absence

As

From

Minuteness"

&.$ for
(i.

instance,
e.,

however,

much we

may may

however attentively we look) we can never perceive atoms, though under our
Intervention"
e.

concentrate

our mind

very eyes.
"From

g.,

one cannot see the

Qneen

behind the walls.
* The maxim of the lion s (backward) glance, is generally used to mark the connection of a thing with what precedes and follows." [Vide. Jfyaya-Latika in loco, ]

[5556]
V From subjugation or
of the sun.
>

25
^-e.

[K.

vm.]

suppression"

g.,

the

non-per-

cepticjn of the constellations, suppressed

by the brighter rays

as one does not preceive intermixture* drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank. (55). The ^ in the Karika has a collective force, implying
"From

even those not here mentioned; such as
is

non-production* of non-perception as one cannot perceive, in the milk, the curd, not yet produced therefrom.
also

among

the causes

The upshot of the whole then is, that the non-exist (56). ence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the
for there is danger of the not being perceived Thus, for principle being unwarrantably stretched too far. instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, can fact

of

its

;

never be he said to be assured of the non-existence of the
inmates, simply on the ground of his not seeing them. The fact is that it is only with reference to objects capable of being perceived on the occasion, that non-perception leads to

the inference of their non-existence, And this capability of teing perceived can never belong to Nature &c., (which are by their nature imperceptible) and as such it is not proper for
;

intelligent

men

to infer their non-existence

merely from their

non-perception or imperceptibility.

Question Which of the above mentioned causes (of nonperception) Applies in the case of Nature, &c. ? The reply is

KiRIKA VIII.

The
The

jion- apprehension of this
non-appre-

(Nature)
to
its

is

due

to

its
;

subtlety,
since
ii:

not
is

non -existence

effects by
its effects.

apprehended through These effects are the ^eat

its

Principle,

and the

rest

effects

(some

oQ

which are
4

similar,

and (some) dissimilar

to Nature.

[5759]
v
*>

26

[K.

vm.]
(

(57).

Why

should

we

not, continues the objector, attribute

the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as of the seventh kind of unction (in rhetoric)?
,

we do

The Author
"Because it is

replies.

"Not

due

to its non-existence"

Why ?.

apprehended through its effects" It refers to Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be mentioned later on, in Karika XVII. If we find direct
is

perception inapplicable in the case of objects, whose existence ascertained by means of evidence other than that afforded

by perception itself, we at once infer the inapplicability to be due to incapacity* (and not to non-existence of the object
itself). f

The seventh unction on the other hand, has not

its

existence ascertained by any proof, and as such, the incapacity of perception cannot be urged in its case.

(58).

Granted

all this,

but which are the

effects

from
is

whose
"The

existence, you

infer that of

Nature

?

The reply

Great Principle, and

the rest are the

effects"

This will be proved later on (Karik& XXII.) Next are mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in form, of these the comprehension of both of which is effects, with Nature
to discriminative auxiliary dissimilar to Nature"

knowledge:

"Similar

and

This division will be further treated of in Karika
et. seq.

XXIII

Different views with regard to the

nature of .the
(i).

(59).
enect
point
a?
*.

effect.

The Bauddha

is

view of the effect an being entity arising from non-

From (the existence of) the * ^ /n n\ JT JT interred (that oi) the cause on this there is diversity of opinion. Thus J
:

some philosophers
the

VedaT?ewof?he
whole
*
series

P^^tion

Bauddhas) assert of entity from noft-entity.
(the

J

of

effects being a

mere

Others (the Vedantists) represent the whole-

the part of perception. is with reference to Nature, the existence of which is proved through its effects the proof being based on the general proposition The effects, Mahat, &c., are perceptible "Every effect must have a cause."

On

f This statement

these must have a cause, and this cause

ia

Nature.

[60]
evolution from a sinpie real
entity.
(3).

27
series of effects as
.

[K.

vm.]

a mere evolution from a
,.."

,.,

The

J

Nyaya

and

single

entity,

and

not a real entity in itf P nilos P hers ( the Set

,

.

non-entity

arising

JhTsInkhya view
of the effect

being

an entity arising from an entity.

Nayayikas) hold the production of noneni from ^^J- The Sankhyas lastly teach that from entity emanates entity.

%

(60).

Now, we cannot
of

establish the existence
.

of Nature,

?S
the
first

The impossibility

in accordance with the first three theories.
J-he

of the existence

Universe consists essentially of sound,

&c
three

"

which are

different

forms and modi -

fications of pleasure, pain

and delusion,

and

as such bears testimony to the charac

ter of Nature, which lies in its being constituted by goodness, Such being the case, if we assert the passion and darkness. of entity from non-entity (the Bauddha view) [we production

would land ourselves in an absurdity] viz., how could the cause, an undefinable (unreal) non-entity, consist of sound, and the rest which are different forms of pleasure, &c.? For, certainly we cannot, hold the identity of entity and non-entity (two opposites). Nor could the doctrine of the emanation of
t

entity from entity (the Sankhya view) be upheld in accordance with the theory that the phenomena of sound, &c., are mere

a single entity (the Vedanta view). Nor could we attribute phenomenality (or changeability) to again the single in fact the notion of .such phenomenality (changeevolutions from
;

ableness) with regard to the unphenomenal (unchangeable) would be a mistake. Even in the theory of Kanada and Gautama, who maintain the production of non-entity from
entity, $he

existence

of

according to

them, the cause

Nature cannot be proved is not identical with the

;

since,
effect,

inasmuch as entity and non-entity are diagonally opposed to
each other.*
*

According to the Nayayikas the cause
;

is

an entity, the

effect

a

non

and since an entity and a non-entity cannot be identical, therefore entity th 1 cause and the effect cannot be identical.

[6163]
(61).

28

[K.IX.]

the author

Hence, in order to establish the existence of Nature., first declares the effect to be an entity, (even prior

to causal operation).

KARIKA IX.

The

effect is

an entity

The five proof a of the effect being an

(1) because a non-entity can never be brought into existence (2) ? because oi a (determinate) relation of
; ;
.
.

the cause

(with the

effect)

;

(3)

be

cause everything cannot be possible (by any and every means) ; (4) because a competent (cause) can do (only)
that for which the effect
(62).
is

and (5) lastly, because competent non- different from the cause.
it is
;

The

effect is

an entity

that

is to say, it is

so

even

The Bauddha view

prior to the operation of the cause. Against this theory, the Nayayikas cannot urge the fault of the absurdity of the production of an

already existing object. Because though.the production of the sprout and the jar is consequent upon the destruction of the
seed and the
of clay respectively, yet causal energy can only be attributed to an entity in the shape of the seed, and not to its destruction [a kind of negation, a non-entity]. Further if you assert the production of entity from non-entity,

lump

this latter, being at

any time available, would give rise to the (absurd) possibility of any and every effect being produced at any and all times. All this has been explained by us in the
Nydyavdrtikatatparyatikd.
f>

(63).

The

belief in

the

existence

of the

phenomenal

The Vedfinta view
met..

world cannot be said to be illusory unless we have some proof invalidating its
. ,

existence.*
* This is urged against the Veddnta evolution from a single real entity,

theory of the

effect

beingi an

[6465]
(64).

29*

[K. ix.]
t

Now

vS^JtowSl*
ticised;

remains the theory of Gautama and Kanada, with reference to which the author asserts f In SU PP rt ?** *$* is
"

*>%"

and

the
"

this

assertion,
:

the
"

VieW C8ta

bHsiSr

adduced
never be

(1)

following proofs are Since a non-entity can

brought into existence" If the effect were a non-entity before the operation of the cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody. By even a
If you assert artists blue can never be made yellow. and non-entity to be mere properties belonging to the entity jar, then in that case, the qualified object (the jar) being non

thousand

existent, no property could belong to it; and as nuch the entity the (property) remains in the same condition (L e., cannot be attributed to the jar). Nor can non-entity (as a quality) be

attributed to

it.

(as a property)

nor cognate to
too before
it,

For, how can non-entity belong to the jar when it is neither in any way related to it it ? Hence as after the causal operation, so

the effect subsists.

Such being the
cause
is-

case, all that

remains to be done by the

the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing effect [i. #., its emanation from the cause wherein it has been

lying latent] , The manifestation of something existing before hand is a fact quite compatible with experience ; as of the oil from sesamum by pressure, of rice from paddy by thumping,

and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we have no instance of the manifestation of a non-entity for a
;

non-entity

is

never seen to be either manifested or produced.

(2)

For the following reason

also
:

does
"

the

effect

subsist before the operation of the cause (determinate) relation of the cause with the

Because of a That is to effect." the effect subsists because of the relation holding between say, That is, the cause produces itself and its material cause. and (we all know) that in relation with it the effect when
;

no relation with a non-existing effect must be an entity.

effect is

possible

;

hence the

[6667]
;

30

[K. ix.]

the objector but, continues (66). Granted all this wherefore is the effect not producible by causes unconnected therewith? We reply, that under such circumstances,

only non-entity would be produced. the author lays down
:
"

With

this reply in

view

(3)

Since

everything cannot be

possible."

-If

the effect

unconnected with the cause could be produced (by that cause), then every effect would arise from every cause (without
restriction), there being no other limitation save that of unconnectedness (which any cause can have with reference to any effect.) But such is not the case. Hence a connected
effect

unconnected

only can be produced by a connected cause, and not an effect as by an unrelated one say the
:
"

no relation of the cause, imbued with entity, with non-entity those holding the production of an un connected effect will land themselves in a regressus ad

Sankhyas

There

is

;

injinitum"

though un which it is related, competent and this competency too could be inferred from the presence of the effect, and as such we sail clear of the
(67).
entity,

Objection: Be it so : will always produce
;

But an
the

effect

for

regressus

ad
(4)

infinitum.
"Since

Reply
is

:

competent"

Now

a competent cause does that for which it does this then, asks our author,

Capability or competency belonging to the cause imbued with the causal energy, apply to every effect or only to those to which the cause is competent? If the former/ then the

same confusion
tion will arise

arises

;

if

the latter, the

then the following ques

how

does

energy apply to non-entity ?

this point if it be asserted that the (causal) energy itfself is so constituted as to produce only certain effects, not others ;

On

then we ask

Is this

peculiarly

constituted

connected with the particular
case,
:

effect or

not

?

energy of yours In the former

r

no relation being possible with a non-entity, the effect must be an entity in the latter, you have the same endless series of causes and effects. Hence it is reasonably declaredl

[6869]
that (the effect
is

31

[K.IX.]

an entity)

"

because a competent cause can
it is competent"

only* produce an
i

effect Jor

tohich

(68).
entity
:

For the following reason too is the effect an (5) ^ Since the effect is connate (non-different) with the and the The effect is not different from the cause an entity then how can the effect, non-different from
;
;

cause."

cause

is

this latter, be a non-entity ?

(69).

The

proofs establishing the non-difference of cause and effect are the following (a) The cloth
:

Proofs of the nondifference of cause

(

an

effect) is
.

not different from the threads
,

..,

and

effect.

(its

material

cause), since

v

.

.,

.

it is

a property

[i. e.,

latter characteristically inhering since the cloth inheres in the threads constituting it].

in the

An

object differing in its essence from another, can never inhere in it as the cow in the horse but the cloth is inherent
;
;

in the threads
(b)

;

hence

it is

not different from

it

in its essence.

Owing

to the causal relation subsisting
differ

between the cloth
because the causal

and the thread, they
from one another
cloth
e.

not in essence

;

relation can never subsist
g.

between objects essentially different between jar and cloth. But between
find the causal relation

and threads we do

subsisting

;

hence they can never differ from one another, in essence, (c) For the following reason also, there is no difference between cloth and threads because of the absence of junction and non:

contiguity between the two.

We

see junction

taking place

between oHjects differing from one another, as between a pool and a tree ; the same with regard to non-contiguity, as between the Himavan and the Vindhya. In the instance
before^is, however, there
is

and as such, no

difference in essence,

neither junction nor non-contiguity, (d) For the following
differ in

reason

too, cloth

and thread do not

essence

:

because

of the non-inclusion (in the particular effect) of any Bother) As a matter of effect different in weight (from the cause).
fact,

an object differing in essence from another always has a
c.

weight different from that of the latter

g.

the lowering of

[70]

32
is

[K. ix.]

the balance caused by two palas*

more than that caused by
between ^the
the weight of non-different from
of

a single pala.
effects of the

But we

find

no such difference

weight of the cloth and those

the threads constituting it. Hence cloth is the threads. These are the proofs afforded by a process of negative inference [Avitdnumdna -see, Kdrika Y] establish

ing the non-difference (of cloth and threads in particular, and of cause and effect in general).

(70). The non-difference being thus established, (it is decided that) the cloth is only a particular development of the threads combining themselves in various ways and that the
;

from each other in essence. No essential difference can be proved on the ground of self-contradictory actions in themselves (i. e., the effects), (difference apprehended

two do not

differ

in) language, or the difference in action (of the cause

of the effect).f

and that Because these differences do not contradict

each other, when we see that they are brought about by the appearance and disappearance of particular conditions as for instance, the limbs of the tortoise disappear on entering its

body and appear again on emerging

from it but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either produced from, or destroyed by, the tortoise. In the same manner, jar, crown,
;

.

fec., which are only particular developments of clay, gold, &c., on emanating from these latter, are said to be produced and
;

*

A

particular weight.

f Self-contradictory actions in themselves. When the cloth is reduced to threads, we say the cloth is destroyed, and the threads are produced now destruction and production are diagonally opposed and as sdch cannot be predicated of the same thing at one and the same time but we do predicate production of the threads and destruction of the cloth at one and the sam
; ;

;

e

time.

So they

differ.

"

Difference apprehended in language Cloth is made of threads." Difference in action

as

when we

use such sentences as

certainly the threads cannot. in essence.

Thus we see that cloth can cover an object which And .objects differing in their action must differ

These three are the objections brought forward against the theory of the
non-difference of cause

and

effect.

Each

of these

is

considered and refuted

separately in the following lines.

[71-72]

33

[K.rx.]
clsty, &c.,)

on entering them again (i. e., being changed into they .disappear and are said to be destroyed.

Nor again can a non-entity ever be produced
destroyed
The Bhagavadgita supporting the Bankhya view.
;

or

an

entity-

as says

the revered
.

Krishna-

dvaipayana: "There is neither an exists ... ^ ence of non-entity, nor non-existence or
entity"

tortoise is not different

[Bhagavadgitd II 16]. As the from its own contracting and expand ing limbs, so also are jar, crown, &c., not different from (their material cause), clay, gold, &c. The assertion cloth is in (i. e,,
"

made

of) threads," is as consistent trees in this forest."*

as the assertion

"Tilaka

Nor does difference of psopose and action establish (71.) difference in essence since a single substance can have mani fold functions, as the fire alone can burn, digest and give light.
;

Nor

is fixity

among

of purpose and action a ground of diiference substances, for we see that this fixity varies in the
;

substances themselves,
bearer, in

company with other

taken singly or collectively as a bearers, can carry the palanquin
;
>

which he can never do when alone*

though unable to cover, when conjoined and thus having their existence as cloth manifested
(i.
.,

Similarly, the threads taken singly, yet do cover when

having developed into cloth).
Objection
:

(72).

Granted

all

this.

But,

is

the

mani

An
of the

objection,

based on the nature

festation or appearance itself an entity or a ., ., ... ,. non-entity, prior to the operation of the
.

^{
*

cstation

cause

?

If the latter, then

you admit the

If, however, non-entity. production hold to the former alternative, then have done with the you causal agency altogether ; for we do not see the necessity of

of

forest itself;

As the Tilaka trees, constituting the forest, are nothing besides the and yet we speak of the" Tilaka trees in the forest," so with the assertion with regard to the cloth and threads.
*

5

[7375]

34

[K. ix.j

the causal operation when the effect already exists. If you assume the manifestation of the manifestation, you will be

landed on a regressus ad infinitum^ Hence the assertion, that the threads are made to have their existence as cloth
manifested,
(73).
is invalid.

To

all this

tion.

eP set~ aside^as
to

we make the following reply. Even on your own theory of the production of nonwhat is this production* ? entity, we ask

common

cause

;

if,

entity or a non-entity ? If an entity, then have done with the agency of the however, you assert it to be a non-entity, you will

both

An

have to postulate the production of that production and so on ad infimtum[a,nd. such being the case, the fault of regressus

ad
it

common

infinitum you urged to both of us ;

against us, loses

its force,
it is

since

it is

and consequently

not fair to urge

against one].*

(74). If, in order to avoid the regressus ad injinitum, you declare that the production is nothing more or less than the
cloth itself
;

then the notion of cloth would coincide with
;

that of production and as such, on saying cloth, one should not add is produced (because it would be a useless repetition) ; nor could he say the cloth is destroyed ; because destruction

and production (denoted by
(75).

cloth)

can never coexist.
alternatives
in
its
:

Consequently,
cloth

we have only two
must inhere in its mere

the

production of the

either

material

existence (Sattd). In cause (the threads), or either case, the cloth cannot be produced without the operation of causes. Thus it is proved that the operation of the cause
is

(If

necessary for the manifestation of already existing effects. causes do you urge against us the common saying
cloth"

(produce) the forms of

then we reply that) the causes,
;

because the?e have no relation with the forms of cloth are not actions, and it is only with actions that causes forms
are r elated
*
;

or

els e

they lose their character.

This point has been discussed by S ankarachaTya, in his Bhfishya on the
"

Yedanta Sutras, under the aphorism

Sivapakshadosh&chcha"

[7681]
,

35

[K. x.]
effect is

(76).

Thus then

it is

proved that the

an

entity.

(77)/ Having thus proved the effect to be an entity, a fact favourable to the doctrine of the existence of Nature, the author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between
the Manifested and the Unmanifested, a right comprehension of which appertains to discriminative knowledge ; and this
is

existence

done in order to show the character of Prakriti, whose is to be proved.

X.

The Manifested has
larity

a cause

:

it

is

neither eternal
;
f*

Points of dissimibetween the Manifested and the

nor pervading
,.

(/. e. 9

universal)

it is
i i
\.

active

/

(i.

*?.,

mobile or

ii

T

modifiable),

characteristic),

multiform, dependent, predicative (or conjunct and subordinate. The Un

manifested
"

is

the reverse.
"

(78).

Hetumat

i. 0.,

having cause.
is

The question as
what, will

AH

the quaiifica-

to

what

the

cause of

be

tions explained.

dealt with later on (Karika
Eternal"
i.

XXII).

(79).

"Not

e.,

destructible, revolving [re

turning to the condition of its material cause*].
that is to say, the Manifested Not pervading (80). does not extond over all evolving or developing substances.
" "

pervaded by the cause but not vice versa, e. g., Consciousness (Buddhi) can never pervade Nature (Prakriti), and as such is non-pervading.

The

effect

is

"

(81).
otc.,

Active

"

i. e.,

mobile.

have

bodies
* Since

mobility inasmuch as they have hitherto occupied, and
the

Consciousness (Buddhi), they renounce certain

occupy

others;

S&nkhyas do not admit of an utter annihilation of a

substance,

[8286]
an explanation.
(82).
"Multiform"
;

36
it is

[K. x.]

as for the mobility of earth, &c.,

too well

known

to
<

need

Since

Consciousness &c,,
too

differ in

different individuals

earth, &c.,

are multiform in

the

shape of

jars, &c.

On its cause; though the effect is (83). "Dependent" non-different from its cause, yet the assertion of the relation
accepted
(84).

of subserviency is based upon a difference conventionally as we say the Tilakas in the forest."
"

;

"

Characteristic

Consciousness (Buddhi),

or predicative i. e., of Nature. &c., are characteristics of Nature,

"

which cannot be

its

own
"

characteristic,

though

it

can be so of

the Spirit (Purusha).
"

(85).

Conjunct

Bearing in

itself the relation of

whole

by (i. *?., and connection with such approach of after) non-approach the whole to the part is what is connoted by conjunct as for instance, earth, &c., conjoin among themselves, and so do others. On the other hand, there is no conjunction of Nature (Prakriti) with Consciousness (Buddhi), since the two are connate (and as such there can be no nonparts.
;
"

and

Conjunction consists in approach preceded

;"

nor is there reciprocal conjunction among approach); Goodness, Foulness and Darkness, since there is no non-

approach among them [since they
Nature],
" "

all

conjointly inhere in

Subordinate Consciousness stands in need (86). the aid of Nature in the completion of the production of
effect,

of
its

Without this aid, Self-consciousness (Ahankara). being, by itself too weak, it could not be efficient to produce its effect. Similarly do Self-consciousness and the rest stand in
need of similar aids in the production of their several effects. Thus, each and all stand in need of the perfecting hand 61
Nature.
the Manifested, though efficient in the of its effects, is yet subordinate, inasmuch as it production stands in need of the aid of the Supreme Nature (the highest
in the scale).

Hence

[8790]
"

37

[K. xi.]
"

(87).

Manifested.
eternal,

of the i. e., Unmanifested is the reverse That is to say the Uumanifested is uncaused, pervading, and inactive (immobile) though to

The

Prakrit! does belong the action of evolution (or development,)

yet

it

can have

no

mobility

single,

independent

(self-

sufficient),

made

non-predicative, unconjunct, compact up of parts), and non-subservient (supreme).

(i. e.,

not

(88). Having thus explained the dissimilarities of the Manifested and the Unmanifested, the author now mentions the similarities between these, and the dissimilarity of both
of these again from the Spirit:

KlRiKA XI.

The Manifested has the
The
points
of

three constituent Attributes
it is

(Gunas), v
i

>

indescrimmatino;, obiectJ
(or

similarity

between

vp

the Manifested and Unmanifested the and those of dissimilarity of these from the soul

generic
.

ligent (or c oo also is
reverse,
similar.

common), non-intelinsentient) and productive. L Ine bpirit is the JNature.
.
.

and yet also

i

/

(in

some

,

^

respects)

"

(89).

Having

the three

constituent

Attributes"

That

is

to say, the Manifested is possessed of the three attributes of By this assertion are set aside all pleasure, psin and duluess.

.the theories attributing pleasure
"

and pain

to the Spirit.

*. Nature is not desIride&criminatwe" e., as (90). criminated from itself so too the Great Principle (Mahat or Bnddhi) being connate with Nature, cannot be descriminated
;

c/rom

it.

tiveness:
efficient

Or indescriminativeness may mean merely co-operanothing singly (among the Manifested) can be a cause for its effect it can be so only when in company
; ;

with others

and as such no
itself.

effect is possible

from any cause

taken singly by

.[9194]
(91).

38

[K.

XL]

Some
,

(the Vijnana-Vadi

An

objection has-

....

ed onthe idealism

Banddhas) assert that it is Idea (Viinana) alone that is denoted by . / the words pleasure, pain and dulnessv; and
that there exists nothing besides

Vijnana

that could possess these (pleasures, &c.,) as

its attributes.

In opposition to this view
fested
idealistic objection set aside.
"

it is
"

laid

down

that the

Mani
That
it

is

objective"

= perceptible). (
and as such

The

js

^

sav J

ft | s

so outside (and as such over N
A

and above)
<?.,

Vijnana,

is

Common"
If,

persons.

perceived (simultaneously) by many however, these were nothing more or less than
z.

Vijnana, then in that case,
(or
specifically

the

this latter being uncommon belonging to particular individuals), all would be so also elements Manifested for the
;

Vijnana of one person can never be perceived by another, owing to the imperceptibility of any intellect other than the
s own. On the contrary, in the case of a Manifested substance (such as) the glances of a dancing girl, the attentiveness of many persons to that single object is quite a consistent

agent

<

which it could not be to mere Idea or Vijnana.
fact,
"

if

we were

to reduce

all

existence

(92).

Non-intelligent or

Insentient"

Nature (Prakriti),

Consciousness (Buddhi), &c., are all non-intelligent. do not, like the Vainasikas (a scion of the Bauddhas) attribute
intelligence to Buddhi.

We

Productive or Prolific" i. e., possessed of the of producing or developing. The particular possessive faculty affix (Main) is used in order to denote the constant character
"

(93).

of the property of productiveness with regard to the Mani That is to say, these are ever accompanied by their several emanations or developments, whether similar or*,
fested.

dissimilar.

is

So also is Nature (94). the Unmanifested Nature.
"

"

i. e.,

as the Manifested
to say,

is,

so

That

is

the properties

of the Manifested, just enumerated, belong to Nature also.

[95-97]
(95).
"

39

[K.XI.]

The

dissimilarity of these

from the Spirit
this

is

stated

Reverse
(96),

is the Spirit.

Objection

.-Granted

all

:

But how can you
of the
;

assert the Spirit to be the reverse

Objection-There
are points of similarity also

Manifested and the Unmanifested
.

when

between

we

.

see that there are points of

similarity

Manifested^ wdi
as the Tjnmanifest-

between the s P irit and the Unmanifested such as Uncausedness, Eternality, &c., and also between the Spirit and the Mani
?
"

fested

such as plurality
"

We
0i
8

reply

:

Yet also

that

is

to say,

though there are

The objection conceded to-there are
0f

points of similarity, such as uncausedness,
&c., yet there
also, in
tn&(\.

im
as

la
f

as

we ii

dS

similarity.

are points of dissimilarity the form of non-possession of the of attributes (Gunas), and the rest.

(97).

The Manifested and the Unmanifested have been
:

described as having three Attributes .* Now the author names and describes these three Constituent Attributes
* This

word Attribute requires some explanation.
"

It stands for the

Gunas

of the S^nkhyas

a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or as says Colebrooke These three qualities are not Primordial Matter
;

mere accidents
tion."

is

and enter into its composi remarks Nature or Primordial Matter described, in the system of Kapila as formed by the Gunas, which were
of Nature, but are of its essence
"

On

this Davies very rightly

primarily in equilibrium, and so long as this state existed, there was no

emanation into separate forms of matter." And, as we shall see later on, the intert condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent predominance of the Attribute of Foulness (Rajas). Davies has rendered this important word GUIICL by Mode. I am afraid this is apt to mislead. For Mode, as understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, a quality which it may have or not, teitkout affecting its essence or existence." Now as we have seen the Guna of the Sankhyas is almost the reverse of
"

it belongs to a substance as constituting its very essence. jnis I have perferred to translate Guna as Attribute using the latter term in the sense imparted to it specifically, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between

Mode By Attribute, I understand, that which the mind perceives of substance as constituting its essence. By Mode, I understand the affections of substances, &c.," (the italics are mine). G. J.
Attribute and
"

:

>

[98100]

40

[K.

xn.]

KARIKA XII.

The Attributes
The character of the three Attributes

are of the nature
stupefaction. .,,...

of. love,

aversion,
aclapted
restraint;

and

They
.
.

are

to illumination, activity,

and

n

port,

and they mutually subdue, and sup and produce each other and consort together (for

one purpose).
(98).

ary) because they exist for the The three Attributes will be

These are called Gunas (literally, subsidiary or second sake of others (the Spirits).

named

in

order in

the

next

Karika.

And

according to the
"

maxim
&c.,"

of presight,

common

among
in the

writers, the

love, &c./ of this

Karika are

to be taken

same order

u
(as
"

Goodness,

in the next).

Thus then, the attribute of Goodness
(99).
"

of) pleasure, of pleasure ; form of) pain, the attribute of Apriti" (aversion) being (a Foulness (Rajas) is of the nature of pain and, lastly,.
<priti"

(love) being (a
is

form

of the

nature

;

"

Vishdda"

Darkness
is

is

being (a form of) stupefaction, the attribute of of the nature of stupefaction. The word Atmd

is

inserted in order to guard against the theory that pleasure nothing more than mere negation of pain, and vice versd.
;

Pleasure and pain are not negations of one another on the Thus are entities independent of one another. contrary, they means one whose existence (not non-existence) apritydtma"
"

consists in love or pleasure

"

;

viskdd&tma"

and

il

>

pritydtma

The fact of pleasure and pain being entities by themselves, and not mere negations of one If they werr mere another, is one of common experience. mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to that of tlr?

may

be similarly explained.

;

other.

(100).

Their functions.

Having thus described the nature of the Attributes, the author next lays down their several
funct i ns
"

They are adapted

to

illumina-

[101]
tion, activity ,

41

[K. xii.]

and

restraint.""

the

compound

are to be construed in the

Here, too, the three members of same order as before.
its

Foulness

(-Rajas), in

accordance with
be

active nature,

always and everywhere
(Sattva) to action, if
it

Darkness
at times
;

thus

(Tamas) Darkness

buoyant urging were not restrained by the sluggish by which restraint it operates only
(Tamas)

the

would Goodness

becomes

a

restraining

agency.
(101).

Having thus
"

their*!? oration**

Now,

The Attributes are Mutually subduing so constituted that when one is brought to play, by some external cause, it subdues the other e. g., Goodness attains
"

(action) is to to explain,

laid down their functions, the author down the method of their operation lays Mutually subdue and support, and produce one another, and consort together" Vritti" be construed with each member of the compound.
" "

;

to its peaceful state only after having

Darkness.

subdued Foulness and do Passion and Darkness, in their turn, Similarly

attain to their respective terrible having subdued the other two.
"Mutually supporting"

and stupid conditions

after

\_Any onydsrdyavrittaydh~\.

Though
con

this statement as not applicable here, in the sense of the

tainer

support (Asraija) here is meant something on which depends the action of another as for instance, Goodness helps by its illuminative character, only
yet

and

the contained,

by

when helped by Foulness and Darkness through their respec tive properties of activity and restraint. [Or else Goodness
itself, without the touch of Foulness, would remain inert, and never be moved to action.] In the same manner do Passion and Darkness help respectively by their activity and

by

i

restraint only

when supported by
each
other"

the functions of the

other

That is to say, one can produce (its effects) only when resting on the other two., By production here is meant development or modification, which is always of the same character as the parent Attribute which latter, therefore, are uncaused there being no possibility of
two.
"Producing

6

[102103]

42

[K.

xm.]
;

anything differing in essence therefrom being the cause
"

nor

are they transient since they are never resolved into an esfeentially different cause. Consorting together" Thatisuto say are mutual companions, not existing apart from one they

another.

^ has a
;

collective force.
:

have the following
all

"all

(attr

In support of the above, we ibutes) are mutual consorts ;

Goodness is the consort of Passion, Passion omnipresent of Goodness, both of these again of Darkness, which latter again of both, Goodness and Passion. The first conjunction
or separation of these has never been perceived/

(102).

It has

been said

"

Adapted,

to illumination activity,

Now it is explained what those are that are restraint" adapted, and wherefore are they so ?
and

KlEIKA XIII.
Goodness
The
butes
three

named

considered to be buoyant and illuminatAttriing ; Foulness is exciting and versa 1
is

and

their nature explain-

^.i/i tile

i\

(mobile)

;

enveloping.
is

Darkness, sluggish and Their action, like a lamp,

T^I

^

for a (single) purpose.

(103).

Goodness alone
of

is

considered, by
to

the masters of

The properties
Goodness (Satwa).

be buoyant and Sankhya philosophy, illuminating. Buoyancy as .opposed to is the property to which the sluggishness
.
-,

ascension of objects

is clue

;

it is

to

this

rising flame of

fire is

due.

property that the In some cases,

this property also brings about lateral as in the case of air. Thus, generally, buoyancy n^ay motion, be said, to be that property in the cause, which greatly helps
its efficiency to its

Illuminativeness.

particular effects sluggishness, on the other hand, would only dull the efficiency .,, , .. m1 of the cause. The illuminative character
;
,,
,*,
.

of Goodness has already been explained (Ktirika XII),

[104106]
(104).

43

[K. xin.]

Goodness and Darkness, being by themselves in active, stand in need of a force, exciting
acti-

ir^erU&Xf^Pouiness
ness.

(Rajas)

and

this force is sup^eir causal operation which excites them and plied by Foulness, roases them from their natural passivity, and urges them on to the accomplishment
;

of their respective effects. Hence, Foulness is said to be This exciting character of Foulness is next account exciting.
ed
for
"

(it

is

also)

versatile"

This

also

proves the

existence of Foulness as a particular Attribute, being necessary for the sake of action.

(105).

Foulness, in accordance with its versatility, would keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous
slug-

ncss (Tama-s)

whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the sluggish and enveloping
"

"

Attribute of Darkness, which thus limits the scope of its actions. Thus, in order to

be distinguished from the active Foulness, Darkness has been said to be the restrainer Darkness is sluggish and envelop
"

ing"
"

The

particle

Eva

is
"

to

be construed
"

not only with
"

Darkness"

but with

Goodness
:

and

"

Foulness

also.

(106).

The enquirer

objects

Objection The Attributes of connatures tradictory

a single purpose,

Instead of co-operating for the Attributes, being

endued as they are with contradictory properties, would counteract each other, like cannot co-operate. opposed wrestlers, (and thus there would be no effect emanating from them). The author replies Like a lamp, their action is for a single purpose." We have
"

all

observed

how

the wick and the
.
,

oil,

Reply- ^they can,
like wick and in giving light.
oil,

eac h by J
fire

opposed to the action of co-operate, when in contact with lire,
itself,

for

and the various

humours

the single purpose of the body

of giving light

;

wind,

bile,
,

and
co

phlegm

though possessed of contradictory properties

operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body. Pre cisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though,

[107]

44

[K. xiii.]

possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate towards a single end the purpose (emancipation) of the This will be further explained in Karika XXXI. Spirit.

(107).

To

return to our original
j-//

subject

Pleasure,

pain

tuiating

Necessity of the three
<pos-

and delusion, opposed to one another, lead
us to three different causes connate

with
these

,-,

themselves
and delusion
spec-

respectively,

(and

as

causes
butes).

we have postulated the

three Attri

These causes too must be multi

form, since, by
pressive.

their

As an example
:

very nature, they are mutually supof the multiform character of these

various causes of pleasure, pain and delusion, we may have the following beautiful, single girl, young, gentle

A

a source of delight to her husband, because and virtuous, to him she is born with her essence consisting in with regard She pains her co-wives, because with regard to pleasure.
is

them, she

lastly, the

born with her essence consisting in pain. And, girl stupefies another man who is unable to at her, because with regard to him, she has her essence in get All the different forms pleasure, &c., have been delusion.
is

same

explained by this single instance of a woman. In the above case, that which is the cause of pleasure, is the Goodness the cause 7 r ~
.
.

of pleasure: Foulness of pain, and Darkness of delusion.

Attribute of Goodness which

7

.

is

essentially
is

made up of
is

pleasure

...
;

the cause of pain

Jboulness, consisting

in

pain; and, lastly,

the cause of delusion

Darkness, consisting of delusion.

The

properties, pleasure, illuminativeness, and buoyancy (belong ing to Goodness) cannot be sifhilarly said J The properties of to be mutually opposed, and thus mcapeach of the Attri.

00

trt^tory/ld
of causes for

^
of

they do not neces-

able of co-existing in a single Attribute. As a matter of fact, we find them Actually
co-existing.

of

dUS
each

Hence,

pleasure,

illnmina-

tiveness,

and buoyancy,

being mutually
the assump
*

consistent, do not necessitate

tion of different causes (for each of them severally) as do pleasure, pain, and delusion which are mutually opposed, (and

as such unable to co-he re

in

a

single

substratum).

In the

[108100]
same manner,

45

[K. xiv.]

pain, versatility, and activity (properties of Foulness), as also delusion, sluggishness, and envelopingness

(properties of Darkness), do not lead to the assumption of Thus the triad of Attributes is established. various causes.

(108).

Objection

we
Attributes,

Attributes, Goodness, and the can never come within the range ot perceptible experience. And under such circumstances, how can we attribute to these latter, the properties of indiscreetproved
?

how

As regards earth, &c., actually perceive the properties of indiscreetness, &c., as belonging to them.
:

Granted

all this.

But the

rest,

ness, objectivity, &c.,

(enumerated above)

?

To

this objection

we reply

KlRIKl

XIV.

Indiscreetness and the rest are proved from the exisTWO reasons for tence of the three Attributes, and from

SSSTJf^itS
proved

the absence of these (the three Attributes) in the reverse (of indiscreetness,

&c.

i.

e.,

Purusha).
is

And

the existence of the

Unmani-

fested (Nature) too

established on the -ground of the

properties of the effect (the Manifested) being consequent

on those of the
(109).
*

cause.
vivc&i"

By

"a
l

in the Karika, is to be understood
9

aioit$kitijtf*i

as

dvi

9

and eka

in "dv6kayordvivaekanaik-

amchane"

[Siddh&ntakaumudi
;

I

iv
it

22]

denote
"

dvitva

9

and

ckatva* respectively
"dveKayok":).

or else

would be
is
"

(*)

dvckeshu"

(and not
these,
}/,((

It
?

being asked
the reply
:

How

do you prove

indiscreetness,

&c.

of

the three Attributes"

That

is

to say,
"del"

From the existwe have found
"/
#,"

* For if the Jhe sum and compound were analysed into would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the dual, which is explained by making and stand for and ekat-oa making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending.
"/Ivi"

"cka"

"dvitva"

[110]
in
First proof: From the existence of the

46

[K. xiv.]

three Attributes.

experience, with regard to the material existence, that, whatperceptible ever consists oi pleasure, &c., is qualified
.

common

by indiscreetness, &c. The affirmative rea
soning, being explicit enough,
"

is

not stated in the Karika*

which only mentions the negative reasonFrom the absence of these in the ing these in the reverse reverse "that is to say, from the non-existence of the Attributes in the Spirit which is the reverse of indiscreetness, &c. Or again, we may have
:

Unmanifested (both together) as the of the syllogism, and then we shall have subject (minor term) the reasoning "From the existence of the three Attributes"
the Manifested
the

and

as a purely negative inference* (Avtta), there being no other case

minor term) where we could have the agreement of the reason (Middle term existence of the Attributes).
(besides the

(110).
Question

An
How

objection
is

is again raised We grant all this but the existence of the properties in;

Nature
exist?

proved to

discreetness, &c.,

cannot be proved before

the object possessing these properties (the
"

To

this

we
:

reply
the the

Unmanifested) has been proved to exist From the properties of the effect being due to
the properties

Reply

From
of

of the
^

cause"
^
:

The connection
All effects are
* -n
>

oerties

may
.

i
"Q

thus explained

j i

being due to those of the cause.

geen to possess properties similar to those of x their respective causes, as the cloth of the
as
"

*

The syllogism has previously been explained

sure, &c., is indiscreet, as the perceptible

material substances
"

Whatever has plea and here
:"

we hand

the agreement (Anwaya) of the reason in the perceptible sub stances" whose connotation is different from that of the subject of the All things having pleasure, &c." Now what our author proposes syllogism,
"

is

All things besides the explain th e reasoning thus Manifested and the Unmanifested) are indiscreet, since thgy possess the three Attributes, and whatever is not indiscreet does not possess* *he three attributes." Thus in the latter syllogism we have for the minor

that

we might

"

:

spirit (the

term Tile Manifested and the Un manifested which comprehend all cases where the reason (the presence of the three attributes) could be found for nothing besides the Manifested and the Unmanifested can be said to have
;

the three Attributes.

[Ill]
threads.

47

[K. xiv.]

Similarly we must admit that pleasure, &c., being properties of Consciousness (Mahat), &c., must be the
outconje of similar properties subsisting in their cause. [And And thus we have this cause is no other than Nature.]

proved the existence of Nature, as possessed of the properties of pleasure, pain, and delusion.*
(111).
"I

grant

all

this",

says the enquirer

;

"but

the

followers of

Kanada

(the Vaiseshikas)

and

aJU?tt
which discards
manifested
the
Entity?"

Gantama (the Nayfiyikas) assert the production of the Manifested, Earth, and the rest ^rom tne binary compound downward

manifested.

from homogeneous atoms, which too are The various properties in the effects owe their
the primary atoms. t

existence to similar properties in
*

And

And consequently Nature too is proved to have indiscreetness, &c., in accordance with the proposition laid down before whatever has pleasure, &c. has indiscreetness, &c, also." The reasoning may be rendered clearer by
"

,

reducing
[

it

to the form of

two Aristotelian syllogisms

:

<

Properties of the effect (Intellect) are properties of the cause (Nature). Pleasure, &c., are properties of the effect (Intellect). /. Pleasure, &c., are properties of the cause (Nature.)

And
/

again

:

Whatever has pleasure, &c., has indiscreetness, &c. Nature has pleasure, &c., (as first proved). /. Nature has indiscreetness, &c.

f It will, I think, not be out of place here, to indicate, in brief, the atomic theory of Kan&da and Gautama, which may be thus summed up. In the beginning the^te existed only atoms of various substances (Earth, Water, Fire These .arid Air) besides, of course, Ak&sa, &c., which are in themselves eternal.

various atoms were respectively endued with four different sets of properties, By some agency or other mainly latterly perceived in their compounds.
all homogeneous atoms combine, one ^Adrishta," the Unseen (Fate) with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary com

that of

pounds, and so on to the various objects of perception. These atoms are de clared to be without extension in space, or else they could not be permanen^t. But, as far as I know, no Nay^yika has even yet tried to show how two things devoid of extension, can combine a point which affords the strongest

handle

to

S ankarachurya

in

his

refutation
ii

of the atomic
12/17.

theory.

See

S tiriraka-TiMshya on

the Brakma-Svtras II

[112J

48

[K. xv.]

thus finding the production of the Manifested from the Manifested, quite explicable, what is the use of postulating an

Unmanifested, an
Nature)
?"

imperceptible

Entity

(in

the

form

of

We

reply

1

KiRlKA XV.

From
Reply
postulate

the
an

finite

we

must Un-

manifested Reality

nature of specific objects, from homogeneity, from evolution being j v n due to active (causal) energy, from the
.

.

.

,

Reasons given.

,

n

separation

of

cause and

-\

f^ effect,

and

-i

from the undividedness (resolution) of the whole uni
verse.

(112).

Of

specific objects, the

First proof of the existence of Prakriti-

primary cause is the Un manifested (Nature). Because (1) There v v ^s separation of cause and effect, and re"

solution o
feet, and re-union of tllewliale

OMwr

already been proved

"-"

the effect
;

It has Karika IX) that (in subsists (in its unmanifested
tke
Universe."

Me

form)
of
its

in the cause

as the

limbs of the tortoise, coming out

body, are perceived as separate from the body, which again they enter and thus disappear (from view). In the same manner, the various objects, jar, &c., are perceived as
different

these

(i.

from their causes, clay, &c., when they come out of are produced from them when they have their .,
the jar manifested out of the
all

existence, as

lump of
is

clay,

wherein they have with earth, &c., as

along inhered.)

The same

the case

effects of the

primary elements,

witli these

latter again as effects of Self-consciousness (Ahankara) ; with this latter again as that of Consciousness and lastly, with tfire
last

a^ain as the

effect of the

Unmanifested, which

is

the final

cause. This separation, from the final cause (the Unmanifested), of the various effects either mediately (as with earth, &c.,)
or immediately
(as

with

Consciousness)

related

to

it,

is

[113114]

49

[K. xv.].

what is meant by the separation of the cause and the effect. In the same manner, at every dissolution, the various grades of effects (1) Earth, &c., (2) The Primary Elements, (3) Selfand (4) Intellect lose themselves in their immediate causes (1) Primary plements (2) Self-consciousness, (3) Intellect and (4) the Unmanifested Nature. Thus we see that it is only a certain form of the cause which becomes imperceptible (at dissolution) as far as a
consciousness
respective

particular effect is concerned. Ascending in the same order as before, we find the various effects up to Will disappearing in their respective immediate causes up to the Final Un

and thus rendering these latter imperceptible, form of the cause which concerns each of them severally. Of this unmanifested, however there is no further receptacle and thus it becomes the receptacle and hence an aggregate of the unmanifested states of all the effects. This is what is meant by the re-union (in the final
manifested
at least that
;

Unmanifested) of the whole Universe.
affix
KZJ

In Vaiswarupya t the

has a reflexive sense.
"

(113).
Second proof:
cause Ecolutwn
to
Energy."

It is a Because Evolution is due to Energy. well-known fact that the Evolution of the
"B*-

"

effect is

is

due

due to the active energy of the cause
.

;

for certainly, no effect can arise from an inefficient cause. This latent energy in the
effect in its

cause

is

no other than the existence therein of the
;

unmanifested state since, on the hypothesis of the effect be ing an entity, there can be no other form of causal energy. The difference of sand from sesarnum the material cause of
oil
lies

only in the fact that

it is

only in the latter that

oil

exists in its unmanifested condition.

(114).

Objection

:

Granted

all

this

:

But the above two

Objection: These

two reasons might
rest

reasons that you have urged might very well res t with the Will what is the use of
>

.

..

with

intellect.

assuming a further Unmanifested Reality

?

from the

fact

From Jiniteness" i. e. } reply: (3) of the effects being, in their very nature
"

We

[115]
finite.

50

[K. xv.]

(In support of his ground, the author puts forth a
Third proof

,

Beply

"From finiteness"

syllogism). The specific objects -nr-ii ^ ^ ^ tion, Will and the rest have an
,
.

in
TT

"ques-

i

Unmam.

(of all manifested existence.)
*

fes t e d
,

Entity for their cause (i. e., they , , have a cause in which they exist in their
.

,

.

.

,

.

unmanifested
objects, jar,

state), since,

they are

finite, as jar, &c.

The

finite

&c.,

as

commonly

seen, have, for

their

cause,

clay,

which inhere) the unmanifested (state of the we have already shown that the cause is no effects); more than the unmanifested condition of the effect. thing And under these circumstances, the cause of Will must be the Unmanifested which must be the final cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested
&c.,

(in

since

Reality.*
(115).
"Because

of

homogeneity"

Homogeneity
rest

consists

in the similarity of different

objects.

In-

Fourtbiproof

-Be-

cause of homogeneity."

tellect,

and the
as

manifesting themare seen to

.

selves

ascertainment, &c.

be similarly related to pleasure, pain and delusion. And whatever is invariably connected with a certain form must have, for its cause (wherein it inheres), something which has
that form for
its

constituent element. Thus

it is

decided that of
is

the specific objects, the

Unmanifested (Nature)

the cause. t

Having proved the existence of the Unmanifested, the author next states the method of its operation
*
.

*
its

effects,

Because the Unmanifested Nature (the cause of Will is not finite, as Consciousness and the rest are. And further, because, by so

doing we would have to postulate causes ad infinitum.

we have in the present case: Will and the rest are invariably f Thus connected, with pleasure, pain and delusion; and, as such, must have, for
their cause, Nature wherein they all lie unmanifested prior to their
tion;

Evolu

and

this

Nature has, for

its

Constituent Elements, the three Attributes

which respectively consist in pleasure, pain and delusion.

[116118]

51

[K.

KARIKA XVI.

The Unmanifested
ky
receptacle

is

the cause

;

it

operates through

the three Attributes

by blending and
on account
from
the

modification, as water,
difference
as

of the of the

arising*

Attributes,

they are

variously

distributed.
"

(116).

At the time of cosmic dissolution, Operates, Attributes continue to be of three the
<j*c"

similar modifications.

Modified condition

forms a part of the nature of the Attri
butes

and as such they can never, for a moment, remain inert. Thus at the time of dissolution, the Attributes operate through their respective forms of Goodness, Foulness and
;

Darkness*.
(117).
3

Another method of operation
blending."

is

next stated
"

"

By

This

"

8
Attributes"

f

the

bllfces

hoover,

is

of the Attriblending not possible without the

this subserviency again is

relation of subserviency due to a diversity

among them, and among the Attri

butes

which diversity again
(i. e.,

tructibility

is not possible without desunless the Attributes are so constituted that

they suppress one another).
operation
(118).
is

Thus the second method through development into Will &c.|
objects
i

of

The enquirer

How

objection- ^How

can an Attribute of uniform nature bring
diVelSe

operation belong r j j have been declared

to
A

can diverse methods of an Attributes which
.

p i_ f to be of uniform nature ?

aC ~

tnV?

We reply

"

By

modification

asiwter"

we
*

all

know how
is

the water falling

from the clouds, though
no

This
is

the state of equilibrium of the Attributes, during which

evolution

possible.

from Nature are due to the disturbance cf equili | The various evolutions brium among the Attributes, which rouses the hitherto dormant, evolving energy of Nature, whence issue forth the various manifestations Intellect and
the rest.

[119120]
naturally of
itself,

52

[K.

xvn.]
,

having one taste,* becomes sweet, bitter, into sonr, &c., according as it comes with different modifications of contact

such as cocoannt, wood-apple, &c. earth In the sam& manner, owing to the blending and the mntnal
suppression of the Attributes, the Attributes occupying a subordinate position base themselves on the prominent one, and thus give rise to diverse forms of cosmic manifestations.

Hence

it is

laid

down
of

"

On

account of the difference arising
Attributes."

from

the receptacle

the various

Now the existence of the Spirit (Purusha) is laid (119). down, in opposition to those self-contented (Materialists) who accept as spirit either Nature or Intellect, or Self-conscious
ness, or the sense-organs, or ( lastly
)

the elements.

KARIKi XVII.
Since
all

composite (or compound) objects are another s use ; since the reverse
16

foj*

of

exwfnTe

of

spm*!

(that which possesses) the three Attributes with other properties (must

exist)

;

since

there

must be superintendence
to

;

since
;

there
since

must be one
there
is

a

enjoy (experience tendency towards final
Spirit

or feel)

and

beatitude
;i

(abstraction

of tbe

from material existence)

therefore Spirit exists.
The
spirit exists:
all
<-<,

A

because

comare

Spirit

exists,

apart

from

r>

-r>

*

-,

-i

Primordial

pound

objects for another.
"

Matter (Nature) :-objects (objects

(120).

Because all compound

made up

of

integral component parts) are for another s use" This when reduced to the syllogistic form, would stand reason,
*

Sweet

according the Nayayikas.

[121]
thns

53

[K. xvir.]

Nature, Intellect and the rest exist for another s use, because they are compounds, as chair, bed, &c., and these
latter are all

compound, inasmuch as they are made up of

pleasure, pain and delusion.*
1

(121).

The Objection: above reasoning

But, says the objector, the compound objects chair, &c., are seen to exist for other objects

rMofcompounds not to an Elementary Spirit.

which too are compound, such as men s todies and not for the sake of Spirit as apart from Matter (the body). And as

Nature, &c., being compounds, should only lead to the inference of another set of compound substances (for whose use they exist) and not to that of an
"

^^

Elementary Non-compound Spirit (an
"

End-in-itself.")

We
_

reply

He ply Since
the

Since the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes and other properties must exist"

of that which the possess three Attributes m ust
reve,

That

,,

,

.

,

.

\

is

to

say,

if

from

the fact

,.

of

exist.

Nature, &c., being for another s use, we were to infer only another compound sub

stance, then in that case we would have to assume such compounds ad infinitum for even this latter compound must lead to another for whose use it will exist and this And when we to another, and so on ad infinitum. again can escape this regressus ad infinitum by postulating a
V
f

object or wouid lead to compounds ad in-

;

reasonable

not proper to the shape of com multiply unnecessary assumptions (in pounds ad infinitum). Nor can it be urged that multiplica tion of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by
resting

ground,

it

is

certainly,

for in the above inference the application of the proofs instance ought to be extended only so far as existing it can be extended no for another s use concerned is
;
"
"

;

larther.
*

And we have
are mere

explained

in

the

Nyayavdrtikat eie

This sounds rather absurd.

But we must not forget that

whole

emanations from Nature, whose constituent elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and
set of material objects

delusion, respectively.

[122]

54

[K.

tdtparyatika* that if the complete identification of every phase of the cited instance were to be looked for in the sub ject in question, then there could be no reasoning by inference.!

Thus then,
if

order to escape the regressus ad infinitum, the non-compound nature of Spirit, we find our accept selves constrained to attribute to it the properties of being
in

we

"

without the three
"

"

"

Attributes,"
"

discreetness,"
"

non-objectivi

ty
"

(subjectivity),
"

uncommonality
"

(i. e.,

specific character),

and (inability to produce). unprolificness intelligence these properties are invariably accompanied by that of For, compoundness, which latter being absent in spirit, must lead
"

to the inference of the absence of the three Attributes, &c., as

when a certain individual is not a Brahmana, he can never be a Katha (a special class of Brahmans). Hence the author when he laid down that the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes, &c., must exist implied that this
"
"

must be an in something which would be the reverse, an End-in-itself." And dependent Elementary Entity
"

&c."

"

this is Spirit.

(122).

For the following reason also there must be a Because there Spirit apart from Matter mustbe superintendence." That is to say,
:

because the objects constituted by the three
*
of

This

is

a

Gautama)

commentary on the Nyayavartika (a gloss on the Nyayasutras of Udyotakara by Va"chaspati Misra. This work with the
latterly
is generally counted as closing V;he epoch of supplanted by the modern system, introduced and

Parisuddhi of udayanacharya
ancient Nyaya,

most

extensively

expounded

by

Gangesa

Upddhyaya,

in

his

Tattwa-

Chintamani.
f

Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature,
identical.

which could be quite
"

Even in the stock example
"

of the Naiyayiif-^

Fiery, because smoking, as the culinary hearth
of the syllogism

we have

a dissimilarity
cited.

between/he subject-matter
the culinary hearth the

and the instance

Thus, in

fire is

for cooking food,
is

and proceeding from a house
fire

made by men,
mountain.

&c.,

&c, whereas such

not the case with the

in the

[123124]

55

[K. xvn.]

Attributes are such as necessitate the existence of a superin

tendent.

For, everything consisting in pleasure, pain and seen to be superintended over by something else delusion, 6. g. the chariot by the charioteer ; and Intellect and the to consist in pleasure, pain and delu rest have been
is

proved

sion
visor

;

therefore, they
"

must have a

an

"

End-in-itself

must be beyond* the three and this is
Again the

and this super Attributes and independent,
supervisor,
Spirit.

(123).

Spirit exists

"

because there must be one
feel)"

to experience,

(or

That

is

to

say,

Because there must
be one to feel.

everv one O f us nas an id ea of pleasure and J pain as something to be lelt as agreeable
.

and as such there must be some substance, the feelings themselves, to which they (feelings) can beyond be agreeable or otherwise. Feelings cannot be pleasurable to the Intellect (Buddhi), &c., for that would imply self-con
or the reverse
;

tradictory actions,

inasmuch as the Intellect and the rest are Thus, integrally composed of pleasure, pain and delusion.f then, something else, independent of pleasure, &c., must be the agent who feels and this is Spirit.
(124).
different of pretation

A

Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of thus the Karika Bhogya (enjoyable) intermeans visible-, and the visibility of Buddhi
:

the

,

..

.

,

.

above reason.
,

and the

rest not being possible

.,

i

without an

i

observer, there

beyond, Intellect, &c.,

and

this is

must be one outside of, and The visibility of Spirit.

* Otherwise the supervisor also will stand in need of another, for the pre sence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure,

&c., which again will necessitate
itself.

its

superintendence by something beyond

And

so

we

shall be landed in a rcgrcssus

ad infinitum.

f That is to say Intellect, as made up of pleasure, pain and dulness, can not be properly said to feel pleasure, &c., for that would imply the feeling of

pleasure by pleasure absurd.

;

or worse

still

by pain

;

and

vice versa,

which

is

[125]
Intellect

56

[K.

xvm.]
,

and the

rest

can be inferred from the fact of their

being

made up

of pleasure, &c., as earlh, &c.
t>

(125).

because there is a tendency Lastly, Spirit exists towards action for final beatitude" The fi^l beatitude, treated of in all the systems
"

O f philosophy, and mentioned by the great sages of divine insight as the absolute and can never apply final alleviation of the three kinds of pain
sages towards beati-

for, these have by their very nature, pain as one of their integral components, from which, therefore, they since a substance cannot be absolved can never be absolved

to Intellect, &c.

;

;

of something forming its constituting element. Thus then, there must be something independent of pleasure, &c., where -

from pain could be expunged. Consequently, as the various systems of philosophy have all along aimed at beatitude, therefore, there exists something beyond (pleasure, &c., and hence) Intellect and the rest and this is Spirit.

Having thus proved the existence of Spirit, the author next Is this spirit one (*) (manifesting itself) raises the question in all bodies, or many, being different in different bodies ?

And

in reply, he lays

down

the theory

of the

plurality

of

Spirits.

KiRIKA XVIII.
t

Prom

allotment of birth, death, and the organs ; (2) from the non-simultaneity of actions
fSpiritS
<

-Bt ons!
s

ra

with different individuals); and

(3)

from the different modifications of c^e
Attributes
"

the plurality of Spirits

is

established.

The plurality of Spirits
*

is established"

How ?

As the Vedantin

asserts.

[127128]
"

ft7

[K.

xvm.]

(127).

From

allotment of birth, death and the organs" Birth of the Spirit consists in its relation
the body the sense-organs, Self-conT-rr-n i ^ T , / ^ Will and sciousness, Feeling* (veaana)
.

allotment.
<of

birth,

death and

w ith

t

the,

organs.

all these latter

birth

gate of a particular character. which does not mean modification

forming into an aggre This is what is meant by
;

since the

Spirit

is

And death too essentially unmodifiable (unchangeable). consists in the departure from the body, of the Spirit, which cannot be destroyed, since it is eternal. The "organs" are
thirteen,

beginning
of these

with

the

Will.
is

The

(diversified)

"allotment"*

births, &c.

not

hypothesis of the unity of Spirit. For, if (in all bodies), the birth, death, blindness or madness of one
individual would lead to exactly the same The several allotment, however, becomes
effects

explicable on the the Spirit were one
in

others.

quite

consistent

with
the

the theory

of

the

Monist
it

ing

to

explain the the Spirit, as

plurality of Spirits. above difference by

Nor can
attribut

conditioned

by
birth

contact

with

different bodies, &c.

For

in

that case he would laud himself
or
!

on another absurdity

that of attributing

death in

which can accordance with the different parts of the body never be. For a woman is not said to be born or dead, by the mere development or derangement of certain portions of
her body.

(128).

For the following reason
is

also, the Spirit is different
"

with different individuals
not simultaneous"
.

:

Since activity

of endeavour,
;

is

Action, in the form a function of the internal

still it is here attributed to the Spirit. If the Spirit organs were one, the activity of one man would lead to similar

activity in all other
*
"

men

;

and thus the motion of one would
"body,"

Vedana"

might b2 takei severally with
"

&c.

In that case the

passage would

be translated thus
";

intellectual cognitions

bodily, sensuous, mental, egoistic and but the translation given above is preferable: for

certainly, there can bs

no cognition

through body,

<fcc.,

taken
(the

singly.

No

cognition

is

mind,

<fcc.,

possible in the body alone, without the aid and so on with the rest.

of

sense-organs)

8

[129132]
lead to that of all others

58
a palpable absurdity,

[K. xix.]

which

is

ex-,

plained away quite reasonably, on the hypothesis of plufality.

(129).

Again, the Spirits are

many

"

because the

modi

fJS*

*

m

fications of the Attributes

are

different"

of the Attributes are differ-

Some

O f Goodness, represent aggregates

persons abounding in the attribute of that
the gods and saints. 0. g. such are men, The rest abound

attribute

Others abound in Foulness
in

and these are the beasts. This diversity in the of Attributes could not be explained if the Spirit distribution were one. The hypothesis of plurality, however, makes it
Darkness
quite explicable.

(130).

Having thus established the plurality of
:

Spirits the
is

author now states their properties a knowledge of which conducive to discriminative knowledge (wisdom)

KlRIKA XIX.

And
T
e

from that contrast (before
that the Spirit
is
f

set

forth)

it

follows

witness, and has final
is

Pr pertieS

the so ui

emancipation, neutrality, and
ceiving and
inactive.

per

"

And

"

connects the following properties of the Spirit with

its plurality.

(131).

If

it

And from this contrast," then it were said would refer to the various distribution of In the three Attributes, of the last Karika.
"

order to avoid this,
subject,
this
;

it

is

said
is

"

and from
is

T

that,

<

C."

A
;

immediately preceding, whereas one not so immediate

referred to

by the pronoun

denoted by tfaf

hence the that here refers to Karika
r

XL

Thus, then, the contrast of "having the three Attributes, &c.," connotes the Spirit s property of being with out the three Attributes, and being discriminative, non-

(132).

[133

135J

5H

[K. xix.j

Abjective,

the properties

Now, singular, intelligent and non-productive. of being a witness and perceptive are
necessary
anc*
-,

The necessity of
so

many

propertiej.

accompaniments of intelligence ,. ,. o Since an mtellinon-objectivity.
.,
. .
,

.

g eut being alone can be a spectator, and one can be a witness only when the as in daily life we find the objects have been shown to him two parties of a dispute showing and explaining their various objects and reasons to the witness similarly does the PraTheirinter-depcmd; ;

fore,

which latter, there becomes the witness. And again no object can be shown to one, himself an object and non-intelligent; and since the Spirit is both intelligent and non-objective, it becomes the loitness. For the same reasons, the Spirit is perceiving.
kriti exhibit its creations before the Spirit,

Farther, the absence of the three Attributes leads to final emancipation by which is meant the final and absolute of pain and this property, as belonging to the spirit, removal

(133).

;

a necessary deduction from the fact of the soul being naturally without; the three Attributes, and hence without
is

pleasure, pain or d illness.

the absence of Attributes, again, follows since this latter property is such as cannot belong neutrality either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling,.
(134:).
;

From

It

only one who is devoid of both pleasure and pain, who can be called neutral also called Uddsina (indifferent).
is

Lastly, the property of inactivity is a necessary outcome of the properties of non-productiveness and discrimiuativeuess(

wisdom). The inactivity of the Spirit wisdom and non-productive character.

is

inferred

from

its-

l>

(135).

Objection:
life
,1
.
-,

We
we
.

grant
,,
/>

all this:

but in
".

our daily
T
,

first

decide our

Objection Intelligence and activity found coalways
exist cut.

think

the following strain I, who am an intelligent be in i?, wish to act. Thus,
then,

m

n

-

duty and then we n
,

we

ly

rind intelligence

and activity co-

[136138]
existent.

60
this goes against the

[K.

xx

xxi.]

And
:

Sankhya tenets which

make

intelligence devoid of activity and vice versa.

We

reply

KA.RIKA
Keply: The appa rent activity of the soul due to union with Buddhi, and the apparent intelligence of the latter due to union with Purusha.

XX.

Thus, from this union the unintelligent Linga (Buddhi. &c..) appears as and from the activity of J
;
m

intelligent

the Attributes, the

indifferent

Spirit

appears as an (active) agent. Since intelligence and activity have been proved to (136). be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. The word Linga includes everything from the Mahat down to the primary elements to be described later on. The cause of the mistake is said to
be the union or
proximity of the
Spirit

with

the

Linga,

(Buddhi and the rest). The rest is clear enough.
(137).
Objection
is

Objection

:

You
$*c.

union,

say that the feeling is due to But no union is possible with-

What
of

the

need

the

union?

ou some need which, again, is not possible .,. without the relation of the helper and the

How is this possible in accordance helped. with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with
the Linga
?

In reply, the author lays down the grounds of need

KARIK!

XXI.

For the
R e piy_The
is

Spirit

s

final
need
final

contemplation of Prakriti, and its Emancipation, the union of both

that

of

Emancipation.

takes place, like that of the halt and , IP ,1 the blind and from this union pro

ITT

;

ceeds creation.
(138).
In
"

Pradhdnasya"

the
"

objective force, the

meaning being

genitive affix has the for the contemplation

by Spirit of

Nature,"

thus implying the fact of Nature being

[139141]
an object

01

[K.

XXIL]

something

to

be

enjoyed.

But

this enjoyalulity

is not possible without an enjoy er, whose becomes necessary, for that of Nature.

existence

thus

The author next lays down the ground of the For the Emancipation of Spirit s need The need explained. __ The while in connection
(139).

^ ^.^

7"

g^

with the enjoyable Nature, believes the three kind of pains the constituents of Nature to be his own and from this
;

which can result only from wisdom discriminating between the Spirit and the three which wisdom thus becomes impossible without Attributes the knowledge; and hence the existence, of Nature. Thus then we find the Spirit standing in need of Nature, for his
self-imposed bond he seeks liberation

Since the relation (of Spirit with Nature) is eternal, therefore, it is quite proper that the Spirit should be related to Nature for emancipation, though primarily, the

emancipation.

relation

enjoyment only. (140). Granted all this relation of Buddhi, &c.?

was

for

But whence the creation
creation"

We
The
dhi, &c.

"

reply
necessity
of

From

this

union proceeds

The

the creation of Bud-

relation (of Spirit with Nature) cannot by itself suffice either for en jovment or eman.

..

circumstances the union about the creation, for the sake primarily of enjoyment, and finally, of emancipation.
;

cipation, if there under the rest

11 j were no Buddhi and the
T>

j

,1

itself brings

The process of creation

is now described KARIK! XXIL

From

Prakriti issues

Mahat

(or

Buddhi)

;

from

this

The process of E-.iutionfromPraGtriti downwards.

Mahat again
(Aiiankara),

issues

Self-consciousness

from
;

which
from

proceeds

the set of sixteen

five of these

sixteen, proceed the five gross elements. Prakriti is a (141). From Prakriti,
<fc.

name

of the
will

Unmanifested

Principle

;

Mahat

and

Ahankdm

be

[142143]

02

[H.

xxm.]
of the

described later on, as also the set of sixteen,

made up

eleven sense-organs and the live primary elements. Oiit of these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respect Akasa, Earth, &c. ively the five gross ones

(142).
The process
production
elements.
of

Thus, from the primary element of sound proceeds Akasa, having sound as its characteristic of the property similarly from the mixture of
the
;

tne primary elements ot touch

f,

.

,

,

,

and sound,

,

characteristic properties

proceeds Air, with sound and touch as its again, from the mixture of the
;

primary elements of sound, touch and colour, proceeds Light, with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties ;

and from the mixture of the primary elements, of sound, touch, colour and taste, proceeds Water, with sound, touch, and lastly, colour, and taste as its characteristic properties from the mixture of the primary element of smell with
;

that of the last four, proceeds Earth, with all
characteristic properties.

the five for

its

(143). The Unmanifested Principle has been defined in general terms in Karika X, and specifically in Karika XIII ; the Manifested also has been generally defined in Karika ;

X

now
the

the author defines

a particular

Manifested Principle

Baddhi
XXIII.

Buddhi

is

the

determining

Principle u (Will)*

;

P

when
-

Though there is some difference of opinion on this point, yet I am inclined to think that Adhyavasaya means * determining, and of all the faculties will appears to be the only determining principle in Man. Hence forth Bnddhi will be translated as Will, and the reader is requested to mark the same change in the foregoing pages,

-____
?o;SS
*
ItS

Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power constitute its form (when afected by Goodness), and the reverse of "these
v
i

affected
.

by Darkness.

[144140]
"

fiS

K. XXIIT.]

"

(144).

Biiddhi

is

determination

Since
the

there

is

no
the

difference

between
( effect

action
>-

and

active a enfc

aml cause

when he comes
done, thinks that he
is

across

something

.Everyone, to be

mines that
plishment.
stic

it is

his duty,

deputed to the work and, finally, deter and thus acts towards its accom
duty
as
is

This determination of the
the

the

charateri-

property of Buddhi

which appears

if

endited
of the

with

intelligence by contact with

intelligence

Spirit.

Buddhi, again, is non-different from determination, which thus forms its definition, inasmuch as it serves to distinguish it from similar as well as dissimilar substances.

(145).

Having thus defined Buddhi, the author next
states its properties, in order
e

to. help
Virtue,"

the
&c.,

Buddhi-vFru,e,
<iom,

wif

attainment of true

wisdom-"

Dispassion and Power, and the reverse of these.

Virtue leads to (worldly) prosperity, as i_ i 1^1j.i as ^ we Super-physical bliss, that
*
"

by the performance of sacrifices &c. leading to the former, and that due to the eight fold practice of Yoga leading to the latter. Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the difference between the Attributes (as
brought
constituting Nature) and the of passion. 9
Spirit.

about

Dispassion

is

absence

(146).
The

This Dispassion

is

of four kinds

Yatamana-SanEkendriyd-Sanjnd The passion ua..
.

four kinds of

chspassion.

jna Vyatireka-Sanjna, and Vatikara-Sanjnd.
.
.

.

,.

residing in the mind, lead turally impure the different senses-organs to action. The effort to put a stop to this action of the senses is named Yatamdna-Sanjnd (li
terally, effort).
so;yie
"the

When

this process of resistance is once

begun,
;

then passions will have been suppressed before others discrimination of these from those still operating is called When the senses have been disabled, then Vyatireka-Sanjna.

the passions that have been suppressed reside in the
Cf. Jjhashy.i

mind

in

uu Yogasutra

1

15.

[147148]
the form of mere anxiety

64
-and this

[K.

xxm.]

is

known

as

Ekendriyd*

Sanjna.

The suppression of even
is

perceptible objects, tioned in the Veda,
to the first

anxiety towards all the ordinary ones as well as thoso men
this

tVee

;

this has

and is superior called Vasikara-Sanjna been thus described by the revered
*

Patanjali: "The dispassion named Vasikam-Sanjnya belongs to one who has no desire for either visible or Yedic objects.

[Yoga-Sutra
(147).

I.

15].
is

This

Dispassiou, a property of Buddhi. an also is a property of Buddhi
j

Power
it

is

to

The eight kinds
power.

of

this that

the * perfections Attenuation and the rest (Awma, are due."* Of these
<fec.)

(1)

Animd

(Lit

Atomic character) the
enter

is

the

which

one

can

the densest

substances,

property by such as

stones. (2) Laghimd (Buoyancy) is that to which is due the ability to traverse solar regions by means of the sun s rays. Garima (Gravity) leads to heaviness (3) and (4) Makima (Grandeur) causes supremacy. To (5) Approach is due the ability to touch the moon with the fingers. (6)

;

Fulfilment of desires is such as can enable one to dip into the earth as in water. (7) Vasitwa leads to the subordination of
all objects to the devotee.

Supremacy brings about mastery
of purpose
is

over all objects.

(8) Infallibility

such that

all

objects follow the course dictated by the will of the devotee. The decisions of ordinary mortals follow the course of events,

whereas those of a trained devotee precede them and dictate
their course.

of the

These four are the properties of Buddhi, partaking of Goodness. Those partaking of the attribute of Darkness are the reverse of these Sin viz.

(148).

attribute

:

Ignorance, Passion and Weakness or Fallibility.

*

There

is

some confusion as

to the
;

number

of

these perfections.
to

As enu
:

merated here, they appear nins have taken Vasitwa and Isltwa

but they ought

be eight only

hence

I

as one.

[149151]
The author next
(Ahttnkara).
defines

65
or

[K.

xxiv

xxv.]

Egoism

Self-consciousness

KlniKA XXIV.
The principle of AhankAra defined,

Egoism

is

self-consciousness

;

thence

the set proceeds a two-iold creation, of eleven and the five primary elements.

(149).
sciousness

"Egoism is

is

self-consciousness perceptible in snch ideas as
known,"
exist,"

observed and

"none

and this Self-con The object I have but myself has power over this
"

"

and

that,"

"I

&c.

All this

is

the characteristic action

of the principle of Egoism, on which the Buddhi depends for its determinative function in such decisions as this is to be
"

done by
"

me"

(150).
creations

The different products of this effect are next stated Thence proceeds a two-fold creation" The forms of these
are stated
"

"

The

set

of eleven and

the five

primary

only these two creations proceed from the principle of Egoism. The eva excludes all other possible suppo
elements
sitions.

Objection : Principle of
kinds of creation proceed from a uni-

We grant all
,

this

:

But the

nature,
.

how

Egoism being of one uniform can two different kinds of
*
/>

form Egoism?

inanimate (the elements) and en lightening (the senses) proceed therefrom?
creation

L

-^

*,

We

reply

KARIKA XXV.

The
Reply

set of eleven

The differ1

of Egoism,
-,

cnce due to the di-

proceeds from the modified principle and partakes of the attrin r\ t mi bute ot (jroodiiess. ihe primary el e^

Ng Attribute?**

ments are due
ness
;

to the Attribute of

Dark

from Foulness proceed both.

senses, being light and enlightening, (151). are said to partake of Goodness, and as such proceed from modified Egoism. From Egoism as affected, on the other hand,

The eleven

9

[152153]
by Darkness, proceed the

66

[K. xxvi.]

set of the primary elements. How so ? Because these elements partake of the Attribute of Darkness. That is to say Though the principle of Egoism is one and

uniform, yet from the operation or suppression of various Attributes, it produces creations of diverse characters.

(152).

This

is

Objection purposelessness Passions.

.The
of

When all the necessary effects objected to are brought about by the action of the attributes of Goodness and Darkness only,
.,1,1 -, have done with the purposeless attribute
,

of Foulness.

We
"

reply
"

From Foulness proceed

both

i.

e.,

the set of eleven as

nccesary for urging the other Attributes to action.

well as the primary elements. Though there is nothing to be done exclusively by
Foulness, J yet it is a necessary factor, since the attributes ol Goodness and Darkness
;

and as such could not are both, by their very nature, inert do their own work unless urged to action by the active and mobile Rajas. Thus then, the efficacy of the attribute of Foulness lies in its character of supplying the motive force to the inert attributes of Goodness and Darkness. And thus

we

see that

it is

not altogether purposeless.

ness

In order to describe the set of eleven the effects of Good the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.

XXVI.
The
intellectual organs are,

Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin ; those
>

the

The ten External
Organs
*

of action are

speech,

hand,

fee*,

the

excretory organs, and
generation.

the organ of

(1^3).

Sense

is

defined as the

immediate

effect

of the

principle of Egoism, as affected by the attribute of Goodness. These are two-fold
intellectual,

and those of

action.

Both these are called

[154155]

07

[K.

xxvn.]

of the Spirit (senses) because they are characteristics The eye, The senses are named (Indra).
"

:

eye is the sense for the ear for perceiving perceiving colour, sound, the nose for perceiving smell, the tongue flor perceiving These are the taste, and the skin for experiencing touch. The action of the organs of speech intellectual sense-organs. and the rest will be spoken of later on (Karika XXVII.)
Functions
#."

Of

these

the

The eleventh sense-organs

is

next described

KARIK! XXVII.

Of these

of the (sense-organs) Mind (Manas) partakes nature of both (intellectual as well as
t } lose

The eleventh sense

Mind denned.

o f ac tion)

:

it

is

the

reflecting
is

(or thinking)

principle,

and

called
Its

a

sense-organ

since

it

has

cognate properties.

multifariousness, as well as its external forms, are due
to the various specific modifications of the Attributes.
"

(154).

Partakes,

uble natUre
of

mhid

Among the eleven organs, Mind $*c" partakes of the nature of both i. e., it is an infcellectual or an of sensation, as well
and speech,

as one of action, since the eye

&c., operate on their respective objects only when influenced by

the principle of Manas.
9

(155).
Mind
The

The author next gives the

Manas
defined.

That
(or

specific definition of It is the reflecting principle ig to sajs ig defined by reflection
"
"

Mnd

reflecting cha-

invariably
thereof.

It is the principle which supplies forms and qualifications to the abstract cognition of a certain object, which precedes the concrete and well-defined knowledge

thought).

As

is laid

down by an ancient

writer

"

At

first,

one observes a certain object without qualifications, and latter ly intelligent people think of the object as belonging to a certain

[156158]
class

G8

[K.

XXVIL]

and having certain properties." It is a well-known fact that on first seeing* an object, the first cognition that one has
it,

of

resembles to a great degree the

cognition of a child

indefinite

and unqualified.

Soon

after this one learns to con

nect the object so observed, with its genus, property, &c. This latter cognition is said to be perception, which is a func
tion characteristic of
it

distinguish serves as its definition.

Manas (Mind), and as such serves to from similar and dissimilar objects, and thus
But we have seen that Egosim and Buddhi, having distinct func,.
,
.

(156).
Oljection
:

Objection .-Granted all this:

Why
own?

make Mind when it has
function of

a sense
distinct
its

tions ot their
;

own

are

not classed

among
shall

same manner, we sense-organs not class Manas among them either. o
in the
"

The author

replies

It

is

a

sense-organ"

Why ?

"

Be

cause of its having cognate properties" This P r P erfc y mainly is the fact of its being
an immediate
effect

by Goodness
is

^,^1^1
which
the definition of a
sense.

the immediate effect of Egoism as affected by Goodness, and not that of being a characteristic of the Spirit for this latter pro*
;
,

,

,

.

perty belongs to Egoism also
this latter

and as such would also have to be classed
;

,

.

.

among sense-organs. Thus then "being the characteristic of the Spirit is only an explanation of the derivation of the term Indriya it cannot be said to form its denotation.
;

(157).
Whence

It is

asked

Whence such

multifarious

effects

the multi.

fanous effects from Egoism.

from the single principle of Egoism as affected by Goodness ? We reply is due to the specific modifications of the
"It
t .

.

Attributes"

The

difference in the effects

is

due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the tive principles of sound, &c.

form of the opera

(158).
Attributes.

Destiny (adrishta) is also a modification of the We have the qualifying term External as
" "

presenting a comprehensible example, the sense of the

sen~

[159]

69

[K.

xxvin

xxix.j:

tence being As the external forms are the effects of the modifications of the Attributes, so are also the internal and

imperceptible ones.

(159).
stated.

Having thus described the forms 6f the eleven

sense-organs, the particular functions of the first ten are next

KARIKA XXVIII.

The

function of the five senses, in respect to colour, &c., is mere observation or feeling ;

The functions of the external organs.

^
the
ar&

walking, excretion gratification are (the functions of) the other five.
speech,

handling,

By

"observation"

here
.

is

meant
(

stract
Otserration-.-the function of the five
intellectual senses.

perception

the primary ab Nirvikalpa ) through
"

/ intellectual
Qf

^

senses.

Speech

yc.,

Mer

fa e
.

L
,

^

of

the
is

Speeeh, handling, walking, excretions thesenses

organs

ot

action.

The

vocal

organ

located in the throat, the palate, &c., whose function is speech. The functions of the

cognitive (intellectual organs) are clear enough.*

The

functions of the three internal organs are next

stated.

XXIX.
Of^he three
Function
of

(the

internal

organs) the functions are

the

constituted
cte ristics
;

by

their

respective

chara-

ijrtemai organs.

these

are peculiar to each.

*

That
P. ff.

is

to say
is

they are denoted by their very names or by their defini

tions

the ear

sound

and

defined as the sense for perceiving (or comprehending) thus the function of the ear is perception of sound, and so with

the others,

[160161]

70

[K.

xxx. j

The

function

common

to the organs consists in the five
rest.
c

vital airs

Prana and the
"

(160).

Reflection of Manas. Self-consciousness of

The functions of the three are constituted by their That is to say* respective characteristics"
.

,

.

,

.,

,.

Ahankara and \<if*rmifiat ion of Buddhi.
tions thus,

the property which serves as the distinguisliin? feature of each of the internal
organs, also denotes their respective func of Buddhi, self-consciousness

,.

;

determination

of Ahankdra and reflection of Manas.

(161).

The double character of the functions hased on the

fact of their heing specific or

common

is

next stated
the

"

These

are peculiar
function"

"
"

fyc.

The jive

vital airs, constitute

common

The

five vital airs,

The function of the three internal organs is the substance (of life, and hence) of the five
.

the common function of the three internal organs.

vital airs

,

.

.

,

,

.

,

,

;

since the latter
an(| cease

former j

are absent.

Of

these

when the to exist when these the air called Prana
exist

(Breath or Life
that called

)

resides in the heart, the navel
resides at the back, &c.,
;

and the

toes ;

Apana

Samdna

in the heart,

the navel and the joints

Uddna

in

and
airs.

lastly,

Vydna

resides in the

skin.

the throat, heart, &c. ; These are the five

The author now
fourfold organs
(the

states the order of the functions of these

external organs and the three

internal

organs).

With regard
The instantaneous

to visible

objects, the functions

of the

^OUr are

sa id to
;

^ e instantaneous, as

ofSso
functions.

well a. gradual
vigible

obj ectS)

with regard to inthe func tions of the three

[162165]

71

[K. xxx.]

(internal organs) are preceded

by that

(/. e.

the cognition

of some visible object.)
(162*).
"Instantaneous"
"with

regard

to visible

objects"

Instantaneous with regard to visible ob-

e
9"

when one

sees in the

da*

by

means

of a flash of lightning, a tiger facing him,
his observation, reflection

are instantaneous and accordingly he runs at once.

and determination away from the place

(163).

"Gradual"

e.

g.,
11

in

dim

light,

a person has

Gradual with regard to visible ob-

at first

a faint cognition of a certain object; then he looks at it more steadily and ascertains that it is a thief with
levelled
is

^

his

bow and arrow
"the

at

him

;

then the conscious
me";

ness follows

finally decides to

advancing against run away from the place.
to invisible objects,

thief

and he

(164).
With regard
visible
ti0

With regard
th
to in-

pendent of the

S

objects,

the
i

th e
n,!::

4at

ex-

aid ot the external organs The function the three is preceded by that,i. of e., the instantaneoiis as well as the gradual func
"

Denial

on the other hand, organs operate without the

tions

of the
.

three
,.

internal

organs

are

The functions of internal organs preceded by those of the external ones.

preceded by some perception of a visible T rn obJ ect smce Inference, lestiniony and the O ther methods of proof operate orilv W!IPI UA r r
*
.
>

_

.

J

they have lor their back ground some sort
of external perception.

(165).
lion.-*

Objection:

Granted

all

this:

But the functions
three

(organs) cannot depend on themselves alone ; for in th ? that case (these organs) must be either or transient if permanent, then their funcions also permanent would be permanent if transient, then the various functions
permanent or
;

Option: Func-

either of the four or of the

;

would combine most absurdly, there
agency.

being no restrictive

[166167]

72

[K.

XXXI.

We

reply

:

They*
thp

(the organs)

operate

towards

performation
of
the

of their

respective

Reply Functions of the organs dufe to mutual impulse. Soul
proposes the incen
tive.

functions.

due to mutual impulse.
Spirit

The
the

purpos e

supplies
is

motive; by nothing (else) caused to act.

an organ

The subject of the first sentence is "organs." (166). A number of persons wielding different weapons, unite for suppressing a common enemy, the one holding a lance uses that alone, and so on, each using his own particular weapon. In the same manner one organ operates towards the fulfilment of another s purpose, which tends to help ita own. And since this movement towards action is the cause
(and hence the regulating motive power) of the action of the organs, there cannot arise any absurd collision of the func
tions.

(167).

Another objection
beings,

The

lancers, &c., being sentient

can

comprehend

each

other

s

motives and can act towards the fulfilment
gent organs understand each other s motives?

thereof.

all m-sentient,

n

,

The organs on the contrary, are i and as such can never act in
,

,

,

the same way as the lancers, &c., do (and hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question), Consequently the in-sentient organs must have an animate and intelligent supervisor over them, who is to understand their

end and urge them to action accordingly. The Spirit s purpose is the motive, by nothing We reply (else) can the organs be brought to aciT
"

:

Kepiy-Soui spurpose urging them to
action.

is to urge . , \ organs to action, what is the need of postulating a supervisor ab extra ? This
.

Since the purpose of the Spirit

the

point will be further elucidated in Karika LVII.
Davies restricts this to the internal organs the Karika should not apply to organs in general
*
;

but there
as

is

no reason

why
it,

the

Kaumudi

takes

[

168170]
(168).
It has
"

73

[K.

xxxn.j

been declared that

"by

nothing

is

an organ
of these

brought

to act

The author next

states the division

organs

:

XXXII.
Organs are of thirteen kinds
; they have variously the functions of seizing, retaining and The objects of these are manifesting.

tenfold,

that which

is

to

be

seized,

retained or manifested.

The thirteen organs consist of the eleven senseorgans, Ahankara and Buddhi. An organ , The thirteen orls a particular kind of agent, and no agency gans the ten exter(169).
.

,

.

,

nai organs,
dhi*

Manas,

js

Ahank&ra and Bua"

possible

without a function

;

hence the

author next states the various functions.

tionT/the semes^f
action.

They have the functions fa" The senses of action have the function of seizing that
,

;

*oT jfaddhi^

is

to say, they extend their action to their

and Ma"Manifestation

respective objects.
func ti ns
;

Buddhi, Ahankdra and

of
or-

Manas retain impressions by their respective
and
the life-breath, &c. (mentioned lastly, the intellectual (per

the
^

intellectual

before) ceptive) organs manifest their respective objects.

(170).

Since every action must have an object, the objects of the above-mentioned functions are next
stated
"

The objects of these functions, tenfold.

That which
i

is to

be

seized"

frc.

objects to be acted upon by the thir teen organs are those that are to be seized,

The

i

*"

retained and manifested.

By

seizure here

is

meant pervasion

The five senses of action extend over speech (or extension). and the rest and each of these being both human and super
;

human

these objects become tenfold. Similarly the object to be retained by the three internal organs is the body, which is

an aggregate of the five great elements, of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour. Each of these five being both human and superhuman, these objects also become 10
fivefold being

[171-174]
tenfold.

74

[K.

XXXIIL]

are five

Similarly the objects of the five intellectual senses and each of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour
;

these being both

human and superhuman,

the objects also

become

tenfold.
ttie sub-divisions of the thirteen

(171).
stated
:

organs are next

KiKiKl XXXIII.
Internal organs are three
The organs numbered and the differbetween the
;

and the external

ten,

making
.,

objects

known
^

to the former

i

tnree,
ti

rm

Ine external
;

organs act at

Sun poinTo^
notedt

present

and the internal at the

three divisions of time.
:

Manas, Akankara (172). The internal organs are three and Biiddhi, called internal because located inside the body.
(173).

The external organs are ten

:

the ten sense-organs.
organs,
i. e.,

These

latter exhibit objects to the three internal

they supply the means for reflection, consciousness and determination of objects the intellectual senses functioning by means of observation, and the senses of action by means of
their respective functions.

(174).
The

The author next
between
" "

states a further point of difference

external
;

senses acting at time the interpresent nai with reference to all three divisions of time.

organs internal and external The external organs act at time present" / ,, is meant here the time By present closely [preceding and following the imJ ir

mediate present

;

thus then,
"

speech* also

The internal or belongs to the present. at the three divisions of time" e. g., the idea that "there gans has been rain," since the river has risen (for the past) ;
"

there
*

is fire

in the mountain, since there
.

is smoke"

(for the
/

..

.

necessary for the case of speech, because no two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word could be uttered at the time present if by this word were meant the present

The

special qualification

is

moment only. This absurdity, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as included in it.

[175178]
present)
;

75
cc

[K. xxxiv.]

and

lastly,
eggs"

we

shall have rain, since

we

see ants

carrying their

(for the futnre).

Time, according to the Vaiseshikas, being one, cann t allow such divisions as past, present Time-not a distinct and future. Hence we must Jiave for the principle according

(175).

e

ant

yas.

various
to

units, the

various

conditions

or

specifications

and

future.

which we give the names, past, So the Stinkhyas do not admit of a

present
distinct

principle in the shape of Time.

(176).

The

author next

considers

the objects

of

the

external senses operating at time present

KABIKA XXXIV.
The
intellectual

Of jfchese,
(those
"

the five intellectual senses

of sensation)

concern

objects
(collec;

s P ecin c

as well as non-specific

sound the garding the
;

rest
five

re-

ob

t i ve ).

spe ech

concerns

sound

the

jects of sense.

YQ

^

regard the five objects

(of sense,)

ten external senses, the five intellectual (177). ones concern specific as well as non-specific objects by
:

Of the

and such objects are sound and specific here is meant gross the rest (the Tanmdtras), manifesting themselves as Earth, &c., (the elements) having the properties of calmness, turbu

and dulness. The non-specific objects are the primary elements. The particle Mdtra, in the word Tanmdtra, serves The senses of to distinguish these from the gross objects.
lence
states,

Yogis concern sound, &c., in their subtle as well as gross whereas the senses of ordinary men relate to sound, forms only.
of
its

&c., in their gross

(1*?8).

Senses). gross form, because is the cause of sound. Speech, however, can not be the Speech cause of the primary element of sound, which is the direct and as such has the effect of Self-consciousness

Similarly of the senses Speech concerns sound, in

action

(the

Motor

(Ahankara)

;

as speech itself (which also being one of senses, proceeds directly from the principle of Self-consciousness.

same cause

[179]
"

76
"

[K.

xxxv

xxxvi.]
the

The

rest,

i.

e.,

the fonr other senses
"

of action

excretory organs,
different objects,
e.

&c.,

concern Jive

objects"

because the
(tf

g. jar &c.,

which are the objects

these

senses, are all

made up

of the five primary elements of sound,

colour, &c.

l

the thirteen organs, some are said to be superior to reasons for which are given others,

Among

:

KiniKA

XXXV.

Since Buddhi with the other internal organs adverts
to (comprehends) all objects (of sense),
The superiority
intern il nai organs.
of over exter-

these three are said to be
(principal ones),

the warders
others

and the

the

gates (secondary).
(179).
Gates

Warders,

i. e.,

chief ones.

i. e.,

such as are the external organs.

Since Buddhi, with Ahankara and Manas, apprehends (i. ., determines) all objects exhibited by the
external organs, these latter are said to be
gates (secondary organs), and Buddhi, with the other internal organs, the warders (chiefs).

the chief, not only in comparison with the external organs, but also with regard to the other external or
is

Buddhi

gans,

Manas and Ahankdra.

To

this effect it is said:

KlRiKi XXXVI.
These (the external organs together with Manas and AhanJcdra), characteristically

Bering from
others

one another and being
of Attributes
;

accounted

different

modifications

resemble a lamp in action
such) having
present
first

(and as
purpose,

enlightened the Spirit

s

it in its

entirety to Buddhi.

[180181]
(180).
treasur ^r,

77

[K.

xxxvu.]

As the

village

officer collects

the rent from the

different heads of families

and

delivers

the collection to the

who

who

finally

makes

again, in his turn, carries it to the head-officer, it over to the king : so, in the same

manner, the external organs, having operated ofi (observed) an object, present the observation to Manas, which reflects on
it

(and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) presenting these qualified observations in turn to Ahankdra, which takes
specific cognizance of them, and finally delivers such personal Hence it is said: cognition to the head-officer, Buddhi.
"

These having enlightened the Spirit s purpose present

it

to

Buddhi."

The external organs together with Manas and In spite of diverse Ahankdra, are various affections of Attrin modifications of butes L e Goodness, A tTributel yet thl internal organs coFoulness and Dulness, which though
(181).
"

8

Sngto
a lamp.

plrposflike

Essentially opposed to one another, are yet brought to co-operate for the supreme
;

as the wick, oil and fire, though purpose of the Spirit just to the action of one another, yet join, under variously opposed the form of a lamp, in removing darkness, and thus illumine

(manifest) the different colours. The same the Attributes such is the connection.
;

is

the

case

with

An

objection

is

raised.

Why
.

should
,

it

be said that the

why Objection Buddhi not make subordinate to the
others
?

other organs present their impressions to , 7 77 TTT1 Buddhi? Why should not we make it
-,-,

,

qu ^e the other way
to

:

Buddhi subordinate

Ahankara

,

?

We
R
a

reply

:

KiRIKA XXXVII.
P
i

y

:

The
,1

Since
the
it is
01

it is
-?

Bucldlii that accomplishes

superiority of Buddhi accounted for, be-

bpirit S

enjoyment, and
-\

again
stibtle

Buddhi

that

exposes

the

di^rence
Spirit

between

Nature

and

and Matter.

Spirit

[182183]
(182).

78

[K.

xxxvu.]

Since the purpose of the Spirit is the only in centive to the action of the organs, that organ is supreme over others which accomplishes that purpose direct}^ and
;

since

it is

Buddhi alone that does

this,

it

is

supreme.

Just

as the chief minister, being the direct agent of the king, is supreme over other officials. Buddhi assumes the form of

the Spirit through its proximity to it, and as such leads to the accomplishment of its purpose. Sensation consisting either of pleasure or pain, resides in Buddhi, which is (reflected) in
the
Spirit

and

thus

leads

to

its

enjoyment.
of

As

the
are
;

observation,

reflection

and

consciousness

objects

transferred to
in the

Buddki through

their various modifications

same manner, the functions of the senses

also coalesce

the subordinate

with the functional determination of Buddhi, as the forces of officials do with that of the master.

(183).

The objector asks:

If

Buddhi only
s

serves

to

accomplish the Spirit

enjoyment, then no

lT?f;
the soul with pleasure, no Mukti, is
possible.

emancipation
ft
.

is

possible

We
the
>>

reply
T>

:-

it latterly Reply shows to the soul its distinction from
:

Matter.

nr * and Nature. By exhere is meant bringing about position Visinashti. the construction of Antaram ... * ^ *i to that of Odanapakam being similar
i 7

afterwards . . , between Spirit

exposes

difference

;

The
The
being

objector
difference will

retorts

:

the difference between Spirit and

Natm e
saying, ,. ln time

caused,

end and thus would
emancipation with ifc
-

being thus, according to your a caused one, must have an
;

own
end

cease

and thus

,

.,

(the Spirit could never

/,-.

.

.,

-,-,

attain to eternal Beatitude).
.

For Buddhi would continue help the Spirit to its enjoyment qf pleasure, and hence this latter could never attain to final beatitude which consist! in the total extinction of both pleasure and pain.
Visinasliti itself has been explained as f expresses the difference," then the mention of Antaram would seem superfluous. But. it is not so ; it helps
"

*

to intensify the

meaning

of the sentence.

[184-186]

79

[K.

xxxvm.]
;

We

reply

;

The

difference

has been everlasting

and the

^
Buddhi only serving
*

function of

only in exhibiting difference to the full view of the Spirit
lies

Buddhi

who then
^lf
is

recognises the fact that he himfy>m

the

loul^vlew!

the con something distinct mobile and modifiable Nature. stitutionally
;

(The distinction is not caused by Buddhi it the Spirit and Nature themselves). By this

is it is

as eternal as

also implied that emancipation is the sole purpose of the Spirit. The distinction of Spirit and Nature, however, is extremely subtle

and hard to be perceived.

The organs having been described, the author next descri bes objects, specific and non-specific
:

KAKIKA XXXVIII.

The

five

primary elements are non-specific
these five

;

from
ele-

The division of objects into specific and
non-specific.

proceed the five gross
latter
)

ments
.

;

these
(

are

said

to

be

p

specific

because

they

are

calm

(soothing), turbulent (terrific) and deluding.
(184). The Tanmdtras sound and the rest are subtle and the character of calmness, &c., do not belong to these. The word Matra denotes the capability of these elements of
;

being enjoyed.
(185).
objects

Having thus stated the
aro
described:
"From

non-specific, the
c."
<f

specific

these

From

the five

respectively

Tanmdtras, of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour proceed the five gross Elements Akasa, Air, Fire,
Earth.
Objection:
because

Waterand
(186).
,

we grant that these are thus produced but what about their specific character
.

;

?

Specific

soothing, tern fie deluding.

and

^y e rep ty L J
?

u

Tj

^

t

^

specific^

Why because"^?/ are calm, turbulent and deluding. The first ^ has a causal
"

and the second a

collective signification.

[187188]

80

[K.

xxxix.]

elements, A kasa, &c., some have the Goodness predominating in them and these others accordingly are pleasing, enlightening and buoyant in Foulness, and are turbulent, painful aricl fickle ; predominate

Among

the gross

attribute

of

;

(

;

the rest predominating in Darkness are dull, confounded and These elements, thus visibly discriminated, are sluggish.
specific

The primary elements on the contrary gross. cannot be similarly discriminated by ordinary people and as such they are said to be non-specific, i. e., subtle.
i. e.,
;

The

sub-divisions of the specific objects are stated

:

KiKIKA XXXIX.
Subtle
(astral) bodies

and such
together

as are

produced of
the
sorts

parents,
Je

with

d into:

(i)
(

elements,

form

the

three
these

gross of

produced
ents?

3

specific objects.

Of

the

subtle

the

Bodies are everlasting, and those duced of parents are perishable.
are specific objects
:

pro
thes e

(187).

"The

of three

sorts";

(1) Subtile bodies (which are not but are only postulated in order to explain certain visible, phenomena) (2) Those produced of parents, comprising the

three sorts are mentioned

;

sixfold Sheaths (Kosas). Among these latter, hair, blood flesh are produced from the mother and the veins, bones
;

marrow from the father then we have seen that
;

;

these six are the six
the subtile bodies

Kos as.
first
(

and and Thus
kind

form the

of specific objects bodies produced of parents, the second ; and the gross elements the third, objects like the jar, &c.,

being included in the

last.

(188).
The

The

difference

between a subtile body and a body
is

produced of parents
subtile bodies
of parents

stated
those
.,,

"

Sufctile

bodies are permanent
O J

and

produced
to
,.

arc permanent, those

produ&d

f

parents
\.
.

perishable"

perishable.

ending ash or

in
dirt.

f,.

,

.

...

that

is

sav
.
,"

(dissolving

into) either liquid,

[189190]

si

[K. XL.]

The Astral body

is

described.

KiuiKA XL.

The mergent,
The Astral Body
unconfined
is

subtle (astral) body,
vall
T
>

pernia-

nent, and migrating, invested with dispositions.

^confined, posed of Buddlli and the rest
>

formed primepemknent, com-

down

tO
is

the * primary
.

elements.

migrates,
is

without
with dispositions.
(189).

enjoyment, and

invested

When
and

the emanations
first

from Nature began, the
n
therefrom,
i_-\

Unconfined Permanent.

AJ -r Spirit individually, was the Astral Body. This body is unconfirmed^ inasmuch as it can
a
i

object to evolve
j
-j

for
i

each
i

enter even a solid piece of stone. It is again permanent since it exists all along, from the first creation to the final
"

"*

;

dissolution.

composed of Buddhi and the rest, That is to say, it is an of Buddhi, Ahankara, the eleven senses and the aggregate and as such it is specific, being five primary elements

The Astral Body is down to the primary

"

elements"

;

endowed with the properties of calmness,
dnlness.

restlessness

and

(190).
Objection
:

Objection

:

Let this astral body

TTn-

necessariness of postainting two bodies, astral and gross.

be the only body the seat of enjoyment for th e spirit What is the need of the gross i ,1 the six comprised oi physical body

,-111
:

/

sheaths

?

*,

The word niyata
body
is

is

vS&nkhya-Chandrika)
astral
astral bodies

He

differently interpreted by Narayana Tirtba (in his takes it in the sense of "restricted,"/.^, an
;

and so there are distinct restricted to one particular Spirit to each Spirit. The interpretation of Gaudap:".ds closoly
There does not seem to be an;- special the though I am more indiael

resembles that of the Kaumudi.

ground for preferring either of the two, interpretation of the Kauttiudl-

U

11

[191-192]

82
"

[

K

.

XL,]

We

reply

:

It

Necessity of the physical body, be-

migrates" i. e., the astral body invariably deserts the body it has lately occupied,* and J * r . .. again occupies another. (If it be asked)
.

.

why
"

does

is)

Jt do so ? ( we reply) (because it without enjoyment, that is to say,
"

because the astral body by itself without a corresponding gross physical body of six sheaths to afford the seat of enjoy ments, would be without any enjoyments, and therefore it
migrates.

(191).
Objection:

Objection

How
?

can the Astral Body imgrate,bemg without dispositions

Transmigration is due to merit and demerit; and these have no connection with A i i / r tne Astral Body ( referring as they do
:
,

1

j

r>

primarily to Buddhi, and then by reflecJ tion, to the Spirit) then how can this
.

latter migrate ?

We

"

reply

:

(because)

it

is

invested with

*

dispositions

The dispositions are merit and demerit, wisdom and ignorance, passion and endowed dispassion, power and weakness
;

with these primarily is the Buddhi, with which latter again the Astral Body is connected and as such the Astral Body
;

becomes mediately connected with the various dispositions, just as a piece of cloth is perfumed by contact with champaka, Thus then, being invested with dispositions, it flowers. becomes quite natural that the Astral Body should
migrate.
(If it is asked) why should not the Astral Bodylike Nature last even after the final

(192).

The Astral Body
dissolving praiaya.
at

dissolution

?

each

We
.

reply
is

mergent,
solves (into

that

to say,
its

(because because

it
.

is)
..

iu

dis

Nature

The mergent character of the Astral Body
from the
c

immediate cause). is to be inferred

fact of its being caused,

(i. e.,

such,
also).

having

a

beginning in time, it

being caused, and, as must have an end

[103]
Objection
:

83

[K.

XLL]

We
?

grant
senses
,
-,

all

this.

Objections :~Why not attribute migration to hAiddhi, &c.

migration to
?
,.
t>

Bat why not attribute Bucldhi, Ahankara and the
the
T>

Have done with
A
j

unwarranted

postulation 01 an Astral Body.

i

i

We

reply

:

KARIKA

XLL

As a

Reply the Buddhi cannot rest without
substrate.

painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a stake, so neither does
the

LlHQa

(Buddlli,

&C.,)
specific

Subsist
(body).

supportless, without a

(193).

Buddhi, &c., are called Lingd, because they are the
:

In cognition (Linganat, Jndpakdt, lingam)* between support of this the author puts forth a syllogism the ordinary physical death and re-birth, Buddhi and the rest

means of

have some sort of evolved body
they
are

for
five

their

aggregates of the

receptacle, because like primary elements
;

their prototypes in the ordinary physical body.
"

Without specific
the

bodies"

i.

.,

without subtle (astral)

bodies.
the Astral Body corthe roborated by

Testifying to this assertion,

we have

MahabhaTata.

following (from the Mahabharata) : "Then Yama extracted from Satyavan s ]
.

body, the thumb-sized body, which he had thus subjugated." Here the mention of the entrapped andj extracted body as "thumb-sized" implies the fact of its

having been the Astral Body, since
Spirit could have been extracted.
extract,
is

it is

By Purusha,
(lies

impossible that the in the above

meant the Astral Body,
that

derivatively as
(puri).

which sleeps

explaining the word s&te) in the body

Having thus proved the existence of the Astral Body, the author states the reason and method of its migration:
The PaneJiikarana-cirarana explanation of the word is given.
Cf.

*

Tatttoaek**driM-r-vr\xm a similar

[194-195]

84

[K.

XLII-XLIII.]

KARIKA XLII.

Formed

for

the

sake of the

Spirit

s

purpose the
parts

Astral
Keasons and man ner of the migration of the Astral Bod}.

Body

plays

its

Kke

a

dramatic

actor,

on account of the

connection of means and consequences, and by union with the predominant power of Nature.
(194).
plays like a

Formed

for the Spirit s purpose
"by

the Astral

Body

dramatic actor

connection with the means

merit, &c., and consequences, the occupation of different kinds of gross hodies, the effects of merit, &c. That is to say, as a dramatic actor, occpuying different stages, plays severally the

parts of Parasurama,

Yudhishthira, Vatsaraja so does the astral body, occupying various gross bodies, play the part of
plant.
is

man, brute or
(195).

(If it

asked) Whence this Astral Body ? We reply,

"

capability of the by union with the
"

The capacity of the Astral Body is due to the power of Nature.
.

predominant power of Nature" As is The various declared by the Puranas . are due to Nature s strange developments
:
"

-

omnipotence."

It has just
"

quences

;

by connection with means and conse the author therefore next describes these means and

been

"

said,

consequences

:

KARIRA XLI1I.

The

essential dispositions are innate ; the incidental such as merit, &c., are seen ones,

sequences

The means and conDharma,

(considered) to be appurtenant
.,
,
.
-,

to the
,

& c.
.

organs
_
.

;

the uterine germ, &c., belong
_

to the effect.*
(

* It

may be
firlt

In the
"

pointed out that Davies has quite misunderstood this Ka rika place, he renders S&m-siddkikdk by transcendental", the very
"

.

reverse of

what

it

does mean.

Secondly

he renders
<;

Karanasrayinak by
located in
organs"

though in reality the compound means as explained by the J&inmudi as well as the Chandrikd.
including
cause",

[196199]
lcntal
dis

85

[K. XLIV.]

"

f
,
"

(196). Incidental = consequent brou g ht about affcer the mau s birth
;

i.

e. y

>

by

propitiating the gods, &c.
*

Essential dispositions are innate" e. g., it is declared that at the boo;! lining of the creation the revered
1

primeval sage Kapila emerged into exist ence, fully equipped with merit, wisdom, and power. Incidental dispositions, on the other dispassion hand, are not innate, that is to say, they are brought about by such merit, &c., are those belonging to personal effort
;

Valmiki and other Great Eishis.
The
o posites of &c., simi-

same
to

*s

^

be nn ^ er stood with regard

ly explained.
(197).

demerit, ignorance, passion and

weak

The agrregate formed of the uterine germ, flesh, blood, &c., of the child in the mother s

Flesh, blood, &c., related to the gross

W0 mb,
body
;

is

related
is

to

the gross physical
f

that

to

say,
;

states of the latter

they are particular as are also the child

hood, youth, &c., of the born man.

(198).

explained

means

means and the consequences have been the respective consequences of the various are described.
;

The

now

KARIK! XLIV.

By
C
the
*

virtue
e

(is

obtained) ascent to higher vice, descent to the lower

planes
;

by from wis;

f

vTiS means.

dom

(results) beatitude

;

and bondage

from the reverse.
"

(199).
various
stai>

By

virtue,

fa."

i.

e.,

to

the
the

ry

spheres (the ,Brahma,
forth.)

Prajapatya and so

[200]
"

86

[K. XLIV.]

Vice to lower.

By

vice,

#c." i.

e.,

to the lower planes

,

known

as sutala, &c.

"

From wisdom,

beatitude."

Nature ministers to

&e

ex

perience of the Spirit discriminative wisdom

only so long as is not attained ;
attained,

when,
finds its
fulfilled,
"

however, this

is

Nature
Spirit

work in connection with that and accordingly retires from him.
till
"

particular

As

is

declared,

The workings of Nature continue only
knowledge."

the attainment of
$*c."

discriminative

From

the reverse,

i. e*

y

from

false

knowledge, results bondage.
This bondage
6

(200).

is

also

of three kinds
Personal.

:

Incidental
oflhe^bove, reTp^tiveiy, contradictory
S
11*

and

The

Natural, natural

bouda g e

is

that of those

Materialists
;

who

kinds Q f bondage*

contemplate on Nature as the Spirit with reference to such men, it is laid down in
the Puranas
"

The contemplators of the nnmanifested (Nature) continue (in the chain of metempsy end of chosis) till a hundred thousand years" [at the
:

which they attain
is

of those

as Spirit,

wisdom]. The incidental bondage who contemplate on the. various products of Nature the elements, the senses, Ahankdra and Buddhi.
to true to these
it is

With regard

laid

down
;

"

:

Th e
;

the senses continue

till

ten Manvantaras

contemplators of those of the ele

ments, till a hundred Manvantaras those of Ahankara, till a thousand and lastly, those of the Buddhi havin g done away with all feverish excitement, continue till ten thousand
;

Manvantaras.

Those labouring under the incidental bondage

are (conventionally called) Videkas?
is due to Ishtdpurta (actions done such as the digging of tanks, &c., cbne with the sole motive of personal gains hereafter). Thos6

The personal bondage
selfish motives,

with

performing such actions, having their minds influenced by desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as

such undergo bondage.

[201203]

87

[K. XLV.]

IURIKA XLV.

From

dispassion results

vaSf

*

absorption* into Prakriti ; from passionate attachment, transmi;

gration

from

power,
;)

ment
reverse, the contrary.
"

(of

desires

and

non-impedifrom the

(201).

From dispassion
Those wll

results absorption into

Prakriti"

L Absorption into Prakriti frdnidispas-

are free

from passion, but are

ignorant of the true nature of spirit, are absorbed into Nature. By Prakriti here are

meant

Prakriti, Buddhi, AJiankdra, the

Elements, and the

senses. Those who meditate upon these as Spirit are absorbed into these (i. e. those mis taking the senses for the Spirit

become absorbed
they rest there

in

till,

the senses, and so on), that is to .say, in the course of time, they are born again.
migration"

(202).
,

"From

passionate attachment results

II.

Transrmgra-

tion

from passionate

implies the painr because fnl character of metempsychosis
"passionate"
.

The epithet
(as

;

has been previously described) passion

is

the source of pain.

(203).
III.

"From

power,
/T
,

non-impediment"
"

i.

e.,

the

non-

obstruction of desires.
Non-impcdi\
-\

A
-\

powerful
-\

man
i

ment from power.
1

(Iswara)
wishes."

is

one who can do whatever he

* Davies takes the Hindu commentators to task, here, and remarks (the Sankhya) does not recognise any absorption of the subtle body into Hence the meaning is that by Nature, until the soul is entirely free
:

"It

the destruction of passion, the influence of the material world

is

destroyed,

and the soul is independent, though not yet finally liberated." All this is quit * true but I don t see how this affects the position of the Hindu cpmmentators, who, at least Vachaspati Misra among them, do not assert the final absorption of the bodies into Nature all that they mean is that by dispassion, the soul or more properly, its seat, the astral body is absorbed into Nature and rests there till it is born again. It may be remarked that
; ;

this resting

is what, in theosophic parlance, enjoyed by the Individuality in Devachaiv

is

called

<;

tjhe

peaceful rest

[204-205]
"

88

[K. XLVI.]

IV. Obstruction of
desires
ness.

From
r.
-i

^e

reverse" i. e.
i.

form weakness,

from weak-

"the

contrary"

e.,

the frequent obstruc-

,.

tion of desires.

With a view to describe collectively as well as individually, the eight properties of Buddhi virtue, vice, &c., in order to show which of these are to be practised, and which relinquish the author first describes ed, by those desiring emancipation
them
collectively
:

KlMKl XLVI.
This
is

an
1

intellectual

creation,

distinguished by

Error, Disablity, Contentment and Per-

cr^n^lST

***<>*.

By

the hostile influence of
of
attributes,
fifty.

the

inequalities

the

different forms of this creation

become

Pratyaya == That by which anything is known, i. e. y Buddhi. "Error" i. e., ignorance, is a proli. perty of Buddhi; so is also "disabUty" which Disability. in. Contentment, results from the incapacity of the senseJ IV. Perfection. Contentment and Perfection also organs.
(204).
are properties of

Buddhi

as will be described later on.

Of these,

the three former, error, disability and content ment include Virtue and the other six intellectnal properties

edTu rotbovefout

dom which
(205).
above
"

is

leaving aside Wisincluded in Perfection.
;

IS fi%

These properties are next considered individually. The forms of these are fifty" If it is 0fthe asked: Whence these fifty forms? We
reply
"from

the

hostile

influence

of the
(

inequalities

of

the

attributes"

The inequality may consist

strength of the one in comparison with the other two, or of two conjointly with that of the third. This inquality is assumed to be more or less in accordance with the requirements of particular cases ; and it leads to the
either in the individual

[206208]

89

[K. XLVII.-- XLVIII.]

suppression of Attributes by one another the fifty forms of intellectual creation.

thus giving rise to

The

tifty

forms are next enumerated

:

KARIKA XLVII.

There are

five

5 forms of Error. 28 of Disability. 9 of Contentment, 8 of Perfection.
so"

twenty-eight of Disability, arising from the imperfecJ
;
;

forms of

Error

tion of the organs 3
.

Contentment has
eight.
egotism,

nine forms

;

and reriection
are
the

(206).

The forms*

of

Error
to

ignorance,

passion, hatred and

body: respectively called, obscurity (Tamos), delusion (Moha). extreme delusion (Mahamoha), gloom ( Tamisra), and utter darkness (Andha-

attachment

Egotism, &c., partake of the nature of Error ; tamisra). as a matter of fact, they are its products. certain though,

A

object being erroneously determined by Ignorance, Egotism

and the

rest,

attached to

it.

partaking of the nature of Ignorance, become It is for this reason that the revered Varshato be

ganya (Vytisa ?) declares Ignorance component parts.

made up

of the five

(207). Now the author states the sub-divisions of the forms of error
:

five

KARIKA XLVIII.

Of Error
sions

there are eight forms, as also of Delusion

;

sixty-two subdiviof^Error.

extreme Delusion

is

ten-fold
is

;

Gloom

^

e ighteen-fold,

and so
"

also utter

Darkness.
"
>

Of

ignorance-

(208).
tj iere

Of Error

i. e.,

of Ignorance,

eight forms.

are eight forms"

is a technicality of Yoga Philosophy. It is defined by Patanjali {Yoga Sutra 11-9) as the "tenacity of life an attachment to the bqdy which relates the residue of one s former life,"

* Abkinivcsa

12

[209212]

90

[K. XLVIIL]

Ignorance of the form of Error consists in mistaking nonEight of Delusion.

non

Nature, Buddhi, Akankdm and. . , f the subtle elements, for Spirit ; and these spiritual things are eight in number, Error is said
spiritual
.

.

to be eight-fold.

(209).

The

^ refers

the eight forms to Delusion.

The

gods having attained the eight occult powers, consider them selves to be immortal, and their powers also to be everlasting
this is the error

;

Siddkis for

its

of Egotism, and since this has the eight object, it is said to be eight-fold.

is ten-fold" By Extreme meant the attachment to the f Extreme objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest DehSon. which are ten-fold, each of the five being and hence having these for its either divine or otherwise Extreme Delusion is said to be ten-fold. object,

(210).

"Extreme

Delusion
is

Delusion

;

"

(211).
fc (

Gloom"

i. e. 9

Hatred,

"

is

eighteen-fold."

The

objects of sense,

sound, &c., are ten by

Gloom

but only as means

themselves the eight occult powers how-^ ever are not objects of sense by themselves, to the attainment of the various sensuous
;

And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive, objects. their means the Powers too are retarded. The Powers,
together with the objects of sense, make up eighteen, and these being the objects of Gloom or Hatred, make it eighteenfold.

(212).

"So

is

Utter

Darkness"

[Utter

Darkness =
"tathd"

Attachment
f

to

life].

The word

*****

refers eighteen-fold-ness to Utter

Darkness.
sensuous

The gods having attained the eight occult
powers and enjoying their consequences
objects
live in continual fear of these
;

the

ten

being wrested from them

by

th/}

attachment

Kakshasas and this fear constitutes Abkinivesa, or and this latter having for its object the aforesaid
;

eighteen things the eight powers said to be eighteeu-fold.

and the ten objects

is

[213216]
(213).
siond

91

[K. XLIX.]

Thus the five forms of Error, with their sub-divibecome sixty-two.

(214). Having thus described the five forms of Error, the author next states the twenty eight forms of Disability :

KARIK! XLIX.

The

injuries of the

eleven organs,* together with those of Buddhi, are pronounced to be

tadti&X.*
The

Disability; the injuries of Buddhi ( itself) are seventeen brought about
perfection.

by the reversion of contentment and
(215).

The Eleven

injuries of the organs are mentioned as causes f so many injuries of Buddhi, and not
as,

caused by injuries to

by themselves, independent forms of These Disability. injuries-" Deafness,
(failure of the sensibility of the olfactory

leprosy, blindness, paralysis, paralysis of the hands, lameness,

dumbness, ajighratd

nerves), impotency, failure of the action of the bowels, and idiocy," consequent on the failure of the various sense-

organs, are the eleven kinds of intellectual disability, and these are mentioned together with those of Buddhi (itself) in

accordance with the theory of the non-difference of cause and
effect.

(216).

Having thus described the
arising
,
,,

Seventeen caused

by the reversion
fection.
,
"

of

contentment of per-

disabilities of Buddhi, from those of the sense-organs, the ,. .,.,. , ^ , 7I ., disabilities of Buddhi itself are next stated With the injuries of Buddhi" If it be
.

,

,

,

_

asked

111how

many

are these?

J.-L

o

we
"

i

reply,

seventeen are the injuries of Buddhi" Wherefore ? by the reversion of contentment and perfection" Contentment being the disabilities caused by its reversion are nine-fold nine-fold,

and similarly perfection being eight-fold, the disability caused by its reversion is eight-fold, thus making the
also
;

seventeen intellectual disabilities proper.

[217220]
(217).

92

[K. L.]

The author next enumerates the nine forms of Contentment
l

:

Nine forms of Contentment
Nine forms
quiescence.
of

are set forth

:

four in-

Ac-

ternal

relating
tf

severally

to

nature,
five

means ^

me and

luck

;

and

ex

ternal, relating to abstinence

from objects of sense.

(218).

The

five internal

forms of Contentment belong to
ascertained that Spirit
is

form Nature, but still being illfor ms do not make further attempts in advised, the direction of meditation, &c., which are the means of discriminative wisdom and these forms are called internal^
differ ent
.

T

e

^

those
intemal

who have

;

because they pre-suppose the difference of Atman and Prakriti. which are these? the reply is "relating It being asked
severally to nature^ means, time are nature &c.

and

luck" i.

.,

whose names

(219).

The contentment called

"prakriti"

consists in

the

on being told that discriminative wisdom is only a modification of Prakriti and, as such, would come to every one in the natural course of events, and there is no need of
satisfaction of the
disciple

hankering after
also called

it by meditation, Ambha.

&c.,

and

this

contentment
t
.

is

(220).
II.

The second form of contentment arises from the wisdom could not following instruction
:

Salila.

,

because,

if it

be attained in the ordinary course of nuture; were so, then everybody would attain to wisdom,
alj,

,

.

j

.

,.

,.

because the course of nature for the forms of nature affects
individuals
equally.
;

Such wisdom could only be attained through asceticism and so thou must follow an ascetic life and give up all meditation, &c. The satisfaction arising from
the above instruction
is

called Salila.

[221224]
(221).

93
third

[K..L.]

The

form, called

"Time,"

or Og/ta,

is

the

arising from the instruction that asceticism too cannot bring about Emancipation for all means await the proper Time for bring ing about their various consequences, and so when the Time
satisfaction
;

has arrived, one s ends will be gained without undergoing the troubles of asceticism.

(222).
.

The fourth form
.
"

called

"Luck,"

or

Vriskti, is the
:

satisfaction

arising

from the following

Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from nature, nor from any other means (such as asceticism, &c.), nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by
luck.

Thus it was through mere luck that the children of Madalasa when quite infants, obtained wisdom by their mother s instructions and thereby attained beatitude.
(223).

The external forms of Contentment are
eXtCrnal

five,

arising

^
foras.

fromfabstinence from sound, odour, &c. the five bJ ects f Sense These belon g to

those who are free from all attachment, but take the non-spirits Nature, &c,, to be Spirit. These forms are called external, because they pre-suppose the and these existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is
;

The causes of this nonattachment being five, it is five-fold, and consequently so is the contentment resulting therefrom. The objects of sense being five,,the abstinence from these must also be five-fold.

come

after

freedom from attachment.

Abstinence too

is

due to the preception of discrepancies in the

process of sensuous enjoyment

consisting mainly of earning, wasting, enjoying, killing lives and so on. saving,

^224).

To

explain

:

The means of acquiring wealth,

"

following

:

are invarably the sources of pain to the servants as is declared in the Who would ever be attracted towards service,
service, &c.,
"

considering the pain caused by the insults to^ be suffered at the contentthe hands of the wardens of a vain monarch ?

[225229]
ment

94

[K. LI.]

resulting from abstinence from objects of sense to the consideration of such troubles, is called Para.

due

(225).

And

then, the wealth being obtained, brings with it the further trouble of protecting it from

the

king,

thieves,

floods

and

fire

the

contentment due to abstience arising from such considerations is the second called Supdra.
(226).
Thirdly,

the wealth

having been obtained and

safely hoarded, there arises the fear of its being spent this consideration gives rise to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment called

Pdrdpdra. (227). Fourthly,
IV. AnuUam&mbtia.

when
i>

one
/

becomes

accustomed
,

to

non-fulfilment of these brings

sensuous objects, his desires increase ; the .1 r i ini j.i about the

fourth, called Anuttamambha.

(228).
V.

Lastly, there arises the notion that there can be no enjoyment (either in this world or the Uttam&mbha. n n 1V ,, i -,, other), without the cruel process of killing

*\

\

l

-

animals, and contentment due to the abstinence arising from the perception of the cruelty of the process, is the fifth
called Uttamambha.

the five internal ones, above.

Thus the four external froms of contentment, together with make up the nine froms mentioned

(229). The author next secondary divisions of Power

describes

the

primary

and

:

KlRiKA

LI.

The
-

eight Powers

(i. e.,

means of acquiring them) are
oral

three-fold suppression of pain, acquisi The three before mentioned tion of friends, and purity. (Error, &c.) are checks to these (Powers).

The eight powers.

reasoning,

instruction,
.

/

study,

V

[230-235]

95

[K. LI.]

(230). The chief among those enumerated above is the threefold suppression of pain three-fold on account of the three-fojdness of the pains to be suppressed.

The o^her means mentioned, being means

to power only

through the three-fold suppression of pain, are culled seconda And these five are both causes and effects. Of these ry.
study is only a cause. The three principal ones (suppression of pain) being only effects the rest are both cause and effect. The first, study, named Tdra, consists in compre (231).
;

hending the sense
sciences

of the

psychological

by listening to the teachings of a

qualified teacher.

(232).

The

effect of this last, oral instruction, implies the

(2) Sutara.

tions, it being

comprehension of the meaning of instruc* ,. .^ a useful habit with writers,
,
, .
, ;

to imply the effect by the cause Siddhi called Sutara.

this constitutes the second

(233).

Reasoning consists in the investigatin of the meaning of scripture by a process of dialetics not tara
consists in

investigation all doubts and objections with scripture by setting aside regard to it; this process is also called meditation by writers on the

contrary to the scriptures themselves. This strengthening the portion of the

Vedas, and the Power due to this
(234).
(4)

is

called Tdrdtara.

The fourth

Eamyaka

the acquisition of friends. Even though one has arrived at truth by the right process of reasoning yet he has no
is

faith in his conclusions until he has talked

his

teacher and follow-students.

them over with Hence the acquisition of
is

a

qualified teacher

and follow-studeuts
is

said to be the fourth

Siddhi called Ramya/ta. (235). By dana here
(5) Sadamudita.

meant purity
purify.
"

(of discriminative wis-

dom)-deriving the
*

word from the root

= to

As

is

declared .by the

Davies remarks that the root is coined for the occasion." But I may refer the reader to the 8iddMnt-a-auiiiudf, Under the Sutra S&nyojaiUh (VI/4/68).

*

[236238]
revered
"

96

[K. LI.]

An unimpeded discriminatve knowledgePatanjali is the means to the suppression of pain." (Yoga-Sutra 1126). By unimpededness in the Sutra is meant purity, by which again is meant the process of placing discriminative wisdom on
:

a clear basis, 4 after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions mixed with different kinds of cravings or desires] This purity is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a
.

long and uninterrupted course of practice (of the wisdom Thus the word dana includes (as a means to power) attained).
Practice also.

This

is

the

fifth,

called Sadd-Mudita.

(236). The three primary means to Power are called, Pramoda Mudita and Modamdna. And these three with the
last five are the eight

(means

to)

Power.
:

(237).

Others explain the distich thus The perception of truth without the instruction of others,
t>>gW;

about purely by means of instrucis

tions received in past births

what

is

meant by uka.
the tenets of the

And

that which

is

obtained by listening to
as learnt

Sankhya Philosophy

by

others, is

the second called Sdbda, because it follows merely from the study of the text. When the truth is learnt at a teacher s, in

the

company of folio w-students, it is said to be the known as study, because it is brought about by study.

third,

The

fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in contact with a friend who has already got it. Fifthly, gene
rosity is said to be a
is

means

to

wisdom, because true wisdom

imparted by the teacher, duly propitiated with gifts.

The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the learned to judge and we desist from pointing out the faults of others, because our duty lies only in elucidating the cardi
;

nal doctrines of the Sankhya Philosophy.

(238).

The

Disabilities of

of Cootentment and

Buddhi arising from the reversion Power thus become seventeen in number.
desired by

Of the different poritions known that Power is most

of intellectual creation, it is wellall. So the author next

mentions Error, Disability and Contentment as impediments

[239240]
to

97

[K. LIL]
9

Power

"

:

The aforesaid

three are checks to

Power.

The

aforesaid three refers to Error, Disability and Contentment. And these are curbs to the different means of attaining Power,

because they retard their progress and thus being opposed to Power, the latter three are ever undesirable.
;

(239).

Objection:

Granted
is

all this.

But

it

has been laid

This pur can be fulfilled either by the intellectual creation alone ; pose or by the elemental alone. Why have both ?
clown that the creation
for the Spirit s purpose.

The reply

is

:

KARIKA LIL

Without dispositions there would be no Linga (Element), and without the Linga there Necessity of twofold creation.

would be no development of

tions.

Wherefore proceeds a

disposi two-fold creation, the

personal (belonging to the body, astral and gross) and
Intellectual.

(240).
elements-;

Linga denotes the creation composed of the primary and disposition, the intellectual.
of the Karika
is

The meaning
cannot manifest
Spirit,

that the elemental creation

itself for the fulfilment of the
;

purpose of the

nor conversely is the latter capable of having its complete manifestation with out the elements. Hence the necessity of a two-fold creation.

without the intellectual creation

Again experience, the purpose of the
in the absence of the

Spirit, is not -possible

two bodies and the
necessity of the

ob
*

Jt

of sense.

Hence the

elemental creation.
Necessity of
intellectual

the

ere a-

conversely ,the the sense-organscould never be complete without the three

And

meaus of experience

internal organs Manas Ahankara and Buddhi. Nor would these latter be what they are, if there were no dispositions, virtue, &c. And lastly, discriminative

13

[241245]
wisdom

98

[K. LIII.]

the only means to emancipation, would not be without the above two kinds of creation. Whence possible the necessity of the double creation.

(241).

plained as
11

^

creationT

The possible objection of reciprocal causality is explained away as being similar to that of the seed and the s P rout due to the fact due to of the creation having had no beginning f 7 in time ( bein eternal), and the creation of bodies and dispositions at the beginning
^"

of the present cycle is said to be due to the impulse of residual tendencies left by the bodies and (dispositions related to particular Spirits), in the previous cycle.

(242). The various forms of the intellectual creation hav ing been mentioned, the author next mentions those of the elemental creation :

KlRiKl LIU.

The divine
The force
of eie-

class

has

eight
;

varieties,
is
ig

the

lower
in

mental creation.

^

animals, five

mankind

single

dags; thus briefly

the

worl( j

of living beings.
(243).
The
go

The eight divine
Pajapatya,

varieties

are the

Brahma, the

the

eight

Gandharva,
the Paisacha.

Aindra, the Paitra, the Yaksha, the Rakshasa and

(244)1
five of

The

five varieties of

the lower

animals.

lower animals are quadrupeds than deer), deer, birds, creeping (other things and the immovable (trees, &c.)
t

(245).
Mankind

Mankind is single, not counting its sub-divisions Brahmanas &c., as separate, as the bodily
singta.

formation

is

the

same

in all

classes

of

men.

[246248]
,

99

[K. LIV

LV.]

(246).
of
tlife

The author

next

lays

down

the

three-foldness

elemental creation based on the excess or

otherwise

of intelligence in the form of the higher, the middle the lower
:

and

KAIUKA LIV.

Among
The

the beings of the
:

higher

WjbS
Brahma
(247).
Heavcnly

predominates lower predominates Dulness; in the of the Attributes. middle reside those predominating in Foulness these constituting the whole Universe, from
different divi-

plane Goodness among those of the

to the tuft of grass.

The Heavenly

regions

Bhnvah,

Swah, Mahah,

Jana, Tapas and Satya predominate in Goodness. Those consisting of the lower

animals and trees, &c., are characterised by The regions of the earth consisting of the seven Dvipas (or continents,) and Oceans predominate in Foulness, inasmuch as they abound in pain and are given to actions,
Dnlness.
righteous or otherwise. o

The whole
"from

of the Universe
to the tuft

is

summed up

in

the pharse

Brahma

of grass."
creation, the author

(248).

Having thus described the
its

next describes

productiveness of pain, that would lead to of the means to Emancipation dispassion,*one
:

KARIKA LY.
There
Ttie

(in the
of

world) does the Sentient Spirit experience pain, arising from decay and death, due to the non-discrimination

sources

^ am

"

of the Spirit from the body, until it is released from its person (until the dissolution of the astral hody) where
;

fore pain

is

natural.

[249251]

100

[K.

LVL]

Among
death, the

corporeal beings there are many varieties of experi ence interspersed with pleasure and pain

;

Pain of decay and

common
1

lot of all creatures.

ye t the pain of decay and death is the * common lot of all. The fear of cteath,

P.I

be

"

&c.

being

may common

"

I not cease to be

;

may

I continue to

to

man

as

well as to the smallest
is

insect,

and the cause of fear constituting pain, death

a

source of pain.*

of

(249). Buddhi

;

Pleasure and pain are the properties Objection: and as such how can these be said to belong to

the Spirit?

Reply

:

(the
e

name)

meaning One who sleeps in the astral body" and this latter bein S connected with Buddki and
"

Puruska"

"

literally

;

its properties,

leads to the idea of the Spirit

being connected with them.

(250).
"

Question

:

How
?

can pain related to the body be

said to belong to the Spirit
"

Reply

:

Due

to the

the

non-discrimination of Spirit from The Spirit, not alive to its dis body."

tinction

ations of the

latter for its

own.

from the body, mistakes the fluctu The srr in sflftRf^** may be

taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit s pain the mean Until the body has ceased to be, the Spirit suffers ing being,
"

pain."

(251).

The author next decides the question ofthe Maker
:

of the Universe

lUniKl
This creation from Buddhi
The question as to the Maker oft he Universe decided.

LV.I.
^

down
i

to the
n^^
.

specific

ele

ments,

is

brought about by the m6din

fications

of
,
,

T Fraknti.

(

I he
.

work
/.

^

is
-.

done

for

the

emancipation

ol

each

* It may be worth noting here that Death in itself is not pain, it is only the fear (the fear of the unknown) that makes the thought of death so painful*

[252-254]
.Spirit,

101

[

K

.

LVI.]

and thus
if it
*

is

for

another

s

sake,

though appear
herself.
it is

ing ds

were

for the sake of
is

Nature

(252).

The creation

brought about by Nature
is
it

;

The different views
of the cause of creation set aside.

neither produced by a God, jnor evolution from Brahman nor can
;

it

an

be said

,

Uncaused since, in this latter case, the Universe would be either an eternal
to be
;

TT

,

.

.

.

,

.

.

.

It cannot be said entity or eternal non-entity (an absurdity). to be evolved from Brahman (the Vedanta view), for there can

be no (material) modification of pure intelligence, Brahman, as postulated by Vedanta. Nor, again can creation be said to be

brought about by Nature under the guiding hand of a God for a God is naturally without action and, as such, cannot be the supervisor, just as an inactive carpenter cannot be said to
;

manipulate his

tools.

(253).
Objection:
activl,

Granted that the creation is due to Objection Nature alone. But Nature is eternally Nature
:

no^emanc^

active

pation possible.

never cease

and aS SUch her Operations should and hence there would be no
>

;

emancipation of any Spirit.

The creation appearing as if it were for Nature s own sa^e is really for the sake of anThe creation is for the spirit s other A cook, having finished the cookend and ceases with , ., , from the work the purification of similarly ing,- retires
"

Reply
.

:

t

.

.

;

thcsc
t

Nature being urged to action

for the

eman
;

and cipation of the Spirit, brings about this emancipation thenceforth cease her operations with regard to the Spirits already liberated (and, thus emancipation is not impossible).
(254).
*
"

Objection

But it is only can act towards something sentient that

.-Granted

all

this.

N^ insentient* cannot act towards a definite end.

the fulfilment of
;

its

own

or of another
,

s

purpose and Nature being insentient cannot
act

m the

manner

described,; and, as such,

she requires a sentient supervisor

(over

her blind

force)

;

[255

255a]

102

[K. LVIT.]

the Spirit residing in the body cannot be snch a supervisor, because snch conditioned Spirits are ignorant of the character of Nature consequently there must be somfl other
""true

;

sentient

agent,

Nature

and
:

*.o

superintending ab extra the operations of this we giv.e the name God.

We
As

reply

KARIKA LVII.
the insentient
^

milk flows out

for the

growth
operate of the

instance of an in-

tne ca ^fj so ^ oes Nature

$*$&&
nitc end.

towards
Spirit.

the

emancipation

(255).

It is a fact of observation that insentient
e.g.,

objects

also act towards definite ends,

the action of milk towards
Similarly

the nourishment

of

the

calf.

Nature,

though

insentient, could act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.

(255a).
Tne
view
Personal

It
ot
,

would not be right to urge that the production of the milk being due to the superintenda
ing car e of God, its action cannot afford a case parallel to the action of insentient

Universal

Nature

because all actions of an intelligent agent are due ; either to selfishness, or benevolence, neither of which can be

said to be the cause of the creation of the Universe, which,
therefore, cannot be said to be due to the action of

an intel For God, being the Lord of the Universe, has ligent agent. all that he requires and, as such, He can have no selfish motive nor can His action be said to be due solely to pity for pity consists in a desire for the removal of others pains but before creation, Spirits were without bodies, and, as such, without pain, for the removal of which God s compassion And if the pain subsequent to crea^ would be moved. said to be the cause of creation, then we should tion were
; ;

;

be in the inextricable nooze of reciprocality the creation due to pity, and pity due to the creation. And again if God were moved to creation by pity, then he would create none
:

[256258]
,but

103

[K. LVIII..]

happy mortals. And if the diversity of pleasures be attributed to the past deeds of the individual Spirit, then what isi the necessity of postulating a supervisor ? And if you urge the incapability of mere Karma an unintelligent

agent without a supervisor, towards creation, then we reply, that the creation of bodies, &c., being incapable of being produced by Karma, we may very easily say the same with
regard to pleasure, &c., as well (and, pleasure, &C M will have to be attributed to God also).

The action of the non-intelligent Prakriti is due neither to selfishness nor to mere pity; None of the above to and thus in this case, none of the above objections apply the case of Nature. faults afe applicable> The ou]y motive of
(256).

Nature

is

the purpose of

the
is

Spirit.

Thus therefore the

instance cited in the Karika

quite appropriate.

(257). It has been The author explains this

said
:

"as

if

for

its

own

purpose"

LVIII.

As
The
ture.

people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does
the

Unmamfested
act
. .

Spirit s

end

Principle

(Nav

the motive of Na-

ture) , c

for

the

emancipation of

the opirit.
Desire
is.

satisfied

which
is

the purpose of the agent only that which is desired.
is

on the attainment of the desired object because an end of action
;

Th3 similarity Principle act for
i

is

pointed out

:

"So

does the Unmanifested
1

the

Emancipation of Spirit.
:

We grant that the purpose of the motive to the action of Nature, but whence the Spirit the cessation of her operations ?
(258).
is

Objection

We

reply

:

[259260]

104

[K. LIX

LX.]

KARIKA LIX.

As

The cause of the cessation of Natiti-e s

a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the spectators of the stage, ceases to
dance, so does Nature cease to operate when she has made herself mani

fest to the Spirit.

the place implies the spectators,? stage," the occupiers of the place. Having manifested herself i. e., her different modifications, sound, &c., as different from
"

The word

the Spirit.

(259).

Objection:

We

grant the action of Nature for

the Spirit s purpose. But she is sure to get some compensa tion for her pains from the Spirit just as a servant does from his gratified master and as such the motive of Nature
;

cannot be said to be purely

altruistic.

We

reply

:

KARIK! LX.
Generous Nature, endowed with attributes, causes ^J manifold means, without benefit to Nature expects no
compensation.

herself, the

good of the

Spirit,
(

who

is

devoid of attributes, and as such ungrateful.

qualified servant accomplishes the good of his un* qualified master, through purely unselfish motives, without
benefit to himself; so does generous Nature, endowed with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good

As a

any

in return to herself.

Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature^

motives

is

established.

(260). Objection: We grant all this But a dancing girl having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it
:

[261

2G2]

105

[K. LXI

LXIL]

would .again, if so desired by the spectators ; similarly act eVen after having manifested herself to Spirit.

Nature

We

%eply

:

IURIKA LXI.

Nothing

is

more modest than Nature
.

:

such

is

my

The reason why Nature does not revert to her actions.

Once aware of having been opinion. _ seen, she does not again expose herselt
.
.

,

.

to the

view

ot the spirit.

modesty here is meant delicacy (of manners), the to the Purusha s view. As a wellinability to suffer exposure tmvisible to the Sun, with her eyes cast down, having bred lady her body uncovered by chance, happening to be seen by a stranger, tries to hide herself in such a way as not to be seen

By

even more modest than such a lady so Nature again having once been seen by the Purusha, will is no case show
;

herself again.

But Purusha, being Let-this be so. (261). Objection: devoid of Attributes and Modifications, how is his emancipa
For emancipation consists in the removal of bondage and bondage being only another name for the karmic residua imbued with dispositions and troubles, it is not possible And as the Purusha is devoid to the unmodifying Purusha. which latter is only another of action it can have no migration
tion possible
;

?

name

for

death.
is

Hence

it is

a meaningless assertion that

the creation

for the purpose of

Purusha.
it
:

The author meets the above objection by accepting

KARIK! LXII.
Verily no Spirit
*
I

is

bound,
;

or
is

Bondage

and

re*

lease in reality ply to Nature.

ap-

migrates has many receptacles, that or is released, or migrates.
.

it

emancipated, or Nature alone which
is is

bound,

(262).

No

emancipated.

Spirit is bound not any migrates nor is any Nature alone, having many receptacles (bodily
;
;

14

[263]

106

[K. LXIII

LXIV.]

forms of being), is bound, migrates and is released. migration and release are ascribed to the Spirit, in

Bondage,
the same the king, it is the

manner
though

as defeat

and victory are attributed
;

to

actually occurring to his soldiers

because

servants that take

which

gain

part in the undertaking, the effects of In the same accrue to the king. or loss

manner, experience and

release, though really belonging to are attributed to the Spirit, on account of the nonNature, discrimination of Spirit from Nature. Thus the objection
all its force.

above urged loses

tion

(263). Objection: We understand that bondage, migra and release, are ascribed to the Spirit but of what good are these to Nature ?
;

We

reply

:

LXIII.

Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven forms sne causes deliverance for the Nature binds and
5

" S h

S elf

of he r

ow^

^efit
Qne f

of thb

Spirit,

by

means of
"

developments.
"

orm>

Nature binds herself by means of seven forms ( i. e. dispositions) all the properties of Buddhi, save discriminative wisdom. For the benefit of the Spirit she releases herself by herself, by means of one form, viz., discriminative wisdom. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience
or emancipation of the

same Spirit. __ ____

(

Objection

:

We
that

grant

What KABIK! LXIV.
all this.

then

?

Thus

it is

by the
attained,

practice

of truth,
is

wisdom

is

which

The form and characterofdiscriminative

,,.-,,
:

complete,

inconT

wisdom.

trovertible,

(and
(by
not,

absolute
idea
is

ana hence) pure, means of wnicn the
naught
is

obtained that)
exist."

"

I

am

mine, and

I

do not

[2G4
,

267]

107
cc

[K. LXIV.]

(264).

The word

trnth

"

indicates the

knowledge thereof.

of practice of truth, in the manner described above, a long course of repeated, uninterrupted and respectful through exercise of true knowledge, the wisdom manifesting the dis

By means

* of Spirit from Matter, is attained. All exercise brings about the knowledge of its object, so in the present case the exercise being one of truth results in the cognition

tinction

thereof.

It is for this reason of its leading to truth
is

that

the

knowledge
(265).

called pure.
"

Why pure ? Because
taken).

"

incontrovertible

(or

Doubt and

error are the
;

unmistwo im-

P urities of knowledge and the above knowledge being free from these is said to
be pure. Doubt consists in thinking a decided fact to be undecided ; and as such it is only a form of error. Thus by hence incontrovertible" the absence of both doubt and saying,
"

contradiction

is

implied

;

this

absence being due also to the

fact of the exercise belonging to truth.
.

We grant all this, but the eternal Objection : (266). tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its
inevitable effect, the

miseries

of metempsychosis,

of which

thus there would be no end.

In reply to the above, with
is

it is

declared

"

Absolute" i.e.,

unmixed
error

error.
>

Though tendency towards
vefc
ifc

ca P ab] e of removal by means of true wisdom, though this has a
eternal
is
"

beginning in time. For partiality towards truth is natural to No Buddhi, as declare also outsiders (here, the Bauddhas) amount of contradiction can set aside the flawless (knowledge
:

of) the

character of objects,

for

such

is

the

partiality

of

(287).

The form of the cognition is stated naught is mine, and I do not
f

:

/ am

not,

exist.

I am

thG

not

action

merel y precludes the. possibility of from the Spirit. As is declared

[268269]
(by grammarians),
"The

108
root

[K. LXV.]

As

together with

Bku and

Kri,

signify action in general." Hence all actions, external as well as determination, self-consciousness, refection, internal,

observation, &c., are

all

precluded from the Spirit.

And

since there is^no action of the Spirit, there arises the idea that here implies agency, such as in am not." give,"
"I
"I"

"I

and no such agency can belong to the Spirit, And from this follows the idea that "naught is mine" For it is only an agent that can have any possession and hence the preclusion of action implies
"

I

eat,"

&c. ;

who

is

without any action.

;

that of possession as well.

The interpret the three forms in another way. I am the Spirit, not I do not exist," means that and because non-productive I have no action productive and since without action, I am not I can have no
sentence
"
"

Or we may
;"

"

"

"

;

"

possessions,

hence

"

naught

is

mine.

"

(268).

Objection
left

might be
birth.

: Even after such a knowledge, there something yet unknown, which would lead to re

We

reply

:

known after Hence there

It is complete" i. e., there is nothing left un the attainment of such knowledge as the above.
"

is

no re-birth.
:

Question (269). ledge of truth ?

What

is

accomplished

by

this

know

We

reply

:

KARIKA LXV.
Possessed of this knowledge,
The cause
cessation of
of

Spirit, as

a

spectator,

the
s

pure, at leisure
.

and

at

ease,

beholds
.

Nature

JNature,
..

which has now reverted from
torms
,,

operation.

her primitive state) after her prolific fruition has ceased, under the force of true wisdom.
(to

the seven

The two things for the production of which Nature had begun action were experience and the perception of truth ; and

[270]

109

[K. LXVI.]

when
"

to be done,

these two have been accomplished there is nothing left and hence Nature ceases from prolfic activity.

Virtue, &c.

Undfer the force (of true ivisdom)" The seven forms are all due to erroneous knowledge. Dispassion,

too, of those

through mere contentment, is due to knowledge. And this erroneous knowledge is removed by its contradictory true knowledge. And thus
it

who have

erroneous

the cause, erroneous knowledge, being removed, its effects, the seven forms are also removed, and hence from these

Nature
k<

desists.
"

At

ease,

i.

e. 9

Inactive

"

;

Pure

"

i. e.,

Unmixed with

the

impurities of Buddhi, due to the Attributes, though to the last moment the Spirit continues to be in contact with the

Attribute of Goodness

;

or else no (perception,

and hence no)

wisdom would be
(270).

possible.
:

Objection

Let this be

so.

We

have nothing to

say against your statement as to Nature desisting from pro But the production has been said to be due to the ductions.

a form of capability

connection (of Spirit and Matter) and this connection is only and the capability to experience con
;

;

stitutes the intelligence of the Spirit, as the capacity of being the object of experience constitutes the non-intelligence and objectivity of Nature and these two capabilities can never be
;

and you cannot urge that they cease, because there is nothing left to be done, for though one set of objects has been experienced by the Spirit, there are others of the same kind still to be experienced. (Thus no emancipation is
said to

cease

;

possible).

We

reply

:

LXVI.
"She

has been seen
of

by
"

NO
dom,

birth
for

attainment

after wisof

retires

;

says the one and so I have been seen," says the
me,"

want

n fh pr er
>

ni1rq ancl

ppncpc cease
is still

fn

act or>t

T1*pnpf

though there
it

their conjunction,

affords

no motive towards further

creation.

[271272]
(271).

110

[K. LXVI.]

So long as nature has not manifested truth, she bring about the enjoyment of the various objects of sense but she cannot do this after she has once ^brought

may

;

For experience is due to wisdom. erroneous knowledge, and when this latter, the cause, has ceased under the force of wisdom, there can be no enjoyment
about discriminative
just as the sprout
is

;

not possible in the absence of the seed. The Spirit mistakes the various objects of sense the modifica tions of Nature to belong to himself. And discriminative
also is a modification of Nature, and as such is taken the Spirit to belong to himself. When however such by wisdom has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit

wisdom

with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to feel. Nor is the Spirit by himself capable of bringing about discriminative wisdom, which is a development* of Nature. And the Spirit who has
attained to wisdom,

cannot accept any purpose as his own.

and emancipation being the purpose of the Spirit, supply the motive to the operations of Nature ; but when these two have ceased to be the purpose of the
further, experience

And

With this view it is Spirit, they cease to be motives also. motive is that which declared There is no motive, &c." and this is not moves Nature to act towards creation
"

A

;

possible,

when

there

is

no purpose of the

Spirit.

We grant all this. But no sooner (272). Objection would wisdom be attained than the body would dissolve and then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature (as distinct
:

;

from, himself) ?

If

it

be asserted that emancipation does not

follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account of the unspent residuum of Karma then we ask, how is

residuum destroyed ? If by mere fruition (i 6., by experi ence), then you tacitly imply the inability of wisdom alone to
this
.

bring about emancipation.
"

And

hence the assertion

th^it

emancipation follows from a knowledge of the distinction between the Manifested, the Un manifested, and the Spirit
"

* Because
N.atnre.

wisdom

is

a property of Bucldhi

which

is

an emanation from

[>73]

111*

[K.LXVIL]

becomes meaningless. And the hope too that emancipation would be obtained on the destruction of the residua of Karma,
1

by

meai>$

of experience extending to a limitless period of time

is

too sanguine ever to be realised.
this

To

we reply

:

LXVII.

By

the attainment of perfect wisdom, the
rest
;

Virtue and

Reason why the body does not dissolve immediately on the attainment of wisdom.

become

devoid of causal

energy

yet the Spirit remains awhile

invested with body, as a potter s wheel r continues to revolve by the force of
it.

the impulse previously imparted to
(273).

The unlimited residua of Karma

prolificness destroyed

also having their by the force of true knowledge, they do

not lead to any further experience. The seeds of action produce sprouts only on the ground of Buddki, damp with the waters

The ground, however, becomes barren by having its dampness of pain dried up by the extreme heat of true wisdom, and hence the Karmic seeds cease to sprout forth into experi ence. With this view it is said Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy" Even when wisdom has been
of pain.
"

body continues for a while, on account of the previous impulse just as even after the action of the potter has ceased, the wheel continues to revolve on account of the
attained, the
;

momentum imparted
having exhausted

to

it.

itself it stops.

In due time, however, the impulse In the continuance of the
"

body, the impulse is supplied by virtue and vice whose fruition has already commenced, as is declared by S ruti Other
(actions) having been destroyed by -itself experience, the soul and "The delay is only so long as beatitude attains beatitude
"

is*

not

attained"

impression)
;

destroyed mains awhile invested with the body.

[Chhandogya VI, i, 2]. This impulse (or a peculiar one, in which all illusion ha* been and in consequence of this impulse, the Spirit re
is

[274275]
(274).
Question

112

[K. LXVIII

LXTX.]

the Spirit remains* invested with body by some sort of impulse, when will be his final release?

.-Let

this be so

:

if

We

reply

:

LXVIII.

When

the separation of the informed Spirit from his corporeal frame f-at length takes place.

Final beatitude.

and Nature ceases
it,

f\T

to act in respect to

then

is final

and absolute emancipation accomplished.

The prolificness of those actions, whose fruition has not commenced, being destroyed, and those also whose fruition has commenced, having been spent by experience, Nature has her purpose fulfilled, and hence ceases with respect to that
particular Spirit, who thus obtains absolute tion of the triad of pain. .

and eternal cessa

(275).

Though the

yet in order to inspire respect towards the great Eishi is stated :

doctrine has been proved by reasoning, the precedence of it,

KARIKA LXIX.
This abstruse knowledge adapted to the emancipa tion of the Spirit, wherein the origin
Duration, and dissolution of beings are
considered, has been thoroughly the great Rishi.

ex

pounded by
" "

Abstruse" i. e.,

hard to be grasped by dull-brained people.
"

By

the great Rishi

i. e.,

by Kapila.
"

The feeling of reverence thus roused is strengthened by Wherein are considered, basing the doctrines on the Veda: i. e., in which fc.," knowledge (i. e., for the sake of which
knowledge).* Veda.
These, origin &c.,

are also considered in the

As

in

Charmani dvipinam

hanti.

[276278]

113

[K.

LXX

LXXII.

Let this be so: shall respect the direct sayings (275). of the great Rishi (Kapila) wherefore should we pay attention to the assertions made by Isvarakrislma ?
;

We

We reply

:

-LXX

LXXI.

This supreme, purifying (doctrine) the sage imparted to Asuri, who taught it to Panchasikha,
rtanCe f the
ce.

ky

whom

the science

was extensively

propagated.

Handed down by
minded
I svarakrishiia

tradition

of pupils,

it

has been

compendiously written in Arya metre by the noble-

who

has thoroughly investigated

the truth.
Purifying, purifying of the triad of pain.
the Spirit from all sins, the
cause

Supreme,
"

i. e.,

chief

among

all

purifying doctrines.
at truth
;

(277).

Arya = that which has arrived

one whose

intellect is such is called Aryamati."

(278).
section

This

science
it

is

a

whole in

itself,

not a
:

mere

because

treats of all branches of

knowledge

KARIKA LXXII.

The

subjects that are treated of in the seventy distiches are those of the complete science
7
t0pics

offence*
1

comprising sixty topics,
illustrative
tales,

exclusive

of

and omitting

con-

troversies.
:

1

The sixty topics are thus laid down in the Rdja-Vdrtika The existence of Prakriti (Karika XIV) 2 its
; ; ;

(XIV) 3 Objectiveness (XI) ;4
Matter) (XI)

singleness Distinctiveness (of Spirit from
to
Spirit)

5 Subserviency (of Matter

(XVII)

;

114
6 Plurality (of spirits) (XVIII) 7 Disjunction (of Spirit, from Matter in the end) (XX) 8 Conjunction (of Spirit and Matter in the beginning) (XXI) 9 Relation of subserviency (of
;
;

;

10 Inactivity (of the Spirit) (XIX) ; these are the ten radical categories.. ( In addition to these) are
;

Matter with Spirit) (XIX)

the five kinds of error

(XL VII), nine of contentment (L), and these, twenty-eight of disability of the organs (XLIX) with the eight sorts of power (LI), make up the sixty together
;
"

topics."

seventy distiches, cannot be said to

All these sixty topics are treated of in the above which therefore form a complete science and

be only a portion thereof.
,

Of the above

(ten radical categories)
;

singleness, objectivity,

and subordination relate to Nature
;

distinctness, inactivity

and

existence, disjunction, and conjunction plurality to Spirit to both and existence of the relation of subserviency relates
;

and
.

to gross bodies also

May

this

work of Vachaspati Misra, the Tattva-Kaumudt
!

(the Moonlight of Truth), continue to please (cause to bloom) the clear (lily-like) hearts of good men

Thus ends the Tattva-Kaumudi of Vachaspati Misra.

ALPHABETICAL INDEX.
PAGE.

PAGE,

Abhinivesa
[212]

(Tenacity

of

Life)

90
(

Organs the three internal [160] Pain three kinds of [4]
Perception
causes of incapacity
of [54-56] Prakriti

70

2

Ahankara
[149]
1

Self -Consciousness )

65

24

Asmita (Egoism) [209]
Astral

90
81

cessation of the activi

Body [189]
[210]

ties of [258]

103
[116].

Attachment (Raga)
Avidya (Ignorance)
Avisesha
[184]

90
89
gross )

Prakriti

modus operandi of

51

[208]

Prakriti

operation of the insen

( Non-specific,

tient, [254]

101
of

79
or Pra-

Prakriti s
[138]

want

a

Purusha
60
13
10

Avyakta (Unmanifested)
kriti

Proofs

of, [110]
of, [200] ...

46

Proofs

consideration of [30]

...

Bondage three kinds Buddhi (will) [143]
Contentment
[217]

86
62

defined [22-23]

Enunciated

[25]

11

Relations of [60]

...

27

Purusha

(Spirit)

consideration of

92
...

[119-125]

52
of [130-

Creation-author of [241]

98 98

Purusha
134]

characteristics

Elemental [242]
Intellectual [206]

58
organs [153] object of the [176]
relative

89 99
61 91

Sense
Senses

66
...

Production of pain [248].
Process of [141]
Disability [214]

75

predominance [179]

76
94
75 79

Siddhis (Powers) [229]

Effect an Entity [62-76]

23
40
...

Time

[175]

Gunas

(attributes) [97-101]

Visesha (specific) [185]

Character of the [103]
Jealousy [217]

42

Vyaktaand Avyakta
between
[77]

differences

92
consideration
of

35
points of
[88]
... ...

Manas (mind}
[155]

67
[196]

Vyakta and Avyakta agreement between,

37
107

Means and Consequences

84

Wisdom

production of [264]

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242

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE

CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET
UNIVERSITY OF

TORONTO LIBRARY

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