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December 10, 2010Mr. Peter Banag16 Annapolis St.Cubao, Quezon CityDear Mr. Banag:Here is the opinion you requested.

The facts, gathered from you and your documents, areas follows:Your daughter, Mary Banag, about six years old, went to Arthur Sison¶s house to buy ice-candy on September 12 at about 3 PM. Mary knocked on the gate, but having gotten no responsefrom Arthur who was napping then, she tested the gate by pushing it. Upon doing so, the gateyielded and Arthur¶s dog jumped out, went after Mary and attacked her from behind, biting her on the leg and arms as she fell to the ground. She was saved by Fred Puzon, a neighbor, whokicked the dog away and protected her. Awakened by the commotion and having heard shoutsthat his dog had attacked a child, Arthur went out, sent the dog back to his yard and bought Maryto a nearby clinic for treatment, paying the medical bill thereafter. You asked Arthur to pay MaryP20,000 in damages for the ordeal but all you got was a letter saying that he cannot grant your demand because he was not at fault. He based his stand on the following:1. That there was a sign at the gate warning about the presence of the dog, in effectimplying that if Mary heeded what the sign says, the attack wouldn¶t havehappened2. That at the time of the attack she was not accompanied by an adult, impliedly putting the blame on you as her parent for letting her roam outside unattended andtherefore exposing her to danger; and3. That he already paid the bill for Mary¶s medication.The issue here is clear: it¶s whether or not Arthur is liable to Mary for damages. In myopinion, Arthur is liable for damages notwithstanding his defenses. First and foremost, whathappened to Mary is classified as a quasi-delict , as defined by Article 2176 of the Civil Code:Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, isobliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existingcontractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.As for the nature of Arthur¶s liability, the provision that governs is Article 2183 of theCivil Code. It provides that:The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for thedamage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shallcease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage The Supreme Court explained said provision in the case of V estil v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 74431, 179 SCRA 47) , saying that:According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of socialinterest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. Now, Arthur may say that what happened was brought about by contributory negligenceon Mary¶s part as the former implied in his letter, or he may claim that letting Mary roam thevicinity unaccompanied is negligence on your part and constitutes the proximate cause of her injuries, notwithstanding his own negligence in leaving the gate unlocked before napping. Bothscenarios are governed by Article 2179 of the Civil Code that provides:When the plaintiff¶s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of hisinjury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, theimmediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant¶s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.In the first scenario, the Supreme Court¶s ruling in Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 129792, 321 SCRA 375) that ³a child under nine years of age must beconclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law´ covers Mary,hence throwing the notion of contributory negligence on her part out the window. As for thesecond scenario, the ruling in Umali v. Bacani (G.R. No. L-40570, 69 SCRA 263)

Judge Lorenzo Menzon of the Regional Trial Court Branch 10 of Pasay City dated June 29. If Arthur didn¶t leave the gate unlocked before takinga nap ± an act showing a lack of due care ± there would have been no way the dog could haveattacked Mary. ArcherPetitioner. being the owner of the dog that attacked Mary. P. is liable for damages. If by any circumstance you take your plight to court.SP No.´and an order made in August 6. Jeffrey A. -versusC. with all possible defenses taken into consideration. The respondent wherein claims that she is the titled owner of thesaid parcel of land being leased by the petitioner and prays that the petitioner be ejected from thesaid property of the respondent.D. files against the defendant. the only reprieve due him would be a mitigation of his liability.A.The petitioner. 2016. I am confident that the case will be decided in your favor.Arthur.R. Mary could test the gate all day long and she wouldn¶t be attacked by Arthur¶sdog had the gate been closed. now the respondent. For: Ejectment JANE DOERespondent. 2009 denying the Motion for Reconsideration made by the petitioner where the dispositive portion reads of which reads and quotes:³WHEREFORE. anaction of Unlawful Detainer. unto this HonorableCourt most respectfully submit this Memorandum in the above-entitled case and aver that: PREFATORY STATEMENT This is a Petition for Review pursuant to Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court assailing thedecision rendered by the Hon. maintained that she can¶t be ejected invokingP.One thing: my opinion is based on the laws and the jurisprudence applicable to your situation.G.2009 where the dispositive portion of which reads and quotes:³WHEREFORE. through the undersigned counsel. the decision of the Metropolitan TrialCourt Branch 1 of Pasay City is hereby affirmed in toto´³So ordered. Asmentioned earlier. APD 1-12 Pasay City and other related laws which grants statutory rightsto bona fide tenants to acquire the said property through purchase of the said property inquestion. but that does not cover the moral damages that Mary is entitled to under Article 2219 (2)of the Civil Code.D.1517. in answering the complaint.provides that parental negligence in allowing a young child to go out of the house alone may at most qualify ascontributory negligence and as such would be covered by the second sentence of Article 2179. X-------------------------------------------------------X MEMORANDUM COME NOW PETITIONER. which specifically pertains to quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. Of course.Very truly yours Republic of the Philippines COURT OF APPEALSSPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION JUANA DELA CRUZRepresented by her attorney-in-factAtty. now the petitioner. for lack of merit-defendantappellant¶sMotion for Reconsideration is hereby denied The plaintiff. The petitioner is willing and able to buy the said property The Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City has decided the case in favor of theownership of the property which was evidently unprocedural considering that in an action of unlawful detainer. only issue of possession de facto can be raised and ignoring the saidPresidential Decrees. Proclamations and . he may say that paying Mary¶s medical bill should beenough.

5. the petitioner constructed their house andcontinued to reside therein up to the present. On February 2. is of legalage. Del Pilar and/or spouses).2..2. On February 18. Thisdecision a quo made by the Metropolitan Trial Court and affirmed by the Regional Trial Court intoto which ought to be reversed or modified THE PARTIES 1. On December 22.3. Pasay City. On February 20. the petitioner never defaulted inthe payment of the agreed monthly rentals. 2009 .2. 2009. the petitioner filed a Position Paper. the petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and elevated thecase to the Regional Trial Court Branch 10 of Pasay City5. the late spouses Marcela and Marcelo Del Pilar (herein referred to as theSPS. 1995. The petitioner entered into an oral contract of lease with the original owners of thesaid parcel of land. Thereafter. STATEMENT OF THE CASES 1. . 2008. the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay Citydecided in favor of the respondent 2 4. On February 12. the size of which is a 65 square meters and located at 123Binibini St.. From the day they started to lease the said land.single and with postal address at 1010 Ginoo Blvd. STATEMENT OF FACTS 1.Issuances which take part of the law of the land. widow and with residence and postal address at 123 Binibini St. Pasay City where she can be served with legal processes and notices issued by this Honorable Court. The Respondent Jane Doe (herein referred to as the Respondent). she filed an action of unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City. The Petitioner Juana Dela Cruz (herein referred to as the Petitioner).3. the respondent has taken her own steps to eject the petitioners fromthe said property until finally. the respondent filed a Complaint for Ejectment against theAppellee at the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City 1 . unknown from the petitioner the respondent has bought tothe said property from the spouses and the respondent has titled it on her own name.4.2008. is of legal age. In line with the lease agreement.. Pasay City.

theSps. now the petitioner. the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court said and quotes:³After the thorough evaluation of the evidence on record. Furthermore.the court believes that the defendants can be lawfully ejectedfrom the subject premises. the Court of Appeals order both parties to submit their memoranda within 15 day. On September 4. In her disquisition. thus. P. Judge Lorenzo Menzon of the Regional Trial CourtBranch 10 of Pasay City affirmed in toto the judgment rendered by the Metropolitan TrialCourt 3 .D. an action for Unlawful Detention resolves only theissue of possession de facto even if the evidence of ownership may be referred to or consideredonly to determine its possession. Del Pilar. is unlawfullywithholding possession of the said property or the refusal of the petitioner is unlawful as held bythe Supreme Court in Huibonhoa v. Such being the case and as an exerciseof ownership the plaintiff can lawfully take possession of the property (pars. 2010. the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City has denied the Motionfor Reconsideration filed by the petitioner.1517.1517. 95897. the filing of this memorandum. the possession of the petitioner is lawful and even her refusal to vacate the said property isalso lawful. the Hon. 1 & 2 pp. Hence.D. GR.D. 2009. the petitioner file a Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals. REFERENCE MUST BE HAD TO THE LIST OFSTREETS SUBJECT TO ZONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NOT TO THE AREASINCLUDED IN THE DELINEATION BY METES AND BOUNDS AS INDICATED INTHE PROCLAMATION ITSELF.9. On August 6.2009 be set aside and another rendered for the Appellee.On June 29. the plaintiff is the registered owner of the propertyon question as evidenced by the Transfer Certificate of theTitle Number 12345.7.D.WHETHER OR NOT SUCH ACT OF THE PETITIONER OF INSTITUTING ACOMPLAINT TO THE HOUSE AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB)CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING Arguments WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT TRIAL COURT ACTEDCORRECTLY IN DECIDING THIS UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AFTER DEFENDANT HAD RAISED IN DEFENSE THE LESSEE¶S RIGHT UNDER P. if the defendant. prompting the petitioner to file a petition for review. On May 21.D. Dec. 1517WHETHER OR NOT IN DETERMINING THE COVERAGE OF AREAS FOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT (APD).8. the respondent were not able tooverthrow thecounterclaim of the petitioner which was overlooked by the HonorableMetropolitan Trial Court when she resolved the case in favor of the respondents. a Motion for Reconsideration is filed by the petitioner thru hiscounsel praying that the decision rendered on June 29.Clearly. 14.2016 AND APD 1-12 PASAY CITYWHETHER OR NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BARS THEBONAFIDE LESSEE¶S RIGHT TO AVAIL OF THE PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITSPROVIDED BY SECTION 6 OF P.2016 AND APD 1-12 PASAY CITY Under the Rule 70 of Rules of Court. 1997. although thecontract between the original owners and the petitioners. In our presentcase. IssuesWHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT TRIAL COURT ACTEDCORRECTLY IN DECIDING THIS UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION ON THE BASISOF EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AFTER DEFENDANT HAD RAISED IN DEFENSETHE LESSEE¶S RIGHT UNDER P. This is. 2009.6. P. On July 5.Since the petitioner has been lawfully leasing the said property to the original owners. it clearly presents us a situation wherein the petitioner is lawfully in possession of the said property and justifies her refusal to vacate the same property. 2009. 2009.2 Decision 2-3-09)´ 4 .

WHETHER OR NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BARS THE BONAFIDE LESSEE¶S RIGHT TO AVAIL OF THE PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITS PROVIDED BY SECTION 6 OF P..the pronouncement made by the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court humbly submits that it isnot in conformity with the rules governing ejectment cases which concerns itself solely with theissue of possession .Furthermore.WHEREAS.´ 7 . he invoked the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Five Star Marketing. under P. The petitioner¶s lease period and in fact that her oral contract with the original owners of the land makes her the legal tenant thereof.WHEREAS. v.WHEREAS. ownership. resources. is to provide a peaceful. the petitioner¶s claim andevidence relating to such decrees and issuances should have been appropriate and laudible for thetrial judge to consider it and not hastily decide the case because the respondent is the titled owner of the said property.WHEREAS. 2 pp 2. the petitioner is no illegally in possession of the said property as indicated inthe previous agreement made by the petitioner for she was the lessee of the original owners of the said land. use. otherwise. the issuance of the decree is used to prevent urban landowners from ejecting thetenants in violation of P. petitioner invokes her statutory rights found under theSection 6 of P. which have been made summary in nature.WHEREAS. Furthermore.D. the environment. the basic law of the land explicitly providesfor the regulation of the acquisition. Also.Decision 6-29-09) 5 In the present case.D. the quality of human life in our times isinescapably determined by the relationship among population.WHEREAS. the evil sought to be prevented in the said Five Star case 6 is not present. In fact. affirmed the decision of the MetropolitanTrial Court. while at the same providing incentives to progressive landowners and developers who wish todevelop their lands in accordance with government plansand programs responsive to community welfare. and intelligent policies.In refusing to vacate the property. Booc (535 SCRA 28) which reads and quotes:³The avowed objective of actions for forcible entry andunlawful detainer. and the design andorganization of human communities consistent with anational framework plan. 1517 which provides the property in question to be purchased by a qualifiedlessee. economic and political reforms attuned to theestablishment of a secure national community and to animproved quality of life for all citizens and for all otherswho may sojourn our shores. a social reform objective of the New Societyis to renew blighted areas. her resistance to vacate the premises is that sheavailed her right granted under PD1517 on which the avowed policies are laid down under it¶s preamble to wit:³WHEREAS. Inc. all for the people's security andwellbeing. Co. the party illegally deprived of possessionmight feel the despair of long waiting and decide as ameasureof self-protection to take the law into his hands andseize the same by force and violence. and the crucial factor in determining the shape of human settlements.´ (par. it is declared objective of the New Society toeffect social. the Sps.D. ownership was never raised as an issue in this case.enjoyment and disposition of private property and for theequitable diffusion of property ownership and profits whichincludes land and land resources. Del Pilar. 2016. improve the conditions of the urban poor and resolve and redress legitimate grievancesarising therefrom. First of all. 1517 When the Honorable Judge Lorenzo Menzon. 1517 and other related laws which are intended to develop such slumareas in the Metro ManilaSince such decree and issuances became part of the land. speedy and expeditiousmeans of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of the property from unjustly continuing his possession for a longtime. human settlement is an integrative conceptembracing the interdependence of man's environment. land is the ultimate platform of all man'sactivities.D. prevents her eviction whenthe entire Barangay San Roque where Binibini Street is located an area of priority development. the traditional concept of landownership hasaggravated the problem arising from urbanization such asthe proliferation of blighted areas and the worsening of the plight of the urban poor and has spawned valid andlegitimate grievances in urban centers giving rise to socialtension and violent conflicts.human shelters and structures.

Furthermore. such reason is one of the paramount objectives of the Urban Reform Law which in turn. on the East. Manila By:Atty. dela Cruz. 2009 and the order of the Honorable RegionalTrial Court Branch 10 of Pasay City dated August 6. 2009. on the South by EDSA and on the West by Zamora-Burgos Streets. the petitioner respectfully prays thatthe Honorable Court of Appeals reverse or modify the decision of the Honorable MetropolitanTrial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City dated June 29. Some streets are also listed within the whole area proclaimed assubject to zonal development. REFERENCE MUST BE HAD TO THE LIST OF STREETS SUBJECT TO ZONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NOT TO THE AREAS INCLUDED IN THE DELINEATION BY METES AND BOUNDS AS INDICATED IN THE PROCLAMATION ITSELF.Respectfully submittedManila. Binibini Street wherein the property is located is located atBarangay San Roque. Archer IBP Lifetime No. Tall Building Condominium. 5/10/2005PTR No. on February 18. Pasay City. by Tripa deGallena somewhere near M. III ± 000897 .The then late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation 1967 as amended byProclamation No. Although the said street is not included in the list as an area for prioritydevelopment but considering that the entire Barangay San Roque is covered by the proclamationas blighted area and subject to priority zonal development Binibini Street is necessarily included. Espana. cannot be rendered nugatory bythe avowed objective of the action for Unlawful Detainer which had been made summary incharacter WHETHER OR NOT IN DETERMINING THE COVERAGE OF AREAS FOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT (APD). Philippines. courts should not render these lawsnugatory but instead to decide to effectively implement these laws for the benefit of the slumdwellers. 1517It is further prayed that the alleged sale of the said parcel of land of the Spouses Marcelaand Marcelo Del Pilar to the respondent. in consideration of all the foregoing. other reliefs that are just and equitable under the present circumstances arelikewise prayed for. 1991 be declared null andvoid due to the violation of the Urban Reform LawFinally.San Roque and Sta.In PD 2016. a new order be rendereddeclaring the areas in Binibini Street be subject to APD 1-12 Pasay City as areas of prioritydevelopment and petitioner be entitled to the benefits and privileges provided under Sec 6 of P.The following Barangays are included in the APD 1-12 are the following: San Isidiro. Clara. APD 1-12 covers a large portion of Pasay City bounded on the North by the Manila-Pasay boundary. this 28thday of May 2010 DE GUZMAN TUGELIDA DE CASTRO AND ASSOCIATESCounsel for Petitioner Address: Unit 1200. Furthermore. 12345. 2284 to ensure a meaningful realization of the said policies therein in PD1517. PD 2016 was also issued to prevent the Circumvention of the Urban ReformLaw by the heartless landowners. The property in question where the petitioner built her house more than 60 years ago islocated at Binibini Street Barangay San Roque. Jane Doe.From the avowed principles of the said laws. 777654. 2005-006341MCLE Compliance No.It would be absurd that not to include a street and the whole Barangay is put as a part of the areasfor priority development Prayer WHEREFORE. Jeffrey A.D. Furthermore. the equitable diffusion of property ownership of land and land resources isthe primary reason why in such Presidential Decree prohibits the ejectment of the qualifiedtenants residing in areas for priority development. 1/10/2011Roll of Attorney No.