You are on page 1of 24

Husserl Studies 22: 137–160, 2006. DOI 10.

1007/s10743-006-9007-6

Ó Springer 2006

Problems of Intersubjectivity in Husserl and Buber1
NAM-IN LEE
Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University, Seoul, NW, South Korea

After the publication of the Logical Investigations in 1900/1901,2 Husserl was engaged throughout the remainder of his life with the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. He was fully conscious of its significance to the entire system of transcendental phenomenology and left many works dealing with this problem. However, his phenomenology of intersubjectivity has been sharply criticized by many interpreters. Among these critics are not only the phenomenologists after Husserl, but the advocates of philosophy of dialog or the critical social theory. Since the phenomenology of intersubjectivity has significant meaning for the whole system of phenomenology, some would not hesitate to draw the conclusion that the whole attempt of Husserl’s phenomenology has failed. I believe that many of the arguments of Husserl’s critics are not on the mark because, in criticizing Husserl, they do not make a clear distinction between the different problems of intersubjectivity. More than anything else, philosophy deals with the most abstract of problems, so the first step to be taken is to make a clear distinction among the different problems concerning a subject. This is particularly true for the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In this respect, I agree with Max Scheler on the following insight: ‘‘The principle error till now that has been committed in the research on the problem of intersubjectivity is the fact that the different problems concerning intersubjectivity have not been clearly distinguished.’’3 In this context, Scheler differentiates the following problems concerning the other person: (1) the problem of the essential relationship between the individuals and society in general; (2) the epistemological problem concerning the validity of positing the existence of the other; (3) the problem concerning the origin of the other consciousness in general, that is, the transcendental psychological problem of the knowledge of the other; (4) the problem of empirical psychology of the other; (5) the metaphysical problem of the other; and finally (6) the problem of value with regard to the other.4

138 Husserl seemed partly conscious of this fact as well. For example, he talks about ‘‘the confusingly involved problems of intersubjectivity and worldly Objectivity’’(Hua XVII, p. 250)5 or about ‘‘the involved set of transcendental problems concerning intersubjectivity’’ (Hua XVII, p. 245; Logic, p. 238) and attempts to make a distinction among the ontological, the transcendental-phenomenological and the metaphysical problems of intersubjectivity. However, one cannot find within his phenomenology of intersubjectivity such a clear distinction among the various problems as is called for by Max Scheler. I believe that, if Husserl made clearer distinctions among the various problems of intersubjecticity, his phenomenology would not have been so sharply criticized. In other words, one can say that some of the criticisms are caused by this lack of distinctions and, in this article I will attempt to reveal the presence of these types of criticisms. Although there are many such criticisms, my discussion will be limited to Theunissen’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity from the standpoint of M. Buber’s philosophy of dialog.6 In order to fulfill this purpose, I will first delineate the main points of the criticism by the philosophy of dialog concerning Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Thereafter, in order to be able to lay a basis for a critical assessment of this criticism, I will attempt to make a clear distinction among the various problems of phenomenology of intersubjecticity. Only those problems that are necessary for the assessment of the criticism of Husserl by the philosophy of dialog will be dealt with. Finally, I will attempt to argue that these criticisms, under scrutiny, are misguided, because they are based on a lack of a clear distinction among the various problems of intersubjectivity.

1. Criticisms of Husserl’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity by the Philosophy of Dialog According to Theunissen, Husserl’s phenomenology is extremely opposed to the philosophy of dialog and, more than any place else, one can find this essential trait in his phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Since Husserl determines the absoluteness of transcendental subjectivity as ‘‘the absoluteness that means asociality,’’7 his phenomenology of intersubjectivity cannot be successful. Emphasizing this point, Theunissen tells us that ‘‘its absoluteness [the absoluteness of the original ego] consists in its ‘solitude’ – admittedly a solitude that, because there is no I alongside of me, is also free of any longing for community.’’8 Theunissen advocates the thesis that Husserl’s phenomenology, determining the ego as a solitary being and totally free from

139 any kind of desire for society, cannot avoid the fate of a solipsism. We know that, here, Theunissen echoes the same criticism of those who insist that, being confined to the analysis of the solipsistic ego and, thus, not being able to solve the problem of intersubjectivity, Husserl’s phenomenology is nothing other than a solipsism. Thereafter, on the basis of a ‘‘destruction of the transcendentalphilosophical model of intentionality,’’9 Theunissen attempts to deepen and widen his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Needless to say that, in this context, the destruction always contains two components, the criticism of the problematic philosophical position, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the grounding of a more original philosophical position than the one criticized. Thus, through a destructive criticism of Husserl, Theunissen attempts to construct a philosophical foundation for a dialogical philosophy as a counterpart to Husserl’s phenomenology. Buber’s distinction between the primary words ‘‘I–Thou’’ and ‘‘I–It’’10 provides the starting point for Theunissen’s destruction of Husserl’s phenomenology. Since his aim is undermining Husserl’s phenomenology, he attempts to clarify the distinction between the ‘‘Thou’’ and the ‘‘It’’ with regard to Husserl’s concept of intentionality. In this context, he sometimes characterizes the sphere of the ‘‘It’’ as ‘‘the sphere of subjectivity’’ that embraces ‘‘the acting subject together with its [the subject’s] constituted world which is governed by it through its intentionality.’’11 Other times, with reference to Gabriel Marcel, he characterizes the sphere of ‘‘It’’ as the ‘‘sphere of ‘having’’’12 that, according to him, means nothing other than ‘‘that of intentionality’’13 and stands out for its will to reign overall. Therefore, according to him, as the expression ‘‘transcendental-philosophical model’’ implies, the intentionality that is the proper theme of transcendental phenomenology is understood as the moment which holds together the sphere of the ‘‘It’’. In contradistinction to the sphere of intentionality as the sphere of It, he determines the sphere of the Thou as the dialogical sphere. This dialogical sphere is distinguished as the ‘‘immediacy ‘between man and man’,’’14 ‘‘the mutuality of inner behavior’’15 as well as ‘‘the mutuality of acceptation, of affirmation and confirmation.’’16 Theunissen points out that, in order to be able to comprehend the sphere of Thou properly, we should not let ourselves be guided by the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality. He adds that, however, it is not easy for us to be entirely free from this model. According to him, even Buber himself was not totally free from this kind of danger and attempted to determine ‘‘the Thou in the same way as the It: as what is intended, as the noematic object, now,

140 admittedly, not of the I–It, but of the I–Thou.’’17 In this context, he refers to the beginning part of Buber’s I and Thou: ‘‘To man the world is twofold, in accordance with his twofold attitude. The attitude of man is twofold, in accordance with the twofold nature of the primary words which he speaks.’’18 So long as the Thou is comprehended as the noematic correlate of the attitude, the essential feature of it is totally concealed. Theunissen calls the Thou, that is, the noematic correlate of the attitude as ‘‘the individual Thou in an improper sense.’’19 Therefore, the next step of the destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality is in the destruction of this individual Thou that should make it possible to bring to light the Thou that lies behind that Thou. What matters here is ‘‘the individual Thou in a proper sense that is utterly unstable.’’20 The individual Thou in a proper sense is not something that appears to us as an object, but something that escapes the objectification. Thus, it means something that does not appear and, for this sense, can be called nothing. In this context, Buber writes: ‘‘But when Thou is spoken, there is no thing. Thou has no bounds. When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing; he has indeed nothing.’’21 With the discovery of the Thou in a proper sense, the destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality is not completely carried out. With respect to the possibility of discovering the Thou that lies deeply concealed even behind the Thou in a proper sense, it should be noted that I happen to meet the individual Thou in two senses, though neither I nor the Thou are able to cause this meeting. My meeting with the Thou is neither my achievement nor yours, but exclusively something that has been presented from somewhere, that is to say, a gift or a grace. The experience of meeting Thou means, at the same time, the experience of him who presents us with this meeting, that is to say, the experience of ‘‘the Thou who, owing to his everlasting presence to me, must be constant, that is, eternal for me.’’22 According to Theunissen, in this context, the Eternal Thou means God who remains an Eternal Mystery to the human understanding, because the human being cannot know, but can only ‘‘vaguely feel’’ or ‘‘glimpse’’ (ahnen)23 him. In this context, Buber writes: ‘‘Of course God is the ‘wholly Other’; but He is also wholly the Same, the wholly Present. Of course, He is the Mysterium Tremendum that appears and overthrows; but He is also the mystery of the self-evident, nearer to me than my I.’’24 Thus, with a complete destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality which enables us to experience the Eternal Thou or God as a Mystery, the philosophy of dialog culminates in a negative theology.

141 2. Various Problems of Intersubjectivity In order to lay the ground for an assessment of the criticisms of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity by the philosophy of dialog, I will attempt to make a clear distinction between the various problems of intersubjectivity. In this article, I will distinguish only the following three problems of intersubjectivity that directly bear on our critical assessment of the criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity by the philosophy of dialog: the ontological, the transcendental-phenomenological and the metaphysical problem of intersubjectivity. Other problems of intersubjectivity that have no direct bearing on our discussion below, such as the empirically scientific problem or the problem of value of intersubjectivity, will not be dealt with. 2.1. The Ontological Problem of Intersubjectivity In the natural attitude, I experience the other in various ways. I can experience the other as my family, my colleague, a student, a teacher, a seller, a member of the country or even as a world citizen. In this case, I experience the other as a person. However, I can experience the other in a totally different way. In the scientific attitude, I can experience the other not as a person, but as a mere scientific object that is present among many other objects. In the natural attitude, I can either describe the givenness of the other as a fact or I can attempt to explain the causal relationship between facts. In this way, we can ground various empirical sciences which concern the other, e.g. sociology, history, anthropology or psychology. Furthermore, in the eidetic attitude, I can try to bring to light the essential structure of the facts concerning the other and thus ground an ontology of the givenness of the other as a philosophical discipline. We can find various attempts by Husserl to ground the ontology of the givenness of the other. A typical example is the text that has been published by Iso Kern as Appendix XVIII in Volume XIII of Husserliana and bears the title: ‘‘The Givenness of the Concrete Social Objects and Products, and the Clarification of the Concepts Related to It. Social Ontology and Descriptive Sociology’’ (Hua XIII, p. 98).25 In this text, Husserl attempts to project social ontology as a systematic ontology of social givenness. It is a well known fact that the ontology of nature, for example, pure geometry, pure theory of number or the pure theory of motion, signifies the apriori science for the empirical sciences of nature. In a similar way, according to Husserl,

142 social ontology signifies the apriori sciences for the empirical sciences of the other. The first requirement in founding an empirical science of social givenness as a science is social ontology. There are a great number of tasks for social ontology. As repeatedly attempted by Husserl, one of the most important tasks of social ontology is to clarify the general structure of the givenness of the other. For the purpose of clarifying it, Husserl grapples with two philosophical positions concerning this problem: Benno Erdmann’s theory of inference by analogy,26 on the one side, and Theodor Lipp’s theory of empathy,27 on the other side. Erdmann holds that the way of gaining access to the mental state of the other person cannot be called an experience, but only a kind of inference that, mediated by the bodily expressions, is carried out analogically. Correspondingly, he characterizes the mental state of the other which is accessible by analogical inference not as ‘‘an immediately given fact, but a hypothesis, a more probable one, because it can be verified by us at every moment’’ (Erdmann, p. 45, cited in Hua XIII, p. 36). According to this theory, it is in principle impossible for us to have an experience of the other’s mental state; the best we can do is to build a hypothesis about them. Contrary to this position, Lipps holds that there is no way of gaining access to the mental state of the other, because the other, as it is supposed to be experienced by me, is nothing other than the product of a mental process called ‘‘duplication of myself’’ (die Vervielfaltigung meiner selbst) (Lipps, p. 36, cited in Hua XIII, ¨ p. 73). According to him, this process of duplication of myself is released by certain sense-perceptions of the body of the other and carried out ‘‘instinctively’’ (Lipps, p. 36, cited in Hua XIII, p. 73). Thereby different sense-perceptions motivate different ways of duplication of myself. Lipps calls this process of duplication of myself ‘‘empathy.’’ According to Husserl, neither Erdmann nor Lipps grasp the essence of the givenness of the other. For the other that I meet everyday is neither a mere hypothesis nor a mere duplication of myself, but the other as he/she is experienced by me. In this context, Husserl maintains that the experience of the other is not a kind of direct experience like the perception of things, but a kind of indirect experience that is mediated by the experience of the body of the other. Husserl names the indirect experience ‘‘presentiation’’ (Vergegenwartigung) ¨ (Hua XIII, p. 30) which should be distinguished from the presencing (Gegenwartigung) that is the direct experience of an object. Of course, ¨ except for the experience of the other person, there are many other forms of presentiation such as remembering, expecting, picturing, fantasizing, etc. Husserl uses the term ‘‘empathy’’ (die Einfuhlung) in ¨

143 order to distinguish the experience of the other as a form of presentiation from its other forms. It is the further task of social ontology to bring to light the concrete essential structure of empathetic presentiation in comparison with other forms of presentiation. 2.2. The Transcendental-phenomenological Problem of Intersubjectivity 2.2.1. The Transcendental Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity and the Problem of Motivation From about 1905, after the transcendental turn in his phenomenology, the transcendental phenomenological problem, that is, the problem of the condition of the possibility for the constitution of objects, signified for Husserl his most important task. In this context, the phenomenology of intersubjectivity is no exception; in this case also, more than anyplace else, he engaged himself with the transcendental phenomenological problem, that is, the problem of the condition of the possibility for the constitution of the other. Husserl formulates this problem in a more concrete way as follows: ‘‘How is it possible that in a pure consciousness, in a certain form of its experiences, an experience of foreign experiences and the subject of those experiences can emerge and along with that an experiential knowledge of another stream of consciousness?’’ (Hua XIII, p. 29) Before I deal with the transcendental phenomenological problem of the other, I would like to clarify the relationship between this problem and the ontological problem of the other discussed above. It should be noted that the transcendental phenomenological research of the other cannot be launched if I have not experienced the other and if I don’t know the ontological structure of the givenness of the other. The ontological structure of the givenness of the other offers the guiding thread (Leitfaden) for transcendental phenomenological research into it; if the ontological structure of the givenness of the other is not first known, transcendental research into it is not only impossible, but also meaningless. Thus, the ontological research necessarily precedes the transcendental-phenomenological one. Corresponding to the right order of research, in section 43 of Cartesian Meditations28 where the transcendental phenomenological research into the intersubjectivity begins, Husserl deals with ‘‘the noematic-ontic mode of givenness of the other as transcendental clue for the constitutional theory of the experience of someone else’’ (Hua I, p. 122; CM, p. 90). With respect to the significance of the ontological research for the transcendentalphenomenological one, he writes thereafter in section 59 as follows: ‘‘Starting from the experiential world given beforehand as existent and (with the shift to the eidetic attitude) from any experiential world

144 whatever, conceived as given beforehand as existent, we exercised transcendental reduction – that is: we went back to the transcendental ego, who constitutes within himself givenness-beforehand and all modes of subsequent givenness [...].’’ (Hua I, pp. 163–164; CM, p. 136) As already mentioned, the other can be experienced or given in various ways. Since each of these various ways of givenness of the other can provide a transcendental clue for transcendental phenomenological research, it is possible to develop as many types of transcendental phenomenology of the other as there are ways of givenness of the other. In this context, Husserl tells us: ‘‘First of all, my ‘transcendental clue’ is the experienced Other, given to me in straightforward consciousness and as I immerse myself in examining the noematic-ontic content belonging to him. [...] By its remarkableness and multiplicity, that content already indicates the manysidedness and difficulty of the phenomenological task.’’ (Hua I, p. 122–123; CM, pp. 90–91) In this article, I cannot develop all the possible types of transcendental phenomenology of the other. Instead, taking the above discussed empathetic presentiation as a transcendental clue for the transcendental phenomenological research, I will briefly sketch the tasks of the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Since the general ontological structure of the givenness of the other is the empathetic presentiation, the transcendental question concerning the constitution of the other can be formulated as follows: What is the condition of the possibility for the empathetic presentiation? In this context, the condition of the possibility for constitution means the motivation for constitution. Accordingly, Husserl formulates the transcendental phenomenological problem of the other in general as follows: ‘‘How can appresentation of another original sphere,29 and thereby the sense ‘someone else,’ be motivated in my original sphere and, in fact, motivated as experience – as the word ‘appresentation’ (making intended as co-present) already indicates? (Hua I, p. 139; CM, p. 109) Thus, transcendental phenomenology deals with the problem: ‘‘How does the motivation [for the experience of the other] run.’’ (Hua I, 140; CM, p. 110) However, the transcendental-phenomenological question concerning the constitution of the other is not yet determined concretely. In this context, one should note that transcendental phenomenology is divided into static and genetic phenomenology. Correspondingly transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity is divided into the static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In order to determine the tasks of static and of genetic phenomenology of

145 intersubjectivity properly, we have to take into account the basic distinction between static and genetic phenomenology.30 2.2.2. The Distinction Between the Static and the Genetic Phenomenology Static phenomenology aims to clarify the motivation for constitution from the standpoint of the foundation of validity (die Geltungsfundierung) (Hua XV, p. 614–616). In this case, the motivation for constitution means concretely the foundation for the justification of the validity of constitution and it plays the role of the norm or the ideal to which I have to appeal in order to justify the validity of constitution.31 According to the principle of all the principles that Husserl discussed in section 24 of Ideas I,32 original intuition is the ultimate source for the justification of every kind of knowledge. This means that, in order to justify the validity-claim of a presentiation, I have to appeal to the original intuition that corresponds to that presentiation. Let’s take as an example a perception of a house that I have carried out from the frontal side at a time t1. In this case, even though I perceive the house from the frontal side, I have a perception of the house as a whole. For example, even though I see immediately only the color of the frontal side of the house, imagining that the backside of the house, for example, might have the same color as the frontal side, I can have an idea of the color of the house as a whole. I might not be quite sure that the idea that I have of the color of the house as a whole is valid. In this case, the static phenomenology attempts to clarify the foundation for the justification of the validity of that idea. Needless to say, that, in order to justify the validity of the idea that I have of the color of the house as a whole, I have to appeal to the validity of the perceptions that I could have of the color of all the possible sides of the house. In this case, from the perspective of validity-foundation, the latter validity is more original than the former one and it is the foundation of justification for the former. In contrast to static phenomenology, genetic phenomenology aims to clarify the motivation for constitution from the standpoint of the foundation of the genesis (die Genesisfundierung).33 In this case, the motivation for a constitution means concretely its genetic foundation, which comprises the various kinds of intentionality that, being more original in the temporal order than that constitution, make possible the genesis of that constitution. Let’s take as an example the perception of the house discussed above. The perception of the house as a whole could not be carried out without the various kinds of intentionality that are more original in the temporal order than that perception and render the genesis of

146 that perception possible. These kinds of intentionality comprise not only the intentionality of the perception of the house from the frontal side, but also the intentionality of the horizon in which the house is embedded, the intentionality of the world, the intentionality of the will to perceive the house, or the intentionality of the previous perception of houses similar to that house. The genesis of the perception of the house is not possible without these intentionalities. It is the task of the genetic phenomenology to clarify all the various kinds of intentionality that play the role of genetic foundation for the various kinds of constitution. The distinction between static and genetic phenomenology comes to light more sharply, if we take into account some basic differences between them. Let me briefly deal with them. 1. Static phenomenology could be defined as a kind of normative phenomenology, since it aims to clarify the foundation of validity that plays the role of the norm or the ideal to which I have to appeal in order to justify the validity of constitution. In contrast to static phenomenology, genetic phenomenology could be defined as a kind of factual phenomenology that attempts to clarify ‘‘the whole concrete nexus in which each particular consciousness stands, along with its intentional object as intentional’’ (Hua XVII, p. 316; Logic, p. 316). 2. The concept of the original plays a significant role not only in static phenomenology, but also in genetic phenomenology. However, the concrete meaning of the concept is different in each. The concept of the original is understood in static phenomenology from the standpoint of the validity-foundation relationship, whereas it is understood in genetic phenomenology from the standpoint of the genesis-foundation relationship. For this reason, the foundational relation between two kinds of intentionality could be different in static and genetic phenomenology. For example, in static phenomenology, the intentionality of a clear perception of an object is the foundation for the intentionality of a vague feeling of the same object, since from the standpoint of the validity foundation, the former is more original than the latter. However, the latter could be the foundation for the former in genetic phenomenology. This is due to the fact that, in the genetic order, the vague feeling of an object could be more original than a clear perception of the same object, since I could have the former first and, then, the latter afterwards. 3. The I, as a reflecting ego, has an absolute priority against the others in static phenomenology. This is due to the fact that, from

147 the perspective of the foundation of validity, the most original realm for a reflecting ego is the self-consciousness of the same ego, since the self-consciousness is the one that is experienced most immediately by the reflecting ego. In genetic phenomenology, however, the I does not have an absolute priority against the others, since the genetic constitution that is carried out by the I is dependent on the others in many respects. 4. Since foundation in static phenomenology is the foundation of validity and only objectifying acts could be the bearers of validity, static phenomenology deals only with objectifying acts or nonobjectifying acts that are based on objectifying acts. In contrast to static phenomenology, genetic phenomenology deals not only with objectifying acts, but also with non-objectifying acts, since every kind of intentionality could play a role in the genetic foundation of a constitution. The general distinction between static and genetic phenomenology enables us to understand more sharply the distinction between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In what follows, confining my discussion to the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity that has the general structure of empathetic presentiation as the transcendental clue, I will try to make a clear distinction between the static and the genetic phenomenologies of intersubjectivity and clarify the main tasks for both of them. Let me first deal with the task for the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity. 2.2.3. The Static Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity The static phenomenology of intersubjectivity aims to clarify the motivation for the empathetic presentiation from the standpoint of the foundation of validity. In this case, the motivation for the empathetic presentiation means concretely the foundation for the justification of the validity of the positing contained in the empathetic presentiation, namely the positing that the other is experienced by me. In the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity, the validity of positing that the other is experienced by me is something incomprehensible and needs explanation. Since the validity of the positing of the existence of the other is something incomprehensible and needs an explanation, the first methodical step to be taken is to exclude that validity from the thematic area and to go back to the more original realm on the basis of which I can justify that validity. This methodical procedure can be called the static dismantling of the constitution (der statische Abbau der Konstitution) of the other. The validity of the positing of the exis-

148 tence of the other is something that I share with other persons, so the exclusion of that validity means, at the same time, the exclusion of all my intentionalities through which I can be influenced by them. The main point of this exclusion is that, as a responsible person, the reflecting ego should make the final decision concerning the validity of the positing of the existence of the other for himself/herself without taking the opinion of the other persons uncritically. The exclusion in this context is needed, since, as a reflecting ego, I should take responsibility for all the validity-claims that I make. Of course, the reflecting ego might consult the other persons concerning any validity-claim, but he/she should make the final decision for himself/herself. Therefore the exclusion in this context has nothing to do with solipsism. Not only I, but also all the other egos should do the same thing to become a responsible subject. Through this methodical procedure, it is possible for every reflecting subject to secure ‘‘the total nexus of that actual and potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself a peculiar ownness’’ (Hua I, p. 124; CM, p. 93). Husserl calls this region of intentionalities the ‘‘primordial sphere’’ (Hua I, p. 169; CM, p. 142) of the reflecting ego. The primordial sphere is just the foundation for the justification of the validity of the positing that the other is experienced by me as the other. After we go back to the primordial sphere, we have to clarify the various kinds of intentionalities that can be found in it and function as the motivations for the justification of the incomprehensible validity in the positing of the existence of the other. In this context, the following points should be noted. 1. In my primordial sphere, I can find a primordial world that is valid only for me. My primordial world should not be confused with the objective world that is valid not only for me, but also for other persons. The objective world has already been excluded. 2. I find in my primordial world many things. However, these things are not homogeneous and among them there is one that stands out, my body. My body is ‘‘the only Object ‘in’ which I ‘rule and govern’ immediately, governing particularly in each of its ‘organs’’’ (Hua I, p. 128; CM, p. 97). For this reason, I can justify the validity of the positing that I experience my body not merely as a thing, but as a living body that is connected with my mind and, with it, makes a person. Thus, in my primordial world, I can justify the positing of a thing as my body and myself as a person. 3. In my primordial world, there is a thing that resembles my body. In this case, due to the resemblance between the thing and my body, I can justify that I could conceive it as a living body and as

149 a person like me. Thus, the resemblance between my body and the body of the other turns out to be the validity-foundation on the ground of which I can justify that I conceive a thing as a living body of the other and, further, the other as a person like me. The static phenomenological analysis of the empathetic presentiation makes it possible for us to justify the fact that I could experience the other as a person.34 It should be noted that, corresponding to the main characteristics of static phenomenology discussed above, static phenomenology of intersubjectivity has the following features: 1. It deals only with the various kinds of objectifying intentionality related to the empathetic presentiation. 2. The reflecting I has an absolute priority against the other subjectivities in the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity. 2.2.4. The Genetic Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity It is the task of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity to clarify the motivations for the empathetic presentiation from the standpoint of transcendental genesis. Therefore the transcendental question about the genetic motivation for the empathetic presentiation can be formulated as follows: What kinds of intentionality motivate the genesis of the positing that the other is experienced by me? The genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity aims at explaining the genetic motivations on the ground of which the positing of the existence of the other has been generated. In the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, the genesis, not the validity, as in the static phenomenology, of the positing of the existence of the other is something incomprehensible and needs an explanation. Due to the incomprehensibility of the genesis of positing of the existence of the other, one should first exclude that positing from the thematic area and go back to the more original realm that makes possible the genesis, not the justification of the validity, of the empathetic. In this case, the more original realm could also be called the primordial sphere, since the empathetic presentiation of the other cannot be carried out without the primordial sphere as it genetic foundation. We could call it the genetic primordial sphere.35 The genetic primoridal sphere contains various factors that make possible the genesis of the empathetic presentiation. For example, the genetic primordial sphere of an adult contains the habitual system of the empathetic presentiation that has been built by him/her in the past. When an ego encounters the other, it activates this habitual system and carries out the act of empathetic presentiation. The static primordial sphere does not contain the habitual system of empathetic

150 presentiation. In this context, one should note that the genetic primordial sphere is totally different from the static one. That makes up the basic difference between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Let me summarize some basic differences between the static primordial sphere and the genetic one.36 1. In contrast to the static primordial sphere that is valid only for the reflecting ego, the genetic primordial sphere is a realm that is structured intersubjectively. Nobody could carry out the empathetic presentiation of the other without communication with other subjectivities. In this sense, subjectivity is always intersubjectivity,37 as Husserl writes in a later manuscript from 1931: ‘‘Nothing absolute can be free from a universal co-existence, it is a non-sense that something is and, at the same time, does stand in connection with no other thing, it is a non-sense that it is alone. Not only am I no solus ipse, nothing absolute that we could think about is solus ipse. It is absolutely a non-sense.’’ (Hua XV, p. 371) Or ‘‘I cannot be what I am without the others who are for me; these others cannot be without me. The intentional being of being implicated is the necessity of the transcendental coexistence.’’ (Hua XV, p. 370) From the perspective of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, there is no primordial sphere that is not influenced by other subjectivities. Therefore, the empathetic presentiation carried out by a subjectivity has always an intersubjective character. 2. Various kinds of objectifying intentionality that could be found in the genetic primordial sphere could play the role of motivation for the genesis of the empathetic presentiation. They could include the intentionality that posits a thing as my body and myself as a person, the intentionality that posits the resemblance between the body of the other person and my body. However, one should not confuse them with the intentionalities that play the role of the foundation for the justification of the empathetic presentiation in static phenomenology, since they have intersubjective characters, whereas it is not the case with the latter. 3. In contrast to the static primordial sphere, the genetic primordial one contains not only the objectifying intentionalities, but also the various kinds of non-objectifying intentionalities such as willing, feeling, drive etc. This is due to the fact that the empathetic presentiation could be motivated by these non-objectifying intentionalities. For example, the empathetic presentiation could be motivated by the will in various ways. There are many such willings, for example, the will to learn from the other, the will to inform the other, the will to love the other, etc. All these willings that are

151 aimed at contacting the other persons can be called social willings. However, these willings are not the final genetic motivations for the empathetic presentiation. They are genetically motivated by the intentionalities of the social drives and instincts38 as the genetic roots of the social willings. It is the task of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity to clarify all the factors that could be found in the genetic primordial sphere and play the role of the genetic foundation for the empathetic presentiation. Above I have dealt with only some of them, but there are many other factors that should be clarified in this respect. For example, one has to clarify the historical aspect of the genetic primordial sphere. In this context, it should be noted that the genetic primordial sphere is an historical product. The historical aspect of the genetic primordial sphere implies that the empathetic presentiation carried out by an individual is historically conditioned. From the perspective of the genetic phenomenology, the empathetic presentiation is always carried out in a historical tradition. The way the empathetic presentiation is carried out by an individual varies from cultural tradition to cultural tradition.39 2.3. The Metaphysical Problem of Intersubjectivity In Ideas I, with respect to the essential character of his phenomenology, Husserl writes: ‘‘If ‘positivism’ is tantamount to an absolutely unprejudiced grounding of all sciences on the ‘positive’, that is to say, on what can be seized upon originaliter, then we are the genuine positivists.’’ (Hua III/1, p. 45; Ideas I, p. 39) Due to the ‘‘positivistic’’ character that Husserl attributes to his phenomenology, one might get the impression that his phenomenology is antimetaphysical, and has nothing to do with metaphysics. However, in this context, it should be mentioned that phenomenology excludes only the groundless metaphysics of the past, and not metaphysics in general. Needless to say that it is one of the most important tasks of phenomenology to properly deal with metaphysical problems such as the problem of Being in itself, the facticity of the transcendental life, the death, the fate, the history or the teleology of the transcendental genesis. In his later phenomenology, Husserl grapples with metaphysical problems with increasing intensity and attempts to found a true metaphysics. Thereby transcendental phenomenology builds the so-called springboard to a true metaphysics that Husserl calls a ‘‘transcendentalphenomenologically founded metaphysics’’ (Manuscript B II 2, p. 23) or ‘‘a transcendental ‘metaphysics’’’ (Hua I, p. 171; CM, p. 144). It is

152 an important task of Husserl’s phenomenology to rebuild a true metaphysics in place of the traditional one that has been decapitated by the physicalistic positivism of the twentieth century. Phenomenological metaphysics can be called the highlight of transcendental phenomenology. Just for this reason, according to ‘‘The Plan of ‘the System of Phenomenological Philosophy’ of Edmund Husserl’’ (Hua XV, p. XXXVI) sketched by Eugen Fink in 1931, ‘‘The Outlines of a Phenomenological Metaphysics’’ should be dealt with as the last step of a pure phenomenology. Below, confining my discussion to the problem of transcendental idealism, I would like to briefly sketch some metaphysical problems of intersubjectivity. In Ideas I, formulating the basic thesis of phenomenological-transcendental idealism, Husserl tells us that the transcendental ego ‘‘nulla ‘re’ indiget ad existendum’’ (‘‘that the transcendental ego, in order to exist, needs ‘nothing’’’) (Hua III/1, p. 104; Ideas I, 110). According to this thesis, the transcendental ego, as the first Being in itself, is the ground of Being of the constituted world and, for its existence, needs ‘nothing’, that is, neither the world nor the things in it. At the beginning stage of the static phenomenological analysis, the transcendental ego was conceived as a quasi-solipsistic one. A testimony to this fact is ‘‘the illusion of a solipsism’’ (Hua I, p. 176; CM, p. 150) which will be discussed in more detail below. However, through further phenomenological analyses, both static and genetic, it could be revealed that there is no solipsistic ego. Corresponding to this discovery, the basic thesis of the phenomenological-transcendental idealism should be reformulated as follows: ‘‘The intrinsically first being, the being that precedes and bears every worldly Objectivity, is transcendental intersubjectivity: the universe of monads, which effects its communion in various forms.’’(Hua I, p. 182; CM, p. 156) With the reformulation of the basic thesis of the phenomenological transcendental idealism in his later phenomenology, Husserl attempts to deepen and widen the idea of the totality of the monads. For example, the totality of the transcendental monads was conceived as including not only the monads of human beings, but also those of animals, plants and, even inorganic nature.40 The deepening and widening of the idea of the totality of the monads has caused the revelation of various new aspects of phenomenological-transcendental idealism. At the same time, there arose various metaphysical problems of intersubjectivity such as the following: 1. What is the relationship among the totality of the monads, the individual monads and their constituted worlds?

153 2. Are the totality of the monads and the individual monads mortal or immortal? 3. Is there a historicity or a teleology of the individual monads and also of the totality of these monads? 4. Is there God as the creator and preserver of the totality of the monads?

3. Buberian Criticism of Husserl’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity Reassessed In his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity, Theunissen overlooks the fact that Husserl deals not with one, but with various problems of intersubjectivity that should be clearly distinguished from one another. For example, Theunissen tells us that ‘‘Husserl is interested in intersubjectivity simply in connection with the question concerning subjectivity and the world constituted in it.’’41 From this statement, it is obvious that some assumptions about the essential character of Husserl’s phenomenology have been made by him. For example, he assumes that, for Husserl, who is interested only in the transcendental-phenomenological problem of intersubjectivity, it would in principle be impossible to deal with the problems of intersubjectivity brought to light by the dialogical-philosophical destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality. Furthermore, by ignoring the distinction between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, he assumes that there is only one form of transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Regarding these assumptions, which arise from lacking a clear distinction among the various problems of intersubjectivity, his criticisms of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity cannot be on the mark. This matter will be discussed in more detail below. In his criticisms of Husserl’s phenomenology as a solipsism, he overlooks the distinction between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. This confusion does not allow him to fully grasp the true meaning of the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As mentioned before, the task of the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity consists in the clarification of the foundation for the justification of the validity of the positing that the other is experienced by me as the other person. In order to fulfill this task, the reflecting ego must go back to his primordial sphere which can function as the foundation for the justification of that validity. Since this primordial sphere is a realm that is valid only for the reflecting ego, this methodical procedure might awaken the impression that Husserl’s

154 phenomenology is a solipsistic one that ignores the intersubjective dimension. Husserl even openly admits that his static phenomenology of intersubjectivity may cause ‘‘the illusion of a solipsism’’(Hua I, p. 176; CM, p. 150). However, this illusion is only the result of the fact that, in order to be responsible for all the validity-claims, the reflecting ego should exclude all the influences of the other subjects on him and go back to the static primordial sphere that is valid only for him/her. It should be noted that this imperative of the static phenomenology holds not only for me, but also for everybody who has to justify any kind of validity-claim and, for this reason, is able to build or take part in a society of research. This reference to the society of research can make the illusion of solipsism disappear. The static phenomenology of intersubjectivity has nothing to do with the position that Husserl’s transcendental ego must be a solipsistic one that has no desire for society and whose absoluteness means ‘‘an absoluteness as an asocial’’. It should be noted that, in the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, it is impossible for us even to observe the illusion of a solipsism. In other words, the illusion of a solipsism has no place in the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As discussed above, the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity reveals that the genetic primordial sphere is intersubjectively structured. For this reason, any transcendental ego is influenced by other transcendental egos and, at the same time, has an influence on them. From the standpoint of a genetic phenomenology, there cannot be a pure solipsistic ego. First of all, the existence of the social intentionalities that work incessantly in the process of genetic constitution means that every transcendental subjectivity has various kinds of desire for other egos and for society. In this respect, in an unpublished manuscript, Husserl depicts the genetic constitution of the Life-World as follows: ‘‘However, as we already know, it is constituted as a world for the society of this ego, as a world that has in itself human beings and, at the same time, is the world for them. In his primitive instinct, every individual ego has his entire development not as a solipsistic one, but as a development of the entire human being, as the development of whole transcendental societies, the development of whole transcendental subjects. Implicitly, the ego bears all the others who can appear to him and all their works, the whole world as humanized, as a cultural world.’’ (Manuscript A VI 34, p. 37) Neither the static nor the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity can be determined as a solipsism. The criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity as a solipsism has been caused partly by the fact that Husserl did not make a clear distinction between the

155 static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. I believe that Husserl was fully conscious of this fact. In this context, he tells us that ‘‘if one has grasped the essential meaning of my description, one would have raised the objection of solipsism not as an objection against the phenomenological idealism, but only as an objection against the imperfect character of my description’’ (Hua V, p. 151, translation mine). Now, I would like to focus on Theunissen’s destructive criticism of Husserl’s transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality. Theunissen’s criticism results from lacking a clear distinction among the various problems of intersubjecitivity. His criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity that it can deal only with the sphere of the It but is unable to touch upon the sphere of the Thou, results from confusing the ontological with the transcendental-phenomenological problem of intersubjectivity. The other as an It as well as a Thou is a fact that can be given to us in the natural attitude and it is the task of the phenomenological ontology of intersubjectivity to clarify the essential structure of the other as the It as well as the other as Thou. Without qualification, phenomenology admits that, according to the way I make contact with the other, I can experience him/ her as an It or as a Thou. Phenomenology is not, as Theunissen insists, a philosophy that is governed by the will to rule and, therefore, admits the other only as an It. Like Buber, Husserl acknowledges that, in the dialogical sphere which stands for the immediacy between persons, the other can appear to us as a Thou. In this sense, he writes: ‘‘Thereby, the other souls appear to me in a totally different way as things. Things appear to me as mere objects, the souls appear to me as persons who address me or whom I address, as my lovers or those who love me. I don’t live isolated, I live, with them, a common and united life.’’ (Hua XIII, p. 92) In fact, in a later manuscript from 1930s, Husserl attempts to analyze ‘‘the socieity of the I and the Thou’’ (die ‘‘Ich-Du-Gemeinschaft’’) (Hua XV, p. 476). Of course, it is an important task of an ontological phenomenology of the other to determine properly the concept of the ‘‘immediacy’’ that Theunissen talks about to characterize the givenness of the other as a Thou. Since the other as an It or as a Thou has its ontological structure, it is definitely possible to make a transcendental-philosophical investigation concerning him/her. This can be carried out in a static and a genetic way. In this case, the other as an It or as a Thou can provide us the transcendental clue with respect to which we can inquire into the condition of the possibility for its givenness. Through this kind of investigation, it would be possible for us to reveal various kinds of

156 intentionality that function as the motivations for the experience of the other as an It or as a Thou. We can do the transcendental research not only of the Thou in an improper sense, but also of the Thou in a proper sense, as well as the Thou as a Mystery or God. Needless to say that, in this context, intentionality as the motivation for the experience of the other in various forms should not, as Theunissen believes, be identified with the will to rule.42 Of course, the will to rule is a kind of intentionality, but there are many other forms of intentionality that cannot be categorized as a will to rule, i.e., the attitude in which I meet the other as an individual Thou. Another example is the vague feeling (die Ahnung) with which I meet the Eternal Thou or God as a Mystery. This would be a kind of intentionality in the wider sense. In this context, it should be noted that, in Husserl’s later phenomenology, the concept of intentionality in his Logical Investigations or Ideas I, as ‘‘the property of referring to something objective’’ that can be found in a group of experience, has been changed to a great measure.43 In his destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality that enabled Theunissen to find out gradually three kinds of the Thou, he assumes that, being confined to the research of the sphere of the It, phenomenology is, in principle, unable to clarify the structure of the Thou in the above three senses. Contrary to this assumption, it has been shown earlier that the Thou in these three senses can be the theme of the phenomenological ontology of the other as well as of the transcendental phenomenology of the other. In this context, I would like to emphasize that the individual Thou in a proper sense and the Eternal Thou or God as a Mystery are important themes of the phenomenological metaphysics of the other. It should be noted that the totality of the transcendental subjectivity or of the transcendental World, as a bearing ground for the constituted world, can be determined as a world that is not yet objectified and, for this reason, can be defined as nothing. Therefore, Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity turns out to be something that is similar to Theunissen’s individual Thou in a proper sense, although the term ‘‘Thou’’ is never used. Furthermore, in Husserl’s phenomenology, the idea of the totality of monads is closely related to the idea of God. God means for Husserl the final ground of the Being of the totality of monads and corresponds to Buber’s Eternal Thou. Thus, finally, the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity ends in a theology, as it is the case with Buber’s philosophy of dialog. In this sense, Husserl characterizes transcendental phenomenology as ‘‘a way to God without confession of faith’’ (Manuscript E III 10, p. 18). The process of

157 gradual development of the ontology of intersubjectivity, then, the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity and, finally, its metaphysics formally corresponds to the process of Theunissen’s destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality. Deepening the transcendental phenomenology of the other into its metaphysics, Husserl also attempts to carry out a destruction of the model of intentionality developed in Logical Investigations or Ideas I, a destruction similar to that which was striven for in the philosophy of dialog.

Notes
1. An earlier version of this was presented at a Colloquium of the Department of Philosophy at SUNY at Buffalo, N.Y. (October 4, 1999), at a Colloquium organized by the Hong Kong Society for Phenomenology (February 16, 2000), and at the 31st Annual Meeting of the Husserl-Circle in Seattle, Washington (June 21– 24, 2000). I thank Professors K.-K. Cho, C. F. Cheung and B. Hopkins for their kind invitations to the colloquiums and the meeting. 2. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, tr. J. N. Findlay. 2 vols. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. 3. M. Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, in: M. Scheler, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 7, Bern: Francke, 1973, p. 211. (translation mine) 4. M. Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, pp. 211–228. 5. E. Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, tr. D. Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978, p. 243. In this article, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Logic. 6. M. Theunissen, Der Andere. Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart, Berlin/ New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1977; M. Theunissen, The Other. Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber, tr. C. Macann, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1984. In this article, the German original and the English translation will respectively be referred to with the abbreviation Theunissen-G and Theunissen. In some passages, I have slightly modified the English translation. 7. Theunissen-G, p. 23; Theunissen, p. 21. 8. Theunissen-G, p. 23; Theunissen, p. 21. 9. Theunissen-G, p. 278; Theunissen, p. 291. 10. M. Buber, I and Thou, tr. R. G. Smith, Edinburgh: T&T, 1994. In this article, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Buber. 11. Theunissen-G, p. 261; Theunissen, p. 273. 12. Theunissen-G, p. 261; Theunissen, p. 272. 13. Theunissen-G, p. 261; Theunissen, p. 273. 14. Theunissen-G, p. 262; Theunissen, p. 274. 15. Theunissen-G, p. 264; Theunissen, p. 276. 16. Theunissen-G, p. 264; Theunissen, p. 276. 17. Theunissen-G, p. 279; Theunissen, p. 292. 18. Buber, p. 15, cf. Theunissen-G, p. 278; Theunissen, p. 291. 19. Theunissen-G, p. 343.

158
20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. Theunissen-G, p. 343. Buber, p. 17. Theunissen-G, p. 343. (translation mine) Buber, p. 50, Theunissen-G, p. 346. Buber, p. 104. In this article, Husserl’s works published in the Husserliana series will be referred to with the abbreviation Hua and the number of the volume. B. Erdmann, Wissenschaftliche Hypothesen u ¨ ¨ber Leib und Seele, Koln: DumonSchauberg, 1907. In this article, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Erdmann. Husserl deals with Erdmann’s theory of inference by analogy in Hua XIII, pp. 36–38. Th. Lipps, Leitfaden der Psychologie, Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1909. In this article, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Lipps. Husserl deals with Lipps’ theory of empathy in Hua XIII, pp. 70–76. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. D. Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. In this article, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation CM. ‘‘The appresentation of another original sphere’’ is a kind of presentiation that is called empathy. I have dealt with the problem of the distinction between static phenomenology and genetic phenomenology in Nam-In Lee, Edmund Husserls Pha¨nomenologie der Instinkte, Dordrecht/Boston/Londong: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, pp. 17–30 and Nam-In Lee, ‘‘Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality in Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation,’’ in: Husserl Studies 18/3 (2002), pp. 165–183. The distinction between static phenomenology and genetic phenomenology as two different kinds of transcendental phenomenology is an important topic and, at the same time, a very controversial issue in Husserl’s later phenomenology after 1920s. One can find Husserl’s attempts to make a distinction between them in various texts and, first of all, in the following texts: Hua XI, pp. 336–345 (English translation: ‘‘Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method.’’ Trans. by A. Steinbock, in Continental Philosophy Review 31 (1998), pp. 135–142); Hua XIV, pp. 34–42 (English translation: ‘‘The Phenomenology of Monadic Individuality and the Phenomenology of the General Possibilities and Compossibilities of Lived-Experiences: Static and Genetic Phenomenology.’’ Trans. by A. Steinbock, in Continental Philosophy Review 31 (1998), pp. 143–152); Hua XV, 613–627. See also M. J. Larrabee, ‘‘Husserl’s Static and Genetic Phenomenology,’’ in: Man and World 9/2 (1976), pp. 163–174; D. Welton, The Origins of Meaning. A Critical Study of the Threshold of Husserlian Phenomenology, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983; D. Welton, ‘‘Structure and Genesis in Husserl’s Phenomenology,’’ in: Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals. By F. A. Elliston/P. Mc Cormick, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977, pp. 54–69; A. Steinbock, Home and Beyond. Generative Phenomenology after Husserl, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995; A. Steinbock, ‘‘Husserl’s Static and Genetic Phenomenology: Translator’s Introduction to Two Essays,’’ in: Continental Philosophy Review 31 (1998), pp. 127–134. Compare Nam-In Lee, ‘‘Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality in Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation,’’ in: Husserl Studies 18/3 (2002), pp. 170–172. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, tr. F. Kersten, The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982. In this article, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Ideas I.

27.

28. 29. 30.

31.

32.

159
33. The term ‘‘die Genesisfundierung’’ is my coinage. Even though Husserl does not use the term, it is legitimate and even necessary to use it as a concept that is distinguished from the ‘‘Geltungsfundierung. In fact, Husserl claims that ‘‘the genesis of the meaning of the higher level of being’’ (Hua XV, 615) is not an issue of the static phenomenology that aims to clarify the ‘‘Geltungsfundierung.’’ The genesis of every kind of meaning is the issue of the genetic phenomenology that aims to clarify the ‘‘Genesisfundierung.’’ 34. The process of the justification for the experience of the other as a person could be understood, at the same time, as a process of the justification for the experience of the other as a transcendental subjectivity, since there is a parallelism between the person as a mundane subjectivity and the transcendental subjectivity. 35. I have dealt with the genetic primordial sphere in section 3: ‘‘The genetic-phenomenological concept of primordiality’’ of the article on ‘‘Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality in Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation.’’ 36. I have dealt with the difference between them in Nam-In Lee, ‘‘Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality in Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation.’’ There I made a distinction between the pre-ideal genetic and the ideal genetic primordial sphere, but below I take into account only the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere and compare it with the primordial sphere of the static phenomenology. 37. Cf. D. Zahavi, Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivita¨t, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 53–70. Zahavi talks about ‘‘the intersubjective subjectivity’’ (die intersubjektive Subjektivitat). ¨ 38. In this context, Husserl talks about social instincts (‘‘soziale Instinkte,’’ Manuscript A V, p. 134) or intersubjective instincts (‘‘intersubjektive Instinkte,’’ Manuscript E III 9, p. 18). 39. With respect to the close relationship between history and genesis, Husserl writes as follows: ‘‘As something that has already been humanized, it [the world] expresses continually its previous genesis. Human being [...] is being in a continually living history and being in the sedimentary history that, as such, always has a new historical face, from which the genesis has to be examined, to be questioned.’’ (Als schon humanisierte druckt sie bestandige fruhere Genesis aus. ¨ ¨ ¨ Menschliches Dasein [...] ist Sein in bestandiger lebendiger Geschichte und Sein in ¨ sedimentiereter Geschichte, die als das ihr immer neues historisches Gesicht hat, dem die Genesis anzusehen, dem sie abzufragen ist.’’ (Hua XV, p. 391) 40. In a later manuscript, Husserl talks about ‘‘the endlessness of the layers of the animate monads, of the monad of the animal, of the pre-animal’’(die Unendlichkeit der Stufen von animalischen Monaden, der tierischen, der vortierischen) (Hua XV, p. 595). With respect to the monad of inorganic nature, he writes as follows: ‘‘Nature before all kinds of organism, ‘nature before the genesis of the consciousness’ means then reality before every kind of awakened consciousness, before all the appearance of nature in the real monads. It means that all the monads were in the sleeping state, in the state of the ‘involution’.’’ (Natur vor allen Organismen. ‘Natur vor dem Auftreten des Bewußtseins’ besagt dann Wirklichkeit vor allem ‘wachen’ Bewußtsein, vor aller Natur-Erscheinung innerhalb der wirklichen Monaden. Es besagt, daß alle Monaden im Schlummerzustande, in dem der ‘Involution’ sich befanden.’’) (Manuscript B II 2, p. 14). I have dealt with this problem in Nam-In Lee, Edmund Husserls Pha¨nomenologie der Instinkte, pp. 225–230.

160
41. Theunissen-G, p. 257; Theunissen, p. 269. 42. Theunissen identifies Husserlian intentionality with the will to rule others. But Husserl does not identify intentionality with the will to rule others. For him, there are various other kinds of intentionality that do not fall under the category of the will to rule others. 43. I have dealt with this problem in: Nam-In Lee, Edmund Husserls Pha¨nomenologie der Instinkte, pp. 31–37.